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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Eagle Protection Act and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act are conservation statutes designed to prevent the destruction of certain species of birds. Challenged in this ease is the validity of regulations promulgated by appellant Secretary of the Interior that prohibit commercial transactions in parts of birds legally killed before the birds came under the protection of the statutes. The regulations provide in pertinent part:
50 CFR § 21.2 (a) (1978):
“Migratory birds, their parts, nests, or eggs, lawfully acquired prior to the effective date of Federal protection under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act... may be possessed or transported without a Federal permit, but may not be imported, exported, purchased, sold, bartered, or offered for purchase, sale, trade, or barter...
50 CFR § 22.2 (a) (1978):
“Bald eagles, alive or dead, or their parts, nests, or eggs lawfully acquired prior to June 8, 1940, and golden eagles, alive or dead, or their parts, nests, or eggs lawfully acquired prior to October 24, 1962, may be possessed, or transported without a Federal permit, but may not be imported, exported, purchased, sold, traded, bartered, or offered for purchase, sale, trade or barter....”
Appellees are engaged in the trade of Indian artifacts: several own commercial enterprises, one is employed by such an enterprise, and one is a professional appraiser. A number of the artifacts are partly composed of the feathers of currently protected birds, but these artifacts existed before the statutory protections came into force. After two of the ap-pellees who had sold “pre-existing” artifacts were prosecuted for violations of the Eagle Protection Act and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, appellees brought this suit for declaratory and injunctive relief in the District Court for the District of Colorado. The complaint alleged that the statutes do not forbid the sale of appellees’ artifacts insofar as the constituent birds’ parts were obtained prior to the effective dates of the statutes. It further alleged that if the statutes and regulations do apply to such property, they violate the Fifth Amendment.
A three-judge court, convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2282 (1970 ed.), held that because of “grave doubts whether these two acts would be constitutional if they were construed to apply to pre-act bird products,” the Acts were to be interpreted as “not applicable to preexisting, legally-obtained bird parts or products therefrom....” App. to Juris. Statement 13ar-14a. Accordingly, the court ruled that “the interpretive regulations, 50 C. F. R. §§ 21.2 (a) and 22.2 (a) '[are] void as unauthorized extensions of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act and the Eagle Protection Act and1 [are] violative of the [appellees’] Fifth Amendment property rights.” Id., at 14a. Judgment was entered declaring “the subject regulations to be invalid and unenforceable as against the [appellees’] property rights in feathers and artifacts owned before the effective date of the subject statute,” and enjoining appellants “from any interference with the exercise of such rights, including the rights of sale, barter or exchange.” Id., at 16a-17a. We noted probable jurisdiction. 440 U. S. 905 (1979). We reverse.
I
Appellant Secretary of the Interior contends that both the Eagle Protection and Migratory Bird Treaty Acts contemplate regulatory prohibition of commerce in the parts of protected birds, without regard to when those birds were originally taken. ■ Appellees respond that such a prohibition serves no purpose, arguing that statutory protection of wildlife is not furthered by an embargo upon traffic in avian artifacts that existed before the statutory safeguards came into effect.
A
Our point of departure in statutory analysis is the language of the enactment. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U. S. 397, 405 (1979). “Though we may not end with the words in construing a disputed statute, one certainly begins there.” F. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes 16 (1947).
The terms of the Eagle Protection Act plainly must be read as appellant Secretary argues. The sweepingly framed prohibition in § 668 (a) makes it unlawful to “take, possess, sell, purchase, barter, offer to sell, purchase or barter, transport, export or import” protected birds. Congress expressly dealt with the problem of pre-existing bird products by qualifying that general prohibition with the proviso that “nothing herein shall be construed to prohibit possession or transportation” of bald or golden eagle parts taken prior to the effective date of coverage under the Act. (Emphasis supplied.)
In view of the exhaustive and careful enumeration of forbidden acts in § 668 (a), the narrow limitation of the proviso to “possession or transportation” compels the conclusion that, with respect to pre-existing artifacts, Congress specifically declined to except any activities other than possession and transportation from the general statutory ban. To read a further exemption • for pre-existing artifacts into the Eagle Protection Act, “we would be forced to ignore the ordinary meaning of plain language.” TV A v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 173 (1978). Nor can there be any question of oversight or drafting error. Throughout the statute the distinct concepts of possession, transportation, taking, and sale or purchase are treated with precision. The broad proscriptive provisions of the Eagle Protection Act were consistently framed to encompass a full catalog of prohibited acts, always including sale or purchase. See §§ 668 (a), 668 (b), 668b (b). In contrast, the exemptions created were specifically limited to possession or transportation, § 668 (a), taking, § 668a, or taking, possession, or transportation, ibid.
That this precise, use of terminology was intentional is clear from the legislative history. An explanatory letter from the Department of Agriculture that was adopted in the Senate Report on the bill defines the reach of the Eagle Protection Act to make it unlawful to
"take, possess, sell, purchase, transport, or otherwise deal with the bald eagle... with the proviso to the effect that it will not apply to the possession or transportation of any such eagle... taken prior to the effective date of the bill.” S. Rep. No. 1589, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 1 (1940). (Emphasis added.)
Further, when Congress amended the Eagle Protection Act in 1962 to cover golden eagles, it once again excepted only possession and transportation of pre-existing artifacts from the general ban. 76 Stat. 1246. And it is particularly relevant that Congress has twice reviewed and amended the statute without rejecting the Department’s view that it is authorized to bar the sale of pre-existing artifacts. Cf. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U. S, 267, 275 (1974).
The prohibition against the sale of bird parts lawfully taken before the effective date of federal protection is fully consonant with the purposes of the Eagle Protection Act. It was reasonable for Congress to conclude that the possibility of commercial gain presents a special threat to the preservation of the eagles because that prospect creates a powerful incentive both to evade statutory prohibitions against taking birds and to take a large volume of birds. The legislative draftsmen might well view evasion as a serious danger because there is no sure means by which to determine the age of bird feathers; feathers recently taken can easily be passed off as having been obtained long ago.
Appellees argue that even if the age of feathers cannot be ascertained, it is still possible to date the Indian artifacts of which the feathers are a constituent. Thus, they contend that the goal of preventing evasion of the statute could have been achieved by means less onerous than a general sales ban: for example, by requiring documentation and appraisal of feathered artifacts. The short answer is that this legislation is not limited to the sale of feathers as part of artifacts; it broadly addresses sale or purchase of feathers and other bird parts in any shape or form. The prohibitions of the statute were devised to resist any evasion, whether in the sale of feathers as part of datable artifacts or in the sale of separate undatable bird products. Moreover, even if there were alternative ways to insure against statutory evasion, Congress was free to choose the method it found most efficacious and convenient. “[T]he legislature... is authorized to pass measures for the protection of the people... in the exercise of the police power, and is itself the judge of the necessity or expediency of the means adopted.” New York ex rel. Site v. Hesterberg, 211 U. S. 31, 40 (1908).
B
The fundamental prohibition in the Migratory Bird Treaty Act is couched in language as expansive as that employed in the Eagle Protection Act. Title 16 U. S. C. § 703 provides that
“[ujnless and except as permitted by regulations made as hereinafter provided in this subchapter, it shall be unlawful... to pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to take, capture, or kill, possess, offer for sale, sell, offer to barter, barter, offer to purchase, purchase, deliver for shipment, ship, export, import, cause to be shipped, exported, or imported, deliver for transportation, transport or cause to be transported, carry or cause to be carried, or receive for shipment, transportation, carriage, or export”
protected birds. But the Migratory Bird Treaty Act contains no explicit exception for the possession or transportation of bird parts obtained before the federal protection became effective: that exception is created by the Secretary’s regulation. 50 CFR § 21.2 (1978). Unlike our analysis under the Eagle Protection Act, therefore, reliance upon the negative inference from a narrow statutory exemption for the transportation or possession of pre-existing artifacts is precluded. Nevertheless, the text, context, and purpose of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act support the Secretary’s interpretative regulations of that enactment.
On its face, the comprehensive statutory prohibition is naturally read as forbidding transactions in all bird parts, including those that compose pre-existing artifacts. While there is no doubt that regulations may exempt transactions from the general ban, nothing in the statute requires an exception for the sale of pre-existing artifacts. And no such statutory exception can be implied. When Congress wanted an exemption from the statutory prohibition, it provided so in unmistakable terms. Cf. 16 U. S. C, § 711.
The structure and context of this enactment — to the extent that they enlighten — also suggest congressional understanding that regulatory authorities could ban the sale of lawfully taken birds, except where otherwise expressly instructed by the statute. If Congress had assumed that lawfully taken birds could automatically be sold under the Act, it would have been unnecessary to specify in § 711 that it is permissible under certain circumstances to sell game birds lawfully bred on farms and preserves. Furthermore, Congress could not have been unaware that a traditional legislative tool for enforcing conservation policy was a flat proscription on the sale of wildlife, without regard to the legality of the taking. At the time, a number of States, for example, simply prohibited or restricted possession or sale of wildlife during seasons closed to hunting. See New York ex rel. Silz v. Hesterberg, supra, at 40. Also before Congress was the Canadian law implementing the Migratory Bird Treaty, and that law itself contained a provision barring the purchase, sale, or possession of protected bird parts “during the time when the capturing, killing, or taking of such bird, nest, or egg is prohibited by law,” 55 Cong. Rec. 5412 (1917). (Emphasis added.) The Canadian sale ban — of which Congress was aware — thus applied not to illegally taken birds, but rather to all protected birds during the season in which hunting was prohibited. Against this background, the absence of a statutory exemption for pre-existing avian artifacts implies that the Migratory Bird Treaty Act was intended to embrace the traditional conservation technique of banning transactions in protected birds, whenever taken.
Related statutes may sometimes shed light upon a previous enactment. Cf. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416, 429 (CA2 1945) (L. Hand, J.). Other conservation legislation enacted by Congress has employed the enforcement technique of forbidding the sale of protected wildlife without respect to the lawfulness of the taking. The Eagle Protection Act is a notable example. The more recent Endangered Species Act of 1973, as originally framed, prohibited the sale of products or parts of endangered species, without an exception for those products legally held for commercial purposes at the time of the Act’s passage. See 16 U. S. C. § 1538; United States v. Kepler, 531 F. 2d 796 (CA6 1976); Delbay Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Department of Commerce, 409 F. Supp. 637, 641-642, 644 (DC 1976); see also H. R. Rep. No. 94-823, pp. 3—4 (1976) (discussing an amendment to the Endangered Species Act). And when Congress has meant to exempt lawfully taken items from the retroactive application of statutory prohibitions, it has taken care to do so explicitly, see 16 U. S. C. § 1372 (Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972); 16 U. S, C. § 1538 (b) (Endangered Species Act of 1973), or it has specifically amended the statute for that purpose, see 90 Stat. 911, amending 16 U. S. Cj § 1539 (Endangered Species Act); 92 Stat. 3760, amending 16 U. S. C. §§ 1538 and 1539 (Endangered Species Act). In contrast, Congress has never established a preexisting-artifacts exception to the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, even though it has amended the statute on several occasions.
We are therefore persuaded that the Migratory Bird Treaty Act empowers the Secretary of the Interior to bar commercial transactions in covered bird parts in spite of the fact that the parts were lawfully taken before the onset of federal protection. We see no indication to the contrary. It follows that the Secretary could properly permit the possession or transportation, and not the sale or purchase, of pre-existing bird artifacts. Accordingly, we disagree with the District Court’s interpretation of the Act as inapplicable to pre-exist-ing legally obtained bird parts.
II
We also disagree with the District Court’s holding that, as construed to authorize the prohibition of commercial transactions in pre-existing avian artifacts, the Eagle Protection and Migratory Bird Treaty Acts violate appellees’ Fifth Amendment property rights because the prohibition wholly deprives them of the opportunity to earn a profit from those relics.
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104, 123-128 (1978), is our most recent exposition on the Takings Clause. That exposition need not be repeated at length here. Suffice it to say that government regulation— by definition — involves the adjustment of rights for the public good. Often this adjustment curtails some potential for the use or economic exploitation of private property. To require compensation in all such circumstances would effectively compel the government to regulate by purchase. “Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law.” Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 413 (1922); see Penn Central, supra, at 124.
The Takings Clause, therefore, preserves governmental power to regulate, subject only to the dictates of “ ‘justice and fairness.’ ” Ibid.; see Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U. S. 590, 594 (1962). There is no abstract or fixed point at which judicial intervention under the Takings Clause becomes appropriate. Formulas and factors have been developed in a variety of settings. See Penn Central, supra, at 123-128. Resolution of each case, however, ultimately calls as much for the exercise of judgment as for the application of logic.
The regulations challenged here do not compel the surrender of the artifacts, and there is no physical invasion or restraint upon them. Rather, a significant restriction has been imposed on one means of disposing of the artifacts. But the denial of one traditional property right does not always amount to a taking. At least where an owner possesses a full “bundle” of property rights, the destruction of one “strand” of the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety. Compare Penn Central, supra, at 130-131, and United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U. S. 222 (1956), with Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, supra, and United States v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 365 U. S. 624 (1961). See also Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1230-1233 (1967). In this case, it is crucial that appellees retain the rights to possess and transport their property, and to donate or devise the protected birds.
It is, to be sure, undeniable that the regulations here prevent the most profitable use of appellees’ property. Again, however, that is not dispositive. When we review regulation, a reduction in the value of property is not necessarily equated with a taking. Compare Goldblatt v. Hempstead, supra, at 594, and Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U. S. 394 (1915), with Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, supra. In the instant case, it is not clear that appellees will be unable to derive economic benefit from the artifacts; for example, they might exhibit the artifacts for an admissions charge. At any rate, loss of future profits—unaccompanied by any physical property restriction—provides a slender reed upon which to rest a takings claim. Prediction of profitability is essentially a matter of reasoned speculation that courts are not especially competent to perform. Further, perhaps because of its very uncertainty, the interest in anticipated gains has traditionally been viewed as less compelling than other property-related interests. Cf., e. g., Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pt. 1), 46 Yale L. J. 52 (1936).
Regulations that bar trade in certain goods have been upheld against claims of unconstitutional taking. For example, the Court has sustained regulations prohibiting the sale of alcoholic beverages despite the fact that individuals were left with previously acquired stocks. Everard’s Breweries v. Day, 265 U. S. 545 (1924), involved a federal statute that forbade the sale of liquors manufactured before passage of the statute. The claim of a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment was tersely rejected. Id., at 563. Similarly, in Jacob Rwppert, Inc. v. Caffey, 251 U. S. 264 (1920), a federal law that extended a domestic sales ban from intoxicating to nonintoxicating alcoholic beverages “on hand at the time of the passage of the act,” id., at 302, was upheld. Mr. Justice Brandéis dismissed the takings challenge, stating that “there was no appropriation of private property, but merely a lessening of value due to a permissible restriction imposed upon its use.” Id., at 303. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623 (1887).
It is true that appellees must bear the costs of these regulations. But, within limits, that is a burden borne to secure “the advantage of living and doing business in a civilized community.” Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, supra, at 422 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). We hold that the simple prohibition of the sale of lawfully acquired property in this case does not effect a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
Reversed.
The Chief Justice concurs in the judgment of the Court.
The Eagle Protection Act, § 1, 54 Stat. 250, as amended, as set forth in 16 U. S. C. § 668 (a), provides in pertinent part:
“Whoever, within the United States or any place subject to the jurisdiction thereof, without being permitted to do so as provided in this sub-chapter, shall knowingly, or with wanton disregard 'for the consequences of his act take, possess, sell, purchase, barter, offer to sell, purchase or barter, transport, export or import, at any time or in any manner any bald eagle commonly known as the American eagle or any golden eagle, alive or dead, or any part, nest, or egg thereof of the foregoing eagles, or whoever violates any permit or regulation issued pursuant to this subehapter, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than one year or both:... Provided further, That nothing herein shaE be construed to prohibit possession or transportation of any bald eagle, alive or dead, or any part, nest, or egg thereof, lawfully taken prior to June 8, 1940, and that nothing herein shaE be construed to prohibit possession or transportation of any golden eagle, alive or dead, or any part, nest, or egg thereof, lawfuUy taken prior to the addition to this subchapter of the provisions relating to preservation of the golden eagle.”
The Migratory Bird Treaty Act, § 2, 40 Stat. 755, as amended, as set forth in 16 U. S. C. § 703, similarly provides:
“Unless and except as permitted by regulations made as hereinafter provided in this subchapter, it shall be unlawful at any time, by any means or in any manner, to pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to take, capture, or kill, possess, offer for sale, sell, offer to barter, barter, offer to purchase, purchase, deliver for shipment, ship, export, import, cause to be shipped, exported, or imported, deliver for transportation, transport or cause to be transported, carry or cause to be carried, or receive for shipment, transportation, carriage, or export, any migratory bird, any part, nest, or eggs of any such bird, or any product, whether or not manufactured, which consists, or is composed in whole or part, of any such bird or any part, nest, or egg thereof, included in the terms of the conventions between the United States and Great Britain for the protection of migratory birds concluded August 16, 1916 (39 Stat. 1702), the United States and the United Mexican States for the protection of migratory birds and game mammals concluded February 7, 1936, and the United States and the Government of Japan for the protection of migratory birds and birds in danger of extinction, and their environment concluded March 4, 1972.”
Appellee L. Douglas Allard was convicted and fined for violating the Eagle Protection Act, 16 U. S. C. §668 (a), which establishes criminal penalties for unpermitted eagle sales. United States v. Allard, 397 F. Supp. 429 (Mont. 1975). Appellee Pierre Bovis was prosecuted under the Eagle Protection Act and under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U. S. C. § 707, which provides criminal penalties for the unlawful sale of migratory birds. United States v. Bovis, Nos. 75-CR-63 and 75-CR-66 (Colo. 1975).
Appellees also alleged that the Migratory Bird Treaty Act and regulations thereunder were unconstitutionally vague and involved an improper delegation of legislative power to the Executive Branch. These allegations were not passed on by the District Court and are not pressed here. We therefore do not address them.
The Secretary contends that appellees’ constitutional claims are insubstantial and did not justify convention of a three-judge court. We disagree. See Goosby v. Osser, 409 U. S. 512 (1973); Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528, 536-538 (1974).
Exemption for pre-existing artifacts.
Exemption for takings necessary to protect wildlife, livestock, or agriculture from predation.
Exemption for scientific, zoological, or religious needs and, in certain circumstances, for falconry.
In 1962, Congress extended the Eagle Protection Act to cover golden, as well as bald, eagles, 76 Stat. 1246, and in 1972 penalties under the statute were reinforced, 86 Stat. 1064. On each occasion — especially the latter—the purposes and scheme of the bill were considered. S. Rep. No. 1986, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962); H. R. Rep. No. 1450, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962); S. Rep. No. 92-1159 (1972); H. R. Rep. No. 92-817 (1972). Regulations preventing the sale of pre-existing artifacts had been in force for some time preceding these amendments, see 50 CFR § 6.1 (Cum. Supp. 1944); 50 CFR §§ 11.1 and 11.8 (b) (1964); 50 CFR § 22.2 (1978), although the wording of the 1960 regulation may suggest otherwise, 50 CFR §§ 11.1 and 11.6 (b) (1961).
See Affidavit of Dr. Alan H. Brush, App. 44-46.
Our reading of the Eagle Protection Act is not shaken by the fact that, until 1959, Alaska was exempted from the strictures of § 668. See 54 Stat. 250, amended by § 14, 73 Stat. 143. The fact that eagles could be taken, possessed, sold, and purchased in the Territory of Alaska in no way undercut the general ban on sales in the 48 States; we do not read the pre-1959 Alaska exemption as a license to sell Alaska eagles in the rest of the country, or vice versa.
We are also unpersuaded by appellees’ argument that the Eagle Protection Act does not apply to feathers that have lost their “identities” as elements in artifacts. This contention is bottomed on the statutory use of the word bird “part” instead of bird “product.” The distinction between the terms is immaterial: for example, when Congress amended the Migratory Bird Treaty Act to specify that it applied to bird products as well as bird parts, Pub. L. 93-300, 88 Stat. 190, the Senate Report indicated that the change was a clarification rather than a substantive change in the reach of the law. S. Rep. No. 93-851, p. 3 (1974).
The Migratory Bird Treaty Act, passed in 1918, 40 Stat. 755, predates the Eagle Protection Act by 22 years. Originally the legislation implementing a Migratory Bird Convention between Great Britain (on behalf of Canada) and the United States, the Act now implements similar treaties between this country and other nations. See generally Coggins & Patti, The Resurrection and Expansion of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 50 Colo. L. Rev. 165, 169-174 (1979); M. Bean, The Evolution of National Wildlife Law 68-74 (1977).
The § 703 prohibition is, by its own terms, subject to regulatory exception. See also 16 U. S. C. § 704.
“Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to prevent the breeding of migratory game birds on farms and preserves and the sale of birds so bred under proper regulation for the purpose of increasing the food supply.”
In fact, the Conference Report accepting the floor amendment that became § 711 was actually withdrawn in order to add language indicating that lawfully bred birds could be sold. See 56 Cong. Rec. 8015 (1918); id., at 8130, 8430.
55 Cong. Rec. 5412-5413 (1917) (Senate); 56 Cong. Rec. 7372 (1918) (House).
Britain entered into the treaty on behalf of Canada.
The Canadian statute indicates that there might be a lawful excuse for possessing or selling birds out of season, but not what such an excuse would be.
In 1976, Congress specifically amended the Act to establish a very limited sales exemption for products of animals lawfully owned for commercial purposes before the Act came into effect. Pub. L. 94-359, 90 Stat. 911, amending 16 U. S. C. § 1539. The amendment was circumscribed in scope and merely authorized but did not order the Secretary of Commerce to grant exemptions for pre-Act animal products.
In arguing the position that the statute prevents only the sale of illegally taken birds, appellees rely upon the language of the 1972 Migratory Bird Convention with Japan, incorporated into the Migratory Bird Treaty Act in 1974. Pub. L. 93-300, 88 Stat. 190. The Convention provides that “[a]ny sale, purchase or exchange of these [migratory] birds or their eggs, taken illegally, alive or dead, and any sale, purchase or exchange of the products thereof or their parts shall... be prohibited.” (Emphasis added.) But the language of the Convention, like the terms of the other Conventions, does not carry great- weight in the interpretation of the statute. There are material variations in the particulars of each of the Conventions, see Coggins & Patti, supra n. 11, at 173-174; Bean, supra n. 11, at 70-73; it is therefore hazardous to look to- any single Convention for definitive resolution of a statutory construction problem. Furthermore, inasmuch as the Conventions represent binding international commitments, they establish minimum protections for wildlife; Congress could and did go further in developing domestic conservation measures. See id., at 74-76.
Our interpretation of the statute does not depart from any course of construction adopted by other courts. Although appellees argue that several courts have determined that lawfully taken birds may be sold under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, we do not read the cases as supporting appellees’ position. Two of the cited cases, United States v. Hamel, 534 F. 2d 1354 (CA9 1976) (per curiam), and United States v. Blanket, 391 F. Supp. 15 (WD Okla. 1975), neither decide nor imply a decision as to the statutory question posed here. Language favorable to appellees in United States v. Aitson, No. 74-1588 (CA10, July 21, 1975), is merely dictum in an unpublished opinion. Contrast also United States v. Richards, 583 F. 2d 491 (CA10 1978). United States v. Marks, 4 F. 2d 420 (SD Tex. 1925), did hold it impermissible to punish the sale of birds taken before the Migratory Bird Treaty Act was passed. But that ruling rested upon the court’s view that Congress’ authority to regulate the birds must rest wholly upon the treaty rather than the commerce power. Whatever the logic of that ruling, the underlying assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed. See, e. g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U. S. 322 (1979). Thus, only two early District Court cases, both authored by the same judge, sustain the statutory proposition advanced by appellees. United States v. Fuld Store Co., 262 F. 836 (Mont. 1920); In re Informations Under Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 281 F. 546 (Mont. 1922). The cases involved no more than a cursory inquiry into the statute, and we find them unconvincing.
Indeed, heightened restrictions on the sale or purchase of migratory bird parts were appropriate in light of congressional recognition of the danger to wildlife posed by commercial exploitation. The 1960 amendments to the Migratory Bird Treaty Act specifically addressed that problem by stiffening penalties for the taking of protected birds with intent to sell and for the sale of protected birds. 74 Stat. 866; see H. R. Rep. No. 1787, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960); S. Rep. No. 1779, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
Although this argument appears to have been cast in the District Court in terms of economic substantive due process, before this Court appellees have used the terminology of the Takings Clause.
The Secretary has raised the question of appellees’ standing to assert a takings claim with respect to their artifacts. He asserts that appellees have not clearly stated that they acquired their property interest in the bird artifacts before the sales ban came into force. If they have not, the Secretary argues, then the “value of any artifacts purchased by appellees after the effective date of the Act had already been diminished by the applicability of the Act.” Brief for Appellants 30. This contention is misplaced. Even assuming that appellees have not sufficiently alleged pre-effectiveness possession, they have standing to urge their constitutional claim. Because the regulation they challenge restricts their ability to dispose of their property, appellees have a personal, concrete, live interest in the controversy. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 204 (1962). The timing of acquisition of the artifacts is relevant to a takings analysis of appellees’ investment-backed expectations, but it does not erect a jurisdictional obstacle at the threshold. Of course, there is no standing to assert a takings claim by those who are merely employed in selling artifacts owned by others. All appellees, however, may face future criminal prosecutions for violations of the statutes, and that, of itself, suffices to give them standing to litigate their interest in the construction of the statutes.
It should be emphasized that in Pennsylvania Cod the loss of profit opportunity was accompanied by a physical restriction against the removal of the coal.
It is not significant that the statute considered in Everard’s Breweries had been passed under the Eighteenth (Prohibition) Amendment. The Court did not suggest that the Amendment gave Congress a special prerogative to override ordinary Fifth Amendment limitations.
Although the beverage owner in Jacob Ruppert retained the ability to export his product or to sell it domestically for purposes other than consumption, see 251 U. S., at 303; Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U. S. 146, 157 (1919), the domestic sales ban was undoubtedly commercially crippling.
No importance should be attached to the fact that the enactment in Jacob Ruppert was promulgated pursuant to the war power. But cf. United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U. S. 155, 168 (1958).
Appellees also briefly argue that the regulations in this case interfere with their right to engage in a lawful occupation. Even if we were inclined to exhume this variant of the theory of substantive due process, it would not be applicable here. Appellees may still sell artifacts that do not consist in part of protected bird
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | D | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns the proper forum for judicial review when a federal employee complains of a serious adverse employment action taken against him, one falling within the compass of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), 5 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., and attributes the action, in whole or in part, to bias based on race, gender, age, or disability, in violation of federal antidiscrimination laws. We refer to complaints of that order, descriptively, as "mixed cases."
In the CSRA, Congress created the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB or Board) to review certain serious personnel actions against federal employees. If an employee asserts rights under the CSRA only, MSPB decisions, all agree, are subject to judicial review exclusively in the Federal Circuit. § 7703(b)(1). If the employee asserts no civil-service rights, invoking only federal antidiscrimination law, the proper forum for judicial review, again all agree, is a federal district court, see Kloeckner v. Solis, 568 U.S. 41, 46, 133 S.Ct. 596, 184 L.Ed.2d 433 (2012) ; the Federal Circuit, while empowered to review MSPB decisions on civil-service claims, § 7703(b)(1)(A), lacks authority over claims arising under antidiscrimination laws, see § 7703(c).
When a complaint presents a mixed case, and the MSPB dismisses it, must the employee resort to the Federal Circuit for review of any civil-service issue, reserving claims under federal antidiscrimination law for discrete district court adjudication? If the MSPB dismisses a mixed case on the merits, the parties agree, review authority lies in district court, not in the Federal Circuit. In Kloeckner, 568 U.S., at 50, 56, 133 S.Ct. 596, we held, the proper review forum is also the district court when the MSPB dismisses a mixed case on procedural grounds, in Kloeckner itself, failure to meet a deadline for Board review set by the MSPB. We hold today that the review route remains the same when the MSPB types its dismissal of a mixed case as "jurisdictional." As in Kloeckner, we are mindful that review rights should be read not to protract proceedings, increase costs, and stymie employees, but to secure expeditious resolution of the claims employees present. See Elgin v. Department of Treasury, 567 U.S. 1, 15, 132 S.Ct. 2126, 183 L.Ed.2d 1 (2012) (emphasizing need for "clear guidance about the proper forum for [an] employee's [CSRA] claims"). Cf. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. l.
I
A
The CSRA "establishes a framework for evaluating personnel actions taken against federal employees." Kloeckner v. Solis, 568 U.S. 41, 44, 133 S.Ct. 596, 184 L.Ed.2d 433 (2012). For "particularly serious" actions, "for example, a removal from employment or a reduction in grade or pay," "the affected employee has a right to appeal the agency's decision to the MSPB." Ibid. (citing §§ 1204, 7512, 7701 ). Such an appeal may present a civil-service claim only. Typically, the employee may allege that "the agency had insufficient cause for taking the action under the CSRA." Id., at 44, 133 S.Ct. 596. An appeal to the MSPB, however, may also complain of adverse action taken, in whole or in part, because of discrimination prohibited by another federal statute, for example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. See 5 U.S.C. § 7702(a)(1) ; Kloeckner, 568 U.S., at 44, 133 S.Ct. 596.
In Kloeckner, we explained, "[w]hen an employee complains of a personnel action serious enough to appeal to the MSPB and alleges that the action was based on discrimination, she is said (by pertinent regulation) to have brought a'mixed case.' " Ibid. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1614.302 (2012) ). See also § 1614.302(a)(2) (2016) (defining "mixed case appeal" as one in which an employee "alleges that an appealable agency action was effected, in whole or in part, because of discrimination"). For mixed cases, "[t]he CSRA and regulations of the MSPB and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) set out special procedures... different from those used when the employee either challenges a serious personnel action under the CSRA alone or attacks a less serious action as discriminatory." Kloeckner, 568 U.S., at 44-45, 133 S.Ct. 596.
As Kloeckner detailed, the CSRA provides diverse procedural routes for an employee's pursuit of a mixed case. The employee "may first file a discrimination complaint with the agency itself," in the agency's equal employment opportunity (EEO) office, "much as an employee challenging a personnel practice not appealable to the MSPB could do." Id., at 45, 133 S.Ct. 596 (citing 5 C.F.R. § 1201.154(a) (2012) ; 29 C.F.R. § 1614.302(b) (2012) ); see § 7702(a)(2). "If the agency [EEO office] decides against her, the employee may then either take the matter to the MSPB or bypass further administrative review by suing the agency in district court." Kloeckner, 568 U.S., at 45, 133 S.Ct. 596 (citing 5 C.F.R. § 1201.154(b) ; 29 C.F.R. § 1614.302(d)(1)(i) ); see § 7702(a)(2). "Alternatively, the employee may initiate the process by bringing her case directly to the MSPB, forgoing the agency's own system for evaluating discrimination charges."
Kloeckner, 568 U.S., at 45, 133 S.Ct. 596 (citing 5 C.F.R. § 1201.154(a) ; 29 C.F.R. § 1614.302(b) ); see § 7702(a)(1).
Section 7702 prescribes appellate proceedings in actions involving discrimination. Defining the MSPB's jurisdiction in mixed-case appeals that bypass an agency's EEO office, § 7702(a)(1) states in relevant part:
"[I]n the case of any employee... who-
"(A) has been affected by an action which the employee... may appeal to the [MSPB], and
"(B) alleges that a basis for the action was discrimination prohibited by [specified antidiscrimination statutes],...
"the Board shall, within 120 days of the filing of the appeal, decide both the issue of discrimination and the appealable action in accordance with the Board's appellate procedures...."
Section 7702(a)(2) similarly authorizes a mixed-case appeal to the MSPB from an agency EEO office's decision. Then, "[i]f the MSPB upholds the personnel action (whether in the first instance or after the agency has done so), the employee again has a choice: She may request additional administrative process, this time with the EEOC, or else she may seek judicial review." Kloeckner, 568 U.S., at 45, 133 S.Ct. 596 (citing § 7702(a)(3), (b) ; 5 C.F.R. § 1201.161 ; 29 C.F.R. § 1614.303 ).
Section 7703(b) designates the proper forum for judicial review of MSPB decisions. Section 7703(b)(1)(A) provides the general rule: "[A] petition to review a... final decision of the Board shall be filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit." Section 7703(b)(2) states the exception here relevant, governing "[c]ases of discrimination subject to the provisions of [§ ]7702." See Kloeckner, 568 U.S., at 46, 133 S.Ct. 596 ("The 'cases of discrimination' in § 7703(b)(2)'s exception... are mixed cases, in which an employee challenges as discriminatory a personnel action appealable to the MSPB."). Such cases "shall be filed under [the enforcement sections of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. ], as applicable." § 7703(b)(2). Those enforcement provisions "all authorize suit in federal district court." Kloeckner, 568 U.S., at 46, 133 S.Ct. 596 (citing, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-16(c), 2000e-5(f) ; 29 U.S.C. § 633a(c) ; § 216(b)). Thus, if the MSPB decides against the employee on the merits of a mixed case, the statute instructs her to seek review in federal district court under the enforcement provision of the relevant antidiscrimination laws. § 7703(b)(2) ; see Kloeckner, 568 U.S., at 56, n. 4, 133 S.Ct. 596.
Federal district court is also the proper forum for judicial review, we held in Kloeckner, when the MSPB dismisses a mixed case on procedural grounds. Id., at 50, 56, 133 S.Ct. 596. We rested that conclusion on this syllogism: "Under § 7703(b)(2), 'cases of discrimination subject to [ § 7702 ]' shall be filed in district court." Id., at 50, 133 S.Ct. 596 (alteration in original). Further, "[u]nder § 7702(a)(1), [mixed cases qualify as] 'cases of discrimination subject to [ § 7702 ].' " Ibid. (third alteration in original). Thus, "mixed cases shall be filed in district court." Ibid. That syllogism, we held, holds true whether the dismissal rests on procedural grounds or on the merits, for "nowhere in the [CSRA's] provisions on judicial review" is a distinction drawn between MSPB merits decisions and procedural rulings. Id., at 51, 133 S.Ct. 596.
The instant case presents this question: Where does an employee seek judicial review when the MSPB dismisses her civil-service case alleging discrimination neither on the merits nor on a procedural ground, but for lack of jurisdiction?
B
Anthony Perry worked at the U.S. Census Bureau until 2012. 829 F.3d 760, 762 (C.A.D.C.2016). In 2011, Perry received notice that he would be terminated because of spotty attendance. Ibid. Later that year, Perry and the Bureau reached a settlement in which Perry agreed to a 30-day suspension and early retirement. Ibid. The agreement required Perry to dismiss discrimination claims he had separately filed with the EEOC. Ibid.
After retiring, Perry appealed his suspension and retirement to the MSPB. Ibid. He alleged discrimination on grounds of race, age, and disability, as well as retaliation by the Bureau for his prior discrimination complaints. Ibid. The settlement, he maintained, did not stand in the way, because the Bureau coerced him into signing it. Ibid.
An MSPB administrative law judge (ALJ) eventually determined that Perry had failed to prove that the settlement was coerced. Perry v. Department of Commerce, No. DC-0752-12-0486-B-1 etc. (Dec. 23, 2013) (initial decision), App. to Pet. for Cert. 32a, 47a. Presuming Perry's retirement to be voluntary, the ALJ dismissed his case. Id., at 33a, 47a. Voluntary actions are not appealable to the MSPB, the ALJ observed, hence, the ALJ concluded, the Board lacked jurisdiction to entertain Perry's claims. Id., at 51a.
The MSPB affirmed the ALJ's decision. See Perry v. Department of Commerce, 2014 WL 5358308, *1 (Aug. 6, 2014) (final order). The settlement agreement, the Board recounted, provided that Perry would waive his Board appeal rights with respect to his suspension and retirement. Ibid. Because Perry did not prove that the agreement was involuntary, the Board determined (in accord with the ALJ) that his separation should be deemed voluntary, hence not an adverse action subject to the Board's jurisdiction under § 7702(a)(1). Id., at *3-*4. If dissatisfied with the MSPB's ruling, the Board stated in its decision, Perry could seek judicial review in the Federal Circuit. Id., at *4.
Perry instead filed a pro se petition for review in the D.C. Circuit. 829 F.3d, at 763. The court ordered jurisdictional briefing and appointed counsel to argue for Perry. Ibid. By the time the court heard argument, the parties had agreed that the D.C. Circuit lacked jurisdiction, but disagreed on whether the proper forum for judicial review was the Federal Circuit, as the Government contended, or federal district court, as Perry maintained. Ibid.
The D.C. Circuit held that the Federal Circuit had jurisdiction over Perry's petition and transferred his case to that court under 28 U.S.C. § 1631. 829 F.3d, at 763. The court's disposition was precedent-bound: In a prior decision, Powell v. Department of Defense, 158 F.3d 597, 598 (1998), the D.C. Circuit had held that the Federal Circuit is the proper forum for judicial review of MSPB decisions dismissing mixed cases "on procedural or threshold grounds." See 829 F.3d, at 764, 767-768. Notably, Powell ranked as a "procedural or threshold matter" "the Board's view of its jurisdiction." 158 F.3d, at 599 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The D.C. Circuit rejected Perry's argument that Powell was undermined by this Court's intervening decision in Kloeckner, which held MSPB procedural dispositions of mixed cases reviewable in district court. 829 F.3d, at 764-768. Kloeckner, the D.C. Circuit observed, repeatedly tied its decision to dismissals on "procedural grounds," 568 U.S., at 44, 46, 49, 52, 54, 55, 133 S.Ct. 596. See 829 F.3d, at 765. Jurisdictional dismissals differ from procedural dismissals, the D.C. Circuit concluded, given the CSRA's reference to mixed cases as those "which the employee... may appeal to the [MSPB]." Id., at 766-767 (quoting § 7702(a)(1)(A) ; emphasis added). A jurisdictional dismissal, the court said, rests on the Board's determination that the employee may not appeal his case to the MSPB. Id., at 766-767. In contrast, a dismissal on procedural grounds, e.g., untimely resort to the MSPB, leaves the employee still "affected by an action which [she] may appeal to the MSPB." Ibid. (quoting § 7702(a)(1)(A) ; alteration in original).
We granted certiorari to review the D.C. Circuit's decision, 580 U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 811, 196 L.Ed.2d 596 (2017), which accords with the Federal Circuit's decision in Conforto v. Merit Systems Protection Bd., 713 F.3d 1111 (2013).
II
Federal employees, the Government acknowledges, have a right to pursue claims of discrimination in violation of federal law in federal district court. Nor is there any doubt that the Federal Circuit lacks authority to adjudicate such claims. See § 7703(c) (preserving "right to have the facts subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court" in any "case of discrimination" brought under § 7703(b)(2) ). The sole question here disputed: What procedural route may an employee in Perry's situation take to gain judicial review of the MSPB's jurisdictional disposition of a complaint that alleges adverse action taken under the CSRA in whole or in part due to discrimination proscribed by federal law?
The Government argues, and the dissent agrees, that employees, situated as Perry is, must split their claims, appealing MSPB nonappealability rulings to the Federal Circuit while repairing to the district court for adjudication of their discrimination claims. As Perry sees it, one stop is all he need make. Exclusively competent to adjudicate "[c]ases of discrimination," § 7703(b)(2), the district court alone can resolve his entire complaint, Perry urges; the CSRA, he maintains, forces no bifurcation of his case.
Section 7702(a)(1), the Government contends, marks a case as mixed only if the employee "has been affected by an action which the employee... may appeal to the [MSPB]." Brief for Respondent 15, 17-19, 21. An MSPB finding of nonappealability removes a case from that category, the Government asserts, and hence, from the purview of "[c]ases of discrimination" described in § 7703(b)(2). Id., at 21. Only this reading of the CSRA's provisions on judicial review-one ordering Federal Circuit review of any and all MSPB appealability determinations-the Government maintains, can ensure nationwide uniformity in answering questions arising under the CSRA. Id., at 26-32.
Perry emphasizes in response that § 7702(a)(1)(A)'s language, delineating cases in which an employee "has been affected by an action which the employee... may appeal to the [MSPB]," is not confined to cases an employee may successfully appeal to the Board. Brief for Petitioner 19. The MSPB's adverse ruling on the merits of his claim that the settlement was coerced, Perry argues, "did not retroactively divest the MSPB of jurisdiction to render that decision."Id., at 21. The key consideration, according to Perry, is not what the MSPB determined about appealability; it is instead the nature of an employee's claim that he had been "affected by an action [appealable] to the [MSPB]" (here, suspension for more than 14 days and involuntary removal, see § 7512(1), (2) ). See id., at 11, 23-24. Perry draws support for this argument from our recognition that "a party [may] establish jurisdiction at the outset of a case by means of a nonfrivolous assertion of jurisdictional elements," Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 537, 115 S.Ct. 1043, 130 L.Ed.2d 1024 (1995). See Brief for Petitioner 21-22.
Perry, we hold, advances the more sensible reading of the statutory prescriptions. The Government's procedure-jurisdiction distinction, we conclude, is no more tenable than "the merits-procedure distinction" we rejected in Kloeckner, 568 U.S., at 51, 133 S.Ct. 596.
A
As just noted, a nonfrivolous allegation of jurisdiction generally suffices to establish jurisdiction upon initiation of a case. See Jerome B. Grubart, Inc., 513 U.S., at 537, 115 S.Ct. 1043. See also Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-683, 66 S.Ct. 773, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946) (To invoke federal-question jurisdiction, allegations in a complaint must simply be more than "insubstantial or frivolous," and "[i]f the court does later exercise its jurisdiction to determine that the allegations in the complaint do not state a ground for relief, then dismissal of the case would be on the merits, not for want of jurisdiction."). So too here: whether an employee "has been affected by an action which [she] may appeal to the [MSPB]," § 7702(a)(1)(A), turns on her well-pleaded allegations. Kloeckner, EEOC regulations, and Courts of Appeals' decisions are corroborative.
We announced a clear rule in Kloeckner : "[M]ixed cases shall be filed in district court." 568 U.S., at 50, 133 S.Ct. 596. An employee brings a mixed case, we explained, when she "complains of a personnel action serious enough to appeal to the MSPB," e.g., suspension for more than 14 days, § 7512(2), "and alleges that the action was based on discrimination." Id., at 44, 133 S.Ct. 596 (emphasis deleted). The key to district court review, we said, was the employee's "clai[m] that an agency action appealable to the MSPB violates an antidiscrimination statute listed in § 7702(a)(1)." Id., at 56, 133 S.Ct. 596 (emphasis added).
EEOC regulations, see supra, at 1980, are in accord: The defining feature of a "mixed case appeal," those regulations instruct, is the employee's "alleg [ation] that an appealable agency action was effected, in whole or in part, because of discrimination." 29 C.F.R. § 1614.302(a)(2) (2016) (emphasis added). Several Courts of Appeals have similarly described mixed-case appeals as those alleging an adverse action subject to MSPB jurisdiction taken, in whole or in part, because of unlawful discrimination.
See, e.g., Downey v. Runyon, 160 F.3d 139, 143 (C.A.2 1998) ("Mixed appeals to the MSPB are those appeals alleging an appealable action affected in whole or in part by prohibited discrimination." (emphasis added)); Powell, 158 F.3d, at 597 (defining mixed-case appeal as "an appeal alleging both a Board-jurisdictional agency action and a claim of unlawful discrimination" (emphasis added)). See also Conforto, 713 F.3d, at 1126-1127, n. 5 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
Because Perry "complain[ed] of a personnel action serious enough to appeal to the MSPB" (in his case, a 30-day suspension and involuntary removal, see supra, at 1982; § 7512(1), (2) ) and "allege[d] that the [personnel] action was based on discrimination," he brought a mixed case. Kloeckner, 568 U.S., at 44, 133 S.Ct. 596. Judicial review of such a case lies in district court. Id., at 50, 56, 133 S.Ct. 596.
B
The Government rests heavily on a distinction between MSPB merits and procedural decisions, on the one hand, and the Board's jurisdictional rulings, on the other. The distinction has multiple infirmities.
"If Congress had wanted to [bifurcate judicial review,] send[ing] merits decisions to district court and procedural dismissals to the Federal Circuit," we observed in Kloeckner, "it could just have said so." Id., at 52, 133 S.Ct. 596. The same observation could be made about bifurcating judicial review here, sending the MSPB's merits and procedural decisions to district court, but its jurisdictional dismissals to the Federal Circuit.
The Government's attempt to separate jurisdictional dismissals from procedural dismissals is newly devised. In Kloeckner, the Government agreed with the employee that there was "no basis" for a procedure-jurisdiction distinction. Brief for Respondent, O.T. 2012, No. 11-184, p. 25, n. 3; see Reply to Brief in Opposition, O.T. 2012, No. 11-184, pp. 1-2 (stating employee's agreement with the Government that procedural and jurisdictional dismissals should travel together). Issues of both kinds, the Government there urged, should go to the Federal Circuit. Drawing such a distinction, the Government observed, would be "difficult and unpredictable." Brief in Opposition in Kloeckner, O.T. 2012, No. 11-184, p. 15 (internal quotation marks omitted). Now, in light of our holding in Kloeckner that procedural dismissals should go to district court, the Government has changed course, contending that MSPB procedural and jurisdictional dismissals should travel different paths.
A procedure-jurisdiction distinction for purposes of determining the court in which judicial review lies, as both parties recognized in Kloeckner, would be perplexing and elusive. If a 30-day suspension followed by termination becomes nonappealable to the MSPB when the Board credits a release signed by the employee, one may ask why a determination that the employee complained of such adverse actions (suspension and termination) too late, i.e., after a Board-set deadline, does not similarly render the complaint nonappealable. In both situations, the Board disassociates itself from the case upon making a threshold determination. This Court, like others, we note, has sometimes wrestled over the proper characterization of timeliness questions. Compare Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 209-211, 215, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007) (timely filing of notice of appeal in civil cases is "jurisdictional"), with id., at 217-219, 127 S.Ct. 2360 (Souter, J., dissenting) (timeliness of notice of appeal is a procedural issue).
Just as the proper characterization of a question as jurisdictional rather than procedural can be slippery, the distinction between jurisdictional and merits issues is not inevitably sharp, for the two inquiries may overlap. See Shoaf v. Department of Agriculture, 260 F.3d 1336, 1341 (C.A.Fed. 2001) ("recogniz[ing] that the MSPB's jurisdiction and the merits of an alleged involuntary separation are inextricably intertwined" (internal quotation marks omitted)). This case fits that bill. The MSPB determined that it lacked jurisdiction over Perry's civil-service claims on the ground that he voluntarily released those claims by entering into a valid settlement with his employing agency, the Census Bureau. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 27a. But the validity of the settlement is at the heart of the dispute on the merits of Perry's complaint. In essence, the MSPB ruled that it lacked jurisdiction because Perry's claims fail on the merits. See Shoaf, 260 F.3d, at 1341 (If it is established that an employee's "resignation or retirement was involuntary and thus tantamount to forced removal," then "not only [does the Board] ha[ve] jurisdiction, but also the employee wins on the merits and is entitled to reinstatement." (internal quotation marks omitted)). See also Conforto, 713 F.3d, at 1126 (Dyk, J., dissenting) ("[I]t cannot be that [the Federal Circuit] lack[s] jurisdiction to review the'merits' of mixed cases but nevertheless may review 'jurisdictional' issues that are identical to the merits....").
Distinguishing between MSPB jurisdictional rulings and the Board's procedural or substantive rulings for purposes of allocating judicial review authority between district court and the Federal Circuit is problematic for a further reason: In practice, the distinction may be unworkable. The MSPB sometimes rules on alternate grounds, one typed "jurisdictional," another either procedural or substantive. See, e.g., Davenport v. Postal Service, 97 M.S.P.R. 417 (2004) (dismissing "for lack of jurisdiction and as untimely filed" (emphasis added)). To which court does appeal lie? Or, suppose that the Board addresses a complaint that encompasses multiple claims, dismissing some for want of jurisdiction, others on procedural or substantive grounds. See, e.g., Donahue v. Postal Service, 2006 WL 859448, *1, *3 (E.D.Pa., Mar. 31, 2006). Tellingly, the Government is silent on the proper channeling of appeals in such cases.
Desirable as national uniformity may be, it should not override the expense, delay, and inconvenience of requiring employees to sever inextricably related claims, resorting to two discrete appellate forums, in order to safeguard their rights. Perry's comprehension of the complex statutory text, we are persuaded, best serves "[t]he CSRA's objective of creating an integrated scheme of review[, which] would be seriously undermined" by "parallel litigation regarding the same agency action." Elgin, 567 U.S., at 14, 132 S.Ct. 2126. See also United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 444-445, 108 S.Ct. 668, 98 L.Ed.2d 830 (1988). Perry asks us not to "tweak" the statute, see post, at 1988, but to read it sensibly, i.e., to refrain from reading into it the appeal-splitting bifurcation sought by the Government. Accordingly, we hold: (1) the Federal Circuit is the proper review forum when the MSPB disposes of complaints arising solely under the CSRA; and (2) in mixed cases, such as Perry's, in which the employee (or former employee) complains of serious adverse action prompted, in whole or in part, by the employing agency's violation of federal antidiscrimination laws, the district court is the proper forum for judicial review.
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice GORSUCH, with whom Justice THOMAS joins, dissenting.
Anthony Perry asks us to tweak a congressional statute-just a little-so that it might (he says) work a bit more efficiently. No doubt his invitation is well meaning. But it's one we should decline all the same. Not only is the business of enacting statutory fixes one that belongs to Congress and not this Court, but taking up Mr. Perry's invitation also seems sure to spell trouble. Look no further than the lower court decisions that have already ventured where Mr. Perry says we should follow. For every statutory "fix" they have offered, more problems have emerged, problems that have only led to more "fixes" still. New challenges come up just as fast as the old ones can be gaveled down. Respectfully, I would decline Mr. Perry's invitation and would instead just follow the words of the statute as written.
Our case concerns the right of federal employees to pursue their employment grievances under the Civil Service Reform Act. Really, it concerns but a small aspect of that right. Everyone agrees that employees may contest certain adverse employment actions-generally serious ones like dismissals-before the Merit Systems Protection Board. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 7701 - 7702, 7512 - 7513. Everyone agrees, too, that employees are generally entitled to seek judicial review of the Board's decisions. See § 7703. The only question we face today is where. And on that question, the Act provides clear directions.
First, the rule. The Act says that an employee's appeal usually "shall be filed in... the Federal Circuit," § 7703(b)(1)(A), which then applies a deferential, APA-style standard of review familiar to administrative law, § 7703(c). No doubt this makes sense, too, for Congress established the Federal Circuit in no small part to ensure a uniform case law governs Executive Branch personnel actions and guarantees the equal treatment of civil servants without regard to geography. See United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 449, 108 S.Ct. 668, 98 L.Ed.2d 830 (1988).
Second, the exception. Congress recognized that sometimes agencies taking adverse employment actions against employees violate not just federal civil service laws, but also federal antidiscrimination laws. Usually, of course, employees who wish to pursue discrimination claims in federal district court must first exhaust those claims in proceedings before their employing agency. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c). But the Act provides another option. Employees affected by adverse employment actions that trigger the Act's jurisdiction may (but need not) elect to exhaust their discrimination claims before the Board. See 5 U.S.C. § 7702(a). They also may ask the Board to review discrimination claims already exhausted before their employing agencies, and in this way obtain an additional layer of administrative review. See ibid. In § 7702 of the Act, Congress proceeded to set forth the rules the Board must apply in reviewing these cases of discrimination. And it then said that "[c]ases of discrimination subject to the provisions of section 7702" are exempt from the default rule of Federal Circuit review and instead "shall be filed" in district court "under" specified antidiscrimination statutes like Title VII or the ADEA. § 7703(b)(2). At that point, district courts are instructed to engage in de novo factfinding, § 7703(c), not APA-style judicial review, just as they would in any other discrimination lawsuit.
Putting these directions together, the statutory scheme is plain. Disputes arising under the civil service laws head to the Federal Circuit for deferential review; discrimination cases go to district court for de novo review. Congress allowed employees an elective option to bring their discrimination claims to the Board, but didn't allow this option to destroy the framework it established for the resolution of civil service questions. These rules provide straightforward direction to courts and guidance to federal employees who often proceed pro se.
These rules also tell us all we need to know to resolve our case. Construing his pro se filings liberally, Mr. Perry pursued civil service and discrimination claims before the Board without first exhausting his discrimination claim before his own agency. The Board held that it couldn't hear Mr. Perry's claims because he hadn't suffered an adverse employment action sufficient to trigger its jurisdiction under the Act. Mr. Perry now seeks to contest the Board's assessment of its jurisdiction and win a review there that so far he's been denied. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner 24. No doubt, too, he wants the chance to proceed on the merits before the Board for good reason: A victory there is largely unappealable by the government. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 7701, 7703(d) ; see also Brief for Respondent 34. And because the scope of the Board's jurisdiction is a question of civil service law, Mr
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Stewart
delivered the opinion of the Court.
A Florida statute requires each employee of the State or its subdivisions to execute a written oath in which he must swear that, among other things, he has never lent his “aid, support, advice, counsel or influence to the Communist Party.” Failure to subscribe to this oath results under the law in the employee's immediate discharge.
After the appellant had been employed for more than nine years as a public school teacher in Orange County, Florida, it was discovered in 1959 that he had never been required to execute this statutory oath. When requested to do so he refused. He then brought an action in the state circuit court asking for a judgment declaring the oath requirement unconstitutional, and for an injunction forbidding the appellee, the Orange County Board of Public Instruction, from requiring him to execute the oath and from discharging him for his failure to do so. The circuit court held the statute valid and denied the prayer for an injunction. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed, 125 So. 2d 554, and this is an appeal from the judgment of affirmance. Having doubt as to the jurisdiction of this Court, we postponed decision of that preliminary question until the hearing of the appeal on the merits. 366 U. S. 934.
I.
In his complaint in the state circuit court Cramp alleged that “he has, does and will support the Constitution of the United States and of the State of Florida; he is not a member of the Communist Party; that he has not, does not and will not lend aid, support, advice, counsel or influence to the Communist Party; he does not believe in the overthrow of the Government of the United States or of the State of Florida by force or violence; he is not a member of any organization or party which believes in or teaches directly or indirectly the overthrow of the Government of the United States or of Florida by force or violence.” He further alleged that he “is a loyal American and does not decline to execute or subscribe to the aforesaid oath for fear of the penalties provided by law for a false oath.”
It is these sworn statements in the complaint which raise two related but separate questions as to our jurisdiction of this appeal. First, did the Florida Supreme Court rest its decision, at least alternatively, upon the ground that the appellant, because of these statements, lacked standing to attack the statutory oath? If so, we should have to consider the applicability of “the settled rule that where the judgment of a state court rests upon two grounds, one of which is federal and the other non-federal in character, our jurisdiction fails if the non-federal ground is independent of the federal ground and adequate to support the judgment.” Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U. S. 207, 210. Secondly, do these sworn statements of the appellant deprive him of standing to attack the state statute in this Court, irrespective of what the Florida court may have decided?
The Supreme Court of Florida ruled that “because of the allegations of his own complaint the appellant teacher has unequivocally demonstrated that he has no standing to assault the subject statute on the grounds that it is a bill of attainder, or an ex post facto law.” 125 So. 2d, at 560. We may assume that this ruling by the state court would operate to foreclose our consideration of this appeal if the appellant had confined his attack upon the statute to the two grounds mentioned. But, in addition to asserting that the Florida statute constitutes an ex post facto law and a bill of attainder, the appellant has from the beginning also claimed that the statute is constitutionally invalid for two further and quite different reasons — that it impinges upon his constitutionally protected right of free speech and association, and that the language of the required oath is so vague and uncertain as to deny him due process of law. As we read the opinion of the Florida Supreme Court, both of these federal constitutional issues were decided upon their merits, without even implicit reliance upon any doctrine of state law.
Whether the appellant has standing to attack the state statute in this Court is, however, a separate issue, to which we must bring our independent judgment. Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U. S. 44; Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 429. The controlling question is whether the appellant “has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of [the statute's] enforcement ...” Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 488.
In the absence of the specific allegations in the complaint to which allusion has been made, there can be no doubt that enforcement of the state law would inflict a direct and serious injury upon the appellant. The statute unequivocally requires the appellant to execute the oath or suffer immediate discharge from public employment. See United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75, 91-92; Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 485. The argument is made, however, that the self-exonerating sworn statements in the complaint conclusively show that this appellant could not possibly sustain injury by executing the oath, and that he consequently has undercut his standing to question the constitutional validity of the state law.
Whatever the merits of this argument, it has, we think, no application to the appellant’s claim that the statutory oath is unconstitutionally vague. The vices inherent in an unconstitutionally vague statute — the risk of unfair prosecution and the potential deterrence of constitutionally protected conduct — have been repeatedly pointed out in our decisions. See Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 391; Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U. S. 445, 465; Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 369; Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242, 258-259; Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451; Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507. See also Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147, 151. These are dangers to which all who are compelled to execute an unconstitutionally vague and indefinite oath may be exposed. Cf. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 96-98.
There is nothing in the allegations of the complaint to indicate that the appellant will not be subjected to these hazards to the same degree as other public employees required to take the oath. The most that can be said of his having subscribed to the allegations in question is that he believes he could truthfully execute the oath, as he understands its language. But the very vice of which he complains is that the language of the oath is so vague and indefinite that others could with reason interpret it differently. He argues, in other words, that he could unconstitutionally be subjected to all the risks of a criminal prosecution despite the sworn allegations as to his past conduct which are contained in the complaint. We cannot say that the appellant lacks standing to attack this statutory oath as unconstitutionally vague simply because he now personally believes he could eventually prevail in the event he were prosecuted for perjury. Cf. Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U. S. 313, 319; Jones v. Opelika, 316 U. S. 584, 602, dissenting opinion, adopted per curiam on rehearing, 319 U. S. 103, 104; Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U. S. 553, 562.
We conclude that the appellant is not without standing to attack the Florida statute upon the ground that it is so vague as to deprive him of liberty or property without due process of law, and we turn, therefore, to the merits of that claim.
II.
The Florida Supreme Court first considered the provisions of this legislative oath in State v. Diez, 97 So. 2d 105, a case involving the validity of an indictment for perjury. There the court upheld the constitutionality of the legislation only upon finding it “. . . inherent in the law that when one takes the oath that he has not lent aid, advice, counsel and the like to the Communist Party, he is representing under oath that he has not done so knowingly.” 97 So. 2d, at 110. In the present case the Florida court adhered to this construction of the statute, characterizing what had been said in Diez as a ruling that “the element of scienter was implicit in each of the requirements of the statute.” 125 So. 2d, at 557. We accept without question this view of the statute’s meaning, as of course we must. This authoritative interpretation by the Florida Supreme Court “puts these words in the statute as definitely as if it had been so amended by the legislature.” Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507, 514. See Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U. S. 684, at 688; Albertson v. Millard, 345 U. S. 242; United States v. Burnison, 339 U. S. 87; Aero Transit Co. v. Commissioners, 332 U. S. 495.
The issue to be decided, then, is whether a State can constitutionally compel those in its service to swear that they have never “knowingly lent their aid, support, advice, counsel, or influence to the Communist Party.” More precisely, can Florida consistently with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment force an employee either to take such an oath, at the risk of subsequent prosecution for perjury, or face immediate dismissal from public service?
The provision of the oath here in question, it is to be noted, says nothing of advocacy of violent overthrow of state or federal government. It says nothing of membership or affiliation with the Communist Party, past or present. The provision is completely lacking in these or any other terms susceptible of objective measurement. Those who take this oath must swear, rather, that they have not in the unending past ever knowingly lent their “aid,” or “support,” or “advice,” or “counsel” or “influence” to the Communist Party. What do these phrases mean? In the not too distant past Communist Party candidates appeared regularly and legally on the ballot in many state and local elections. Elsewhere the Communist Party has on occasion endorsed or supported candidates nominated by others. Could one who had ever cast his vote for such a candidate safely subscribe to this legislative oath? Could a lawyer who had ever represented the Communist Party or its members swear with either confidence or honesty that he had never knowingly lent his “counsel” to the Party? Could a journalist who had ever defended the constitutional rights of the Communist Party conscientiously take an oath that he had never lent the Party his “support”? Indeed, could anyone honestly subscribe to this oath who had ever supported any cause with contemporaneous knowledge that the Communist Party also supported it?
The very absurdity of these possibilities brings into focus the extraordinary ambiguity of the statutory language. With such vagaries in mind, it is not unrealistic to suggest that the compulsion of this oath provision might weigh most heavily upon those whose conscientious scruples were the most sensitive. While it is perhaps fanciful to suppose that a perjury prosecution would ever be instituted for past conduct of the kind suggested, it requires no strain of the imagination to envision the possibility of prosecution for other types of equally guiltless knowing behaviour. It would be blinking reality not to acknowledge that there are some among us always ready to affix a Communist label upon those whose ideas they violently oppose. And experience teaches that prosecutors too are human.
We think this case demonstrably falls within the compass of those decisions of the Court which hold that "... a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.” Connolly v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 391. “No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids.” Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451, 453. “Words which are vague and fluid . . . may be as much of a trap for the innocent as the ancient laws of Caligula.” United States v. Cardiff, 344 U. S. 174, 176. “In the light of our decisions, it appears upon a mere inspection that these general words and phrases are so vague and indefinite that any penalty prescribed for their violation constitutes a denial of due process of law. It is not the penalty itself that is invalid but the exaction of obedience to a rule or standard that is so vague and indefinite as to be really no rule or standard at all.” Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission of Oklahoma, 286 U. S. 210, 243.
The vice of unconstitutional vagueness is further aggravated where, as here, the statute in question operates to inhibit the exercise of individual freedoms affirmatively protected by the Constitution. As we said in Smith v. California, . . stricter standards of permissible statutory vagueness may be applied to a statute having a potentially inhibiting effect on speech; a man may the less be required to act at his peril here, because the free dissemination of ideas may be the loser.” 361 U. S. 147, at 151. “The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system., A statute which upon its face, and as authoritatively construed, is so vague and indefinite as to permit the punishment of the fair use of this opportunity is repugnant to the guaranty of liberty contained in the Fourteenth Amendment.” Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 369. See also Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88; Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507.
As in Wieman v. Updegraff, we are not concerned here with the question “whether an abstract right to public employment exists.” 344 U. S. 183, at 192. Nor do we question the power of a State to safeguard the public service from disloyalty. Cf. Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U. S. 551; Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 485. It is enough for the present case to reaffirm “that constitutional protection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory.” Wieman v. Updegraff, supra, at 192. “The fact . . . that a person is not compelled to hold public office cannot possibly be an excuse for barring him from office by.state-imposed criteria forbidden by the Constitution.” Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U. S. 488, at 495-496.
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas join the Court’s judgment and opinion, but also adhere to the view expressed in their dissents in Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 485, 496, 508; Garner v. Los Angeles Board, 341 U. S. 716, 730, 731; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U. S. 109, 134; and to their concurrences in Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183, 192.
The statute in its entirety provides as follows:
“All persons who now or hereafter are employed by or who now or hereafter are on the payroll of the state, or any of its departments and agencies, subdivisions, counties, cities, school boards and districts of the free public school system of the state or counties, or institutions of higher learning and all candidates for public office, are hereby required to take an oath before any person duly authorized to take acknowledgments of instruments for public record in the state in the following form:
“I, ., a citizen of the State of Florida and of the United States of America, and being employed by or an officer of.and a recipient of public funds as such employee or officer, do hereby solemnly swear or affirm that I will support the Constitution of the United States and of the State of Florida; that I am not a member of the Communist Party; that 1 have not and will not lend my aid, support, advice, counsel or influence to the Communist Party; that I do not believe in the overthrow of the Government of the United States or of the State of Florida by force or violence; that I am not a member of any organization or party which believes in or teaches, directly or indirectly, the overthrow of the Government of the United States or of Florida by force or violence.
“And said oath shall be filed with the records of the governing official or employing governmental agency prior to the approval of any voucher for the payment of salary, expenses, or other compensation.” Fla. Stat. § 876.05. (Italics added.)
The Supreme Court of Florida has construed the portion of the statutory oath printed in italics as follows: “We think the pertinent clause, despite its ungrammatical construction was meant to apply retrospectively and that it should be read as if it had been written T have not lent and will not lend . . . .’ State v. Diez, 97 So. 2d 105, 109.
“If any person required by §§ 876.05-876.10 to take the oath herein provided for fails to execute the same, the governing authority under which such person is employed shall cause said person to be immediately discharged, and his name removed from the payroll, and such person shall not be permitted to receive any payment as an employee or as an officer where he or she was serving.” Fla. Stat. §876.06. See also Fla. Stat. §876.08, which provides that: “[a]ny governing authority or person, under whom any employee is serving or by whom employed who shall knowingly or carelessly permit any such employee to continue in employment after failing to comply with the provisions of §§ 876.05-876.10” shall be subject to fine, imprisonment, or both.
The statute requiring execution of the oath was enacted in 1949. Laws of Florida, 1949, c. 25046.
The Florida Supreme Court disposed of the claimed violation of the right of free speech and association in the following language:
“It has long been recognized that the First Amendment freedoms are not absolutes in and of themselves. When they are asserted as a barrier to government action we are confronted by the necessity of balancing the asserted private right against the alleged public interest. The private right will certainly not be lightly regarded. However, an indirect adverse effect on the asserted right of the individual will not preclude the exercise of governmental power when the power is shown to exist and its assertion is necessitated by the exigencies of the public wellbeing. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U. S. 109. . . .
“As we have pointed out in other parts of this opinion, the failure to take the required oath does not work an adjudication of guilt nor does it burden the employee with the responsibility of proving innocence against an assertion of guilt. Statutes of this type have been consistently sustained on the theory that they constitute merely a stipulation of qualifications or disqualifications for public employment. The statute contains no prohibition against the right of a citizen to speak out or to assemble peaceably. It merely provides that when one speaks out to advocate the violent overthrow of the government of the United States, or assembles for that purpose, he cannot simultaneously work for and draw compensation from the government he seeks to overthrow.” 125 So. 2d, at 558-559.
The court disposed of the claim that the oath requirement was unconstitutionally vague as follows:
“Certainly the instant statute is perfectly clear in its requirements. There could be no doubt in the minds of anyone who can read English as to the requirements of the statute and the effect of a failure to comply. Adler v. Board of Education, supra.” 125 So. 2d, at 558.
“If any person required by the provisions of §§ 876.05-876.10 to execute the oath herein required executes such oath, and it is subsequently proven that at the time of the execution of said oath said individual was guilty of making a false statement in said oath, he shall be guilty of perjury, and shail be prosecuted and punished for the crime of perjury in the event of conviction.” Fla. Stat. § 876.10.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | C | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
After a hearing before a juvenile court judge, appellant DeBacker was found to be a “delinquent child” and ordered committed to the Boys’ Training School at Kearney, Nebraska. DeBacker did not seek direct review of his commitment, but instead sought state habeas corpus. The Nebraska District Court dismissed appellant’s petition, a divided Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed, and last Term we noted probable jurisdiction over the present appeal, 393 U. S. 1076. Because we find that resolution of the constitutional issues presented by appellant would not be appropriate in the circumstances of this case, the appeal is dismissed. See Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U. S. 549.
1. Appellant asks this Court to decide whether the Fourteenth and Sixth Amendments, in light of this Court’s decisions in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145; Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 194; and In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, require a trial by jury in a state juvenile court proceeding based on an alleged act of the juvenile which, if committed by an adult, would, under the Duncan and Bloom cases, require a jury trial if requested. In DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U. S. 631, we held that Duncan and Bloom “should receive only prospective application” and stated that we would “not reverse state convictions for failure to grant jury trial where trials began prior to May 20, 1968, the date of this Court’s decisions in Duncan v. Louisiana and Bloom v. Illinois.” 392 U. S., at 633, 635. Because appellant’s juvenile court hearing was held on March 28, 1968 — prior to the date of the decisions in Duncan and Bloom — appellant would have had no constitutional right to a trial by jury if he had been tried as an adult in a criminal proceeding. It thus seems manifest that this case is not. an appropriate one for considering whether the Nebraska statute which provides that juvenile hearings be “without a jury,” Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-206.03 (2), is constitutionally invalid in light of Duncan and Bloom
2. Appellant next asks this Court to decide whether the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard for burden of proof in juvenile court proceedings, required by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-206.03 (3), satisfies the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, at the appellant’s juvenile court hearing, his counsel neither objected to the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, nor asked the judge to make a ruling based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In explaining why he did not seek a direct appeal from the juvenile court’s determination that appellant had committed the act upon which rested the delinquent child finding, appellant’s counsel stated at oral argument before this Court:
“[I]t has been pointed out that I did not attack the sufficiency of the evidence.
“Of course, the reason for that is obvious. The evidence is more than sufficient to sustain a conviction of what he did. An appeal on the sufficiency of the evidence would have been close to frivolous.” (Tr. 41-^2.)
Later in oral argument counsel acknowledged that “[n]o matter what the standard was . . . [o]ur evidence just isn’t insufficient.” (Tr. 47.) And when specifically asked whether “[t]he evidence was sufficient even under a reasonable doubt standard,” counsel responded: “Even under a reasonable doubt standard . . . .” (Tr. 47.)
Given this commendably forthright explanation by appellant’s counsel, this case is not an appropriate vehicle for consideration of the standard of proof in juvenile proceedings.
3. Appellant finally asks us to decide whether due process is denied because, as it is claimed, the Nebraska prosecutor had unreviewable discretion whether he would proceed against appellant in juvenile court rather than in ordinary criminal proceedings. The record shows (1) that appellant did not make this contention before the juvenile court judge; (2) that appellant raised the issue in his habeas corpus petition but that it was not passed on by the Nebraska District Court; (3) that appellant did not press the District Court’s failure to consider this issue in his appeal to the Nebraska Supreme Court, and made only passing reference to the issue in his brief to that court; and (4) that the opinions of the Nebraska Supreme Court did not pass on the issue, or even refer to the contention. Given the barrenness of the record on this issue, in the exercise of our discretion, we decline to pass on it. So far as we have been made aware, this issue does not draw into question the validity of any Nebraska statute. Therefore, it could not, standing alone, be subject to review in this Court by way of an appeal. See 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2). “[IJnsofar as notation of probable jurisdiction may be regarded as a grant of the certiorari writ” as to this issue, we dismiss such writ as improvidently granted. Mishkin v. New York, 383 U. S. 502, 513.
For the foregoing reasons this appeal is
Dismissed.
“Delinquent child shall mean any child under the age of eighteen years who has violated any law of the state or any city or village ordinance.” Neb. Rev. Stat. §43-201 (4). Appellant was charged with having a forged check in his possession with the intent to utter it as genuine, an act which for an adult would be forgery under Neb. Rev. Stat. §28-601 (2).
Appellant was 17 when committed, and it appears that under Nebraska law he could be kept in the training school until his 21st birthday.
Four of the seven justices of the Nebraska Supreme Court thought the Nebraska statutory provisions which require that juvenile hearings be without a jury, Neb. Rev. Stat. §43-206.03 (2), and be based on the preponderance of the evidence, Neb. Rev. Stat. §43-206.03 (3), were unconstitutional. The Nebraska Constitution provides, however, that: “No legislative act shall be held unconstitutional except by the concurrence of five judges.” Neb. Const., Art. V, §2.
Although a comment made by appellant’s counsel at oral argument before this Court (in response to a question) suggests reliance also on the Equal Protection Clause for the claim that a jury trial was constitutionally required (Tr. 5), an examination of the record clearly reveals that this was not any part of the basis on which probable jurisdiction was noted here. Appellant made no equal protection claim before the juvenile court, in his petition for habeas corpus to the state courts, or in his jurisdictional statement or brief in this Court. The Sixth Amendment as reflected in the Fourteenth was the exclusive basis for appellant’s claim that he had a right to a jury trial. (See “Questions Presented” in Jurisdictional Statement 3-4, and Appellant’s Brief 2.) Nor has any of the Nebraska courts below passed on any equal protection claim.
This Court has recently noted probable jurisdiction to consider this issue in In re Winship (No. 85, Misc.), probable jurisdiction noted, post, p. 885.
In his petition for state habeas corpus, appellant did not allege as to this issue that any Nebraska statutory provision was invalid. Instead he claimed: “Petitioner is deprived of his liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States when his right to a jury trial and the protective procedures of the criminal code are left to depend on the uncontrolled discretion of the prosecutor as to whether petitioner should be proceeded against in juvenile court or should be informed against in District Court under the provisions of the code of criminal procedure.” If it can be fairly said that the prosecutor’s discretion under Nebraska law is “uncontrolled,” or not subject to review, this is not because of any explicit statutory provision making it such, cf. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-205.04, but because of language in Nebraska case law. See State v. McCoy, 145 Neb. 750, 18 N. W. 2d 101 (1945); Fugate v. Bonin, 167 Neb. 70, 75, 91 N. W. 2d 240, 243-244 (1958).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case we must decide whether a Maine statute requiring employers to provide a one-time severance payment to employees in the event of a plant closing, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 26, §625-B (Supp. 1986-1987), is pre-empted by either the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 832, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §§1001-1381 (ERISA), or the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 452, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §§ 157-158 (NLRA). The statute was upheld by the Maine Superior Court, Civ. Action No. CV81-516 (Oct. 29, 1982), and by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, 510 A. 2d 1054 (1986). We noted probable jurisdiction, 479 U. S. 947 (1986), and now affirm.
l — l
In 1972, Fort Halifax Packing Company (Fort Halifax or Company) purchased a poultry packaging and processing plant that had operated in Winslow, Maine, for almost two decades. The Company continued to operate the plant for almost another decade, until, on May 23, 1981, it discontinued operations at the plant and laid off all its employees except several maintenance and clerical workers. At the time of closing, over 100 employees were on the payroll. Forty-five had worked in the plant for over 10 years, 19 for over 20 years, and 2 for 29 years. Plaintiff’s Supplementary Response to Employee List, Exhibit A (June 3, 1983). Following the closing, the Company met with state officials and with representatives of Local 385 of the Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America, which represented many of the employees who had worked in the plant. While Fort Halifax initially suggested that reopening the plant might be feasible if the union agreed to certain concessions in the form of amendments to the collective-bargaining agreement, ultimately the Company decided against resuming operations and to close the plant.
On October 30, 1981, 11 employees filed suit in Superior Court seeking severance pay pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 26, §625-B (Supp. 1986-1987). This statute, which is set forth in n. 1, supra, provides that any employer that terminates operations at a plant with 100 or more employees, or relocates those operations more than 100 miles away, must provide one week’s pay for each year of employment to all employees who have worked in the plant at least three years. The employer has no such liability if the employee accepts employment at the new location, or if the employee is covered by a contract that deals with the issue of severance pay. §§625-B(2), (3). Under authority granted by the statute, the Maine Director of the Bureau of Labor Standards also commenced an action to enforce the provisions of the state law, which action superseded the suit filed by the employees.
The Superior Court, ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, granted the Director’s motion, holding that Fort Halifax is liable for severance pay under the statute. Civ. Action No. CV81-516 (Oct. 29, 1982). The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. 510 A. 2d 1054 (1986). The court rejected the Company’s contention that the plant-closing statute was pre-empted by ERISA, holding that ERISA preempted only benefit plans created by employers or employee organizations. Id., at 1059. It observed that the severance pay liability in this case results from the operation of the state statute, rather than from the operation of an employer-created benefit plan. Ibid. Therefore, reasoned the court, “[inasmuch as § 625-B does not implicate a plan created by an employer or employee organization, it cannot be said to be preempted by ERISA.” Ibid. The court also rejected the argument that the state provision was pre-empted by the NLRA because it regulated conduct covered by either § 7 or § 8 of that statute. It found that the Maine statute applies equally to union and nonunion employees, and reflects “the state’s substantial interest in protecting Maine citizens from the economic dislocation that accompanies large-scale plant closings.” Id., at 1062. As a result, the court found that eligible employees were entitled to severance pay due to the closure of the plant at Winslow.
We hold that the Maine statute is not pre-empted by ERISA, not for the reason offered by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, but because the statute neither establishes, nor requires an employer to maintain, an employee welfare benefit “plan” under that federal statute. We hold further that the Maine law is not pre-empted by the NLRA, since it establishes a minimum labor standard that does not intrude upon the collective-bargaining process. As a result, we affirm the judgment of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court that the Maine statute is not pre-empted by either ERISA or the NLRA.
II
Appellant’s basic argument is that any state law pertaining to a type of employee benefit listed in ERISA necessarily regulates an employee benefit plan, and therefore must be pre-empted. Because severance benefits are included in ERISA, see 29 U. S. C. § 1002(1)(B), appellant argues that ERISA pre-empts the Maine statute. In effect, appellant argues that ERISA forecloses virtually all state legislation regarding employee benefits. This contention fails, however, in fight of the plain language of ERISA’s pre-emption provision, the underlying purpose of that provision, and the overall objectives of ERISA itself.
A
The first answer to appellant’s argument is found in the express language of the statute. ERISA’s pre-emption provision does not refer to state laws relating to “employee benefits,” but to state laws relating to “employee benefit plans”:
“[T]he provisions of this subchapter... shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in § 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under § 1003(b) of this title.” 29 U. S. C. § 1144(a) (emphasis added).
We have held that the words “relate to” should be construed expansively: “[a] law ‘relates to’ an employee benefit plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan.” Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U. S. 85, 96-97 (1983). Nothing in our case law, however, supports appellant’s position that the word “plan” should in effect be read out of the statute. Indeed, Shaw itself speaks of a state law’s connection with or reference to a plan. Ibid. The words “benefit” and “plan” are used separately throughout ERISA, and nowhere in the statute are they treated as the equivalent of one another. Given the basic difference between a “benefit” and a “plan,” Congress’ choice of language is significant in its pre-emption of only the latter.
Thus, as a first matter, the language of the ERISA presents a formidable obstacle to appellant’s argument. The reason for Congress’ decision to legislate with respect to plans rather than to benefits becomes plain upon examination of the purpose of both the pre-emption section and the regulatory scheme as a whole.
B
The second answer to appellant’s argument is that preemption of the Maine statute would not further the purpose of ERISA pre-emption. In analyzing whether ERISA’s preemption section is applicable to the Maine law, “as in any preemption analysis, ‘the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone.’” Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U. S. 724, 747 (1985) (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U. S. 497, 504 (1978)). Attention to purpose is particularly necessary in this case because the terms “employee benefit plan” and “plan” are defined only tautologically in the statute, each being described as “an employee welfare benefit plan or employee pension benefit plan or a plan which is both an employee welfare benefit plan and an employee pension benefit plan.” 29 U. S. C. § 1002(3).
Statements by ERISA’s sponsors in the House and Senate clearly disclose the problem that the pre-emption provision was intended to address. In the House, Representative Dent stated that “with the preemption of the field [of employee benefit plans], we round out the protection afforded participants by eliminating the threat of conflicting and inconsistent State and local regulation.” 120 Cong. Rec. 29197 (1974). Similarly, Senator Williams declared: “It should be stressed that with the narrow exceptions specified in the bill, the substantive and enforcement provisions of the conference substitute are intended to preempt the field for Federal regulations, thus eliminating the threat of conflicting or inconsistent State and local regulation of employee benefit plans.” Id., at 29933.
These statements reflect recognition of the administrative realities of employee benefit plans. An employer that makes a commitment systematically to pay certain benefits undertakes a host of obligations, such as determining the eligibility of claimants, calculating benefit levels, making disbursements, monitoring the availability of funds for benefit payments, and keeping appropriate records in order to comply with applicable reporting requirements. The most efficient way to meet these responsibilities is to establish a uniform administrative scheme, which provides a set of standard procedures to guide processing of claims and disbursement of benefits. Such a system is difficult to achieve, however, if a benefit plan is subject to differing regulatory requirements in differing States. A plan would be required to keep certain records in some States but not in others; to make certain benefits available in some States but not in others; to process claims in a certain way in some States but not in others; and to comply with certain fiduciary standards in some States but not in others.
We have not hesitated to enforce ERISA’s pre-emption provision where state law created the prospect that an employer’s administrative scheme would be subject to conflicting requirements. In Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U. S. 504 (1981), for instance, we struck down a New Jersey statute that prohibited offsetting worker compensation payments against pension benefits. Since such a practice is permissible under federal law and the law of other States, the effect of the statute was to force the employer either to structure all its benefit payments in accordance with New Jersey law, or to adopt different payment formulae for employees inside and outside the State. The employer therefore was required to accommodate conflicting regulatory schemes in devising and operating a system for processing claims and paying benefits — precisely the burden that ERISA preemption was intended to avoid.
This point was emphasized in Shaw, supra, where we said with respect to another form of State regulation: “Obligating the employer to satisfy the varied and perhaps conflicting requirements of particular state fair employment laws... would make administration of a nationwide plan more difficult.” 463 U. S., at 105, n. 25. Such a situation would produce considerable inefficiencies, which the employer might choose to offset by lowering benefit levels. As the Court in Shaw indicated, “ERISA’s comprehensive preemption of state law was meant to minimize this sort of interference with the administration of employee benefit plans,” ibid., so that employers would not have to “administer their plans differently in each State in which they have employees.” Id., at 105 (footnote omitted).
This concern about the effect of state regulation on the administration of benefit programs is reflected in Shaw’s holding that only disability programs administered separately from other benefit plans fall within ERISA’s pre-emption exemption for plans maintained “for the purpose of complying with... disability insurance laws.” 29 U. S. C. § 1003(b)(3). To permit the exemption to apply to disability benefits paid under a multibenefit plan was held to be inconsistent with the purpose of ERISA’s pre-emption provision:
“An employer with employees in several States would find its plan subject to a different jurisdictional pattern of regulation in each State, depending on what benefits the State mandated under disability, workmen’s compensation, and unemployment compensation laws. The administrative impracticality of permitting mutually exclusive pockets of federal and state jurisdiction within a plan is apparent.” 463 U. S., at 107-108.
It is thus clear that ERISA’s pre-emption provision was prompted by recognition that employers establishing and maintaining employee benefit plans are faced with the task of coordinating complex administrative activities. A patchwork scheme of regulation would introduce considerable inefficiencies in benefit program operation, which might lead those employers with existing plans to reduce benefits, and those without such plans to refrain from adopting them. Pre-emption ensures that the administrative practices of a benefit plan will be governed by only a single set of regulations. See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 93-533, p. 12 (1973) (“[A] fiduciary standard embodied in Federal legislation is considered desirable because it will bring a measure of uniformity in an area where decisions under the same set of facts may differ from state to state”).
The purposes of ERISA’s pre-emption provision make clear that the Maine statute in no way raises the types of concerns that prompted pre-emption. Congress intended pre-emption to afford employers the advantages of a uniform set of administrative procedures governed by a single set of regulations. This concern only arises, however, with respect to benefits whose provision by nature requires an ongoing administrative program to meet the employer’s obligation. It is for this reason that Congress pre-empted state laws relating to plans, rather than simply to benefits. Only a plan embodies a set of administrative practices vulnerable to the burden that would be imposed by a patchwork scheme of regulation.
The Maine statute neither establishes, nor requires an employer to maintain, an employee benefit plan. The requirement of a one-time, lump-sum payment triggered by a single event requires no administrative scheme whatsoever to meet the employer’s obligation. The employer assumes no responsibility to pay benefits on a regular basis, and thus faces no periodic demands on its assets that create a need for financial coordination and control. Rather, the employer’s obligation is predicated on the occurrence of a single contingency that may never materialize. The employer may well never have to pay the severance benefits. To the extent that the obligation to do so arises, satisfaction of that duty involves only making a single set of payments to employees at the time the plant closes. To do little more than write a check hardly constitutes the operation of a benefit plan. Once this single event is over, the employer has no further responsibility. The theoretical possibility of a one-time obligation in the future simply creates no need for an ongoing administrative program for processing claims and paying benefits.
This point is underscored by comparing the consequences of the Maine statute with those produced by a state statute requiring the establishment of a benefit plan. In Standard Oil Co. of California v. Agsalud, 633 F. 2d 760 (CA9 1980), summarily aff’d, 454 U. S. 801 (1981), for instance, Hawaii had required that employers provide employees with a comprehensive health care plan. The Hawaii law was struck down, for it posed two types of problems. First, the employer in that case already had in place a health care plan governed by ERISA, which did not comply in all respects with the Hawaii Act. If the employer sought to achieve administrative efficiencies by integrating the Hawaii plan into its existing plan, different components of its single plan would be subject to different requirements. If it established a separate plan to administer the program directed by Hawaii, it would lose the benefits of maintaining a single administrative scheme. Second, if Hawaii could demand the operation of a particular benefit plan, so could other States, which would require that the employer coordinate perhaps dozens of programs. Agsalud thus illustrates that whether a State requires an existing plan to pay certain benefits, or whether it requires the establishment of a separate plan where none existed before, the problem is the same. Faced with the difficulty or impossibility of structuring administrative practices according to a set of uniform guidelines, an employer may decide to reduce benefits or simply not to pay them at all.
By contrast, the Maine law does not put the employer to the choice of either: (1) integrating a state-mandated ongoing benefit plan with an existing plan or (2) establishing a separate plan to process and pay benefits under the plan required by the State. This is because there is no state-mandated benefit plan to administer. In this case, for instance, Fort Halifax found no need to respond to passage of the Maine statute by setting up an administrative scheme to meet its contingent statutory obligation, any more than it would find it necessary to set up an ongoing scheme to deal with the obligations it might face in the event that some day it might go bankrupt. The Company makes no contention that its statutory duty has in any way hindered its ability to operate its retirement plan in uniform fashion, a plan that pays retirement, death, and permanent and total disability benefits on an ongoing basis. App. 40. The obligation imposed by the Maine statute thus differs radically in impact from a requirement that an employer pay ongoing benefits on a continuous basis.
The Maine statute therefore creates no impediment to an employer’s adoption of a uniform benefit administration scheme. Neither the possibility of a one-time payment in the future, nor the act of making such a payment, in any way creates the potential for the type of conflicting regulation of benefit plans that ERISA pre-emption was intended to prevent. As a result, pre-emption of the Maine law would not serve the purpose for which ERISA’s pre-emption provision was enacted.
C
The third answer to appellant’s argument is that the Maine statute not only fails to implicate the concerns of ERISA’s pre-emption provision, it fails to implicate the regulatory concerns of ERISA itself. The congressional declaration of policy, codified at 29 U. S. C. § 1001, states that ERISA was enacted because Congress found it desirable that “disclosure be made and safeguards be provided with respect to the establishment, operation, and administration of [employee benefit] plans.” § 1001(a). Representative Dent, the House sponsor of the legislation, represented that ERISA’s fiduciary standards “will prevent abuses of the special responsibilities borne by those dealing with plans.” 120 Cong. Rec. 29197 (1974). Senator Williams, the Senate sponsor, stated that these standards would safeguard employees from “such abuses as self-dealing, imprudent investing, and misappropriation of plan funds.” Id., at 29932. The focus of the statute thus is on the administrative integrity of benefit plans —which presumes that some type of administrative activity is taking place. See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 94-1785, p. 46 (1977) (“In electing deliberately to preclude state authority over these plans, Congress acted to insure uniformity of regulation with respect to their activities”) (emphasis added); 120 Cong. Rec. 29197 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Dent) (disclosure and reporting requirements “will enable both participants and the Federal Government to monitor the plans’ operations”) (emphasis added); id., at 29935 (remarks of Sen. Javits) (disclosure meant to provide employees information “covering in detail the fiscal operations of their plan”) (emphasis added).
The foregoing makes clear both why ERISA is concerned with regulating benefit “plans” and why the Maine statute does not establish one. Only “plans” involve administrative activity potentially subject to employer abuse. The obligation imposed by Maine generates no such activity. There is no occasion to determine whether a “plan” is “operated” in the interest of its beneficiaries, because nothing is “operated.” No financial transactions take place that would be listed in an annual report, and no further information regarding the terms of the severance pay obligation is needed because the statute itself makes these terms clear. It would make no sense for pre-emption to clear the way for exclusive federal regulation, for there would be nothing to regulate. Under such circumstances, pre-emption would in no way serve the overall purpose of ERISA.
D
Appellant contends that failure to pre-empt the Maine law will create the opportunity for employers to circumvent ERISA’s regulatory requirements by persuading a State to require the type of benefit plan that the employer otherwise would establish on its own. That may be so under the rationale offered by the State Supreme Judicial Court, but that is not the rationale on which we rely today.
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court rested its decision on the premise that ERISA only pre-empts state regulation of pre-existing benefit plans established by the employer, and not state-mandated benefit plans. We agree that such an approach would afford employers a readily available means of evading ERISA’s regulatory scope, thereby depriving employees of the protections of that statute. In addition, it would permit States to circumvent ERISA’s pre-emption provision, by allowing them to require directly what they are forbidden to regulate. In contrast, our analysis of the purpose of ERISA pre-emption makes clear why the mere fact that a plan is required by a State is insufficient to fend off pre-emption. The requirements imposed by a State’s establishment of a benefit plan would pose a formidable barrier to the development of a uniform set of administrative practices. As Standard Oil Co. of California v. Agsalud, 633 F. 2d 760 (CA9 1980), illustrates, an employer would be put to the choice of operating separate ongoing benefit plans or a single plan subject to different regulatory requirements, and would face the prospect that numerous other States would impose their own distinct requirements — a result squarely inconsistent with the goal of ERISA pre-emption.
Appellant’s arguments are thus well taken insofar as they are addressed to the reasoning of the court below. We have demonstrated, supra, however, they have no force with respect to a state statute that, as here, does not establish a plan. Such a statute generates no program activity that normally would be subject to ERISA regulation. Enforcement of the Maine statute presents no risk either that an employer will evade or that a State will dislodge otherwise applicable federal regulatory requirements. Nor is there any prospect that an employer will face difficulty in operating a unified administrative scheme for paying benefits. The rationale on which we rely thus does not create the dangers that appellant contends will result from upholding the Maine law.
Appellant also argues that its contention that the severance obligation under the Maine statute is an ERISA plan is supported by Holland v. Burlington Industries, Inc., 772 F. 2d 1140 (CA4 1985), summarily aff’d, 477 U. S. 901 (1986), and Gilbert v. Burlington Industries, Inc., 765 F. 2d 320 (CA2 1985), summarily aff’d, 477 U. S. 901 (1986). We disagree. Those cases hold that a plan that pays severance benefits out of general assets is an ERISA plan. That holding is completely consistent with our analysis above. There was no question in the Burlington cases, as there is in this case, whether the employer had a “plan”; there was a “plan” and the only issue was whether the type of benefits paid by that plan are among those covered by ERISA. The precise question was simply whether severance benefits paid by a plan out of general assets, rather than out of a trust fund, should be regarded as employee welfare benefits under 29 U. S. C. §^.
The courts’ conclusion that they should be so regarded took into account ERISA’s central focus on administrative integrity: if an employer has an administrative scheme for paying benefits, it should not be able to evade the requirements of the statute merely by paying those benefits out of general assets. Some severence benefit obligations by their nature necessitate an ongoing administrative scheme, but others do not. Those that do not, such as the obligation imposed in this case, simply do not involve a state law that “relate[s], to” an employee benefit “plan.” 29 U. S. C. § 1144(a). The Burlington cases therefore do not support appellant’s argument.
E
ERISA pre-emption analysis “must be guided by respect for the separate spheres of governmental authority preserved in our federalist system.” Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U. S., at 522. The argument that ERISA pre-empts state laws relating to certain employee benefits, rather than to employee benefit plans, is refuted by the express language of the statute, the purposes of the preemption provision, and the regulatory focus of ERISA as a whole. If a State creates no prospect of conflict with a federal statute, there is no warrant for disabling it from attempting to address uniquely local social and economic problems. Since the Maine severance payment statute raises no danger of such conflict, we hold that the statute is not preempted by ERISA.
Ill
Appellant also contends that Maine’s statute is pre-empted by the NLRA. In so arguing, the Company relies on the strand of NLRA pre-emption analysis that prohibits States from “imposing additional restrictions on economic weapons of self-help.” Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U. S. 608, 614 (1986). Restriction on state activity in this area rests on the theory that pre-emption is necessary to further Congress’ intent that “the conduct involved be unregulated because [it should be] left ‘to be controlled by the free play of economic forces.’” Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm’n, 427 U. S. 182, 140 (1976) (quoting NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U. S. 138, 144 (1971)).
Appellant concedes that, unlike cases in which state laws have been struck down under this doctrine, Maine has not directly regulated any economic activity of either of the parties. See, e. g., Machinists, supra (State enjoined union members from continuing to refuse to work overtime); Garner v. Teamsters, 346 U. S. 485 (1953) (State enjoined union picketing). Nor has the State sought directly to force a party to forgo the use of one of its economic weapons. See, e. g., Golden State Transit, supra (City Council conditioned taxicab franchise renewal on settlement of strike). Nonetheless, appellant maintains that the Maine law intrudes on the bargaining activities of the parties because the prospect of a statutory obligation undercuts an employer’s ability to withstand a union’s demand for severance pay.
This argument — that a State’s establishment of minimum substantive labor standards undercuts collective bargaining — was considered and rejected in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U. S. 724 (1985). That case involved a state law requiring that minimum mental health benefits be provided under certain health insurance policies. Appellants there presented the same argument that appellant makes in this case: “[B]ecause Congress intended to leave the choice of terms in collective-bargaining agreements to the free play of economic forces,... mandated-benefit laws should be pre-empted by the NLRA.” Id., at 748. The Court held, however, that the NLRA is concerned with ensuring an equitable bargaining process, not with the substantive terms that may emerge from such bargaining. “The evil Congress was addressing thus was entirely unrelated to local or federal regulation establishing minimum terms of employment.” Id., at 754. Such regulation provides protections to individual union and nonunion workers alike, and thus “neither encourage[s] nor discourage[s] the collective-bargaining processes that are the subject of the NLRA.” Id., at 755. Furthermore, pre-emption should not be lightly inferred in this area, since the establishment of labor standards falls within the traditional police power of the State. As a result, held the Court: “When a state law establishes a minimal employment standard not inconsistent with the general legislative goals of the NLRA, it conflicts with none of the purposes of the Act.” Id., at 757. It is true that the Maine statute gives employees something for which they otherwise might have to bargain. That is true, however, with regard to any state law that substantively regulates employment conditions. Both employers and employees come to the bargaining table with rights under state law that form a “‘backdrop’” for their negotiations. Ibid, (quoting Taggart v. Weinacker’s, Inc., 397 U. S. 223, 228 (1970) (concurring opinion)). Absent a collective-bargaining agreement, for instance, state common law generally permits an employer to run the workplace as it wishes. The employer enjoys this authority without having to bargain for it. The parties may enter negotiations designed to alter this state of affairs, but, if impasse is reached, the employer may rely on pre-existing state law to justify its authority to make employment decisions; that same state law defines the rights and duties of employees. Similarly, Maine provides that employer and employees may negotiate with the intention of establishing severance pay terms. If impasse is reached, however, preexisting state law determines the right of employees to a certain level of severance pay and the duty of the employer to provide it. Thus, the mere fact that a state statute pertains to matters over which the parties are free to bargain cannot support a claim of pre-emption, for “there is nothing in the NLRA... which expressly forecloses all state regulatory power with respect to those issues... that may be the subject of collective bargaining.” Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U. S. 497, 504-505 (1978).
Appellant maintains that this case is distinguishable from Metropolitan Life. It points out that, unlike Metropolitan Life, the statutory obligation at issue here is optional, since it applies only in the absence of an agreement between employer and employees. Therefore, the Company argues, the Maine law cannot be regarded as establishing a genuine minimum labor standard. The fact that the parties are free to devise their own severance pay arrangements, however, strengthens the case that the statute works no intrusion on collective bargaining. Maine has sought to balance the desirability of a particular substantive labor standard against the right of self-determination regarding the terms and conditions of employment. If a statute that permits no collective bargaining on a subject escapes NLRA pre-emption, see Metropolitan Life, surely one that permits such bargaining cannot be pre-empted.
We therefore find that Maine’s severance payment law is “a valid and unexc'eptional exercise of the [State’s] police power.” Metropolitan Life, 471 U. S., at 758. Since “Congress developed the framework for self-organization and collective bargaining of the NLRA within the larger body of state law promoting public health and safety,” id., at 756, the Maine statute is not pre-empted by the NLRA.
rH <1
We hold that the Maine severance pay statute is not preempted by ERISA, since it does not “relate to any employee benefit plan” under that statute. 29 U. S. C. § 1144(a). We hold further that the law is not pre-empted by the NLRA, since its establishment of a minimum labor standard does not impermissibly intrude upon the collective-bargaining process. The judgment of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court is therefore
Affirmed.
The statute provides in pertinent part:
“2. Severance pay. Any employer who relocates or terminates a covered establishment shall be liable to his employees for severance pay at the rate of one week’s pay for each year of employment by the employee in that establishment. The severance pay to eligible employees shall be in addition to any final wage payment to the employee and shall be paid within one regular pay period after the employee’s last full day of work, notwithstanding any other provisions of law.
“3. Mitigation of severance pay liability. There shall be no liability for severance pay to an eligible employee if:
“A. Relocation or termination of a covered establishment is necessitated by a physical calamity;
“B. The employee is covered by an express contract providing for severance pay;
“C. That employee accepts employment at the new location; or
“D. That employee has been employed by the employer for less than 3 years.”
Section 625-B(l)(A) defines “covered establishment” as a facility that employs 100 or more persons, while § 625-B(l)(F) defines “relocation” as the removal of all or substantially all operations at least 100 miles away from their original location.
Section 625-B (5) of the Maine statute provides in relevant part:
“5. Suits by the director. The director is authorized to supervise the payment of the unpaid severance pay owing to any employee under this section. The director may bring an action in any court of competent jurisdiction to recover the amount of any unpaid severance pay. The right provided by subsection 4 to bring an action by or on behalf of any employee, and of any employee to become a party plaintiff to any such action, shall terminate upon the filing of a complaint by the director in an action under this subsection, unless the action is dismissed without prejudice by the director....”
Ninety-three employees of the plant are eligible for lump-sum payments ranging from $490 to $11,500. The total amount due is about $256,600. Affidavit of Xavier J. Dietrich, Exhibit A (Aug. 13, 1984).
Because we hold that the obligation created by the Maine statute does not involve a plan, we do not address the State’s alternative argument that, even if the law does establish a plan, it is not pre-empted by virtue of the exemption for plans “maintained solely for the purpose of complying with applicable... unemployment compensation or disability insurance laws.” 29 U. S. C. § 1003(b)(3).
Section 1002(1)(B) defines an employee welfare benefit plan as a plan that pays, inter alia, benefits described in 29 U. S. C. § 186(c). The latter section includes, inter alia, money paid by an employer to a trust fund to pay for severance benefits. Section 1002(1)(B) has been construed to include severance benefits paid out of general assets, as well as out of a trust fund. See Holland v. Burlington Industries, Inc., 772 F. 2d 1140 (CA4 1985), summarily aff’d, 477 U. S. 901 (1986); Gilbert v. Burlington Industries, Inc., 765 F. 2d 320 (CA2 1985), summarily aff’d, 477 U. S. 901 (1986); Scott v. Gulf Oil Corp., 754 F. 2d 1499 (CA9 1985); 29 CFR § 2510.3-1(a)(3) (1986). See also discussion, infra, at 17-19.
See Martori Bros. Distributors v. James-Massengale, 781 F. 2d 1349, 1358 (CA9) (“It is difficult to see how the making of one-time lump sum payments could constitute the establishment of a plan”), amended on other grounds, 791 F. 2d 799, cert. denied, 479 U. S. 949 (1986). Cf. Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F. 2d 1367, 1373 (CA11 1982) (“A decision to extend benefits is not the establishment of a plan or program”).
In 1983, Congress amended ERISA to exempt from pre-emption certain provisions of the Hawaii Act in place before the enactment of ERISA, Haw. Rev. Stat. §§393-1 through 393-48 (1976 and Supp. 1984). 29
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | J | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners in this case, tenants living in low-income housing projects owned by respondent, brought suit under 42 U. S. C. §1983, alleging that respondent overbilled them for their utilities and thereby violated the rent ceiling imposed by the Brooke Amendment to the Housing Act of 1937, and the implementing regulations of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The District Court, 605 F. Supp. 532 (WD Va. 1984), and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 771 F. 2d 833 (1985), concluded that petitioners did not have a cause of action under § 1983. We granted certiorari and now reverse.
I — I
Respondent is one of many public housing authorities (PHA’s) established throughout the country under the United States Housing Act of 1937, ch. 896, 60 Stat. 888, 42 U. S. C. §1401 et seq., (1970 ed.), to provide affordable housing for low-income people. In 1969, the Housing Act was amended in a fundamental respect: the Brooke Amendment, Pub. L. 91-152, §213, 83 Stat. 389, imposed a ceiling for rents charged to low-income people living in public housing projects, and, as later amended, Pub. L. 97-35, § 322, 95 Stat. 400, provides that a low-income family “shall pay as rent” a specified percentage of its income. HUD has consistently considered “rent” to include a reasonable amount for the use of utilities, which is defined by regulation as that amount equal to or less than an amount determined by the PHA to be a reasonable part of the rent paid by low-income tenants.
In their suit against respondent, petitioners alleged that respondent had overcharged them for their utilities by failing to comply with the applicable HUD regulations in establishing the amount of utility service to which petitioners were entitled. Thus, according to petitioners, respondent imposed a surcharge for “excess” utility consumption that should have been part of petitioners’ rent and deprived them of their statutory right to pay only the prescribed maximum portion of their income as rent. The District Court granted summary judgment for respondent on petitioners’ § 1983 claim, holding that a private cause of action was unavailable to enforce the Brooke Amendment. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Relying primarily on two of its earlier decisions, Perry v. Housing Authority of Charleston, 664 F. 2d 1210 (1981), and Phelps v. Housing Authority of Woodruff, 742 F. 2d 816 (1984), the Court of Appeals held that while the Brooke Amendment confers certain rights on tenants, these rights are enforceable only by HUD, not by the individual tenant: “[T]he situation is very analogous to the one in which a trustee [that is, HUD], not the cestui que trust, must bring suit.” 771 F. 2d, at 836.
h-I I — (
Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1 (1980), held that §1983 was available to enforce violations of federal statutes by agents of the State. Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981), and Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1 (1981), however, recognized two exceptions to the application of § 1983 to remedy statutory violations: where Congress has foreclosed such enforcement of the statute in the enactment itself and where the statute did not create enforceable rights, privileges, or immupities within the meaning of § 1983. In Pennhurst, a § 1983 action did not lie because the statutory provisions were thought to be only statements of “findings” indicating no more than a congressional preference — at most a “nudge in the preferred direc-tio[n],” 451 U. S., at 19, and not intended to rise to the level of an enforceable right. In Sea Clammers, an intent to foreclose resort to § 1983 was found in the comprehensive remedial scheme provided by Congress, a scheme that itself provided for private actions and left no room for additional private remedies under § 1983. Similarly, Smith v. Robinson, 468 U. S. 992, 1012 (1984), held that allowing a plaintiff to circumvent the Education of the Handicapped Act’s administrative remedies would be inconsistent with Congress’ carefully tailored scheme, which itself allowed private parties to seek remedies for violating federal law. Under these cases, if there is a state deprivation of a “right” secured by a federal statute, § 1983 provides a remedial cause of action unless the state actor demonstrates by express provision or other specific evidence from the statute itself that Congress intended to foreclose such private enforcement. “We do not lightly conclude that Congress intended to preclude reliance on § 1983 as a remedy” for the deprivation of a federally secured right. Ibid.
Here, the Court of Appeals held that the statute and the Brooke Amendment clearly manifested congressional intention to vest in HUD the exclusive power to enforce the benefits due housing project tenants and hence the intention to foreclose both a private cause of action under the Housing Act and any private enforcement under § 1983. For the Court of Appeals, the barrier was not the lack of statutory right or its quality or enforceability — “the plaintiffs under 42 U. S. C. § 1437a have certain rights,” 771 F. 2d, at 837 — but the fact that Congress had not intended tenants to have the authority themselves to sue: “HUD alone may, as quasi trustee, take legal action, for the right is explicitly tailored not to allow the beneficiaries, the low cost housing tenants, to do so.” Ibid.
We disagree with the Court of Appeals’ rather summary conclusion that the administrative scheme of enforcement foreclosed private enforcement. The Court of Appeals merely relied on one of its prior cases which had referred to HUD’s authority to enforce the annual contributions contracts between PHA’s and HUD, see 42 U. S. C. § 1437c, to conduct audits and to cut off funds. HUD undoubtedly has considerable authority to oversee the operation of the PHA’s. We are unconvinced, however, that respondent has overcome its burden of showing that “the remedial devices provided in [the Housing Act] are sufficiently comprehensive ... to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under § 1983.” Sea Clammers, supra, at 20. They do not show that “Congress specifically foreclosed a remedy under § 1983.” Smith v. Robinson, supra, at 1004-1005, n. 9. Not only are the Brooke Amendment and its legislative history devoid of any express indication that exclusive enforcement authority was vested in HUD, but there have also been both congressional and agency actions indicating that enforcement authority is not centralized and that private actions were anticipated. Neither, in our view, are the remedial mechanisms provided sufficiently comprehensive and effective to raise a clear inference that Congress intended to foreclose a §1983 cause of action for the enforcement of tenants’ rights secured by federal law.
In 1981, Congress changed the maximum percentage of income' that could be paid as “rent” from 25 percent to 30 percent. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. 97-35, § 322, 95 Stat. 400. In making this change, Congress gave the Secretary of HUD discretion to raise tenants’ rent incrementally over a 5-year period to ease the burden on low-income tenants during the transition. § 322(i), 95 Stat. 404. To avoid a potential multitude of litigation over the way in which the Secretary implemented the phased-in rate increase, Congress specifically made the Secretary’s decisions effectuating the phase-in immune from judicial review. § 322(i)(3). At congressional hearings in which this specific and limited exception to judicial review was discussed, HUD representatives explained that this exception had no effect on tenants’ ability to enforce their rights under the Housing Act in federal court other than the limited exception concerning the phase-in. Apparently dissatisfied with even a temporary preclusion of judicial review, Congress repealed it two years later. Pub. L. 98-181, § 206(e), 97 Stat. 1181.
Also at odds with the holding that HUD has exclusive authority to enforce the Brooke Amendment is the enactment in 1985 of 42 U. S. C. § 1437d(k) (1982 ed., Supp. Ill), which directed HUD to continue its longstanding regulatory requirement that each PHA provide formal grievance, procedures for the resolution of tenant disputes with the PHA arising out of their lease or PHA regulations. These procedures, which Congress ordered continued, include informal and formal hearings and administrative appeals, conducted within each PHA by impartial decisionmakers, to consider adverse decisions taken against tenants by the PHA. Congress’ aim was to provide a “decentralized, informal, and relatively non-adversarial administrative process” for resolving tenant-management disputes. Samuels v. District of Columbia, 248 U. S. App. D. C. 128, 133, 770 F. 2d 184, 189 (1985). The procedures are open to individual grievances but not to class actions. See 24 CFR § 966.51(b) (1986). HUD itself has never provided a procedure by which tenants could complain to it about the alleged failures of PHA’s to abide by their annual contribution contracts, the Brooke Amendment, or HUD regulations; nor has it taken unto itself the task of reviewing PHA grievance procedure decisions. Moreover, § 966.57(c) of HUD’s grievance procedure regulations provides that a decision terminating a grievance proceeding shall in no way affect the rights of a tenant either to seek “trial de novo or judicial review in any judicial proceedings, which may thereafter be brought in the matter. ” HUD thus had no thought that its own supervisory powers or the grievance system that it had established foreclosed resort to the courts by tenants who claimed that a PHA was not observing the commands of the Brooke Amendment.
There is other evidence clearly indicating that in HUD’s view tenants have the right to bring suit in federal court to challenge housing authorities’ calculations of utility allowances. Among HUD’s 1982 proposed regulations was § 865.476(d), 47 Fed. Reg. 35249, 35254 (1982), which would have confined tenant utility-allowance challenges to the procedures available in state court. The final regulation, however, contained no such limitation and contemplated that tenants could challenge PHA actions in federal as well as state courts. 24 CFR § 965.473(e) (1985). As the comment accompanying the final regulation explained, the proposal to limit challenges to state-court actions had been abandoned. The final “provision does not preclude Federal court review.” 49 Fed. Reg. 31403 (1984). HUD’s opinion as to available tenant remedies under the Housing Act is entitled to some deference by this Court. See Jean v. Nelson, 472 U. S. 846, 865 (1985); Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 844 (1984).
In both Sea Clammers and Smith v. Robinson, the statutes at issue themselves provided for private judicial remedies, thereby evidencing congressional intent to supplant the § 1983 remedy. There is nothing of that kind found in the Brooke Amendment or elsewhere in the Housing Act. Indeed, the only private remedy provided for is the local grievance procedures which the Act now requires. These procedures are not open to class grievances; and even if tenants may grieve about a PHA’s utility allowance schedule, which petitioners dispute, the existence of a state administrative remedy does not ordinarily foreclose resort to § 1983. See Patsy v. Board of Regents of Florida, 457 U. S. 496, 516 (1982).
The Court of Appeals and respondents rely on HUD’s authority to audit, enforce annual contributions contracts, and cut off federal funds. But these generalized powers are insufficient to indicate a congressional intention to foreclose § 1983 remedies. Cf. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 704-707 (1979); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397, 420 (1970). HUD has the authority to audit, but it does not do so frequently and its own Handbook requires audits only every eight years. There are no other mechanisms provided to enable HUD to effectively oversee the performance of the some 3,000 local PHA’s across the country. The statute does not require and HUD has not provided any formal procedure for tenants to bring to HUD’s attention alleged PHA failures to abide by the Brooke Amendment and HUD regulations. Hence, there will be little occasion to exercise HUD’s power to sue PHA’s to enforce the provisions of the annual contributions contracts. Respondent asserts PHA’s must annually file their utility allowance schedules with HUD and that HUD must approve them, but the final regulations eliminated HUD’s duty to approve these schedules before their effective date. 24 CFR § 965.473(d) (1986). Review of the schedules would be done in the course of audits or reviews of PHA operations.
Lastly, it is said that tenants may sue on their lease in state courts and enforce their Brooke Amendment rights in that litigation. Perhaps they could, but the state-court remedy is hardly a reason to bar an action under § 1983, which was adopted to provide a federal remedy for the enforcement of federal rights.
In sum, we conclude that nothing in the Housing Act or the Brooke Amendment evidences that Congress intended to preclude petitioners’ § 1983 claim against respondent.
HH HH I — I
Although the Court of Appeals read the Brooke Amendment as extending to housing project tenants certain rights enforceable only by HUD, respondent asserts that neither the Brooke Amendment nor the interim regulations gave the tenants any specific or definable rights to utilities, that is, no enforceable rights within the meaning of § 1983. We perceive little substance in this claim. The Brooke Amendment could not be clearer: as further amended in 1981, tenants could be charged as rent no more and no less than 30 percent of their income. This was a mandatory limitation focusing on the individual family and its income. The intent to benefit tenants is undeniable. Nor is there any question that HUD interim regulations, in effect when this suit began, expressly required that a “reasonable” amount for utilities be included in rent that a PHA was allowed to charge, an interpretation to which HUD has adhered both before and after the adoption of the Brooke Amendment. HUD’s view is entitled to deference as a valid interpretation of the statute, and Congress in the course of amending that provision has not disagreed with it.
Respondent nevertheless asserts that the provision for a “reasonable” allowance for utilities is too vague and amorphous to confer on tenants an enforceable “right” within the meaning of § 1983 and that the whole matter of utility allowances must be left to the discretion of the PHA, subject to supervision by HUD. The regulations, however, defining the statutory concept of “rent” as including utilities, have the force of law, Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U. S. 281, 294-295 (1979), they specifically set out guidelines that the PHAs were to follow in establishing utility allowances, and they require notice to tenants and an opportunity to comment on proposed allowances. In our view, the benefits Congress intended to confer on tenants are sufficiently specific and definite to qualify as enforceable rights under Pennhurst and § 1983, rights that are not, as respondent suggests, beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly
Reversed.
“[42 U. S. C.] § 1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights:
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”
The Brooke Amendment in its present form reads as follows:
Ҥ 1437a. Rental payments
“(a) Families included; amount
“Dwelling units assisted under this chapter shall be rented only to families who are lower income families at the time of their initial occupancy of such units. Reviews of family income shall be made at least annually. A family shall pay as rent for a dwelling unit assisted under this chapter (other than a family assisted under section 1437f(o) of this title) the highest of the following amounts, rounded to the nearest dollar:
“(1) 30 per centum of the family’s monthly adjusted income;
“(2) 10 per centum of the family’s monthly income; or
“(3) if the family is receiving payments for welfare assistance from a public agency and a part of such payments, adjusted in accordance with the family’s actual housing costs, is specifically designated by such agency to meet the family’s housing costs, the portion of such payments which is so designated.” 42 U. S. C. § 1437a (1982 ed. and Supp. III).
The language of the original Brooke Amendment required that low-income tenant’s rent “may not exceed one-fourth of the family’s income, as defined by the Secretary.”
The complaint was filed December 8, 1982. The regulations in effect at that time defined “contract rent,” that is, the amount actually charged to low-income tenants, as follows:
“Contract rent means the rent charged a tenant for the use of the dwelling accommodation and equipment (such as ranges and refrigerators but not including furniture), services, and reasonable amounts of utilities determined in accordance with the PHA’s [public housing authority’s] schedule of allowances for utilities supplied by the project. Contract rent does not include charges for utility consumption in excess of the public housing agency’s schedule of allowances for utility consumption, or other miscellaneous charges . . . .” 24 CFR § 860.403 (1982).
The relevant regulations were originally promulgated as an interim rule on September 9,1980. 45 Fed. Reg. 59502 (1980). As there noted, HUD had previously regulated the way in which utility charges were dealt with in HUD’s Local Housing Authority Management Handbook, pt. 2, §9, Controlling Utility Consumption and Costs (1963). Ibid. On August 13, 1982, HUD published a proposed rule to amend the interim regulations, commenting as follows with respect to the inclusion of utilities in the calculation of rent:
“In administering the low-income public housing program under the United States Housing Act of 1937, as amended, HUD historically has considered ‘rent’ to include shelter cost plus a reasonable amount for utilities. As a result, even prior to adoption of the ‘Brooke Amendment’ in 1969 (limiting the amount of ‘rent’ chargeable to public housing tenants to a stated percentage of income, then 25 percent), HUD provided for a system under which allowances were established as part of the rent schedule showing the amounts of electricity in kilowatt-hours to which tenants were entitled.” 47 Fed. Reg. 35249-35250 (1982).
The regulation was finally amended on August 7, 1984. 49 Fed. Reg. 31399 (1984). The Supplementary Information section of the published regulation contains a discussion which underscores the fact that HUD has traditionally treated “rent” to include a reasonable amount of utility usage. Id., at 31400. That section also provides an overview of the development of the utility regulations at issue here.
The dissent may have a different view, but to us it is clear that the regulations gave low-income tenants an enforceable right to a reasonable utility allowance and that the regulations were fully authorized by the statute.
The applicable regulations, 24 CFR §865.470 et seq. (1983), require housing authorities like respondent to, inter alia, recalculate their utility allowances on the basis of current data, to set the allowances in such a fashion that 90 percent of a particular authority’s dwelling units do not pay surcharges, and to review tenant surcharges quarterly and consider revision of the allowances if more than 26 percent of any category of units are being surcharged.
The complaint also contained a claim against respondent for breach of paragraph 4 of the standard lease agreement providing:
“Utilities: Management Agent agrees to furnish at no charge to the Resident the following utilities as reasonably necessary: hot and cold water, gas for cooking, and electricity for lighting and general household appliances and heat at appropriate times of the year, and also range and refrigerator. Resident will be required to pay for all excess consumption of utilities above the monthly allocated amount as developed by the Authority and determined by the individual check meter servicing the leased unit. The schedule of allocations and charges for excess consumption is posted on the bulletin board of each Housing Development office.” Record, Exh. H.
The original complaint asked for both injunctive relief and recovery of whatever amount respondent allegedly overcharged petitioners. Pursuant to new HUD regulations, respondent revised its allowances for reasonable utility use. Petitioners are now seeking only recovery of alleged past improper charges. Brief for Petitioners 8.
Petitioners asserted that while their right to sue on the lease derives from state law, the lease claim is controlled by federal law and hence is within the jurisdiction of the federal courts under 28 U. S. C. § 1331.
The court acknowledged that its conclusion that the Brooke Amendment created no enforceable rights in petitioners conflicted with the See-ond Circuit’s decision in Beckham v. New York City Housing Authority, 755 F. 2d 1074 (1985). The court stated, however, that this decision “must yield to the authority of Perry and Phelps, supra, from our own circuit.” 771 F. 2d, at 837, n. 8.
In response to a question by Congressman Vento concerning the reason for the exception to judicial review, a representative of HUD explained that this limited exception had no effect on tenants’ ability to protect their rights other than limiting their right to challenge the Secretary’s actions in implementing the phase-in:
“Mr. Vento. Well, has this been a special problem? Usually we don’t exempt people from going to the district court unless there has been some problem that has developed. Has there been that type of a problem in the past?
“Mr. Hovde. I will call upon Mr. Hipps for a response.
“Mr. Hipps. In direct answer to your question, yes, we have had a lot of litigation involving tenants rights over the past several years. The provision that you have raised a question about is addressed only at the 5-year phase in of the increase, and is not intended, as I understand, to eliminate any tenants rights beyond that point.” Hearings on Housing and Community Development Amendments before the Subcommittee on Housing and Community Development of the House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 654 (1981).
Petitioners assert that the grievance mechanism is not available for challenges to the general utility allowance schedules. They rely on HUD statements to this effect, the first in 1984 in connection with the issuance of formal regulations, 49 Fed. Reg. 31407:
“Some legal services organizations recommended that grievance procedures should apply to the utility allowance provisions. Grievance procedures under former Part 866 (now Part 966) apply to individual, not class, grievances so that challenges to the general utility allowance schedules would be precluded. The Department believes that procedures to be followed on claims for individual relief under § 965.479 should be left to PHA determination.”
The second statement by HUD was in connection with proposing new grievance hearing regulations in 1986, 51 Fed. Reg. 26528:
“(a) Purpose of informal hearing. (1) The grievance procedure shall provide the Family an opportunity for an informal hearing to review proposed PHA adverse action. The purpose of the informal hearing shall be to review whether the proposed adverse action by the PHA is in accordance with, the lease, or with the law, HUD regulations or PHA rules.
“(2) PHA action or non-action concerning general policy issues or class grievances (including determination of the PHA’s schedules of allowances for PHA-furnished utilities or of allowances for Tenant-purchased utilities) does not constitute adverse action by the PHA, and the PHA is not required to provide the opportunity for a hearing to consider such issues or grievances.”
United States Dept, of Housing and Urban Development, Field Office Monitoring of Public Housing Agencies (PHAs) 6-1 (Handbook 7460.7, Rev. Sept. 9, 1985).
HUD explained, 49 Fed. Reg. 31403 (1984), as follows:
“In a related issue, legal service organizations expressed concern about the absence of any HUD review of the PHA’s allowance determination.
“HUD’s regulatory reform goals include the removal of unnecessary reviews and approvals of actions by responsible parties having equal or greater information at hand. This is particularly appropriate in the case of public housing in view of the ’37 Act’s injunction that ‘[I]t is the policy of the United States to vest in the local public housing agencies the maximum amount of responsibility in the administration of their housing programs.’ 42 U. S. C. 1437. The Department believes that the definition of standards in § 965.476, combined with the record and notice provisions added to § 965.473, should adequately assure the reasonableness of PHA determinations so as to obviate the necessity or usefulness of HUD review and approval before implementation of PHA-determined allowances.”
We thus reject respondent’s argument that the Brooke Amendment’s rent ceiling applies only to the charge for shelter and that the HUD definition of rent as including a reasonable charge for utilities is not authorized by the statute.
The dissent misconstrues our discussion of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 and the enactment of the grievance procedures as codified at 42 U. S. C. § 1437d(k) (1982 ed., Supp. III). Our conclusion that low-income tenants have a right to a reasonable amount of utilities does not come from these two congressional Acts. Rather, these Acts and their history show that Congress did not close the courthouse door to low-income tenants by establishing an alternative enforcement mechanism.
The dissent is also quite wrong in concluding that HUD’s “regulations indicate that while it did not have the authority finally to resolve the question, HUD viewed utilities determinations as a matter for state rather than federal courts.” Post, at 440. It is true that the 1982 proposed regulations would have confined review of PHA utility allowances to state forums, but it was never indicated that the governing law was state rather than federal law; and in the final regulations, even the provision making PHA determinations final unless overturned in state courts was deleted. HUD thus abandoned any attempt to foreclose resort to federal courts and surely negated any conclusion that PHA determinations were not judicially re viewable. The Supplemental Information section to HUD’s final regulations contains the following revealing discussion, 49 Fed. Reg. 31403 (1984):
“C. Review of PHA Decisions by State Courts
“The National Housing Law Project and other legal service groups challenged, as illegal, proposed § 865.476(d) which would make PHA determinations of allowances and revisions thereof final unless found, upon review pursuant to such procedures as may be available under State or local law, to be arbitrary or capricious.
“The commenters challenged HUD’s power .(1) to prescribe a standard of review for State courts, and (2) to divest Federal court of jurisdiction over cases involving questions of compliance with Federal statutes and regulations.
“State procedures for review of actions by administrative bodies created under State law frequently have provided a forum for review of agency determinations that involve questions of Federal law. Such State law proceedings may be more accessible to public housing tenants in some localities than a Federal court. Moreover, the Department believes that State courts are fully competent to review determinations by authorities created under State law.
“Nevertheless, the Department also recognizes that some plaintiffs may prefer to challenge PHA determinations in Federal rather than State court and that the Department’s power to preclude access to Federal court is doubtful. The Department also recognizes that not all States may have adopted procedures providing for judicial review of administrative action. Accordingly, this provision (transferred to § 965.473(e)) has been revised (i) to expand the standard of review to ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law’ (compare Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. 706(2)), and (ii) to state that such standard of review will govern ‘except where a different standard of review is applicable in review procedures governed by applicable State law.’ This provision does not preclude Federal court review.”
Petitioners also argue that the District Court has subject-matter jurisdiction to consider their breach-of-lease claims given the federal nature of the rights contained in their leases. In light of our decision that petitioners have a § 1983 claim, the District Court can certainly exercise pendent jurisdiction over petitioners’ breach-of-lease claims. We offer no opinion as to whether the District Court has jurisdiction to consider only their breach-of-lease claims irrespective of their § 1983 claim.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner’s complaints allege that her applications for admission to medical school were denied by the respondents because she is a woman. Accepting the truth of those allegations for the purpose of its decision, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner has no right of action against respondents that may be asserted in a federal court. 559 F. 2d 1063. We granted certiorari to review that holding. 438 U. S. 914.
Only two facts alleged in the complaints are relevant to our decision. First, petitioner was excluded from participation in the respondents’ medical education programs because of her sex. Second, these education programs were receiving federal financial assistance at the time of her exclusion. These facts, admitted arguendo by respondents’ motion to dismiss the complaints, establish a violation of § 901 (a) of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (hereinafter Title IX).
That section, in relevant part, provides:
“No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
The statute does not, however, expressly authorize a private right of action by a person injured by a violation of § 901. For that reason, and because it concluded that no private remedy should be inferred, the District Court granted the respondents’ motions to dismiss. 406 F. Supp. 1257, 1259.
The Court of Appeals agreed that the statute did not contain an implied private remedy. Noting that § 902 of Title IX establishes a procedure for the termination of federal financial support for institutions violating § 901, the Court of Appeals concluded that Congress intended that remedy to be the exclusive means of enforcement. It recognized that the statute was patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (hereinafter Title VI), but rejected petitioner’s argument that Title VI included an implied private cause of action. 559 F. 2d, at 1071-1075.
After the Court of Appeals’ decision was announced, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2641, which authorizes an award of fees to prevailing private parties in actions to enforce Title IX. The court therefore granted a petition for rehearing to consider whether, in the light of that statute, its original interpretation of Title IX had been correct. After receiving additional briefs, the court concluded that the 1976 Act was not intended to create a remedy that did not previously exist. The court also noted that the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare had taken the position that a private cause of action under Title IX should be implied, but the court disagreed with that agency’s interpretation of the Act. In sum, it adhered to its original view, 559 F. 2d, at 1077-1080.
The Court of Appeals quite properly devoted careful attention to this question of statutory construction. As our recent cases — particularly Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66 — demonstrate, the fact that a federal statute has been violated and some person harmed does not automatically give rise to a private cause of action in favor of that person. Instead, before concluding that Congress intended to make a remedy available to a special class of litigants, a court must carefully analyze the four factors that Cort identifies as indicative of such an intent. Our review of those factors persuades us, however, that the Court of Appeals reached the wrong conclusion and that petitioner does have a statutory right to pursue her claim that respondents rejected her application on the basis of her sex. After commenting on each of the four factors, we shall explain why they are not overcome by respondents' countervailing arguments.
I
First, the threshold question under Cort is whether the statute was enacted for the benefit of a special class of which the plaintiff is a member. That question is answered by looking to the language of the statute itself. Thus, the statutory reference to “any employee of any such common carrier” in the 1893 legislation requiring railroads to equip their cars with secure “grab irons or handholds,” see 27 Stat. 532, 531, made “irresistible” the Court’s earliest “inference of a private right of action” — in that case in favor of a railway employee who was injured when a grab iron gave way. Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S. 33, 40.
Similarly, it was statutory language describing the special class to be benefited by § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that persuaded the Court that private parties within that class were implicitly authorized to seek a declaratory judgment against a covered State. Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 554 — 555. The dispositive language in that statute — “no person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to comply with [a new state enactment covered by, but not approved under, § 5]” — is remarkably similar to the language used by Congress in Title IX. See n. 3, supra.
The language in these statutes — which expressly identifies the class Congress intended to benefit — contrasts sharply with statutory language customarily found in criminal statutes, such as that construed in Cort, supra, and other laws enacted for the protection of the general public. There would be far less reason to infer a private remedy in favor of individual persons if Congress, instead of drafting Title IX with an unmistakable focus on the benefited class, had written it simply as a ban on discriminatory conduct by recipients of federal funds or as a prohibition against the disbursement of public funds to educational institutions engaged in discriminatory practices.
Unquestionably, therefore, the first of the four factors identified in Cort favors the implication of a private cause of action. Title IX explicitly confers a benefit on persons discriminated. against on the basis of sex, and petitioner is clearly a member of that class for whose special benefit the statute was enacted.
Second, the Gort analysis requires consideration of legislative history. We must recognize, however, that the legislative history of a statute that does not expressly create or deny a private remedy will typically be equally silent or ambiguous on the question. Therefore, in situations such as the present one “in which it is clear that federal law has granted a class of persons certain rights, it is not necessary to show an intention to create a private cause of action, although an explicit purpose to deny such cause of action would be controlling.” Gort, 422 U. S., at 82 (emphasis in original). But this is not the typical case. Far from evidencing any purpose to deny a private cause of action, the history of Title IX rather plainly indicates that Congress intended to create such a remedy.
Title IX was patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Except for the substitution of the word “sex” in Title IX to replace the words “race, color, or national origin” in Title VI, the two statutes use identical language to describe the benefited class. Both statutes provide the same administrative mechanism for terminating federal financial support for institutions engaged in prohibited discrimination. Neither statute expressly mentions a private remedy for the person excluded from participation in a federally funded program. The drafters of Title IX explicitly assumed that it would be interpreted and applied as Title VI had been during the preceding eight years.
In 1972 when Title IX was enacted, the critical language in Title VI had already been construed as creating a private remedy. Most particularly, in 1967, a distinguished panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit squarely decided this issue in an opinion that was repeatedly cited with approval and never questioned during the ensuing five years. In addition, at least a dozen other federal courts reached similar conclusions in the same or related contexts during those years. It is always appropriate to assume that our elected representatives, like other citizens, know the law; in this case, because of their repeated references to Title VI and its modes of enforcement, we are especially justified in presuming both that those representatives were aware of the prior interpretation of Title VI and. that that interpretation reflects their intent with respect to Title IX.
Moreover, in 1969, in Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, this Court had interpreted the comparable language in § 5 of the Voting Rights Act as sufficient to authorize a private remedy. Indeed, during the. period between the enactment of Title VI in 1964 and the enactment of Title IX in 1972, this Court had consistently found implied remedies— often in cases much less clear than this. It was after 1972 that this Court decided Cort v. Ash and the other cases cited by the Court of Appeals in support of its strict construction of the remedial aspect of the statute. We, of course, adhere to the strict approach followed in our recent cases, but our evaluation of congressional action in 1972 must take into account its contemporary legal context. In sum, it is not only appropriate but also realistic to presume that Congress was thoroughly familiar with these unusually important precedents from this and other federal courts and that it expected its enactment to be interpreted in conformity with them.
It is not, however, necessary to rely on these presumptions. The package of statutes of which Title IX is one part also contains a provision whose language and history demonstrate that Congress itself understood Title VI, and thus its companion, Title IX, as creating a private remedy. Section 718 of the Education Amendments authorizes federal courts to award attorney’s fees to the prevailing parties, other than the United States, in private actions brought against public educational agencies to enforce Title VI in the context of elementary and secondary education. The language of this provision explicitly presumes the availability of private suits to enforce Title VI in the education context. For many such suits, no express cause of action was then available; hence Congress must have assumed that one could be implied under Title VI itself. That assumption was made explicit during the debates on § 718. It was also aired during the debates on other provisions in the Education Amendments of 1972 and on Title IX itself, and is consistent with the Executive Branch's apparent understanding of Title VI at the time.
Finally, the very persistence — before 1972 and since, among judges and executive officials, as well as among litigants and their counsel, and even implicit in decisions of this Court— of the assumption that both Title "VI and Title IX created a private right of action for the victims of illegal discrimination and the absence of legislative action to change that assumption provide further evidence that Congress at least acquiesces in, and apparently affirms, that assumption. See n. 7, supra. We have no doubt that Congress intended to create Title IX remedies comparable to those available under Title VI and that it understood Title VI as authorizing an implied private cause of action for victims of the prohibited discrimination.
Third, under Cort, a private remedy should not be implied if it would frustrate the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme. On the other hand, when that remedy is necessary or at least helpful to the accomplishment of the statutory purpose, the Court is decidedly receptive to its implication under the statute.
Title IX, like its model Title VI, sought to accomplish two related, but nevertheless somewhat different, objectives. First, Congress wanted to avoid the use of federal resources to support discriminatory practices; second, it wanted to provide individual citizens effective protection against those practices. Both of these purposes were repeatedly identified in the debates on the two statutes.
The first purpose is generally served by the statutory procedure for the termination of federal financial support for institutions engaged in discriminatory practices. That remedy is, however, severe and often may not provide an appropriate means of accomplishing the second purpose if merely an isolated violation has occurred. In that situation, the violation might be remedied more efficiently by an order requiring an institution to accept an applicant who had been improperly excluded. Moreover, in that kind of situation it makes little sense to impose on an individual, whose only interest is in obtaining a benefit for herself, or on HEW, the burden of demonstrating that an institution’s practices are so pervasively discriminatory that a complete cutoff of federal funding is appropriate. The award of individual relief’ to a private litigant who has prosecuted her own suit is not only sensible but is also fully consistent with — and in some cases even necessary to — the orderly enforcement of the statute.
The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, which is charged with the responsibility for administering Title IX, perceives no inconsistency between the private remedy and the public remedy. On the contrary, the agency takes the unequivocal position that the individual remedy will provide effective assistance to achieving the statutory purposes. See n. 8, supra. The agency’s position is unquestionably correct.
Fourth, the final inquiry suggested by Cort is whether implying a federal remedy is inappropriate because the subject matter involves an area basically of concern to the States. No such problem is raised by a prohibition against invidious discrimination of any sort, including that on the basis of sex. Since the Civil War, the Federal Government and the federal courts have been the “ ‘primary and powerful reliances’ ” in protecting citizens against such discrimination. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 464 (emphasis in original), quoting F. Frankfurter & J. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 65 (1928). Moreover, it is the expenditure of federal funds that provides the justification for this particular statutory prohibition. There can be no question but that this aspect of the Cort analysis supports the implication of a private federal remedy.
In sum, there is no need in this case to weigh the four Cort factors; all of them support the same result. Not only the words and history of Title IX, but also its subject matter and underlying purposes; counsel implication of a cause of action in favor of private victims of discrimination.
II
Respondents’ principal argument against implying a cause of action under Title IX is that it is unwise to subject admissions decisions of universities to judicial scrutiny at the behest of disappointed applicants on a case-by-case basis. They argue that this kind of litigation is burdensome and inevitably will have an adverse effect on the independence of members of university committees.
This argument is not original to this litigation. It was forcefully advanced in both 1964 and 1972 by the congressional opponents of Title VI and Title IX, and squarely rejected by the congressional majorities that passed the two statutes. In short, respondents’ principal contention is not a legal argument at all; it addresses a policy issue that Congress has already resolved.
History has borne out the judgment of Congress. Although victims of discrimination on the basis of race, religion, or national origin have had private Title VI remedies available at least since 1965, see n. 21, supra, respondents have not come forward with any demonstration that Title VI litigation has been so costly or voluminous that either the academic community or the courts have been unduly burdened. Nothing but speculation supports the argument that university administrators will be so concerned about the risk of litigation that they will fail to discharge their important responsibilities in an independent and professional manner.
Ill
Respondents advance two other arguments that deserve brief mention. Starting from the premise that Title IX and Title VI should receive the same construction, respondents argue (1) that a comparison of Title VI with other Titles of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 demonstrates that Congress created express private remedies whenever it found them desirable; and (2) that certain excerpts from the legislative history of Title VI foreclose the implication of a private remedy.
Even if these arguments were persuasive with respect to Congress’ understanding in 1964 when it passed Title VI, they would not overcome the fact that in 1972 when it passed Title IX, Congress was under the impression that Title VI could be enforced by a private action and that Title IX would be similarly enforceable. See supra, at 696-699. “For the relevant inquiry is not whether Congress correctly perceived the then state of the law, but rather what its perception of the state of the law was.” Brown v. GSA, 425 U. S. 820, 828. But each of respondents’ arguments is, in any event, unpersuasive.
The fact that other provisions of a complex statutory scheme create express remedies has not been accepted as a sufficient reason for refusing to imply an otherwise appropriate remedy under a separate section. See, e. g., J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U. S. 426; Wyandotte Transportation Co. v. United States, 389 U. S. 191. Rather, the Court has generally avoided this type of “excursion into extrapolation of legislative intent,” Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S., at 83 n. 14, unless there is other, more convincing, evidence that Congress meant to exclude the remedy. See National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Assn. of Railroad Passengers, 414 U. S., at 458-461.
With one set of exceptions, the excerpts from the legislative history cited by respondents as contrary to implication of a private remedy under Title VI, were all concerned with a procedure for terminating federal funding. None of them evidences any hostility toward an implied private remedy to terminate the offending discrimination. They are consistent with the assumption expressed frequently during the debates that such a judicial remedy — either through the kind of broad construction of state action under § 1983 adopted by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 323 F. 2d 959 (1963), or through an implied remedy — would be available to private litigants regardless of how the fund-cutoff issue was resolved.
The only excerpt relied upon by respondents that deals precisely with the question whether the victim of discrimination has a private remedy under Title VI was a comment by Senator Keating. In it, he expressed disappointment at the administration’s failure to include his suggestion for an express remedy in its final proposed bill. Our analysis of the legislative history convinces us, however, that neither the administration’s decision not to incorporate that suggestion expressly in its bill, nor Senator Keating’s response to that decision, is indicative of a rejection of a private right of action against recipients of federal funds. Instead, the former appears to have been a compromise aimed at protecting individual rights without subjecting the Government to suits, while the latter is merely one Senator’s isolated expression of a preference for an express private remedy. In short, neither is inconsistent with the implication of such a remedy. Nor is there any other indication in the legislative history that any Member of Congress voted in favor of the statute in reliance on an understanding that Title VI did not include a private remedy.
IV
When Congress intends private litigants to have a cause of action to support their statutory rights, the far better course is for it to specify as much when it creates those rights. But the Court has long recognized that under certain limited circumstances the failure of Congress to do so is not inconsistent with an intent on its part to have such a remedy available to the persons benefited by its legislation. Title IX presents the atypical situation in which all of the circumstances that the Court has previously identified as supportive of an implied remedy are present. We therefore conclude that petitioner may maintain her lawsuit, despite the absence of any express authorization for it in the statute.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Chief Justice Burger concurs in the judgment.
Each of petitioner’s two complaints names as defendant a private university — the University of Chicago and Northwestern University — and various officials of the medical school operated by that university. In addition, both complaints name the Secretary, and the Region V Director of the Office for Civil Rights, of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Although all of these defendants prevailed below, and are respondents here, the federal defendants have taken a position that basically accords with the position advanced by petitioner. See Brief for Federal Respondents. Unless otherwise clear in context, all references to respondents in this opinion will refer to the private defendants named in petitioner’s complaints.
Petitioner’s complaints allege violations of various federal statutes including Title IX. Although the District Court and Court of Appeals ruled adversely on all of these theories, petitioner confined her petition for a writ of certiorari to the Title IX question. Pet. for Cert. 3. On that question, the District Court and Court of Appeals ruled favorably on respondents’ motion to dismiss the complaints for failure to state a cause of action. See App. 22. Although respondents sought summary judgment simultaneously with their motion to dismiss, and submitted supporting affidavits, the courts below did not purport to rule on summary judgment or to make factual findings. Accordingly, all of the facts alleged in petitioner’s complaints must be taken as true for purposes of review.
According to her complaints, petitioner was qualified to attend both of the respondent medical schools based on both objective (i. e., grade-point average and test scores) and subjective criteria. In fact, both schools admitted some persons to the classes to which she applied despite the fact that those persons had less impressive objective qualifications than she did. Id., at 6-7, 12-13.
Both medical schools receive federal aid, id., at 15-16, and both have policies against admitting applicants who are more than 30 years old (petitioner was 39 years old at the time she applied), at least if they do not have advanced degrees. Id., at 7. Northwestern Medical School absolutely disqualifies applicants over 35. Id., at 7 n. 3. These policies, it is alleged, prevented petitioner from being asked to an interview at the medical schools, so that she was denied even the opportunity to convince the schools that her personal qualifications warranted her admission in place of persons whose objective qualifications were better than hers. Id., at 10, and n. 4, 11-12. Because the incidence of interrupted higher education is higher among women than among men, it is further claimed, the age and advanced-degree criteria operate to exclude women from consideration even though the criteria are not valid predictors of success in medical schools or in medical practice. Id., at 7-11. As such, the existence of the criteria either makes out or evidences a violation of the medical school’s duty under Title IX to avoid discrimination on the basis of sex. Id., at 13. Petitioner also claimed that the schools accepted a far smaller percentage of women than their percentage in the general population and in the class of persons with bachelor’s degrees. Id., at 9. But cf. 559 F. 2d 1063, 1067, referring to statistics submitted by the University of Chicago in its affidavit accompanying its summary judgment motion indicating that the percentage of women admitted to classes from 1972 to 1975, 18.3%, was virtually identical to the percentage of women applicants. Of course, the dampening impact of a discriminatory rule may undermine the relevance of figures relating to actual applicants. See Dothard v. Bawlinson, 433 U. S. 321, 330.
Upon her rejection by both schools, petitioner sought reconsideration of the decisions by way of written and telephonic communications with admissions officials. Finding these avenues of no avail, she filed a complaint with the local office of HEW in April 1975, alleging, inter alia, violations of Title IX. App. 16. Three months later, having received only an acknowledgment of receipt of her letter from HEW, petitioner filed suit in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against the private defendants. After she amended her complaints to include the federal defendants and requested injunctive relief ordering them to complete their investigation, she was informed that HEW would not begin its investigation of her complaint until early 1976. 559 F. 2d, at 1068, and n. 3; App. 49. In June 1976, HEW informed petitioner that the local stages of its investigation had been completed but that its national headquarters planned to conduct a further “in-depth study of the issues raised” because those issues were “of first impression and national in scope.” App. to Pet. for Cert. A-35. As far as the record indicates, HEW has announced no further action in this case. See 559 F. 2d, at 1077.
In relevant part, § 901, 86 Stat. 373, as amended, as set forth in 20 U. S. C. § 1681, provides:
“(a)... No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance, except that:
“(1)... in regard to admissions to educational institutions, this section shall apply only to institutions of vocational education, professional education, and graduate higher education, and to public institutions of undergraduate higher education;
“(2)... in regard to admissions to educational institutions, this section shall not apply (A) for one year from June 23, 1972, nor for six years after June 23, 1972, in the case of an educational institution which has begun the process of changing from being an institution which admits only students of one sex to being an institution which admits students of both sexes, but only if it is carrying out a plan for such a change which is approved by the Commissioner of Education or (B) for seven years from the date an educational institution begins the process of changing from being an institution which admits only students of only one sex to being an institution which admits students of both sexes, but only if it is carrying out a plan for such a change which is approved by the Commissioner of Education, whichever is the later;
“(3)... this section shall not apply to an educational institution which is controlled by a religious organization if the application of this subsection would not be consistent with the religious tenets of such organization;
“(4)... this section shall not apply to an educational institution whose primary purpose is the training of individuals for the military services of the United States, or the merchant marine; [and]
“(5)... in regard to admissions this section shall not apply to any public institution of undergraduate higher education which is an institution that traditionally and continually from its establishment has had a policy of admitting only students of one sex.
“(b)... Nothing contained in subsection (a) of this section shall be interpreted to require any educational institution to grant preferential or disparate treatment to the members of one sex on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of that sex participating in or receiving the benefits of any federally supported program or activity, in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of that sex in any community, State, section, or other area: Provided, That this subsection shall not be construed to prevent the consideration in any hearing or proceeding under this chapter of statistical evidence tending to show that such an imbalance exists with respect to the participation in, or receipt of the benefits of, any such program or activity by the members of one sex.
“(c)... For purposes of this chapter an educational institution means any public or private preschool, elementary, or secondary school, or any institution of vocational, professional, or higher education, except that in the case of an educational institution composed of more than one school, college, or department which are administratively separate units, such term means each such school, college, or department.”
Section 902, 86 Stat. 374, as set forth in 20 U. S. C. § 1682, provides:
“Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal financial assistance to any education program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of section 1681 of this title with respect to such program or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which the action is taken. No such rule, regulation, or order shall become effective unless and until approved by the President. Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section may be effected (1) by the termination of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance under such program or activity to any recipient as to whom there has been an express finding on the record, after opportunity for hearing, of a failure to comply with such requirement, but such termination or refusal shall be limited to the particular political entity, or part thereof, or other recipient as to whom such a finding has been made, and shall be limited in its effect to the particular program, or part thereof, in which such noncompliance has been so found, or (2) by any other means authorized by law: Provided, however, That no such action shall be taken until the department or agency concerned has advised the appropriate person or persons of the failure to comply with the requirement and has determined that compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means. In the case of any action terminating, or refusing to grant or continue, assistance because of failure to comply with a requirement imposed pursuant to this section, the head of the Federal department or agency shall file with the committees of the House and Senate having legislative jurisdiction over the program or activity involved a full written report of the circumstances and the grounds for such action. No such action shall become effective until thirty days have elapsed after the filing of such report.”
Section 903 of Title IX, 86 Stat. 374, as set forth in 20 U. S. C. § 1683, provides for judicial review of actions taken under § 902:
“Any department or agency action taken pursuant to section 1682 of this title shall be subject to such judicial review as may otherwise be provided by law for similar action taken by such department or agency on other grounds. In the case of action, not otherwise subject to judicial review, terminating or refusing to grant or to continue financial assistance upon a finding of failure to comply with any requirement imposed pursuant to section 1682 of this title, any person aggrieved (including any State or political subdivision thereof and any agency of either) may obtain judicial review of such action in accordance with chapter 7 of title 5, and such action shall not be deemed committed to unreviewable agency discretion within the meaning of section 701 of that title.”
Section 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 252, 42 U. S. C. §2000d, provides:
"No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”
The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976 amended 42 U. S. C. § 1988. That section, in relevant part, provides:
“... In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX [of the Education Amendments of 1972], or in any civil action or proceedings, by or on behalf of the United States of America, to enforce, or charging a violation of, a provision of the United States Internal Revenue Code, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,... the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.”
Respondents have argued that the amendment to § 1988 was merely intended to allow attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in actions brought under the express provision in Title IX, 20 U. S. C. § 1683, quoted in n. 4, supra, authorizing alleged discriminators to obtain judicial review of Government decisions to cut off federal funds. See 559 F. 2d, at 1078. The legislative history of § 1988, as amended, belies this argument. The provision was clearly intended, inter alia, to allow awards of fees on behalf of “private” victims of discrimination who have successfully brought suit in court where authorized by the enumerated statutes:
“All of these civil rights laws [referred to in § 1988] depend heavily upon private enforcement, and fee awards have proved an essential remedy if private citizens are to have a meaningful opportunity to vindicate the important Congressional policies which these laws contain.” S. Rep. No. 94r-1011, p. 2 (1976) (emphasis added).
Furthermore, the attorney’s fee amendment passed in 1976 was designed to expand the availability of § 718 of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U. S. C. § 1617, quoted in n. 25, infra, which unequivocally provides fees to litigants “other than the United States” who secure judicial relief against certain defendants for discrimination in violation of Title VI. Hence, although the language in §§ 718 and 1988 is not parallel, it appears that both authorize attorney’s fees to certain private plaintiffs where the specified statute itself authorizes the relief sought by that plaintiff and the plaintiff proves his entitlement to such relief.
We find nothing objectionable in this conclusion, as far as it goes. The legislative history quoted in the opinion of the Court of Appeals makes clear that the supporters of the legislation did not intend it to amend Title IX to include an express cause of action where none existed before. Instead, they clearly only meant to provide attorney’s fees in the event that that statute as it had always existed implicitly created a cause of action. 559 F. 2d, at 1079-1080.
On the other hand, the language added to § 1988 by the 1976 amendment, and the legislative history surrounding it, do indicate that many “members of Congress may have assumed that private suits were authorized under” Title IX, 559 F. 2d, at 1079, and, more importantly, that many Members felt that private enforcement of Title IX was entirely consistent with, and even necessary to, the enforcement of Title IX and the other statutes listed in § 1988. In addition to reflecting this sentiment in the Senate Report on the 1976 amendment, see n. 6, supra, numerous legislators said as much on the floor of the two Houses:
“It is Congress [’] obligation to enforce the 14th amendment by eliminating entirely such forms of discrimination, and that is why both title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 have been included [in the amendment to § 1988]. As basic provisions of the civil rights enforcement scheme that Congress has created, it is essential that private enforcement be made possible by authorizing attorneys’ fees in this essential area of the law.” 122 Cong. Rec. 31472 (1976) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
See also id., at 31471 (Sen. Scott); id., at 31482 (Sen. Allen); id., at 31832 (Sen. Hathaway); id., at 33313 (Sen. Tunney); id., at 33314 (Sen. Abourezk); id., at 35122 (Rep. Drinan); id., at 35125-35126 (Rep. Kas-tenmeier); id., at 35127 (Rep. Holtzman); id., at 35128 (Rep. Seiberling).
Although we cannot accord these remarks the weight of contemporary legislative history, we would be remiss if we ignored these authoritative expressions concerning the scope and purpose of Title IX and its place within “the civil rights enforcement scheme” that successive Congresses have created over the past 110 years.
At least since September 17, 1974, HEW has taken the position that an implied cause of action does exist under Title IX in certain circumstances. Letter from HEW Assistant General Counsel Theodore A. Miles to Dr. Bernice Sandler (Sept. 17, 1974), reproduced in App. to Pet. for Cert. A-36 to A-38. See also Memorandum for United States as Amicus Curiae in Lau v. Nichols, O. T. 1973, No. 72-6520, p. 13 n. 5, in which the Justice Department on behalf of HEW took
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Fernando Belmontes, the respondent here, was tried in 1982 in the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Joaquin. A jury returned a verdict of murder in the first degree and then determined he should be sentenced to death. The issue before us concerns a jury instruction in the sentencing phase.
The trial court, following the statute then in effect, directed the jury, with other instructions and in a context to be discussed in more detail, to consider certain specific factors either as aggravating or mitigating. The trial court further instructed the jury to consider “[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime.” App. 184. Under the then-applicable statutory scheme this general or catchall factor was codified at Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 190.3(k) (West 1988); and it is referred to as “factor (k).”
Belmontes contended, on direct review, in state collateral proceedings, and in the federal habeas proceedings giving rise to this case, that factor (k) and the trial court’s other instructions barred the jury from considering his forward-looking mitigation evidence — specifically evidence that he likely would lead a constructive life if incarcerated instead of executed. The alleged limitation, in his view, prevented the jury from considering relevant mitigation evidence, in violation of his Eighth Amendment right to present all mitigating evidence in capital sentencing proceedings. See, e. g., Penry v. Johnson, 532 U. S. 782, 797 (2001); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U. S. 1, 4-5, 8 (1986); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104, 112 (1982). The California Supreme Court, affirming the judgment and sentence, rejected this contention and other challenges. People v. Belmontes, 45 Cal. 3d 744, 799-802, 819, 755 P. 2d 310, 341-343, 355 (1988).
In February 1994, after exhausting state remedies, respondent filed an amended federal habeas petition. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California denied relief, App. to Pet. for Cert. 140a-141a, 145a, but a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in relevant part, Belmontes v. Woodford, 350 F. 3d 861, 908 (2003). Over the dissent of eight judges, the Court of Appeals denied rehearing en banc. Belmontes v. Woodford, 359 F. 3d 1079 (2004). This Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded for further consideration in light of Brown v. Payton, 544 U. S. 133 (2005). Brown v. Belmontes, 544 U. S. 945 (2005). On remand, a divided panel again invalidated respondent’s sentence; it distinguished Payton on the grounds that the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 110 Stat. 1214, though applicable in that case, does not apply here. Belmontes v. Brown, 414 F. 3d 1094, 1101-1102 (2005). Over yet another dissent, the Court of Appeals again denied rehearing en banc. Belmontes v. Stokes, 427 F. 3d 663 (2005). We granted certiorari, 547 U. S. 1110 (2006), and now reverse.
I
The evidence at trial showed that in March 1981, while burglarizing a home where two accomplices had attended a party, respondent unexpectedly encountered 19-year-old Steacy McConnell. Respondent killed her by striking her head 15 to 20 times with a steel dumbbell bar. Respondent had armed himself with the dumbbell bar before entering the victim’s home. See Belmontes, supra, at 760-764, 755 P. 2d, at 315-317.
In the sentencing phase of his trial Belmontes introduced mitigating evidence to show, inter alia, that he would make positive contributions to society in a structured prison environment. Respondent testified that, during a previous term under the California Youth Authority (CYA), he had behaved in a constructive way, working his way to the number two position on a fire crew in the CYA fire camp in which he was incarcerated. App. 44-45, 53. About that time he had embraced Christianity and entered into a Christian sponsorship program. He admitted that initially he participated in this program to spend time away from the camp. Later, after forming a good relationship with the married couple who were his Christian sponsors, he pursued a more religious life and was baptized. Although his religious commitment lapsed upon his release from the C YA, he testified that he would once again turn to religion whenever he could rededicate himself fully to it. Id., at 46-48, 53-55. Finally, he answered in the affirmative when asked if he was “prepared to contribute in anyway [he] can to society if [he was] put in prison for the rest of [his] life.” Id., at 58.
Respondent’s former CYA chaplain testified at the sentencing hearing that respondent’s conversion appeared genuine. The chaplain, describing respondent as “salvageable,” expressed hope that respondent would contribute to prison ministries if given a life sentence. Id., at 79-83. An assistant chaplain similarly testified that, based on past experience, respondent likely would be adept at counseling other prisoners to avoid the mistakes he had made when they leave prison. Id., at 95-96. And respondent’s Christian sponsors testified he was like a son to them and had been a positive influence on their own son. They also indicated he had participated in various activities at their church. Id., at 99-103, 110-114.
After respondent presented his mitigating evidence, the parties made closing arguments discussing respondent’s mitigating evidence and how the jury should consider it. Respondent was also allowed to provide his own statement. The trial judge included in his instructions the disputed factor (k) language, an instruction that has since been amended, see Cal. Jury Instr., Crim., No. 8.85(k) (2005).
II
In two earlier cases this Court considered a constitutional challenge to the factor (k) instruction. See Brown v. Pay-ton, supra; Boyde v. California, 494 U. S. 370 (1990). In Boyde, the Court rejected a claim that factor (k), with its focus on circumstances “ 'extenuating] the gravity of the crime,’” precluded consideration of mitigating evidence unrelated to the crime, such as evidence of the defendant’s background and character. Id., at 377-378, 386. The “proper inquiry,” the Court explained, “is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence.” Id., at 380. Since the defendant in Boyde “had an opportunity through factor (k) to argue that his background and character ‘extenuated’ or ‘excused’ the seriousness of the crime,” the Court saw “no reason to believe that reasonable jurors would resist the view, ‘long held by society,’ that in an appropriate case such evidence would counsel imposition of a sentence less than death.” Id., at 382 (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302, 319 (1989)). During the sentencing phase in Boyde, moreover, the defense had presented extensive evidence regarding background and character, so construing factor (k) to preclude consideration of that evidence would have required the jurors not only to believe that “the court’s instructions transformed all of this ‘favorable testimony into a virtual charade,’ ” 494 U. S., at 383 (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U. S. 538, 542 (1987)), but also to disregard another instruction requiring the jury to “ ‘consider all of the evidence which has been received during any part of the trial of this case,”’ 494 U. S., at 383.
In Payton, the Court again evaluated arguments that factor (k) barred consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence — this time, evidence relating to postcrime rehabilitation, rather than precrime background and character. See 544 U. S., at 135-136. Payton did not come to this Court, as had Boyde, on direct review, but rather by federal habeas petition subject to AEDPA. Relief was available only if “the state court’s adjudication of the claim ‘resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’” Payton, supra, at 141 (quoting 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1)). Although the prosecutor in Payton had argued to the jury — incorrectly—that factor (k) did not permit consideration of postcrime rehabilitation evidence, this Court concluded that the California Supreme Court reasonably applied Boyde in finding no Eighth Amendment violation. 544 U. S., at 142, 146-147. Accepting the prosecutor’s reading would have required “the surprising conclusion that remorse could never serve to lessen or excuse a crime.” Id., at 142. Furthermore, countering any misimpression created by the prosecution’s argument, the defense in Payton had presented extensive evidence and argument regarding a postcrime religious conversion and other good behavior. The trial court had instructed the jury to consider all evidence admitted “‘during any part of the trial in this case, except as you may be hereafter instructed,’” and the prosecution itself “devoted substantial attention to discounting [the postcrime evidence’s] importance as compared to the aggravating factors.” Id., at 145-146. Hence, the state court in Payton could reasonably have concluded that, as in Boyde, there was no reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instruction to preclude consideration of the postcrime mitigation evidence it had heard. 544 U. S., at 147.
III
As the Court directed in Boyde, we inquire “whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence.” 494 U. S., at 380. Here, as in Payton, respondent argues that factor (k) prevented the jury from giving effect to his forward-looking evidence. And, as in Payton, respondent’s case comes to this Court in federal habeas proceedings collaterally attacking the state court’s ruling. Unlike in Payton, however, the federal petition in this case was filed before AEDPA’s effective date. AEDPA and its deferential standards of review are thus inapplicable. See Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U. S. 202, 210 (2003). The Court of Appeals distinguished Payton on this ground. See 414 F. 3d, at 1101-1102. It was mistaken, however, to find a “reasonable probability” that the jury did not consider respondent’s future potential. Id., at 1138.
A
The Court of Appeals erred by adopting a narrow and, we conclude, an unrealistic interpretation of factor (k). “Most naturally read,” the Court of Appeals reasoned, “this instruction allows the jury to consider evidence that bears upon the commission of the crime by the defendant and excuses or mitigates his culpability for the offense.” Id, at 1134. As both Boyde and Payton explain, however, this interpretation is too confined. “The instruction did not . . . limit the jury’s consideration to ‘any other circumstance of the crime which extenuates the gravity of the crime.’ The jury was directed to consider any other circumstance that might excuse the crime.” Boyde, swpra, at 382; see also Payton, supra, at 141-142. And just as preerime background and character (Boyde) and postcrime rehabilitation (Payton) may “extenuare] the gravity of the crime,” so may some likelihood of future good conduct count as a circumstance tending to make a defendant less deserving of the death penalty. Cf. Skipper, 476 U. S., at 4-5 (explaining that while inferences regarding future conduct do not “relate specifically to [a defendant’s] culpability for the crime he committed,” those inferences are “ ‘mitigating’ in the sense that they might serve ‘as a basis for a sentence less than death’ ” (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion))).
The Court of Appeals failed to heed the full import of Pay-ton’s holding, a holding that has significance even where AEDPA is inapplicable. Payton indicated that reading factor (k) to preclude consideration of postcrime evidence would require “the surprising conclusion that remorse could never serve to lessen or excuse a crime.” 544 U. S., at 142. So, too, would it be counterintuitive if a defendant’s capacity to redeem himself through good works could not extenuate his offense and render him less deserving of a death sentence.
In any event, since respondent sought to extrapolate future behavior from precrime conduct, his mitigation theory was more analogous to the good-character evidence examined in Boyde and held to fall within factor (k)’s purview. See 494 U. S., at 381 (describing the evidence at issue as including evidence of the defendant’s “strength of character”). Both types of evidence suggest' the crime stemmed more from adverse circumstances than from an irredeemable character. See 414 F. 3d, at 1141-1142 (O’Scannlain, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); cf. Johnson v. Texas, 509 U. S. 350, 369 (1993) (noting that the “forward-looking” future-dangerousness inquiry “is not independent of an assessment of personal culpability”).
B
Our interpretation of factor (k) is the one most consistent with the evidence presented to the jury, the parties’ closing arguments, and the other instructions provided by the trial court. Each of these will be discussed in turn.
As the Court of Appeals recognized, future-conduct evidence was central to the mitigation case presented by the defense. See 414 F. 3d, at 1134. Indeed, although the defense also adduced evidence of a troubled upbringing, respondent testified that he could not use his difficult life “as a crutch to say I am in a situation right now, I’m here now because of that.” App. 40. Given this assertion, and considering the extensive forward-looking evidence presented at sentencing — evidence including testimony from two prison chaplains, respondent’s church sponsors, and respondent himself — the jurors could have disregarded respondent’s future potential only if they drew the unlikely inference that “the court's instructions transformed all of this ‘favorable testimony into a virtual charade,’” Boyde, supra, at 383 (quoting Brown, 479 U. S., at 542). It is improbable the jurors believed that the parties were engaging in an exercise in futility when respondent presented (and both counsel later discussed) his mitigating evidence in open court.
Arguments by the prosecution and the defense assumed the evidence was relevant. The prosecutor initially discussed the various factors that were to guide the jury. He referred to factor (k) as “a catchall.” App. 153. He then discussed respondent’s religious experience in some detail. With respect to whether this experience fit within factor (k), he indicated: “I’m not sure it really fits in there. I’m not sure it really fits in any of them. But I think it appears to be a proper subject of consideration.” Id., at 154. These seemingly contradictory statements are explained by the prosecutor’s following comments.
The prosecutor suggested (quite understandably on the record) that respondent’s religious evidence was weak. He stated: “You know, first of all, it’s no secret that the evidence upon which the defendant’s religious experience rests is somewhat shaky.” Ibid. He also opined that the experience had to be taken “with a grain of salt.” Id., at 155. The jury would have realized that, when the prosecutor suggested respondent’s religious experience did not fit within factor (k), he was discussing the persuasiveness of the evidence, not the jury’s ability to consider it. After all, he thought religion was “a proper subject of consideration.” Id., at 154.
The prosecutor then discussed how the jury should weigh respondent’s “religious awakening”:
“I suppose you can say it would be appropriate because — in this fashion: The defendant may be of value to the community later. You recall the people talking about how he would have the opportunity to work with other prisoners in prison. And I think that value to the community is something that you have to weigh in. There’s something to that.
“On the other hand, the fact that someone has religion as opposed to someone doesn’t should be no grounds for either giving or withholding life. I mean let’s turn it around and look at the other side of the coin. Suppose someone said he didn’t belong to a church and didn’t talk to a minister. Would that man deserve to die merely because of that? So if he says he has religion, does he deserve the other penalty, life? I don’t think that that should be an influencing factor at all in that respect. I don’t think the law contemplates that and I don’t think it’s right.” Id., at 155.
These remarks confirmed to the jury that it should analyze respondent’s future potential, his future “value to the community.” Ibid. This is what respondent himself wanted it to do. And while the prosecutor commented that the law did not contemplate jury consideration of respondent’s religious conversion, respondent did not argue that the jury should consider the mere fact that he had discovered religion. Rather, as manifested by his arguments on appeal, respondent wanted to use this religious evidence to demonstrate his future “value to the community,” not to illustrate his past religious awakening. Nothing the prosecutor said would have convinced the jury that it was forbidden from even considering respondent’s religious conversion, though surely the jury could discount it; and nothing the prosecutor said would have led the jury to think it could not consider respondent’s future potential, especially since he indicated that this is exactly what the jury had “to weigh” in its deliberation. Ibid.
After the prosecutor concluded his arguments, the trial judge allowed respondent to speak on his own behalf. Respondent, while not showing any remorse, suggested that life imprisonment offered “an opportunity to achieve goals and try to better yourself.” Id., at 163. He also stated: “I myself would really like to have my life and try to improve myself.” Id., at 164. Respondent’s personal pleas were consistent with a trial in which the jury would assess his future prospects in determining what sentence to impose.
Defense counsel’s closing arguments confirm this analysis. To be sure, commenting on the mitigating evidence, he initially indicated: “I’m not going to insult you by telling you I think [the mitigating evidence] excuses in any way what happened here. That is not the reason I asked these people to come in.” Id., at 166. Read in context defense counsel’s remarks did not imply the jury should ignore the mitigating evidence. Rather, conforming to the dichotomy within factor (k) itself, his remarks merely distinguished between a legal excuse and an extenuating circumstance. Cf. Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 190.3(k) (“[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime”).
That defense counsel did, in fact, want the jury to take into account respondent’s future potential became manifest near the end of his argument. He suggested that the “people who came in here [and] told you about [respondent]” provided the jury with “a game plan” for what respondent could do with his life. App. 170. He continued: “We’re just suggesting the tip of the iceberg because who knows in 20, 30, 40, 50 years what sorts of things he can do, as he fits into the system, as he learns to set his goals, to contribute something in whatever way he can.” Ibid. This would have left the jury believing it could and should contemplate respondent’s potential.
Other instructions from the trial court make it quite implausible that the jury would deem itself foreclosed from considering respondent’s full case in mitigation. Before enumerating specific factors for consideration — factors in-eluding the circumstances of the crime, the defendant’s age, and “[t]he presence or absence of any prior felony conviction,” id., at 184, as well as the factor (k) catchall — the judge told the jury: “In determining which penalty is to be imposed on the defendant you shall consider all of the evidence which has been received during any part of the trial of this case, except as you may be hereafter instructed.” Id., at 183. After listing the factors, he indicated:
“After having heard all of the evidence and after having heard and considered the arguments of counsel, you shall consider, take into account and be guided by the applicable factors of aggravating and mitigating circumstances upon which you have been instructed.
“If you conclude that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, you shall impose a sentence of death. However, if you determine that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances, you shall impose a sentence of confinement in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole.” Id., at 185.
The judge then gave a supplemental instruction regarding aggravating and mitigating factors:
“I have previously read to you the list of aggravating circumstances which the law permits you to consider if you find that any of them is established by the evidence. These are the only aggravating circumstances that you may consider. You are not allowed to take account of any other facts or circumstances as the basis for deciding that the death penalty would be an appropriate punishment in this case.
"However, the mitigating circumstances which I have read for your consideration are given to you merely as examples of some of the factors that you may take into account as reasons for deciding not to impose a death penalty or a death sentence upon Mr. Belmontes. You should pay careful attention to each of these factors. Any one of them standing alone may support a decision that death is not the appropriate punishment in this case.” Id., at 185-186.
Given the evidence and arguments presented to the jury, these instructions eliminate any reasonable likelihood that a juror would consider respondent’s future prospects to be beyond the bounds of proper consideration. The judge told the jury to consider “all of the evidence,” and “all of the evidence” included respondent’s forward-looking mitigation case. While the judge did end his broad command to appraise all the evidence with the qualifier “except as you may be hereafter instructed,” id., at 183, he did not later instruct the jury that it should disregard respondent’s future potential in prison. The jury could not fairly read the limitation in the instruction to apply to respondent’s central mitigation theory. By contrast, in response to a juror’s question, the trial judge specifically instructed the jury not to consider whether respondent could receive psychiatric treatment while in prison.
The sharp contrast between the court’s instruction on aggravation (that only enumerated factors could be considered) and its instruction on mitigation (that listed factors were “merely . . . examples,” id., at 186) made it clear that the jury was to take a broad view of mitigating evidence. Coming back to back, the instructions conveyed the message that the jury should weigh the finite aggravators against the potentially infinite mitigators. That the trial judge told the jury to “pay careful attention” to the listed mitigating factors, ibid., moreover, did not compel the jury to give them sole consideration. For this to be the case, the jury would have had to fail to take the judge at his word. The judge did not advise the jury to pay exclusive attention to the listed mitigating circumstances, and he had told the jury that these circumstances were simply examples.
It is implausible that the jury supposed that past deeds pointing to a constructive future could not “extenuat[e] the gravity of the crime,” as required by factor (k), much less that such evidence could not be considered at all. Boyde concludes that in jury deliberations “commonsense understanding of the instructions in the light of all that has taken place at the trial [is] likely to prevail over technical hairsplitting.” 494 U. S., at 381. Here, far from encouraging the jury to ignore the defense’s central evidence, the instructions supported giving it due weight.
In concluding otherwise, the Court of Appeals cited queries from some of the jurors as evidence of confusion. Although the jury’s initial question is not in the record, it appeared to ask the judge about the consequences of failing to reach a unanimous verdict. Cf. 414 F. 3d, at 1135. In response, the judge reread portions of the instructions and stated that “all 12 jurors must agree, if you can.” App. 190. Before the judge sent the jury back for further deliberation, the following exchange took place:
“JUROR HERN: The statement about the aggravation and mitigation of the circumstances, now, that was the listing?
“THE COURT: That was the listing, yes, ma’am.
“JUROR HERN: Of those certain factors we were to decide one or the other and then balance the sheet?
“THE COURT: That is right. It is a balancing process. Mr. Meyer?
“JUROR MEYER: A specific question, would this be an either/or situation, not a one, if you cannot the other?
“THE COURT: No. It is not that.
“JUROR MEYER: It is an either/or situation?
“THE COURT: Exactly. If you can make that either/or decision. If you cannot, then I will discharge you.
“JUROR HAILSTONE: Could I ask a question? I don’t know if it is permissible. Is it possible that he could have psychiatric treatment during this time?
“THE COURT: That is something you cannot consider in making your decision.” Id., at 191.
The Court of Appeals decided Juror Hern’s questions indicated she thought (incorrectly) that only listed mitigating factors were on the table — an error, in the Court of Appeals’ view, that should have prompted a clarifying instruction confirming that all the mitigating evidence was relevant. 414 F. 3d, at 1136. The Court of Appeals further supposed the response to Juror Hailstone’s question compounded the problem, since psychiatric treatment presumably would be necessary only in aid of future rehabilitation. Id., at 1137.
The Court of Appeals’ analysis is flawed. To begin with, attributing to Juror Hern a dilemma over the scope of mitigation is only one way to interpret her questions, and, as the California Supreme Court observed on direct review, it is not necessarily the correct one, see Belmontes, 45 Cal. 3d, at 804, 755 P. 2d, at 344. It is at least as likely that the juror was simply asking for clarification about California’s overall balancing process, which requires juries to consider and balance enumerated factors (such as age and criminal history) that are labeled neither as mitigating nor as aggravating. As Juror Hern surmised (but sought to clarify), the jury itself must determine the side of the balance on which each listed factor falls. See Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 190.3 (providing that, “[i]n determining the penalty, the trier of fact shall take into account” any relevant listed factors); see generally Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U. S. 967, 978-979 (1994) (noting that the § 190.3 sentencing factors “do not instruct the sentencer how to weigh any of the facts it finds in deciding upon the ultimate sentence”).
Even assuming the Court of Appeals correctly interpreted Juror Hern’s questions, the court’s conclusion that this juror likely ignored forward-looking evidence presupposes what it purports to establish, namely, that forward-looking evidence could not fall within factor (k). As discussed earlier, nothing barred the jury from viewing respondent’s future prospects as “extenuat[ing] the gravity of the crime,” so nothing barred it from considering such evidence under the rubric of the “listing.” As for Juror Hailstone’s psychiatric-care question, this inquiry shows that, if anything, the jurors were considering respondent’s potential. The trial court’s response, far from implying a broad prohibition on forward-looking inferences, was readily explicable by the absence of any evidence in the record regarding psychiatric care.
In view of our analysis and disposition in this case it is unnecessary to address an argument for reversing the Court of Appeals based on the Court’s holding in Johnson v. Texas, 509 U. S. 350 (1993), a subject raised by Judge O’Scannlain in his separate opinion in the Court of Appeals. See 414 F. 3d, at 1141-1142 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part).
IV
In this case, as in Boyde and as in Payton, the jury heard mitigating evidence, the trial court directed the jury to consider all the evidence presented, and the parties addressed the mitigating evidence in their closing arguments. This Court’s cases establish, as a general rule, that a jury in such circumstances is not reasonably likely to believe itself barred from considering the defense’s evidence as a factor “extenuating] the gravity of the crime.” The factor (k) instruction is consistent with the constitutional right to present mitigating evidence in capital sentencing proceedings.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U. S. C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000 ed. and Supp. III), prohibits certain conduct involving a “pattern of racketeering activity.” §1962 (2000 ed.). One of RICO’s enforcement mechanisms is a private right of action, available to “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation” of RICO’s substantive restrictions. § 1964(c).
In Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corporation, 503 U. S. 258, 268 (1992), this Court held that a plaintiff may sue under § 1964(c) only if the alleged RICO violation was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury. The instant case requires us to apply the principles discussed in Holmes to a dispute between two. competing businesses.
I
Because this case arises from a motion to dismiss, we accept as true the factual allegations in the amended complaint. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U. S. 163, 164 (1993).
Respondent Ideal Steel Supply Corporation (Ideal) sells steel mill products along with related supplies and services. It operates two store locations in New York, one in Queens and the other in the Bronx. Petitioner National Steel Supply, Inc. (National), owned by petitioners Joseph and Vincent Anza, is Ideal’s principal competitor. National offers a similar array of products and services, and it, too, operates one store in Queens and one in the Bronx.
Ideal sued petitioners in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. It claimed petitioners were engaged in an unlawful racketeering scheme aimed at “gaining] sales and market share at Ideal’s expense.” App. 7. According to Ideal, National adopted a practice of failing to charge the requisite New York sales tax to cash-paying customers, even when conducting transactions that were not exempt from sales tax under state law. This practice allowed National to reduce its prices without affecting its profit margin. Petitioners allegedly submitted fraudulent tax returns to the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance in an effort to conceal their conduct.
Ideal’s amended complaint contains, as relevant here, two RICO claims. The claims assert that petitioners, by submitting the fraudulent tax returns, committed various acts of mail fraud (when they sent the returns by mail) and wire fraud (when they sent them electronically). See 18 U. S. C. §§1341, 1343 (2000 ed., Supp. III). Mail fraud and wire fraud are forms of “racketeering activity” for purposes of RICO. § 1961(1)(B). Petitioners’ conduct allegedly constituted a “pattern of racketeering activity,” see § 1961(5) (2000 ed.), because the fraudulent returns were submitted on an ongoing and regular basis.
Ideal asserts in its first cause of action that Joseph and Vincent Anza violated § 1962(c), which makes it unlawful for “any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.” The complaint states that the Anzas’ goal, which they achieved, was to give National a competitive advantage over Ideal.
The second cause of action is asserted against all three petitioners. It alleges a violation of § 1962(a), which makes it unlawful for any person who has received income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity “to use or invest” that income “in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of,” an enterprise engaged in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce. As described in the complaint, petitioners used funds generated by their fraudulent tax scheme to open National’s Bronx location. The opening of this new facility caused Ideal to lose “significant business and market share.” App. 18.
Petitioners moved to dismiss Ideal’s complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 9(b). The District Court granted the Rule 12(b)(6) motion, holding that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court began from the proposition that to assert a RICO claim predicated on mail fraud or wire fraud, a plaintiff must have relied on the defendant’s misrepresentations. Ideal not having alleged that it relied on petitioners’ false tax returns, the court concluded Ideal could not go forward with its RICO claims.
Ideal appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the District Court’s judgment. 373 F. 3d 251 (2004). Addressing Ideal’s § 1962(c) claim, the court held that where a complaint alleges a pattern of racketeering activity “that was intended to and did give the defendant a competitive advantage over the plaintiff, the complaint adequately pleads proximate cause, and the plaintiff has standing to pursue a civil RICO claim.” Id., at 263. This is the case, the court explained, “even where the scheme depended on fraudulent communications directed to and relied on by a third party rather than the plaintiff.” Ibid.
The court reached the same conclusion with respect to Ideal’s § 1962(a) claim. It reasoned that Ideal adequately pleaded its claim because it alleged an injury by reason of petitioners’ use and investment of racketeering proceeds, “as distinct from injury traceable simply to the predicate acts of racketeering alone or to the conduct of the business of the enterprise.” Id., at 264.
We granted certiorari. 546 U. S. 1029 (2005).
II
Our analysis begins — and, as will become evident, largely ends — with Holmes. That case arose from a complaint filed by the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC), a private corporation with a duty to reimburse the customers of registered broker-dealers who became unable to meet their financial obligations. SIPC claimed that the petitioner, Robert Holmes, conspired with others to manipulate stock prices. When the market detected the fraud, the share prices plummeted, and the “decline caused [two] broker-dealers’ financial difficulties resulting in their eventual liquidation and SIPC’s advance of nearly $13 million to cover their customers’ claims.” 503 U. S., at 262, 263. SIPC sued on several theories, including that Holmes participated in the conduct of an enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of § 1962(c) and conspired to do so in violation of § 1962(d).
The Court held that SIPC could not maintain its RICO claims against Holmes for his alleged role in the scheme. The decision relied on a careful interpretation of § 1964(c), which provides a civil cause of action to persons injured “by reason of” a defendant’s RICO violation. The Court recognized the phrase “by reason of” could be read broadly to require merely that the claimed violation was a “but for” cause of the plaintiff’s injury. Id., at 265-266. It rejected this reading, however, noting the “unlikelihood that Congress meant to allow all factually injured plaintiffs to recover.” Id., at 266.
Proper interpretation of § 1964(c) required consideration of the statutory history, which revealed that “Congress modeled § 1964(c) on the civil-action provision of the federal antitrust laws, §4 of the Clayton Act.” Id., at 267. In Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 U. S. 519 (1983), the Court held that “a plaintiff’s right to sue under § 4 required a showing that the defendant’s violation not only was a ‘but for’ cause of his injury, but was the proximate cause as well.” Holmes, supra, at 268 (citing Associated Gen. Contractors, supra, at 534). This reasoning, the Court noted in Holmes, “applies just as readily to § 1964(c).” 503 U. S., at 268.
The Holmes Court turned to the common-law foundations of the proximate-cause requirement, and specifically the “demand for some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.” Ibid. It concluded that even if SIPC were subrogated to the rights of certain aggrieved customers, the RICO claims could not satisfy this requirement of directness. The deficiency, the Court explained, was that “the link is too remote between the stock manipulation alleged and the customers’ harm, being purely contingent on the harm suffered by the broker-dealers.” Id., at 271.
Applying the principles of Holmes to the present case, we conclude Ideal cannot maintain its claim based on § 1962(c). Section 1962(c), as noted above, forbids conducting or participating in the conduct of an enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. The Court has indicated the compensable injury flowing from a violation of that provision “necessarily is the harm caused by predicate acts sufficiently related to constitute a pattern, for the essence of the violation is the commission of those acts in connection with the conduct of an enterprise.” Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U. S. 479, 497 (1985).
Ideal’s theory is that Joseph and Vincent Anza harmed it by defrauding the New York tax authority and using the proceeds from the fraud to offer lower prices designed to attract more customers. The RICO violation alleged by Ideal is that the Anzas conducted National’s affairs through a pattern of mail fraud and wire fraud. The direct victim of. this conduct was the State of New York, not Ideal. It was the State that was being defrauded and the State that lost tax revenue as a result.
The proper referent of the proximate-cause analysis is an alleged practice of conducting National’s business through a pattern of defrauding the State. To be sure, Ideal asserts it suffered its own harms when the Anzas failed to charge customers for the applicable sales tax. The cause of Ideal’s asserted harms, however, is a set of actions (offering lower prices) entirely distinct from the alleged RICO violation (defrauding the State). The attenuation between the plaintiff’s harms and the claimed RICO violation arises from a different source in this case than in Holmes, where the alleged violations were linked to the asserted harms only through the broker-dealers’ inability to meet their financial obligations. Nevertheless, the absence of proximate causation is equally clear in both cases.
This conclusion is confirmed by considering the directness requirement’s underlying premises. See 503 U. S., at 269-270. One motivating principle is the difficulty that can arise when a court attempts to ascertain the damages caused by some remote action. See id., at 269 (“[T]he less direct an injury is, the more difficult it becomes to ascertain the amount of a plaintiff’s damages attributable to the violation, as distinct from other, independent, factors”). The instant case is illustrative. The injury Ideal alleges is its own loss of sales resulting from National’s decreased prices for cash-paying customers. National, however, could have lowered its prices for any number of reasons unconnected to the asserted pattern of fraud. It may have received a cash inflow from some other source or concluded that the additional sales would justify a smaller profit margin. Its lowering of prices in no sense required it to defraud the state tax authority. Likewise, the fact that a company commits tax fraud does not mean the company will lower its prices; the additional cash could go anywhere from asset acquisition to research and development to dividend payouts. Cf. id., at 271 (“The broker-dealers simply cannot pay their bills, and only that intervening insolvency connects the conspirators’ acts to the losses suffered by the nonpurchasing customers and general creditors”).
There is, in addition, a second discontinuity between the RICO violation and the asserted injury. Ideal’s lost sales could have resulted from factors other than petitioners’ alleged acts of fraud. Businesses lose and gain customers for many reasons, and it would require a complex assessment to establish what portion of Ideal’s lost sales were the product of National’s decreased prices. Cf. id., at 272-273 (“If the nonpurchasing customers were allowed to sue, the district court would first need to determine the extent to which their inability to collect from the broker-dealers was the result of the alleged conspiracy to manipulate, as opposed to, say, the broker-dealers’ poor business practices or their failures to anticipate developments in the financial markets”).
The attenuated connection between Ideal’s injury and the Anzas’ injurious conduct thus implicates fundamental concerns expressed in Holmes. Notwithstanding the lack of any appreciable risk of duplicative recoveries, which is another consideration relevant to the proximate-cause inquiry, see id., at 269, these concerns help to illustrate why Ideal’s alleged injury was not the direct result of a RICO violation. Further illustrating this point is the speculative nature of the proceedings that would follow if Ideal were permitted to maintain its claim. A court considering the claim would need to begin by calculating the portion of National’s price drop attributable to the alleged pattern of racketeering activity. It next would have to calculate the portion of Ideal’s lost sales attributable to the relevant part of the price drop. The element of proximate causation recognized in Holmes is meant to prevent these types of intricate, uncertain inquiries from overrunning RICO litigation. It has particular resonance when applied to claims brought by economic competitors, which, if left unchecked, could blur the line between RICO and the antitrust laws.
The requirement of a direct causal connection is especially warranted where the immediate victims of an alleged RICO violation can be expected to vindicate the laws by pursuing their own claims. See id., at 269-270 (“[D]irectly injured victims can generally be counted on to vindicate the law as private attorneys general, without any of the problems attendant upon suits by plaintiffs injured more remotely”). Again, the instant case is instructive. Ideal accuses the Anzas of defrauding the State of New York out of a substantial amount of money. If the allegations are true, the State can be expected to pursue appropriate remedies. The adjudication of the State’s claims, moreover, would be relatively straightforward; while it may be difficult to determine facts such as the number of sales Ideal lost due to National’s tax practices, it is considerably easier to make the initial calculation of how much tax revenue the Anzas withheld from the State. There is no need to broaden the universe of actionable harms to permit RICO suits by parties who have been injured only indirectly.
The Court of Appeals reached a contrary conclusion, apparently reasoning that because the Anzas allegedly sought to gain a competitive advantage over Ideal, it is immaterial whether they took an indirect route to accomplish their goal. See 373 F. 3d, at 263. This rationale does not accord with Holmes. A RICO plaintiff cannot circumvent the proximate-cause requirement simply by claiming that the defendant’s aim was to increase market share at a competitor’s expense. See Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U. S., at 537 (“We are also satisfied that an allegation of improper motive ... is not a panacea that will enable any complaint to withstand a motion to dismiss”). When a court evaluates a RICO claim for proximate causation, the central question it must ask is whether the alleged violation led directly to the plaintiff’s injuries. In the instant ease, the answer is no. We hold that Ideal’s § 1962(c) claim does not satisfy the requirement of proximate causation.
Petitioners alternatively ask us to hold, in line with the District Court’s decision granting petitioners’ motion to dismiss, that a plaintiff may not assert a RICO claim predicated on mail fraud or wire fraud unless it demonstrates it relied, on the defendant’s misrepresentations. They argue that RICO’s private right of action must be interpreted in light of common-law principles, and that at common law a fraud action requires the plaintiff to prove reliance. Because Ideal has not satisfied the proximate-cause requirement articulated in Holmes, we have no occasion to address the substantial question whether a showing of reliance is required. Cf. 503 U. S., at 275-276.
Ill
The amended complaint also asserts a RICO claim based on a violation of § 1962(a). The claim alleges petitioners’ tax scheme provided them with funds to open a new store in the Bronx, which attracted customers who otherwise would have purchased from Ideal.
In this Court petitioners contend that the proximate-cause analysis should function identically for purposes of Ideal’s § 1962(c) claim and its § 1962(a) claim. (Petitioners also contend that “a civil RICO plaintiff does not plead an injury proximately caused by a violation of § 1962(a) merely by alleging that a corporate defendant reinvested profits back into itself,” Brief for Petitioners 20, n. 5, but this argument has not been developed, and we decline to address it.) It is true that private actions for violations of § 1962(a), like actions for violations of § 1962(c), must be asserted under § 1964(c). It likewise is true that a claim is cognizable under § 1964(c) only if the defendant’s alleged violation proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury. The proximate-cause inquiry, however, requires careful consideration of the “relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.” Holmes, supra, at 268. Because § 1962(c) and § 1962(a) set forth distinct prohibitions, it is at least debatable whether Ideal’s two claims should be analyzed in an identical fashion for proximate-cause purposes.
The Court of Appeals held that Ideal adequately pleaded its § 1962(a) claim, see 373 F. 3d, at 264, but the court did not address proximate causation. We decline to consider Ideal’s § 1962(a) claim without the benefit of the Court of Appeals’ analysis, particularly given that the parties have devoted nearly all their attention in this Court to the § 1962(c) claim. We therefore vacate the Court of Appeals’ judgment with respect to Ideal’s § 1962(a) claim. On remand, the court should determine whether petitioners’ alleged violation of § 1962(a) proximately caused the injuries Ideal asserts.
* * *
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed in part and vacated in part. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Chief Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner Ansonia Board of Education has employed respondent Ronald Philbrook since 1962 to teach high school business and typing classes in Ansonia, Connecticut. In 1968, Philbrook was baptized into the Worldwide Church of God. The tenets of the church require members to refrain from secular employment during designated holy days, a practice that has caused respondent to miss approximately six schooldays each year. We are asked to determine whether the employer’s efforts to adjust respondent’s work schedule in light of his belief fulfill its obligation under § 701 (j) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 86 Stat. 103, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e(j), to “reasonably accommodate to an employee’s . . . religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”
Since the 1967-1968 school year, the school board’s collective-bargaining agreements with the Ansonia Federation of Teachers have granted to each teacher 18 days of leave per year for illness, cumulative to 150 and later to 180 days. Accumulated leave may be used for purposes other than illness as specified in the agreement. A teacher may accordingly use five days’ leave for a death in the immediate family, one day for attendance at a wedding, three days per year for attendance as an official delegate to a national veterans organization, and the like. See, e. g., App. 98-99. With the exception of the agreement covering the 1967-1968 school year, each contract has specifically provided three days’ annual leave for observance of mandatory religious holidays, as defined in the contract. Unlike other categories for which leave is permitted, absences for religious holidays are not charged against the teacher’s annual or accumulated leave.
The school board has also agreed that teachers may use up to three days of accumulated leave each school year for “necessary personal business.” Recent contracts limited permissible personal leave to those uses not otherwise specified in the contract. This limitation dictated, for example, that an employee who wanted more than three leave days to attend the convention of a national veterans organization could not use personal leave to gain extra days for that purpose. Likewise, an employee already absent three days for mandatory religious observances could not later use personal leave for “[a]ny religious activity,” id., at 80, 83, 86, 89, 92, or “[a]ny religious observance.” Id., at 96, 100. Since the 1978-1979 school year, teachers have been allowed to take one of the three personal days without prior approval; use of the remaining two days requires advance approval by the school principal.
The limitations on the use of personal business leave spawned this litigation. Until the 1976-1977 year, Philbrook observed mandatory holy days by using the three days granted in the contract and then taking unauthorized leave. His pay was reduced accordingly. In 1976, however, respondent stopped taking unauthorized leave for religious reasons, and began scheduling required hospital visits on church holy days. He also worked on several holy days. Dissatisfied with this arrangement, Philbrook repeatedly asked the school board to adopt one of two alternatives. His preferred alternative would allow use of personal business leave for religious observance, effectively giving him three additional days of paid leave for that purpose. Short of this arrangement, respondent suggested that he pay the cost of a substitute and receive full pay for additional days off for religious observances. Petitioner has consistently rejected both proposals.
In 1973 Philbrook filed a complaint with the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission against the school board and the Ansonia Federation of Teachers. After exhausting the available administrative avenues, he filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, alleging that the prohibition on the use of “necessary personal business” leave for religious observance violated §§ 703(a)(1), (2) of Title VII, 42 U. S. C. §§2000e-2(a)(l), (2), and seeking both damages and injunc-tive relief.
After a 2-day trial, the District Court concluded that Philbrook had failed to prove a case of religious discrimination because he had not been placed by the school board in a position of violating his religion or losing his job.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings. It held that a prima facie case of discrimination is established when an employee shows that
“ ‘(1) he or she has a bona fide religious belief that conflicts with an employment requirement; (2) he or she informed the employer of this belief; (3) he or she was disciplined for failure to comply with the conflicting employment requirement.’ ” 757 F. 2d 476, 481 (1985), quoting Turpen v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co., 736 F. 2d 1022, 1026 (CA5 1984).
Philbrook established his case, the court held, by showing that he had a sincere religious belief that conflicted with the employer’s attendance requirements, that the employer was aware of the belief, and that he suffered a detriment— namely, a loss of pay — from the conflict. The court then assumed that the employer’s leave policy constituted a reasonable accommodation to Philbrook’s belief. It held, however, that “[w]here the employer and the employee each propose a reasonable accommodation, Title VII requires the employer to accept the proposal the employee prefers unless that accommodation causes undue hardship on the employer’s conduct of his business.” 757 F. 2d, at 484. The Court of Appeals remanded for consideration of the hardship that would result from Philbrook’s suggestions.
We granted certiorari to consider the important questions of federal law presented by the decision of the Court of Appeals. 474 U. S. 1080 (1986). Specifically, we are asked to address whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that Philbrook established a prima facie case of religious discrimination and in opining that an employer must accept the employee’s preferred accommodation absent proof of undue hardship. We find little support in the statute for the approach adopted by the Court of Appeals, but we agree that the ultimate issue of reasonable accommodation cannot be resolved without further factual inquiry. We accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals remanding the case to the District Court for additional findings.
As we noted in our only previous consideration of § 701(j), its language was added to the 1972 amendments on the floor of the Senate with little discussion. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U. S. 63, 74, n. 9 (1977). See 118 Cong. Rec. 705-706 (1972). In Hardison, supra, at 84, we determined that an accommodation causes “undue hardship” whenever that accommodation results in “more than a de minimis cost” to the employer. Hardison had been discharged because his religious beliefs would not allow him to work on Saturdays and claimed that this action violated the employer’s duty to effect a reasonable accommodation of his beliefs. Because we concluded that each of the suggested accommodations would impose on the employer an undue hardship, we had no occasion to consider the bounds of a prima facie case in the religious accommodation context or whether an employer is required to choose from available accommodations the alternative preferred by the employee. The employer in Hardison simply argued that all conceivable accommodations would result in undue hardship, and we agreed.
Petitioner asks us to establish for religious accommodation claims a proof scheme analogous to that developed in other Title VII contexts, delineating the plaintiff’s prima facie case and shifting production burdens. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973). But the present case raises no such issue. As in United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U. S. 711 (1983), the defendant here failed to persuade the District Court to dismiss the action for want of a prima facie case, and the case was fully tried on the merits. We held in Aikens that these circumstances place the ultimate Title VII question of discrimination vel non directly before the court. “Where the defendant has done everything that would be required of him if the plaintiff had properly made out a prima facie case, whether the plaintiff really did so is no longer-relevant.” Id., at 715. We may therefore proceed to the question whether the employer’s proposed accommodation of respondent’s religious practices comports with the statutory mandate of §701(j).
In addressing this question, the Court of Appeals assumed that the employer had offered a reasonable accommodation of Philbrook’s religious beliefs. This alone, however, was insufficient in that court’s view to allow resolution of the dispute. The court observed that the duty to accommodate “cannot be defined without reference to undue hardship.” 757 F. 2d, at 484. It accordingly determined that the accommodation obligation includes a duty to accept “the proposal the employee prefers unless that accommodation causes undue hardship on the employer’s conduct of his business.” Ibid. Cf. American Postal Workers Union v. Postmaster General, 781 F. 2d 772, 776 (CA9 1986) (Title VII does not dictate that “an employer must accept any accommodation, short of ‘undue hardship,’ proposed by an employee . . .”). Because the District Court had not considered whether Philbrook’s proposals would impose undue hardship, the Court of Appeals remanded for further consideration of those proposals.
We find no basis in either the statute or its legislative history for requiring an employer to choose any particular reasonable accommodation. By its very terms the statute directs that any reasonable accommodation by the employer is sufficient to meet its accommodation obligation. The employer violates the statute unless it “demonstrates that [it] is unable to reasonably accommodate ... an employee’s ... religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e(j). Thus, where the employer has already reasonably accommodated the employee’s religious needs, the statutory inquiry is at an end. The employer need not further show that each of the employee’s alternative accommodations would result in undue hardship. As Hardison illustrates, the extent of undue hardship on the employer’s business is at issue only where the employer claims that it is unable to offer any reasonable accommodation without such hardship. Once the Court of Appeals assumed that the school board had offered to Philbrook a reasonable alternative, it erred by requiring the Board to nonetheless demonstrate the hardship of Phil-brook’s alternatives.
The legislative history of § 701(j), as we noted in Hardison, supra, at 74-75, and n. 9, is of little help in defining the employer’s accommodation obligation. To the extent it provides any indication of congressional intent, however, we think that the history supports our conclusion. Senator Randolph, the sponsor of the amendment that became §701(j), expressed his hope that accommodation would be made with “flexibility” and “a desire to achieve an adjustment.” 118 Cong. Rec. 706 (1972). Consistent with these goals, courts have noted that “bilateral cooperation is appropriate in the search for an acceptable reconciliation of the needs of the employee’s religion and the exigencies of the employer’s business.” Brener v. Diagnostic Center Hospital, 671 F. 2d 141, 145-146 (CA5 1982). See also American Postal Workers, supra, at 777. Under the approach articulated by the Court of Appeals, however, the employee is given every incentive to hold out for the most beneficial accommodation, despite the fact that an employer offers a reasonable resolution of the conflict. This approach, we think, conflicts with both the language of the statute and the views that led to its enactment. We accordingly hold that an employer has met its obligation under § 701(j) when it demonstrates that it has offered a reasonable accommodation to the employee.
The remaining issue in the case is whether the school board’s leave policy constitutes a reasonable accommodation of Philbrook’s religious beliefs. Because both the District Court and the Court of Appeals applied what we hold to be an erroneous view of the law, neither explicitly considered this question. We- think that there are insufficient factual findings as to the manner in which the collective-bargaining agreements have been interpreted in order for us to make that judgment initially. We think that the school board policy in this case, requiring respondent to take unpaid leave for holy day observance that exceeded the amount allowed by the collective-bargaining agreement, would generally be a reasonable one. In enacting § 701(j), Congress was understandably motivated by a desire to assure the individual additional opportunity to observe religious practices, but it did not impose a duty on the employer to accommodate at all costs. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U. S. 63 (1977). The provision of unpaid leave eliminates the conflict between employment requirements and religious practices by allowing the individual to observe fully religious holy days and requires him only to give up compensation for a day that he did not in fact work. Generally speaking, “[t]he direct effect of [unpaid leave] is merely a loss of income for the period the employee is not at work; such an exclusion has no direct effect upon either employment opportunities or job status.” Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U. S. 136, 145 (1977).
But unpaid leave is not a reasonable accommodation when paid leave is provided for all purposes except religious ones. A provision for paid leave “that is part and parcel of the employment relationship may not be doled out in a discriminatory fashion, even if the employer would be free . . . not to provide the benefit at all.” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U. S. 69, 75 (1984). Such an arrangement would display a discrimination against religious practices that is the antithesis of reasonableness. Whether the policy here violates this teaching turns on factual inquiry into past and present administration of the personal business leave provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement. The school board contends that the necessary personal business category in the agreement, like other leave provisions, defines a limited purpose leave. Philbrook, on the other hand, asserts that the necessary personal leave category is not so limited, operating as an open-ended leave provision that may be used for a wide range of secular purposes in addition to those specifically provided for in the contract, but not for similar religious purposes. We do not think that the record is sufficiently clear on this point for us to make the necessary factual findings, and we therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals remanding the case to the District Court. The latter court on remand should make the necessary findings as to past and existing practice in the administration of the collective-bargaining agreements.
It is so ordered.
The reasonable accommodation duty was incorporated into the statute, somewhat awkwardly, in the definition of religion. Title VIPs central provisions make it an unlawful employment practice for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . . religion ...,”§ 703(a)(1), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a)(l), or “to limit, segregate, or classify his employees ... in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s . . . religion_” § 703(a)(2), 42 U. S. C. §2000e-2(a)(2). Section 701(j), 42 U. S. C. §2000e(j), was added in 1972 to illuminate the meaning of religious discrimination under the statute. It provides that “[t]he term ‘religion’ includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”
Absence for reasons not contemplated by the contract resulted in a proportionate deduction from pay; since 1971, 1/180 of annual salary had been deducted for each day of unexcused absence. App. 84, 90, 93, 97, 101.
The suggested accommodation would reduce the financial costs to Philbrook of unauthorized absences. In 1984, for example, a substitute cost $30 per day, and respondent’s loss in pay from an unauthorized absence was over $130.
Philbrook’s complaint also alleged that petitioner Board’s policies and practices violated his free exercise rights under the First Amendment. Because the Court of Appeals remanded the Title VII claim for further proceedings, it did not address Philbrook’s First Amendment claims, and we have no occasion to consider them here.
Judge Pollack, Senior District Judge of the Southern District of New York sitting by designation, dissented. He agreed with the District Court that “[t]he School Board’s policy neither deprives the plaintiff of employment opportunities nor adversely affects his employment status.” 757 F. 2d, at 489. Accordingly, he found that the policy did not “ ‘discriminate’ within Title VH’s use and meaning of that term . . . .” Ibid.
The Court of Appeals found support for its decision in the EEOC’s guidelines on religious discrimination. 757 F. 2d, at 485, and n. 7. Specifically, the guidelines provide that “when there is more than one means of accommodation which would not cause undue hardship, the employer . . . must offer the alternative which least disadvantages the individual with re-speet to his or her employment opportunities.” 29 CFR § 1605.2(c)(2)(ii) (1986). Though superficially consistent with the burden imposed by the Court of Appeals, this guideline, by requiring the employer to choose the option that least disadvantages an individual’s employment opportunities, contains a significant limitation not found in the court’s standard. To the extent that the guideline, like the approach of the Court of Appeals, requires the employer to accept any alternative favored by the employee short of undue hardship, we find the guideline simply inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statute. We have, of course, noted that EEOC guidelines are properly accorded less weight than administrative regulations declared by Congress to have the force of law. General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125, 141 (1976); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 139-140 (1944). See also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison 432 U. S. 63, 76, n. 11. (1977).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | B | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
PER CURIAM.
The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | B | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
Petitioner, who had been employed by respondent New York Central Railroad for 40 years, brought this action against respondent under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 51 et seq., in the District Court for the Southern District of New York. The complaint alleged that in 1960, as a result of respondent’s negligence, petitioner suffered a permanently disabling injury. The jury returned a verdict of $51,000 for petitioner and the District Court entered judgment in accordance with that verdict. Respondent offered evidence that petitioner was receiving $190 a month in disability pension payments under the Railroad Retirement Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 309, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 228b (a) 4. This evidence was offered for the purpose of impeaching the testimony of petitioner as to his motive for not returning to work and as to the permanency of his injuries. The trial court excluded the evidence in response to the objection of petitioner’s counsel. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding it prejudicial error to exclude the evidence of the disability pension, and remanded “for a new trial, limited, however, to the issues of injury and resulting damages . . . .” 319 F. 2d 12, 14. The court affirmed the judgment “as to the determination of negligence.” Ibid. We grant certiorari and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Respondent does not dispute that it would be highly improper for the disability pension payments to be considered in mitigation of the damages suffered by petitioner. Thus it has been recognized that:
“The Railroad Retirement Act is substantially a Social Security Act for employees of common carriers. . . . The benefits received under such a system of social legislation are not directly attributable to the contributions of the employer, so they cannot be considered in mitigation of the damages caused by the employer.” New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. Leary, 204 F. 2d 461, 468, cert. denied, 346 U. S. 856.
Respondent argues that the evidence of the disability payments, although concededly inadmissible to offset or mitigate damages, is admissible as bearing on the extent and duration of the disability suffered by petitioner. At the trial counsel for respondent argued that the pension would show “a motive for [petitioner’s] not continuing work, and for his deciding not to continue going back to work after the last accident.” On the basis of this argument the Court of Appeals concluded that the disputed evidence should have been admitted because: “Its substantial probative value cannot reasonably be said to be outweighed by the risk that it will . . . create substantial danger of undue prejudice through being considered by the jury for the incompetent purpose of a set-off against lost earnings.” 319 F. 2d, at 20.
We disagree. In our view the likelihood of misuse by the jury clearly outweighs the value of this evidence. Insofar as the evidence bears on the issue of malingering, there will generally be other evidence having more probative value and involving less likelihood of prejudice than the receipt of a disability pension. Moreover, it would violate the spirit of the federal statutes if the receipt of disability benefits under the Railroad Retirement Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 309, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 228b (a) 4, were considered as evidence of malingering by an employee asserting a claim under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. We have recently had occasion to be reminded that evidence of collateral benefits is readily subject to misuse by a jury. Tipton v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., Inc., 375 U. S. 34. It has long been recognized that evidence showing that the defendant is insured creates a substantial likelihood of misuse. Similarly, we must recognize that the petitioner’s receipt of collateral social insurance benefits involves a substantial likelihood of prejudicial impact. We hold therefore that the District Court properly excluded the evidence of disability payments. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Mr. Justice Douglas concurs in the result.
See Sinovich v. Erie R. Co., 230 F. 2d 658, 661; Page v. St. Louis S. R. Co., 312 F. 2d 84, 94. See also Gregory and Kalven, Cases and Materials on Torts (1959), pp. 480-482; McCormick, Damages (1935), p. 310, n. 2; Comment, 38 Mich. L. Rev. 1073.
Cf. McCormick, Evidence (1954), c. 19; 2 Wigmore, Evidence (1940), § 282a.
See Kalven, The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 Ohio St. L. J. 158, 169.
See notes 1-3, supra.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice GORSUCH delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1998, al Qaeda operatives simultaneously detonated truck bombs outside the United States Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Hundreds died, thousands were injured. In time, victims and their family members sued the Republic of Sudan in federal court, alleging that it had assisted al Qaeda in perpetrating the attacks. After more than a decade of motions practice, intervening legislative amendments, and a trial, the plaintiffs proved Sudan's role in the attacks and established their entitlement to compensatory and punitive damages. On appeal, however, Sudan argued, and the court agreed, that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act barred the punitive damages award. It is that decision we now review and, ultimately, vacate.
*
The starting point for nearly any dispute touching on foreign sovereign immunity lies in Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon , 7 Cranch 116, 3 L.Ed. 287 (1812). There, Chief Justice Marshall explained that foreign sovereigns do not enjoy an inherent right to be held immune from suit in American courts: "The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself." Id., at 136. Still, Chief Justice Marshall continued, many countries had declined to exercise jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns in cases involving foreign ministers and militaries. Id., at 137-140. And, accepting a suggestion from the Executive Branch, the Court agreed as a matter of comity to extend that same immunity to a foreign sovereign in the case at hand. Id., at 134, 145-147.
For much of our history, claims of foreign sovereign immunity were handled on a piecework basis that roughly paralleled the process in Schooner Exchange . Typically, after a plaintiff sought to sue a foreign sovereign in an American court, the Executive Branch, acting through the State Department, filed a "suggestion of immunity"-case-specific guidance about the foreign sovereign's entitlement to immunity. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria , 461 U.S. 480, 487, 103 S.Ct. 1962, 76 L.Ed.2d 81 (1983). Because foreign sovereign immunity is a matter of "grace and comity," Republic of Austria v. Altmann , 541 U.S. 677, 689, 124 S.Ct. 2240, 159 L.Ed.2d 1 (2004), and so often implicates judgments the Constitution reserves to the political branches, courts "consistently ... deferred" to these suggestions. Verlinden , 461 U.S. at 486, 103 S.Ct. 1962.
Eventually, though, this arrangement began to break down. In the mid-20th century, the State Department started to take a more restrictive and nuanced approach to foreign sovereign immunity. See id., at 486-487, 103 S.Ct. 1962. Sometimes, too, foreign sovereigns neglected to ask the State Department to weigh in, leaving courts to make immunity decisions on their own. See id., at 487-488, 103 S.Ct. 1962. "Not surprisingly" given these developments, "the governing standards" for foreign sovereign immunity determinations over time became "neither clear nor uniformly applied." Id ., at 488, 103 S.Ct. 1962.
In 1976, Congress sought to remedy the problem and address foreign sovereign immunity on a more comprehensive basis. The result was the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). As a baseline rule, the FSIA holds foreign states and their instrumentalities immune from the jurisdiction of federal and state courts. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1603(a), 1604. But the law also includes a number of exceptions. See, e.g., §§ 1605, 1607. Of particular relevance today is the terrorism exception Congress added to the law in 1996. That exception permits certain plaintiffs to bring suits against countries who have committed or supported specified acts of terrorism and who are designated by the State Department as state sponsors of terror. Still, as originally enacted, the exception shielded even these countries from the possibility of punitive damages. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (codifying state-sponsored terrorism exception at 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) ); § 1606 (generally barring punitive damages in suits proceeding under any of § 1605's sovereign immunity exceptions).
Two years after Congress amended the FSIA, al Qaeda attacked the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. In response, a group of victims and affected family members led by James Owens sued Sudan in federal district court, invoking the newly adopted terrorism exception and alleging that Sudan had provided shelter and other material support to al Qaeda. As the suit progressed, however, a question emerged. In its recent amendments, had Congress merely withdrawn immunity for state-sponsored terrorism, allowing plaintiffs to proceed using whatever pre-existing causes of action might be available to them? Or had Congress gone further and created a new federal cause of action to address terrorism? Eventually, the D.C. Circuit held that Congress had only withdrawn immunity without creating a new cause of action. See Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 353 F.3d 1024, 1033 (2004).
In response to that and similar decisions, Congress amended the FSIA again in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (NDAA), 122 Stat. 338. Four changes, all found in a single section, bear mention here. First, in § 1083(a) of the NDAA, Congress moved the state-sponsored terrorism exception from its original home in § 1605(a)(7) to a new section of the U.S. Code, 28 U.S.C. § 1605A. This had the effect of freeing claims brought under the terrorism exception from the FSIA's usual bar on punitive damages. See § 1606 (denying punitive damages in suits proceeding under a sovereign immunity exception found in § 1605 but not § 1605A ). Second, also in § 1083(a), Congress created an express federal cause of action for acts of terror. This new cause of action, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c), is open to plaintiffs who are U.S. nationals, members of the Armed Forces, U.S. government employees or contractors, and their legal representatives, and it expressly authorizes punitive damages. Third, in § 1083(c)(2) of the NDAA, a provision titled "Prior Actions," Congress addressed existing lawsuits that had been "adversely affected on the groun[d] that" prior law "fail[ed] to create a cause of action against the state." Actions like these, Congress instructed, were to be given effect "as if " they had been originally filed under § 1605A(c)'s new federal cause of action. Finally, in § 1083(c)(3) of the NDAA, a provision titled "Related Actions," Congress provided a time-limited opportunity for plaintiffs to file new actions "arising out of the same act or incident" as an earlier action and claim the benefits of 28 U.S.C. § 1605A.
Following these amendments, the Owens plaintiffs amended their complaint to include the new federal cause of action, and hundreds of additional victims and family members filed new claims against Sudan similar to those in Owens . Some of these new plaintiffs were U.S. nationals or federal government employees or contractors who sought relief under the new § 1605A(c) federal cause of action. But others were the foreign-national family members of U.S. government employees or contractors killed or injured in the attacks. Ineligible to invoke § 1605A(c)'s new federal cause of action, these plaintiffs relied on § 1605A(a)'s state-sponsored terrorism exception to overcome Sudan's sovereign immunity and then advance claims sounding in state law.
After a consolidated bench trial in which Sudan declined to participate, the district court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. District Judge John Bates offered detailed factual findings explaining that Sudan had knowingly served as a safe haven near the two United States Embassies and allowed al Qaeda to plan and train for the attacks. The court also found that Sudan had provided hundreds of Sudanese passports to al Qaeda, allowed al Qaeda operatives to travel over the Sudan-Kenya border without restriction, and permitted the passage of weapons and money to supply al Qaeda's cell in Kenya. See Owens v. Republic of Sudan , 826 F.Supp.2d 128, 139-146 (DC 2011).
The question then turned to damages. Given the extensive and varied nature of the plaintiffs' injuries, the court appointed seven Special Masters to aid its factfinding. Over more than two years, the Special Masters conducted individual damages assessments and submitted written reports. Based on these reports, and after adding a substantial amount of prejudgment interest to account for the many years of delay, the district court awarded a total of approximately $10.2 billion in damages, including roughly $4.3 billion in punitive damages to plaintiffs who had brought suit in the wake of the 2008 amendments.
At that point, Sudan decided to appear and appeal. Among other things, Sudan sought to undo the district court's punitive damages award. Generally, Sudan argued, Congress may create new forms of liability for past conduct only by clearly stating its intention to do so. And, Sudan continued, when Congress passed the NDAA in 2008, it nowhere clearly authorized punitive damages for anything countries like Sudan might have done in the 1990s.
The court of appeals agreed. It started by addressing the plaintiffs who had proceeded under the new federal cause of action in § 1605A(c). The court noted that, in passing the NDAA, Congress clearly authorized individuals to use the Prior Actions and Related Actions provisions to bring new federal claims attacking past conduct. Likewise, the law clearly allowed these plaintiffs to collect compensatory damages for their claims. But, the court held, Congress included no statement clearly authorizing punitive damages for preenactment conduct. See Owens v. Republic of Sudan , 864 F.3d 751, 814-817 (CADC 2017). Separately but for essentially the same reasons, the court held that the foreign-national family member plaintiffs who had proceeded under state-law causes of action were also barred from seeking and obtaining punitive damages. Id., at 817.
The petitioners responded by asking this Court to review the first of these rulings and decide whether the 2008 NDAA amendments permit plaintiffs proceeding under the federal cause of action in § 1605A(c) to seek and win punitive damages for past conduct. We agreed to resolve that question. 588 U.S. ----, 139 S.Ct. 2771, 204 L.Ed.2d 1155 (2019).
*
The principle that legislation usually applies only prospectively "is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic." Landgraf v. USI Film Products , 511 U.S. 244, 265, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994). This principle protects vital due process interests, ensuring that "individuals ... have an opportunity to know what the law is" before they act, and may rest assured after they act that their lawful conduct cannot be second-guessed later. Ibid. The principle serves vital equal protection interests as well: If legislative majorities could too easily make new laws with retroactive application, disfavored groups could become easy targets for discrimination, with their past actions visible and unalterable. See id., at 266-267, 114 S.Ct. 1483. No doubt, reasons like these are exactly why the Constitution discourages retroactive lawmaking in so many ways, from its provisions prohibiting ex post facto laws, bills of attainder, and laws impairing the obligations of contracts, to its demand that any taking of property be accompanied by just compensation. See id., at 266, 114 S.Ct. 1483.
Still, Sudan doesn't challenge the constitutionality of the 2008 NDAA amendments on these or any other grounds-the arguments we confront today are limited to the field of statutory interpretation. But, as both sides acknowledge, the principle of legislative prospectivity plays an important role here too. In fact, the parties devote much of their briefing to debating exactly how that principle should inform our interpretation of the NDAA.
For its part, Sudan points to Landgraf . There, the Court observed that, "in decisions spanning two centuries," we have approached debates about statutory meaning with an assumption that Congress means its legislation to respect the principle of prospectivity and apply only to future conduct-and that, if and when Congress wishes to test its power to legislate retrospectively, it must say so "clear[ly]." Id., at 272, 114 S.Ct. 1483. All this is important, Sudan tells us, because when we look to the NDAA we will find no clear statement allowing courts to award punitive damages for past conduct.
But if Sudan focuses on the rule, the petitioners highlight an exception suggested by Altmann . Because foreign sovereign immunity is a gesture of grace and comity, Altmann reasoned, it is also something that may be withdrawn retroactively without the same risk to due process and equal protection principles that other forms of backward-looking legislation can pose. Foreign sovereign immunity's "principal purpose," after all, "has never been to permit foreign states ... to shape their conduct in reliance on the promise of future immunity from suit in United States courts." 541 U.S. at 696, 124 S.Ct. 2240. Thus, Altmann held, "[i]n th[e] sui generis context [of foreign sovereign immunity], ... it [is] more appropriate, absent contraindications, to defer to the most recent decision [of the political branches] than to presume that decision inapplicable merely because it postdates the conduct in question." Ibid. And, the petitioners stress, once the presumption of prospectivity is swept away, the NDAA is easily read to authorize punitive damages for completed conduct.
Really, this summary only begins to scratch the surface of the parties' debate. Sudan replies that it may be one thing to retract immunity retroactively consistent with Altmann , because all that does is open a forum to hear an otherwise available legal claim. But it is another thing entirely to create new rules regulating primary conduct and impose them retroactively. When Congress wishes to do that , Sudan says, it must speak just as clearly as Landgraf commanded. And, Sudan adds, the NDAA didn't simply open a new forum to hear a pre-existing claim; it also created a new cause of action governing completed conduct that the petitioners now seek to exploit. Cf. Altmann , 541 U.S. at 702-704, 124 S.Ct. 2240 (Scalia, J., concurring). In turn, the petitioners retort that Altmann itself might have concerned whether a new forum could hear an otherwise available and pre-existing claim, but its reasoning went further. According to the petitioners, the decision also strongly suggested that the presumption of prospectivity does not apply at all when it comes to suits against foreign sovereigns, full stop. These points and more the parties develop through much of their briefing before us.
As we see it, however, there is no need to resolve the parties' debate over interpretive presumptions. Even if we assume (without granting) that Sudan may claim the benefit of Landgraf 's presumption of prospectivity, Congress was as clear as it could have been when it authorized plaintiffs to seek and win punitive damages for past conduct using § 1065A(c)'s new federal cause of action. After all, in § 1083(a), Congress created a federal cause of action that expressly allows suits for damages that "may include economic damages, solatium, pain and suffering, and punitive damages ." (Emphasis added.) This new cause of action was housed in a new provision of the U.S. Code, 28 U.S.C. § 1605A, to which the FSIA's usual prohibition on punitive damages does not apply. See § 1606. Then, in §§ 1083(c)(2) and (c)(3) of the very same statute, Congress allowed certain plaintiffs in "Prior Actions" and "Related Actions" to invoke the new federal cause of action in § 1605A. Both provisions specifically authorized new claims for preenactment conduct. Put another way, Congress proceeded in two equally evident steps: (1) It expressly authorized punitive damages under a new cause of action; and (2) it explicitly made that new cause of action available to remedy certain past acts of terrorism. Neither step presents any ambiguity, nor is the NDAA fairly susceptible to any competing interpretation.
Sudan's primary rejoinder only serves to underscore the conclusion. Like the court of appeals before it, Sudan stresses that § 1083(c) itself contains no express authorization of punitive damages. But it's hard to see what difference that makes. Sudan admits that § 1083(c) authorizes plaintiffs to bring claims under § 1605A(c) for acts committed before the 2008 amendments. Sudan concedes, too, that § 1605A(c) authorizes plaintiffs to seek and win "economic damages, solatium, [and] pain and suffering," for preenactment conduct. In fact, except for the two words "punitive damages," Sudan accepts that every other jot and tittle of § 1605A(c) applies to actions properly brought under § 1083(c) for past conduct. And we can see no plausible account on which § 1083(c) could be clear enough to authorize the retroactive application of all other features of § 1605A(c), just not these two words.
Sudan next contends that § 1605A(c) fails to authorize retroactive punitive damages with sufficient clarity because it sounds equivocal-the provision says only that awards "may" include punitive damages. But this language simply vests district courts with discretion to determine whether punitive damages are appropriate in view of the facts of a particular case. As we have repeatedly observed when discussing remedial provisions using similar language, "the 'word "may" clearly connotes discretion.' " Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc. , 579 U.S. ----, ----, 136 S.Ct. 1923, 1931, 195 L.Ed.2d 278 (2016) (quoting Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp. , 546 U.S. 132, 136, 126 S.Ct. 704, 163 L.Ed.2d 547 (2005), in turn quoting Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc. , 510 U.S. 517, 533, 114 S.Ct. 1023, 127 L.Ed.2d 455 (1994) ; emphasis added). What's more, all of the categories of special damages mentioned in § 1605A(c) are provided on equal terms: "[D]amages may include economic damages, solatium, pain and suffering, and punitive damages." (Emphasis added.) Sudan admits that the statute vests the district court with discretion to award the first three kinds of damages for preenactment conduct-and the same can be no less true when it comes to the fourth.
That takes us to Sudan's final argument. Maybe Congress did act clearly when it authorized a new cause of action and other forms of damages for past conduct. But because retroactive damages of the punitive variety raise special constitutional concerns, Sudan says, we should create and apply a new rule requiring Congress to provide a super-clear statement when it wishes to authorize their use.
We decline this invitation. It's true that punitive damages aren't merely a form a compensation but a form of punishment, and we don't doubt that applying new punishments to completed conduct can raise serious constitutional questions. See Landgraf , 511 U.S., at 281, 114 S.Ct. 1483. But if Congress clearly authorizes retroactive punitive damages in a manner a litigant thinks unconstitutional, the better course is for the litigant to challenge the law's constitutionality, not ask a court to ignore the law's manifest direction. Besides, when we fashion interpretive rules, we usually try to ensure that they are reasonably administrable, comport with linguistic usage and expectations, and supply a stable backdrop against which Congress, lower courts, and litigants may plan and act. See id ., at 272-273, 114 S.Ct. 1483. And Sudan's proposal promises more nearly the opposite: How much clearer-than-clear should we require Congress to be when authorizing the retroactive use of punitive damages? Sudan doesn't even try to say, except to assure us it knows a super-clear statement when it sees it, and can't seem to find one here. That sounds much less like an administrable rule of law than an appeal to the eye of the beholder.
*
With the question presented now resolved, both sides ask us to tackle other matters in this long-running litigation. Perhaps most significantly, the petitioners include a postscript asking us to decide whether Congress also clearly authorized retroactive punitive damages in claims brought by foreign-national family members under state law using § 1605A(a)'s exception to sovereign immunity. Sudan insists that, if we take up that question, we must account for the fact that § 1605A(a), unlike § 1605A(c), does not expressly discuss punitive damages. And in fairness, Sudan contends, we should also resolve whether litigants may invoke state law at all, in light of the possibility that § 1605A(c) now supplies the exclusive cause of action for claims involving state-sponsored acts of terror.
We decline to resolve these or other matters outside the question presented. The petitioners chose to limit their petition to the propriety of punitive damages under the federal cause of action in § 1605A(c). See Pet. for Cert. i. The Solicitor General observed this limitation in the question presented at the petition stage. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 19, n. 8. The parties' briefing and argument on matters outside the question presented has been limited, too, and we think it best not to stray into new terrain on the basis of such a meager invitation and with such little assistance.
Still, we acknowledge one implication that necessarily follows from our holding today. The court of appeals refused to allow punitive damages awards for foreign-national family members proceeding under state law for "the same reason" it refused punitive damages for the plaintiffs proceeding under § 1605A(c)'s federal cause of action. 864 F.3d at 818. The court stressed that it would be "puzzling" if punitive damages were permissible for state claims but not federal ones. Id., at 817. Having now decided that punitive damages are permissible for federal claims, and that the reasons the court of appeals offered for its contrary decision were mistaken, it follows that the court of appeals must also reconsider its decision concerning the availability of punitive damages for claims proceeding under state law.
The judgment of the court of appeals with respect to punitive damages is vacated. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice KAVANAUGH took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We decide whether, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq., an employee who refuses the unwelcome and threatening sexual advances of a supervisor, yet suffers no adverse, tangible job consequences, can recover against the employer without showing the employer is negligent or otherwise at fault for the supervisor’s actions.
í — H
Summary judgment was granted for the employer, so we must take the facts alleged by the employee to be true. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U. S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam). The employer is Burlington Industries, the petitioner. The employee is Kimberly Ellerth, the respondent. From March 1993 until May 1994, Ellerth worked as a salesperson in one of Burlington’s divisions in Chicago, Illinois. During her employment, she alleges, she was subjected to constant sexual harassment by her supervisor, one Ted Slowik.
In the hierarchy of Burlington’s management structure, Slowik was a midlevel manager. Burlington has eight divisions, employing more than 22,000 people in some 50 plants around the United States. Slowik was a vice president in one of five business units within one of the divisions. He had authority to make hiring and promotion decisions subject to the approval of his supervisor, who signed the paperwork. See 912 F. Supp. 1101, 1119, n. 14 (ND Ill. 1996). According to Slowik’s supervisor, his position was “not considered an upper-level management position,” and he was “not amongst the decision-making or policy-making hierarchy.” Ibid. Slowik was not Ellerth’s immediate supervisor. Ellerth worked in a two-person office in Chicago, and she answered to her office colleague, who in turn answered to Slowik in New York.
Against a background of repeated boorish and offensive remarks and gestures which Slowik allegedly made, Ellerth places particular emphasis on three alleged incidents where Slowik’s comments could be construed as threats to deny her tangible job benefits. In the summer of 1993, while on a business trip, Slowik invited Ellerth to the hotel lounge, an invitation Ellerth felt compelled to accept because Slowik was her boss. App. 155. When Ellerth gave no encouragement to remarks Slowik made about her breasts, he told her to “loosen up" and warned, “you know, Kim, I could make your life very hard or very easy at Burlington.” Id., at 156.
In March 1994, when Ellerth was being considered for a promotion, Slowik expressed reservations during the promotion interview because she was not “loose enough.” Id., at 159. The comment was followed by his reaching over and rubbing her knee. Ibid. Ellerth did receive the promotion; but when Slowik called to announce it, he told Ellerth, “you’re gonna be out there with men who work in factories, and they certainly like women with pretty butts/legs.” Id., at 159-160.
In May 1994, Ellerth called Slowik, asking permission to insert a customer’s logo into a fabric sample. Slowik responded, “I don’t have time for you right now, Kim...— unless you want to tell me what you’re wearing.” Id., at 78. Ellerth told Slowik she had to go and ended the call. Ibid. A day or two later, Ellerth called Slowik to ask permission again. This time he denied her request, but added something along the lines of, “are you wearing shorter skirts yet, Kim, because it would make your job a whole heck of a lot easier.” Id., at 79.
A short time later, Ellerth’s immediate supervisor cautioned her about returning telephone calls to customers in a prompt fashion. 912 F. Supp., at 1109. In response, Ellerth quit. She faxed a letter giving reasons unrelated to the alleged sexual harassment we have described. Ibid. About three weeks later, however, she sent a letter explaining she quit because of Slowik’s behavior. Ibid.
During her tenure at Burlington, Ellerth did not inform anyone in authority about Slowik’s conduct, despite knowing Burlington had a policy against sexual harassment. Ibid. In fact, she chose not to inform her immediate supervisor (not Slowik) because “ ‘it would be his duty as my supervisor to report any incidents of sexual harassment.’ ” Ibid. On one occasion, she told Slowik a comment he made was inappropriate. Ibid.
In October 1994, after receiving a right-to-sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Copimission (EEOC), Ellerth filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, alleging Burlington engaged in sexual harassment and forced her constructive discharge, in violation of Title VIL The District Court granted summary judgment to Burlington. The court found Slowik’s behavior, as described by Ellerth, severe and pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment, but found Burlington neither knew nor should have known about the conduct. There was no triable issue of fact on the latter point, and the court noted Ellerth had not used Burlington’s internal complaint procedures. Id., at 1118. Although Ellerth’s claim was framed as a hostile work environment complaint, the District Court observed there was a quid pro quo “component” to the hostile environment. Id., at 1121. Proceeding from the premise that an employer faces vicarious liability for quid pro quo harassment, the District Court thought it necessary to apply a negligence standard because the quid pro quo merely contributed to the hostile work environment. See id., at 1123. The District Court also dismissed Ellerth’s constructive discharge claim.
The Court of Appeals en bane reversed in a decision which produced eight separate opinions and no consensus for a controlling rationale. The judges were able to agree on the problem they confronted: Vicarious liability, not failure to comply with a duty of care, was the essence of Ellerth’s case against Burlington on appeal. The judges seemed to agree Ellerth could recover if Slowik’s unfulfilled threats to deny her tangible job benefits was sufficient to impose vicarious liability on Burlington. Jansen v. Packing Corp. of America, 123 F. 3d 490, 494 (CA7 1997) (per curiam). With the exception of Judges Coffey and Easterbrook, the judges also agreed Ellerth’s claim could be categorized as one of quid pro quo harassment, even though she had received the promotion and had suffered no other tangible retaliation. Ibid.
The consensus disintegrated on the standard for an employer’s liability for such a claim. Six judges, Judges Flaum, Cummings, Bauer, Evans, Rovner, and Diane P. Wood, agreed the proper standard was vicarious liability, and so Ellerth could recover even though Burlington was not negligent. Ibid. They had different reasons for the conclusion. According to Judges Flaum, Cummings, Bauer, and Evans, whether a claim involves a quid pro quo determines whether vicarious liability applies; and they in turn defined quid pro quo to include a supervisor’s threat to inflict a tangible job injury whether or not it was completed. Id., at 499. Judges Wood and Rovner interpreted agency principles to impose vicarious liability on employers for most claims of supervisor sexual harassment, even absent a quid pro quo. Id., at 565.
Although Judge Easterbrook did not think Ellerth had stated a quid pro quo claim, he would have followed the law of the controlling State to determine the employer’s liability, and by this standard, the employer would be liable here. Id., at 552. In contrast, Judge Kanne said Ellerth had stated a quid pro quo claim, but negligence was the appropriate standard of liability when the quid pro quo involved threats only. Id., at 505.
Chief Judge Posner, joined by Judge Manion, disagreed. He asserted Ellerth could not recover against Burlington despite having stated a quid pro quo claim. According to Chief Judge Posner, an employer is subject to vicarious liability for “aet[s] that significantly alte[r] the terms or conditions of employment,” or “company act[s].” Id., at 515. In the emergent terminology, an unfulfilled quid pro quo is a mere threat to do a company act rather than the act itself, and in these circumstances, an employer can be found liable for its negligence only. Ibid. Chief Judge Posner also found Ellerth failed to create a triable issue of fact as to Burlington’s negligence. Id., at 517.
Judge Coffey rejected all of the above approaches because he favored a uniform standard of negligence in almost all sexual harassment eases. Id., at 518.
The disagreement revealed in the careful opinions of the judges of the Court of Appeals reflects the fact that Congress has left it to the courts to determine controlling agency law principles in a new and difficult area of federal law. We granted certiorari to assist in defining the relevant standards of employer liability. 522 U. S. 1086 (1998).
i — i
At the outset, we assume an important proposition yet to be established before a trier of fact. It is a premise assumed as well, in explicit or implicit terms, in the various opinions by the judges of the Court of Appeals. The premise is: A trier of fact could find in Slowik’s remarks numerous threats to retaliate against Ellerth if she denied some sexual liberties. The threats, however, were not carried out or fulfilled. Cases based on threats which are carried out are referred to often as quid pro quo cases, as distinct from bothersome attentions or sexual remarks that are sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment. The terms quid pro quo and hostile work environment are helpful, perhaps, in making a rough demarcation between cases in which threats are carried out and those where they are not or are absent altogether, but beyond this are of limited utility.
Section 708(a) of Title YII forbids
“an employer—
“(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s... sex.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e-2(a)(l).
“Quid pro quo” and “hostile work environment” do not appear in the statutory text. The terms appeared first in the academic literature, see C. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women (1979); found their way into decisions of the Courts of Appeals, see, e. g., Henson v. Dundee, 682 F. 2d 897, 909 (CA11 1982); and were mentioned in this Court’s decision in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U. S. 57 (1986). See generally E. Scalia, The Strange Career of Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment, 21 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Policy 807 (1998).
In Meritor, the terms served a specific and limited purpose. There we considered whether the conduct in question constituted discrimination in the terms or conditions of employment in violation of Title VII. We assumed, and with adequate reason, that if an employer demanded sexual favors from an employee in return for a job benefit, discrimination with respect to terms or conditions of employment was explicit. Less obvious was whether an employer’s sexually demeaning behavior altered terms or conditions of employment in violation of Title VII. We distinguished between quid pro quo claims and hostile environment claims, see 477 U. S., at 65, and said both were cognizable under Title VII, though the latter requires harassment that is severe or pervasive. Ibid. The principal significance of the distinction is to instruct that Title VII is violated by either explicit or constructive alterations in the terms or conditions of employment and to explain the latter must be severe or pervasive. The distinction was not discussed for its bearing upon an employer’s liability for an employee’s discrimination. On this question Meritor held, with no further specifics, that agency principles controlled. Id., at 72.
Nevertheless, as use of the terms grew in the wake of Meritor, they acquired their own significance. The standard of employer responsibility turned on which type of harassment occurred. If the plaintiff established a quid pro quo claim, the Courts of Appeals held, the employer was subject to vicarious liability. See Davis v. Sioux City, 115 F. 3d 1365, 1367 (CA8 1997); Nichols v. Frank, 42 F. 3d 503, 513-514 (CA9 1994); Bouton v. BMW of North America, Inc., 29 F. 3d 103, 106-107 (CA3 1994); Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F. 3d 1122, 1127 (CA10 1993); Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F. 2d 178, 185-186 (CA6), cert. denied, 506 U. S. 1041 (1992); Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F. 2d 1311, 1316 (CA11 1989). The rule encouraged. Title VII plaintiffs to state their claims as quid pro quo claims, which in turn put expansive pressure on the definition. The equivalence of the quid pro quo label and vicarious liability is illustrated by this case. The question presented on certiorari is whether Ellerth can state a claim of quid pro quo harassment, but the issue of real concern to the parties is whether Burlington has vicarious liability for Slowik’s alleged misconduct, rather than liability limited to its own negligence. The question presented for certiorari asks:
‘Whether a claim of quid pro quo sexual harassment may be stated under Title VII... where the plaintiff employee has neither submitted to the sexual advances of the alleged harasser nor suffered any tangible effects on the compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment as a consequence of a refusal to submit to those advances?” Pet. for Cert. i.
We do not suggest the terms quid pro quo and hostile work environment are irrelevant to Title VII litigation. To the extent they illustrate the distinction between eases involving a threat which is carried out and offensive conduct in general, the terms are relevant when there is a threshold question whether a plaintiff can prove discrimination in violation of Title VII. When a plaintiff proves that a tangible employment action resulted from a refusal to submit to a supervisor’s sexual demands, he or she establishes that the employment decision itself constitutes a change in the terms and conditions of employment that is actionable under Title VII. For any sexual harassment preceding the employment decision to be actionable, however, the conduct must be severe or pervasive. Because Ellerth’s claim involves only unfulfilled threats, it should be categorized as a hostile work environment claim which requires a showing of severe or pervasive conduct. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U. S. 75, 81 (1998); Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U. S. 17, 21 (1993). For purposes of this ease, we accept the District Court’s finding that the alleged conduct was severe or pervasive. See supra, at 749. The case before us involves numerous alleged threats, and we express no opinion as to whether a single unfulfilled threat is sufficient to constitute discrimination in the terms or conditions of employment.
When we assume discrimination can be proved, however, the factors we discuss below, and not the categories quid pro quo and hostile work environment, will be controlling on the issue of vicarious liability. That is the question we must resolve.
Ill
We must decide, then, whether an employer has vicarious liability when a supervisor creates á hostile work environment by making explicit threats to alter a subordinate’s terms or conditions of employment, based on sex, but does not fulfill the threat. We turn to principles of agency law, for the term “employer” is defined under Title VII to include “agents.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e(b); see Meritor, supra, at 72. In express terms, Congress has directed federal courts to interpret Title VII based on agency principles. Given such an explicit instruction, we conclude a uniform and predictable standard must be established as a matter of federal law. We rely “on the general common law of agency, rather than on the law of any particular State, to give meaning to these terms.” Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U. S. 730, 740 (1989). The resulting federal rule, based on a body of ease law developed over time, is statutory interpretation pursuant to congressional direction. This is not federal common law in “the strictest sense, i. e., a rule of decision that amounts, not simply to an interpretation of a federal statute..., but, rather, to the judicial ‘creation’ of a special federal rule of decision.” Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U. S. 213, 218 (1997). State-court decisions, applying state employment discrimination law, may be instructive in applying general agency principles, but, it is interesting to note, in many cases their determinations of employer liability under state law rely in large part on federal-court decisions under Title VIL E. g., Arizona v. Schallock, 189 Ariz. 250, 259, 941 P. 2d 1275, 1284 (1997); Lehmann v. Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc., 132 N. J. 587, 622, 626 A. 2d 445, 463 (1993); Thompson v. Berta Enterprises, Inc., 72 Wash. App. 531, 537-539, 864 P. 2d 983, 986-988 (1994).
As Meritor acknowledged, the Restatement (Second) of Agency (1957) (hereinafter Restatement) is a useful beginning point for a discussion of general agency principles. 477 U. S., at 72. Since our decision in Meritor, federal courts have explored agency principles, and we find useful instruction in their decisions, noting that “common-law principles may not be transferable in all their particulars to Title VII.” Ibid. The EEOC has issued Guidelines governing sexual harassment claims under Title VII, but they provide little guidance on the issue of employer liability for supervisor harassment. See 29 CFR § 1604.11(e) (1997) (vicarious liability for supervisor harassment turns on “the particular employment relationship and the job functions performed by the individual”).
A
Section 219(1) of the Restatement sets out a central principle of agency law:
“A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their employment.”
An employer may be liable for both negligent and intentional torts committed by an employee within the scope of his or her employment. Sexual harassment under Title VII presupposes intentional conduct. While early decisions absolved employers of liability for the intentional torts of their employees, the law now imposes liability where the employee’s “purpose, however misguided, is wholly or in part to further the master’s business.” W. Keeton, B. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts §70, p. 505 (5th ed. 1984) (hereinafter Prosser and Keeton on Torts). In applying scope of employment principles to intentional torts, however, it is accepted that “it is less likely that a willful tort will properly be held to be in the course of employment and that the liability of the master for such torts will naturally be more limited.” F. Mechem, Outlines of the Law of Agency §394, p. 266 (P. Mechem 4th ed. 1952). The Restatement defines conduct, including an intentional tort, to be within the scope of employment when “actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the [employer],” even if it is forbidden by the employer. Restatement §§ 228(l)(e), 230. For example, when a salesperson lies to a customer to make a sale, the tortious conduct is within the scope of employment because it benefits the employer by increasing sales, even though it may violate the employer’s policies. See Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 70, at 505-506.
As Courts of Appeals have recognized, a supervisor acting out of gender-based animus or a desire to fulfill sexual urges may not be actuated by a purpose to serve the employer. See, e. g., Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F. 3d 1437, 1444 (CA10 1997), vacated on other grounds, post, p. 947; Torres v. Pisano, 116 F. 3d 625, 634, n. 10 (CA2 1997). But see Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F. 2d, at 184-185 (holding harassing supervisor acted within scope of employment, but employer was not liable because of its quick and effective remediation). The harassing supervisor often acts for personal motives, motives unrelated and even antithetical to the objectives of the employer. Cf. Mechem, supra, §368 (“[F]or the time being [the supervisor] is conspicuously and unmistakably seeking a personal end”); see also Restatement §235, Illustration 2 (tort committed while “[ajeting purely from personal ill will” not within the scope of. employment); id., Illustration 3 (tort committed in retaliation for failing to pay the employee a bribe not within the scope of employment). There are instances, of course, where a supervisor engages in unlawful discrimination with the purpose, mistaken or otherwise, to serve the employer. E. g., Sims v. Montgomery County Comm’n, 766 F. Supp. 1052, 1075 (MD Ala. 1990) (supervisor acting in scope of employment where employer has a policy of discouraging women from seeking advancement and “sexual harassment was simply a way of furthering that policy”).
The concept of scope of employment has not always been construed to require a motive to serve the employer. E. g., Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F. 2d 167, 172 (CA2 1968). Federal courts have nonetheless found similar limitations on employer liability when applying the agency laws of the States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, which makes the Federal Government liable for torts committed by employees within the scope of employment. 28 U. S. C. § 1346(b); see, e. g., Jamison v. Wiley, 14 F. 3d 222, 237 (CA4 1994) (supervisor’s unfair criticism of subordinate’s work in retaliation for rejecting his sexual advances not within scope of employment); Wood v. United States, 995 F. 2d 1122, 1123 (CA1 1993) (Breyer, C. J.) (sexual harassment amounting to assault and battery “clearly outside the scope of employment”); see also 2 L. Jayson & R. Longstreth, Handling Federal Tort Claims § 9.07[4], p. 9-211 (1998).
The general rule is that sexual harassment by a supervisor is not conduct within the scope of employment.
B
Scope of employment does not define the only basis for employer liability under agency principles. In limited circumstances, agency principles impose liability on employers even where employees commit torts outside the scope of employment. The principles are set forth in the much-cited § 219(2) of the Restatement:
“(2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the scope of their employment, unless:
“(a) the master intended the conduct or the consequences, or
“(b) the master was negligent or reckless, or
“(c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the master, or
“(d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation.”
See also §219, Comment e (Section 219(2) “enumerates the situations in which a master may be liable for torts of servants acting solely for their own purposes and hence not in the scope of employment”).
Subsection (a) addresses direct liability, where the employer acts with tortious intent, and indirect liability, where the agent's high rank in the company makes him or her the employer’s alter ego. None of the parties contend Slowik’s rank imputes liability under this principle. There is no contention, furthermore, that a nondelegable duty is involved. See § 219(2) (e). So, for our purposes here, subsections (a) and (c) can be put aside.
Subsections (b) and (d) are possible grounds for imposing employer liability on account of a supervisor’s acts and must be considered. Under subsection (b), an employer is liable when the tort is attributable to the employer’s own negligence. §219(2)(b). Thus, although a supervisor’s sexual harassment is outside the scope of employment because the conduct was for personal motives, an employer can be liable, nonetheless, where its own negligence is a cause of the harassment. An employer is negligent with respect to sexual harassment if it knew or should have known about the conduct and failed to stop it. Negligence sets a minimum standard for employer liability under Title VII; but Ellerth seeks to invoke the more stringent standard of vicarious liability.
Section 219(2)(d) concerns vicarious liability for intentional torts committed by an employee when the employee uses apparent authority (the apparent authority standard), or when the employee “was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation” (the aided in the agency relation standard). Ibid. As other federal decisions have done in discussing vicarious liability for supervisor harassment, e. g., Henson v. Dundee, 682 F. 2d 897, 909 (CA11 1982), we begin with § 219(2)(d).
C
As a general rule, apparent authority is relevant where the agent purports to exercise a power which he or she does not have, as distinct from where the agent threatens to misuse actual power. Compare Restatement §6 (defining “power”) with §8 (defining “apparent authority”). In the usual case, a supervisor’s harassment involves misuse of actual power, not the false impression of its existence. Apparent authority analysis therefore is inappropriate in this context. If, in the unusual case, it is alleged there is a false impression that the actor was a supervisor, when he in fact was not, the victim’s mistaken conclusion must be a reasonable one. Restatement § 8, Comment c (“Apparent authority exists only to the extent it is reasonable for the third person dealing with the agent to believe that the agent is authorized”). When a party seeks to impose vicarious liability based on an agent’s misuse of delegated authority, the Restatement’s aided in the agency relation rule, rather than the apparent authority rule, appears to be the appropriate form of analysis.
D
We turn to the aided in the agency relation standard. In a sense, most workplace tortfeasors are aided in accomplishing their tortious objective by the existence of the agency relation: Proximity and regular contact may afford a captive pool of potential victims. See Gary v. Long, 59 F. 3d 1391, 1397 (CADC 1995). Were this to satisfy the aided in the agency relation standard, an employer would be subject to vicarious liability not only for all supervisor harassment, but also for all co-worker harassment, a result enforced by neither the EEOC nor any court of appeals to have considered the issue. See, e. g., Blankenship v. Parke Care Centers, Inc., 123 F. 3d 868, 872 (CA6 1997), cert. denied, 522 U. S. 1110 (1998) (sex discrimination); McKenzie v. Illinois Dept. of Transp., 92 F. 3d 473, 480 (CA7 1996) (sex discrimination); Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F. 2d 1264, 1273 (CA7 1991) (race discrimination); see also 29 CFR § 1604.11(d) (1997) (“knows or should have known” standard of liability for cases of harassment between “fellow employees”). The aided in the agency relation standard, therefore, requires the existence of something more than the employment relation itself.
At the outset, we can identify a class of cases where, beyond question, more than the mere existence of the employment relation aids in commission of the harassment: when a supervisor takes a tangible employment action against the subordinate. Every Federal Court of Appeals to have considered the question has found vicarious liability when a discriminatory act results in a tangible employment action. See, e. g., Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F. 3d 1122, 1127 (CA10 1993) (“ ‘If the plaintiff can show that she suffered an economic injury from her supervisor’s actions, the employer becomes strictly liable without any further showing...’ ”). In Meritor, we acknowledged this consensus. See 477 U. S., at 70-71 (“[Tjhe courts have consistently held employers liable for the discriminatory discharges of employees by supervisory personnel, whether or not the employer knew, or should have known, or approved of the supervisor’s actions”). Although few courts have elaborated how agency principles support this rule, we think it reflects a correct application of the aided in the agency relation standard.
In the context of this ease, a tangible employment action would have taken the form of a denial of a raise or a promotion. The concept of a tangible employment aetion appears in numerous cases in the Courts of Appeals discussing claims involving race, age, and national origin discrimination, as well as sex discrimination. Without endorsing the specific results of those decisions, we think it prudent to import the concept of a tangible employment action for resolution of the vicarious liability issue we consider here. A tangible employment action constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits. Compare Crady v. Liberty Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Ind., 993 F. 2d 132, 136 (CA7 1993) (“A materially adverse change might be indicated by a termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices that might be unique to a particular situation”), with Flaherty v. Gas Research Institute, 31 F. 3d 451, 456 (CA7 1994) (a “bruised ego” is not enough), Kocsis v. Multi-Care Management, Inc., 97 F. 3d 876, 887 (CA6 1996) (demotion without change in pay, benefits, duties, or prestige insufficient), and Harlston v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37 F. 3d 379, 382 (CA8 1994) (reassignment to more inconvenient job insufficient).
When a supervisor makes a tangible employment decision, there is assurance the injury could not have been inflicted absent the agency relation. A tangible employment action in most eases inflicts direct economic harm. As a general proposition, only a supervisor, or other person acting with the authority of the company, can cause this sort of injury. A co-worker can break a co-worker’s arm as easily as a supervisor, and anyone who has regular contact with an employee can inflict psychological injuries by his or her offensive conduct. See Gary, supra, at 1397; Henson, 682 F. 2d, at 910; Barnes v. Costle, 561 F. 2d 983, 996 (CADC 1977) (MacKinnon, J., concurring). But one co-worker (absent some elaborate scheme) cannot dock another’s pay, nor can. one co-worker demote another. Tangible employment actions fall within the special province of the supervisor. The supervisor has been empowered by the company as a distinct class of agent to make economic decisions affecting other employees under his or her control.
Tangible employment actions are the means by which the supervisor brings the official power of the enterprise to bear on subordinates. A tangible employment decision requires an official act of the enterprise, a company act. Tie decision in most cases is documented in official company records, and may be subject to review by higher level supervisors. E. g., Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F. 2d 398, 405 (CA7 1990) (noting that the supervisor did not fire plaintiff; rather, the Career Path Committee did, but the employer was still liable because the committee functioned as the supervisor’s “cat’s-paw”). The supervisor often must obtain the imprimatur of the enterprise and use its internal processes. See Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Center, Inc., 957 F. 2d 59, 62 (CA2 1992) (“From the perspective of the employee, the supervisor and the employer merge into a single entity”).
For these reasons, a tangible employment action taken by the supervisor becomes for Title VII purposes the act of the employer. Whatever the exact contours of the aided in the agency relation standard, its requirements will always be met when a supervisor takes a tangible employment action against a subordinate. In that instance, it would be implausible to interpret agency principles to allow an employer to escape liability, as Meritor itself appeared to acknowledge. See supra, at 760-761.
Whether the agency relation aids in commission of supervisor harassment which does not culminate in a tangible employment action is less obvious. Application of the standard is made difficult by its malleable terminology, which can be read to either expand or limit liability in the context of supervisor harassment. On the one hand, a supervisor’s power and authority invests his or her harassing conduct with a particular threatening character, and in this sense, a supervisor always is aided by the agency relation. See Meritor, 477 U. S., at 77 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment) (“[I]t is precisely because the supervisor is understood to be clothed with the employer’s authority that he is able to impose unwelcome sexual conduct on subordinates”). On the other hand, there are acts of harassment a supervisor might commit which might be the same acts a coemployee would commit, and there may be some circumstances where the supervisor’s status makes little difference.
It is this tension which, we think, has caused so much confusion among the Courts of Appeals which have sought to apply the aided in the agency relation standard to Title VII cases. The aided in the agency relation standard, however, is a developing feature of agency law, and we hesitate to render a definitive explanation of our understanding of the standard in an area where other important considerations must affect our judgment. In particular, we are bound by our holding in Meritor that agency principles constrain the imposition of vicarious liability in cases of supervisory harassment. See id., at 72 (“Congress’ decision to define ‘employer’ to include any ‘agent’ of an employer, 42 U. S
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | B | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Breyer
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (MPPAA), 94 Stat. 1208, 29 U. S. C. §§1381-1461, provides that an employer who withdraws from an underfunded multi-employer pension plan must pay a charge sufficient to cover that employer’s fair share of the plan’s unfunded liabilities. The statute permits the employer to pay that charge in lump sum or to “amortize” it, making payments over time. This case focuses upon a withdrawing employer who amortizes the charge, and it asks when, for purposes of calculating the amortization schedule, interest begins to accrue on the amortized charge. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that, for purposes of computation, interest begins to accrue on the first day of the year after withdrawal. We agree and affirm its judgment.
I
We shall briefly describe the general purpose of MPPAA, the basic way MPPAA works, and the relevant interest-related facts of the case before us.
A
MPPAA’s General Purpose
MPPAA helps solve a problem that became apparent after Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 829, 29 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq. ERISA helped assure private-sector workers that they would receive the pensions that their employers had promised them. See, e. g., Concrete Pipe & Products of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern Cal., 508 U. S. 602, 605-609 (1993). To do so, among other things, ERISA required employers to make contributions that would produce pension plan assets sufficient to meet future vested pension liabilities; it mandated termination insurance to protect workers against a plan’s bankruptcy; and, if a plan became insolvent, it held any employer who had withdrawn from the plan during the previous five years liable for a fair share of the plan’s underfunding. See 26 U. S. C. § 412 (minimum funding standards); 29 U. S. C. § 1082 (samé); 29 U. S. C. § 1301 et seq. (termination insurance); 29 Ü. S. C. § 1364 (withdrawal liability).
Unfortunately, this scheme encouraged an employer to withdraw from a financially shaky plan and risk paying its share if the plan later became insolvent, rather than to remain and (if others withdrew) risk having to bear alone the entire cost of keeping the shaky plan afloat. Consequently, a plan’s financial troubles could trigger a stampede for the exit doors, thereby ensuring the plan’s demise. See Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 475 U. S. 211, 216 (1986); Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation v. R. A. Gray & Co., 467 U. S. 717, 722-723, n. 2 (1984); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1001a(a)(4); H. R. Rep. No. 96-869, pt. 1, pp. 54-55 (1980); D. McGill & D. Grubbs, Fundamentals of Private Pensions 618-619 (6th ed. 1989). MPPAA helped eliminate this problem by changing the strategic considerations. It transformed what was only a risk (that a withdrawing employer would have to pay a fair share of underfunding) into a certainty. That is to say, it imposed a withdrawal charge on all employers withdrawing from an underfunded plan (whether or not the plan later became insolvent). And, it set forth a detailed set of rules for determining, and collecting, that charge.
B
MPPAA’s Basic Approach
The way in which MPPAA calculates interest is related to the way in which that statute answers three more general, and more important, questions: First, how much is the withdrawal charge? MPPAA’s lengthy charge-determination section, § 1391, sets forth rules for calculating a withdrawing employer’s fair share of a plan’s underfunding. See 29 U. S. C. § 1391. It explains (a) how to determine a plan’s total underfunding; and (b) how to determine an employer’s fair share (based primarily upon the comparative number of that employer’s covered workers in each earlier year and the related level of that employer’s contributions).
One might expect § 1391 to calculate a withdrawal charge that equals the withdrawing employer’s fair share of a plan’s underfunding as of the day the employer withdraws. But, instead, §1391 instructs a plan to make the withdrawal charge calculation, not as of the day of withdrawal, but as of the last day of the plan year preceding the year during which the employer withdrew — a day that could be up to a year earlier. See §§ 1391(b)(2)(A)(ii), (b)(2)(E)(i), (c)(2)(C)(i), (c)(3)(A), and (c)(4)(A). Thus (assuming for illustrative purposes that a plan’s bookkeeping year and the calendar year coincide), the withdrawal charge for an employer withdrawing from an underfunded plan in 1981 equals that employer’s fair share of the underfunding as calculated on December 31, 1980, whether the employer withdrew the next day (January 1,1981) or a year later (December 31,1981). The reason for this calculation date seems one of administrative convenience. Its use permits a plan to base the highly complex calculations upon figures that it must prepare in any event for a report required under ERISA, see 29 U. S. C. § 1082(c) (9), thereby avoiding the need to generate new figures tied to the date of actual withdrawal.
Second, how may the employer pay the withdrawal charge? The statute sets forth two methods: (a) payment in a lump sum; and (b) payment in installments. The statute’s lump-sum method is relatively simple. A withdrawing employer may pay the entire liability when the first payment falls due; pay installments for a while and then discharge its remaining liability; or make a partial balloon payment and afterwards pay installments. See 29 U. S. C. § 1399(c)(4). The statute’s installment method is more complex. The statutory method is unusual in that the statute does not ask the question that a mortgage borrower would normally ask, namely, what is the amount of each of my monthly payments? What size monthly payment will amortize, say, a 7% 30-year loan of $100,000? Rather, the statute fixes the amount of each payment and asks how many such payments there will have to be. To put the matter more precisely, (1) the statute fixes the amount of each annual payment at a level that (roughly speaking) equals the withdrawing employer’s typical contribution in earlier years; (2) it sets an interest rate, equal to the rate the plan normally uses for its calculations; and (3) it then asks how many such annual payments it will take to “amortize” the withdrawal charge at that interest rate. 29 U. S. C. §§ 1399(c)(l)(A)(i), (c)(l)(A)(ii), (c)(1)(C).
It is as if Brown, who owes Smith $1,000, were to ask, not, “How much must I pay each month to pay off the debt (with 7% interest) over two years?” — but, rather, “Assuming 7% interest, how many $100 monthly payments must I make to pay off that debt?” To bring the facts closer to those of this case, assume that an employer withdraws from an underfunded plan in mid-1981; that the withdrawal charge (calculated as of the end of 1980) is $23.3 million; that the employer normally contributes about $4 million per year to the plan; and that the plan uses a 7% interest rate. In that case, the statute asks: “How many annual payments of about $4 million does it take to pay off a debt of $23.3 million if the interest rate is 7%?” The fact that the statute poses the installment-plan question in this way, along with an additional feature of the statute, namely, that the statute forgives all debt outstanding after 20 years, 29 U. S. C. § 1399(c)(1)(B), suggests that maintaining level funding for the plan is an important goal of the statute. The practical effect of this concern with maintaining level payments is that any amortization interest § 1399(c)(l)(A)(i) may cause to accrue is added to the end of the payment schedule (unless forgiven by § 1399(c)(1)(B)).
Third, when must the employer pay? The statute could not make the employer pay the calculated sum (or begin to pay that sum) on the date in reference to which one calculates the withdrawal charge, for that date occurs before the employer withdraws. (It is the last day of the preceding plan year, i. e., December 31,1980, for an employer who withdraws in 1981.) The statute, of course, might make the withdrawing employer pay (or begin payment) on the date the employer actually withdraws. But, it does not do so. Rather, the statute says that a plan must draw up a schedule for payment and “demand payment” as “soon as practicable” after withdrawal. 29 U. S. C. § 1399(b)(1). It adds that “[withdrawal liability shall be payable ... no more than 60 days after the date of the demand.” § 1399(c)(2).
Thus, a plan that calculates quickly might demand payment the day after withdrawal and make the charge “payable” within 60 days thereafter. A plan that calculates slowly might not be able to demand payment for many months after withdrawal. For example, in the case of the employer who withdraws on August 14, 1981, incurring a withdrawal charge of $23.3 million (calculated as of December 31, 1980), the lump sum of $23.3 million, or the first of the installment payments of roughly $4 million, will become “payable” to the plan “no later than 60 days” after the plan sent the withdrawing employer a demand letter. The day of the first payment may thus come as soon as within 60 days after August 15, 1981, or it may not come for many months thereafter, depending upon the plan’s calculating speed.
C
This Case
The facts of this case approximate those of our example. Three brewers, Schlitz, Pabst, and Miller, contributed for many years to a multiemployer pension plan (Plan). On August 14, 1981, Schlitz withdrew from the Plan. See App. 151-152. By the end of September 1981, the Plan completed its calculations, created a payment schedule, and sent out a demand for payment (thereby making the first installment payment “payable”) “on or before November 1, 1981.” Id., at 153, 154. From the outset, the parties agreed that the annual installment payment amounted to $3,945,481, and that the relevant interest rate was 7% per year. After various controversies led to arbitration and a court proceeding between Schlitz and the Plan, the courts and parties eventually determined that the withdrawal charge (calculated as of the last day of the previous plan-bookkeeping year, December 31, 1980) amounted to $23.3 million.
But the parties disagreed whether interest accrued during 1981, the year in which Schlitz withdrew. The Plan claimed that, for purposes of calculating the installment schedule, interest started accruing on the last day of the plan year preceding withdrawal (December 31, 1980). Schlitz, on the other hand, argued that accrual began on the first day of the plan year following withdrawal (January 1, 1982). Under either reading, the number of annual payments is eight. But, under the Plan’s reading, the final payment would amount to $3,499,361, whereas, in Schlitz’s reading, that payment would amount to $880,331.
The arbitrator in this case agreed with Schlitz’s reading. See 9 EBC 2385,2405 (1988). The District Court, reviewing the arbitration award, disagreed, No. 88-C-908 (ED Wis., June 6, 1991), reprinted in App. 25, 62-69, but the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the District Court, 3 F. 3d 994 (1993). Because the Seventh Circuit’s decision conflicts with a holding of the Third Circuit, Huber v. Casablanca Industries, Inc., 916 F. 2d 85, 95-100 (1990), cert. dism’d, 506 U. S. 1088 (1993), this Court granted certiorari, 512 U. S. 1234 (1994). Our conclusion, like that of the Seventh Circuit, is that, for purposes of computation, interest does not start accruing until the beginning of the plan year after withdrawal.
II
At first glance, the statutory provision that (the parties agree) governs this case seems silent on the issue of withdrawal-year interest. Indeed, it does not mention interest directly at all. Rather, it says that a withdrawing employer
“shall pay the amount determined under section 1391... over the period of years necessary to amortize the amount in level annual payments determined under sub-paragraph (C), calculated as if the first payment were made on the first day of the plan year following the plan year in which the withdrawal occurs and as if each subsequent payment were made on the first day of each subsequent plan year.” 29 U. S. C. § 1399(c)(l)(A)(i) (emphasis added).
After considering the parties’ arguments, which focus upon the emphasized language, we have become convinced that, for purposes of computation, this provision, although causing interest to accrue over subsequent plan years, does not cause interest to accrue during the withdrawal year itself.
A
The Plan points out, and we agree, that' the word “amortize” normally assumes interest charges. After all, the very idea of amortizing, say, a mortgage loan, involves paying the principal of the debt over time along with interest. But the Plan (supported by the Government, which is taking a view of the matter contrary to the view the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation took in the Huber case, see 916 F. 2d, at 96) goes on to claim that the word “amortize” indicates that interest accrues during the withdrawal year as well as during subsequent years. We do not agree with that claim. In our view, one generally does not pay interest on a debt until that debt arises — that is to say, until the principal of the debt is outstanding. And the instruction to calculate payment as if the first payment were made at the beginning of the following year tells us to treat the debt as if it arose at that time (i. e., the first day of the year after withdrawal), not as if it arose one year earlier.
For one thing, unless a loan is involved, one normally expects a debtor to make a first payment at the time the debt arises, not one payment cycle later. Suppose, for example, that a taxpayer arranges to pay a large tax debt in four quarterly installments. Would one not expect the taxpayer to make the first payment on April 16, the day the tax debt becomes due? Similarly, would one not expect a buyer of, say, a business to make the first payment (a down payment) at the time of the closing? By way of contrast, when a loan is involved (say, when one borrows money on a home mortgage and repays it in installments), interest accrual normally does begin before the first payment. That is because the borrower has had the use of the money for one cycle before the first payment. In the case of a loan, it would seem pointless, and would simply generate an unnecessary back-and-forth transfer of money, for a first repayment to take place on the very day the lender disburses the loan proceeds.
The “first payment” at issue here, however, looks more like a tax or purchase-money installment than a loan installment. Under the statute, the withdrawing employer’s debt does not arise at the end of the year preceding the year of withdrawal. In fact, the employer may not have withdrawn from the plan at the beginning of the year, but instead may have continued to make its ordinary contribution until well into the year. In any event, the statute makes clear that the withdrawing employer owes nothing until its plan demands payment, which will inevitably happen some time after the beginning of the year. See 29 U. S. C. §§ 1399(b)(1), (c)(2). In fact, the withdrawing employer cannot determine, or pay, the amount of its debt until the plan has calculated that amount — which must take place some time after the beginning of the withdrawal year. All these features make it difficult to find any analogy in withdrawal liability to a loan.
For another thing, we cannot easily reconcile the Plan’s reading of the statute with the statutory provision that permits an employer to pay the amount owed in a lump sum. That provision says that a withdrawing employer We read this provision to permit an employer, by paying a lump sum, to avoid paying the amortization interest that § 1399(c)(l)(A)(i) would otherwise cause to accrue. (Under any other reading, the prepayment provision would not create much of an “entitle[ment].” Moreover, the prepayment provision refers to “payments determined under [§ 1399(c)(1) (C)]” — not § 1399(c)(1)(A), the provision that causes amortization interest to accrue.) It would seem odd if the prepayment provision enabled an employer to avoid all interest except the interest accruing during the year of withdrawal. And, if interest accrued from the last day of the year before withdrawal, there would hardly ever be a time that no interest was due. Such a reading would thus make it very difficult to give meaning to the words “if any” in the phrase “plus accrued interest, if any.” (The Third Circuit suggested that these words might refer to a lump-sum payment made immediately after a scheduled installment. See Huber, 916 F. 2d, at 99. We agree that they could, theoretically. But, realistically speaking, it seems unlikely that Congress inserted “if any” to deal with such an unusual event.)
“shall be entitled to prepay the outstanding amount of the unpaid annual withdrawal liability payments determined under [§ 1399(c)(1)(C)], plus accrued interest, if any, in whole or in part, without penalty.” § 1399(c)(4).
Further, the interpretation under which interest would accrue from the last day of the year before withdrawal is difficult to reconcile with the statutory language that defines a withdrawing employer’s basic liability. Section 1381(a) says that the withdrawing employer becomes “liable to the plan in the amount determined under this part to be the withdrawal liability.” Section 1381(b)(1) defines “withdrawal liability” as “the amount determined under section 1391.” Yet, § 1391 says nothing about a year’s worth of interest. Why then read the provision here at issue so that it inevitably and always creates liability in the amount of the withdrawal charge plus one year's interest, irrespective of when the employer, in fact, withdraws and how or when the employee begins to pay?
Finally, the provision here at issue asks one to calculate the installment payments as if the “first payment” was made, not on the last day of the withdrawal year, but on the “first day” of the next year, i. e., one year plus one day after the withdrawal charge calculation date. This choice of time (a year and a day) would be an odd way to signal that one is to treat the first payment as if it occurred at the end of a cycle.
B
The Plan (and supporting amici) make several arguments in support of a reading in which, for purposes of calculation, interest starts accruing on the last day of the year before withdrawal. But we are not persuaded.
First, the Plan argues that our interpretation works against the basic objective of the statute, requiring a withdrawing employer to pay a fair share of the underfunding. Under our interpretation, says the Plan, the withdrawing employer will fail to pay a year’s worth of interest on the withdrawal charge, thereby requiring the remaining employers to make up what, in fact, was part of the withdrawing employer’s fair share. Suppose, for example, that an underfunded plan needed exactly $20 million as of the end of 1980 to create a sum that would grow to just the amount needed to pay then-vested benefits falling due, say, in 1999. By the end of 1981 that same plan would need more money; indeed, if we assume the $20 million would have grown 7% each year, it would need 7% more to pay those same vested 1999 benefits. Thus, if the withdrawing employer’s fair share of the $20 million is $3 million as of the end of 1980, its fair share must have grown to $3,210,000 by the end of 1981. Why, asks the Plan, should the remaining employers have to make up for this missing $210,000?
One answer to the Plan’s question is that the $210,000 will not necessarily be missing. For one thing, until the employer withdraws, it will be required to make contributions that should contain a component designed to reduce underfunding. See 26 U. S. C. § 412(b)(2); 29 U. S. C. § 1082. For another thing, if a plan moves quickly, it may be able to force a withdrawing employer to begin making installment payments even before the end of the withdrawal year. Either way, to charge such an employer a full year’s worth of interest would overcharge that employer and thereby provide the remaining employers with a kind of underfunding-reduction windfall.
Another answer is that we are not convinced that MPPAA aims to make withdrawing employers pay an actuarially perfect fair share, namely, a set of payments in amounts that, when invested, would theoretically produce (on the plan’s actuarial assumptions) a sum precisely sufficient to pay (the employer’s proportional share of) a plan’s estimated vested future benefits. For one thing, the statute forgives de mini-mis amounts. See 29 U. S. C. § 1389. For another thing, it forgives all annual installment payments after 20 years, see § 1399(c)(1)(B) — and that means that, if an employer’s normal annual contribution was low compared to the withdrawal charge, the presence or absence of withdrawal-year interest (which shows up at the end of the payment schedule, see supra, at 419) will make no difference (for the last payments will never be made). Finally, in making the first installment “payable” only after a plan demands it, MPPAA contemplates that an employer sometimes may pay its actual first installment long after the withdrawal year — as was the case in Huber, supra, at 88 (2V2-year delay) — in which case no interpretation of the statute can avoid an employer’s actually paying something less than its fair share of interest.
Second, the Plan argues that the statute’s language favors its interpretation. It refers to a dictionary that defines an amortization plan as “ ‘one where there are partial payments of the principal, and accrued interest, at stated periods for a definite time, at the expiration of which the entire indebtedness will be extinguished,’ ” Brief for Petitioner 27 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 76 (5th ed. 1979)) (emphasis added), and to another definition that says that, “ ‘[i]f a loan is being repaid by the amortization method, each payment is partially repayment of principal and partially payment of interest/ ” Brief for Petitioner 27 (quoting S. Kellison, The Theory of Interest 169 (2d ed. 1991)) (emphasis added). These definitions accurately describe the repayment of loans. But, they do not seem to focus upon whether or not one would normally include interest in the first installment of an amortized payment of a debt that is not a loan. We have no reason to believe they intend to define away the issue before us here.
The Plan adds that our reading of the statute makes the first “as if” clause in § 1399(c)(l)(A)(i) superfluous because, “if Congress had not intended to include interest in the first payment, it could have simply provided that the presumed payment schedule should be calculated as if payments were made annually.” Brief for Petitioner 38. It seems to us that the premise of this argument is that, without contrary indication, one would expect that, in the case of an indebtedness of the kind here at issue, interest would not start accruing before the first payment is due — a premise with which we agree, see supra, at 422-423. More importantly, had Congress not used the words “as if the first payment were made on the first day of the plan year following the plan year in which the withdrawal occurs,” the reader might have thought that interest would begin to accrue immediately upon withdrawal, a reading that has some intuitive appeal, see 3 F. 3d, at 1004 (“An assessment of interest between the date of withdrawal and the date on which payments begin . . . would not be troubling”). But, the first “as if” clause makes clear that interest does not begin accruing on that date. (The same concern may explain the second “as if” clause in §.1399(c)(l)(A)(i), concerning subsequent payments. Without that clause, one might think that one should calculate the amortization schedule as if the first payment is made out of order, and as if each successive payment is made on the anniversary of the date of withdrawal.)
We recognize that Congress might have been more specific. For example, it could have said: “Calculate amortization as if the first payment is made on the date the employer’s withdrawal liability is due” (had it intended interest to start accruing on that date); or: “Calculate amortization as if each payment is made on the last day of the year at the beginning of which it is due” (had it intended interest to start accruing one cycle before the first payment is due). Instead, Congress said that one should calculate amortization “as if the first payment were made on the first day of the plan year following the plan year in which the withdrawal occurs.” And, that actual language, as we have said, offers more support for our interpretation than for the alternative. Were we to read the actual language as does the Plan, we would have to analogize the valuation date (the last day of the year preceding withdrawal) to the date on which liability arises; to the date on which the debt becomes “payable”; or to the date on which the employer withdraws. But, in fact, the calculation date is none of those things; it is a date chosen simply for ease of administration; and ease of administration does not require choosing the same date for interest-accrual purposes. See 3 F. 3d, at 1004 (“Establishing a simple rule for calculating funding shortfalls has nothing to do with interest”).
Third, the Plan points to legislative history. The Plan says that the original bill provided that interest would not begin accruing until the date of withdrawal. And, the Plan points out, just like the version that ultimately became law, the bill located the valuation date (the date as of which the withdrawing employer’s share in the plan’s underfunding is determined) at the end of the plan year before withdrawal. Thus, the Plan says, the original bill contemplated a “funding gap” — from the valuation date to the withdrawal date. Because the section providing that interest started accruing on the withdrawal date did not make it into the statute as enacted, the Plan argues, Congress expressly rejected the idea of a “gap.” Brief for Petitioner 41.
For the reasons stated above, see supra, at 426-427, we doubt that our reading, as a practical matter, will cause a significant gap to occur. But, regardless, if we were to consider legislative history in this case, we would find that it undermines, rather than supports, the Plan’s reading. The Plan’s rendering is incomplete, for the relevant statutory provisions went through not two but four versions:
(1) the original bill, calling for a valuation on the last day of the year before withdrawal and for interest accrual beginning on the date of withdrawal,
see S. 1076, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., § 104 (1979) (adding ERISA §§ 4201(d)(1)(A), (e)(5)), reprinted in 125 Cong. Rec. 9800, 9803 (1979); H. R. 3904, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., §104 (1979) (adding ERISA §§ 4201(d) (1)(A), (e)(5)), reprinted in Hearings on the Multiem-ployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1979 before the Task Force on Welfare and Pension Plans of the Subcommittee on Labor-Management Relations of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 3,21,25 (1979) (hereinafter Task Force Hearings);
(2) a second version, which moved the valuation date to the end of the withdrawal year and also said that interest shall be determined “as if each payment were made at the end of the year in which it is due” (thus apparently indicating that interest would start accruing one year before the first payment fell due),
see H. R. 3904, supra, § 104 (adding ERISA §§ 4201(e) (2)(E), (f)(2)(C), (f)(3)(A), (f)(4)(A), (i)(2)(A) (ii)), reprinted in Task Force Hearings 246-247, 249, 251, 252,256;
(3) a third version, which kept the valuation date at the end of the withdrawal year but changed the interest-accrual language to the “as if” clauses found in the statute as we now know it,
see H. R. 3904, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., §104 (1980) (adding ERISA §§ 4201(e)(2)(E)(i), (f)(2)(C)(i), (f) (3)(A), (f)(4)(A), (i)(2)(A)(i)), reprinted in H. R. Rep. No. 96-869, pt. 1, pp. 12-15 (1980); H. R. 3904, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., §104 (1980) (adding ERISA §§4201(e)(2)(E)(i), (f)(2)(C)(i), (f)(3)(A), (f)(4)(A), 4202(c)(l)(A)(i)), reprinted in H. R. Rep. No. 96-869, pt. 2, pp. 129-131, 135-136 (1980); and
(4) a final version, which moved the valuation date back to the end of the year preceding withdrawal but retained the third version’s interest-accrual language,
see H. R. 3904, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., § 104 (1980) (adding ERISA §§4211(b)(2)(E)(i), (c)(2)(C)(i)(I), (c)(3)(A), (c)(4)(A)(i), 4219(c)(l)(A)(i)), reprinted in 126 Cong. Rec. 23003, 23014, 23016 (1980).
This history suggests two things, neither of which helps the Plan. First, throughout the bill’s history, the valuation date and interest-accrual date moved about in an apparently uncoordinated way. This somewhat undermines the Plan’s suggestion that Congress was very concerned about the interplay between the two. It certainly dispels the notion that the final version should primarily be viewed as a rejection of the “funding gap” found in the original bill. Second, the evolution of the “as if” clause from “as if each payment were made at the end of the year in which it is due” to “as if the payment were made on the first day of the plan year [following withdrawal]” suggests that Congress replaced a scheme in which interest starts accruing a full payment cycle before the first payment with a scheme in which interest starts accruing on the first day of the year following withdrawal.
III
We consequently hold that MPPAA calculates its installment schedule on the assumption that interest begins accruing on the first day of the year following withdrawal. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore
Affirmed.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Colonel John P. King, respondent, was retired from the Army for longevity (length of service) over his objection that he should have been retired for physical disability. Had his retirement been based on disability, Colonel King would have been entitled to an exemption from income taxation allowed by § 104 (a)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. § 104 (a) (4). He brought this action in the Court of Claims alleging that the Secretary of the Army’s action in rejecting his disability retirement was arbitrary, capricious, not supported by evidence, and therefore unlawful, and asked for a judgment against the United States for an amount of excess taxes he had been compelled to pay because he had been retired for longevity instead of disability. The Court of Claims agreed with the United States that the claim as filed was basically one for a refund of taxes and was therefore barred by King’s failure to allege that he had filed a timely claim for refund as required by 26 U. S. C. § 7422 (a). In this situation, the court suggested to counsel that it might have jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act and requested that briefs and arguments on this point be submitted to the court. This was done. The Court of Claims, in an illuminating and interesting opinion by Judge Davis, reached the conclusion that the court could exercise jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U. S. C. § 2201. In so holding, the court thereby rejected the Government’s contentions that the Declaratory Judgment Act does not apply to the Court of Claims and that the court’s jurisdiction is limited to actions asking for money judgments. By this ruling the court expressly declined to follow a long line of its own decisions beginning with Twin Cities Properties, Inc. v. United States, 81 Ct. Cl. 655 (1935). As the opinion of Judge Davis showed, the question of whether the Court of Claims has jurisdiction to issue declaratory judgments is both substantial and important. We granted certiorari to decide that question.
The Court of Claims was established by Congress in 1855. Throughout its entire history up until the time that this case was filed, its jurisdiction has been limited to money claims against the United States Government. In 1868 this Court held that “the only judgments which the Court of Claims [is] authorized to render against the government . . . are judgments for money found due from the government to the petitioner.” United States v. Alire, 6 Wall. 573, 575. In United States v. Jones, 131 U. S. 1, this Court reaffirmed this view of the limited jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, and held that the passage of the Tucker Act in 1887 had not expanded that jurisdiction to equitable matters. More recently, in 1962, it was said in the prevailing opinion in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U. S. 530, 557, on a point not disputed by any of the other members of the Court that “[f]rom the beginning [the Court of Claims] has been given jurisdiction only to award damages . . . .” No amendment purporting to increase the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims has been enacted since the decision in Zdanok.
The foregoing cases decided by this Court therefore clearly show that neither the Act creating the Court of Claims nor any amendment to it grants that court jurisdiction of this present case. That is true because Colonel King’s claim is not limited to actual, presently due money damages from the United States. Before he is entitled to such a judgment he must establish in some court that his retirement by the Secretary of the Army for longevity was legally wrong and that he is entitled to a declaration of his right to have his military records changed to show that he was retired for disability. This is essentially equitable relief of a kind that the Court of Claims has held throughout its history, up to the time this present case was decided, that it does not have the power to grant.
It is argued, however, that even if the Court of Claims Act with its amendments did not grant that court the authority to issue declaratory judgments, it was given that authority by the Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934. Support for this proposition is drawn from the language in the Declaratory Judgment Act that “[i]n a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any court of the United States . . . may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration.” The first answer to this contention is that, as we have pointed out, cases seeking relief other than money damages from the Court of Claims have never been “within its jurisdiction.” And we agree with the opinion of the Court of Claims in this case that the legislative history materials concerning the application of this Act to the Court of Claims “are, at best, ambiguous.” For the court below, it was sufficient that there was no clear indication that Congress affirmatively intended to exclude the Court of Claims from the scope of the Declaratory Judgment Act. We think that this approach runs counter to the settled propositions that the Court of Claims’ jurisdiction to grant relief depends wholly upon the extent to which the United States has waived its sovereign immunity to suit and that such a waiver cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584. This was precisely the position taken by the Court of Claims in a line of its own decisions beginning with Twin Cities Properties, Inc. v. United States, 81 Ct. Cl. 655 (1935). In that case, decided soon after the passage of the Declaratory Judgment Act, the Court of Claims held that it would require a specific and express statute of Congress to give the Court of Claims the power to issue declaratory judgments. The Court of Claims said in Twin Cities that:
“If Congress had intended to extend the scope of this court’s jurisdiction and subject the United States to the declaratory judgment act, we think express language would have been used to do so, and the court is not warranted in assuming an intention to widen its jurisdiction from the general provisions of the act which concerns a proceeding equitable in nature and foreign to any jurisdiction this court has heretofore exercised.” 81 Ct. Cl., at 658.
We think that the earlier decisions of the Court of Claims and those that have consistently followed them were correct. There is not a single indication in the Declaratory Judgment Act or its history that Congress, in passing that Act, intended to give the Court of Claims an expanded jurisdiction that had been denied to it for nearly a century. In the absence of an express grant of jurisdiction from Congress, we decline to assume that the Court of Claims has been given the authority to issue declaratory judgments.
Reversed.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Harlan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents a question concerning “federal common law" best explained after a summary of the facts and the legal proceedings involved.
At stake in the litigation are rights in several tracts, aggregating 827 acres, of oil-rich “mud lumps” or islands owned by the United States and located in a mouth of the Mississippi River near Burrwood, Louisiana. In 1954 petitioner, Floyd Wallis, filed with the Secretary of the Interior applications for a lease to exploit oil and gas deposits in the tracts. Because the tracts were deemed by Wallis to be “acquired lands” of the United States rather than “public domain lands,” these applications were filed under the Mineral Leasing Act for Acquired Lands, which governs the former, instead of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, which controls the latter. Subsequently, Wallis entered into a written joint venture agreement with respondent Patrick McKenna giving McKenna a one-third interest in the pending applications and any lease issued under those applications. Then Wallis, who had exclusive management of the property under his agreement with McKenna, sold respondent Pan American Petroleum Corporation an option to acquire any lease Wallis might obtain under the applications then on file with the Secretary.
In 1956, fearing that the tracts might prove to be public domain land, Wallis filed new applications for the same tracts under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. Thereafter the tracts were ruled to be public domain land, the conflicting applications of one or more competitors were rejected, and in 1958 the Secretary issued a lease of the tracts to Wallis under the 1920 Act. See Morgan v. Udall, 306 F. 2d 799. After the lease was issued to Wallis, McKenna brought a diversity action against him in Federal District Court in Louisiana seeking to be declared a one-third owner of the lease by virtue of the original joint venture agreement. Pan American also brought a diversity action in the same court to oblige Wallis to perform the option agreement by transferring the lease to Pan American.
The actions were consolidated, and following a nonjury trial the District Court held that neither McKenna nor Pan American was entitled to any interest in the disputed lease. 200 F. Supp. 468. The trial judge ruled that Louisiana law governed the rights of the parties and required a written agreement to create or transfer any interest in a mineral lease, thus excluding oral agreements as a basis for relief in this case. The judge then decided that the written agreements available to McKenna and Pan American contemplated they would share only in leases obtained by Wallis under the Mineral Leasing Act for Acquired Lands and not in any leases granted him under any other law. The court’s judgment in favor of Wallis on the question of lease ownership reserved to McKenna and Pan American whatever rights they might have to damages, restitution, or like remedies based on oral agreements or other conduct.
Over a dissent, the Court of Appéals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, filing an initial opinion, 344 F. 2d 432, and after petitions for rehearing, a further opinion adhering to its earlier result, 344 F. 2d 439. The court decided only that the trial judge had erred in applying Louisiana law to the controversy and it remanded for a new trial in which “applicable principles of federal law” would control the issues. 344 F. 2d, at 437, 442. In its latter opinion the Court of Appeals reasoned that the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 imposed pervasive federal regulation and that the Act’s policies and the federal interest would be impaired if Louisiana law were to thwart the transfer of these federally granted leases. The opinion acknowledged an apparent conflict with the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Blackner v. McDermott, 176 F. 2d 498. We granted certiorari and invited the views of the United States, 382 U. S. 810, which filed a brief amicus curiae. We now reverse the Court of Appeals.
The question before us is whether in general federal or state law should govern the dealings of private parties in an oil and gas lease validly issued under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. Several related matters in the case should be distinguished and laid aside at the outset.
First, we are not concerned with whether under Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, the Federal District Court might have diverged from state practice on the relevant issues of statute of frauds, parol evidence, estoppel, trust remedies, and so forth, on the ground that they were no more than “procedural” rules or fell under some similar rubric. See generally Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U. S. 460. Respondents do not argue that these rules are merely “housekeeping” matters on which state and federal courts may ordinarily differ but rather that the federal interest in government-granted mineral leases requires supplanting Louisiana law, in which event the federal rule would normally govern any such case whether in state or federal court. See Dice v. Akron, C. & Y. R. Co., 342 U. S. 359. Second, apart from a pre-empting federal interest, we do not consider suggestions that some law other than Louisiana’s should govern because the land at issue may be outside the legal boundaries of the State and transactions between the parties may have occurred elsewhere. The District Court sitting in Louisiana obviously assumed that the State as a choice of law matter would apply its own law to the questions. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U. S. 487. If any challenge was offered on this point below, it has not yet been passed on by the Court of Appeals. Third, whether on the merits the trial court correctly interpreted and implemented Louisiana law is not before us; presumably that issue was presented to the Court of Appeals but not resolved because of its decision that federal law should apply.
We focus now on the central question in the case. In deciding whether rules of federal common law should be fashioned, normally the guiding principle is that a significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use of state law in the premises must first be specifically shown. It is by no means enough that, as we may assume, Congress could under the Constitution readily enact a complete code of law governing transactions in federal mineral leases among private parties. Whether latent federal power should be exercised to displace state law is primarily a decision for Congress. Even where there is related federal legislation in an area, as is true in this instance, it must be remembered that “Congress acts . . . against the background of the total corpus juris of the states . . . .” Hart & Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 435 (1953). Because we find no significant threat to any identifiable federal policy or interest, we do not press on to consider other questions relevant to invoking federal common law, such as the strength of the state interest in having its own rules govern, cf. United States v. Yazell, 382 U. S. 341, 351-353, the feasibility of creating a judicial substitute, cf. U. A. W. v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U. S. 696, 701, and other similar factors.
If there is a federal statute dealing with the general subject, it is a prime repository of federal policy and a starting point for federal common law. See Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U. S. 190; Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F. 2d 691. We find nothing in the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 expressing policies inconsistent with state law in the area that concerns us here. In providing for development of public domain lands containing minerals, the Act comprehensively regulates various aspects of the process. For example, it governs issuance of leases among competing applicants, e. g., § 17 (b), (c), 30 U. S. C. § 226 (b), (c); it controls in some measure the actual use of the leased tract, to promote goals such as conservation and safety, e. g., § 30, 30 U. S. C. § 187; and it deals with rent and royalty payments to be made to the Government, e. g., § 17 (d), 30 U. S. C. §226 (d). New provisions lend themselves at all to the creation of a federal law of the rights inter se of private parties dealing in the leases.
Perhaps most prominent among those that are relevant is § 30a, 30 U. S. C. § 187a, which provides that oil and gas leases shall be assignable. The Court of Appeals’ opinion relied on this provision, together with reasons why assignment of leases may promote federal policy, in justifying the use of federal rather than state law. However fitting this approach may be where a State interposes unreasonable conditions on assignability, it can have no force in this instance because Louisiana concededly provides a quite feasible route for transferring any mineral lease or contracting to do so, namely, by written instrument. See 200 F. Supp., at 471 and n. 13. Section 27 (d)(2), 30 U. S. C. § 184 (d)(2), also bears directly on the rights of the parties between themselves by rendering unenforcible any option not filed with the Secretary and any option running for more than three years without prior approval of the Secretary; however, this section enacts a pair of narrow, self-sufficient statutory defenses, which is no reason for creating at large a federal common law of federal mineral lease contracts among private interests.
Nor is respondents’ position aided by the provisions fixing qualifications for lessees to the extent of curtailing alien ownership and limiting any lessee or option holder to a maximum number of acres. The Secretary, who must approve all assignments before the lease obligations or record titles are shifted finally, is entirely free to disapprove assignees however valid their assignments may otherwise be. Finally, it is said that because the leases are issued by the United States and concern federal lands, there is a federal interest in having private disputes over them justly resolved. Apart from the highly abstract nature of this interest, there has been no showing that state law is not adequate to achieve it.
A concluding word must be said about precedents in this Court, which have been copiously cited in this litigation. The Court of Appeals in its initial opinion and at least one of the respondents in his brief have sought support in the general principle, repeated in a number of our cases, that the transfer of property by the United States to a private party is governed by federal law and only subsequent transfers among private parties are subject to state law. E. g., Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet. 498, 517; Buchser v. Buchser, 231 U. S. 157. Notwithstanding the unchallenged grant of the lease to Wallis, it is apparently argued that this conveyed title subject to outstanding equities in favor of respondents and that federal law retains its initial hold on the lease until existing equities are resolved. The important case cited by respondents and the Court of Appeals for this approach, which would presumably confine federal law to governing equitable obligations of the lessee arising prior to his receipt of the lease, is Irvine v. Marshall, 20 How. 558. In that case an agent who had purchased land in his own name on behalf of two principals refused to convey one of the principals his interest; although local law aimed to discourage undisclosed purchases by proxy by refusing to enforce such equitable claims, this Court held that fed-, eral law displaced local law and ordered that a trust be recognized.
We take the decision in Irvine to rest on its most precise explanation: that enforcement of the equitable claim was required because the local rule discouraged purchasing through agents and so threatened to hamper the Federal Government in selling its land. 20 How., at 562. While this appraisal of the interests may be debatable, the use of federal law beyond the stage of the initial grant was explained by a specific federal interest found to conflict with local law. That no conflict exists in the present case has already been demonstrated. Other cases cited to us of federal equity courts resolving private disputes over government-granted property seem quite distinguishable, for example, because there was no asserted conflict with local law, Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch 148, or because a government grant itself was flawed in some manner, see Widdicombe v. Childers, 124 U. S. 400.
Having concluded that federal law should not govern the present controversy, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to that court so that it may consider any other contentions respondents may have urged, including their claim that they should prevail under Louisiana law.
Vacated and remanded.
Mr. Justice Black, substantially agreeing with the majority opinions of the Court of Appeals, would affirm its judgment.
Louisiana is said to have challenged the title of the United States in another suit, see McKenna v. Wallis, 200 F. Supp. 468, 470, n. 2, but in this case the parties accept the premise of federal ownership.
The Mineral Leasing Act for Acquired Lands is 61 Stat. 913, 30 U. S. C. §§351-359 (1964 ed.); the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 is 41 Stat. 437, as amended, 30 U. S. C. § 181 et seq. (1964 ed.). While the precise distinction is of no concern here, in general acquired lands are those granted or sold to the United States by a State or citizen and public domain lands were usually never in state or private ownership.
It appears that applications filed under the wrong Act are treated as ineffective, 200 F. Supp., at 471 and n. 10; see 43 CFK, § 3212.1 (b) (1965), but that filing separate applications under each Act for the same land is allowed.
See also other arguably conflicting decisions in the Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits collected in 40 Tulane L. Rev. 195, 199, nn. 18-20.
How possible federal rules would differ from those used by Louisiana has not been specified precisely. The Court of Appeals intimated that the devices of resulting and constructive trusts, said not to be recognized in Louisiana, might be available under federal law and useful to respondents. It may be thought that federal law would not embody a statute of frauds so oral understandings could be proved. In this instance, we believe the question of applicability of state versus federal law can be decided without further refinement of the issue.
Other provisions that have something to do with transfer of lease rights are ones providing for surrender of leases to the Secretary, §30, 30 U. S. C. §187; for a time period in which persons may dispose of leases illegally held but involuntarily acquired, § 27 (g), 30 U. S. C. § 184 (g); and for protecting the rights of bona fide purchasers if the Secretary seeks to cancel a lease for violations of the Act, §27 (h), 30 U. S. C. § 184 (h). Nowhere is it suggested how use of Louisiana law on the questions before us might interfere with policies behind these sections, whose provisions basically relate to the rights of private persons vis-á-vis the Secretary.
§§ 1, 27 (d), 30 U. S. C. §§ 181, 184 (d). Conceivably, the rights of private parties among themselves might be relevant data in deciding whether these sections were violated, e. g., whether an alien “controlled” a lease within the meaning of the statute; since the relevance would itself be decided by federal law, the federal interest is secure.
Section 30a, 30 U. S. C. § 187a, requires approval unless the assignee is not qualified or fails to post the required bond. Where there is a private dispute as to the validity or effect of an assignment, the Secretary does not decide the question and he will not approve the assignment or take other action until the parties settle their dispute in court. See McCulloch Oil Corp. of California, Int. Dept. Decision No. A-30208 (Nov. 25, 1964).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | J | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This appeal challenges the power of the State of Massachusetts to impose a tax on federal savings and loan associations. Relying on a federal law forbidding States to tax federal associations more heavily than “similar” state institutions, appellants contend that the State’s tax discriminates against federal associations because: (1) the state institutions subject to the tax are allowed a larger deduction for required additions to reserves than federal associations, and (2) the state tax does not apply to credit unions, which appellants believe to be “similar” to federal savings and loan associations.
In the Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933, Congress authorized the creation of federally chartered savings and loan associations. 48 Stat. 128. Section 5 (h) of that Act, as amended, 76 Stat. 984, 12 U. S, 0. § 1464 (h) (1976 ed.), provides:
“No State, county, municipal, or local taxing authority shall impose any tax on such associations or their franchise, capital, reserves, surplus, loans, or income greater than that imposed by such authority on other similar local mutual or cooperative thrift and' home financing institutions.”
As enacted in 1966, the Massachusetts statute imposed an excise tax, measured by deposits and income, on state cooperative banks, state savings banks, and state and federal savings and loan associations. 1966 Mass. Acts, ch. 14, § 11. In 1973, the deposits aspect of the tax was invalidated as discriminatory. United States v. State Tax Comm’n, 481 F. 2d 963 (CA1 1973). See n. 3, infra. The present case, brought in state court in 1975, challenges the income aspect of the tax. It was presented on stipulated facts to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, which upheld the statute. 372 Mass. 478, 363 N. E. 2d 474 (1977). We affirm.
I
The state tax statute allows a financial institution to deduct from its taxable income any “minimum additions ... to its guaranty fund or surplus required by law or the appropriate federal and state supervisory authorities.” Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 63, § 11 (6) (West Supp. 1977). As might be expected, the reserves required by state and federal regulators are not precisely the same. Before 1970, each federal association was required to adopt a charter providing for a minimum reserve equal to 10% of the association’s capital. See 12 CFR §544.1 (1977). This reserve was as large as, or larger than, the reserves that Massachusetts required its institutions to maintain. In 1970, federal associations were allowed to delete the reserve provision from their charters, a change that dropped their reserve requirement to 5% of checking and savings account balances. 35 Fed. Reg. 4044 (1970); 12 CFR §§544.8 (c)(1), 563.13 (1977); 12 U. S. C. § 1726 (b) (1976 ed.). More than three-quarters of the federal associations in Massachusetts adopted the change within a few months of the new regulation, and all but four have now amended their charters. The new requirement is lower than those set for state institutions. For this reason, the federal associations argue, their tax deductions are smaller than those of state institutions; they contend that this disparity in deductions is the sort of discrimination that has been proscribed by federal law.
Section 5 (h) of the Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933 “unequivocally bars discriminatory state taxation of the Federal Savings and Loan Associations.” Laurens Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. South Carolina Tax Comm’n, 365 U. S. 517, 523. It is one of several laws passed by Congress to protect federally chartered financial institutions from “unequal and unfriendly competition” caused by state tax laws favoring state-chartered institutions. On its face, however, Massachusetts’ tax scheme is not unfriendly or discriminatory. It applies a single neutral standard to state and federal institutions alike. The amount of the deduction depends on varying regulatory practices, but a tax is not invalid because it recognizes that state and federal regulations may differ. There is no reason to believe that § 5 (h) was intended to force state and federal regulation into the same mold.
Notwithstanding its neutral language, the federal associations argue that the tax is discriminatory in fact. They have not, however, established that it is unfairly burdensome in “practical operation.” Michigan Nat. Bank v. Michigan, 365 U. S. 467, 476. The record does not indicate that federal associations have suffered a significant handicap in competing with state institutions, or that any other federal policies have been thwarted. The lower reserve requirement, by making more funds available for dividends, may well give the associations a competitive advantage, despite the tax. Certainly the associations’ rush to amend their charters in 1970 lends support to that conclusion. Any suggestion of discriminatory purpose is foreclosed by the fact that the tax was enacted when federal reserve requirements were as high as state requirements.
II
Massachusetts does not impose its tax on credit unions. Arguing that credit unions in Massachusetts are “similar” to federal savings and loan associations, the associations claim entitlement to the credit unions’ exemption.
There are indeed similarities between these two kinds of financial institutions. For example, both are characterized by mutual ownership and control; 12 CFR § 544.1 (1977); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 171, §§ 10, 13, and 24 (West 1971 and Supp. 1977); and both are empowered to make loans secured by real estate. 12 U. S. C. § 1464 (c) (1976 ed.); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 171, § 24 (West Supp. 1977). But the institutions are far from identical.
Congress has long treated federally chartered credit unions differently from federally chartered savings and loan associations, giving the credit unions, but not the savings and loan associations, an exemption from state taxes. See 12 U. S. C. § 1768 (1976 ed.). In establishing insurance programs to protect members’ deposits, Congress distinguished state and federal credit unions from state and federal savings and loan associations. See 12 U. S. C. §§ 1726 (a) and 1781 (a) (1976 ed.). Moreover, courts in other jurisdictions have generally rejected the claim that credit unions are “similar” under § 5 (h) to federal savings and loan associations.
The distinctions found in those jurisdictions have validity in Massachusetts as well. By law, Massachusetts credit unions must give preference to small personal loans, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 171, §24 (West Supp. 1977), while the primary-lending role of federal savings and loan associations is “to provide for the financing of homes.” 12 U. S. C. § 1464 (a) (1976 ed.). Massachusetts credit unions may lend only to members, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 171, § 24 (West Supp. 1977), while federal associations are not so limited. And, despite individual exceptions, there are major differences between the actual lending practices of state credit unions as a class and federal associations as a class.
Of greater importance than these differences, however, is the fact that Massachusetts credit unions are not the federal associations’ closest state-chartered competitors. Massachusetts savings banks and cooperative banks have much more in common with federal associations than do state credit unions; their business is unquestionably similar to that of the federal associations. These institutions are an important segment of Massachusetts’ financial community. Any favoritism shown to Massachusetts credit unions falls as harshly on them as on the federal associations. Nonetheless, the Massachusetts Legislature has concluded that credit unions are not similar to state cooperative and savings banks or to state and federal savings and loan associations.
When Congress required that federal savings and loan associations be placed in the same classification as “similar” state institutions, it certainly did not assume that every local and mutual or cooperative thrift and home-financing institution is similar to a federal association. See 12 U. S. C. § 1464 (h) '(1964 ed.). It recognized that States might classify their own institutions in various ways. Massachusetts has excluded credit unions from a large classification that includes the institutions most closely resembling federal savings and loan associations. The composition of the class in which Massachusetts has placed the federal associations satisfies the federal statute’s central purpose of protecting federal associations from discriminatory treatment. We conclude that Massachusetts has not imposed a greater tax on the federal associations than that imposed on other “similar” institutions.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court is affirmed.
So ordered.
Massachusetts savings banks must set aside 7%% of deposits. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 168, § 58 (West 1971). State cooperative banks must reserve 10% of their assets. Ch. 170, § 38. The reserve requirement for state savings and loan associations is not spelled out by statute. Cf. ch. 93, § 34 (West Supp. 1977).
Mercantile Bank v. New York, 121 U. S. 138, 155. See 12 U. S. C. § 548 (1976 ed.) (national banks); 12 U. S. C. § 627 (1976 ed.) (corporations federally authorized to engage in foreign banking).
Indeed, the federal statute protects federal associations from being forced into the state regulatory mold. The deposits aspect of the tax was invalidated partly because its apparently neutral provisions were calculated to impose state regulatory requirements on federal associations. The statute permitted an institution to take a deduction for loans secured by out-of-state real estate but only if the property was within 50 miles of the institution’s home office. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 63, § 11 (West Supp. 1977). This limit reflected state restrictions on making out-of-state loans more than 50 miles from the home office. United States v. State Tax Comm’n, 481 F. 2d 963, 968-969, n. 6 (CA1 1973). But federal associations are empowered by federal law to make such loans up to 100 miles from home. 12 U. S. C. § 1464 (c) (1976 ed.). By treating the state and federal institutions as though they were subject to the same regulatory limits, the statute exacted a higher tax from federal associations and tended at the same time to force federal associations to follow state rather than federal regulations. It is difficult to conceive of a nondiscriminatory reason for the 50-mile limit on deductions. For these reasons, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held the tax discriminatory under § 5 (h). 481 F. 2d, at 970.
Cf. n. 3, supra. The sparse evidence introduced on this point by the associations is ambiguous at best. For example, in three of the seven years from 1968 to 1975, federal associations put a larger proportion of their assets into required reserves than did state savings banks, which are the dominant state mutual institutions. From 1970 through 1973, federal associations made smaller contributions to surplus than state savings banks, but in these years the federal associations may have been simply consuming reserves built up under the stringent requirements of their pre-1970 charters.
See Manchester Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. State Tax Comm’n, 105 N. H. 17, 191 A. 2d 529 (1963); First Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Connelly, 142 Conn. 483, 115 A. 2d 455 (1955), appeal dismissed, 350 U. S. 927; State v. Minnesota Federal Savings & Loan Assn., 218 Minn. 229, 15 N. W. 2d 568 (1944).
As the Supreme Judicial Court noted:
“In 1972, . . . credit unions placed 30.1% of their total investments (in dollars) in real estate mortgages. Federal savings and loan associations had 87.7% of their total investments (in dollars) in real estate mortgages. . . . Federal savings and loan associations had almost 98% of their total loans in real estate mortgages .... Credit unions, on the other hand, had only about 42% of their total loans in real estate mortgages.” 372 Mass. 478, 493-494, 363 N. E. 2d 474, 484 (1977).
See, e. g., Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation v. Flaherty, 306 Mass. 461, 28 N. E. 2d 433 (1940); Springfield Institution for Savings v. Worcester Federal Savings & Loan Assn., 329 Mass. 184, 107 N. E. 2d 315 (1952). Massachusetts cooperative banks had more than 97% of their total loans in real estate mortgages in 1972, while state savings banks had 95% of their loans in real estate mortgages. Federal associations had almost 98% of their loans in real estate mortgages. Cooperative banks had 80.4% of their total dollar investments in real estate mortgages, and savings banks had 65.3% in such mortgages. The figure for federal associations was 87.7%. See 372 Mass., at 493, 363 N. E. 2d, at 484.
Their assets greatly exceed those of state credit unions. State savings banks had assets of almost $18.5 billion in 1973; cooperative banks had almost $3 billion in assets; federal associations had almost $2.5 billion; and credit unions had over $1 billion. App. 131-132; Annual Report of the Commissioner of Banks, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Division of Banks and Loan Agencies, Sec. B (Credit Unions), iv (1973).
Only two of the associations’ remaining attacks on the statute deserve mention. They claim that Massachusetts’ tax is not one of the enumerated taxes approved by § 5 (h), which allows a nondiscriminatory “tax on [federal] associations or their franchise, capital, reserves, surplus, loans, or income.” 12 U. S. C. § 1464 (h) (1976 ed.). Whether or not this tax may be characterized as a “franchise” or an “income” tax, it is certainly a tax “on” federal associations and therefore within the ambit of § 5 (h).
The federal associations also argue that the state statute violates the Commerce Clause by creating a risk of multiple taxation. They claim that some neighboring State may at some time in the future attempt to tax the income from loans secured by property in that State. This argument is wholly speculative and unsupported by evidence in the record.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Black
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in which Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Brennan, and Mr. Justice Marshall join.
This is the second of two cases involving the refusal of States to admit applicants to practice law because they declined to answer questions relating to their beliefs about government and their affiliations with organizations suspected of advocating the overthrow of government by force. These cases, which concern inquisitions about loyalty and government overthrow, are relics of a turbulent period known as the “McCarthy era,” which drew its name from Senator Joseph McCarthy from Wisconsin. We have just referred in our opinion in Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, ante, p. 1, to the confusion and uncertainty created by past cases in this constitutional field. The central question in all of them has been the same, whether involving lawyers, doctors, marine workers, or State or Federal Government employees, namely: to what extent does the First or Fifth Amendment or other constitutional provision protect persons against governmental intrusion and invasion into private beliefs and views that have not ripened into any punishable conduct? Without attempting in that case to bring about a complete reconciliation of all that this Court has previously said about this particular phase of First Amendment protection, we held that under the circumstances present there, Mrs. Baird could not, consistently with the First Amendment, be denied a state license to practice law because she refused to state whether she had belonged to the Communist Party or any organization that advocated overthrow of the United States Government by force. Here we hold that Stolar’s refusals to answer certain questions asked him by the Ohio Bar Committee were also protected by the First Amendment.
The facts are these: Stolar, whose home is in Rochester, New York, has an A. B. degree from the University of Rochester and received an LL. B. degree from New York University Law School in 1968. The dean of that school has certified that Stolar has received instructions in legal ethics, has a good moral character, and has sufficient knowledge and ability to discharge the duties of an attorney at law. He has a license to practice law in New York State. To become a member of the New York Bar, Stolar was asked and answered the following questions, along with many others:
“18. State whether you have participated in activities of a public or patriotic nature or in philanthropic, religious, or social services? If so, state the facts fully.
“I was a Cub Scout and Boy Scout and Explorer Scout during elementary and high school.
“I also participated fully in my Temple’s religious education programs until I went to college.
“In addition, my time spent as a VISTA is a service of the above described nature.
“19. Do you believe in the principles underlying the form of government of the United States? Yes.
“20. State whether you have been or are a member of any party or organisation engaged in propagating or pledged to effect changes in the form of government provided for by the United States Constitution, or in advancing the interests of a foreign country? If so, state the facts fully. No. (Emphasis supplied in part.)
“21. Can you conscientiously, and do you, affirm, without any mental reservation, that you have been and are loyal to the Government of the United States? Yes.
“24. (a) Have you studied the Canons of Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association? Yes.
“(b) Do you unconditionally subscribe to the same? Yes.
“(c) Will you conscientiously endeavor to conform your professional conduct to them? Yes.”
In 1969 Mr. Stolar applied to the Ohio Bar for admission to practice. He made available to Ohio all the information he had previously given the New York Bar Committee, including his answers to the New York questions stated above. Stolar then answered a long series of questions posed by the Ohio committee. In response to oral interrogation he stated:
“that he is not now and has never been a member of the Communist Party, of any socialist party, or of the Students for a Democratic Society, and . . . that he has signed the standard U. S. Army pre-induction security oath, which has reference to the ‘Attorney General’s List.’ ”
However, Stolar declined to answer certain questions on the Ohio application on the grounds they infringed his rights under the First and Fifth Amendments. These questions were:
“12. State whether you have been, or presently are ... (g) a member of any organization which advocates the overthrow of the government of the United States by force ....
“13. List the names and addresses of all clubs, societies or organizations of which you are or have been a member.”
“7. List the names and addresses of all clubs, societies or organizations of which you are or have been a member since registering as a law student.”
Because of his refusal to answer these questions, one member of the committee who investigated Stolar recommended that he be denied admission. The other stated:
“I found Mr. Stolar to be honest and forthright. His statements evidenced also a certain commitment to principle for its own sake, an unusually great amount of social awareness, and a degree of self-interest not reprehensible. On the basis of the interview and the background actually revealed in Mr. Stolar’s applications I have no reluctance to recommend Mr. Stolar for admission to the practice of law.”
The full committee then recommended that petitioner’s application to take the Ohio Bar examination be denied. The Ohio Supreme Court approved the committee’s recommendation without opinion. We granted certiorari. 396 U. S. 816.
We deal first with Ohio’s demands that petitioner Martin Stolar list all the organizations to which he has belonged since registering as a law student and those of which he has ever been a member. In our view requiring a Bar applicant to answer these questions is impermissible in light of the First Amendment, as was made clear in Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479 (1960). At issue in Shelton was an Arkansas statute that required every state teacher, as a condition of employment, to file an affidavit listing every organization to which he had belonged within the preceding five years. The Court noted that this requirement impinged upon the teacher’s right to freedom of association because it placed “pressure upon a teacher to avoid any ties which might displease those who control his professional destiny . . . .” Id., at 486. Similarly here, the listing of an organization considered by committee members to be controversial or “subversive” is likely to cause delay and extensive interrogation or simply denial of admission to the Bar. Respondent committee frankly suggests that the listing of an organization which it felt “espoused illegal aims” would cause it to “investigate further.” Law students who know they must survive this screening process before practicing their profession are encouraged to protect their future by shunning unpopular or controversial organizations. Cf. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513 (1958).
The committee suggests its “listing” question serves a legitimate interest because it needs to know whether an applicant has belonged to an organization which has “espoused illegal aims” and whether the applicant himself has espoused such aims. But the First Amendment prohibits Ohio from penalizing an applicant by denying him admission to the Bar solely because of his membership in an organization. Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, supra; cf. United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258, 266 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589, 607 (1967). Nor may the State penalize petitioner solely because he personally, as the committee suggests, “espouses illegal aims.” See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303-304 (1940); Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, supra.
The committee also argues it needs answers to Questions 7 and 13 because responses might direct its attention to persons who have known an applicant and who could supply information relevant to his qualifications. Undoubtedly Ohio has a legitimate interest in determining whether an applicant has “the qualities of character and the professional competence requisite to the practice of law.” Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, supra. But petitioner Stolar, already a member in good standing of the New York Bar, supplied the Ohio committee with extensive personal and professional information as well as numerous character references to enable it to make the necessary investigation and determination. Moreover, even though irrelevant to his fitness to practice law, Stolar’s answers to questions on the New York application provided Ohio with substantially the information it was seeking by Questions 7, 12 (g), and 13. The information contained in the two applications included petitioner’s law school; every address at which he had ever lived; the names, addresses, and occupations of his parents; the names and addresses of his elementary school, his high school and high school principal; the names of nine former employers (which included three different law firms for which he had done summer work); his “criminal record” (which consisted of two speeding convictions); nine different people as character references (two of whom had known Stolar for more than 20 years); and extensive information about his previous activities (e. g., law school moot court, graduate advisor at N. Y. U., Cub Scout, Boy Scout, Explorer Scout, and his temple’s religious education programs).
We conclude also that Ohio may not require an applicant for admission to the Bar to state whether he has been or is a “member of any organization which advocates the overthrow of the government of the United States by force.” As we noted above, the First Amendment prohibits Ohio from penalizing a man solely because he is a member of a particular organization. See also Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, supra. Since this is true, we can see no legitimate state interest which is served by a question which sweeps so broadly into areas of belief and association protected against government invasion. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303-304 (1940); United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258, 266 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589, 607 (1967); Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, supra; Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360 (1964).
There is not one word in this entire record that reflects adversely on Mr. Stolar’s moral character or his professional competence. Although there were three questions that he did not answer with a simple “yes” or “no,” he did answer all of the Committee’s questions relevant to his fitness and competence to practice law. It is difficult if not impossible to see how the State of Ohio could have been obstructed or frustrated to any extent in determining Mr. Stolar’s fitness to practice law by his failure to answer the questions more fully. The record shows a young man who, from his boyhood up, had no adverse marks except for two speeding convictions. He answered numerous prying questions about personal affairs that could hardly have been necessary for a State interested only in whether he would make an honest lawyer faithful to his clients. The questions he did not answer related only to his beliefs and associations, both protected by the First Amendment. The State points to not one overt act on Stolar’s part that even suggests a possible reason for denying his application. Here, as in Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, it was a denial of a Bar applicant’s First Amendment rights to refuse him admission simply because he declined to answer questions about his beliefs and associations.
The judgment of the Ohio Supreme Court is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
[For dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice White, see ante, p. 10.]
The other is No. 15, Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, ante, p. 1. Cf. No. 49, Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, post, p. 154.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | C | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The writ is dismissed as improvidently granted, it appearing that the judgment of the court below rested on independent and adequate state grounds.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Chief Justice Warren
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioner, Pete Hernandez, was indicted for the murder of one Joe Espinosa by a grand jury in Jackson County, Texas. He was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court.-Tex. Cr. R. -, 251 S. W. 2d 531. Prior to the trial, the petitioner, by his counsel, offered timely motions to quash the indictment and the jury panel. He alleged that persons of Mexican descent were systematically excluded from service as jury commissioners, grand jurors, and petit jurors, although there were such persons fully qualified to serve residing in Jackson County. The petitioner asserted that exclusion of this class deprived him, as a member of the class, of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motions. At the trial, the motions were renewed, further evidence taken, and the motions again denied. An allegation that the trial court erred in denying the motions was the sole basis of petitioner’s appeal. In affirming the judgment of the trial court, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals considered and passed upon the substantial federal question raised by the petitioner. We granted a writ of certiorari to review that decision. 346 U. S. 811.
In numerous decisions, this Court has held that it is a denial of the equal protection of the laws to try a defendant of a particular race or color under an indictment issued by a grand jury, or before a petit jury, from which all persons of his race or color have, solely because of that race or color, been excluded by the State, whether acting through its legislature, its courts, or its executive or administrative officers. Although the Court has had little occasion to rule on the question directly, it has been recognized since Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, that the exclusion of a class of persons from jury service on grounds other than race or color may also deprive a defendant who is a member of that class of the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws. The State of Texas would have us hold that there are only two classes — white and Negro — within the contemplation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The decisions of this Court do not support that view. And, except where the question presented involves the exclusion of persons of Mexican descent from juries, Texas courts have taken a broader view of the scope of the equal protection clause.
Throughout our history differences in race and color have defined easily identifiable groups which have at times required the aid of the courts in securing equal treatment under the laws. But community prejudices are not static, and from time to time other differences from the community norm may define other groups which need the same protection. Whether such a group exists within a community is a question of fact. When the existence of a distinct class is demonstrated, and it is further shown that the laws, as written or as applied, single out that class for different treatment not based on some reasonable classification, the guarantees of the Constitution have been violated. The Fourteenth Amendment is not directed solely against discrimination due to a “two-class theory” — that is, based upon differences between “white” and Negro.
As the petitioner acknowledges, the Texas system of selecting grand and petit jurors by the use of jury commissions is fair on its face and capable of being utilized without discrimination. But as this Court has held, the system is susceptible to abuse and can be employed in a discriminatory manner. The exclusion of otherwise eligible persons from jury service solely because of their ancestry or national origin is discrimination prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Texas statute makes no such discrimination, but the petitioner alleges that those administering the law do.
The petitioner’s initial burden in substantiating his charge of group discrimination was to prove that persons of Mexican descent constitute a separate class in Jackson County, distinct from “whites.” One method by which this may be demonstrated is by showing the attitude of the community. Here the testimony of responsible officials and citizens contained the admission that residents of the community distinguished between “white” and “Mexican.” The participation of persons of Mexican descent in business and community groups was shown to be slight. Until very recent times, children of Mexican descent were required to attend a segregated school for the first four grades. At least one restaurant in town prominently displayed a sign announcing “No Mexicans Served.” On the courthouse grounds at the time of the hearing, there were two men’s toilets, one unmarked, and the other marked “Colored Men” and “Hombres Aqui” (“Men Here”). No substantial evidence was offered to rebut the logical inference to be drawn from these facts, and it must be concluded that petitioner succeeded in his proof.
Having established the existence of a class, petitioner was then charged with the burden of proving discrimination. To do so, he relied on the pattern of proof established by Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587. In that case, proof that Negroes constituted a substantial segment of the population of the jurisdiction, that some Negroes were qualified to serve as jurors, and that none had been called for jury service over an extended period of time, was held to constitute prima facie proof of the systematic exclusion of Negroes from jury service. This holding, sometimes called the “rule of exclusion,” has been applied in other cases, and it is available in supplying proof of discrimination against any delineated class.
The petitioner established that 14% of the population of Jackson County were persons with Mexican or Latin-American surnames, and that 11% of the males over 21 bore such names. The County Tax Assessor testified that 6 or 7 percent of the freeholders on the tax rolls of the County were persons of Mexican descent. The State of Texas stipulated that "“for the last twenty-five years there is no record of any person with a Mexican or Latin American name having served on a jury commission, grand jury or petit jury in Jackson County.” The parties also stipulated that “there are some male persons of Mexican or Latin American descent in Jackson County who, by virtue of being citizens, householders, or freeholders, and having all other legal prerequisites to jury service, are eligible to serve as members of a jury commission, grand jury and/or petit jury.”
The petitioner met the burden of proof imposed in Norris v. Alabama, supra. To rebut the strong prima facie case of the denial of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Constitution thus established, the State offered the testimony of five jury commissioners that they had not discriminated against persons of Mexican or Latin-American descent in selecting jurors. They stated that their only objective had been to select those whom they thought were best qualified. This testimony is not enough to overcome the petitioner’s case. As the Court said in Norris v. Alabama:
“That showing as to the long-continued exclusion of negroes from jury service, and as to the many negroes qualified for that service, could not be met by mere generalities. If, in the presence of such testimony as defendant adduced, the mere general assertions by officials of their performance of duty were to be accepted as an adequate justification for the complete exclusion of negroes from jury service, the constitutional provision . . . would be but a vain and illusory requirement.”
The same reasoning is applicable to these facts.
Circumstances or chance may well dictate that no persons in a certain class will serve on a particular jury or during some particular period. But it taxes our credulity to say that mere chance resulted in there being no members of this class among the over six thousand jurors called in the past 25 years. The result bespeaks discrimination, whether or not it was a conscious decision on the part of any individual jury commissioner. The judgment of conviction must be reversed.
To say that this decision revives the rejected contention that the Fourteenth Amendment requires proportional representation of all the component ethnic groups of the community on every jury ignores the facts. The petitioner did not seek proportional representation, nor did he claim a right to have persons of Mexican descent sit on the particular juries which he faced. His only claim is the right to be indicted and tried by juries from which all members of his class are not systematically excluded— juries selected from among all qualified persons regardless of national origin or descent. To this much, he is entitled by the Constitution.
Reversed.
Texas law provides that at each term of court, the judge shall appoint three to five jury commissioners. The judge instructs these commissioners as to their duties. After taking an oath that they will not knowingly select a grand juror they believe unfit or unqualified, the commissioners retire to a room in the courthouse where they select from the county assessment roll the names of 16 grand jurors from different parts of the county. These names are placed in a sealed envelope and delivered to the clerk. Thirty days before court meets, the clerk delivers a copy of the list to the sheriff who summons the jurors. Vernon’s Tex. Code Crim. Proc., 1948, Arts. 333-350.
The general jury panel is also selected by the jury commission. Vernon’s Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat., 1948, Art. 2107. In capital cases, a special venire may be selected from the list furnished by the commissioners. Vernon’s Tex. Code Crim. Proc., 1948, Art. 592.
See Carter v. Texas, 177 U. S. 442, 447.
“Nor if a law should be passed excluding all naturalized Celtic Irishmen [from jury service], would there be any doubt of its inconsistency with the spirit of the amendment.” 100 U. S., at 308. Cf. American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89, 92.
See Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33; Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission, 334 U. S. 410. Cf. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 100: “Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.”
Sanchez v. State, 147 Tex. Cr. R. 436, 181 S. W. 2d 87; Salazar v. State, 149 Tex. Cr. R. 260, 193 S. W. 2d 211; Sanchez v. State, 243 S.W. 2d 700.
In Juarez v. State, 102 Tex. Cr. R. 297, 277 S. W. 1091, the Texas court held that the systematic exclusion of Roman Catholics from juries was barred by the Fourteenth Amendment. In Clifton v. Puente, 218 S. W. 2d 272, the Texas court ruled that restrictive covenants prohibiting the sale of land to persons of Mexican descent were unenforceable.
Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128, 130.
Smith v. Texas, supra, note 7; Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400; Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. 282; Ross v. Texas, 341 U. S. 918.
We do not have before us the question whether or not the Court might take judicial notice that persons of Mexican descent are there considered as a separate class. See Marden, Minorities in American Society; McDonagh & Richards, Ethnic Relations in the United States.
The reason given by the school superintendent for this segregation was that these children needed special help in learning English. In this special school, however, each teacher taught two grades, while in the regular school each taught only one in most instances. Most of the children of Mexican descent left school by the fifth or sixth grade.
See note 8, supra.
The 1950 census report shows that of the 12,916 residents of Jackson County, 1,865, or about 14%, had Mexican or Latin-American surnames. U. S. Census of Population, 1950, Vol. II, pt. 43, p. 180; id., Vol. IV, pt. 3, c. C, p. 45. Of these 1,865, 1,738 were native-born American citizens and 65 were naturalized citizens. Id., Vol. IV, pt. 3, c. C, p. 45. Of the 3,754 males over 21 years of age in the County, 408, or about 11%, had Spanish surnames. Id., Vol. II, pt. 43, p. 180; id., Vol. IV, pt. 3, c. C, p. 67. The State challenges any reliance on names as showing the descent of persons in the County. However, just as persons of a different race are distinguished by color, these Spanish names provide ready identification of the members of this class. In selecting jurors, the jury commissioners work from a list of names.
R. 34.
R. 55. The parties also stipulated that there were no persons of Mexican or Latin-American descent on the list of talesmen. R. 83. Each item of each stipulation was amply supported by the testimony adduced at the hearing.
294 U. S., at 598.
See Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398, 403; Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. 282, 286-287.
See Akins v. Texas, supra, note 16, at 403.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | B | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Chief Justice Warren
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The sole issue before us is whether the Louisiana úse tax, as applied to the appellant, discriminates against interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.
The Louisiana sales and use taxes follow the basic pattern approved by this Court in Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U. S. 577. Louisiana Revised Statutes, Tit. 47, § 302, provides for the imposition of a tax “[a]t the rate of two per centum (2%) of the sales price of each item or article of .tangible personal property .when sold at retail in this state . It imposes another tax “[a]t the rate of two per centum (2%) of the’cost'price of each item or article of tangible personal property- when the same is not sold but is used.. . . in this state . . . This latter tax, commonly known as a use tax, is to be reduced by the amount of.any similar sales or use tax paid on the item in a different State. La. Rev.-Stat. Ann. §47:305. As noted by the Louisiana Supreme Court below and approved in Silas Mason, the purpose of such á sales-use tax scheme is to make all tangible property .used or consumed in the State subject to a uniform tax burden irrespective of whether it is acquired within the State, making it subject to the sales tax, or from without the State, making it subject to a use tax at the same rate. The appellant admits' the validity of such a scheme. It contends, however, that in this case Louisiana has departed'from the norm of tax equality and imposes on the appellant a greater tax burden solely because the property it uses in Louisiana is brought from out-of-state. The difference in tkx burden is admitted by.the appellee.
The facts were stipulated by the parties. The appellant is engaged in- the business of servicing oil wells in a number of oil producing States, including Louisiana. Its business requires the use of specialized equipment including oil well cementing trucks and electrical well logging trucks. These trucks and their equipment are not generally available on the retail market, but are manufactured by the appellant at its principal place of business in Duncan, Oklahoma. The raw materials and semifinished and finished articles necessary for the manufacture of these units are acquired on the open market by the appellant and assembled by its employees. The completed units are tested at Duncan and then assigned to specific field camps maintained by the appellant. The assignment is-permanent unless better use of the unit can.be made at another camp. None of these units is manufactured or held for sale to third parties.
Between January 1, 1952, and May 31,1955, the appellant: shipped new and used units of its specialized equipment to field camps in Louisiana. In its Louisiana tax-returns filed for these years, the appellant calculated, and paid use taxes upon the value of the raw materials and semifinished and finished articles used in manufacturing the units. The appellant did not include in its calculations the value of labor and shop overhead attributable to assembling the units. It is admitted that this cost factor would not have been taxed had the appellant assembled its units in Louisiana rather than in Oklahoma. The stipulation of facts stated:
“If Halliburton had purchased its materials, operated its shops, and incurred its Labor and Shop Overhead expenses at a location within the State of Louisiana, there would have been a sales tax due to. the State of Louisiana upon the cost of materials purchased in Louisiana and a Use Tax on materials ■ purchased outside of Louisiana; but there would have been no Louisiana sales tax or use tax due upon the Labor and Shop Overhead.”
Nevertheless, in September 1955, the Louisiana Collector of Revenue, the appellee-, assessed a deficiency , of $36,238.43 in taxes, including interest, on the labor and shop overhead cost of assembling the units. The Collector held that this was required by the language of the use tax section of the statute which levies the 2% use tax on the “cost price” of the item, “cost price” being defined in an earlier section as'the actual cost without deductions on account of “labor or service cost, . . ..or ány other expenses whatsoever.” La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 47:301 (3).
Also during this period, the appellant purchased 14 oil well cementing service units from the Spartan Tool-and Service Company of Houston, Texas. Spartan was not regularly engaged in the sale of such equipment and-made the sale after deciding to liquidate its oil well servicing business. The appellant transferred these units to Louisiana. On one other occasion, the appellant purchased an airplane from the Western Newspaper Union of New York, a company not regularly engaged in the business of selling airplanes. The appellant, acquired the plane for use in Louisiana. No Louisiana use tax was declared or paid subsequent to the transfer of these items to Louisiana. It is admitted in the stipulation of facts that had these acquisitions been made within Louisiana, they would have not been taxed. This is occasioned by the fact that the sales tax section of the. statute applies only to sales made at retail and not to isolated sales by those not regularly engaged in the business of selling the item involved. Nevertheless, the Collector assessed a deficiency of $4,404.22 on the value of these items since the use tax on goods imported from out-of-state contains no equivalent distinction between- isolated and retail sales.
The appellant paid the deficiency under protest and brought an action in the Louisiana District Court for the Nineteenth. District for a refund pursuant to La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 47:1576, alleging that this unequal tax burden is a discrimination against interstate commerce. The •District Court, found the assessment discriminatory. On appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed, holding that’ since no unreasonable distinctions or classifications had been drawn in the Louisiana sales and use tax statute, the incidental discrepancy in tax burden did not amount to a discrimination against interstate commerce. 241 La. 67, 127 So. 2d 502. On appeal to this Court, we noted probable jurisdiction. 368 U. S. 809. The case was first argued during the October Term 1961. We subsequently ordered it reargued. 369 U. S. 835.
I.
This is another in a long line of cases attacking state taxation as-unduly burdening interstate commerce. As this Court stated in Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U. S. 454, 455-456: “In each case it is our duty to determine whéther the statute under attack, whatever its name may be, will in its practical operation work discrimination- against interstate commerce.” This concern with the actuality of operation, a dominant theme running through all state taxation cases, extends to every aspect of the tax operations. Thus, in Nippert v. Richmond; 327 U. S. 416, the City of Richmond placed a fixed fee and earnings tax on itinerant solicitors.of sales within the city. Omits face, the ordinance applied to in-state as well as out-of-state distributors doing business by means of' itinerant-solicitors. The- Coürt noted, however, the very fact that a distributor is out-of-state makes his use of, and dependence on, solicitors more likely. Thus, “the very difference between interstate and local trade, taken in-conjunction with the inherent character of the tax, makes equality of application as between those, two classes of commerce, generally speaking, impossible.” Id., at 432. The Court concluded that the tax was “discriminatory in favor of the local merchant as against the out-of-state one.” ■ Id., at' 431. Considered in isolation, the Louisiana use tax is discriminatory; it was intended to apply primarily to-goods acquired out-of-state and used in Louisiana. If it stood alone, it would -fye-invalid. However, a proper, analysis must take “the whole scheme of taxation into account.” Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217, 227; Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U. S. 472, 479-480. Thús, in Best & Co. v. Maxwell, supra,, the Court compared the' solicitation tax with the equivalent tax on local retail merchants before finding it discriminatory. 311 U. S., at 456. See Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc., v. Stone, 342 U. S. 389, 394-395; cf. Phillips Chemical Co. v. Dumas School District, 361 U. S. 376.
When Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U. S. 577, reached this . Court on appeal, the Court considered the Washington use tax in the context of the tax scheme of which it was a part, as a “compensating tax” intended to complement the state sales tax. So considered, the Court concluded: “Equality is the theme that runs through all the sections of the statute. . . . No one who uses property in Washington after buying it at retail is to be exempt from a tax upon the privilege of enjoyment-except-to the extent that he has paid a use or sales tax somewhere.” The use tax is “upon one activity or incident,” and the sales tax is “upon another, but the sum is the same when the reckoning is closed.” The burden on the out-of-state acquisition “is balanced by an equal burden where the sale is strictly local.” 300 U. S., at 583-584.
The conclusion is inescapable: equal treatment for instate and out-of-state taxpayers similarly situated is the condition precedent for a valid use tax on goods imported from out-of-state.
The inequality of the Louisiana tax burden between instate and out-of-state manufacturer-users is admitted. Although the rate is the same, the appellant’s tax base is . increased through the inclusion of its product’s labor and shop overhead. The Louisiana Supreme Court characterized this discrepancy as incidental. However, equality for the purposes of competition and the flow of commerce is measured in dollars and cénts, not legal abstractions. In this case the “incidental discrepancy”- — the labor and shop overhead for the units in dispute — amounts to $1,547,109.70. The use tax rate in Louisiana is 2% and has risen in some States toA%. The'resulting tax inequality is clearly substantial.
But even accepting this, the Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that the comparison between in-state and out-of-state manufacturer-users is not the proper way to frame the issue of equality. It stated: “The proper comparison would be between the use tax on the assembled equipment and a sales tax on the same equipment if it were sold.” On the basis of such a comparison, the óut-of-state manufacturer-user is on the same tax footing with respect to the item used as the retailer of a similar item,. or the .competitor who buys from the retailer rather than manufacture his own.. However, such a'comparison excludes from consideration, without any explanation, the very in-state taxpayer who is most similarly situated to the appellant, the local manufacturer-user. If the Louisiana Legislature were in fact concerned over any tax break the manufacturer-user obtains, it. would surely have made special arrangements to take care of the in-state as.well as out-of-state loophole — unless, of course, -it intended to. discriminate. We can only conclude, therefore, that the proper comparison on the basis, of this record is between in-state ‘and out-of-státe' manufacturer-users. And if this comparison- discloses discriminatory, effects, it could be ignored only after a showing of adequate justification.
While the inequality in question may have been an accident of statutory drafting, it does in fact strike at a significant segment of economic activity and carries eco-' nomic effects of a type proscribed by many previous cases. The appellant manufactures equipment specially adapted to its oil servicing business. The equipment is expensive ; because of its limited and custom production, the labor and shop overhead, is necessarily a-significant cost factor. Activity of this character is often on the forefront of economic development where equipment and methods have yet to reach the standardization and acceptance necessary for mass production. If Louisiana were, the only State to impose an additional tax burden for such out-of-state operations, the disparate treatment would be ah incentive to .locate within .Louisiana; it would tend “to neutralize advantages belonging to the place of origin.” Baldwin v. Seelig, Inc., 294 U. S. 511, 527. Disapproval of such a result is implicit in all cases dealing with tax discrimination, since a tax which is “discriminatory - in favor of the local merchant,” Nippert v. Richmond, supra, also encourages an out-of-state operator to. become a resident in order to compete on equal terms. If similar unequal tax structures were adopted' in other States, a not unlikely result of affirming here, the effects would be more widespread. The economic advantages of a single assembly plant for the appellant’s multistate activities would be decreased for units sent to every State other than the State of residence. At best, this would encourage the appellant to locate his assembly operations in the State of largest’use for the units. At worst, it would encourage their actual fractionalization or discontinuance. Clearly, approval of the Louisiana .use tax in this case would “invite a multiplication of preferential trade areas destructive of the very purpose of the Commerce Clause.” Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U. S. 349, 356.
In light of these considerations we see no reason to depart from the strict rule of equality adopted in Silas-Mason, and we conclude that the Louisiana use tax as applied to the appellant’s specialized equipment discriminates against interstate commerce.
A similar disposition of the tax on the isolated sales follows as a mátter of course; The disparate treatment is baldly admitted by the Louisiana Supreme Court: ‘'The exemption of an isolated sale from the provisions of the sales tax applies strictly to sales within the State of Louisiana; it has no effect whatsoever on any transaction without the state.” The out-of-state isolated sale, it concludes, must therefore be treated “as if”, it were a sale at retail. As the facts of this' case indicate-, isolated sales involve primarily the acquisition of second-hand equipment from previous users. The effect of the.'tax is to favor local users who wish to dispose of equipment over out-of-state users similarly situated.. Whatever the Louisiana Legisláture’s reasons for granting such an exemption to this segment of the local second-hand market, no attempt has been made to justify it or 'to show how its purpose would be defeated by extending the same exemption to similar out-of-state transactions. We therefore conclude that the use tax on isolated sales in this case departs from the equality required by Silas Mason and discriminates against interstate commerce.
Thirty-five States other than Louisiana have sales and use tax statutes. At this juncture, Louisiana, according to the parties, is the only State to adopt the constructions presented for decision in this case. Those few States which have considered these issues at all appear to have rejected the Louisiana position for reasons in accord with our opinion here. Both Ohio and North Dakota have by administrative regulations excluded labor and shop overhead from the tax báse of the out-of-state manufacturer-user on the ground that its inclusion might violate the Commerce Clause. In Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Johnson, 19 Cal. 2d 162, 119 P. 2d 945, the California Supreme Court upheld the application of its use tax to an out-of-state manufacturer-user, expressly pointing .out that because labor and shop overhead had been excluded from its tax base, .the taxpayer was in no different position from its in-state competitor.' The parties have been able to find only one state cash passing directly on either question. In State v. Bay Towing & Dredging Co., Inc., 265 Ala. 282, 90 So. 2d 743, the Alabama Supreme Court held that the in-state exemption for.isolated sales had to be extended to out-of-state isolated sales to avoid discrimination against interstate commerce.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Louisiana is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this.'opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Emphasis added.
Emphasis added.
In fact, it was just such isolated consideration that led the trial court in Silas Mason Co. v. Henneford, 15 F. Supp. 958, 962, rev’d, 300 U. S. 577, to strike down the State of Washington.use tax. •
Thus in Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc., v. Stone, supra, and Best & Co. v. Maxwell, supra, the Court compared the actual tax bills of the local arid out-of-state taxpayers. In the former, the Court found discriminatory a $50 license tax on each truck used by an out-of-state'laundry business soliciting and picking up laundry in Mississippi because resident laundries were required to pay only. $8 per truck. In the latter, the Court found • determinative a similar discrepancy between the $1 tax paid by local merchants and the $250 tax paid by the itinerant solicitor.
Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Washington each has 4% sales and use taxes. 2 -P-H 1963 Fed. Tax Serv. ¶ 13,299.
See cases collected in Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc., v. Stone, supra, p. 392, n. 7.
In Dean Milk .Co., the City of Madison passed an ordinance requiring milk pasteurization plants to locate'within a- live mile radius of Madison to ease thé problem of local' health inspection. The Court held that where there were adequate alternative methods for insuring health standards, the locational requirement was a burden on interstate commerce. The dissent saw no problem in this restriction:
“As a practical matter, so far as the record shows, D.ean can easily comply with the ordinance whenever it wants to. Therefore, Dean’s •personal preference to pasteurize in Illinois, not the ordinance, keeps Dean’s milk out of Madison.” 340 U. S., at 357.
However, this “personal preference” is the essence of a national unrestricted market. If, before striking down a burden on interstate commerce, this Court hád to look to the record for economic justifications for Dean’s location in Illinois, for the appellant’s location in Oklahoma, for single rather than multipasteurization or assembly operations, the free flow of commerce would disappear before our .very eyes. Justification for the system is presumed in the Commerce Clause itself.
The appellee argues that the reason for the exemption is that any item sold in a local isolated sale has already been-subjected to either a saies tax if it was originally acquired in Louisiana or a use tax if it was imported, whereas there is no assurance that an item acquired in an out-of-state isolated sale has ever sustained such a tax burden. The appellee further maintains that the taxes here in question could have been reduced by any such previous taxation. If the record supported the appellee’s position, it would be carefully considered. However, the appellee has shown us no regulations providing for the deduction of sales or use taxes paid on the item prior to the out-of-state isolated sale; the appellee stated in the stipulation of facts that all evidence showing an isolated sale was irrelevant; and the above-quoted statement of the Louisiana Supreme Court leaves little room for such modification.
Although no evidence was presented on the issue, one. reason for not taxing local isolated sales and the labor and shop overhead of the local manufacturer-user may be the difficult administrative burden in either calculating or enforcing the tax. However, such a local administrative problem would not justify a different treatment of the similar out-of-state transaction, since the mere extension of the special treatment to the out-of-state transaction would satisfy both the local problem and the Commerce Clause. ■
We fail to see a similar admiijistrative problem in calculating the appellant’s labor and shop overhead, since the tax base under either approach is calculated on the basis of the cost factors recorded in the appellant’s books.
CCH Ohio State Rep., Cir. No. 18, Mar. 1, 1954, ¶ 60371.70; North Dakota Tax Commission, Rules Nos. 55 and 113.
Moreover, as this Court noted in Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U. S. 577, 581, the State of Washington, recognizing the latent inequality, made special arrangements for the manufacturer-user:
“The tax presupposes everywhere a retail purchase by the user before the time of use. If he has manufactured the chattel for himself, . . . he is exempt from the use tax, whether title was acquired in Washington or elsewhere.”
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice O’Connor
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case raises the question whether a tenant by the entirety possesses “property” or “rights to property” to which a federal tax lien may attach. 26 U. S. C. §6321. Relying on the state law fiction that a tenant by the entirety has no separate interest in entireties property, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that such property is exempt from the tax lien. We conclude that, despite the fiction, each tenant possesses individual rights in the estate sufficient to constitute “property” or “rights to property” for the purposes of the lien, and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I
In 1988, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) assessed $482,446 in unpaid income tax liabilities against Don Craft, the husband of respondent Sandra L. Craft, for failure to file federal income tax returns for the years 1979 through 1986. App. to Pet. for Cert. 45a, 72a. When he failed to pay, a federal tax lien attached to “all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to” him. 26 U. S. C. §6321.
At the time the lien attached, respondent and her husband owned a piece of real property in Grand Rapids, Michigan, as tenants by the entirety. App. to Pet. for Cert. 45a. After notice of the lien was filed, they jointly executed a quitclaim deed purporting to transfer the husband’s interest in the property to respondent for one dollar. Ibid. When respondent attempted to sell the property a few years later, a title search revealed the lien. The IRS agreed to release the lien and allow the sale with the stipulation that half of the net proceeds be held in escrow pending determination of the Government’s interest in the property. Ibid.
Respondent brought this action to quiet title to the es-crowed proceeds. The Government claimed that its lien had attached to the husband’s interest in the tenancy by the entirety. It further asserted that the transfer of the property to respondent was invalid as a fraud on creditors. Id., at 46a-47a. The. District Court granted the Government’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the federal tax lien attached at the moment of the transfer to respondent, which terminated the tenancy by the entirety and entitled the Government to one-half of the value of the property. No. 1:93-CV-306, 1994 WL 669680, *3 (WD Mich., Sept. 12, 1994).
Both parties appealed. The Sixth Circuit held that the tax lien did not attach to the property because under Michigan state law, the husband had no separate interest in property held as a tenant by the entirety. 140 F. 3d 638, 643 (1998). It remanded to the District Court to consider the Government’s alternative claim that the conveyance should be set aside as fraudulent. Id., at 644.
On remand, the District Court concluded that where, as here, state law makes property exempt from the claims of creditors, no fraudulent conveyance can occur. 65 F. Supp. 2d 651, 657-658 (WD Mich. 1999). It found, however, that respondent’s husband’s use of nonexempt funds to pay the mortgage on the entireties property, which placed them beyond the reach of creditors, constituted a fraudulent act under state law, and the court awarded the IRS a share of the proceeds of the sale of the property equal to that amount. Id., at 659.
Both parties appealed the District Court’s decision, the Government again claiming that its lien attached to the husband’s interest in the entireties property. The Court of Appeals held that the prior panel’s opinion was law of the case on that issue. 233 F. 3d 358, 363-369 (CA6 2000). It also affirmed the District Court’s determination that the husband’s mortgage payments were fraudulent. Id., at 369-375.
We granted certiorari to consider the Government’s claim that respondent’s husband had a separate interest in the en-tireties property to which the federal tax lien attached. 533 U. S. 976 (2001).
II
Whether the interests of respondent’s husband in the property he held as a tenant by the entirety constitutes “property and rights to property” for the purposes of the federal tax lien statute, 26 U. S. C. § 6321, is ultimately a question of federal law. The answer to this federal question, however, largely depends upon state law. The federal tax lien statute itself “creates no property rights but merely attaches consequences, federally defined, to rights created under state law.” United States v. Bess, 357 U. S. 51, 55 (1958); see also United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 472 U. S. 713, 722 (1985). Accordingly, “[w]e look initially to state law to determine what rights the taxpayer has in the property the Government seeks to reach, then to federal law to determine whether the taxpayer’s state-delineated rights qualify as ‘property’ or ‘rights to property’ within the compass of the federal tax lien legislation.” Drye v. United States, 528 U. S. 49, 58 (1999).
A common idiom describes property as a “bundle of sticks” — a collection of individual rights which, in certain combinations, constitute property. See B. Cardozo, Paradoxes of Legal Science 129 (1928) (reprint 2000); see also Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U. S. 330, 336 (1984). State law determines only which sticks are in a person’s bundle. Whether those sticks qualify as “property” for purposes of the federal tax lien statute is a question of federal law.
In looking to state law, we must be careful to consider the substance of the rights state law provides, not merely the labels the State gives these rights or the conclusions it draws from them. Such state law labels are irrelevant to the federal question of which bundles of rights constitute property that may be attached by a federal tax lien. In Drye v. United States, supra, we considered a situation where state law allowed an heir subject to a federal tax lien to disclaim his. interest in the estate. The state law also provided that such a disclaimer would “creat[e] the legal fiction” that the heir had predeceased the decedent and would correspondingly be deemed to have had no property interest in the estate. Id., at 53. We unanimously held that this state law fiction did not control the federal question and looked instead to the realities of the heir’s interest. We concluded that, despite the State’s characterization, the heir possessed a “right to property” in the estate — the right to accept the inheritance or pass it along to another — to which the federal lien could attach. Id., at 59-61.
Ill
We turn first to the question of what rights respondent’s husband had in the entireties property by virtue of state law. In order to understand these rights, the tenancy by the entirety must first be placed in some context.
English common law provided three legal structures for the concurrent ownership of property that have survived into modern times: tenancy in common, joint tenancy, and tenancy by the entirety. 1 G. Thompson, Real Property § 4.06(g) (D. Thomas ed. 1994) (hereinafter Thompson). The tenancy in common is now the most common form of concurrent ownership. 7 R. Powell & P. Rohan, Real Property §51.01[3] (M. Wolf ed. 2001) (hereinafter Powell). The common law characterized tenants in common as each owning a separate fractional share in undivided property. Id., § 50.01[1]. Tenants in common may each unilaterally alienate their shares through sale or gift or place encumbrances upon these shares. They also have the power to pass these shares to their heirs upon death. Tenants in common have many other rights in the property, including the right to use the property, to exclude third parties from it, and to receive a portion of any income produced from it. Id., §§50.03-50.06.
Joint tenancies were the predominant form of concurrent ownership at common law, and still persist in some States today. 4 Thompson § 31.05. The common law characterized each joint tenant as possessing the entire estate, rather than a fractional share: “[J]oint-tenants have one and the same interest... held by one and the same undivided possession.” 2 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 180 (1766). Joint tenants possess many of the rights enjoyed by tenants in common: the right to use, to exclude, and to enjoy a share of the property’s income. The main difference between a joint tenancy and a tenancy in common is that a joint tenant also has a right of automatic inheritance known as “survivorship.” Upon the death of one joint tenant, that tenant’s share in the property does not pass through will or the rules of intestate succession; rather, the remaining tenant or tenants automatically inherit it. Id., at 183; 7 Powell §51.01 [3]. Joint tenants’ right to alienate their individual shares is also somewhat different. In order for one tenant to alienate his or her individual interest in the tenancy, the estate must first be severed — that is, converted to a tenancy in common with each tenant possessing an equal fractional share. Id., § 51.04[1], Most States allowing joint tenancies facilitate alienation, however, by allowing severance to automatically accompany a conveyance of that interest or any other overt act indicating an intent to sever. Ibid.
A tenancy by the entirety is a unique sort of concurrent ownership that can only exist between married persons. 4 Thompson § 33.02. Because of the common-law fiction that the husband and wife were one person at law (that person, practically speaking, was the husband, see J. Cribbet et al., Cases and Materials on Property 329 (6th ed. 1990)), Blackstone did not characterize the tenancy by the entirety as a form of concurrent ownership at all. Instead, he thought that entireties property was a form of single ownership by the marital unity. Orth, Tenancy by the Entirety: The Strange Career of the Common-Law Marital Estate, 1997 B. Y. U. L. Rev. 35, 38-39. Neither spouse was considered to own any individual interest in the estate; rather, it belonged to the couple.
Like joint tenants, tenants by the entirety enjoy the right of survivorship. Also like a joint tenancy, unilateral alienation of a spouse’s interest in entireties property is typically not possible without severance. Unlike joint tenancies, however, tenancies by the entirety cannot easily be severed unilaterally. 4 Thompson § 33.08(b). Typically, severance requires the consent of both spouses, id., § 33.08(a), or the ending of the marriage in divorce, id., § 33.08(d). At common law, all of the other rights associated with the entireties property belonged to the husband: as the head of the household, he could control the use of the property and the exclusion of others from it and enjoy all of the income produced from it. Id., § 33.05. The husband’s control of the property was so extensive that, despite the rules on alienation, the common law eventually provided that he could unilaterally alienate entireties property without severance subject only to the wife’s survivorship interest. Orth, supra, at 40-41.
With the passage of the Married Women’s Property Acts in the late 19th century granting women distinct rights with respect to marital property, most States either abolished the tenancy by the entirety or altered it significantly. 7 Powell § 52.01[2]. Michigan’s version of the estate is typical of the modern tenancy by the entirety. Following Blackstone, Michigan characterizes its tenancy by the entirety as creating no individual rights whatsoever: “It is well settled under the law of this State that one tenant by the entirety has no interest separable from that of the other .... Each is vested with an entire title.” Long v. Earle, 277 Mich. 505, 517, 269 N. W. 577, 581 (1936). And yet, in Michigan, each tenant by the entirety possesses the right of survivorship. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 554.872(g) (West Supp. 1997), recodified at § 700.2901(2)(g) (West Supp. Pamphlet 2001). Each spouse — the wife as well as the husband — may also use the property, exclude third parties from it, and receive an equal share of the income produced by it. See §557.71 (West 1988). Neither spouse may unilaterally alienate or encumber the property, Long v. Earle, supra, at 517, 269 N. W., at 581; Rogers v. Rogers, 136 Mich. App. 125, 134, 356 N. W. 2d 288, 292 (1984), although this may be accomplished with mutual consent, Eadus v. Hunter, 249 Mich. 190, 228 N. W. 782 (1930). Divorce ends the tenancy by the entirety, generally giving each spouse an equal interest in the property as a tenant in common, unless the divorce decree specifies otherwise. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 552.102 (West 1988).
In determining whether respondent’s husband possessed “property” or “rights to property” within the meaning of 26 U. S. C. § 6321, we look to the individual rights created by these state law rules. According to Michigan law, respondent’s husband had, among other rights, the following rights with respect to the entireties property: the right to use the property, the right to exclude third parties from it, the right to a share of income produced from it, the right of survivor-ship, the right to become a tenant in common with equal shares upon divorce, the right to sell the property with the respondent’s consent and to receive half the proceeds from such a sale, the right to place an encumbrance on the property with the respondent’s consent, and the right to block respondent from selling or encumbering the property unilaterally.
IV
We turn now to the federal question of whether the rights Michigan law granted to respondent’s husband as a tenant by the entirety qualify as “property” or “rights to property” under §6321. The statutory language authorizing the tax lien “is broad and reveals on its face that Congress meant to reach every interest in property that a taxpayer might have.” United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 472 U. S., at 719-720. “Stronger language could hardly have been selected to reveal a purpose to assure the collection of taxes.” Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U. S. 265, 267 (1945). We conclude that the husband’s rights in the entireties property fall within this broad statutory language.
Michigan law grants a tenant by the entirety some of the most essential property rights: the right to use the property, to receive income produced by it, and to exclude others from it. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U. S. 374, 384 (1994) (“[T]he right to exclude others” is “ ‘one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property’ ” (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S. 164, 176 (1979))); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U. S. 419, 435 (1982) (including “use” as one of the “[property rights in a physical thing”). These rights alone may be sufficient to subject the husband’s interest in the entireties property to the federal tax lien. They gave him a substantial degree of control over the entireties property, and, as we noted in Drye, “in determining whether a federal taxpayer’s state-law rights constitute ‘property’ or ‘rights to property,’ [tjhe important consideration is the breadth of the control the [taxpayer] could exercise over the property.” 528 U. S., at 61 (some internal quotation marks omitted).
The husband’s rights in the estate, however, went beyond use, exclusion, and income. He also possessed the right to alienate (or otherwise encumber) the property with the consent of respondent, his wife. Loretto, supra, at 435 (the right to “dispose” of an item is a property right). It is true, as respondent notes, that he lacked the right to unilaterally alienate the property, a right that is often in the bundle of property rights. See also post, at 296-297 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). There is no reason to believe, however, that this one stick — the right of unilateral alienation — is essential to the category of “property.”
This Court has already stated that federal tax liens may attach to property that cannot be unilaterally alienated. In United States v. Rodgers, 461 U. S. 677 (1983), we considered the Federal Government’s power to foreclose homestead property attached by a federal tax lien. Texas law provided that “‘the owner or claimant of the property claimed as homestead [may not], if married, sell or abandon the homestead without the consent of the other spouse.’ ” Id., at 684-685 (quoting Tex. Const., Art. 16, §50). We nonetheless stated that “[i]n the homestead context . . . , there is no doubt... that not only do both spouses (rather than neither) have an independent interest in the homestead property, but that a federal tax lien can at least attach to each of those interests.” 461 U. S., at 703, n. 31; cf. Drye, supra, at 60, n. 7 (noting that “an interest in a spendthrift trust has been held to constitute ‘“property” for purposes of §6321’ even though the beneficiary may not transfer that interest to third parties”).
Excluding property from a federal tax lien simply because the taxpayer does not have the power to unilaterally alienate it would, moreover, exempt a rather large amount of what is commonly thought of as property. It would exempt not only the type of property discussed in Rodgers, but also some community property. Community property States often provide that real community property cannot be alienated without the consent of both spouses. See, e. g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §25-214(0 (2000); Cal. Fam. Code Ann. §1102 (West 1994); Idaho Code §32-912 (1996); La. Civ. Code Ann., Art. 2347 (West Supp. 2002); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 123.230(3) (Supp. 2001); N. M. Stat. Ann. §40-3-13 (1999); Wash. Rev. Code §26.16.030(3) (1994). Accordingly, the fact that respondent’s husband could not unilaterally alienate the property does not preclude him from possessing “property and rights to property” for the purposes of § 6321.
Respondent’s husband also possessed the right of survivor-ship — the right to automatically inherit the whole of the estate should his wife predecease him. Respondent argues that this interest was merely an expectancy, which we suggested in Drye would not constitute “property” for the purposes of a federal tax lien. 528 U. S., at 60, n. 7 (“[We do not mean to suggest] that an expectancy that has pecuniary value .. . would fall within § 6321 prior to the time it ripens into a present estate”). Drye did not decide this question, however, nor do we need to do so here. As we have discussed above, a number of the sticks in respondent’s husband’s bundle were presently existing. It is therefore not necessary to decide whether the right to survivorship alone would qualify as “property” or “rights to property” under §6321.
That the rights of respondent’s husband in the entireties property constitute “property” or “rights to property” “belonging to” him is further underscored by the fact that, if the conclusion were otherwise, the entireties property would belong to no one for the purposes of § 6321. Respondent had no more interest in the property than her husband; if neither of them had a property interest in the entireties property, who did? This result not only seems absurd, but would also allow spouses to shield their property from federal taxation by classifying it as entireties property, facilitating abuse of the federal tax system. Johnson, After Drye: The Likely Attachment of the Federal Tax Lien to Tenancy-by-the-Entireties Interests, 75 Ind. L. J. 1163, 1171 (2000).
Justice Scalia’s and Justice Thomas’ dissents claim that the conclusion that the husband possessed an interest in the entireties property to which the federal tax lien could attach is in conflict with the rules for tax liens relating to partnership property. See post, at 289 (opinion of Scalia, J.); see also post, at 295-296, n. 4 (opinion of Thomas, J.). This is not so. As the authorities cited by Justice Thomas reflect, the federal tax lien does attach to an individual partner’s interest in the partnership, that is, to the fair market value of his or her share in the partnership assets. Ibid. (citing B. Bittker & M. McMahon, Federal Income Taxation of Individuals ¶ 44.5[4][a] (2d ed. 1995 and 2000 Cum. Supp.)); see also 1 A. Bromberg & L. Ribstein, Partnership § 3.05(d) (2002-1 Supp.) (hereinafter Bromberg & Ribstein) (citing Uniform Partnership Act §28, 6 U. L. A. 744 (1995)). As a holder of this lien, the Federal Government is entitled to “receive ... the profits to which the assigning partner would otherwise be entitled,” including predissolution distributions and the proceeds from dissolution. Uniform Partnership Act §27(1), id., at 736.
There is, however, a difference between the treatment of entireties property and partnership assets. The Federal Government may not compel the sale of partnership assets (although it may foreclose on the partner’s interest, 1 Bromberg & Ribstein § 3.05(d)(3)(iv)). It is this difference that is reflected in Justice Scalia’s assertion that partnership property cannot be encumbered by an individual partner’s debts. See post, at 289. This disparity in treatment between the two forms of ownership, however, arises from our decision in United States v. Rodgers, supra (holding that the Government may foreclose on property even where the co-owners lack the right of unilateral alienation), and not our holding today. In this ease, it is instead the dissenters’ theory that departs from partnership law, as it would hold that the Federal Government’s lien does not attach to the husband’s interest in the entireties property at all, whereas the lien may attach to an individual’s interest in partnership property.
Respondent argues that, whether or not we would conclude that respondent’s husband had an interest in the en-tireties property, legislative history indicates that Congress did not intend that a federal tax lien should attach to such an interest. In 1954, the Senate rejected a proposed amendment to the tax lien statute that would have provided that the lien attach to “property or rights to property (including the interest- of such person as tenant by the entirety).” S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 575 (1954). We have elsewhere held, however, that failed legislative proposals are “a particularly dangerous ground on which to rest an interpretation of a prior statute,” Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation v. LTV Corp., 496 U. S. 633, 650 (1990), reasoning that “ ‘[congressional inaction lacks persuasive significance because several equally tenable inferences may be drawn from such inaction, including the inference that the existing legislation already incorporated the offered change.’ ” Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U. S. 164, 187 (1994). This case exemplifies the risk of relying on such legislative history. As we noted in United States v. Rodgers, 461 U. S., at 704, n. 31, some legislative history surrounding the 1954 amendment indicates that the House intended the amendment to be nothing more than a “clarification” of existing law, and that the Senate rejected the amendment only because it found it “superfluous.” See H. R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., A406 (1954) (noting that the amendment would “clarif[y] the term ‘property and rights to property’ by expressly including therein the interest of the delinquent taxpayer in an estate by the entirety”); S. Rep. No. 1622, at 575 (“It is not clear what change in existing law would be made by the parenthetical phrase. The deletion of the phrase is intended to continue the existing law”).
The same ambiguity that plagues the legislative history accompanies the common-law background of Congress’ enactment of the tax lien statute. Respondent argues that Congress could not have intended the passage of the federal tax lien statute to alter the generally accepted rule that liens could not attach to entireties property. See Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Solimino, 501 U. S. 104, 108 (1991) (“[W]here a common-law principle is well established ... the courts may take it as given that Congress has legislated with an expectation that the principle will apply except ‘when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident’”). The common-law rule was not so well established with respect to the application of a federal tax lien that we must assume that Congress considered the impact of its enactment on the question now before us. There was not much of a common-law background on the question of the application of federal tax liens, as the first court of appeals cases dealing with the application of such a lien did not arise until the 1950’s. United States v. Hutcherson, 188 F. 2d 326 (CA8 1951); Raffaele v. Granger, 196 F. 2d 620 (CA3 1952). This background is not sufficient to overcome the broad statutory language Congress did enact, authorizing the lien to attach to “all property and rights to property” a taxpayer might have.
We therefore conclude that respondent’s husband’s interest in the entireties property constituted “property” or “rights to property” for the purposes of the federal tax lien statute. We recognize that Michigan makes a different choice with respect to state law creditors: “[L]and held by husband and wife as tenants by entirety is not subject to levy under execution on judgment rendered against either husband or wife alone.” Sanford v. Bertrau, 204 Mich. 244, 247, 169 N. W. 880, 881 (1918). But that by no means dictates our choice. The interpretation of 26 U. S. C. §6321 is a federal question, and in answering that question we are in no way bound by state courts’ answers to similar questions involving state law. As we elsewhere have held, “‘exempt status under state law does not bind the federal collector.’” Drye v. United States, 528 U. S., at 59. See also Rodgers, supra, at 701 (clarifying that the Supremacy Clause “provides the underpinning for the Federal Government’s right to sweep aside state-created exemptions”).
V
We express no view as to the proper valuation of respondent’s husband’s interest in the entireties property, leaving this for the Sixth Circuit to determine on remand. We note, however, that insofar as the amount is dependent upon whether the 1989 conveyance was fraudulent, see post, at 290, n. 1 (Thomas, J., dissenting), this case is somewhat anomalous. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment that this conveyance was not fraudulent, and the Government has not sought certiorari review of that determination. Since the District Court’s judgment was based on the notion that, because the federal tax lien could not attach to the property, transferring it could not constitute an attempt to evade the Government creditor, 65 F. Supp. 2d, at 657-659, in future cases, the fraudulent conveyance question will no doubt be answered differently.
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is accordingly reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | L | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court.
Mr. Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted.
Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
PER CURIAM.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) requires a state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief first to "exhaus[t] the remedies available in the courts of the State." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). If the state courts adjudicate the prisoner's federal claim "on the merits," § 2254(d), then AEDPA mandates deferential, rather than de novo, review, prohibiting federal courts from granting habeas relief unless the state-court decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law," § 2254(d)(1), or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts," § 2254(d)(2). The Ninth Circuit in this case decided that the Supreme Court of California's summary denial of a habeas petition was not "on the merits," and therefore AEDPA's deferential-review provisions did not apply. We summarily reverse.
Respondent Antonio Hinojosa was serving a 16-year sentence for armed robbery and related crimes when, in 2009, California prison officials "validated" him as a prison-gang associate and placed him in a secured housing unit. At the time of Hinojosa's offense and conviction, California law had permitted prisoners placed in a secured housing unit solely by virtue of their prison-gang affiliations to continue to accrue good-time credits. See Cal.Penal Code Ann. § 2933.6 (West 2000). In 2010, the California Legislature amended the law so that prison-gang associates placed in a secured housing unit could no longer earn future good-time credits, although they would retain any credits already earned. § 2933.6(a) (West Supp.2016).
Hinojosa filed a state habeas petition, arguing (as relevant here) that applying the new law to him violated the Federal Constitution's prohibition of ex post facto laws. See Art. I, § 10, cl. 1; Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981). The Orange County Superior Court denied the claim "on grounds petitioner has not sought review of his claim of error in the proper judicial venue." App. to Pet. for Cert. 44a. The court explained:
" 'Although any superior court has jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate a petition for writ of habeas corpus, it does not follow that it should do so in all instances.' Challenges to conditions of an inmate's confinement should be entertained by the superior court of county wherein the inmate is confined. (Griggs v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 341, 347 [128 Cal.Rptr. 223, 546 P.2d 727].)
"The petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED." Id., at 44a-45a.
Rather than file a new petition in the correct venue (Kings County Superior Court), Hinojosa turned to the appellate court, which summarily denied his petition. Instead of appealing that denial, see Cal.Penal Code Ann. § 1506 (West Supp.2016), Hinojosa sought an original writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of California, see Cal. Const., Art. 6, § 10, which summarily denied relief without explanation.
A petition for federal habeas relief followed. Adopting the Magistrate Judge's findings and recommendation, the District Court denied Hinojosa's ex post facto claim under AEDPA's deferential review. A Ninth Circuit panel reversed. Hinojosa v. Davey, 803 F.3d 412 (2015). Citing our decision in Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991), the panel "looked through" the Supreme Court of California's summary denial to the last reasoned decision adjudicating Hinojosa's claim: the Superior Court's dismissal for improper venue. The panel reasoned that the Superior Court's decision "is not a determination 'on the merits' " and that as a result it was "not bound by AEDPA." 803 F.3d, at 419. Having thus freed itself from AEDPA's strictures, the court granted Hinojosa's petition for habeas relief.
We reverse. In Ylst, we said that where "the last reasoned opinion on the claim explicitly imposes a procedural default, we will presume that a later decision rejecting the claim did not silently disregard that bar and consider the merits." 501 U.S., at 803, 111 S.Ct. 2590. We adopted this presumption because "silence implies consent, not the opposite-and courts generally behave accordingly, affirming without further discussion when they agree, not when they disagree, with the reasons given below." Id., at 804, 111 S.Ct. 2590. But we pointedly refused to make the presumption irrebuttable; "strong evidence can refute it." Ibid.
It is amply refuted here. Improper venue could not possibly have been a ground for the high court's summary denial of Hinojosa's claim. There is only one Supreme Court of California-and thus only one venue in which Hinojosa could have sought an original writ of habeas corpus in that court. Under these circumstances, it cannot be that the State Supreme Court's denial "rest[ed] upon the same ground" as the Superior Court's. Id., at 803, 111 S.Ct. 2590. It quite obviously rested upon some different ground. Ylst 's "look-through" approach is therefore inapplicable.
Hinojosa resists this conclusion, remarking that "a reviewing court has discretion to deny without prejudice a habeas corpus petition that was not filed first in a proper lower court." In re Steele, 32 Cal.4th 682, 692, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 536, 85 P.3d 444, 449 (2004) (emphasis added). But there is no indication that the summary denial here was without prejudice, thus refuting Hinojosa's speculation.
Containing no statement to the contrary, the Supreme Court of California's summary denial of Hinojosa's petition was therefore on the merits. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011). Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit should have reviewed Hinojosa's ex post facto claim through AEDPA's deferential lens. And although we express no view on the merits of that claim, we note that the Ninth Circuit has already held that state-court denials of claims identical to Hinojosa's are not contrary to clearly established federal law. See Nevarez v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 1124 (C.A.9 2014) ; see also In re Efstathiou, 200 Cal.App.4th 725, 730-732, 133 Cal.Rptr.3d 34, 37-40 (2011) ; In re Sampson, 197 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1240-1244, 130 Cal.Rptr.3d 39, 43-46 (2011). The panel below recognized as much: "If AEDPA applies here, we are bound by our decision in Nevarez and must affirm the district court's denial of Hinojosa's petition." 803 F.3d, at 418. AEDPA applies here.
The petition for a writ of certiorari and Hinojosa's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis are granted, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed.
It is so ordered.
Justice SOTOMAYOR, with whom Justice GINSBURG joins, dissenting.
When faced with a state-court order that denies a habeas petition without explanation, this Court has long presumed that the order agrees with the "last reasoned state-court opinion" in the case unless there is "strong evidence" to the contrary. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804-805, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991). In this case, the parties agree that a California Superior Court denied a petition for improper venue because it was filed in the wrong county. The California Supreme Court later denied the same petition for no explained reason. Applying Ylst 's commonsense presumption, it is "most improbable" that the California Supreme Court's unexplained order disagreed with the Superior Court's reasoned order. Id., at 804, 111 S.Ct. 2590. We should therefore presume that the California Supreme Court denied Antonio Hinojosa's habeas petition because he filed the first one in the wrong county.
The Court, however, believes there is strong evidence to the contrary-for two inexplicable reasons. The first reason-the California Supreme Court could not have denied the petition for "improper venue" because there is only one California Supreme Court, ante, at 1605 - 1606-is a straw man, and a poorly constructed one at that. Obviously the California Supreme Court did not deny Hinojosa's petition because he filed it in the wrong State Supreme Court. But it easily could have denied his petition because it agreed with the Superior Court's conclusion that he filed the first petition in the wrong county. See In re Steele, 32 Cal.4th 682, 692, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 536, 85 P.3d 444, 449 (2004). That possibility becomes even more likely in light of California's atypical habeas rules, which treat an original habeas petition to the California Supreme Court as the commonplace method for seeking review of a lower court's order. See Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 221-222, 122 S.Ct. 2134, 153 L.Ed.2d 260 (2002). By issuing a silent order after reviewing the lower court's reasoned decision, the California Supreme Court presumably denied Hinojosa's petition on the same ground. Cf. Ylst, 501 U.S., at 800, 111 S.Ct. 2590 (applying its presumption on an identical posture out of California).
The majority's second reason is even flimsier. The majority suggests that the California Supreme Court's order did not include the words "without prejudice" and therefore could not have agreed with the Superior Court's denial-which the majority assumes was without prejudice. Ante, at 1606. But as the majority quotes, the Superior Court simply " 'DENIED' " the petition; neither it nor the California Supreme Court "DENIED" it "without prejudice." Ante, at 1605, 1606. It is mindboggling how one opinion necessarily disagrees with another opinion merely because it omits language that the other opinion also lacks.
I would hold, as the Ninth Circuit did, that the California Supreme Court presumably agreed with the reasoning of the Superior Court. See Ylst, 501 U.S., at 804, 111 S.Ct. 2590. At the very least, I would not hold that there is such "strong evidence" to the contrary that we should summarily reverse the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the California Supreme Court's order-and, in the process, reverse the Ninth Circuit's separate conclusion that Hinojosa's incarceration had been unconstitutionally extended.
In Griggs v. Superior Ct. of San Bernardino Cty., 16 Cal.3d 341, 347, 128 Cal.Rptr. 223, 546 P.2d 727, 731 (1976), the Supreme Court of California stated that "[a]s a general rule," if a prisoner files a habeas petition challenging the conditions of his confinement in a county other than the one in which he is confined, the court should not deny the petition unless it fails to state a prima facie case. In this case, however, there is no hint in the opinion of the Superior Court that it followed this approach, and petitioner does not claim that it did.
Alternatively, if the Superior Court in fact followed Griggs ' instructions and silently concluded that the claim did not state a prima facie case for relief, see n. 1, supra, the decision of the Supreme Court of California would still be a decision on the merits, and the AEDPA standard of review would still apply.
Contrary to the majority's characterization, Hinojosa did not file his petition "[i]nstead of appealing" the lower court's denial, ante, at 1605-his petition was itself his appeal. See Carey, 536 U.S., at 225, 122 S.Ct. 2134 (calling an original habeas petition and the alternative "petition for hearing" "interchangeable " methods of appeal, "with neither option bringing adverse consequences to the petitioner").
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Burton
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question before us is whether the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, has given the National Labor Relations Board such exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of a common-law tort action for damages as to preclude an appropriate state court from hearing and determining its issues where such conduct constitutes an unfair labor practice under that Act. For the reasons hereafter stated, we hold that it has not.
November 16, 1949, Laburnum Construction Corporation, a Virginia corporation, respondent herein, filed a notice of motion for judgment in the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond, Virginia, against petitioners United Construction Workers, affiliated with United Mine Workers of America; District 50, United Mine Workers of America; and United Mine Workers of America. The proceeding was a common-law tort action for compensatory and punitive damages totaling $500,000. The notice contained substantially the following allegations: While respondent was performing construction work in Breathitt County, Kentucky, under contracts with Pond Creek Pocahontas Company and others, July 26-August 4, 1949, agents of the respective petitioners came there. They demanded that respondent’s employees join the United Construction Workers and that respondent recognize that organization as the sole bargaining agent for respondent’s employees on the project. They added that, if respondent and its employees did not comply, respondent would not be allowed to continue its work. Upon respondent’s refusal and that of many of its employees to yield to such demands, petitioners’ agents threatened and intimidated respondent’s officers and employees with violence to such a degree that respondent was compelled to abandon all its projects in that area. The notice further alleged that, as the result of this conduct of petitioners’ agents, respondent was deprived of substantial profits it otherwise would have earned on those and other projects. After trial, a jury found petitioners jointly and severally liable to respondent for $175,437.19 as compensatory damages, and $100,-000 as punitive damages, making a total of $275,437.19.
Petitioners moved for a new trial claiming numerous errors of law, and for a dismissal on the ground that the Labor Management Relations Act had deprived the court of its jurisdiction over the subject matter. Both motions were overruled and the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia granted a writ of error and supersedeas. After argument, it struck out $146,111.10 of the compensatory damages and affirmed the judgment for the remaining $129,326.09. 194 Va. 872, 75 S. E. 2d 694. Because of . the importance of the jurisdictional issue to the enforcement of common-law rights and to the administration of the Labor Management Relations Act, we granted certiorari limited to the following question:
“ Tn view of the type of conduct found by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia to have been carried out by Petitioners, does the National Labor Relations Board have exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter so as to preclude the State Court from hearing and determining the issues in a common-law tort action based upon this conduct?’ ” 346 U. S. 936.
We are concerned only with the above-stated jurisdictional question. We accept the view of the National Labor Relations Board that respondent’s activities affect interstate commerce within the meaning of the Labor Management Relations Act. The “type of conduct found by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia” is set out in the margin. Although the notice for judgment does not mention the Labor Management Relations Act or unfair labor practices as such, we assume the conduct before us also constituted an unfair labor practice within the following provisions of that Act:
“Sec. 8. . . .
“(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents—
“(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7: . . .
61 Stat. 140, 141, 29 U. S. C. (1952 ed.) § 158 (b) (1) (A).
“Sec. 7. Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities . . . 61 Stat. 140, 29 U. S. C. (1952 ed.) § 157.
Petitioners contend that the Act of 1947 has occupied the labor relations field so completely that no regulatory agency other than the National Labor Relations Board and no court may assert jurisdiction over unfair labor practices as defined by it, unless expressly authorized by Congress to do so. They claim that state courts accordingly are excluded not only from enjoining future unfair labor practices and thus colliding with the Board, as occurred in Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U. S. 485, but that state courts are excluded also from entertaining common-law tort actions for the recovery of damages caused by such conduct. The latter exclusion is the issue here. In the Garner case, Congress had provided a federal administrative remedy, supplemented by judicial procedure for its enforcement, with which the state injunctive procedure conflicted. Here Congress has neither provided nor suggested any substitute for the traditional state court procedure for collecting damages for injuries caused by tortious conduct. For us to cut off the injured respondent from this right of recovery will deprive it of its property without recourse or compensation. To do so will, in effect, grant petitioners immunity from liability for their tortious conduct. We see no substantial reason for reaching such a result. The contrary view is consistent with the language of the Act and there is positive support for it in our decisions and in the legislative history of the Act.
In the Garner case, we said:
“The national Labor Management Relations Act, as we have before pointed out, leaves much to the states, though Congress has refrained from telling us how much. We must spell out from conflicting indications of congressional will the area in which state action is still permissible.
“This is not an instance of injurious conduct which the National Labor Relations Board is without express power to prevent and which therefore either is 'governable by the State or it is entirely ungoverned.’ In such cases we have declined to find an implied exclusion of state powers. International Union v. Wisconsin Board, 336 U. S. 245, 254. Nor is this a case of mass picketing, threatening of employees, obstructing streets and highways, or picketing homes. We have held that the state still may exercise ‘its historic powers over such traditionally local matters as public safety and order and the use of streets and highways.’ Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Board, 315 U. S. 740, 749.” 346 U. S., at 488.
To the extent that Congress prescribed preventive procedure against unfair labor practices, that case recognized that the Act excluded conflicting state procedure to the same end. To the extent, however, that Congress has not prescribed procedure for dealing with the consequences of tortious conduct already committed, there is no ground for concluding that existing criminal penalties or liabilities for tortious conduct have been eliminated. The care we took in the Garner case to demonstrate the existing conflict between state and federal administrative remedies in that case was, itself, a recognition that if no conflict had existed, the state procedure would have survived. The primarily private nature of claims for damages under state law also distinguishes them in a measure from the public nature of the regulation of future labor relations under federal law.
The Labor Management Relations Act sets up no general compensatory procedure except in such minor supplementary ways as the reinstatement of wrongfully discharged employees with back pay. 61 Stat. 147, 29 U. S. C. (1952 ed.) § 160 (c). See also, Labor Board v. Electrical Workers, 346 U. S. 464.
One instance in which the Act prescribes judicial procedure for the recovery of damages caused by unfair labor practices is that with reference to the jurisdiction of federal and other courts to adjudicate claims for damages resulting from secondary boycotts. In that instance the Act expressly authorizes a recovery of damages in any Federal District Court and “in any other court having jurisdiction of the parties.” By this provision, the Act assures uniformity,- otherwise lacking, in rights of recovery in the state courts and grants jurisdiction to the federal courts without respect to the amount in controversy. To recover damages under that section is consistent with the existence of jurisdiction in state courts to enforce criminal penalties and common-law liabilities generally. On the other hand, it is not consistent to say that Congress, in that section, authorizes court action for the recovery of damages caused by tortious conduct related to secondary boycotts and yet, without express mention of it, Congress abolishes all common-law rights to recover damages caused more directly and flagrantly through such conduct as is before us.
Considerable legislative history supports this interpretation. Under the National Labor Relations Act, 1935, there were no prohibitions of unfair labor practices on the part of labor organizations. Yet there is no doubt that if agents of such organizations at that time had damaged property through their tortious conduct, the persons responsible would have been liable to a tort action in state courts for the damage done. See Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Board, 315 U. S. 740.
The 1947 Act has increased, rather than decreased, the legal responsibilities of labor organizations. Certainly that Act did not expressly relieve labor organizations from liability for unlawful conduct. It sought primarily to empower a federal regulatory body, through administrative procedure, to forestall unfair labor practices by anyone in circumstances affecting interstate commerce. The fact that it prescribed new preventive procedure against unfair labor practices on the part of labor organizations was an additional recognition of congressional disapproval of such practices. Such an express recognition is consistent with an increased insistence upon the liability of such organizations for tortious conduct and inconsistent with their immunization from liabilty for damages caused by their tortious practices.
The language declaring the congressional policy against such practices is phrased in terms of their prevention:
“Sec. 10. (a) The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in section 8) affecting commerce. This power shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise: . . . .” 61 Stat. 146, 29 U. S. C. (1952 ed.) § 160 (a).
Section 10 (c) directs the Board to issue a cease-and-desist order after an appropriate finding of fact. There is no declaration that this procedure is to be exclusive.
The history of the enactment of § 8 (b)(1)(A) lends further support to this interpretation. Senate Report No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 50, as to S. 1126, said in part:
“Since this bill establishes the principle of unfair labor practices on the part of unions, we can see no reason whatever why they should not be subject to the same rules as the employers. The committee heard many instances of union coercion of employees such as that brought about by threats of reprisal against employees and their families in the course of organizing campaigns; also direct interference by mass picketing and other violence. Some of these acts are illegal under State law, hut we see no reason why they should not also constitute unfair labor practices to he investigated hy the National Labor Relations Board, and at least deprive the violators of any protection furnished hy the Wagner Act.” (Emphasis added.)
Senator Taft, one of the sponsors of the bill, added later:
“But suppose there is duplication in extreme cases; suppose there is a threat of violence constituting violation of the law of the State. Why should it not be an unfair labor practice? It is on the part of the employer. If an employer proceeds to use violence, as employers once did, if they use the kind of goon-squad tactics labor unions are permitted to use— and they once did — if they threaten men with physical violence if they join a union, they are subject to State law, and they are also subject to be proceeded against for violating the National Labor Relations Act. There is no reason in the world why there should not he two remedies for an act of that kind.” (Emphasis added.) 93 Cong. Rec. 4024.
If Virginia is denied jurisdiction in this case, it will mean that where the federal preventive administrative procedures are impotent or inadequate, the offenders, by coercion of the type found here, may destroy, property without liability for the damage done. If petitioners were unorganized private persons, conducting themselves as petitioners did here, Virginia would have had undoubted jurisdiction of this action against them. The fact that petitioners are labor organizations, with no contractual relationship with respondent or its employees, provides no reasonable basis for a different conclusion.
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia is, therefore, sustained and its judgment
Affirmed.
Me. Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
61 Stat. 136 et seq., 29 U. S. C. (1952 e d.) § 141 et seq.
Our order also stated that—
“The Government is invited to submit a memorandum setting forth the policy of the National Labor Relations Board in regard to: (1) the proviso in § 10 (a), 61 Stat. 146, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. Ill) § 160 (a); and (2) other cases, apart from those in § 10 (a), in which the Board declines to exercise its statutory jurisdiction. The memorandum should indicate by what standards the Board declines to act and whether the standards are applied by rule or regulation or on a case-by-case method.”
The Government filed a memorandum stating that it had found it “not feasible under the limitations prescribed by the Act to consummate agreements ceding jurisdiction” under the proviso in § 10 (a). It stated also that “Under the standards which the Board is currently continuing to apply, it would assert jurisdiction over an enterprise similar to [that of] respondent company herein.” It found that respondent’s enterprises came within at least the following categories of the Board’s jurisdictional standards:
“4. Enterprises producing or handling goods destined for out-of-State shipment, or performing services outside the State in which the firm is located, valued at $25,000 a year.
“5. Enterprises furnishing goods or services of $50,000 a year or more to concerns in categories 1, 2, or 4 [supra].”
See also, Mimeograph Release of National Labor Relations Board, dated October 6, 1950, entitled “N. L. R. B. Clarifies and Defines Areas In Which It Will and Will Not Exercise Jurisdiction”; Labor Board v. Denver Building Council, 341 U. S. 675, 684-685.
See note 2, supra.
“During the period from September 6, 1947 to December 1, 1949, the plaintiff performed work in West Virginia and Kentucky for Pond Creek Pocahontas Company, Island Creek Coal Company, and their subsidiary companies, under twelve separate contracts amounting to more than $650,000, from which it derived an annual profit slightly over $25,000. . . .
“In October, 1948, the two coal-producing companies determined to open a mine in Breathitt county, Kentucky, and Bryan [president of respondent] was asked to undertake the building of the preparation plant there. Because of the undeveloped condition of the roads and lack of living accommodations for the laborers, Bryan was told that if Laburnum would undertake the project it would be awarded additional work which would be required for the operation of another mine in Breathitt county, amounting to more than $600,000, on the basis of cost plus a fee of five per cent.
“On October 28, 1948, Pond Creek Pocahontas Company awarded the plaintiff a contract for construction of the preparation plant on the basis of cost plus a fee of five per cent, the total fee not to exceed the sum of $12,000. The estimated cost of the project was $200,000. Work on this project was commenced November 1, 1948, and was approximately ninety-five per cent completed when it was interrupted on July 26, 1949. Pursuant to their agreement the coal companies also awarded Laburnum several projects included in the additional work to which reference has been made.
“Upon commencing the work in Breathitt county, Laburnum, in compliance with its agreement with Richmond Building & Construction Trades Council, procured skilled laborers through the nearest local affiliates of the American Federation of Labor. With the knowledge and consent of these affiliates it employed local unskilled laborers who were not members of any labor organization.
“Laburnum proceeded with its work on these several projects without trouble until July 14, 1949, when William O. Hart, speaking from Pikeville, Kentucky, telephoned Bryan who was in Richmond. According to the testimony of Bryan, which was accepted by the jury, Hart identified himself as a 'field representative of the United Construction Workers and District 50 of the United Mine Workers of America,’ working under David Hunter, ‘Regional Director of Region 58 of United Construction Workers and District 50/ with headquarters in Pikeville. Hart told Bryan that he was familiar with the work which Laburnum was doing and about to do in Breathitt county, that the plaintiff was ‘working in United Mine Workers territory,’ and that he (Hart) would close down this work unless the plaintiff recognized the United Construction Workers in the employment of its workers. Bryan told Hart of Laburnum’s agreement with the American Federation of Labor affiliate at Richmond, under which it was to employ members of that union, and that consequently it would not be able to comply with Hart’s demand and make an agreement with the United Construction Workers. Hart replied that he was going ‘to take over’ the plaintiff’s work, that he intended to ‘organize’ all of its workers, ‘including the carpenters, electricians, pipefitters, ironworkers, millwrights, laborers, and everybody else,’ and that if the plaintiff failed to make an agreement ‘recognizing the United Construction Workers, he (Hart) would close down’ all of the plaintiff’s work in Breathitt county, as had been done in other instances within his (Hart’s) territory.
“On Monday, July 25, about 7:30 p. m., Delinger [in respondent’s employ] telephoned Bryan that he had been informed that on the next day, at noon, the United Construction Workers were coming to the job site with a large group of men, that they would be armed, and would stop the plaintiff’s employees from working on the projects.
“. . . When he [Bryan] arrived there [July 26] he found that all work on the several projects in which his men were engaged had stopped. It developed that about noon on that day Hart had arrived at the job site accompanied by a crowd variously estimated at from 40 to 150 men. There is evidence that this was ‘a very rough, boisterous crowd,’ that some of the men used abusive language, that some were drunk, and that some carried guns and knives.
“Hart and his men went to the coal preparation plant and told the Laburnum workers there that he was taking over the job and that the Laburnum workers would have to ‘join up with the United Construction Workers.’ He accosted other employees of the plaintiff at another site where he repeated his threats that he would ‘take over’ the job unless they joined the union which he represented. Some of the plaintiff’s employees yielded to these threats and agreed to join Hart’s labor organization, while others refused to do so.
“Bryan talked with Hart again at the job site on August 1, and, as he says, Hart ‘left no doubt in anybody’s mind that he was going to have people to stop any men from working who tried.’ ‘He continually threatened to bring a large crowd of people there from Beaver Creek and other places to stop us from working if any of our people went to work. He said he would do that unless we signed a paper recognizing his organization as the representative of the laborers.’ Bryan replied that he ‘wouldn’t do it and couldn’t do it’ because of his prior obligation to another labor organization. Moreover, Hart threatened that if the Laburnum men ‘went back to work he was going to close down the mine operations by stopping the United Mine Workers from working for Pond Creek.’
“. . . Consequently, on August 4, the coal companies, because of the dispute in which the plaintiff had become involved with representatives of these labor organizations, canceled the construction contracts with Laburnum which were then in progress.
“After the violent events of July, 1949, Pond Creek Pocahontas Company and Island Creek Coal Company abandoned the award of the additional work upon a cost plus five per cent basis which they had promised the Laburnum company. The coal companies invited bids upon this proposed construction, but Laburnum was unsuccessful in all of its bids for such work. The officials of the coal companies expressed their high regard and sympathy for Bryan, but explained that they could not run the risk of having the defendant unions shut down the mining operations because of the unions’ differences with Laburnum.” 194 Va. 872, 880-881, 882, 883, 884-885, 75 S. E. 2d 694, 700-701, 702, 703.
The cases relied upon to exclude state jurisdiction are those where a conflict with federal control has been made clear.
“[W]hen Congress does exercise its paramount authority, it is obvious that Congress may determine how far its regulation shall go. There is no constitutional rule which compels Congress to occupy the whole field. Congress may circumscribe its regulation and occupy only a limited field. When it does so, state regulation outside that limited field and otherwise admissible is not forbidden or displaced. The principle is thoroughly established that the exercise by the State of its police power, which would be valid if not superseded by federal action, is superseded only where the repugnance or conflict is so ‘direct and positive’ that the two acts cannot ‘be reconciled or consistently stand together.’ ” Kelly v. Washington, 302 U. S. 1, 10. See also, Amalgamated Assn. v. Wisconsin Board, 340 U. S. 383; United, Automobile Workers v. O’Brien, 339 U. S. 454; Plankinton Packing Co. v. Wisconsin Board, 338 U. S. 953; La Crosse Telephone Corp. v. Wisconsin Board, 336 U. S. 18; Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York Board, 330 U. S. 767; Hill v. Florida, 325 U. S. 538.
“Sec. 303. . . .
“(b) Whoever shall be injured in his business or property by reason or [of] any violation of subsection (a) [boycotts and other unlawful combinations] may sue therefor in any district court of the United States subject to the limitations and provisions of section 301 hereof without respect to the amount in controversy, or in any other court having jurisdicion of the parties, and shall recover the damages by him sustained and the cost of the suit.” 61 Stat. 158, 159, 29 U. S. C. (1952 ed.) § 187(b).
49 Stat. 449 et seq., 29 U. S. C. (1946 ed.) § 151 et seq.
“. . . While the Federal Board is empowered to forbid a strike, when and because its purpose is one that the Federal Act made illegal, it has been given no power to forbid one because its method is illegal— even if the illegality were to consist of actual or threatened violence to persons or destruction of property. Policing of such conduct is left wholly to the states. In this case there was also evidence of considerable injury to property and intimidation of other employees by threats and no one questions the State’s power to police coercion by those methods.” International Union v. Wisconsin Board, 336 U. S. 245, 253. See also, pp. 255-258 distinguishing the conduct there complained of from that protected by § 7 of the Labor Management Relations Act.
“. . . By retaining the language which provides the Board’s powers under section 10 shall not be affected by other means of adjustment, the conference agreement makes clear that, when two remedies exist, one before the Board and one before the courts, the remedy before the Board shall be in addition to, and not in lieu of, other remedies.” Conference Report on H. R. 3020, H. R. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 52.
Similarly, H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, said:
“Equal Responsibility Before the Law
“When employers violate rights that the Labor Act gives to employees or to unions, the Board can issue orders against them. When employers violate rights of employees or of unions under other laws, they must answer in court for what they do. Under the bill, when unions and their members violate rights given to employers and to employees, the new Board can issue orders protecting the employers and the employees.” (Emphasis added.)
See generally, Note, Labor Law — Federal and State Jurisdiction-Common Law Remedies, 27 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 468; Cox and Seidman, Federalism and Labor Relations, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 211, 236.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | J | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question here is whether the claim of a federal prisoner that he was convicted on evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search and seizure is cognizable in a post-conviction proceeding under 28 U. S. C. § 2255.
Petitioner was tried and convicted in the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri on charges of armed robbery of a federally insured savings and loan association. At trial, petitioner’s only defense was insanity. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, on petitioner’s direct appeal, affirmed the conviction. Kaufman v. United States, 350 F. 2d 408 (1965).
Petitioner then filed this post-conviction proceeding under § 2255 and included a claim that the finding of sanity was based upon the improper admission of unlawfully seized evidence. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Judge, who had also presided at petitioner’s trial, denied relief with a written opinion. As respects the claim of unlawful search and seizure, the opinion states that: “The record does not substantiate this claim. In any event, this matter was not assigned as error on Kaufman’s appeal from conviction and is not available as a ground for collateral attack on the instant § 2255 motion.” 268 F. Supp. 484, 487 (1967). Petitioner’s applications to the District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit for leave to appeal in forma pauperis were denied.
We treat the actions of the District Court and the Court of Appeals as grounded on the view consistently followed by the Court of Appeals that claims of unlawful search and seizure “are not proper matters to be presented by a motion to vacate sentence under § 2255 but can only be properly presented by appeal from the conviction.” Other courts of appeals have indicated a contra-ry view. In light of the importance of the issue in the administration of § 2255 we granted certiorari. 390 U. S. 1002 (1968). We reverse.
The authority of the federal courts to issue the writ of habeas corpus was incorporated in the very first grant of federal court jurisdiction made by the Judiciary Act of 1789, c. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81, with the limiting provision that “writs of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to prisoners in gaol, unless where they are in custody, under or by colour of the authority of the United States . . . .” Common-law principles initially determined the scope of the writ. Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 93-94 (1807). In 1867, however, the writ was extended to state prisoners, and its scope was expanded to authorize relief, both as to federal and state prisoners, in “all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States . . . .” Act of February 5, 1867, c. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385.
Section 2255 revised the procedure by which federal prisoners are to seek such relief but did not in any respect cut back the scope of the writ. The section was included in the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code “at the instance of the Judicial Conference [of the United States] to meet practical difficulties that had arisen in administering the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the federal courts. Nowhere in the history of Section 2255 do we find any purpose to impinge upon prisoners’ rights of collateral attack upon their convictions. On the contrary, the sole purpose was to minimize the difficulties encountered in habeas corpus hearings by affording the same rights in another and more convenient jorum,” United States v. Hayman, 342 U. S. 205, 219 (1952) (italics supplied); “the legislation was intended simply to provide in the sentencing court a remedy exactly commensurate with that which had previously been available by habeas corpus in the court of the district where the prisoner was confined.” Hill v. United States, 368 U. S. 424, 427 (1962). Thus, we may refer to our decisions respecting the availability of the federal habeas remedy in deciding the question presented in this case.
We noted in Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 409 (1963) that “[t]he course of decisions of this Court . . . makes plain that restraints contrary to our fundamental law, the Constitution, may be challenged on federal habeas even though imposed pursuant to the conviction of a federal court of competent jurisdiction.” We have given the same recognition to constitutional claims in § 2255 proceedings. See, e. g., United States v. Hayman, supra; Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1 (1963); Jordan v. United States, 352 U. S. 904 (1956). The courts of appeals which have denied cognizance under § 2255 to unconstitutional search-and-seizure claims have not generally supplied reasons supporting their apparent departure from this course of our decisions. Rather, these courts have made the bald statement, variously expressed, that a motion under § 2255 cannot be used in lieu of an appeal. It is true that in Sunal v. Large, 332 U. S. 174,179 (1947), we held that “the writ is not designed for collateral review of errors of law committed by the trial court — the existence of any evidence to support the conviction, irregularities in the grand jury procedure, departure from a statutory grant of time in which to prepare for trial, and other errors in trial procedure which do not cross the jurisdictional line.” But we there recognized that federal habeas relief for constitutional claims asserted by federal prisoners is not limited by that rule. 332 U. S., at 182; see also Hill v. United States, supra, at 428. Later, in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293, 311-312 (1963), we pointed out the vital distinction between the appellate and habeas functions and concluded that habeas relief cannot be denied solely on the ground that relief should have been sought by appeal to prisoners alleging constitutional deprivations:
“The whole history of the writ — its unique development — refutes a construction of the federal courts’ habeas corpus powers that would assimilate their task to that of courts of appellate review. The function on habeas is different. It is to test by way of an original civil proceeding, independent of the normal channels of review of criminal judgments, the very gravest allegations. . . . The language of Congress, the history of the writ, the decisions of this Court, all make clear that the power of inquiry on federal habeas corpus is plenary. Therefore, where an applicant for a writ of habeas corpus alleges facts which, if proved, would entitle him to relief, the federal court to which the application is made has the power to receive evidence and try the facts anew.”
The Government suggests another rationale for denying post-conviction relief to federal prisoners with illegal search-and-seizure claims. The denial of Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Government’s argument runs, is of a different nature from denials of other constitutional rights which we have held subject to collateral attack by federal prisoners. -For unlike a claim of denial of effective counsel or of violation of the privilege against self-incrimination, as examples, a claim of illegal search and seizure does not impugn the integrity of the fact-finding process or challenge evidence as inherently unreliable; rather, the exclusion of illegally seized evidence is simply a prophylactic device intended generally to deter Fourth Amendment violations by law enforcement officers. This deterrent function, the Government argues, is adequately served by the opportunities afforded a federal defendant to enforce the exclusionary rule before or at trial, so that the relatively minimal additional deterrence afforded by a post-conviction remedy would not seem to justify, except in special circumstances, the collateral release of guilty persons who did not raise the search-and-seizure issue at trial or on direct appeal. In sum, the Government sponsors adoption by this Court of the rule announced in the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Thornton v. United States, 125 U. S. App. D. C. 114, 116, 368 F. 2d 822, 824 (1966), that in the absence of a showing of “special circumstances” a claim by a federal prisoner that evidence admitted at his trial was the fruit of an unconstitutional search or seizure is not properly the ground of a collateral attack on his conviction.
The Government concedes in its brief that we have already rejected this approach with respect to the availability of the federal habeas corpus remedy to state prisoners. This rejection was premised in large part on a recognition that the availability of collateral remedies is necessary to insure the integrity of proceedings at and before trial where constitutional rights are at stake. Our decisions leave no doubt that the federal habeas remedy extends to state prisoners alleging that unconstitutionally obtained evidence was admitted against them at trial. See, e. g., Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U. S. 364 (1968); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U. S. 234 (1968); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294 (1967); see also Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U. S. 443, 452 (1965). The Government argues, however, that federal post-conviction relief should not be available to federal prisoners in as broad a range of cases as that cognizable when presented by state prisoners. Support for this proposition is drawn from the fact that considerations which this Court, in Fay v. Noia, supra, deemed justifications for affording a federal forum to state prisoners — e. g., the necessity that federal courts have the “last say” with respect to questions of federal law, the inadequacy of state procedures to raise and preserve federal claims, the concern that state judges may be unsympathetic to federally created rights, the institutional constraints on the exercise of this Court’s certiorari jurisdiction to review state convictions — do not obtain with respect to federal prisoners. Thus, we are told that the federal prisoner, having already had his day in federal court, stands in a different position with regard to federal collateral remedies than does the state prisoner. Conceding this distinction, we are unable to understand why it should lead us to restrict, completely or severely, access by federal prisoners with illegal search- and-seizure claims to federal collateral remedies, while placing no similar restriction on access by state prisoners.
The opportunity to assert federal rights in a federal forum is clearly not the sole justification for federal post-conviction relief; otherwise there would be no need to make such relief available to federal prisoners at all. The provision of federal collateral remedies rests more fundamentally upon a recognition that adequate protection of constitutional rights relating to the criminal trial process requires the continuing availability of a mechanism for relief. This is no less true for federal prisoners than it is for state prisoners.
In Townsend v. Sain, supra, at 313, 318, we set down the circumstances under which a federal court must review constitutional claims- — including, of course, claims of illegal search and seizure — presented by state prisoners:
“If (1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing; (2) the state factual determination is not fairly supported by the record as a whole; (3) the fact-finding procedure employed by the state court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence; (5) the material facts were not adequately developed at the state-court hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing.
“In all other cases where the material facts are in dispute, the holding of such a hearing is in the discretion of the district judge.”
Of these, only the duty of the federal habeas court to scrutinize “the fact-finding procedure” under (3) does not apply in the case of a federal prisoner; federal fact-finding procedures are by hypothesis adequate to assure the integrity of the underlying constitutional rights. Thus, when a request for relief under § 2255 asserts a claim of unconstitutional search and seizure which was tested by a motion to suppress at or before trial under Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 41 (e), the § 2255 court need not stop to review the adequacy of the procedure established by that Rule. In this respect, and in this respect only, the position of the federal prisoner does differ from that of the state prisoner. We perceive no differences between the situations of state and federal prisoners which should make allegations of the other circumstances listed in Townsend v. Sain less subject to scrutiny by a § 2255 court.
The approach adopted by the court in Thornton and pressed upon us here exalts the value of finality in criminal judgments at the expense of the interest of each prisoner in the vindication of his constitutional rights. Such regard for the benefits of finality runs contrary to the most basic precepts of our system of post-conviction relief. In Fay v. Noia, supra, at 424, a case involving a state prisoner who claimed that his confession was coerced, we said that “conventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review.” The same view was expressed in Sanders v. United States, supra, at 8, a case involving a federal prisoner: “ [conventional notions of finality of litigation have no place where life or liberty is at stake and infringement of constitutional rights is alleged.” This philosophy inheres in our recognition of state prisoners’ post-conviction claims of illegal search and seizure. Plainly the interest in finality is the same with regard to both federal and state prisoners. With regard to both, Congress has determined that the full protection of their constitutional rights requires the availability of a mechanism for collateral attack. The right then is not merely to a federal forum but to full and fair consideration of constitutional claims. Federal prisoners are no less entitled to such consideration than are state prisoners. There is no reason to treat federal trial errors as less destructive of constitutional guarantees than state trial errors, nor to give greater preclusive effect to procedural defaults by federal defendants than to similar defaults by state defendants. To hold otherwise would reflect an anomalous and erroneous view of federal-state relations.
We cannot agree with the suggestion in Mr. Justice Black’s dissent that the weight to be accorded the benefits of finality is as controlling in the context of post-conviction relief as in the context of retroactive relief. The availability of post-conviction relief serves significantly to secure the integrity of proceedings at or before trial and on appeal. No such service is performed by extending rights retroactively. Thus, collateral relief, unlike retroactive relief, contributes to the present vitality of all constitutional rights whether or not they bear on the integrity of the fact-finding process.
More fundamentally, the logic of his dissent cannot be limited to the availability of post-conviction relief. It brings into question the propriety of the exclusionary rule itself. The application of that rule is not made to turn on the existence of a possibility of innocence; rather, exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is deemed necessary to protect the right of all citizens, not merely the citizen on trial, to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures. As we said in Miller v. United States, 357 U. S. 301, 313 (1958):
“We are duly mindful of the reliance that society must place for achieving law and order upon the enforcing agencies of the criminal law. But insistence on observance by law officers of traditional fair procedural requirements is, from the long point of view, best calculated to contribute to that end. However much in a particular case insistence upon such rules may appear as a technicality that inures to the benefit of a guilty person, the history of the criminal law proves that tolerance of short-cut methods in law enforcement impairs its enduring effectiveness. . . . Every householder, the good and the bad, the guilty and the innocent, is entitled to the protection designed to secure the common interest against unlawful invasion of the house.”
Finally, Mr. Justice Black’s reliance on petitioner’s concession of participation in the robbery is misplaced. That concession is irrelevant in light of petitioner’s defense at trial based on insanity. Surely that defense, any more than any other defense, cannot be prejudiced by the admission of unconstitutionally seized evidence.
We thus reject the rule announced in the majority opinion in Thornton and adopt the reasoning of Judge Wright’s dissent in that case, 125 U. S. App. D. C., at 123, 368 F. 2d, at 831:
“There is undoubtedly a difference in the way federal courts should treat post-conviction applications by state and federal prisoners. Brown v. Allen, [344 U. S. 443, 508], 73 S. Ct. 397 (opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter), interprets 28 U. S. C. § 2241 as requiring federal courts to have the 'last say’ with respect to questions of federal law. Federal prisoners applying for collateral relief often have had their constitutional claims passed on by federal courts at trial or on appeal, so the Brown v. Allen rationale for federal court relitigation is inapposite. But this difference provides no basis for limiting the grounds upon which federal prisoners may obtain collateral relief, or for formulating a separate set of rules to determine when a federal prisoner’s claim has adequately been adjudicated. Where a federal trial or appellate court has had a ‘say’ on a federal prisoner’s claim, there may be no need for collateral relitigation. But what if the federal trial or appellate court said nothing because the issue was not raised? What if it is unclear whether the ‘say’ was on the merits? What if new law has been made or facts uncovered relating to the constitutional claim since the trial and appeal? What if the trial or appellate court based its rulings on findings of fact made after a hearing not ‘full and fair’ within the meaning of Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293, 83 S. Ct. 745, 9 L. Ed. 2d 770 (1963)? All these problems are common to state and federal prisoners, and the interest in finality operates equally in both situations. These problems raise, not the issue whether relitigation is necessary, but whether one adequate litigation has been afforded. It would be anomalous indeed, especially in light of the interest in maintaining good federal-state relations, if defaults not precluding one adequate federal review for the constitutional claims of state prisoners precluded such a review for federal prisoners, or if defects rendering state court adjudications inadequate did not similarly affect federal court adjudications.”
We therefore hold that a claim of unconstitutional search and seizure is cognizable in a § 2255 proceeding. The order of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
The pertinent provisions of 28 17. S. C. §2255 are:
“A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
“A motion for such relief may be made at any time.
“Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon the United States attorney, grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto. If the court finds that the . . . sentence imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise open to collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the court shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate.
“A court may entertain and determine such motion without requiring the production of the prisoner at the hearing.
“The sentencing court shall not be required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.”
Petitioner initiated the § 2255 proceeding by a pro se motion. The only claim presented was denial of effective assistance of counsel. The District Judge ordered a hearing, and appointed counsel to assist petitioner. Counsel filed a supplemental motion presenting two additional claims, one of which was that the search of petitioner’s automobile was illegal.
Warren v. United States, 311 F. 2d 673, 675 (1963); see also Springer v. United States, 340 F. 2d 950 (1965); Peters v. United States, 312 F. 2d 481 (1963); Gendron v. United States, 340 F. 2d 601 (1965). Accord: United States v. Re, 372 F. 2d 641 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1967); United States v. Jenkins, 281 F. 2d 193 (C. A. 3d Cir. 1960); Armstead v. United States, 318 F. 2d 725 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1963); Eisner v. United States, 351 F. 2d 55 (C. A. 6th Cir. 1965); De Welles v. United States, 372 F. 2d 67 (C. A. 7th Cir. 1967); Williams v. United States, 307 F. 2d 366 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1962).
We have not overlooked that the District Court’s statement that “this matter was not assigned as error on Kaufman’s appeal from conviction . . .” suggests that in any event failure to appeal the conviction renders the § 2255 remedy unavailable. This suggestion is contrary to our decisions that failure to take a direct appeal from conviction does not deprive a federal post-conviction court of power to adjudicate the merits of constitutional claims; the question rather is whether the case is one in which refusal to exercise that power would be appropriate. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 438-440 (1963); Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U. S. 443, 451-452 (1965).
This certainly is not a case where there was a “deliberate by-pass” of a direct appeal. Appointed counsel had objected at trial to the admission of certain evidence on grounds of unlawful search and seizure, but newly appointed appellate counsel did not assign the admission as error either in his brief or on oral argument of the appeal. After oral argument of the appeal, however, petitioner wrote a letter to appellate counsel asking him to submit to the Court of Appeals a claim of illegal search and seizure of items from his automobile. Counsel forwarded petitioner’s letter to the Clerk of the Court of Appeals who notified counsel that petitioner’s letter had been given to the panel which had heard and was considering the appeal. The opinion of the Court of Appeals affirming petitioner’s conviction does not appear to pass on the search-and-seizure claim.
United States v. Sutton, 321 F. 2d 221 (C. A. 4th Cir. 1963); Gaitan v. United States, 317 F. 2d 494 (C. A. 10th Cir. 1963).
Among the serious administrative problems under habeas corpus practice in the case of federal prisoners was that created by the requirement that the action be brought in the district of confinement, where the records of the case were often not readily available. Section 2255 changed this to require an application by motion filed in the sentencing court. See United States v. Hayman, 342 U. S. 205, 212-219 (1952).
See, e. g., Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163 (1874); Ex parte Wilson, 114 U. S. 417 (1885); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540 (1888); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547 (1892); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 (1938); Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U. S. 19 (1939); Waley v. Johnston, 316 U. S. 101 (1942); Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U. S. 708 (1948); see also cases collected in Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 409, n. 17.
See, e. g., “A motion under § 2255 cannot be made the substitute for an appeal,” Peters v. United States, supra, n. 3, at 482 (C. A. 8th Cir.); “Section 2255 provides for a collateral attack on a judgment of conviction and is not a substitute for appeal for alleged errors committed at the trial,” Eisner v. United States, supra, n. 3, at 57 (C. A. 6th Cir.); “Questions concerning the admissibility of evidence obtained directly or indirectly as a result of an unlawful search can be reviewed on an appeal from a judgment of conviction, but cannot be dealt with in a section 2255 proceeding,” Williams v. United States, supra, n. 3, at 367 (C. A. 9th Cir.); “It has long been the law that habeas corpus and § 2255 will not be allowed to do service as an appeal, and that so far as federal prisoners are concerned, failure to appeal will normally bar resort to post-conviction relief,” Nash v. United States, 342 F. 2d 366, 367 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1965). These paraphrase the statement in Sunal v. Large, 332 U. S. 174, 178 (1947), that “the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed to do service for an appeal,” but that statement was made in the context of an alleged nonconstitutional trial error. See United States v. Sobell, 314 F. 2d 314, 322-323 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1963).
Where a trial or appellate court has determined the federal prisoner’s claim, discretion may in a proper case be exercised against the grant of a § 2255 hearing. Section 2255 provides for hearing “[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief . . . In Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1 (1963), we announced standards governing the determination whether a hearing should be ordered in the case of a successive motion under § 2255. Similarly, where the trial or appellate court has had a “say” on a federal prisoner’s claim, it may be open to the § 2255 court to determine that on the basis of the motion, files, and records, “the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” See Thornton v. United States, 125 U. S. App. D. C. 114, 125, 368 F. 2d 822, 833 (1966) (dissenting opinion of Wright, J.).
Furthermore, the §2255 court may in a proper case deny relief to a federal prisoner who has deliberately bypassed the orderly federal procedures provided at or before trial and by way of appeal — e. g., motion to suppress under Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 41 (e) or appeal under Fed. Rule App. Proc. 4 (b). Fay v. Noia, supra, n. 3, at 438; Henry v. Mississippi, supra, n. 3, at 451-452.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Me. Justice Marshall
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 3 (a) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U. S. C. § 1842 (a), prohibits any company from acquiring control of a bank without prior approval by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board). Under §3 (c)(1) of the Act, 12 U. S. C. § 1842 (c)(1), the Board may not approve a transaction that would create a monopoly or further an attempt to monopolize the business of banking. In addition, it must disapprove a transaction that would generate anticompetitive effects not clearly outweighed by beneficial effects upon the bank’s ability to serve the community. § 1842 (c) (2). The final sentence of § 3 (c) directs that
“[i]n every case, the Board shall take into consideration the financial and managerial resources and future prospects of the company or companies and the banks concerned, and the convenience and needs of the community to be served.”
The threshold question before us is whether this final sentence authorizes the Board to disapprove a transaction on grounds of financial unsoundness in the absence of any anticompeti-tive impact. If so, we must decide whether the Board can only exercise that authority when the transaction would cause or exacerbate the financial unsoundness of the holding company or a subsidiary bank.
I
The First National Bank of Lincolnwood, Ill., is controlled by four individuals who hold 86% of its stock in a voting trust. These individuals organized respondent, the First Lincoln-wood Corp., to serve as a bank holding company. They planned to exchange their shares in the bank for shares of respondent and, in addition, to have respondent assume a $3.7 million debt they had incurred in acquiring control of the bank. Respondent intended to use the dividends it would receive on the bank’s shares to retire this debt over a 12-year period. Further, in order to augment the bank’s capital, respondent would issue $1.5 million in capital notes and then use the proceeds to purchase new shares issued by the bank. The purpose of restructuring ownership interests in this fashion was to enable the holding company and the bank to file a consolidated tax return and thereby realize substantial tax savings.
Because under the proposed transaction respondent would become a bank holding company, § 3 (a) of the Act required that the proposal be submitted for the Board’s approval. See n. 1, supra. Respondent filed its application with the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, as specified by Board regulations. The Chicago Reserve Bank concluded that the Lincolnwood bank’s capital position — in essence, the difference between its assets and its liabilities — was inadequate and, under respondent’s proposal, was unlikely to improve enough to attain the minimum level the Board had determined necessary to protect the bank’s depositors. Nonetheless, the Lincolnwood bank’s favorable earnings prospects and strong management led the Chicago Reserve Bank to recommend that the transaction be approved. The Comptroller of the Currency, however, independently reviewed respondent’s application and concluded that it should be denied unless the bank’s capital position was strengthened.
Respondent thereupon modified its proposal to accommodate the Comptroller’s objections. Instead of issuing $1.5 million in capital notes and using the proceeds to purchase new bank stock, respondent proposed that the bank itself sell $1 million in long-term capital notes and $1.1 million in new common stock. In addition, respondent proposed a substantial reduction in the dividends to be paid on the bank stock. Upon review of the modified proposal, the Chicago Reserve Bank adhered to its original recommendation, finding the modification salutary insofar as it increased the total addition to the bank’s capital, though “slightly unfavorable” insofar as it decreased the addition to the bank’s equity capital from $1.5 to $1.1 million. The Comptroller considered the revised plan superior to the original proposal; therefore, he, too, recommended approval.
The Board staff independently evaluated the application and determined that the bank’s projected capital position would fall below the Board’s requirements. The staff also found that respondent had not established its ability to raise the additional capital without the individual shareholders’ incurring more debt. Although acknowledging that the bank’s management was capable, the staff concluded that
“it would appear desirable that Bank’s overall capital position should be materially improved and that financing arrangements for the proposed capital injections into Bank [should] be made more definite.” App. 54 — 55.
The Board concurred. It reviewed each of the elements enumerated in §3(c), determining first that the proposal had no anticompetitive impact because the transaction merely transferred control of the bank “from individuals to a corporation owned by the same individuals.” First Lincolnwood Corp., 62 Fed. Res. Bull. 153 (1976). Similiarly, the Board found that the proposal would effect no significant changes in the services offered by the bank to customers, so factors relating to the convenience and needs of the community militated neither for nor against approval. Id., at 154. Thus, the financial and managerial considerations specified in the final sentence of § 3 (c) were dispositive of respondent’s application.
Addressing these considerations, the Board ruled that a bank holding company “should provide a source of financial and managerial strength to its subsidiary bank(s).” 62 Fed. Res. Bull., at 153. Here, the Board found, even if the bank’s optimistic earnings projections were realized, respondent would lack the financial flexibility necessary both to service its debt and to maintain adequate capital at the bank. This, as well as the uncertainty regarding the proposed source of the capital injections, raised serious doubts as to respondent’s financial' ability to resolve unforeseen problems that could arise at the bank. The Board therefore concluded that
“it would not be in the public interest to approve the formation of a bank holding company with an initial debt structure that could result in the weakening of Bank’s overall financial condition.” Id., at 154.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, the majority finding substantial evidence to support the denial of respondent’s application. 546 F. 2d 718, 720-721 (1976). On rehearing en banc, the court unanimously set aside the Board’s order. The court recognized that Congress had empowered the Board “to deny approval of a bank acquisition upon finding it not to be in the public interest for reasons other than an anticompetitive tendency.” 560 F. 2d 258, 261 (1977). However, in the court’s view, § 3 (c) of the Act did not permit the Board to withhold approval because of financial or managerial deficiencies unless those deficiencies were “caused or enhanced by the proposed transaction.” 560 F. 2d, at 262. This transaction, the court observed, merely reshuffled ownership interests in the bank. Apart from the proposed addition to capital and the tax advantage, which could accelerate reduction of the $3.7 million debt, respondent’s proposal was without financial consequence. The court therefore held that the Board had overstepped its authority under § 3 (c) in denying respondent’s application. 560 F. 2d, at 262-263.
We granted certiorari because of the impact of this holding on the Board’s ability to fulfill its regulatory responsibilities under the Bank Holding Company Act. 434 U. S. 1061 (.1978). We conclude that the court below improperly restricted the Board’s authority, and, accordingly, we reverse.
II
Respondent contends that the Court of Appeals misinterpreted the legislative history of the Bank Holding Company Act in sustaining the Board’s authority to deny applications for holding-company status solely on grounds of financial or managerial unsoundness. As respondent reads the legislative history, Congress’ only concern in passing the Act was with the anticompetitive potential in the concentration of banking resources and the combination of banking and nonbanking enterprises. See S. Rep. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1955); S. Rep. No. 1179, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1966). This focus on competitive considerations was reflected in the amendment of the Act in 1966 to conform § 3 (c) with the standards enunciated in the Bank Merger Act amendments of the same year. See 80 Stat. 8, 12 U. S. C. § 1828 (c)(5). The amended standards in the Bank Merger Act were intended to provide an exception to the antitrust laws for those bank mergers in which the benefits to the community outweighed the anticompetitive impact. See United States v. Third Nat. Bank, 390 U. S. 171 (1968). By incorporating these same standards into the Bank Holding Company Act, respondent infers, Congress intended to authorize the Board to consider financial and managerial resources only as counterweights to a transaction’s anticompetitive impact. We do not agree that the Board’s authority under the Bank Holding Company Act is so limited.
The language of the statute supports the Board’s interpretation of § 3 (c) as an authorization to deny applications on grounds of financial and managerial unsoundness even in the absence of any anticompetitive impact. Section 3 (c) directs the Board to consider the financial and managerial resources and future prospects of the applicants and banks concerned “[i]n every case,” not just in cases in which the Board finds that the transaction will have an anticompetitive effect.
Moreover, the Board’s interpretation of § 3 (c) draws support from the legislative history. Section 19 of the original version of the Banking Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 186, authorized the Board to regulate the financial and managerial soundness of bank holding companies and their banking subsidiaries. Holding companies were required to obtain a permit from the Board before voting the shares of a national bank. Section 19 directed the Board to consider, in acting upon an application for a voting permit, the financial condition of the company and the general character of its management. 48 Stat. 186. In addition, an applicant had to submit to financial examination by the Board and to maintain a prescribed reserve of liquid assets. 48 Stat. 187. However, the voting-permit provisions applied only if the bank was a member of the Federal Reserve System and the holding company sought to exercise control by actually voting the bank shares. Because of this limitation, § 19 ultimately proved of little value in ensuring the financial responsibility of bank holding companies and their subsidiaries. See H. R. Rep. No. 609, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 4-5 (1955).
To ameliorate this deficiency, Congress expanded the Board's authority by enacting the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. Section 3 (c) of the Act enumerated five factors for the Board to consider whenever a company sought to acquire control of a bank:
“(1) the financial history and condition of the company or companies and the banks concerned; (2) their prospects; (3) the character of their management; (4) the convenience, needs, and welfare of the communities and the area concerned; and (5) whether or not the effect of such acquisition or merger or consolidation would be to expand the size or extent of the bank holding company system involved beyond limits consistent with adequate and sound banking, the public interest, and the preservation of competition in the field of banking.” 70 Stat. 135.
The House Report on the Act noted the similarity between these factors and those specified in other banking statutes as the basis for admitting state banks to membership in the Federal Reserve System and for granting federal deposit-insurance coverage. H. R. Rep. No. 609, supra, at 15. In both instances, the adequacy of the bank’s capital is an important factor to be considered by the reviewing agency. See 12 TJ. S. C. §§ 329, 1816.
In amending § 3 (c) to conform to the language of the Bank Merger Act in 1966, see supra, at 243, Congress did not intend to confine the Board’s consideration of financial and managerial soundness only to transactions that would have an anticompetitive impact. The sole reason given for the change was “the interests of uniform standards” in regulating both mergers and acquisitions in the banking industry. S. Rep. No. 1179, supra, at 9. Regardless of whether Congress intended to limit the inquiry under the Bank Merger Act, there is no indication that it intended to incorporate that limitation into the Bank Holding Company Act. Indeed, in 1966 Congress repealed the voting-permit provisions of the 1933 Act, which had been left intact in 1956, because it believed that the Board retained authority under § 3 (c), even as amended, to ensure the financial and managerial soundness of holding companies and their subsidiary banks. The Senate Committee on Banking and Currency stated:
“Since the Bank Holding Company Act makes it necessary for any bank holding company to obtain the Board's prior approval before acquiring the stock of any bank (whether member or nonmember) and since, in granting that approval, the Board must consider the financial condition and management of the holding company, the voting permit procedure... serves no substantial purpose.” S. Rep. No. 1179, supra, at 12.
In 1970, Congress amended the Bank Holding Company Act to extend its coverage to holding companies that controlled only one bank. 84 Stat. 1760, 12 U. S. C. § 1841 (a). Previously, the Act had applied only to multibank holding-companies. The principal purpose of this change was to prevent one-bank holding companies from entering businesses not related to banking. S. Rep. No. 91-1084, pp. 2-4 (1970). Nothing in the legislative history of the 1970 amendments suggests that in extending the Act, Congress intended to depart from its prior understanding of the Board’s authority or to establish a different rule for one-bank holding companies.
Our conclusion as to the scope of the Board's authority is bolstered by reference to the principle that an agency’s longstanding construction of its statutory mandate is entitled to great respect, “especially when Congress has refused to alter the administrative construction.” Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 381 (1969); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 11-12 (1965); Udall v. Tollman, 380 U. S. 1, 16 (1965). The Board has regularly treated deficiencies in the financial and managerial resources of holding companies and their banking subsidiaries as sufficient grounds for denying an application. Clayton Bancshares Corp., 50 Fed. Res. Bull. 1261, 1264-1265 (1964); Mid-Continent Bancorporation, 52 Fed. Res. Bull. 198, 200-201 (1966); Midwest Bancorporation, Inc., 56 Fed. Res. Bull. 948, 950 (1970); Citizens Bancorp, 61 Fed. Res. Bull. 806 (1975); Bankshares of Hawley, Inc., 62 Fed. Res. Bull. 610 (1976); see 12 CFR § 265.2 (f) (22) (vii) (1978). Moreover, Congress has been made aware of this practice, yet four times has “revisited the Act and left the practice untouched.” Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U. S. 65, 74 (1974). See 80 Stat. 236; 84 Stat. 1760; 91 Stat. 1388; 92 Stat. 3641. We therefore agree with the Court of Appeals that the Board can disapprove formation of a bank holding company solely on grounds of financial or managerial unsoundness.
III
While the Court of Appeals recognized the Board’s authority to treat financial or managerial unsoundness as a dispositive consideration, it held that this authority was limited to instances in which the unsoundness was caused or exacerbated by the proposed transaction. The Court of Appeals rejected the Board’s argument that permission to form a holding company is “a reward which it may withhold until the applicant’s financial status fulfills the Board’s standard of desirability.” 560 F. 2d, at 262. The legislative history, the court held, revealed nothing that would allow the Board to disapprove formation of a bank holding company where the transaction would not weaken a subsidiary bank’s financial condition. In addition, the already extensive regulation of the financial integrity of banks by the Comptroller of the Currency and state regulatory agencies persuaded the court that Congress could not have intended to extend identical authority to the Federal Reserve Board. Id., at 262-263.
We perceive no basis for the limitation the Court of Appeals imposed. Certainly, it is not compelled by the language of the statute. By its terms, § 3 (c) requires the Board to consider financial and managerial factors in “every case.” Just as we observed earlier that this language encompasses cases in which the proposed transaction would have no anti-competitive effect, supra, at 243, so, too, it encompasses cases in which the transaction would not weaken the bank or the bank holding company. Indeed, the Court of Appeals’ construction of the statute would require the Board to approve formation of a bank holding company with corrupt management simply because management would become no more corrupt by virtue of the transaction. We hesitate to adopt a construction that would yield such an anomalous result.
Furthermore, the legislative record does provide support for the Board’s actions. In deliberations on the Bank Holding Company Act, see, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 609, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 4r-5 (1955); H. R. Rep. No. 95-1383, p. 19 (1978), and in subsequent inquiries into banking regulation, see, e. g., Hearing on Problem Banks, supra, n. 6; Hearings on the Safe Banking Act of 1977, pts. 1-4, supra, n. 13, Congress has evinced substantial concern for the financial soundess of the banking system. And Congress has long regarded capital adequacy as a measure of bank safety. See, e. g., 12 U. S. C. § 329 (Federal Reserve Act), § 1816 (Federal Deposit Insurance Act); S. Rep. No. 133, 63d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, p. 11 (1913); S. Rep. No. 1623, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1952). To rule that the Board could not require applicants for holding-company status and their subsidiary banks to meet minimum capital-adequacy requirements would be inconsistent with this general legislative mandate.
Nor can we accept the conclusion that Congress intended to reserve questions of bank safety to the Comptroller or state agencies except where a transaction would harm the financial condition of an applicant or the bank. The history of the Bank Holding Company Act nowhere suggests that Congress sought to delineate such a jurisdictional boundary. Indeed, our decision in Whitney Nat. Bank v. Bank of New Orleans, 379 U. S. 411 (1965), indicates that the Board’s jurisdiction is paramount. We ruled there that the Comptroller could not deny a new bank a license to do business — a decision normally within his competence, see 12 U. S. C. §§26, 27— once the Board approved a bank holding company transaction that entailed formation of the new bank. 379 U. S., at 419, 423. It follows that the Federal Reserve Board's actions here are not invalid merely because the powers exercised duplicate those of other regulators.
Again, our conclusion is influenced by the principle that courts should defer to an agency’s construction of its own statutory mandate, Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S., at 381; Commissioner v. Sternberger’s Estate, 348 U. S. 187, 199 (1955), particularly when that construction accords with well-established congressional goals. The Board has frequently reiterated that holding companies should be a source of strength to subsidiary financial institutions. See, e. g., Northern States Financial Corp., 58 Fed. Res. Bull. 827, 828 (1972); Citizens Bancorp, 61 Fed. Res. Bull. 806 (1975); Downs Bancshares, Inc., 61 Fed. Res. Bull. 673 (1975). It has used the substantial advantages of bank holding-company status to induce applicants to improve their own and their subsidiaries’ capital positions. See P. Heller, Handbook of Federal Bank Holding Company Law 127, and n. 195 (1976); The Bank Holding Company — 1973, pp. 35, 83 (R. Johnson ed. 1973). In fact, between 1970 and 1975, the Board convinced 397 applicants to provide additional capital totaling $788 million and indirectly prompted the infusion of even more capital. Hearings on Financial Institutions and the Nation’s Economy, supra n. 13, at 2403 (testimony of Philip Coldwell, member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System). Congress has been apprised of this consistent administrative practice, ibid.; Compendium of Major Issues in Bank Regulation, supra n. 13, at 379, and has not undertaken to change it. Indeed, a Report of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs in 1977 echoed the exact language of the Board’s standard. S. Rep. No. 95-323, p. 11 (“Holding companies are supposed to be a source of strength to subsidiary financial institutions”).
We hold that the Board may deny applications for holding-company status solely on grounds of financial or managerial unsoundness, regardless of whether that unsoundness would be caused or exacerbated by the proposed transaction.
IV
Respondent contends that the Board’s denial of its application was arbitrary and capricious. We have already determined that the Board’s “source of strength” requirement is consistent with the language, purpose, and legislative history of the Bank Holding Company Act. Our only remaining inquiry is whether substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that respondent fell short of this standard. 12 U. S. C. § 1848.
The Court of Appeals panel had “no difficulty” in finding substantial evidence to sustain the Board’s decision, 546 F. 2d, at 720, and respondent did not press this issue in its petition for rehearing en banc. We, too, find in this record more than the amount of evidence “a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support [the Board’s] conclusion.” Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U. S. 197, 229 (1938); accord, Richardson v. Perales, 402 U. S. 389, 401 (1971); Consolo v. FMC, 383 U. S. 607, 619-620 (1966). The application failed to establish that respondent could raise the $2.1 million in additional capital in the manner proposed. Moreover, it revealed that even with this infusion, the bank’s capital would have been well below the level the Board had determined necessary to sustain the financial soundness of the enterprise. Thus, the Board was entitled to conclude that respondent would not be a sufficient source of financial and managerial strength to its subsidiary bank. Having so determined, the Board was entitled to deny the application.
We hold that the Board’s actions were within the authority-conferred by Congress and were supported by substantial evidence. Consequently, the judgment is
Reversed.
More specifically, §3 (a), 70 Stat. 134, as amended, 80 Stat. 237, 12 U, S. C. § 1842 (a), provides in pertinent part:
“It shall be unlawful, except with the prior approval of the Board, (1) for any action to be taken that causes any company to become a bank holding company; (2) for any action to be taken that causes a bank to become a subsidiary of a bank holding company; (3) for any bank holding company to acquire direct or indirect ownership or control of any voting shares of any bank if, after such acquisition, such company will directly or indirectly own or control more than 5 per centum of the voting shares of such bank; (4) for any bank holding company or subsidiary thereof, other than a bank, to acquire all or substantially all of the assets of a bank; or (5) for any bank holding company to merge or consolidate with any other bank holding company.”
Section 2 (a) (1) of the Act, 70 Stat. 133, as amended, 84 Stat. 1760, 12 U. S. C. § 1841 (a)(1), defines a “bank holding company” as “any company which has control over any bank or over any company that is or becomes a bank holding company by virtue of this Act.”
A company has “control” over a bank or over any company if
“(A) the company directly or indirectly or acting through one or more other persons owns, controls, or has power to vote 25 per centum or more of any class of voting securities of the bank or company;
“(B) the company controls in any manner the election of a majority of the directors or trustees of the bank or company; or
“(C) the Board determines, after notice and opportunity for hearing, that the company directly or indirectly exercises a controlling influence over the management or policies of the bank or company.” § 2 (a) (2) of the Act, 70 Stat. 133, as amended, 84 Stat. 1760, 12 U. S. C. § 1841 (a) (2).
In its entirety, § 3 (c) provides:
“The Board shall not approve—
“(1) any acquisition or merger or consolidation under this section which would result in a monopoly, or which would be in furtherance of any combination or conspiracy to monop[o]lize or to attempt to monopolize the business of banking in any part of the United States, or
“(2) any other proposed acquisition or merger or consolidation under this section whose effect in any section of the country may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly, or which in any other manner would be in restraint or [sic] trade, unless it finds that the anticompetitive effects of the proposed transaction are clearly outweighed in the public interest by the probable effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and needs of the community to be served.
“In every case, the Board shall take into consideration the financial and managerial resources and future prospects of the company or companies and the banks concerned, and. the convenience and needs of the community to be served.” 70 Stat. 135, as amended, 80 Stat. 237, 12 U. S. C. § 1842(c).
The four individuals incurred part of this $3.7 million debt in order to buy out the shares of a former chairman and president of the bank, who had been indicted for securities fraud. See 546 F. 2d 718, 723-724,. n. 1 (CA7 1976) (Fairchild, C. J., dissenting from the panel opinion). The entire $3.7 million debt was secured by the bank stock they had acquired in this and previous transactions. While the proposed transaction with respondent would relieve the individual shareholders of their primary obligations under the loans, these shareholders would remain secondarily liable if respondent defaulted and its obligations exceeded the value of the bank’s stock. See App. 24, 29-30, 42, 55-56.
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954,26 U. S. C. § 1501, permits an affiliated group of corporations to file a consolidated income tax return. Respondent and the bank would be affiliated by virtue of respondent’s ownership of at least 80% of the bank’s stock. 26 U. S. C. § 1504. Filing a consolidated return would permit the group to deduct the interest on the $3.7 million debt from the bank’s gross income when determining the taxable income of the consolidated entity. 26 CFR § 1.1502-11 (a) (1) (1977); 26 U. S. C. § 163. The tax savings from this deduction could then be transferred to respondent as a tax-free intercorporate dividend and used to retire the acquisition debt. 26 CFR § 1.1501-14 (a) (1) (1977). Although in the absence of this transaction, the individual shareholders presumably can deduct from personal income their interest payments on the debt, see 26 U. S. C. § 163, respondent contends that approval of the transaction would have saved the bank and holding company approximately $142,000 in taxes in the first year alone. Brief for Respondent 5-6, n. 2. These tax’ savings would have diminished as interest payments on the outstanding debt declined.
A company seeking to acquire a bank must submit an application to the Federal Reserve bank of the district in which the applicant is located. 12 CFR §§225.3 (a)-(b), 262.3 (b) (1978). The Reserve bank evaluates the application against the Board’s standards and makes a recommendation to the Board. §262.3 (c). At the “appropriate” time, the Reserve bank forwards the application to the Board so that the Board staff can undertake an independent evaluation. Ibid.
After the application is forwarded, the Board must notify the Comptroller of the Currency if a national bank is involved, or state supervisory authorities if a state bank is involved, and in most cases must allow the agency 30 days to submit a recommendation. 12 U. S. C. § 1842 (b). See n. 12, infra. If the Comptroller or state supervisory authority recommends that the application be denied, the Board must notify the applicant and conduct a hearing. 12 U. S. C. § 1842 (b). On the other hand, if the Comptroller or state authority recommends approval of the transaction or declines to submit a timely recommendation, several Courts of Appeals have held that the Board need not provide a hearing before making its decision, see, e. g., Kirsch v. Board of Governors, 353 F. 2d 353, 356 (CA6 1965); Northwest Bancorporation v. Board of Governors, 303 F. 2d 832, 842-844 (CA8 1962), though it may choose to provide one. See 12 CFR §§262.3 (g)(2), (3) (1978). In neither case is the Board bound by the recommendation of these agencies. See Whitney Nat. Bank v. Bank of New Orleans, 379 U. S. 411, 419-420, 423 (1965). For a more complete explication of the Board’s procedures, see P. Heller, Handbook of Federal Bank Holding Company Law 317-363 (1976).
The Board uses several measures of capital adequacy. One is the ratio of equity capital to total liabilities less cash on hand, known as the invested-asset ratio. Another is the ratio of total capital (debt and equity) to total assets, known as the capital-asset ratio. See Heller, supra n. 5, at 131-132; Clark, The Soundness of Financial Intermediaries, 86 Yale L. J. 1, 63 (1976). The Board regards an invested-asset ratio of 9%, see App. 52-53 (Board staff memorandum), and a capital-asset ratio of 8%, see Hearing on Problem Banks before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 137 (1976), as the minimal levels of capital necessary to maintain financial soundness. Respondent has not specifically challenged the validity of these standards as measures of bank safety.
While the Board considers capital notes that are subordinated to depositors’ demands to be part of a bank’s overall capital, it regards them as a less desirable financial cushion than equity. See Heller, supra n. 5, at 130-131, n. 209; see, e. g., Clayton Bancshares Corp., 50 Fed. Res. Bull. 1261, 1264 (1964); Mid-Continent Bancorporation, 52 Fed. Res. Bull. 198, 200 (1966).
The bank’s invested-asset ratio was 5.3% in 1975. The Board staff estimated that an infusion of $2.5 million in equity capital would be necessary to bring the bank up to the Board’s minimum standard of 9%. The respondent’s proposed addition of $1.1 million in equity and $1 million in debt would have raised the bank’s invested-asset ratio to only 6.8%, $1.5 million short of the minimum 9%. The additional $2.1 million in total capital would have raised the bank’s capital-asset ratio for 1975 from 5.2% to 7.4%. However, amortization of the $3.7 million acquisition debt and the $1 million in capital notes would have caused the ratio to dwindle to 5.2% by 1987, well short of the Board’s 8% minimum. App. 52-54.
The Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to review the Board’s order pursuant to 12 U. S. C. § 1848.
Section 329 provides that no state bank may be admitted to membership in the Federal Reserve System unless “it possesses capital stock and surplus which, in the judgment of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, are adequate in relation to the character and condition of its assets and to its existing and prospective deposit liabilities and other corporate responsibilities.” 38 Stat. 258, as amended, 12 TJ. S. C. §329.
Section 1816 enumerates the factors to be considered in the determination whether to grant a bank federal deposit insurance coverage:
“The financial history and condition of the bank, the adequacy of its capital structure, its future earnings prospects, the general character of its management, the convenience and needs of the community to be served by the bank, and whether or not its corporate powers are consistent with the purposes of this Act.” 64 Stat. 876, 12 U. S. C. § 1816.
Respondent’s argument that Congress circumscribed the role of banking factors in the Board’s inquiry under § 3 by borrowing the language of the Bank Merger Act assumes that supervisory agencies applying that Act can consider such factors only as they bear upon competitive considerations. This assumption may be unwarranted.
The House Report on the 1966 amendments to the Bank Merger Act is somewhat ambiguous regarding the weight that may be assigned to financial and managerial factors, but it does not appear to preclude consideration of those factors as independent bases for disapproval of a merger:
“Of course, the expression of these factors in the statute would not preclude the banking agencies, charged as they are with general supervisory responsibility, from considering in any particular case such other factors as they might deem relevant. However, only the convenience and needs of the community to be served can be weighed against anticompetitive effects, with financial and managerial resources being considered only as they throw light on the capacity of the existing and proposed institutions to serve the community.” H. R. Rep. No. 1221, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1966).
This language speaks only to the role of financial and managerial factors in determining under 12 U. S. C. § 1828 (c)(5)(B) whether the anticom-petitive effects of
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Scalia
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellant, the State of Texas, appeals from the judgment of a three-judge District Court for the District of Columbia. The State had sought a declaratory judgment that the pre-clearance provisions of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 439, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c, do not apply to implementation of certain sections of the Texas Education Code that permit the State to sanction local school districts for failure to meet state-mandated educational achievement levels. This appeal presents the question whether the controversy is ripe.
I
In Texas, both the state government and local school districts are responsible for the public schools. There are more than 1,000 school districts, each run by an elected school board. In 1995, the Texas Legislature enacted a comprehensive scheme (Chapter 39) that holds local school boards accountable to the State for student achievement. Tex. Educ. Code Ann. §§39.021-39.131 (1996). Chapter 39 contains detailed prescriptions for assessment of student academic skills, development of academic performance indicators, determination of accreditation status for school districts, and imposition of accreditation sanctions. It seeks to measure the academic performance of Texas schoolchildren, to reward the schools and school districts that achieve the legislative goals, and to sanction those that fall short.
When a district fails to satisfy the State’s accreditation criteria, the State Commissioner of Education may select from 10 possible sanctions that are listed in ascending order of severity. §§39.131(a)(1)-(10). Those include, “to the extent the [C]ommissioner determines necessary,” § 39.131(a), appointing a master to oversee the district’s operations, § 39.131(a)(7), or appointing a management team to direct the district’s operations in areas of unacceptable performance or to require the district to contract for services from another person, § 39.181(a)(8). When the Commissioner appoints masters or management teams, he “shall clearly define the[ir] powers and duties” and shall review the need for them every 90 days. § 39.131(e). A master or management team may approve or disapprove any action taken by a school principal, the district superintendent, or the district’s board of trustees, and may also direct them to act. §§ 39.131(e)(1), (2). State law prohibits masters or management teams from taking any action concerning a district election, changing the number of members on or the method of selecting the board of trustees, setting a tax rate for the district, or adopting a budget which establishes a different level of spending for the district from that set by the board. §§ 39.131(e)(3)-(6).
Texas is a covered jurisdiction under §5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, see 28 CFR pt. 51, App. (1997), and consequently, before it can implement changes affecting voting it must obtain preclearanee from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia or from the Attorney General of the United States. 42 U. S. C. § 1973e. Texas submitted Chapter 39 to the Attorney General for administrative preclearanee. The Assistant Attorney General requested further information, including the criteria used to select special masters and management teams, a detailed description of their powers and duties, and the difference between their duties and those of the elected boards. The State responded by pointing out the limits placed on masters and management teams in § 39.131(e), and by noting that the-actual authority granted “is set by the Commissioner at the time of appointment depending on the needs of the district.” App. to Juris. Statement 99a. After receiving this information, the Assistant Attorney General concluded that the first six sanctions do not affect voting and therefore do not require preclearanee. He did not object to §§ 39.131(a)(7) and (8), insofar as the provisions are “enabling in nature,” but he cautioned that “under certain foreseeable circumstances their implementation may result in a violation of Section 5” which would require preclearanee. Id., at 36a.
On June 7, 1996, Texas filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking a declaration that § 5 does not apply to the sanctions authorized by §§ 39.131(a)(7) and (8), because (1) they are not changes with respect to voting, and (2) they are consistent with conditions attached to grants of federal financial assistance that authorize and require the imposition of sanctions to ensure accountability of local education authorities. The District Court did not reach the merits of these arguments because it concluded that Texas’s claim was not ripe. We noted probable jurisdiction. 521 U. S. 1150 (1997).
H-i 1 — 4
A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon “ ‘contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.’” Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U. S. 568, 580-581 (1985) (quoting 13A C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §3532, p. 112 (1984)). Whether Texas will appoint a master or management team under §§ 39.131(a)(7) and (8) is contingent on a number of factors. First, a school district must fall below the state standards. Then, pursuant to state policy, the Commissioner must try first “the imposition of sanctions which do not include the appointment of a master or management team,” App. 10 (Original Complaint ¶12). He may, for example, “order the preparation of a student achievement improvement plan ..., the submission of the plan to the [C]ommissioner for approval, and implementation of the plan,” § 39.131(a)(3), or “appoint an agency monitor to participate in and report to the agency on the activities of the board of trustees or the superintendent,” § 39.131(a)(6). It is only if these less intrusive options fail that a Commissioner may appoint a master or management team, Tr. of Oral Arg. 16, and even then, only “to the extent the [C]ommissioner determines necessary,” § 39.131(a). Texas has not pointed to any particular school district in which the application of § 39.131(a)(7) or (8) is currently foreseen or even likely. Indeed, Texas hopes that there will be no need to appoint a master or management team for any district. Tr. of Oral Arg. 16-17. Under these circumstances, where “we have no idea whether or when such [a sanction] will be ordered,” the issue is not fit for adjudication. Toilet Goods Assn., Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 158, 163 (1967); see also Renne v. Geary, 501 U. S. 312, 321-322 (1991).
Even if there were greater certainty regarding ultimate implementation of paragraphs (a)(7) and (a)(8) of the statute, we do not think Texas’s claim would be ripe. Ripeness “re-quir[es] us to evaluate both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.” Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 149 (1967). As to fitness of the issues: Texas asks us to hold that under no circumstances can the imposition of these sanctions constitute a change affecting voting. We do not have sufficient confidence in our powers of imagination to affirm such a negative. The operation of the statute is better grasped when viewed in light of a particular application. Here, as is often true, “[d3etermination of the scope ... of legislation in advance of its immediate adverse effect in the context of a concrete case involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of the judicial function.” Longshoremen v. Boyd, 347 U. S. 222, 224 (1954). In the present ease, the remoteness and abstraction are increased by the fact that Chapter 39 has yet to be interpreted by the Texas courts. Thus, “[postponing consideration of the questions presented, until a more concrete controversy arises, also has the advantage of permitting the state courts further opportunity to construe” the provisions. Renne, supra, at 323.
And as for hardship to the parties: This is not a ease like Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, supra, at 152, where the regulation at issue had a “direct effect on the day-to-day business” of the plaintiffs, because they were compelled to affix required labeling to their products under threat of criminal sanction. Texas is not required to engage in, or to refrain from, any conduct, unless and until it chooses to implement one of the noneleared remedies. To be sure, if that contingency should arise compliance with the preclearance procedure could delay much needed action. (Prior to this litigation, Texas sought preclearance for the appointment of a master in a Dallas County school district, and despite a request for expedition the Attorney General took 90 days to give approval. See Brief for Appellant 37, n. 28.) But even that inconvenience is avoidable. If Texas is confident that the imposition of a master or management team does not constitute a change affecting voting, it should simply go ahead with the' appointment. Should the Attorney General or a private individual bring suit (and if the matter is as clear, even at this distance, as Texas thinks it is), we have no reason to doubt that a district court will deny a preliminary injunction. See Presley v. Etowah County Comm’n, 502 U. S. 491, 506 (1992); City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U. S. 125, 129, n. 3 (1983). Texas claims that it suffers the immediate hardship of a “threat to federalism." But that is an abstraction — and an abstraction no graver than the “threat to personal freedom” that exists whenever an agency regulation is promulgated, which we hold inadequate to support suit unless the person’s primary conduct is affected. Cf. Toilet Goods Assn., supra, at 164.
In sum, we find it too speculative whether the problem Texas presents will ever need solving; we find the- legal issues Texas raises not yet fit for our consideration, and the hardship to Texas of biding its time insubstantial. Accordingly, we agree with the District Court that this matter is not ripe for adjudication.
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
The authority for determinations under §5'has been delegated to the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division. 28 CFR §51.3(1997).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
Petitioner, an inmate at the Illinois State Penitentiary, Menard, Illinois, commenced this action against the Governor of Illinois and other state officers and prison officials under the Civil Rights Act of 1871,17 Stat. 13, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3), seeking to recover damages for claimed injuries and deprivation of rights while incarcerated under a judgment not challenged here. Petitioner’s pro se complaint was premised on alleged action of prison officials placing him in solitary confinement as a disciplinary measure after he had struck another inmate on the head with a shovel following a verbal altercation. The assault by petitioner on another inmate is not denied. Petitioner’s pro se complaint included general allegations of physical injuries suffered while in disciplinary confinement and denial of due process in the steps leading to that confinement. The claimed physical suffering was aggravation of a preexisting foot injury and a circulatory ailment caused by forcing him to sleep on the floor of his cell with only blankets.
The District Court granted respondents’ motion under Rule 12 (b) (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, suggesting that only under exceptional circumstances should courts inquire into the internal operations of state penitentiaries and concluding that petitioner had failed to show a deprivation of federally protected rights. The Court of Appeals affirmed, emphasizing that prison officials are vested with “wide discretion” in disciplinary matters. We granted certiorari and appointed counsel to represent petitioner. The only issue now before us is petitioner’s contention that the District Court erred in dismissing his pro se complaint without allowing him to present evidence on his claims.
Whatever may be the limits on the scope of inquiry of courts into the internal administration of prisons, allegations such as those asserted by petitioner, however inartfully pleaded, are sufficient to call for the opportunity to offer supporting evidence. We cannot say with assurance that under the allegations of the pro se complaint, which we hold to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, it appears “beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41, 45-46 (1957). See Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F. 2d 774 (CA2 1944).
Accordingly, although we intimate no view whatever on the merits of petitioner’s allegations, we conclude that he is entitled to an opportunity to offer proof. The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.
Reversed and remanded.
Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Marshall
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a party may take an appeal, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1291, from a district court order denying a motion to disqualify counsel for the opposing party in a civil case. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that such orders are not appealable, but made its decision prospective only and therefore reached the merits of the challenged order. We hold that orders denying motions to disqualify counsel are not appealable final decisions under § 1291, and we therefore vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand with instructions that the appeal be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
I
Respondent is lead counsel for the plaintiffs in four product-liability suits seeking damages from petitioner and other manufacturers of multipiece truck tire rims for injuries caused by alleged defects in their products. The complaints charge petitioner and the other defendants with various negligent, willful, or intentional failures to correct or to warn of the supposed defects in the rims. Plaintiffs seek both compensatory and exemplary damages. App. 6-72.
Petitioner was at all relevant times insured by Home Insurance Co. (Home) under a contract providing that Home would be responsible only for some types of liability beyond a minimum “deductible” amount. Home was also an occasional client of respondent's law firm. Based on these facts, petitioner in May 1979 filed a motion to disqualify respondent from further representation of the plaintiffs. Petitioner argued that respondent had a clear conflict of interest because his representation of Home would give him an incentive to structure plaintiffs’ claims for relief in such a way as to enable the insurer to avoid any liability. This in turn, petitioner argued, could increase its own potential liability. Home had in fact advised petitioner in the course of the litigation that its policy would cover neither an award of compensatory damages for willful or intentional acts nor any award of exemplary or punitive damages. The District Court entered a pretrial order requiring that respondent terminate his representation of the plaintiffs unless both the plaintiffs and Home consented to his continuing representation. Id., at 157, 160.
In accordance with the District Court’s order, respondent filed an affidavit in which he stated that he had infprmedboth the plaintiffs and Home of the potential conflict and that neither had any objection to his continuing representation of them both. He filed supporting affidavits executed by the plaintiffs and by a representative of Home. Because he had satisfied the requirements of the pretrial order, respondent was able to continue his representation of the plaintiffs. Petitioner objected to the District Court’s decision to permit respondent to continue his representation if he met the stated conditions, and therefore filed a notice of appeal pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1291.
Although it did not hear oral argument on the appeal, the Eighth Circuit decided the case en banc and affirmed the trial court’s order permitting petitioner to continue representing the plaintiffs. In re Multi-Piece Rim Products Liability, 612 E. 2d 377 (1980). Before considering the merits of the appeal, the court reconsidered and overruled its prior decisions holding that orders denying disqualification motions were immediately appealable under § 1291. The Court of Appeals reasoned that such orders did not fall within the collateral-order doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949), which allows some appeals prior to final judgment. Because it was overruling prior cases, the court stated that it would reach the merits of the challenged order “[i]n fairness to the appellant in the instant case,” but held that in the future, appellate review of such orders would have to await final judgment on the merits of the main proceeding. 612 F. 2d, at 378-379. We granted certiorari, 446 U. S. 934 (1980), to resolve a conflict among the Circuits on the appealability question.
II
Under § 1291, the courts of appeals are vested with “jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts . . . except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.” We have consistently interpreted this language as indicating that a party may not take an appeal under this section until there has been “a decision by the District Court that ‘ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.’ ” Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463, 467 (1978), quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U. S. 229, 233 (1945). This rule, that a party must ordinarily raise all claims of error in a single appeal following final judgment on the merits, serves a number of important purposes. It emphasizes the deference that appellate courts owe to the trial judge as the individual initially called upon to decide the many questions of law and fact that occur in the course of a trial. Permitting piecemeal appeals would undermine the independence of the district judge, as well as the special role that individual plays in our judicial system. In addition, the rule is in accordance with the sensible policy of “avoid [ing] the obstruction to just claims that would come from permitting the harassment and cost of a succession of separate appeals from the various rulings to which a litigation may give rise, from its initiation to entry of judgment.” Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U. S. 323, 325 (1940). See DiBella v. United States, 369 U. S. 121, 124 (1962). The rule also serves the important purpose of promoting efficient judicial administration. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U. S. 156, 170 (1974).
Our decisions have recognized, however, a narrow exception to the requirement that all appeals under § 1291 await final judgment on the merits. In Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Cory., supra, we held that a “small class” of orders that did not end the main litigation were nevertheless final and appealable pursuant to § 1291. Cohen was a shareholder’s derivative action in which the Federal District Court refused to apply a state statute requiring a plaintiff in such a suit to post security for costs. The defendant appealed the ruling without awaiting final judgment on the merits, and the Court of Appeals ordered the trial court to require that costs be posted. We held that the Court of Appeals properly assumed jurisdiction of the appeal pursuant to § 1291 because the District Court’s order constituted a final determination of a claim “separable from, and collateral to,” the merits of the main proceeding, because it was “too important to be denied review/’ and because it was “too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.” Id., at 546. Cohen did not establish new law; rather, it continued a tradition of giving § 1291 a “practical rather than a technical construction.” Ibid. See, e. g., United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co., 269 U. S. 411, 413-414 (1926); Bronson v. LaCrosse & Milwaukee R. Co., 2 Black 524, 530-531 (1863); Forgay v. Conrad, 6 How. 201, 203 (1848); Whiting v. Bank of the United States, 13 Pet. 6, 15 (1839). We have recently defined this limited class of final “collateral orders” in these terms: “[T]he order must conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and be effectively unre-viewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, supra, at 468 (footnote omitted). See Abney v. United States, 431 U. S. 651, 658 (1977).
Because the litigation from which the instant petition arises had not reached final judgment at the time the notice of appeal was filed, the order denying petitioner’s motion to disqualify respondent is appealable under § 1291 only if it falls within the Cohen doctrine. The Court of Appeals held that it does not, and 5 of the other 10 Circuits have also reached the conclusion that denials of disqualification motions are not immediately appealable “collateral orders.” We agree with these courts that under Cohen such an order is not subject to appeal prior to resolution of the merits.
An order denying a disqualification motion meets the first part of the “collateral order” test. It “conclusively determine [s] the disputed question,” because the only issue is whether challenged counsel will be permitted to continue his representation. In addition, we will assume, although we do not decide, that the disqualification question “resolve [s] an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action,” the second part of the test. Nevertheless, petitioner is unable to demonstrate that an order denying disqualification is “effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment” within the meaning of our cases.
In attempting to show why the challenged order will be effectively unreviewable on final appeal, petitioner alleges that denying immediate review will cause it irreparable harm. It is true that the finality requirement should “be construed so as not to cause crucial collateral claims to be lost and potentially irreparable injuries to be suffered,” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 331, n. 11 (1976). In support of its assertion that it will be irreparably harmed, petitioner hints at “the possibility that the course of the proceedings may be indelibly stamped or shaped with the fruits of a breach of confidence or by acts or omissions prompted by a divided loyalty,” Brief for Petitioner 15, and at “the effect of such a tainted proceeding in frustrating public policy,” id., at 16. But petitioner fails to supply a single concrete example of the indelible stamp or taint of which it warns. The only ground that petitioner urged in the District Court was that respondent might shape the p'roducts-liability plaintiffs’ claims for relief in such a way as to increase the burden on petitioner. Our cases, however, require much more before a ruling may be considered “effectively unreviewable” absent immediate appeal.
To be appealable as a final collateral order, the challenged order must constitute “a complete, formal and, in the trial court, final rejection,” Abney v. United States, supra, at 659, of a claimed right “where denial of immediate review would render impossible any review whatsoever,” United States v. Ryan, 402 U. S. 530, 533 (1971). Thus we have permitted appeals prior to criminal trials when a defendant has claimed that he is about to be subjected to forbidden double jeopardy, Abney v. United States, supra, or a violation of his constitutional right to bail, Stack v. Boyle, 342 U. S. 1 (1951), because those situations, like the posting of security for costs involved in Cohen, “each involved an asserted right the legal and practical value of which could be destroyed if it were not vindicated before trial.” United States v. MacDonald, 435 U. S. 850, 860 (1978). By way of contrast, we have generally denied review of pretrial discovery orders, see, e. g., United States v. Ryan, supra; Cobbledick v. United States, supra. Our rationale has been that in the rare case when appeal after final judgment will not cure an erroneous discovery order, a party may defy the order, permit a contempt citation to be entered against him, and challenge the order on direct appeal of the contempt ruling. See Cobbledick v. United States, supra, at 327. We have also rejected immediate ap-pealability under § 1291 of claims that “may fairly be assessed” only after trial, United States v. MacDonald, supra, at 860, and those involving “considerations that are ‘enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff’s cause of action.’ ” Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S., at 469, quoting Mercantile National Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U. S. 555, 558 (1963).
An order refusing to disqualify counsel plainly falls within the large class of orders that are indeed reviewable on appeal after final judgment, and not within the much smaller class of those that are not. The propriety of the district court’s denial of a disqualification motion will often be difficult to assess until its impact on the underlying litigation may be evaluated, which is normally only after final judgment. The decision whether to disqualify an attorney ordinarily turns on the peculiar factual situation of the case then at hand, and the order embodying such a decision will rarely, if ever, represent a final rejection of a claim of fundamental right that cannot effectively be reviewed following judgment on the merits. In the case before us, petitioner has made no showing that its opportunity for meaningful review will perish unless immediate appeal is permitted. On the contrary, should the Court of Appeals conclude after the trial has ended that permitting continuing representation was prejudicial error, it would retain its usual authority to vacate the judgment appealed from and order a new trial. That remedy seems plainly adequate should petitioner’s concerns of possible injury ultimately prove well founded. As the Second Circuit has recently observed, the potential harm that might be caused by requiring that a party await final judgment before it may appeal even when the denial of its disqualification motion was erroneous does not “diffe[r] in any significant way from the harm resulting from other interlocutory orders that may be erroneous, such as orders requiring discovery over a work-product objection or orders denying motions for recusal of the trial judge.” Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F. 2d 433, 438 (1980), cert. pending, No. 80-431. But interlocutory orders are not appealable “on the mere ground that they may be erroneous.” Will v. United States, 389 U. S. 90, 98, n. 6 (1967). Permitting wholesale appeals on that ground not only would constitute an unjustified waste of scarce judicial resources, but also would transform the limited exception carved out in Cohen into a license for broad disregard of the finality rule imposed by Congress in § 1291. This we decline to do.
III
We hold that a district court’s order denying a motion to disqualify counsel is not appealable under § 1291 prior to final judgment in the underlying litigation. Insofar as the Eighth Circuit reached this conclusion, its decision is correct. But because its decision was contrary to precedent in the Circuit, the court went further and reached the merits of the order appealed from. This approach, however, overlooks the fact that the finality requirement embodied in § 1291 is jurisdictional in nature. If the appellate court finds that the order from which a party seeks to appeal does not fall within the statute, its inquiry is over. A court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction, and thus, by definition, a jurisdictional ruling may never be made prospective only. We therefore hold that because the Court of Appeals was without jurisdiction to hear the appeal, it was without authority to decide the merits. Consequently, the judgment of the Eighth Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded with instructions to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. See DiBella v. United States, 369 U. S., at 133.
So ordered.
Title 28 U. S. C. §1291 provides in relevant part: “The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States . . . except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.”
Pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1407, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has ordered these and other suits against multipiece truck tire rim manufacturers consolidated for trial in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri. App. 73.
The firm included Home in a list of its clients in the Martindale-Hubbell- Law Directory and had occasionally represented the insurer on matters unrelated to the multipiece rim litigation. At the time that petitioner filed its disqualification motion, respondent was defending Home and five other carriers against a suit on certain fire insurance policies. Home does not pay respondent or his firm a retainer.
In April 1979 Home sent letters containing similar advice to the defendants in some of the other consolidated suits. The plaintiffs in these other actions were not represented by respondent.
In the alternative, the District Court stated that respondent could terminate his representation of Home in the unrelated matter. See n! 3, supra.
The trial court based its determination that a potential conflict existed on its interpretation of Disciplinary Rule 5-105 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, most of which had been adopted verbatim as a local rule of court. That rule prohibits a lawyer from “continu[ing] multiple employment if the exercise of his independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by his representation of another client” except when “it is obvious that he can adequately represent the interest of each and if each consents to the representation . . . .” The District Court agreed with petitioner that it was likely that the dual representation would adversely affect respondent’s “ 'exercise of his independent judgment App. 160, quoting International Business Machines Corp. v. Levin, 579 F. 2d 271, 280 (CA3 1978). It therefore ordered that he “either comply with the consent requirement ... or terminate his representation . . . .” App. 160.
The District Court certified its pretrial order on disqualification for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (b), which provides in relevant part:
“When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing such order. The Court of Appeals may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order . . . .” Neither party elected to> proceed under § 1292 (b). Respondent chose to comply with the order rather than appeal. Petitioner chose to appeal the denial of its motion under § 1291 rather than under § 1292 (b). After filing its notice of appeal, petitioner moved that respondent be held in contempt for allegedly failing to comply with the pretrial order, but this motion was subsequently withdrawn.
The Court of Appeals also stated that orders granting motions to disqualify counsel would be appealable under § 1291. 612 F. 2d, at 378. That question is not presented by the instant petition, and we express no opinion on it. Neither do we express any view on whether an order denying a disqualification motion in a criminal case would be appealable under § 1291.
During pendency of its appeal to the Eighth Circuit, petitioner filed a federal-court action against Home, charging that by consenting to respondent’s continuing representation of the plaintiffs in the multipiece rim prod-uets-liability suits, the insurer had breached its fiduciary duty to petitioner. App. 217. At the time of oral argument, counsel for petitioner represented that no resolution had been reached in that litigation. Tr. of Oral Arg. 7-8.
In addition to the Eighth Circuit decision currently before us, five other Circuits now follow the rule that denials of disqualification motions are not appealable. See In re Continental Investment Corp., 637 F. 2d 1 (CA1 1980); Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F. 2d 433 (CA2 1980), cert. pending, No. 80-431, overruling Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 496 F. 2d 800 (CA2 1974); Melamed v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 592 F. 2d 290 (CA6 1979) (Melamed II), overruling Melamed v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 534 F. 2d 82 (CA6 1976) (Melamed I); Community Broadcasting of Boston, Inc. v. FCC, 178 U. S. App. D. C. 256, 546 F. 2d 1022 (1976); Cord v. Smith, 338 F. 2d 516 (CA9 1964). Five Circuits permit such appeals under §1291. See Westinghome Electric Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F. 2d 1311 (CA7 1978); MacKethan v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 557 F. 2d 395 (CA4 1977); Kroungold v. Triester, 521 F. 2d 763 (CA3 1975); Fullmer v. Harper, 517 F. 2d 20 (CA10 1975); Uniweld Products, Inc. v. Union Carbide Corp., 385 F. 2d 922 (CA5 1967), cert. denied, 390 U. S. 921 (1968).
Counsel for respondent represented at oral argument in this Court that the case was, at that time, in the discovery stage. Tr. of Oral Arg. 35-36.
See n. 10, supra.
Although there may be situations in which a party will be irreparably damaged if forced to wait until final resolution of the underlying litigation before securing review of an order denying its motion to disqualify opposing counsel, it is not necessary, in order to resolve those situations, to create a general rule permitting the appeal of all such orders. In the proper circumstances, the moving party may seek sanctions short of disqualification, such as a protective order limiting counsel’s ability to disclose or to act' on purportedly confidential information. If additional facts in support of the motion develop in the course of the litigation, the moving party might ask the trial court to reconsider its decision. Ultimately, if dissatisfied with the result in the District Court and absolutely determined that it will be harmed irreparably, a party may seek to have the question certified for interlocutory appellate review pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (b), see n. 7, supra, and, in the exceptional circumstances for which it was designed, a writ of mandamus from the court of appeals might be available. See In re Continental Investment Corp., 637 F. 2d, at 7; Community Broadcasting of Boston, Inc. v. FCC, 178 U. S. App. D. C., at 262, 546 F. 2d, at 1028. See generally Comment, The Appealability of Orders Denying Motions for Disqualification of Counsel in the Federal Courts, 45 U. Chi. L. Rev. 450, 468-480 (1978). We need not be concerned with the availability of such extraordinary procedures in the case before us, because petitioner has made no colorable claim that the harm it might suffer if forced to await the final outcome of the litigation before appealing the denial of its disqualification motion is any greater than the harm suffered by any litigant forced to wait until the termination of the trial before challenging interlocutory orders it considers erroneous.
The United States, in its brief amicus curiae, has challenged petitioner’s standing to attack the order permitting respondent to continue his representation of the plaintiffs. In light of our conclusion that the Eighth Circuit was without jurisdiction to hear petitioner’s appeal, we have no occasion to address the standing issue.
Two other Courts of Appeals that have overruled their precedent and held that orders denying disqualification motions are not immediately ap-pealable have similarly made their decisions prospective only and therefore reached the merits of the disputes before them. See Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F. 2d, at 441-442 (citing need to provide guidance to district courts and to avoid waste of judicial resources); Melamed II, 592 F. 2d, at 295 (earlier ruling in Melamed I established appealability as law of the case). To the extent that the rationales of those cases would allow a court to agree to decide the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction, we respectfully disagree.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice THOMAS
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 180 L.Ed.2d 475 (2011), this Court held that even though bankruptcy courts are statutorily authorized to enter final judgment on a class of bankruptcy-related claims, Article III of the Constitution prohibits bankruptcy courts from finally adjudicating certain of those claims. Stem did not, however, decide how bankruptcy or district courts should proceed when a “Stem claim” is identified. We hold today that when, under Stem’s reasoning, the Constitution does not permit a bankruptcy court to enter final judgment on a bankruptcy-related claim, the relevant statute nevertheless permits a bankruptcy court to issue proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to be reviewed de novo by the district court. Because the District Court in this case conducted the de novo review that petitioner demands, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals upholding the District Court’s decision.
I
Nicolas Paleveda and his wife owned and operated two companies — Aegis Retirement Income Services, Inc. (ARIS), and Bellingham Insurance Agency, Inc. (BIA). By early 2006, BIA had become insolvent, and on January 31, 2006, the company ceased operation. The next day, Paleveda used BIA funds to incorporate Executive Benefits Insurance Agency, Inc. (EBIA), petitioner in this case. Paleveda and others initiated a scheme to transfer assets from BIA to EBIA. The assets were deposited into an account held jointly by ARIS and EBIA and ultimately credited to EBIA at the end of the year.
On June 1, 2006, BIA filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Washington. Peter Arkison, the bankruptcy trustee and respondent in this case, filed a complaint in the same Bankruptcy Court against EBIA and others. As relevant here, the complaint alleged that Paleveda used various methods to fraudulently convey BIA assets to EBIA. EBIA filed an answer and denied many of the trustee’s allegations.
After some disagreement as to whether the trustee’s claims should continue in the Bankruptcy Court or instead proceed before a jury in Federal District Court, the trustee filed a motion for summary judgment against EBIA in the Bankruptcy Court. The Bankruptcy Court granted summary judgment for the trustee on all claims, including the fraudulent conveyance claims. EBIA then appealed that determination to the District Court. The District Court conducted de novo review, affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s decision, and entered judgment for the trustee.
EBIA appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. After EBIA filed its opening brief, this Court decided Stem, supra. In Stem, we held that Article III of the Constitution did not permit a bankruptcy court to enter final judgment on a counterclaim for tor-tious interference, id., at -, 131 S.Ct., at -, even though final adjudication of that claim by the Bankruptcy Court was authorized by statute, see Part II-B, infra. In light of Stem, EBIA moved to dismiss its appeal in the Ninth Circuit for lack of jurisdiction, contending that Article III did not permit Congress to vest authority in a bankruptcy court to finally decide the trustee’s fraudulent conveyance claims.
The Ninth Circuit rejected EBIA’s motion and affirmed the District Court. In re Bellingham, Ins. Agency, Inc., 702 F.3d 553 (2012). As relevant here, the court held that Stem, supra, and Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 109 S.Ct. 2782, 106 L.Ed.2d 26 (1989), taken together, lead to the conclusion that Article III does not permit a bankruptcy court to enter final judgment on a fraudulent conveyance claim against a noncred-itor unless the parties consent. 702 F.3d, at 565. The Ninth Circuit concluded that EBIA had impliedly consented to the Bankruptcy Court’s jurisdiction, and that the Bankruptcy Court’s adjudication of the fraudulent conveyance claim was therefore permissible. Id., at 566, 568. The Court of Appeals also observed that the Bankruptcy Court’s judgment could instead be treated as proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, subject to de novo review by the District Court. Id., at 565-566.
We granted certiorari, 570 U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2880, 186 L.Ed.2d 908 (2013).
II
In Stem, we held that Article III prohibits Congress from vesting a bankruptcy court with the authority to finally adjudicate certain claims. 564 U.S., at -, 131 S.Ct., at -. But we did not address how courts should proceed when they encounter one of these “Stem claims” — a claim designated for final adjudication in the bankruptcy court as a statutory matter, but prohibited from proceeding in that way as a constitutional matter.
As we explain in greater detail below, when a bankruptcy court is presented with such a claim, the proper course is to issue proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The district court will then review the claim de novo and enter judgment. This approach accords with the bankruptcy statute and does not implicate the constitutional defect identified by Stem.
A
We begin with an overview of modern bankruptcy legislation. Prior to 1978, federal district courts could refer matters within the traditional “summary jurisdiction” of bankruptcy courts to specialized bankruptcy referees. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 53, 102 S.Ct. 2858, 73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982) (plurality opinion). Summary jurisdiction covered claims involving “property in the actual or constructive possession of the [bankruptcy] court,” ibid., i.e., claims regarding the apportionment of the existing bankruptcy estate among creditors. See Brubaker, A “Summary” Statutory and Constitutional Theory of Bankruptcy Judges’ Core Jurisdiction After Stern v. Marshall, 86 Am. Bankr. L.J. 121, 124 (2012). Proceedings to augment the bankruptcy estate, on the other hand, implicated the district court’s plenary jurisdiction and were not referred to the bankruptcy courts absent both parties’ consent. See MacDonald v. Plymouth County Trust Co., 286 U.S. 263, 266, 52 S.Ct. 505, 76 L.Ed. 1093 (1932); see also Brubaker, supra, at 128.
In 1978, Congress enacted sweeping changes to the federal bankruptcy laws. See 92 Stat. 2549. The Bankruptcy Reform Act eliminated the historical distinction between “ ‘summary’ ” jurisdiction belonging to bankruptcy courts and “ ‘plenary’ ” jurisdiction belonging to either a district court or an appropriate state court. Northern Pipeline, supra, at 54, 102 S.Ct. 2858 (plurality opinion); see also 1 W. Norton & W. Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice § 4:12, p. 4-44 (3d ed. 2013). Instead, the 1978 Act mandated that bankruptcy judges “shall exercise” jurisdiction over “all civil proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to cases under title 11.” 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b)-(c) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). Under the 1978 Act, bankruptcy judges were “vested with all of the ‘powers of a court of equity, law, and admiralty,’ ” with only a few limited exceptions. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S., at 55, 102 S.Ct. 2858 (plurality opinion) (quoting § 1481). Notwithstanding their expanded jurisdiction and authority, these bankruptcy judges were not afforded the protections of Article I II — namely, life tenure and a salary that may not be diminished. Id., at 53, 102 S.Ct. 2858.
In Northern Pipeline, this Court addressed whether bankruptcy judges under the 1978 Act could “constitutionally be vested with jurisdiction to decide [a] state-law contract claim” against an entity not otherwise a party to the proceeding. Id., at 53, 87, n. 40, 102 S.Ct. 2858. The Court concluded that assignment of that claim for resolution by the bankruptcy judge “violates Art. Ill of the Constitution.” Id., at 52, 87, 102 S.Ct. 2858 (plurality opinion); see id., at 91, 102 S.Ct. 2858 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment). The Court distinguished between cases involving so-called “public rights,” which may be removed from the jurisdiction of Article III courts, and eases involving “private rights,” which may not. See id., at 69-71, 102 S.Ct. 2858 (plurality opinion); id., at 91, 102 S.Ct. 2858 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment). Specifically, the plurality noted that “the restructuring of debtor-creditor relations, which is at the core of the federal bankruptcy power, must be distinguished from the adjudication of state-created private rights,” which belong in an Article III court. Id., at 71-72, and n. 26, 102 S.Ct. 2858.
B
Against that historical backdrop, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 — the Act at issue in this case. See 28 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. Under the 1984 Act, federal district courts have “original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11,” § 1334(a), and may refer to bankruptcy judges any “proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11,” § 157(a). Bankruptcy judges serve 14-year terms subject to removal for cause, §§ 152(a)(1), (e), and their salaries are set by Congress, § 153(a).
The 1984 Act largely restored the bifurcated jurisdictional scheme that existed prior to the 1978 Act. The 1984 Act implements that bifurcated scheme by dividing all matters that may be referred to the bankruptcy court into two categories: “core” and “non-core” proceedings. See generally § 157. It is the bankruptcy court’s responsibility to determine whether each claim before it is core or non-core. § 157(b)(3); cf. Fed. Rule Bkrtcy. Proc. 7012. For core proceedings, the statute contains a nonexhaustive list of examples, including — as relevant here — “proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent conveyances.” § 157(b)(2)(H). The statute authorizes bankruptcy judges to “hear and determine” such claims and “enter appropriate orders and judgments” on them. § 157(b)(1). A final judgment entered in a core proceeding is appealable to the district court, § 158(a)(1), which reviews the judgment under traditional appellate standards, Rule 8013.
As for “non-core” proceedings—ie., proceedings that are “not ... core” but are “otherwise related to a case under title 11”—the statute authorizes a bankruptcy court to “hear [the] proceeding,” and then “submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court.” § 157(c)(1). The district court must then review those proposed findings and conclusions de novo and enter any final orders or judgments. Ibid. There is one statutory exception to this rule: If all parties “consent,” the statute permits the bankruptcy judge “to hear and determine and to enter appropriate orders and judgments” as if the proceeding were core. § 157(c)(2).
Put simply: If a matter is core, the statute empowers the bankruptcy judge to enter final judgment on the claim, subject to appellate review by the district court. If a matter is non-core, and the parties have not consented to final adjudication by the bankruptcy court, the bankruptcy judge must propose findings of fact and conclusions of law. Then, the district court must review the proceeding de novo and enter final judgment.
C
Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 180 L.Ed.2d 475, confronted an underlying conflict between the 1984 Act and the requirements of Article III. In particular, Stem considered a constitutional challenge to the statutory designation of a particular claim as “core.” The bankrupt in that case had filed a common-law counterclaim for tortious interference against a creditor to the estate. Id., at -, 131 S.Ct., at -. Section 157(b)(2)(C), as added by the 1984 Act, lists “counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against the estate” as a core proceeding, thereby authorizing the bankruptcy court to adjudicate the claim to final judgment. See supra this page. The respondent in Stem objected that Congress had violated Article III by vesting the power to adjudicate the tortious interference counterclaim in bankruptcy court. Stern, 564 U.S., at -, 131 S.Ct., at -.
We agreed. Id., at -, 131 S.Ct., at -. In that circumstance, we held, Congress had improperly vested the Bankruptcy Court with the “ ‘judicial Power of the United States,’ ” just as in Northern Pipeline. 564 U.S., at -, -, 131 S.Ct., at 2611, 2620. Because “[n]o ‘public right’ exception excuse[d] the failure to comply with Article III,” we concluded that Congress could not confer on the Bankruptcy Court the authority to finally decide the claim. Id., at -, 131 S.Ct., at 2611.
Ill
Stem made clear that some claims labeled by Congress as “core” may not be adjudicated by a bankruptcy court in the manner designated by § 157(b). Stem did not, however, address how the bankruptcy court should proceed under those circumstances. We turn to that question now.
The Ninth Circuit held that the fraudulent conveyance claims at issue here are Stem claims—that is, proceedings that are defined as “core” under § 157(b) but may not, as a constitutional matter, be adjudicated as such (at least in the absence of consent, see n. 4, supra. See 702 F.3d, at 562. Neither party contests that conclusion.
The lower courts, including the Ninth Circuit in this case, have described Stem claims as creating a statutory “gap.” See, e.g., 702 F.3d, at 565. By definition, a Stem claim may not be adjudicated to final judgment by the bankruptcy court, as in a typical core proceeding. But the alternative procedure, whereby the bankruptcy court submits proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, applies only to non-core claims. See § 157(c)(1). Because § 157(b) does not explicitly authorize bankruptcy judges to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in a core proceeding, the argument goes, Stem created a “gap” in the bankruptcy statute. See 702 F.3d, at 565. That gap purportedly renders the bankruptcy court powerless to act on Stem claims, see Brief for Petitioner 46^48, thus requiring the district court to hear all Stem claims in the first instance.
We disagree. The statute permits Stem claims to proceed as non-core within the meaning of § 157(c). In particular, the statute contains a severability provision that accounts for decisions, like Stem, that invalidate certain applications of the statute:
“If any provision of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of this Act, or the application of that provision to persons or circumstances other than those as to which it is held invalid, is not affected thereby.” 98 Stat. 344, note following 28 U.S.C. § 151.
The plain text of this severability provision closes the so-called “gap” created by Stem claims. When a court identifies a claim as a Stem claim, it has necessarily “held invalid” the “application” of § 157(b) — ie., the “core” label and its attendant procedures — to the litigant’s claim. Note following § 151. In that circumstance, the statute instructs that “the remainder of th[e] Act ... is not affected thereby.” Ibid. That remainder includes § 157(c), which governs non-core proceedings. With the “core” category no longer available for the Stem claim at issue, we look to § 157(c)(1) to determine whether the claim may be adjudicated as a non-core claim — specifically, whether it is “not a core proceeding” but is “otherwise related to a case under title 11.” If the claim satisfies the criteria of § 157(c)(1), the bankruptcy court simply treats the claims as non-core: The bankruptcy court should hear the proceeding and submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court for de novo review and entry of judgment.
The conclusion that the remainder of the statute may continue to apply to Stem claims accords with our general approach to severability. We ordinarily give effect to the valid portion of a partially unconstitutional statute so long as it “remains ‘ “fully operative as a law,” ’ ” Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 509, 130 S.Ct. 3138, 177 L.Ed.2d 706 (2010) (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 186, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992)), and so long as it is not “ ‘evident’ ” from the statutory text and context that Congress would have preferred no statute at all, 561 U.S., at 509, 130 S.Ct. 3138 (quoting Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684, 107 S.Ct. 1476, 94 L.Ed.2d 661 (1987)). Neither of those concerns applies here. Thus, § 157(c) may be applied naturally to Stem claims. And, EBIA has identified “nothing in the statute’s text or historical context” that makes it “evident” that Congress would prefer to suspend Stem claims in limbo. 561 U.S., at 509, 130 S.Ct. 3138.
3
>
Now we must determine whether the procedures set forth in § 157(c)(1) apply to the fraudulent conveyance claims at issue in this case. The Court of Appeals held, and we assume without deciding, that the fraudulent conveyance claims in this case are Stem claims. See Part III, supra. For purposes of this opinion, the “application” of both the “core” label and the procedures of § 157(b) to the trustee’s claims has therefore been “held invalid.” Note following § 151. Accordingly, we must decide whether the fraudulent conveyance claims brought by the trustee are within the scope of § 157(c)(1) — that is, “not ... core” proceedings but “otherwise related to a case under title 11.” We hold that this language encompasses the trustee’s claims of fraudulent conveyance.
First, the fraudulent conveyance claims in this case are “not ... core.” The Ninth Circuit held — and no party disputes — that Article III does not permit these claims to be treated as “core.” See Part III, supra. Second, the fraudulent conveyance claims are self-evidently “related to a case under title 11.” At bottom, a fraudulent conveyance claim asserts that property that should have been part of the bankruptcy estate and therefore available for distribution to creditors pursuant to Title 11 was improperly removed. That sort of claim is “related to a case under title 11” under any plausible construction of the statutory text, and no party contends otherwise. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 307, n. 5, 308, 115 S.Ct. 1493, 131 L.Ed.2d 403 (1995) (“Proceedings ‘related to’ the bankruptcy include ... suits between third parties which have an effect on the bankruptcy estate”). Accordingly, because these Stem claims fit comfortably withm the category of claims governed by § 157(c)(1), the Bankruptcy Court would have been permitted to follow the procedures required by that provision, i.e., to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the District Court to be reviewed de novo.
B
Although this case did not proceed in precisely that fashion, we affirm nonetheless. A brief procedural history of the case helps explain why.
As noted, § 157 permits a bankruptcy court to adjudicate a claim to final judgment in two circumstances — in core proceedings, see § 157(b), and in non-core proceedings “with the consent of all the parties,” § 157(c)(2). In this case, the Bankruptcy Court entered judgment in favor of the bankruptcy trustee without specifying in its order whether it was acting pursuant to § 157(b) (core) or § 157(c)(2) (non-core with consent). EBIA immediately appealed to the District Court, see § 158, but it did not argue that the Bankruptcy Court lacked constitutional authority to grant summary judgment. As a result, the District Court did not analyze whether there was a Stem problem and did not, as some district courts have done, relabel the bankruptcy order as mere proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. See, e.g., In re Parco Merged Media Corp., 489 B.R. 323, 326 (D.Me.2013) (collecting cases). The District Court did, however, review de novo the Bankruptcy Court’s grant of summary judgment for the trustee — a legal question — and issued a reasoned opinion affirming the Bankruptcy Court. The District Court then separately entered judgment in favor of the trustee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (“[T]he district courts shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings ... related to cases under title 11”).
EBIA now objects on constitutional grounds to the Bankruptcy Court’s disposition of the fraudulent conveyance claims. EBIA contends that it was constitutionally entitled to review of its fraudulent conveyance claims by an Article III court regardless of whether the parties consented to adjudication by a bankruptcy court. Brief for Petitioner 25-27. In an alternative argument, EBIA asserts that even if the Constitution permitted the Bankruptcy Court to adjudicate its claim with the consent of the parties, it did not in fact consent. Id., at 38.
In light of the procedural posture of this case, however, we need not decide whether EBIA’s contentions are correct on either score. At bottom, EBIA argues that it was entitled to have an Article III court review de novo and enter judgment on the fraudulent conveyance claims asserted by the trustee. In effect, EBIA received exactly that. The District Court conducted de novo review of the summary judgment claims, concluding in a written opinion that there were no disputed issues of material fact and that the trustee was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In accordance with its statutory authority over matters related to the bankruptcy, see § 1334(b), the District Court then separately entered judgment in favor of the trustee. EBIA thus received the same review from the District Court that it would have received if the Bankruptcy Court had treated the fraudulent conveyance claims as non-core proceedings under § 157(c)(1). In short, even if EBIA is correct that the Bankruptcy Court’s entry of judgment was invalid, the District Court’s de novo review and entry of its own valid final judgment cured any error. Cf. Carter v. Kubler, 320 U.S. 243, 248, 64 S.Ct. 1, 88 L.Ed. 26 (1943) (bankruptcy commissioner’s error was cured after the District Court “made an independent and complete review of the conflicting evidence”).
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
It is so ordered.
. The trustee asserted claims of fraudulent conveyance under 11 U.S.C. § 544, and under state law, Wash. Rev. Code, ch. 19.40 (2012).
. As we explain below, see Part II-B, infra, the statutory scheme at issue both in Stem and in this case grants bankruptcy courts the authority to "hear and determine” and “enter appropriate orders and judgments” in "core” proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1). The statute lists counterclaims like the one brought in Stem as "core” claims. § 157(b)(2)(C).
.Granfinanciera held that a fraudulent conveyance claim under Title 11 is not a matter of "public right” for purposes of Article III, 492 U.S., at 55, 109 S.Ct. 2782, and that the defendant to such a claim is entitled to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment, id., at 64, 109 S.Ct. 2782.
. Because we conclude that EBIA received the de novo review and entry of judgment to which it claims constitutional entitlement, see Part IV-B, infra, this case does not require us to address whether EBIA in fact consented to the Bankruptcy Court’s adjudication of a Stem claim and whether Article III permits a bankruptcy court, with the consent of the parties, to enter final judgment on a Stem claim. We reserve that question for another day.
. Bankruptcy referees were designated “judges” in 1973. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 53, n. 2, 102 S.Ct. 2858, 73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982) (plurality opinion).
. In addition, district courts may also withdraw such matters from the bankruptcy courts for "cause shown.” § 157(d).
. In using the term "core,” Congress tracked the Northern Pipeline plurality’s use of the same term as a description of those claims that fell within the scope of the historical bankruptcy court’s power. See 458 U.S., at 71, 102 S.Ct. 2858 (“[T]he restructuring of debtor-creditor relations, which is at the core of the federal bankruptcy power, must be distinguished from the adjudication of state-created private rights ...” (emphasis added)).
. To the contrary, we noted in Stem that removal of claims from core bankruptcy jurisdiction does not "meaningfully changfe] the division of labor in the current statute.” 564 U.S., at -, 131 S.Ct., at 2620. Accepting EBIA’s contention that district courts are required to hear all Stem claims in the first instance, see Brief for Petitioner 46-48, would dramatically alter the division of responsibility set by Congress.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Me. Justice Frankfurter
delivered the opinion of the Court. .
The C-O-Two Fire Equipment Company, the respondent here, owns two patents, one issued on November 23, 1948, and the other reissued on August 23, 1949, for squeeze-grip valves and discharge heads for portable fire extinguishers. C-O-Two, incorporated in Delaware, has offices in Newark, New Jersey. On January 17, 1950, it commenced in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois an action against the Acme Equipment Company for “making and causing to be made and selling and using” devices which were charged with infringing C-O-Two’s patents.
On March 9, 1950,. the petitioner Kerotest began in the District Court of Delaware this proceeding against C-O-Two for a declaration that the two patents sued on in the Illinois action are-invalid and that the devices which Kerotest manufactures and supplies to Acme, the Illinois defendant, do not. infringe the C-O-Two patents. Kerotest, a Pennsylvania corporation, has its offices in Pittsburgh, but was subject to service of process in Illinois. C-O-Two on March 22, 1950, filed an amendment to its complaint joining Kerotest as a defendant in the Illinois ■action.
In Delaware, C-O-Two moved for a stay of the declaratory judgment action and Kerotest sought to enjoin C-O-Two from prosecuting the Illinois suit. “either as against Kerotest alone, or generally, as [the Delaware District Court might] deem just and proper."’ The District Court stayed the Delaware proceeding and refused to enjoin that in Illinois, subject to reexamination of the questions after 90 days, 85 U. S. P. Q. 185. On appeal by Kerotest, the Court ó£ Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the District Court had not abused its discretion in staying the Delaware action for 90 days to permit it-to get “more information concerning the controverted status of Kerotest in the Illinois suit." 182 F. 2d 773, 775.
During the 90-day period the Illinois District Court kllowed the joinder of Kerotest‘as a defendant, denying a. motion by Acme to stay the Illinois proceeding pending' disposition of the Delaware suit^and Kerotest. made a i general appearance. After 90 days both parties renewed their motions in Delaware, with Kerotest this time asking that C-O-Two be enjoined from prosecuting the Illinois suit only as to Kerotest. The District Court, a different judge sitting, enjoined C-O-Two from proceeding in- the Illinois-suit against Kerotest, and denied the stay of the Delaware action, largely acting on the assumption that rulings by its own and other Courts of Appeals required such a result except in “exceptional cases,” since the Delaware action between C-O-Two and Kerotest was commenced before Kerotest Vas made a defendant in the Illinois suit. 92 F. Supp. 943. On appeal, the Court . of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, saying in part:
. “. . . the whole of the war and all the parties to it are in the Chicago theatre and there only can-it be fought to a finish as the litigations are now cast. On the other hand if the battle is waged in the Delaware arena there is a strong probability that the Chicago suit nonetheless would have to be proceeded with for Acme is not and cannot be made a party to the Delaware litigation. The Chicago suit when adjudicated will bind all the parties in both cases. Why should there be two litigations where one will suffice? We can find no adequate reason. We assume, of course, that, there will be prompt' action in the Chicago theatre.” 88 U. S. P. Q. 335, 337.
A petition for rehearing was, granted and the Court of Appeals,, the seven circuit judges sitting en banc, in an expanded opinion- from which two judges dissented, adhered to the views of the court of three judges. 189 F. 2d 31, 89 U. S. P. Q. 411. Inasmuch as a question of importance to the conduct of multiple litigation in the federal judicial system was involved, we granted certiorari. 342 U. S. 810.
The Federal Declaratory Judgments Act, facilitating as it does the initiation of litigation by different parties to many-sided transactions, has created complicated problems for coordinate courts. Wise judicial .administratioñ, giving regard to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation, does not counsel rigid mechanical solution of such problems. The factors relevant to wise administration here are equitable in nature. Necessarily, an ample degree of discretion, appropriate for disciplined and experienced judges, must be left to the lower courts. The conclusion which we are asked to upset derives from an extended and careful study of the circumstances of this litigation. Such an estimate has led the Court of Appeals twice to' conclude that all interests will be best served by prosecution of the single suit in Illinois. Even if we had more'doubts than we do about the analysis made by the Court of Appeals, we would not feel justified in displacing its judgment with ours.
It was strongly pressed upon us that the résult below may encourage owners of weak patents to avoid real tests of their patents’ validity by successive suits against customers in forums inconvenient for the manufacturers, or selected because of greater hospitality to patents. Such apprehension implies a lack of discipline and of disinterestedness on the part of the lower courts, hardly a worthy or wise basis for fashioning rules of procedure. It reflects an attitude against which we were warned by Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the whole Court, like-., wise in regard to a question of procedure: “Universal distrust creates universal incompetence.” Graham v. United States, 231 U. S. 474, 480. If in a rare instance a district judge abuses the discretionary authority the Want of which precludes an effective, independent judiciary, there is always tlm "opportunity for corrective review by a Court of Appeals and ultimately by this Court.
The manufacturer who is charged with infringing a patent cannot stretch the Federal Declaratory Judgments Act to give' him a paramount right to choose the forum for trying out questions of infringement and validity. He is given an equal start in the race to the courthouse, not a headstart. If he is forehanded, subsequent suits against him by the patentee can within the trial court’s discretion be enjoined pending determination of the declaratory judgment suit, and a judgment in his favor bars suits against his customers. If he is anticipated, the court’s discretion is broad enough to protect him from harassment of his customers. If the patentee’s suit against a customer is brought in a district where the manufacturer cannot be joined as a defendant, the manufacturer may be permitted simultaneously to prosecute a declaratory action against the patentee elsewhere. And if the manufacturer is joined as an unwilling defendant in a jorum non conveniens, he has available upon an appropriate showing the relief provided by § 1404 (a) of the Judicial Code. 62 Stat. 869, 937, 28 U. S. C. § 1404 (a).
The judgment below must be
Affirmed.
The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Black dissent.
48 Stat. 955, 28 U. S. C. §§ 2201-2202.
See Developments in the Law — Declaratory Judgments, 1941— 1949, 62 Harv. L. Rev, 787, 814-815, 866 (1949).
Other cases in Courts of Appeals which present at all comparable situations do not show any rigid rule such as that under which the District Court felt constrained. In view of the basis of our decision it would not be profitable to discuss these cases in detail. It will suffice to indicate the concurrent controversies for which adjustment was sought. Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. National Elec. Prod. Corp., 125 F. 2d 1008 (C. A. 3d Cir.) (suit 1 — declaratory action by manufacturer against patentee; suit 2 — patentee sues manufacturer and customer for infringement: suit 2 enjoined as to manufacturer) ; Cresta Blanca Wine Co. v. Eastern Wine Corp., 143 F. 2d 1012 (C. A. 2d Cir.) (suit 1 — declaratory action by manufacturer against trademark owner; suit 2 — trademark owner sues manufacturer and distributor for infringement; thereafter, distributor seeks to intervene as plaintiff in suit 1: intervention denied and suit 2 enjoined as to manufacturer); Speed Products Co. v. Tinnerman Products, Inc., 83 U. S. App. D. C. 243, 171 F. 2d 727 (suit 1— A sues Commissioner of Patents in District of Columbia for registration of trademark; suit 2 — suit by A in N. Y. against B alone for registration of trademark and for declaration of noninfringement of B’s mark; thereafter, B joins as defendant in suit 1 and files counterclaim for infringement of B’s mark: suit 2 not enjoined and suit 1 not advanced for trial); Hammett v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 176 F. 2d 145 (C. A. 2d Cir.) (suit 1 — alleged copyright owner sues broadcaster for infringement; suit 2 — declaratory action by writer for broadcaster against alleged copyright owner; thereafter, writer joined as defendant in suit 1: suit 2 dismissed); Remington Prod. Corp. v. American Aerovap, Inc., 192 F. 2d 872 (C. A. 2d Cir.), December 4, 1951 (suit 1 — manufacturer and customer A bring declaratory action against patentee; suit 2 — patentee sues customers A, B, C, and D for infringement; thereafter, customer B joins as plaintiff in suit 1: suit 2 enjoined). By endorsing what was in effect an exercise of discretion by the Court of Appeals below upon consideration of the specific.circumstances .here, we neither approve nor throw doubt upon decisions by it or other Courts of Appeals.
See, e. g., Crosley Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 130 F. 2d 474 (C. A. 3d Cir.); Carbide & Carbon Chemicals Corp. v. United States Industrial Chemicals, Inc., 140 F. 2d 47 (C. A. 4th Cir.); Independent Pneumatic Tool Co. v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 167 F. 2d 1002 (C. A. 7th Cir.).
Kessler v. Eldred, 206 U. S. 285.
It is suggested that Rule 15 (c) of the Federal (Rules of Civil .^Procedure makes the. joinder of Kerotest take the date, as it were, of the original action against Acme, which of course preceded the Delaware action. The equities of the_ situation do not depend on this argument.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Me. Chief Justice Vinson
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellant was incorporated in 1833 by a Special Act of the Georgia General Assembly that included a provision for exemption from taxation. In 1945, the Georgia Constitution was amended to provide that “All exemptions from taxation heretofore granted in corporate charters are declared to be henceforth null and void.” According to appellant’s complaint, appellee, who is State Revenue Commissioner, is threatening to act pursuant to this amendment by proceeding against appellánt for the collection of ad valorem taxes for the year 1939, and all subsequent years, on behalf of the State and every county, school district and municipality through which appellant’s lines run. Appellant claims that this threatened taxation would be contrary to its legislative charter and would impair the obligation of contract between appellant and the State of Georgia, contrary to Article I, Section 10 of the Federal Constitution.
This latest phase of appellant’s frequent litigation over the tax exemption provision of its 1833 charter began when appellant filed suit against appellee’s predecessor in a Georgia state court .seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. Relief was denied without reaching the merits of appellant’s claim when the Georgia Supreme Court held that the action was, in effect, an unconsented suit against the State which could not be maintained in the state courts. Musgrove v. Georgia Railroad & Banking Co., 204 Ga. 139, 49 S. E. 2d 26 (1948). We dismissed an appeal from that judgment because it was based upon a nonfederal ground adequate to support it. 335 U. S. 900 (1949).
Thereafter, appellant filed this action in the District Court to enjoin appellee from assessing or collecting ad valorem taxes contrary to its legislative charter. Appellant also asked that appellee’s threatened acts be adjudged in violation of a prior decree also entered by the court below and affirmed by this Court. Wright v. Georgia Railroad & Banking Co., 216 U. S. 420 (1910). A court of three judges dismissed appellant’s complaint for want of jurisdiction, holding that the State of Georgia had not submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court so as to be barred by the Wright decree and that this action against appellee is in effect an unconsented suit against the State prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment. 85 F. Supp. 749 (1949).
The Attorney General of Georgia stated at the bar of this Court that “plain, speedy and efficient” state remedies were available to appellant, particularly by appeal from an assessment by appellee. We ordered the cause continued to enable appellant to assert such remedies. 339 U. S. 901 (1950). After the District Court modified the restraining order which it had entered pending appeal to permit , assessment, appellee held appellant liable for the full ad valorem tax and appellant appealed to the state courts. The Georgia Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, holding that such remedy was not available to appellant. Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 208 Ga. 261, 66 S. E. 2d 234 (1951). Following this decision, appellant moved for termination of the continuance of its appeal in this Court and we ordered reargument.
First. On reargument, the Attorney General of Georgia again maintained that “plain, speedy and efficient” remedies were available to appellant in the state courts. If so, the District Court is without jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. (Supp. IV) § 1341. The remedies now suggested are: (1) suit for injunction in the Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia; (2) arresting tax execution by affidavits of illegality; and (3) suing the State for refund after payment of taxes. The first route was tried by appellant without success in the Musgrove litigation, supra. The second remedy, the present availability of which was doubted by the three Justices of the Georgia Supreme Court that considered the matter in the appeal case, would require the filing of over three hundred separate Claims in^ourteen different counties to protect the single federal claim asserted by appellant. The third remedy, suit for refund after payment, is applicable only to taxes payable directly to the State and amounting to less than 15% of the total taxes in controversy. We cannot say that the remedies suggested by the Attorney General afford appellant the “plain, speedy and efficient remedy” necessary to deprive the District Court of jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. (Supp. IV) § 1341.
Second: Passing to the jurisdictional ground upon which the District Court rested its decision, we note that the State of Georgia was not named as a party in the District Court. But, since appellee is a state officer, the court below properly considered whether the relief sought against the officer is not, in substance, sought against the sovereign. If this action is, in effect, an unconsented suit against the State, the action is barred.
The District Court characterized appellant’s action as one to enforce an alleged contract with the State of Georgia, and, as such, a suit against the State. But appellant’s complaint is not framed as a suit for specific performance. It seeks to enjoin appellee from collecting taxes in violation of appellant’s rights under the Federal Constitution. This Court has long held that a suit to restrain unconstitutional action threatened by an individual who is a state officer is not a suit against the State. These decisions were reexamined and reaffirmed in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), and have been consistently followed to the present day. This general.rule has been applied in suits against individuals threatening to enforce allegedly unconstitutional taxation, including cases where, as here, it is alleged that taxation would impair the obligation of contract. Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 200 U. S. 273 (1906); Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U. S. 1 (1891); Allen v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 114 U. S. 311 (1885).
In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443 (1887), relied upon below, is not a contrary holding. In that case, complainant had not alleged that officers threatened to tax its property iri violation of its constitutional rights. As a result, the Court held the action barred as one in substance directed at the State merely to obtain specific performance of a contract with the State. Since appellant seeks to enjoin appellee from a threatened and allegedly unconstitutional invasion of its property, we hold that this action against appellee as an individual is not barred as an unconsented suit against the State. The State is free to carry out its functions without judicial interference directed at the sovereign or its agents, but this immunity from federal jurisdiction does not extend to individuals who act as officers without constitutional authority.
Accordingly, we find that the District Court was not deprived of jurisdiction in this case on either the ground that it is a suit against the State or that “plain, speedy and efficient” remedies are available to appellant in the state courts. Since the District Court did not determine whether appellee was bound by the Wright decree and did not address itself to the merits of appellant’s claim, we do not pass upon these questions but remand the case to the District Court for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
Ga. Laws 1833, pp. 256, 264.
Ga. Const., Art. I, § III, par. III. See Ga. Laws 1945, No. 34, pp. 8, 14.
Ga. Code Ann., 1937, cc. 92-26, 92-27, 92-28, as amended, contains the taxation provisions which appellee is allegedly threatening to invoke against appellant.
“No State, shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, ...” U. S. Const., Art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
The cases concerning this exemption that have reached this Court are collected in Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Phillips, 332 U. S. 168, 173 (1947).
Required under 28 U. S. C. (Supp. IV) §§ 2281, 2284. Query v. United States, 316 U. S. 486 (1942).
“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend .to any- suit in- law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U. S. Const., Amend. XI.
“The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.”
208 Ga. at 272, 66 S. E. 2d at 241.
Compare Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R. Co., 244 U. S. 499, 520 (1917), with Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 521, 529-530 (1932). See also Graves v. Texas Co., 298 U. S. 393, 403 (1936).
An adequate remedy as to only a portion of the taxes in controversy does not deprive the federal court of jurisdiction over the entire controversy. Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R. Co., note 10, supra. See Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U. S. 620, 629 (1946).
It was also suggested that appellant’s federal claim could be raised in defense to a suit brought by appellee to recover taxes, but. this is hardly a remedy that could have been .invoked by appellant,
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U. S. 682, 687-688 (1949); In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443 (1887).
Appellant is incorporated in Georgia and a suit by it against the State of Georgia is not expressly barred by the language of the Eleventh Amendment. Nevertheless, a federal court may not entertain the action if it is a suit against the State. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890).
Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 200 U. S. 273 (1906); Prout v. Starr, 188 U. S. 537 (1903); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 518-519 (1898); Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U. S. 204 (1897); Reagan v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362 (1894); Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U. S. 1 (1891), and numerous cases cited therein.
Alabama, Comm’n v. Southern R. Co., 341 U. S. 341, 344 (1951); Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U. S. 378, 393 (1932), and cases cited therein; Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R. Co., note 10, supra, at 507, and cases cited therein. See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., note 12, supra, at 690-691, 704.
Appellant in this case merely seeks the cessation of appellee’s allegedly unconstitutional conduct and does not request affirmative action, by the State. Compare Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U. S. 459, 462-463 (1945); Great Northern Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 50-51 (1944); North Carolina v. Temple, 134 U. S. 22 (1890); Hagood v. Southern, 117 U. S. 52 (1886).
That there is no inconsistency between the decision in Ayers and the cases above cited is shown by the careful differentiation of Allen v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., supra, an opinion also written by Mr. Justice Matthews. See also Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, note 14, supra.
The fact that the Georgia Supreme Court has considered that appellee acts with official immunity does not, of course, impart immunity from responsibility to the supreme federal authority.. Ex parte Young, supra, at 167. See also Graves v. Texas Co., note 10, supra, at 403-404.
We dp not find it necessary to consider whether the State of Georgia had submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the District Court in the Wright litigation. Unlike Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., supra, where additional parties were brought into the second action, appellant has limited its' complaint to a request for relief against appellee, alone.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Clark
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The precise issue in this proceeding is whether petitioner, who filed his petition for naturalization two days before the effective date of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163, 8 U. S. C. § 1101 et seq., may compel a final hearing on the same before the determination of deportation proceedings instituted after the effective date of the Act and based solely on grounds initiated by that Act. The “priority provision”' of the Act, § 318, states “no petition for naturalization shall be finally heard ... if there is pending against the petitioner a deportation proceeding.” 66 Stat. 244, 8 U. S. C. § 1429. But petitioner claims that the savings clause of the Act, § 405, 66 Stat. 280, 8 U. S. C. § 1101, note, which we considered in United States v. Menasche, ante, p. 528, preserves his eligibility for citizenship under prior law, and that final hearing thereon cannot be delayed by reason of the pendency of the subsequently instituted deportation action. Both the trial court, 115 F. Supp. 336, and the Court of Appeals, 210 F. 2d 82, decided against the petitioner. We granted certiorari, 348 U. S. 811, in order to determine the relationship between § 318 and § 405 of the 1952 Act.
On October 1, 1952, petitioner submitted to the Immigration and Naturalization Service a preliminary application to file a petition for naturalization, Form N-400. Following a preliminary examination, he filed his petition for naturalization on December 22, 1952, two days before the effective date of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. The prenaturalization investigation disclosed that petitioner had a criminal record; he had been convicted of grand larceny in 1913 and of manslaughter in 1915. Section 241 (a) of the 1952 Act subjects aliens to deportation if they are convicted “at any time after entry ... of two crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct.” 66 Stat. 204, 8 U. S. C. § 1251 (a) (4). On June 22, 1953, a warrant of arrest was issued against petitioner, based on his 1913 and 1915 convictions, charging as grounds for deportation petitioner’s presence in the country in violation of § 241 (a)(4). The deportation proceedings were in progress when on July 28, 1953, petitioner, through an order to show cause filed in this case, moved to compel a final hearing on his petition for naturalization, and, in the interim, to stay the deportation proceedings. Relying on § 318, supra, the district judge denied the motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Petitioner’s main argument is that under § 405 (a) nothing contained in the new Act, “unless otherwise specifically provided therein, shall be construed to affect . . . any status, condition, right in process of acquisition . . . done or existing, at the time this Act shall take effect.” Petitioner was eligible for citizenship under the prior law and remains eligible under the new Act. But under the prior law petitioner was not deportable. Petitioner argues that the deportation proceeding, based solely on § 241 (a) of the new Act, is adversely affecting a right protected by § 405 (a), to wit, his inchoate right to citizenship. This, he claims, is in direct contravention of the terms of § 405 (a) unless some other section in the Act “otherwise specifically provide [s].” Section 318, advanced as just such an exception, says “Notwithstanding the provisions of section 405 (b) . . . ,” and makes no mention of § 405 (a). Thus, petitioner concludes, § 318 is not a specific exception to the protection afforded his rights by § 405 (a), and if he is to vindicate his rights under that section he must prevail in the present proceedings.
We agree with petitioner that, absent a specific provision to the contrary, he has rights protected by § 405 (a). These stem from the filing of his Form N-400, from his petition for naturalization, and, perhaps, from his fulfillment of the five-year residence requirement. United States v. Menasche, supra. But we hold that § 318 specifically excepts rights under the prior law from the protection of § 405 when these rights stem from a petition for naturalization or from some other step in the naturalization process.
The practice previous to the enactment of a priority provision in the immigration and nationality laws was for both the deportation and naturalization processes to proceed along together until either petitioner’s deportation or naturalization ipso jacto terminated the possibility of the other occurring. See United States v. Waskowski, 158 F. 2d 962. And in the few instances where deportations were stayed in order to permit aliens to obtain a hearing under a recently enacted naturalization provision, the remedy was by habeas corpus after the termination of the deportation proceedings and after a stay had been denied in those proceedings. United States ex rel. Walther v. District Director of Immigration and Naturalization, 175 F. 2d 693; Petition of Kavadias, 177 F. 2d 497. But as a general rule stays were not utilized, cf. Klig v. Watkins, 84 F. Supp. 486, and there ensued a race between the alien to gain citizenship and the Attorney General to deport him. If the alien was successful in forcing a final hearing and the granting of his naturalization petition, the deportation proceedings were completely nullified. To remedy this situation, the Congress incorporated § 27 in the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 1015, 8 U. S. C. (1946 ed., Supp. V) § 729 (c). This section prohibited naturalization or the holding of final hearings on naturalization petitions where deportation proceedings were instituted “under the provisions of this or any other Act.” The 1950 Act took effect immediately and contained no savings clause, although it introduced new grounds for deportation which were to be retroactively applied. See Galvan v. Press, 347 U. S. 522. And in United States ex rel. Jankowski v. Shaughnessy, 186 F. 2d 580, the priority provision— § 27 — was held to apply to naturalization petitions filed before the effective date of the Act, even though the deportation proceedings were commenced, as here, under the new statute.
Section 318 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 re-enacted § 27 in substantially the same form, retaining the language of its predecessor in suspending final hearings on naturalization where deportation proceedings were instituted under this or any other Act. But petitioner contends that this plain language does not apply to his case because Congress did not specifically exempt §318 from the operation of the.savings clause embodied in § 405 (a), under which his inchoate right to citizenship is preserved.
It is true that § 318 begins with the phrase “Notwithstanding the provisions of section 405 (b),” which at first glance might indicate that it was intended not to apply to § 405 (a). But further analysis renders this position untenable. The same priority section had been inserted as an emergency provision in the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, and had been given immediate prospective and retroactive effect. It was carried forward almost verbatim as § 318 in the 1952 Act. And to make certain that it would apply to rights existing under petitions for naturalization, the Congress added to § 318 the phrase “Notwithstanding the provisions of section 405 (b),” referring to the only part of the savings clause which deals explicitly with the law applicable to naturalization petitions. The congressional purpose must have been to have § 318 supersede rights stemming from such petitions, for under any other interpretation its previous approach under the 1950 law is unexplainedly reversed and the “notwithstanding” clause is rendered meaningless. It may be that the draftsmen could have been more exact in their language, since §405 (a), as well as §405 (b), embraces rights under pending petitions, see United States v. Menasche, supra. But we think their intent is plain enough.
Petitioner contends that this application of § 318 will have the result of affording more protection to pre-petition rights of the Menasche-type than to inchoate rights under a petition for naturalization itself, since the former are not embraced within §405 (b). But we do not believe § 318 differentiates between these steps in the process of naturalization. Each is but part of the whole process leading to citizenship and each is subject to the provisions of § 318.
Nor can we accept petitioner’s argument that Congress intended § 318 to apply only to deportation proceedings based on grounds existing under the prior law. In making this contention, petitioner gives away nothing and gains nothing. If the grounds for deportation are the same under the prior law as under the new Act, then nothing in the new Act affects petitioner; it is clear that rights under the savings clause have not been infringed even if there is no specific exception. Only where something in the new law introduces a change, thereby affecting one’s status under the old law, is the savings clause called into play. Only then is a specific exception to § 405 required. Thus, if petitioner's construction were to prevail, the “notwithstanding” language in § 318 would be as meaningless as under the interpretation previously advanced and rejected. The “notwithstanding” clause takes on meaning only when we assume that the new Act has made some change in the law to which the “notwithstanding” statement is noting a specific exception. That is this case.
The role thus played by § 405 (b) is in substantial accord with the operation of its predecessor, § 347 (b) of the Nationality Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1168, 8 U. S. C. (1946 ed.) § 747. It was pointed out in Menasche, supra, that § 347 (b), with its two-year limitation, was considered to be a special limitation on the rights preserved by subsection (a) of that savings clause. The two-year period has been deleted in § 405 (b), but the subsection remains a special limitation on the broad savings provision, bringing to bear the specific exceptions found in § 318 and other provisions of the new Act whenever the protection of § 405 (a) is sought for rights connected with the naturalization process.
In our view, § 405 (b) is the vehicle for applying each of these exceptions to the rights and liabilities emerging from naturalization proceedings under prior law and otherwise preserved by §405 (a). In using the “notwithstanding” language in these sections, Congress clearly manifested its intent that certain policies should override the otherwise broad and pervasive principle of the savings clause. In United States v. Menasche, supra, we recognized the wide scope to be given the savings clause. We would be lax in our duty.if we did not give recognition also to the congressional purpose to override the savings clause when other considerations were thought more compelling than the preservation of the status quo. If we are not to nullify this clear legislative purpose and render meaningless the “notwithstanding” language of § 318 and the other sections, we must find for the Government and hold that § 318 bars petitioner’s attempt to compel a hearing on his naturalization petition while the deportation proceeding is pending.
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Harlan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
The text of this provision, in material part, is as follows:
“Sec. 318. . . . Notwithstanding the provisions of section 405 (b), and except as provided in sections 327 and 328 no person shall be naturalized against whom there is outstanding a final finding of de-portability pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued under the provisions of this or any other Act; and no petition for naturalization shall be finally heard by a naturalization court if there is pending against the petitioner a deportation proceeding pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued under the provisions of this or any other Act: . . .
It is assumed for the purposes of this proceeding that petitioner is deportable under § 241 (a). See note 3, infra.
This is not to say that petitioner cannot challenge the authority of the Attorney General to deport him under § 241 (a) of the 1952 Act. We express no opinion as to whether such a challenge, grounded on the savings clause or otherwise, might succeed if made in the deportation proceedings. Whether the question of deportability could be raised in a naturalization proceeding was expressly waived by the petitioner. See Petitioner’s Brief, p. 7.
Petitioner’s further argument, that a change in the punctuation of § 318 resulted in the application of the “notwithstanding” clause to final findings of deportability but not to pending proceedings, must be rejected. When viewed against the purpose of the clause, the circumstances surrounding the controverted change, and the usual rules of proper punctuation, the contention is shown to be without substance.
Section 311 provides that the right to naturalization shall not be abridged because of race, sex or marriage, and, “ [n] otwithstanding section 405 (b), this section shall apply to any person whose petition for naturalization shall hereafter be filed, or shall have been pending on the effective date of this Act.” 66 Stat. 239, 8 U. S. C. § 1422.
Section 313 (a) states: “Notwithstanding the provisions of section 405 (b), no person shall hereafter be naturalized” who engages in specified subversive activities or who is a member of described subversive organizations. 66 Stat. 240, 8 U. S. C. § 1424 (a).
Section 315 (a) provides: “Notwithstanding the provisions of section 405 (b),” one who claims or has claimed his alienage and “is or was” thereby relieved of service in the armed forces, “shall be permanently ineligible to become a citizen.” 66 Stat. 242, 8 U. S. C. § 1426 (a).
Section 331 (d) provides for the ending of enemy alien status and states: “Notwithstanding the provisions of section 405 (b), this subsection shall also apply to the case of any such alien whose petition for naturalization was filed prior to the effective date of this Act and which is still pending on that date.” 66 Stat. 252, 8 U. S. C. § 1442 (d).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | B | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Teleflex Incorporated and its subsidiary Technology Holding Company — both referred to here as Teleflex — sued KSR International Company for patent infringement. The patent at issue, United States Patent No. 6,237,565 Bl, is entitied “Adjustable Pedal Assembly With Electronic Throttle Control.” Supp. App. 1. The patentee is Steven J. Engelgau, and the patent is referred to as “the Engelgau patent.” Teleflex holds the exclusive license to the patent.
Claim 4 of the Engelgau patent describes a mechanism for combining an electronic sensor with an adjustable automobile pedal so the pedal’s position can be transmitted to a computer that controls the throttle in the vehicle’s engine. When Teleflex accused KSR of infringing the Engelgau patent by adding an electronic sensor to one of KSR’s previously designed pedals, KSR countered that claim 4 was invalid under the Patent Act, 35 U. S. C. § 103 (2000 ed. and Supp. IV), because its subject matter was obvious.
Section 103(a) forbids issuance of a patent when “the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.”
In Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U. S. 1 (1966), the Court set out a framework for applying the statutory language of § 103, language itself based on the logic of the earlier decision in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, li How. 248 (1851), and its progeny. See 383 U. S., at 15-17. The analysis is objective:
“Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against this background, the obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined. Such secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented.” Id., at 17-18..
While the sequence of these questions might be reordered in any particular case, the factors continue to define the inquiry that controls. If a court, or patent examiner, conducts this analysis and concludes the claimed subject matter was obvious, the claim is invalid under § 103.
Seeking to resolve the question of obviousness with more uniformity and consistency, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has employed an approach referred to by the parties as the “teaching, suggestion, or motivation” test (TSM test), under which a patent claim is only proved obvious if “some motivation or suggestion to combine the prior art teachings” can be found in the prior art, the nature of the problem, or the knowledge of a person having ordinary skill in the art. See, e. g., Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l, Inc., 174 F. 3d 1308, 1323-1324 (CA Fed. 1999). KSR challenges that test, or at least its application in this case. See 119 Fed. Appx. 282, 286-290 (CA Fed. 2005). Because the Court of Appeals addressed the question of obviousness in a manner contrary to § 103 and our precedents, we granted certiorari, 548 U. S. 902 (2006). We now reverse.
I
A
In car engines without computer-controlled throttles, the accelerator pedal interacts with the throttle via cable or other mechanical link. The pedal arm acts as a lever rotating around a pivot point. In a cable-actuated throttle control the rotation caused by pushing down the pedal pulls a cable, which in turn pulls open valves in the carburetor or fuel injection unit. The wider the valves open, the more fuel and air are released, causing combustion to increase and the car to accelerate. When the driver takes his foot off the pedal, the opposite occurs as the cable is released and the valves slide closed.
In the 1990’s it became more common to install computers in cars to control engine operation. Computer-controlled throttles open and close valves in response to electronic signals, not through force transferred from the pedal by a mechanical link. Constant, delicate adjustments of air and fuel mixture are possible. The computer’s rapid processing of factors beyond the pedal’s position improves fiiel efficiency and engine performance.
For a computer-controlled throttle to respond to a driver’s operation of the car, the computer must know what is happening with the pedal. A cable or mechanical link does not suffice for this purpose; at some point, an electronic sensor is necessary to translate the mechanical operation into digital data the computer can understand.
Before discussing sensors further we turn to the mechanical design of the pedal itself. In the traditional design a pedal can be pushed down or released but cannot have its position in the footwell adjusted by sliding the pedal forward or back. As a result, a driver who wishes to be closer or farther from the pedal must either reposition himself in the driver’s seat or move the seat in some way. In cars with deep footwells these are imperfect solutions for drivers of smaller stature. To solve the problem, inventors, beginning in the 1970’s, designed pedals that could be adjusted to change their location in the footwell. Important for this case are two adjustable pedals disclosed in U. S. Patent Nos. 5,010,782 (filed July 28, 1989) (Asano) and 5,460,061 (filed Sept. 17,1993) (Redding). The Asano patent reveals a support structure that houses the pedal so that even when the pedal location is adjusted relative to the driver, one of the pedal’s pivot points stays fixed. The pedal is also designed so that the force necessary to push the pedal down is the same regardless of adjustments to its location. The Redding patent reveals a different, sliding mechanism where both the pedal and the pivot point are adjusted.
We return to sensors. Well before Engelgau applied for his challenged patent, some inventors had obtained patents involving electronic pedal sensors for computer-controlled throttles. These inventions, such as the device disclosed in U. S. Patent No. 5,241,936 (filed Sept. 9, 1991) (’936), taught that it was preferable to detect the pedal’s position in the pedal assembly, not in the engine. The ’936 patent disclosed a pedal with an electronic sensor on a pivot point in the pedal assembly. U. S. Patent No. 5,063,811 (filed July 9, 1990) (Smith) taught that to prevent the wires connecting the sensor to the computer from chafing and wearing out, and to avoid grime and damage from the driver’s foot, the sensor should be put on a fixed part of the pedal assembly rather than in or on the pedal’s footpad.
In addition to patents for pedals with integrated sensors inventors obtained patents for self-contained modular sensors. A modular sensor is designed independently of a given pedal so that it can be taken off the shelf and attached to mechanical pedals of various sorts, enabling the pedals to be used in automobiles with computer-controlled throttles. One such sensor was disclosed in U. S. Patent No. 5,385,068 (filed Dec. 18, 1992) (’068). In 1994, Chevrolet manufactured a line of trucks using modular sensors “attached to the pedal assembly support bracket, adjacent to the pedal and engaged with the pivot shaft about which the pedal rotates in operation.” 298 F. Supp. 2d 581, 589 (ED Mich. 2003).
The prior art contained patents involving the placement of sensors on adjustable pedals as well. For example, U. S. Patent No. 5,819,593 (filed Aug. 17, 1995) (Rixon) discloses an adjustable pedal assembly with an electronic sensor for detecting the pedal’s position. In the Rixon pedal the sensor is located in the pedal footpad. The Rixon pedal was known to suffer from wire chafing when the pedal was depressed and released.
This short account of pedal and sensor technology leads to the instant case.
B
KSR, a Canadian company, manufactures and supplies auto parts, including pedal systems. Ford Motor Company hired KSR in 1998 to supply an adjustable pedal system for various lines of automobiles with cable-actuated throttle controls. KSR developed an adjustable mechanical pedal for Ford and obtained U. S. Patent No. 6,151,986 (filed July 16, 1999) (’986) for the design. In 2000, KSR was chosen by General Motors Corporation (GMC or GM) to supply adjustable pedal systems for Chevrolet and GMC light trucks that used engines with computer-controlled throttles. To make the ’986 pedal compatible with the trucks, KSR merely took that design and added a modular sensor.
Teleflex is a rival to KSR in the design and manufacture of adjustable pedals. As noted, it is the exclusive licensee of the Engelgau patent. Engelgau filed the patent application on August 22, 2000, as a continuation of a previous application for U. S. Patent No. 6,109,241, which was filed on January 26,1999. He has sworn he invented the patent’s subject matter on February 14, 1998. The Engelgau patent discloses an adjustable electronic pedal described in the specification as a “simplified vehicle control pedal assembly that is less expensive, and which uses fewer parts and is easier to package within the vehicle.” Engelgau, col. 2,11. 2-5, Supp. App. 6. Claim 4 of the patent, at issue here, describes:
“A vehicle control pedal apparatus comprising:
“a support adapted to be mounted to a vehicle structure; “an adjustable pedal assembly having a pedal arm moveable in for[e] and aft directions with respect to said support;
“a pivot for pivotally supporting said adjustable pedal assembly with respect to said support and defining a pivot axis; and
“an electronic control attached to said support for controlling a vehicle system;
“said apparatus characterized by said electronic control being responsive to said pivot for providing a signal that corresponds to pedal arm position as said pedal arm pivots about said pivot axis between rest and applied positions wherein the position of said pivot remains constant while said pedal arm moves in fore and aft directions with respect to said pivot.” Id., col. 6, 11. 17-36, Supp. App. 8 (diagram numbers omitted).
We agree with the District Court that the claim discloses “a position-adjustable pedal assembly with an electronic pedal position sensor attached to the support member of the pedal assembly. Attaching the sensor to the support member allows the sensor to remain in a fixed position while the driver adjusts the pedal.” 298 F. Supp. 2d, at 586-587.
Before issuing the Engelgau patent the U. S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) rejected one of the patent claims that was similar to, but broader than, the present claim 4. The claim did not include the requirement that the sensor be placed on a fixed pivot point. The PTO concluded the claim was an obvious combination of the prior art disclosed in Redding and Smith, explaining:
“‘Since the prior ar[t] references are from the field of endeavor, the purpose disclosed... would have been recognized in the pertinent art of Redding. Therefore it would have been obvious... to provide the device of Redding with the... means attached to a support member as taught by Smith.’ ” Id., at 595.
In other words Redding provided an example of an adjustable pedal, and Smith explained how to mount a sensor on a pedal’s support structure, and the rejected patent claim merely put these two teachings together.
Although the broader claim was rejected, claim 4 was later allowed because it included the limitation of a fixed pivot point, which distinguished the design from Redding’s. Ibid. Engelgau had not included Asano among the prior art references, and Asano was not mentioned in the patent’s prosecution. Thus, the PTO did not have before it an adjustable pedal with a fixed pivot point. The patent issued on May 29, 2001, and was assigned to Teleflex.
Upon learning of KSR’s design for GM, Teleflex sent a warning letter informing KSR that its proposal would violate the Engelgau patent. “ ‘Teleflex believes that any supplier of a product that combines an adjustable pedal with an electronic throttle control necessarily employs technology covered by one or more’” of Teleflex’s patents. Id., at 585. KSR refused to enter a royalty arrangement with Teleflex; so Teleflex sued for infringement, asserting KSR’s pedal infringed the Engelgau patent and two other patents. Ibid. Teleflex later abandoned its claims regarding the other patents and dedicated the patents to the public. The remaining contention was that KSR’s pedal system for GM infringed claim 4 of the Engelgau patent. Teleflex has not argued that the other three claims of the patent are infringed by KSR’s pedal, nor has Teleflex argued that the mechanical adjustable pedal designed by KSR for Ford infringed any of its patents.
C
The District Court granted summary judgment in KSR’s favor. After reviewing the pertinent history of pedal design, the scope of the Engelgau patent, and the relevant prior art, the court considered the validity of the contested claim. By direction of 35 U. S. C. § 282, an issued patent is presumed valid. The District Court applied Graham’s framework to determine whether under summary-judgment standards KSR had overcome the presumption and demonstrated that claim 4 was obvious in light of the prior art in existence when the claimed subject matter was invented. See § 103(a).
The District Court determined, in light of the expert testimony and the parties’ stipulations, that the level of ordinary skill in pedal design was “ ‘an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering (or an equivalent amount of industry experience) [and] familiarity with pedal control systems for vehicles.’” 298 F. Supp. 2d, at 590. The court then set forth the relevant prior art, including the patents and pedal designs described above.
Following Graham’s direction, the court compared the teachings of the prior art to the claims of Engelgau. It found “little difference.” 298 F. Supp. 2d, at 590. Asano taught everything contained in claim 4 except the use of a sensor to detect the pedal’s position and transmit it to the computer controlling the throttle. That additional aspect was revealed in sources such as the ’068 patent and the sensors used by Chevrolet.
Under the controlling cases from the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, however, the District Court was not permitted to stop there. The court was required also to apply the TSM test. The District Court held KSR had satisfied the test. It reasoned (1) the state of the industry would lead inevitably to combinations of electronic sensors and adjustable pedals, (2) Rixon provided the basis for these developments, and (3) Smith taught a solution to the wire-chafing problems in Rixon, namely, locating the sensor on the fixed structure of the pedal. This could lead to the combination of Asano, or a pedal like it, with a pedal position sensor.
The conclusion that the Engelgau design was obvious was supported, in the District Court’s view, by the PTO’s rejection of the broader version of claim 4. Had Engelgau included Asano in his patent application, it reasoned, the PTO would have found claim 4 to be an obvious combination of Asano and Smith, as it had found the broader version an obvious combination of Redding and Smith. As a final matter, the District Court held that the secondary factor of Teleflex’s commercial success with pedals based on Engelgau’s design did not alter its conclusion. The District Court granted summary judgment for KSR.
With principal reliance on the TSM test, the Court of Appeals reversed. It ruled the District Court had not been strict enough in applying the test, having failed to make “‘finding[s] as to the specific understanding or principle within the knowledge of a skilled artisan that would have motivated one with no knowledge of [the] invention’... to attach an electronic control to the support bracket of the Asano assembly.” 119 Fed. Appx., at 288 (quoting In re Kotzab, 217 F. 3d 1365, 1371 (CA Fed. 2000); brackets in original). The Court of Appeals held that the District Court was incorrect that the nature of the problem to be solved satisfied this requirement because unless the “prior art references address[ed] the precise problem that the patentee was trying to solve,” the problem would not motivate an inventor to look at those references. 119 Fed. Appx., at 288.
Here, the Court of Appeals found, the Asano pedal was designed to solve the “ ‘constant ratio problem’ ” — that is, to ensure that the force required to depress the pedal is the same no matter how the pedal is adjusted — whereas Engelgau sought to provide a simpler, smaller, cheaper adjustable electronic pedal. Ibid. As for Rixon, the court explained, that pedal suffered from the problem of wire chafing but was not designed to solve it. In the court’s view Rixon did not teach anything helpful to Engelgau’s purpose. Smith, in turn, did not relate to adjustable pedals and did not “necessarily go to the issue of motivation to attach the electronic control on the support bracket of the pedal assembly.” Ibid. When the patents were interpreted in this way, the Court of Appeals held, they would not have led a person of ordinary skill to put a sensor on the sort of pedal described in Asano.
That it might have been obvious to try the combination of Asano and a sensor was likewise irrelevant, in the court’s view, because “ ‘ “[o]bvious to try” has long been held not to constitute obviousness.’” Id., at 289 (quoting In re Deuel, 51 F. 3d 1552,1559 (CA Fed. 1995)).
The Court of Appeals also faulted the District Court’s consideration of the PTO’s rejection of the broader version of claim 4. The District Court’s role, the Court of Appeals explained, was not to speculate regarding what the PTO might have done had the Engelgau patent mentioned Asano. Rather, the court held, the District Court was obliged first to presume that the issued patent was valid and then to render its own independent judgment of obviousness based on a review of the prior art. The fact that the PTO had rejected the broader version of claim 4, the Court of Appeals said, had no place in that analysis.
The Court of Appeals further held that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment. Teleflex had proffered statements from one expert that claim 4 “‘was a simple, elegant, and novel combination of features,’ ” 119 Fed. Appx., at 290, compared to Rixon, and from another expert that claim 4 was nonobvious because, unlike in Rixon, the sensor was mounted on the support bracket rather than the pedal itself. This evidence, the court concluded, sufficed to require a trial.
II
A
We begin by rejecting the rigid approach of the Court of Appeals. Throughout this Court’s engagement with the question of obviousness, our cases have set forth an expansive and flexible approach inconsistent with the way the Court of Appeals applied its TSM test here. To be sure, Graham recognized the need for “uniformity and definiteness.” 383 U. S., at 18. Yet the principles laid down in Graham reaffirmed the “functional approach” of Hotchkiss, 11 How. 248. See 383 U. S., at 12. To this end, Graham set forth a broad inquiry and invited courts, where appropriate, to look at any secondary considerations that would prove instructive. Id., at 17.
Neither the enactment of § 103 nor the analysis in Graham disturbed this Court’s earlier instructions concerning the need for caution in granting a patent based on the combination of elements found in the prior art. For over a half century, the Court has held that a “patent for a combination which only unites old elements with no change in their respective functions... obviously withdraws what already is known into the field of its monopoly and diminishes the resources available to skillful men.” Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U. S. 147, 152-153 (1950). This is a principal reason for declining to allow patents for what is obvious. The combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results. Three cases decided after Graham illustrate the application of this doctrine.
In United States v. Adams, 383 U. S. 39, 40 (1966), a companion case to Graham, the Court considered the obviousness of a “wet battery” that varied from prior designs in two ways: It contained water, rather than the acids conventionally employed in storage batteries; and its electrodes were magnesium and cuprous chloride, rather than zinc and silver chloride. The Court recognized that when a patent claims a structure already known in the prior art that is altered by the mere substitution of one element for another known in the field, the combination must do more than yield a predictable result. 383 U. S., at 50-51. It nevertheless rejected the Government’s claim that Adams’ battery was obvious. The Court relied upon the corollary principle that when the prior art teaches away from combining certain known elements, discovery of a successful means of combining them is more likely to be nonobvious. Id., at 51-52. When Adams designed his battery, the prior art warned that risks were involved in using the types of electrodes he employed. The fact that the elements worked together in an unexpected and fruitful manner supported the conclusion that Adams’ design was not obvious to those skilled in the art.
In Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U. S. 57 (1969), the Court elaborated on this approach. The subject matter of the patent before the Court was a device combining two pre-existing elements: a radiant-heat burner and a paving machine. The device, the Court concluded, did not create some new synergy: The radiant-heat burner functioned just as a burner was expected to function; and the paving machine did the same. The two in combination did no more than they would in separate, sequential operation. Id., at 60-62. In those circumstances, “while the combination of old elements performed a useful function, it added nothing to the nature and quality of the radiant-heat burner already patented,” and the patent failed under § 103. Id., at 62 (footnote omitted).
Finally, in Sakraida v. AG Pro, Inc., 425 U. S. 273 (1976), the Court derived from the precedents the conclusion that when a patent “simply arranges old elements with each performing the same function it had been known to perform” and yields no more than one would expect from such an arrangement, the combination is obvious. Id., at 282.
The principles underlying these cases are instructive when the question is whether a patent claiming the combination of elements of prior art is obvious. When a work is available in one field of endeavor, design incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it, either in the same field or a different one. If a person of ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, §103 likely bars its patentability. For the same reason, if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill. Sakraida and Anderson’s-Black Rock are illustrative — a court must ask whether the improvement is more than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions.
Following these principles may be more difficult in other cases than it is here because the claimed subject matter may involve more than the simple substitution of one known element for another or the mere application of a known technique to a piece of prior art ready for the improvement. Often, it will be necessary for a court to look to interrelated teachings of multiple patents; the effects of demands known to the design community or present in the marketplace; and the background knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary skill in the art, all in order to determine whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue. To facilitate review, this analysis should be made explicit. See In re Kahn, 441 F. 3d 977, 988 (CA Fed. 2006) (“[Rejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness”). As our precedents make clear, however, the analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.
B
When it first established the requirement of demonstrating a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine known elements in order to show that the combination is obvious, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals captured a helpful insight. See Application of Bergel, 292 F. 2d 955, 956-957 (1961). As is clear from cases such as Adams, a patent composed of several elements is not proved obvious merely by demonstrating that each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior art. Although common sense directs one to look with care at a patent application that claims as innovation the combination of two known devices according to their established functions, it can be important to identify a reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine the elements in the way the claimed new invention does. This is so because inventions in most, if not all, instances rely upon building blocks long since uncovered, and claimed discoveries almost of necessity will be combinations of what, in some sense, is already known.
Helpful insights, however, need not become rigid and mandatory formulas; and when it is so applied, the TSM test is incompatible with our precedents. The obviousness analysis cannot be confined by a formalistic conception of the words teaching, suggestion, and motivation, or by overemphasis on the importance of published articles and the explicit content of issued patents. The diversity of inventive pursuits and of modern technology counsels against limiting the analysis in this way. In many fields it may be that there is little discussion of obvious techniques or combinations, and it often may be the case that market demand, rather than scientific literature, will drive design trends. Granting patent protection to advances that would occur in the ordinary course without real innovation retards progress and may, in the case of patents combining previously known elements, deprive prior inventions of their value or utility.
In the years since the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals set forth the essence of the TSM test, the Court of Appeals no doubt has applied the test in accord with these principles in many cases. There is no necessary inconsistency between the idea underlying the TSM test and the Graham analysis. But when a court transforms the general principle into a rigid rule that limits the obviousness inquiry, as the Court of Appeals did here, it errs.
C
The flaws in the analysis of the Court of Appeals relate for the most part to the court’s narrow conception of the obviousness inquiry reflected in its application of the TSM test. In determining whether the subject matter of a patent claim is obvious, neither the particular motivation nor the avowed purpose of the patentee controls. What matters is the objective reach of the claim. If the claim extends to what is obvious, it is invalid under § 103. One of the ways in which a patent’s subject matter can be proved obvious is by noting that there existed at the time of invention a known problem for which there was an obvious solution encompassed by the patent’s claims.
The first error of the Court of Appeals in this case was to foreclose this reasoning by holding that courts and patent examiners should look only to the problem the patentee was trying to solve. 119 Fed. Appx., at 288. The Court of Appeals failed to recognize that the problem motivating the patentee may be only one of many addressed by the patent’s subject matter. The question is not whether the combination was obvious to the patentee but whether the combination was obvious to a person with ordinary skill in the art. Under the correct analysis, any need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining the elements in the manner claimed.
The second error of the Court of Appeals lay in its assumption that a person of ordinary skill attempting to solve a problem will be led only to those elements of prior art designed to solve the same problem. Ibid. The primary purpose of Asano was solving the constant ratio problem; so, the court concluded, an inventor considering how to put a sensor on an adjustable pedal would have no reason to consider putting it on the Asano pedal. Ibid. Common sense teaches, however, that familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and in many cases a person of ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle. Regardless of Asano’s primary purpose, the design provided an obvious example of an adjustable pedal with a fixed pivot point; and the prior art was replete with patents indicating that a fixed pivot point was an ideal mount for a sensor. The idea that a designer hoping to make an adjustable electronic pedal would ignore Asano because Asano was designed to solve the constant ratio problem makes little sense. A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.
The same constricted analysis led the Court of Appeals to conclude, in error, that a patent claim cannot be proved obvious merely by showing that the combination of elements was “[ojbvious to try.” Id., at 289 (internal quotation marks omitted). When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to the anticipated success, it is likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense. In that instance the fact that a combination was obvious to try might show that it was obvious under § 103.
The Court of Appeals, finally, drew the wrong conclusion from the risk of courts and patent examiners falling prey to hindsight bias. A factfinder should be aware, of course, of the distortion caused by hindsight bias and must be cautious of arguments reliant upon ex post reasoning. See Graham, 383 U. S., at 36 (warning against a “temptation to read into the prior art the teachings of the invention in issue” and instructing courts to “‘guard against slipping into use of hindsight’ ” (quoting Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. Heckethorn Mfg. & Supply Co., 332 F. 2d 406, 412 (CA6 1964))). Rigid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it.
We note the Court of Appeals has since elaborated a broader conception of the TSM test than was applied in the instant matter. See, e. g., DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C. H. Patrick Co., 464 F. 3d 1356, 1367 (CA Fed. 2006) (“Our suggestion test is in actuality quite flexible and not only permits, but requires, consideration of common knowledge and common sense”); Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 464 F. 3d 1286, 1291 (2006) (“There is flexibility in our obviousness jurisprudence because a motivation may be found implicitly in the prior art. We do not have a rigid test that requires an actual teaching to combine... ”). Those decisions, of course, are not now before us and do not correct the errors of law made by the Court of Appeals in this case. The extent to which they may describe an analysis more consistent with our earlier precedents and our decision here is a matter for the Court of Appeals to consider in its future cases. What we hold is that the fundamental misunderstandings identified above led the Court of Appeals in this case to apply a test inconsistent with our patent law decisions.
Ill
When we apply the standards we have explained to the instant facts, claim 4 must be found obvious. We agree with and adopt the District Court’s recitation of the relevant prior art and its determination of the level of ordinary skill in the field. As did the District Court, we see little difference between the teachings of Asano and Smith and the adjustable electronic pedal disclosed in claim 4 of the Engelgau patent. A person having ordinary skill in the art could have combined Asano with a pedal position sensor in a fashion encompassed by claim 4, and would have seen the benefits of doing so.
A
Teleflex argues in passing that the Asano pedal cannot be combined with a sensor in the manner described by claim 4 because of the design of Asano’s pivot mechanisms. See Brief for Respondents 48-49, and n. 17. Therefore, Teleflex reasons, even if adding a sensor to Asano was obvious, that does not establish that claim 4 encompasses obvious subject matter. This argument was not, however, raised before the District Court. There Teleflex was content to assert only that the problem motivating the invention claimed by the Engelgau patent would not lead to the solution of combining Asano with a sensor. See Teleflex’s Response to KSR’s Motion for Summary Judgment of Invalidity in No. 02-74586 (ED Mich.), pp. 18-20, App. 144a-146a. It is also unclear whether the current argument was raised before the Court of Appeals, where Teleflex advanced the nonspecific, conelusory contention that combining Asano with a sensor would not satisfy the limitations of claim 4. See Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants in No. 04-1152 (CA Fed.), pp. 42-44. Teleflex’s own expert declarations, moreover, do not support the point Teleflex now raises. See Declaration of Clark J. Radcliffe, Ph.D., Supp. App. 204-207; Declaration of Timothy L. Andresen, id., at 208-210. The only statement in either declaration that might bear on the argument is found in the Radcliffe declaration:
“Asano... and the Rixon... are complex mechanical linkage-based devices that are expensive to produce and assemble and difficult to package. It is exactly these difficulties with prior art designs that [Engelgau] resolves. The use of an adjustable pedal with a single pivot reflecting pedal position combined with an electronic control mounted between the support and the adjustment assembly at that pivot was a simple, elegant, and novel combination of features in the Engelgau ’565 patent.” Id., at 206, ¶ 16.
Read in the context of the declaration as a whole this is best interpreted to mean that Asano could not be used to solve “[t]he problem addressed by Engelgau ’565[:] to provide a less expensive, more quickly assembled, and smaller package adjustable pedal assembly with electronic control.” Id., at 205, ¶ 10.
The District Court found that combining Asano with a pivot-mounted pedal position sensor fell within the scope of claim 4. 298 F. Sup
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner Carlos Ayestas, who was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in a Texas court, argues that he was wrongfully denied funding for investigative services needed to prove his entitlement to federal habeas relief. Petitioner moved for funding under 18 U.S.C. § 3599(f), which makes funds available if they are "reasonably necessary," but petitioner's motion was denied. We hold that the lower courts applied the wrong legal standard, and we therefore vacate the judgment below and remand for further proceedings.
I
A
In 1997, petitioner was convicted of capital murder in a Texas court. Evidence at trial showed that he and two accomplices invaded the home of a 67-year-old Houston woman, Santiaga Paneque, bound her with duct tape and electrical cord, beat and strangled her, and then made off with a stash of her belongings.
The jury also heard testimony from Henry Nuila regarding an incident that occurred about two weeks after the murder. Petitioner was drunk at the time, and he revealed to Nuila that he had recently murdered a woman in Houston. Petitioner then brandished an Uzi machinegun and threatened to murder Nuila if he did not help petitioner kill his two accomplices. Fortunately for Nuila, petitioner kept talking until he eventually passed out; Nuila then called the police, who arrested petitioner, still in possession of the gun.
After the jury found petitioner guilty, it was asked to determine whether he should be sentenced to death or to life in prison. In order to impose a death sentence, Texas law required the jury to answer the following three questions. First, would petitioner pose a continuing threat to society? Second, had he personally caused the death of the victim, intended to kill her, or anticipated that she would be killed? Third, in light of all the evidence surrounding the crime and petitioner's background, were there sufficient mitigating circumstances to warrant a sentence of life without parole instead of death? Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 37.071, §§ 2(b), (e) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 2017). Only if the jury gave a unanimous yes to the first two questions, and a unanimous no to the third question, could a death sentence be imposed; otherwise, petitioner would receive a sentence of life without parole. See §§ 2(d)(2), (f)(2), (g).
In asking the jury to impose a death sentence, the prosecution supplemented the trial record with evidence of petitioner's criminal record and his encounter with a man named Candelario Martinez a few days after the murder. Martinez told the jury that he was standing in a hotel parking lot waiting for a friend when petitioner approached and began to make small talk. Before long, petitioner pulled out a machinegun and forced Martinez into a room where two of petitioner's compatriots were holding Martinez's friend at knifepoint. Ordered to lie down on the bathroom floor and await his execution, Martinez begged for his life while petitioner and his cohorts haggled about who would carry out the killing. Finally, petitioner relented, but he threatened to kill Martinez and his family if he contacted the police. Petitioner then stole Martinez's truck.
Petitioner's trial counsel presented very little mitigation evidence. This was due, at least in part, to petitioner's steadfast refusal for many months to allow his lawyers to contact his family members, who were living in Honduras and might have testified about his character and upbringing. Petitioner gave in on the eve of trial, and at that point, according to the state habeas courts, his lawyers "made every effort to contact [his] family." App. 171. They repeatedly contacted petitioner's family members and urged them to attend the trial; they requested that the U.S. Embassy in Honduras facilitate family members' travel to the United States; and they met in person with the Honduran Consulate to seek assistance. But these efforts were to no avail. Petitioner's sister told his legal team that the family would not leave Honduras because the journey would create economic hardship and because their father was ill and had killed one of their neighbors. A defense attorney who spoke to petitioner's mother testified that she seemed unconcerned about her son's situation. In general, the state habeas courts found, petitioner "did nothing to assist counsel's efforts to contact his family and did not want them contacted by the consulate or counsel."Id., at 174.
In the end, the only mitigation evidence introduced by petitioner's trial counsel consisted of three letters from petitioner's English instructor. The letters, each two sentences long, described petitioner as "a serious and attentive student who is progressing well in English." Ibid.
The jury unanimously concluded that petitioner should be sentenced to death, and a capital sentence was imposed. Petitioner secured new counsel to handle his appeal, and his conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in 1998. Ayestas v. State., No. 72,928, App. 115. Petitioner did not seek review at that time from this Court.
B
While petitioner's direct appeal was still pending, a third legal team filed a habeas petition on his behalf in state court. This petition included several claims of trial-level ineffective assistance of counsel, but the petition did not assert that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to investigate petitioner's mental health and abuse of alcohol and drugs. Petitioner's quest for state habeas relief ended unsuccessfully in 2008. Ex parte Ayestas, No. WR-69,674-01 (Tex.Ct.Crim.App., Sept. 10, 2008), 2008 WL 4151814 (per curiam ) (unpublished).
In 2009, represented by a fourth set of attorneys, petitioner filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and this time he did allege that his right to the effective assistance of counsel at trial was violated because his attorneys failed to conduct an adequate search for mitigation evidence. As relevant here, petitioner argued that trial counsel overlooked evidence that he was mentally ill and had a history of drug and alcohol abuse. Ayestas v. Thaler, Civ. Action No. H-09-2999 (S.D.Tex., Jan. 26, 2011), 2011 WL 285138, *4. Petitioner alleged that he had a history of substance abuse, and he noted that he had been diagnosed with schizophrenia while the state habeas proceeding was still pending. See Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus in Ayestas v. Quarterman, No. 4:09-cv-2999 (SD Tex.), Doc. 1, pp. 21-23. Petitioner claimed that trial counsel's deficient performance caused prejudice because there was a reasonable chance that an adequate investigation would have produced mitigation evidence that would have persuaded the jury to spare his life.
Among the obstacles standing between petitioner and federal habeas relief, however, was the fact that he never raised this trial-level ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim in state court. The District Court therefore held that the claim was barred by procedural default, Ayestas v. Thaler, 2011 WL 285138, *4-*7, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, Ayestas v. Thaler, 462 Fed.Appx. 474, 482 (2012) (per curiam ).
Petitioner sought review in this Court, and we vacated the decision below and remanded for reconsideration in light of two of our subsequent decisions, Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 182 L.Ed.2d 272 (2012), and Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413, 133 S.Ct. 1911, 185 L.Ed.2d 1044 (2013). Ayestas v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 1015, 133 S.Ct. 2764, 186 L.Ed.2d 214 (2013). Martinez held that an Arizona prisoner seeking federal habeas relief could overcome the procedural default of a trial-level ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim by showing that the claim is substantial and that state habeas counsel was also ineffective in failing to raise the claim in a state habeas proceeding. 566 U.S., at 14, 132 S.Ct. 1309. Trevino extended that holding to Texas prisoners, 569 U.S., at 416-417, 133 S.Ct. 1911 and on remand, petitioner argued that he fell within Trevino because effective state habeas counsel would have uncovered evidence showing that trial counsels' investigative efforts were deficient.
To assist in developing these claims, petitioner filed an ex parte motion asking the District Court for $20,016 in funding to conduct a search for evidence supporting his petition. He relied on 18 U.S.C. § 3599(f), which provides in relevant part as follows:
"Upon a finding that investigative, expert, or other services are reasonably necessary for the representation of the defendant, whether in connection with issues relating to guilt or the sentence, the court may authorize the defendant's attorneys to obtain such services on behalf of the defendant and, if so authorized, shall order the payment of fees and expenses therefor."
Petitioner averred that the funds would be used to conduct an investigation that would show that his trial counsel and his state habeas counsel were ineffective. Accordingly, he claimed, the investigation would establish both that his trial-level ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim was not barred by procedural default and that he was entitled to resentencing based on the denial of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of trial counsel.
The District Court refused the funding request and ultimately denied petitioner's habeas petition. Ayestas v. Stephens, Civ. Action No. H-09-2999, (S.D.Tex., Nov. 18, 2014), 2014 WL 6606498, *6-*7. On the merits of petitioner's new ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim, the District Court held that petitioner failed both prongs of the Strickland test. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Noting that most of the evidence bearing on petitioner's mental health had emerged only after he was sentenced, the court concluded that petitioner's trial lawyers were not deficient in failing to find such evidence in time for the sentencing proceeding. 2014 WL 6606498, *5. In addition, the court found that state habeas counsel did not render deficient performance by failing to investigate petitioner's history of substance abuse, and that, in any event, petitioner was not prejudiced at the sentencing phase of the trial or during the state habeas proceedings because the potential mitigation evidence at issue would not have made a difference to the jury in light of "the extremely brutal nature of [the] crime and [petitioner's] history of criminal violence." Ibid.
With respect to funding, the District Court pointed to Fifth Circuit case law holding that a § 3599(f) funding applicant cannot show that investigative services are "'reasonably necessary' " unless the applicant can show that he has a "'substantial need' " for those services. Id., at *6. In addition, the court noted that "[t]he Fifth Circuit upholds the denial of funding" when, among other things, "a petitioner has... failed to supplement his funding request with a viable constitutional claim that is not procedurally barred." Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Given its holding that petitioner's new ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim was precluded by procedural default, this rule also doomed his request for funding. The District Court denied petitioner's habeas petition and refused to grant him a certificate of appealability (COA). Id., at *7. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that a COA was not needed for review of the funding issue, but it rejected that claim for essentially the same reasons as the District Court, citing both the "substantial need" test and the rule that funding may be denied when a funding applicant fails to present "a viable constitutional claim that is not procedurally barred." Ayestas v. Stephens, 817 F.3d 888, 895-896 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). With respect to petitioner's other claims, including his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the Fifth Circuit refused to issue a COA. Id., at 898.
C
We granted certiorari to decide whether the lower courts applied the correct legal standard in denying the funding request. 581 U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 1433, 197 L.Ed.2d 647 (2017).
II
Before we reach that question, however, we must consider a jurisdictional argument advanced by respondent, the Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Respondent contends that the District Court's denial of petitioner's funding request was an administrative, not a judicial, decision and therefore falls outside the scope of the jurisdictional provisions on which petitioner relied in seeking review in the Court of Appeals and in this Court.
A
When the District Court denied petitioner's funding request and his habeas petition, he took an appeal to the Fifth Circuit under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253, which grant the courts of appeals jurisdiction to review final "decisions" and "orders" of a district court. And when the Fifth Circuit affirmed, petitioner sought review in this Court under § 1254, which gives us jurisdiction to review "[c]ases" in the courts of appeals. As respondent correctly notes, these provisions confer jurisdiction to review decisions made by a district court in a judicial capacity. But we have recognized that not all decisions made by a federal court are "judicial" in nature; some decisions are properly understood to be "administrative," and in that case they are "not subject to our review." Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 245, 118 S.Ct. 1969, 141 L.Ed.2d 242 (1998).
The need for federal judges to make many administrative decisions is obvious. The Federal Judiciary, while tiny in comparison to the Executive Branch, is nevertheless a large and complex institution, with an annual budget exceeding $7 billion and more than 32,000 employees. See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, The Judiciary FY 2018 Congressional Budget Summary Revised 9-10 (June 2017). Administering this operation requires many "decisions" in the ordinary sense of the term-decisions about such things as facilities, personnel, equipment, supplies, and rules of procedure. In re Application for Exemption from Electronic Pub. Access Fees by Jennifer Gollan and Shane Shifflett, 728 F.3d 1033, 1037 (C.A.9 2013). It would be absurd to suggest that every "final decision" on any such matter is appealable under § 1291 or reviewable in this Court under § 1254. See Hohn, supra ; 15A C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3903, pp. 134-135 (2d ed. 1992). Such administrative decisions are not the kind of decisions or orders-i.e., decisions or orders made in a judicial capacity-to which the relevant jurisdictional provisions apply.
Respondent argues that the denial of petitioner's funding request was just such an administrative decision, but the District Court's ruling does not remotely resemble the sort of administrative decisions noted above. Petitioner's request was made by motion in his federal habeas proceeding, which is indisputably a judicial proceeding. And as we will explain, resolution of the funding question requires the application of a legal standard-whether the funding is "reasonably necessary" for effective representation-that demands an evaluation of petitioner's prospects of obtaining habeas relief. We have never held that a ruling like that is administrative and thus not subject to appellate review under the standard jurisdictional provisions.
Respondent claims that two factors support the conclusion that the funding decision was administrative, but her argument is unpersuasive.
B
Respondent first argues as follows: Judicial proceedings must be adversarial; 18 U.S.C. § 3599(f) funding adjudications are not adversarial because the statute allows requests to be decided ex parte ; therefore, § 3599(f) funding adjudications are not judicial in nature. This reasoning is flawed.
It is certainly true that cases and controversies in our legal system are adversarial in nature, e.g., Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 217, 131 S.Ct. 2355, 180 L.Ed.2d 269 (2011) ; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-241, 57 S.Ct. 461, 81 L.Ed. 617 (1937), but here, both the habeas proceeding as a whole and the adjudication of the specific issue of funding were adversarial. That the habeas proceeding was adversarial is beyond dispute. And on the funding question, petitioner and respondent plainly have adverse interests and have therefore squared off as adversaries. The motion for funding was formally noted as "opposed" on the District Court's docket. App. 341. That is not surprising: On one side, petitioner is seeking funding that he hopes will prevent his execution. On the other, respondent wants to enforce the judgment of the Texas courts and to do so without undue delay. Petitioner and respondent have vigorously litigated the funding question all the way to this Court.
In arguing that the funding dispute is nonadversarial, respondent attaches too much importance to the fact that the request was made ex parte. As we have noted, the "ex parte nature of a proceeding has not been thought to imply that an act otherwise within a judge's lawful jurisdiction was deprived of its judicial character." Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227, 108 S.Ct. 538, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988).
In our adversary system, ex parte motions are disfavored, but they have their place. See, e.g., Hohn, supra, at 248, 118 S.Ct. 1969 (application for COA) ; Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 255, 99 S.Ct. 1682, 60 L.Ed.2d 177 (1979) (application for a search warrant); 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a) (application to conduct electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence); 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (applications to intercept "wire, oral, or electronic communications"); 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(1)(A) (application to seize certain goods and counterfeit marks involved in violations of the trademark laws); Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 17(b) (application for witness subpoena); Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 47(c) (generally recognizing ex parte motions and applications); Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 423-424, 434, 76 S.Ct. 497, 100 L.Ed. 511 (1956) (application for an order granting a witness immunity in exchange for self-incriminating testimony); United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 603-604, 109 S.Ct. 2657, 105 L.Ed.2d 512 (1989) (motion to freeze defendant's assets pending trial).
Thus, the mere fact that a § 3599 funding request may sometimes be made ex parte is hardly dispositive. See Hohn, 524 U.S., at 249, 118 S.Ct. 1969 ; Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568, 577, 46 S.Ct. 425, 70 L.Ed. 738 (1926).
C
Respondent's second argument is based on the venerable principle "that Congress cannot vest review of the decisions of Article III courts in" entities other than "superior courts in the Article III hierarchy." Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218-219, 115 S.Ct. 1447, 131 L.Ed.2d 328 (1995) (citing Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 409, 1 L.Ed. 436 (1792) ). Respondent claims that § 3599 funding decisions may be revised by the Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts and that this shows that such decisions must be administrative. This argument, however, rests on a faulty premise. Nothing in § 3599 even hints that review by the Director of the Administrative Office is allowed.
Respondent's argument rests in part on a handful of old lower court cases that appear to have accepted Administrative Office review of Criminal Justice Act of 1964 (CJA) payments that had been authorized by a District Court and approved by the chief judge of the relevant Circuit. See United States v. Aadal, 282 F.Supp. 664, 665 (S.D.N.Y.1968) ; United States v. Gast, 297 F.Supp. 620, 621-622 (D.Del.1969) ; see also United States v. Hunter, 385 F.Supp. 358, 362 (D.D.C.1974). The basis for these decisions was a provision of the CJA, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(h) (1964 ed.), stating that CJA payments "shall be made under the supervision of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts."
It is not clear whether these decisions correctly interpreted the CJA, but in any event, no similar language appears in § 3599. And respondent has not identified a single instance in which the Director of the Administrative Office or any other nonjudicial officer has attempted to review or alter a § 3599 decision.
Moreover, attorneys' requests for CJA funds are markedly different from the funding application at issue here. Attorneys appointed under the CJA typically submit those requests after the conclusion of the case, and the prosecution has no stake in the resolution of the matter. The judgment in the criminal case cannot be affected by a decision on compensation for services that have been completed, and any funds awarded come out of the budget of the Judiciary, not the Executive. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(i) (2012 ed.). Thus, the adversaries in the criminal case are not pitted against each other. In this case, on the other hand, as we have explained, petitioner and respondent have strong adverse interests. For these reasons, we reject respondent's argument that the adjudication of the funding issue is nonadversarial and administrative.
Respondent, however, claims that the funding decision is administrative for an additional reason. "A § 3599(f) funding determination is properly deemed administrative," she contends, "because it... may be revised outside the traditional Article III judicial hierarchy." Brief for Respondent 23. The basis for this argument is a provision of § 3599 stating that funding in excess of the generally applicable statutory cap of $7,500 must be approved by the chief judge of the circuit or another designated circuit judge. § 3599(g)(2). If a funding decision is judicial and not administrative, respondent suggests, it could not be reviewed by a single circuit judge as opposed to a panel of three.
This argument confuses what is familiar with what is constitutionally required. Nothing in the Constitution ties Congress to the typical structure of appellate review established by statute. If Congress wishes to make certain rulings reviewable by a single circuit judge, rather than a panel of three, the Constitution does not stand in the way.
III
Satisfied that we have jurisdiction, we turn to the question whether the Court of Appeals applied the correct legal standard when it affirmed the denial of petitioner's funding request.
Section 3599(a) authorizes federal courts to provide funding to a party who is facing the prospect of a death sentence and is "financially unable to obtain adequate representation or investigative, expert, or other reasonably necessary services." The statute applies to defendants in federal cases, § 3599(a)(1), as well as to state and federal prisoners seeking collateral relief in federal court, § 3599(a)(2).
Here we are concerned not with legal representation but with services provided by experts, investigators, and the like. Such services must be "reasonably necessary for the representation of the [applicant]" in order to be eligible for funding. § 3599(f). If the statutory standard is met, a court "may authorize the [applicant's] attorneys to obtain such services on [his] behalf." Ibid.
The Fifth Circuit has held that individuals seeking funding for such services must show that they have a "substantial need" for the services. 817 F.3d, at 896 ; Allen v. Stephens, 805 F.3d 617, 626 (2015) ; Ward v. Stephens, 777 F.3d 250, 266, cert. denied, 577 U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 86, 193 L.Ed.2d 76 (2015). Petitioner contends that this interpretation is more demanding than the standard-"reasonably necessary"-set out in the statute. And although the difference between the two formulations may not be great, petitioner has a point.
In the strictest sense of the term, something is "necessary" only if it is essential. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1510 (1993) (something is necessary if it "must be by reason of the nature of things," if it "cannot be otherwise by reason of inherent qualities"); 10 Oxford English Dictionary 275-276 (2d ed. 1989) (OED) (defining the adjective "necessary" to mean "essential"). But in ordinary speech, the term is often used more loosely to refer to something that is merely important or strongly desired. ("I need a vacation." "I need to catch up with an old friend.") The term is sometimes used in a similar way in the law. The term "necessary" in the Necessary and Proper Clause does not mean "absolutely necessary," McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 414-415, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819), and a "necessary" business expense under the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 162(a), may be an expense that is merely helpful and appropriate, Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689, 86 S.Ct. 1118, 16 L.Ed.2d 185 (1966). As Black's Law Dictionary puts it, the term "may import absolute physical necessity or inevitability, or it may import that which is only convenient, useful, appropriate, suitable, proper, or conducive to the end sought." Black's Law Dictionary 928 (5th ed. 1979) (Black's).
Section 3599 appears to use the term "necessary" to mean something less than essential. The provision applies to services that are "reasonably necessary," but it makes little sense to refer to something as being "reasonably essential." What the statutory phrase calls for, we conclude, is a determination by the district court, in the exercise of its discretion, as to whether a reasonable attorney would regard the services as sufficiently important, guided by the considerations we set out more fully below.
The Fifth Circuit's test-"substantial need"-is arguably more demanding. We may assume that the term "need" is comparable to "necessary"-that is, that something is "needed" if it is "necessary." But the term "substantial" suggests a heavier burden than the statutory term "reasonably." Compare 13 OED 291 (defining "reasonably" to mean, among other things, "[s]ufficiently, suitably, fairly"; "[f]airly or pretty well") with 17 id., at 66-67 (defining "substantial," with respect to "reasons, causes, evidence," to mean "firmly or solidly established"); see also Black's 1456 (10th ed. 2014) (defining "reasonable" to mean "[f]air, proper, or moderate under the circumstances... See plausible"); id., at 1656 (defining "substantial" to mean, among other things, "[i]mportant, essential, and material").
The difference between "reasonably necessary" and "substantially need[ed]" may be small, but the Fifth Circuit exacerbated the problem by invoking precedent to the effect that a habeas petitioner seeking funding must present "a viable constitutional claim that is not procedurally barred." 817 F.3d, at 895 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also, e.g., Riley v. Dretke, 362 F.3d 302, 307 (C.A.5 2004) ("A petitioner cannot show a substantial need when his claim is procedurally barred from review"); Allen, supra, at 638-639 (describing " 'our rule that a prisoner cannot show a substantial need for funds when his claim is procedurally barred from review' " (quoting Crutsinger v. Stephens, 576 Fed.Appx. 422, 431 (C.A.5 2014) (per curiam ))); Ward, supra, at 266 ("The denial of funding will be upheld... when the constitutional claim is procedurally barred").
The Fifth Circuit adopted this rule before our decision in Trevino, but after Trevino, the rule is too restrictive. Trevino permits a Texas prisoner to overcome the failure to raise a substantial ineffective-assistance claim in state court by showing that state habeas counsel was ineffective, 569 U.S., at 429, 133 S.Ct. 1911 and it is possible that investigation might enable a petitioner to carry that burden. In those cases in which funding stands a credible chance of enabling a habeas petitioner to overcome the obstacle of procedural default, it may be error for a district court to refuse funding.
Congress has made it clear, however, that district courts have broad discretion in assessing requests for funding. Section 3599's predecessor declared that district courts "shall authorize" funding for services deemed "reasonably necessary." 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(9) (1988 ed.). Applying this provision, courts of appeals reviewed district court funding decisions for abuse of discretion. E.g., Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 837 (C.A.9 1995) ; In re Lindsey, 875 F.2d 1502, 1507, n. 4 (C.A.11 1989) ; United States v. Alden, 767 F.2d 314, 319 (C.A.7 1984). Then, as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 1226, Congress changed the verb from "shall" to "may," and thus made it perfectly clear that determining whether funding is "reasonably necessary" is a decision as to which district courts enjoy broad discretion. See Kingdomware Technologies, Inc. v. United States, 579 U.S. ----, ----, 136 S.Ct. 1969, 1977, 195 L.Ed.2d 334 (2016).
A natural consideration informing the exercise of that discretion is the likelihood that the contemplated services will help the applicant win relief. After all, the proposed services must be "reasonably necessary" for the applicant's representation, and it would not be reasonable-in fact, it would be quite unreasonable-to think that services are necessary to the applicant's representation if, realistically speaking, they stand little hope of helping him win relief. Proper application of the "reasonably necessary" standard thus requires courts to consider the potential merit of the claims that the applicant wants to pursue, the likelihood that the services will generate useful and admissible evidence, and the prospect that the applicant will be able to clear any procedural hurdles standing in the way.
To be clear, a funding applicant must not be expected to prove that he will be able to win relief if given the services he seeks. But the "reasonably necessary" test requires an assessment of the likely utility of the services requested, and § 3599(f) cannot be read to guarantee that an applicant will have enough money to turn over every stone.
Petitioner does not deny this. He agrees that an applicant must "articulat[e] specific reasons why the services are warranted"-which includes demonstrating that the underlying claim is at least " 'plausible' "-and he acknowledges that there may even be cases in which it would be within a court's discretion to "deny funds after a finding of'reasonable necessity.' " Brief for Petitioner 43.
These interpretive principles are consistent with the way in which § 3599's predecessors were read by the lower courts. See, e.g., Alden, supra, at 318-319 (explaining that it was "appropriate for the district court to satisfy itself that [the] defendant may have a plausible defense before granting the defendant's... motion for psychiatric assistance to aid in that defense," and that it is not proper to use the funding statute to subsidize a " 'fishing expedition' "); United States v. Hamlet, 480 F.2d 556, 557 (C.A.5 1973) (per curiam ) (upholding District Court's refusal to fund psychiatric services based on the District Court's conclusion that "the request for psychiatric services was... lacking in merit" because there was "no serious possibility that appellant was legally insane at any time pertinent to the crimes committed"). This abundance of precedent shows courts have plenty of experience making the determinations that § 3599(f) contemplates.
IV
Perhaps anticipating that we might not accept the Fifth Circuit's reading of § 3599(f), respondent devotes a substantial portion of her brief to an alternative ground for affirmance that was neither presented nor passed on below.
Respondent contends that whatever "reasonably necessary" means, funding is never "reasonably necessary" in a case like this one, where a habeas petitioner seeks to present a procedurally defaulted ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim that depends on facts outside the state-court record. Citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), respondent contends that the fruits of any such investigation would be inadmissible in a federal habeas court.
We decline to decide in the first instance whether respondent's reading of § 2254(e)(2) is correct. Petitioner agrees that the argument remains open for the Fifth Circuit to consider on remand. Tr. of Oral Arg. 6.
* * *
We conclude that the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of § 3599(f) is not a permissible reading of the statute. We therefore vacate the judgment below and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
The Court correctly concludes that the Fifth Circuit applied the wrong legal standard in evaluating a request for funding for investigative services under 18 U.S.C. § 3599(f). That should come as no surprise, as the Fifth Circuit required capital habeas petitioners to show a "'substantial need' " for services, when the statute requires only a showing that the services are "'reasonably necessary.' " Ante, at 1093. "Substantial," of course, imposes a higher burden than "reasonable." Ante, at 1093. The Fifth Circuit "exacerbated the problem" by requiring a showing of "a viable constitutional claim that is not procedurally barred," which ignores "that investigation might enable a petitioner... to overcome the obstacle of procedural default." Ante, at 1094 (internal quotation marks omitted). I therefore join the opinion of the Court in full holding that to satisfy § 3599(f), a
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | B | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 28.04 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code prohibits the posting of signs on public property. The question presented is whether that prohibition abridges appellees’ freedom of speech within the meaning of the First Amendment.
In March 1979, Roland Vincent was a candidate for election to the Los Angeles City Council. A group of his supporters known as Taxpayers for Vincent (Taxpayers) entered into a contract with a political sign service company known as Candidates’ Outdoor Graphics Service (COGS) to fabricate and post signs with Vincent’s name on them. COGS produced 15- by 44-inch cardboard signs and attached them to utility poles at various locations by draping them over crosswires which support the poles and stapling the cardboard together at the bottom. The signs’ message was: “Roland Vincent— City Council.”
Acting under the authority of §28.04 of the Municipal Code, employees of the city’s Bureau of Street Maintenance routinely removed all posters attached to utility poles and similar objects covered by the ordinance, including the COGS signs. The weekly sign removal report covering the period March 1-March 7, 1979, indicated that among the 1,207 signs removed from public property during that week, 48 were identified as “Roland Vincent” signs. Most of the other signs identified in that report were apparently commercial in character.
On March 12, 1979, Taxpayers and COGS filed this action in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, naming the city, the Director of the Bureau of Street Maintenance, and members of the City Council as defendants. They sought an injunction against enforcement of the ordinance as well as compensatory and punitive damages. After engaging in discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of liability. The District Court entered findings of fact, concluded that the ordinance was constitutional, and granted the City’s motion.
The District Court’s findings do not purport to resolve any disputed issue of fact; instead, they summarize material in the record that appears to be uncontroverted. The findings recite that the principal responsibility for locating and removing signs and handbills posted in violation of §28.04 is assigned to the Street Use Inspection Division of the city’s Bureau of Street Maintenance. The court found that both political and nonpolitical signs are illegally posted and that they are removed “without regard to their content.”
After explaining the purposes for which the City’s zoning code had been enacted, and noting that the prohibition in §28.04 furthered those purposes, the District Court found that the large number of illegally posted signs “constitute a clutter and visual blight.” With specific reference to the posting of the COGS signs on utility pole crosswires, the District Court found that such posting “would add somewhat to the blight and inevitably would encourage greatly increased posting in other unauthorized and unsightly places....”
In addition, the District Court found that placing signs on utility poles creates a potential safety hazard, and that other violations of §28.04 “block views and otherwise cause traffic hazards.” Finally, the District Court concluded that the sign prohibition does not prevent taxpayers or COGS “from exercising their free speech rights on the public streets and in other public places; they remain free to picket and parade, to distribute handbills, to carry signs and to post their signs and handbills on their automobiles and on private property with the permission of the owners thereof.”
In its conclusions of law the District Court characterized the esthetic and economic interests in improving the beauty of the City “by eliminating clutter and visual blight” as “legitimate and compelling.” Those interests, together with the interest in protecting the safety of workmen who must scale utility poles and the interest in eliminating traffic hazards, adequately supported the sign prohibition as a reasonable regulation affecting the time, place, and manner of expression.
The Court of Appeals did not question any of the District Court’s findings of fact, but it rejected some of its conclusions of law. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the ordinance was presumptively unconstitutional because significant First Amendment interests were involved. It noted that the City had advanced three separate justifications for the ordinance, but concluded that none of them was sufficient. The Court of Appeals held that the City had failed to make a sufficient showing that its asserted interests in esthetics and preventing visual clutter were substantial because it had not offered to demonstrate that the City was engaged in a comprehensive effort to remove other contributions to an unattractive environment in commercial and industrial areas. The City’s interest in minimizing traffic hazards was rejected because it was readily apparent that no substantial traffic problems would result from permitting the posting of certain kinds of signs on many of the publicly owned objects covered by the ordinance. Finally, while acknowledging that a flat prohibition against signs on certain objects such as fire hydrants and traffic signals would be a permissible method of preventing interference with the intended use of public property, and that regulation of the size, design, and construction of posters, or of the method of removing them, might be reasonable, the Court of Appeals concluded that the City had not justified its total ban.
In its appeal to this Court the City challenges the Court of Appeals’ holding that §28.04 is unconstitutional on its face. Taxpayers and COGS defend that holding and also contend that the ordinance is unconstitutional as applied to their posting of political campaign signs on the crosswires of utility poles. There are two quite different ways in which a statute or ordinance may be considered invalid “on its face” — either because it is unconstitutional in every conceivable application, or because it seeks to prohibit such a broad range of protected conduct that it is unconstitutionally “overbroad.” We shall analyze the “facial” challenges to the ordinance, and then address its specific application to appellees.
I
The seminal cases in which the Court held state legislation unconstitutional “on its face” did not involve any departure from the general rule that a litigant only has standing to vindicate his own constitutional rights. In Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931), and Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 (1938), the statutes were unconstitutional as applied to the defendants’ conduct, but they were also unconstitutional on their face because it was apparent that any attempt to enforce such legislation would create an unacceptable risk of the suppression of ideas. In cases of this character a holding of facial invalidity expresses the conclusion that the statute could never be applied in a valid manner. Such holdings invalidated entire statutes, but did not create any exception from the general rule that constitutional adjudication requires a review of the application of a statute to the conduct of the party before the Court.
Subsequently, however, the Court did recognize an exception to this general rule for laws that are written so broadly that they may inhibit the constitutionally protected speech of third parties. This “overbreadth” doctrine has its source in Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940). In that case the Court concluded that the very existence of some broadly written statutes may have such a deterrent effect on free expression that they should be subject to challenge even by a party whose own conduct may be unprotected. The Court has repeatedly held that such a statute may be challenged on its face even though a more narrowly drawn statute would be valid as applied to the party in the case before it. This exception from the general rule is predicated on “a judicial prediction or assumption that the statute’s very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 612 (1973).
In the development of the overbreadth doctrine the Court has been sensitive to the risk that the doctrine itself might sweep so broadly that the exception to ordinary standing requirements would swallow the general rule. In order to decide whether the overbreadth exception is applicable in a particular case, we have weighed the likelihood that the statute’s very existence will inhibit free expression.
“[T]here comes a point where that effect — at best a prediction — cannot, with confidence, justify invalidating a statute on its face and so prohibiting a State from enforcing the statute against conduct that is admittedly within its power to proscribe. To put the matter another way, particularly where conduct and not merely speech is involved, we believe that the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S., at 615 (citation omitted).
The concept of “substantial overbreadth” is not readily reduced to an exact definition. It is clear, however, that the mere fact that one can conceive of some impermissible applications of a statute is not sufficient to render it susceptible to an overbreadth challenge. On the contrary, the requirement of substantial overbreadth stems from the underlying justification for the overbreadth exception itself— the interest in preventing an invalid statute from inhibiting the speech of third parties who are not before the Court.
“The requirement of substantial overbreadth is directly derived from the purpose and nature of the doctrine. While a sweeping statute, or one incapable of limitation, has the potential to repeatedly chill the exercise of expressive activity by many individuals, the extent of deterrence of protected speech.can be expected to decrease with the declining reach of the regulation.” New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, 772 (1982) (footnote omitted).
In short, there must be a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court for it to be facially challenged on overbreadth grounds. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205, 216 (1975). See also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U. S. 447, 462, n. 20 (1978); Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733, 760-761 (1974).
The Court of Appeals concluded that the ordinance was vulnerable to an overbreadth challenge because it was an “overinclusive” response to traffic concerns and not the “least drastic means” of preventing interference with the normal use of public property. This conclusion rested on an evaluation of the assumed effect of the ordinance on third parties, rather than on any specific consideration of the impact of the ordinance on the parties before the court. This is not, however, an appropriate case to entertain a facial challenge based on overbreadth. For we have found nothing in the record to indicate that the ordinance will have any different impact on any third parties’ interests in free speech than it has on Taxpayers and COGS.
Taxpayers and COGS apparently would agree that the prohibition against posting signs on most of the publicly owned objects mentioned in the ordinance is perfectly reasonable. Thus, they do not dispute the City’s power to proscribe the attachment of any handbill or sign to any sidewalk, crosswalk, curb, lamppost, hydrant, or lifesaving equipment. Their position with respect to utility poles is not entirely clear, but they do contend that it is unconstitutional to prohibit the attachment of their cardboard signs to the horizontal cross-wires supporting utility poles during a political campaign. They have, in short, failed to identify any significant difference between their claim that the ordinance is invalid on overbreadth grounds and their claim that it is unconstitutional when applied to their political signs. Specifically, Taxpayers and COGS have not attempted to demonstrate that the ordinance applies to any conduct more likely to be protected by the First Amendment than their own crosswire signs. Indeed, the record suggests that many of the signs posted in violation of the ordinance are posted in such a way that they may create safety or traffic problems that COGS has tried to avoid. Accordingly, on this record it appears that if the ordinance may be validly applied to COGS, it can be validly applied to most if not all of the signs of parties not before the Court. Appellees have simply failed to demonstrate a realistic danger that the ordinance will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of individuals not before the Court. It would therefore be inappropriate in this case to entertain an overbreadth challenge to the ordinance.
Taxpayers and COGS do argue generally that the City’s interest in eliminating visual blight is not sufficiently weighty to justify an abridgment of speech. If that were the only interest the ordinance advanced, then this argument would be analogous to the facial challenges involved in cases like Stromberg and Lovell. But as previously observed, appel-lees acknowledge that the ordinance serves safety interests in many of its applications, and hence do not argue that the ordinance can never be validly applied. Instead, appellees argue that they have placed their signs in locations where only the esthetic interest is implicated. In addition, they argue that they have developed an expertise in not “placing signs in offensive manners which will alienate its own clientele or their constituencies,” and emphasize the special value of free communication during political campaigns, see Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U. S. 490, 555 (1981) (STEVENS, J., dissenting in part); id., at 550 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In light of these arguments, appellees’ attack on the ordinance is basically a challenge to the ordinance as applied to their activities. We therefore limit our analysis of the constitutionality of the ordinance to the concrete case before us, and now turn to the arguments that it is invalid as applied to the expressive activity of Taxpayers and COGS.
II
The ordinance prohibits appellees from communicating with the public in a certain manner, and presumably diminishes the total quantity of their communication in the City. The application of the ordinance to appellees’ expressive activities surely raises the question whether the ordinance abridges their “freedom of speech” within the meaning of the First Amendment, and appellees certainly have standing to challenge the application of the ordinance to their own expressive activities. “But to say the ordinance presents a First Amendment issue is not necessarily to say that it constitutes a First Amendment violation.” Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U. S., at 561 (Burger, C. J., dissenting). It has been clear since this Court’s earliest decisions concerning the freedom of speech that the state may sometimes curtail speech when necessary to advance a significant and legitimate state interest. Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 52 (1919).
As Stromberg and Lovell demonstrate, there are some purported interests — such as a desire to suppress support for a minority party or an unpopular cause, or to exclude the expression of certain points of view from the marketplace of ideas — that are so plainly illegitimate that they would immediately invalidate the rule. The general principle that has emerged from this line of cases is that the First Amendment forbids the government to regulate speech in ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U. S. 60, 65, 72 (1983); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 447 U. S. 530, 535-536 (1980); Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 462-463 (1980); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U. S. 50, 63-65, 67-68 (1976) (plurality opinion); Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92, 95-96 (1972).
That general rule has no application to this case. For there is not even a hint of bias or censorship in the City’s enactment or enforcement of this ordinance. There is no claim that the ordinance was designed to suppress certain ideas that the City finds distasteful or that it has been applied to appellees because of the views that they express. The text of the ordinance is neutral — indeed it is silent — concerning any speaker’s point of view, and the District Court’s findings indicate that it has been applied to appellees and others in an evenhanded manner.
In United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367 (1968), the Court set forth the appropriate framework for reviewing a viewpoint-neutral regulation of this kind:
“[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.” Id., at 377.
It is well settled that the state may legitimately exercise its police powers to advance esthetic values. Thus, in Berman v. Parker, 348 U. S. 26, 32-33 (1954), in referring to the power of the legislature to remove blighted housing, this Court observed that such housing may be “an ugly sore, a blight on the community which robs it of charm, which makes it a place from which men turn.” Ibid. We concluded: “The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary.” Id., at 33 (citation omitted). See also Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104, 129 (1978); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U. S. 1, 9 (1974); Euclid v. Ambler Co., 272 U. S. 365, 387-388 (1926); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U. S. 91, 108 (1909).
In this case, taxpayers and COGS do not dispute that it is within the constitutional power of the City to attempt to improve its appearance, or that this interest is basically unrelated to the suppression of ideas. Therefore the critical inquiries are whether that interest is sufficiently substantial to justify the effect of the ordinance on appellees’ expression, and whether that effect is no greater than necessary to accomplish the City’s purpose.
III
In Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 (1949), the Court rejected the notion that a city is powerless to protect its citizens from unwanted exposure to certain methods of expression which may legitimately be deemed a public nuisance. In upholding an ordinance that prohibited loud and raucous sound trucks, the Court held that the State had a substantial interest in protecting its citizens from unwelcome noise. In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U. S. 298 (1974), the Court upheld the city’s prohibition of political advertising on its buses, stating that the city was entitled to protect unwilling viewers against intrusive advertising that may interfere with the city’s goal of making its buses “rapid, convenient, pleasant, and inexpensive,” id., at 302-303 (plurality opinion). See also id., at 307 (Douglas, J., concurring in judgment); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U. S., at 209, and n. 5. These eases indicate that the municipalities have a weighty, essentially esthetic interest in proscribing intrusive and unpleasant formats for expression.
Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, supra, dealt with San Diego’s prohibition of certain forms of outdoor billboards. There the Court considered the city’s interest in avoiding visual clutter, and seven Justices explicitly concluded that this interest was sufficient to justify a prohibition of billboards, see id., at 507-508, 510 (opinion of WHITE, J., joined by Stewart, Marshall, and Powell, JJ.); id., at 552 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part); id., at 559-561 (Burger, C. J., dissenting); id., at 570 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice White, writing for the plurality, expressly concluded that the city’s esthetic interests were sufficiently substantial to provide an acceptable justification for a content-neutral prohibition against the use of billboards; San Diego’s interest in its appearance was undoubtedly a substantial governmental goal. Id., at 507-508.
We reaffirm the conclusion of the majority in Metromedia. The problem addressed by this ordinance — the visual assault on the citizens of Los Angeles presented by an accumulation of signs posted on public property — constitutes a significant substantive evil within the City’s power to prohibit. “[T]he city’s interest in attempting to preserve [or improve] the quality of urban life is one that must be accorded high respect.” Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U. S., at 71 (plurality opinion).
IV
We turn to the question whether the scope of the restriction on appellees’ expressive activity is substantially broader than necessary to protect the City’s interest in eliminating visual clutter. The incidental restriction on expression which results from the City’s attempt to accomplish such a purpose is considered justified as a reasonable regulation of the time, place, or manner of expression if it is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. See, e. g., Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U. S. 640, 647-648 (1981); Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U. S. 61, 68-71 (1981); Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S., at 470-471 (1980); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 115-117 (1972); Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S., at 98. The District Court found that the signs prohibited by the ordinance do constitute visual clutter and blight. By banning these signs, the City did no more than eliminate the exact source of the evil it sought to remedy. The plurality wrote in Metromedia: “It is not speculative to recognize that billboards by their very nature, wherever located and however constructed, can be perceived as an ‘esthetic harm.’” 453 U. S., at 510. The same is true of posted signs.
It is true that the esthetic interest in preventing the kind of litter that may result from the distribution of leaflets on the public streets and sidewalks cannot support a prophylactic prohibition against the citizen’s exercise of that method of expressing his views. In Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147 (1939), the Court held that ordinances that absolutely prohibited handbilling on the streets were invalid. The Court explained that cities could adequately protect the esthetic interest in avoiding litter without abridging protected expression merely by penalizing those who actually litter. See id., at 162. Taxpayers contend that their interest in supporting Vincent’s political campaign, which affords them a constitutional right to distribute brochures and leaflets on the public streets of Los Angeles, provides equal support for their asserted right to post temporary signs on objects adjacent to the streets and sidewalks. They argue that the mere fact that their temporary signs “add somewhat” to the city’s visual clutter is entitled to no more weight than the temporary unsightliness of discarded handbills and the additional street-cleaning burden that were insufficient to justify the ordinances reviewed in Schneider.
The rationale of Schneider is inapposite in the context of the instant case. There, individual citizens were actively exercising their right to communicate directly with potential recipients of their message. The conduct continued only while the speakers or distributors remained on the scene. In this case, appellees posted dozens of temporary signs throughout an area where they would remain unattended until removed. As the Court expressly noted in Schneider, the First Amendment does not “deprive a municipality of power to enact regulations against throwing literature broadcast in the streets. Prohibition of such conduct would not abridge the constitutional liberty since such activity bears no necessary relationship to the freedom to speak, write, print or distribute information or opinion.” 308 U. S., at 160-161. In short, there is no constitutional impediment to “the punishment of those who actually throw papers on the streets.” Id., at 162. A distributor of leaflets has no right simply to scatter his pamphlets in the air — or to toss large quantities of paper from the window of a tall building or a low flying airplane. Characterizing such an activity as a separate means of communication does not diminish the State’s power to condemn it as a public nuisance. The right recognized in Schneider is to tender the written material to the passerby who may reject it or accept it, and who thereafter may keep it, dispose of it properly, or incur the risk of punishment if he lets it fall to the ground. One who is rightfully on a street open to the public “carries with him there as elsewhere the constitutional right to express his views in an orderly fashion. This right extends to the communication of ideas by handbills and literature as well as by the spoken word.” Jamison v. Texas, 318 U. S. 413, 416 (1943); see also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 559, 578 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting in part).
With respect to signs posted by appellees, however, it is the tangible medium of expressing the message that has the adverse impact on the appearance of the landscape. In Schneider, an antilittering statute could have addressed the substantive evil without prohibiting expressive activity, whereas application of the prophylactic rule actually employed gratuitously infringed upon the right of an individual to communicate directly with a willing listener. Here, the substantive evil — visual blight — is not merely a possible byproduct of the activity, but is created by the medium of expression itself. In contrast to Schneider, therefore, the application of the ordinance in this case responds precisely to the substantive problem which legitimately concerns the City. The ordinance curtails no more speech than is necessary to accomplish its purpose.
V
The Court of Appeals accepted the argument that a prohibition against the use of unattractive signs cannot be justified on esthetic grounds if it fails to apply to all equally unattractive signs wherever they might be located. A comparable argument was categorically rej ected in Metromedia. In that case it was argued that the city could not simultaneously permit billboards to be used for onsite advertising and also justify the prohibition against offsite advertising on esthetic grounds, since both types of advertising were equally unattractive. The Court held, however, that the city could reasonably conclude that the esthetic interest was outweighed by the countervailing interest in one kind of advertising even though it was not outweighed by the other. So here, the validity of the esthetic interest in the elimination of signs on public property is not compromised by failing to extend the ban to private property. The private citizen’s interest in controlling the use of his own property justifies the disparate treatment. Moreover, by not extending the ban to all locations, a significant opportunity to communicate by means of temporary signs is preserved, and private property owners’ esthetic concerns will keep the posting of signs on their property within reasonable bounds. Even if some visual blight remains, a partial, content-neutral ban may nevertheless enhance the City’s appearance.
Furthermore, there is no finding that in any area where appellees seek to place signs, there are already so many signs posted on adjacent private property that the elimination of appellees’ signs would have an inconsequential effect on the esthetic values with which the City is concerned. There is simply no predicate in the findings of the District Court for the conclusion that the prohibition against the posting of appellees’ signs fails to advance the City’s esthetic interest.
VI
While the First Amendment does not guarantee the right to employ every conceivable method of communication at all times and in all places, Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U. S., at 647, a restriction on expressive activity may be invalid if the remaining modes of communication are inadequate. See, e. g., United States v. Grace, 461 U. S. 171, 177 (1983); Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U. S., at 654-655; Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 447 U. S., at 535; Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U. S. 85, 93 (1977). The Los Angeles ordinance does not affect any individual’s freedom to exercise the right to speak and to distribute literature in the same place where the posting of signs on public property is prohibited. To the extent that the posting of signs on public property has advantages over these forms of expression, see, e. g., Talley v. California, 362 U. S. 60, 64-65 (1960), there is no reason to believe that these same advantages cannot be obtained through other means. To the contrary, the findings of the District Court indicate that there are ample alternative modes of communication in Los Angeles. Notwithstanding appellees’ general assertions in their brief concerning the utility of political posters, nothing in the findings indicates that the posting of political posters on public property is a uniquely valuable or important mode of communication, or that appellees’ ability to communicate effectively is threatened by ever-increasing restrictions on expression.
VII
Appellees suggest that the public property covered by the ordinance either is itself a “public forum” for First Amendment purposes, or at least should be treated in the same respect as the “public forum” in which the property is located. “Traditional public forum property occupies a special position in terms of First Amendment protection,” United States v. Grace, 461 U. S., at 180, and appellees maintain that their sign-posting activities are entitled to this protection.
In Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 515-516 (1939) (opinion of Roberts, J.), it was recognized:
“Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public, and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.”
See also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S., at 115; Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U. S. 147, 152 (1969); Kunz v. New York, 340 U. S. 290, 293 (1951); Schneider v. State, 308 U. S., at 163.
Appellees’ reliance on the public forum doctrine is misplaced. They fail to demonstrate the existence of a traditional right of access respecting such items as utility poles for purposes of their communication comparable to that recognized for public streets and parks, and it is clear that “the First Amendment does not guarantee access to government property simply because it is owned or controlled by the government.” United States Postal Service v. Greenburgh Civic Assns., 453 U. S. 114, 129 (1981). Rather, the “existence of a right of access to public property and the standard by which limitations upon such a right must be evaluated differ depending on the character of the property at issue.” Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 44 (1983).
Lampposts can of course be used as signposts, but the mere fact that government property can be used as a vehicle for communication does not mean that the Constitution requires such uses to be permitted. Cf. United States Postal Service v. Greenburgh Civic Assns., 453 U. S., at 131. Public property which is not by tradition or designation a forum for public communication may be reserved by the State “for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s view.” Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U. S., at 46. Given our analysis of the legitimate interest served by the ordinance, its viewpoint neutrality, and the availability of alternative channels of communication, the ordinance is certainly constitutional as applied to appellees under this standard.
VIII
Finally, Taxpayers and COGS argue that Los Angeles could have written an ordinance that would have had a less severe effect on expressive activity such as theirs, by permitting the posting of any kind of sign at any time on some types of public property, or by making a variety of other more specific exceptions to the ordinance: for signs carrying certain types of messages (such as political campaign signs), for signs posted during specific time periods (perhaps during political campaigns), for particular locations (perhaps for areas already cluttered by an excessive number of signs on adjacent private property), or for signs meeting design specifications (such as size or color). Plausible public policy arguments might well be made in support of any such exception, but it by no means follows that it is therefore constitutionally mandated, cf. Singer v. United States, 380 U. S. 24, 34-35 (1965), nor is it clear that some of the suggested exceptions would even be constitutionally permissible. For example, even though political speech is entitled to the fullest possible measure of constitutional protection, there are a host of other communications that command the same respect. An assertion that “Jesus Saves,” that “Abortion is Murder,” that every woman has the “Right to Choose,” or that “Alcohol Kills,” may have a claim to a constitutional exemption from the ordinance that is just as strong as “Roland Vincent — City Council.” See Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U. S. 209, 231-232 (1977). To create an exception for appellees’ political speech and not these other types of speech might create a risk of engaging in constitutionally forbidden content discrimination. See, e. g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455 (1980); Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972). Moreover, the volume of permissible postings under such a mandated exemption might so limit the ordinance’s effect as to defeat its aim of combating visual blight.
Any constitutionally mandated exception to the City’s total prohibition against temporary signs on public property would necessarily rest on a judicial determination that the City’s traffic control and safety interests had little or no applicability within the excepted category, and that the City’s interests in esthetics are not sufficiently important to justify the prohibition in that category. But the findings of the District Court provide no basis for questioning the substantiality of the esthetic interest at stake, or for believing that a uniquely important form of communication has been abridged for the categories of expression engaged in by Taxpayers and COGS. Therefore, we accept the City’s position that it may decide that the esthetic interest in avoiding “visual clutter” justifies a removal of signs creating or increasing that clutter. The findings of the District Court that COGS signs add to the problems addressed by the ordinance and, if permitted to remain, would encourage others to post additional signs, are sufficient to justify application of the ordinance to these appellees.
As recognized in Metromedia, if the city has a sufficient basis for believing that billboards are traffic hazards and are unattractive, “then obviously the most direct and perhaps the only effective approach to solving the problems they create is to prohibit them.” 453 U. S., at 508. As is true of billboards, the esthetic interests that are
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | C | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
Alleging a course of racially discriminatory practices calculated to deprive Negro citizens of their voting rights in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Part IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1957, 71 Stat. 637, 42 U. S. C. § 1971 (a), the United States, proceeding under 42 U. S. C. § 1971 (c), brought this action against the Board of Registrars of Macon County, Alabama, and the two individual respondents as members thereof, for declaratory and injunctive relief. Thereafter the Government amended its complaint so as to join the State of Alabama as a party defendant.
The District Court dismissed the complaint as to all defendants. It held (1) that the individual respondents had been sued only as Registrars, and that having under Alabama law effectively resigned their offices they were not suable in their official capacities; (2) that the Board of Registrars was not a suable legal entity; and (3) that the Civil Rights Act of 1957 did not authorize this action against the State. 171 F. Supp. 720. The Court of Appeals, sustaining each of these holdings, affirmed. 267 P. 2d 808. Because of the importance of the issues involved we brought the case here. 361 U. S. 893.
Shortly before the case was heard in this Court on May 2, 1960, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1960. The bill was signed by the President on May 6, 1960, and has now become law. Act of May 6, 1960, 74 Stat. 86. Among other things § 601 (b) of that Act amends 42 U. S. C. § 1971 (c) by expressly authorizing actions such as this to be brought against a State. Under familiar principles, the case must be decided on the basis of law now controlling, and the provisions of § 601 (b) are applicable to this litigation. American Foundries v. Tri-City Council, 257 U. S. 184, 201; Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 60; see also Reynolds v. United States, 292 U. S. 443, 449.
We hold that by virtue of the provisions of that section the District Court has jurisdiction to entertain this action against the State. In so holding we do not reach, or intimate any view upon, any of the issues decided below, the merits of the controversy, or any defenses, constitutional or otherwise, that may be asserted by the State.
Accordingly, the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the District Court will be vacated, and the case remanded to the District Court for the Middle District of Alabama with instructions to reinstate the action as to the State of Alabama, and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.
Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment provides: “The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”
42 U. S. C. § 1971 (a) provides: “All citizens of the United States who are otherwise qualified by law to vote at any election by the people in any State, Territory, district, county, city, parish, township, school district, municipality, or other territorial subdivision, shall be entitled and allowed to vote at all such elections, without distinction of race, color, or previous condition of servitude; any constitution, law, custom, usage, or regulation of any State or Territory, or by or under its authority, to the contrary notwithstanding.”
42 U. S. C. § 1971 (c) provides: “Whenever any person has engaged or there are reasonable grounds to believe that any person is about 'to engage in any act or practice which would deprive any other person of any right or privilege secured by subsection (a) . . . the Attorney General may institute for the United States, or in the name of the United States, a civil action or other proper proceeding for preventive relief, including an application for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order. In any proceeding hereunder the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.”
Section 601 (b) provides: “Whenever, in a proceeding instituted under this subsection [42 U. S. C. § 1971 (e) ] any official of a State or subdivision thereof is alleged to have committed any act or practice constituting a deprivation of any right or privilege secured by subsection (a), the act or practice shall also be deemed that of the State and the State may be joined as a party defendant and, if, prior to the institution of such proceeding, such official has resigned or has been relieved of his office and no successor has assumed such office, the proceeding may be instituted against the State.”
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | B | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellant Giaccio was indicted by a Pennsylvania grand jury and charged with two violations of a state statute which makes it a misdemeanor to wantonly point or discharge a firearm at any other person. In a trial before a judge and jury appellant’s defense was that the firearm he had discharged was a starter pistol which only fired blanks. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty on each charge, but acting pursuant to instructions of the court given under authority of a Pennsylvania statute of 1860, assessed against, appellant the court costs of one of the charges (amounting to $230.95). The Act of 1860, set out below, provides among other things that:
“. . . in all cases of acquittals by the petit jury on indictments for [offenses other than felonies], the. jury trying the same shall determine, by their verdict, whether the county, or the prosecutor, or the defendant shall pay the costs . . . and whenever the jury shall determine as aforesaid, that the . . . defendant shall pay the costs, the court in which the said determination shall be made shall forthwith . pass sentence to that effect, and order him to be committed to the jail of the county until the costs are paid, unless he give security to pay the same within ten days.”
Appellant made timely objections to the validity of this statute on several grounds, including an objection that the statute is unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause because it authorizes juries to assess costs against acquitted defendants, with a threat of imprisonment until the costs are paid, without prescribing definite standards to govern the jury’s determination. The trial court held the 1860 Act void for vagueness in violation of due process, set aside the jury’s verdict imposing costs on the appellant, and vacated the “sentence imposed upon Defendant that he pay said costs forthwith or give security to pay the same within ten (10) days and to stand committed until he had complied therewith.” The Superior Court of Pennsylvania, one judge dissenting, reversed the trial court closing its opinion this way:
“We can find no reason that would justify our holding it [the 1860 Act] unconstitutional.
“Order reversed, sentence reinstated.”
The State Supreme Court, again with one judge dissenting, agreed with the Superior Court and affirmed its judg-ment. This left appellant subject to the judgment for costs and the “sentence” to enforce payment. We noted jurisdiction to consider the question raised concerning vagueness and absence of proper standards in the 1860 Act. 381 U. S. 923. We agree with the trial court and the dissenting judges in the appellate courts below that the 1860 Act is invalid under the Due Process Clause because of vagueness and the absence of any standards sufficient to enable defendants to protect themselves against arbitrary and discriminatory impositions of costs.
1. In holding that the 1860 Act was not unconstitutionally vague the State Superior and Supreme Courts rested largely on the declaration that the Act “is not a penal statute” but simply provides machinery for the collection of costs of a “civil character” analogous to imposing costs in civil cases “not as a penalty but rather as compensation to a litigant for expenses. . . .” But admission of an analogy between the collection of civil costs and collection of costs here does not go far towards settling the constitutional question before us. Whatever label be given the 1860 Act, there is no doubt that it provides the State with a procedure for depriving an acquitted defendant of his liberty and his property. Both liberty and property are specifically protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against any state deprivation which does not meet the standards of due process, and this protection is not to be avoided by the simple label a State chooses to fasten upon its conduct or its statute. So here this state Act whether labeled “penal” or not must meet the challenge that it is unconstitutionally vague.
2. It is established that a law fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits or leavés judges and jurors free to decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not in each particular case. See, e. g., Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451; Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360. This 1860 Pennsylvania Act contains no standards at all, nor does it place any conditions of any kind upon the jury’s power to impose costs upon a defendant who has been found by the jury to be not guilty of a crime charged against him. The Act, without imposing a single condition, limitation or contingency on a jury which has acquitted a defendant simply says the jurors “shall determine, by their verdict, whether . . . the defendant, shall pay the costs” whereupon the trial judge is told he “shall forthwith pass sentence to that effect, and order him [defendant] to be committed to the jail of the county” there to remain until he either pays or gives security for the costs. Certainly one of the basic purposes of the Due Process Clause has always been to protect a person against having the Government impose burdens upon him except in accordance with the valid laws of the land. Implicit in this constitutional safeguard is the premise that the law must be one that carries an understandable meaning with legal standards that courts must enforce. This state Act as written does not even begin to meet this constitutional requirement.
3. The State contends that even if the Act would have been void for vagueness as it was originally written, subsequent state court interpretations have provided standards and guides that cure the former constitutional deficiencies. We do not agree. All of the so-called court-created conditions and standards still leave to the jury such broad and unlimited power in imposing costs on acquitted defendants that the jurors must make determinations of the crucial issue upon their own notions of what the law should be instead of what it is. Pennsylvania decisions have from time to time said expressly, or at least implied, that juries having found a defendant not guilty may impose costs upon him if they find that his conduct, though not unlawful, is “reprehensible in some respect,” “improper,” outrageous to “morality and justice,” or that his conduct was “not reprehensible enough for a criminal conviction but sufficiently reprehensible to deserve an equal distribution of costs” or that though acquitted “his innocence may have been doubtful.” In this case the trial judge instructed the jury that it might place the costs of prosecution on the appellant, though found not guilty of the crime charged, if the jury found that “he has been guilty of some misconduct less than the offense which is charged but nevertheless misconduct of some kind as a result of which he should be required to pay some penalty short of conviction [and] ... his misconduct has given rise to the prosecution.”
It may possibly be that the trial court’s charge comes nearer to giving a guide to the jury than those that preceded it, but it still falls short of the kind of legal standard due process requires. At best it only told the jury that if it found appellant guilty of “some misconduct” less than that charged against him, it was authorized by law to saddle him with the State’s costs in its unsuccessful prosecution. It would be difficult if not impossible for a person to prepare a defense against such general abstract charges as “misconduct,” or “reprehensible conduct.” If used in a statute which imposed forfeitures, punishments or judgments for costs, such loose and unlimiting terms would certainly cause the statute to fail to measure up to the requirements of the Due Process Clause. And these terms are no more effective to make a statute valid which standing alone is void for vagueness.
We hold that the 1860 Act is constitutionally invalid both as written and as explained by the Pennsylvania courts. The judgment against appellant is reversed and the case is remanded to the State Supreme Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Act of June 24, 1939, Pub. L. 872, § 716, Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 18, § 4716.
Act of March 31, 1860, Pub. L. 427, § 62, Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 19, § 1222, provides:
“In all prosecutions, cases of felony excepted, if the bill of indictment shall be returned ignoramus, the grand jury returning the same shall decide and certify on such bill whether the county or the prosecutor shall pay the costs of prosecution; and in all cases of acquittals by the petit jury on indictments for the offenses aforesaid, the jury trying the same shall determine, by their verdict, whether the county, or the prosecutor, or the defendant shall pay the costs, or whether the same shall be apportioned between the prosecutor and the defendant, and in what proportions; and the jury, grand or petit, so determining, in case they direct the prosecutor to pay the costs or any portion thereof, shall name him in their return or verdict; and whenever the jury shall determine as aforesaid, that the prosecutor or defendant shall pay the costs, the court in which the said determination shall be made shall forthwith pass sentence to that effect, and order him to be committed to the jail of the county until the costs are paid, unless he give security to pay the same within ten days."
One objection was that the Act violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it discriminates against defendants in misdemeanor cases by imposing greater burdens upon them than upon defendants in felony cases and cases involving summary offenses. We do not reach or decide this question.
30 Pa. D. & C. 2d 463 (Q. S. Chester, 1963).
202 Pa. Super. 294, 310, 196 A. 2d 189, 197.
415 Pa. 139, 202 A. 2d 55.
Tlie foregoing quotations appear in a number of Pennsylvania cases including Commonwealth v. Tilghman, 4 S. & R. 127; Baldwin v. Commonwealth, 26 Pa. 171; Commonwealth v. Daly, 11 Pa. Dist. 527 (Q. S. Clearfield); and in the opinion of the Superior Court in this case, 202 Pa. Super. 294, 196 A. 2d 189.
In so holding we intend to cast no doubt whatever on the constitutionality of the settled practice of many States to leave to juries finding defendants guilty of a crime the power to fix punishment within legally prescribed limits.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | D | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Alabama imposes a hazardous waste disposal fee on hazardous wastes generated outside the State and disposed of at a commercial facility in Alabama. The fee does not apply to such waste having a source in Alabama. The Alabama Supreme Court held that this differential treatment does not violate the Commerce Clause. We reverse.
I
Petitioner, Chemical Waste Management, Inc., a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Oak Brook, Illinois, owns and operates one of the Nation’s oldest commercial hazardous waste land disposal facilities, located in Emelle, Alabama. Opened in 1977 and acquired by petitioner in 1978, the Emelle facility is a hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facility operating pursuant to permits issued by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 90 Stat. 2795, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §6901 et seq., and the Toxic Substances Control Act, 90 Stat. 2003, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 2601 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. II), and by the State of Alabama under Ala. Code § 22 — 30—12(i) (1990). Alabama is 1 of only 16 States that have commercial hazardous waste landfills, and the Emelle facility is the largest of the 21 landfills of this kind located in these 16 States. Brief for National Governors’ Assn, et al. as Amici Curiae 3, citing E. Smith, El Digest 26-27 (Mar. 1992).
The parties do not dispute that the wastes and substances being landfilled at the Emelle facility “include substances that are inherently dangerous to human health and safety and to the environment. Such waste consists of ignitable, corrosive, toxic and reactive wastes which contain poisonous and cancer causing chemicals and which can cause birth defects, genetic damage, blindness, crippling and death.” 584 So. 2d 1367, 1373 (Ala. 1991). Increasing amounts of out-of-state hazardous wastes are shipped to the Emelle facility for permanent storage each year. From 1985 through 1989, the tonnage of hazardous waste received per year has more than doubled, increasing from 341,000 tons in 1985 to 788,000 tons by 1989. Of this, up to 90% of the tonnage permanently buried each year is shipped in from other States.
Against this backdrop Alabama enacted Act No. 90-326 (Act). Ala. Code §§22-30B-1 to 22-30B-18 (1990 and Supp. 1991). Among other provisions, the Act includes a “cap” that generally limits the amount of hazardous wastes or substances that may be disposed of in any 1-year period, and the amount of hazardous waste disposed of during the first year under the Act’s new fees becomes the permanent ceiling in subsequent years. Ala. Code § 22-30B-2.3 (1990). The cap applies to commercial facilities that dispose of over 100,000 tons of hazardous wastes or substances per year, but only the Emelle facility, as the only commercial facility operating within Alabama, meets this description. The Act also imposes a “base fee” of $25.60 per ton on all hazardous wastes and substances disposed of at commercial facilities, to be paid by the operator of the facility. Ala. Code §22-30B-2(a) (Supp. 1991). Finally, the Act imposes the “additional fee” at issue here, which states in full:
“For waste and substances which are generated outside of Alabama and disposed of at a commercial site for the disposal of hazardous waste or hazardous substances in Alabama, an additional fee shall be levied at the rate of $72.00 per ton.” § 22-30B-2(b).
Petitioner filed suit in state court requesting declaratory relief against respondents and seeking to enjoin enforcement of the Act. In addition to state-law claims, petitioner contended that the Act violated the Commerce, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution, and was pre-empted by various federal statutes. The trial court declared the base fee and the cap provisions of the Act to be valid and constitutional; but, finding the only basis for the additional fee to be the origin of the waste, the trial court declared it to be in violation of the Commerce Clause. App. to Pet. for Cert. 83a-88a. Both sides appealed. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the rulings concerning the base fee and cap provisions but reversed the decision regarding the additional fee. The court held that the fee at issue advanced legitimate local purposes that could not be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives and was therefore valid under the Commerce Clause. 584 So. 2d, at 1390.
Chemical Waste Management, Inc., petitioned for writ of certiorari, challenging all aspects of the Act. Because of the importance of the federal question and the likelihood that it had been decided in a way conflicting with applicable decisions of this Court, this Court’s Rule 10.1(c), we granted certiorari limited to petitioner’s Commerce Clause challenge to the additional fee. 502 U. S. 1070 (1992). We now reverse.
II
No State may attempt to isolate itself from a problem common to the several States by raising barriers to the free flow of interstate trade. Today, in Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dept. of Natural Resources, post, p. 358, we have also considered a Commerce Clause challenge to a Michigan law prohibiting private landfill operators from accepting solid waste originating outside the county in which their facilities operate. In striking down that law, we adhered to our decision in Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U. S. 617 (1978), where we found New Jersey’s prohibition of solid waste from outside that State to amount to economic protectionism barred by the Commerce Clause:
“‘[T]he evil of protectionism can reside in legislative means as well as legislative ends. Thus, it does not matter whether the ultimate aim of ch. 363 is to réduce the waste disposal costs of New Jersey residents or to save remaining open lands from pollution, for we assume New Jersey has every right to protect its residents’ pocketbooks as well as their environment. And it may be assumed as well that New Jersey may pursue those ends by slowing the flow of all waste into the State’s remaining landfills, even though interstate commerce may incidentally be affected. But whatever New Jersey’s ultimate purpose, it may not be accompanied by discriminating against articles of commerce coming from outside the State unless there is some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently. Both on its face and in its plain effect, ch. 363 violates this principle of nondiscrimination.
“ ‘The Court has consistently found parochial legislation of this kind to be constitutionally invalid, whether. the ultimate aim of the legislation was to assure a steady supply of milk by erecting barriers to allegedly ruinous outside competition, Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U. S. [511,] 522-524 [(1935)]; or to create jobs by keeping industry within the State, Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U. S. 1, 10 [(1928)]; Johnson v. Haydel, 278 U. S. 16 [(1928)]; Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U. S. [385,] 403-404 [(1948)]; or to preserve the State’s financial resources from depletion by fencing out indigent immigrants, Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160, 173-174 [(1941)].’ ” Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, post, at 360 (quoting Philadelphia v. New Jersey, supra, at 626-627).
To this list may be added cases striking down a tax discriminating against interstate commerce, even where such tax was designed to encourage the use of ethanol and thereby reduce harmful exhaust emissions, New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U. S. 269, 279 (1988), or to support inspection of foreign cement to ensure structural integrity, Hale v. Bimco Trading, Inc., 306 U. S. 375, 379-380 (1939). For in all of these cases, “a presumably legitimate goal was sought to be achieved by the illegitimate means of isolating the State from the national economy.” Philadelphia v. New Jersey, supra, at 627.
The Act’s additional fee facially discriminates against hazardous waste generated in States other than Alabama, and the Act overall has plainly discouraged the full operation of petitioner’s Emelle facility. Such burdensome taxes imposed on interstate commerce alone are generally forbidden: “[A] State may not tax a transaction or incident more heavily when it crosses state lines than when it occurs entirely within the State.” Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U. S. 638, 642 (1984); see also Walling v. Michigan, 116 U. S. 446, 455 (1886); Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U. S. 434, 439 (1880). Once a state tax is found to discriminate against out-of-state commerce, it is typically struck down without further inquiry. See, e. g., Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully, 466 U. S. 388, 406-407 (1984); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U. S. 725, 759-760 (1981); Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U. S. 318, 336-337 (1977).
The State, however, argues that the additional fee imposed on out-of-state hazardous waste serves legitimate local purposes related to its citizens’ health and safety. Because the additional fee discriminates both on its face and in practical effect, the burden falls on the State “to justify it both in terms of the local benefits flowing from the statute and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve the local interests at stake.” Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U. S. 333, 353 (1977); see also Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, post, at 359; New Energy Co., supra, at 278-279. “At a minimum such facial discrimination invokes the strictest scrutiny of any purported legitimate local purpose and of the absence of nondiscriminatory alternatives.” Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U. S. 322, 337 (1979).
The State’s argument here does not significantly differ from the Alabama Supreme Court’s conclusions on the legitimate local purposes of the additional fee imposed, which were:
“The Additional Fee serves these legitimate local purposes that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives: (1) protection of the health and safety of the citizens of Alabama from toxic substances; (2) conservation of the environment and the state’s natural resources; (3) provision for compensatory revenue for the costs and burdens that out-of-state waste generators impose by dumping their hazardous waste in Alabama; (4) reduction of the overall flow of wastes traveling on the state’s highways, which flow creates a great risk to the health and safety of the state’s citizens.” 584 So. 2d, at 1389.
These may all be legitimate local interests, and petitioner has not attacked them. But only rhetoric, and not explanation, emerges as to why Alabama targets only interstate hazardous waste to meet these goals. As found by the trial court, “[although the Legislature imposed an additional fee of $72.00 per ton on waste generated outside Alabama, there is absolutely no evidence before this Court that waste generated outside Alabama is more dangerous than waste generated in Alabama. The Court finds under the facts of this case that the only basis for the additional fee is the origin of the waste.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 83a-84a. In the face of such findings, invalidity under the Commerce Clause necessarily follows, for “whatever [Alabama’s] ultimate purpose, it may not be accomplished by discriminating against articles of commerce coming from outside the State unless there is some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently.” Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U. S., at 626-627; see New Energy Co., 486 U. S., at 279-280. The burden is on the State to show that “the discrimination is demonstrably justified by a valid factor unrelated to economic protectionism,” Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U. S. 437, 454 (1992) (emphasis added), and it has not carried this burden. Cf. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, post, at 361.
Ultimately, the State’s concern focuses on the volume of the waste entering the Emelle facility. Less discriminatory alternatives, however, are available to alleviate this concern, not the least of which are a generally applicable per-ton additional fee on all hazardous waste disposed of within Alabama, cf. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U. S. 609, 619 (1981), or a per-mile tax on all vehicles transporting hazardous waste across Alabama roads, cf. American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U. S. 266, 286 (1987), or an evenhanded cap on the total tonnage landfilled at Emelle, see Philadelphia v. New Jersey, supra, at 626, which would curtail volume from all sources. To the extent Alabama’s concern touches environmental conservation and the health and safety of its citizens, such concern does not vary with the point of origin of the waste, and it remains within the State’s power to monitor and regulate more closely the transportation and disposal of all hazardous waste within its borders. Even with the possible future financial and environmental risks to be borne by Alabama, such risks likewise do not vary with the waste’s State of origin in a way allowing foreign, but not local, waste to be burdened. In sum, we find the additional fee to be “an obvious effort to saddle those outside the State” with most of the burden of slowing the flow of waste into the Emelle facility. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U. S., at 629. “That legislative effort is clearly impermissible under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.” Ibid.
Our decisions regarding quarantine laws do not counsel a different conclusion. The Act’s additional fee may not legitimately be deemed a quarantine law because Alabama permits both the generation and landfilling of hazardous waste within its borders and the importation of still more hazardous waste subject to payment of the additional fee. In any event, while it is true that certain quarantine laws have not been considered forbidden protectionist measures, even though directed against out-of-state commerce, those laws “did not discriminate against interstate commerce as such, but simply prevented traffic in noxious articles, whatever their origin.” Philadelphia v. New Jersey, supra, at 629. As the Court stated in Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U. S., at 443:
“In the exercise of its police powers, a State may exclude from its territory, or prohibit the sale therein of any articles which, in its judgment, fairly exercised, are prejudicial to the health or which would endanger the lives or property of its people. But if the State, under the guise of exerting its police powers, should make such exclusion or prohibition applicable solely to articles, of that kind, that may be produced or manufactured in other States, the courts would find no difficulty in holding such legislation to be in conflict with the Constitution of the United States.”
See also Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137, 151 (1902); Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465, 472 (1878).
The law struck down in Philadelphia v. New Jersey left local waste untouched, although no basis existed by which to distinguish interstate waste. But “[i]f one is inherently harmful, so is the other. Yet New Jersey has banned the former while leaving its landfill sites open to the latter.” 437 U. S., at 629. Here, the additional fee applies only to interstate hazardous waste, but at all points from its entrance into Alabama until it is landfilled at the Emelle facility, every concern related to quarantine applies perforce to local hazardous waste, which pays no additional fee. For this reason, the additional fee does not survive the appropriate scrutiny applicable to discriminations against interstate commerce.
Maine v. Taylor, 477 U. S. 131 (1986), provides no additional justification. Maine there demonstrated that the out-of-state baitfish were subject to parasites foreign to in-state baitfish. This difference posed a threat to the State’s natural resources, and absent a less discriminatory means of protecting the environment — and none was available — the importation of baitfish could properly be banned. Id., at 140. To the contrary, the record establishes that the hazardous waste at issue in this case is the same regardless of its point of origin. As noted in Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, “our conclusion would be different if the imported waste raised health or other concerns not presented by [Alabama] waste.” Post, at 367. Because no unique threat is posed, and because adequate means other than overt discrimination meet Alabama’s concerns, Maine v. Taylor provides the State no respite.
Ill
The decision of the Alabama Supreme Court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion, including consideration of the appropriate relief to petitioner. See McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Fla. Dept. of Business Regu lations, 496 U. S. 18, 31 (1990); Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington State Dept. of Revenue, 483 U. S. 232, 251-253 (1987).
So ordered.
As used in RCRA, 42 U. S. C. § 6903(5), the term “hazardous waste” means:
“a solid waste, or combination of solid wastes, which because of its quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics may—
“(A) cause, or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness; or
“(B) pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed of, or otherwise managed.”
RCRA directs the EPA to establish a comprehensive “cradle to grave” system regulating the generation, transport, storage, treatment, and disposal of hazardous wastes, §§6921-6939b, which includes identification and listing of hazardous wastes, § 6921. At present, there are more than 600 such listed wastes. See 40 CFR pt. 261, subpt. D (1991).
“Hazardous substance(s)” and “hazardous waste(s)” are defined terms in the Act, §§ 22-30B-1(3) and 22-30B-1(4), but these definitions largely parallel the meanings given under federal law.
The Alabama Supreme Court assumed that the disposal of hazardous waste constituted an article of commerce, and the State does not explicitly argue here to the contrary. In Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dept. of Natural Resources, post, at 359, we have reaffirmed the idea that “[s]olid waste, even if it has no value, is an article of commerce.” As stated in Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U. S. 617, 622-623 (1978): “All objects of interstate trade merit Commerce Clause protection; none is excluded by definition at the outset. . . . Just as Congress has power to regulate the interstate movement of these wastes, States are not free from constitutional scrutiny when they restrict that movement.” The definition of “hazardous waste” makes clear that it is simply a grade of solid waste, albeit one of particularly noxious and dangerous propensities, see n. 1, supra, but whether the business arrangements between out-of-state generators of hazardous waste and the Alabama operator of a hazardous waste landfill are viewed as “sales” of hazardous waste or “pirn-chases” of transportation and disposal services, “the commercial transactions unquestionably have an interstate character. The Commerce Clause thus imposes some constraints on [Alabama’s] ability to regulate these transactions.” Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, post, at 359. See National Solid Wastes Management Assn. v. Alabama Dept. of Environmental Mgmt., 910 F. 2d 713, 718-719 (CA11 1990), modified, 924 F. 2d 1001, cert. denied, 501 U. S. 1206 (1991).
The Act went into effect July 15, 1990. The volume of hazardous waste buried at the Emelle facility fell dramatically from 791,000 tons in 1989 to 290,000 tons in 1991.
To some extent the State attempts to avail itself of the more flexible approach outlined in, e. g., Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 476 U. S. 573, 579 (1986), and Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137, 142 (1970), but this lesser scrutiny is only available “where other legislative objectives are credibly advanced and there is no patent discrimination against interstate trade.” Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U. S., at 624 (emphasis added). We find no room here to say that the Act presents “effects upon interstate commerce that are only incidental,” ibid., for the Act’s additionabfee on its face targets only out-of-state hazardous waste. While no “clear line” separates close cases on which scrutiny should apply, “this is not a close case.” Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U. S. 437, 455, n. 12 (1992).
The Alabama Supreme Court found no “economic protectionism” here, and thus purported to distinguish Philadelphia v. New Jersey, based on its conclusions that the legislature was motivated by public health and environmental concerns. 584 So. 2d 1367, 1388-1389 (1991). This narrow focus on the intended consequence of the additional fee does not conform to our precedents, for “[a] finding that state legislation constitutes ‘economic protectionism’ may be made on the basis of either discriminatory purpose, see Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U. S. 333, 352-353 (1977), or discriminatory effect, see Philadelphia v. New Jersey, supra.” Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U. S. 263, 270 (1984). The “virtually per se rule of invalidity,” Philadelphia v. New Jersey, supra, at 624, applies “not only' to laws motivated solely by a desire to protect local industries from out-of-state competition, but also to laws that respond to legitimate local concerns by discriminating arbitrarily against interstate trade.” Maine v. Taylor, 477 U. S. 131, 148, n. 19 (1986).
“The risk created by hazardous waste and other similarly dangerous waste materials is proportional to the volume of such waste materials present, and may be controlled by controlling that volume.” Brief for Respondents 38 (citation omitted; emphasis in original).
The State asserts: “An equal fee, at any level, would necessarily fail to serve the State’s purpose. An equal fee high enough to provide any significant deterrent to the importation of hazardous waste for landfilling in the State would amount to an attempt by the State to avoid its responsibility to deal with its own problems, by tending to cause in-state waste to be exported for disposal. An equal fee not so high as to amount to an attempt to force Alabama’s own problems to be borne by citizens of other states would fail to provide any significant reduction in the enormous volumes of imported hazardous waste being dumped in the State. At the point where an equal fee would become effective to serve the State’s purpose in protecting public health and the environment from uncontrolled volumes of imported waste, that equal fee would also become an avoidance of the State’s responsibility to deal with its own waste problems.” Id., at 46. These assertions are without record support and in any event do not suffice to validate plain discrimination against interstate commerce. See New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U. S. 269, 280 (1988); Hale v. Bimco Trading, Inc., 306 U. S. 375, 380 (1939): “That no Florida cement needs any inspection while all foreign cement requires inspection at a cost of fifteen cents per hundredweight is too violent an assumption to justify the discrimination here disclosed.” The additional fee is certainly not a “ ‘last ditch’ attempt” to meet Alabama’s expressed purposes “after nondis-eriminatory alternatives have proved unfeasible. It is rather a choice of the most discriminatory [tax] even though nondiscriminatory alternatives would seem likely to fulfill the State’s purported legitimate local purpose more effectively.” Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U. S. 322, 338 (1979).
The State presents no argument here, as it did below, that the additional fee makes out-of-state generators pay their “fair share” of the costs of Alabama waste disposal facilities, or that the additional fee is justified as a “compensatory tax.” The trial court rejected these arguments, App. to Pet. for Cert. 88a, n. 6., finding the former foreclosed by American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U. S. 266, 287-289 (1987), and the latter to be factually unsupported by a requisite “substantially equivalent” tax imposed solely on in-state waste, as required by, e. g., Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington State Dept. of Revenue, 483 U. S. 232, 242-244 (1987). Various amici assert that the discrimination patent in the Act’s additional fee is consistent with congressional authorization. We pretermit this issue, for it was not the basis for the decision below and has not been briefed or argued by the parties here.
The State collects and refers to the following decisions, inter alia, as “quarantine cases”: Clason v. Indiana, 306 U. S. 439 (1939); Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U. S. 346 (1933); Oregon-Washington Railroad & Navigation Co. v. Washington, 270 U. S. 87 (1926); Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U. S. 52 (1915); Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U. S. 251 (1908); Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137 (1902); Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. Louisiana Bd. of Health, 186 U. S. 380 (1902); Smith v. St. Louis & Southwestern R. Co., 181 U. S. 248 (1901); Rasmussen v. Idaho, 181 U. S. 198 (1901); Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613 (1898); Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern R. Co., 125 U. S. 466 (1888); Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465 (1878).
“The hostility is to the thing itself, not to merely interstate shipments of the thing; and an undiscriminating hostility is at least nondiscriminatory. But that is not the case here. The State of Illinois is quite willing to allow the storage and even the shipment for storage of spent nuclear fuel in Illinois, provided only that its origin is intrastate.” Illinois v. General Elec. Co., 683 F. 2d 206, 214 (CA7 1982), cert. denied, 461 U. S. 913 (1983); cf Oregon-Washington Co. v. Washington, swpra, at 96: Inspection followed by quarantine of hay from fields infested with weevils is “a real quarantine law, and not a mere inhibition against importation of alfalfa from a large part of the country without regard to the condition which might make its importation dangerous.”
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Me. Justice Stewart
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In evident conflict with the present view of every other court that has considered the issue, the North Carolina Supreme Court has held that Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, requires that no statement of a person under custodial interrogation may be admitted in evidence against him unless, at the time the statement was made, he explicitly waived the right to the presence of a lawyer. We granted certiorari to consider whether this per se rule reflects a proper understanding of the Miranda decision. 439 U. S. 1046.
The respondent was convicted in a North Carolina trial court of kidnaping, armed robbery, and felonious assault. The evidence at his trial showed that he and a man named Elmer Lee had robbed a gas station in Goldsboro, N. C., in December 1976, and had shot the station attendant as he was attempting to escape. The attendant was paralyzed, but survived to testify against the respondent.
The prosecution also produced evidence of incriminating statements made by the respondent shortly after his arrest by Federal Bureau of Investigation agents in the Bronx, N. Y., on the basis of a North Carolina fugitive warrant. Outside the presence of the jury, FBI Agent Martinez testified that at the time of the arrest he fully advised the respondent of the rights delineated in the Miranda case. According to the uncontroverted testimony of Martinez, the agents then took the respondent to the FBI office in nearby New Rochelle, N. Y. There, after the agents determined that the respondent had an 11th grade education and was literate, he was given the Bureau’s “Advice of Rights” form which he read. When asked if he understood his rights, he replied that he did. The respondent refused to sign the waiver at the bottom of the form. He was told that he need neither speak nor sign the form, but that the agents would like him to talk to them. The respondent replied: “I will talk to you but I am not signing any form.” He then made inculpatory statements. Agent Martinez testified that the respondent said nothing when advised of his right to the assistance of a lawyer. At no time did the respondent request counsel or attempt to terminate the agents’ questioning.
At the conclusion of this testimony the respondent moved to suppress the evidence of his incriminating statements on the ground that he had not waived his right to the assistance of counsel at the time the statements were made. The court denied the motion, finding that
“the statement made by the defendant, William Thomas Butler, to Agent David C. Martinez, was made freely and voluntarily to said agent after having been advised of his rights as required by the Miranda ruling, including his right to an attorney being present at the time of the inquiry and that the defendant, Butler, understood his rights; [and] that he effectively waived his rights, including the right to have an attorney present during the questioning by his indication that he was willing to answer questions, having read the rights form together with the Waiver of Rights . . . App. A-22 to A-23.
The respondent’s statements were then admitted into evidence, and the jury ultimately found the respondent guilty of each offense charged.
On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the convictions and ordered a new trial. It found that the statements had been admitted in violation of the requirements of the Miranda decision, noting that the respondent had refused to waive in writing his right to have counsel present and that there had not been a specific oral waiver. As it had in at least two earlier cases, the court read the Miranda opinion as
“provid [ing] in plain language that waiver of the right to counsel during interrogation will not be recognized unless such waiver is 'specifically made’ after the Miranda warnings have been given.” 295 N. C. 250, 255, 244 S. E. 2d 410, 413 (1978).
See State v. Blackmon, 280 N. C. 42, 49-50, 185 S. E. 2d 123, 127-128 (1971); State v. Thacker, 281 N. C. 447, 453-454, 189 S. E. 2d 145, 149-150 (1972).
We conclude that the North Carolina Supreme Court erred in its reading of the Miranda opinion. There, this Court said:
“If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel.” 384 U. S., at 475.
The Court’s opinion went on to say:
“An express statement that the individual is willing to make a statement and does not want an attorney followed closely by a statement could constitute a waiver. But a valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after warnings are given or simply from the fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained.” Ibid.
Thus, the Court held that an express statement can constitute a waiver, and that silence alone after such warnings cannot do so. But the Court did not hold that such an express statement is indispensable to a finding of waiver.
An express written or oral statement of waiver of the right to remain silent or of the right to counsel is usually strong proof of the validity of that waiver, but is not inevitably either necessary or sufficient to establish waiver. The question is not one of form, but rather whether the defendant in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived the rights delineated in the Miranda case. As was unequivocally said in Miranda, mere silence is not enough. That does not mean that the defendant’s silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver, may never support a conclusion that a defendant has waived his rights. The courts must presume that a defendant did not waive his rights; the prosecution’s burden is great; but in at least some cases waiver can be clearly inferred from the actions and words of the person interrogated.
The Court’s opinion in Miranda explained the reasons for the prophylactic rules it created:
“We have concluded that without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely. In order to combat these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored.” Id., at 467.
The per se rule that the North Carolina Supreme Court has found in Miranda does not speak to these concerns. There is no doubt that this respondent was adequately and effectively apprised of his rights. The only question is whether he waived the exercise of one of those rights, the right to the presence of a lawyer. Neither the state court nor the respondent has offered any reason why there must be a negative answer to that question in the absence of an express waiver. This is not the first criminal case to question whether a defendant waived his constitutional rights. It is an issue with which courts must repeatedly deal. Even when a right scr fundamental as that to counsel at trial is involved, the question of waiver must be determined on “the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464. See also United States v. Washington, 431 U. S. 181, 188; Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218; Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U. S. 731, 739.
We see no reason to discard that standard and replace it with an inflexible per se rule in a case such as this. As stated at the outset of this opinion, it appears that every court that has considered this question has now reached the same conclusion. Ten of the eleven United States Courts of Appeals and the courts of at least 17 States have held that an explicit statement of waiver is not invariably necessary to support a finding that the defendant waived the right to remain silent or the right to counsel guaranteed by the Miranda case. By creating an inflexible rule that no implicit waiver can ever suffice, the North Carolina Supreme Court has gone beyond the requirements of federal organic law. It follows that its judgment cannot stand, since a state court can neither add to nor subtract from the mandates of the United States Constitution. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U. S. 714.
Accordingly, the judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the North Carolina Supreme Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
The parties disagree over whether the respondent was also orally advised of his Miranda rights at the New Rochelle office. There is no dispute that he was given those warnings orally at the scene of the arrest, or that he read the “Advice of Rights” form in the New Rochelle office. This factual controversy, therefore, is not relevant to the basic issue in this case.
The dissenting opinion points out, post, at 378, that at oral argument the respondent’s counsel disputed the fact that the respondent is literate. But the trial court specifically found that “it had been . . . determined by Agent Martinez that the defendant has an Eleventh Grade Education and that he could read and write . . . .” App. A-21. This finding, based upon uncontroverted evidence, is binding on this Court.
The respondent admitted to the agents that he and Lee had been drinking heavily on' the day of the robbery. He acknowledged that they had decided to rob a gas station, but denied that he had actually participated in the robbery. His friend, he said, had shot the attendant.
But see State v. Siler, 292 N. C. 543, 550, 234 S. E. 2d 733, 738 (1977). In that case, the North Carolina Supreme Court adhered to the interpretation of Miranda it first expressed in Blackmon, but acknowledged that it might find waiver without an express written or oral statement if the defendant’s subsequent comments revealed that his earlier silence had been meant as a waiver. Although Siler was cited by the State Supreme Court in the present case, that portion of the Siler opinion was not discussed.
We do not today even remotely question the holding in Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U. S. 506, which was specificaEy approved in the Miranda opinion, 384 U. S., at 475. In that case, decided before Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, the Court held that the defendant had a constitutional right to counsel under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Florida Supreme Court had presumed that his right had been waived because there was no evidence in the record that he had requested counsel. The Court refused to allow a presumption of waiver from a silent record. It said: “The record must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer.” 369 U. S., at 516. This statement is consistent with our decision today, which is merely that a court may find an intelligent and understanding rejection of counsel in situations where the defendant did not expressly state as much.
United States v. Speaks, 453 F. 2d 966 (CA1 1972); United States v. Boston, 508. F. 2d 1171 (CA2 1974); United States v. Stuckey, 441 F. 2d 1104 (CA3 1971); Blackmon v. Blackledge, 541 F. 2d 1070 (CA4 1976); United States v. Hayes, 385 F. 2d 375 (CA4 1967); United States v. Cavallino, 498 F. 2d 1200 (CA5 1974); United States v. Montos, 421 F. 2d 215 (CA5 1970); United States v. Ganter, 436 F. 2d 364 (CA7 1970); United States v. Marchildon, 519 F. 2d 337 (CA8 1975); Hughes v. Swenson, 452 F. 2d 866 (CA8 1971); United States v. Moreno-Lopez, 466 F. 2d 1205 (CA9 1972); United States v. Hilliker, 436 F. 2d 101 (CA9 1970); Bond v. United States, 397 F. 2d 162 (CA10 1968) (but see Sullins v. United States, 389 F. 2d 985 (CA10 1968)); United States v. Cooper, 163 U. S. App. D. C. 55, 499 F. 2d 1060 (1974). In Blackmon v. Blackledge, supra, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit specifically rejected the North Carolina Supreme Court’s inflexible view that only express waivers of Miranda rights can be valid.
The Courts of Appeals have unanimously rejected the similar argument that refusal to sign a written waiver form precludes a finding of waiver. See United States v. Speaks, supra; United States v. Boston, supra; United States v. Stuckey, supra; United States v. Thompson, 417 F. 2d 196 (CA4 1969); United States v. Guzman-Guzman, 488 F. 2d 965 (CA5 1974); United States v. Caulton, 498 F. 2d 412 (CA6 1974); United States v. Crisp, 435 F. 2d 354 (CA7 1970); United States v. Zamarripa, 544 F. 2d 978 (CA8 1976); United States v. Moreno-Lopez, supra; Bond v. United States, supra; and United States v. Cooper, supra.
Sullivan v. State, 351 So. 2d 659 (Ala. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 351 So. 2d 665 (Ala. 1977); State v. Pineda, 110 Ariz. 342, 519 P. 2d 41 (1974); State ex rel. Berger v. Superior Court, 109 Ariz. 506, 513 P. 2d 935 (1973); People v. Johnson, 70 Cal. 2d 541, 450 P. 2d 865 (1969) (reversing lower court on other grounds); People v. Weaver, 179 Colo. 331, 500 P. 2d 980 (1972); Reed v. People, 171 Colo. 421, 467 P. 2d 809 (1970); State v. Craig, 237 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1970); Peek v. State, 239 Ga. 422, 238 S. E. 2d 12 (1977); People v. Brooks, 51 Ill. 2d 156, 281 N. E. 2d 326 (1972); State v. Wilson, 215 Kan. 28, 523 P. 2d 337 (1974); State v. Hazelton, 330 A. 2d 919 (Me. 1975); Miller v. State, 251 Md. 362, 247 A. 2d 530 (1968); Commonwealth v. Murray, 359 Mass. 541, 269 N. E. 2d 641 (1971); State v. Alewine, 474 S. W. 2d 848 (Mo. 1971); Burnside v. State, 473 S. W. 2d 697 (Mo. 1971); Shirey v. State, 520 P. 2d 701 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974); State v. Davidson, 252 Ore. 617, 451 P. 2d 481 (1969); Commonwealth v. Garnett, 458 Pa. 4, 326 A. 2d 335 (1974); Bowling v. State, 458 S. W. 2d 639 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970); State v. Young, 89 Wash. 2d 613, 574 P. 2d 1171 (1978). See also Aaron v. State, 275 A. 2d 791 (Del. 1971); State v. Nelson, 257 N. W. 2d 356 (Minn. 1977); Land v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 223, 176 S. E. 2d 586 (1970) (reversing lower court on other grounds).
By the same token this Court must accept whatever construction of a state constitution is placed upon it by the highest court of the State.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This appeal presents the question whether due process under the Fourteenth Amendment was denied the appellants by the application in this case of Missouri’s procedures authorizing the search for and seizure of allegedly obscene publications preliminarily to their destruction by burning or otherwise if found by a court to be obscene. The procedures are statutory, but are supplemented by a rule of the Missouri Supreme Court. The warrant for search for and seizure of obscene material issues on a sworn complaint filed with a judge or magistrate. If the complainant states “positively and not upon information or belief,” or states “evidential facts from which such judge or magistrate determines the existence of probable cause” to believe that obscene material “is being held or kept in any place or in any building,” “such judge or magistrate shall issue a search warrant directed to any peace officer commanding him to search the place therein described and to seize and bring before such judge or magistrate the personal property therein described.” The owner of the property is not afforded a hearing before the warrant issues; the proceeding is ex parte. However, the judge or magistrate issuing the warrant must fix a date, not less than five nor more than 20 days after the seizure, for a hearing to determine whether the seized material is obscene. The owner of the material may appear at such hearing and defend against the charge. No time limit' is provided within which the judge must announce his decision. If the judge finds that the material is obscene, he is required to order it to be publicly destroyed, by burning or otherwise; if he finds that it is not obscene, he shall order its return to its owner.
The Missouri Supreme Court sustained the validity of the procedures as applied in this case. 334 S. W. 2d 119. The appellants brought this appeal here under 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2). We postponed consideration of the question of our jurisdiction to the hearing of the case on the merits. 364 U. S. 811. We hold that the appeal is properly here, see Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282, and turn to the merits.
Appellant, Kansas City News Distributors, managed by appellant, Homer Smay, is a wholesale distributor of magazines, newspapers and books in the Kansas City area. The other appellants operate five retail newsstands in Kansas City. In October 1957, Police Lieutenant Coughlin of the Kansas City Police Department Vice Squad was conducting an investigation into the distribution of allegedly obscene magazines. On October 8, 1957, he visited Distributors’ place of business and showed Smay a list of magazines. Smay admitted that his company distributed all but one of the magazines on the list. The following day, October 9, Lieutenant Coughlin visited the five newsstands and purchased one magazine at each. On October 10 the officer signed and filed six sworn complaints in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, stating in each complaint that “of his own knowledge” the appellant named therein, at its stated place of business, “kept for the purpose of [sale]... obscene... publications....” No copy of any magazine on Lieutenant Coughlin’s list, or purchased by him at the newsstands, was filed with the complaint or shown to the circuit judge. The circuit judge issued six search warrants authorizing, as to the premises of the appellant named in each, “any peace officer in the State of Missouri... [to] search the said premises... within 10 days after the issuance of this warrant by day or night, and... seize... [obscene materials] and take same into your possession....”
All of the warrants were executed on October 10, but by different law enforcement officers. Lieutenant Coughlin with two other Kansas City police officers, and an officer of the Jackson County Sheriff’s Patrol, executed the warrant against Distributors. Distributors’ stock of magazines runs “into hundreds of thousands... [p]robably closer to a million copies.” The officers examined the publications in the stock on the main floor of the establishment, not confining themselves to Lieutenant Coughlin’s original list. They seized all magazines which “[i]n our judgment” were obscene; when an officer thought “a magazine... ought to be picked up” he seized all copies of it. After three hours the examination was completed and the magazines seized were “hauled away in a truck and put on the 15th floor of the courthouse.” A substantially similar procedure was followed at each of the five newsstands. Approximately 11,000 copies of 280 publications, principally magazines but also some books and photographs, were seized at the six places.
The circuit judge fixed October 17 for the hearing, which was later continued to October 23. Timely motions were made by the appellants to quash the search warrants and to suppress as evidence the property seized, and for the immediate return of the property. The motions were rested on a number of grounds but we are concerned only with the challenge to the application of the procedures in the context of the protections for free speech and press assured against state abridgment by the Fourteenth Amendment. Unconstitutionality in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment was asserted because the procedures as applied (1) allowed a seizure by police officers “without notice or any hearing afforded to the movants prior to seizure for the purpose of determining whether or not these... publications are obscene...,” and (2) because they “allowed police officers and deputy sheriffs to decide and make a judicial determination after the warrant was issued as to which... magazines were... obscene... and were subject to seizure, impairing movants’ freedom of speech and publication.” The circuit judge reserved rulings on the motions and heard testimony of the police officers concerning the events surrounding the issuance and execution of the several warrants. On December 12, 1957, the circuit judge filed an unreported opinion in which he overruled the several motions and found that 100 of the 280 seized items were obscene. A judgment thereupon issued directing that the 100 items, and all copies thereof, “shall be retained by the Sheriff of Jackson County... as necessary evidence for the purpose of possible criminal prosecution or prosecutions, and, when such necessity no longer exists, said Sheriff... shall publicly destroy the same by burning within thirty days thereafter”; it ordered further that the 180 items not found to be obscene, and all copies thereof, “shall be returned forthwith by the Sheriff... to the rightful owner or owners....”
I.
The use by government of the power of search and seizure as an adjunct to a system for the suppression of objectionable publications is not new. Historically the struggle for freedom of speech and press in England was bound up with the issue of the scope of the search and seizure power. See generally Siebert, Freedom of the Press in England, 1476-1776; Hanson, Government and the Press, 1695-1763. It was a principal instrument for the enforcement of the Tudor licensing system. The Stationers’ Company was incorporated in 1557 to help implement that system and was empowered “to make search whenever it shall please them in any place, shop, house, chamber, or building or any printer, binder or bookseller whatever within our kingdom of England or the dominions of the same of or for any books or things printed, or to be printed, and to seize, take hold, burn, or turn to the proper use of the foresaid community, all and several those books and things which are or shall be printed contrary to the form of any statute, act, or proclamation, made or to be made...
An order of council confirmed and expanded the Company’s power in 1566, and the Star Chamber reaffirmed it in 1586 by a decree “That it shall be lawful for the wardens of the said Company for the time being or any two of the said Company thereto deputed by the said wardens, to make search in all workhouses, shops, warehouses of printers, booksellers, bookbinders, or where they shall have reasonable cause of suspicion, and all books [etc.]... contrary to... these present ordinances to stay and take to her Majesty’s use....” Books thus seized were taken to Stationers’ Hall where they were inspected by ecclesiastical officers, who decided whether they should be burnt. These powers were exercised under the Tudor censorship to suppress both Catholic and Puritan dissenting literature.
Each succeeding regime during turbulent Seventeenth Century England used the search and seizure power to suppress publications. James I commissioned the ecclesiastical judges comprising the Court of High Commission “to enquire and search for... all heretical, schismatical and seditious books, libels, and writings, and all other books, pamphlets and portraitures offensive to the state or set forth without sufficient and lawful authority in that behalf,... and the same books [etc.] and their printing-presses themselves likewise to seize and so to order and dispose of them... as they may not after serve or be employed for any such unlawful use....” The Star Chamber decree of 1637, re-enacting the requirement that all books be licensed, continued the broad powers of the Stationers' Company to enforce the licensing laws. During the political overturn of the 1640’s Parliament on several occasions asserted the necessity of a broad search and seizure power to control printing. Thus an order of 1648 gave power to the searchers “to search in any house or place where there is just cause of suspicion, that Presses are kept and employed in the printing of Scandalous and lying Pamphlets,... [and] to seize such scandalous and lying pamphlets as they find upon search....” The Restoration brought a new licensing act in 1662. Under its authority “messengers of the press” operated under the secretaries of state, who issued executive warrants for the seizure of persons and papers. These warrants, while sometimes specific in content, often gave the most general discretionary authority. For example, a warrant to Roger L’Estrange, the Surveyor of the Press, empowered him to “seize all seditious books and libels and to apprehend the authors, contrivers, printers, publishers, and dispersers of them,” and to “search any house, shop, printing room, chamber, warehouse, etc. for seditious, scandalous or unlicensed pictures, books, or papers, to bring away or deface the same, and the letter press, taking away all the copies....” Another warrant gave L’Estrange power to “search for & seize authors, contrivers, printers,... publishers, dispensers, & concealers of treasonable, schismaticall, seditious or unlicensed books, libells, pamphlets, or papers... together with all copys exemplaryes of such Books, libells, pamphlets or paper as aforesaid.”
Although increasingly attacked, the licensing system was continued in effect for a time even after the Revolution of 1688 and executive warrants continued to issue for the search for and seizure of offending books. The Stationers’ Company was also ordered “to make often and diligent searches in all such places you or any of you shall know or have any probable reason to suspect, and to seize all unlicensed, scandalous books and pamphlets....” And even when the device of prosecution for seditious libel replaced licensing as the principal governmental control of the press, it too was enforced with the aid of general warrants — authorizing either the arrest of all persons connected with the publication of a particular libel and the search of their premises, or the seizure of all the papers of a named person alleged to be connected with the publication of a libel.
Enforcement through general warrants was finally judicially condemned in England. This was the consequence of the struggle of the 1760’s between the Crown and the opposition press led by John Wilkes, author and editor of the North Briton. From this struggle came the great case of Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, which this Court has called “one of the landmarks of English liberty.” Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 626. A warrant based on a charge of seditious libel issued for the arrest of Entick, writer for an opposition paper, and for the seizure of all his papers. The officers executing the warrant ransacked Entick’s home for four hours and carted away great quantities of books and papers. Lord Camden declared the general warrant for the seizure of papers contrary to the common law, despite its long history. Camden said: “This power so assumed by the secretary of state is an execution upon all the party’s papers, in the first instance. His house is rifled; his most valuable secrets are taken out of his possession, before the paper for which he is charged is found to be criminal by any competent jurisdiction, and before he is convicted either of writing, publishing, or being concerned in the paper.” At 1064. Camden expressly dismissed the contention that such a warrant could be justified on the grounds that it was “necessary for the ends of government to lodge such a power with a state officer; and... better to prevent the publication before than to punish the offender afterwards.” At 1073. In Wilkes v. Wood, 19 How. St. Tr. 1153, Camden also condemned the general warrants employed against John Wilkes for his publication of issue No. 45 of the North Briton. He declared that these warrants, calling for the arrest of unnamed persons connected with the alleged libel and seizure of their papers, amounted to a “discretionary power given to messengers to search wherever their suspicions may chance to fall. If such a power is truly invested in a secretary of state, and he can delegate this power, it certainly may affect the person and property of every man in this kingdom, and is totally subversive of the liberty of the subject.” Id., 1167.
This history was, of course, part of the intellectual matrix within which our own constitutional fabric was shaped. The Bill of Rights was fashioned against the background of knowledge that unrestricted power of search and seizure could also be an instrument for stifling liberty of expression. For the serious hazard of suppression of innocent expression inhered in the discretion confided in the officers authorized to exercise the power.
II.
The question here is whether the use by Missouri in this case of the search and seizure power to suppress obscene publications involved abuses inimical to protected expression. We held in Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 485, that “obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press.” But in Roth itself we expressly recognized the complexity of the test of obscenity fashioned in that case, and the vital necessity in its application of safeguards to prevent denial of “the protection of freedom of speech and press for material which does not treat sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest.” Id., p. 488. We have since held that a State’s power to suppress obscenity is limited by the constitutional protections for free expression. In Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147, 155, we said, “The existence of the State’s power to prevent the distribution of obscene matter does not mean that there can be no constitutional barrier to any form of practical exercise of that power,” inasmuch as “our holding in Roth does not recognize any state power to restrict the dissemination of books which are not obscene.” Id., p. 152. We therefore held that a State may not impose absolute criminal liability on a bookseller for the possession of obscene material, even if it may dispense with the element of scienter in dealing with such evils as impure food and drugs. We remarked the distinction between the cases: “There is no specific constitutional inhibition against making the distributors of food the strictest censors of their merchandise, but the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of speech and of the press stand in the way of imposing a similar requirement on the bookseller.” Id., pp. 152-153. The Missouri Supreme Court’s assimilation of obscene literature to gambling paraphernalia or other contraband for purposes of search and seizure does not therefore answer the appellants’ constitutional claim, but merely restates the issue whether obscenity may be treated in the same way. The authority to the police officers under the warrants issued in this case, broadly to seize “obscene... publications,” poses problems not raised by the warrants to seize “gambling implements” and “all intoxicating liquors” involved in the cases cited by the Missouri Supreme Court. 334 S. W. 2d, at 125. For the use of these warrants implicates questions whether the procedures leading to their issuance and surrounding their execution were adequate to avoid suppression of constitutionally protected publications. “... [T]he line between speech unconditionally guaranteed and speech which may legitimately be regulated, suppressed, or punished is finely drawn.... The separation of legitimate from illegitimate speech calls for... sensitive tools....” Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 525. It follows that, under the Fourteenth Amendment, a State is not free to adopt whatever procedures it pleases for dealing with obscenity as here involved without regard to the possible consequences for constitutionally protected speech.
We believe that Missouri’s procedures as applied in this case lacked the safeguards which due process demands to assure nonobscene material the constitutional protection to which it is entitled. Putting to one side the fact that no opportunity was afforded the appellants to elicit and contest the reasons for the officer’s belief, or otherwise to argue against the propriety of the seizure to the issuing judge, still the warrants issued on the strength of the conclusory assertions of a single police officer, without any scrutiny by the judge of any materials considered by the complainant to be obscene. The warrants gave the broadest discretion to the executing officers; they merely repeated the language of the statute and the complaints, specified no publications, and left to the individual judgment of each of the many police officers involved the selection of such magazines as in his view constituted “obscene... publications.” So far as appears from the record, none of the officers except Lieutenant Coughlin had previously examined any of the publications which were subsequently seized. It is plain that in many instances, if not in all, each officer actually made ad hoc decisions on the spot and, gauged by the number of publications seized and the time spent in executing the warrants, each decision was made with little opportunity for reflection and deliberation. As to publications seized because they appeared on the Lieutenant’s list, we know nothing of the basis for the original judgment that they were obscene. It is no reflection on the good faith or judgment of the officers to conclude that the task they were assigned was simply an impossible one to perform with any realistic expectation that the obscene might be accurately separated from the constitutionally protected. They were provided with no guide to the exercise of informed discretion, because there was no step in the procedure before seizure designed to focus searchingly on the question of obscenity. See generally 1 Chafee, Government and Mass Communications, pp. 200-218. In consequence there were suppressed and withheld from the market for over two months 180 publications not found obscene. The fact that only one-third of the publications seized were finally condemned strengthens the conclusion that discretion to seize allegedly obscene materials cannot be confided to law enforcement officials without greater safeguards than were here operative. Procedures which sweep so broadly and with so little discrimination are obviously deficient in techniques required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to prevent erosion of the constitutional guarantees.
III.
The reliance of the Missouri Supreme Court upon Kingsley Books, Inc., v. Brown, 354 U. S. 436, is misplaced. The differences in the procedures under the New York statute upheld in that case and the Missouri procedures as applied here are marked. They amount to the distinction between “a 'limited injunctive remedy,’ under closely defined procedural safeguards, against the sale and distribution of written and printed matter found after due trial to be obscene,” Kingsley Books, supra, at 437, and a scheme which in operation inhibited the circulation of publications indiscriminately because of the absence of any such safeguards. First, the New York injunctive proceeding was initiated by a complaint filed with the court which charged that a particular named obscene publication had been displayed, and to which were annexed copies of the publication alleged to be obscene. The court, in restraining distribution pending final judicial determination of the claim, thus had the allegedly obscene material before it and could exercise an independent check on the judgment of the prosecuting authority at a point before any restraint took place. Second, the restraints in Kingsley Books, both temporary and permanent, ran only against the named publication ; no catchall restraint against the distribution of all “obscene” material was imposed on the defendants there, comparable to the warrants here which authorized a mass seizure and the removal of a broad range of items from circulation. Third, Kingsley Books does not support the proposition that the State may impose the extensive restraints imposed here on the distribution of these publications prior to an adversary proceeding on the issue of obscenity, irrespective of whether or not the material is legally obscene. This Court expressly noted there that the State was not attempting to punish the distributors for disobedience of any interim order entered before hearing. The Court pointed out that New York might well construe its own law as not imposing any punishment for violation of an interim order were the book found not obscene after due trial. 354 U. S., at 443, n. 2. But there is no doubt that an effective restraint — indeed the most effective restraint possible — was imposed prior to hearing on the circulation of the publications in this case, because all copies on which the police could lay their hands were physically removed from the newsstands and from the premises of the wholesale distributor. An opportunity comparable to that which the distributor in Kingsley Books might have had to circulate the publication despite the interim restraint and then raise the claim of nonobscenity by way of defense to a prosecution for doing so was never afforded these appellants because the copies they possessed were taken away. Their ability to circulate their publications was left to the chance of securing other copies, themselves subject to mass seizure under other such warrants. The public’s opportunity to obtain the publications was thus determined by the distributor’s readiness and ability to outwit the police by obtaining and selling other copies before they in turn could be seized. In addition to its unseemliness, we do not believe that this kind of enforced competition affords a reasonable likelihood that nonobscene publications, entitled to constitutional protection, will reach the public. A distributor may have every reason to believe that a publication is constitutionally protected and will be so held after judicial hearing, but his belief is unavailing as against the contrary judgment of the police officer who seizes it from him. Finally, a subdivision of the New York statute in Kingsley Books required that a judicial decision on the merits of obscenity be made within two days of trial, which in turn was required to be within one day of the joinder of issue on the request for an injunction. In contrast, the Missouri statutory scheme drawn in question here has no limitation on the time within which decision must be made, only a provision for rapid trial of the issue of obscenity. And in fact over two months elapsed between seizure and decision. In these circumstances the restraint on the circulation of publications was far more thoroughgoing and drastic than any restraint upheld by this Court in Kingsley Books.
Mass seizure in the fashion of this case was thus effected without any safeguards to protect legitimate expression. The judgment of the Missouri Supreme Court sustaining the condemnation of the 100 publications therefore cannot be sustained. We have no occasion to reach the question of the correctness of the finding that the publications are obscene. Nor is it necessary for us to decide in this case whether Missouri lacks all power under its statutory scheme to seize and condemn obscene material. Since a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment infected the proceedings, in order to vindicate appellants’ constitutional rights the judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
These procedures are separate from and in addition to the State’s criminal statutes. See State v. Mac Sales Co., 263 S. W. 2d 860. The criminal statutes are Mo. Rev. Stat., §§563.270, 563.280, 563.290; see also § 563.310.
Mo. Rev. Stat., §542.380, in pertinent part provides:
“Upon complaint being made, on oath, in writing, to any officer authorized to issue process for the apprehension of offenders, that any of the property or articles herein named are kept within the county of such officer, if he shall be satisfied that there is reasonable ground for such complaint, shall issue a warrant to the sheriff or any constable of the county, directing him to search for and seize any of the following property or articles:
“(2) Any of the following articles, kept for the purpose of being sold, published, exhibited, given away or otherwise distributed or circulated, viz.: obscene, lewd, licentious, indecent or lascivious books, pamphlets, ballads, papers, drawings, lithographs, engravings, pictures, models, casts, prints or other articles or publications of an indecent, immoral or scandalous character, or any letters, handbills, cards, circulars, books, pamphlet's or advertisements or notices of any kind giving information, directly or indirectly, when, where, how or of whom any of such things can be obtained.” These procedures also govern seizure and condemnation of gambling paraphernalia, contraceptive devices, and tools and other articles used to manufacture or produce such items. Fraudulent, forged, and counterfeited writings and other articles, and the instruments used to make them, are also declared contraband and subject to seizure. § 542.440.
Missouri Supreme Court Rule 33.01 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
“(a) If a complaint in writing be filed with the judge or magistrate of any court having original jurisdiction to try criminal offenses stating that personal property... the seizure of which under search warrant is now or may hereafter be authorized by any statute of this State, is being held or kept at any place or in any building... within the territorial jurisdiction of such judge or magistrate, and if such complaint be verified by the oath or affirmation of the complainant and states such facts positively and not upon information or belief; or if the same be supported by written affidavits verified by oath or affirmation stating evidential facts from which such judge or magistrate determines the existence of probable cause, then such judge or magistrate shall issue a search warrant directed to any peace officer commanding him to search the place therein described and to seize and bring before such judge or magistrate the personal property therein described.
“ (b) The complainant and the warrant issued thereon must contain a description of the personal property to be searched for and seized and a description of the place to be searched, in sufficient detail and particularity to enable the officer serving the warrant to readily ascertain and identify the same.”
Mo. Rev. Stat., §542.400 provides:
“The judge or magistrate issuing the warrant shall set a day, not less than five days nor more than twenty days after the date of such service and seizure, for determining whether such property is the kind of property mentioned in section 542.380, and shall order the officer having such property in charge to retain possession of the same until after such hearing. Written notice of the date and place of such hearing shall be given, at least five days before such date, by posting a copy of such notice in a conspicuous place upon the premises in which such property is seized, and by delivering a copy of such notice to any person claiming an interest in such property, whose name may be known to the person making the complaint or to the officer'issuing or serving such warrant, or leaving the same at the usual place of abode of such person with any member of his family or household above the age of fifteen years. Such notice shall be signed by the magistrate or judge or by the clerk of the court of such judge.”
Mo. Rev. Stat., § 542.410 provides:
“Rights of property owner. — The owner or owners of such property may appear at such hearing and defend against the charges as to the nature and use of the property so seized, and such judge or magistrate shall determine, from the evidence produced at such hearing, whether the property is the kind of property m'entioned in section 542.380.”
Mo. Rev. Stat., § 542.420 provides:
“Disposition of property. — If the judge or magistrate hearing such cause shall determine that the property or articles are of the kind mentioned in section 542.380, he shall cause the same to be publicly destroyed, by burning or otherwise, and if he find that such property is not of the kind mentioned, he shall order the same returned to its owner. If it appears that it may be necessary to use such articles or property as evidence in any criminal prosecution, the judge or magistrate shall order the officer having possession of them to retain such possession until such necessity no longer exists, and they shall neither be destroyed nor returned to the owner until they are no longer needed as such evidence.”
He bought a copy of the same magazine at three of the stands, a copy of another edition of this magazine at a fourth stand, and a copy of one other magazine at the fifth stand;
The publications seized included so-called “girlie” magazines, nudist magazines, treatises and manuals on sex, photography magazines, cartoon and joke books and still photographs.
Because of the result which we reach, it is unnecessary to decide other constitutional questions raised by the appellants, (1) whether the Missouri statutes are invalid on their face as authorizing an unconstitutional censorship and previous restraint of publications; (2) whether the Missouri courts applied an unconstitutional test of obscenity; and (3) whether the publications condemned are obscene under the test of Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476.
1 Arber, Transcript of the Registers of the Company of Stationers of London, 1554 — 1640 A. D., p. xxxi.
Elton, The Tudor Constitution, p. 106.
Elton, supra, pp. 182-183.
Siebert, supra, pp. 83, 85-86, 97.
Siebert, supra, p. 139, citing Pat. Roll, 9 Jac. I, Pt. 18; id., II, Pt. 15.
4 Arber, supra, pp. 529-536.
Siebert, supra, 214-215, note 72.
Siebert, supra, p. 254, citing Minute Entry Book 5, p. 177.
Siebert, supra, p. 256, citing Entry Book, Chas. II, 1664, Vol. 21, p. 21; also Vol. 16, p. 130.
Cal. St. P., Dom. Ser., 1690-1691, p. 74.
One of the primary objections to licensing was its enforcement through search and seizure. The House of Commons’ list of reasons why the licensing act should not be renewed included: “Because that Act subjects all Mens Houses, as well Peers as Commoners, to be searched at any Time, either by Day or Night, by a Warrant under the Sign Manual, or under the Hand of One of the Secretaries of State, directed to any Messenger, if such Messenger shall upon probable Reason suspect that there are any unlicensed Books there; and the Houses of all Persons free of the Company of Stationers are subject to the like Search, on a Warrant from the Master and Wardens of the said Company, or any One of them.” 15 Journals of the House of Lords, April 18, 1695, p. 546.
Siebert, supra, pp. 374 — 376.
A contemporary London pamphlet summed up the widespread indignation against the use of the general warrant for the seizure of papers: “In such a party-crime, as a public libel, who can endure this assumed authority of taking all papers indiscriminately?... where there is even a charge against one particular paper, to seize all, of every kind, is extravagant, unreasonable and inquisitorial. It is infamous in theory, and downright tyranny and despotism in practice.” Father of Candor, A Letter Concerning Libels, Warrants, and the Seizure of Papers, p. 48 (2d ed. 1764, J. Almon printer).
See generally Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment, pp'. 42-50; Hanson, Government and the Press, 1695-1763, pp. 29-32, 49-50. An even broader form of general warrant was the writ of assistance, which met such vigorous opposition in the American Colonies prior to the Revolution. Unlike the warrants of the North Briton affair and Entick v. Carrington, which were at least concerned with a particular designated libel, these writs empowered the executing officer to seize any illegally imported goods or merchandise. Moreover, in addition to authorizing search without limit of place, they had no fixed duration. In effect, complete discretion was given to the executing officials; in the words of James Otis, their use placed “the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer.” Tudor, Life of James Otis (1823), p. 66. See Lasson, supra, pp. 51-78.
This holding applied also to the obscenity question raised under the Fourteenth Amendment in Alberts v. California, decided in the same opinion.
Lord Camden in Entick v. Carrington recognized that there was no justification for the abuse of the search and seizure power in suppressing seditious libel, even if the view were accepted that “men ought not to be allowed to have such evil instruments in their keeping.” 19 How. St. Tr., at 1072. He said, “If [libels may be seized], I am afraid, that all the inconveniences of a general seizure will follow upon a right allowed to seize a part. The search in such cases will be general, and every house will fall under the power of a secretary of state to be rummaged before proper conviction.” Id.., at 1071.
Among the publications ordered returned were such titles as “The Dawn of Rational Sex Ethics,” “Sex Symbolism,” “Notes on Cases of Sexual Suppression,” “Your Affections, Emotions and Feelings,” “Sexual Impotence, Its Causes and Treatments,” “The Psychology of Sex Life,” “Freud on Sleep and Sexual Dreams,” “The Determination of Sex,” “Sex and Psychoanalysis,” “Artificial Insemination,” “Syphilis, A Treatise for the American Public,” “What You Should Know About Sexual Impotency,” “Variations in Sexual Behavior,” “Sex Life in Marriage,” “Psychopathia Sexualis,” “The Sex Technique in Marriage,” “Sexual Deviations,” “Sex Practice in Later Years,” and “Marriage, Sex, and Family Problems.”
English practice in such cases has placed greater restraint on the seizure power. Seizure of obscene material, as a prelude to condemnation, was authorized there by Lord Campbell’s Obscene Publications Act of 1857, 20 & 21 Vict., c. 83. As originally proposed, that statute would have allowed search for and seizure of obscene matter either under authority granted by magistrates or on warrants granted by the Chief Commissioner of Police. Moreover, the affidavit for obtaining a warrant would have been required to contain merely the statement that the person making it had reasonable ground for suspicion that obscene publications were kept on the premises to be searched. See 146 Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, 3d Series, p. 866. These provisions met vigorous opposition in Parliament. A number of members emphasized that the difficulty of defining obscenity made broad search powers in police hands
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
Probable jurisdiction is noted.
Mr. Justice Brennan, who voted to note probable jurisdiction, filed a separate memorandum.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Clark, Mr. Justice HariÍan, and Mr. Justice Whittaker, who voted against noting probable jurisdiction, filed a separate memorándum.
'*’■ Mr. Justice Clark, who voted against noting probable jurisdiction, filed a separate memorandum.
Mr. Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration or decision of this application.
Mr. Justice Brennan.
The Court’s practice, when considering a jurisdictional statement whereby a litigant attempts to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction on appeal, is quite similar to its well-known one on applications for writs of certiorari. That is, if four Justices or more are of opinion that the questions presented by the appeal should be fully briefed and argued orally, an order noting probable jurisdiction or postponing further consideration of the jurisdictional questions to a hearing- on the merits is entered. Even though this action is taken on the votes of only a minority of four of the Justices, the Court then approaches plenary consideration of the case anew as a Court; votes previously cast in Conference that the judgment of the court appealed from be summarily affirmed, or that the appeal be dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, do not conclude the Justices casting them, and every member of the Court brings to the ultimate disposition of the case his judgment based on the full briefs and the oral arguments. Because of this, disagreeing Justices do not ordinarily make a public notation, when an order setting an appeal for argument is entered, that they would have summarily affirmed-the judgment below, or have dismissed the appeal from it for want of a substantial federal qüestion. Research has not disclosed any instance of such notations until today.
The reasons for such forbearance are obvious. Votes to affirm summarily, and to dismiss for want of a substantial federal question, it hardly needs comment, are votes on the merits of a case, and public expression of views on the merits of a case by a Justice before argument and decision may well be misunderstood; the usual practice in judicial adjudication in this country, where hearings are held, is that judgment follow, and not precede them. Public respect for the judiciary might well suffer if, any basis were given for an assumption, however wrong in fact, that this were not so. Thus, the practice of not noting dissents from such orders has been followed, regardless of how strongly Justices may have felt as to the merits of a case or how clearly they have thought decision in it controlled by past precedent. A precedent which appears to some Justices, upon the preliminary consideration given a jurisdictional statement, to be completely controlling may not appear to be so to other Justices. Plenary consideration can change views strongly held, and on close, reflective analysis precedents may appear inapplicable to varying fact situations. I believe .that this approach will obtain in this case despite the unusual notation made today by four of my colleagues.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Clark, Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Whittaker are of the view that this case is controlled by, and should be affirmed on the authority of, Frank v. Maryland, 359 U. S. 360.
The Frank case was decided on May 4. Application to review this case came before us within two weeks of the Frank decision. Since we deem the decision in the Maryland case to be completely controlling upon the Ohio decision, we - are of the opinion that it would manifest disrespect by the Court for its own process to indicate its willingness to create an opportunity to overrule á case decided only a fortnight ago" after , thorough discussion at the bar and in the briefs and after the weightiest deliberation within the Court.
Mr. Justice Clark.
This case cannot be considered in isolation. In his jurisdictional statement filed February 12,1959, appellant stated that No. 278, Frank v. Maryland, “is similar to the-facts in this case at bar and involves the same constitutional questions,”. thus raising “substantially the same problems presented by this appeal.” We, therefore, held this case awaiting the decision in No. 278, Frank v. Maryland. It was decided May 4, 1959, by a 5-4 vote. 359 U. S. 360. Thereafter this case was again considered and Brother Stewart, who was with the majority in Frank recused himself because the case came from Ohio’s Supreme Court, where his father then served. After a study of the two cases I agreed with appellant that this case was “similar to the facts,” involved the same constitutional questions .and raised “substantially the same problems” as the' Frank case. In. fact, as presented here, the cases appeared to be on all fours, except that the penalty provision in Maryland’s Act is $20, while that of Ohio’s law is a maximum of $200, or a jail sentence not. exceeding 30 days. I therefore voted to affirm. My brothers in the majority in Frank voted likewise. However, the four dissenters in Frank voted to note probable jurisdiction and bring the case on for argument. The result, for all practical purposes, is a reconsideration of the constitutional question decided in Frank by a full Court. This flies in the face of the real purpose, as well as the intended effect, of our Rule 58 which permits rehearings only “at the instance of a justice who concurred in the judgment or decision . . . .” It likewise is, in my view, very poor judicial administration, especially since Frank was decided less than four weeks ago and only an eight-man Court can sit to review the question decided there.
Believing that the Bar will be confused by this action today, which beyond doubt will be characterized as a reconsideration of the Frank holding, I have noted my adherence to Frank. Otherwise my silence would be construed as acquiescence in a reconsideration of that case. While I have followed a policy of not noting my vote in Conference, except on the merits, our reports are full of such notations.
Likewise, dissents from orders granting certiorari are ordinarily not publicly noted, even though the grant or denial of certiorari,' as we have often said, expresses no intimation. as to the merits of a case. The sole exception found appears to be Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 937, where the extraordinary power to grant certiorari before judgment in the Court of Appeals was exercised, and two Justices expressed their view that judgment in that court should have been obtained before this Court reviewed the case. Of course, in these circumstances, the notation could not possibly have implied or have been taken to imply any view of the case on the merits.
Notation of dissent from a denial of certiorari, or from a summary disposition of an appeal, is a completely different matter. Such notations occur with some frequency and I have made them myself. They are expressions of a Justice’s view that a case should be heard when the Court decides not- to have a hearing. Obviously such notations do not tend to foreclose or embarrass consideration of the case when it is later heard, since by definition it,is not to be heard.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
Petitioners are 42 independent travel- agents doing business in Massachusetts. They ask for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Comptroller of the Currency and the South Shore National Bank. They seek to invalidate a ruling by the Comptroller that, incidental to their banking. services, national banks may provide travel services for their customers. Petitioners allege that as a result they have lost substantial business and profits and stand to lose even greater business in the future. They contend the Comptroller exceeded his authority when he authorized national banks to provide travel services.
The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 408 F. 2d 1147 (CAI 1969.). Following our decisions last Term in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U. S. 160, and Barlow v. Collins, 397 U. S. 159, we vacated and remanded the case for reconsideration (397 U. S. 315) and the Court of Appeals reaffirmed its previous decision.
Here, as in Data Processing, we are concerned with § 4 of the Bank Service Corporation Act, 76 Stat. 1132, 12 U. S. C. § 1864. In Data Processing we did not rely on any legislative history showing that Congress desired to protect data processors alone from competition. Moreover, we noted a growing trend “toward enlargement of the class of people'who may protest administrative action.” 397. U. S., at 154. We held that § 4 “arguably brings a competitor within the zone of interests protected by it.” Id., at 156. Nothing in the opinion limited § 4 to protecting only competitors in the data-processing field. When national banks begin to provide travel services for their customers, they compete with travel agents no less than they'compete with data processors when they, provide data-processing services to their -customers.
Accordingly the writ of certiorari is granted, the judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Harlan would set the case for argument.
Paragraph 7475 of the Comptroller’s Manual for National Banks provides: “Incident to those powers vested in them under 12 U. S. C. .24, national banks may provide travel services for their customers and receive compensation therefor. Such services may include the sale of trip insurance and the rental of automobiles, as agent for a local rental service. In connection therewith, national banks may advertise, develop, and extend such travel services for the purpose of attracting customers to the bank.”
“No bank service corporation may engage in any activity other than the performance of bank services for banks.”
The only legislative history of the Bank Service Corporation Act mentioned in the opinion was that § 4 was a “ ‘response t.o the fears expressed by a few senators, that without such a prohibition, the bill would have -enabled “banks to engage in a nonbanking activity,” S. Rep. No. 2105 [87th Cong;, 2d-Sess., 7-12] (Supplemental views of Senators Proxmiire, Douglas, and Neuberger), and thus constitute “a serious exception to the accepted public policy which strictly limits banks to banking.” .(Supplemental views of . Senators Muskie and Clark).’ ” 397 U. S., at 155.
The final question under Data Processing, whether judicial review of the administrative decision has been precluded,' was specifically' Tesolved against the Comptroller in that case. 397 U, S., at 157.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent is a white football player of unknown political affiliation who seeks to recover damages under 42 U. S. C. § 1985(2) (1976 ed., Supp. V) for an alleged conspiracy to intimidate potential witnesses in a federal lawsuit. Petitioners argue that the action must be dismissed because there is no claim that the conspiracy was motivated by the kind of “racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus” we held to be necessary in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U. S. 88, 102 (1971). We reject their contention, because the critical language in § 1985(3), the statute that applied to the Griffin conspiracy, does not apply to the violation of the first part of § 1985(2) alleged in this case.
The issue before us is narrow and may be briefly stated. In both federal and state tribunals, respondent Rutledge has asserted a variety of common-law and statutory claims against Arizona State University and its officials arising out of incidents that occurred while he was a member of the University’s football squad. One of his claims is that three of the petitioners — the Arizona State University athletic director, head football coach, and assistant football coach— engaged in a conspiracy to intimidate and threaten various potential material witnesses in order to prevent them from testifying “freely, fully and truthfully” in his lawsuit in federal court.
The District Court granted a motion to dismiss the entire complaint on the grounds that the action was barred by the Eleventh Amendment and that respondent had failed to allege a violation of his civil rights. It concluded that respondent had failed to state a §1985 claim because he had not shown that he was a member of an identifiable class, and because his general allegations of a conspiracy were unsupported by specific facts. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-2. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of all claims against the University and its Board of Regents and of the vicarious liability claims against petitioner Miller, remanded for further proceedings on the other state-law tort claims against petitioners, and affirmed the dismissal of all federal civil rights claims against petitioners except the one at issue here. Rutledge v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 660 F. 2d 1345 (CA9 1981).
The Court of Appeals construed respondent’s allegations of witness intimidation, see n. 1, supra, as containing two components — obstruction of justice at the state level, and interference with federal litigation. The former was not actionable under the second part of §1985(2), the court held, because “there exists no sufficient allegation of racial or class-based invidiously discriminatory animus.” 660 F. 2d, at 1355. The court acknowledged that this Court’s decision in Griffin v. Breckenridge, supra, had interpreted a portion of § 1985(3) to include such a requirement in order to avoid the constitutional issues that would have attended enactment of a general federal tort law. It decided that the same principles applied to claims based on private conspiracies to obstruct justice in state-court proceedings.
But the Court of Appeals concluded that no allegations of class-based animus were required under the first part of § 1985(2), which proscribes intimidation of witnesses in the federal courts. It relied on the plain language of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and on the legislative history. Noting the Federal Government’s unquestioned constitutional authority to protect the processes of its own courts, and the absence of any need to limit the first part of § 1985(2) to avoid creating a general federal tort law, the Court of Appeals declined to impose the limitation set forth in Griffin v. Breckenridqe. 660 F. 2d, at 1355.
Because other Circuits have read the first part of § 1985(2) more narrowly, see Kimble v. D. J. McDuffy, Inc., 648 F. 2d 340, 346-348 (CA5) (en banc), cert. denied, 454 U. S. 1110 (1981); Jones v. United States, 536 F. 2d 269, 271 (CA8 1976), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1039 (1977), we granted certiorari limited to the question of statutory construction, 458 U. S. 1120 (1982). As have the Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, McCord v. Bailey, 204 U. S. App. D. C. 334, 345, 636 F. 2d 606, 616 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U. S. 983 (1981), and the Third Circuit, Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F. 2d 830, 840 (1976), we agree with the Ninth Circuit’s analysis.
t — I I — I
The statutory provision that is now codified as § 1985 of Title 42 of the United States Code was originally enacted as §2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13. The length and style of § 2 of the 1871 Act, reprinted in full as an Appendix to this opinion, make it somewhat difficult to parse. Nevertheless, if its several components are carefully identified, its meaning becomes clear.
Although §2 contained only one long paragraph when it was originally enacted, that single paragraph outlawed five broad classes of conspiratorial activity. In general terms, §2 proscribed conspiracies that interfere with (a) the performance of official duties by federal officers; (b) the administration of justice in federal courts; (c) the administration of justice in state courts; (d) the private enjoyment of “equal protection of the laws” and “equal privileges and immunities under the laws”; and (e) the right to support candidates in federal elections. As now codified in § 1985, the long paragraph is divided into three subsections. One of the five classes of prohibited conspiracy is proscribed by § 1985(1), two by § 1985(2), and two by § 1985(3). The civil remedy for a violation of any of the subsections is found at the end of § 1985(3). The reclassification was not intended to change the substantive meaning of the 1871 Act.
Three of the five broad categories, the first two and the fifth, relate to institutions and processes of the Federal Government — federal officers, § 1985(1); federal judicial proceedings, the first portion of § 1985(2); and federal elections, the second part of § 1985(3). The statutory provisions dealing with these categories of conspiratorial activity contain no language requiring that the conspirators act with intent to deprive their victims of the equal protection of the laws. Nor was such language found in the corresponding portions of § 2 of the 1871 Act. See Appendix to this opinion.
The remaining two categories, however, encompass underlying activity that is not institutionally linked to federal interests and that is usually of primary state concern. The second part of § 1985(2) applies to conspiracies to obstruct the course of justice in state courts, and the first part of § 1985(3) provides a cause of action against two or more persons who “conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another.” Each of these portions of the statute contains language requiring that the conspirators’ actions be motivated by an intent to deprive their victims of the equal protection of the laws.
This limiting language was construed in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U. S. 88 (1971), a case in which a unanimous Court held that § 1985(3) applies to purely private conspiracies. In explaining why that holding would not create an open-ended federal tort law applicable “to all tortious, conspiratorial interferences with the rights of others,” id., at 101, we expressly stated:
“The language requiring intent to deprive of equal protection, or equal privileges and immunities, means that there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action. The conspiracy, in other words, must aim at a deprivation of the equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law to all.” Id., at 102.
Although Griffin itself arose under the first clause of § 1985(3), petitioners argue that its reasoning should be applied to the remaining portions of § 1985 as well. We cannot accept that argument for three reasons. First, the scope of the Griffin opinion is carefully confined to “the portion of § 1985 (3) now before us,” id., at 99; see also id., at 102, n. 9. There is no suggestion in the opinion that its reasoning applies to any other portion of § 1985. Second, the analysis in the Griffin opinion relied heavily on the fact that the sponsors of the 1871 bill added the “equal protection” language in response to objections that the “enormous sweep of the original language” vastly extended federal authority and displaced state control over private conduct. Id., at 99-100. That legislative background does not apply to the portions of the statute that prohibit interference with federal officers, federal courts, or federal elections. Third, and of greatest importance, the statutory language that provides the textual basis for the “class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus” requirement simply does not appear in the portion of the statute that applies to this case. See n. 4, supra.
Given the structure of § 2 of the 1871 Act, it is clear that Congress did not intend to impose a requirement of class-based animus on persons seeking to prove a violation of their rights under the first clause of §1985(2). The legislative history supports the conclusion we have drawn from the language of the statute. Protection of the processes of the federal courts was an essential component of Congress’ solution to disorder and anarchy in the Southern States. Neither proponents nor opponents of the bill had any doubt that the Constitution gave Congress the power to prohibit intimidation of parties, witnesses, and jurors in federal courts.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT
Section 2 of the 1871 Civil Rights Act, 17 Stat. 13 (emphasis supplied).
“That if two or more persons within any State or Territory of the United States shall conspire together to overthrow, or to put down, or to destroy by force the government of the United States, or to levy war against the United States, or to oppose by force the authority of the government of the United States, or by force, intimidation, or threat to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United States, or by force to seize, take, or possess any property of the United States contrary to the authority thereof, or by force, intimidation, or threat to prevent any person from accepting or holding any office or trust or place of confidence under the United States, or from discharging the duties thereof, or by force, intimidation, or threat to induce any officer of the United States to leave any State, district, or place where his duties as such officer might lawfully be performed, or to injure him in his person or property on account of his lawful discharge of the duties of his office, or to injure his person while engaged in the lawful discharge of the duties of his office, or to injure his property so as to molest, interrupt, hinder, or impede him in the discharge of his official duty, or by force, intimidation, or threat to deter any party or witness in any court of the United States from attending such court, or from testifying in any matter pending in such court fully, freely, and truthfully, or to injure any such party or witness in his person or property on account of his having so attended or testified, or by force, intimidation, or threat to influence the verdict, presentment, or indictment, of any juror or grand juror in any court of the United States, or to injure such juror in his person or property on account of any verdict, presentment, or indictment lawfully assented to by him, or on account of his being or having been such juror, or shall conspire together, or go in disguise upon the public highway or upon the premises of another for the purpose, either directly or indirectly, of depriving any person or any class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges or immunities under the laws, or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State from giving or securing to all persons within such State the equal protection of the laws, or shall conspire together for the purpose of in any manner impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating the due course of justice in any State or Territory, with intent to deny to any citizen of the United States the due and equal protection of the laws, or to injure any person in his person or his property for lawfully enforcing the right of any person or class of persons to the equal protection of the laws, or by force, intimidation, or threat to prevent any citizen of the United States lawfully entitled to vote from giving his support or advocacy in a lawful manner towards or in favor of the election of any lawfully qualified person as an elector of President or Vice-President of the United States, or as a member of the Congress of the United States, or to injure any such citizen in his person or property on account of such support or advocacy, each and every person so offending shall be deemed guilty of a high crime, and, upon conviction thereof in any district or circuit court of the United States or district or supreme court of any Territory of the United States having jurisdiction of similar offences, shall be punished by a fine not less than five hundred nor more than five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment, with or without hard labor, as the court may determine, for a period of not less than six months nor more than six years, as the court may determine, or by both such fine and imprisonment as the court shall determine. And if any one or more persons engaged in any such conspiracy shall do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby any person shall be injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the person so injured or deprived of such rights and privileges may have and maintain an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation of rights and privileges against any one or more of the persons engaged in such conspiracy, such action to be prosecuted in the proper district or circuit court of the United States, with and subject to the same rights of appeal, review upon error, and other remedies provided in like cases in such courts under the provisions of the act of April ninth, eighteen hundred and sixty-six, entitled ‘An act to protect all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and to furnish the means of their vindication.”’
This is the essence of the § 1985(2) claim as described in the briefs and arguments in this Court. The Court of Appeals recognized that whether respondent had “adequately alleged a claim under the first part of section 1985(2) is a close question,” but decided it in the affirmative. Rutledge v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 660 F. 2d 1345, 1355 (CA9 1981). Under the liberal pleading rules of Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41, 47-48 (1957), the Court of Appeals properly construed the amended complaint as raising the issue presented to this Court on certiorari.
Count Five of the amended complaint, which was added two days after the filing of the original complaint in United States District Court, does not expressly allege that witnesses were intimidated in connection with a federal-court proceeding. It alleges in part that:
“56. On information and belief, since the time of filing the statutorily mandated claim with the Arizona Board of Regents, defendants Kush, Miller and Horton have conspired to prevent, by intimidation and threat, various material witnesses from freely, fully and truthfully testifying as to matters raised in the within complaint.
“57. On information and belief, since the time of filing the statutorily mandated claim with the Arizona Board of Regents, defendants Kush, Miller and Horton have conspired for the purpose of hindering or obstructing the due course of justice with an intent to deny the plaintiff equal protection of the laws by threatening and intimidating potential material witnesses, to prevent the plaintiff from lawfully enforcing his rights and to ‘cover up’ the wrongful acts of defendants Kush and Maskill.” App. to Pet. for Cert. E-ll to E-12.
These allegations might appear to describe only a conspiracy to interfere with potential witnesses before the Arizona Board of Regents. But ¶ 56 reflects the specific language of the first clause of § 1985(2), which relates to witness intimidation in connection with federal proceedings, see n. 4, infra, whereas ¶ 57 closely follows the wording of the second clause of that provision, which applies to witness intimidation in state-court proceedings, see n. 3, infra. Paragraph 60 then alleges generally that § 1985(2) has been violated by the defendants. Thus ¶ 56 of the complaint can fairly be read as alleging a conspiracy related to federal judicial proceedings.
The Court of Appeals concluded:
“On remand the district court may wish to require the appellant to amend Count Five to make more particular his allegations under part one of section 1985(2) and to eliminate those allegations pertaining to the second part of that section. Nothing in this opinion should be construed to prevent this course of action.” 660 F. 2d, at 1355.
The second portion of § 1985(2) provides:
“[0]r if two or more persons conspire for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating, in any manner, the due course of justice in any State or Territory, with intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection of the laws, or to injure him or his property for lawfully enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the right of any person, or class of persons, to the equal protection of the laws ...” (emphasis added).
The first part of § 1985(2) provides:
“If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to deter, by force, intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in any court of the United States from attending such court, or from testifying to any matter pending therein, freely, fully, and truthfully, or to injure such party or witness in his person or property on account of his having so attended or testified, or to influence the verdict, presentment, or indictment of any grand or petit juror in any such court, or to injure such juror in his person or property on account of any verdict, presentment, or indictment lawfully assented to by him, or of his being or having been such juror . . . .”
Our limited grant of certiorari does not encompass the question whether the alleged conspiracy to interfere with witnesses gave rise to any recoverable damages. This issue remains open for consideration by the District Court on remand from the Court of Appeals.
When Congress passed legislation in 1874 to consolidate and collect all federal statutes and laws in the Revised Statutes, 18 Stat. 113, it expressed no intention to change the meaning of the laws, although minor changes in language were made to accommodate the consolidation. Cf. Pott v. Arthur, 104 U. S. 735, 736 (1881).
Although the provisions dealing with interference with federal judicial proceedings and state judicial proceedings now appear together in § 1985(2), they were separated by other material in the original version of § 2. See Appendix to this opinion.
For the second clause of § 1985(2), see n. 3, supra. The first portion of § 1985(3), which actually contains two separate clauses, reads as follows:
“If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws ...” (emphasis added).
We are unpersuaded by petitioners’ argument that a contrary conclusion is required because the authorization of remedies found at the end of § 1985(3) applies to the entire section. The location of the remedial language merely confirms our view that the meaning of any part of § 1985 is informed by its entire text.
See Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 486 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Cook, supporter); id., at App. 220 (remarks of Sen. Thurman, opponent). The legislative history is discussed accurately and persuasively by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in McCord v. Bailey, 204 U. S. App. D. C. 334, 345, 636 F. 2d 606, 615-617 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U. S. 983 (1981).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | B | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Stewart
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (Act) prohibits an employer from discharging or discriminating against any employee who exercises “any right afforded by” the Act. The Secretary of Labor (Secretary) has promulgated a regulation providing that, among the rights that the Act so protects, is the right of an employee to choose not to perform his assigned task because of a reasonable apprehension of death or serious injury coupled with a reasonable belief that no less drastic alternative is available. The question presented in the case before us is whether this regulation is consistent with the Act.
"No person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this Act or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding or because of the exercise by such employee on behalf of himself or others of any right afforded by this Act.”
I
The petitioner company maintains a manufacturing plant in Marion, Ohio, for the production of household appliances. Overhead conveyors transport appliance components throughout the plant. To protect employees from objects that occasionally fall from these conveyors, the petitioner has installed a horizontal wire-mesh guard screen approximately 20 feet above the plant floor. This mesh screen is welded to angle-iron frames suspended from the building’s structural steel skeleton.
'Maintenance employees of the petitioner spend several hours each week removing objects from the screen, replacing paper spread on the screen to catch grease drippings from the material on the conveyors, and performing occasional maintenance work on the conveyors themselves. To perform these duties, maintenance employees usually are able to stand on the iron frames, but sometimes find it necessary to step onto the steel mesh screen itself.
In 1973, the company began to install heavier wire in the screen because its safety had been drawn into question. Several employees had fallen partly through the old screen, and on one occasion an employee had fallen completely through to the plant floor below but had survived. A number of maintenance employees had reacted to these incidents by bringing the unsafe screen conditions to the attention of their foremen. The petitioner company’s contemporaneous safety instructions admonished employees to step only on the angle-iron frames.
On June 28, 1974, a maintenance employee fell to his death through the guard screen in an area where the newer, stronger mesh had not yet been installed. Following this incident, the petitioner effectuated some repairs and issued an order strictly forbidding maintenance employees from stepping on either the screens or the angle-iron supporting structure. An alternative but somewhat more cumbersome and less satisfactory method was developed for removing objects from the screen. This procedure required employees to stand on power-raised mobile platforms and use hooks to recover the material.
On July 7, 1974, two of the petitioner's maintenance employees, Virgil Deemer and Thomas Cornwell, met with the plant maintenance superintendent to voice their concern about the safety of the screen. The superintendent disagreed with their view, but permitted the two men to inspect the screen with their foreman and to point out dangerous areas needing repair. Unsatisfied with the petitioner's response to the results of this inspection, Deemer and Cornwell met on July 9 with the plant safety director. At that meeting, they requested the name, address, and telephone number of a representative of the local office of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). Although the safety director told the men that they “had better stop and think about what [they] were doing,” he furnished the men with the information they requested. Later that same day, Deemer contacted an official of the regional OSHA office and discussed the guard screen.
The next day, Deemer and Cornwell reported for the night shift at 10:45 p. m. Their foreman, after himself walking on some of the angle-iron frames, directed the two men to perform their usual maintenance duties on a section of the old screen. Claiming that the screen was unsafe, they refused to carry out this directive. The foreman then sent them to the personnel office, where they were ordered to punch out without working or being paid for the remaining six hours of the shift. The two men subsequently received written, reprimands, which were placed in their employment files.
A little over a month later, the Secretary filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, alleging that the petitioner’s actions against Deemer and Corn-well constituted discrimination in violation of § 11 (c)(1) of the Act. As relief, the complaint prayed, inter alia, that the petitioner be ordered to expunge from its personnel files all references to the reprimands issued to the two employees, and for a permanent injunction requiring the petitioner to compensate the two employees for the six hours of pay they had lost by reason of their disciplinary suspensions.
Following a bench trial, the District Court found that the regulation in question justified Deemer’s and Cornwell’s refusals to obey their foreman’s order on July 10, 1974. The court found that the two employees had “refused to perform the cleaning operation because of a genuine fear of death or serious bodily harm,” that the danger presented had been “real and not something which [had] existed only in the minds of the employees,” that the employees had acted in good faith, and that no reasonable alternative had realistically been open to them other than to refuse to work. The District Court nevertheless denied relief, holding that the Secretary’s regulation was inconsistent with the Act and therefore invalid. Usery v. Whirlpool Corp., 416 F. Supp. 30, 32-34.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the District Court’s judgment. 593 F. 2d 715. Finding ample support in the record for the District Court’s factual determination that the actions of Deemer and Cornwell had been justified under the Secretary’s regulation, id., at 719, n. 5, the appellate court disagreed with the District Court’s conclusion that the regulation is invalid. Id., at 721-736. It accordingly remanded the case to the District Court for further proceedings. Id., at 736. We granted certiorari, 444 U. S. 823, because the decision of the Court of Appeals in this case conflicts with those of two other Courts of Appeals on the important question in issue. See Marshall v. Daniel Construction Co., 563 F. 2d 707 (CA5 1977); Marshall v. Certified Welding Corp., No. 77-2048 (CA10 Dec. 28, 1978). That question, as stated at the outset of this opinion, is whether the Secretary’s regulation authorizing employee “self-help” in some circumstances, 29 CFR § 1977.12 (b)(2) (1979), is permissible under the Act.
II
The Act itself creates an express mechanism for protecting workers from employment conditions believed to pose an emergent threat of death or serious injury. Upon receipt of an employee inspection request stating reasonable grounds to believe that an imminent danger is present in a workplace, OSHA must conduct an inspection. 29 U. S. C. § 657 (f)(1). In the event this inspection reveals workplace conditions or practices that “could reasonably be expected to cause death or serious physical harm immediately or before the imminence of such danger can be eliminated through the enforcement procedures otherwise provided by” the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 662 (a), the OSHA inspector must inform the affected employees and the employer of the danger and notify them that he is recommending to the Secretary that injunctive relief be sought. § 662 (c). At this juncture, the Secretary can petition a federal court to restrain the conditions or practices giving rise to the imminent danger. By means of a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, the court may then require the employer to avoid, correct, or remove the danger or to prohibit employees from working in the area. § 662 (a).
To ensure that this process functions effectively, the Act expressly accords to every employee several rights, the exercise of which may not subject him to discharge or discrimination. An employee is given the right to inform OSHA of an imminently dangerous workplace condition or practice and request that OSHA inspect that condition or practice. 29 U. S. C. § 657 (f) (1). He is given a limited right to assist the OSHA inspector in inspecting the workplace, §§ 657 (a)(2), (e), and (f)(2), and the right to aid a court in determining whether or not a risk of imminent danger in fact exists. See § 660 (c)(1). Finally, an affected employee is given the right to bring an action to compel the Secretary to seek injunctive relief if he believes the Secretary has wrongfully declined to do so. § 662 (d).
In the light of this detailed statutory scheme, the Secretary is obviously correct when he acknowledges in his regulation that, “as a general matter, there is no right afforded by the Act which would entitle employees to walk off the job because of potential unsafe conditions at the workplace.” By providing for prompt notice to the employer of an inspector’s intention to seek an injunction against an imminently dangerous condition, the legislation obviously contemplates that the employer will normally respond by voluntarily and speedily eliminating the danger. And in the few instances where this does not occur, the legislative provisions authorizing prompt judicial action are designed to give employees full protection in most situations from the risk of injury or death resulting from an imminently dangerous condition at the worksite.
As this case illustrates, however, circumstances may sometimes exist in which the employee justifiably believes that the express statutory arrangement does not sufficiently protect him from death or serious injury. Such circumstances will probably not often occur, but such a situation may arise when (1) the employee is ordered by his employer to work under conditions that the employee reasonably believes pose an imminent risk of death or serious bodily injury, and (2) the employee has reason to believe that there is not sufficient time or opportunity either to seek effective redress from his employer or to apprise OSHA of the danger.
Nothing in the Act suggests that those few employees who have to face this dilemma must rely exclusively on the remedies expressly set forth in the Act at the risk of their own safety. But nothing in the-Act explicitly provides otherwise. Against this background of legislative silence, the Secretary has exercised his rulemaking power under 29 U. S. C. § 657 (g)(2) and has determined that, when an employee in good faith finds himself in such a predicament, he may refuse to expose himself to the dangerous condition, without being subjected to “subsequent discrimination” by the employer.
The question before us is whether this interpretative regulation constitutes a permissible gloss on the Act by the Secretary, in light of the Act’s language, structure, and legislative history. Our inquiry is informed by an awareness that the regulation is entitled to deference unless it can be said not to be a reasoned and supportable interpretation of the Act. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 139-140. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U. S. 555; Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U. S. 356.
A
The regulation clearly conforms to the fundamental objective of the Act — to prevent occupational deaths and serious injuries. The Act, in its preamble, declares that its purpose and policy is “to assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions and to preserve our human resources....” 29 U. S. C. § 651 (b). (Emphasis added.)
To accomplish this basic purpose, the legislation’s remedial orientation is prophylactic in nature. See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 430 U. S. 442, 444-445. The Act does not wait for an employee to die or become injured. It authorizes the promulgation of health and safety standards and the issuance of citations in the hope that these will act to prevent deaths or injuries from ever occurring. It would seem anomalous to construe an Act so directed and constructed as prohibiting an employee, with no other reasonable alternative, the freedom to withdraw from a workplace environment that he reasonably believes is highly dangerous.
Moreover, the Secretary’s regulation can be viewed as an appropriate aid to the full effectuation of the Act’s “general duty” clause. That clause provides that “[e]ach employer....shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees.” 29 U. S. C. § 654 (a)(1). As the legislative history of this provision reflects it was intended itself to deter the occurrence of occupational deaths and serious injuries by placing on employers a mandatory obligation independent of the specific health and safety standards to be promulgated by the Secretary... Since.OSHA inspectors cannot be present around the clock in every workplace, the Secretary's regulation ensures that employees will in all circumstances enjoy the rights afforded them by the “general duty” clause.
The regulation thus on its face appears to further the overriding purpose of the Act, and rationally to complement its remedial scheme. In the absence of some contrary indication in the legislative history, the Secretary’s regulation must, therefore, be upheld, particularly when it is remembered that safety legislation is to be liberally construed to effectuate the congressional purpose. United States v. Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U. S. 784, 798; Lilly v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 317 U. S. 481, 486.
B
In urging reversal of the judgment before us, the petitioner relies primarily on two aspects of the Act’s legislative history.
1
Representative Daniels of New Jersey sponsored one of several House bills that led ultimately to the passage of the Act. As reported to the House by the Committee on Education and Labor, the Daniels bill contained a section that was soon dubbed the “strike with pay” provision. This section provided that employees could request an examination by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) of the toxicity of any materials in their workplace. If that examination revealed a workplace substance that had “potentially toxic or harmful effects in such concentration as used or found,” the employer was given 60 days to correct the potentially dangerous condition. Following the expiration of that period, the employer could not require that an employee be exposed to toxic concentrations of the substancé unless the employee was informed of the hazards and symptoms associated with the substance, the' employee was instructed in the proper precautions for dealing with the substance, and the employee was furnished with personal protective equipment. If these conditions were not met, an employee could “absent himself from such risk of harm for the period necessary to avoid such danger without loss of regular compensation for such period.”
This provision encountered stiff opposition in the House. Representative Steiger of Wisconsin introduced a substitute bill containing no “strike with pay” provision. In response, Representative Daniels offered a floor amendment that, among other things, deleted his bill's “strike with pay” provision. He suggested that employees instead be afforded the right to request an immediate OSHA inspection of the premises, a right which the Steiger bill did not provide. The House ultimately adopted the Steiger bill.
The bill that was reported to and, with a few amendments, passed by the Senate never contained a “strike with-pay” provision. It did, however, give employees the means by which they could request immediate Labor Department inspections. These two characteristics of the bill were underscored on the floor of the Senate by Senator Williams, the bill's sponsor.
After passage of the Williams bill by the Senate, it and the Steiger bill were submitted to a Conference Committee. There, the House acceded to the Senate bill’s inspection request provisions.
The petitioner reads into this legislative history a congressional intent incompatible with an administrative interpretation of the Act such as is embodied in the regulation at issue in this case. The petitioner argues that Congress’ overriding concern in rejecting the “strike with pay” provision was to. avoid giving employees a unilateral authority to walk off the job which they might abuse in order to intimidate or harass their employer. Congress deliberately chose instead, the petitioner maintains, to grant employees the power to request immediate administrative inspections of the workplace which could in appropriate cases lead to coercive judicial remedies. As the petitioner views the regulation, therefore, it gives to workers precisely what Congress determined to withhold from them.
We read the legislative history differently. Congress rejected a provision that did not concern itself at all with conditions posing real and immediate threats of death or severe injury. The remedy which the rejected provision furnished employees could have been invoked only after 60 days had passed following HEW’s inspection and notification that improperly high levels of toxic substances were present in the workplace. Had that inspection revealed employment conditions posing a threat of imminent and grave harm, the Secretary of Labor would presumably have requested, long before expiration of the 60-day period, a court injunction pursuant to other provisions of the Daniels bill. Consequently, in rejecting the Daniels bill’s “strike with pay” provision, Congress was not rejecting a legislative provision dealing with the highly perilous and fast-moving situations covered by the regulation now before us.
It is also important to emphasize that what primarily troubled Congress about the Daniels bill’s “strike with pay” provision was its requirement that employees be paid their regular salary after having properly invoked their right to refuse to work under the section. It is instructive that virtually every time the issue of an employee's right to absent himself from hazardous work was discussed in the legislative debates, it was in the context of the employee’s right to continue to receive his usual compensation.
When it rejected the “strike with pay” concept, therefore, Congress very clearly meant to reject a law unconditionally imposing upon employers an obligation to continue to pay their employees their regular paychecks when they absented themselves from work for reasons of safety. But the regulation at issue here does not require employers to pay workers who refuse to perform their assigned tasks in the face of imminent danger. It simply provides that in such cases the employer may not “discriminate” against the employees involved. An employer “discriminates” against an employee only when he treats that employee less favorably than he treats others similarly situated.
2
The second aspect of the Act’s legislative history upon which the petitioner relies is the rejection by Congress of provisions contained in both the Daniels and the Williams bills that would have given Labor Department officials, in imminent-danger situations, the power temporarily to shut down all or part of an employer’s plant. These provisions aroused considerable opposition in both Houses of Congress. The hostility engendered in the House of Representatives led Representative Daniels to delete his version of the provision in proposing amendments to his original bill. The Steiger bill that ultimately passed the House gave the Labor Department no such authority. The Williams bill, as approved by the Senate, did contain an administrative shutdown provision, but the Conference Committee rejected this aspect of the Senate bill.
The petitioner infers from these events a congressional will hostile to the regulation in question here. The regulation, the petitioner argues, provides employees with the very authority to shut down an employer’s plant that was expressly denied a more expert and objective United States Department of Labor.
As we read the pertinent legislative history, however, the petitioner misconceives the thrust of Congress’ concern. Those in Congress who prevented passage of the administrative shutdown provisions in the Daniels and Williams bills were opposed to the unilateral authority those provisions gave to federal officials, without any judicial safeguards, drastically to impair the operation of an employer’s business. Congressional opponents also feared that the provisions might jeopardize the Government’s otherwise neutral role in labor-management relations.
Neither of these congressional concerns is implicated by the regulation before us. The regulation accords no authority to Government officials. It simply permits private employees of a private employer to avoid workplace conditions that they believe pose grave dangers to their own safety. The employees have no power under the regulation to order their employer to correct the hazardous condition or to clear the dangerous workplace of others. Moreover, any employee who acts in reliance on the regulation runs the risk of discharge or reprimand in the event a court subsequently finds that he acted unreasonably or in bad faith. The regulation, therefore, does not remotely resemble the legislation that Congress rejected.
c
For these reasons we conclude that 29 CFR § 1977.12 (b) (2) (1979) was promulgated by the Secretary in the valid exercise of his authority under the Act. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
84 Stat. 1590, as amended, 92 Stat. 183, 29 U. S. C. § 651 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. II).
Section 11 (c)(1) of the Act, 84 Stat. 1603, 29 U. S. C. § 660 (c)(1), provides in full:
The regulation, 29 CFR § 1977.12 (1979), provides in full:
“(a) In’addition to protecting employees who file complaints, institute proceedings, or testify in.proceedings under or related to the Act, section 11 (c) also protects employees from discrimination occurring because of the exercise 'of any right afforded by this Act.’ Certain rights are explicitly provided in the Act; for example, there is a right to participate as a party in enforcement proceedings (sec. 10). Certain other rights exist by necessary implication. For example, employees may request information from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration; such requests would constitute the exercise of a right afforded by the Act. Likewise, employees interviewed by agents of the Secretary in the course of inspections or investigations could not subsequently be discriminated against because of their cooperation.
“(b)(1) On the other hand, review of the Act and examination of the legislative history discloses that, as a general matter, there is no right afforded by the Act which would entitle employees to walk off the job because of potential unsafe conditions at the workplace. Hazardous conditions which may be violative of the Act wiE ordinarily be corrected by the employer, once brought lo his attention. If corrections are not accomplished, or if there is dispute about the existence of a hazard, the employee wiE normally have opportunity to request inspection of the workplace pursuant to section 8 (f) of the Act, or to seek the assistance of other pubEc agencies which have responsibEity in the field of safety and health. Under such circumstances, therefore, an employer would not ordinarily be in violation of section 11 (c) by taking action to discipline an employee for refusing to perform normal job activities because of alleged safety or health hazards.
“(2) However, occasions might arise when an employee is confronted with a choice between not performing assigned tasks or subjecting himself to serious injury or death arising from a hazardous condition at the workplace. If the employee, with no reasonable alternative, refuses in good faith to expose himself to the dangerous condition, he would' be protected • against subsequent discrimination. The condition causing the employee’s apprehension of death or injury must be of such a nature that a reasonable person, under the circumstances then confronting the employee, would conclude that there is a real danger of death or serious injury and that there is insufficient time, due to the urgency of the situation, to eliminate the danger through resort to regular statutory enforcement channels. In addition, in such circumstances, the employee, where possible, must also have sought from his employer, and been unable to obtain, a correction of the dangerous condition.”
As a result of this fatality, the Secretary conducted an investigation that led to the issuance of a citation charging the company with maintaining an unsafe walking and working surface in violation of 29 U. S. C. § 654 (a)(1). The citation required immediate abatement of the hazard and proposed a $600 penalty. Nearly five years following the accident, the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission affirmed the citation, but decided to permit the petitioner six months in which to correct the unsafe condition. Whirlpool Corp., 1979 CCH OSHD ¶ 23,552. A petition to review that decision is pending in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
The record does not disclose the substance of this conversation beyond the fact that it concerned the safety of the guard screen.
This order appears to have been in direct violation of the outstanding company directive that maintenance work was to be accomplished without stepping on the screen apparatus.
Both employees apparently returned to work the following day without further incident.
See n. 2, supra.
See n. 3, supra.
In its petition for certiorari, the petitioner did not cite this aspect of the Court of Appeals’ decision as raising a question for review. Accordingly, the issue of whether the regulation covers the particular circumstances of this ease is not before the Court. This Court’s Rule 23 (1) (c) ; General Pictures Co. v. Electric Co., 304 U. S. 175, 177-179.
These usual enforcement procedures involve the issuance of citations and imposition of penalties. When an OSHA inspection reveals a violation of 29 U. S. C. § 654 or of any standard promulgated under the Act, the Secretary may issue a citation for the alleged violation, fix a reasonable time for the dangerous condition’s abatement, and propose a penalty. §§ 658 (a), 659 (a), 666. The employer may contest the citation and proposed penalty. §§ 659 (a), (c). Should he do so, the effective date of the abatement order is postponed until the completion of all administrative proceedings initiated in good faith. §§ 659 (b), 666 (d). Such proceedings may include a hearing before an administrative law judge and review by the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission. §§ 659 (c), 661 (i).
Such an order may continue pending the consummation of the Act’s normal enforcement proceedings. § 662 (b).
Should the Secretary determine that “there are no reasonable grounds to believe that a violation or danger exists be shall notify the em-ployefe]... of such determination.” § 657 (f)(1).
See n. 3, supra.
The petitioner has raised no issue concerning whether or not this regulation was promulgated in accordance with the procedural requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. § 553. Thus, we accept the Secretary’s designation of the regulation as “interpretative,” and do not consider whether it qualifies as an “interpretative rule” within the meaning of the APA, 5 U. S. C. § 553 (b) (A).
The Act’s legislative history contains numerous references to the Act’s preventive purpose and to the tragedy of each individual death or accident. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 91-1282, p. 2 (1970) (hereinafter S. Rep.), Leg. Hist. 142; 116 Cong. Rec. 37628 (1970), Leg. Hist. 516-517 (Sen. Nelson); 116 Cong. Rec. 37628, 37630 (1970), Leg. Hist. 518, 522 (Sen. Cranston); 116 Cong. Rec. 37630 (1970), Leg. Hist. 522-523 (Sen. Randolph); H. R. Rep. No. 91-1291, pp. 14, 23 (1970) (hereinafter H. R. Rep.), Leg. Hist. 844, 853; 116 Cong. Rec. 38366 (1970), Leg. Hist. 978 (Rep. Young); 116 Cong. Rec. 38367-38368 (1970), Leg. Hist. 981 (Rep. Anderson); 116 Cong. Rec. 38386 (1970), Leg. Hist. 1031, 1032 (Rep. Dent); 116 Cong. Rec. 42203 (1970), Leg. Hist. 1210 (Rep. Daniels). As stated by Senator Yarborough, a sponsor of the Senate bill:
“We are talking about people’s lives, not the indifference of some cost accountants. We are talking about assuring the men and women who work in our plants and factories that they will go home after a day’s work with their bodies intact.” 116 Cong. Rec. 37625 (1970), Leg. Hist. 510.
House and Senate debates are reprinted, along with the House, Senate, and Conference Reports, in a one-volume Committee Print entitled Legislative History of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (June 1971) (cited supra and hereafter as Leg. Hist.).
See S. Rep. 9-10, Leg. Hist. 149-150; H. R. Rep. 21-22, Leg. Hist. 851-852.
It is also worth noting that the Secretary’s interpretation of 29 U. S. C. § 660 (c)(1) conforms to the interpretation that Congress clearly wished the courts to give to the parallel antidiscrimination provision of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977; 30 U. S. C. § 801 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. II). The legislative history of that provision, 30 U. S. C. §815 (c)(1) (1976 ed., Supp. II), establishes that Congress intended it to protect “the refusal to work in conditions which are believed to be unsafe or unhealthful.” S. Rep. No. 95-181, p. 35 (1977). See id., at 36; 123 Cong. Rec. 20043-20044 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Church, Sen. Williams, Sen. Javits).
H. R. 16785, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), Leg. Hist. 893-976 (bill as reported to the House). See H. R. Rep., Leg. Hist. 831.
Section 19(a)(5) of H. R. 16785, supra, Leg. Hist. 969-970 (as reported to the House floor) provided in relevant part:
“The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare shall publish... a list of all known or potentially toxic substances and the concentrations at which such toxicity is known to occur; and shall determine following a request by any employer or authorized representative of any group of employees whether any substance normally found in the working place has potentially toxic or harmful effects in such concentration as used or found; and shall submit such determination both to employers and affected employees as soon as possible. Within sixty days of such determination by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare of potential toxicity of any substance, an employer shall not require any employee to be exposed to such substance designated above in toxic or greater concentrations unless it is accompanied by information, made available to employees, by label or other appropriate means, of the known hazards or toxic or long-term ill effects, the nature of the substance, and the signs, symptoms, emergency treatment and proper conditions and precautions of safe use, and personal protective equipment is supplied which allows established work procedures to be performed with such equipment, or unless such exposed employee may absent himself from such risk of harm for the period necessary to avoid such danger without loss of regular compensation for such period.”
The Committee Report explained the provision as follows:
“There is still a real danger that an employee may be economically coerced into self-exposure in order to earn his livelihood, so the bill allows an employee to absent himself from that specific danger for the period of its duration without loss of pay.... Nothing herein restricts the right of the employer, except as he is obligated under other agreements, to assign a worker to other non-prohibited work during this time. This should eliminate possible abuse by allowing the employer to avoid payment for work not performed.” H. R. Rep. 30, Leg. Hist. 860.
H. R. 19200, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), Leg. Hist. 763-830 (bill as originally introduced). See H. Res. 1218, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), Leg. Hist. 977.
116 Cong. Rec. 38376, 38377-38378, 38707 (1970), Leg. Hist. 1004, 1005, 1008-1009, 1071 (Rep. Daniels). See 116 Cong. Rec. 38369 (1970), Leg. Hist. 986 (Rep. Perkins). Representative Daniels explained to the House why he was proposing his amendment:
“The provision on employees not losing pay was so generally misunderstood that we have decided to drop it. We have no provision for payment of employees who want to absent themselves from risk of harm; instead, we have this amendment which enables employees subject to a risk of harm to get the Secretary into the situation quickly. Instead of making provisions for employees when their employer is not providing a safe workplace, we have strengthened the enforcement by this amendment provision to try and minimize the amount that employees will be subject to the risk of harm.” 116 Cong. Rec. 38377-38378 (1970), Leg. Hist. 1009.
116 Cong. Rec. 38715 (teller vote), 38723-38724 (rollcall vote) (1970), Leg. Hist. 1091, 1112-1115.
Representative Daniels’ proposed amendments were never acted upon. His original bill was voted down in favor of the Steiger bill. See 116 Cong. Rec. 38704-38705 (1970), Leg. Hist. 1064 (the Chairman and Rep. Perkins); 116 Cong. Rec. 38707 (1970), Leg. Hist. 1072 (Rep. O’Hara).
S. 2193, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), Leg. Hist. 204-295 (bill as reported to Senate by Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare). See S. Rep., Leg. Hist. 141.
See S. 2193, supra, § 8 (f) (1), Leg. Hist. 252-253.
“[D]espite some wide-spread contentions to the contrary,... the committee bill does not contain a so-called strike-with-pay provision. Rather than raising a possibility for endless disputes over whether employees were entitled to walk off the job with full pay, it was decided in committee to enhance the prospects of compliance by the employer through such means as giving the employees the right to request a special Labor Department investigation or inspection.” 116 Cong. Rec. 37326 (1970), Leg. Hist. 416.
H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-1765, pp. 37-38 (1970), Leg. Hist. 1190-1191. See 29 U. S. C. §657 (f).
See H. R. 16785, supra n. 19, § 12 (b), Leg. Hist. 956 (bill as reported to House).
Congress’ concern necessarily was with the provision’s compensation requirement. The law then, as it does today, already afforded workers a right, under certain circumstances, to walk off their jobs when faced with hazardous conditions. See 116 Cong. Rec. 42208 (1970), Leg. Hist. 1223-1224 (Rep. Scherle) (reference to Taft-Hartley Act). Under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 157, employees have a protected right to strike over safety issues. See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U. S. 9. Similarly, Section 502 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 143, provides that “the quitting of labor by an employee or employees in good faith because of abnormally dangerous conditions for work at the place of employment
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | G | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the grant of habeas relief to respondent John Visci-otti after concluding that he had been prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. 288 F. 3d 1097 (2002). Because this decision exceeds the limits imposed on federal habeas review by 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d), we reverse.
I
Respondent and a co-worker, Brian Hefner, devised a plan to rob two fellow employees, Timothy Dykstra and Michael Wolbert, on November 8, 1982, their payday. They invited the pair to join them at a party. As the four were driving to that supposed destination in Wolbert’s car, respondent asked Wolbert to stop in a remote area so that he could relieve himself. When all four men had left the car, respondent pulled a gun, demanded the victims’ wallets (which turned out to be almost empty), and got Wolbert to tell him where in the car the cash was hidden. After Hefner had retrieved the cash, respondent walked over to the seated Dykstra and killed him with a shot in the chest from a distance of three or four feet. Respondent then raised the gun in both hands and shot Wolbert three times, in the torso and left shoulder, and finally, from a distance of about two feet, in the left eye. Respondent and Hefner fled the scene in Wolbert’s car. Wolbert miraculously survived to testify against them.
Respondent was convicted by a California jury of first-degree murder, attempted murder, and armed robbery, with a special-circumstance finding that the murder was committed during the commission of a robbery. The same jury determined that respondent should suffer death. The California Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. People v. Visciotti, 2 Cal. 4th 1, 825 P. 2d 388 (1992).
Respondent filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. That court appointed a referee to hold an evidentiary hearing and make findings of fact — after which, and after briefing on the merits, it denied the petition in a lengthy opinion. In re Visciotti, 14 Cal. 4th 325, 926 P. 2d 987 (1996). The California Supreme Court assumed that respondent’s trial counsel provided constitutionally inadequate representation during the penalty phase, but concluded that this did not prejudice the jury’s sentencing decision. Id., at 353, 356-357, 926 P. 2d, at 1004, 1006.
Respondent filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. That court determined that respondent had been denied effective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase of his trial, and granted the habeas petition as to his sentence. The State appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
The Court of Appeals correctly observed that a federal habeas application can only be granted if it meets the requirements of 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d), which provides:
“An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—
“(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
“(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”
The Court of Appeals found that the California Supreme Court decision ran afoul of both the “contrary to” and the “unreasonable application” conditions of § 2254(d)(1), and affirmed the District Court’s grant of relief. See 288 F. 3d, at 1118-1119. The State of California petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which we now grant along with respondent’s motion for leave to proceed informa pauperis.
II
A
We consider first the Ninth Circuit’s holding that the California Supreme Court’s decision was “contrary to” our decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984). Strickland held that to prove prejudice the defendant must establish a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different,” id., at 694 (emphasis added); it specifically rejected the proposition that the defendant had to prove it more likely than not that the outcome would have been altered, id., at 693. The Court of Appeals read the State Supreme Court opinion in this case as applying the latter test— as requiring respondent to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the result of the sentencing proceedings would have been different. See 288 F. 3d, at 1108-1109. That is, in our view, a mischaracterization of the state-court opinion, which expressed and applied the proper standard for evaluating prejudice.
The California Supreme Court began its analysis of the prejudice inquiry by setting forth the “reasonable probability” criterion, with a citation of the relevant passage in Strickland; and it proceeded to state that “[t]he question we must answer is whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors and omissions, the sentencing authority would have found that the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors did not warrant imposition of the death penalty,” again with a citation of Strickland. In re Visciotti, 14 Cal. 4th, at 352, 926 P. 2d, at 1003 (citing Strickland, supra, at 696). Twice, the court framed its inquiry as turning on whether there was a “reasonable probability” that the sentencing jury would have reached a more favorable penalty-phase verdict. 14 Cal. 4th, at 352, 353, 926 P. 2d, at 1003, 1004. The following passage, moreover, was central to the California Supreme Court’s analysis:
“In In re Fields,... we addressed the process by which the court assesses prejudice at the penalty phase of a capital trial at which counsel was, allegedly, incompetent in failing to present mitigating evidence: ‘What kind of evidentiary showing will undermine confidence in the outcome of a penalty trial that has resulted in a death verdict? Strickland . . . and the cases it cites offer some guidance. United States v. Agurs ... , the first case cited by Strickland, spoke of evidence which raised a reasonable doubt, although not necessarily of such character as to create a substantial likelihood of acquittal. . . . United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal. . . , the second case cited by Strickland, referred to evidence which is “material and favorable ... in ways not merely cumulative. . . Id., at 353-354, 926 P. 2d, at 1004.
“Undermin[ing] confidence in the outcome” is exactly Strickland’s description of what is meant by the “reasonable probability” standard. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, supra, at 694.
Despite all these citations of, and quotations from, Strickland, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the California Supreme Court had held respondent to a standard of proof higher than what that case prescribes for one reason: in three places (there was in fact a fourth) the opinion used the term “probable” without the modifier “reasonably.” 288 F. 3d, at 1108-1109, and n. 11. This was error. The California Supreme Court’s opinion painstakingly describes the Strickland standard. Its occasional shorthand reference to that standard by use of the term “probable” without the modifier may perhaps be imprecise, but if so it can no more be considered a repudiation of the standard than can this Court’s own occasional indulgence in the same imprecision. See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U. S. 162, 166 (2002) (“probable effect upon the outcome”); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 393 (2000) (“probably affected the outcome”).
The Court of Appeals made no effort to reconcile the state court’s use of the term “probable” with its use, elsewhere, of Strickland’s term “reasonably probable,” nor did it even acknowledge, much less discuss, the California Supreme Court’s proper framing of the question as whether the evidence “undermines confidence” in the outcome of the sentencing proceeding. This readiness to attribute error is inconsistent with the presumption that state courts know and follow the law. See, e. g., Parker v. Dugger, 498 U. S. 308, 314-316 (1991); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639, 653 (1990), overruled on other grounds, Ring v. Arizona, 536 U. S. 584 (2002); LaVallee v. Delle Rose, 410 U. S. 690, 694-695 (1973) (per curiam). It is also incompatible with §2254(d)’s “highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,” Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U. S. 320, 333, n. 7 (1997), which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.
B
The Court of Appeals also held that, regardless of whether the California Supreme Court applied the proper standard for determining prejudice under Strickland, its decision involved an unreasonable application of our clearly established precedents. 288 F. 3d, at 1118. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the determination that VIsciotti suffered no prejudice as a result of his trial counsel’s deficiencies was “objectively unreasonable.” Ibid. Under §2254(d)’s “unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the state-court decision applied Strickland incorrectly. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U. S. 685, 698-699 (2002); Williams, supra, at 411. Rather, it is the habeas applicant’s burden to show that the state court applied Strickland to the facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner. An “unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.” Williams, supra, at 410; see Bell, supra, at 694. The Ninth Circuit did not observe this distinction, but ultimately substituted its own judgment for that of the state court, in contravention of 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d).
The Ninth Circuit based its conclusion of “objective unreasonableness” upon its perception (1) that the California Supreme Court failed to “take into account” the totality of the available mitigating evidence, and “to consider” the prejudicial impact of certain of counsel's actions, and (2) that the “aggravating factors were not overwhelming.” 288 F. 3d, at 1118. There is no support for the first of these contentions. All of the mitigating evidence, and all of counsel’s prejudicial actions, that the Ninth Circuit specifically referred to as having been left out of account or consideration were in fact described in the California Supreme Court’s lengthy and careful opinion. The Court of Appeals asserted that the California Supreme Court “completely ignored the mitigating effect of Visciotti’s brain damage,” and failed to consider the prejudicial effect of counsel’s “multiple concessions during closing argument.” Ibid. However, the California Supreme Court specifically considered the fact that an expert “had testified at the guilt phase that [Visciotti] had a minimal brain injury of a type associated with impulse disorder and learning disorder.” In re Visciotti, 14 Cal. 4th, at 354, 926 P. 2d, at 1004. And it noted that under the trial court’s instructions, this and other evidence that had been introduced “might have been considered mitigating at the penalty phase,” despite trial counsel’s concessions during closing argument. Ibid.
The California Supreme Court then focused on counsel’s failure to introduce mitigating evidence about respondent’s background, including expert testimony that could have been presented about his “growing up in a dysfunctional family in which he suffered continual psychological abuse.” Id., at 355, 926 P. 2d, at 1005. This discussion referred back to a lengthy, detailed discussion about the undiscovered mitigating evidence that trial counsel might have presented during the penalty phase. See id., at 341-345, 926 P. 2d, at 996-998. The California Supreme Court concluded that despite the failure to present evidence of respondent’s “troubled family background,” id., at 355, 926 P. 2d, at 1005, which included his being “berated,” being “markedly lacking in self-esteem and depressed,” having been “born with club feet,” having “feelings of inadequacy, incompetence, inferiority,” and the like, moving “20 times” while he was growing up, and possibly suffering a “seizure disorder,” id., at 341-343, 926 P. 2d, at 996-998, the aggravating factors were overwhelming. In the state court’s judgment, the circumstances of the crime (a cold-blooded execution-style killing of one victim and attempted execution-style killing of another, both during the course of a preplanned armed robbery) coupled with the aggravating evidence of prior offenses (the knifing of one man, and the stabbing of a pregnant woman as she lay in bed trying to protect her unborn baby) was devastating. See id., at 355, 926 P. 2d, at 1005; see also People v. Visciotti, 2 Cal. 4th, at 33-34, 825 P. 2d, at 402. The California Supreme Court found these aggravating factors to be so severe that it concluded respondent suffered no prejudice from trial counsel’s (assumed) inadequacy. In re Visciotti, supra, at 355, 926 P. 2d, at 1005.
The Court of Appeals disagreed with this assessment, suggesting that the fact that the jury deliberated for a full day and requested additional guidance on the meaning of “moral justification” and “extreme duress” meant that the “aggravating factors were not overwhelming.” 288 F. 3d, at 1118. Perhaps so. However, “under § 2254(d)(1), it is not enough to convince a federal habeas court that, in its independent judgment, the state-court decision applied Strickland incorrectly.” Bell, 535 U. S., at 699. The federal habeas scheme leaves primary responsibility with the state courts for these judgments, and authorizes federal-court intervention only when a state-court decision is objectively unreasonable. It is not that here. Whether or not we would reach the same conclusion as the California Supreme Court, “we think at the very least that the state court’s contrary assessment was not ‘unreasonable.’ ” Id., at 701. Habeas relief is therefore not permissible under § 2254(d).
* * *
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is
Reversed.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners were convicted in the District Court on evidence obtained by a search made without a warrant. The Court of Appeals affirmed on a divided vote. 83 U. S. App. D. C. 96, 166 F. 2d 957. We brought the case here on certiorari because of doubts whether that result squared with Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, and Trupiano v. United States, 334 U. S. 699.
Petitioners were tried without a jury in the District Court for the District of Columbia on an indictment in four counts, charging offenses of carrying on a lottery known as the numbers game in violation of 22 D. C. Code §§ 1501, 1502, 1504 (1940). They were found guilty on all counts.
Petitioner McDonald, who had previously been arrested for numbers operations, had been under police observation for several months prior to the arrest. During this period and while he was maintaining a home in the District of Columbia, he rented a room in the residence of a Mrs. Terry, who maintained a rooming house in the District. His comings and goings at this address were under surveillance by the police for about two months. They had observed him enter the rooming house during the hours in which operations at the headquarters of the numbers game are customarily carried on.
On the day of the arrest three police officers surrounded the house. This was midafternoon. They did not have a warrant for arrest nor a search warrant. While outside the house, one of the officers thought that he heard an adding machine. These machines are frequently used in the numbers operation. Believing that the numbers game was in process, the officers sought admission to the house.
One of them opened a window leading into the landlady’s room and climbed through. He identified himself to her and admitted the other officers to the house.
After searching the rooms on the ground floor, they proceeded to the second floor. The door of an end bedroom was closed. But one of the officers stood on a chair and looked through the transom. He observed both petitioners in the room, as well as numbers slips, money piled on the table, and adding machines. He yelled to McDonald to open the door and McDonald did so. Both petitioners were arrested, and the officers seized the machines, a suitcase of papers, and money. Whether these machines and papers should have been suppressed as evidence and returned to petitioner McDonald is the major question presented.
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution provides: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” This guarantee of protection against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to the innocent and guilty alike. It marks the right of privacy as one of the unique values of our civilization and, with few exceptions, stays the hands of the police unless they have a search warrant issued by a magistrate on probable cause supported by oath or affirmation. And the law provides as a sanction against the flouting of this constitutional safeguard the suppression of evidence secured as a result of the violation, when it is tendered in a federal court. Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383.
The prosecution seeks to build the lawfulness of the search on the lawfulness of the arrest and so justify the search and seizure without a warrant. See Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20, 30; Harris v. United States, 331 U. S. 145, 150-151. The reasoning runs as follows: Although it was an invasion of privacy for the officers to enter Mrs. Terry's room, that was a trespass which violated her rights under the Fourth Amendment, not McDonald's. Therefore so far as he was concerned, the officers were lawfully within the hallway, as much so as if Mrs. Terry had admitted them. Looking over the transom was not a search, for the eye cannot commit the trespass condemned by the Fourth Amendment. Since the officers observed McDonald in the act of committing an offense, they were under a duty then and there to arrest him. See 4 D. C. Code §§ 140, 143 (1940). The arrest being valid the search incident thereto was lawful.
We do not stop to examine that syllogism for flaws. Assuming its correctness, we reject the result.
This is not a case where the officers, passing by on the street, hear a shot and a cry for help and demand entrance in the name of the law. They had been following McDonald and keeping him under surveillance for two months at this rooming house. The prosecution now tells us that the police had no probable cause for obtaining a warrant until,. shortly before the arrest, they heard the sound of the adding machine coming from the rooming house. And there is vague and general testimony in the record that on previous occasions the officers had sought search warrants but had been denied them. But those statements alone do not lay the proper foundation for dispensing with a search warrant.
Where, as here, officers are not responding to an emergency, there must be compelling reasons to justify the absence of a search warrant. A search without a warrant demands exceptional circumstances, as we held in Johnson v. United States, supra. We will not assume that where a defendant has been under surveillance for months, no search warrant could have been obtained. What showing these officers made when they applied on the earlier occasions, the dates of these applications, and all the circumstances bearing upon the necessity to make this search without a warrant are absent from this record. We cannot allow the constitutional barrier that protects the privacy of the individual to be hurdled so easily. Moreover, when we move to the scene of the crime, the reason for the absence of a search warrant is even less obvious. When the officers heard the adding machine and, at the latest, when they saw what was transpiring in the room, they certainly had adequate grounds for seeking a search warrant.
Here, as in Johnson v. United States and Trupiano v. United States, the defendant was not fleeing or seeking to escape. Officers were there to apprehend petitioners in case they tried to leave. Nor was the property in the process of destruction nor as likely to be destroyed as the opium paraphernalia in the Johnson case. Petitioners were busily engaged in their lottery venture. No reason, except inconvenience of the officers and delay in preparing papers and getting before a magistrate, appears for the failure to seek a search warrant. But those reasons are no justification for by-passing the constitutional requirement, as we held in Johnson v. United States, supra, p. 15.
We are not dealing with formalities. The presence of a search warrant serves a high function. Absent some grave emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the citizen and the police. This was done not to shield criminals nor to make the home a safe haven for illegal activities. It was done so that an objective mind might weigh the need to invade that privacy in order to enforce the law. The right of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the discretion of those whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of criminals. Power is a heady thing; and history shows that the police acting on their own cannot be trusted. And so the Constitution requires a magistrate to pass on the desires of the police before they violate the privacy of the home. We cannot be true to that constitutional requirement and excuse the absence of a search warrant ' without a showing by those who seek exemption from the constitutional mandate that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative.
It follows from what we have said that McDonald’s motion for suppression of the evidence and the return of the property to him should have been granted. Weeks v. United States, supra; Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344, 358. It was, however, denied and the unlawfully seized evidence was used not only against McDonald but against Washington as well, the two being tried jointly. Apart from this evidence there seems to have been little or none against Washington. Even though we assume, without deciding, that Washington, who was a guest of McDonald, had no right of privacy that was broken when the officers searched McDonald’s room without a warrant, we think that the denial of McDonald’s motion was error that was prejudicial to Washington as well. In this case, unlike Agnello v. United States, supra, p. 35, the unlawfully seized materials were the basis of evidence used against the codefendant. If the property had been returned to McDonald, it would not have been available for use at the trial. We can only speculate as to whether other evidence which might have been used against Washington would have been equally probative.
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Black concurs in the result.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The petition for writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment is reversed. Hamm v. City of Rock Hill and Lupper v. Arkansas, 379 U. S. 306.
Mr. Justice Stewart would vacate the judgment and remand the case to the Supreme Court of Georgia for reconsideration in the light of supervening federal legislation, in accordance with the views expressed in his dissenting opinion in Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U. S. 306, 326.
Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Harlan, and Mr. Justice White would affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of Georgia for the reasons stated in their dissenting opinions in Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U. S. 306, 318, 322, 327.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | B | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Chief Justice Burger
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented by this appeal is whether Puerto Rico may by statute vest in a political party the power to fill an interim vacancy in the Puerto Rico Legislature. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico held that such a procedure did not violate the United States Constitution. We noted probable jurisdiction, 454 U. S. 938 (1981), and we affirm.
I
In the November 4, 1980, Puerto Rico general election, Ramon Muniz, a member of appellee Popular Democratic Party, was elected to the Puerto Rico House of Representatives from District 31. Muniz died on January 28, 1981. The Governor of Puerto Rico, a member of the opposition New Progressive Party, subsequently called for a “by-election” — open to all qualified voters in District 31 — to fill the vacancy caused by Muniz’ death. The Governor purported to act pursuant to Articles 5.006 and 5.007 of the Electoral Law of Puerto Rico, P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 16, §§3206, 3207 (Supp. 1980).
On March 3, 1981, the Popular Democratic Party instituted this action in the Superior Court of Puerto Rico, alleging that Articles 5.006 and 5.007 authorized only candidates and electors affiliated with the Party to participate in the by-election. Appellants, 10 qualified electors in District 31 who are not affiliated with the Popular Democratic Party, intervened as defendants. On March 20,1981, the Superior Court entered judgment for the Popular Democratic Party; it ordered the Governor and General Administrator of Elections to limit participation in the by-election to Party members. App. to Juris. Statement 36a.
A divided Supreme Court of Puerto Rico modified the Superior Court’s judgment. It interpreted Articles 5.006 and 5.007 to require a by-election only in the event that the party of the legislator vacating the seat fails to designate a replacement within 60 days after the vacancy occurred; if the party selects a single candidate within the 60-day period, that candidate is “automatically elected to fill the vacancy,” rendering a by-election unnecessary. Popular Democratic Party v. Barcelo, — P. R. R. —, — (1981). The court held further that if the party presents more than one candidate during the 60-day period, a by-election must be conducted in which only party-affiliated candidates may run but in which all qualified electors may vote. In the event no candidate is presented within the 60-day period, candidates affiliated with any party, as well as independent candidates, are permitted to run in the by-election. Because of the delay already occasioned by the litigation, the court permitted appellee Party only 30 days from the entry of judgment, May 8, 1981, to present a “slate” of candidates to the Commonwealth Election Commission. The court ordered that “[i]f said slate is limited to only one candidate, he shall be certified by the General Administrator of Elections as the person entitled to hold the vacant seat.” Id., at-.
The court rejected appellants’ contention that this procedure violated the United States Constitution. It noted that the Constitution does not expressly require a fixed method for filling vacancies in a state or commonwealth legislature. The court also held that Puerto Rico’s party appointment system serves several “compelling interests,” such as ensuring the stability and continuity of the “legislative balance” until the next general election; protecting the “electoral mandate” of the previous election; and reducing “inter-partisan political campaigns to once every four years.” Id., at-.
II
Puerto Rico, in common with many of the States, has adopted means of filling interim vacancies in elective commonwealth offices without the necessity of a full-scale special election. If a vacancy occurs in the office of Governor, it is automatically filled by the Secretary of State, an officer appointed by the Governor. P. E. Const., Art. IV, §7. Mayoral vacancies and vacancies in the municipal assemblies are filled by appointment upon the recommendation of the political party to which the incumbent belonged. P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 21, §§ 1161, 1259 (1974). Similarly, the Commonwealth Constitution provides that vacancies in the posts of at-large senators and representatives, see n. 13, infra, shall be filled “upon recommendation of the political party to which belonged the Senator or Representative causing the vacancy . . . .” Art. Ill, §8. Article 5.006 of the Puerto Rico Electoral Law, as interpreted by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico in this case, likewise confers on a political party the initial opportunity to appoint an interim replacement for one of its members who vacates a position as a district senator or representative. In each case, the appointee serves only until the next regularly scheduled election.
Appellants’ challenge to the procedure mandated by Article 5.006 is essentially two-pronged. Appellants first contend that qualified voters have a federal constitutional right to elect their representatives to the Puerto Rico Legislature, and that vacancies in legislative offices therefore must be filled by a special election open to all qualified electors, not by interim appointment of any kind. Alternatively, appellants maintain that even if legislative vacancies may be filled by an interim appointment of the Governor or some other elected official, Puerto Rico’s party appointment mechanism imper-missibly infringes upon their right of association under the First Amendment and denies them equal protection of the laws.
A
It is not disputed that the fundamental protections of the United States Constitution extend to the inhabitants of Puerto Rico. See Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U. S. 465, 469-470 (1979). Cf. Dorr v. United States, 195 U. S. 138, 148 (1904). In particular, we have held that Puerto Rico is subject to the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws. Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U. S. 572, 599-601 (1976); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U. S. 663 (1974). We thus think it is clear that the voting rights of Puerto Rico citizens are constitutionally protected to the same extent as those of all other citizens of the United States.
At the same time, Puerto Rico, like a state, is an autonomous political entity, “ ‘sovereign over matters not ruled by the Constitution.’” Calero-Toledo, supra, at 673 (quoting Mora v. Mejias, 115 F. Supp. 610 (PR 1953)). See Cordova & Simonpietri Ins. Agency Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 649 F. 2d 36, 39-42 (CA1 1981). The methods by which the people of Puerto Rico and their representatives have chosen to structure the Commonwealth’s electoral system are entitled to substantial deference. Moreover, we should accord weight to the Puerto Rico Supreme Court’s assessment of the justification and need for particular provisions to fill vacancies caused by the death, resignation, or removal of a member of the legislature. Bearing these considerations in mind, we turn to appellants’ constitutional challenges.
B
No provision of the Federal Constitution expressly mandates the procedures that a state or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico must follow in filling vacancies in its own legislature. Cf. U. S. Const., Art. I, §2; Arndt. 17, cl. 2. Appellants nevertheless maintain that qualified electors have an absolute constitutional right to vote for the members of a state or commonwealth legislature, even when a special election is required for this purpose. However, this Court has often noted that the Constitution “does not confer the right of suffrage upon any one,” Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 178 (1875), and that “the right to vote, per se, is not a constitutionally protected right,” San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 35, n. 78 (1973). See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, 38-39 (1892). Moreover, we have previously rejected claims that the Constitution compels a fixed method of choosing state or local officers or representatives.
For example, in Fortson v. Morris, 385 U. S. 231, 234 (1966), Justice Black, speaking for the Court, stated:
“There is no provision of the United States Constitution or any of its amendments which either expressly or impliedly dictates the method a State must use to select its Governor.”
In Fortson, the Court sustained a Georgia constitutional provision empowering the state legislature to elect a Governor from the two candidates receiving the highest number of votes cast in the general election, in the event neither received a majority. Similarly, in Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U. S. 105 (1967), the Court upheld a statute authorizing appointment rather than election of the members of a county school board.
To be sure, when a state or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has provided that its representatives be elected, “a citizen has a constitutionally protected right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction.” Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 336 (1972). See Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U. S. 621, 626-629 (1969); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368, 379-380 (1963). However, the Puerto Rico statute at issue here does not restrict access to the electoral process or afford unequal treatment to different classes of voters or political parties. All qualified voters have an equal opportunity to select a district representative in the general election; and the interim appointment provision applies uniformly to all legislative vacancies, whenever they arise.
In Valenti v. Rockefeller, 393 U. S. 405 (1969), the Court sustained the authority of the Governor of New York to fill a vacancy in the United States Senate by appointment pending the next regularly scheduled congressional election — in that case, a period of over 29 months. Thus, although most Members of the United States Senate hold office by virtue of popular election, some Members, at any given time, may hold office by virtue of an interim appointment. The Court found nothing invidious or arbitrary in this distinction in Valenti, nor do we here. As the three-judge District Court observed in Valenti:
“In this case we are confronted with no fundamental imperfection in the functioning of democracy. No political party or portion of the state’s citizens can claim it is permanently disadvantaged ... or that it lacks effective means of securing legislative reform if the statute is regarded as unsatisfactory. We have, rather, only the unusual, temporary, and unfortunate combination of a tragic event and a reasonable statutory scheme.” Valenti v. Rockefeller, 292 F. Supp. 851, 867 (SDNY 1968).
Valenti, of course, unlike this case, involved an interpretation of the Seventeenth Amendment, which explicitly outlines the procedures for filling vacancies in the United States Senate. See n. 7, supra. However, the fact that the Seventeenth Amendment permits a state, if it chooses, to forgo a special election in favor of a temporary appointment to the United States Senate suggests that a state is not constitutionally prohibited from exercising similar latitude with regard to vacancies in its own legislature. We discern nothing in the Federal Constitution that imposes greater constraints on the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
The Commonwealth’s choice to fill legislative vacancies by-appointment rather than by a full-scale special election may have some effect on the right of its citizens to elect the members of the Puerto Rico Legislature; however, the effect is minimal, and like that in Valenti, it does not fall disproportionately on any discrete group of voters, candidates, or political parties. See n. 10, supra. Moreover, the interim appointment system plainly serves the legitimate purpose of ensuring that vacancies are filled promptly, without the necessity of the expense and inconvenience of a special election. The Constitution does not preclude this practical and widely accepted means of addressing an infrequent problem.
C
Puerto Rico’s appointment mechanism is not rendered constitutionally defective by virtue of the fact that the interim appointment power is given to the political party with which the previous incumbent was affiliated. Appellants maintain that the power to make interim appointments must be vested in an elected official, such as the Governor of the Commonwealth, so that the appointments will have “the legitimacy of derivative voter approval and control.” Reply Brief for Appellants 15. However, that such control may often be largely illusory is illustrated by this case, where the Governor and the incumbent belonged to different parties. The Puerto Rico Legislature could reasonably conclude that appointment by the previous incumbent’s political party would more fairly reflect the will of the voters than appointment by the Governor or some other elected official.
The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico held that party appointment was a legitimate mechanism serving to protect the mandate of the preceding election and to preserve the “legislative balance” until the next general election is held. Such protection is particularly important in light of Puerto Rico’s special interest in ensuring minority representation in its legislature. See Garcia v. Barcelo, 671 F. 2d 1, 6-7 (CA1 1982). It was thus not unreasonable for the Puerto Rico Legislature, in establishing an appointment systemior filling legislative vacancies, to make provision for continuity of party representation. Cf. Kaelin v. Warden, 334 F. Supp. 602, 607-608 (ED Pa. 1971) (three-judge District Court). Absent some clear constitutional limitation, Puerto Rico is free to structure its political system to meet its “special concerns and political circumstances,” Garcia, supra, at 7.
Finally, appellants argue that their rights of association and equal protection of the laws were violated by their exclusion, based solely upon their party affiliation, from the Party-sponsored election held to select Muniz' successor, see n. 3, supra. Cf. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U. S. 507 (1980). However, appellants' argument misconceives the nature of the election held in this case. Puerto Rico law authorized the Popular Democratic Party to designate an interim replacement to fill Muniz’ seat. The Party was entitled to adopt its own procedures to select this replacement; it was not required to include nonmembers in what can be analogized to a party primary election. Cf. Democratic Party of U. S. v. Wisconsin, 450 U. S. 107 (1981); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U. S. 477 (1975). Appellants’ exclusion from this election did not violate their rights of association, nor did it deprive them of equal protection of the laws.
hH H
We hold that the mechanism adopted by the Puerto Rico Legislature for filling legislative vacancies is not foreclosed by the Federal Constitution. Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico is
Affirmed.
The Puerto Rico Legislative Assembly consists of two chambers — the House of Representatives, with 51 members, and the Senate, with 27 members. P. R. Const., Art. Ill, §§ 1 and 2. A single general election is held in Puerto Rico every four years for all elective officials. Art. VI, § 4; P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 16, §§3201, 3205 (Supp. 1980).
Article 5.006 provides, in pertinent part:
“When a vacancy occurs in the office of a senator or representative elected as an independent candidate for a district, or when a vacancy occurs in the office of a senator or representative for a district, nominated by a party before the fifteen (15) months immediately preceding the date of the following general election, the Governor, with the advice of the [Commonwealth Election] Commission shall, within the thirty (30) days following the date on which the vacancy occurred, call a by-election in such district which shall be held no later than ninety (90) days after the date of the call, and the person elected in such by-election shall hold the office until the term of his predecessor has expired.
“If within sixty (60) days following the date such vacancy arises, the party to which the legislator of the vacant office belonged has not presented a candidate to fill such office, the office shall be deemed to be that of an independent legislator, to the effects of holding the by-election to fill it.”
Article 5.007 provides:
“All electors entitled to vote within the geographic district in which the by-election is to be held, pursuant to the call issued by the Governor to such effect, shall vote in a by-election.”
On March 22, 1981, while the case was pending before the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, the Popular Democratic Party held a primary election in which only its members were permitted to participate. From a field of four candidates, the Party’s members selected Juan Corujo Collazo. Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s mandate, Corujo Collazo’s name was presented to the Election Commission, and on July 6,1981, he was sworn in as the new Representative from District 31.
In 22 States, legislative vacancies are filled by appointment, with the appointee serving either until the next general election or until expiration of the term of the previous incumbent. Alaska Stat. Ann. § 15.40.320 et seq. (1975) (unless term expires or election held before next legislative session convenes); Colo. Rev. Stat. §1-12-103 (1980); Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 17-3,17-4 (1976 and Supp. 1981); Idaho Code § 59-904A (1976); Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 46, ¶25-6 (1980); Ind. Code §2-2.1-2-1 el seq. (Cum. Supp. 1981); Kan. Stat. Ann. §25-312 (1981); Md. Const., Art. Ill, §13; Mont. Code Ann. § 5-2-401 et seq. (1981); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32-1042(3) (1978); Nev. Const., Art. IV, § 12 (unless biennial or regular election held between time of vacancy and next legislative session); N. M. Stat. Ann. §§2-7-9B, 2-8-9B (1978); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 163-11 (Cum. Supp. 1981); Ohio Const., Art. II, § 11; Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 171.051, 171.060 (1981) (unless the legislature is not in session; a general election will be held within 90 days; and no special session of the legislature will be convened before such election); S. D. Const., Art. Ill, § 10; Tenn. Code Ann. §2-14-201 et seq. (1979) (if less than 12 months remain before next general election); Utah Code Ann. §20-1-5 (Supp. 1981); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17, §2623 (Supp. 1981); Wash. Const., Amdt. 52, Art. 2, §15; W. Va. Code §3-10-5 (1979); Wyo. Stat. §§ 22-18-lll(a)(ii), (iii) (1977). Like Puerto Rico, five of these States— Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, and North Carolina — confer the appointment power on the political party to which the previous incumbent belonged. Nine more States — Alaska, Idaho, Montana, Ohio, Oregon, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming — require that the appointee be selected from a list submitted by the political party, or that the appointee be chosen or confirmed by elected officials affiliated with the party. Another two States — Hawaii and Nevada — simply require that the appointee be a member of the party to which his or her predecessor belonged.
The current procedure for filling legislative vacancies is similar to that prescribed by a 1938 amendment to Puerto Rico’s Organic Act, which remained in effect until Puerto Rico assumed Commonwealth status in 1952. In the 1938 amendment, Congress mandated that vacancies in the Puerto Rico Legislature be filled by the Governor “upon the recommendation of the central committee of the political party of which such senator or representative was a member.” Act of June 1, 1938, ch. 308, § 30, 52 Stat. 595. Title 48 U. S. C. §§ 891, 892 presently provide that vacancies in the elective office of Resident Commissioner to the United States are to be filled by appointment of the Governor with the advice and consent of the Puerto Rico Senate.
We have never found it necessary to resolve the precise question whether the guarantee of equal protection is provided to Puerto Ricans under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U. S., at 601.
With regard to Members of the United States House of Representatives, Art. I, § 2, cl. 4, provides:
“When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies.”
The Seventeenth Amendment provides:
“When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.”
The source of this purported right is somewhat unclear. Appellants contend that Art. I, § 2, cl. 1, of the Constitution — which provides that those eligible to vote for Members of the United States House of Representatives “shall have the Qualifications requisite for the Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature” — contemplates that state legislators will be popularly elected. See also U. S. Const., Arndt. 17. Moreover, appellants contend that a popularly elected legislature is an essential element of a “Republican Form of Government,” U. S. Const., Art. IV, § 4. See 48 U. S. C. § 731c, requiring Puerto Rico to provide a republican form of government. However, this seems largely irrelevant, since Puerto Rico has in fact established a legislature “whose members shall be elected by direct vote at each general election,” P. R. Const., Art. Ill, § 1. See also Art. II, §2, guaranteeing “equal, direct, and . . . universal suffrage . . . .”
In Sailors, we expressly left open the question “whether a State may constitute a local legislative body through the appointive rather than the elective process.” 387 U. S., at 109-110 (emphasis added). However, we need not consider whether, as urged by appellants, a state or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is constitutionally barred from abolishing its elected legislative branch of government; that question is not presented. See n. 8, supra.
Appellants contend that Article 5.006 “discriminates” between voters in districts in which a vacancy occurs and those in which the elected representative or senator serves out his term, because only the former are denied the opportunity to be represented by an elected legislator. Obviously, a statute designed to deal with the occasional problem of legislative vacancies will affect only those districts in which vacancies actually arise. However, such a statute is not for this reason rendered invalid under equal protection principles. A vacancy in the legislature is an unexpected, unpredictable event, and a statute providing that all such vacancies be filled by appointment does not have a special impact on any discrete group of voters or candidates. Cf. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134 (1972); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23 (1968). Appellants’ equal protection argument adds nothing to their basic assertion of an absolute constitutional right to elect representatives to a state or commonwealth legislature.
In Valenti, the vacancy was created by the death of Senator Robert F. Kennedy on June 6, 1968. Under New York law, since the vacancy arose less than 60 days prior to New York’s regular spring primary in an even-numbered year, an election to fill the vacancy would not be held until the general election in the next even-numbered year, i. e., November 1970. The Governor was empowered to make an interim appointment, effective until December 1, 1970. See Valenti v. Rockefeller, 292 F. Supp. 851, 853 (SDNY 1968) (three-judge District Court).
See Garcia v. Barcelo, 671 F. 2d 1, 6 (CA1 1982):
“One might argue, as a matter of form, that appointment by a governor is indeed more ‘democratic’ because the governor is himself elected. Yet in practice this is not likely to be so when the governor and former representative are of different parties. In that case the party difference is likely to produce successors of different parties. In such circumstances, we see how the framers of a state constitution might conclude that party selection is more likely to reflect the will of the voters than selection by the governor, for it was the former representative’s party, not that of the governor, that won the prior seat. Such a judgment, reflecting a knowledge of political practice, seems perfectly consistent with the basic democratic role of the modem political party — translating the individual wills of myriad voters into a practically achievable program administered by a government that can be held responsible for its performance at the polls.”
Two devices in Puerto Rico’s Constitution ensure representation of minority parties in the Puerto Rico Legislative Assembly. First, 11 of 27 senators and 11 of 51 representatives are elected "at-large,” and each voter may vote for only one candidate for senator or representative at-large. Art. Ill, § 3. Second, if any one party elects more than two-thirds of the members of either house of the legislature, the number of members in that house is increased by declaring elected a sufficient number of minority-party candidates to bring the total number of minority-party members to 9 in the Senate and to 17 in the House. Art. Ill, § 7. Appellees maintain that “the Commonwealth’s unique guarantee of minority party representation ... is and has been particularly important in Puerto Rico, far beyond its importance in any State of the Union, in order to provide a democratic forum and an outlet for the radically different views of the various political parties as to the ultimate status of Puerto Rico . . . .” Brief for Appellees 14.
Puerto Rico is in no sense unique in maintaining continuity of party representation between elections; 16 States have chosen to require that legislative vacancies be filled by appointment of a person affiliated with the same party as the previous incumbent, or by designation of that party, see n. 4, supra.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | B | sc_issuearea |
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Mr. Justice Frankfurter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Court has here under review the decision of a state court rejecting a claim of infirmity in a conviction for murder based on a constitutional ground raised for the first time in an extraordinary proceeding after the conviction had been affirmed on appeal. Respect for the State’s administration of criminal justice requires a detailed narrative of the procedural course of this litigation and an adequate consideration of the legal factors relevant to our disposition.
Petitioner, a Negro, was convicted in Fulton County, Georgia, of the murder of a white man and sentenced to death. According to the allegations before us, the petit jury which convicted him was selected in the following manner:
On February 18, 1953, a judge of the Fulton County Superior Court selected from a box the names of prospective jurors. The names of white persons were on white tickets and the names of Negroes were on yellow tickets. The tickets were handed to a deputy sheriff, who in turn gave them to a deputy clerk for listing. The named jurors were subsequently summoned, some were excused, and the remaining 120 were available for the ten panels of twelve jurors each to serve in the trial of civil and criminal cases in the Fulton County Superior Court for the week of March 9, 1953. Of the 120 jurors, four were Negroes, and all four were assigned to the criminal docket.
On March 10, 1953, a panel of 48 of the 120 jurors was “put upon” Williams at his trial. Thirteen jurors, including three of the four Negroes, were excused for cause. The State peremptorily challenged the fourth Negro, so that no Negroes served on the jury of twelve which was finally selected to try Williams.
The trial, which immediately followed the selection of the jury, lasted one day. Twenty-three witnesses appeared against Williams. His only defense was a short unsworn statement to the effect that he had not committed the crime and that he had been “afraid” when he signed the written confession introduced against him.
Williams’ court-appointed attorney filed a formal motion for new trial on March 27, 1953, and a more detailed amendment to the motion on June 29, 1953. The motion was overruled, and an appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court followed. On October 14,1953, that court affirmed the judgment. 210 Ga. 207, 78 S. E. 2d 521.
On December 1,1953, Williams’ counsel filed in the trial court an extraordinary motion for new trial under Ga. Code Ann., § 70-303. In this motion he alleged for the first time that Williams had been denied equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by the manner in which the petit jury had been selected, organized, impaneled and challenged. An affidavit by Williams accompanied the motion, stating that at the time of trial he had no knowledge of the methods used to select the jury. A similar affidavit by his counsel stated further that “the same could not have been discovered by him [the counsel] in the exercise of ordinary diligence.” The law partner of Williams’ counsel submitted a third affidavit to the effect that he had taken no part in the trial or in its preparation.
On January 18, 1954, the trial court dismissed the extraordinary motion for new trial. An appeal was taken to the Georgia Supreme Court. In the appeal, reliance was placed almost exclusively upon the case of Avery v. Georgia, 345 U. S. 559, for the claim that Williams had been denied equal protection of the laws. The pertinence of that case to this turns on the time sequence in the two cases as well as on the relevant substantive facts.
Avery was convicted of rape on September 20, 1951, in Fulton County, Georgia — the same county in which Williams was tried a year and a half later. Avery’s petit jury was drawn with yellow and white tickets, precisely in the manner used later in the case of Williams. In Avery’s case, no Negroes appeared on the list of 60 jurors put upon him at the trial, whereas here, four Negroes appeared on the list of 120 jurors from which Williams’ jury was selected. Avery, however, challenged the array when the jury was put upon him; Williams did not. Avery’s challenge was overruled, and after trial he appealed on the ground of discrimination in the selection of the jury. The Georgia Supreme Court disapproved of the use of yellow and white tickets but affirmed the judgment on the ground that no discrimination was actually shown.
Certiorari in the Avery case was filed in this Court on July 28, 1952, nine weeks before the alleged murder in the Williams case. The ground, as here, was that the use of different-colored tickets for whites and Negroes deprived the defendant of equal protection of the laws. Avery’s petition for certiorari was granted March 9,1953, the day before the petit jury was put upon Williams. This Court reversed the Avery case on May 25, 1953, holding that Avery had made out a prima facie case of an unconstitutional discrimination by showing the use of different-colored tickets which the State had not rebutted.
While this Court’s decision in the Avery case was thus rendered over two months after Williams’ trial, it came a month before the amendment to his formal motion for new trial. Yet Williams’ counsel did not rely upon the ground raised by the Avery decision until some six months later in his extraordinary motion for new trial.
As already stated, the extraordinary motion was dismissed by the trial court, and Williams again appealed to the Georgia Supreme Court. That court affirmed the dismissal of the extraordinary motion. The court concluded that Williams, having failed to challenge the array when put upon him, had waived any objections to the jury’s selection. The affidavits of Williams, his counsel, and his counsel’s partner were deemed insufficient to excuse Williams’ failure to challenge the array at the outset of the trial.
The court did not rest on this consideration. It urged that the facts inherent in the case contradicted the affidavits. The court said that its own decision in the Avery case, prior to the Williams trial, had fully set out the practice of using different-colored tickets in the selection of juries. “Due diligence would certainly have required the defendant and his attorney to make themselves familiar with the opinions of this court on the question now raised. It follows that, for this reason, the motion for new trial was not sufficient as an extraordinary motion for new trial.” 210 Ga. 665, 668, 82 S. E. 2d 217, 219.
In view of the entanglement of this case with our decision in Avery, we granted certiorari. 348 U. S. 854. Since the attorney appointed by the Georgia court advised the Clerk of this Court that he would not be in a position to present oral argument before this Court, we appointed amicus curiae to present argument on Williams’ behalf. 348 U. S. 957.
In his brief on behalf of the State before the State Supreme Court, the Solicitor General of Fulton County-had urged, inter alia, that there was no showing of a denial of equal protection in this case. On oral argument here, however, the State, with commendable regard for its responsibility, agreed that the use of yellow and white tickets in this case was, in light of this Court’s decision in Avery, a denial of equal protection, so that a new trial would be required but for the failure to challenge the array. We need only add that it was the system of selection and the resulting danger of abuse which was struck down in Avery and not an actual showing of discrimination on the basis of comparative numbers of Negroes and whites on the jury lists. The question now before us, in view of the State’s concession, is whether the ruling of the Georgia Supreme Court rests upon an adequate nonfederal ground, so that this Court is without jurisdiction to review the Georgia court.
A state procedural rule which forbids the raising of federal questions at late stages in the case, or by any other than a prescribed method, has been recognized as a valid exercise of state power. The principle is clear enough. But the unique aspects of the never-ending new cases that arise require its individual application to particular circumstances. Thus, we would have a different question from that before us if the trial court had no power to consider Williams’ constitutional objection at the belated time he raised it. But, where a State allows questions of this sort to be raised at a late stage and be determined by its courts as a matter of discretion, we are not concluded from assuming jurisdiction and deciding whether the state court action in the particular circumstances is, in effect, an avoidance of the federal right. A state court may not, in the exercise of its discretion, decline to entertain a constitutional claim while passing upon kindred issues raised in the same manner.
The Georgia courts have indicated many times that motions for new trial after verdict are not favored, and that extraordinary motions for new trial after final judgment are favored even less. But the Georgia statute provides for such motion, and it has been granted in “exceptional” or “extraordinary” cases. The general rule is that the granting or denying of an extraordinary motion for new trial rests primarily in the discretion of the trial court, and the appellate court will not reverse except for a clear abuse of discretion. In practice, however, the Georgia appellate courts have not hesitated to reverse and grant a new trial in exceptional cases. For example:
In Wright v. Davis, 184 Ga. 846, 193 S. E. 757 (1937), the defendant was sentenced to death, his motion for new trial was overruled, and the judgment was affirmed on appeal by the Georgia Supreme Court. Three months after the affirmance the defendant made an extraordinary motion for new trial on the ground that an ex-convict had obtained a seat on the jury by impersonating his father, whose name was properly on the jury list. The trial court denied the extraordinary motion. The Georgia Supreme Court granted mandamus and made it absolute. It said:
“In the instant case we are of the opinion that the extraordinary motion for a new trial and the proffered amendment presented a state of facts which, standing without dispute, required as a matter of law that a new trial should be granted. . . .
. . The verdict itself shows that the defendant was not benefited, as he received the extreme penalty, and it is clear that he was deprived of his right to have a jury composed entirely of upright men. Code, §§ 2-4502, 59-106. It will not do to speculate on whether the accused suffered actual injury, when so vital a right has been violated. There are some conditions from which injury will be presumed. . . .” (184 Ga., at 851, 853, 193 S. E., at 760.)
The court rejected the State’s contention that the defendant had not shown due diligence in discovering the juror’s disqualification.
Smith v. Georgia, 2 Ga. App. 574, 59 S. E. 311 (1907), involved a conviction for arson. A motion for new trial was denied, the judgment was affirmed on appeal, and five months later the defendant filed an extraordinary motion for new trial on the ground that one of the jurors was related to the deceased wife of the prosecutor within the ninth degree, and several of the prosecutor’s'children continued the kinship by affinity. The trial court denied the motion, but the appellate court granted a new trial. It said:
“. . . There is no higher purpose to be subserved in the administration of the criminal law than that every defendant shall be accorded a trial by jury, and jury trial is a mockery unless the jury be not only impartial but also beyond just suspicion of partiality. . . .” (2 Ga. App., at 578, 59 S. E., at 313.)
In answer to the State’s contention that the defendant and his attorney had not shown due diligence in discovering the prohibited relationship, the court said that the trial judge had inquired into the question of relationship when the jury was impaneled, and then the court added this quotation from a Georgia Supreme Court opinion:
. . ‘Parties are not required to make searching investigation out of court to determine whether the jurors who are summoned are disqualified in their cases. Not only is such a duty not placed by the law upon parties and their counsel, but the contrary practice is to be encouraged, for obvious reasons.’ ” (2 Ga. App., at 582, 59 S. E., at 315.)
In Crawley v. Georgia, 151 Ga. 818, 108 S. E. 238 (1921), four defendants were convicted of murder. Two were sentenced to death and two to life imprisonment. A motion for new trial was overruled, the judgment was affirmed on appeal, a motion for rehearing was denied, and a week later the defendants filed an extraordinary motion for new trial, which the trial court overruled. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed. The extraordinary motion showed that the wife of one juror was within the ninth degree of relationship to the wife of the murdered man. A new trial was granted even though the State submitted an affidavit by the juror that he did not know of the relationship at the time of the trial and therefore could not have been prejudiced.
In Doyal v. Georgia, 73 Ga. 72 (1884), the defendant was convicted of murder. His motion for new trial was denied, and the judgment was affirmed on appeal. He filed an extraordinary motion for new trial on the ground that five witnesses were ready to testify that one of the jurors had said in effect before the trial that the defendant ought to be hung and that the juror would see to it if he got on the jury. The defendant and his attorney filed affidavits to the effect that they had been ignorant of the facts at the time of trial. Despite affidavits submitted by the State showing the availability of three of the five witnesses at the time of trial, the Georgia Supreme Court granted a new trial.
There are other cases of like tenor.
All these cases (barring Harris v. Georgia, n. 14) involved objections to individual jurors, as contrasted with the objection to the whole panel in this case. But the two situations cannot be distinguished on this ground. Georgia has a rule, as the State Supreme Court noted in this case, that an objection to the whole panel must be made by way of a challenge to the array at the time the panel is put upon the defendant. Cornelious v. Georgia, 193 Ga. 25, 17 S. E. 2d 156 (1941); Wilcoxon v. Aldredge, 192 Ga. 634, 15 S. E. 2d 873 (1941); Cumming v. Georgia, 155 Ga. 346, 117 S. E. 378 (1923); Lumpkin v. Georgia, 152 Ga. 229, 109 S. E. 664 (1921). But none of these cases declare that an extraordinary motion is not available in a proper case for granting a new trial when the objection is to the panel. On the contrary, several factors indicate that the trial judge and the appellate court have the same degree of discretion in the “array” cases as in cases involving individual j urors. First: There is also a rule in Georgia that an objection to an individual juror must be made at the trial by a challenge to the poll. But as the cases above demonstrate, this rule gives way in an exceptional case to the need for a new trial shown by extraordinary motion. It does not appear rational to deny that the rule as to challenges to the array is likewise not inflexible. Second: The opinion of the Georgia Supreme Court in this case supports this conclusion. If the trial court had no power to entertain the motion, it was immaterial whether the affidavits were faulty. Yet the Supreme Court felt called upon to question the reliability of the affidavits, concluding that Williams’ counsel must have failed to use due diligence and “for this reason” the motion was “not sufficient.”
We conclude that the trial court and the State Supreme Court declined to grant Williams’ motion though possessed of power to do so under state law. Since his motion was based upon a constitutional objection, and one the validity of which has in principle been sustained here, the discretionary decision to deny the motion does not deprive this Court of jurisdiction to find that the substantive issue is properly before us.
But the fact that we have jurisdiction does not compel us to exercise it. In Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 600, we remanded a case to the highest court of the State, even though that court had affirmed on state procedural grounds, because after that affirmance we had reversed on constitutional grounds a case having identical substantive facts. We said there:
“While we must have proper regard to this ruling of the state court in relation to its appellate procedure, we cannot ignore the exceptional features of the present case. An important question under the Federal Constitution was involved, and, from that standpoint, the case did not stand alone. . . .
. . We are not satisfied that the court would have dealt with the case in the same way if it had determined the constitutional question as we have determined it. . . .
“We have frequently held that in the exercise of our appellate jurisdiction we have power not only to correct error in the judgment under review but to make such disposition of the case as justice requires. And in determining what justice does require, the Court is bound to consider any change, either in fact or in law, which has supervened since the judgment was entered. We may recognize such a change, which may affect the result, by setting aside the judgment and remanding the case so that the state court may be free to act. We have said that to do this is not to review, in any proper sense of the term, the decision of the state court upon a non-federal question, but only to deal appropriately with a matter arising since its judgment and having a bearing upon the right disposition of the case. . . .” (294 U. S., at 605, 606, 607.)
In the instant case, there is an important factor which has intervened since the affirmance by the Georgia Supreme Court which impels us to remand for that court’s further consideration. This is the acknowledgment by the State before this Court that, as a matter of substantive law, Williams has been deprived of his constitutional rights. The Solicitor General of Fulton County, it should be recalled, had urged before the Georgia Supreme Court that no denial of equal protection was involved, and that court may well have been influenced by the contention. Moreover, if there is another remedy open to Williams, as the Attorney General of the State intimated in his brief to the Georgia Supreme Court, that court should have an opportunity to designate the appropriate remedy.
The facts of this case are extraordinary, particularly in view of the use of yellow and white tickets by a judge of the Fulton County Superior Court almost a year after the State’s own Supreme Court had condemned the practice in the Avery case. That life is at stake is of course another important factor in creating the extraordinary situation. The difference between capital and non-capital offenses is the basis of differentiation in law in diverse ways in which the distinction becomes relevant. We think that orderly procedure requires a remand to the State Supreme Court for reconsideration of the case. Fair regard for the principles which the Georgia courts have enforced in numerous cases and for the constitutional commands binding on all courts compels us to reject the assumption that the courts of Georgia would allow this man to go to his death as the result of a conviction secured from a jury which the State admits was unconstitutionally impaneled. Cf. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103.
Remanded.
[For dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Clark, see post, p. 393.]
[For dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Minton, see post, p. 403.]
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT.
WILLIAMS CASE
Oct. 4, 1952 — alleged murder occurs.
Oct. 17, 1952 — Williams arrested, placed in a line-up, confesses. Oct. 21, 1952 — Williams indicted. Feb. 18, 1953 — jury panels chosen for trials during week of March 9th.
March 10, 1953 — jury put upon Williams, trial held, and verdict of guilty. March 11, 1953 — sentenced. March 27, 1953 — formal motion for new trial filed.
June 29, 1953 — amendment to motion for new trial filed; motion overruled.
July 16, 1953 — bill of exceptions filed.
Oct. 14, 1953 — Georgia Supreme Court affirms.
Nov. 23, 1953 — Williams again sentenced to death.
Dec. 1, 1953 — extraordinary motion for new trial filed.
Jan. 18, 1954 — trial court dismisses extraordinary motion.
May 19, 1954 — Georgia Supreme Court affirms.
Oct. 18, 1954 — this Court grants certiorari.
AVERY CASE
Sept. 20, 1951 — Avery convicted. April 14,1952 — Georgia Supreme Court affirms.
July 28, 1952 — certiorari filed in this Court.
March 9,1953-certiorari. -this Court grants
April 30, 1953 — case argued in this Court.
May 25, 1953 — this Court reverses, holding jury selection unconstitutional.
“In case of a motion for a new trial made after the adjournment of the court, some good reason must be shown why the motion was not made during the term, which shall be judged of by the court. In all such cases, 20 days’ notice shall be given to the opposite party. Whenever a motion for a new trial shall have been made at the term of trial in any criminal case and overruled, or when a motion for a new trial has not been made at such term, no motion for a new trial from the same verdict shall be made or received, unless the same is an extraordinary motion or case, and but one such extraordinary motion shall be made or allowed.”
See Appendix, post, p. 392, for table comparing the dates in the two cases.
The court said: “And while the statute does not say so, its manifest intention is that the tickets shall be of uniform size and color, so as to make discrimination impossible in the drawing of jurors; and, where not so done, this is prima facie evidence of discrimination, and, if nothing else appeared, would require a reversal. In this case, however, it is not charged or contended that any discrimination was practiced in drawing the challenged jurors; and the judge who drew them, as a witness for the accused, testified there was in fact none. Therefore, the practice of placing the names of white and colored jurors in the jury box on tickets of different colors did no harm in this instance, and consequently furnished no sufficient objection to the jurors challenged by the accused.” 209 Ga. 116, 124, 70 S. E. 2d 716, 722.
Counsel were informed that this case would be argued in this Court on March 3, 1955. On February 14, 1955, the Assistant Attorney General of Georgia wrote the Clerk of this Court that his office had been informed by Williams’ counsel that “in all probability he would not participate in the oral argument of this case.” The Clerk requested the attorney on February 18 to inform the Court of his plans. Under date of February 22, the attorney wrote to the Clerk as follows:
“Dear Sir:
“At the present time, it does not appear that I will be able to come to Washington to present oral argument in the above case. I have little or nothing to add to the brief.
“It is entirely agreeable, insofar as my agreement has any bearing, that the Attorney General’s request in letter of February 14, 1955, [for permission to have two counsel present the State’s case] be granted.
“I am assuming that if events take such a turn that I am able to come to Washington, I will be permitted to make a short oral argument. “Yours truly,”
“Yours very truly,”
Under date of February 26, 1955, the Clerk sent the attorney the following letter:
“Dear Sir:
“I have spoken to the Chief Justice about the oral argument in this case and of the probability that you would not be present. “He asked me to inform you that the Court would appreciate your presenting oral argument if at all possible, particularly in view of the fact that this a capital case. “Yours truly ”
The attorney replied under date of February 28:
“Dear Sir:
“I am in this position about this case: I originally entered the case by appointment, before our General Assembly enacted legislation authorizing the payment of appointed counsel from the Treasury of Fulton County. This petitioner has no money. His family have made contributions which have in part paid actual expenses. At the present time, they have only paid one-half the cost of printing the brief, and in this situation, it appears that any expense connected with a trip to Washington will be out-of-pocket to me.
“In addition, I am sole counsel in a suit in the Superior Court of Polk County, Georgia, on the calendar of that court for trial during the present week where my absence for any cause will have the result that payment of temporary alimony to my client will not be continued, which in turn, will have the result that I will lose the client.
“I have appeared in the Supreme Court of Georgia twice in this case and have pursued it thus far in the Supreme Court of the United States at a considerable sacrifice. It has been my intention to present oral argument if at all possible. In view of the foregoing, however, it simply does not seem that I will be able to. If I can try the case in Polk Superior Court tomorrow (March 1st), there remains a possibility that I will be able to appear before the Supreme Court. I do not, however, believe such will be the case and for that reason, I cannot plan on going to Washington. “Very truly yourS;”
Oral argument was subsequently reset for April 18, 1955.
The Solicitor General said at the end of his brief: “. . .In the Avery Case no negro jurors were drawn and impanelled. In this case 4 negro jurors were actually impanelled and sworn for the trial of this case. The mere fact that 3 were disqualified for cause and one was stricken peremptorily by the State would not suffice to show a course of systematic exclusion of negroes from the jury such as would amount to discrimination against the defendant in the trial of his case.
“We respectfully submit that the facts alleged in the extraordinary motion for a new trial do not make out a case showing denial of equal protection of the law or due process of law under the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and that under the authorities cited above the judgment of the trial judge in dismissing the extraordinary motion should be affirmed.”
The Attorney General of the State, who also filed a brief on behalf of the State, did not discuss the constitutional question except in his concluding paragraph:
“If, under the decision in the Avery case, there was in fact a discrimination against the movant in his trial, we do not say that he does not have some remedy at law but we do contend that the question is not ground for extraordinary motion for new trial and that the Court did not err in dismissing the same.”
No other remedy was mentioned by the Georgia Supreme Court, and none has been called to our attention by the parties.
See, e. g., Parker v. Illinois, 333 U. S. 571; Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U. S. 120, 128; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Illinois Brick Co., 297 U. S. 447, 462-463; Central Union Telephone Co. v. City of Edwardsville, 269 U. S. 190.
Cf. Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U. S. 226; Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U. S. 765, 772-773; Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354, 358; Urie v. Thompson, 337 U. S. 163, 172-173; Vandalia R. Co. v. Indiana ex rel. South Bend, 207 U. S. 359, 367.
E. g., Parks v. Georgia, 204 Ga. 41, 48 S. E. 2d 837 (1948); Brown v. Georgia, 141 Ga. 783, 82 S. E. 238 (1914); Tyre v. Georgia, 38 Ga. App. 206, 143 S. E. 778 (1928).
Ga. Code Ann., § 70-303. See note 1, supra.
E. g., Patterson v. Georgia, 208 Ga. 689, 69 S. E. 2d 84 (1952) ; Pulliam v. Georgia, 199 Ga. 709, 35 S. E. 2d 250 (1945); Rogers v. Georgia, 129 Ga. 589, 59 S. E. 288 (1907); Echols v. Georgia, 87 Ga. App. 565, 74 S. E. 2d 474 (1953); Bivins v. McDonald, 50 Ga. App. 299, 177 S. E. 829 (1934).
Cf. Williams v. Georgia, 12 Ga. App. 337, 77 S. E. 189 (1913), in which the presence on the jury of a juror previously convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude was deemed to warrant a new trial on a motion after verdict, as compared with an extraordinary motion after final judgment.
Cf. the following cases in which new trials were granted on motion after verdict, as compared with an extraordinary motion after final judgment, because of a juror’s disqualification. Harris v. Georgia, 188 Ga. 745, 4 S. E. 2d 651 (1939); Ethridge v. Georgia, 164 Ga. 53, 137 S. E. 784 (1927); Currie v. Georgia, 156 Ga. 85, 118 S. E. 724 (1923); O’Berry v. Georgia, 153 Ga. 644, 113 S. E. 2 (1922); Merritt v. Georgia, 152 Ga. 405, 110 S. E. 160 (1921); Hubbard v. Georgia, 5 Ga. App. 599, 63 S. E. 588 (1909); Perrett v. Georgia, 16 Ga. App. 587, 85 S. E. 820 (1915); Cray v. Georgia, 37 Ga. App. 371, 140 S. E. 402 (1927).
Under Georgia practice, the headnotes to cases are written by the court. The headnote in this case said: “Held, that conviction for murder and sentence of death on the verdict of a juror so utterly destitute of truth and uprightness of character, would shock the conscience of civilization, and soil the purity of jury trial; and no matter how heinous the crime committed, the preservation of that purity is of more consequence than the speedy punishment of any one man for any one offense, and public policy, as well as individual right, demand a new trial.”
In Wallace v. Georgia, 205 Ga. 751, 55 S. E. 2d 145 (1949), affidavits similar to those in the Boyal case were presented by the defendant, but the State introduced positive affidavits to the effect that no such statements by the juror had been made. The headnote written by the Georgia Supreme Court stated: “There was no manifest abuse of discretion by the trial judge in overruling [this] ground of the extraordinary motion for a new trial, based upon conflicting evidence as to the alleged disqualification of the juror therein referred to.” (205 Ga., at 752, 55 S. E. 2d, at 146.)
In Bloodworth v. Georgia, 161 Ga. 332, 334, 131 S. E. 80, 81 (1925), it was stated that in a prior trial defendant was granted a new trial on an extraordinary motion after final judgment because a juror was disqualified.
In Harris v. Georgia, 150 Ga. 680, 104 S. E. 902 (1920), the defendant was sentenced to death for murder, a motion for a new trial was denied, and the judgment was affirmed on appeal. An extraordinary motion for new trial was overruled by the trial court, but the State Supreme Court reversed. The ground of the reversal was that after the jury had informed the judge that they could not agree, a deputy sheriff gave them the judge’s message that he could not help them further, and then the deputy added, “the judge would keep them locked up until they did make a verdict,” after which a verdict was brought in.
Some of these cases are not entirely clear. For example, Lump-kin stated that all objections to the impaneling of the grand jury should be made by challenge to the array before the indictment is found, where the illegality is known, or, if not known, by plea in abatement to the indictment; objections to “certain jurors” on the trial jury should be raised by a challenge to the juror when put upon the defendant. This rule is cited in Cornelious for the proposition that an objection to both grand and petit juries must be made by a challenge to the array before indictment or by plea in abatement before trial. In Kato v. Georgia, 33 Ga. App. 342, 126 S. E. 266 (1925), the grand jury rule was applied to individual grand jurors rather than to the panel, and the challenge was said to be one to the array. And in Moon v. Georgia, 68 Ga. 687 (1882), it was said that an objection to a single juror should be made by a challenge to the array. Cf. note 16, infra.
E. g., Fudge v. Georgia, 190 Ga. 340, 9 S. E. 2d 259 (1940); Bryan v. Georgia, 124 Ga. 79, 52 S. E. 298 (1905); Taylor v. Georgia, 121 Ga. 348, 49 S. E. 303 (1904). In Georgia, challenges to the array go to the form and manner of making up the entire panel, whereas challenges to the poll are directed solely to the individual juror. See Humphries v. Georgia, 100 Ga. 260, 262, 28 S. E. 25, 26 (1897); Mitchell v. Georgia, 69 Ga. App. 771, 776, 26 S. E. 2d 663, 667 (1943).
210 Ga. 665, 668, 82 S. E. 2d 217, 219.
Even if extraordinary motion is the appropriate remedy, local practice may require Williams to be put to his proof. The State, for purposes of presenting its legal arguments, has not disputed the facts alleged in the extraordinary motion, but there has not been a hearing on those facts or an admission of their truth.
Cf. Patterson v. Alabama, supra, with Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | B | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner manufactures a drug called Ritonic Capsules for which it filed a new drug application (NDA) that became effective in 1959. Under the Act then in force, an NDA for a “new drug” required the manufacturer to submit to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) adequate proof of the drug's safety. This particular NDA became effective on the basis of the drug’s safety. As we have noted in the companion cases, the 1962 amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1040, as amended, 76 Stat. 780, directed FDA to withdraw approval for NDA’s which became effective prior to that time if, after notice and opportunity for hearing, it found a lack of “substantial evidence” that the drug involved was effective as claimed in its labeling. And, as we have noted, “substantial evidence” as used in the Act, §§ 505 (d) and 505 (e)(3), 21 U. S. C. §§ 355 (d) and 355 (e)(3), means “adequate and well-controlled investigations” from which experts may conclude that the drug will have the claimed effect.
A panel of the National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council (NAS-NRC) reviewed the claims made for Ritonic Capsules and found it “ineffective” for each of the claims. FDA concluded there was a lack of substantial evidence of its efficacy and gave notice of its intent to withdraw the NDA, offering petitioner an opportunity to submit the required kind of data bearing on the efficacy of the drug and stating that withdrawal of approval of the NDA would cause the Ritonic Capsules to be a “new drug” for which no NDA was in effect, thereby making future sales unlawful.
Petitioner responded, submitting data on the issue of efficacy and maintained that Ritonic Capsules was not a “new drug” for purposes of the Act as amended. FDA concluded that petitioner’s evidence was insufficient to establish effectiveness and gave notice of a hearing on the withdrawal of the NDA. Petitioner responded, contested FDA’s authority to proceed further, and claimed that the product was not a “new drug” under the 1962 Act. It reserved the right to establish its position in the administrative proceedings, in judicial proceedings, or in both. Petitioner filed no more data to support its position; and accordingly FDA withdrew approval of the NDA on the ground that there was no substantial evidence that the drug was effective as claimed. Petitioner sought review of the withdrawal order in the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, as provided in § 505 (h), 21 U. S. C. § 355 (h). The Court of Appeals affirmed the withdrawal order. CIBA-Geigy Corp. v. Richardson, 446 F. 2d 466.
Meanwhile, and prior to the issuance of the withdrawal order, petitioner brought suit in the District Court for the District of New Jersey seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. After hearing, the District Court granted the Government’s motion .to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, 463 F. 2d 225, holding that FDA was authorized to decide the jurisdictional question as an incident of its power to approve or withdraw approval for NDA’s, that its decision on that issue was reviewable on direct appeal by a court of appeals, and since the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had ruled against petitioner on that appeal, the jurisdictional question could not be relitigated in a separate suit for a declaratory judgment. We affirm the Court of Appeals.
We have stated in Weinberger v. Bentex Pharmaceuticals, Inc., post, p. 645, our reasons for concluding that FDA has jurisdiction in an administrative proceeding to determine whether a drug product is a “new drug” within the meaning of § 201 (p) of the Act, 21 U. S. C. §321(p). A decision that FDA lacks authority to determine in its own proceedings the coverage of the Act it administers, subject of course to judicial review, would seriously impair FDA’s ability to discharge the responsibilities placed on it by Congress. As we said in Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., ante, p. 609, and the Bentex case, supra, the definition of “new drug” as used in §201(p)(1) involves a determination of technical and scientific questions by experts. The agency is therefore appropriately the arm of Government to make the threshold determination of the issue of coverage. Cf. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186, 210-211, n 47.
It is, of course, true that the Act gives FDA a second line of defense — civil injunction proceedings, criminal penalties, and in rem seizure and condemnation. See §§ 302 (a), 303, 304, 21 U. S. C. §§ 332 (a), 333, 334. Those are sanctions to enforce the prohibition of the Act against the sale in commerce of any article in violation of § 505. But the Act does not create a dual system of control — one administrative, and the other judicial. Cases may arise where there has been no formal administrative determination of the “new drug” issue, it being first tendered to a district court. Even then, however, the district court might well stay its hand, awaiting an appropriate administrative determination of the threshold question. See the Bentex case, supra. Where there is, however, an administrative determination, whether it be explicit or implicit in the withdrawal of an NDA, the tactic of “reserving” the threshold question (the jurisdictional issue) for later judicial determination is not tolerable. There is judicial review of FDA's ruling. But petitioner, having an opportunity to litigate the “new drug” issue before FDA and to raise the issue on appeal to a court of appeals, may not relitigate the issue in another proceeding. Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 444-446.
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Mr. Justice Stewart took no part in the decision of this case.
it is a prescription drug recommended “for patients who are losing their drive, alertness, vitality and zest for living because of the natural degenerative changes of advancing years”; and for patients who are “debilitated or depressed by chronic illness, overwork, etc., as well as those recuperating from illness or surgery.”
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the-Court.
This is a civil rights action, 42 U. S. C. §§ 1983, 1985, attacking the constitutionality of certain Texas statutes, brought by appellees. It alleges that the defendants, members of the Texas Rangers and the Starr County, Texas, Sheriff’s Department, and a Justice of the Peace in Starr* County, conspired to deprive appellees of their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, by unlawfully arresting, detaining, and confining them without due process and without legal justification, and by unlawfully threatening, harassing, coercing, and physically assaulting them to prevent their exercise of the rights of free speech and assembly. A three-judge court was convened which declared five Texas statutes unconstitutional and; enjoined their enforcement. 347 F. Supp. 605, 634. In addition, the court permanently enjoined the defendants from a variety of unlawful practices which formed the core of the alleged conspiracy. ■Five defendants, all members of the Texas Rangers, have perfected this appeal. 28 U. S. C. § 1253. The appellees consist of the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee, certain named plaintiffs, and the class they represented in the District Court on whose behalf the judgment was also rendered.
From June 1966 until June 1967, the appellees were engaged in an effort to organize into the union the predominantly Mexican-American farmworkers of the lower Rio Grande Valley. This effort led to considerable local controversy which brought appellees into conflict with the state and local authorities, and the District Court found that as a result of the unlawful practices enjoined below the organizing efforts were crushed. This lawsuit followed.
The factual findings of the District Court are not challenged here. In early June 1966, at the beginning of the organizing effort, Eugene Nelson, one of the strikers’ principal leaders, stationed himself at the International Bridge in Roma, Texas, attempting, to persuade laborers from Mexico to support the strike. He was taken into custody by the Starr County Sheriff, detained for four hours, questioned about the strike, and was told he was under investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. No charges were ever filed against him. 347 F. Supp., at 612.
In October 1966, about 25 union members and sympathizers picketed alongside the Rancho Grande Farms exhorting the laborers to join the strike; they were-ordered to disperse by' the sheriffs although their picketing was .peaceful. When Raymond Chandler, one of the union- leaders, engaged an officer in conversation contesting the validity of the order, he was arrested under Art. 474 of the Texas Penal Code for breach of the peace. Although the maximum punishment for this offense is a-$200 fine, bond was set for Chandler at $500. When two of Chandler’s friends came to the courthouse to make bond, they were verbally abused, told they had no business there, and that if they did not leave they would be placed in jail themselves. 347 F. Supp., at 612-613. They left.
Later that month, when the president of the local union and others were in • the courthouse under arrest, they shouted “viva la huelga” in support of the strike. A deputy sheriff struck the union official and held a gun at his forehead, ordering him not to repeat those words in the courthouse' because it was a “respectful place.” Id., at 613. As the strike continued through the year and the Texas Rangers were called into the local area, there, were more serious incidents of violénce.. In May 1967 some union pickets gathered in Mission, Texas, to protest the carrying of produce from the valley on the Missouri-Pacific Railroad. They were initially charged with trespass on private property; this was changed to unlawful assembly, and finally was supferseded by complaints of secondary, picketing. The Reverend Edgar' Krueger.and Magdaleno Dimas were taken into custody by the Rangers. As a train passed, the Rangers held these two prisoners’ bodies so that their faces were only .inches from the train. Id., at 615.
A few weeks later the Rangers sought to arrest Dimas for allegedly brandishing a gun in a threatening manner, and found him by “tailing” Chandler and Moreno, also union members. Chandler was arrested with no expía-' nation as was Moreno, who was also assaulted by Captain Allee at the time. These two men were later charged with assisting Dimas to evade arrest, although by, Allee’s own testimony they were never told Dimas was sought by the Rangers. Indeed, because the officers had no-arrest warrant or formal complaint against Dimas, they could not then arrest him, so they put'in a call to a justice of the peace who arrived on the scene and filled out a warrant on forms he carried with him. The Rangers then broke into a house and arrested Dimas and Rodriguez, another union member, in a violent and brutal fashion. Dimas was hospitalized four days with a brain concussion, and X-rays revealed that he had been struck so hard on the back that his spine was curved out of shape. Rodriguez had cuts and bruises on his ear, elbow, upper arm, back, and jaw; one of his fingers was broken and the nail torn off. Id., at 616-617.
Earlier, in May, Nelson had gone down to the Sheriff’s office, according to appellees, to complain that the Rangers were acting as a priváte police force for one of the farms in the area. The three-judge District Court found that Nelson was then arrested and charged with threatening the life of certain Texas Rangers, despite the fact that Captain Allee conceded there was no serious threat. Allee had directed that the charges be filed to protect the Rangers from censure if something happened to Nelson. Id., at 615.
During this entire period the Starr County Sheriff’s office regularly distributed an aggressive anti-union newspaper. A deputy driving an official car would pick up the papers' each week and bring them back to the Sheriff’s office; they would then be distributed by various deputies. Id,, at 617. The District Court included copies of the paper in an appendix to its opinion; a typical headline was. “Only Mexican Subversive Group Could Sympathize with Valley Farm Workers.” The views of the Texas Rangers were similarly explicit. On a number of occasions they offered farm jobs to.the union leaders, at the union demand wage, in return for, an end to the strike'. Id., at 613, 614. The Rangers told one union member that they had been called into the area to break the strike and would not leave until they had done so. Id., at 613.
AmPng other findings of the three-judge District Court were that the defendants selectively enforced the unlawful assembly law, Art. 439 of the Texas Penal Code, treating as criminal an inoffensive union gathering, 347 F. Supp., at 613; solicited'criminal, complaints against appellees from persons with no knowledge of the alleged Offense, id., at 615; and filed baseless. charges against one appellee for impersonating an officer.
The' three-judge District Court found , that the law enforcement officials “took sides in what was essentially a labor-management controversy.” Id., at 618. Although there was .virtually no evidence of assault upon anyone by union people during the strike, the officials “concluded that the maintenance of law and order was inextricably bound to preventing the success of the strike.” Ibid. Thus, these were not a series of isolated incidents but a prevailing pattern throughout the controversy.
I
It is argued that a state injunction against the appellees, issued on July 11, 1967, ended the strike and thus rendered- the controversy moot. That is not the case.
After summarizing the defendants’ unlawful practices, the District Court concluded that “[t]he union’s efforts collapsed under this pressure in June of 1967 and this suit was filed in an effort to seek relief.” Ibid. Thus it was the defendants’ conduct, which is the subject of this suit, that ended the strike, not the state court injunction, which came afterward. With the protection of the federal court decree, appellees could again begin their efforts.
Moreover, the state court injunction is quite limited. It proscribes picketing by the appellees and those acting in concert with them only on or near property owned by La Casita Farms, Inc.,' the plaintiff in the state case. But the appellants agreed at oral argument that La Casita is only one of the major employers in the area, and some of the incidents involved occurred at other locations. Moreover the state court injunction was only, temporary, and on appeal the Texas Court of- Civil Appeals, after finding that most of the trial court findings were unsupported, affirmed 'only because of the limited nature of review, under Texas law, of a temporary injunction. The appellate court concluded that “nothing in this opinion is to be taken as a ruling that the evidence before us would support the issuance of a permanent injunction . ...” United Farm Workers Organizing Comm. v. La Casita Farms, Inc., 439 S. W. 2d 398, 403. We were advised at oral argument that no permanent injunction against picketing has ever been issued, and we cannot assume that one will be.
Nor can it be argued that the case has become moot because appellees have abandoned their efforts as a result of the very-harassment they sought to restrain by this suit. There can be no requirement that appellees continue to subject themselves to physical violence and unlawful restrictions upon their liberties throughout the pendency of the action in order to preserve it as a live controversy. In the face of appellants’ conduct, appel-' lees sought to vindicate their rights in the federal court. In June 1967 they rechannelgd- their efforts from direct attempts at unionizing the workers to seeking 'the protection of a federal decree, and hence they brought this suit.. In their amended complaint, filed in October' 1967, they charged that the defendants’ conduct, aimed at all those who make common cause with appellees, “chill[ed] the willingness of people to exércise their First Amendment rights,” resulting, ás the three-judge District Court found, in the “collapse” of the union drive. Appellees continued to prosecute the suit and won a judgment in December 1972. We may not assume that because during this period they directed their efforts to the judicial battle, they have abandoned their principal cause. Rather, the very purpose of the suit was to seek protection of the federal court so that the efforts at unionization could be renewed. It is settled that an action for an injunction does not become moot merely because the conduct complained of has terminated, if there is a póssibility of recurrence, since otherwise the defendants “would be free to return . to ‘ [their] old ways.’Gray v. Sanders, 372. U. S. 368, 376; Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 323 U. S. 37, 43; United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U. S. 629, 632; NLRB v. Raytheon Co., 398 U. S. 25, 27; SEC v. Medical Committee for Human Rights, 404 U. S. 403, 406. The appellee union remains very much a' live organization and its goal continues to be the unionization of farmworkers. The essential controversy is therefore not moot, but very much alive.
II
We first consider the provisions of the federal court decree enjoining police intimidation of the appellees. This part of the decree complements the other relief, in that it places boundaries on all police conduct, not just that which is based upon state statutes struck down by the federal court. The complaint charged that the enjoined conduct was but one part of a single plan by the defendants, and the District Court found a pervasive pattern of intimidation in which the law enforcement authorities sought to suppress appellees' constitutional rights. In this blunderbuss effort the police not only relied on statutes the District Court found constitutionally deficient, but concurrently exercised their authority under valid laws in an unconstitutional manner. While it is argued that a three-judge District Court could not properly be convened if police harassment under concededly constitutional statutes were the only question presented to it, it could properly consider the question and grant relief in the exercise of jurisdiction ancillary to that conferred by the constitutional attack on the state statutes which plainly required a three-judge court.
That part of the decree in question here prohibits appellants from using their authority as peace officers to arrest, stop, disperse, or imprison appellees, or otherwise interfere with their organizational efforts, without “adequate cause.” “Adequate cause” is defined as (1) actual obstruction of public or private passways causing unreasonable interference,' (2) force or violence, or threat thereof, actually committed by any person, or the aiding and abetting of such conduct, or, (3) probable cause to" bélieve in good faith that a criminal law of the State of Texas has been violated, other than the ones struck down in the remainder of the decree. On its face the injunction does no more than require the police to abide by constitutional requirements; and there is no contention that this decree would interfere with' law enforcement by- restraining the police from engaging in conduct that would be otherwise lawful.
Thus the only question before us is whether this was an appropriate exercise of the federal court’s equitable powers. We first note that this portion of the decree creates no interference with prosecutions pending in the state courts, so that the special considerations relevant to cases like Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37, do not apply here. Nor. w;as there any requirement that appellees first exhaust state remedies before bringing their federal claims under the Civil Rights-Act of 1871 to federal court. McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U. S. 668; Monroe v, Pape, 365 U. S. 167. Nonetheless there remains the necessity of showing, irreparable injury, “the traditional prerequisite to obtaining an injunction” in any case. Younger, supra, at 46.
Such a showing was clearly made here as the unchallenged findings of the. District Court show. The .appellees sought to. do no more than organize a lawful union to better the situation of one of the most economically oppressed classes of workers in the country. Because of the intimidation by state authorities, their lawful effort was crushed. The workers, aAd their leaders and organizers were placed in fear of exercising their constitutionally protected rights of free, expression, assembly, and association. Potential supporters of their cause were placed in fear of lending their support.. If they were to be able to regain those rights and continue furthering their cause by constitutional means, they required protection from appellants’ concerted conduct. .No remedy at law would be adequate to provide such protection. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479, 485-489.
Isolated incidents of. police misconduct under valid statutes would not, of course, be cause for the exércise of a federal court’s equitable powers. But “[w]e have not hesitated on direct review to strike down applications of constitutional statutes which we have found to be unconstitutionally applied.” Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U. S. 611, 620, citing Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 559; Wright v. Georgia, 373 U. S. 284; Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229. Where, as here, there is .a persistent pattern of police misconduct, injunctive relief is appropriate. In Hague, v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S. 496, we affirmed the granting of such relief under strikingly similar facts. There also law enforcement officials set out to crush a nascent labor union. The police interfered with the lawful distributiofl of pamphlets, prevented the holding of public meetings, and ran some labor organizers out of town. The District Court declared some of the municipal ordinances unconstitutional. In addition, it enjoined the police from “exercising personal restraint over [the plaintiffs] without warrant or confining them without lawful .arrest and production of them' for prompt judicial hearing ... or interfering with their free access to the streets, parks, or public places of the city,” or from “interfering with the right of the [plaintiffs],.their agents and those acting with them, to communicate their views as individuals to others on the streets in an. orderly and peaceable manner.” Id., at 517. The. lower federal courts have also granted such relief in similar eases.
For reasons to be stated, that portion of this relief based on holdings that certain state statutes are- unconstitutional should be modified. In all other respects this portion of the. District Court decree was quite proper.
Ill
Finally, we consider the portion of the District-Court's judgment declaring five Texas statutes unconstitutional, with the accompanying injunctive relief. We have been pressed with arguments by the appellants that these parts of the decree are inconsistent with the teachings of Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37, and Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U. S. 66. For reasons explained below, it is unnecessary to reach these' contentions at present. ■
Younger and its companion cases are grounded upon the special considerations which apply when a federal court is asked to intervene in pending state criminal prosecutions. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452. Although both parties here have assumed the relevance of Younger, we have been unable to find any precise indication in the District Court opinion or in the record that there were pending prosecutions at the time of the District Court decision. Indeed, the chronology of events gives rise to the contrary inference.- Although the District Court issued its opinion in December 1972, the union effort which was the' source of this contest had been interrupted more than five years earlier. It seems likely that any state prosecutions initiated during the effort would have been concluded by that time unless they had been restrained by a temporary order of the federal court. But there is no indication that such an order was ever issued. Moreover, the injunctive relief granted does not appear to be directed at restraining any state court proceedings.
If in fact there were no pending prosecutions, the relief could have impact only on future events in which the challenged statutes might be invoked by the appellants. Since this remains a live, continuing controversy, such relief would ordinarily be appropriate if justified by the merits of the case. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368, 376. But here we have a special situation, for three of the statutes in question have since been repealed by the Texas Legislature. Article 474 of the Penal Code, the breach-of-the-peace provision, has been replaced .by §§42.01, 42.03, and 42.05 in the new codification; Art. 482, the abusive-language statute, has been replaced by § 42.01; and Art. 439, the unlawful-assembly provision, has been replaced by § 42.02., These new enactments, which replaced the earlier statutes as .of January 1, 1974, are more narrowly drawn than their predecessors. Whatever the merits of the District Court’s conclusions on the earlier statutes, any challenge to the new provisions presents a different case.
Thus, although there was a live controversy as to these statutes, at the time of the District Court decree, if there are no pending prosecutions under the old statutes, the portions of the District Court’s judgment relating to. them has become moot. But because we cannot determine with certainty 'whether there are pending prosecutions, or even whether the District Court intended to enjoin them if there “were, the proper disposition is to remand the case to the District Court for further' findings. Cf. Diffenderfer v. Central Baptist Church, 404 U. S. 412. If there are no pending prosecutions under these superseded statutes, the ■ District Court should vacate both the declaratory and injunctive relief as to them. If there are pending prosecutions remaining against any of the appellees, then the District Court should make findings as to. whether these particular prosecutions were brought in bad faith; with no genuine expectation of conviction. If it so finds, the court will. enter an appropriate decree which this Court may ultimately review, both as to the propriety of federal court intervention in the circumstances of the case, and as to the merits of any holding striking down the state statutes.
As to the two remaining statutes, Tex. Civ. Stat., Arts. 5154d and 5154f, it is not necessary for other reasons for us at this time to reach any Younger questions or the merits of the decision below as to the statutes’ constitutionality. As to these also we must remand for a determination as to whether there are pending prosecutions, although if there are none the appellees might still be threatened with prosecutions in the future since these statutes are still in force. But if there are only threatened prosecutions, and the appellees sought only declaratory relief as to the statutes, then the case would not be governed by Younger at all, but by Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, decided this Term. The District Court, of course, did not have the benefit of our opinion in Steffel at the time of its decision. We therefore think it appropriate to vacate the judgment of the District Court as to these statutes and remand for further findings and reconsideration in light of Steffel v. Thompson. If there are pending prosecutions then the District Court should determine whether they were brought in bad faith, for the purpose of harassing appellees and deterring the exercise of First Amendment rights, so that allowing the prosecutions to proceed will result in irreparable injury to the appellees. If there are no pending prosecutions and only declaratory relief is sought, then Steffel clearly controls and no Younger showing need be made.
In summary, we affirm the decree granting injunctive relief against police misconduct, with appropriate modifications to delete reference to the five statutes held unconstitutional by the District Court. We vacate the District Court’s judgment as to those five statutes, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the decision, of this casé.
Jurisdiction in the District Court was based upon 28 U. S. C. §13.43, and,a three-judge court was properly convened under 28 U. S. C. § 2231.
Named in the caption were Francisco Medrano, Kathy Baker, David Lopez, Gilbert Padilla, Magdaleno Dimas, and Benjamin Rodriguez. Other individual plaintiffs were named in the body of the complaint.
The judgment was also rendered for all members of the plaintiff United Farmworkers Organizing Committee, AFL-CIO, and- “all other persons who because of their sympathy for or voluntary support of the aims of said Plaintiff union have engaged in. are engaging in, or may hereafter, engage in peaceful picketing, peaceful assembly, or other organizational activities of or in support of said Plaintiff union or who may engage in concert of action with one or more of Plaintiffs for the solicitation of agricultural workers oj* others to join or make common cause with them in matters pertaining to the work and labor of agricultural workers.”
This was not the only abuse of the bonding process. Later when Eugene Nelson was arrested for threatening the life of a Texas Ranger, see infra, at 807,. the deputy sheriff rejected for no valid reason a bond he knew was good.
Deputy Paul. Pena filed these charges against Reynaldo De La Cruz although Pena had never seen the offense, which was wearing a badge around the union hall. The badge in question was óf the shield type, while those worn by the officers were of the star type, and Pena conceded that he knew that De La Cruz and Dimas had worn similar badges when directing traffic at union functions. 347 E. Supp., at 616.
La Casita Farms, Inc. v. United Farm Workers Organizing Comm., Dist. Ct. of Starr County, Texas, No. 3809, July 11, 1967. Appellants’ exhibit D-l in the District Court.
“It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed by the Court that Defendants, their successors, agents and employees, and persons acting in-concert with them, are permanently enjoined and restrained from any of the following acts or conduct directed toward or applied to Plaintiffs and the persons they represent, to-wit:.'
“A. Using in any manner Defendants’ authority as peace officers for the purpose of preventing or discouraging peaceful organizational activities without adequate cause.
“B. Interfering by stopping, dispersing, arresting, or imprisoning any person, or by any other means, with picketing, assembling, solicitation, or organizational effort without adequate cause.
“C. Arresting any person without warrant or without probable cause .which probable cause is accompanied by intention to present appropriate written complaint to a court of competent jurisdiction.
“D. Stopping, dispersing, arresting or imprisoning any person without adequate cause because of the arrest of some other person.'
“E. As used in this Paragraph 16, Subparagraphs A, B and D above, the term ‘adequate cause’ shall mean (1) actual obstruction of a public or private passway, road, street, or entrance which actually causes unreasonable interference with ingress, egress, or flow of traffic; or (2) force or violence, or the threat of force or violence, actually committed by any person by his own conduct or by actually aiding, abetting, or participating in such conduct by another person; or (3) probable cause which may cause a Defendant to believe in good faith that one or more particular persons did violate a criminal law of the State of Texas other than those specific laws herein declared unconstitutional, or a municipal ordinance.”
It is argued that Public Service Comm’n v. Brashear Lines, 312 U. S. 621, holds that there is no ancillary jurisdiction in three-judge courts. In Brashear the plaintiffs refused to pay fees assessed under the statute challenged in their suit; when their attack on the statute failed the defendants sought damages, and the Court held that the damages action should have been heard by a single district judge.' This was not a proper exercise of ancillary jurisdiction because the defendants* claim was- completely unrelated to the basis on which the three-judge court- was convened, and there' was no purpose to be served by having it determined by the same tribunal. But we have held that “[o]nce [a three-judge court is] convened the case can be disposed of below or here on any ground, whether or not it would have justified the calling of a three-judge court.'” United States v. Georgia Public Service Comm’n, 371 U. S. 285., 287-288. Indeed, the three-judge court is required to hear the nonconstitutional attack upon the statute; Florida Lime Growers v. Jacobsen, 362 U. S. 73, 85; Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397, 402. The instant case is nearly identical to Milky Way v. Leary, 397 U. S. 98, in which we considered and summarily affirmed the judgment of a three-judge court regarding the assertedly illegal application of a New York statute which was concededly constitutional; this decision was rendered in the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction acquired as a result of a facial attack oh a different but related state statute. 305 F. Supp. 288, 296 (SDNY). The part.of the .decree enjoining police misconduct is intimately bound up with and ancillary to the remainder of the court’s judgment, and even Brashear held that the court has jurisdiction to hear every question pertaining to the prayer for the injunction “in order that a single lawsuit may afford final and authoritative decision of the controversy between the parties.” 312 U. S., at 625 n. 5.
• This view was followed in. Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82, in which a .three-judge District Court had sustained a state obscenity statute against the federal constitutional attack that provided the basis for convening it. But the District Court went on to determine that the arrests of the plaintiffs and the seizures incident thereto were unconstitutional because no prior adversary hearing had been held, 304 F. Supp., 662, 667 (ED La.), and therefore issued an. order suppressing the evidence in the state court case'. We reviewed that order on the merits, assuming it was properly before us as an appeal “from an order granting or denying ... an interlocutory of permanent injunction in any civil” action required to be heard by a three-judge court. See 401 U. S., at 89 (Stewart, J., concurring). The basis for ancillary jurisdiction here is at least as compelling.'
It is true that we also held in Perez that an order striking down á local parish ordinance was not properly before us. But that was an attack on a wholly different enactment not involving detailed factual inquiries common with and ancillary to the constitutional challenge on the state law supporting the three-judge court’s jurisdiction. ■ And central to our determination wás the finding that the order regarding the parish ordinance “was not issued by a three-judge court, but rather by Judge Boyle, acting as a single district judge.” Id., at 87. That is obviously not the case here.
In NAACP v. Thompson, 357 F. 2d 831 (CA5), the Court of Appeals reversed the denial of relief by the District Court, concluding that defendants believed that plaintiffs’ demonstrations “must be suppressed and that, in order to do so, they intend to take advantage of ant- latv or ordinance, however inapplicable or however slight the transgression, and to continue to harass and intimidate [the] plaintiffs.” Id., at S3S. The findings here show at least that much. In Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F. 2d 197 (CA4) (en banc), the court ordered the police enjoined from making searches without probable cause after concluding that the “raids were not isolated instances undertaken by individual police officers.” Id., at 202. See also Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 392 F. 2d 83 (CA2).
There was no challenge here to the District Court’s conclusion that this was a proper class action, see n. 14, infra. Moreover as to this portion of the decree, directed at police misconduct generally rather than to any particular state statute, named plaintiffs intimidated by misconduct may represent all others in the class of those similarly abused, without regard to the asserted state statutory basis for the police actions.
The decree is not directed at any state prosecutors or state judges with the exception of one justice of the peace-whose involvement-apparently conasted of issuing warrants without proper basis. Moreover it does not in terms restrain any prosecutions, but only the “arresting, imprisoning, filing criminal charges, threatening to arrest, or ordering or advising or suggesting that [appellees] disperse under authority of any portion of” the statutes struck down. A reading of the complaint suggests that no injunctive relief against pending-prosecutions was ever requested. As to whether there in fact were pending prosecutions,"our only guidance from the District Court is a passing reference that “plaintiffs [are] now facing charges in the Texas courts . . .,” 347 F. Supp., at 620, but it is impossible to determine against whom any charges might be pending. Indeed, in light of the District Court’s failure to treat the statutes separately in their findings of harassment, we cannot be certain that their.reference to pending charges here is a finding that there are charges pending under each of the statutes. And if there are state charges pending, we could do no more than speculate as to why trial never commenced during the five-year pendency of the federal suit. This may be the. result of an informal agreement with the federal court, or it may indicate that the State has abandoned any intention to bring these, cases to trial. Indeed it may be that state law, would bar prosecutions now after such a delay. See Tex. Const., Art. 1, § 10, and Tex. Code Crim. Proc., Art. 32.01. It- is therefore appropriate- to remand to the District Court for further findings on this question.
In the federal system an appellate court determines mootness as of the time it considers the case, not as of the time it was filed. Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 125.
If there are pending prosecutions against members of the class not named in the action, the District Court must find that the class was properly represented. Appellants stipulated in District Court that “plaintiffs are properly representative of the class they purport to represent.” Document 33, ¶ 2, Record on Appeal. In this regard we note that ".the union was itself a named plaintiff, and the judgment was issued on behalf of all of its members.
. In this case the union has standing as a named plaintiff to raise any of the claims that a member .of the union would have standing to raise. Unions may sue under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 as persons deprived of their rights secured by the Constitution and laws, American Fed. of State, Co., & Mun. Emp. v. Woodward, 406 F. 2d 137 (CA8), and it has ' been implicitly recognized that protected First Amendment rights flow to unions as well as to their members and organizers. Carpenters Union v. Ritter’s Cafe, 315 U. S. 722; cf. NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 428. If, as alleged by the union in its complaint, its members were subject to unlawful arrests and intimidation for engaging in union organizational activity protected by the First Amendment, the union’s capacity to communicate is unlawfully impeded, since the union can act only through its members. The union then has standing to complain of the arrests and intimidation and bring this action.
See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479, 490: “[Ajppellants have attacked the good faith of the appellees in enforcing the statutes, claiming that they have invoked, and threaten'to continue to' invoke, criminal process without any hope of ultimate success, but only to discourage appellants’ civil rights activities.” See also Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U. S. 611, 619-620, and Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82, 118 n. 11 (separate opinion of Brennan, J.).
We do not reach the question reserved in Steffel as to -whether á Younger showing is necessary to obtain injunctive relief against threatened prosecutions. See generally Note, Federal Relief Against Threatened State Prosecutions: The Implications of Younger, Lake Carriers and Roe, 48 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 965 (1973).
See n. 18, infra.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Thomas
delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part III-A.
Petitioner was sentenced to death for committing a kid-naping resulting in death to the victim. His sentence was imposed under the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, 18 U. S. C. § 3591 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. III). We are presented with three questions: whether petitioner was entitled to an instruction as to the effect of jury deadlock; whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury was led to believe that petitioner would receive a court-imposed sentence less than life imprisonment in the event that they could not reach a unanimous sentence recommendation; and whether the submission to the jury of two allegedly duplicative, vague, and overbroad nonstatutory aggravating factors was harmless error. We answer “no” to the first two questions. As for the third, we are of the view that there was no error in allowing the jury to consider the challenged factors. Assuming error, arguendo, we think it clear that such error was harmless.
I
Petitioner Louis Jones, Jr., kidnaped Private Trade Joy McBride at gunpoint from the Goodfellow Air Force Base in San Angelo, Texas. He brought her to his house and sexually assaulted her. Soon thereafter, petitioner drove Private McBride to a bridge just outside of San Angelo, where he repeatedly struck her in the head with a tire iron until she died. Petitioner administered blows of such severe force that, when the victim’s body was found, the medical examiners observed that large pieces of her skull had been driven into her cranial cavity or were missing.
The Government charged petitioner with, inter alia, kid-naping with death resulting to the victim, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1201(a)(2), an offense punishable by life imprisonment or death. Exercising its discretion under the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, 18 U. S. C. § 3591 et seq., the Government decided to seek the latter sentencing option. Petitioner was tried in the District Court for the Northern District of Texas and found guilty by the jury.
The District Court then conducted a separate sentencing hearing pursuant to § 3593. As an initial matter, the sentencing jury was required to find that petitioner had the requisite intent, see § 3591(a)(2); it concluded that petitioner intentionally killed his victim and intentionally inflicted serious bodily injury resulting in her'death. Even on a finding of intent, however, a defendant is not death eligible unless the sentencing jury also finds that the Government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt at least one of the statutory aggravating factors set forth at §3592. See § 3593(e). Because petitioner was charged with committing a homicide, the Government had to prove 1 of the 16 statutory aggravating factors set forth at 18 U. S. C. § 3592(c) (1994 ed. and Supp. III) (different statutory aggravating factors for other crimes punishable by death are set forth at §§ 3592(b), (d)). The jury unanimously found that two such factors had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt — it agreed that petitioner caused the death of his victim during the commission of another crime, see § 3592(c)(1), and that he committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel, and depraved manner, see § 3592(c)(6).
Once petitioner became death eligible, the jury had to decide whether he should receive a death sentence. In making the selection decision, the Act requires that the sentencing jury consider all of the aggravating and mitigating factors and determine whether the former outweigh the latter (or, if there are no mitigating factors, whether the aggravating factors alone are sufficient to warrant a death sentence). §§ 3591(a), 3592, 3593(e). The Act, however, requires more exacting proof of aggravating factors than mitigating ones— although a jury must unanimously agree that the Government established the existence of an aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt, § 3593(e), the jury may consider a mitigating factor in its weighing process so long as one juror finds that the defendant established its existence by preponderance of the evidence, §§ 3593(c), (d). In addition to the two statutory aggravators that established petitioner’s death eligibility, the jury also unanimously found two aggravators of the nonstatutory variety had been proved: One set forth victim impact evidence and the other victim vulnerability evidence. As for mitigating factors, at least one juror found 10 of the 11 that petitioner proposed and seven jurors wrote in a factor petitioner had not raised on the Special Findings Form.
After weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors, the jury unanimously recommended that petitioner be sentenced to death. App. 57-58. The District Court imposed sentence in accordance with the jury’s recommendation pursuant to §3594. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the sentence. 132 F. 3d 232 (1998). We granted certiorari, 525 U. S. 809 (1998), and now affirm.
II
A
We first decide the question whether petitioner was entitled to an instruction as to the consequences of jury deadlock. Petitioner requested, in relevant part, the following instruction:
“In the event, after due deliberation and reflection, the jury is unable to agree on a unanimous decision as to the sentence to be imposed, you should so advise me and I will impose a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of release....
“In the event you are unable to agree on [a sentence of] Life Without Possibility of Release or Death, but you are unanimous that the sentence should not be less than Life Without Possibility of Release, you should report that vote to the Court and the Court will sentence the defendant to Life Without the Possibility of Release.” App. 14-15.
In petitioner’s view, the Eighth Amendment requires that the jurors be instructed as to the effect of their inability to agree. He alternatively argues that we should invoke our supervisory power over the federal courts and require that such an instruction be given.
Before we turn to petitioner’s Eighth Amendment argument, a question of statutory interpretation calls for our attention. The Fifth Circuit held that the District Court did not err in refusing petitioner’s requested instruction because it was not substantively correct. See 132 F. 3d, at 242-243. According to the Court of Appeals, § 3593(b)(2)(C), which provides that a new jury shall be impaneled for a new sentencing hearing if the guilt phase jury is discharged for “good cause,” requires the District Court to impanel a second jury and hold a second sentencing hearing in the event of jury deadlock. Id., at 243. The Government interprets the statute the same way (although its reading is more nuaneed) and urges that the judgment below be affirmed on this ground.
Petitioner, however, reads the Act differently. In his view, whenever the jury reaches a result other than a unanimous verdict recommending a death sentence or life imprisonment without the possibility of release, the duty of sentencing falls upon the district court pursuant to § 3594, which reads:
“Upon a recommendation under section 3593(e) that the defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment without possibility of release, the court shall sentence the defendant accordingly. Otherwise, the court shall impose any lesser sentence that is authorized by law. Notwithstanding any other law, if the maximum term of imprisonment for the offense is life imprisonment, the court may impose a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of release.”
Petitioner’s argument is based on his construction of the term “[otherwise.” He argues that this term means that when the jury, after retiring for deliberations, reports itself as unable to reach a unanimous verdict, the sentencing determination passes to the court.
As the dissent also concludes, post, at 417-418, petitioner’s view of the statute is the better one. The phrase “good cause” in § 3593(b)(2)(C) plainly encompasses events such as juror disqualification, but cannot be read so expansively as to include the jury’s failure to reach a unanimous decision. Nevertheless, the Eighth Amendment does not require that the jurors be instructed as to the consequences of their failure to agree.
To be sure, we have said that the Eighth Amendment requires that a sentence of death not be imposed arbitrarily. See, e. g., Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U. S. 269, 275 (1998). In order for a capital sentencing scheme to pass constitutional muster, it must perform a narrowing function with respect to the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must also ensure that capital sentencing decisions rest upon an individualized inquiry. Ibid. The instruction that petitioner requested has no bearing on what we have called the “eligibility phase” of the capital sentencing process. As for what we have called the “selection phase,” our cases have held that in order to satisfy the requirement that capital sentencing decisions rest upon an individualized inquiry, a scheme must allow a “broad inquiry” into all “constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence.” Id., at 276. Petitioner does not argue, nor could he, that the District Court’s failure to give the requested instruction prevented the jury from considering such evidence.
In theory, the District Court’s failure to instruct the jury as to the consequences of deadlock could give rise to an Eighth Amendment problem of a different sort: We also have held that a jury cannot be “affirmatively misled regarding its role in the sentencing process.” Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U. S. 1, 9 (1994). In no way, however, was the jury affirmatively misled by the District Court's refusal to give petitioner’s proposed instruction. The truth of the matter is that the proposed instruction has no bearing on the jury's role in the sentencing process. Rather, it speaks to what happens in the event that the jury is unable to fulfill its role — when deliberations break down and the jury is unable to produce a unanimous sentence recommendation. Petitioner’s argument, although less than clear, appears to be that a death sentence is arbitrary within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment if the jury is not given any bit of information that might possibly influence an individual juror's voting behavior. That contention has no merit. We have never suggested, for example, that the Eighth Amendment requires a jury be instructed as to the consequences of a breakdown in the deliberative process. On the contrary, we have long been of the view that “[t]he very object of the jury system is to secure unanimity by a comparison of views, and by arguments among the jurors themselves.” Allen v. United States, 164 U. S. 492, 501 (1896). We further have recognized that in a capital sentencing proceeding, the Government has “a strong interest in having the jury express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death.” Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U. S. 231, 238 (1988) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We are of the view that a charge to the jury of the sort proposed by petitioner might well have the effect of undermining this strong governmental interest.
We similarly decline to exercise our supervisory powers to require that an instruction on the consequences of deadlock be given in every capital ease. In drafting the Act, Congress chose not to require such an instruction. Cf. § 3593(f) (district court “shall instruct the jury that, in considering whether a sentence of death is justified, it shall not consider the race, color, religious beliefs, national origin, or sex of the defendant or of any victim and that the jury is not to recommend a sentence of death unless it has concluded that it would recommend a sentence of death for the crime in question no matter what the race, color, religious beliefs, national origin, or sex of the defendant or of any victim may be”). Petitioner does point us to a decision from the New Jersey Supreme Court requiring, in an exercise of that court’s supervisory authority, that the jury be informed of the sentencing consequences of nonunanimity. See New Jersey v. Ramseur, 106 N. J. 123, 304-315, 524 A. 2d 188, 280-286 (1987). Of course, New Jersey’s practice has no more relevance to our decision than the power to persuade. Several other States have declined to require a similar instruction. See, e. g., North Carolina v. McCarver, 341 N. C. 364, 394, 462 S. E. 2d 25, 42 (1995); Brogie v. Oklahoma, 695 P. 2d 538, 547 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985); Calhoun v. Maryland, 297 Md. 563, 593-595, 468 A. 2d 45, 58-60 (1983); Coulter v. Alabama, 438 So. 2d 336, 346 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982); Justus v. Virginia, 220 Va. 971, 979, 266 S. E. 2d 87, 92-98 (1980). We find the reasoning of the 'Virginia Supreme Court in Justus far more persuasive than that of the New Jersey Supreme Court, especially in light of the strong governmental interest that we have recognized in having the jury render a unanimous sentence recommendation:
“The court properly refused an instruction offered by the defendant which would have told the jury that if it could not reach agreement as to the appropriate punishment, the court would dismiss it and impose a life sentence. While this was a correct statement of law it concerned a procedural matter and was not one which should have been the subject of an instruction. It would have been an open invitation for the jury to avoid its responsibility and to disagree.” Id., at 979, 266 S. E. 2d, at 92.
In light of the legitimate reasons for not instructing the jury as to the consequences of deadlock, and in light of congressional silence, we will not exercise our supervisory powers to require that an instruction of the sort petitioner sought be given in every case. Cf. Shannon v. United States, 512 U. S. 573, 587 (1994).
B
Petitioner further argues that the jury was led to believe that if it could not reach a unanimous sentence recommendation he would receive a judge-imposed sentence less severe than life imprisonment, and his proposed instruction as to the consequences of deadlock was necessary to correct the jury’s erroneous impression. Moreover, he contends that the alleged confusion independently warrants reversal of his sentence under the Due Process Clause, the Eighth Amendment, and the Act itself. He grounds his due process claim in the assertion that sentences may not be based on materially untrue assumptions, his Eighth Amendment claim in his contention that the jury is entitled to accurate sentencing information, and his statutory claim in an argument that jury confusion over the available sentencing options constitutes an “arbitrary factor” under § 3595(c)(2)(A).
To put petitioner’s claim in the proper context, we must briefly review the jury instructions and sentencing procedures used at trial. After instructing the jury on the aggravating and mitigating factors and explaining the process of weighing those factors, the District Court gave the following instructions pertaining to the jury’s sentencing recommendation:
“Based upon this consideration, you the jury, by unanimous vote, shall recommend whether the defendant should be sentenced to death, sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of release, or sentenced to some other lesser sentence.
“If you unanimously conclude that the aggravating factors found to exist sufficiently outweigh any mitigating factor or factors found to exist, or in the absence of any mitigating factors, that the aggravating factors are themselves sufficient to justify a sentence of death, you may recommend a sentence of death. Keep in mind, however, that regardless of your findings with respect to aggravating and mitigating factors, you are never required to recommend a death sentence.
“If you recommend the imposition of a death sentence, the court is required to impose that sentence. If you recommend a sentence of life without the possibility of release, the court is required to impose that sentence. If you recommend that some other lesser sentence be imposed, the court is required to impose a sentence that is authorized by the law. In deciding what recommendation to make, you are not to be concerned with the question of what sentence the defendant might receive in the event you determine not to recommend a death sentence or a sentence of life without the possibility of release. That is a matter for the court to decide in the event you conclude that a sentence of death or life without the possibility of release should not be recommended.” App. 43-44.
The District Court also provided the jury with four decision forms on which to record its recommendation. In its instructions explaining those forms, the District Court told the jury that its choice of form depended on its recommendation:
“The forms are self-explanatory: Decision Form A should he used if you determine that a sentence of death should not be imposed because the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of the required intent on the part of the defendant or a required aggravating factor. Decision Form B should be used if you unanimously recommend that a sentence of death should be imposed. Decision Form C or Decision Form D should be used if you determine that a sentence of death should not be imposed because: (1) you do not unanimously find that the aggravating factor or factors found to exist sufficiently outweigh any mitigating factor or factors found to exist; (2) you do not unanimously find that the aggravating factor or factors found to exist are themselves sufficient to justify a sentence of death where no mitigating factor has been found to exist; or (3) regardless of your findings with respect to aggravating and mitigating factors you are not unanimous in recommending that a sentence of death should be imposed. Decision Form C should be used if you unanimously recommend that a sentence of imprisonment for life without the possibility of release should be imposed.
"Decision Form D should be used if you recommend that some other lesser sentence should be imposed.” Id., at 47-48.
Petitioner maintains that the instructions in combination with the decision forms led the jury to believe that if it failed to recommend unanimously a sentence of death or life imprisonment without the possibility of release, then it would be required to use Decision Form D and the court would impose a sentence less than life imprisonment. The scope of our review is shaped by whether petitioner properly raised and preserved an objection to the instructions at trial. A party generally may not assign error to a jury instruction if he fails to object before the jury retires or to “stat[e] distinctly the matter to which that party objects and the grounds of the objection.” Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 30. These timeliness and specificity requirements apply during the sentencing phase as well as the trial. See 18 U. S. C. § 3595(e)(2)(C); see also Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. 1, 54(a). They enable a trial court to correct any instructional mistakes before the jury retires and in that way help to avoid the burdens of an unnecessary retrial. While an objection in a directed verdict motion before the jury retires can preserve a claim of error, Leary v. United States, 895 U. S. 6, 32 (1969), objections raised after the jury has completed its deliberations do not. See Singer v. United States, 380 U. S. 24, 38 (1965); Lopez v. United States, 373 U. S. 427, 436 (1963); cf. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 238-239 (1940). Nor does a request for an instruction before the jury retires preserve an objection to the instruction actually given by the court. Otherwise, district judges would have to speculate on what sorts of objections might be implied through a request for an instruction and issue rulings on “implied” objections that a defendant never intends to raise. Such a rule would contradict Rule 30’s mandate that a party state distinctly his grounds for objection.
Petitioner did not voice the objections to the instructions and decision forms that he now raises before the jury retired. See App. 16-33. While Rule 30 could be read literally to bar any review of petitioner’s claim of error, our decisions instead have held that an appellate court may conduct a limited review for plain error. Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 52(b); Johnson v. United States, 520 U. S. 461, 465-466 (1997); United States v. Olano, 507 U. S. 725, 731-732 (1993); Lopez, supra, at 436-437; Namet v. United States, 373 U. S. 179, 190-191 (1963). Petitioner, however, contends that the Federal Death Penalty Act creates an exception. He relies on language in the Act providing that an appellate court shall remand a case where it finds that “the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor.” § 3595(c)(2)(A). According to petitioner, the alleged jury confusion over the available sentencing options is an arbitrary factor and thus warrants resen-tencing even if he did not properly preserve the objection.
This argument rests on an untenable reading of the Act. The statute does not explicitly announce an exception to plain-error review, and a congressional intent to create snch an exception cannot be inferred from the overall scheme. Statutory language must be read in context and a phrase “gathers meaning from the words around it.” Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U. S. 303, 307 (1961); see also Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U. S. 561, 575 (1995). Here, the same subsection that petitioner relies upon further provides that reversal is warranted where “the proceedings involved any other legal error requiring reversal of the sentence that was properly preserved for appeal under the rules of criminal procedure.” § 3595(c)(2)(C). This language makes clear that Congress sought to impose a timely objection requirement at sentencing and did not intend to equate the phrase “arbitrary factor” with legal error. Petitioner’s broad interpretation of § 3595(c)(2)(A) would drain § 3595(c)(2)(C) of any independent meaning.
We review the instructions, then, for plain error. Under that review, relief is not warranted unless there has been (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) affects substantial rights. Johnson, supra, at 467; Olano, supra, at 732. Appellate review under the plain-error doetrine, of course, is circumscribed and we exercise our power under Rule 52(b) sparingly. See United States v. Young, 470 U. S. 1, 15 (1985); United States v. Frady, 456 U. S. 152, 163, and n. 14 (1982); cf. Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U. S. 145, 154 (1977) (“It is the rare case in which an improper instruction will justify reversal of a criminal conviction when no objection has been made in the trial court”). An appellate court should exercise its discretion to correct plain error only if it “seriously affeet[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Olano, supra, at 732 (internal quotation marks omitted); Young, supra, at 15; United States v. Atkinson, 297 U. S. 157, 160 (1936).
Petitioner’s argument — which depends on the premise that the instructions and decision forms led the jury to believe that it did not have to recommend unanimously a lesser sentence — falls short of satisfying even the first requirement of the plain-error doctrine, for we cannot see that any error occurred. We have considered similar claims that allegedly ambiguous instructions caused jury confesión. See, e.g., Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U. S. 1 (1994); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U. S. 62 (1991); Boyde v. California, 494 U. S. 370 (1990). The proper standard for reviewing such claims is “ ‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way* that violates the Constitution.” Estelle, supra, at 72 (quoting Boyde, supra, at 380); see also Victor, supra, at 6 (applying reasonable likelihood standard to direct review of state criminal conviction).
There is no reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the instructions incorrectly. The District Court did not expressly inform the jury that it would impose a lesser sentence in case of deadlock. It simply told the jury that, if it recommended a lesser sentence, the court would impose a sentence “authorized by the law.” App. 44. Nor did the District Court expressly require the jury to select Decision Form D if it could not reach agreement. Instead, it exhorted the jury “to discuss the issue of punishment with one another in an effort to reach agreement, if you can do so.” Id., at 46.
Notwithstanding the absence of an explicit instruction on the consequences of nonunanimity, petitioner identifies several passages which, he believes, support the inference that the jury was confused on this point. He trains on that portion of the instructions telling the jurors that the court would decide the sentence if they did not recommend a sentence of death or life without the possibility of release. Petitioner argues that this statement, coupled with two earlier references to a “lesser sentence” option, caused the jurors to infer that the District Court would impose a lesser sentence if they could not unanimously agree on a sentence of death or life without the possibility of release. He maintains that this inference is strengthened by a later instruction: “In order to bring back a verdict recommending the punishment of death or life without the possibility of release, all twelve of you must unanimously vote in favor of such specific penalty.” Id., at 45. According to petitioner, the failure to mention the “lesser sentence” option in this statement strongly implied that, in contradistinction to the first two options, the “lesser sentence” option did not require jury unanimity.
Petitioner parses these passages too finely. Our decisions repeatedly have cautioned that instructions must be evaluated not in isolation but in the context of the entire charge. See, e. g., Bryan v. United States, 524 U. S. 184, 199 (1998); United States v. Park, 421 U. S. 658, 674 (1975); Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U. S. 141, 147 (1973); Boyd v. United States, 271 U. S. 104, 107 (1926). We agree with the Fifth Circuit that when these passages are viewed in the context of the entire instructions, they lack ambiguity and cannot be given the reading that petitioner advances. See 132 F. 3d, at 244. We previously have held that instructions that might be ambiguous in the abstract can be cured when read in conjunction with other instructions. Bryan, supra, at 199; Victor, supra, at 14-15; Estelle, supra, at 74-75. Petitioner’s claim is far weaker than those we evaluated in Bryan, Victor, and Estelle because the jury in this case received an explicit in-. struction that it had to be unanimous. Just prior to its admonition that the jury should not concern itself with the ultimate sentence if it does not recommend death or life without the possibility of release, the trial court expressly instructed the jury in unambiguous language that any sentencing recommendation had to be by a unanimous vote. Specifically, it stated that “you the jury, by unanimous vote, shall recommend whether the defendant should be sentenced to death, sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of release, or sentenced to some other lesser sentence.” App. 43. Other instructions, by contrast, specified when the jury did not have to act unanimously. For example, the District Court explicitly told the jury that its findings on the mitigating circumstances, unlike those on the aggravating circumstances, did not have to be unanimous. To be sure, the District Court could have used the phrase “unanimously” more frequently. But when read alongside an unambiguous charge that any sentencing recommendation be unanimous and other instructions explicitly identifying when the jury need not be unanimous, the passages identified by petitioner do not create a reasonable likelihood that the jury believed that deadlock would cause the District Court to impose a lesser sentence.
Petitioner also relies on alleged ambiguities in the decision forms and the explanatory instructions. He stresses the fact that Decision Form D (lesser sentence recommendation), unlike Decision Forms B (death sentence) and C (life without the possibility of release), did not contain the phrase “by unanimous vote” and required only the foreperson’s signature. These features of Decision Form D, according to petitioner, led the jury to conclude that nonunanimity would result in a lesser sentence. According to petitioner, the instructions accompanying Decision Form D, unlike those respecting Decision Forms B and C, did not mention unanimity, thereby increasing the likelihood of confusion.
With respect to this aspect of petitioner’s argument, we agree with the Fifth Circuit that “[although the verdict forms standing alone could have persuaded a jury to conclude that unanimity was not required for the lesser sentence option, any confusion created by the verdict forms was clarified when considered in light of the entire jury instruction.” 132 F. 3d, at 245. The District Court’s explicit instruction that the jury had to be unanimous and its exhortation to the jury to discuss the punishment and attempt to reach agreement, App. 46, malee it doubtful that the jury thought it was compelled to employ Decision Form D in the event of disagreement.
Petitioner also places too much weight on the fact that Decision Form D required only the foreperson’s signature. Although it only contained a space for the foreperson’s signature, Form D, Like the others, used the phrase “We the jury recommend...,” thereby signaling that Form D represented the jury’s recommendation. Id., at 59. Moreover, elsewhere, the jury foreperson alone signed the jury forms to indicate the jury’s unanimous agreement. Specifically, only the jury foreperson signed the special findings form on which the jury was required to indicate its unanimous agreement that an aggravating factor had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id., at 51-53. In these circumstances, we do not think that the decision forms or accompanying instructions created a reasonable likelihood of confusion over the effect of nonunanimity.
Even assuming, arguendo, that an error occurred (and that it was plain), petitioner cannot show that it affected his substantial rights. Any confusion among the jurors over the effect of a lesser sentence recommendation was allayed by the District Court’s admonition that the jury should not concern itself with the effect of such a recommendation. See supra, at 390 (quoting App. 44). The jurors are presumed to have followed these instructions. See Shannon, 512 U. S., at 585; Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U. S. 200, 206 (1987). Even if the jurors had some lingering doubts about the effect of deadlock, therefore, the instructions made clear that they should set aside their concerns and either report that they were unable to reach agreement or recommend a lesser sentence if they believed that this was the only option.
Moreover, even assuming that the jurors were confused over the consequences of deadlock, petitioner cannot show the confusion necessarily worked to his detriment. It is just as likely that the jurors, loath to recommend a lesser sentence, would have compromised on a sentence of life imprisonment as on a death sentence. Where the effect of an alleged error is so uncertain, a defendant cannot meet his burden of showing that the error actually affected his substantial rights. Cf. Romano, 512 U. S., at 14. In Romano, we considered a similar argument, namely, that jurors had disregarded a trial judge’s instructions and given undue weight to certain evidence. In rejecting that argument, we noted that, even assuming that the jury disregarded the trial judge’s instructions, “[i]t seems equally plausible that the evidence could have made the jurors more inclined to impose a death sentence, or it could have made them less inclined to do so.” Ibid. Any speculation on the effect of a lesser sentence recommendation, like the evidence in Romano, would have had such an indeterminate effect on the outcome of the proceeding that we cannot conclude that any alleged error in the District Court’s instructions affected petitioner’s substantial rights. See Park, 421 U. S., at 676; Lopez, 373 U. S., at 436-437.
III
A
Apart from the claimed instructional error, petitioner argues that the nonstatutory aggravating factors found and considered by the jury, see n. 2, supra, were vague, over-broad, and duplicative in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and that the District Court’s error in allowing the jury to consider them was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Eighth Amendment, as the Court of Appeals correctly recognized, see 132 F. 3d, at 250, permits capital sentencing juries to consider evidence relating to the victim’s personal characteristics and the emotional impact of the murder on the victim’s family in deciding whether an eligible defendant should receive a death sentence. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 827 (1991) (“A State may legitimately conclude that evidence about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the victim’s family is relevant to the jury’s decision as to whether or not the death penalty should be imposed. There is no reason to treat such evidence differently than other relevant evidence is treated”). Petitioner does not dispute that, as a general matter, such evidence is appropriate for the sentencing jury’s consideration. See Reply Brief for Petitioner 15. His objection is that the two non-statutory aggravating factors were duplicative, vague, and overbroad so as to render their use in this ease unconstitutional, a point with which the Fifth Circuit agreed, 132 F. 3d, at 250-251, although it ultimately ruled in the Government’s favor on the ground that the alleged error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, id., at 251-252.
The Government here renews its argument that the non-statutory aggravators in this ease were constitutionally valid. At oral argument, however, it was suggested that this case comes to us on the assumption that the nonstatu-tory aggravating factors were invalid because the Government did not cross-appeal on the question. Tr. of Oral Arg. 25. As the prevailing party, the Government is entitled to defend the judgment on any ground that it properly raised below. See, e. g., El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U. S. 473, 479 (1999); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. County of Kent, 510 U. S. 355, 364 (1994) (“A prevailing party need not cross-petition to defend a judgment on any ground properly raised below, so long as that party seeks to preserve, and not to change, the. judgment”). It further was suggested that because we granted certiorari on the Government’s rephrasing of petitioner’s questions and because the third question — “whether the court of appeals correctly held that the submission of invalid nonstatutory aggravating factors was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” — presumes error, we must assume the nonstatutory aggravating factors were erroneous. Tr. of Oral Arg. 25-27. We are not convinced that the reformulated question presumes error. The question whether the nonstatutory aggravating factors were constitutional is fairly included within the third question presented — we might answer “no” to the question “[w]hether the Court of Appeals correctly held that the submission of invalid nonstatutory aggravating factors was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,” 525 U. S. 809 (1998), by explaining that the Fifth Circuit was incorrect in holding that there was error
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
Appellant is a bondholder of the New York, New Haven &.Hartford Railroad Company (the New Haven), which is now undergoing a reorganization under § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U. S. C. § 205. On April 6, 1966, the Interstate Commerce Commission directed inclusion of the New Haven in the merger of the New York Central Railroad Company and the Pennsylvania Railroad Company as soon as terms and conditions could be settled, but approved the Penn-Central merger and authorized its consummation prior to such inclusion. Appellant then petitioned the Commission to reconsider this order. The Commission allowed appellant to intervene but denied the petition to reconsider, and appellant then challenged the Commission’s order of April 6 in the District Court, which dismissed the complaint on the ground, among others, that appellant lacked standing to attack the Penn-Central merger. Since that time this Court has reviewed other aspects of the Commission’s order approving the merger ¿nd has directed a remand to the Commission for further proceedings. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. United States, ante, p. 372. Since the order which appellant’s suit attacked is now subject to further consideration by the Commission and since proceedings to achieve inclusion of the New.Haven are also under way before the Commission, it appears inappropriate to review the decision of the District Court at this time. Rather, we vacate the order of the. District Court and remand the case , to that court. Should appellant still be dissatisfied with the ultimate order of the Commission in the merger proceedings, it may attempt a fresh challenge in the District Court..
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Alito
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The costs that may be awarded to prevailing parties in lawsuits brought in federal court are set forth in 28 U. S. C. § 1920. The Court Interpreters Act amended that statute to include “compensation of interpreters.” §1920(6); see also § 7, 92 Stat. 2044. The question presented in this case is whether “compensation of interpreters” covers the cost of translating documents. Because the ordinary meaning of the word “interpreter” is a person who translates orally from one language to another, we hold that “compensation of interpreters” is limited to the cost of oral translation and does not include the cost of document translation.
I — <
This case arises from a personal injury action brought by petitioner Kouichi Taniguchi, a professional baseball player in Japan, against respondent Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., the owner of a resort in the Northern Mariana Islands. Petitioner was injured when his leg broke through, a wooden deck during a tour of respondent’s resort property. Initially, petitioner said that he needed no medical attention, but two weeks later, he informed respondent that he had suffered cuts, bruises, and torn ligaments from the accident. Due to these alleged injuries, he claimed damages for medical expenses and for lost income from contracts he was unable to honor. After discovery concluded, both parties moved for summary judgment. The United States District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands granted respondent’s motion on the ground that petitioner offered no evidence that respondent knew of the defective deck or otherwise failed to exercise reasonable care.
In preparing its defense, respondent paid to have various documents translated from Japanese to English. After the District Court granted summary judgment in respondent’s favor, respondent submitted a bill for those costs. Over petitioner’s objection, the District Court awarded the costs to respondent as “compensation of interpreters” under § 1920(6). Explaining that interpreter services “cannot be separated into ‘translation’ and ‘interpretation,’” App. to Pet. for Cert. 25a, the court held that costs for document translation “fal[l] within the meaning of ‘compensation of an interpreter,’” ibid. Finding that it was necessary for respondent to have the documents translated in order to depose petitioner, the court concluded that the translation services were properly taxed as costs.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed both the District Court’s grant of summary judgment and its award of costs. The court rejected petitioner’s argument that the cost of document translation services is not recoverable as “compensation of interpreters.” The court explained that “the word ‘interpreter’ can reasonably encompass a ‘translator,’ both according to the dictionary definition and common usage of these terms, which does not always draw precise distinctions between foreign language interpretations involving live speech versus written documents.” 633 F. 3d 1218, 1221 (2011). “More importantly,” the court stressed, this construction of the statute “is more compatible with Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which includes a decided preference for the award of costs to the prevailing party.” Ibid. The court thus concluded that “the prevailing party should be awarded costs for services required to interpret either live speech or written documents into a familiar language, so long as. interpretation of the items is necessary to the litigation.” Id., at 1221-1222.
Because there is a split among the Courts of Appeals on this issue, we granted certiorari. 564 U. S. 1066 (2011).
HH f — <
A
Although the taxation of costs was not allowed at common law, it was the practice of federal courts in the early years to award costs in the same manner as the courts of the relevant forum State. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S. 240, 247-248 (1975). In 1793, Congress enacted a statute that authorized the awarding of certain costs to prevailing parties based on state law:
“That there be allowed and taxed in the supreme,.circuit and district courts of the United States, in favour of the parties obtaining judgments therein, such compensation for their travel and attendance, and for attornies and counsellors’ fees ... as are allowed in the supreme or superior courts of the respective states.” Act of Mar. 1, 1793, ch. 20, §4, 1 Stat. 333.
Although twice reenacted, this provision expired in 1799. Alyeska Pipeline, supra, at 248, n. 19; Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U. S. 437, 439 (1987). Yet even in the absence of express legislative authorization, the practice of referring to state rules for the taxation of costs persisted. See Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U. S., at 250.
Not until 1853 did Congress enact legislation specifying the costs allowable in federal court. Id., at 251. The impetus for a uniform federal rule was largely the consequence of two developments. First, a “great diversity in practice among the courts” had emerged. Ibid. Second, “losing litigants were being unfairly saddled with exorbitant fees for the victor’s attorney.” Ibid. Against this backdrop, Congress passed the 1853 Fee Act, which we have described as a “far-reaching Act specifying in detail the nature and amount of the taxable items of cost in the federal courts.” Id., at 251-252; The substance of this Act was transmitted through the Revised Statutes of 1874 and the Judicial Code of 1911 to the Revised Code of 1948, where it was codified, “without any apparent intent to change the controlling rules,” as 28 U. S. C. § 1920. 421 U. S., at 255.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) gives courts the discretion to award costs to prevailing parties. That Rule provides in relevant part: “Unless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs — other than attorney’s fees — should be allowed to the prevailing party.” Rule 54(d)(1). We have held that “§ 1920 defines the term ‘costs’ as used in Rule 54(d).” Crawford Fitting, 482 U. S., at 441. In so doing, we rejected the view that “the discretion granted by Rule 54(d) is a separate source of power to tax as costs expenses not enumerated in § 1920.” Ibid.
As originally configured, § 1920 contained five categories of taxable costs: (1) “[f]ees of the clerk and marshal”; (2) “[f]ees of the court reporter for all or any part of the stenographic transcript necessarily obtained for use in the case”; (3) “[f]ees and disbursements for printing and witnesses”; (4) “[f]ees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained for use in the case”; and (5) “[djocket fees under section 1923 of this title.” 62 Stat. 955. In 1978, Congress enacted the Court Interpreters Act, which amended § 1920 to add a sixth category: “[ejompensation of court appointed experts, compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special interpretation services- under section 1828 of this title.” 28 U. S. C. § 1920(6); see also § 7, 92 Stat. 2044. We are concerned here with this sixth category, specifically the item of taxable costs identified as “compensation of interpreters.”
B
To determine whether the item “compensation of interpreters” includes costs for document translation, we must look to the meaning of “interpreter.” That term is not defined in the Court Interpreters Act or in any other relevant statutory provision. When a term goes undefined in a statute, we give the term its ordinary meaning. Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U. S. 179, 187 (1995). The question here is: What is the ordinary meaning of “interpreter”?
Many dictionaries in use when Congress enacted the Court Interpreters Act in 1978 defined “interpreter” as one who translates spoken, as opposed to written, language. The American Heritage Dictionary, for instance, defined the term as “[o]ne who translates orally from one language 'into another.” American Heritage Dictionary 685 (1978). The Scribner-Bantam English Dictionary defined the related word “interpret” as “to translate orally.” Scribner-Bantam English Dictionary 476 (1977). Similarly, the Random House Dictionary defined the intransitive form of “interpret” as “to translate what is said in a foreign language.” Random House Dictionary of the English Language 744 (1973) (emphasis added). And, notably, the Oxford English Dictionary defined “interpreter” as “[o]ne who translates languages,” but then divided that definition into two senses: “a. [a] translator of books or writings,” which it designated as obsolete, and “b. [o]ne who translates the communications of persons speaking different languages; spec, one whose office it is to do so orally in the presence of the persons; a dragoman.” 5 Oxford English Dictionary 416 (1933); see also Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English 566 (6th ed. 1976) (“[o]ne who interprets; one whose office it is to translate the words of persons speaking different languages, esp. orally in their presence”); Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary 686 (1973) (“one who translates orally for the benefit of two or more parties speaking different languages:... a translator (obs.)”).
Pre-1978 legal dictionaries also generally defined the words “interpreter” and “interpret” in terms of oral, translation. The; then-current edition of Black’s Law Dictionary, for example, defined “interpreter” as “[a] person sworn at a trial to interpret the evidence of a foreigner... to the court,” and it defined “interpret” in relevant part as “to translate orally from one tongue to another.” Black’s Law Dictionary 954, 953 (rev. 4th ed. 1968); see also W. Anderson, A Dictionary of Law 565 (1888) (“[o]ne who translates the testimony of witnesses speaking a foreign tongue, for the benefit of the court and jury”); 1 B. Abbott, Dictionary of Terms and Phrases Used in American or English Jurisprudence 639 (1878) (“one who restates the testimony of a witness testifying in a foreign tongue, to the court and jury, in their language”). But see Ballentine’s Law Dictionary 655, 654 (3d ed. 1969) (defining “interpreter” as “[o]ne who interprets, particularly one who interprets words written or spoken in a foreign language,” and “interpret” as “to translate from a foreign language”).
Against these authorities, respondent relies almost exclusively on Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (hereinafter Webster’s Third). The version of that dictionary in print when Congress enacted the Court Interpreters Act defined “interpreter” as “one that translates; esp: a person who translates orally for parties conversing in different tongues.” Webster’s Third 1182 (1976). The sense divider esp (for especially) indicates that the most common meaning of the term is one “who translates orally,” but that meaning is subsumed within the more general definition “one that translates.” See 12,000 Words: A Supplement to Webster’s Third 15a (1986) (explaining that esp “is used to introduce the most common meaning included in the more general preceding definition”). For respondent, the general definition suffices to establish that the term “interpreter” ordinarily includes persons who translate the written word. Explaining that “the word ‘interpreter’ can reasonably encompass a ‘translator,’ ” the Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion. 633 F. 3d, at 1221. We disagree.
That a definition is broad enough to encompass one sense of a word does not establish that the word is ordinarily understood in that sense. See Mallard v. United States Dist. Court for Southern Dist. of Iowa, 490 U. S. 296, 301 (1989) (relying on the “most common meaning” and the “ordinary and natural signification” of the word “request,” even though it may sometimes “double for ‘demand’ or ‘command’ ”). The fact that the definition of “interpreter” in Webster’s Third has a sense divider denoting the most common usage suggests that other usages, although acceptable, might not be common-or ordinary. It is telling that all the dictionaries cited above defined “interpreter” at the time of the statute’s enactment as including persons who translate orally, but only a handful defined the word broadly enough to encompass translators of written material. See supra, at 566-568. Although the Oxford English Dictionary, one of the most authoritative on the English language, recognized that “interpreter” can mean one who translates writings, it expressly designated that meaning as obsolete. See supra, at 566-567. Were the meaning of “interpreter” that respondent advocates truly common or ordinary, we would expect to see more support for that meaning. We certainly would not expect to see it designated as obsolete in the Oxford English Dictionary. Any definition of a word that is absent from many dictionaries and is deemed obsolete in others is hardly a common or ordinary meaning.
Based on our survey of the relevant dictionaries, we conclude that the ordinary or common meaning of “interpreter” does not include those who translate writings. Instead, we find that an interpreter is normally understood as one who translates orally from one language to another. This sense of the word is far more natural. As the Seventh Circuit put it: “Robert Fagles made famous translations into English of the Iliad, the Odyssey, and the Aeneid, but no one would refer to him as an English-language ‘interpreter’ of these works.” Extra Equipamentos E Exportaȩão Ltda. v. Case Corp., 541 F. 3d 719, 727 (2008).
To be sure, the word “interpreter” can encompass persons who translate documents, but because that is not the ordinary meaning of the word, it does not control unless the context in which the word appears indicates that it does. Nothing in the Court Interpreters Act or in § 1920, however, even hints that Congress intended to go beyond the ordinary meaning of “interpreter” and to embrace the broadest possible meaning that the definition of the word can bear.
If anything, the statutory context suggests the opposite: that the word “interpreter” applies only to those who translate orally. As previously mentioned, Congress enacted § 1920(6) as part of the Court Interpreters Act. The main provision of that Act is §2(a), codified in 28 U. S. C. §§ 1827 and 1828. See 92 Stat. 2040-2042. Particularly relevant here is § 1827. As it now reads, that statute provides for the establishment of “a program to facilitate the use of certified and otherwise qualified interpreters in judicial proceedings instituted by the United States.” § 1827(a). Subsection (d) directs courts to use an interpreter in any criminal or civil action instituted by the United States if a party or witness “speaks only or primarily a language other than the English language” or “suffers from a hearing impairment” “so as to inhibit such party's comprehension of the proceedings or communication with counsel or the presiding judicial officer, or so as to inhibit such witness' comprehension of questions and the presentation of such testimony.” § 1827(d)(1). As originally enacted, subsection (k) mandated that the “interpretation provided by certified interpreters . . . shall be in the consecutive mode except that the presiding judicial officer . . . may authorize a simultaneous or summary interpretation.” § 1827(k) (1976 ed., Supp. II); see also 92 Stat. 2042. In its current form, subsection (k) provides that interpretation “shall be in the simultaneous mode for any party ., . and in the consecutive mode for witnesses,” unless the court directs otherwise. The simultaneous, consecutive, and summary modes are all methods of oral interpretation and have nothing to do with the translation of writings. Taken together, these provisions are a strong contextual clue that Congress was dealing only with oral translation in the Court Interpreters Act and that it intended to use the term “interpreter” throughout the Act in its ordinary sense as someone who translates the spoken word. As we have said before, it is a “ ‘normal rule of statutory construction’ that ‘identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.’ ” Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U. S. 561, 570 (1995) (quoting Department of Revenue of Ore. v. ACF Industries, Inc., 510 U. S. 332, 342 (1994)).
The references to technical terminology in the Court Interpreters Act further suggest that Congress used “interpreter” in a technical sense, and it is therefore significant that relevant professional literature draws a line between “interpreters,” who “are used for oral conversations,” and “translators,” who “are, used for written communications.” Zazueta, supra n. 4, at 477; see also M. Frankenthaler, Skills for Bilingual Legal Personnel 67 (1982) (“While the translator deals with the written word, the interpreter is concerned with the spoken language”); Brislin, Introduction, in Translation: Applications and Research i (R. Brislin ed. 1976) (explaining that when both terms are used together, translation “refers to the processing [of] written input, and interpretation to the processing of oral input” (emphasis deleted)); J. Herbert, Interpreter’s Handbook 1 (2d ed. 1952) (“In the present-day jargon of international organisations, the words translate, translations, translator are used when the immediate result of the work is a written text; and the words interpret, interpreter, interpretation when it is a speech delivered orally”). That Congress specified “interpreters” but not “translators” is yet another signal that it intended to limit § 1920(6) to the costs of oral, instead of written, translation.
In sum, both the ordinary and technical meanings of “interpreter,” as well as the statutory context in which the word is found, lead to the conclusion that § 1920(6) does not apply to translators of written materials.
C
No other rule of construction compels us to depart from the ordinary meaning of “interpreter.” The Court of Appeals reasoned that a broader meaning is “more compatible with Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which includes a decided preference for the award of costs to the prevailing party.” 633 F. 3d, at 1221. But we have never held that Rule 54(d) creates a presumption of statutory construction in favor of the broadest possible reading of the costs enumerated in § 1920. To the contrary, we have made clear that the “discretion granted by Rule 54(d) is not a power to evade” the specific categories of costs set forth by Congress. Crawford, Fitting, 482 U. S., at 442. “Rather,” we have said, “it is solely a power to decline to tax, as costs, the items enumerated in §1920.” Ibid. Rule 54(d) thus provides no sound basis for casting aside the ordinary meaning of the various items enumerated in the costs statute, including the ordinary meaning of “interpreter.”
Our decision is in keeping with the narrow scope of taxable costs. “Although ‘costs’ has an everyday meaning synonymous with ‘expenses,’ the concept of taxable costs under Rule 54(d) is more limited and represents those expenses, including, for example, court fees, that a court will assess against a litigant.” 10 C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2666, pp. 202-203 (3d ed. 1998) (hereinafter Wright & Miller). Taxable costs are limited to relatively minor, incidental expenses as is eyident from § 1920, which lists such items as clerk fees, court reporter fees, expenses for printing and witnesses, expenses for exemplification and copies, docket fees, and compensation of court-appointed experts. Indeed, “the assessment of costs most often is merely a clerical matter that can be done by the court clerk.” Hairline Creations, Inc. v. Refalas, 664 F. 2d 652, 656 (CA7 1981). Taxable costs are a fraction of the nontaxable expenses borne by litigants for attorneys, experts, consultants, and investigators. It comes as little surprise, therefore, that “costs almost always amount to less than the successful litigant’s total expenses in connection with a lawsuit.” 10 Wright & Miller §2666, at 203. Because taxable costs are limited by statute and are modest in scope, we see no compelling reason to stretch the ordinary meaning of the cost items Congress authorized in § 1920.
As for respondent’s extratextual arguments, they are more properly directed at Congress. Respondent contends that documentary evidence is no less important than testimonial evidence and that it would be anomalous to.require the losing party to cover translation costs for spoken words but not for written words. Brief for Respondent 20. Respondent also observes that some translation tasks are not entirely oral or entirely written. Id., at 20-24. One task, called “ ‘sight translation,”’ involves the oral translation of a document. Id., at 21. Another task involves the written translation of speech. Ibid. And a third task, called “ ‘document comparison,’ ” involves comparing documents in the source and target language to verify that the two are identical. Id., at 21-22. Respondent argues that a narrow definition cannot account for these variations and that a bright-line definition of “interpreter” as someone who translates spoken and written words would avoid complication and provide a simple, administrable rule for district courts.
Neither of these arguments convinces us that Congress must have intended to dispense with the ordinary meaning of “interpreter” in §1920(6). First, Congress might have distinguished between oral and written translation out of a concern that requiring losing parties to bear the potentially sizable costs of translating discovery documents, as opposed to the more limited costs of oral testimony, could be too burdensome and possibly unfair, especially for litigants with limited means. Cf. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U. S. 714, 718 (1967) (noting the argument “that since litigation is at best uncertain one should not be penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit, and that the poor might be unjustly discouraged from instituting actions to vindicate their rights if the penalty for losing included the fees of their opponents’ counsel”). Congress might also have concluded that a document translator is more akin to an expert or consultant retained by a party to decipher documentary evidence — like, for instance, a forensic accountant — than to an interpreter whose real-time oral translation services are necessary for communication between litigants, witnesses, and the court.
Second, respondent has not shown that any of the hybrid translation/interpretation tasks to which it points actually arise with overwhelming frequency or that the problem of drawing the line between taxable and nontaxable costs in such cases will vex the trial courts. It certainly has not shown that any such problems will be more troublesome than the task of sifting through translated discovery documents to ascertain which can be taxed as necessary to the litigation. In any event, the present case does not present a hybrid situation; it involves purely written translation, which falls outside the tasks performed by an “interpreter” as that term is ordinarily understood.
* * *
Because the ordinary meaning of “interpreter” is someone who translates orally from one language to another, we hold that the category “compensation of interpreters” in § 1920(6) does not include costs for document translation. We therefore vacate the judgment of the United States Court of Ap- . peals for the Ninth Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Compare BDT Products, Inc. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 405 F. 3d 415, 419 (CA6 2005) (holding that document translation costs are taxable under § 1920(6) because the “definition of interpret expressly includes to ‘translate into intelligible or familiar language’ ” (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1182 (1981))), with Extra Equipamentos E Exportando Ltda. v. Case Corp., 541 F. 3d 719, 727-728 (CA7 2008) (holding that document translation costs are not taxable under § 1920(6) because an interpreter is “normally understood [as] a person who translates living speech from one language to another”).
A handful of other contemporaneous dictionaries used a similar formulation. See Funk & Wagnalls New Comprehensive International Dictionary of the English Language 665 (1977) (“[o]ne who interprets or translates; specifically, one who serves as oral translator between people speaking different languages”); 1 World Book Dictionary 1103 (C. Barn-hart & R. Barnhart eds. 1977) (“a person whose business is translating, especially orally, from a foreign language”); Cassell’s English Dictionary 617 (4th ed. 1969) (“[o]ne who interprets, esp. one employed to translate orally to persons speaking a foreign language”).
This provision remains substantially the same as it appeared when first enacted. See 28 U. S. C. § 1827(d)(1) (1976 ed., Supp. II); see also 92 Stat. 2040.
The simultaneous mode requires the interpreter “to interpret and to speak contemporaneously with the individual whose communication is being translated.” H. R. Rep. No. 95-1687, p. 8 (1978). The consecutive mode requires the speaker whose communication is being translated to pause so that the interpreter can “convey the testimony given.” Ibid. And the summary mode “allow[s] the interpreter to condense and distill the speech of the speaker.” Ibid.; see generally Zazueta, Attorneys Guide to the Use of Court Interpreters, 8 U. C. D. L. Rev. 471, 477-478 (1975).
The dissent agrees that context should help guide our analysis, but instead of looking to the Court Interpreters Act, it looks to “the practice of federal courts both before and after § 1920(6)’s enactment.” Post, at 579 (opinion of Ginsburg, J.). The practice of federal courts after the Act’s enactment tells us nothing about what Congress intended at the time of enactment. And federal-court practice before the Act under other provisions of § 1920 tells us little, if anything, about what Congress intended when it added paragraph (6). We think the statutory context in which the word “interpreter” appears is a more reliable guide to its meaning.
Some provisions within the United States Code use both “interpreter” and “translator” together, thus implying that Congress understands the terms to have the distinct meanings described above. See, e. g., 8 U. S. C. § 1555(b) (providing that appropriations for the Immigration and Naturalization Service “shall be available for payment of . . . interpreters and translators who are not citizens of the United States”); 28 U. S. C. § 530C(b)(1)(1) (providing that Department of Justice funds may be used for “[pjayment of interpreters and translators who are not citizens of the United States”).
Our conclusion is buttressed by respondent’s concession at oral argument that there is no provision in the United States Code where it is clear that the word extends to those who translate documents. Tr. of Oral Arg. 39; see also Brief for Petitioner 32 (“And the Code is wholly devoid of any corresponding definition of ‘interpreter’ extending to the translation of written documents”). As respondent acknowledged, either the word is used in a context that strongly suggests it applies only to oral translation or its meaning is unclear. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 38.
The dissent contends that document translation, no less than oral translation, is essential “to ecpiip the parties to present their case clearly and the court to decide the merits intelligently. ” Post, at 579. But a document translator is no more important than an expert or consultant in making sense of otherwise incomprehensible documentary evidence, yet expenses for experts and consultants are generally not taxable as costs. To be sure, forgoing document translation can impair a litigant’s case, but document translation is not indispensable, in the way oral translation is, to the parties’ ability to communicate with each other, with witnesses, and with the court.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Marshall
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case, we consider the power of a federal court to enjoin a politically motivated work stoppage in an action brought by an employer pursuant to § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 61 Stat. 156,29 U. S. C. § 185(a), to enforce a union’s obligations under a collective-bargaining agreement. We first address whether the broad anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-La Guardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, 29 U. S. C. §101 et seq., apply to politically motivated work stoppages. Finding these provisions applicable, we then consider whether the work stoppage may be enjoined under the rationale of Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 398 U. S. 235 (1970), and Buffalo Forge Co. v. Steelworkers, 428 U. S. 397 (1976), pending an arbitrator’s decision on whether the strike violates the collective-bargaining agreement.
I
On January 4, 1980, President Carter announced that, due to the Soviet Union’s intervention in Afghanistan, certain trade with the Soviet Union would be restricted. Super-phosphoric acid (SPA), used in agricultural fertilizer, was not included in the Presidential embargo. On January 9, 1980, respondent International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA) announced that its members would not handle any cargo bound to, or coming from, the Soviet Union or carried on Russian ships. In accordance with this resolution, respondent local union, an ILA affiliate, refused to load SPA bound for the Soviet Union aboard three ships that arrived at the shipping terminal operated by petitioner Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. (JBT), at the Port of Jacksonville, Fla., during the month of January 1980.
In response to this work stoppage, petitioners JBT, Hooker Chemical Corp., and Occidental Petroleum Co. (collectively referred to as the Employer) brought this action pursuant to § 301(a) of the LMRA, 29 U. S. C. § 185(a), against respondents ILA, its affiliated local union, and its officers and agents (collectively referred to as the Union). The Employer alleged that the Union’s work stoppage violated the collective-bargaining agreement between the Union and JBT. The Employer sought to compel arbitration under the agreement, requested a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction pending arbitration, and sought damages.
The agreement contains both a broad no-strike clause and a provision requiring the resolution of all disputes through a grievance procedure, ending in arbitration. The no-strike clause provides:
“During the term of this Agreement,... the Union agrees there shall not be any strike of any kind or degree whatsoever,... for any cause whatsoever; such causes including but not limited to, unfair labor practices by the Employer or violation of this Agreement. The right of employees not to cross a bona fide picket line is recognized by the Employer....”
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida ordered the Union to process its grievance in accordance with the contractual grievance procedure. The District Court also granted the Employer’s request for a preliminary injunction pending arbitration, reasoning that the political motivation behind the work stoppage rendered the Norris-La Guardia Act’s anti-injunction provisions inapplicable.
The United States Court of Appeals for. the Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s order to the extent it required arbitration of the question whether the work stoppage violated the collective-bargaining agreement. New Orleans Steamship Assn. v. General Longshore Workers, 626 F. 2d 455 (1980). However, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the District Court’s conclusion that the provisions of the Norris-La Guardia Act are inapplicable to politically motivated work stoppages. Relying on Buffalo Forge, the Court of Appeals further held that the Employer was not entitled to an injunction pending arbitration because the underlying dispute was not arbitrable. We granted certiorari, 450 U. S. 1029 (1981), and agree with the Court of Appeals that the provisions of the Norris-La Guardia Act apply to this case, and that, under Buffalo Forge, an injunction pending arbitration may not issue.
II
Section 4 of the Norris-La Guardia Act provides in part:
“No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such dispute... from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts:
“(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of employment.” 47 Stat. 70, 29 U. S. C. § 104.
Congress adopted this broad prohibition to remedy the growing tendency of federal courts to enjoin strikes by narrowly construing the Clayton Act’s labor exemption from the Sherman Act’s prohibition against conspiracies to restrain trade, see 29 U. S. C. §52. See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 669, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., 7-8, 10-11 (1932). This Court has consistently given the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-La Guardia Act a broad interpretation, recognizing exceptions only in limited situations where necessary to accommodate the Act to specific federal legislation or paramount congressional policy. See, e. g., Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 398 U. S., at 249-253; Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana R. Co., 353 U. S. 30, 39-42 (1957).
The Boys Markets exception, as refined in Buffalo Forge Co. v. Steelworkers, 428 U. S. 397 (1976), is relevant to our decision today. In Boys Markets, this Court re-examined Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U. S. 195 (1962), which held that the Norris-La Guardia Act precludes a federal district court from enjoining a strike in breach of a collective-bargaining agreement, even where that agreement contains provisions for binding arbitration of the grievance concerning which the strike was called. 398 U. S., at 237-238. The Court overruled Sinclair and held that, in order to accommodate the anti-injunction provisions of Norris-La Guardia to the subsequently enacted provisions of § 301(a) and the strong federal policy favoring arbitration, it was essential to recognize an exception to the anti-injunction provisions for cases in which the employer sought to enforce the union’s contractual obligation to arbitrate grievances rather than to strike over them. 398 U. S., at 249-253.
After Boys Markets, the Courts of Appeals divided on the question whether a strike could be enjoined under the Boys Markets exception to the Norris-La Guardia Act pending arbitration, when the strike was not over a grievance that the union had agreed to arbitrate. In Buffalo Forge, the Court resolved this conflict and held that the Boys Markets exception does not apply when only the question whether the strike violates the no-strike pledge, and not the dispute that precipitated the strike, is arbitrable under the parties’ collective-bargaining agreement.
The Employer argues that the Norris-La Guardia Act does not apply in this case because the political motivation underlying the Union’s work stoppage removes this controversy from that Act’s definition of a “labor dispute.” Alternatively, the Employer argues that this case fits within the exception to that Act recognized in Boys Markets as refined in Buffalo Forge. We review these arguments in turn.
HH t-H
At the outset, we must determine whether this is a “case involving or growing out of any labor dispute” within the meaning of §4 of the Norris-La Guardia Act, 29 U. S. C. §104. Section 13(c) of the Act broadly defines the term “labor dispute” to include “any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment.” 47 Stat. 73, 29 U. S. C. § 113(c).
The Employer argues that the existence of political motives takes this work stoppage controversy outside the broad scope of this definition. This argument, however, has no basis in the plain statutory language of the Norris-La Guardia Act or in our prior interpretations of that Act. Furthermore, the argument is contradicted by the legislative history of not only the Norris-La Guardia Act but also the 1947 amendments to the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).
A
An action brought by an employer against the union representing its employees to enforce a no-strike pledge generally involves two controversies. First, there is the “underlying dispute,” which is the event or condition that triggers the work stoppage. This dispute may or may not be political, and it may or may not be arbitrable under the parties’ collective-bargaining agreement. Second, there is the parties’ dispute over whether the no-strike pledge prohibits the work stoppage at issue. This second dispute can always form the basis for federal-court jurisdiction, because § 301(a) gives federal courts jurisdiction over “[sjuits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization.” 29 U. S. C. § 185(a).
It is beyond cavil that the second form of dispute — whether the collective-bargaining agreement either forbids or permits the union to refuse to perform certain work — is a “controversy concerning the terms or conditions of employment.'” 29 U. S. C. § 113(c). This §301 action was brought to resolve just such a controversy. In its complaint, the Employer did not seek to enjoin the intervention of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, nor did it ask the District Court to decide whether the Union was justified in expressing disapproval of the Soviet Union’s actions. Instead, the Employer sought to enjoin the Union’s decision not to provide labor, a decision which the Employer believed violated the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement. It is this contract dispute, and not the political dispute, that the arbitrator will resolve, and on which the courts are asked to rule.
The language of the Norris-La Guardia Act does not except labor disputes having their genesis in political protests. Nor is there any basis in the statutory language for the argument that the Act requires that each dispute relevant to the case be a labor dispute. The Act merely requires that the case involve “any” labor dispute. Therefore, the plain terms of § 4(a) and § 13 of the Norris-La Guardia Act deprive the federal courts of the power to enjoin the Union’s work stoppage in this § 301 action, without regard to whether the Union also has a nonlabor dispute with another entity.
The conclusion that this case involves a labor dispute within the meaning of the Norris-La Guardia Act comports with this Court’s consistent interpretation of that Act. Our decisions have recognized that the term “labor dispute” must not be narrowly construed because the statutory definition itself is extremely broad and because Congress deliberately included a broad definition to overrule judicial decisions that had unduly restricted the Clayton Act’s labor exemption from the antitrust laws. For example, in Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Panama S.S. Co., 362 U. S. 365, 369 (1960), the Court observed:
“Th[e] Act’s language is broad. The language is broad because Congress was intent upon taking the federal courts out of the labor injunction business except in the very limited circumstances left open for federal jurisdiction under the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The history and background that led Congress to take this view have been adverted to in a number of prior opinions of this Court in which we refused to give the Act narrow interpretations that would have restored many labor dispute controversies to the courts” (emphasis added; footnote omitted).
The critical element in determining whether the provisions of the Norris-La Guardia Act apply is whether “the employer-employee relationship [is] the matrix of the controversy.” Columbia River Packers Assn., Inc. v. Hinton, 315 U. S. 143, 147 (1942). In this case, the Employer and the Union representing its employees are the disputants, and their dispute concerns the interpretation of the labor contract that defines their relationship. Thus, the employer-employee relationship is the matrix of this controversy.
Nevertheless, the Employer argues that a “labor dispute” exists only when the Union’s action is taken in its own “economic self-interest.” The Employer cites Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U. S. 99 (1968), and Columbia River Packers Assn., supra, for this proposition. In these cases, however, the Court addressed the very different question whether the relevant parties were “labor” groups involved in a labor' dispute for the purpose of determining whether their actions were exempt from the antitrust laws. These cases do not hold that a union’s noneconomic motive inevitably takes the dispute out of the Norris-La Guardia Act, but only that the protections of that Act do not extend to labor organizations when they cease to act as labor groups or when they enter into illegal combinations with nonlabor groups in restraint of trade. Here, there is no question that the Union is a labor group, representing its own interests in a dispute with the Employer over the employees’ obligation to provide labor.
Even in cases where the disputants did not stand in the relationship of employer and employee, this Court has held that the existence of noneconomic motives does not make the Norris-La Guardia Act inapplicable. For example, in New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U. S. 552 (1938), this Court held that the Norris-La Guardia Act prohibited an injunction against picketing by members of a civic group, which was aimed at inducing a store to employ Negro employees. In determining that the group and its members were “persons interested in a labor dispute” within the meaning of § 13, the Court found it immaterial that the picketers, who were neither union organizers nor store employees, were not asserting economic interests commonly associated with labor unions — e. g., terms and conditions of employment in the narrower sense of wages, hours, unionization, or betterment of working conditions. Id., at 560. Although the lower courts found Norris-La Guardia inapplicable because the picketing was motivated by the group’s “political” or “social” goals of improving the position of Negroes generally, and not by the desire to improve specific conditions of employment, this Court reasoned: “The Act does not concern itself with the background or the motives of the dispute.” Id., at 561.
B
The Employer’s argument that the Union’s motivation for engaging in a work stoppage determines whether the Norris-La Guardia Act applies is also contrary to the legislative history of that Act. The Act was enacted in response to federal-court intervention on behalf of employers through the use of injunctive powers against unions and other associations of employees. This intervention had caused the federal judiciary to fall into disrepute among large segments of this Nation’s population. See generally S. Rep. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., 8, 16-18 (1932); 75 Cong. Rec. 4915 (1932) (remarks of Sen. Wagner).
Apart from the procedural unfairness of many labor injunctions, one of the greatest evils associated with them was the use of tort-law doctrines, which often made the lawftilness of a strike depend upon judicial views of social and economic policy. See, e. g., Cox, Current Problems in the Law of Grievance Arbitration, 30 Rocky Mountain L. Rev. 247, 256 (1958). In debating the Act, its supporters repeatedly expressed disapproval of this Court’s interpretations of the Clayton Act’s labor exemption — interpretations which permitted a federal judge to find the Act inapplicable based on his or her appraisal of the “legitimacy” of the union’s objectives. override Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443 (1921) (holding a strike and picketing with the purpose of unionizing a plant not a labor dispute because the objectives were not legitimate and there was no employer-employee relationship between the disputants)); 75 Cong. Rec., at 5487-5488 (remarks of Rep. Celler) (bill brought forth to remedy decisions allowing injunction in Duplex and in Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Stone Cutters, 274 U. S. 37 (1927) (holding that decision by workers not to work on nonunion goods not a labor dispute)). See also 75 Cong. Rec., at 4686 (remarks of Sen. Hebert) (Committee minority agreed that injunctions should not have issued in Bedford and Duplex). See generally H. R. Rep. No. 669, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., 8, 10-11 (1932). The legislative history is replete with criticisms of the ability of powerful employers to use federal judges as “strike-breaking” agencies; by virtue of their almost unbridled “equitable discretion,” federal judges could enter injunctions based on their disapproval of the employees’ objectives, or on the theory that these objectives or actions, although lawful if pursued by a single employee, became unlawful when pursued through the “conspiracy” of concerted activity. See, e. g., 75 Cong. Rec., at 4928-4938, 5466-5468, 5478-5481, 5487-5490.
Furthermore, the question whether the Norris-La Guardia Act would apply to politically motivated strikes was brought to the attention of the 72d Congress when it passed the Act. Opponents criticized the definition of “labor dispute” in § 13(c) on the ground that it would cover politically motivated strikes. Representative Beck argued that federal courts should have jurisdiction to enjoin political strikes like those threatened by labor unions in Europe. Id., at 5471-5473 (discussing threatened, strike by British unions protesting the cancellation of leases held by Communist Party members, and threatened strikes by Belgian unions protesting a decision to supply military aid to Poland). In response, Representative Oliver argued that the federal courts should not have the power to enjoin such strikes. Id., at 5480-5481. Finally, Representative Beck offered an amendment to the Act that would have permitted federal courts to enjoin strikes called for ulterior purposes, including political motives. This amendment was defeated soundly. See id., at 5507.
Further support for our conclusion that Congress believed that the Norris-La Guardia Act applies to work stoppages instituted for political reasons can be found in the legislative history of the 1947 amendments to the NLRA. That history reveals that Congress rejected a proposal to repeal the Norris-La Guardia Act with respect to one broad category of political strikes. The House bill included definitions of various kinds of labor disputes. See H. R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., §2,1 Legislative History of the LMRA 158,160 (1947) (Leg. Hist.); H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1, 18-19 (1947), 1 Leg. Hist. 292, 309-310. Of relevance here, § 2(13) defined a “sympathy” strike as a strike “called or conducted not by reason of any dispute between the employer and the employees on strike or participating in such concerted interference, but rather by reason of either (A) a dispute involving another employer or other employees of the same employer, or (B) disagreement with some governmental'policy” H. R. 3020, §2(13), 1 Leg. Hist. 168 (emphasis added). Section 12 of the House bill made this kind of strike “unlawful concerted activity,” and “it remove[d] the immunities that the present laws confer upon persons who engage in them.” H. R. Rep. No. 245, supra, at 23, 1 Leg. Hist. 314. In particular, the Norris-La Guardia Act would not apply to suits brought by private parties to enjoin such activity, and damages could be recovered. See H. R. Rep. No. 245, supra, at 23-24, 43-44, 1 Leg. Hist. 314-315, 334-335. In explaining these provisions, the House Report stated that strikes “against a policy of national or local government, which the employer cannot change,” should be made unlawful, and that “[t]he bill makes inapplicable in such suits the Norris-La Guardia Act, which heretofore has protected parties to industrial strife from the consequences of their lawlessness.” H. R. Rep. No. 245, supra, at 24, 44, 1 Leg. Hist. 315, 335.
The Conference Committee accepted the Senate version, which had eliminated these provisions of the House bill. The House Managers’ statement accompanying the Conference Report explained that its recommendation did not go as far as the House bill, that §8(b) prohibits jurisdictional strikes and illegal secondary boycotts, and that the Board, not private parties, may petition a district court under § 10(k) or § 10(Z) to enjoin these activities notwithstanding the provisions of the Norris-La Guardia Act. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 36, 42-43, 57, 58-59 (1947), 1 Leg. Hist. 540, 546-547, 561, 562-563. In short, Congress declined in 1947 to adopt a broad “political motivation” exception to the Norris-La Guardia Act for strikes in protest of some governmental policy. Instead, if a strike of this nature takes the form of a secondary boycott prohibited by § 8(b), Congress chose to give the Board, not private parties, the power to petition a federal district court for an injunction. See 29 U. S. C. §§160(k), 160(0- Cf. Longshoremen v. Allied International, Inc., 456 U. S. 212 (1982).
C
This case, brought by the Employer to enforce its collective-bargaining agreement with the Union, involves a “labor dispute” within any common-sense meaning of that term. Were we to ignore this plain interpretation and hold that the political motivation underlying the work stoppage removes this controversy from the prohibitions of the Norris-La Guardia Act, we would embroil federal judges in the very scrutiny of “legitimate objectives” that Congress intended to prevent when it passed that Act. The applicability not only of § 4, but also of all of the procedural protections embodied in that Act, would turn on a single federal judge’s perception of the motivation underlying the concerted activity. The Employer’s interpretation is simply inconsistent with the need, expressed by Congress when it enacted the Norris-La Guardia Act, for clear “mileposts for judges to follow.” 75 Cong. Rec. 4935 (1932) (remarks of Sen. Bratton).
In essence, the Employer asks us to disregard the legislative history of the Act and to distort the definition of a labor dispute in order to reach what it believes to be an “equitable” result. The Employer’s real complaint, however, is not with the Union’s political objections to the conduct of the Soviet Union, but with what the Employer views as the Union’s breach of contract. The Employer’s frustration with this alleged breach of contract should not be remedied by characterizing it as other than a labor dispute. We will not adopt by judicial fiat an interpretation that Congress specifically rejected when it enacted the 1947 amendments to the NLRA. See generally n. 17, supra. In the past, we have consistently declined to constrict Norris-La Guardia’s broad prohibitions except in narrowly defined situations where accommodation of that Act to specific congressional policy is necessary. We refuse to deviate from that path today.
> HH
Alternatively, the Employer argues that the Union’s work stoppage may be enjoined under the rationale of Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 398 U. S. 235 (1970), and Buffalo Forge Co. v. Steelworkers, 428 U. S. 397 (1976), because the dispute underlying the work stoppage is arbitrable under the collective-bargaining agreement. In making this argument, the Employer disavows its earlier argument that the underlying dispute is purely political, and asserts that the Union’s work stoppage was. motivated by a disagreement with the Employer over the management-rights clause in the collective-bargaining agreement. The Solicitor General, in an amicus brief filed on behalf of the United States, agrees with the Employer that the work stoppage may be enjoined pending arbitration. He contends that in addition to the political dispute, disputes concerning both the management-rights clause and the work-conditions clause underlie the work stoppage, and that at least one of these disputes is arguably arbitrable.
We disagree. Buffalo Forge makes it clear that a Boys Markets injunction pending arbitration should not issue unless the dispute underlying the work stoppage is arbitrable. The rationale of Buffalo Forge compels the conclusion that the Union’s work stoppage, called to protest the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, may not be enjoined pending the arbitrator’s decision on whether the work stoppage violates the no-strike clause in the collective-bargaining agreement. The underlying dispute, whether viewed as an expression of the Union’s “moral outrage” at Soviet military policy or as an expression of sympathy for the people of Afghanistan, is plainly not arbitrable under the collective-bargaining agreement.
The attempts by the Solicitor General and the Employer to characterize the underlying dispute as arbitrable do not withstand analysis. The “underlying” disputes concerning the management-rights clause or the work-conditions clause simply did not trigger the work stoppage. To the contrary, the applicability of these clauses to the dispute, if any, was triggered by the work stoppage itself. Consideration of whether the strike intruded on the management-rights clause or was permitted by the work-conditions clause may inform the arbitrator’s ultimate decision on whether the strike violates the no-strike clause. Indeed, the question whether striking over a nonarbitrable issue violates other provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement may itself be an arbi-trable dispute. The fact remains, however, that the strike itself was not over an arbitrable dispute and therefore may not be enjoined pending the arbitrator’s ruling on the legality of the strike under the collective-bargaining agreement.
The weaknesses in the analysis of the Employer and the Solicitor General can perhaps best be demonstrated by applying it to a pure sympathy strike, which clearly cannot be enjoined pending arbitration under the rationale of Buffalo Forge. If this work stoppage were a pure sympathy strike, it could be characterized alternatively as a dispute over the Employer’s right to choose to do business with the employer embroiled in a dispute with a sister union, as a dispute over management’s right to assign and direct work, or as a dispute over whether requiring the union to handle goods of the employer whose employees are on strike is an unreasonable work condition. None of these characterizations, however, alters the fact, essential to the rationale of Buffalo Forge, that the strike was not over an arbitrable issue and therefore did not directly frustrate the arbitration process.
The Employer’s argument that this work stoppage may be enjoined pending arbitration really reflects a fundamental disagreement with the rationale of Buffalo Forge, and not a belief that this rationale permits an injunction in this case. The Employer apparently disagrees with the Buffalo Forge Court’s conclusion that, in agreeing to broad arbitration and no-strike clauses, the parties do not bargain for injunctive relief to restore the status quo pending the arbitrator’s decision on the legality of the strike under the collective-bargaining agreement, without regard to what triggered the strike. Instead, they bargain only for specific enforcement of the union’s promise to arbitrate the underlying grievance before resorting to a strike. See 428 U. S., at 410-412. The Employer also apparently believes that Buffalo Forge frustrates the arbitration process and encourages industrial strife. But see id., at 412. However, this disagreement with Buffalo Forge only argues for reconsidering that decision. It does not justify distorting the rationale of that case beyond recognition in order to reach the result urged by the Employer.
V
In conclusion, we hold that an employer’s §801 action to enforce the provisions of a collective-bargaining agreement allegedly violated by a union’s work stoppage involves a “labor dispute” within the meaning of the Norris-La Guardia Act, without regard to the motivation underlying the union’s decision not to provide labor. Under our decisions in Boys Markets and Buffalo Forge, when the underlying dispute is not arbitrable, the employer may not obtain injunctive relief pending the arbitrator’s ruling on the legality of the strike under the collective-bargaining agreement. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
On February 25, 1980, the embargo was extended to include SPA along with other products. On April 24, 1981, President Reagan lifted the SPA embargo as part of his decision to remove restrictions on the sale of grain to the Soviets. By telegrams dated April 24, 1981, and June 5, 1981, the International Longshoremen’s Association recommended to its members that they resume handling goods to and from the Soviet Union. Although the work stoppage is no longer in effect, there remains a live controversy over whether the collective-bargaining agreement prohibits politically motivated work stoppages, and the Union may resume such a work stoppage at any time. As a result, this case is not moot. See Buffalo Forge Co. v. Steelworkers, 428 U. S. 397, 403, n. 8 (1976).
The President of the ILA made the following announcement:
“In response to overwhelming demands by the rank and file members of the Union, the leadership of the ILA today ordered immediate suspension in handling all Russian ships and all Russian cargoes in ports from Maine to Texas and Puerto Rico where ILA workers are employed.
“The reason for this action should be apparent in light of international events that have affected relations between the U. S. & Soviet Union.
“However, the decision by the Union leadership was made necessary by the demands of the workers.
“It is their will to refuse to work Russian vessels and Russian cargoes under present conditions of the world.
“People are upset and they refuse to continue the business as usual policy as long as the Russians insist on being international bully boys. It is a decision in which the Union leadership concurs. ” Brief for Respondents 2, n. 2.
JBT is a wholly owned subsidiary of Oxy Chemical Corp., which is a subsidiary of Hooker. Ownership of all these corporations is ultimately vestéd in Occidental. Hooker Chemical Co. manufactures SPA at a manufacturing facility in Florida. Pursuant to a bilateral trade agreement between Occidental and the Soviet Union, SPA is shipped to the Soviet Union from the JBT facility in Jacksonville.
The grievance and arbitration clause provides in relevant part:
“Matters under dispute which cannot be promptly settled between the Local and an individual Employer shall... be referred... to a Port. Grievance Committee.... In the event this Port Grievance Committee cannot reach an agreement... the dispute shall be referred to the Joint Negotiating Committee....
“A majority decision of this Committee shall be final and binding on both parties and on all Employers signing this Agreement. In the event the Committee is unable to reach a majority decision within 72 hours after meeting to discuss the case, it shall employ a professional arbitrator....”
The Union concedes that the question whether the work stoppage violates the no-strike clause is arbitrable. In a consolidated case, the Court of Appeals upheld an injunction issued by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana enforcing an arbitrator’s decision that the ILA work stoppage violated a collective-bargaining agreement. 626 F. 2d, at 469.
In Boys Markets, the underlying dispute was clearly subject to the grievance and arbitration procedures of the collective-bargaining agreement, and the strike clearly violated the no-strike clause.
See cases cited in Buffalo Forge, 428 U. S., at 404, n. 9.
In Buffalo Forge, the strike at issue was a sympathy strike in support of sister unions negotiating with the employer. The Court reasoned that there was no need to accommodate the policies of the Norris-La Guardia Act to § 301 and to the federal policy favoring arbitration when a strike is not called over an arbitrable dispute, because such a strike does not directly frustrate the arbitration process by denying or evading the union’s promise to arbitrate. 428 U. S., at 407-412.
Section 13(c) provides:
“(c) The term ‘labor dispute’ includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.”
Of course, there are exceptions to the Act’s prohibitions against enjoining work stoppages. See, e. g., Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 398 U. S. 235 (1970). The employer may obtain an injunction to enforce an arbitrator’s decision that the strike violates the collective-bargaining agreement and can recover damages for the violation, pursuant to § 301 of the LMRA, 29 U. S. C. § 185. See, e. g., Buffalo Forge, supra, at 405. See also infra, at 718-719, and n. 18 (discussing Board’s authority under 29 U. S. C. §§ 160(k), 160(0, to petition for an injunction upon finding reasonable cause to believe that the strike is an unfair labor practice).
The Employer’s reliance on Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U. S. 556 (1978), to argue that a politically motivated strike is not a labor dispute is misplaced. In Eastex, we addressed whether certain concerted activity was protected under § 7 of the NLRA, 29 U. S. C. § 157, and we recognized that “[t]here may well be types of conduct or speech that are so purely political or so remotely connected to the concerns of employees as employees as to be beyond the protection of [§7].” Id., at 570, n. 20. Although the definition of a “labor dispute” in §2(9) of the NLRA, 29 U. S. C. § 152(9), is virtually identical to that in § 13(c) of the Norris-La Guardia Act, 29 U. S. C. § 113(c), and the two provisions have been construed consistently with one another, e. g., United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219, 234, n. 4 (1941), this similarity does not advance the Employer’s argument. Union activity that prompts a “labor dispute” within the meaning of these sections may be protected by § 7, prohibited by § 8(b), 29 U. S. C. § 158(b), or neither protected nor prohibited. The objective of the concerted activity is relevant in determining whether such activity is protected under § 7 or prohibited by § 8(b), but not in determining whether the activity is a “labor dispute” under § 2(9).
Moreover, the conclusion that a purely political work stoppage is not protected under §7 means simply that the employer is not prohibited by § 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, 29 U. S. C. § 158(a)(1), from discharging or disciplining employees for this activity. It hardly establishes that no “labor dispute” existed within the meaning of § 2
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | G | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Black
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion,
in which The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Douglas, and Mr. Justice Brennan join.
These cases raise basic constitutional issues of the utmost concern. They call into question the role of the military under our system of government. They involve the power of Congress to expose civilians to trial by military tribunals, under military regulations and procedures, for offenses against the United States thereby depriving them of trial in civilian courts, under civilian laws and procedures and with all the safeguards of the Bill of Rights. These cases are particularly significant because for the first time since the adoption of the Constitution wives of soldiers have been denied trial by jury in a court of law and forced to trial before courts-martial.
In No. 701 Mrs. Clarice Covert killed her husband, a sergeant in the United States Air Force, at an airbase in England. Mrs. Covert, who was not a member of the armed services, was residing on the base with her husband at the time. She was tried by a court-martial for murder under Article 118 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). The trial was on charges preferred by Air Force personnel and the court-martial was composed of Air Force officers. The court-martial asserted jurisdiction over Mrs. Covert under Article 2 (11) of the UCMJ, which provides:
“The following persons are subject to this code:
“(11) Subject to the provisions of any treaty or agreement to which the United States is or may be a party or to any accepted rule of international law, all persons serving with, employed by, or accompanying the armed forces without the continental limits of the United States...
Counsel for Mrs. Covert contended that she was insane at the time she killed her husband, but the military tribunal found her guilty of murder and sentenced her to life imprisonment. The judgment was affirmed by the Air Force Board of Review, 16 CMR 465, but was reversed by the Court of Military Appeals, 6 USCMA 48, because of prejudicial errors concerning the defense of insanity. While Mrs. Covert was being held in this country pending a proposed retrial by court-martial in the District of Columbia, her counsel petitioned the District Court for a writ of habeas corpus to set her free on the ground that the Constitution forbade her trial by military authorities. Construing this Court's decision in United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U. S. 11, as holding that “a civilian is entitled to a civilian trial” the District Court held that Mrs. Covert could not be tried by court-martial and ordered her released from custody. The Government appealed directly to this Court under 28 U. S. C. § 1252. See 350 U. S. 985.
In No. 713 Mrs. Dorothy Smith killed her husband, an Army officer, at a post in Japan where she was living with him. She was tried for murder by a court-martial and despite considerable evidence that she was insane was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment. The judgment was approved by the Army Board of Review, 10 CMR 350, 13 CMR 307, and the Court of Military Appeals, 5 USCMA 314. Mrs. Smith was then confined in a federal penitentiary in West Virginia. Her father, respondent here, filed a petition for habeas corpus in a District Court for West Virginia. The petition charged that the court-martial was without jurisdiction because Article 2 (11) of the UCMJ was unconstitutional insofar as it authorized the trial of civilian dependents accompanying servicemen overseas. The District Court refused to issue the writ, 137 F. Supp. 806, and while an appeal was pending in the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit we granted certiorari at the request of the Government, 350 U. S. 986.
The two cases were consolidated and argued last Term and a majority of the Court, with three Justices dissenting and one reserving opinion, held that military trial of Mrs. Smith and Mrs. Covert for their alleged offenses was constitutional. 351 U. S. 470, 487. The majority held that the provisions of Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments which require that crimes be tried by a jury after indictment by a grand jury did not protect an American citizen when he was tried by the American Government in foreign lands for offenses committed there and that Congress could provide for the trial of such offenses in any manner it saw fit so long as the procedures established were reasonable and consonant with due process. The opinion then went on to express the view that military trials, as now practiced, were not unreasonable or arbitrary when applied to dependents accompanying members of the armed forces overseas. In reaching their conclusion the majority found it unnecessary to consider the power of Congress “To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces” under Article I of the Constitution.
Subsequently, the Court granted a petition for rehearing, 352 U. S. 901. Now, after further argument and consideration, we conclude that the previous decisions cannot be permitted to stand. We hold that Mrs. Smith and Mrs. Covert could not constitutionally be tried by military authorities.
I.
At the beginning we reject the idea that when the United States acts against citizens abroad it can do so free of the Bill of Rights. The United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power and authority have no other source. It can only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution. When the Government reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution provide to protect his life and liberty should not be stripped away just because he happens to be in another land. This is not a novel concept. To the contrary, it is as old as government. It was recognized long before Paul successfully invoked his right as a Roman citizen to be tried in strict accordance with Roman law. And many centuries later an English historian wrote:
"In a Settled Colony the inhabitants have all the rights of Englishmen. They take with them, in the first place, that which no Englishman can by expatriation put off, namely, allegiance to the Crown, the duty of obedience to the lawful commands of the Sovereign, and obedience to the Laws which Parliament may think proper to make with reference to such a Colony.' But, on the other hand, they take with them all the rights and liberties of British Subjects; all the rights and liberties as against the Prerogative of the Crown, which they would enjoy in this country.”
The rights and liberties which citizens of our country enjoy are not protected by custom and tradition alone, they have been jealously preserved from the encroachments of Government by express provisions of our written Constitution.
Among those provisions, Art. Ill, § 2 and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments are directly relevant to these cases. Article III, § 2 lays down the rule that:
“The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.”
The Fifth Amendment declares:
“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger;....”
And tfte"Sixth Amendment provides:
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed....”
The language of Art. Ill, § 2 manifests that constitutional protections for the individual were designed to restrict the United States Government when it acts outside of this country, as well as here at home. After declaring that all criminal trials must be by jury, the section states that when a crime is “not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.” If this language is permitted to have its obvious meaning, § 2 is applicable to criminal trials outside of the States as a group without regard to where the offense is committed or the trial held. From the very first Congress, federal statutes have implemented the provisions of § 2 by providing for trial of murder and other crimes committed outside the jurisdiction of any State “in the district where the offender is apprehended, or into which he may first be brought.” The Fifth and Sixth Amendments, like Art. Ill, § 2, are also all inclusive with their sweeping references to “no person” and to “all criminal prosecutions.”
This Court and other federal courts have held or asserted that various constitutional limitations apply to the Government when it acts outside the continental United States. While it has been suggested that only those constitutional rights which are “fundamental” protect Americans’ abroad, we can find no warrant, in logic or otherwise, for picking and choosing among the remarkable collection of “Thou shalt nots” which were explicitly fastened on all departments and agencies of the Federal Government by the Constitution and its Amendments. Moreover, in view of our heritage and the history of the adoption of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, it seems peculiarly anomalous to say that trial before a civilian judge and by an independent jury picked from the common citizenry is not a fundamental right. As Blackstone wrote in his Commentaries:
“... the trial by jury ever has been, and I trust ever will be, looked upon as the glory of the English law. And if it has so great an advantage over others in regulating civil property, how much must that advantage be heightened when it is applied to criminal cases!... [I]t is the most transcendent privilege which any subject can enjoy, or wish for, that he cannot be affected either in his property, his liberty, or his person, but by the unanimous consent of twelve of his neighbours and equals.”
Trial by jury in a court of law and in accordance with traditional modes of procedure after an indictment by grand jury has served and remains one of our most vital barriers to governmental arbitrariness. These elemental procedural safeguards were embedded in our Constitution to. secure their inviolateness and sanctity against the passing demands of expediency or convenience.
The keystone of supporting authorities mustered by the Court’s opinion last June to justify its holding that Art. Ill, § 2, and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments did not apply abroad was In re Ross, 140 U. S. 453. The Ross case is one of those cases that cannot be understood except in its peculiar setting; even then, it seems highly unlikely that a similar result would be reached today. Ross was serving as a seaman on an American ship in Japanese waters. He killed a ship’s officer, was seized and tried before a consular “court” in Japan. At that time, statutes authorized American consuls to try American citizens charged with committing crimes in Japan and certain other “non-Christian” countries. These statutes provided that the laws of the United States were to govern the trial except:
“... where such laws are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies, the common law and the law of equity and admiralty shall be extended in like manner over such citizens and others in those countries; and if neither the common law, nor the law of equity or admiralty, nor the statutes of the United States, furnish appropriate and sufficient remedies, the ministers in those countries, respectively, shall, by decrees and regulations which shall have the force of law, supply such defects and deficiencies.”
The consular power approved in the Ross case was about as extreme and absolute as that of the potentates of the “non-Christian” countries to which the statutes applied. Under these statutes consuls could and did make the criminal laws, initiate charges, arrest alleged offenders, try them, and after conviction take away their liberty or their life — sometimes at the American consulate. Such a blending of executive, legislative, and judicial powers in one person or even in one branch of the Government is ordinarily regarded as the very acme of absolutism. Nevertheless, the Court sustained Ross’ conviction by the consul. It stated that constitutional protections applied “only to citizens and others within the United States, or who are brought there for trial for alleged offences committed elsewhere, and not to residents or temporary sojourners abroad.” Despite the fact that it upheld Ross’ conviction under United States laws passed pursuant to asserted constitutional authority, the Court went on to make a sweeping declaration that “[t]he Constitution can have no operation in another country.”
The Ross approach that the Constitution has no applicability abroad has long since been directly repudiated by numerous cases. That approach is obviously erroneous if the United States Government, which has no power except that granted by the Constitution, can and does try citizens for crimes committed abroad. Thus the Ross case rested, at least in substantial part, on a fundamental misconception and the most that can be said in support of the result reached there is that the consular court jurisdiction had a long history antedating the adoption of the Constitution. The Congress has recently buried the consular system of trying Americans. We are not willing to jeopardize the lives and liberties of Americans by disinterring it. At best, the Ross case should be left as a relic from a different era.
The Court’s opinion last Term alsp relied on the “Insular Cases” to support its conclusion that Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments were not applicable to the trial of Mrs. Smith and Mrs. Covert. We believe that reliance was misplaced. The “Insular Cases,” which arose at the turn of the century, involved territories which had only recently been conquered or acquired by the United States. These territories, governed and regulated by Congress under Art. IV, § 3, had entirely different cultures and customs from those of this country. This Court, although closely divided, ruled that certain constitutional safeguards were not applicable to these territories since they had not been “expressly or impliedly incorporated” into the Union by Congress. While conceding that “fundamental” constitutional rights applied everywhere, the majority found that it would disrupt long-established practices and would be inexpedient to require a jury trial after an indictment by a grand jury in the insular possessions.
The "Insular Cases” can be distinguished from the present cases in that they involved the power of Congress to provide rules and regulations to govern temporarily territories with wholly dissimilar traditions and institutions whereas here the basis for governmental power is American citizenship. None of these cases had anything to do with military trials and they cannot properly be used as vehicles to support an extension of military jurisdiction to civilians. Moreover, it is our judgment that neither the cases nor their reasoning should be given any further expansion. The concept that the Bill of Rights and other constitutional protections against arbitrary government are inoperative when they become inconvenient or when expediency dictates otherwise is a very dangerous doctrine and if allowed to flourish would destroy the benefit of a written Constitution and undermine the basis of our Government. If our foreign commitments become of such nature that the Government can no longer satisfactorily operate within the bounds laid down by the Constitution, that instrument can be amended by the method which it prescribes. But we have no authority, or inclination, to read exceptions into it which are not there.
HH 1 — 1
At the time of Mrs. Covert's alleged offense, an executive agreement was in effect between the United States and Great Britain which permitted United States' military courts to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over offenses committed in Great Britain by American servicemen or their dependents. For its part, the United States agreed that these military courts would be willing and able to try and to punish all offenses against the laws of Great Britain by such persons. In all material respects, the same situation existed in Japan when Mrs. Smith killed her husband. Even though a court-martial does not give an accused trial by jury and other Bill of Rights protections, the Government contends that Art. 2 (11) of the TJCMJ, insofar as it provides for the military trial of dependents accompanying the armed forces in Great Britain and Japan, can be sustained as legislation which is necessary and proper to carry out the United States’ obligations under the international agreements made with those countries. The obvious and decisive answer to this, of course, is that no agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any other branch of Government, which is free from the restraints of the Constitution.
Article VI, the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, declares:
“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land;....”
There is nothing in this language which intimates that treaties and laws enacted pursuant to them do not have to comply with the provisions of the Constitution. Nor is there anything in the debates which accompanied the drafting and ratification of the Constitution which even suggests such a result. These debates as well as the history that surrounds the adoption of the treaty provision in Article VI make it clear that the reason treaties were not limited to those made in “pursuance” of the Constitution was so that agreements made by the United States under the Articles of Confederation, including the important peace treaties which concluded the Revolutionary War, would remain in effect. It would be manifestly contrary to the objectives of those who created the Constitution, as well as those who were responsible for the Bill of Rights — let alone alien to our entire constitutional history and tradition — to construe Article VI as permitting the United States to exercise power under an international agreement without observing constitutional prohibitions. In effect, such construction would permit amendment of that document in a manner not sanctioned by Article V. The prohibitions of the Constitution were designed to apply to all branches of the National Government and they cannot be nullified by the Executive or by the Executive and the Senate combined.
There is nothing new or unique about what we say here. This Court has regularly and uniformly recognized the supremacy of the Constitution over a treaty. For example, in Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U. S. 258, 267, it declared:
“The treaty power, as expressed in the Constitution, is in terms unlimited except by those restraints which are found in that instrument against the action of the government or of its departments, and those arising from the nature of the government itself and of that of the States. It would not be contended that it extends so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids, or a change in the character of the government or in that of one of the States, or a cession of any portion of the territory of the latter, without its consent.”
This Court has also repeatedly taken the position that an Act of Congress, which must comply with the Constitution, is on a full parity with a treaty, and that when a statute which is subsequent in time is inconsistent with a treaty, the statute to the extent of conflict renders the treaty null. It would be completely anomalous to say that a treaty need not comply with the Constitution when such an agreement can be overridden by a statute that must conform to that instrument.
There is nothing in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416, which is contrary to the position taken here. There the Court carefully noted that the treaty involved was not inconsistent with any specific provision of the Constitution. The Court was concerned with the Tenth Amendment which reserves to the States or the people all power not delegated to the National Government. To the extent that the United States can validly make treaties, the people and the States have delegated their power to the National Government and the Tenth Amendment is no barrier.
In summary, we conclude that the Constitution in its entirety applied to the trials of Mrs. Smith and Mrs. Covert. Since their court-martial did not meet the requirements of Art. Ill, § 2 or the Fifth and Sixth Amendments we are compelled to determine if there is anything within the Constitution which authorizes the military trial of dependents accompanying the armed forces overseas.
III.
Article I, § 8, cl. 14 empowers Congress “To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.” It has been held that this creates an exception to the normal method of trial in civilian courts as provided by the Constitution and permits Congress to authorize military trial of members of the armed services without all the safeguards given an accused by Article III and the Bill of Rights. But if the language of Clause 14 is given its natural meaning, the power granted does not extend to civilians — even though they may be dependents living with servicemen on a military base. The term “land and naval Forces” refers to persons who are members of the armed services and not to their civilian wives, children and other dependents. It seems inconceivable that Mrs. Covert or Mrs. Smith could have been tried by military authorities as members of the “land and naval Forces” had they been living on a military post in this country. Yet this constitutional term surely has the same meaning everywhere. The wives of servicemen are no more members of the “land and naval Forces” when living at a military post in England or Japan than when living at a base in this country or in Hawaii or Alaska.
The Government argues that the Necessary and Proper Clause when taken in conjunction with Clause 14 allows Congress to authorize the trial of Mrs. Smith and Mrs. Covert by military tribunals and under military law. The Government claims that the two clauses together constitute a broad grant of power “without limitation” authorizing Congress to subject all persons, civilians and soldiers alike, to military trial if “necessary and proper” to govern and regulate the land and naval forces. It was on a similar theory that Congress once went to the extreme of subjecting persons who made contracts with the military to court-martial jurisdiction with respect to frauds related to such contracts. In the only judicial test a Circuit Court held that the legislation was patently unconstitutional. Ex parte Henderson, 11 Fed. Cas. 1067, No. 6,349.
It is true that the Constitution expressly grants Congress power to make all rules necessary and proper to govern and regulate those persons who are serving in the “land and naval Forces.” But the Necessary and Proper Clause cannot operate to extend military jurisdiction to any group of persons beyond that class described in Clause 14 — “the land and naval Forces.” Under the grand design of the Constitution civilian courts are the normal repositories of power to try persons charged with crimes against the United States. And to protect persons brought before these courts, Article III and the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments establish the right to trial by jury, to indictment by a grand jury and a number of other specific safeguards. By way of contrast the jurisdiction of military tribunals is a very limited and extraordinary jurisdiction derived from the cryptic language in Art. I, § 8, and, at most, was intended to be only a narrow exception to the normal and preferred method of trial in courts of law. Every extension of military jurisdiction is an encroachment on the jurisdiction of the civil courts, and, more important, acts as a deprivation of the right to jury trial and of other treasured constitutional protections. Having run up against the steadfast bulwark of the Bill of Rights, the Necessary and Proper Clause cannot extend the scope of Clause 14.
Nothing said here contravenes the rule laid down in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, at 421, that:
“Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”
In McCulloch this Court was confronted with the problem of determining the scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause in a situation where no specific restraints on governmental power stood in the way. Here the problem is different. Not only does Clause 14, by its terms, limit military jurisdiction to members of the “land and naval Forces,” but Art. Ill, § 2 and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require that certain express safeguards, which were designed to protect persons from oppressive governmental practices, shall be given in criminal prosecutions — safeguards which cannot be given in a military trial. In the light of these as well as other constitutional provisions, and the historical background in which they were formed, military trial of civilians is inconsistent with both the “letter and spirit of the constitution.”
Further light is reflected on the scope of Clause 14 by the Fifth Amendment. That Amendment which was adopted shortly after the Constitution reads:
“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger;....” (Emphasis added.)
Since the exception in this Amendment for “cases arising in the land or naval forces” was undoubtedly designed to correlate with the power granted Congress to provide for the “Government and Regulation” of the armed services, it is a persuasive and reliable indication that the authority conferred by Clause 14 does not encompass persons who cannot fairly be said to be “in” the military service.
Even if it were possible, we need not attempt here to precisely define the boundary between “civilians” and members of the “land and naval Forces.” We recognize that there might be circumstances where a person could be “in” the armed services for purposes of Clause 14 even though he had not formally been inducted into the military or did not wear a uniform. But the wives, children and other dependents of servicemen cannot be placed in that category, even though they may be accompanying a serviceman abroad at Government expense and receiving other benefits from the Government. We have no difficulty in saying that such persons do not lose their civilian status and their right to a civilian trial because the Government helps them live as members of a soldier’s family.
The tradition of keeping the military subordinate to civilian authority may not be so strong in the minds of this generation as it was in the minds of those who wrote the Constitution. The idea that the relatives of soldiers could be denied a jury trial in a court of law and instead be tried by court-martial under the guise of regulating the armed forces would have seemed incredible to those men, in whose lifetime the right of the military to try soldiers for any offenses in time of peace had only been grudgingly conceded. The Founders envisioned the army as a necessary institution, but one dangerous to liberty if not confined within its essential bounds. Their fears were rooted in history. They knew that ancient republics had been overthrown by their military leaders. They were familiar with the history of Seventeenth Century England, where Charles I tried to govern through the army and without Parliament. During this attempt, contrary to the Common Law, he used courts-martial to try soldiers for certain non-military offenses. This court-martialing of soldiers in peacetime evoked strong protests from Parliament. The reign of Charles I was followed by the rigorous military rule of Oliver Cromwell. Later, James II used the Army in his fight against Parliament and the people. He promulgated Articles of War (strangely enough relied on in the Government’s brief) authorizing the trial of soldiers for non-military crimes by courtsmartial. This action hastened the revolution that brought William and Mary to the throne upon their agreement to abide by a Bill of Rights which, among other things, protected the right of trial by jury. It was against this general background that two of the greatest English jurists, Lord Chief Justice Hale and Sir William Blackstone — men who exerted considerable influence on the Founders — expressed sharp hostility to any expansion of the jurisdiction of military courts. For instance, Blackstone went so far as to assert:
“For martial law, which is built upon no settled principles, but is entirely arbitrary in its decisions, is, as Sir Matthew Hale observes, in truth and reality no law, but something indulged rather than allowed as a law. The necessity of order and discipline in an army is the only thing which can give it countenance; and therefore it ought not to be permitted in time of peace, when the king’s courts are open for all persons to receive justice according to the laws of the land.”
The generation that adopted the Constitution did not distrust the military because of past history alone. Within their own lives they had seen royal governors sometimes resort to military rule. British troops were quartered in Boston at various times from 1768 until the outbreak of the Revolutionary War to support unpopular royal governors and to intimidate the local populace.. The trial of soldiers by courts-martial and the interference of the military with the civil courts aroused great anxiety and antagonism not only in Massachusetts but throughout the colonies. For example, Samuel Adams in 1768 wrote:
“... [I] s it not enough for us to have seen soldiers and mariners forejudged of life, and executed within the body of the county by martial law? Are citizens to be called upon, threatened, ill-used at the will of the soldiery, and put under arrest, by pretext of the law military, in breach of the fundamental rights Of subjects, and contrary to the law and franchise of the land?... Will the spirits of people as yet unsubdued by tyranny, unawed by the menaces of arbitrary power, submit to be governed by military force? No! Let us rouse our attention to the common law, — which is our birthright, our great security against all kinds of insult and oppression...
Colonials had also seen the right to trial by jury subverted by acts of Parliament which authorized courts of admiralty to try alleged violations of the unpopular “Molasses” and “Navigation” Acts. This gave the admiralty courts jurisdiction over offenses historically triable only by a jury in a court of law and aroused great resentment throughout the colonies. As early as 1765 delegates from nine colonies meeting in New York asserted in a “Declaration of Rights” that trial by jury was the “inherent and invaluable” right of every citizen in the colonies.
With this background it is not surprising that the Declaration of Independence protested that George III had “affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil Power” and that Americans had been deprived in many cases of “the benefits of Trial by Jury.” And those who adopted the Constitution embodied their profound fear and distrust of military power, as well as their determination to protect trial by jury, in the Constitution and its Amendments. Perhaps they were aware that memories fade and hoped that in this way they could keep the people of this Nation from having to fight again and again the same old battles for individual freedom.
In light of this history, it seems clear that the Founders had no intention to permit the trial of civilians in military courts, where they would be denied jury trials and other constitutional protections, merely by giving Congress the power to make rules which were “necessary and proper” for the regulation of the “land and naval Forces.” Such a latitudinarian interpretation of these clauses would be at war with the well-established purpose of the Founders to keep the military strictly within its proper sphere, subordinate to civil authority. The Constitution does not say that Congress can regulate “the land and naval Forces and all other persons whose regulation might have some relationship to maintenance of the land and naval Forces.” There is no indication that the Founders contemplated setting up a rival system of military courts to compete with civilian courts for jurisdiction over civilians who might have some contact or relationship with the armed forces. Courts-martial were not to have concurrent jurisdiction with courts of law over nonmilitary America.
On several occasions this Court has been faced with an attempted expansion of the jurisdiction of military courts. Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, one of the great landmarks in this Court’s history, held that military authorities were without power to try civilians not in the military or naval service by declaring martial law in an area where the civil administration was not deposed and the courts were not closed. In a stirring passage the Court proclaimed:
“Another guarantee of freedom was broken when Milligan was denied a trial by jury. The great minds of the country have differed on the correct interpretation to be given to various provisions of the Federal Constitution; and judicial decision has been often invoked to settle their true meaning; but until recently no one ever doubted that the right of trial by jury was fortified in the organic law against the power of attack. It is now assailed; but if ideas can be expressed in words, and language has any meaning, this right — one of the most valuable in a free country — is preserved to everyone accused of crime who is not attached to the army, or navy, or militia in actual service.”
In Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U. S. 304, the Court reasserted the principles enunciated in Ex parte Milligan and reaffirmed the tradition of military subordination to civil authorities and institutions. It refused to sanction the military trial of civilians in Hawaii during wartime despite government claims that the needs of defense made martial law imperative.
Just last Term, this Court held in United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U. S. 11, that military courts could not constitutionally try a discharged serviceman for an offense which he had allegedly committed while in the armed forces. It was decided (1) that since Toth was a civilian he could not be tried by military court-martial, and (2) that since he was charged with murder, a “crime” in the constitutional sense, he was entitled to indictment by a grand jury, jury trial, and the other protections contained in Art. Ill, § 2 and the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments. The Court pointed out that trial by civilian courts was the rule for persons who were not members of the armed forces.
There are no supportable grounds upon which to distinguish the Toth case from the present cases. Toth, Mrs. Covert, and Mrs. Smith were all civilians. All three were American citizens. All three were tried for murder. All three alleged crimes were committed in a foreign country. The only differences were: (1) Toth was an ex-serviceman while they were wives of soldiers; (2) Toth was arrested in the United States while they were seized in foreign countries. If anything, Toth had closer connection with the military than the two women for his crime was committed while he was actually serving in the Air Force. Mrs. Covert and Mrs. Smith had never been members of the army, had never been employed by the army, had never served in the army in any capacity. The Government appropriately argued in Toth that the constitutional basis for court-martialing him was clearer than for court-martialing wives who are accompanying their husbands abroad. Certainly Toth’s conduct as a soldier bears a closer relation to the maintenance of order and discipline in the armed forces than the conduct of these wives. The fact that Toth was arrested here while the wives were arrested in foreign countries is material only if constitutional safeguards do not shield a citizen abroad when the Government exercises its power over him. As we have said before, such a view of the Constitution is erroneous. The mere fact that these women had gone overseas with their husbands should not reduce the protection the Constitution gives them.
The Milligan, Duncan and Toth cases recognized and manifested the deeply rooted and ancient opposition in this country to the extension of military control over civilians. In each instance an effort to expand the jurisdiction of military courts to civilians was repulsed.
There have been a number of decisions in the lower federal courts which have upheld military trial of civilians performing services for the armed forces “in the field” during time of war. To the extent that these cases can be justified, insofar as they involved trial of persons who were not “members” of the armed forces, they must rest on the Government’s “war powers.” In the face of an actively hostile enemy, military commanders necessarily have broad power over persons on the battlefront. From a time prior to the adoption of the Constitution the extraordinary- circumstances present in an area of actual fighting have been considered sufficient to permit punishment of some civilians in that area by military courts under military rules. But neither Japan nor Great Britain could properly be said to be an area where active hostilities were under way at the time Mrs. Smith and Mrs. Covert committed their offenses or at the time they were
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | B | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The information charged that appellee shipped sulfuric acid and hydrofluosilicic acid in interstate commerce and “did knowingly fail to show on the shipping papers the required classification of said property, to wit, Corrosive Liquid, in violation of 49 C. P. R. 173.427.”
Title 18 U. S. C. § 834 (a) gives the Interstate Commerce Commission power to “formulate regulations for the safe transportation” of “corrosive liquids” and 18 U. S. C. § 834 (f) states that whoever “knowingly violates any such regulation” shall be fined or imprisoned.
Pursuant to the power granted by § 834 (a) the regulatory agency promulgated the regulation already cited which reads in part:
“Each shipper offering for transportation any hazardous material subject to the regulations in this chapter, shall describe that article on the shipping paper by the shipping name prescribed in § 172.5 of this chapter and by the classification prescribed in § 172.4 of this chapter, and may add a further description not inconsistent therewith. Abbreviations must not be used.” 49 CFR § 173.427.
The District Court, relying primarily on Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U. S, 337, ruled that the information did not charge a “knowing violation” of the regulation and accordingly dismissed the information.
The United States filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals, 18 U. S. C. § 3731, and in reliance on that section later moved to certify the case to this Court which the Court of Appeals did; and we noted probable jurisdiction, 400 U. S. 990.
Here as in United States v. Freed, 401 U. S. 601, which dealt with the possession of hand grenades, strict or absolute liability is not imposed; knowledge of the shipment of the dangerous materials is required. The sole and narrow question is whether “knowledge” of the regulation is also required. It is in that narrow zone that the issue of “mens rea” is raised; and appellee bears down hard on the provision in 18 U. S. C. § 834 (f) that whoever “knowingly violates any such regulation” shall be fined, etc.
Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, supra, on which the District Court relied, is not dispositive of the issue. It involved a regulation governing transporting explosives, inflammable liquids, and the like and required drivers to “avoid, so far as practicable, and, where feasible, by prearrangement of routes, driving into or through congested thoroughfares, places where crowds are assembled, street car tracks, tunnels, viaducts, and dangerous crossings.” The statute punished whoever “knowingly” violated the regulation. Id., at 339. The issue of “mens rea” was not raised below, the sole question turning on whether the standard of guilt was unconstitutionally vague. Id., at 340. In holding the statute was not void for vagueness we said:
“The statute punishes only those who knowingly violate the Regulation. This requirement of the presence of culpable intent as a necessary element of the offense does much to destroy any force in the argument that application of the Regulation would be so unfair that it must be held invalid. That is evident from a consideration of the effect of the requirement in this case. To sustain a conviction, the Government not only must prove that petitioner could have taken another route which was both commercially practicable and appreciably safer (in its avoidance of crowded thoroughfares, etc.) than the one it did follow. It must also be shown that petitioner knew that there was such a practicable, safer route and yet deliberately took the more dangerous route through the tunnel, or that petitioner willfully neglected to exercise its duty under the Regulation to inquire into the availability of such an alternative route.
“In an effort to give point to its argument, petitioner asserts that there was no practicable route its trucks might have followed which did not pass through places they were required to avoid. If it is true that in the congestion surrounding the lower Hudson there was no practicable way of crossing the River which would have avoided such points of danger to a substantially greater extent than the route taken, then petitioner has not violated the Regulation. But that is plainly a matter for proof at the trial. We are not so conversant with all the routes in that area that we may, with no facts in the record before us, assume the allegations of the indictment to be false. We will not thus distort the judicial notice concept to strike down a regulation adopted only after much consultation with those affected and penalizing only those who knowingly violate its prohibition.” Id., at 342-343.
The “mens rea” that emerged in the foregoing discussion was not knowledge of the regulation but knowledge of the safer routes and those that were less safe within the meaning of the regulation. Mr. Justice Jackson, writing in dissent for himself, Mr. Justice Black, and Mr. Justice Frankfurter, correctly said:
“I do not suppose the Court intends to suggest that if petitioner knew nothing of the existence of such a regulation its ignorance would constitute a defense.” 342 U. S., at 345.
There is no issue in the present case of the propriety of the delegation of the power to establish regulations and of the validity of the regulation at issue. We therefore see no reason why the word “regulations” should not be construed as a shorthand designation for specific acts or omissions which violate the Act. The Act, so viewed, does not signal an exception to the rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse and is wholly consistent with the legislative history.
The failure to change the language in § 834 in 1960 should not lead to a contrary conclusion. The Senate approved an amendment deleting “knowingly” and substituting therefor the language “being aware that the Interstate Commerce Commission has formulated regulations for the safe transportation of explosives and other dangerous articles.” But the House refused to agree. As the House Committee stated, its version would “retain the present law by providing that a person must ‘knowingly’ violate the regulations.”
The House Committee noted there was a “judicial pronouncement as to the standards of conduct that make a violation a ‘knowing’ violation.” In St. Johnsbury Trucking Co. v. United States, 220 F. 2d 393, 397, Chief Judge Magruder had concluded that knowledge of the regulations was necessary. But whether the House Committee was referring to Boyce Motor Lines or the opinion of Chief Judge Magruder is not clear since both views of the section were before Congress. It is clear that strict liability was not intended. The Senate Committee felt it would be too stringent and thus rejected the position of the Interstate Commerce Commission. But despite protestations of avoiding strict liability the Senate version was very likely to result in strict liability because knowledge of the facts would have been unnecessary and anyone involved in the business of shipping dangerous materials would very likely know of the regulations involved. Thus in rejecting the Senate version the House was rejecting strict liability. But it is too much to conclude that in rejecting strict liability the House was also carving out an exception to the general rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse.
The principle that ignorance of the law is no defense applies whether the law be a statute or a duly promulgated and published regulation. In the context of these proposed 1960 amendments we decline to attribute to Congress the inaccurate view that that Act requires proof of knowledge of the law, as well as the facts, and that it intended to endorse that interpretation by retaining the word “knowingly.” We conclude that the meager legislative history of the 1960 amendments makes unwarranted the conclusion that Congress abandoned the' general rule and required knowledge of both the facts and the pertinent law before a criminal conviction could be sustained under this Act.
So far as possession, say, of sulfuric acid is concerned the requirement of “mens rea” has been made a requirement of the Act as evidenced by the use of the word “knowingly.” A person thinking in good faith that he was shipping distilled water when in fact he was shipping some dangerous acid would not be covered. As stated in Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246, 250:
“The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil.”
There is leeway for the exercise of congressional discretion in applying the reach of “mens rea.” United States v. Balint, 258 U. S. 250. United States v. Murdock, 290 U. S. 389, closely confined the word “willfully” in the income tax law to include a purpose to bring about the forbidden result:
“He whose conduct is defined as criminal is one who ‘willfully’ fails to pay the tax, to make a return, to keep the required records, or to supply the needed information. Congress did not intend that a person, by reason of a bona fide misunderstanding as to his liability for the tax, as to his duty to make a return, or as to the adequacy of the records he maintained, should become a criminal by his mere failure to measure up to the prescribed standard of conduct. And the requirement that the omission in these instances, must be willful, to be criminal, is persuasive that the same element is essential to the offense of failing to supply information.” Id., at 396.
In Balint the Court was dealing with drugs, in Freed with hand grenades, in this case with sulfuric and other dangerous acids. Pencils, dental floss, paper clips may also be regulated. But they may be the type of products which might raise substantial due process questions if Congress did not require, as in Murdock, “mens rea” as to each ingredient of the offense. But where, as here and as in Balint and Freedl, dangerous or deleterious devices or products or obnoxious waste materials are involved, the probability of regulation is so great that anyone who is aware that he is in possession of them or dealing with them must be presumed to be aware of the regulation.
Reversed.
The regulatory authority originally granted the Interstate Commerce Commission was transferred to the Department of Transportation by 80 Stat. 939, 49 U. S. C. § 1655 (e) (1964 ed., Supp. V).
See H. R. Rep. No. 1975, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 10-11.
Id., at 2.
Ibid.
See the HEW Staff Memorandum, id., at 16-19.
S. Rep. No. 901, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 3.
The Senate language might “well create an almost absolute liability for violation.” H. R. Rep. No. 1975, supra, at 2.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Chief Justice ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Three Terms ago, we held that one of multiple cases consolidated for multidistrict litigation under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 is immediately appealable upon an order disposing of that case, regardless of whether any of the others remain pending. Gelboim v. Bank of America Corp., 574 U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 897, 190 L.Ed.2d 789 (2015). We left open, however, the question whether the same is true with respect to cases consolidated under Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id., at ----, n. 4, 135 S.Ct., at 904, n. 4. This case presents that question.
I
Petitioner Elsa Hall and respondent Samuel Hall are siblings enmeshed in a long-running family feud. Their mother, Ethlyn Hall, lived and owned property in the United States Virgin Islands. Samuel, a lawyer in the Virgin Islands, served as Ethlyn's caretaker and provided her with legal assistance. But trouble eventually came to paradise, and Samuel and Ethlyn fell out over Samuel's management of Ethlyn's real estate holdings. During a visit from Elsa, Ethlyn established an inter vivos trust, transferred all of her property into the trust, and designated Elsa as her successor trustee. Ethlyn then moved to Miami-under circumstances disputed by the parties-to live with her daughter.
The family squabble made its way to court in May 2011. Ethlyn, acting in her individual capacity and as trustee of her inter vivos trust, sued Samuel and his law firm in Federal District Court (the "trust case"). Ethlyn's claims-for breach of fiduciary duty, legal malpractice, conversion, fraud, and unjust enrichment-concerned the handling of her affairs by Samuel and his law firm before she left for Florida.
Then Ethlyn died, and Elsa stepped into her shoes as trustee and accordingly as plaintiff in the trust case. Samuel promptly filed counterclaims in that case against Elsa-in both her individual and representative capacities-for intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, and tortious interference. Samuel contended that Elsa had turned their mother against him by taking advantage of Ethlyn's alleged mental frailty. But Samuel ran into an obstacle: Elsa was not a party to the trust case in her individual capacity (only Ethlyn had been). So Samuel filed a new complaint against Elsa in her individual capacity in the same District Court (the "individual case"), raising the same claims that he had asserted as counterclaims in the trust case.
The trust and individual cases initially proceeded along separate tracks. Eventually, on Samuel's motion, the District Court consolidated the cases under Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, ordering that "[a]ll submissions in the consolidated case shall be filed in" the docket assigned to the trust case. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-15.
Just before the trial commenced, the District Court dismissed from the trust case Samuel's counterclaims against Elsa. Those claims remained in the individual case. The parties then tried the consolidated cases together before a jury.
In the individual case, the jury returned a verdict for Samuel on his intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against Elsa, awarding him $500,000 in compensatory damages and $1.5 million in punitive damages. The clerk entered judgment in that case, but the District Court granted Elsa a new trial, which had the effect of reopening the judgment. The individual case remains pending before the District Court.
In the trust case, the jury returned a verdict against Elsa, in her representative capacity, on her claims against Samuel and his law firm. The clerk entered judgment in that case directing that Elsa "recover nothing" and that "the action be dismissed on the merits." Id., at A-12.
Elsa filed a notice of appeal from the District Court's judgment in the trust case. Samuel and his law firm moved to dismiss the appeal on jurisdictional grounds, arguing that the judgment was not final and appealable because his claims against Elsa remained unresolved in the individual case. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed. When two cases have been consolidated for all purposes, the court reasoned, a final decision on one set of claims is generally not appealable while the second set remains pending. The court explained that it considers "whether a less-than-complete judgment is appealable" on a "case-by-case basis." 679 Fed.Appx. 142, 145 (2017). Here, the fact that the claims in the trust and individual cases had been "scheduled together and tried before a single jury" "counsel[ed] in favor of keeping the claims together on appeal." Ibid. The court dismissed Elsa's appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
We granted certiorari, 582 U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 54, 198 L.Ed.2d 780 (2017), and now reverse.
II
A
Had the District Court never consolidated the trust and individual cases, there would be no question that Elsa could immediately appeal from the judgment in the trust case. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1291 vests the courts of appeals with jurisdiction over "appeals from all final decisions of the district courts," except those directly appealable to this Court. A final decision "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Central Pension Fund of Operating Engineers and Participating Employers, 571 U.S. 177, 183, 134 S.Ct. 773, 187 L.Ed.2d 669 (2014). The archetypal final decision is "one[ ] that trigger[s] the entry of judgment." Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 103, 130 S.Ct. 599, 175 L.Ed.2d 458 (2009). Appeal from such a final decision is a "matter of right." Gelboim, 574 U.S., at ----, 135 S.Ct., at 898-899. Under § 1291, "any litigant armed with a final judgment from a lower federal court is entitled to take an appeal," Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 244, 101 S.Ct. 1657, 68 L.Ed.2d 58 (1981), which generally must be filed within 30 days, 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a).
Here the jury's verdict against Elsa resolved all of the claims in the trust case, and the clerk accordingly entered judgment in that case providing that "the action be dismissed on the merits." App. to Pet. for Cert. A-12. With the entry of judgment, the District Court "completed its adjudication of [Elsa's] complaint and terminated [her] action." Gelboim, 574 U.S., at ----, 135 S.Ct., at 905. An appeal would normally lie from that judgment.
But, Samuel contends, there is more to the litigation than the suit Elsa pursued against him in her representative capacity. There is also his suit against her in her individual capacity, which has not yet been decided. Because the District Court consolidated the trust and individual cases under Rule 42(a)(2), he argues, they merged and should be regarded as one case. Viewed that way, the judgment in the trust case was merely interlocutory, and more remains to be done in the individual case before the consolidated cases in the aggregate are finally resolved and subject to appeal.
B
Rule 42(a) -entitled "[c]onsolidation"-provides that if "actions before the court involve a common question of law or fact, the court may" take one of three measures. First, the court may "join for hearing or trial any or all matters at issue in the actions." Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 42(a)(1). Second, the court may "consolidate the actions." Rule 42(a)(2). Third, the court may "issue any other orders to avoid unnecessary cost or delay." Rule 42(a)(3). Whether the judgment entered in the trust case is an immediately appealable final decision turns on the effect of consolidation under Rule 42(a).
Samuel, looking to dictionary definitions, asserts that the "plain meaning of the phrase 'consolidate the actions' is... to unite two or more actions into one whole-that is, to join them into a single case." Brief for Respondents 23 (citing Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014); some internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). But the meaning of "consolidate" in the present context is ambiguous. When Rule 42(a) was adopted, the term was generally defined, as it is now, as meaning to "unite, as various particulars, into one mass or body; to bring together in close union; to combine." Webster's New International Dictionary 570 (2d ed. 1942). Consolidation can thus sometimes signify the complete merger of discrete units: "The company consolidated two branches." But the term can also mean joining together discrete units without causing them to lose their independent character. The United States, for example, is composed of States "unite[d], as various particulars, into one mass or body," "br[ought] together in close union," or "combine[d]." Yet all agree that entry into our Union "by no means implies the loss of distinct and individual existence... by the States." Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 725, 19 L.Ed. 227 (1869). "She consolidated her books" hardly suggests that the "books" became "book." The very metaphor Samuel offers-that consolidation "make[s] two one, like marriage"-highlights this point. Tr. of Oral Arg. 56. However dear to each other, spouses would be surprised to hear that their union extends beyond the metaphysical. This is not a plain meaning case.
It is instead about a term-consolidate-with a legal lineage stretching back at least to the first federal consolidation statute, enacted by Congress in 1813. Act of July 22, 1813, § 3, 3 Stat. 21 (later codified as Rev. Stat. § 921 and 28 U.S.C. § 734 (1934 ed.)). Over 125 years, this Court, along with the courts of appeals and leading treatises, interpreted that term to mean the joining together-but not the complete merger-of constituent cases. Those authorities particularly emphasized that constituent cases remained independent when it came to judgments and appeals. Rule 42(a), promulgated in 1938, was expressly based on the 1813 statute. The history against which Rule 42(a) was adopted resolves any ambiguity regarding the meaning of "consolidate" in subsection (a)(2). It makes clear that one of multiple cases consolidated under the Rule retains its independent character, at least to the extent it is appealable when finally resolved, regardless of any ongoing proceedings in the other cases.
C
Lord Mansfield pioneered the consolidation of related cases in England, and the practice quickly took root in American courts. See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285, 292, 12 S.Ct. 909, 36 L.Ed. 706 (1892). In 1813, Congress authorized the newly formed federal courts, when confronted with "causes of like nature, or relative to the same question," to "make such orders and rules concerning proceedings therein as may be conformable to the principles and usages belonging to courts for avoiding unnecessary costs or delay in the administration of justice" and to "consolidate[ ]" the causes when it "shall appear reasonable." § 3, 3 Stat. 21. This consolidation statute applied at law, equity, and admiralty, see 1 W. Rose, A Code of Federal Procedure § 823(a) (1907) (Rose), and remained in force for 125 years, until its replacement by Rule 42(a).
From the outset, we understood consolidation not as completely merging the constituent cases into one, but instead as enabling more efficient case management while preserving the distinct identities of the cases and the rights of the separate parties in them. In Rich v. Lambert, 12 How. 347, 13 L.Ed. 1017 (1852), for example, we considered an appeal from several consolidated cases in admiralty. The appellees, the owners of cargo damaged during shipment, raised a challenge to our jurisdiction that turned on the nature of the consolidation. At the time, we could exercise appellate jurisdiction only over cases involving at least $2,000 in controversy. The damages awarded to the cargo owners in the consolidated cases surpassed $2,000 in the aggregate, but most of the constituent cases did not individually clear that jurisdictional hurdle. Id., at 352-353.
We declined to view the consolidated cases as one for purposes of appeal, concluding that we had jurisdiction only over those constituent cases that individually involved damages exceeding $2,000. Ibid. As we explained, "although [a consolidated] proceeding assumes the form of a joint suit, it is in reality a mere joinder of distinct causes of action by distinct parties, arising out of a common injury, and which are heard and determined, so far as the merits are concerned, the same as in the case of separate libels for each cause of action." Id., at 353. Consolidation was "allowed by the practice of the court for its convenience, and the saving of time and expense to the parties." Ibid.
The trial court's decree, we noted, had the effect of individually resolving each constituent case. Ibid. ("The same decree... is entered as in the case of separate suits."); see Black's Law Dictionary 532 (3d ed. 1933) ("decree" is a "judgment of a court of equity or admiralty, answering for most purposes to the judgment of a court of common law"). Accordingly, we did "not perceive... any ground for a distinction as to the right of appeal from a decree as entered in these cases from that which exists where the proceedings have been distinct and separate throughout." Rich, 12 How., at 353 ; see Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Kinneard, 129 U.S. 176, 177, 9 S.Ct. 269, 32 L.Ed. 653 (1889) (evaluating appellate jurisdiction over a writ of error in one of several consolidated cases without reference to the others).
We elaborated on the principles underlying consolidation in Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285, 12 S.Ct. 909, 36 L.Ed. 706 (1892). Hillmon, a staple of law school courses on evidence, involved three separate actions instituted against different life insurance companies by one Sallie Hillmon, the beneficiary on policies purchased by her husband John. Sallie claimed she was entitled to the sizable proceeds of the policies because John had died while journeying through southern Kansas with two companions in search of a site for a cattle ranch. The three companies countered that John was in fact still alive, having conspired with one of the companions to murder the other and pass his corpse off as John's, all as part of an insurance fraud scheme. The trial court consolidated the cases and tried them together. Id., at 285-287, 12 S.Ct. 909.
The court, for purposes of determining the number of peremptory juror challenges to which each defendant was entitled, treated the three cases as though they had merged into one. Ibid. On appeal we disagreed, holding that each defendant should receive the full complement of peremptory challenges. Id., at 293, 12 S.Ct. 909. That was because, "although the defendants might lawfully be compelled, at the discretion of the court, to try the cases together, the causes of action remained distinct, and required separate verdicts and judgments; and no defendant could be deprived, without its consent, of any right material to its defence... to which it would have been entitled if the cases had been tried separately." Ibid. On remand, one case settled, and a consolidated trial of the others "result[ed] in separate judgments" for Sallie. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 188 U.S. 208, 209, 23 S.Ct. 294, 47 L.Ed. 446 (1903).
In Stone v. United States, 167 U.S. 178, 189, 17 S.Ct. 778, 42 L.Ed. 127 (1897), we held that a party appealing from the judgment in one of two cases consolidated for trial could not also raise claims with respect to the other case. John Stone was the sole defendant in one case and one of three defendants in the other. Id., at 179-181, 17 S.Ct. 778. After a consolidated trial, the jury returned a verdict in the case against Stone alone; its verdict in the multidefendant case was set aside. Id., at 181, 17 S.Ct. 778. Stone appealed from the judgment in his case, arguing that the failure to grant a peremptory challenge in the multidefendant case affected the jury's verdict in his. Id., at 189, 17 S.Ct. 778. We rejected that claim, punctiliously respecting the distinction between the constituent cases. There was "no merit in the objection," we said, because in the case before us Stone had "had the benefit of the three peremptory challenges" to which he was entitled in that case. Ibid. ; see Stone v. United States, 64 F. 667, 672 (C.A.9 1894) ("The two cases, although consolidated, were separate and distinct. Defendant had exercised all the rights and privileges he was entitled to in this case.").
And just five years before Rule 42(a) became law, we reiterated that, under the consolidation statute, consolidation did not result in the merger of constituent cases. Johnson v. Manhattan R. Co., 289 U.S. 479, 496-497, 53 S.Ct. 721, 77 L.Ed. 1331 (1933). A major case of its day, Johnson arose from the "financial embarrassment" during the Great Depression of two companies involved in operating the New York subway system. Johnson v. Manhattan R. Co., 61 F.2d 934, 936 (C.A.2 1932). In the resulting litigation, the District Court consolidated two suits, apparently with the intent to "effect an intervention of the parties to the [first suit] in the [second] suit"-in other words, to make the two suits one. Id., at 940. Judge Learned Hand, writing for the Second Circuit on appeal, would have none of it: "consolidation does not merge the suits; it is a mere matter of convenience in administration, to keep them in step. They remain as independent as before." Ibid. We affirmed, relying on Hillmon and several lower court cases reflecting the same understanding of consolidation. Johnson, 289 U.S., at 497, n. 8, 53 S.Ct. 721. We explained once more that "consolidation is permitted as a matter of convenience and economy in administration, but does not merge the suits into a single cause, or change the rights of the parties, or make those who are parties in one suit parties in another." Id., at 496-497, 53 S.Ct. 721.
Decisions by the Courts of Appeals, with isolated departures, reflected the same understanding in cases involving all manners of consolidation. See, e.g., Baltimore S.S. Co., Inc. v. Koppel Indus. Car & Equip. Co., 299 F. 158, 160 (C.A.4 1924) ("the consolidation for convenience of trial did not merge the two causes of action" or "deprive either party of any right or relieve it of any burden incident to the libel or cross-libel as a separate proceeding"); Taylor v. Logan Trust Co., 289 F. 51, 53 (C.A.8 1923) (parties to one constituent case could not appeal orders in the other because "consolidation did not make the parties to one suit parties to the other"; cited in Johnson ); Toledo, St. L. & K.C.R. Co. v. Continental Trust Co., 95 F. 497, 506 (C.A.6 1899) (consolidation "operates as a mere carrying on together of two separate suits supposed to involve identical issues" and "does not avoid the necessity of separate decrees in each case"; cited in Johnson ).
One frequently cited case illustrates the point. In Adler v. Seaman, 266 F. 828, 831 (C.A.8 1920), the District Court "sought to employ consolidation as a medium of getting the two independent suits united," but the Court of Appeals made clear that the consolidation statute did not authorize such action. The court explained that constituent cases sometimes "assume certain natural attitudes toward each other, such as 'in the nature of' a cross-bill or intervention." Id., at 838. Be that as it may, the court continued, "this is purely a rule of convenience, and does not result in actually making such parties defendants or interveners in the other suit." Ibid. The court described "the result of consolidation" as instead "merely to try cases together, necessitating separate verdicts and judgments or separate decrees," and to "leave" the constituent cases "separate, independent action[s]." Id., at 838, 840.
Treatises summarizing federal precedent applying the consolidation statute also concluded that consolidated cases "remain distinct." 1 Rose § 823(c), at 758. They recognized that consolidated cases should "remain separate as to parties, pleadings, and judgment," W. Simkins, Federal Practice 63 (rev. ed. 1923), and that "[t]here must be separate verdicts, judgments or decrees, even although the consolidating party wished for one verdict," 1 Rose § 823(c), at 758; see also G. Virden, Consolidation Under Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in 141 F.R.D. 169, 173-174 (1992) (Virden) ("as of 1933 and the Johnson case of that year, it was well settled that consolidation in the federal courts did not merge the separate cases into a single action").
Several aspects of this body of law support the inference that, prior to Rule 42(a), a judgment completely resolving one of several consolidated cases was an immediately appealable final decision. We made clear, for example, that each constituent case must be analyzed individually on appeal to ascertain jurisdiction and to decide its disposition-a compartmentalized analysis that would be gratuitous if the cases had merged into a single case subject to a single appeal. We emphasized that constituent cases should end in separate decrees or judgments-the traditional trigger for the right to appeal, for which there would be no need if an appeal could arise only from the resolution of the consolidated cases as a whole. We explained that the parties to one case did not become parties to the other by virtue of consolidation-indicating that the right of each to pursue his individual case on appeal should not be compromised by the litigation conduct of the other. And, finally, we held that consolidation could not prejudice rights to which the parties would have been due had consolidation never occurred. Forcing an aggrieved party to wait for other cases to conclude would substantially impair his ability to appeal from a final decision fully resolving his own case-a "matter of right," Gelboim, 574 U.S., at ----, 135 S.Ct., at 901, to which he was "entitled," Manypenny, 451 U.S., at 244, 101 S.Ct. 1657.
D
Against this background, two years after Johnson, the Rules Advisory Committee began discussion of what was to become Rule 42(a). The Rule, which became effective in 1938, was expressly modeled on its statutory predecessor, the Act of July 22, 1813. See Advisory Committee's Notes on 1937 Adoption of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 42(a), 28 U.S.C. App., p. 887. The Rule contained no definition of "consolidate," so the term presumably carried forward the same meaning we had ascribed to it under the consolidation statute for 125 years, and had just recently reaffirmed in Johnson. See Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L.Rev. 527, 537 (1947) ("if a word is obviously transplanted from another legal source, whether the common law or other legislation, it brings the old soil with it"); cf. Class v. United States, 583 U.S. ----, ----, 138 S.Ct. 798, 812, ---L.Ed.2d ---- (2018) ( Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(a)(2) did not silently alter existing doctrine established by this Court's past decisions).
Samuel nonetheless asserts that there is a significant distinction between the original consolidation statute and Rule 42(a). The statute authorized district courts to "consolidate" related "causes when it appears reasonable to do so" or to "make such orders and rules... as may be conformable to the usages of courts for avoiding unnecessary costs or delay in the administration of justice." 28 U.S.C. § 734 (1934 ed.). Rule 42(a) permits district courts not only to "consolidate the actions" (subsection (a)(2)) and "issue any other orders to avoid unnecessary cost or delay" (subsection (a)(3)), but also to "join for hearing or trial any or all matters at issue in the actions" (subsection (a)(1)).
Whatever "consolidate" meant under the statute, Samuel posits, it took on a different meaning under Rule 42(a) with the addition of subsection (a)(1). Samuel describes the Rule as "permit[ting] two forms of consolidation": consolidation that "extend[s] only to certain proceedings," such as discovery, and consolidation "for all purposes." Brief for Respondents 4-5. He locates textual authority for the former in subsection (a)(1), which he says empowers courts to "join[ ] multiple actions for procedural purposes." Id., at 23. In light of this broad grant of authority, he contends, subsection (a)(2) must provide for something more if it is not to be superfluous. And Samuel sees that something more as the ability to merge cases that have been consolidated for "all purposes" into a single, undifferentiated case-one appealable only when all issues in each formerly distinct case have been decided. See id., at 22-24 (to "consolidate" separate actions is "to join them into a single case" or "meld [them] into a single unit" (alterations omitted)).
We disagree. It is only by substantially overreading subsection (a)(1) that Samuel can argue that its addition compels a radical reinterpretation of the familiar term "consolidate" in subsection (a)(2). The text of subsection (a)(1) permits the joining of cases only for "hearing or trial." That narrow grant of authority cannot fairly be read as the exclusive source of a district court's power to "join[ ] multiple actions for procedural purposes." Brief for Respondents 23. There is, after all, much more to litigation than hearings or trials-such as motions practice or discovery. A district court's undisputed ability to consolidate cases for such limited purposes must therefore stem from subsection (a)(2). That defeats Samuel's argument that interpreting subsection (a)(2) to adopt the traditional understanding of consolidation would render it "wholly duplicative of [subsection] (a)(1)," and that subsection (a)(2) "therefore must permit courts... to 'consolidate' the actions themselves into a single unit." Id., at 23-24. Samuel's reinterpretation of "consolidate" is, in other words, a solution in search of a problem.
We think, moreover, that if Rule 42(a) were meant to transform consolidation into something sharply contrary to what it had been, we would have heard about it. Congress, we have held, "does not alter the fundamental details" of an existing scheme with "vague terms" and "subtle device[s]." Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468, 121 S.Ct. 903, 149 L.Ed.2d 1 (2001) ; cf. Class, 583 U.S., at ----, 138 S.Ct., at 812. That is true in spades when it comes to the work of the Federal Rules Advisory Committees. Their laborious drafting process requires years of effort and many layers of careful review before a proposed Rule is presented to this Court for possible submission to Congress. See Report of Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure (Apr. 1937) (describing the exhaustive process undertaken to draft the first Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). No sensible draftsman, let alone a Federal Rules Advisory Committee, would take a term that had meant, for more than a century, that separate actions do not merge into one, and silently and abruptly reimagine the same term to mean that they do.
Similarly, nothing in the pertinent proceedings of the Rules Advisory Committee supports the notion that Rule 42(a) was meant to overturn the settled understanding of consolidation. See United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 64, n. 6, 122 S.Ct. 1043, 152 L.Ed.2d 90 (2002) (Advisory Committee Notes are "a reliable source of insight into the meaning of a rule"). In this instance, the Committee simply commented that Rule 42(a)"is based upon" its statutory predecessor, "but insofar as the statute differs from this rule, it is modified." Advisory Committee's Notes on 1937 Adoption of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 42(a), 28 U.S.C. App., at 887. The Committee did not identify any specific instance in which Rule 42(a) changed the statute, let alone the dramatic transformation Samuel would have us recognize. See Virden 174-181 (evaluating the history of the development of Rule 42(a) and finding no evidence that the Committee intended a shift in meaning along the lines proposed by Samuel). This is significant because when the Committee intended a new rule to change existing federal practice, it typically explained the departure. See, e.g., Advisory Committee's Notes on 1937 Adoption of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 4, 28 U.S.C. App., p. 747 (a predecessor statute "is substantially continued insofar as it applies to a summons, but its requirements as to teste of process are superseded"); Advisory Committee's Notes on 1937 Adoption of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 18, 28 U.S.C. App., p. 802 ("In respect to fraudulent conveyances the rule changes the former rule requiring a prior judgment against the owner... to conform to the provisions of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, §§ 9 and 10.").
As a leading treatise explained at the time, through consolidation under Rule 42(a)"one or many or all of the phases of the several actions may be merged. But merger is never so complete in consolidation as to deprive any party of any substantial rights which he may have possessed had the actions proceeded separately." 3 J. Moore & J. Friedman, Moore's Federal Practice § 42.01, pp. 3050-3051 (1938). Thus, "separate verdicts and judgments are normally necessary." Id., at 3051, n. 12.
The limited extent to which this Court has addressed consolidation since adoption of Rule 42(a) confirms the traditional understanding. Just recently in Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 578 U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 136 S.Ct. 1310, 1326-1327, 194 L.Ed.2d 463 (2016), for example, the Court determined that cases "consolidated for administrative purposes at the execution stage... were not independent of the original actions for damages and each claim retained its separate character." The Court quoted as authority a treatise explaining that "actions do not lose their separate identity because of consolidation." Id., at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 1327 (quoting 9A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2382, p. 10 (3d ed. 2008) (Wright & Miller)).
In Butler v. Dexter, 425 U.S. 262, 266-267, 96 S.Ct. 1527, 47 L.Ed.2d 774 (1976) (per curiam ), we dismissed an appeal because the constitutional question that supplied our jurisdiction had been raised not in the case before us, but instead only in other cases with which it had been consolidated. We explained that "[e]ach case... must be considered separately to determine whether or not this Court has jurisdiction to consider its merits". Id., at 267, n. 12, 96 S.Ct. 1527 ; see Rich, 12 How., at 352-353. And in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 735, and n. 22, 96 S.Ct. 1854, 48 L.Ed.2d 301 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting), four dissenting Justices-reaching an issue not addressed by the majority-cited Johnson for the proposition that actions are "not merged" and do "not lose their separate identities because of... consolidation" under Rule 42(a).
In the face of all the foregoing, we cannot accept Samuel's contention that "consolidate" in Rule 42(a) carried a very different meaning-with very different consequences-than it had in Johnson, just five years before the Rule was adopted.
None of this means that district courts may not consolidate cases for "all purposes" in appropriate circumstances. District courts enjoy substantial discretion in deciding whether and to what extent to consolidate cases. See 9A Wright & Miller § 2383 (collecting cases). What our decision does mean is that constituent cases retain their separate identities at least to the extent that a final decision in one is immediately appealable by the losing party. That is, after all, the point at which, by definition, a "district court disassociates itself from a case." Swint v. Chambers County Comm'n, 514 U.S. 35, 42, 115 S.Ct. 1203, 131 L.Ed.2d 60 (1995). We thus express no view on any issue arising prior to that time.
* * *
The normal rule is that a "final decision" confers upon the losing party the immediate right to appeal. That rule provides clear guidance to litigants. Creating exceptions to such a critical step in litigation should not be undertaken lightly. Congress has granted us the authority to prescribe rules "defin[ing] when a ruling of a district court is final for the purposes of appeal under" § 1291, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(c), and we have explained that changes with respect to the meaning of final decision "are to come from rulemaking,... not judicial decisions in particular controversies," Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 582 U.S. ----, ----, 137 S.Ct. 1702, 1714, 198 L.Ed.2d 132 (2017). If, as Samuel fears, our holding in this case were to give rise to practical
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for further consideration in light of Younger v. Gilmore, ante, p. 15.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question we granted certiorari to decide is whether evidence obtained in violation of Internal Revenue Service (IRS) regulations may be admitted at the criminal trial of a taxpayer accused of bribing an IRS agent. 436 U. S. 943 (1978).
Unbeknown to respondent, three of his face-to-face conversations with IRS Agent Yee were monitored by means of a radio transmitter concealed on Yee’s person. Respondent moved to suppress tape recordings of the three conversations on the ground that the authorizations required by IRS regulations had not been secured. The District Court granted the motion. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed as to the third tape; it concluded that adequate authorization had been obtained. As to the first two tapes, however, the Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court both that the IRS regulations had not been followed and that exclusion of the recordings was therefore required. It is the latter conclusion that is at issue here.
The Government argues that exclusion of probative evidence in a criminal trial is an inappropriate sanction for violation of an executive department’s regulations. In this case, moreover, it argues that suppression is especially inappropriate because the violation of the regulation was neither deliberate nor prejudicial, and did not affect any constitutional or statutory rights. We agree that suppression should not have been ordered in this case, and therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I
Neither the Constitution nor any Act of Congress requires that official approval be secured before conversations are overheard or recorded by Government agents with the consent of one of the conversants. Such “consensual electronic surveillance” between taxpayers and IRS agents is, however, prohibited by IRS regulations unless appropriate prior authorization is obtained.
The IRS Manual sets forth in detail the procedures to be followed in obtaining such approvals. For all types of requests the regulations require an explanation of the reasons for the proposal, the type of equipment to be used; the names of the persons involved, and the duration of the proposed monitoring.
Approval by as many as three different levels of authority may be required, depending on the kind of surveillance that is contemplated and the circumstances of the request. Telephone conversations may be monitored with the approval of an Assistant Regional Inspector of the Internal Security Division. Such advance approval may be requested and given verbally, although the authorization must subsequently be confirmed in writing. The monitoring of nontelephone conversations requires approval at the national as well as the regional level. In emergency situations, the Director, or Acting Director, Internal Security Division, or the Assistant Commissioner (Inspection) may authorize the recording. If there is at least 48 hours in which to obtain approval, a signed request must also be submitted to the Attorney General of the United States, or a designated Assistant Attorney General, by the Director or Acting Director of the Internal Security Division.
II
On March 14, 1974, Agent Yee met with respondent and his wife in connection with an audit of their 1971 income tax returns. After Mrs. Caceres left the meeting, respondent offered Yee a “personal settlement” of $500 in exchange for a favorable resolution of the audit. When he returned to the IRS office, Yee reported the offer to his superiors and prepared an affidavit describing it.
The record reflects no further discussion of the offer until January 1975. It does indicate, however, that one telephone conversation between Yee and respondent, on March 21, 1974, was recorded with authorization, and that authority was also obtained to monitor face-to-face conversations with respondent from time to time during the period between March and September 1974. Yee continued to work on the audit of respondent’s records throughout this period, but his meetings, until January 1975, were with Mrs. Caceres and the Cacereses’ accountant.
On January 27, 1975, Yee had a meeting with respondent that was not recorded. According to Yee’s affidavit, the meeting proceeded in two stages. First, he discussed his calculations with respondent, Mrs. Caceres, and their accountant. When respondent and his wife asked for an additional week to check their records, Yee told them it would be necessary to sign an extension becau'se the statute of limitations would otherwise expire soon. Respondent stated that he would have to consult his attorney before signing any extension, and would call Yee with his decision later that day.
Yee then left the office to return to his car. He was followed by respondent, who revived the subject of a “personal settlement.” This time, respondent indicated that he had $500 that he would give Yee immediately, with an additional $500 to be paid when the matter was finally settled. Yee refused the offer, but at respondent’s insistence, eventually stated that he might consider it.
In subsequent conversations initiated by Agent Yee, all of which were monitored, respondent indicated that he was not prepared for another meeting with Yee. .Finally, in a conversation on January 30 at 5:15 p. m., respondent agreed to a meeting the following day at 2 p. m. At 8:15 a. m. on the 31st, the Regional Inspector in San Francisco telephoned the Director of Internal Security in Washington and obtained emergency approval for the use of electronic equipment to monitor the meeting that afternoon. On the same day, a written request for authority to monitor face-to-face conversations for a period of 30 days was initiated and, in due course, forwarded to Washington for submission to the Department of Justice.
At the meeting on the 31st, respondent gave Yee $500 and promised to give him an additional $500 when he received a notice from IRS showing his deficiency at an amount upon which he and Yee had agreed. As in all his future meetings with respondent, Yee wore a concealed radio transmitter which allowed other agents to monitor and record their conversation.
Yee next called respondent on February 5 and arranged a meeting for the next day to review the audit agreement. Because the Department of Justice had not yet acted on, or perhaps even received, the request for a 30-day authorization, the Regional Inspector again requested and obtained emergency approval to monitor the meeting with respondent. At the February 6 meeting, respondent renewed his promise to pay an additional $500 in connection with the 1971 return, and also offered Yee another $2,000 for help in settling his 1973 and 1974 returns.
On February 11, a Deputy Assistant Attorney General approved the request for authority to monitor Yee’s conversations with respondent for 30 days. The approval was received in time to cover a meeting held that day at which Yee was paid the additional $500. Because the 30-day period did not commence until February 11, however, no approval from the Department of Justice was ever obtained for the earlier monitorings of January 31 and February 6.
The District Court and the Court of Appeals both held that the two earlier meetings had not been monitored in accordance with IRS regulations, since Justice Department approval had not been secured. The courts recognized that such approval is not required, by the terms of the regulations, in “emergency situations” when less than 48 hours is available to secure authorization. They recognized, too, that in each instance, less than 48 hours did exist between the time the IRS initiated its request for monitoring approval and the time of the scheduled meeting with Yee. But the courts concluded that neither meeting fell within the emergency provision of the regulations because the exigencies were the product of “government-created scheduling problems.”
The Government does not challenge that conclusion. We are therefore presented with the question whether the tape recordings, and the testimony of the agents who monitored the January 31 and February 6 conversations, should be excluded because of the violation of the IRS regulations.
Ill
A court’s duty to enforce an agency regulation is most evident when compliance with the regulation is mandated by the Constitution or federal law. In Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S. 135, 152-153, for example, this Court held invalid a deportation ordered on the basis of statements which did not comply with the Immigration Service’s rules requiring signatures and oaths, finding that the rules were designed “to afford [the alien] due process of law” by providing “safeguards against essentially unfair procedures.”
In this case, however, unlike Bridges v. Wixon, the agency was not required by the Constitution or by statute to adopt any particular procedures or rules before engaging in consensual monitoring and recording. While Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 IT. S. C. § 2510 et seq., regulates electronic surveillance conducted without the consent of either party to a conversation, federal statutes impose no restrictions on recording a conversation with the consent of one of the conversants.
Nor does the Constitution protect the privacy of individuals in respondent’s position. In Lopez v. United States, 373 U. S. 427, 439, we held that the Fourth Amendment provided no protection to an individual against the recording of his statements by the IRS agent to whom he was speaking. In doing so, we repudiated any suggestion that the defendant had a “constitutional right to rely on possible flaws in the agent’s memory, or to challenge the agent’s credibility without being beset by corroborating evidence that is not susceptible of impeachment,” concluding instead that “the risk that petitioner took in offering a bribe to [the IRS agent] fairly included the risk that the offer would be accurately reproduced in court, whether by faultless memory or mechanical recording.” The same analysis was applied in United States v. White, 401 U. S. 745, to consensual monitoring and recording by means of a transmitter concealed on an informant’s person, even though the defendant did not know that he was speaking with a Government agent:
“Concededly a police agent who conceals his police connections may write down for official use his conversations with a defendant and testify concerning them, without a warrant authorizing his encounters with the defendant and without otherwise violating the latter’s Fourth Amendment rights. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U. S., at 300-303. For constitutional purposes, no different result is required if the agent instead of immediately reporting and transcribing his conversations with defendant, either (1) simultaneously records them with electronic equipment which he is carrying on his person, Lopez v. United States, supra; (2) or carries radio equipment which simultaneously transmits the conversations either to recording equipment located elsewhere or to other agents monitoring the transmitting frequency. On Lee v. United States, [343 U. S. 747]. If the conduct and revelations of an agent operating without electronic equipment do not invade the defendant’s constitutionally justifiable expectations of privacy, neither does a simultaneous recording of the same conversations made by the agent or by others from transmissions received from the agent to whom the defendant is talking and whose trustworthiness the defendant necessarily risks.” United States v. White, supra, at 751 (opinion of White, J.).
Our decisions in Lopez and White demonstrate that the IRS was not required by the Constitution to adopt these regulations. It is equally clear that the violations of agency regulations disclosed by this record do not raise any constitutional questions.
It is true, of course, that respondent’s conversations were monitored without the approval of the Department of Justice, whereas the conversations of others in a similar position would, assuming the IRS generally follows its regulations, be recorded only with Justice Department approval. But this difference does not even arguably amount to a denial of equal protection. No claim is, or reasonably could be, made that if the IRS had more promptly addressed this request to the Department of Justice, it would have been denied. As a result, any inconsistency of which respondent might complain is purely one of form, with no discernible effect in this case on the action taken by the agency and its treatment of respondent.
Moreover, the failure to secure Justice Department authorization, while conceded here to be a violation of the IRS regulations, was attributable to the fact that the IRS officials responsible for administration of the relevant regulations, both in San Francisco and Washington, construed the situation as an emergency within the meaning of those regulations. Their construction of their own regulations, even if erroneous, was not obviously so. That kind of error by an executive agency in interpreting its own regulations surely does not raise any constitutional questions.
Nor is this a case in which the Due Process Clause is implicated because an individual has reasonably relied on agency regulations promulgated for his guidance or benefit and has suffered substantially because of their violation by the agency. Respondent cannot reasonably contend that he relied on the regulation, or that its breach had any effect on his conduct. He did not know that his conversations with Yee were being recorded without proper authority.' He was, of course, prejudiced in the sense that he would be better off if all monitoring had been postponed until after the Deputy Assistant Attorney General’s approval was obtained on February 11, 1975, but precisely the same prejudice would have ensued if the approval had been issued more promptly. For the record makes it perfectly clear that a delay in processing the request, rather than any doubt about its propriety or sufficiency, was the sole reason why advance authorization was not obtained before February 11.
Finally, the Administrative Procedure Act provides no grounds for judicial enforcement of the regulation violated in this case. The APA authorizes judicial review and invalidation of agency action that is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not in accordance with law, as well as action taken “without observance of procedure required by law.” Agency violations of their own regulations, whether or not also in violation of the Constitution, may well be inconsistent with the standards of agency action which the APA directs the courts .to enforce. Indeed, some of our most important decisions holding agencies bound by their regulations have been in cases originally brought under the APA.
But this is not an APA case, and the remedy sought is not invalidation of the agency action. Rather, we are dealing with a criminal prosecution in which respondent seeks judicial enforcement of the agency regulations by means of the exclusionary rule. That rule has primarily rested on the judgment that the importance of deterring police conduct that may invade the constitutional rights of individuals throughout the community outweighs the importance of securing the conviction of the specific defendant on trial. In view of our conclusion that none of respondent’s constitutional rights has been violated here, either by the actual recording or by the agency violation of its own regulations, our precedents enforcing the exclusionary rule to deter constitutional violations provide no support for the rule’s application in this case.
IY
Respondent argues that the regulations concerning electronic eavesdropping, even though not required by the Constitution or by statute, are of such importance in safeguarding the privacy of the citizenry that a rigid exclusionary rule should be applied to all evidence obtained in violation of any of their provisions. We do not doubt the importance of these rules. Nevertheless, without pausing to evaluate the Government’s challenge to our power to do so, we decline to adopt any rigid rule requiring federal courts to exclude any evidence obtained as a result of a violation of these rules.
Regulations governing the conduct of criminal investigations are generally considered desirable, and may well provide more valuable protection to the public at large than the deterrence flowing from the occasional exclusion of items of evidence in criminal trials. Although we do not suggest that a suppression order in this case would cause the IRS to abandon or modify its electronic surveillance regulations, we cannot ignore the possibility that a rigid application of an exclusionary rule to every regulatory violation could have a serious deterrent impact on the formulation of additional standards to govern prosecutorial and police procedures. Here, the Executive itself has provided for internal sanctions in cases of knowing violations of the electronic-surveillance regulations To go beyond that, and require exclusion in every case, would take away from the Executive Department the primary responsibility for fashioning the appropriate remedy for the violation of its regulations. But since the content, and indeed the existence, of the regulations would remain, within the Executive’s sole authority, the result might well be fewer and less protective regulations. In the long run, it is far better to have rules like those contained in the IRS Manual, and to tolerate occasional erroneous administration of the kind displayed by this record, than either to have no rules except those mandated by statute, or to have them framed in a mere precatory form.
Nor can we accept respondent’s further argument that even without a rigid rule of exclusion, his is a case in which evidence secured in violation of the agency regulation should be excluded on the basis of a more limited, individualized approach. Quite the contrary, this case exemplifies those situations in which evidence would not be excluded if a case-by-case approach were applied. The two conversations at issue here were recorded with the approval of the IRS officials in San Francisco and Washington. In an emergency situation, which the agents thought was present, this approval would have been sufficient. The agency action, while later found to be in violation of the regulations, nonetheless reflected a reasonable, good-faith attempt to comply in a situation in which no one questions that monitoring was appropriate and would have certainly received Justice Department authorization, had the request been received more promptly. In these circumstances, there is simply no reason why a court should exercise whatever discretion it may have to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the regulations.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
545 F. 2d 1182 (1976). The District Court suppressed evidence relating to the third conversation as well on the ground that the approval of a Deputy Assistant Attorney General was not sufficient to comply with the regulations. The Court of Appeals disagreed, concluding that the Attorney General’s authority to approve such monitoring could be delegated not only to Assistant Attorneys General, as provided specifically in the regulation, but also to their deputies. That conclusion is not at issue here.
See United States v. White, 401 U. S. 745, 752 (plurality opinion); Lopez v. United States, 373 U. S. 427; 18 U. S. C. §2511 (2) (c); infra, at 749-751.
The IRS regulations were drafted to conform to the requirements of the Attorney General’s October 16, 1972, Memorandum to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies. The memorandum mandates Justice Department approval for all consensual monitoring of nontelephone conversations by federal departments and agencies. The only exceptions are if less than 48 hours is available to secure approval or if exigent circumstances preclude requests for advance authorization from the Justice Department; in such cases, monitoring may be instituted under the authorization of the head of the department or agency, or other officials designated by him.
Paragraph 652.22 of the IRS Manual (in effect Sept. 1975) provides in pertinent part:
“(1) The monitoring of non-telephone conversations with the consent of one party requires the advance authorization of the Attorney General or any designated Assistant Attorney General. Requests for such authority may be signed by the Director, Internal Security Division, or, in his/her absence, the Acting Director. This authority cannot be redelegated. These same officials may authorize temporary emergency monitoring when exigent circumstances preclude requesting the authorization of the Attorney General in advance. If the Director, Internal Security Division, cannot be reached, the Assistant Commissioner (Inspection) may grant emergency approval. This authority cannot be redelegated.
“(2) Written approval of the Attorney General must be requested 48 hours prior to the use of mechanical, electronic or other devices to overhear, transmit or record a non-telephone private conversation with the permission of one party to the conversation. . . . Any requests being telefaxed into the National Office should be submitted four days prior to the anticipated equipment use. . . .
“(3) [A request] must be signed and submitted by the Regional Inspector or Chief, Investigations Branch, to the Director, Internal Security Division. Such requests will contain [reason for such proposed use; type of equipment to be used; names of persons involved; proposed location of equipment; duration of proposed use (limited to 30 days from proposed beginning date); and manner or method of installation] ....
“(6) When emergency situations occur, the Director or Acting Director, Internal Security Division, or the Assistant Commissioner (Inspection) will be contacted to grant emergency approval to monitor. This emergency approval authority cannot be redelegated. . . . Emergency authorization pursuant to this exception will not be given where the requesting official has in excess of 48 hours to obtain written advance approval from the Attorney General.
“(7) If, at the time the emergency approval request is submitted, it is desired that approval for use of electronic equipment be given for an extended period, this should be indicated on the [appropriate form]. The Director, in addition to reporting his authorization for emergency use to the Attorney General, will also request approval for the Use of Electronic Equipment for the duration of that period specified by the requestor.”
App. 20, 23-24, 46.
Id,., at 25-27, 46.
Requests for authorization to use electronic equipment to monitor nontelephone conversations are made on a form (No. 5177) that requires disclosure of the dates of previous authorizations. The form dated January 31, 1975, App. 63, is termed an extension, and reports prior authorizations dated March 25, April 24, May 24, June 27, July 23, and August 29, 1974. Under the regulations, a single authorization may cover a period of up to 30 days; the intervals between the dates of prior authorizations in this case are consistent with successive 30-day authorizations, although this has not been established by any evidence called to our attention.
Yee had one follow-up conversation with respondent later in March, which was not monitored. From that point until January 1975, he had no further contact with respondent. App. to Pet. for Cert. 16a (opinion and order of the District Court); App. 21-22,
Id., at 65-67.
In the District Court, respondent moved to suppress evidence relating to these telephone conversations on the grounds that the monitoring had not been properly authorized. The District Court rejected that challenge, concluding that the applicable IRS regulations had been followed with respect to these conversations. App. to Pet. for Cert. 16a-17a. That ruling is not at issue here.
545 E. 2d, at 1187. See also App. to Pet. for Cert. 20a (opinion of District Court) (“the only 'emergency’ was created wholly by the I. R. S.”).
See also United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U. S. 149, 155 (Court assumed that “one under investigation with a view to deportation is legally entitled to insist upon the observance of rules promulgated by the Secretary pursuant to law”).
Mr. Justice White further stated:
“Nor should we be too ready to erect constitutional barriers to relevant and probative evidence which is also accurate and reliable. An electronic recording will many times produce a more reliable rendition of what a defendant has said than will the unaided memory of a police agent. It may also be that with the recording in existence it is less likely that the informant will change his mind, less chance that threat or injury will suppress unfavorable evidence and less chance that cross-examination will confound the testimony. Considerations like these obviously do not favor the defendant, but we are not prepared to hold that a defendant who has no constitutional right to exclude the informer’s unaided testimony nevertheless has a Fourth Amendment privilege against a more accurate version of the events in question.” 401 U. S., at 753.
It does not necessarily follow, however, as a matter of either logic or law, that the agency had no duty to obey them. “Where the rights of individuals are affected, it is incumbent upon agencies to follow their own procedures. This is so even where the internal procedures are possibly more rigorous than otherwise would be required.” Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U. S. 199, 235. See, e. g., United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U. S. 260 (holding habeas corpus relief proper where Government regulations “with the force and effect of law” governing the procedure to be foEowed in processing and passing upon an alien’s application for suspension of deportation were not followed); Service v. Dulles, 354 U. S. 363 (invalidating Secretary of State’s dismissal of an employee where regulations requiring approval of the Deputy Undersecretary and consultation of full record were not satisfied); Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U. S. 535 (invalidating dismissal of Interior Department employee where regulations governing hearing procedures for national security dismissals were not followed). See also Yellin v. United States, 374 U. S. 109 (reversing contempt conviction where congressional committee had not complied with its rules requiring it to consider a witness’ request to be heard in executive session).
In Raley v. Ohio, 360 U. S. 423, 437-438, we held that due process precluded the conviction of individuals for refusing to answer questions asked by a state investigating commission which itself had erroneously provided assurances, express or implied, that the defendants had a privilege under state law to refuse to answer. And in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 559, the Court held that an individual could not be punished for demonstrating “near” a courthouse where the highest police officials of the city had advised the demonstrators that they could meet where they did without violating the statutory proscription against demonstrations “near” the courthouse. Cf. Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 284 U. S. 370 (holding invalid Interstate Commerce Commission's retroactive application of new rate); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States, 316 U. S. 407, 422 (agency regulations on which individuals are “-entitled to rely” bind agency and are therefore ripe for judicial review). The underlying rationale of the foregoing cases is plainly inapplicable here.
The Act was originally passed in 1946, 60 Stat. 237, and is codified at 5 U. S. C. § 551 et seq. and § 701 et seq.
5 U. S. C. § 706.
Cf. Board of Curators, Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U. S. 78, 92 n. 8; Vitarelli v. Seaton, supra, at 547 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“This judicially evolved rule of administrative law is now firmly established and, if I may add, rightly so. He that takes the procedural sword shall perish with that sword”).
Even as a matter of administrative law, however, it seems clear that agencies are not required, at the risk of invalidation of their action, to follow all of their rules, even those properly classified as “internal.” In American Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Service, 397 U. S. 532, 538, for example, ICC rules requiring certain information to be included in applications had not been followed. This Court rejected the argument that the agency action was therefore invalid, concluding that the Commission was “entitled to a measure of discretion in administering its own procedural rules in such a manner as it deems necessary to resolve quickly and correctly urgent transportation problems.”
See App. in Service v. Dulles, O. T. 1956, No. 407, p. 40; App. in Vitarelli v. Seaton, O. T. 1958, No. 101, p. 7. The complaints in both of these cases invoked 5 U. S. C. § 1009 (1964 ed.), the then-applicable APA judicial-review provision.
See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 633, 636-637; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 656; Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 217.
Since no statute was violated by the recording of respondent’s conversations, this Court’s decision in Miller v. United States, 357 U. S. 301, is likewise inapplicable.
The Government argues that Fed. Rule Evid. 402 and 18 U. S. C. § 3501 prohibited the Court of Appeals from exercising whatever supervisory power it might otherwise have to suppress evidence of respondent’s statements to Yee. Brief for United States 42.
See Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349, 416-428 (1974); McGowan, Rule-Making and the Police, 70 Mich. L. Rev. 659 (1972).
See F. Cooper, Administrative Agencies and the Courts 289-290 (1951) (“[T]oo rigid an application of the doctrine prohibiting disregard of procedural rules would encourage the tendency of some agencies to proceed almost without rules. The doctrine should not be pressed so far as to induce agencies to adopt the protective device of promulgating procedural rules so vague in nature as to make it impossible to show a violation of the rules”).
See IRS Manual ¶ 652.1 (3) (in effect Sept. 1975) (“Any employee who knowingly violates or in any way knowingly countenances violation of this policy will be subject to disciplinary action and may be removed from the Service”).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Marshall
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents a challenge to an effort by the Interstate Commerce Commission to create a new remedy to enforce motor-carrier rate-bureau agreements. The remedy at issue is the Commission’s authority to reject effective tariffs that have been submitted in substantial violation of rate-bureau agreements. As we have recognized in the past, the Interstate Commerce Commission (Commission or ICC) has discretion to fashion remedies in furtherance of its statutory responsibilities. Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases, 436 U. S. 631, 654 (1978). Although rejection of effective tariffs is a form of remedial power not expressly delegated to the Commission, the remedy as proposed by the Commission in this case is closely and directly related to the Commission’s express statutory powers and is designed to achieve objectives set for the Commission by Congress. Under these limited circumstances, we hold that the proposed remedy lies within the Commission’s discretion.
1 — 1
Motor-carrier rate bureaus are groups of motor carriers formed to negotiate collective rates. Since the Reed-Bulwinkle Act of 1948, motor carriers within the jurisdiction of the Commission have enjoyed immunity from the antitrust laws to enter into rate bureaus and to submit collective rates to the Commission. Ch. 491, 62 Stat. 472. To receive this immunity, rate bureaus must apply for Commission approval of bureau agreements, which describe the manner in which a bureau will negotiate collective tariffs. The original Reed-Bulwinkle Act gave the ICC broad discretion to determine which rate-bureau agreements were consistent with national transportation policy. 49 U. S. C. §5 (1976 ed.). Until recently, the Commission was fairly liberal in approving rate-bureau agreements, but, in the late 1970’s, the Commission began to disapprove an increasing number of agreements on the grounds that the agreements were undermining competition among motor carriers. In 1980, apparently disturbed by this abrupt shift in Commission policy but persuaded that some deregulation of motor carriers was necessary, Congress passed the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 (MCA). Pub. L. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793. The MCA in 49 !U. S. C. § 10706(b)(3) establishes specific guidelines, to which rate-bureau agreements must conform if they are to receive antitrust immunity. Because the MCA creates a presumption that bureau agreements meeting the requirements of § 10706(b)(3) will qualify for antitrust immunity, the Act divests the Commission of much of its discretion to approve and disapprove rate-bureau agreements. See H. R. Rep. No. 96-1069, p. 29 (1980).
This case arises out of an ICC interpretative ruling issued in 1980 explaining how the Commission planned to implement the new statutory guidelines for rate-bureau immunity. Motor Carrier Rate Bureaus — Implementation of P. L. 96-296, 364 I. C. C. 464 (1980). For the most part, this interpretative ruling presented the Commission’s views on the substance of the new legislation, and established procedures whereby rate bureaus could submit existing agreements to the Commission for approval under the new standards. Before concluding, however, the ruling also addressed a problem the Commission had faced in regulating rate-bureau agreements even before Congress in 1980 amended the Reed-Bulwinkle Act: “the lack of definite remedies for proven rate bureau violations.” Id., at 499. The Commission announced its intention to fashion the following new remedy:
“In addition to the possible remedy of withdrawal of immunity for serious and continuing violations, we proposed to adopt a standard providing that proof of significant violations of an approved agreement will result in tariff rejection. Allegations of lesser violations would subject the tariff item to suspension or investigation.” Ibid.
The Commission subsequently explained how its new remedy would be implemented. The Commission intends to use the remedy to discipline motor carriers for substantial bureau agreement violations, such as unauthorized collusion or illegal bureau pressure on independent carriers. Brief for Petitioners 24. Interested parties — for instance, shippers or other carriers — may file complaints of such violations with the Commission. Upon receiving such a complaint, the Commission’s Office of Consumer Protection will investigate the allegations, and, if a serious violation is discovered, the Office will refer the matter to the Commission for a full hearing. If the hearing confirms that a serious violation has occurred, the Commission has the authority to reject the affected tariffs. The Commission’s decision to reject is reviewable in federal court. Motor Carrier Rate Bureaus — Implementation of PL 96-296, 364 I. C. C. 921, 926 (1981).
Rejection of an effective tariff applies retroactively, and can have serious consequences for affected motor carriers. Rejection renders the tariff void ab initio. Brief for Petitioners 7. As a result, whatever tariff was in effect prior to the adoption of the rejected rate becomes the applicable tariff for the period during which motor carriers charged the rejected tariff. Under 49 U. S. C. § 11705(b)(1), shippers that were charged the rejected tariff can then bring actions to recover the “overcharge,” which is the amount by which the rejected tariff exceeded the prior tariff.
Alarmed by the prospect of overcharge liability, respondents, a group of motor-carrier rate bureaus, petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit to review the Commission’s new remedy. The Eleventh Circuit accepted respondents’ argument that the Commission lacks the power to reject effective tariffs. American Trucking Assn., Inc. v. United States, 688 F. 2d 1337 (1982). Because the Fifth Circuit previously had found the Commission to possess authority to reject effective tariffs in a different context, Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co. v. United States, 682 F. 2d 1092 (1982), cert. pending, No. 82-707, we granted certiorari in this case to examine the Commission’s powers to reject effective tariffs. 462 U. S 1130 (1983). We now reverse the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit.
The issue before us is narrow. Most aspects of the Commission’s authority to supervise motor-carrier rate-bureau agreements are not seriously challenged. For example, the Commission undisputedly has the power to terminate a rate-bureau agreement if the agreement itself fails to meet MCA guidelines or if bureau members persist in filing tariffs in violation of the terms of the agreement. 49 U. S. C. § 10706(f). Moreover, during the 30 days before a tariff proposed by a bureau member goes into effect, the Commission clearly has authority to reject the proposal if it was submitted in violation of a rate-bureau agreement. 49 U. S. C. § 10762(e). In addition, if the Commission suspects that a proposed tariff has been submitted in violation of a rate-bureau agreement but no violation is immediately evident, the Commission may postpone the tariff’s effective date for up to seven months, and conduct an investigation into its lawfulness. §10708. If the investigation uncovers a rate-bureau agreement violation before the suspension period expires, the Commission may reject the proposed tariff. Furthermore, the Commission may conduct an investigation into a tariff’s lawfulness at any time after it has gone into effect, and, if the tariff is found to have been the product of a bureau agreement violation, the Commission has authority to cancel the tariff and require that a reasonable and nondiscriminatory rate apply in the future. § 10704(b)(1). Whenever the Commission finds an effective tariff unlawful, injured parties can recover both damages under § 11705(b)(3) and whatever additional amounts the antitrust laws allow. Finally, the Commission has authority to impose civil and criminal penalties on rate agreement violators. §§ 11901(b), 11914(b).
Our sole concern in this case is whether, in addition to the remedial powers listed above, the Commission has the authority to reject retroactively a tariff submitted in substantial violation of a rate-bureau agreement once that tariff has gone into effect. As a practical matter, the question is whether motor carriers that provide services based on effective tariffs submitted in substantial violation of rate-bureau agreements can be held liable to injured parties for the entire amount by which their rates exceed the previous rates, and not just for the damages caused by the violation.
A
Since the Commission styled its new remedy as a rejection power, the most obvious source of the authority claimed by the Commission is 49 U. S. C. § 10762(e), which provides:
“The Commission may reject a tariff submitted to it by a common carrier under this section if that tariff violates this section or regulation of the Commission carrying out this section.”
At least superficially, § 10762(e) supports the Commission’s exercise of the power it asserts in this case. The subsection authorizes the rejection of tariffs, and does not distinguish between proposed and effective tariffs. Inasmuch as Congress in other contexts has expressly limited aspects of the Commission’s enforcement powers to proposed tariffs, e. g., 49 U. S. C. § 10708(a)(1) (suspension of proposed rates), the absence of limitation in § 10762(e) suggests that the Commission may reject both proposed and effective tariffs. However, the language of § 10762(e) and the structure of the Commission’s remedial authority under the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA), as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 10101 et seq., persuade us that Congress could not have meant § 10762(e) to confer on the Commission a broad power to nullify effective tariffs retroactively.
To begin with, the term “reject” connotes a refusal to receive at the threshold. To interpret the power to reject as a license to revoke a tariff that the Commission has already accepted would be contrary to the plain language of the subsection. For this reason, the District of Columbia Circuit has concluded that rejection provisions analogous to § 10762(e) do not extend to tariffs that have gone into effect. In a case involving the former Federal Power Commission’s rejection authority, Judge Leventhal likened rejection to “a motion to dismiss on the face of the pleading,” and declared rejection to be ‘“a peremptory form of response to filed tariffs.’” Municipal Light Boards v. FPC, 146 U. S. App. D. C. 294, 299, 450 F. 2d 1341, 1346 (1971) (quoting F. Welch, Cases and Text on Public Utility Regulation 581 (1961)), cert. denied, 405 U. S. 989 (1972). In a subsequent case dealing with the former Civil Aeronautics Board’s rejection authority, another appellate panel approved of Judge Leventhal’s analysis and concluded: “[Rejection is a regulatory device properly used only prior to a tariff’s effective date.” Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 177 U. S. App. D. C. 100, 121, 543 F. 2d 247, 268 (1976) (emphasis in original).
A further reason to believe that § 10762(e) does not extend to effective tariffs is the difference between the procedural safeguards incorporated into § 10762(e) and those that Congress built into remedies clearly designed to reach effective tariffs. On its face and as applied by the Commission, § 10762(e) offers affected carriers no opportunity to challenge a decision to reject. Rejection is peremptory, and the carrier’s only recourse is to submit a corrected tariff. On the other hand, § 10704(b), which deals with the Commission’s authority to cancel effective tariffs and to prescribe new rates for the future, provides that the Commission must conduct a full hearing before taking any action. It would be bizarre, to say the least, to interpret § 10762(e) to give the Commission peremptory authority to void effective rates retroactively, when § 10704(b) places procedural constraints on the Commission’s authority to take the less drastic step of modifying effective tariffs prospectively.
Similarly, reading § 10762(e) to give the Commission unbridled discretion to reject effective tariffs at any time would undermine restraints placed by Congress on the Commission’s power to suspend a proposed tariff pending investigation. See §10708; supra, at 360. The Commission’s power to suspend is limited to the seven months after the proposed tariff’s effective date, and final action in a suspension-investigation proceeding can be taken only after a full hearing. §§ 10708(a)(2), (b). Were we to read § 10762(e) as broadly as the Commission proposes, the temporal and procedural constraints of § 10708 would be nugatory, since the Commission could rely on its rejection powers to void a regulation at any time and without any procedural safeguards.
The language of § 10762(e) is admittedly ambiguous, and, in the ordinary course, we might defer to the Commission’s view that the subsection should be given a liberal interpretation. However, in this case, the Commission’s interpretation is unsupported by a natural reading of the provision and inconsistent with the remedial structure established by Congress. Under these circumstances, we cannot defer to the Commission’s interpretation, and we accept the view of the Eleventh Circuit that § 10762(e) does not license the Commission to reject effective tariffs.
B
Although we conclude that § 10762(e) does not bestow on the Commission a general authority to reject effective tariffs, this conclusion does not resolve the dispute. The Commission’s authority under the Interstate Commerce Act is not bounded by the powers expressly enumerated in the Act. 49 U. S. C. § 10321(a). As we have held in the past, the Commission also has discretion to take actions that are “legitimate, reasonable, and direct[ly] adjunct to the Commission’s explicit statutory power.’” Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases, 436 U. S., at 655 (quoting United States v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 426 U. S. 500, 514 (1976)). We have recognized that the Commission may elaborate upon its express statutory remedies when necessary to achieve specific statutory goals. In this case, the Commission argues that the retroactive rejection of rate-bureau tariffs is simply an adjunct to the Commission’s § 10762(e) rejection authority, and that, to the extent that there is an elaboration on that authority, it is necessary to ensure compliance with rate-bureau agreements. In these narrow circumstances, we agree.
The doctrine of ICC discretion arose out of a recognition that, since drafters of complex ratemaking statutes like the ICA neither can nor do “include specific consideration of every evil sought to be corrected,” the absence of express remedial authority should not force the Commission “to sit idly by and wink at practices that lead to violations of [ICA] provisions.” American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. United States, 344 U. S. 298, 309-310, 311 (1953). The doctrine originated in cases in which we accorded the Commission latitude to interpret its statutory powers in a reasonable manner. See, e. g., American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. United States, supra; cf. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U. S. 747, 774-777 (1968) (comparable construction of the authority of the FPC under the Natural Gas Act). More recently, however, we have applied the doctrine to sustain the Commission’s efforts to place reasonable conditions on its acceptance of proposed tariffs. For instance, in United States v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., supra, we upheld a decision by the Commission to approve tariff increases only on the condition that carriers spend a specific portion of the increase on capital improvements and deferred maintenance. Although the ICA provides the Commission no express authority to dictate the manner in which carriers expend their revenues, we held that the Commission’s conditions of approval were sufficiently tied td the ICA’s statutory goal of safeguarding the Nation’s transportation system to withstand judicial review.
In Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases, supra, this Court again addressed the Commission’s discretionary authority to condition tariff approval in a manner reasonably tied to statutory objectives. In that case, the Commission had extracted from pipeline owners, in exchange for approval of a tentative tariff schedule, the owners’ promise to refund whatever portion of the tentative rates the Commission subsequently found to be unreasonable. Claiming this action was unauthorized under the ICA, the pipeline owners argued that the Commission was required to choose between either suspending the proposed tariffs for an investigation into their reasonableness or approving the tariffs subject to prospective modification at some future date. Even though we agreed that the Commission lacks explicit authority to order refunds on tariffs that have gone into effect, we declined to interpret the ICA as placing the Commission in the dilemma posited by the pipeline owners. Suspension would have delayed the opening of the Alaska pipeline, whereas unconditional approval of the proposed rates might have unjustly enriched the pipeline owners. Since both alternatives were inconsistent with the policies underlying the ICA, we concluded that the Commission was justified in transcending its explicit remedial authorities and conditioning the approval of the Alaska-pipeline tariffs on a commitment to refund unreasonably high rates.
The remedial authority at issue in this case consists of another effort by the Commission to place a condition on the approval of a proposed tariff. In effect, the Commission has informed all motor carriers submitting proposed tariff increases that the Commission will approve those increases subject to the condition that the carriers may be called upon to disgorge the increases if the Commission later discovers that the tariffs were submitted in substantial violation of a rate-bureau agreement. This retroactive rejection of tariffs is akin to the remedial authorities that Congress expressly delegated the Commission. A primary responsibility of the Commission is to supervise and approve tariffs submitted under the ICA. Under 49 U. S. C. § 10762(e), the Commission is expressly empowered to reject tariffs prior to their effective date. The Commission’s proposal to reject effective tariffs submitted in substantial violation of rate-bureau agreements simply extends the Commission’s express rejection authority so that the Commission may adequately supervise motor-carrier rate-bureau agreements. The question presented by this case is whether fashioning this remedy falls within the Commission’s authority to modify express remedies in order to achieve legitimate statutory purposes. To lie within the Commission’s discretionary power, the proposed remedy must satisfy two criteria: first, the power must further a specific statutory mandate of the Commission, and second, the exercise of power must be directly and closely tied to that mandate.
The Motor Carrier Act of 1980 presents a statutory basis for the Commission to approve motor-carrier tariffs on the condition that the Commission may later nullify increases found to have been submitted in substantial violation of rate-bureau agreements. The legislative history of the Act is clear that, beyond the bounds of immunity granted in § 10706(b)(3), Congress wanted the forces of competition to determine motor-carrier tariffs. The function of the Commission’s proposed remedy is to ensure that motor carriers collude only as permitted by the MCA guidelines. The conditional approval of motor-carrier tariffs with concomitant threat of overcharge liability provides strong incentives for motor carriers to abide by the terms of their rate-bureau agreements. Since § 10706(b)(3) prescribes the guidelines for rate-bureau agreements, this remedy encourages motor carriers to limit their collective activities to the areas that Congress described in the statutory guidelines.
There can be little doubt that Congress intended for the Commission to play a key role in holding carriers to the § 10706(b)(3) guidelines. Section 10706(b)(3), like the Reed-Bulwinkle Act before it, grants motor carriers immunity from the antitrust laws. To some degree, § 10706(b)(3) is self-enforcing,, because bureau members will strive to stay within its guidelines in order to avoid the antitrust liability that transgressions could precipitate. However, the procedures governing the administration of § 10706(b)(3) demonstrate that Congress envisioned that the Commission — and not the threat of antitrust liability — would be the primary enforcer of the guidelines. It is, after all, the Commission that decides which bureau agreements conform to the dictates of § 10706(b)(3). 49 U. S. C. § 10706(b)(2). It is the Commission that is empowered to terminate or suspend rate-bureau agreements. §§ 10706(f), (h). And, it is the Commission that may impose conditions on rate-bureau agreements in order to further National Transportation Policy. § 10706(b)(2).
More difficult to answer is the question whether the Commission’s conditional approval of motor-carrier tariffs is a means of policing rate-bureau agreements sufficiently direct and close to the Commission’s statutory mandate to warrant approval. The Commission offers two imbricated justifications for its new remedy. First, the Commission argues that, without the potential for overcharge damages awards, shippers will not have sufficient incentive to report rate-bureau violations to the Commission or to file antitrust suits on their own. Second, the Commission claims that it must have the power to approve bureau tariffs conditionally because the other remedial tools at its disposal are inadequate to enforce compliance with bureau agreements. In the Commission’s view, the threshold remedies of peremptory rejection of proposed rates and of suspension of rates pending investigation are inadequate to cope with substantial violations, which are typically shrouded in secrecy and undetectable on the face of a tariff proposal. If a substantial bureau violation comes to light once a tariff is in effect, the Commission’s only statutory remedy is to declare the tariff in violation of the ICA and to prescribe a new rate for the future. Admittedly, such a declaration and prescription will render the offending carriers liable for damages actions brought by injured shippers, but the size of the damages awards would, in the Commission’s opinion, provide insufficient incentive to keep carriers faithful to their bureau agreements. Similarly, the Commission maintains that its penalty authority is too weak to guarantee compliance with bureau agreements.
But the very potency of overcharge is what makes the nullification of motor-carrier tariffs a troubling exercise of Commission authority. For a motor carrier, overcharge liability may be ruinous. Overcharge awards can easily surpass the damages for which carriers have historically been liable under § 11705(b)(3), and may even exceed the treble damages to which the carriers are vulnerable under the antitrust laws. Indeed, the effect of the Commission’s proposed new remedy is to convert the ICC into the Federal Government’s most potent enforcer of the antitrust laws, albeit for the limited purpose of ensuring compliance with the guidelines of § 10706(b)(3).
Nevertheless, we agree with the Commission that its new remedy is a justifiable adjunct to its express statutory mandate. The nullification of effective tariffs submitted in violation of rate-bureau agreements is directly aimed at ensuring that motor carriers comply with the guidelines established by Congress in the MCA. Consistent with congressional intent, the remedy stimulates competitive pricing beyond the bounds of the motor-carrier immunity granted in § 10706(b)(3). Moreover, the structure of the MCA and its legislative history establish that Congress expected that the Commission would play a key role in holding carriers to the § 10706(b)(3) guidelines, and it is within the Commission’s discretion to decide that the only feasible way to fulfill its mandate is to condition approval of motor-carrier tariffs on compliance with approved rate-bureau agreements.
Our concern over the harshness of this new remedial authority is lessened by the significant steps the Commission has taken to ensure that the penalty will not be imposed unfairly. Under the Commission’s proposed scheme, effective tariffs will be nullified only upon findings of substantial violations of rate-bureau agreements. The guidelines for antitrust immunity set out in § 10706(b)(3) are of such a nature that carriers who submit tariffs in substantial violation of agreements will be aware of their transgressions. So concerns that the new remedy will be used to penalize carriers that inadvertently transgress rate-bureau agreements are largely unfounded. Moreover, the risk that the Commission will err in finding substantial violations is lessened by the procedural safeguards of full hearings and judicial review that are built into the Commission’s proposal. Finally, the Commission has reserved the discretion to withhold the sanction of retroactive rejection, should the circumstances of a violation counsel lenity.
h — I I — I
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Commission does not exceed its authority by nullifying effective motor-carrier tariffs submitted in substantial violation of rate-bureau agreements. Accordingly, the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
The guidelines set disclosure requirements for rate agreements, sunshine rules for bureau meetings, and limitations on the issues that bureau members may discuss. 49 U. S. C. §§ 10706(b)(3)(A), (B). The most significant deregulatory aspect of the guidelines is a ban on discussions of tariffs applicable solely to individual carriers. § 10706(b)(3)(D). The scope of collective ratemaking permitted under the MCA is summarized in H. R. Rep. No. 96-1069, pp. 29-30 (1980).
The Commission explicated its proposed remedy in orders issued on January 28,1981, and April 27,1981. See Record 375, 381; Motor Carrier Rate Bureaus — Implementation of P. L. 96-296, 364 I. C. C. 921, 927.
Respondents contest this point. In an argument repudiated by the Eleventh Circuit, American Trucking Assn., Inc. v. United States, 688 F. 2d 1337, 1353 (1982), respondents contend that under § 10762(e) the Commission is empowered to reject a tariff only when the application therefor contains a formal, as opposed to a substantive, defect. We decline to read § 10762(e) so narrowly. As the District of Columbia Circuit noted in a similar context: “[Rejection] is not limited to defects of form. It may be used by an agency where the filing is so patently a nullity as a matter of substantive law, that administrative efficiency and justice are furthered by obviating any docket at the threshold rather than opening a futile docket.” Municipal Light Boards v. FPC, 146 U. S. App. D. C. 294, 299, 450 F. 2d 1341, 1346 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U. S. 989 (1972); see also Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 676 F. 2d 1374, 1377 (CA11 1982) (amended opinion); cf. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp., 350 U. S. 332, 347 (1956).
Respondents also argue that, even if § 10762(e) extends to substantive defects, it should not apply to violations of rate-bureau agreements because the ICC’s sole remedy for such violations is termination of agreement approval under 49 U. S. C. § 10706(f). While the ICC has the option to terminate agreement approval under § 10706(f), see supra this page, Congress has expressly provided that powers enumerated in the Interstate Commerce Act do not preclude the Commission from taking other actions consistent with its statutory duties. § 10321(a). Since the Commission has a statutory duty to supervise rate-bureau agreements, see supra, at 356-357, we agree with the Eleventh Circuit that it is a perfectly reasonable exercise of administrative authority for the Commission to refuse to accept proposed tariffs submitted in violation of rate-bureau agreements. 688 F. 2d, at 1352-1353; cf. Board of Trade v. ICC, 646 F. 2d 1187, 1193 (CA7 1981) (Commission is obliged to reject such tariffs).
Prior to 1979, the Commission had no need to reject effective tariffs, because the Commission’s staff examined every filing prior to the effective date of the proposed tariff and, if an obvious defect was discovered, the tariff was rejected immediately. In 1979, however, budgetary cutbacks forced the Commission to abandon its comprehensive examination program. Since then, the Commission has reviewed only a random sampling of tariff filings, and tariffs with obvious defects inevitably are permitted to go into effect. See Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, supra, at 1376-1377.
The difference can be significant for carriers. In suits under 49 U. S. C. § 11705(b)(3), damages awards are limited to the extent to which an unlawful tariff was unreasonable or discriminatory. See Spencer Plant Foods, Inc. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 302 I. C. C. 799, 800 (1958); Boren-Stewart Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 196 I. C. C. 120, 125-126 (1933). Accordingly, if a motor carrier submits a large tariff increase in violation of its rate-bureau agreement, but the increase is neither unreasonable nor discriminatory, application of the Commission’s proposed remedy will expose the carrier to liabilities greatly in excess of the damages available under § 11705(b)(3).
Section 10762(e)’s placement within the ICA lends credence to the view that rejection is a summary power to be used at the outset of the rate-filing process. Section 10762(e) appears in a section regulating the manner in which new tariffs are to be filed with the Commission prior to their effective date. By authorizing the Commission to “reject a tariff ... if that tariff violates this section,” § 10762(e) seems focused on the Commission’s authority to turn away a tariff submission at the time of filing.
Previous decisions of this Court coupled with past rulings of the Commission east further doubt on the proposition that § 10762(e) authorizes the Commission to nullify any effective tariff containing either substantive or formal defects. In Berwind-White Coal Mining Co. v. Chicago & Erie R. Co., 235 U. S. 371 (1914), and again in Davis v. Portland Seed Co., 264 U. S. 403 (1924), we stressed the importance of common carriers’ being able to rely on effective tariffs on file with the Commission. As the Commission itself once recognized, these cases “strongly sugges[t] that recovery for a tariff’s failure to comply with a formal requirement may be limited to the amount of damage suffered by the shipper.” Brief for Federal Respondents in Opposition in Nitrochem, Inc. v. ICC, O. T. 1981, No. 81-1205, p. 6. Reading § 10762(e) to authorize retroactive rejection of effective tariffs would significantly undermine the repose that carriers have traditionally been permitted to enjoy once their tariffs have been accepted by the Commission.
Indeed, until the recent past, the Commission generally shared the view that, though a tariff might have been submitted in a technically deficient manner, the tariff was not a nullity and a shipper’s recovery was limited to actual damages. See Boren-Stewart Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 196 I. C. C. 120 (1933); see also Acme Peat Products, Ltd. v. Akron, C. & Y. R. Co., 2771. C. C. 641, 644 (1950) (“Where tariffs are tendered to and accepted by the Commission, the rates therein become applicable, even though technically they should have been rejected upon tender”). The few instances in which the Commission has nullified effective tariffs have involved cases of tariffs mistakenly filed with the Commission by carriers outside the Commission’s jurisdiction. See Acme Fast Freight, Inc., et al., Common Carrier Application, 17 M. C. C. 549(1939), sustained, 30 F. Supp. 968 (SDNY), aff’d, 309 U. S. 638 (1940) (per curiam); Mercer Valley R. Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 69 I. C. C. 233 (1922). Only in 1978 did the Commission propose to nullify an effective tariff of a carrier within the Commission’s jurisdiction. National Assn, of Specialized Carriers, Inc., Agent-Show Cause and Strike Order, I. C. C. Order No. 36870 (Apr. 11, 1978). While an agency is free to change its mind about the meaning of an enabling Act, that the Commission has so long adhered to a narrow view of its rejection authority has some probative value for our decision today.
See H. R. Rep. No. 96-1069, pp. 27-28 (1980); 126 Cong. Rec. 7777 (1980) (statement of Sen. Cannon).
As respondents stress, Congress passed § 10706(b)(3) partially to restrain the Commission from exercising too much discretion in dictating the terms of rate-bureau agreements. See supra, at 356-357. However, the limitations on the Commission’s power embodied in the MCA are all directed at the Commission’s substantive authority to set the criteria for acceptable rate-bureau agreements. No provision of the Act limits the Commission’s remedial authority to deal with motor carriers that operate in clear violation of approved agreements. To the contrary, the House Report on the MCA expressly states that the legislation will not diminish the Commission’s enforcement authority. See H. R. Rep. No. 96-1069, supra, at 40.
See n. 5, supra.
In another field, the inadequacy of an agency’s express statutory authority might be seen as evidence that Congress intended for the agency not to possess more adequate powers. However, this inference cannot be drawn in this area because 49 U. S. C. § 10321(a) provides: “Enumeration of a power of the Commission in this subtitle does not exclude another power the Commission may have in carrying out this subtitle.”
Under some circumstances, overcharge liability might exceed the maximum penalty for criminal violations of the antitrust laws, which is $1 million. See 15 U. S. C. § 1 et seq.
Although it is difficult to know how the Commission will exercise this discretion, in the only analogous case to date, which happened to involve a railroad rate bureau, the Commission decided that the circumstances of the rate-bureau agreement violation did not warrant rejection. See Transit on Wheat Between Reshipping Point and Destination, 365 I. C. C. 890 (1982).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Chief Justice Warren
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether certain pricing activities of respondent, Anheuser-Busch, Inc., constituted price discrimination within the meaning of § 2 (a) of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U. S. C. § 13 (a).
Section 2 (a) provides in pertinent part:
“That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United States or any Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United States, and where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them....”
This controversy had its genesis in a complaint issued by the Federal Trade Commission in 1955, which charged respondent, a beer producer, with a violation of § 2 (a). The complaint alleged that respondent had “discriminated in price between different purchasers of its beer of like grade and quality by selling it to some of its customers at higher prices than to other [s]”; that, more specifically, respondent had lowered prices in the St. Louis, Missouri, market, without making similar price reductions in other markets; that this discrimination had already diverted substantial business from respondent’s St. Louis competitors; that it was “sufficient” to have the same impact in the future; that there was a “reasonable probability” it would substantially lessen competition in respondent’s line of commerce; and that it might also tend to create a monopoly or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with respondent. Thus the complaint described a pricing pattern which had adverse effects only upon sellers’ competition, commonly termed primary-line competition, and not upon buyers’ competition, commonly termed secondary-line competition.
Both the hearing examiner and, on appeal, the Commission held that the evidence introduced at the hearing established a violation of §2 (a). The Commission found the facts to be as follows:
Respondent, a leading national brewer, sells a so-called premium beer, which is priced higher than the beers of regional and local breweries in the great majority of markets, although both the price of respondent’s beer and the premium differential vary from market to market and from time to time. During the period relevant to this case, respondent had three principal competitors in the St. Louis area, all regional breweries: Falstaff Brewing Corporation, Griesedieck Western Brewing Company, and Griesedieck Brothers Brewery Company. In accord with the generally prevailing price structure, these breweries normally sold their products at a price substantially lower than respondent’s.
In 1953, most of the national breweries, including respondent, granted their employees a wage increase, and on October 1, 1953, they put into effect a general price increase. Although many regional and local breweries throughout the country followed suit by raising their prices, Faistaff, Griesedieck Western, and Griesedieck Brothers maintained their pre-October price of $2.35 per standard case. Although respondent’s sales in the St. Louis area did not decline, its national sales fell, along with industry sales in general.
On January 4, 1954, respondent lowered its price in the St. Louis market from $2.93 to $2.68 per case, thereby reducing the previous 580 differential to 330. A second price cut occurred on June 21, 1954, this time to $2.35, the same price charged by respondent’s three competitors. On January 3, 1954, the day before the first price cut, respondent’s price in the St. Louis market had been lower than its price in other markets, and during the period of the price reductions in the St. Louis area, respondent made no similar price reductions in any other market. In March, 1955, respondent increased its St. Louis price 45$ per case, and Falstaff, Griesedieck Western, and Griese-dieck Brothers almost immediately raised their prices 150, which re-established a substantial differential. This ended the period of alleged price discrimination.
The Commission concluded:
“As a result of maintaining higher prices to all purchasers outside of the St. Louis area and charging the lower prices, as reduced in 1954, to only those customers in the St. Louis area, respondent discriminated in price as between purchasers differently located.”
Since, as will appear, it is this aspect of the decision which concerns us, it is necessary only to sketch summarily the remaining elements in the Commission’s decision. The Commission’s finding of competitive injury was predicated to a substantial degree upon what it regarded as a demonstrated diversion of business to respondent from its St. Louis competitors during the period of price discrimination. For example, by comparing that period with a similar period during the previous year, the Commission determined that respondent’s sales had risen 201.5%, Falstaff’s sales had dropped slightly, Griesedieck Western’s sales had fallen about 33%, and Griesedieck Brothers’ sales had plummeted about 41%. In tabular form, the relative market positions of the St. Louis sellers were as follows:
Dec. SI June 30 Mar. 1 July 31 1953 1954 1955 1955
Respondent. 12.5 16.55 39.3 21.03
Griesedieck Brothers. 14.4 12.58 4.8 7.36
Falstaff. 29.4 32.05 29.1 36.62
Griesedieck Western. 38.9 33. 23.1 27.78
All others. 4.8 5.82 3.94 7.21
The Commission rejected respondent’s contention that its price reductions had been made in good faith to meet the equally low price of a competitor within the meaning of the proviso to § 2 (b) of the Act, 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U. S. C. § 13 (b), and also found respondent’s attack upon the examiner’s cease-and-desist order to be meritless. The Commission thereupon adopted and issued that order, with only slight modification.
On review, the Court of Appeals set aside the order. 265 F. 2d 677. We granted certiorari, 361 U. S. 880, because a conflict had developed among the Courts of Appeals on a question of importance in the administration of the statute. See Atlas Building Products Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F. 2d 950 (C. A. 10th Cir.).
The limited nature of our inquiry can be fully appreciated only in the light of the correspondingly narrow decision of the Court of Appeals, which rested entirely upon the holding that the threshold statutory element of price discrimination had not been established. Thus the Court of Appeals did not consider whether the record supported a finding of the requisite competitive injury, whether respondent’s good faith defense was valid, or whether the Commission’s order was unduly broad. We have concluded that the Court of Appeals erred in its construction of § 2 (a) and that the evidence fully warranted the Commission’s finding of price discrimination. Respondent would have us affirm nonetheless on any of the alternative grounds it strongly urged below. While this is, to be sure, an appropriate course of action under proper circumstances, we believe that it would be unwise for us to grapple with these intricate problems, the solution to which requires a careful examination of a voluminous record, before they have been dealt with by the Court of Appeals. Therefore, the case will be remanded, and of course nothing in this opinion should be interpreted as intimating a view upon the remaining aspects of the controversy.
A discussion of the import of the § 2 (a) phrase “discriminate in price,” in the context of this case, must begin with a consideration of the purpose of the statute with respect to primary-line competition. The Court of Appeals expressed some doubt that § 2 (a) was designed to protect this competition at all, but respondent has not undertaken to defend that position here. This is entirely understandable. While “precision of expression is not an outstanding characteristic of the Robinson-Patman Act,” Automatic Canteen Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 346 U. S. 61, 65, it is certain at least that § 2 (a) is violated where there is a price discrimination which deals the requisite injury to primary-line competition, even though secondary-line and tertiary-line competition are unaffected. The statute could hardly be read any other way, for it forbids price discriminations “where the effect... may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them.” (Emphasis added.)
The legislative history of § 2 (a) is equally plain. The section, when originally enacted as part of the Clayton Act in 1914, was born of a desire by Congress to curb the use by financially powerful corporations of localized price-cutting tactics which had gravely impaired the competitive position of other sellers. It is, of course, quite true — and too well known to require extensive exposition — that the 1936 Robinson-Patman amendments to the Clayton Act were motivated principally by congressional concern over the impact upon secondary-line competition of the burgeoning of mammoth purchasers, notably chain stores. However, the legislative history of these amendments leaves no doubt that Congress was intent upon strengthening the Clayton Act provisions, not weakening them, and that it was no part of Congress' purpose to curtail the pre-existing applicability of § 2 (a) to price discriminations affecting primary-line competition.
The federal courts, both before and after the amendment of § 2 (a), have taken this view of the scope of the statute in cases involving impairment of primary-line competition. See Porto Rican American Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 30 F. 2d 234 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1929); E. B. Muller & Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 142 F. 2d 511 (C. A. 6th Cir. 1944); Maryland Baking Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 243 F. 2d 716 (C. A. 4th Cir. 1957); Atlas Building Products Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., supra (1959). In fact, the original focus of § 2 (a) on sellers’ competition was so evident that this Court was compelled to hold explicitly, contrary to lower court decisions, that the statute was not restricted to price discrim-inations impeding primary-line competition, but protected secondary-line competition as well. Van Camp & Sons v. American Can Co., 278 U. S. 245 (1929). And more recently, in Moore v. Mead’s Fine Bread Co., 348 U. S. 115 (1954), the Court sustained a treble damage judgment in favor of a competing seller which was based partly upon a violation of § 2 (a).
Thus neither the language of § 2 (a), its legislative history, nor its judicial application countenances a construction of the statute which draws strength from even a lingering doubt as to its purpose of protecting primary-line competition. But the rationale of the Court of Appeals appears to have been shaped by precisely this type of doubt. The view of the Court of Appeals was that, before there can be a price discrimination within the meaning of § 2 (a), “[t]here must be some relationship between the different purchasers which entitles them to comparable treatment.” 265 F. 2d, at 681. Such a relationship would exist, the court reasoned, if different prices were being charged to competing purchasers. But the court observed that in this case all competing purchasers paid respondent the same price, so far as the record disclosed. Consequently, the court concluded that, even assuming the price cuts “were directed at [Anheuser-Busch’s] local competitors, they were not discriminatory.” Ibid.
This qualification upon the applicability of § 2 (a) to primary-line-competition cases is in no way adumbrated by the prevailing line of relevant decisions. In Mead’s Fine Bread Co., supra, in Maryland Baking Co., supra, and in Porto Rican American Tobacco Co., supra, violations of § 2 (a) were predicated upon injury to primary-line competition without reliance upon the presence or absence of competition among purchasers as a relevant factor. And in Muller & Co., supra, while there was evidence that the purchasers in question were competing, the court explicitly rejected the notion that this was a necessary element of a violation in a primary-line case. 142 F. 2d, at 518. But cf. Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 231 F. 2d 356.
More important, however, is the incompatibility of the Circuit Court’s rule with the purpose of § 2 (a). The existence of competition among buyers who are charged different prices by a seller is obviously important in terms of adverse effect upon secondary-line competition, but it would be merely a fortuitous circumstance so far as injury to primary-line competition is concerned. Since, as we have indicated, an independent and important goal of § 2 (a) is to extend protection to competitors of the discriminating seller, the limitation of that protection by the alien factor of competition among purchasers would constitute a debilitating graft upon the statute.
Although respondent’s starting point is the same as that of the Court of Appeals — that a price discrimination is not synonymous with a price difference — its test of price discrimination is somewhat broader. Respondent concedes that a competitive relationship among purchasers is not a prerequisite of price discrimination, but maintains that at least there must be “proof that the lower price is below cost or unreasonably low for the purpose or design to eliminate competition and thereby obtain a monopoly.” Since such a finding is lacking here, respondent argues that it cannot be said that there was price discrimination.
Respondent asserts that its view is supported by legislative history, court decisions, and reason. Respondent relies heavily, as did the Court of Appeals, upon a statement made during Congress’ consideration of the Robinson-Patman legislation by Representative Utterback, a manager of the conference bill which became §2 (a). In this rather widely quoted exegesis of the section, Representative Utterback declared that “a discrimination is more than a mere difference,” and exists only when there is “some relationship... between the parties to the discrimination which entitles them to equal treatment.” Such a relationship would prevail among competing purchasers, according to the Congressman, and also “where... the price to one is so low as to involve a sacrifice of some part of the seller’s necessary costs and profit,” so that “it leaves that deficit inevitably to be made up in higher prices to his other customers.” 80 Cong. Rec. 9416. Respondent also cites expressions in the legislative history of the Clayton Act which reflect Congress’ concern over classic examples of predatory business practices. See H. R. Rep. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 8; S. Rep. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-4. Moreover, respondent maintains that the principle it advances has found expression in the decisions of the federal courts in primary-line-competition cases, which consistently emphasize the unreasonably low prices and the predatory intent of the defendants. Respondent also urges that its view is grounded upon the statutory scheme of § 2 (a), which penalizes sellers only if an anticompetitive effect stems from a discriminatory pricing pattern, not if it results merely from a low price. Thus, the argument goes, unless there is proof that high prices in one area have subsidized low prices in another, the price differential does not fall within the compass of the section. In such a case, it is contended, § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1528, 15 U. S. C. § 13a, may be applicable, but not § 2 (a). Finally, respondent argues that, unless its position is accepted, the law will impose rigid price uniformity upon the business world, contrary to sound economics and the policy of the antitrust laws.
The trouble with respondent’s arguments is not that they are necessarily irrelevant in a § 2 (a) proceeding, but that they are misdirected when the issue under consideration is solely whether there has been a price discrimination. We are convinced that, whatever may be said with respect to the rest of §§ 2 (a) and 2 (b) — and we say nothing here — there are no overtones of business buccaneering in the § 2 (a) phrase “discriminate in price.” Rather, a price discrimination within the meaning of that provision is merely a price difference.
When this Court has spoken of price discrimination in § 2 (a) cases, it has generally assumed that the term was synonymous with price differentiation. In Federal Trade Comm’n v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683, 721, the Court referred to “discrimination in price” as “selling the same kind of goods cheaper to one purchaser than to another.” And in Federal Trade Comm’n v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U. S. 37, 45, the Court said, “Congress meant by using the words 'discrimination in price’ in § 2 that in a case involving competitive injury between a seller’s customers the Commission need only prove that a seller had charged one purchaser a higher price for like goods than he had charged one or more of the purchaser’s competitors.” The commentators have generally shared this view.
These assumptions, we now conclude, were firmly rooted in the structure of the statute, for it is only by equating price discrimination with price differentiation that § 2 (a) can be administered as Congress intended. As we read that provision, it proscribes price differences, subject to certain defined defenses, where the effect of the differences “may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit” of the price differential, “or with customers of either of them.” See Federal Trade Comm’n v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U. S. 37, 45-47. In other words, the statute itself spells out the conditions which make a price difference illegal or legal, and we would derange this integrated statutory scheme were we to read other conditions into the law by means of the nondirective phrase, “discriminate in price.” Not only would such action be contrary to what we conceive to be the meaning of the statute, but, perhaps because of this, it would be thoroughly undesirable. As one commentator has succinctly put it, “Inevitably every legal controversy over any price difference would shift from the detailed governing provisions— 'injury/ cost justification,'meeting competition/ etc.— over into the 'discrimination’ concept for ad hoc resolution divorced from specifically pertinent statutory text.” Rowe, Price Differentials and Product Differentiation: The Issues Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 66 Yale L. J. 1, 38.
In the face of these considerations, we do not find respondent’s arguments persuasive. The fact that activity which falls within the civil proscription of § 2 (a) may also be criminal under § 3 is entirely irrelevant. The partial overlap between these sections, which was to a significant extent the by-product of the tortuous path of the Robinson-Patman bills through Congress/ has been widely recognized.. " [T]his section [§ 3] does not restrict the operation of the prohibitions, with civil sanctions, of the Robinson-Patman amendments to § 2 (a) of the Clayton Act.” Corn Products Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 324 U. S. 726, 734.
The other materials adduced by respondent do no more than indicate that the factors in question — predatory intent and unreasonably low local price cuts — may possibly be relevant to other matters which may be put in issue in a § 2 (a) proceeding. For example, it might be argued that the existence of predatory intent bears upon the likelihood of injury to competition, and that a price reduction below cost tends to establish such an intent. Practically all of the legislative materials and court decisions relied upon by respondent are explicable on this basis, since hardly any of them are concerned specifically with the meaning of price discrimination. Moreover, many of the legislative expressions cited by respondent may merely be descriptive of the prototype of the evil with which Congress dealt in § 2 (a), rather than delinea-tive of the outer reach of that section. A possible exception is the statement of Representative Utterback. But the primary function of statutory construction is to effectuate the intent of Congress, and that function cannot properly be discharged by reliance upon a statement of a single Congressman, in the face of the weighty countervailing considerations which are present in this case.
Nothing that we have said, of course, should be construed to be the expression of any view concerning the relevance of the factors stressed by respondent to statutory standards other than price discrimination. We wish merely to point out, on the one hand, why respondent’s arguments in our view are not pertinent to the issue at bar, and, on the other, that we are not foreclosing respondent from urging in the Court of Appeals that such arguments are material to issues not now before us.
What we have said makes it quite evident, we believe, that our decision does not raise the specter of a flat prohibition of price differentials, inasmuch as price differences constitute but one element of a § 2 (a) violation. In fact, as we have indicated, respondent has vigorously contested this very case on the entirely separate grounds of insufficient injury to competition and good faith lowering of price to meet competition. Nor is it relevant that the Commission did not proceed upon the basis of the respondent’s price differentials which existed prior to the period in question in this case. This choice is committed to the discretion of the Commission; and it may well be that the Commission did not believe the remaining statutory elements could be established with respect to other differentials. Our interest is solely with this case, and at this stage of the litigation that interest is confined exclusively to identifying and keeping distinct the various statutory standards which are part of the § 2 (a) complex.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed.
Anheuser-Busch ranked second nationally in gross sales in 1952 and 1955, and first in 1953 and 1954.
It appears that Griesedieck Western sold out to Carling Brewing Company in October, 1954.
Respondent maintains — and petitioner agrees — that the evidence establishes that it did not raise its prices in Missouri or Wisconsin. In view of our disposition of the case, this is immaterial to the issue presented on this review.
Possibly we should note that most of the facts in this particular paragraph are taken from the initial decision. Although the Commission adopted “the findings, conclusions, and order, as modified, contained in the initial decision,” there is some disagreement as to how encompassing this incorporation order was. See note 10, infra. Since that dispute concerns matters not relevant to our decision, and since the facts set forth above are merely background and appear to be unquestioned, we find it unnecessary to resolve the disagreement.
The following table discloses the degree of this price spread:
St. Louis, Mo. $2.93
Chicago, Ill. 3.44
Cincinnati, Ohio. 3.75
Houston, Tex. 3.70
Bronx, N. Y. 3.68
Kearney, Nebr. 3.68
St. Joseph, Mo. 3.17
Buffalo, N. Y. 3.60
Baltimore, Md. 3.62
Washington, D. C. $3.65
Detroit, Mich. 3.55
Boston, Mass. 3.69
Kansas City, Mo. 3.15
St. Paul, Minn. 3.53
Sioux Falls, S. Dak. 3.50
Denver, Colo.
San Francisco, Calif. 3.79
Los Angeles, Calif. 3.80
“It Is Ordered that the respondent, Anheuser-Busch, Inc., a corporation, and its officers, representatives, agents and employees, directly or through any corporate or other device, in the sale of beer of like grade and quality, do forthwith cease and desist from discriminating, directly or indirectly, in price, between different purchasers engaged in the same line of commerce, where either, or any, of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, as ‘commerce’ is defined in the Clayton Act, by a price reduction in any market where respondent is in competition with any other seller, unless it proportionally reduces its prices everywhere for the same quantity of beer.”
“Section 2 of the bill... is expressly designed with the view of correcting and forbidding a common and widespread unfair trade practice whereby certain great corporations and also certain smaller concerns which seek to secure a monopoly in trade and commerce by aping the methods of the great corporations, have heretofore endeavored to destroy competition and render unprofitable the business of competitors by selling their goods, wares, and merchandise at a less price in the particular communities where their rivals are engaged in business than at other places throughout the country.... In the past it has been a most common practice of great and powerful combinations engaged in commerce — notably the Standard Oil Co., and the American Tobacco Co., and others of less notoriety, but of great influence — to lower prices of their commodities, oftentimes below the cost of production in certain communities and sections where they had competition, with the intent to destroy and make unprofitable the business of their competitors, and with the ultimate purpose in view of thereby acquiring a monopoly in the particular locality or section in which the discriminating price is made....” H. R. Rep. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 8. See also S. Rep. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-4.
See H. R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.; S. Rep. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.; F. T. C., Final Report on the Chain-Store Investigation, S. Doe. No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.; Federal Trade Comm’n v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U. S. 37, 43; Report of the Attorney General’s National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws, 155-156; Austin, Price Discrimination and Related Problems under the Robinson-Patman Act (2d rev. ed., 1959), 8-11; Palamountain, The Politics of Distribution, 188-234; Rowe, The Evolution of the Robinson-Patman Act: A Twenty-Year Perspective, 57 Col. L. Rev. 1059.
See sources cited in note 7, supra.
See Mennen Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 288 F. 774; National Biscuit Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 299 F. 733.
There is a dispute as to whether the Commission adopted a finding by the examiner which related to the purpose of the price reductions. Since we conclude that the issue of predatory intent is irrelevant to the question before us, it is unnecessary for us to resolve this dispute.
Respondent maintains that the opinion of the Court of Appeals may and should be read to encompass respondent's views. It is true that there are certain passages in the opinion which lend some support to respondent’s interpretation. In view of our disposition of the case, it is unnecessary for us either to accept or reject that construction.
The statement in full is as follows:
“In its meaning as simple English, a discrimination is more than a mere difference. Underlying the meaning of the word is the idea that some relationship exists between the parties to the discrimination which entitles them to equal treatment, whereby the difference granted to one casts some burden or disadvantage upon the other. If the two are competing in the resale of the goods concerned, that relationship exists. Where, also, the price to one is so low as to involve a sacrifice of some part of the seller’s necessary costs and profit as applied to that business, it leaves that deficit inevitably to be made up in higher prices to his other customers; and there, too, a relationship may exist upon which to base the charge of discrimination. But where no such relationship exists, where the goods are sold in different markets and the conditions affecting those markets set different price levels for them, the sale to different customers at those different prices would not constitute a discrimination within the meaning of this bill.”
See, e. g., Porto Rican American Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., supra; Atlas Building Products Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., supra; Maryland Baking Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, supra.
Section 3 provides:
“It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, to be a party to, or assist in, any transaction of sale, or contract to sell, which discriminates to his knowledge against competitors of the purchaser, in that, any discount, rebate, allowance, or advertising service charge is granted to the purchaser over and above any discount, rebate, allowance, or advertising service charge available at the time of such transaction to said competitors in respect of a sale of goods of like grade, quality, and quantity; to sell, or contract to sell, goods in any part of the United States at prices lower than those exacted by said person elsewhere in the United States for the purpose of destroying competition, or eliminating a competitor in such part of the United States; or, to sell, or contract to sell, goods at unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor.”
See also Federal Trade Comm'n v. Staley Co., 324 U. S. 746, 757; Samuel H. Moss, Inc., v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 148 F. 2d 378, 379, 155 F. 2d 1016. Compare Automatic Canteen Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, supra, at 70 n. 10, 71.
See Att’y Gen. Natl Comm. Antitrust Rep. 156; Austin, Price Discrimination and Related Problems Under the Robinson-Patman Act (2d rev. ed. 1959), 18-20; McAllister, Price Control by Law in the United States: A Survey, 4 Law and Contemp. Prob. 273, 291-293; Rowe, Price Differentials and Product Differentiation: The Issues Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 66 Yale L. J. 1, 36-38; Comment, 12 Stan. L. Rev. 460, 461. But see Zorn and Feldman, Business Under The New Price Laws, 75.
In addition to the statutory provisions regarding injury to competition, set out at p. 537, supra, there are other relevant portions of the statute, such as the seller’s § 2 (b) defense of “showing that his lower price... was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor....” And a proviso to § 2 (a) states:
“That nothing herein contained shall prevent differentials which make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or- quantities in which such commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered...
And still another proviso to § 2 (a) states:
“That nothing herein contained shall prevent price changes from time to time where in response to changing conditions affecting the market for or the marketability of the goods concerned, such as but not limited to actual or imminent deterioration of perishable goods, obsolescence of seasonal goods, distress sales under court process, or sales in good faith in discontinuance of business in the goods concerned.”
See also Austin, Price Discrimination and Related Problems Under the Robinson-Patman Act (2d rev. ed. 1959), 18-20; McAllister, Price Control by Law in the United States: A Survey, 4 Law and Contemp. Prob. 273, 291-293.
See Palamountain, The Politics of Distribution, 188-234; Rowe, The Evolution of the Robinson-Patman Act: A Twenty-Year Perspective, 57 Col. L. Rev. 1059.
“Subsection (h) of the Senate amendment... appears in the conference report as section 3 of the bill itself. It contains the operative and penal provisions of what was originally the Borah-Van Nuys bill (S. 4171). While they overlap in some respects, they are in no way inconsistent with the provisions of the Clayton Act amendment provided for in section 1. Section 3 authorizes nothing-which that amendment prohibits, and takes nothing from it. On the contrary, where only civil remedies and liabilities attach to violations of the amendment provided in section 1, section 3 sets up-special prohibitions as to the particular offenses therein described and attaches to them also the criminal penalties therein provided.” H. R. Rep. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 8. See also Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U. S. 373, 378; Austin, Price Discrimination and Related Problems Under the Robinson-Patman Act (2d rev. ed. 1959), 3-4; 108 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 116, 121; 45 Va. L. Rev. 1397, 1400; sources cited in note 19, supra.
Of course we do not depart from our holding in Federal Trade Comm’n v. Morton Salt, supra, at pp. 50-51, as to adequacy of proof of tendency to injure competition in cases involving discrimination between purchasers. The instant case, as we have pointed out, involves differences in prices among competing sellers.
See Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., supra, at 369; Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws, 165; Rowe, Price Discrimination, Competition, and Confusion: Another Look at Robinson-Patman, 60 Yale L. J. 929, 956; The "New” Federal Trade Commission and the Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws, 65 Yale L. J. 34, 74r-75; A Symposium on the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 N. W. U. L. Rev. 197, 215, 224. But cf. Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U. S. 373, 378; Federal Trade Comm’n v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U. S. 470, 484 (dissenting opinion).
Perhaps it is worth noting in this connection that the Senate and House committee reports appear to use
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Marshall
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The “filed rate doctrine” prohibits a federally regulated seller of natural gas from charging rates higher than those filed with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission pursuant to the Natural Gas Act, 52 Stat. 821, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 717 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. III). The question before us is whether that doctrine forbids a state court to calculate damages in a breach-of-contract action based on an assumption that had a higher rate been filed, the Commission would have approved it.
I
Respondents are producers of natural gas, and petitioner Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. (Arkla) is a customer who buys their gas. In 1952, respondents and Arkla entered into a contract under which respondents agreed to sell Arkla natural gas from the Sligo Gas Field in Louisiana. The contract contained a fixed price schedule and a “favored nations clause.” The favored nations clause provided that if Arkla purchased Sligo Field natural gas from another party at a rate higher than the one it was paying respondents, then respondents would be entitled to a higher price for their sales to Arkla. In 1954, respondents filed with the Federal Power Commission (now the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission) the contract and their rates and obtained from the Commission a certificate authorizing the sale of gas at the rates specified in the contract.
In September 1961, Arkla purchased certain leases in the Sligo Field from the United States and began producing gas on its leasehold. In 1974, respondents filed this state-court action contending that Arkla’s lease payments to the United States had triggered the favored nations clause. Because Arkla had not increased its payments to respondents as required by the clause, respondents sought as damages an amount equal to the difference between the price they actually were paid in the intervening years and the price they would have been paid had the favored nations clause gone into effect.
In its answer, Arkla denied that its lease payments were purchases of gas within the meaning of the favored nations clause. Arkla subsequently amended its answer to allege in addition that the Commission had primary jurisdiction over the issues in contention. Arkla also sought a Commission ruling that its lease payments had not triggered the favored nations clause. The Commission did not act immediately, and the case proceeded to trial. The state trial court found that Arkla’s payments had triggered the favored nations clause, but nonetheless held that the filed rate doctrine pre-eluded an award of damages for the period prior to 1972. The intermediate appellate court affirmed, 359 So. 2d 255 (1978), and both parties sought leave to appeal. The Supreme Court of Louisiana denied Arkla’s petition for appeal, 362 So. 2d 1120 (1978), and Arkla sought certiorari in this Court on the question whether the interpretation of the favored nations clause should have been referred to the Commission. We denied the petition. 444 U. S. 878 (1979).
While Arkla’s petition for certiorari was pending, the Supreme Court of Louisiana granted respondents’ petition for review and reversed the intermediate court on the measure of damages. 368 So. 2d 984 (1979). The court held that respondents were entitled to damages for the period between 1961 and 1972 notwithstanding the filed rate doctrine. The court reasoned that Arkla’s failure to inform respondents of the lease payments to the United States had prevented respondents from filing rate increases with the Commission, and that had respondents filed rate increases with the Commission, the rate increases would have been approved. Id., at 991. After the decision by the Supreme Court of Louisiana, the Commission in May 1979 finally declined to exercise primary jurisdiction over the case, holding that the interpretation of the favored nations clause raised no matters on which the Commission had particular expertise. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 7 FERC ¶ 61,175, p. 61,321. The Commission did, however, state: “It is our opinion that the Louisiana Supreme Court's award of damages for the 1961-1972 period violates the filed rate doctrine.” Id., at 61,325, n. 18. Under that doctrine, no regulated seller is legally entitled to collect a rate in excess of the one filed with the Commission for a particular period. See infra, at 576-579. We granted Arkla's subsequent petition for certiorari challenging the judgment of the Louisiana Supreme Court. 449 U. S. 1109 (1981).
II
Sections 4 (c) and 4 (d) of the Natural Gas Act, 52 Stat. 822-823, 15 U. S. C. §§ 717c (c) and 717c (d), require sellers of natural gas in interstate commerce to file their rates with the Commission. Under § 4 (a) of the Act, 52 Stat. 822, 15 U. S. C. § 717c (a), the rates that a regulated gas company-files with the Commission for sale and transportation of natural gas are lawful only if they are “just and reasonable.” No court may substitute its own judgment on reasonableness for the judgment of the Commission. The authority to decide whether the rates are reasonable is vested by § 4 of the Act solely in the Commission, see FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591, 611 (1944), and “the right to a reasonable rate is the right to the rate which the Commission files or fixes,” Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public Service Co., 341 U. S. 246, 251 (1951). Except when the Commission permits a waiver, no regulated seller of natural gas may collect a rate other than the one filed with the Commission. § 4 (d), 52 Stat. 823, 15 U. S. C. § 717c (d). These straightforward principles underlie the “filed rate doctrine,” which forbids a regulated entity to charge rates for its services other than those properly filed with the appropriate federal regulatory authority. See, e. g., T. I. M. E. Inc. v. United States, 359 U. S. 464, 473 (1959). The filed rate doctrine has its origins in this Court’s cases interpreting the Interstate Commerce Act, see, e. g., Lowden v. Simonds-Shields-Lonsdale Grain Co., 306 U. S. 516, 520-521 (1939); Pennsylvania R. Co. v. International Coal Co., 230 U. S. 184, 196-197 (1913), and has been extended across the spectrum of regulated utilities. “The considerations underlying the doctrine . . . are preservation of the agency’s primary jurisdiction over reasonableness of rates and the need to insure that regulated companies charge only those rates of which the agency has been made cognizant.” City of Cleveland v. FPC, 174 U. S. App. D. C. 1, 10, 525 F. 2d 845, 854 (1976). See City of Piqua v. FERC, 198 U. S. App. D. C. 8, 13, 610 F. 2d 950, 955 (1979).
Not only do the courts lack authority to impose a different rate than the one approved by the Commission, but the Commission itself has no power to alter a rate retroactively. When the Commission finds a rate unreasonable, it “shall determine the just and reasonable rate ... to be thereafter observed and in force.” § 5 (a), 52 Stat. 823, 15 U. S. C. § 717d (a) (emphasis added). See, e. g., FPC v. Tennessee Gas Co., 371 U. S. 145, 152-153 (1962); FPC v. Sierra Pacific Power Co., 350 U. S. 348, 353 (1956). This rule bars “the Commission’s retroactive substitution of an unreasonably high or low rate with a just and reasonable rate.” City of Piqua v. FERC, supra, at 12, 610 F. 2d, at 954.
In sum, the Act bars a regulated seller of natural gas from collecting a rate other than the one filed with the Commission and prevents the Commission itself from imposing a rate increase for gas already sold. Petitioner Arkla and the Commission as amicus curiae both argue that these rules taken in tandem are sufficient to dispose of this case. No matter how the ruling of the Louisiana Supreme Court may be characterized, they argue, it amounts to nothing less than the award of a retroactive rate increase based on speculation about what the Commission might have done had it been faced with the facts of this case. This, they contend, is precisely what the filed rate doctrine forbids. We agree. It would undermine the congressional scheme of uniform rate regulation to allow a state court to award as damages a rate never filed with the Commission and thus never found to be reasonable within the meaning of the Act. Following that course would permit state courts to grant regulated sellers greater relief than they could obtain from the Commission itself.
In asserting that the filed rate doctrine has no application here, respondents contend first that the state court has done no more than determine the damages they have suffered as a result of Arkla’s breach of the contract. No federal interests, they maintain, are affected by the state court’s action. But the Commission itself has found that permitting this damages award could have an “unsettling effect ... on other gas purchase transactions” and would have a “potential for disruption of natural gas markets . . . .” Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 13 FERC ¶ 61,100, p. 61,213 (1980).
Even were the Commission not on record in this case, the mere fact that respondents brought this suit under state law would not rescue it, for when Congress has established an exclusive form of regulation, “there can be no divided authority over interstate commerce.” Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Stroud, 267 U. S. 404, 408 (1925). Congress here has granted exclusive authority over rate regulation to the Commission. In so doing, Congress withheld the authority to grant retroactive rate increases or to permit collection of a rate other than the one on file. It would surely be inconsistent with this congressional purpose to permit a state court to do through a breach-of-contract action what the Commission itself may not do.
We rejected an analogous claim earlier this Term in Chicago & North Western Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U. S. 311 (1981). There, a shipper of goods by rail sought to assert a state common-law tort action for damages stemming from a regulated rail carrier’s decision to cease service on a rail line. We held unanimously that because the Interstate Commerce Commission had, in approving the cessation, ruled on all issues that the shipper sought to raise in the state-court suit, the common-law action was pre-empted. In reaching our conclusion, we explained that “[a] system under which each State could, through its courts, impose on railroad carriers its own version of reasonable service requirements could hardly be more at odds with the uniformity contemplated by Congress in enacting the Interstate Commerce Act.” Id., at 326. To hold otherwise, we said, would merely approve “an attempt by a disappointed shipper to gain from the Iowa courts the relief it was denied by the Commission.” Id., at 324.
In the case before us, the Louisiana Supreme Court’s award of damages to respondents was necessarily supported by an assumption that the higher rate respondents might have filed with the Commission was reasonable. Otherwise, there would have been no basis for that court’s conclusion, 368 So. 2d, at 991, that the Commission would have approved the rate. But under the filed rate doctrine, the Commission alone is empowered to make that judgment, and until it has done so, no rate other than the one on file may be charged. And far from approving the rate here in issue, the Commission has expressly declined to speculate on what its predecessor might have done. The court below, like the state court in Kalo Brick, has consequently usurped a function that Congress has assigned to a federal regulatory body. This the Supremacy Clause will not permit.
Respondents’ theory of the case would give inordinate importance to the role of contracts between buyers and sellers in the federal scheme for regulating the sale of natural gas. Of course, as we have held on more than one occasion, nothing in the Act forbids parties to set their rates by contract. E. g., Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U. S. 747, 820-822 (1968); United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp., 350 U. S. 332, 338-340 (1956). But those cases stand only for the proposition that the Commission itself lacks affirmative authority, absent extraordinary circumstances, to “abrogate existing contractual arrangements.” Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, supra, at 820. See United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp., supra, at 338-339. That rule does not affect the supremacy of the Act itself, and under the filed rate doctrine, when there is a conflict between the filed rate and the contract rate, the filed rate controls. See, e. g., Louisville :& Nashville R. Co. v. Maxwell, 237 U. S. 94, 97 (1915); Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Mugg, 202 U. S. 242, 245 (1906). “This rule is undeniably strict, and it obviously may work hardship in some cases, but it embodies the policy which has been adopted by Congress . . . .” Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Maxwell, supra, at 97. Moreover, to permit parties to vary by private agreement the rates filed with the Commission would undercut the clear purpose of the congressional scheme: granting the Commission an opportunity in every case to judge the reasonableness of the rate. Cf. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp., supra, at 338-339.
Respondents also appeal to what they say are equitable considerations. The filed rate doctrine and the Supremacy Clause, we are told, should not bar recovery when the defendant’s misconduct prevented filing of a higher rate. We do not find this argument compelling. The court below did not find that Arkla intentionally failed to inform respondents of its lease payments to the United States in an effort to defraud them. Consequently, we are not faced with affirmative misconduct, and we need not consider the application of the filed rate doctrine in such a case. The courts below found that Arkla has done no more than commit a simple breach of its contract. But when a court is called upon .to decide whether state and federal laws are in conflict, the fact that the state law has been violated does not affect the analysis. Every pre-emption case involves a conflict between a claim of right under federal law and a claim of right under state law. A finding that federal law provides a shield for the challenged conduct will almost always leave the state-law violation unredressed. Thus in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236 (1959), the mere fact that a group of unions violated state law through their peaceful picketing did not permit enforcement of that law when it would conflict with the federal regulatory scheme. That the state-court suit was one for damages rather than for the type of relief available from the National Labor Relations Board weighed against pre-emption, not in favor of it. “[S]ince remedies form an ingredient of any integrated scheme of regulation,” Justice Frankfurter wrote for the Court, “to allow the State to grant a remedy here which has been withheld from the National Labor Relations Board only accentuates the danger of conflict.” Id., at 247.
The same principle applies here. Permitting the state court to award what amounts to a retroactive right to collect a rate in excess of the filed rate “only accentuates the danger of conflict.” No appeal to equitable principles can justify this usurpation of federal authority.
Ill
We hold that the filed rate doctrine prohibits the award of damages for Arkla’s breach during the period that respondents were subject to Commission jurisdiction. In all respects other than those relating to damages, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Louisiana is affirmed. With respect to its calculation of damages, the judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Respondents include both original parties to the contract and successors in interest to parties to the contract.
The favored nations clause provided in relevant part:
“If at any time during the term of this agreement Buyer should purchase from another party seller gas produced from the subject wells or any other well or wells located in the Sligo Gas Field at a higher price than is provided to be paid for gas delivered under this agreement, then in such event the price to be paid for gas thereafter delivered hereunder shall be increased by an amount equal to the difference between the price provisions hereof and the concurrently effective higher price provisions of such subsequent contract.” App. 99.
On October 1, 1977, the relevant responsibilities of the Federal Power Commission were transferred to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. See 10 CFR § 1000.1 (d) (1980). The term “Commission” in this opinion refers to the Federal Power Commission when referring to action taken prior to that date and to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission when referring to action taken after that date.
The May 1979 order was actually the Commission’s second decision on primary jurisdiction. The Commission initially declined to exercise primary jurisdiction in March 1976, citing a then-existing policy against assuming jurisdiction over matters pending before a court. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 55 F. P. C. 1018, 1020-1021. On rehearing, the Commission further noted that on October 19, 1972, respondents had gained “small producer” status, see n. 5, infra, and were therefore no longer required to make rate increase filings, Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 56 F. P. C. 2905 (1976). Arkla challenged the Commission’s automatic deferral policy before the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. While the matter was pending before that court, the Commission asked that the record be remanded to it for further consideration, and the Court of Appeals granted the motion. The May 1979 order resulted from this remand, and review of that order is pending before the Court of Appeals.
The Commission limited its disagreement with the state court to the period before 1972 because of its additional finding that as of October 1972 respondents had become “small producers” and were no longer required to file their rates with the Commission. See 18 CFR § 157.40 (1980). It therefore took the position that the filed rate doctrine did not apply to respondents after that date. Arida disputes here the administrative determination that respondents met the criteria to be considered “small producers.” The Commission's finding itself is not before us, and we do not believe that the state courts erred in deferring to that finding.
Subsequent to the award of damages but prior to our action on Arlda’s petition for certiorari, the Commission informed respondents that in order to collect a damages award amounting to a retroactive rate increase, they would have to ask the Commission to waive the filing requirements of the Natural Gas Act. Respondents sought a waiver, which was denied by the Commission. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 13 FERC ¶ 61, 000 (1980). In its order, the Commission explained that in order to grant a waiver, it would have to “speculat[e] as to what the Commission would or would not have done in 1961 . . . .” Id., at 61,213. The Commission added that because the request for an increase called for contract interpretation, the 1961 Commission “would almost certainly have either suspended or rejected the filing.” Ibid. The Commission added that granting a waiver in this case would present a “potential for disruption of natural gas markets.” Ibid. Review of that order is pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Montana-Dakota Utilities was a case under the Federal Power Act rather than under the Natural Gas Act, but as we have previously said, the relevant provisions of the two statutes “are in all material respects substantially identical.” FPC v. Sierra Pacific Power Co., 350 U. S. 348, 353 (1956). In this opinion we therefore follow our established practice of citing interchangeably decisions interpreting the pertinent sections of the two statutes. See, e. g., ibid.; Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U. S. 747, 820-821 (1968).
Although the Commission may not impose a retroactive rate alteration and, in particular, may not order reparations, see, e. g., FPC v. Sunray DX Oil Co., 391 U. S. 9, 24 (1968), it may “for good cause shown/’ 15 U. S. C. § 717c (d), waive the usual requirement of timely filing of an alteration in a rate. Assuming, arguendo, that waiver is available for retroactive collection of a higher rate than the one on file, we note that in this case, the Commission has expressly found that respondents have not demonstrated that good cause exists for waiving the filing requirements on their behalf. See n. 6, supra.
Arkla seeks to have this Court determine, as a matter of law, whether it actually breached its contract with respondents. This we decline to do. We see no reason to disagree with the Commission’s judgment that interpretation of the favored nations clause raises only questions, of state law. The state court found that the contract had been breached. We will not overturn the construction of Louisiana law by the highest court of that State.
Apparently in an effort to challenge this determination, respondents assert that the damages would be paid entirely from Arkla’s corporate assets and would not be passed on to consumers. We see no reason why this fact, even if true, would alter our analysis. In any case, the record does not support respondents’ assertion that Arkla could not pass the damages award along to its customers. In its order denying respondents’ request for a waiver of the § 4 (d) notice requirement, the Commission conceded that Arkla would have the right to do so, even though all the natural gas for which Arkla would be paying was long since sold. 13 FERC, at 61,213.
Respondents assert, and the Supreme Court of Louisiana found, that the Commission has expressly approved the damages award through its repeated statements that the award is not in excess of applicable ceilings. This is simply not the case. The court below based its conclusion on the Commission’s order denying rehearing on Arkla’s request that it exercise primary jurisdiction. 368 So. 2d, at 991, citing Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 56 F. P. C. 2905 (1976). Nothing in that order approves the retroactive rate increase; it only lists, at the request of the parties, “the maximum rates . . . which, if contractually authorized and if proper filing procedures had been followed, would have been approved . . . .” Id., at 2906. The fact that the retroactive rate increase was within the rate ceiling does not mean that it would have been approved if actually submitted, and certainly does not mean that it would be approved after the fact. In rejecting Respondents’ request for a waiver of its filing requirements, the Commission set forth several reasons for disapproving a rate increase falling within the ceiling rates and expressly declined to speculate on what the earlier Commission might have done. See n. 6, supra.
In addition to the order denying rehearing, respondents also rely on language in the Commission’s May 18, 1979, order declining to exercise primary jurisdiction and in a letter from the Commission’s staff counsel. Staff counsel’s letter is ambiguous at best, and in any case, it should be unnecessary to add that staff counsel may not speak for the Commission. The language relied on in the May 18 order appears to have reference only to damages for the period after 1972. The same order twice disapproves granting, damages for the period prior to respondents’ assumption of small-producer status. See Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 7 FERC ¶ 61,175, p. 61,325, n. 18 (1979) (“It is our opinion that the Louisiana Supreme Court’s award of damages for the 1961-1972 period violates the filed rate doctrine”); id., at 61,325, n. 20 (“As we stated above, the Louisiana Supreme Court, in effect, waived one of this Commission’s filing requirements when it determined that [respondents’] group was entitled to damages back to 1961. This holding of the Louisiana Supreme Court conflicts with the filed rate doctrine”). The unconnected and ambiguous references on which respondents and the court below rely to find Commission “approval” of the retroactive rate increase cannot override these express statements of disapproval.
None of the other cases relied on by respondents commands a contrary result. Shelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U. S. 667 (1950), held only that federal courts are not granted jurisdiction over state-law declaratory judgment actions merely because a federal question might potentially be raised in defense of the suit. The only issue in Shelly Oil was whether certain contracts had properly been terminated, so there was no occasion to consider whether the filed rate doctrine barred a damages remedy. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Memphis Light, Gas and Water Division, 358 U. S. 103 (1958), like the cases mentioned in text, held only that the Act does not automatically abrogate all private contracts. And Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Superior Court, 366 U. S. 656 (1961), stated only that a state rather than a federal court was the proper forum in which a buyer should bring a breach-of-coniiract action to obtain a refund of charges in excess of the filed rate. Permitting that action in no way contravened the filed rate doctrine; in fact, it furthered the doctrine’s purpose.
We note that a panel of the District of Columbia Circuit stated in City of Cleveland v. FPC, 174 U. S. App. D. C. 1, 10-11, 525 F. 2d 845, 854-855 (1976), that "the proposition that a filed rate variant from an agreed rate is nonetheless the legal rate wages war with basic premises of the . . . Act.” That case is immediately distinguishable from the one before us because it involved a claim that the rate itself had been filed in violation of a contract. We express no opinion on the merits of that case, but to the extent that the quoted dictum would lead to a contrary result in the instant case, it is expressly disapproved.
We agree with the Commission’s finding that Arkla “could have reasonably assumed that the government royalty payment did not trigger the [favored nations clause].” 13 FERC, at 61,213. Because the record contains no findings of misconduct, respondents’ argument that this Court has consistently recognized the doctrine of estoppel has no relevance. We save for another day the question whether the filed rate doctrine applies in the face of fraudulent conduct.
There is no bar to damages for the period after respondents gained “small producer” status. See n. 5, supra.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | J | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Scalia
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We consider whether a law enforcement official can, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, attempt to stop a fleeing motorist from continuing his public-endangering flight by ramming the motorist’s car from behind. Put another way: Can an officer take actions that place a fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death in order to stop the motorist’s flight from endangering the lives of innocent bystanders?
I
In March 2001, a Georgia county deputy clocked respondent’s vehicle traveling at 73 miles per hour on a road with a 55-mile-per-hour speed limit. The deputy activated his blue flashing lights indicating that respondent should pull over. Instead, respondent sped away, initiating a chase down what is in most portions a two-lane road, at speeds exceeding 85 miles per hour. The deputy radioed his dispatch to report that he was pursuing a fleeing vehicle, and broadcast its license plate number. Petitioner, Deputy Timothy Scott, heard the radio communication and joined the pursuit along with other officers. In the midst of the chase, respondent pulled into the parking lot of a shopping center and was nearly boxed in by the various police vehicles. Respondent evaded the trap by making a sharp turn, colliding with Scott’s police car, exiting the parking lot, and speeding off once again down a two-lane highway.
Following respondent’s shopping center maneuvering, which resulted in slight damage to Scott’s police car, Scott took over as the lead pursuit vehicle. Six minutes and nearly 10 miles after the chase had begun, Scott decided to attempt to terminate the episode by employing a “Precision Intervention Technique (‘PIT’) maneuver, which causes the fleeing vehicle to spin to a stop.” Brief for Petitioner 4. Having radioed his supervisor for permission, Scott was told to “‘[g]o ahead and take him out.’” Harris v. Coweta Cty., 433 F. 3d 807, 811 (CA11 2005). Instead, Scott applied his push bumper to the rear of respondent’s vehicle. As a result, respondent lost control of his vehicle, which left the roadway, ran down an embankment, overturned, and crashed. Respondent was badly injured and was rendered a quadriplegic.
Respondent filed suit against Deputy Scott and others under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, alleging, inter alia, a violation of his federal constitutional rights, viz. use of excessive force resulting in an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. In response, Scott filed a motion for summary judgment based on an assertion of qualified immunity. The District Court denied the motion, finding that “there are material issues of fact on which the issue of qualified immunity turns which present sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury.” Harris v. Coweta Cty., No. 3:01-CV-148-WBH (ND Ga., Sept. 23,2003), App. to Pet. for Cert. 41a-42a. On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision to allow respondent’s Fourth Amendment claim against Scott to proceed to trial. Taking respondent’s view of the facts as given, the Court of Appeals concluded that Scott’s actions could constitute “deadly force” under Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U. S. 1 (1985), and that the use of such force in this context “would violate [respondent’s] constitutional right to be free from excessive force during a seizure. Accordingly, a reasonable jury could find that Scott violated [respondent’s] Fourth Amendment rights.” 433 F. 3d, at 816. The Court of Appeals further concluded that “the law as it existed [at the time of the incident], was sufficiently clear to give reasonable law enforcement officers 'fair notice’ that ramming a vehicle under these circumstances was unlawful.” Id., at 817. The Court of Appeals thus concluded that Scott was not entitled to qualified immunity. We granted certiorari, 549 U. S. 991 (2006), and now reverse.
II
In resolving questions of qualified immunity, courts are required to resolve a “threshold question: Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right? This must be the initial inquiry.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U. S. 194, 201 (2001). If, and only if, the court finds a violation of a constitutional right, “the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established ... in light of the specific context of the case.” Ibid. Although this ordering contradicts “[o]ur policy of avoiding unnecessary adjudication of constitutional issues,” United States v. Treasury Employees, 513 U. S. 454, 478 (1995) (citing Ash-wander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 346-347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)), we have said that such a departure from practice is “necessary to set forth principles which will become the basis for a [future] holding that a right is clearly established,” Saucier, supra, at 201. We therefore turn to the threshold inquiry: whether Deputy Scott’s actions violated the Fourth Amendment.
Ill
A
The first step in assessing the constitutionality of Scott’s actions is to determine the relevant facts. As this case was decided on summary judgment, there have not yet been factual findings by a judge or jury, and respondent’s version of events (unsurprisingly) differs substantially from Scott’s version. When things are in such a posture, courts are required to view the facts and draw reasonable inferences “in the light most favorable to the party opposing the [summary judgment] motion.” United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U. S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam); Saucier, supra, at 201. In qualified immunity cases, this usually means adopting (as the Court of Appeals did here) the plaintiff’s version of the facts.
There is, however, an added wrinkle in this case: existence in the record of a videotape capturing the events in question. There are no allegations or indications that this videotape was doctored or altered in any way, nor any contention that what it depicts differs from what actually happened. The videotape quite clearly contradicts the version of the story told by respondent and adopted by the Court of Appeals. For example, the Court of Appeals adopted respondent’s assertions that, during the chase, “there was little, if any, actual threat to pedestrians or other motorists, as the roads were mostly empty and [respondent] remained in control of his vehicle.” 433 F. 3d, at 815. Indeed, reading the lower court’s opinion, one gets the impression that respondent, rather than fleeing from police, was attempting to pass his driving test:
“[T]aking the facts from the non-movant’s viewpoint, [respondent] remained in control of his vehicle, slowed for turns and intersections, and typically used his indicators for turns. He did not run any motorists off the road. Nor was he a threat to pedestrians in the shopping center parking lot, which was free from pedestrian and vehicular traffic as the center was closed. Significantly, by the time the parties were back on the highway and Scott rammed [respondent], the motorway had been cleared of motorists and pedestrians allegedly because of police blockades of the nearby intersections.” Id., at 815-816 (citations omitted).
The videotape tells quite a different story. There we see respondent’s vehicle racing down narrow, two-lane roads in the dead of night at speeds that are shockingly fast. We see it swerve around more than a dozen other cars, cross the double-yellow line, and force cars traveling in both directions to their respective shoulders to avoid being hit. We see it run multiple red lights and travel for considerable periods of time in the occasional center left-turn-only lane, chased by numerous police cars forced to engage in the same hazardous maneuvers just to keep up. Far from being the cautious and controlled driver the lower court depicts, what we see on the video more closely resembles a Hollywood-style car chase of the most frightening sort, placing police officers and innocent bystanders alike at great risk of serious injury.
At the summary judgment stage, facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a “genuine” dispute as to those facts. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(c). As we have emphasized, “[w]hen the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’ ” Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U. S. 574, 586-587 (1986) (footnote omitted). “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., ATI U. S. 242, 247-248 (1986). When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.
That was the case here with regard to the factual issue whether respondent was driving in such fashion as to endanger human life. Respondent’s version of events is so utterly discredited by the record that no reasonable jury could have believed him. The Court of Appeals should not have relied on such visible fiction; it should have viewed the facts in the light depicted by the videotape.
B
Judging the matter on that basis, we think it is quite clear that Deputy Scott did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Scott does not contest that his decision to terminate the car chase by ramming his bumper into respondent’s vehicle constituted a “seizure.” “[A] Fourth Amendment seizure [occurs] . . . when there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied.” Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U. S. 593, 596-597 (1989) (emphasis deleted). See also id., at 597 (“If . . . the police cruiser had pulled alongside the fleeing car and sideswiped it, producing the crash, then the termination of the suspect’s freedom of movement would have been a seizure”). It is also conceded, by both sides, that a claim of “excessive force in the course of making [a]... ‘seizure’ of [the] person ... [is] properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s ‘objective reasonableness’ standard.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 388 (1989). The question we need to answer is whether Scott’s actions were objectively reasonable.
1
Respondent urges us to analyze this case as we analyzed Garner, 471 U. S. 1. See Brief for Respondent 16-29. We must first decide, he says, whether the actions Scott took constituted “deadly force.” (He defines “deadly force” as “any use of force which creates a substantial likelihood of causing death or serious bodily injury,” id., at 19.) If so, respondent claims that Garner prescribes certain preconditions that must be met before Scott’s actions can survive Fourth Amendment scrutiny: (1) The suspect must have posed an immediate threat of serious physical harm to the officer or others; (2) deadly force must have been necessary to prevent escape; and (3) where feasible, the officer must have given the suspect some warning. See Brief for Respondent 17-18 (citing Garner, supra, at 9-12). Since these Garner preconditions for using deadly force were not met in this case, Scott’s actions were per se unreasonable.
Respondent’s argument falters at its first step; Garner did not establish a magical on/off switch that triggers rigid preconditions whenever an officer's actions constitute “deadly force.” Gamer was simply an application of the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonableness” test, Graham, supra, at 388, to the use of a particular type of force in a particular situation. Garner held that it was unreasonable to kill a “young, slight, and unarmed” burglary suspect, 471 U. S., at 21, by shooting him “in the back of the head” while he was running away on foot, id., at 4, and when the officer “could not reasonably have believed that [the suspect]. . . posed any threat,” and “never attempted to justify his actions on any basis other than the need to prevent an escape,” id., at 21. Whatever Gamer said about the factors that might have justified shooting the suspect in that case, such “preconditions” have scant applicability to this case, which has vastly different facts. “Gamer had nothing to do with one car striking another or even with car chases in general____ A police car’s bumping a fleeing car is, in fact, not much like a policeman’s shooting a gun so as to hit a person.” Adams v. St. Lucie County Sheriff’s Dept., 962 F. 2d 1563, 1577 (CA11 1992) (Edmondson, J., dissenting), adopted by 998 F. 2d 923 (CA11 1993) (en banc) (per curiam). Nor is the threat posed by the flight on foot of an unarmed suspect even remotely comparable to the extreme danger to human life posed by respondent in this case. Although respondent’s attempt to craft an easy-to-apply legal test in the Fourth Amendment context is admirable, in the end we must still slosh our way through the factbound morass of “reasonableness.” Whether or not Scott’s actions constituted application of “deadly force,” all that matters is whether Scott’s actions were reasonable.
2
In determining the reasonableness of the manner in which a seizure is effected, “[w]e must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.” United States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696,703 (1983). Scott defends his actions by pointing to the paramount governmental interest in ensuring public safety, and respondent nowhere suggests this was not the purpose motivating Scott’s behavior. Thus, in judging whether Scott’s actions were reasonable, we must consider the risk of bodily harm that Scott’s actions posed to respondent in light of the threat to the public that Scott was trying to eliminate. Although there is no obvious way to quantify the risks on either side, it is clear from the videotape that respondent posed an actual and imminent threat to the lives of any pedestrians who might have been present, to other civilian motorists, and to the officers involved in the chase. See Part III-A, swpra. It is equally clear that Scott’s actions posed a high likelihood of serious injury or death to respondent — though not the near certainty of death posed by, say, shooting a fleeing felon in the back of the head, see Garner, supra, at 4, or pulling alongside a fleeing motorist’s car and shooting the motorist, cf. Vaughan v. Cox, 343 F. 3d 1323, 1326-1327 (CA11 2003). So how does a court go about weighing the perhaps lesser probability of injuring or killing numerous bystanders against the perhaps larger probability of injuring or killing a single person? We think it appropriate in this process to take into account not only the number of lives at risk, but also their relative culpability. It was respondent, after all, who intentionally placed himself and the public in danger by unlawfully engaging in the reckless, high-speed flight that ultimately produced the choice between two evils that Scott confronted. Multiple police cars, with blue lights flashing and sirens blaring, had been chasing respondent for nearly 10 miles, but he ignored their warning to stop. By contrast, those who might have been harmed had Scott not taken the action he did were entirely innocent. We have little difficulty in concluding it was reasonable for Scott to take the action that he did.
But wait, says respondent: Couldn’t the innocent public equally have been protected, and the tragic accident entirely avoided, if the police had simply ceased their pursuit? We think the police need not have taken that chance and hoped for the best. Whereas Scott’s action — ramming respondent off the road — was certain to eliminate the risk that respondent posed to the public, ceasing pursuit was not. First of all, there would have been no way to convey convincingly to respondent that the chase was off, and that he was free to go. Had respondent looked in his rearview mirror and seen the police cars deactivate their flashing lights and turn around, he would have had no idea whether they were truly letting him get away, or simply devising a new strategy for capture. Perhaps the police knew a shortcut he didn’t know, and would reappear down the road to intercept him; or perhaps they were setting up a roadblock in his path. Cf. Brower, 489 U. S., at 594. Given such uncertainty, respondent might have been just as likely to respond by continuing to drive recklessly as by slowing down and wiping his brow.*
Second, we are loath to lay down a rule requiring the police to allow fleeing suspects to get away whenever they drive so recklessly that they put other people’s lives in danger. It is obvious the perverse incentives such a rule would create: Every fleeing motorist would know that escape is within his grasp, if only he accelerates to 90 miles per hour, crosses the double-yellow line a few times, and runs a few red lights. The Constitution assuredly does not impose this invitation to impunity-earned-by-recklessness. Instead, we lay down a more sensible rule: A police officer’s attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death.
* * *
The car chase that respondent initiated in this case posed a substantial and immediate risk of serious physical injury to others; no reasonable jury could conclude otherwise. Scott's attempt to terminate the chase by forcing respondent off the road was reasonable, and Scott is entitled to summary judgment. The Court of Appeals’ judgment to the contrary is reversed.
It is so ordered.
Scott says he decided not to employ the PIT maneuver because he was “concerned that the vehicles were moving too quickly to safely execute the maneuver.” Brief for Petitioner 4. Respondent agrees that the PIT maneuver could not have been safely employed. See Brief for Respondent 9. It is irrelevant to our analysis whether Scott had permission to take the precise actions he took.
Qualified immunity is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, 526 (1985). Thus, we have held that an order denying qualified immunity is immediately appealable even though it is interlocutory; otherwise, it would be “effectively unreviewable.” Id., at 527. Further, “we repeatedly have stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U. S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam).
None of the other claims respondent brought against Scott or any other party are before this Court.
Prior to this Court’s announcement of Saucier’s “rigid ‘order of battle,’ ” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U. S. 194, 201-202 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring), we had described this order of inquiry as the “better approach,” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U. S. 833, 841, n. 5 (1998), though not one that was required in all cases. See id., at 858-859 (Breyer, J., concurring); id., at 859 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). There has been doubt expressed regarding the wisdom of Saueier’s decision to make the threshold inquiry mandatory, especially in cases where the constitutional question is relatively difficult and the qualified immunity question relatively straightforward. See, e. g., Brosseau, supra, at 201 (Breyer, J., joined by Scalia and Ginsburg, JJ., concurring); Bunting v. Mellen, 541 U. S. 1019 (2004) (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., respecting denial of certiorari); id., at 1025 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting). See also Lyons v. Xenia, 417 F. 3d 565, 580-584 (CA6 2005) (Sutton, J., concurring). We need not address the wisdom of Saucier in this case, however, because the constitutional question with which we are presented is, as discussed in Part III-B, infra, easily decided. Deciding that question first is thus the “better approach,” Lewis, supra, at 841, n. 5, regardless of whether it is required.
Justice Stevens suggests that our reaction to the videotape is somehow idiosyncratic, and seems to believe we are misrepresenting its contents. See post, at 392 (dissenting opinion) (“In sum, the factual statements by the Court of Appeals quoted by the Court . . . were entirely accurate”). We are happy to allow the videotape to speak for itself See Record 36, Exh. A, available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/ video/scott_v_harris.html and in Clerk of Court’s case file.
Justice Stevens hypothesizes that these cars “had already pulled to the side of the road or were driving along the shoulder because they heard the police sirens or saw the flashing lights,” so that “[a] jury could certainly conclude that those motorists were exposed to no greater risk than persons who take the same action in response to a speeding ambulance.” Post, at 391. It is not our experience that ambulances and fire engines careen down two-lane roads at 85-plus miles per hour, with an unmarked scout car out in front of them. The risk they pose to the public is vastly less than what respondent created here. But even if that were not so, it would in no way lead to the conclusion that it was unreasonable to eliminate the threat to life that respondent posed. Society accepts the risk of speeding ambulances and fire engines in order to save life and property; it need not (and assuredly does not) accept a similar risk posed by a reckless motorist fleeing the police.
This is not to say that each and every factual statement made by the Court of Appeals is inaccurate. For example, the videotape validates the court’s statement that when Scott rammed respondent’s vehicle it was not threatening any other vehicles or pedestrians. (Undoubtedly Scott waited for the road to be clear before executing his maneuver.)
Justice Stevens incorrectly declares this to be “a question of fact best reserved for a jury,” and complains we are “usurping] the jury’s factfinding function.” Post, at 395. At the summary judgment stage, however, once we have determined the relevant set of facts and drawn all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party to the extent supportable by the record, see Part III-A, supra, the reasonableness of Scott’s actions— or, in Justice Stevens’ parlance, “[wjhether [respondent’s] actions have risen to a level warranting deadly force,” post, at 395 — is a pure question of law.
Respondent, like the Court of Appeals, defines this second precondition as “‘necessary to prevent escape,’” Brief for Respondent 17; 433 F. 3d 807, 813 (CA11 2005) (quoting Garner, 471 U. S., at 11). But that quote from Garner is taken out of context. The necessity described in Gamer was, in fact, the need to prevent “serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others.” Ibid. By way of example only, Gamer hypothesized that deadly force may be used “if necessary to prevent escape” when the suspect is known to have “committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm,” ibid., so that his mere being at large poses an inherent danger to society. Respondent did not pose that type of inherent threat to society, since (prior to the car chase) he had committed only a minor traffic offense and, as far as the police were aware, had no prior criminal record. But in this case, unlike in Garner, it was respondent’s flight itself (by means of a speeding automobile) that posed the threat of “serious physical harm ... to others.” Ibid.
The Court of Appeals cites Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U. S. 593, 595 (1989), for its refusal to “countenance the argument that by continuing to flee, a suspect absolves a pursuing police officer of any possible liability for all ensuing actions during the chase,” 433 F. 3d, at 816. The only question in Brower was whether a police roadblock constituted a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. In deciding that question, the relative culpability of the parties is, of course, irrelevant; a seizure occurs whenever the police are “ ‘responsible] for the termination of [a person’s] movement,”’ 433 F. 3d, at 816 (quoting Brower, supra, at 595), regardless of the reason for the termination. Culpability is relevant, however, to the reasonableness of the seizure — to whether preventing possible harm to the innocent justifies exposing to possible harm the person threatening them.
Contrary to Justice Stevens’ assertions, we do not “assum[e] that dangers caused by flight from a police pursuit will continue after the pursuit ends,” post, at 394, nor do we make any “factual assumptions,” post, at 393, with respect to what would have happened if the police had gone home. We simply point out the uncertainties regarding what would have happened, in response to respondent’s factual assumption that the high-speed flight would have ended.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
Petitioner, whose husband was killed while testing the operation of a “skip hoist,” brought this diversity action claiming that respondent had negligently designed the hoist. The Trial Judge submitted this question to the jury in the form of a special interrogatory which asked that the jury, if it found negligent design, “please indicate” which of five specified design aspects of the hoist had been found unsafe. The jury was to answer “Yes” or “No” with respect to each of the five enumerated factors. The jury returned a special verdict for petitioner, answering one of the five subsections of the interrogatory in petitioner’s favor and leaving the other four unanswered. The Trial Judge denied respondent’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the jury’s verdict, and respondent appealed.
The Court of Appeals in its principal opinion concluded that “we must take it that they [the jury] found that Lummus’ negligence was not established” as to the four aspects of design covered by the unanswered subsections of the interrogatory. The court then held that the evidence did not support the jury’s finding of negligence as to the fifth aspect of design and reversed the trial court’s judgment with instructions to enter judgment for respondent. Petitioner sought rehearing in the Court of Appeals, noting her timely objection to the trial court’s use of the special interrogatory and arguing that the Court of Appeals had improperly restricted its review of the evidence to the one aspect of design. Rehearing was denied, one judge again dissenting, and this petition for a writ of certiorari followed.
We do not share the Court of Appeals’ confidence as to the meaning, in light of the trial court’s instructions, of the jury’s failure to answer four subdivisions of the interrogatory. Perhaps the jury intended to resolve these questions in respondent’s favor; but the jury might have been unable to agree on these issues, or it simply might not have passed upon them because it concluded that respondent had negligently designed the hoist in another respect. In either of the latter two situations, petitioner would clearly deserve a new trial, at least as to these unresolved issues of negligence. See Union Pac. R. Co. v. Bridal Veil Lumber Co., 219 F. 2d 825; 5 Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 49.03[4], at 2208 (1964 ed.). Under these circumstances, we think the Court of Appeals erred in directing entry of judgment for respondent; the case should have been remanded to the Trial Judge, who was in the best position to pass upon the question of a new trial in light of the evidence, his charge to the jury, and the jury’s verdict and interrogatory answers. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 50 (d). See Neely v. Eby Construction Co., 386 U. S. 317; Weade v. Dichmann, Wright & Pugh, Inc., 337 U. S. 801. Accordingly, the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated insofar as it directed entry of judgment for respondent, and the case is remanded with instructions to remand to the District Court to determine whether petitioner is entitled to a new trial.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Black would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the District Court in favor of petitioner.
In addition, one member of the panel concurred and the other dissented. The concurring opinion, though based upon a completely different aspect of this complex case, appears to adopt the interpretation of the interrogatory answers which we find unwarranted.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Rebcnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Nearly 40 years ago Congress enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act, and required employers covered by the Act to pay their employees a minimum hourly wage and to pay them at one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for hours worked in excess of 40 during a workweek. By this Act covered employers were required to keep certain records to aid in the enforcement of the Act, and to comply with specified child labor standards. This Court unanimously upheld the Act as a valid exercise of congressional authority under the commerce power in United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100 (1941), observing:
"Whatever their motive and purpose, regulations of commerce which do not infringe some constitutional prohibition are within the plenary power conferred on Congress by the Commerce Clause.” Id., at 115.
The original Fair Labor Standards Act passed in 1938 specifically excluded the States and their political subdivisions from its coverage. In 1974, however, Congress enacted the most recent of a series of broadening amendments to the Act. By these amendments Congress has extended the minimum wage and maximum hour provisions to almost all public employees employed by the States and by their various political subdivisions. Appellants in these cases include individual cities and States, the National League of Cities, and the National Governors' Conference; they brought an action in the District Court for the District of Columbia which challenged the validity of the 1974 amendments. They asserted in effect that when Congress sought to apply the Fair Labor Standards Act provisions virtually across the board to employees of state and municipal governments it “infringed a constitutional prohibition” running in favor of the States as States. The gist of their complaint was not that the conditions of employment of such public employees were beyond the scope of the commerce power had those employees been employed in the private sector but that the established constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental immunity consistently recognized in a long series of our cases affirmatively prevented the exercise of this authority in the manner which Congress chose in the 1974 amendments.
I
In a series of amendments beginning in 1961 Congress began to extend the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act to some types of public employees. The 1961 amendments to the Act extended its coverage to persons who were employed in “enterprises” engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce. And in 1966, with the amendment of the definition of employers under the Act, the exemption heretofore extended to the States and their political subdivisions was removed with respect to employees of state hospitals, institutions, and schools. We nevertheless sustained the validity of the combined effect of these two amendments in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968).
In 1974, Congress again broadened the coverage of the Act, 88 Stat, 55. The definition of “employer” in the Act now specifically “includes a public agency,” 29 U. S. C. §203 (d) (1970 ed., Supp, IV). In addition, the critical definition of “[e]nterprise[s] engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce” was expanded to encompass “an activity of a public agency,” and goes on to specify that
“[t]he employees of an enterprise which is a public agency shall for purposes of this subsection be deemed to be employees engaged in commerce, or in the production of goods for commerce, or employees handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods or materials that have been moved in or produced for commerce.” 29 U; S. C. §203 (s)(5) (1970 ed., Supp. IV).
Under the amendments “[p]ublic agency” is in turn defined as including
“the Government of the United States; the government of a State or political subdivision thereof; any agency of the United States (including the United States Postal Service and Postal Rate Commission), a State, or a political subdivision of a State; or any interstate governmental agency.” 29 U. S. C. § 203 (x) (1970 ed., Supp. IV).
By its 1974 amendments, then, Congress has now entirely removed the exemption previously afforded States and their political subdivisions, substituting only the Act’s general exemption for executive, administrative, or profession^l personnel, 29 U. S. C. §213 (a)(1), which is supplemented by provisions excluding from the Act’s coverage those individuals holding public elective office or serving such an officeholder in one of several specific capacities. 29 U. S. C. § 203 (e) (2) (C) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). The Act thus imposes upon almost all public employment the minimum wage and maximum hour requirements previously restricted to employees engaged in interstate commerce. These requirements are essentially identical to those imposed upon private employers, although the Act does attempt to make some provision for public employment relationships which are without counterpart in the private sector, such as those presented by fire protection and law enforcement personnel. See 29 U. S. C. §207 (k) (1970 ed., Supp. IV).
Challenging these 1974 amendments in the District Court, appellants sought both declaratory and injunc-tive relief against the amendments’ application to them, and a three-judge court was accordingly convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2282. That court, after hearing argument on the law from the parties, granted appel-lee Secretary of Labor’s motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief might be granted. The District Court stated it was “troubled” by appellants’ contentions that the amendments would intrude upon the States’ performance of essential governmental functions. The court went on to say that it considered their contentions
“substantial and that it may well be that the Supreme Court will feel it appropriate to draw back from the far-reaching implications of [Maryland v. Wirtz, supra]; but that is a decision that only the Supreme Court can make, and as a Federal district court we feel obliged to apply the Wirtz opinion as it stands.” National League of Cities v. Brennan, 406 F. Supp, 826, 828 (DC 1974).
We noted probable jurisdiction in order to consider the important questions recognized by the District Court. 420 U. S. 906 (1975). We agree with the District Court that the appellants' contentions are substantial. Indeed upon full consideration of the question we have decided that the “far-reaching implications” of Wirtz should be overruled, and that the judgment of the District Court must be reversed.
II
It is established beyond peradventure that the Commerce Clause of Art. I of the Constitution is a grant of plenary authority to Congress. That authority is, in the words of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824), “the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed.” Id., at 196.
When considering the validity of asserted applications of this power to wholly private activity, the Court has made it clear that
“[e]ven activity that is purely intrastate in char^ acter may be regulated by Congress, where the activity, combined with like conduct by others similarly situated, affects commerce among the States or with foreign nations.” Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542, 547 (1975).
Congressional power over areas of private endeavor, even when its exercise may pre-empt express state-law determinations contrary to the result which has commended itself to the collective wisdom of Congress, has been held to be limited only by the requirement that “the means chosen by [Congress] must be reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution.” Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U. S. 241, 262 (1964).
Appellants in no way challenge these decisions establishing the breadth of authority granted Congress under the commerce power. Their contention, on the contrary, is that when Congress seeks to regulate directly the activities of States as public employers, it transgresses an affirmative limitation on the exercise of its power akin to other commerce power affirmative limitations contained in the Constitution. Congressional enactments which may be fully within the grant of legislative authority contained in the Commerce Clause may nonetheless be invalid because found to offend against the right to trial by jury contained in the Sixth Amendment, United States v. Jackson, 390 U. S. 570 (1968), or the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, Leary v. United States, 395 U. S. 6 (1969). Appellants’ essential contention is that the 1974 amendments to the Act, while undoubtedly within the scope of the Commerce Clause, encounter a similar constitutional barrier because they are to be applied directly to the States and subdivisions of States as employers.
This Court has never doubted that there are limits upon the power of Congress to override state sovereignty, even when exercising its otherwise plenary powers to tax or to regulate commerce which are conferred- by Art. I of the Constitution. In Wirts, for example, the Court took care to assure the appellants that it had “ample power to prevent... 'the utter destruction of the State as a sovereign political entity/ ” which they feared. 392 U. S., at 196. Appellee Secretary in this case, both in his brief and upon oral argument, has agreed that our federal system of government imposes definite limits upon the authority of Congress to regulate the activities of the States as States by means of the commerce power. See, e. g., Brief for Appellee 30-41; Tr. of Oral Arg. 39-43. In Fry, supra, the Court recognized that an express declaration of this limitation is found in the Tenth Amendment:
“While the Tenth Amendment has been characterized as a 'truism/ stating merely that 'all is retained which has not been surrendered,' United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 124 (1941), it is not without significance. The Amendment expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States’ integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal system.” 421 U. S., at 547 n. 7.
In New York v. United States, 326 U. S. 572 (1946), Mr. Chief Justice Stone, speaking for four Members of an eight-Member Court in rejecting the proposition that Congress could impose taxes on the States so long as it did so in a nondiscriminatory manner, observed:
“A State may, like a private individual, own real property and receive income. But in view of our former decisions we could hardly say that a general non-discriminatory real estate tax (apportioned), or an income tax laid upon citizens and States alike could be constitutionally applied to the State’s capitol, its State-house, its public school houses, public parks, or its revenues from taxes or school lands, even though all real property and all income of the citizen.is taxed.” Id., at 587-588.
The expressions in these more recent cases trace back to earlier decisions of this Court recognizing the essential role of the States in our federal system of government. Mr. Chief Justice Chase, perhaps because of the particular time at which he occupied that office, had occasion more than once to speak for the Court on this point. In Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 725 (1869), he declared that “[t]he Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States.” In Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71 (1869), his opinion for the Court said:
“Both the States and the United States existed before the Constitution. The people, through that instrument, established a more perfect union by substituting a national government, acting, with ample power, directly upon the citizens, instead of the Confederate government, which acted with powers, greatly restricted, only upon the States. But in many articles of the Constitution the necessary existence of the States, and, within their proper spheres, the independent authority of the States, is distinctly recognized.” Id., at 76.
In Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514 (1926), the Court likewise observed that “neither government may destroy the other nor curtail in any substantial manner the exercise of its powers.” Id., at 523.
Appellee Secretary argues that the cases in which this Court has upheld sweeping exercises of authority by Congress, even though those exercises pre-empted state regulation of the private sector, have already curtailed the sovereignty of the States quite as much as the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act. We do not agree. It is one thing to recognize the authority of Congress to enact laws regulating individual businesses necessarily subject to the dual sovereignty of the government of the Nation and of the State in which they reside. It is quite another to uphold a similar exercise of congressional authority directed, not to private citizens, but to the States as States. We have repeatedly recognized that there are attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state government which may not be impaired by Congress, not because Congress may lack an affirmative grant of legislative authority to reach the matter, but because the Constitution prohibits it from exercising the authority in that manner. In Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U. S. 559 (1911), the Court gave this example of such an attribute:
“The power to locate its own seat of government and to determine when and how it shall be changed from one place to another, and to appropriate its own public funds for that purpose, are essentially and peculiarly state powers. That one of the original thirteen States could now be shorn of such powers by an act of Congress would not be for a moment entertained.” Id., at 565.
One undoubted attribute of state sovereignty is the States’ power to determine the wages which shall be paid to those whom they employ in order to carry out their governmental functions, what hours those persons will work, and what compensation will be provided where these employees may be called upon to work overtime. The question we must resolve here, then, is whether these determinations are “ 'functions essential to separate and independent existence,’ ” id., at 580, quoting from Lane County v. Oregon, supra, at 76, so that Congress may not abrogate the States’ otherwise plenary authority to make them.
In their complaint appellants advanced estimates of substantial costs which will be imposed upon them by the 1974 amendments. Since the District Court dismissed their complaint, we take its well-pleaded allegations as true, although it appears from appellee’s submissions in the District Court and in this Court that resolution of the factual disputes as to the effect of the amendments is not critical to our disposition of the case.
Judged solely in terms of increased costs in dollars, these allegations show a significant impact on the functioning of the governmental bodies involved. The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tenn., for example, asserted that the Act will increase its costs of providing essential police and fire protection, without any increase in service or in current salary levels, by $938,000 per year. Cape Girardeau, Mo., estimated that its annual budget for fire protection may have to be increased by anywhere from $250,000 to $400,000 over the current figure of $350,000. The State of Arizona alleged that the annual additional expenditures which will be required if it is to continue to provide essential state services may total $2.5 million. The State of California, which must devote significant portions of its budget to fire-suppression endeavors, estimated that application of the Act to its employment practices will necessitate an increase in its budget of between $8 million and $16 million.
Increased costs are not, of course, the only adverse effects which compliance with the Act will visit upon state and local governments, and in turn upon the citizens who depend upon those governments. In its complaint in intervention, for example, California asserted that it could not comply with the overtime costs (approximately $750,000 per year) which the Act required to be paid to California Highway Patrol cadets during their academy training program. California reported that it had thus been forced to reduce its academy training program from 2,080 hours to only 960 hours, a compromise undoubtedly of substantial importance to those whose safety and welfare may depend upon the preparedness of the California Highway Patrol.
This type of forced relinquishment of important governmental activities is further reflected in the complaint’s allegation that the city of Inglewoód, Cal., has been forced to curtail its affirmative action program for providing employment opportunities for men and women interested in a career in law enforcement. The Inglewood police department has abolished a program for police trainees who split their week between on-the-job training and the classroom. The city could not abrogate its contractual obligations to these trainees, and it concluded that compliance with the Act in these circumstances was too' financially burdensome to permit continuance of the classroom program. The city of Clovis, Cal., has been put to a similar choice regarding an internship program it was running in cooperation with a California state university. According to the complaint, because the interns’ compensation brings them within the purview of the Act the city must decide whether to eliminate the program entirely or to substantially reduce its beneficial aspects by doing away with any pay for the interns.
Quite apart from the substantial costs imposed upon the States and their political subdivisions, the Act displaces state policies regarding the manner in which they will structure delivery of those governmental services which their citizens require. The Act, speaking directly to the States qua States, requires that they shall pay all but an extremely limited minority of their employees the minimum wage rates currently chosen by Congress. It may well be that as a matter of economic policy it would be desirable that States, just as private employers, comply with these minimum wage requirements. But it cannot be gainsaid that the federal requirement directly supplants the considered policy choices of the States’ elected officials and administrators as to how they wish to structure pay scales in state employment. The State might wish to employ persons with little or no training, or those who wish to work on a casual basis, or those who for some other reason do not possess minimum employment requirements, and pay them less than the federally prescribed minimum wage. It may wish to- offer part-time or summer employment to teenagers at a figure less than the minimum wage, and if unable to do so may decline to offer such employment at all. But the Act would forbid such choices by the States. The only “discretion” left to them under the Act is either to attempt to increase their revenue to meet the additional financial burden imposed upon them by paying congressionally prescribed wages to their existing complement of employees, or to reduce that complement to a number which can be paid the federal minimum wage without increasing revenue.
This dilemma presented by the minimum wage restrictions may seem not immediately different from that faced by private employers, who have long been covered by the Act and who must find ways to increase their gross income if they are to pay higher wages while maintaining current earnings. The difference, however, is that a State is not merely a factor in the “shifting economic arrangements” of the private sector of the economy, Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), but is itself a coordinate element in the system established by the Framers for governing our Federal Union.
The degree to which the FLSA amendments would interfere with traditional aspects of state sovereignty can be seen even more clearly upon examining the overtime requirements of the Act. The general effect of these provisions is to require the States to pay their employees at premium rates whenever their work exceeds a specified number of hours in a given period. The asserted reason for these provisions is to provide a financial disincentive upon using employees beyond the work period deemed appropriate by Congress. According to appellee:
“This premium rate can be avoided if the [State] uses other employees to do the overtime work. This, in effect, tends to discourage overtime work and to spread employment, which is the result Congress intended.” Brief for Appellee 43.
We do not doubt that this may be a salutary result,.and that it has a sufficiently rational relationship to commerce to validate the application of the overtime provisions to private employers. But, like the minimum wage provisions, the vice of the Act as sought to be applied here is that it directly penalizes the States for choosing to hire governmental employees on terms different from those which Congress has sought to impose.
This congressionally imposed displacement of state decisions may substantially restructure traditional ways in which the local governments have arranged their affairs. Although at this point many of the actual effects under the proposed amendments remain a matter of some dispute among the parties, enough can be satisfactorily anticipated for an outline discussion of their general import. The requirement imposing premium rates upon any employment in excess of what Congress has decided is appropriate for a governmental employee’s workweek, for example, appears likely to have the effect of coercing the States to structure work periods in some employment areas, such as police and fire protection, in a manner substantially different from practices which have long been commonly accepted among local governments of this Nation. In addition, appellee represents that the Act will require that the premium compensation for overtime worked must be paid in cash, rather than with compensatory time off, unless such compensatory time is taken in the same pay period. Supplemental Brief for Appellee 9-10; see Dunlop v. New Jersey, 522 P. 2d 504 (CA3 1975), cert. pending sub nom. New Jersey v. Usery, No. 75-532. This, too, appears likely to be highly disruptive of accepted employment practices in many governmental areas where the demand for a number of employees to perform important jobs for extended periods on short notice can be both unpredictable and critical. Another example of congressional choices displacing those of the States in the area of what are without doubt essential governmental decisions may be found in the practice of using volunteer firemen, a source of manpower crucial to many of our smaller towns’ existence. Under the regulations proposed by appellee, whether individuals are indeed “volunteers” rather than “employees” subject to the minimum wage provisions of the Act are questions to be decided in the courts. See Brief for Appellee 49, and n. 41. It goes without saying that provisions such as these contemplate a significant reduction of traditional volunteer assistance which has been in the past drawn on to complement the operation of many local governmental functions.
Our examination of the effect of the 1974 amendments, as sought to be extended to the States and their political subdivisions, satisfies us that both the minimum wage and the maximum hour provisions will impermissibly interfere with the integral governmental functions of these bodies. We earlier noted some disagreement between the parties regarding the precise effect the amendments will have in application. We do not believe particularized assessments of actual impact are crucial to resolution of the issue presented, however. For even if we accept appellee's assessments concerning the impact of the amendments, their application will nonetheless significantly alter or displace the States' abilities to structure employer-employee relationships in such areas as fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public health, and parks and recreation. These activities are typical of those performed by state and local governments in discharging their dual functions of administering the public law and furnishing public services. Indeed, it is functions such as these which governments are created to provide, services such as these which the States have traditionally afforded their citizens. If Congress may withdraw from the States the authority to make those fundamental employment decisions upon which their systems for performance of these functions must rest, we think there would be little left of the States’ “ ‘separate and independent existence.’ ” Coyle, 221 U. S., at 580. Thus, even if appellants may have overestimated the effect which the Act will have upon their current levels and patterns of governmental activity, the dispositive factor is that Congress has attempted to exercise its Commerce Clause authority to prescribe minimum wages and maximum hours to be paid by the States in their capacities as sovereign governments. In so doing, Congress has sought to wield its power in a fashion that would impair the States' “ability to function effectively in a federal system,” Fry, 421 U. S., at 547 n. 7. This exercise of congressional authority does not comport with the federal system of government embodied in the Constitution. We hold that insofar as the challenged amendments operate to directly displace the States’ freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions, they are not within the authority granted Congress by Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Ill
One final matter requires our attention. Appellee has vigorously urged that we cannot, consistently with the Court’s decisions in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968), and Fry, supra, rule against him here. It is important to examine this contention so that it will be clear what we hold today, and what we do not.
With regard to Fry, we disagree with appellee. There the Court held that the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 was constitutional as applied to temporarily freeze the wages of state and local government employees. The Court expressly noted that the degree of intrusion upon the protected area of state sovereignty was in that case even less than that worked by the amendments to the FLSA which were before the Court in Wirtz. The Court recognized that the Economic Stabilization Act was “an emergency measure to counter severe inflation that threatened the national economy.” 421 U. S., at 548.
We think our holding today quite consistent with Fry. The enactment at issue there was occasioned by an extremely serious problem which endangered the well-being of all the component parts of our federal system and which only collective action by the National Government might forestall. The means selected were carefully drafted so as not to interfere with the States’ freedom beyond a very limited, specific period of time. The effect of the across-the-board freeze authorized by that Act, moreover, displaced no state choices as to how governmental operations should be structured, nor did it force the States to remake such choices themselves. Instead, it merely required that the wage scales and employment relationships which the States themselves had chosen be maintained during the period of the emergency. Finally, the Economic Stabilization Act operated to reduce the pressures upon state budgets rather than increase them. These factors distinguish the statute in Fry from the provisions at issue here. The limits imposed upon the commerce power when Congress seeks to apply it to the States are not so inflexible as to preclude temporary enactments tailored to combat a national emergency. “[Although an emergency may not call into life a power which has never lived, nevertheless emergency may afford a reason for the exertion of a living power already enjoyed.” Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332, 348 (1917).
With respect to the Court’s decision in Wirtz, we reach a different conclusion. Both appellee and the District Court thought that decision required rejection of appellants’ claims. Appellants, in turn, advance several arguments by which they seek to distinguish the facts before the Court in Wirtz from those presented by the 1974 amendments to the Act. There are undoubtedly factual distinctions between the two situations, but in view of the conclusions expressed earlier in this opinion we do not believe the reasoning in Wirtz may any longer be regarded as authoritative.
Wirtz relied heavily on the Court’s decision in United States v. California, 297 U. S. 175 (1936). The opinion quotes the following language from that case:
“‘[We] look to the activities in which the states have traditionally engaged as marking the boundary of the restriction upon the federal taxing power. But there is no such limitation upon the plenary power to regulate commerce. The state can no more deny the power if its exercise has been authorized by Congress than can an individual.’ 297 U. S., at 185.” 392 U. S., at 198.
But we have reaffirmed today that the States as States stand on a quite different footing from an individual or a corporation when challenging the exercise of Congress’ power to regulate commerce. We think the dicta from United States v. California, simply wrong. Congress may not exercise that power so as to force directly upon the States its choices as to how essential decisions regarding the conduct of integral governmental functions are to be made. We agree that such assertions of power, if unchecked, would indeed, as Mr. Justice Douglas cautioned in his dissent in Wirtz, allow “the National Government [to] devour the essentials of state sovereignty,” 392 U. S., at 205, and would therefore transgress the bounds of the authority granted Congress under the Commerce Clause. While there are obvious differences between the schools and hospitals involved in Wirtz, and the fire and police departments affected'here, each provides an integral portion of those governmental services which the States and their political subdivisions have traditionally afforded their citizens. We are therefore persuaded that Wirtz must be overruled.
The judgment of the District Court is accordingly reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U. S. C. §201 et seq. (1940 ed.).
§206 (a) (1940 ed.).
§ 207 (a)(3) (1940 ed.).
§211 (c) (1940 ed.).
§ 212 (1940 ed.).
Title 29 U. S. C. § 203 (d) (1940 ed.):
“ 'Employer’ includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee but shall not include the United States or any State or political subdivision of a State....”
Appellants in No. 74^878 are the National League of Cities, the National Governors’ Conference, the States of Arizona, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming, the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tenn., and the cities of Cape Girardeau, Mo., Lompoc, Cal., and Salt Lake City, Utah. The appellant in No. 74-879 is the State of California.
In view of the fact that the appellants include sovereign States and their political subdivisions to which application of the 1974 amendments is claimed to be unconstitutional, we need not consider whether the organizational appellants had standing to challenge the Act. See California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U. S. 21, 44-45 (1974).
Pub. L. 87-30, 75 Stat. 65.
29 U. S. C. §§203 (r), 203 (s), 206 (b), 207 (a)(2) (1964 ed.).
80 Stat. 831, 29 U. S. C. §203 (d) (1964 ed., Supp. II).
When the cases were not decided in October Term, 1974, they were set down for reargument, 421 U. S. 986 (1975).
Mr. Justice Brennan’s dissent intimates, post, at 858, that guarantees of individual liberties are the only sort of constitutional restrictions which this Court will enforce as against congressional action. It reasons that “Congress is constituted of representatives in both Senate and House elected from, the States.... Decisions upon the extent of federal intervention under the Commerce Clause into the affairs of the States are in that sense decisions of the States themselves.” Post, at 876. Precisely what is meant by the phrase “are in that sense decisions of the States themselves” is not entirely clear from this language; it is indisputable that a common constituency of voters elects both a State’s Governor and its two United States Senators. It is equally indisputable that since the enactment of the Seventeenth Amendment those Senators are not dependent upon state legislators for their election. But in any event the intimation which this reasoning is used to support is incorrect.
In Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926), the Court held that Congress could not by law limit the authority of the President to remove at will an officer of the Executive Branch appointed by him. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976), the Court held that Congress could not constitutionally require that members of the Federal Elections Commission be appointed by officers of the House of Representatives and of the Senate, and that all such appointments had to be made by the President. In each of these cases, an even stronger argument than that made in the dissent could be made to the effect that since each of these bills had been signed by the President, the very officer who challenged them had consented to their becoming law, and it was therefore no concern of this Court that the law violated the Constitution. Just as the dissent contends that “the States are fully able to protect their own interests... post, at 876, it could have been contended that the President, armed with the mandate of a national constituency and with the veto power, was able to protect his own interests. Nonetheless, in both cases the laws were held unconstitutional, because they trenched on the authority of the Executive 'Branch.
In quoting from the separate opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in New York v. United States, 326 U. S., at 573, Mr. Justice Brennan fails to add that this opinion attracted only one other adherent. The separate opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Stone, on the other hand, was joined by three other Members of the Court. And the two dissenters advocated a position even more protective of state sovereignty than that advanced by Stone. See Id., at 590-598 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Mr. Justice Brennan suggests that “the Chief Justice was addressing not the question of a state sovereignty restraint upon the exercise of the commerce power, but rather the principle of implied immunity of the States and Federal Government from taxation by the other....” Post, at 863-864. The asserted distinction, however, escapes us. Surely the federal power to tax is no less a delegated power than is the commerce power: both find their genesis in Art. I, § 8. Nor can characterizing the limitation recognized upon the federal taxing power as an “implied immunity” obscure the fact that this “immunity” is derived from the sovereignty of the States and the concomitant barriers which such sovereignty presents to otherwise plenary federal authority.
The complaint recited that a number of appellants were prohibited by their State Constitutions from incurring debts in excess of taxes for the current year. Those Constitutions also impose ceilings upon the percentage rates at which property might be taxed by those governmental units. App. 36-37.
These examples are obviously not an exhaustive catalogue of the numerous line and support activities which are well within the area of traditional operations of state and local governments.
We express no view as to whether different results might obtain if Congress seeks to affect integral operations of state governments by exercising authority granted it under other sections of the Constitution such as the spending power, Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, or § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The holding of United States v. California, as opposed to the language quoted in the text, is quite consistent with our holding today. There California's activity to which the congressional command was directed was not in an area that the States have regarded as integral parts of their governmental activities. It was, on the contrary, the operation of a railroad engaged in "common carriage by rail in interstate commerce....” 297 U. S., at 182.
For the same reasons, despite Mr. Justice Brennan’s claims to the contrary, the holdings in Parden v. Terminal R. Co., 377 U. S. 184 (1964), and California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553 (1957), are likewise unimpaired by our decision today. It also seems appropriate to note that Case v. Bowles, 327 U. S. 92 (1946), has not been
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | G | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Chief Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented by this case is whether the Fourth Amendment applies to the search and seizure by United States agents of property that is owned by a nonresident alien and located in a foreign country. We hold that it does not.
Respondent Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez is a citizen and resident of Mexico. He is believed by the United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) to be one of the leaders of a large and violent organization in Mexico that smuggles narcotics into the United States. Based on a complaint charging respondent with various narcotics-related offenses, the Government obtained a warrant for his arrest on August 3, 1985. In January 1986, Mexican police officers, after discussions with United States marshals, apprehended Verdugo-Urquidez in Mexico and transported him to the United States Border Patrol station in Calexico, California. There, United States marshals arrested respondent and eventually moved him to a correctional center in San Diego, California, where he remains incarcerated pending trial.
Following respondent’s arrest, Terry Bowen, a DEA agent assigned to the Calexico DEA office, decided to arrange for searches of Verdugo-Urquidez’s Mexican residences located in Mexicali and San Felipe. Bowen believed that the searches would reveal evidence related to respondent’s alleged narcotics trafficking activities and his involvement in the kidnaping and torture-murder of DEA Special Agent Enrique Camarena Salazar (for which respondent subsequently has been convicted in a separate prosecution. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, No. CR-87-422-ER (CD Cal., Nov. 22, 1988)). Bowen telephoned Walter White, the Assistant Special Agent in charge of the DEA office in Mexico City, and asked him to seek authorization for the search from the Director General of the Mexican Federal Judicial Police (MFJP). After several attempts to reach high ranking Mexican officials, White eventually contacted the Director General, who authorized the searches and promised the cooperation of Mexican authorities. Thereafter, DEA agents working in concert with officers of the MFJP searched respondent’s properties in Mexicali and San Felipe and seized certain documents. In particular, the search of the Mexicali residence uncovered a tally sheet, which the Government believes reflects the quantities of marijuana smuggled by Verdugo-Urquidez into the United States.
The District Court granted respondent’s motion to suppress evidence seized during the searches, concluding that the Fourth Amendment applied to the searches and that the DEA agents had failed to justify searching respondent’s premises without a warrant. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 856 F. 2d 1214 (1988). It cited this Court’s decision in Reid v. Covert, 354 U. S. 1 (1957), which held that American citizens tried by United States military authorities in a foreign country were entitled to the protections of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, and concluded that “[t]he Constitution imposes substantive constraints on the federal government, even when it operates abroad.” 856 F. 2d, at 1218. Relying on our decision in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U. S. 1032 (1984), where a majority of Justices assumed that illegal aliens in the United States have Fourth Amendment rights, the Ninth Circuit majority found it “difficult to conclude that Verdugo-Urquidez lacks these same protections.” 856 F. 2d, at 1223. It also observed that persons in respondent’s position enjoy certain trial-related rights, and reasoned that “[i]t would be odd indeed to acknowledge that Verdugo-Urquidez is entitled to due process under the fifth amendment, and to a fair trial under the sixth amendment, . . . and deny him the protection from unreasonable searches and seizures afforded under the fourth amendment.” Id., at 1224. Having concluded that the Fourth Amendment applied to the searches of respondent’s properties, the court went on to decide that the searches violated the Constitution because the DEA agents failed to procure a search warrant. Although recognizing that “an American search warrant would be of no legal validity in Mexico,” the majority deemed it sufficient that a warrant would have “substantial constitutional value in this country,” because it would reflect a magistrate’s determination that there existed probable cause to search and would define the scope of the search. Id., at 1230.
The dissenting judge argued that this Court’s statement in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 318 (1936), that “[n]either the Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have any force in foreign territory unless in respect of our own citizens,” foreclosed any claim by respondent to Fourth Amendment rights. More broadly, he viewed the Constitution as a “compact” among the people of the United States, and the protections of the Fourth Amendment were expressly limited to “the people.” We granted certiorari, 490 U. S; 1019 (1989).
Before analyzing the scope of the Fourth Amendment, we think it significant to note that it operates in a different manner than the Fifth Amendment, which is not at issue in this case. The privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment is a fundamental trial right of criminal defendants. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 (1964). Although conduct by law enforcement officials prior to trial may ultimately impair that right, a constitutional violation occurs only at trial. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441, 453 (1972). The Fourth Amendment functions differently. It prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures” whether or not the evidence is sought to be used in a criminal trial, and a violation of the Amendment is “fully accomplished” at the time of an unreasonable governmental intrusion. United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 354 (1974); United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897, 906 (1984). For purposes of this case, therefore, if there were a constitutional violation, it occurred solely in Mexico. Whether evidence obtained from respondent’s Mexican residences should be excluded at trial in the United States is a remedial question separate from the existence vel non of the constitutional violation. Calandra, supra, at 354; Leon, supra, at 906.
The Fourth Amendment provides:
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
That text, by contrast with the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, extends its reach only to “the people.” Contrary to the suggestion of amici curiae that the Framers used this phrase “simply to avoid [an] awkward rhetorical redundancy,” Brief for American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae 12, n. 4, “the people” seems to have been a term of art employed in select parts of the Constitution. The Preamble declares that the Constitution is ordained and established by “the People of the United States.” The Second Amendment protects “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms,” and the Ninth and Tenth Amendments provide that certain rights and powers are retained by and reserved to “the people.” See also U. S. Const., Arndt. 1 (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging ... the right of the people peaceably to assemble”) (emphasis added); Art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States”) (emphasis added). While this textual exegesis is by no means conclusive, it suggests that “the, people” protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and Second Amendments, and to whom rights and powers are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that community. See United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U. S. 279, 292 (1904) (Excludable alien is not entitled to First Amendment rights, because “[h]e does not become one of the people to whom these things are secured by our Constitution by an attempt to enter forbidden by law”). The language of these Amendments contrasts with the words “person” and “accused” used in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments regulating procedure in criminal cases.
What we know of the history of the drafting of the Fourth Amendment also suggests that its purpose was to restrict searches and seizures which might be conducted by the United States in domestic matters. The Framers originally decided not to include a provision like the Fourth Amendment, because they believed the National Government lacked power to conduct searches and seizures. See C. Warren, The Making of the Constitution 508-509 (1928); The Federalist No. 84, p. 513 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton); 1 Annals of Cong. 437 (1789) (statement of J. Madison). Many disputed the original view that the Federal Government possessed only narrow delegated powers over domestic affairs, however, and ultimately felt an Amendment prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures was necessary. Madison, for example, argued that “there is a clause granting to Congress the power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution all of the powers vested in the Government of the United States,” and that general warrants might be considered “necessary” for the purpose of collecting revenue. Id., at 438. The driving force behind the adoption of the Amendment, as suggested by Madison’s advocacy, was widespread hostility among the former colonists to the issuance of writs of assistance empowering revenue officers to search suspected places for smuggled goods, and general search warrants permitting the search of private houses, often to uncover papers that might be used to' convict persons of libel. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 625-626 (1886). The available historical data show, therefore, that the purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to protect the people of the United States against arbitrary action by their own Government; it was never suggested that the provision was intended to restrain the actions of the Federal Government against aliens outside of the United States territory.
There is likewise no indication that the Fourth Amendment was understood by contemporaries of the Framers to apply to activities of the United States directed against aliens in foreign territory or in international waters. Only seven years after the ratification of the Amendment, French interference with American commercial vessels engaged in neutral trade triggered what came to be known as the “undeclared war” with France. In an Act to “protect the Commerce of the United States” in 1798, Congress authorized President Adams to “instruct the commanders of the public armed vessels which are, or which shall be employed in the service of the United States, to subdue, seize and take any armed French vessel, which shall be found within the jurisdictional limits of the United States, or elsewhere, on the high seas.” § 1 of An Act Further to Protect the Commerce of the United States, ch. 68, 1 Stat. 578. This public naval force consisted of only 45 vessels, so Congress also gave the President power to grant to the owners of private armed ships and vessels of the United States “special commissions,” which would allow them “the same license and authority for the subduing, seizing and capturing any armed French vessel, and for the recapture of the vessels, goods and effects of the people of the United States, as the public armed vessels of the United States may by law have.” § 2, 1 Stat. 579; see U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 11 (Congress has power to grant letters of marque and reprisal). Under the latter provision, 365 private armed vessels were commissioned before March 1, 1799, see G. Allen, Our Naval War with France 59 (1967); together, these enactments resulted in scores of seizures of foreign vessels under congressional authority. See M. Palmer, Stoddert’s War: Naval Operations During the Quasi-War with France, 1798-1801, p. 235 (1987). See also An Act Further to Suspend the Commercial Intercourse Between the United States and France, ch. 2, 1 Stat. 613. Some commanders were held liable by this Court for unlawful seizures because their actions were beyond the scope of the congressional grant of authority, see, e. g., Little v. Barreme, 2 Cranch 170, 177-178 (1804); cf. Talbot v. Seeman, 1 Cranch 1, 81 (1801) (seizure of neutral ship lawful where American captain had probable cause to believe vessel was French), but it was never suggested that the Fourth Amendment restrained the authority of Congress or of United States agents to conduct operations such as this.
The global view taken by the Court of Appeals of the application of the Constitution is also contrary to this Court’s decisions in the Insular Cases, which held that not every constitutional provision applies to governmental activity even where the United States has sovereign power. See, e. g., Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U. S. 298 (1922) (Sixth Amendment right to jury trial inapplicable in Puerto Rico); Ocampo v. United States, 234 U. S. 91 (1914) (Fifth Amendment grand jury provision inapplicable in Philippines); Dorr v. United States, 195 U. S. 138 (1904) (jury trial provision inapplicable in Philippines); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U. S. 197 (1903) (provisions on indictment by grand jury and jury trial inapplicable in Hawaii); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244 (1901) (Revenue Clauses of Constitution inapplicable to Puerto Rico). In Dorr, we declared the general rule that in an unincorporated territory — one not clearly destined for statehood — Congress was not required to adopt “a system of laws which shall include the right of trial by jury, and that the Constitution does not, without legislation and of its own force, carry such right to territory so situated.” 195 U. S., at 149 (emphasis added). Only “fundamental” constitutional rights are guaranteed to inhabitants of those territories. Id., at 148; Balzac, supra, at 312-313; see Examining Board of Engineers, Architects and Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U. S. 572, 599, n. 30 (1976). If that is true with respect to territories ultimately governed by Congress, respondent’s claim that the protections of the Fourth Amendment extend to aliens in foreign nations is even weaker. And certainly, it is not open to us in light of the Insular Cases to endorse the view that every constitutional provision applies wherever the United States Government exercises its power.
Indeed, we have rejected the claim that aliens are entitled to Fifth Amendment rights outside the sovereign territory of the United States. In Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U. S. 763 (1950), the Court held that enemy aliens arrested in China and imprisoned in Germany after World War II could not obtain writs of habeas corpus in our federal courts on the ground that their convictions for war crimes had violated the Fifth Amendment and other constitutional provisions. The Eisentrager opinion acknowledged that in some cases constitutional provisions extend beyond the citizenry; “[t]he alien . . . has been accorded a generous and ascending scale of rights as he increases his identity with our society.” Id., at 770. But our rejection of extraterritorial application of the Fifth Amendment was emphatic:
“Such extraterritorial application of organic law would have been so significant an innovation in the practice of governments that, if intended or apprehended, it could scarcely have failed to excite contemporary comment. Not one word can be cited. No decision of this Court supports such a view. Cf. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244 [(1901)]. None of the learned commentators on our Constitution has even hinted at it. The practice of every modern government is opposed to it.” Id., at 784.
If such is true of the Fifth Amendment, which speaks in the relatively universal term of “person,” it would seem even more true with respect to the Fourth Amendment, which applies only to “the people.”
To support his all-encompassing view of the Fourth Amendment, respondent points to language from the plurality opinion in Reid v. Covert, 354 U. S. 1 (1957). Reid involved an attempt by Congress to subject the wives of American servicemen to trial by military tribunals without the protection of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The Court held that it was unconstitutional to apply the Uniform Code of Military Justice to the trials of the American women for capital crimes. Four Justices “rejected] the idea that when the United States acts against citizens abroad it can do so free of the Bill of Rights.” Id., at 5 (emphasis added). The plurality went on to say:
“The United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power and authority have no other source. It can only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution. When the Government reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution provide to protect his life and liberty should not be stripped away just because he happens to be in another land.” Id., at 5-6 (emphasis added; footnote omitted).
Respondent urges that we interpret this discussion to mean that federal officials are constrained by the Fourth Amendment wherever and against whomever they act. But the holding of Reid stands for no such sweeping proposition: it decided that United States citizens stationed abroad could invoke the protection of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The concurrences by Justices Frankfurter and Harlan in Reid resolved the case on much narrower grounds than the plurality and declined even to hold that United States citizens were entitled to the full range of constitutional protections in all overseas criminal prosecutions. See id., at 75 (Harlan, J., concurring in result) (“I agree with my brother Frankfurter that... we have before us a question analogous, ultimately, to issues of due process; one can say, in fact, that the question of which specific safeguards of the Constitution are appropriately to be applied in a particular context overseas can be reduced to the issue of what process is ‘due’ a defendant in the particular circumstances of a particular case”). Since respondent is not a United States citizen, he can derive no comfort from the Reid holding.
Verdugo-Urquidez also relies on a series of cases in which we have held that aliens enjoy certain constitutional rights. See, e. g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U. S. 202, 211-212 (1982) (illegal aliens protected by Equal Protection Clause); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U. S. 590, 596 (1953) (resident alien is a “person” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S. 135, 148 (1945) (resident aliens have First Amendment rights); Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U. S. 481 (1931) (Just Compensation Clause of Fifth Amendment); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 228, 238 (1896) (resident aliens entitled to Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 369 (1886) (Fourteenth Amendment protects resident aliens). These cases, however, establish only that aliens receive constitutional protections when they have come within the territory of the United States and developed substantial connections with this country. See, e. g., Plyler, supra, at 212 (The provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment “ ‘are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction . . .’”) (quoting Yick Wo, supra, at 369); Kwong Hai Chew, supra, at 596, n. 5 (“The Bill of Rights is a futile authority for the alien seeking admission for the first time to these shores. But once an alien lawfully enters and resides in this country he becomes invested with the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all people within our borders”) (quoting Bridges, supra, at 161 (concurring opinion) (emphasis added)). Respondent is an alien who has had no previous significant voluntary connection with the United States, so these cases avail him not.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Ginsburg
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Bankruptcy Code accords a priority, among unsecured creditors’ claims, for unpaid “wages, salaries, or commissions,” 11 U. S. C. § 507(a)(4)(A), and for unpaid contributions to “an employee benefit plan,” § 507(a)(5). It is uncontested here that § 507(a)(5) covers fringe benefits that complete a pay package — typically pension plans, and group health, life, and disability insurance — whether unilaterally provided by an employer or the result of collective bargaining. This case presents the question whether the § 507(a)(5) priority also encompasses claims for unpaid premiums on a policy purchased by an employer to cover its workers’ compensation liability. We hold that premiums owed by an employer to a workers’ compensation carrier do not fit within § 507(a)(5).
Workers’ compensation laws ensure that workers will be compensated for work-related injuries whether or not negligence of the employer contributed to the injury. To that extent, arrangements for the payment of compensation awards might be typed “employee benefit plants].” On the other hand, statutorily prescribed workers’ compensation regimes do not run exclusively to the employees’ benefit. In this regard, they differ from privately ordered, employer-funded pension and welfare plans that, together with wages, remunerate employees for services rendered. Employers, too, gain from workers’ compensation prescriptions. In exchange for no-fault liability, employers gain immunity from tort actions that might yield damages many times higher than awards payable under workers’ compensation schedules. Although the question is close, we conclude that premiums paid for workers’ compensation insurance are more appropriately bracketed with premiums paid for other liability insurance, e.g., motor vehicle, fire, or theft insurance, than with contributions made to secure employee retirement, health, and disability benefits.
In holding that claims for workers’ compensation insurance premiums do not qualify for § 507(a)(5). priority, we are mindful that the Bankruptcy Code aims, in the main, to secure equal distribution among creditors. See Kothe v. R. C. Taylor Trust, 280 U. S. 224, 227 (1930); Kuehner v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U. S. 445, 451 (1937). We take into account, as well, the complementary principle that preferential treatment of a class of creditors is in order only when clearly authorized by Congress. See Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U. S. 25, 29 (1952); United States v. Embassy Restaurant, Inc., 359 U. S. 29, 31 (1959).
I
Petitioner Howard Delivery Service, Inc. (Howard), for many years owned and operated a freight trucking business. Howard employed as many as 480 workers and operated in about a dozen States. Each of those States required Howard to maintain workers’ compensation coverage to secure its employees’ receipt of health, disability, and death benefits in the event of on-the-job accidents. Howard contracted with Zurich to provide this insurance for Howard’s operations in ten States.
On January 30, 2002, Howard filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. Zurich filed an unsecured creditor’s claim in that proceeding, seeking priority status for some $400,000 in unpaid workers’ compensation premiums. In an amended proof of claim, Zurich asserted that these unpaid premiums qualified as “[(Contributions to an employee benefit plan” entitled to priority under § 507(a)(5). App. 32a. The Bankruptcy Court denied priority status to Zurich’s claim, reasoning that the overdue premiums do not qualify as bargained-for benefits furnished in lieu of increased wages, hence they fall outside § 507(a)(5)’s compass. App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a-57a. The District Court affirmed, similarly determining that unpaid workers’ compensation premiums do not share the priority provided for unpaid contributions to employee pension and health plans. Id., at 39a-50a.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed 2 to 1 in a per curiam opinion. 403 F. 3d 228 (2005). The judges in the majority, however, disagreed on the rationale. Judge King concluded that § 507(a)(5) unambiguously accorded priority status to claims for unpaid workers’ compensation premiums. Id., at 237. Judge Shedd, concurring in the judgment, found the § 507(a)(5) phrase “employee benefit plan” ambiguous. Looking to legislative history, he concluded that Congress likely intended to give past due workers’ compensation premiums priority status. Id., at 238-239. In dissent, Judge Niemeyer, like Judge King, relied on the “plain meaning” of § 507(a)(5), but read the provision unequivocally to deny priority status to an insurer’s claim for unpaid workers’ compensation premiums. Id., at 241-244.
We granted certiorari, 546 U. S. 1002 (2005), to resolve a split among the Circuits concerning the priority status of premiums owed by a bankrupt employer to a workers’ compensation carrier. Compare In re Birmingham-Nashville Express, Inc., 224 F. 3d 511, 517 (CA6 2000) (denying priority status to unpaid workers’ compensation premiums), In re Southern Star Foods, Inc., 144 F. 3d 712, 717 (CA10 1998) (same), and In re HLM Corp., 62 F. 3d 224, 226-227 (CA8 1995) (same), with Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Plaid Pantries, Inc., 10 F. 3d 605, 607 (CA9 1993) (according priority status), and 403 F. 3d, at 229 (case below) (same).
II
Adjoining subsections of the Bankruptcy Code, § 507(a)(4) and (5), are centrally involved in this case. Subsections 507(a)(4) and (5) currently provide:
“(a) The following expenses and claims have priority in the following order:
“(4) Fourth, allowed unsecured claims ... for—
“(A) wages, salaries, or commissions, including vacation, severance, and sick leave pay earned by an individual....
“(5) Fifth, allowed unsecured claims for contributions to an employee benefit plan—
“(A) arising from services rendered within 180 days before the date of the filing of the [bankruptcy] petition or the date of the cessation of the debtor’s business, whichever occurs first. . . .” 11 U. S. C. §507.
Two decisions of this Court, United States v. Embassy Restaurant, Inc., 359 U. S. 29 (1959), and Joint Industry Bd. of Elec. Industry v. United States, 391 U. S. 224 (1968), prompted the enactment of § 507(a)(5). Embassy Restaurant concerned a provision of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act that granted priority status to “wages” but said nothing of “employee benefits plans” or anything similar. 11 U. S. C. § 104(a)(2) (1952 ed., Supp. V; repealed 1978). We held that a debtor’s unpaid contributions to a union welfare plan — which provided life insurance, weekly sick benefits, hospital and surgical benefits, and other advantages — did not qualify within the priority for unpaid “wages.” 359 U. S., at 29-35. In Joint Industry Bd., we followed Embassy Restaurant and held that an employer’s bargained-for contributions to an employees’ annuity plan did not qualify as “wages” entitled to priority status. 391 U. S., at 228-229.
To provide a priority for fringe benefits of the kind at issue in Embassy Restaurant and Joint Industry Bd., Congress added what is now § 507(a)(5) when it amended the Bankruptcy Act in 1978. See H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 187 (1977) (hereinafter H. R. Rep.) (explaining that the amendment covers “health insurance programs, life insurance plans, pension funds, and all other forms of employee compensation that [are] not in the form of wages”); S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 69 (1978). Notably, Congress did not enlarge the “wages, salaries, [and] commissions” priority, § 507(a)(4), to include fringe benefits. Instead, Congress created a new priority for such benefits, one step lower than the wage priority. The new provision, currently contained in § 507(a)(5), allows the provider of an employee benefit plan to recover unpaid premiums — albeit only after the employees’ claims for “wages, salaries, or commissions” have been paid. § 507(a)(4).
Beyond genuine debate, the main office of § 507(a)(5) is to capture portions of employee compensation for services rendered not covered by § 507(a)(4). Cf. Embassy Restaurant, 359 U. S., at 35; Joint Industry Bd., 391 U. S., at 228-229 (both emphasizing Congress’ prerogative in this regard). The current Code’s juxtaposition of the wages and employee benefit plan priorities manifests Congress’ comprehension that fringe benefits generally complement, or “substitute” for, hourly pay. See H. R. Rep., at 357 (noting “the realities of labor contract negotiations, under which wage demands are often reduced if adequate fringe benefits are substituted”); id., at 187 (“[T]o ignore the reality of collective bargaining that often trades wage dollars for fringe benefits does a severe disservice to those working for a failing enterprise.”); In re Saco Local Development Corp., 711 F. 2d 441, 449 (CA1 1983) (majority opinion of Breyer, J.) (substitution of fringe benefits for wages “can normally be assumed, unless the employer is a philanthropist”).
Congress tightened the linkage of subsections (a)(4) and (a)(5) by imposing a combined cap on the two priorities, currently set at $10,000 per employee. See § 507(a)(5)(B). Because (a)(4) has a higher priority status, all claims for wages are paid first, up to the $10,000 limit; claims under (a)(5) for contributions to employee benefit plans can be recovered next up to the remainder of the $10,000 ceiling. No other subsections of §507 are joined together by a common cap in this way.
Putting aside the clues provided by Embassy Restaurant, Joint Industry Bd., and the textual ties binding § 507(a)(4) and (5), we recognize that Congress left undefined the § 507(a)(5) terms: “contributions to an employee benefit plan ... arising from services rendered within 180 days before the date of the filing of the [bankruptcy] petition.” (Emphasis added.) Maintaining that subsection (a)(5) covers more than wage substitutes of the kind at issue in Embassy Restaurant and Joint Industry Bd., Zurich urges the Court to borrow the encompassing definition of employee benefit plan contained in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 829, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. III). See §1002(1) (term “employee welfare benefit plan” means, inter alia, “any plan, fund, or program [that provides] its participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, . . . benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment”); § 1002(3) (term “employee benefit plan . . . means an employee welfare benefit plan or an employee pension benefit plan or a plan which is both an employee welfare benefit plan and an employee pension benefit plan”); cf. § 1003(b)(3) (excluding plans “maintained solely for the purpose of complying with applicable workers’] compensation laws or unemployment compensation or disability insurance laws”). The dissent endorses this borrowing. See post, at 676.
Federal courts have questioned whether ERISA is appropriately used to fill in blanks in a Bankruptcy Code provision, and the panel below parted ways on this issue. See 403 F. 3d, at 235, n. 9 (King, J., concurring in judgment) (“declin[ing] to rely upon the ERISA definition”); id., at 239-241 (Shedd, J., concurring in judgment) (reading legislative history to indicate that Congress intended “‘employee benefit plan’ in the bankruptcy priority provision to have the same meaning that [the term] has in ERISA”); id., at 245 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (maintaining that ERISA definition is inapt in Bankruptcy Code priority context); cf. Birmingham-Nashville Express, 224 F. 3d, at 516-517 (noting division of opinion but concluding that decisions rejecting incorporation of ERISA’s “employee benefit plan” definition into § 507(a)(5) “ha[ve] the better of the argument”); HLM Corp., 62 F. 3d, at 226 (“[T]he ERISA definition and associated court guidelines were designed to effectuate the purpose of ERISA, not the Bankruptcy Code.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Southern Star Foods, 144 F. 3d, at 714 (same). Compare Brief for American Home Assurance Company et al. as Amici Curiae 17-25 (legislative history suggests Congress intended to incorporate ERISA definition) with Brief for National Coordinating Committee for Multiemployer Plans as Amicus Curiae 22-27, and n. 21 (legislative history suggests Congress did not intend to incorporate ERISA definition).
ERISA’s omnibus definition does show, at least, that the term “employee welfare benefit plan” is susceptible of a construction that would include workers’ compensation plans. That Act’s signals are mixed, however, for 29 U. S. C. § 1003(b)(3) specifically exempts from ERISA’s coverage the genre of plan here at issue, i. e., one “maintained solely for the purpose of complying with applicable workers’] compensation laws.” The § 1003(b)(3) exemption strengthens our resistance to Zurich’s argument. We follow the lead of an earlier decision, United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U. S. 213, 219 (1996), in noting that “[h]ere and there in the Bankruptcy Code Congress has included specific directions that establish the significance for bankruptcy law of a term used elsewhere in the federal statutes.” Id., at 219-220. No such directions are contained in § 507(a)(5), and we have no warrant to write them into the text.
This case turns, we hold, not on a definition borrowed from a statute designed without bankruptcy in mind, but on the essential character of workers’ compensation regimes. Unlike pension provisions or group life, health, and disability insurance plans — negotiated or granted as pay supplements or substitutes — workers’ compensation prescriptions have a dominant employer-oriented thrust: They modify, or substitute for, the common-law tort liability to which employers were exposed for work-related accidents. See 6 A. Larson & L. Larson, Workers’ Compensation Law §100.01[1], pp. 100-2 to 100-3 (2005) (hereinafter Larson & Larson); 4 J. Lee & B. Lindahl, Modern Tort Law: Liability and Litigation §43:25, pp. 43-45 to 43-46 (2d ed. 2003). As typically explained:
“The invention of workers compensation as it has existed in this country since about 1910 involves a classic social trade-off or, to use a Latin term, a quid pro quo. . . . What is given to the injured employee is the right to receive certain limited benefits regardless of fault, that is, even in cases in which the employee is partially or entirely at fault, or when there is no fault on anyone’s part. What is taken away is the employee’s right to recover full tort damages, including damages for pain and suffering, in cases in which there is fault on the employer’s part.” P. Lencsis, Workers Compensation: A Reference and Guide 9 (1998) (hereinafter Lencsis).
Workers’ compensation regimes thus provide something for employees — they ensure limited fixed payments for on-the-job injuries — and something for employers — they remove the risk of large judgments and heavy costs generated by tort litigation. See 6 Larson & Larson §100.03[1], at 100-11 (“[Workers’ compensation] relieves the employer not only of common-law tort liability, but also of statutory liability under virtually all state statutes, as well as of liability in contract and in admiralty, for an injury covered by the compensation act.” (footnote omitted)); Lubove, Workmen’s Compensation and the Prerogatives of Voluntarism, 8 Lab. Hist. 254, 258-262 (Fall 1967) (workers’ compensation programs were adopted by nearly every State in large part because employers anticipated significant benefits from the programs; other programs workers’ groups sought to make mandatory — notably, health insurance — were not similarly embraced). No such tradeoff is involved in fringe benefit plans that augment each covered worker’s hourly pay.
Employer-sponsored pension plans, and group health or life insurance plans, characteristically insure the employee (or his survivor) only. In contrast, workers’ compensation insurance, in common with other liability insurance in this regard, e. g., fire, theft, and motor vehicle insurance, shield the insured enterprise: Workers’ compensation policies both protect the employer-policyholder from liability in tort, and cover its obligation to pay workers’ compensation benefits. See In re HLM Corp., 165 B. R. 38, 41 (Bkrtcy. Ct. Minn. 1994). When an employer fails to secure workers’ compensation coverage, or loses coverage for nonpayment of premiums, an affected employee’s remedy would not lie in a suit for premiums that should have been paid to a compensation carrier. Instead, employees who sustain work-related injuries would commonly have recourse to a state-maintained fund. See, e. g., Minn. Stat. § 176.183, subd. 1 (2004); N. Y. Work. Comp. Law Ann. § 26-a (West Supp. 2006). Or, in lieu of the limited benefits obtainable from a state fund under workers’ compensation schedules, the injured employee might be authorized to pursue the larger recoveries successful tort litigation ordinarily yields. See, e. g., id., § 11 (West 2005); W. Va. Code §23-2-8 (Lexis 2005); Lencsis 67.
Further distancing workers’ compensation arrangements from bargained-for or voluntarily accorded fringe benefits, nearly all States, with limited exceptions, require employers to participate in their workers’ compensation systems. See, e. g., Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 820, § 305/4 (West 2004); Minn. Stat. § 176.181, subd. 2 (2004); U. S. Dept, of Labor, Office of Workers’ Compensation, State Workers’ Compensation Laws, Table 1: Type of Law and Insurance Requirements for Private Employment (2005), online at http://www.dol.gov/esa/ regs/statutes/owcp/stwclaw/tables-pdf/tablel.pdf (as visited June 13, 2006, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file). An employer who fails to secure the mandatory coverage is subject to substantial penalties, even criminal liability. We do not suggest, as the dissent hypothesizes, see post, at 674, that a compensation carrier would gain § 507(a)(5) priority for unpaid premiums in States where workers’ compensation coverage is elective. Nor do we suggest that wage surrogates or supplements, e. g., pension and health benefits plans, would lose protection under § 507(a)(5) if a State were to mandate them. We simply count it a factor relevant to our assessment that States overwhelmingly prescribe and regulate insurance coverage for on-the-job accidents, while commonly leaving pension, health, and life insurance plans to private ordering.
We note that when the Fourth Circuit confronted a claim for workers’ compensation premiums owed not to a private insurer but to a state fund, that court ranked the premiums as “excise taxes” qualifying for bankruptcy priority under what is now § 507(a)(8)(E). See New Neighborhoods, Inc. v. West Virginia Workers’ Comp. Fund, 886 F. 2d 714, 718-720 (1989). See also In re Suburban Motor Freight, Inc., 998 F. 2d 338, 342 (CA6 1993) (“Where a State ‘compels] the payment’ of ‘involuntary exactions, regardless of name,’ and where such payment is universally applicable to similarly situated persons or firms, these payments are taxes for bankruptcy purposes.” (quoting New Neighborhoods, 886 F. 2d, at 718-719; alteration in original)); LeRoy et al., Workers’ Compensation in Bankruptcy: How Do the Parties Fare? 24 Tort & Ins. L. J. 593, 623-624 (1989) (describing disagreement among courts on whether payments to state-run workers’ compensation funds qualify as excise taxes under § 507(a)(8)). We express no view on the § 507(a)(8)(E) issue presented in New Neighborhoods. We venture only this observation: It is common for Congress to prefer Government creditors over private creditors, see Birmingham-Nashville Express, 224 F. 3d, at 517-518; it would be anomalous, however, to advance Zurich’s claim to level (a)(5) while leaving state-fund creditors at level (a)(8).
Zurich argues that according its claim an (a)(5) priority will give workers’ compensation carriers an incentive to continue coverage of a failing enterprise, thus promoting rehabilitation of the business. It may be doubted whether the projected incentive would outweigh competing financial pressure to pull the plug swiftly on an insolvent policyholder, and thereby contain potential losses. An insurer undertakes to pay the scheduled benefits to workers injured on the job while the policy is in effect. In the case of serious injuries, however, benefits may remain payable years after termination of coverage. See 1 Larson & Larson §§ 10.02-10.03, at 10-3 to 10-7; Lencsis 51-52. While cancellation relieves the insurer from responsibility for future injuries, the insurer cannot escape the obligation to continue paying benefits for enduring maladies or disabilities, even though no premiums are paid by the former policyholder. An insurer would likely weigh in the balance the risk of incurring fresh obligations of long duration were it to continue insuring employers unable to pay currently for coverage. That consideration might well be controlling even with an assurance of priority status, for there is no guarantee that creditors accorded preferred positions will in fact be paid. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 31-32 (“[A]s soon as they smell bankruptcy, they’re going to pull the plug anyway.” (SCALIA, J.)); LeRoy, supra, at 596 (noting “general reluctance on the part of private insurers to provide debtors with the necessary Workers’ Compensation coverage”).
Rather than speculating on how workers’ compensation insurers might react were they to be granted an (a)(5) priority, we are guided in reaching our decision by the equal distribution objective underlying the Bankruptcy Code, and the corollary principle that provisions allowing preferences must be tightly construed. See Kothe, 280 U. S., at 227 (“The broad purpose of the Bankruptcy Act is to bring about an equitable distribution of the bankrupt’s estate ....”); Nathanson, 344 U. S., at 29 (“The theme of the Bankruptcy Act is 'equality of distribution’ . . . ; and if one claimant is to be preferred over others, the purpose should be clear from the statute.” (quoting Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 313 U. S. 215, 219 (1941))); H. R. Rep., at 186; 2 Collier Bankruptcy Manual ¶ 507.01, p. 507-4 (rev. 3d ed. 2005) (“[P]riorities under the Code are to be narrowly construed.”).
Every claim granted priority status reduces the funds available to general unsecured creditors and may diminish the recovery of other claimants qualifying for equal or lesser priorities. See Joint Industry Bd., 391 U. S., at 228-229. “To give priority to a claimant not clearly entitled thereto is not only inconsistent with the policy of equality of distribution; it dilutes the value of the priority for those creditors Congress intended to prefer.” In re Mammoth Mart, Inc., 536 F. 2d 950, 953 (CA1 1976). Cases like Zurich’s are illustrative. The Bankruptcy Code caps the amount recoverable for contributions to employee benefit plans. See supra, at 659-660. Opening the (a)(5) priority to workers’ compensation carriers could shrink the amount available to cover unpaid contributions to plans paradigmatically qualifying as wage surrogates, prime among them, pension and health benefit plans.
In sum, we find it far from clear that an employer’s liability to provide workers’ compensation coverage fits the § 507(a)(5) category “contributions to an employee benefit plan ... arising from services rendered.” Weighing against such categorization, workers’ compensation does not compensate employees for work performed, but instead, for on-the-job injuries incurred; workers’ compensation regimes substitute not for wage payments, but for tort liability. Any doubt concerning the appropriate characterization, we conclude, is best resolved in accord with the Bankruptcy Code’s equal distribution aim. We therefore reject the expanded interpretation Zurich invites. Unless and until Congress otherwise directs, we hold that carriers’ claims for unpaid workers’ compensation premiums remain outside the priority allowed by § 507(a)(5).
* * *
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
All references to provisions of the Bankruptcy Code use the current numbering. At the time respondent Zurich American Insurance Company (Zurich) claimed priority treatment for unpaid workers’ compensation premiums, the relevant subsections were numbered (a)(3) (wages) and (a)(4) (employee benefit plans). The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-8, §212(2), 119 Stat. 51, altered the priority list so that (a)(3) became (a)(4), and (a)(4) became (a)(5). The only other statutory change relevant here concerns the dollar amount accorded priority status under current § 507(a)(4) and (a)(5). When Zurich filed its proof of claim, the total sum allowed under those two subsections was $4,650 for each employee, see note following 11 U. S. C. § 104 (2000 ed., Supp. III). That ceiling has since been raised, pursuant to § 104, to $10,000 per employee, 11 U. S. C. A. § 507(a)(5)(B)® (Supp. 2006).
In its initial proof of claim, Zurich did not check the box marked “Contributions to an employee benefit plan,” but instead checked a box marked “Other,” and wrote in “Administrative Expense — Insurance Premiums.” App. 22a, 30a. Zurich does not argue here that the workers’ compensation premiums owed by Howard qualify as administrative expenses entitled to priority under § 507(a)(2).
We have jurisdiction of this case, as did the Court of Appeals, because the District Court’s ruling qualifies as a final decision under 28 U. S. C. § 158(d). See 403 F. 3d, at 231, and n. 6 (District Court’s ruling effectively concluded the dispute between Zurich and Howard, for the adverse decision rendered Zurich’s claim valueless and Zurich agreed to withdraw the claim if it failed to prevail on appeal). See also In re Saco Local Development Corp., 711 F. 2d 441, 444 (CA1 1983) (majority opinion of Breyer, J.) (“Congress has long provided that orders in bankruptcy cases may be immediately appealed if they finally dispose of discrete disputes within the larger case — and in particular, it has long provided that orders finally settling creditors’ claims are separately appealable.”).
Section 507(a)(5)(B) provides:
“(a) The following expenses and claims have priority in the following order:
“(5) Fifth, allowed unsecured claims for contributions to an employee benefit plan—
“(B) for each such plan, to the extent of—
“(i) the number of employees covered by each such plan multiplied by $10,000; less
“(ii) the aggregate amount paid to such employees under paragraph (4) of this subsection, plus the aggregate amount paid by the estate on behalf of such employees to any other employee benefit plan.” 11 U.S. C. §507.
Congress also excluded most workers’ compensation benefits from the purview of the Davis-Baeon Act, 40 U. S. C. § 3141(2) (2000 ed., Supp. III), a measure that fixes a floor under wages on Government projects. The Davis-Baeon Act incorporates “bona fide fringe benefits,” broadly defined, into prevailing wage determinations, but specifically excludes benefits contractors are required to provide under federal, state, or local law. § 3141(2)(B).
Providing health care to workers fosters a healthy and happy work force, and a contented work force benefits employers. The dissent suggests this as a reason to rank workers’ compensation insurance with health and pension plans for bankruptcy priority purposes. See post, at 672. But the benefit employers gain from providing health and pension plans for their employees is of a secondary order; indeed, under the dissent’s logic, wages could be said to “benefit” the employer because they ensure that employees come to work, can afford transportation to the jobsite, etc. These benefits redound to the employer reflexively, as a consequence of the benefit to the employee. Workers’ compensation insurance, by contrast, directly benefits insured employers by eliminating their tort liability for workplace accidents.
Saco Local Development Corp., 711 F. 2d, at 448-449, we note, is not at odds with our conclusion that unpaid workers’ compensation premiums do not qualify for priority status. The First Circuit held in Saco that a group life, health, and disability insurance plan fit within § 507(a)(5), though the benefit package was unilaterally provided by the employer, and not installed pursuant to collective bargaining. Wage surrogates, then-Judge Breyer explained, need not be negotiated to qualify under § 507(a)(5) as “employee benefit plants],” for “Congress’ object in enacting [that subsection] was to extend the 1898 Act’s wage priority to new forms of compensation, such as insurance and other fringe benefits.” Id., at 449. Saco did not involve workers’ compensation regimes, and the First Circuit expressed no opinion on them.
The state fund in New Neighborhoods, it appears, did not urge that claims for unpaid workers’ compensation premiums qualify for the higher (a)(5) priority. The Fourth Circuit’s opinion in that case, however, suggests that the court assumed a private compensation carrier would be accorded no priority. See 886 F. 2d, at 720 (under court’s holding, “a state agency is given, as an insurer, priority in bankruptcy when a private insurer is not”).
The dissenting opinion nowhere homes in on the reality that including amounts owed to workers’ compensation carriers risks diminishing funds available to cover contributions to workers’ pension and "health-care plans.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case, we consider whether the ‘“plain statement’ rule” of Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1042, and n. 7 (1983), applies in a case on federal habeas review as well as in a case on direct review in this Court. We hold that it does.
I
Petitioner Warren Lee Harris was convicted in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Ill., of murder. On direct appeal, petitioner challenged only the sufficiency of the evidence. The Appellate Court of Illinois, by an unpublished order, affirmed the conviction. App. 5; see 71 Ill. App. 3d 1113, 392 N. E. 2d 1386 (1979).
Petitioner then returned to the Circuit Court of Cook County and filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance in several respects, including his failure to call alibi witnesses. The court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing. The Appellate Court of Illinois, in another unpublished order, again affirmed. App. 9.
In its order, the Appellate Court referred to the “well-settled” principle of Illinois law that “those [issues] which could have been presented [on direct appeal], but were not, are considered waived.” Id., at 12. The court found that, “except for the alibi witnesses,” petitioner’s ineffective-assistance allegations “could have been raised in [his] direct appeal.” Ibid. The court, however, went on to consider and reject petitioner’s ineffective-assistance claim on its merits.
Petitioner did not seek review in the Supreme Court of Illinois. Instead, he pursued his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim in federal court by a petition for a writ of ha-beas corpus under 28 U. S. C. §2254. The District Court recognized that if the Illinois Appellate Court had held this claim to be waived under Illinois law, this Court’s decision in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72 (1977), would bar a federal court’s consideration of the claim unless petitioner was able to show either “cause and prejudice” or a “miscarriage of justice.” 608 F. Supp. 1369, 1377 (ND Ill. 1985).
The District Court, however, determined that the Illinois Appellate Court had not held any portion of the ineffective-assistance claim to have been waived. First, the District Court observed, the state court had “made clear” that the waiver did not apply to the issue of alibi witnesses. Id., at 1378. Second, the court never clearly held any other issue waived. The state court “did not appear to make two rulings in the alternative, but rather to note a procedural default and then ignore it, reaching the merits instead.” Ibid. Based on this determination, the District Court concluded that it was permitted to consider the ineffective-assistance claim in its entirety and ordered an evidentiary hearing. Id., at 1385. After that hearing, the court, in an unpublished memorandum and order, dismissed the claim on the merits, although it characterized the case as “a close and difficult” one. App. 45.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, 822 F. 2d 684 (CA7 1987), but did not reach the merits because, in disagreement with the District Court, it believed the ineffective-assistance claim to be procedurally barred. Considering the Illinois Appellate Court’s order “ambiguous” because it contained “neither an explicit finding of waiver nor an expression of an intention to ignore waiver,” the Court of Appeals nonetheless asserted that a reviewing court “should try to assess the state court’s intention to the extent that this is possible.” Id,., at 687. Undertaking this effort, the Court of Appeals concluded that the order “suggested]” an intention “to find all grounds waived except that pertaining to the alibi witnesses.” Ibid. Based on this interpretation of the order, the Court of Appeals concluded that the merits of petitioner’s federal claim had been reached only “as an alternate holding,” ibid., and considered itself precluded from reviewing the merits of the claim.
Concurring separately, Judge Cudahy stated: “Rather than attempting to divine the unspoken ‘intent’ of [the state] court, I think we should invoke a presumption that waiver not clearly found has been condoned.” Ibid.
The disagreement between the majority and the concurrence reflects a conflict among the Courts of Appeals over the standard for determining whether a state court’s ambiguous invocation of a procedural default bars federal habeas review. We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict. 485 U. S. 934 (1988).
II
The confusion among the courts evidently stems from a failure to recognize that the procedural default rule of Wainwright v. Sykes has its historical and theoretical basis in the “adequate and independent state ground” doctrine. 433 U. S., at 78-79, 81-82, 87. Once the lineage of the rule is clarified, the cure for the confusion becomes apparent.
A
This Court long has held that it will not consider an issue of federal law on direct review from a judgment of a state court if that judgment rests on a state-law ground that is both “independent” of the merits of the federal claim and an “adequate” basis for the court’s decision. See, e. g., Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U. S. 207, 210 (1935); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 20 Wall. 590, 635-636 (1875). Although this doctrine originated in the context of state-court judgments for which the alternative state and federal grounds were both “substantive” in nature, the doctrine “has been applied routinely to state decisions forfeiting federal claims for violation of state procedural rules.” Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1128, 1134 (1986).
The question whether a state court’s reference to state law constitutes an adequate and independent state ground for its judgment may be rendered difficult by ambiguity in the state court’s opinion. In Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032 (1983), this Court laid down a rule to avoid the difficulties associated with such ambiguity. Under Long, if “it fairly appears that the state court rested its decision primarily on federal law,” this Court may reach the federal question on review unless the state court’s opinion contains a “ ‘plain statement’ that [its] decision rests upon adequate and independent state grounds.” Id., at 1042.
The Long “plain statement” rule applies regardless of whether the disputed state-law ground is substantive (as it was in Long) or procedural, as in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U. S. 320, 327 (1985). Thus, the mere fact that a federal claimant failed to abide by a state procedural rule does not, in and of itself, prevent this Court from reaching the federal claim: “[T]he state court must actually have relied on the procedural bar as an independent basis for its disposition of the ease.” Ibid. Furthermore, ambiguities in that regard must be resolved by application of the Long standard. Id., at 328.
B
The adequate and independent state ground doctrine, and the problem of ambiguity resolved by Long, is of concern not only in cases on direct review pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1257, but also in federal habeas corpus proceedings pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §2254.
Wainwright v. Sykes made clear that the adequate and independent state ground doctrine applies on federal habeas. 433 U. S., at 81, 87. See also Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U. S. 140, 148 (1979). Under Sykes and its progeny, an adequate and independent finding of procedural default will bar federal habeas review of the federal claim, unless the ha-beas petitioner can show “cause” for the default and “prejudice attributable thereto,” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U. S. 478, 485 (1986), or demonstrate that failure to consider the federal claim will result in a “‘fundamental miscarriage of justice.’” Id., at 495, quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 135 (1982). See also Smith v. Murray, 477 U. S. 527, 537 (1986).
Conversely, a federal claimant’s procedural default precludes federal habeas review, like direct review, only if the last state court rendering a judgment in the case rests its judgment on the procedural default. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U. S., at 327; Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U. S., at 152-154. Moreover, the question whether the state court indeed has done so is sometimes as difficult to answer on habeas review as on direct review. Just as this Court under § 1257 encounters state-court opinions that are unclear on this point, so too do the federal courts under §2254.
Habeas review thus presents the same problem of ambiguity that this Court resolved in Michigan v. Long. We held in Long that unless the state court clearly expressed its reliance on an adequate and independent state-law ground, this Court may address a federal issue considered by the state court. We applied that rule in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U. S., at 327, to a “somewhat cryptic” reference to procedural default in a state-court opinion.
Although Long and Caldwell arose on direct review, the principles underlying those decisions are not limited to direct review. Indeed, our opinion in Caldwell relied heavily upon our earlier application of the adequate and independent state ground doctrine to habeas review in Ulster County. See Caldwell, 472 U. S., at 327-328. Caldwell thus indicates that the problem of ambiguous state-court references to state law, which led to the adoption of the Long “plain statement” rule, is common to both direct and habeas review. Faced with a common problem, we adopt a common solution: a procedural default does not bar consideration of a federal claim on either direct or habeas review unless the last state court rendering a judgment in the case “ ‘clearly and expressly’ ” states that its judgment rests on a state procedural bar. Caldwell, 472 U. S., at 327, quoting Long, 463 U. S., at 1041.
C
Respondents, however, urge us to adopt a different rule for habeas cases, arguing that if a state-court decision is ambiguous as to whether the judgment rests on a procedural bar, the federal court should presume that it does. Respondents claim that applying the Long “plain statement” requirement to habeas cases would harm the interests of finality, federalism, and comity. This Court has been alert in recognizing that federal habeas review touches upon these significant state interests. Wainwright v. Sykes itself reveals this. See 433 U. S., at 90-91. We believe, however, that applying Long to habeas burdens those interests only minimally, if at all. The benefits, in contrast, are substantial.
A state court remains free under the Long rule to rely on a state procedural bar and thereby to foreclose federal ha-beas review to the extent permitted by Sykes. Requiring a state court to be explicit in its reliance on a procedural default does not interfere unduly with state judicial decision-making. As Long itself recognized, it would be more intrusive for a federal court to second-guess a state court’s determination of state law. 463 U. S., at 1041. Moreover, state courts have become familiar with the “plain statement” requirement under Long and Caldivell. Under our decision today, a state court need do nothing more to preclude habeas review than it must do to preclude direct review.
In contrast, respondents’ proposed rule would impose substantial burdens on the federal courts. At oral argument, counsel for respondents conceded that in some circumstances, under their proposal, the federal habeas court would be forced to examine the state-court record to determine whether procedural default was argued to the state court, or would be required to undertake an extensive analysis of state law to determine whether a procedural bar was potentially applicable to the particular case. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 28-29. Much time would be lost in reviewing legal and factual issues that the state court, familiar with state law and the record before it, is better suited to address expeditiously. The “plain statement” requirement achieves the important objective of permitting the federal court rapidly to identify whether federal issues are properly presented before it. Respondents’ proposed rule would not do that.
Thus, we are not persuaded that we should depart from Long and Caldwell simply because this is a habeas case. Having extended the adequate and independent state ground doctrine to habeas cases, we now extend to habeas review the “plain statement” rule for determining whether a state court has relied on an adequate and independent state ground.
hH HH
Applying the “plain statement” requirement in this case, we conclude that the Illinois Appellate Court did not “clearly and expressly” rely on waiver as a ground for rejecting any aspect of petitioner’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S., at 1041. To be sure, the state court perhaps laid the foundation for such a holding by stating that most of petitioner’s allegations “could have been raised [on] direct appeal.” App. 12. Nonetheless, as the Court of Appeals recognized, this statement falls short of an explicit reliance on a state-law ground. Accordingly, this reference to state law would not have precluded our addressing petitioner’s claim had it arisen on direct review. As is now established, it also does not preclude habeas review by the District Court.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
For a more extensive description of petitioner’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, see the opinions of the District Court and the Court of Appeals in this case. 608 F. Supp. 1369 (ND Ill. 1985), and 822 F. 2d 684 (CA7 1987).
For discussion of the terms “cause and prejudice” and “miscarriage of justice,” see Murray v. Carrier, 477 U. S. 478 (1986), and Smith v. Murray, 477 U. S. 527 (1986). This opinion need not, and thus does not, address the meanings of those terms.
It is not clear why the Court of Appeals did not review at least the merits of petitioner’s claim concerning the failure to present alibi witnesses, inasmuch as the court acknowledged that petitioner had not waived that aspect of his claim. Nor is it clear why, even with regard to the rest of petitioner’s claim, the Court of Appeals did not consider the possibility of “cause and prejudice” or a “miscarriage of justice” under Sykes and its progeny. In view of our disposition of the ease, we need not consider these omissions.
Compare, e. g., Hardin v. Black, 845 F. 2d 953, 959 (CA11 1988) (federal court must address the merits of federal claim when it is unclear whether state court denied relief because of a procedural default or because of its view of the merits), with Brasier v. Douglas, 815 F. 2d 64, 65 (CA10 1987) (federal court must address the merits of federal claim whenever state court has addressed the merits of the federal claim, even if it is clear that the state court alternatively relied on a procedural bar), cert. denied, 483 U. S. 1023 (1987), and with Shepard v. Foltz, 771 F. 2d 962, 965 (CA6 1985) (when it is unclear whether the state court relied upon a procedural bar, the federal court should examine the arguments presented to the state court). See also Mann v. Dugger, 817 F. 2d 1471, 1487-1489 (CA11 1987) (Clark, J., specially concurring) (the Michigan v. Long “plain statement” rule applies on habeas as well as direct review), on rehearing en banc, 844 F. 2d 1446 (1988), cert. pending, No. 87-2073.
Some judges, indeed, have analyzed the problem in terms of the adequate and independent state ground doctrine. See Meadows v. Holland, 831 F. 2d 493, 504 (CA4 1987) (Winter, C. J., dissenting from en banc decision), cert. pending, No. 87-6063; Mann v. Dugger, 817 F. 2d, at 1487-1489 (Clark, J., specially concurring).
See, e. g., Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U. S. 441 (1935). For a discussion of whether a state procedural default ruling is “independent,” see Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U. S. 68, 74-75 (1985). On whether a state procedural default ruling is “adequate,” see Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U. S. 578, 587 (1988). See generally P. Bator, D. Meltzer, P. Mishkin, & D. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 590-627 (3d ed. 1988).
Since Long, we repeatedly have followed this “plain statement” requirement. See, e. g., Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U. S. 567, 571, n. 3 (1988); Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U. S. 730, 735, n. 7 (1987); Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U. S. 79, 83-84 (1987); New York v. P. J. Video, Inc., 475 U. S. 868, 872, n. 4 (1986); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U. S. 673, 678, n. 3 (1986); New York v. Class, 475 U. S. 106, 109-110 (1986).
In this case, for example, both the District Court and the Court of Appeals found the Illinois Appellate Court’s opinion ambiguous on this point.
This rule necessarily applies only when a state court has been presented with the federal claim, as will usually be true given the requirement that a federal claimant exhaust state-court remedies before raising the claim in a federal habeas petition. See 28 U. S. C. § 2254(b). Of course, a federal habeas court need not require that a federal claim be presented to a state court if it is clear that the state court would hold the claim procedurally barred. Castille v. Peoples, post, at 351; Teague v. Lane, post, at 297-298 (plurality opinion). This case, however, does not involve an application of this exhaustion principle because petitioner did raise his ineffective-assistance claim in state court.
Moreover, a state court need not fear reaching the merits of a federal claim in an alternative holding. By its very definition, the adequate and independent state ground doctrine requires the federal court to honor a state holding that is a sufficient basis for the state court’s judgment, even when the state court also relies on federal law. See Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U. S. 207, 210 (1935). Thus, by applying this doctrine to ha-beas cases, Sykes curtails reconsideration of the federal issue on federal habeas as long as the state court explicitly invokes a state procedural bar rule as a separate basis for decision. In this way, a state court may reach a federal question without sacrificing its interests in finality, federalism, and comity.
Respondents argue that the “plain statement” requirement entails a presumption that state courts disobey their own procedural bar rules. This argument is inconsistent with Caldwell, which confirmed Long's applicability to procedural default cases. In any event, respondents themselves recognize that in some instances state courts have discretion to forgive procedural defaults. See Brief for Respondents 10-11. The “plain statement” rule relieves a federal court from having to determine whether in a given case, consistent with state law, the state court has chosen to forgive a procedural default.
Insofar as the dissent urges us to repudiate the application of Long in Caldwell, we decline to do so. Additionally, the dissent’s fear, poet, at 282, and n. 6, that our holding will submerge courts in a flood of improper prisoner petitions is unrealistic: a state court that wishes to rely on a procedural bar rule in a one-line proforma order easily can write that “relief is denied for reasons of procedural default.” Of course, if the state court under state law chooses not to rely on a procedural bar in such circumstances, then there is no basis for a federal habeas court’s refusing to consider the merits of the federal claim. See Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U. S. 140, 147-154 (1979).
While it perhaps could be argued that this statement would have sufficed had the state court never reached the federal claim, the state court clearly went on to reject the federal claim on the merits. As a result, the reference to state law in the state court’s opinion is insufficient to demonstrate clearly whether the court intended to invoke waiver as an alternative ground. It is precisely with regard to such an ambiguous reference to state law in the context of clear reliance on federal law that Long permits federal review of the federal issue. See 463 U. S., at 1040-1041.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Jackson
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The principal question here concerns personal liability of a reorganization trustee who, although making no personal profit, permitted key employees to profit from trading in securities of the debtors’ subsidiaries. Upon a long record, controlling facts have been found with little disagreement.-
In 1935, the United States District Court appointed respondent Darrow as reorganization trustee for two common-law trusts. These had functioned as holding companies and their principal assets were the securities of twenty-seven underlying companies, each of which owned improved real estate and had its own debt and capital structure. Both the subsidiary companies and the two trusts had been promoted by Jacob Kulp and Myrtle Johnson, who thoroughly knew the inside of the business and were acquainted with many of the investors. The tangled financial history leading to the reorganization is not important to our issue.
Darrow employed Kulp and Miss Johnson to assist in his trusteeship. That they were competent and useful is undenied. Kulp managed the physical properties while Miss Johnson supervised the office, had complete charge of all records of income, expenditures and properties of both debtors and all underlying companies. Darrow decided upon a policy of buying in bonds of the subsidiaries for retirement, where they were available at a discount, and during his trusteeship reduced the outstanding bonds of subsidiaries by this method by about two and one-half million dollars. Darrow depended upon Miss Johnson’s judgment and advice in allocating funds for sinking fund operations, in his purchase of securities and in fixing prices to be offered.
Kulp and Miss Johnson were employed by Darrow with the express agreement that they could continue to trade in securities of the debtors’ subsidiaries personally and through Colonial Securities Corporation, which they owned. Without such consent they stated they would not have remained. Darrow and Colonial for a considerable period shared office facilities and personnel, with Miss Johnson in charge both of the trustee’s office, which was interested in the purchase of bonds, and her own Colonial, interested in the same thing.
Miss Johnson and Kulp, during their employment by the trustee, traded extensively in bonds of the subsidiary companies. On many occasions they acquired bonds for themselves and on the same day, or within a few days, transferred them to Darrow at a profit. Darrow paid for some securities in advance of their delivery to him and for some even before Miss Johnson had made her own purchase of them. Johnson and Kulp sometimes bought for themselves bonds offered by bondholders who had come to the trustee’s office to dispose of them to the trustee. They made substantial profits through these transactions.
In his eight years of trusteeship, Darrow filed but one account for one of the debtor-corporations and none for the other. The Securities and Exchange Commission intervened and demanded investigation of his conduct of the trust and thereafter he resigned and filed his accounts, which were met with objections by his successor trustee. These issues were referred to a special master, who heard a long contest over the foregoing and many other items unimportant here. The master recommended a surcharge on account of the foregoing conduct. The master’s report was reviewed by the District Court, which concluded that the evidence supported the findings and recommendations and surcharged the trustee in the amount of $43,447.46, reserving some questions for later consideration. Darrow appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the District Court, for reasons that we will later consider. 184 F. 2d 1. We conclude that the District Court was correct and the decision of the Court of Appeals cannot stand.
At the outset we are met with a jurisdictional objection. Respondent contends that we are powerless to grant a motion to substitute parties because the petition for. the writ of certiorari is jurisdictionally defective in that it is filed in the name of Stacy Mosser, a resigned trustee. It is further contended that John W. Guild, the other named petitioner, is without standing to seek review because he is only an indenture trustee. Both contentions are erroneous.
An indenture trustee’s standing is expressly authorized by 52 Stat. 894, 11 U. S. C. § 606, which provides, “the debtor, the indenture trustees, and any creditor or stockholder of the debtor shall have the right to be heard on all matters arising in a proceeding under this chapter.” (Italics added.) And respondent, in opposing the motion to substitute, erroneously relies on cases involving government officers. Davis v. Preston, 280 U. S. 406; Snyder v. Buck, 340 U. S. 15. Successor trustees, unlike successors of public officers, are regarded as transferees or assignees of all the interests of their predecessor, and removal of a trustee does not cause abatement. 52 Stat. 840, 860, 11 U. S. C. § 74. We hold, in accord with Bowden v. Johnson, 107 U. S. 251, 264, that substitution is fully authorized and proper in these circumstances and accordingly turn to the merits.
This was a strict trusteeship, not one of those quasi-trusteeships in which self-interest and representative interests are combined. A reorganization trustee is the representative of the court and it is not contended and would not be arguable that if he had engaged for his own advantage in the same transactions that he authorized on the part of his subordinates he should not be surcharged. Equity tolerates in bankruptcy trustees no interest adverse to the trust. This is not because such interests are always corrupt but because they are always corrupting. By its exclusion of the trustee from any personal interest, it seeks to avoid such delicate inquiries as we have here into the conduct of its own appointees by exacting from them forbearance of all opportunities to advance self-interest that might bring the disinterestedness of their administration into question.
These strict prohibitions would serve little purpose if the trustee were free to authorize others to do what he is forbidden. While there is no charge of it here, it is obvious that this would open up opportunities for devious dealings in the name of others that the trustee could not conduct in his own. The motives of man are too complex for equity to separate in the case of its trustees the motive of acquiring efficient help from motives of favoring help, for any reason at all or from anticipation of counter-favors later to come. We think that which the trustee had no right to do he had no right to authorize, and that the transactions were as forbidden for benefit of others as they would have been on behalf of the trustee himself.
It is argued here, and appears to have been the view of the Court of Appeals, that principles of negligence applied and that a trustee could not be surcharged under many decisions unless guilty of “supine negligence.” We see no room for the operation of the principles of negligence in a case in which conduct has been knowingly authorized. This is not the case of a trustee betrayed by those he had grounds to believe were trustworthy, for these employees did exactly what it was agreed by the trustee that they should do. The question whether he was negligent in not making detailed inquiries into their operations is unimportant, because he had given a blanket authority for the operations. The liability here is not created by a failure to detect defalcations, in which case negligence might be required to surcharge the trustee, but is a case of a willful and deliberate setting up of an interest in employees adverse to that of the trust.
It is contended, however, that the trust has incurred no loss. Indeed, it is argued, and much evidence was taken to the effect, that the buying program of Darrow as a whole was to the advantage of the trust. Of course, ’ these dealings in a rising market did not directly extract any amounts from the till of the trustee. But it is obvious that a buying program to retire at discount bonds of subsidiaries advances most rapidly and achieves its greatest results when the purchase prices are lowest. Darrow concededly relied on Miss Johnson in fixing offering prices. Those offering prices were sufficiently above what bondholders were willing to accept, so that a margin was left for Miss Johnson to profit. It may not have been intentionally rigged for the purpose, but there can be no doubt of the result. If people were willing to trudge to the trustee’s office to dispose of their holdings for less than his offer, there is no reason why the advantage of that low price should not have been taken by the trustee. Instead, in his own office, Miss Johnson intervened between the seller and the buyer and made a profit for herself by doing so.
In one of the larger transactions, a block of securities was offered at judicial sale. Darrow did not bid but Miss Johnson did. About one-half of the purchase price she obtained through a resale to Darrow. He paid her, in advance of delivery, $12,447 for securities that cost her approximately $8,000, and his check was used by Miss Johnson to make the payment due under her bid. If Darrow’s employees were able to purchase in the open market these securities at less than Darrow on their advice thereafter offered and paid, it is difficult to say that there was no injury to the estate of the trust through these transactions. But equity has sought to limit difficult and delicate fact-finding tasks concerning its own trustee by precluding such transactions for the reason that their effect is often difficult to trace, and the prohibition is not merely against injuring the estate — it is against profiting out of the position of trust. That this has occurred, so far as the employees are concerned, is undenied.
It is argued, and the Court of Appeals appears to have been impressed by the argument, that this surcharge creates a very heavy liability upon a man who enjoyed no personal profit and must be condoned “ ‘so as not to strike terror into mankind acting for the benefit of others and not for their own.’ ” 184 F. 2d 1, 8. Trustees are often obliged to make difficult business judgments, and the best that disinterested judgment can accomplish with foresight may be open to serious criticism by obstreperous creditors aided by hindsight. Courts are quite likely to protect trustees against heavy liabilities for disinterested mistakes in business judgment. But a trusteeship is serious business and is not to be undertaken lightly or so discharged. The most effective sanction for good administration is personal liability for the consequences of forbidden acts, and there are ways by which a trustee may effectively protect himself against personal liability.
The practice is well established by which trustees seek instructions from the court, given upon notice to creditors and interested parties, as to matters which involve difficult questions of judgment. In this particular matter, it is claimed that the special knowledge of Miss Johnson and Kulp was indispensable to the trustee. This, it is said, is the reason the trustee yielded to their insistence upon the right to speculate in the securities underlying the trust. If their services were so indispensable that an arrangement so highly irregular was of advantage to the trust, this might have been fully disclosed to the court and the creditors cited to show cause why it should not have been openly authorized. Instead of this, the trustee, although he did discuss with Judge Holly the employment of Kulp and Miss Johnson, did not disclose the critical fact that he was employing them on terms which permitted their trading in the underlying securities. Indeed, it appears that he did not even disclose this feature of the transaction to his own counsel. It is hardly probable that a candid disclosure to creditors, to the court, and to interested parties would have resulted in instructions to have pursued this course; but, had it been authorized, at least the assenting creditors might have found themselves estopped to question the transaction.
A further remedy of a trustee for limiting, if not avoiding, personal liability is to account at prompt intervals, which puts upon objectors the burden of raising their objections. And had the trustee accounted, as good practice would have required, he undoubtedly would have discovered long ago that this arrangement was objectionable. It hardly lies in the mouth of a trustee to allow his liabilities to accumulate over such a period of time and then ask the court to relieve him of them because they have become too burdensome.
In fairness to the trustee, it is to be noted that there is no hint or proof that he has been corrupt or that he has any interest, present or future, in the profits he has permitted these employees to make. For all that appears, he was simply misled into thinking these persons indispensable, but he entered into an arrangement which courts cannot sanction unless they are to open the door to practices which would demoralize trusteeships and discredit bankruptcy administration.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the cause remanded to the District Court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Mr. Justice Burton took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The petition for writ of certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio is reversed, and the cause is remanded. Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U. S. 500 (1957).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondents sued their employer, petitioner Icicle Sea-foods, Inc., to recover overtime benefits to which they thought they were entitled under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U. S. C. § 207(a)(1). After a 2-day trial, the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington held that respondents were excluded from the overtime benefits of the FLSA by 29 U. S. C. § 213(b)(6), which excludes “any employee employed as a seaman.” Reviewing this issue under a “de novo” standard of review, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the judgment of the District Court, holding that respondents were not “seamen,” but instead were industrial maintenance employees on a barge that processed fish caught by a fishing fleet in the coastal waters of the Pacific Northwest. 774 F. 2d 349 (1985). We granted certiorari to consider whether the Court of Appeals applied the appropriate standard of review in passing on the District Court’s judgment. 474 U. S. 900 (1985).
The District Court made the following pertinent findings of fact related to whether respondents were “seamen” within the meaning of § 213(b)(6):
“2. Defendant Icicle Seafoods owned and operated a seafood processing vessel named the ARCTIC STAR. Each of the Plaintiffs worked for Defendant on board the ARCTIC STAR as members of the Engineering Department .... The ARCTIC STAR is a nonself-propelled barge which is moved from place to place with the aid of a tow boat, and is located throughout the waters of Alaska or Washington, depending on the season and type of seafood being caught and processed.
“7. None of the Plaintiffs were members of the Processing Crew on board the ARCTIC STAR. The Processing Crew performed all the hands-on processing or packing of the fish or shellfish. Plaintiffs were members of the Engineering Department on board the ARCTIC STAR, considered themselves very distinct from the Processing Crew, and did not perform any hands-on processing or packing of fish or shellfish. As members of the Engineering Department, Plaintiffs were responsible for maintaining all systems for support and continuous operation of the vessel while at moorage or underway. Although working in shifts, the Plaintiffs had to be available on call 24 hours a day to perform work at a moment’s notice if necessary to keep the vessel operating. Even though the plaintiffs were not licensed by the Coast Guard as engineers or members of an engineering department, each of the Plaintiffs performed tasks which conformed to those expected of Coast Guard licensed personnel. The very description of the Plaintiff’s work is that of a marine engineer or member of an engineering department. In summary, each of the Plaintiffs were members of the crew of the ARCTIC STAR and performed work which was maritime in character and rendered while the ARCTIC STAR was in navigable waters. Each of the Plaintiff’s employment was that of a seaman.” App. A-3 to Pet. for Cert. 2-3, 5-6.
The Court of Appeals read the District Court’s opinion as holding that respondents were “seamen” under § 213(b)(6) because the evidence showed that they “performed work of a maritime character on navigable waters.” 774 F, 2d, at 351.
In reviewing this conclusion, the Court of Appeals initially pointed out that it and other Courts of Appeals have applied conflicting standards of review to claims of exclusion from the FLSA, and attributed these different approaches to three cases decided by this Court within a few months of each other during its October 1946 Term. Ibid. The Court of Appeals recognized that in Walling v. General Industries Co., 380 U. S. 545 (1947), this Court held that whether an employee falls within the exclusion for “executives” under 29 U. S. C. § 213(a)(1) is a factual question subject to the “clearly erroneous” standard of review set forth in Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 774 F. 2d, at 352. But it thought that in Levinson v. Speetor Motor Service, 330 U. S. 649 (1947), and Rutherford Ford Corp. v. McComb, 331 U. S. 722 (1947), this Court appeared to apply a “de novo” standard of review to whether an employee falls within an exclusion for employees covered by the Motor Carrier Act and to whether someone is an independent contractor rather than an employee. 774 F. 2d, at 352. The Court of Appeals reconciled its reading of these cases on grounds that the regulations implementing the provisions at issue in Levinson and Rutherford were “illustrative and general,” whereas those in Walling were “specific,” and that the trial court’s findings in Walling were based on the conflicting testimony of witnesses. Ibid.
We think that neither Levinson nor Rutherford should be read to depart from the rule laid down in Walling. Levinson involved a case that was brought to this Court from the Supreme Court of Illinois, and that court had accepted the factual findings made by the Illinois Appellate Court. But state courts are not required to apply Rule 52(a) — a rule of federal civil procedure — to their own appellate system for reviewing factual determinations of trial courts. Rutherford came up through the federal court system, and this Court held that the District Court erroneously based its conclusion that particular employees were independent contractors on “isolated factors” in the employee’s relationship with the employer. 331 U. S., at 729-730. We set forth a lengthy summary of the facts without indicating the source for such a summary; but a fair reading of the opinion indicates that we were focusing on a legal question, and not on the allocation of factfinding responsibilities between district courts and courts of appeals. We therefore reaffirm our holding in Walling that the facts necessary to a proper determination of the legal question whether an exemption to the FLSA applies in a particular case should be reviewed by the courts of appeals pursuant to Rule 52(a), like the facts in other civil bench-tried litigation in federal courts.
The Court of Appeals in this case proposed to “apply a de novo standard of review to the application of the exemption to the facts and [to] review the facts under a clearly erroneous standard.” 774 F. 2d, at 352, citing United States v. McConney, 728 F. 2d 1195, 1202 (CA9) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 824 (1984). But nowhere in its opinion did the court ever mention any of the factual findings of the District Court, much less discuss or analyze them. The Court of Appeals seems to have believed that the District Court applied the wrong legal standard for what constitutes a “seaman” under § 213(b)(6). Whereas the District Court concluded that respondents were seamen because they performed work of a maritime character on navigable waters, see App. A-3 to Pet. for Cert. 6, the Court of Appeals held that under the pertinent regulations, the critical factor for determining whether an employee on a vessel is a seaman is whether his “duties primarily aid navigation of the vessel.” 774 F. 2d, at 353; see also 29 CFR §§783.31, 783.33, 783.36 (1985). The Court of Appeals reviewed the record independently and found that the “dominant employment” of the respondents was “industrial maintenance,” and that the “maritime work” that the respondents performed took but a small portion of their work time. 774 F. 2d, at 353. It therefore concluded that respondents were industrial maintenance employees and not seamen. Ibid.
We think that the Court of Appeals was mistaken to engage in such factfinding. The District Court found that “each of the [respondents] . . . performed work which was maritime in character and rendered while the ARCTIC STAR was in navigable waters.” App. A-3 to Pet. for Cert. 6. But it made no finding that the “maritime work” was “incidental and occasional, taking but a small portion of the work time.” 774 F. 2d, at 353. The question of how the respondents spent their working time on board the Arctic Star is a question of fact. The question whether their particular activities excluded them from the overtime benefits of the FLSA is a question of law which both parties concede is governed by the pertinent regulations promulgated by the Wage and Hour Administrator. See 29 CFR pt. 783 (1985). If the Court of Appeals believed that the District Court had failed to make findings of fact essential to a proper resolution of the legal question, it should have remanded to the District Court to make those findings. If it was of the view that the findings of the District Court were “clearly erroneous” within the meaning of Rule 52(a), it could have set them aside on that basis. If it believed that the District Court’s factual findings were unassailable, but that the proper rule of law was misapplied to those findings, it could have reversed the District Court’s judgment. But it should not simply have made factual findings on its own. As we stated in Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U. S. 564, 574-575 (1985):
“The rationale for deference to the original finder of fact is not limited to the superiority of the trial judge’s position to make determinations of credibility. The trial judge’s major role is the determination of fact, and with experience in fulfilling that role comes expertise. Duplication of the trial judge’s efforts in the court of appeals would very likely contribute only negligibly to the accuracy of fact determination at a huge cost in diversion of judicial resources.”
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly vacated, and the cause is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Marshall
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue in this case is whether States must protect the right of prisoners to access to the courts by providing them with law libraries or alternative sources of legal knowledge. In Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U. S. 15 (1971), we held per curiam that such services are constitutionally mandated. Petitioners, officials of the State of North Carolina, ask us to overrule that recent case, but for reasons explained below, we decline the invitation and reaffirm our previous decision.
I
Respondents are inmates incarcerated in correctional facilities of the Division of Prisons of the North Carolina Department of Correction. They filed three separate actions under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, all eventually consolidated in the District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. Respondents alleged, in pertinent part, that they were denied access to the courts in violation of their Fourteenth Amendment rights by the State’s failure to provide legal research facilities.
The District Court granted respondents’ motion for summary judgment on this claim, finding that the sole prison library in the State was “severely inadequate” and that there was no other legal assistance available to inmates. It held on the basis of Younger v. Gilmore that respondents’ rights to access to the courts and equal protection of the laws had been violated because there was “no indication of any assistance at the initial stage of preparation of writs and petitions.” The court recognized, however, that determining the “appropriate relief to be ordered . . . presents a difficult problem,” in view of North Carolina’s decentralized prison system. Rather than attempting “to dictate precisely what course the State should follow,” the court “charge [d] the Department of Correction with the task of devising a Constitutionally sound program” to assure inmate access to the courts. It left to the State the choice of what alternative would “most easily and economically” fulfill this duty, suggesting that a program to make available lawyers, law students, or public defenders might serve the purpose at least as well as the provision of law libraries. Supp. App. 12-13.
The State responded by proposing the establishment of seven libraries in institutions located across the State chosen so as to serve best all prison units. In addition, the State planned to set up smaller libraries in the Central Prison segregation unit and the Women’s Prison. Under the plan, inmates desiring to use a library would request appointments. They would be given transportation and housing, if necessary, for a full day’s library work. In addition to its collection of lawbooks, each library would stock legal forms and writing paper and have typewriters and use of copying machines. The State proposed to train inmates as research assistants and typists to aid fellow prisoners. It was estimated that ultimately some 350 inmates per week could use the libraries, although inmates not facing court deadlines might have to wait three or four weeks for their turn at a library. Respondents protested that the plan was totally inadequate and sought establishment of a library at every prison.
The District Court rejected respondents’ objections, finding the State’s plan “both economically feasible and practicable,” and one that, fairly and efficiently run, would “insure each inmate the time to prepare his petitions.” Id., at 19. Further briefing was ordered on whether the State was required to provide independent legal advisors for inmates in addition to the library facilities.
In its final decision, the District Court held that petitioners were not constitutionally required to provide legal assistance as well as libraries. It found that the library plan was sufficient to give inmates reasonable access to the courts and that our decision in Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U. S. 600 (1974), while not directly in point, supported the State’s claim that it need not furnish attorneys to bring habeas corpus and civil rights actions for prisoners.
After the District Court approved the library plan, the State submitted an application to the Federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) for a grant to cover 90% of the cost of setting up the libraries and training a librarian and inmate clerks. The State represented to LEAA that the library project would benefit all inmates in the State by giving them “meaningful and effective access to the court[s]. . . . [T]he ultimate result . . . should be a diminution in the number of groundless petitions and complaints filed . . . . The inmate himself will be able to determine to a greater extent whether or not his rights have been violated” and judicial evaluation of the petitions will be facilitated. Brief for Respondents 3a.
Both sides appealed from those portions of the District Court orders adverse to them. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed in all respects save one. It found that the library plan denied women prisoners the same access rights as men to research facilities. Since there was no justification for this discrimination, the Court of Appeals ordered it eliminated. The State petitioned for review and we granted certiorari. 425 U. S. 910 (1976). We affirm.
II
A. It is now established beyond doubt that prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts. This Court recognized that right more than 35 years ago when it struck down a regulation prohibiting state prisoners from filing petitions for habeas corpus unless they were found “ 'properly drawn’ ” by the “ 'legal investigator’ ” for the parole board. Ex parte Hull, 312 U. S. 546 (1941). We held this violated the principle that “the state and its officers may not abridge or impair petitioner’s right to apply to a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus.” Id., at 549. See also Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U. S. 255 (1942).
More recent decisions have struck down restrictions and required remedial measures to insure that inmate access to the courts is adequate, effective, and meaningful. Thus, in order to prevent “effectively foreclosed access,” indigent prisoners must be allowed to file appeals and habeas corpus petitions without payment of docket fees. Burns v. Ohio, 360 U. S. 252, 257 (1959); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U. S. 708 (1961). Because we recognized that “adequate and effective appellate review” is impossible without a trial transcript or adequate substitute, we held that States must provide trial records to inmates unable to buy them. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12, 20 (1956). Similarly, counsel must be appointed to give indigent inmates “a meaningful appeal” from their convictions. Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353, 358 (1963).
Essentially the same standards of access were applied in Johnson v. Avery, 393 U. S. 483 (1969), which struck down a regulation prohibiting prisoners from assisting each other with habeas corpus applications and other legal matters. Since inmates had no alternative form of legal assistance available to them, we reasoned that this ban on jailhouse lawyers effectively prevented prisoners who were “unable themselves, with reasonable adequacy, to prepare their petitions,” from challenging the legality of their confinements. Id., at 489. Johnson was unanimously extended to cover assistance in civil rights actions in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 577-580 (1974). And even as it rejected a claim that indigent defendants have a constitutional right to appointed counsel for discretionary appeals, the Court reaffirmed that States must “assure the indigent defendant an adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly.” Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U. S., at 616. “ [M] eaningful access” to the courts is the touchstone. See id., at 611, 612, 615.
Petitioners contend, however, that this constitutional duty merely obliges States to allow inmate “writ writers” to function. They argue that under Johnson v. Avery, supra, as long as inmate communications on legal problems are not restricted, there is no further obligation to expend state funds to implement affirmatively the right of access. This argument misreads the cases.
In Johnson and Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, the issue was whether the access rights of ignorant and illiterate inmates were violated without adequate justification. Since these inmates were unable to present their own claims in writing to the courts, we held that their “constitutional right to help,” Johnson v. Avery, supra, at 502 (White, J., dissenting), required at least allowing assistance from their literate fellows. But in so holding, we did not attempt to set forth the full breadth of the right of access. In McDonnell, for example, there was already an adequate law library in the prison. The case was thus decided against a backdrop of availability of legal information to those inmates capable of using it. And in Johnson, although the petitioner originally requested law-books, see 393 U. S., at 484, the Court did not reach the question, as it invalidated the regulation because of its effect on illiterate inmates. Neither case considered the question we face today and neither is inconsistent with requiring additional measures to assure meaningful access to inmates able to present their own cases.
Moreover, our decisions have consistently required States to shoulder affirmative obligations to assure all prisoners meaningful access to the courts. It is indisputable that indigent inmates must be provided at state expense with paper and pen to draft legal documents, with notarial services to authenticate them, and with stamps to mail them. States must forgo collection of docket fees otherwise payable to the treasury and expend funds for transcripts. State expenditures are necessary to pay lawyers for indigent defendants at trial, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (1972), and in appeals as of right, Douglas v. California, supra. This is not to say that economic factors may not be considered, for example, in choosing the methods used to provide meaningful access. But the cost of protecting a constitutional right cannot justify its total denial. Thus, neither the availability of jailhouse lawyers nor the necessity for affirmative state action is dispositive of respondents’ claims. The inquiry is rather whether law libraries or other forms of legal assistance are needed to give prisoners a reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the courts.
B. Although it is essentially true, as petitioners argue, that a habeas corpus petition or civil rights complaint need only set forth facts giving rise to the cause of action, but see, Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 8 (a) (1), (3), it hardly follows that a law library or other legal assistance is not essential to frame such documents. It would verge on incompetence for a lawyer to file an initial pleading without researching such issues as jurisdiction, venue, standing, exhaustion of remedies, proper parties plaintiff and defendant, and types of relief available. Most importantly, of course, a lawyer must know what the law is in order to determine whether a colorable claim exists, and if so, what facts are necessary to state a cause of action.
If a lawyer must perform such preliminary research, it is no less vital for a pro se prisoner. Indeed, despite the “less stringent standards” by which a pro se pleading is judged, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U. S. 519, 520 (1972), it is often more important that a prisoner complaint set forth a nonfrivolous claim meeting all procedural prerequisites, since the court may pass on the complaint's sufficiency before allowing filing in forma pauperis and may dismiss the case if it is deemed frivolous. See 28 U. S. C. § 1915. Moreover, if the State files a response to a pro se pleading, it will undoubtedly contain seemingly authoritative citations. Without a library, an inmate will be unable to rebut the State’s argument. It is not enough to answer that the court will evaluate the facts pleaded in light of the relevant law. Even the most dedicated trial judges are bound to overlook meritorious cases without the benefit of an adversary presentation. Cf. Gardner v. California, 393 U. S. 367, 369-370 (1969). In fact, one of the consolidated cases here was initially dismissed by the same judge who later ruled for respondents, possibly because Younger v. Gilmore was not cited.
We reject the State’s claim that inmates are “ill-equipped to use” “the tools of the trade of the legal profession,” making libraries useless in assuring meaningful access. Brief for Petitioners 17. In the first place, the claim is inconsistent with the State’s representations on its LEAA grant application, supra, at 821, and with its argument that access is adequately protected by allowing inmates to help each other with legal problems. More importantly, this Court’s experience indicates that pro se petitioners are capable of using lawbooks to file cases raising claims that are serious and legitimate even if ultimately unsuccessful. Finally, we note that if petitioners had any doubts about the efficacy of libraries, the District Court’s initial decision left them free to choose another means of assuring access.
It is also argued that libraries or other forms of legal assistance are unnecessary to assure meaningful access in light of the Court’s decision in Ross v. Moffitt. That case held that the right of prisoners to “an adequate opportunity to present [their] claims fairly,” 417 U. S., at 616, did not require appointment of counsel to file petitions for discretionary review in state courts or in this Court. Moffitt’s rationale, however, supports the result we reach here. The decision in Moffitt noted that a court addressing a discretionary review petition is not primarily concerned with the correctness of the judgment below. Rather, review is generally granted only if a case raises an issue of significant public interest or jurisprudential importance or conflicts with controlling precedent. Id., at 615-617. Moffitt held that pro se applicants can present their claims adequately for appellate courts to decide whether these criteria are met because they have already had counsel for their initial appeals as of right. They are thus likely to have appellate briefs previously written on their behalf, trial transcripts, and often intermediate appellate court opinions to use in preparing petitions for further review. Id., at 615.
By contrast in this case, we are concerned in large part with original actions seeking new trials, release from confinement, or vindication of fundamental civil rights. Rather than presenting claims that have been passed on by two courts, they frequently raise heretofore unlitigated issues. As this Court has “constantly emphasized,” habeas corpus and civil rights actions are of “fundamental importance . . . in our constitutional scheme” because they directly protect our most valued rights. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U. S., at 485; Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S., at 579. While applications for discretionary review need only apprise an appellate court of a case’s possible relevance to the development of the law, the prisoner petitions here are the first line of defense against constitutional violations. The need for new legal research or advice to make a meaningful initial presentation to a trial court in such a case is far greater than is required to file an adequate petition for discretionary review.
We hold, therefore, that the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.
C. Our holding today is, of course, a reaffirmation of the result reached in Younger v. Gilmore. While Gilmore is not a necessary element in the preceding analysis, its precedential weight strongly reinforces our decision. The substantive question presented in Gilmore was: “Does a state have an affirmative federal constitutional duty to furnish prison inmates with extensive law libraries or, alternatively, to provide inmates with professional or quasi-professional legal assistance?” Jurisdictional Statement 5, Brief for Appellants 4, in No. 70-9, O. T. 1971. This Court explicitly decided that question when it affirmed the judgment of the District Court in reliance on Johnson v. Avery. Cf. this Court’s Rule 15 (c). The affirmative answer was given unanimously after full briefing and oral argument. Gilmore has been relied upon without question in our subsequent decisions. Cruz v. Hauck, 404 U. S. 59 (1971) (vacating and remanding for reconsideration in light of Gilmore a decision that legal materials need not be furnished to county jail inmates); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U. S. 319, 321 (1972) (Gilmore cited approvingly in support of inmates’ right of access to the courts); Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U. S. 17, 34 n. 22 (1973) (Gilmore cited approvingly as a decision “removing roadblocks and disincentives to appeal”). Most recently, in Wolff v. McDonnell, despite differences over other issues in the case, the Court unanimously reaffirmed that Gilmore requires prison officials “to provide indigent inmates with access to a reasonably adequate law library for preparation of legal actions.” 418 U. S., at 578-579.
Experience under the Gilmore decision suggests no reason to depart from it. Most States and the Federal Government have made impressive efforts to fulfill Gilmore’s mandate by establishing law libraries, prison legal-assistance programs, or combinations of both. See Brief for Respondents, Ex. B. Correctional administrators have supported the programs and acknowledged their value. Resources and support including substantial funding from LEAA have come from many national organizations.
It should be noted that while adequate law libraries are one constitutionally acceptable method to assure meaningful access to the courts, our decision here, as in Gilmore, does not foreclose alternative means to achieve that goal. Nearly half the States and the District of Columbia provide some degree of professional or quasi-professional legal assistance to prisoners. Brief for Respondents, Ex. B. Such programs take many imaginative forms and may have a number of advantages over libraries alone. Among the alternatives are the training of inmates as paralegal assistants to work under lawyers’ supervision, the use of paraprofessionals and law students, either as volunteers or in formal clinical programs, the organization of volunteer attorneys through bar associations or other groups, the hiring of lawyers on a part-time consultant basis, and the use of full-time staff attorneys, working either in new prison legal assistance organizations or as part of public defender or legal services offices. Legal services plans not only result in more efficient and skillful handling of prisoner cases, but also avoid the disciplinary problems associated with writ writers, see Johnson v. Avery, 393 U. S., at 488; Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 421-422 (1974). Independent legal advisors can mediate or resolve administratively many prisoner complaints that would otherwise burden the courts, and can convince inmates that other grievances against the prison or the legal system are ill-founded, thereby facilitating rehabilitation by assuring the inmate that he has not been treated unfairly. It has been estimated that as few as 500 full-time lawyers would be needed to serve the legal needs of the entire national prison population. Nevertheless, a legal access program need not include any particular element we have discussed, and we encourage local experimentation. Any plan, however, must be evaluated as a whole to ascertain its compliance with constitutional standards.
III
Finally, petitioners urge us to reverse the decision below because federal courts should not “sit as co-administrators of state prisons,” Brief for Petitioners 13, and because the District Court “exceeded its powers when it puts [sic] itself in the place of the [prison] administrators,” id., at 14. While we have recognized that judicial restraint is often appropriate in prisoners’ rights cases, we have also repeatedly held that this policy “cannot encompass any failure to take cognizance of valid constitutional claims.” Procunier v. Martinez, supra, at 405.
Petitioners’ hyperbolic claim is particularly inappropriate in this case, for the courts below scrupulously respected the limits on their role. The District Court initially held only that petitioners had violated the “fundamental constitutional guarantee,” ibid., of access to the courts. It did not thereupon thrust itself into prison administration. Rather, it ordered petitioners themselves to devise a remedy for the violation, strongly suggesting that it would prefer a plan providing trained legal advisors. Petitioners chose to establish law libraries, however, and their plan was approved with only minimal changes over the strong objections of respondents. Prison administrators thus exercised wide discretion within the bounds of constitutional requirements in this case.
The judgment is
Affirmed.
The complaints also alleged a number of other constitutional violations not relevant to the issue now before us.
The District Court had originally granted summary judgment for the state officials in one of the three consolidated actions. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit appointed counsel and remanded that case with the suggestion that it be consolidated with the other two cases, then still pending in the District Court.
North Carolina’s 13,000 inmates are housed in 77 prison units located in 67 counties. Sixty-five of these units hold fewer than 200 inmates. Brief for Petitioners 7 n. 3.
The State proposed inclusion of the following lawbooks:
North Carolina General Statutes
North Carolina Reports (1960-present)
North Carolina Court of Appeals Reports
Strong’s North Carolina Index
North Carolina Rules of Court
United States Code Annotated:
Title 18
Title 28 §§ 2241-2254
Title 28 Rules of Appellate Procedure
Title 28 Rules of Civil Procedure
Title 42 §§ 1891-2010
Supreme Court Reporter (1960-present)
Federal 2d Reporter (1960-present)
Federal Supplement (1960-present)
Black’s Law Dictionary
Sokol: Federal Habeas Corpus
LaFave and Scott: Criminal Law Hornbook (2 copies)
Cohen: Legal Research
Criminal Law Reporter
Palmer: Constitutional Rights of Prisoners
This proposal adheres to a list approved as the minimum collection for prison law libraries by the American Correctional Association (ACA), American Bar Association (ABA), and the American Association of Law Libraries, except for the questionable omission of several treatises, Shepard’s Citations, and local rules of court. See ACA, Guidelines for Legal Reference Service in Correctional Institutions: A Tool for Correctional Administrators 5-9 (2d ed. 1975) (hereafter ACA Guidelines); ABA Commission on Correctional Facilities and Services, Bar Association Support to Improve Correctional Services (BASICS), Offender Legal Services 29-30, 70-78 (rev. ed. 1976).
Respondents also contended that the libraries should contain additional legal materials, and they urged creation of a large central circulating library.
The District Court did order two changes in the plan: that extra copies of the U. S. C. A. Habeas Corpus and Civil Rights Act volumes be provided, and that no reporter advance sheets be discarded, so that the libraries would slowly build up duplicate sets. But the court found that most of the prison units were too small to require their own libraries, and that the cost of the additional books proposed by respondents would surpass their usefulness.
Respondents filed no cross-appeal and do not now question the library plan, nor do petitioners challenge the sex discrimination ruling.
See also Eskridge v. Washington Prison Bd., 357 U. S. 214 (1958) (provision of trial transcript may not be conditioned on approval of judge); Draper v. Washington, 372 U. S. 487 (1963) (same); Lane v. Brown, 372 U. S. 477 (1963) (public defender’s approval may not be required to obtain coram nobis transcript); Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U. S. 305 (1966) (unconstitutional to require reimbursement for cost of trial transcript only from unsuccessful imprisoned defendants); Long v. District Court of Iowa, 385 U. S. 192 (1966) (State must provide transcript of post-conviction proceeding); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U. S. 40 (1967) (State must provide preliminary hearing transcript); Gardner v. California, 393 U. S. 367 (1969) (State must provide habeas corpus transcript); Williams v. Oklahoma City, 395 U. S. 458 (1969) (State must provide transcript of petty-offense trial); Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U. S. 189 (1971) (State must provide transcript of nonfelony trial).
The only cases that have rejected indigent defendants’ claims to transcripts have done so either because an adequate alternative was available but not used, Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U. S. 226 (1971), or because the request was plainly frivolous and a prior opportunity to obtain a transcript was waived, United States v. MacCollom, 426 U. S. 317 (1976).
The same standards were applied in United, States v. MacCollom, supra.
The plaintiffs stipulated in the District Court to the general adequacy of the library, see McDonnell v. Wolff, 342 F. Supp. 616, 618, 629-630 (Neb. 1972), although they contested certain limitations on its use. Those claims were resolved by the lower courts. See id., at 619-622; 483 F. 2d 1059, 1066 (CA8 1973); 418 U. S., at 543 n. 2.
Indeed, our decision is supported by the holding in Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396 (1974), in a related right-of-access context. There the Court invalidated a California regulation barring law students and paraprofessionals employed by lawyers representing prisoners from seeing inmate clients. Id., at 419-422. We did so even though California has prison law libraries and permits inmate legal assistance, Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105, 107 n. 1 (ND Cal. 1970), aff’d sub nom. Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U. S. 15 (1971). Even more significantly, the prisoners in question were actually represented by lawyers. Thus, despite the challenged regulation, the inmates were receiving more legal assistance than prisoners aided only by writ writers. Nevertheless, we found that the regulation “impermissibly burdened the right of access.” 416 U. S., at 421.
Cf. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97 (1976), holding that States must treat prisoners’ serious medical needs, a constitutional duty obviously requiring outlays for personnel and facilities.
Brief for Petitioners 16-17; Tr. of Oral Arg. 3-9, 11-12.
A source of current legal information would be particularly important so that prisoners could learn whether they have claims at all, as where new court decisions might apply retroactively to invalidate convictions.
The propriety of these practices is not before us. Courts may also impose additional burdens before appointing counsel for indigents in civil suits. See Johnson v. Avery, 393 U. S. 483, 487-488 (1969).
Nor is United States v. MacCollom, 426 U. S. 317 (1976), inconsistent with our decision. That case held that in a post-conviction proceeding under 28 U. S. C. § 2255, an applicant was not unconstitutionally deprived of access to the courts by denial of a transcript of his original trial pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 753 (f), where he had failed to take a direct appeal and thereby secure the transcript, where his newly asserted claim of error was frivolous, and where he demonstrated no need for the transcript. Without a library or legal assistance, however, inmates will not have “a current opportunity to present [their] claims fairly,” 426 U. S., at 329 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment), and valid claims will undoubtedly be lost.
Since our main concern here is “protecting the ability of an inmate to prepare a petition or complaint,” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S., at 576, it is irrelevant that North Carolina authorizes the expenditure of funds for appointment of counsel in some state post-conviction proceedings for prisoners whose claims survive initial review by the courts. See N. C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-451 (Supp. 1975); Brief for Petitioners 3 n. 1, 12 n. 8, 14 n. 9, and accompanying text; but cf. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U. S. 600, 614 (1974). Moreover, this statute does not cover appointment of counsel in federal habeas corpus or state or federal civil rights actions, all of which are encompassed by the right of access.
Similarly, the State's creation of an advisory Inmate Grievance Commission, see N. C. Gen. Stat. § 148-101 et seq. (Supp. 1975); Brief for Petitioners 14, while certainly a noteworthy innovation, does not answer the constitutional requirement for legal assistance to prisoners.
Nearly 95% of the state corrections commissioners, prison wardens, and treatment directors responding to a national survey supported creation and expansion of prison legal services. Cardarelli & Finkelstein, Correctional Administrators Assess the Adequacy and Impact of Prison Legal Services Programs in the United States, 65 J. Crim. L., C. & P. S. 91, 99 (1974). Almost 85% believed that the programs would not adversely affect discipline or security or increase hostility toward the institution. Rather, over 80% felt legal services provide a safety valve for inmate grievances, reduce inmate power structures and tensions from unresolved legal problems, and contribute to rehabilitation by providing a positive experience with the legal system. Id., at 95-98. See also ACA Guidelines, supra, n. 4; National Sheriffs’ Assn., Inmates’ Legal Rights, Standard 14, pp. 33-34 (1974); Bluth, Legal Services for Inmates: Coopting the Jailhouse Lawyer, 1 Capital U. L. Rev. 59, 61, 67 (1972); Sigler, A New Partnership in Corrections, 52 Neb. L. Rev. 35, 38 (1972).
See, e. g., U. S. Dept. of Justice, LEAA, A Compendium of Selected Criminal Justice Projects, III-201, IV-361-366 (1975); U. S. Dept. of Justice, LEAA, Grant 75 DF-99-0013, Consortium of States to Furnish Legal Counsel to Prisoners, Final Report, and Program Narrative (1975). The ABA BASICS program, see n. 4, supra, makes grants to state and local bar associations for prison legal services and libraries and publishes a complete technical assistance manual, Offender Legal Services (rev. ed. 1976). See also ABA Resource Center on Correctional Law and Legal Services, Providing Legal Services to Prisoners, 8 Ga. L. Rev. 363 (1974). The American Correctional Association publishes Guidelines for Legal Reference Service in Correctional Institutions (2d ed. 1975). The American Association of Law Libraries publishes O. Werner, Manual for Prison Law Libraries (1976), and its members offer assistance to prison law library personnel.
See also ABA Joint Committee on the Legal Status of Prisoners, Standards Relating to the Legal Status of Prisoners, Standards 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 and Commentary, 14 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 377, 420-443 (tent. draft 1977); National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Corrections Code, § 2-601 (tent. draft 1976); National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Corrections 26-30, Standards 2.2, 2.3 (1973).
For example, full-time staff attorneys assisted by law students and a national back-up center were used by the Consortium of States to Furnish Legal Counsel to Prisoners, see n. 19, supra. State and local bar associations have established a number of legal services and library programs with support from the ABA BASICS program, see nn. 4 and 19, supra. Prisoners’ Legal Services of New York plans to use 45 lawyers and legal assistants in seven offices to give comprehensive legal services to all state inmates. Offender Legal Services, supra, n. 19, at iv. Other programs are described in Providing Legal Services to Prisoners, supra, n. 19, at 399-416.
See Cardarelli & Finkelstein, supra, n. 18, at 96-99; LEAA Consortium Reports, supra, n. 19; Champagne & Haas, The Impact of Johnson v. Avery on Prison Administration, 43 Tenn. L. Rev. 275, 295-299 (1976). Cf. 42 U. S. C. § 2996 (4) (1970 ed., Supp. V), in which Congress, establishing the Legal Services Corp., declared that “for many of our citizens, the availability of legal services has reaffirmed faith in our government of laws.”
ABA Joint Committee, supra, n. 19, at 428-429.
See, e. g., Stevenson v. Reed, 530 F. 2d 1207 (CA5 1976), aff’g 391 F. Supp. 1375 (ND Miss. 1975); Bryan v. Werner, 516 F. 2d 233 (CA3 1975); Gaglie v. Ulibarri, 507 F. 2d 721 (CA9 1974); Corpus v. Estelle, 409 F. Supp. 1090 (SD Tex. 1975).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | D | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented for review is whether a State, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, may require a religious organization desiring to distribute and sell religious literature and to solicit donations at a state fair to conduct those activities only at an assigned location within the fairgrounds' even though application of the rule limits the religious practices of the organization.
I
Each year, the Minnesota Agricultural Society (Society), a public corporation organized under the laws of Minnesota, see Minn. Stat. § 37.01 (1980), operates a State Fair on a 125-acre state-owned tract located in St. Paul, Minn. The Fair is conducted for the purpose of “exhibiting . . . the agricultural, stock-breeding, horticultural, mining, mechanical, industrial, and other products and resources of the state, including proper exhibits and expositions of the arts, human skills, and sciences.” Ibid. The Fair is a major public event and attracts visitors from all over Minnesota as well as from other parts of the country. During the past five years, the average total attendance for the 12-day Fair has been 1,320,000 persons. The average daily attendance on weekdays has been 115,000 persons and on Saturdays and Sundays 160,000.
The Society is authorized to make all “bylaws, ordinances, and rules, not inconsistent with law, which it may deem necessary or proper for the government of the fair grounds . . . .” Minn Stat. § 37.16 (1980). Under this authority, the Society promulgated Minnesota State Fair Rule 6.05 which provides in relevant part that
“[s]ale or distribution of any merchandise, including printed or written material except under license issued [by] the Society and/or from a duly-licensed location shall be a misdemeanor.”
As Rule 6.05 is construed and applied by the Society, “all persons, groups or firms which desire to sell, exhibit or distribute materials during the annual State Fair must do so only from fixed locations on the fairgrounds.” Although the Rule does not prevent organizational representatives from walking about the fairgrounds and communicating the organization’s views with fair patrons in face-to-face discussions, it does require that any exhibitor conduct its sales, distribution, and fund solicitation operations from a booth rented from the Society. Space in the fairgrounds is rented to all comers in a nondiscriminatory fashion on a first-come, first-served basis with the rental charge based on the size and location of the booth. The Rule applies alike to nonprofit, charitable, and commercial enterprises.
One day prior to the opening of the 1977 Minnesota State Fair, respondents International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. (ISKCON), an international religious society espousing the views of the Krishna religion, and Joseph Beca, head of the Minneapolis ISKCON temple, filed suit against numerous state officials seeking a declaration that Rule 6.05, both on its face and as applied, violated respondents’ rights under the First Amendment, and seeking injunctive relief prohibiting enforcement of the Rule against ISKCON and its members. Specifically, ISKCON asserted that the Rule would suppress the practice of Sankirtan, one of its religious rituals, which enjoins its members to go into public places to distribute or sell religious literature and to solicit donations for the support of the Krishna religion. The trial court entered temporary orders to govern the conduct of the parties during the 1977 Fair. When that event concluded and after a hearing, the trial court granted the state officials’ motion for summary judgment, upholding the constitutionality of Rule 6.05. Relying on the reasoning in International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Evans, 440 F. Supp. 414 (SD Ohio 1977), the court found that the State’s interest “in providing all fair goers and concessionaries with adequate and equal access to each other and in providing a minimum of congestion on the fairgrounds” was sufficient to sustain Rule 6.05’s limitations as applied to respondents. The court, however, provided that respondents were free to “ [r] oam throughout those areas of the fairgrounds generally open to the public for the purpose of discussing with others their religious beliefs.”
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, holding that Rule 6.05, as applied to respondents, unconstitutionally restricted the Krishnas’ religious practice of Sankirtan. 299 N. W. 2d 79 (1980). The court rejected the Society’s proffered justifications for the Rule as inadequate to warrant the restriction. Furthermore, the application of Rule 6.05 to ISKCON was not essential to the furtherance of the State’s interests in that those interests could be served by means less restrictive of respondents’ First Amendment rights. We granted the state officials’ petition for writ of certiorari in light of the important constitutional issues presented and the conflicting results reached in similar cases in various lower courts. 449 U. S. 1109.
II
The State does not dispute that the oral and written dissemination of the Krishnas’ religious views and doctrines is protected by the First Amendment. See Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 160, 162-164 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 452 (1938). Nor does it claim that this protection is lost because the written- materials sought to be distributed are sold rather than given away or because contributions or gifts are solicited in the course of propagating the faith. Our cases indicate as much. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105, 111 (1943); Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U. S. 620, 632 (1980). See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940).
It is also common ground, however, that the First Amendment does not guarantee the right to communicate one’s views at all times and places or in any manner that may be desired. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U. S. 39, 47-48 (1966); Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U. S. 395, 405 (1953); see Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536, 554 (1965). As the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized, the activities of ISKCON, like those of others protected by the First Amendment, are subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104 (1972); Adderley v. Florida, supra; Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 (1949); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569 (1941). “We have often approved restrictions of that kind provided that they are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they serve a significant governmental interest, and that in doing so they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.” Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U. S. 748, 771 (1976); see also Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 447 U. S. 530, 535 (1980). The issue here, as it was below, is whether Rule 6.05 is a permissible restriction on the place and manner of communicating the views of the Krishna religion, more specifically, whether the Society may require the members of ISKCON who desire to practice San-kirtan at the State Fair to confine their distribution, sales, and solicitation activities to a fixed location.
A major criterion for a valid time, place, and manner restriction is that the restriction “may not be based upon either the content or subject matter of speech.” Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, supra, at 536. Rule 6.05 qualifies in this respect, since, as the Supreme Court of Minnesota observed, the Rule applies evenhandedly to all who wish to distribute and sell written materials or to solicit funds. No person or organization, whether commercial or charitable, is permitted to engage in such activities except from a booth rented for those purposes.
Nor does Rule 6.05 suffer from the more covert forms of discrimination that may result when arbitrary discretion is vested in some governmental authority. The method of allocating space is a straightforward first-come, first-served system. The Rule is not open to the kind of arbitrary application that this Court has condemned as inherently inconsistent with a valid time, place, and manner regulation because such discretion has the potential for becoming a means of suppressing a particular point of view. See Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U. S. 147, 150-153 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, supra, at 555-558; Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U. S. 313, 321-325 (1958); Largent v. Texas, 318 U. S. 418 (1943) ; Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, at 304; Schneider v. State, 308 U. S., at 164; Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 516 (1939).
A valid time, place, and manner regulation must also “serve a significant governmental interest.” Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, supra, at 771. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, supra, at 108. Here, the principal justification asserted by the State in support of Rule 6.05 is the need to maintain the orderly movement of the crowd given the large number of exhibitors and persons attending the Fair.
The fairgrounds comprise a relatively small area of 125 acres, the bulk of which is covered by permanent buildings, temporary structures, parking lots, and connecting thoroughfares. There were some 1,400 exhibitors and concessionaries renting space for the 1977 and 1978 Fairs, chiefly in permanent and temporary buildings. The Fair is designed to exhibit to the public an enormous variety of goods, services, entertainment, and other matters of interest. This is accomplished by confining individual exhibitors to fixed locations, with the public moving to and among the booths or other attractions, using streets and open spaces provided for that purpose. Because the Fair attracts large crowds, see supra, at 643, it is apparent that the State’s interest in the orderly movement and control of such an assembly of persons is a substantial consideration.
As a general matter, it is clear that a State’s interest in protecting the “safety and convenience” of persons using a public forum is a valid governmental objective. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S., at 115; Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S., at 574. Furthermore, consideration of a forum’s special attributes is relevant to the constitutionality of a regulation since the significance of the governmental interest must be assessed in light of the characteristic nature and function of the particular forum involved. See, e. g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, supra, at 116-117; Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U. S. 298, 302-303 (1974). This observation bears particular import in the present case since respondents make a number of analogies between the fairgrounds and city streets, which have “immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and . . . have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.” Hague v. CIO, supra, at 515. See Kunz v. New York, 340 U. S. 290, 293 (1951). But it is clear that there are significant differences between a street and the fairgrounds. A street is continually open, often uncongested, and constitutes not only a necessary conduit in the daily affairs of a locality’s citizens, but also a place where people may enjoy the open air or the company of friends and neighbors in a relaxed environment. The Minnesota Fair, as described above, is a temporary event attracting great numbers of visitors who come to the event for a short period to see and experience the host of exhibits and attractions at the Fair. The flow of the crowd and demands of safety are more pressing in the context of the Fair. As such, any comparisons to public streets are necessarily inexact.
The Minnesota Supreme Court recognized that the State’s interest in the orderly movement of a large crowd and in avoiding congestion was substantial and that Rule 6.05 furthered that interest significantly. Nevertheless, the Minnesota Supreme Court declared that the case did not turn on the “importance of the state’s undeniable interest in preventing the widespread disorder that would surely exist if no regulation such as Rule 6.05 were in effect” but upon the significance of the State’s interest in avoiding whatever disorder would likely result from granting members of ISKCON an exemption from the Rule. 299 N. W. 2d, at 83. Approaching the case in this way, the court concluded that although some disruption would occur from such an exemption, it was not of sufficient concern to warrant confining the Krishnas to a booth. The court also concluded that, in any event, the Rule was not essential to the furtherance of the State’s interest in crowd control, which could adequately be served by less intrusive means.
As we see it, the Minnesota Supreme Court took too narrow a view of the State’s interest in avoiding congestion and maintaining the orderly movement of fair patrons on the fairgrounds. The justification for the Rule should not be measured by the disorder that would result from granting an exemption solely to ISKCON. That organization and its ritual of Sankirtan have no special claim to First Amendment protection as compared''to that of other religions who also distribute literature and solicit funds. None of our cases suggest that the inclusion of peripatetic solicitation as part of a church ritual entitles church' members to solicitation rights in a public forum superior to those of members of other religious groups that raise money but do not purport to ritualize the process. Nor for present purposes do religious organizations enjoy rights to communicate, distribute, and solicit on the fairgrounds superior to those of other organizations having social, political, or other ideological messages to proselytize. These nonreligious organizations seeking support for their activities are entitled to rights equal to those of religious groups to enter a public forum and spread their views, whether by soliciting funds or by distributing literature.
If Rule 6.05 is an invalid restriction on the activities of ISKCON, it is no more valid with respect to the other social, political, or charitable organizations that have rented booths at the Fair and confined their distribution, sale, and fund solicitation to those locations. Nor would it be valid with respect to other organizations that did not rent booths, either because they were unavailable due to a lack of space or because they chose to avoid the expense involved, but that would in all probability appear in the fairgrounds to distribute, sell, and solicit if they could freely do so. The question would also inevitably arise as to what extent the First Amendment also gives commercial\organizations a right to move among the crowd to distribute information about or to sell their wares as respondents claim they may do.
ISKCON desires to proselytize at the fair because it believes it can successfully communicate and raise funds. In its view, this can be done only by intercepting fair patrons as they move about, and if success is achieved, stopping them momentarily or for longer periods as money is given or exchanged for literature. This consequence would be multiplied many times over if Rule 6.05 could not be applied to confine such transactions by ISKCON and others to fixed locations. Indeed, the court below agreed that without Rule 6.05 there would be widespread disorder at the fairgrounds. The court also recognized that some disorder would inevitably result from exempting the Krishnas from the Rule. Obviously, there would be a much larger threat to the State’s interest in crowd control if all other religious, nonreligious, and noncommercial organizations could likewise move freely about the fairgrounds distributing and selling literature and soliciting funds at will.
Given these considerations, we hold that the State’s interest in confining distribution, selling, and fund solicitation activities to fixed locations is sufficient to satisfy the requirement that a place or manner restriction must serve a substantial state interest. By focusing on the incidental effect of providing an exemption from Rule 6.05 to ISKCON, the Minnesota Supreme Court did not take into account the fact that any such exemption cannót be meaningfully limited to ISKCON, and as applied to similarly situated groups would prevent the State from furthering its important concern with managing the flow of the crowd. In our view, the Society may apply its Rule and confine the type of transactions at issue to designated locations without violating the First Amendment.
For similar reasons, we cannot agree with the Minnesota Supreme Court that Rule 6.05 is an unnecessary regulation because the State could avoid the threat to its interest posed by ISKCON by less restrictive means, such as penalizing disorder or disruption, limiting the number of solicitors, or putting more narrowly drawn restrictions on the location and movement of ISKCON’s representatives. As we have indicated, the inquiry must involve not only ISKCON, but also all other organizations that would be entitled to distribute, sell, or solicit if the booth rule may not be enforced with respect to ISKCON. Looked at in this way, it is quite improbable that the alternative means suggested by the Minnesota Supreme Court would deal adequately with the problems posed by the much larger number of distributors and solicitors that would be present on the fairgrounds if the judgment below were affirmed.
For Rule 6.05 to be valid as a place and manner restriction, it must also be sufficiently clear that alternative forums for the expression of respondents’ protected speech exist despite the effects of the Rule. Rule 6.05 is not vulnerable on this ground. First, the Rule does not prevent ISKCON from practicing Sankirtan anywhere outside the fairgrounds. More importantly, the Rule has not been shown to deny access within the forum in question. Here, the Rule does not exclude ISKCON from the fairgrounds, nor does it deny that organization the right to conduct any desired activity at some point within the forum. Its members may mingle with the crowd and orally propagate their views. The organization may also arrange for a booth and distribute and sell literature and solicit funds from that location on the fairgrounds itself. The Minnesota State Fair is a limited public forum in that it exists to provide a means for a great number of exhibitors temporarily to present their products or views, be they commercial, religious, or political, to a large number of people in an efficient fashion. Considering the limited functions of the Fair and the combined area within which it operates, we are unwilling to say that Rule 6.05 does not provide ISKCON and other organizations with an adequate means to sell and solicit on the fairgrounds. The First Amendment protects the right of every citizen to “reach the minds of willing listeners and to do so there must be opportunity to win their attention.” Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77, 87 (1949). Rule 6.05 does not unnecessarily limit that right within the fairgrounds.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Minnesota is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
The facts are taken primarily from the parties’ stipulation of facts filed with the Minnesota District Court on July 31, 1978, and reprinted in the joint appendix. App. A-30 through A-36.
Stipulation of Fact #16.
Fair officials did not “intend to restrict [respondents] from peaceably-walking about the fairgrounds and discussing their political, religious or other views with Fair patrons.” Affidavit of Michael Heffron, App. A-28. See also Tr. of Oral Arg. 5-7. The trial court expressly permitted such oral proselytizing, see infra, at 646, and that part of the order was not challenged or appealed.
Over 1,400 exhibitors and concessionaires rented booth space during the 1977 and 1978 Fairs, with several hundred potential exhibitors denied rental space solely because of the limited amount of area available. The propriety of the fee is not an issue in the present case. Cf. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569, 576-577 (1941).
The following represent some of the charitable, religious, and other noncommercial organizations that rented booth space at the 1978 Minnesota State Fair: Abortion Rights Council of Minnesota, American Association of Retired Persons, American Heart Association, American Party of Minnesota, Christian Business Men’s Association, Church of Christ, D. F. L. State Central Committee, Faith Broadcasting Network, Inc., Independent Republicans of Minnesota, Minnesota Foster Parents Association, Twin Cities Baptist Messianic Witness, World Home Bible League, Christian Educational Service, Lutheran Colportage Service, Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life, Save Our Unwanted Life, Inc., and United States-China Peoples Friendship Association.
In performing Sankirtan, ISKCON members “often greet members of the public by giving them flowers or small American flags . . . .” Stipulation of Fact #11. For the purpose of this lawsuit, respondents did not assert any right to seek contributions in return for these “greeting gifts,” nor did they seek to dance, chant, or engage in any other activities besides the distribution and sale of literature and the solicitation of donations. Ibid.
The trial court temporarily restrained the officials from “arresting, participating in the arrest of, excluding from the Fairgrounds, or preventing activities of [respondents], such as, espousing their religious beliefs, proselytizing others to those beliefs, distributing religious literature or soliciting donations for religious purposes in any portion of the Minnesota Fair Grounds generally open to the public during the 1977 Minnesota State Fair.” The court enjoined respondents from “selling or inducing others to purchase, religious literature, items or artifacts, except at a space rented for that purpose on the grounds of the Minnesota Agricultural Society in compliance with the applicable regulations of said Society.” Respondents took part in the 1977 Fair pursuant to the terms of the court order. The State submitted various affidavits stating that respondents violated the terms of the order by misrepresenting their cause in seeking solicitations, and by making similar fraudulent statements. These charges are disputed by respondents.
Given the great number of exhibitors at the State Fair, the trial court was of the view that “[s]ome form of time, place and manner restriction is clearly required if the free speech rights of each of these exhibitors are to be protected.” Accordingly, the court ordered that respondents be prohibited from distributing materials such as books, flowers, flags, incense, or artifacts and from engaging in sales or solicitation for monetary donations throughout the fairgrounds except from a booth rented from the Society.
Compare International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 506 F. Supp. 147 (NDNY 1980), rev’d, 650 F. 2d 430 (CA2 1981) (invalidating “booth” rule); Edwards v. Maryland State Fair and Agricultural Society, Inc., 628 F. 2d 282 (CA4 1980) (same); International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Bowen, 600 F. 2d 667 (CA7) (same), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 963 (1979); International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Colorado State Fair and Industrial Exposition Comm’n, 199 Colo. 265, 610 P. 2d 486 (1980) (same), with Hynes v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville, 478 F. Supp. 9 (MD Tenn. 1979) (upholding “booth” rule); International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Evans, 440 F. Supp. 414 (SD Ohio 1977) (same). Related issues have been raised concerning religious groups’ access to other types of public facilities. See International Society for Krishna Consciousness of Atlanta v. Eaves, 601 F. 2d 809 (CA5 1979) (airports); International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Rochford, 585 F. 2d 263 (CA7 1978) (same); International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. McAvey, 450 F. Supp. 1265 (SDNY 1978) (World Trade Center); International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Hays, 438 F. Supp. 1077 (SD Fla. 1977) (highway rest stops); United States v. Boesewetter, 463 F. Supp. 370 (DC 1978) (performing arts center).
In Cox v. New Hampshire, a religious group challenged a local ordinance forbidding street parades without a license. The Court held the requirement constitutional as a reasonable time, place, and manner regulation: “Where a restriction of the use of highways in that relation is designed to promote the public convenience in the interest of all, it cannot be disregarded by the attempted exercise of some civil right which in other circumstances would be entitled to protection.” 312 U. S., at 574. Kovacs v. Cooper upheld as applied to a sound truck a content-neutral and nondiscriminatory local ordinance against the emission of loud and raucous noises on the public streets. In Adderley v. Florida, no constitutional violation was discerned in applying a local trespass ordinance to persons demonstrating on the grounds of a city jail. We rejected the argument “that people who want to propagandize protests or views have a constitutional right to do so whenever and however and wherever they please” and held that the “State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.” 385 U. S., at 47-48. Grayned v. City of Rockford sustained as a reasonable time, place, and manner regulation a local ordinance forbidding disturbing noises in the vicinity of a building in which a school is in session.
See Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U. S. 748, 771 (1976); Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U. S. 85, 93-94 (1977); Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972); Papish v. University of Missouri Curators, 410 U. S. 667, 670 (1973).
Respondents do argue that because the Rule requires ISKCON to await expressions of interest from fair patrons before it may distribute, sell, or solicit funds, the regulation is not content-neutral in that it prefers listener-initiated exchanges to those originating with the speaker. The argument is interesting but has little force. This aspect of the Rule is inherent in the determination to confine exhibitors to fixed locations, it applies to all exhibitors alike, and it does not invalidate the Rule as a reasonable time, place, and manner regulation.
Petitioners assert two other state interests in support of the Rule. First, petitioners claim that the Rule forwards the State’s valid interest in protecting its citizens from fraudulent solicitations) deceptive or false speech, and undue annoyance. See Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U. S. 620 (1980); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 306-307 (1940). Petitioners also forward the State’s interest in protecting the fairgoers from being harassed or otherwise bothered, on the grounds that they are a captive audience. In light of our holding that the Rule is justified solely in terms of the State’s interest in managing the flow of the crowd, we do not reach whether these other two purposes are constitutionally sufficient to support the imposition of the Rule.
The court stated that the facts suggested “a situation in which the state’s interest in maintaining order is substantial. We have no doubt that Rule 6.05’s requirement that all vendors, exhibitors, and concessionaires perform their functions at fixed locations furthers that interest significantly.” 299 N. W. 2d, at 83.
Respondents do not defend the limited approach of the Minnesota Supreme Court. They concede that whatever exemption they were entitled to under the First Amendment would apply to other organizations seeking similar rights to take part in certain protected activities in the public areas of the fairgrounds. See Brief for Respondents 8; Tr. of Oral Arg. 25-26.
Given this understanding of the nature of the Fair, we reject respondents’ claim that Rule 6.05 effects a total ban on protected First Amendment activities in the open areas of the fairgrounds. In effect, respondents seek to separate, for constitutional purposes, the open areas of the- fairgrounds from that part of the fairgrounds where the booths are located. For the reasons stated in text, we believe respondents’ characterization of the Rule is plainly incorrect. The booths are not secreted away in some nonaccessible location, but are located within the area of the fairgrounds where visitors are expected, and indeed encouraged, to pass. Since respondents are permitted to solicit funds and distribute and sell literature from within the fairgrounds, albeit from a fixed location, it is inaccurate to say that Rule 6.05 constitutes a ban on such protected activity in the relevant public forum. Accordingly, the only question is the Rule’s validity as a time, place, and manner restriction.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | C | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We brought this case here because it involves a question of importance in the administration of the Federal Crop Insurance Act. 331U. S. 798.
The relevant facts may be briefly stated. Petitioner (hereinafter called the Corporation) is a wholly Government-owned enterprise, created by the Federal Crop Insurance Act, as an “agency of and within the Department of Agriculture.” Sec. 603 of Chapter 30, Act of February 16, 1938, 52 Stat. 72, 7 U. S. C. § 1503, as amended. To carry out the purposes of the Act, the Corporation, “Commencing with the wheat . . . crops planted for harvest in 1945” is empowered “to insure, upon such terms and conditions not inconsistent with the provisions of this title as it may determine, producers of wheat . . . against loss in yields due to unavoidable causes, including drought . . . .” 52 Stat. 74, § 508 (a) as amended, 55 Stat. 255, in turn amended by the Act of December 23, 1944, Chapter 713, 58 Stat. 918, 7 U. S. C. (Supp. V, 1946), § 1508 (a). In pursuance of its authority, the Corporation on February 5, 1945, promulgated its Wheat Crop Insurance Regulations, which were duly published in the Federal Register on February 7, 1945. 10 Fed. Reg. 1586.
On March 26, 1945, respondents applied locally for insurance under the Federal Crop Insurance Act to cover wheat farming operations in Bonneville County, Idaho. Respondents informed the Bonneville County Agricultural Conservation Committee, acting as agent for the Corporation, that they were planting 460 acres of spring wheat and that on 400 of these acres they were reseeding on winter wheat acreage. The Committee advised respondents that the entire crop was insurable, and recommended to the Corporation’s Denver Branch Office acceptance of the application. (The formal application itself did not disclose that any part of the insured crop was reseeded.) On May 28, 1945, the Corporation accepted the application.
In July, 1945, most of the respondents’ crop was destroyed by drought. Upon being notified, the Corporation, after discovering that the destroyed acreage had been reseeded, refused to pay the loss, and this litigation was appropriately begun in one of the lower courts of Idaho. The trial court rejected the Corporation’s contention, presented by a demurrer to the complaint, that the Wheat Crop Insurance Regulations barred recovery as a matter of law. Evidence was thereupon permitted to go to the jury to the effect that the respondents had no actual knowledge of the Regulations, insofar as they precluded insurance for reseeded wheat, and that they had in fact been misled by petitioner’s agent into believing that spring wheat reseeded on winter wheat acreage was insurable by the Corporation. The jury returned a verdict for the loss on all the 460 acres and the Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the resulting judgment. 67 Idaho 196,174 P. 2d 834. That court in effect adopted the theory of the trial judge, that since the knowledge of the agent of a private insurance company, under the circumstances of this case, would be attributed to, and thereby bind, a private insurance company, the Corporation is equally bound.
The case no doubt presents phases of hardship. We take for granted that, on the basis of what they were told by the Corporation’s local agent, the respondents reasonably believed that their entire crop was covered by petitioner’s insurance. And so we assume that recovery could be had against a private insurance company. But the Corporation is not a private insurance company. It is too late in the day to urge that the Government is just another private litigant, for purposes of charging it with liability, whenever it takes over a business theretofore conducted by private enterprise or engages in competition with private ventures. Government is not partly public or partly private, depending upon the governmental pedigree of the type of a particular activity or the manner in which the Government conducts it. The Government may carry on its operations through conventional executive agencies or through corporate forms especially created for defined ends. See Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 306 U. S. 381, 390. Whatever the form in which the Government functions, anyone entering into an arrangement with the Government takes the risk of having accurately ascertained that he who purports to act for the Government stays within the bounds of his authority. The scope of this authority may be explicitly defined by Congress or be limited by delegated legislation, properly exercised through the rule-making power. And this is so even though, as here, the agent himself may have been unaware of the limitations upon his authority. See, e. g., Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U. S. 389, 409; United States v. Stewart, 311 U. S. 60, 70, and see, generally, The Floyd Acceptances, 7 Wall. 666.
If the Federal Crop Insurance Act had by explicit language prohibited the insurance of spring wheat which is reseeded on winter wheat acreage, the ignorance of such a restriction, either by the respondents or the Corporation’s agent, would be immaterial and recovery could not be had against the Corporation for loss of such reseeded wheat. Congress could hardly define the multitudinous details appropriate for the business of crop insurance when the Government entered it. Inevitably “the terms and conditions” upon which valid governmental insurance can be had must be defined by the agency acting for the Government. And so Congress has legislated in this instance, as in modern regulatory enactments it so often does, by conferring the rule-making power upon the agency created for carrying out its policy. See § 616 (b), 52 Stat. 72, 77, 7 U. S. C. § 1516 (b). Just as everyone is charged with knowledge of the United States Statutes at Large, Congress has provided that the appearance of rules and regulations in the Federal Register gives legal notice of their contents. 49 Stat. 502,44 U. S. C. § 307.
Accordingly, the Wheat Crop Insurance Regulations were binding on all who sought to come within the Federal Crop Insurance Act, regardless of actual knowledge of what is in the Regulations or of the hardship resulting from innocent ignorance. The oft-quoted observation in Rock Island, Arkansas & Louisiana Railroad Co. v. United States, 254 U. S. 141, 143, that “Men must turn square corners when they deal with the Government,” does not reflect a callous outlook. It merely expresses the duty of all courts to observe the conditions defined by Congress for charging the public treasury. The “terms and conditions” defined by the Corporation, under authority of Congress, for creating liability on the part of the Government preclude recovery for the loss of the reseeded wheat no matter with what good reason the respondents thought they had obtained insurance from the Government. Indeed, not only do the Wheat Regulations limit the liability of the Government as if they had been enacted by Congress directly, but they were in fact incorporated by reference in the application, as specifically required by the Regulations.
We have thus far assumed, as did the parties here and the courts below, that the controlling regulation in fact precluded insurance coverage for spring wheat reseeded on winter wheat acreage. It explicitly states that the term “wheat crop shall not include . . . winter wheat in the 1945 crop year, and spring wheat which has been reseeded on winter wheat acreage in the 1945 crop year.” (Sec. 414.37 (v) of Wheat Crop Insurance Regulations, 10 Fed. Reg. 1591.) The circumstances of this case tempt one to read the regulation, since it is for us to read it, with charitable laxity. But not even the temptations of a hard case can elude the clear meaning of the regulation. It precludes recovery for “spring wheat which has been reseeded on winter wheat acreage in the 1945 crop year.” Concerning the validity of the regulation, as “not inconsistent with the provisions” of the Federal Crop Insurance Act, no question has been raised.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Rutledge dissent.
Judging from the legislative history of the Act, the Government engaged in crop insurance as a pioneer. Private insurance companies apparently deemed all-risk crop insurance too great a commercial hazard. See Report and Recommendations of the President’s Committee on Crop Insurance, H. Doc. No. 150, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 2-4, 11-12; H. R. Rep. No. 1479, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2; 81 Cong. Rec. 2866, 2867, 2887, 2891, 2893, 2895; Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry on S. 1397, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 125, 185. But this does not affect the legal issues. It merely underscores the fact that the undertaking by the Government is not an ordinary commercial undertaking, and thereby reenforces the conclusion that the rules of law whereby private insurance companies are rendered liable for the acts of their agents are not bodily applicable to a Government agency like the Corporation, unless Congress has so provided.
“H. Acceptance by the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation.— It is understood and agreed that upon acceptance of the application by a duly authorized representative of the Corporation as evidenced by his approval below, the insurance contract shall be in effect, provided the application has been submitted in accordance with the provisions of the application and the applicable Wheat Crop Insurance Regulations. It is further understood and agreed that the accepted application and the applicable Wheat Crop Insurance Regulations, including any amendments thereto, constitute the contract between the Corporation and the insured.”
“§ 414.3 Acceptance of applications by the Corporation, (a) Upon acceptance of an application by a duly authorized representative of the Corporation, the insurance contract shall be in effect, provided such application is submitted in accordance with the provisions of the application and of these regulations, including any amendments thereto." 10 Fed. Reg. 1586. The regulation defined “insurance contract” as “the contract of insurance entered into between the applicant and the Corporation by virtue of the application for insurance and these regulations and any amendments thereto.” 10 Fed. Reg. 1591.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.
We consider whether using a drug-sniffing dog on a homeowner's porch to investigate the contents of the home is a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
I
In 2006, Detective William Pedraja of the Miami-Dade Police Department received an unverified tip that marijuana was being grown in the home of respondent Joelis Jardines. One month later, the Department and the Drug Enforcement Administration sent a joint surveillance team to Jardines' home. Detective Pedraja was part of that team. He watched the home for fifteen minutes and saw no vehicles in the driveway or activity around the home, and could not see inside because the blinds were drawn. Detective Pedraja then approached Jardines' home accompanied by Detective Douglas Bartelt, a trained canine handler who had just arrived at the scene with his drug-sniffing dog. The dog was trained to detect the scent of marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and several other drugs, indicating the presence of any of these substances through particular behavioral changes recognizable by his handler.
Detective Bartelt had the dog on a six-foot leash, owing in part to the dog's "wild" nature, App. to Pet. for Cert. A-35, and tendency to dart around erratically while searching. As the dog approached Jardines' front porch, he apparently sensed one of the odors he had been trained to detect, and began energetically exploring the area for the strongest point source of that odor. As Detective Bartelt explained, the dog "began tracking that airborne odor by... tracking back and forth," engaging in what is called "bracketing," "back and forth, back and forth." Id., at A-33 to A-34. Detective Bartelt gave the dog "the full six feet of the leash plus whatever safe distance [he could] give him" to do this-he testified that he needed to give the dog "as much distance as I can." Id., at A-35. And Detective Pedraja stood back while this was occurring, so that he would not "get knocked over" when the dog was "spinning around trying to find" the source. Id., at A-38.
After sniffing the base of the front door, the dog sat, which is the trained behavior upon discovering the odor's strongest point. Detective Bartelt then pulled the dog away from the door and returned to his vehicle. He left the scene after informing Detective Pedraja that there had been a positive alert for narcotics.
On the basis of what he had learned at the home, Detective Pedraja applied for and received a warrant to search the residence. When the warrant was executed later that day, Jardines attempted to flee and was arrested; the search revealed marijuana plants, and he was charged with trafficking in cannabis.
At trial, Jardines moved to suppress the marijuana plants on the ground that the canine investigation was an unreasonable search. The trial court granted the motion, and the Florida Third District Court of Appeal reversed. On a petition for discretionary review, the Florida Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal and approved the trial court's decision to suppress, holding (as relevant here) that the use of the trained narcotics dog to investigate Jardines' home was a Fourth Amendment search unsupported by probable cause, rendering invalid the warrant based upon information gathered in that search. 73 So.3d 34 (2011). We granted certiorari, limited to the question of whether the officers' behavior was a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 565 U.S. ----, 132 S.Ct. 995, 181 L.Ed.2d 726 (2012).
II
The Fourth Amendment provides in relevant part that the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." The Amendment establishes a simple baseline, one that for much of our history formed the exclusive basis for its protections: When "the Government obtains information by physically intruding" on persons, houses, papers, or effects, "a'search' within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment" has "undoubtedly occurred." United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. ----, ----, n. 3, 132 S.Ct. 945, 950-951, n. 3, 181 L.Ed.2d 911 (2012). By reason of our decision in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), property rights "are not the sole measure of Fourth Amendment violations," Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 64, 113 S.Ct. 538, 121 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992) -but though Katz may add to the baseline, it does not subtract anything from the Amendment's protections "when the Government does engage in [a] physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area," United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
That principle renders this case a straightforward one. The officers were gathering information in an area belonging to Jardines and immediately surrounding his house-in the curtilage of the house, which we have held enjoys protection as part of the home itself. And they gathered that information by physically entering and occupying the area to engage in conduct not explicitly or implicitly permitted by the homeowner.
A
The Fourth Amendment "indicates with some precision the places and things encompassed by its protections": persons, houses, papers, and effects. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 176, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984). The Fourth Amendment does not, therefore, prevent all investigations conducted on private property; for example, an officer may (subject to Katz ) gather information in what we have called "open fields"-even if those fields are privately owned-because such fields are not enumerated in the Amendment's text. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 44 S.Ct. 445, 68 L.Ed. 898 (1924).
But when it comes to the Fourth Amendment, the home is first among equals. At the Amendment's "very core" stands "the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion." Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961). This right would be of little practical value if the State's agents could stand in a home's porch or side garden and trawl for evidence with impunity; the right to retreat would be significantly diminished if the police could enter a man's property to observe his repose from just outside the front window.
We therefore regard the area "immediately surrounding and associated with the home"-what our cases call the curtilage-as "part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes." Oliver, supra, at 180, 104 S.Ct. 1735. That principle has ancient and durable roots. Just as the distinction between the home and the open fields is "as old as the common law," Hester,supra, at 59, 44 S.Ct. 445, so too is the identity of home and what Blackstone called the "curtilage or homestall," for the "house protects and privileges all its branches and appurtenants." 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 223, 225 (1769). This area around the home is "intimately linked to the home, both physically and psychologically," and is where "privacy expectations are most heightened." California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213, 106 S.Ct. 1809, 90 L.Ed.2d 210 (1986).
While the boundaries of the curtilage are generally "clearly marked," the "conception defining the curtilage" is at any rate familiar enough that it is "easily understood from our daily experience." Oliver, 466 U.S., at 182, n. 12, 104 S.Ct. 1735. Here there is no doubt that the officers entered it: The front porch is the classic exemplar of an area adjacent to the home and "to which the activity of home life extends." Ibid.
B
Since the officers' investigation took place in a constitutionally protected area, we turn to the question of whether it was accomplished through an unlicensed physical intrusion. While law enforcement officers need not "shield their eyes" when passing by the home "on public thoroughfares," Ciraolo, 476 U.S., at 213, 106 S.Ct. 1809, an officer's leave to gather information is sharply circumscribed when he steps off those thoroughfares and enters the Fourth Amendment's protected areas. In permitting, for example, visual observation of the home from "public navigable airspace," we were careful to note that it was done "in a physically nonintrusive manner." Ibid. Entick v. Carrington, 2 Wils. K.B. 275, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765), a case "undoubtedly familiar" to "every American statesman" at the time of the Founding, Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886), states the general rule clearly: "[O]ur law holds the property of every man so sacred, that no man can set his foot upon his neighbour's close without his leave." 2 Wils. K.B., at 291, 95 Eng. Rep., at 817. As it is undisputed that the detectives had all four of their feet and all four of their companion's firmly planted on the constitutionally protected extension of Jardines' home, the only question is whether he had given his leave (even implicitly) for them to do so. He had not.
"A license may be implied from the habits of the country," notwithstanding the "strict rule of the English common law as to entry upon a close." McKee v. Gratz, 260 U.S. 127, 136, 43 S.Ct. 16, 67 L.Ed. 167 (1922) (Holmes, J.). We have accordingly recognized that "the knocker on the front door is treated as an invitation or license to attempt an entry, justifying ingress to the home by solicitors, hawkers and peddlers of all kinds." Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 626, 71 S.Ct. 920, 95 L.Ed. 1233 (1951). This implicit license typically permits the visitor to approach the home by the front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then (absent invitation to linger longer) leave. Complying with the terms of that traditional invitation does not require fine-grained legal knowledge; it is generally managed without incident by the Nation's Girl Scouts and trick-or-treaters.
Thus, a police officer not armed with a warrant may approach a home and knock, precisely because that is "no more than any private citizen might do." Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. ----, ----, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 1862, 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011).
But introducing a trained police dog to explore the area around the home in hopes of discovering incriminating evidence is something else. There is no customary invitation to do that. An invitation to engage in canine forensic investigation assuredly does not inhere in the very act of hanging a knocker. To find a visitor knocking on the door is routine (even if sometimes unwelcome); to spot that same visitor exploring the front path with a metal detector, or marching his bloodhound into the garden before saying hello and asking permission, would inspire most of us to-well, call the police. The scope of a license-express or implied-is limited not only to a particular area but also to a specific purpose. Consent at a traffic stop to an officer's checking out an anonymous tip that there is a body in the trunk does not permit the officer to rummage through the trunk for narcotics. Here, the background social norms that invite a visitor to the front door do not invite him there to conduct a search.
The State points to our decisions holding that the subjective intent of the officer is irrelevant. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. ----, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011) ; Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). But those cases merely hold that a stop or search that is objectively reasonable is not vitiated by the fact that the officer's real reason for making the stop or search has nothing to do with the validating reason. Thus, the defendant will not be heard to complain that although he was speeding the officer's real reason for the stop was racial harassment. See id., at 810, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769. Here, however, the question before the court is precisely whether the officer's conduct was an objectively reasonable search. As we have described, that depends upon whether the officers had an implied license to enter the porch, which in turn depends upon the purpose for which they entered. Here, their behavior objectively reveals a purpose to conduct a search, which is not what anyone would think he had license to do.
III
The State argues that investigation by a forensic narcotics dog by definition cannot implicate any legitimate privacy interest. The State cites for authority our decisions in United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983), United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984), and Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005), which held, respectively, that canine inspection of luggage in an airport, chemical testing of a substance that had fallen from a parcel in transit, and canine inspection of an automobile during a lawful traffic stop, do not violate the "reasonable expectation of privacy" described in Katz.
Just last Term, we considered an argument much like this. Jones held that tracking an automobile's whereabouts using a physically-mounted GPS receiver is a Fourth Amendment search. The Government argued that the Katz standard "show[ed] that no search occurred," as the defendant had "no'reasonable expectation of privacy' " in his whereabouts on the public roads, Jones, 565 U.S., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 950 -a proposition with at least as much support in our case law as the one the State marshals here. See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 278, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983). But because the GPS receiver had been physically mounted on the defendant's automobile (thus intruding on his "effects"), we held that tracking the vehicle's movements was a search: a person's "Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the Katz formulation." Jones, supra, at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 950. The Katz reasonable-expectations test "has been added to, not substituted for, " the traditional property-based understanding of the Fourth Amendment, and so is unnecessary to consider when the government gains evidence by physically intruding on constitutionally protected areas. Jones, supra, at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 951-952.
Thus, we need not decide whether the officers' investigation of Jardines' home violated his expectation of privacy under Katz. One virtue of the Fourth Amendment's property-rights baseline is that it keeps easy cases easy. That the officers learned what they learned only by physically intruding on Jardines' property to gather evidence is enough to establish that a search occurred.
For a related reason we find irrelevant the State's argument (echoed by the dissent) that forensic dogs have been commonly used by police for centuries. This argument is apparently directed to our holding in Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001), that surveillance of the home is a search where "the Government uses a device that is not in general public use" to "explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion." Id., at 40, 121 S.Ct. 2038 (emphasis added). But the implication of that statement (inclusio unius est exclusio alterius ) is that when the government uses a physical intrusion to explore details of the home (including its curtilage), the antiquity of the tools that they bring along is irrelevant.
* * *
The government's use of trained police dogs to investigate the home and its immediate surroundings is a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida is therefore affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Justice KAGAN, with whom Justice GINSBURG and Justice SOTOMAYOR join, concurring.
For me, a simple analogy clinches this case-and does so on privacy as well as property grounds. A stranger comes to the front door of your home carrying super-high-powered binoculars. See ante, at 1416, n. 3. He doesn't knock or say hello. Instead, he stands on the porch and uses the binoculars to peer through your windows, into your home's furthest corners. It doesn't take long (the binoculars are really very fine): In just a couple of minutes, his uncommon behavior allows him to learn details of your life you disclose to no one. Has your "visitor" trespassed on your property, exceeding the license you have granted to members of the public to, say, drop off the mail or distribute campaign flyers? Yes, he has. And has he also invaded your "reasonable expectation of privacy," by nosing into intimacies you sensibly thought protected from disclosure? Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Yes, of course, he has done that too.
That case is this case in every way that matters. Here, police officers came to Joelis Jardines' door with a super-sensitive instrument, which they deployed to detect things inside that they could not perceive unassisted. The equipment they used was animal, not mineral. But contra the dissent, see post, at 1420 (opinion of ALITO, J.) (noting the ubiquity of dogs in American households), that is of no significance in determining whether a search occurred. Detective Bartelt's dog was not your neighbor's pet, come to your porch on a leisurely stroll. As this Court discussed earlier this Term, drug-detection dogs are highly trained tools of law enforcement, geared to respond in distinctive ways to specific scents so as to convey clear and reliable information to their human partners. See Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. ----, 133 S.Ct. 1050, 1053-1054, 1056-1057, 185 L.Ed.2d 61 (2013). They are to the poodle down the street as high-powered binoculars are to a piece of plain glass. Like the binoculars, a drug-detection dog is a specialized device for discovering objects not in plain view (or plain smell). And as in the hypothetical above, that device was aimed here at a home-the most private and inviolate (or so we expect) of all the places and things the Fourth Amendment protects. Was this activity a trespass? Yes, as the Court holds today. Was it also an invasion of privacy? Yes, that as well.
The Court today treats this case under a property rubric; I write separately to note that I could just as happily have decided it by looking to Jardines' privacy interests. A decision along those lines would have looked... well, much like this one. It would have talked about " 'the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.' " Ante, at 1414 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961) ). It would have insisted on maintaining the "practical value" of that right by preventing police officers from standing in an adjacent space and "trawl[ing] for evidence with impunity." Ante, at 1414. It would have explained that " 'privacy expectations are most heightened' " in the home and the surrounding area. Ante, at 1414 - 1415 (quoting California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213, 106 S.Ct. 1809, 90 L.Ed.2d 210 (1986) ). And it would have determined that police officers invade those shared expectations when they use trained canine assistants to reveal within the confines of a home what they could not otherwise have found there. See ante, at 1415 - 1416, and nn. 2-3.
It is not surprising that in a case involving a search of a home, property concepts and privacy concepts should so align. The law of property "naturally enough influence[s]" our "shared social expectations" of what places should be free from governmental incursions. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111, 126 S.Ct. 1515, 164 L.Ed.2d 208 (2006) ; see Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143, n. 12, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). And so the sentiment "my home is my own," while originating in property law, now also denotes a common understanding-extending even beyond that law's formal protections-about an especially private sphere. Jardines' home was his property; it was also his most intimate and familiar space. The analysis proceeding from each of those facts, as today's decision reveals, runs mostly along the same path.
I can think of only one divergence: If we had decided this case on privacy grounds, we would have realized that Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001), already resolved it. The Kyllo Court held that police officers conducted a search when they used a thermal-imaging device to detect heat emanating from a private home, even though they committed no trespass. Highlighting our intention to draw both a "firm" and a "bright" line at "the entrance to the house," id., at 40, 121 S.Ct. 2038, we announced the following rule:
"Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a'search' and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant." Ibid.
That "firm" and "bright" rule governs this case: The police officers here conducted a search because they used a "device... not in general public use" (a trained drug-detection dog) to "explore details of the home" (the presence of certain substances)
that they would not otherwise have discovered without entering the premises.
And again, the dissent's argument that the device is just a dog cannot change the equation. As Kyllo made clear, the "sense-enhancing" tool at issue may be "crude" or "sophisticated," may be old or new (drug-detection dogs actually go back not "12,000 years" or "centuries," post, at 1420, 1424, 1428, but only a few decades), may be either smaller or bigger than a breadbox; still, "at least where (as here)" the device is not "in general public use," training it on a home violates our "minimal expectation of privacy"-an expectation "that exists, and that is acknowledged to be reasonable." 533 U.S., at 34, 36, 121 S.Ct. 2038. That does not mean the device is off-limits, as the dissent implies, see post, at 1425 - 1426; it just means police officers cannot use it to examine a home without a warrant or exigent circumstance. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403-404, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006) (describing exigencies allowing the warrantless search of a home). With these further thoughts, suggesting that a focus on Jardines' privacy interests would make an "easy cas[e] easy" twice over, ante, at 1417, I join the Court's opinion in full.
Justice ALITO, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Justice KENNEDY, and Justice BREYER join, dissenting.
The Court's decision in this important Fourth Amendment case is based on a putative rule of trespass law that is nowhere to be found in the annals of Anglo-American jurisprudence.
The law of trespass generally gives members of the public a license to use a walkway to approach the front door of a house and to remain there for a brief time. This license is not limited to persons who intend to speak to an occupant or who actually do so. (Mail carriers and persons delivering packages and flyers are examples of individuals who may lawfully approach a front door without intending to converse.) Nor is the license restricted to categories of visitors whom an occupant of the dwelling is likely to welcome; as the Court acknowledges, this license applies even to "solicitors, hawkers and peddlers of all kinds." Ante, at 1415 (internal quotation marks omitted). And the license even extends to police officers who wish to gather evidence against an occupant (by asking potentially incriminating questions).
According to the Court, however, the police officer in this case, Detective Bartelt, committed a trespass because he was accompanied during his otherwise lawful visit to the front door of respondent's house by his dog, Franky. Where is the authority evidencing such a rule? Dogs have been domesticated for about 12,000 years; they were ubiquitous in both this country and Britain at the time of the adoption of the Fourth Amendment; and their acute sense of smell has been used in law enforcement for centuries. Yet the Court has been unable to find a single case-from the United States or any other common-law nation-that supports the rule on which its decision is based. Thus, trespass law provides no support for the Court's holding today.
The Court's decision is also inconsistent with the reasonable-expectations-of-privacy test that the Court adopted in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). A reasonable person understands that odors emanating from a house may be detected from locations that are open to the public, and a reasonable person will not count on the strength of those odors remaining within the range that, while detectible by a dog, cannot be smelled by a human.
For these reasons, I would hold that no search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment took place in this case, and I would reverse the decision below.
I
The opinion of the Court may leave a reader with the mistaken impression that Detective Bartelt and Franky remained on respondent's property for a prolonged period of time and conducted a far-flung exploration of the front yard. See ante, at 1414 ("trawl for evidence with impunity"), 1416 ("marching his bloodhound into the garden"). But that is not what happened.
Detective Bartelt and Franky approached the front door via the driveway and a paved path-the route that any visitor would customarily use -and Franky was on the kind of leash that any dog owner might employ. As Franky approached the door, he started to track an airborne odor. He held his head high and began "bracketing" the area (pacing back and forth) in order to determine the strongest source of the smell. App. 95-96. Detective Bartelt knew "the minute [he] observed" this behavior that Franky had detected drugs. Id., at 95. Upon locating the odor's strongest source, Franky sat at the base of the front door, and at this point, Detective Bartelt and Franky immediately returned to their patrol car. Id., at 98.
A critical fact that the Court omits is that, as respondent's counsel explained at oral argument, this entire process-walking down the driveway and front path to the front door, waiting for Franky to find the strongest source of the odor, and walking back to the car-took approximately a minute or two. Tr. of Oral Arg. 57-58. Thus, the amount of time that Franky and the detective remained at the front porch was even less. The Court also fails to mention that, while Detective Bartelt apparently did not personally smell the odor of marijuana coming from the house, another officer who subsequently stood on the front porch, Detective Pedraja, did notice that smell and was able to identify it. App. 81.
II
The Court concludes that the conduct in this case was a search because Detective Bartelt exceeded the boundaries of the license to approach the house that is recognized by the law of trespass, but the Court's interpretation of the scope of that license is unfounded.
A
It is said that members of the public may lawfully proceed along a walkway leading to the front door of a house because custom grants them a license to do so. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 626, 71 S.Ct. 920, 95 L.Ed. 1233 (1951) ; Lakin v. Ames, 64 Mass. 198, 220 (1852) ; J. Bishop, Commentaries on the Non-Contract Law § 823, p. 378 (1889). This rule encompasses categories of visitors whom most homeowners almost certainly wish to allow to approach their front doors-friends, relatives, mail carriers, persons making deliveries. But it also reaches categories of visitors who are less universally welcome-"solicitors," "hawkers," "peddlers," and the like. The law might attempt to draw fine lines between categories of welcome and unwelcome visitors, distinguishing, for example, between tolerable and intolerable door-to-door peddlers (Girl Scouts selling cookies versus adults selling aluminum siding) or between police officers on agreeable and disagreeable missions (gathering information about a bothersome neighbor versus asking potentially incriminating questions). But the law of trespass has not attempted such a difficult taxonomy. See Desnick v. American Broadcasting Cos., 44 F.3d 1345, 1351 (C.A.7 1995) ("[C]onsent to an entry is often given legal effect even though the entrant has intentions that if known to the owner of the property would cause him for perfectly understandable and generally ethical or at least lawful reasons to revoke his consent"); cf. Skinner v. Ogallala Public School Dist., 262 Neb. 387, 402, 631 N.W.2d 510, 525 (2001) ( "[I]n order to determine if a business invitation is implied, the inquiry is not a subjective assessment of why the visitor chose to visit the premises in a particular instance"); Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Kane, 213 Md. 152, 159, 131 A.2d 470, 473-474 (1957) (noting that "there are many cases in which an invitation has been implied from circumstances, such as custom," and that this test is "objective in that it stresses custom and the appearance of things" as opposed to "the undisclosed intention of the visitor").
Of course, this license has certain spatial and temporal limits. A visitor must stick to the path that is typically used to approach a front door, such as a paved walkway. A visitor cannot traipse through the garden, meander into the backyard, or take other circuitous detours that veer from the pathway that a visitor would customarily use. See, e.g., Robinson v. Virginia, 47 Va.App. 533, 549-550, 625 S.E.2d 651, 659 (2006) (en banc); United States v. Wells, 648 F.3d 671, 679-680 (C.A.8 2011) (police exceeded scope of their implied invitation when they bypassed the front door and proceeded directly to the back yard); State v. Harris, 919 S.W.2d 619, 624 (Tenn.Crim.App.1995) ("Any substantial and unreasonable departure from an area where the public is impliedly invited exceeds the scope of the implied invitation..." (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)); 1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.3(c), p. 578 (2004) (hereinafter LaFave); id., § 2.3(f), at 600-603 ("[W]hen the police come on to private property to conduct an investigation or for some other legitimate purpose and restrict their movements to places visitors could be expected to go (e.g., walkways, driveways, porches), observations made from such vantage points are not covered by the Fourth Amendment" (footnotes omitted)).
Nor, as a general matter, may a visitor come to the front door in the middle of the night without an express invitation. See State v. Cada, 129 Idaho 224, 233, 923 P.2d 469, 478 (App.1996) ("Furtive intrusion late at night or in the predawn hours is not conduct that is expected from ordinary visitors. Indeed, if observed by a resident of the premises, it could be a cause for great alarm").
Similarly, a visitor may not linger at the front door for an extended period. See 9 So.3d 1, 11 (Fla.App.2008) (case below) (Cope, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[T]here is no such thing as squatter's rights on a front porch. A stranger may not plop down uninvited to spend the afternoon in the front porch rocking chair, or throw down a sleeping bag to spend the night, or lurk on the front porch, looking in the windows"). The license is limited to the amount of time it would customarily take to approach the door, pause long enough to see if someone is home, and (if not expressly invited to stay longer), leave.
As I understand the law of trespass and the scope of the implied license, a visitor who adheres to these limitations is not necessarily required to ring the doorbell, knock on the door, or attempt to speak with an occupant. For example, mail carriers, persons making deliveries, and individuals distributing flyers may leave the items they are carrying
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Me. Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires that we decide whether our decision in Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971), bars a federal district court from intervening in a state civil proceeding such as this, when the proceeding is based on a state statute believed by the district court to be unconstitutional. A similar issue was raised in Gibson v. Berry hill, 411 U. S. 564 (1973), but we were not required to decide it because there the enjoined state proceedings were before a biased administrative body which could not provide a necessary predicate for a Younger dismissal, that is, “the opportunity to raise and have timely decided by a competent state tribunal the federal issues involved.” Id., at 577. Similarly, in Speight v. Slaton, 415 U. S. 333 (1974), we noted probable jurisdiction to consider the applicability of Younger to noncriminal cases, but remanded for reconsideration in light of a subsequent decision of the Georgia Supreme Court which struck down the challenged statute on similar facts. Today we do reach the issue, and conclude that in the circumstances presented here the principles of Younger are applicable even though the state proceeding is civil in nature.
I
Appellants are the sheriff and prosecuting attorney of Allen County, Ohio. This case arises from their efforts to close the Cinema I Theatre, in Lima, Ohio. Under the management of both its current tenant, ap-pellee Pursue, Ltd., and appellee’s predecessor, William Dakota, the Cinema I has specialized in the display of films which may fairly be characterized as pornographic, and which in numerous instances have been adjudged obscene after adversary hearings.
Appellants sought to invoke the Ohio public nuisance statute, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3767.01 et seq. (1971), against appellee. Section 3767.01 (C) provides that a place which exhibits obscene films is a nuisance, while § 3767.06 requires closure for up to a year of any place determined to be a nuisance. The statute also provides for preliminary injunctions pending final determination of status as a nuisance, for sale of all personal property used in conducting the nuisance, and for release from a closure order upon satisfaction of certain conditions (including a showing that the nuisance will not be re-established).
Appellants instituted a nuisance proceeding in the Court of Common Pleas of Allen County against appel-lee’s predecessor, William Dakota. During the course of the somewhat involved legal proceedings which followed, the Court of Common Pleas reviewed 16 movies which had been shown at the theater. The court rendered a judgment that Dakota had engaged in a course of conduct of displaying obscene movies at the Cinema I, and that the theater was therefore to be closed, pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3767.06 (1971), “for any purpose for a period of one year unless sooner released by Order of [the] Court pursuant to defendant-owners fulfilling the requirements provided in Section 3767.04 of the Revised Code of Ohio.” The judgment also provided for the seizure and sale of personal property used in the theater’s operations.
Appellee, Pursue, Ltd., had succeeded to William Dakota’s leasehold interest in the Cinema I prior to entry of the state-court judgment. Rather than appealing that judgment within the Ohio court system, it immediately filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. The complaint was based on 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and alleged that appellants’ use of Ohio’s nuisance statute constituted a deprivation of constitutional rights under the color of state law. It sought injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment that the statute was unconstitutional and unenforceable. Since the complaint was directed against the constitutionality of a state statute, a three-judge court was convened. The District Court concluded that while the statute was not vague, it did constitute an overly broad prior restraint on First Amendment rights insofar as it permanently or temporarily prevented the showing of films which had not been adjudged obscene in prior adversary hearings. Cf. Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697 (1931). Fashioning its remedy to match the perceived constitutional defect, the court permanently enjoined the execution of that portion of the state court’s judgment that closed the Cinema I to films which had not been adjudged obscene. The judgment and opinion of the District Court give no indication that it considered whether it should have stayed its hand in deference to the principles of federalism which find expression in Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971).
On this appeal, appellants raise the Younger problem, as well as a variety of constitutional and statutory issues. We need consider only the applicability of Younger.
II
Younger and its companion cases considered the propriety of federal-court intervention in pending state criminal prosecutions. The issue was not a novel one, and the Court relied heavily on Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U. S. 240 (1926), and subsequent cases which endorsed its holding that federal injunctions against the state criminal law enforcement process could be issued only “under extraordinary circumstances where the danger of irreparable loss is both great and immediate.” Id., at 243. Younger itself involved a challenge to a prosecution under the California Criminal Syndicalism Act, which allegedly was unconstitutional on its face. In an opinion for the Court by Mr. Justice Black, we observed that “it has been perfectly natural for our cases to repeat time and time again that the normal thing to do when federal courts are asked to enjoin pending proceedings in state courts is not to issue such injunctions.” 401 U. S., at 45. We noted that not only had a congressional statute manifested an interest in permitting state courts to try state cases, but that there had also long existed a strong judicial policy against federal interference with state criminal proceedings. We recognized that this judicial policy is based in part on the traditional doctrine that a court of equity should stay its hand when a movant has an adequate remedy at law, and that it “particularly should not act to restrain a criminal prosecution.” Id,, at 43. But we went on to explain that this doctrine “is reinforced by an even more vital consideration,” an aspect of federalism which we described as
“the notion of 'comity/ that is, a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways.” Id., at 44.
Central to Younger was the recognition that ours is a system in which
“the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States.” Ibid.
We reaffirmed the requirement of Fenner v. Boykin that extraordinary circumstances must be present to justify federal injunctive relief against state criminal prosecutions. Echoing Fenner, we stated that a movant must show not merely the “irreparable injury” which is a normal prerequisite for an injunction, but also must show that the injury would be “ ‘great and immediate.’ ” 401 U. S., at 46. The opinion also suggested that only in extraordinary situations could the necessary injury be shown if the prosecution was conducted in good faith and without an intent to harass. Id., at 54. It was particularly noted that the “cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of having to defend against a single criminal prosecution” was not the type of injury that could justify federal interference. Id., at 46.
In Younger we also considered whether the policy of noninterference had been modified by our decision in Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479 (1965), at least insofar as First Amendment attacks on statutes thought to be facially invalid are concerned. We observed that the arrests and threatened prosecutions in Dombrowski were alleged to have been in bad faith and employed as a means of harassing the federal-court plaintiffs. That case was thus within the traditional narrow exceptions to the doctrine that federal courts should not interfere with state prosecutions. We acknowledged in Younger that it is “ ‘of course conceivable that a statute might be flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against whomever an effort might be made to apply it/ ” and that such a situation might justify federal intervention, 401 U. S., at 53-54. But we unequivocally held that facial invalidity of a statute is not itself an exceptional circumstance justifying federal interference with state criminal proceedings.
In Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452 (1974), we considered whether Younger required exceptional circumstances to justify federal declaratory relief against state criminal statutes when a prosecution was not pending. In concluding that it did not, we had occasion to identify more specifically some of the means by which federal interference with state proceedings might violate the principles of comity and federalism on which Younger is based. We noted that “the relevant principles of equity, comity, and federalism 'have little force in the absence of a pending state proceeding.' ” Id., at 462. We explained:
“When no state criminal proceeding is pending at the time the federal complaint is filed, federal intervention does not result in duplicative legal proceedings or disruption of the state criminal justice system; nor can federal intervention, in that circumstance, be interpreted as reflecting negatively upon the state court’s ability to enforce constitutional principles.” Ibid.
It is against this background that we consider the propriety of federal-court intervention with the Ohio nuisance proceeding at issue in this case.
Ill
The seriousness of federal judicial interference with state civil functions has long been recognized by this Court. We have consistently required that when federal courts are confronted with requests for such relief, they should abide by standards of restraint that go well beyond those of private equity jurisprudence. For example, Massachusetts State Grange v. Benton, 272 U. S. 525 (1926), involved an effort to enjoin the operation of a state daylight savings act. Writing for the Court, Mr. Justice Holmes cited Fenner v. Boykin, supra, and emphasized a rule that “should be very strictly observed,” 272 U. S., at 529, “that no injunction ought to issue against officers of a State clothed with authority to enforce the law in question, unless in a case reasonably free from doubt and when necessary to prevent great and irreparable injury.” Id., at 527.
Although Mr. Justice Holmes was confronted with a bill seeking an injunction against state executive officers, rather than against state judicial proceedings, we think that the relevant considerations of federalism are of no less weight in the latter setting. If anything, they counsel more heavily toward federal restraint, since interference with a state judicial proceeding prevents the state not only from effectuating its substantive policies, but also from continuing to perform the separate function of providing a forum competent to vindicate any constitutional objections interposed against those policies. Such interference also results in duplicative legal proceedings, and can readily be interpreted “as reflecting negatively upon the state court's ability to enforce constitutional principles.” Cf. Stefiel v. Thompson, supra, at 462.
The component of Younger which rests upon the threat to our federal system is thus applicable to a civil proceeding such as this quite as much as it is to a criminal proceeding. Younger, however, also rests upon the traditional reluctance of courts of equity, even within a unitary system, to interfere with a criminal prosecution. Strictly speaking, this element of Younger is not available to mandate federal restraint in civil cases. But whatever may be the weight attached to this factor in civil litigation involving private parties, we deal here with a state proceeding which in important respects is more akin to a criminal prosecution than are most civil cases. The State is a party to the Court of Common Pleas proceeding, and the proceeding is both in aid of and closely related to criminal statutes which prohibit the dissemination of obscene materials. Thus, an offense to the State’s interest in the nuisance litigation is likely to be every bit as great as it would be were this a criminal proceeding. Cf. Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S., at 55 n. 2 (Stewart, J., concurring). Similarly, while in this case the District Court’s injunction has not directly disrupted Ohio’s criminal justice system, it has disrupted that State’s efforts to protect the very interests which underlie its criminal laws and to obtain compliance with precisely the standards which are embodied in its criminal laws.
IV
In spite of the critical similarities between a criminal prosecution and Ohio nuisance proceedings, appellee nonetheless urges that there is also a critical difference between the two which should cause us to limit Younger to criminal proceedings. This difference, says appellee, is that whereas a state-court criminal defendant may, after exhaustion of his state remedies, present his constitutional claims to the federal courts through habeas corpus, no analogous remedy is available to one, like appellee, whose constitutional rights may have been infringed in a state proceeding which cannot result in custodial detention or other criminal sanction.
A civil litigant may, of course, seek review in this Court of any federal claim properly asserted in and rejected by state courts. Moreover, where a final decision of a state court has sustained the validity of a state statute challenged on federal constitutional grounds, an appeal to this Court lies as a matter of right. 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2). Thus, appellee in this case was assured of eventual consideration of its claim by this Court. But quite apart from appellee’s right to appeal had it remained in state court, we conclude that it should not be permitted the luxury of federal litigation of issues presented by ongoing state proceedings, a luxury which, as we have already explained, is quite costly in terms of the interests which Younger seeks to protect.
Appellee's argument, that because there may be no civil counterpart to federal habeas it should have contemporaneous access to a federal forum for its federal claim, apparently depends on the unarticulated major premise that every litigant who asserts a federal claim is entitled to have it decided on the merits by a federal, rather than a state, court. We need not consider the validity of this premise in order to reject the result which appellee seeks. Even assuming, arguendo, that litigants are entitled to a federal forum for the resolution of all federal issues, that entitlement is most appropriately asserted by a state litigant when he seeks to relitigate a federal issue adversely determined in completed state court proceedings. We do not understand why the federal forum must be available prior to completion of the state proceedings in which the federal issue arises, and the considerations canvassed in Younger militate against such a result.
The issue of whether federal courts should be able to interfere with ongoing state proceedings is quite distinct and separate from the issue of whether litigants are entitled to subsequent federal review of state-court dispositions of federal questions. Younger turned on considerations of comity and federalism peculiar to the fact that state proceedings were pending; it did not turn on the fact that in any event a criminal defendant could eventually have obtained federal habeas consideration of his federal claims. The propriety of federal-court interference with an Ohio nuisance proceeding must likewise be controlled by application of those same considerations of comity and federalism.
Informed by the relevant principles of comity and federalism, at least three Courts of Appeals have applied Younger when the pending state proceedings were civil in nature. See Duke v. Texas, 477 F. 2d 244 (CA5 1973); Lynch v. Snepp, 472 F. 2d 769 (CA4 1973); Cousins v. Wigoda, 463 F. 2d 603 (CA7 1972). For the purposes of the case before us, however, we need make no general pronouncements upon the applicability of Younger to all civil litigation. It suffices to say that for the reasons heretofore set out, we conclude that the District Court should have applied the tests laid down in Younger in determining whether to proceed to the merits of appellee’s prayer for relief against this Ohio civil nuisance proceeding.
Appellee contends that even if Younger is applicable to civil proceedings of this sort, it nonetheless does not govern this case because at the time the District Court acted there was no longer a “pending state court proceeding” as that term is üsed in Younger. Younger and subsequent cases such as Steffel have used the term “pending proceeding” to distinguish state proceedings which have already commenced from those which are merely incipient or threatened. Here, of course, the state proceeding had begun long before appellee sought intervention by the District Court. But appellee’s point, we take it, is not that the state proceeding had not begun, but that it had ended by the time its District Court complaint was filed.
Appellee apparently relies on the facts that the Allen County Court of Common Pleas had already issued its judgment and permanent injunction when this action was filed, and that no appeal from that judgment has ever been taken to Ohio’s appellate courts. As a matter of state procedure, the judgment presumably became final, in the sense of being nonappealable, at some point after the District Court filing, possibly prior to entry of the District Court’s own judgment, but surely after the single judge stayed the state court’s judgment. We need not, however, engage in such inquiry. For regardless of when the Court of Common Pleas’ judgment became final, we believe that a necessary concomitant of Younger is that a party in appellee’s posture must exhaust his state appellate remedies before seeking relief in the District Court, unless he can bring himself within one of the exceptions specified in Younger.
Virtually all of the evils at which Younger is directed would inhere in federal intervention prior to completion of state appellate proceedings, just as surely as they would if such intervention occurred at or before trial. Intervention at the later stage is if anything more highly duplicative, since an entire trial has already taken place, and it is also a direct aspersion on the capabilities and good faith of state appellate courts. Nor, in these state-initiated nuisance proceedings, is federal intervention at the appellate stage any the less a disruption of the State’s efforts to protect interests which it deems important. Indeed, it is likely to be even more disruptive and offensive because the State has already won a nisi prius determination that its valid policies are being violated in a fashion which justifies judicial abatement.
Federal post-trial intervention, in a fashion designed to annul the results of a state trial, also deprives the States of a function which quite legitimately is left to them, that of overseeing trial court dispositions of constitutional issues which arise in civil litigation over which they have jurisdiction. We think this consideration to be of some importance because it is typically a judicial system’s appellate courts which are by their nature a litigant’s most appropriate forum for the resolution of constitutional contentions. Especially is this true when, as here, the constitutional issue involves a statute which is capable of judicial narrowing. In short, we do not believe that a State’s judicial system would be fairly accorded the opportunity to resolve federal issues arising in its courts if a federal district court were permitted to substitute itself for the State’s appellate courts. We therefore hold that Younger standards must be met to justify federal intervention in a state judicial proceeding as to which a losing litigant has not exhausted his state appellate remedies.
At the time appellee filed its action in the United States District Court, it had available the remedy of appeal to the Ohio appellate courts. Appellee nonetheless contends that exhaustion of state appellate remedies should not be required because an appeal would have been “futile.” This claim is based on the decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio in State ex rel. Keating v. A Motion Picture Film Entitled “Vixen,” 27 Ohio St. 2d 278, 272 N. E. 2d 137 (1971), which had been rendered at the time of the proceedings in the Court of Common Pleas. While Keating did uphold the use of a nuisance statute against a film which ran afoul of Ohio’s statutory definition of obscenity, it had absolutely nothing to say with respect to appellee’s principal contention here, that of whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit a blanket injunction against a showing of all films, including those which have not been adjudged obscene in adversary proceedings. We therefore have difficulty understanding appellee’s belief that an appeal was doomed to failure.
More importantly, we are of the opinion that the considerations of comity and federalism which underlie Younger permit no truncation of the exhaustion requirement merely because the losing party in the state court of general jurisdiction believes that his chances of success on appeal are not auspicious. Appellee obviously believes itself possessed of a viable federal claim, else it would not so assiduously seek to litigate in the District Court. Yet, Art. VI of the United States Constitution declares that “the Judges in every State shall be bound” by the Federal Constitution, laws, and treaties. Appel-lee is in truth urging us to base a rule on the assumption that state judges will not be faithful to their constitutional responsibilities. This we refuse to do. The District Court should not have entertained this action, seeking preappeal interference with a state judicial proceeding, unless appellee established that early intervention was justified under one of the exceptions recognized in Younger.
VI
Younger, and its civil counterpart which we apply today, do of course allow intervention in those cases where the District Court properly finds that the state proceeding is motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith, or where the challenged statute is “ 'flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against whomever an effort might be made to apply it/ ” As we have noted, the District Court in this case did not rule on the Younger issue, and thus apparently has not considered whether its intervention was justified by one of these narrow exceptions. Even if the District Court’s opinion can be interpreted as a sub silentio determination that the case fits within the exception for statutes which are “ 'flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions/ ” such a characterization of the statute is not possible after the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio in State ex rel. Ewing v. A Motion Picture Film Entitled “Without a Stitch,” 37 Ohio St. 2d 95, 307 N. E. 2d 911 (1974). That case narrowly construed the Ohio nuisance statute, with a view to avoiding the constitutional difficulties which concerned the District Court.
We therefore think that this case is appropriate for remand so that the District Court may consider whether irreparable injury can be shown in light of “Without a Stitch,” and if so, whether that injury is of such a nature that the District Court may assume jurisdiction under an exception to the policy against federal judicial interference with state court proceedings of this kind. The judgment of the District Court is vacated and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Other recent cases raising issues of the applicability of Younger in the noncriminal context include Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U. S. 225 (1972), and Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393 (1975). In Mitchum, a 42 U. S. C. § 1983 action to enjoin a pending nuisance proceeding was remanded for further proceedings; the District Court had denied relief solely on the basis of the anti-injunction, statute, 28 U. S. C. § 2283, see n. 15, infra. Our opinion specified that we were in no way questioning or qualifying “the principles of equity, comity, and federalism” canvassed in Younger. 407 U. S., at 243.
In Sosna we directed the parties to address the Younger issue, 415 U. S. 911 (1974), reflecting our concern as to whether the constitutional merits should be reached in light of Sosna’s failure to appeal the state trial court’s adverse ruling through the state appellate network. Because both parties urged that we proceed to the merits, we did not reach the issue. Sosna, 419 U. S., at 396-397, n. 3.
See Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 18-19, n. 2 (1973), which discusses the distinction between “pornography” and “obscenity.”
Ҥ 3767.01 Definitions.
“As used in all sections of the Revised Code relating to nuisances:
“(C) ‘Nuisance’ means that which is defined and declared by statutes to be such and also means any place in or upon which lewdness, assignation, or prostitution is conducted, permitted, continued, or exists, or any place, in or upon which lewd, indecent, lascivious, or obscene films or plate negatives, film or plate positives, films designed to be projected on a screen for exhibition, films or glass slides either in negative or positive form designed for exhibition by projection on a screen, are photographed, manufactured, developed, screened, exhibited, or otherwise prepared or shown, and the personal property and contents used in conducting and maintaining any such place for any such purpose. This chapter shall not affect any newspaper, magazine, or other publication entered as second class matter by the post-office department.”
As interpreted by the Ohio Supreme Court, State ex rel. Keating v. A Motion Picture Film Entitled “Vixen,” 27 Ohio St. 2d 278, 272 N. E. 2d 137 (1971), the determination of obscenity is to be based on the definition contained in Ohio’s criminal statutes, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2905.34 (Supp. 1972), now §2907.01 (1975). On this Court’s remand of Keating, 413 U. S. 905 (1973), following our decision in Miller v. California, swpra, the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that the statute’s definition comported with Miller’s, constitutional standards. 35 Ohio St. 2d 215, 301 N. E. 2d 880 (1973).
Ҥ 3767.06 Content of judgment and order.
“If the existence of a nuisance is admitted or established in an action as provided in sections 3767.01 to 3767.11, inclusive, of the Revised Code, or in a criminal proceeding, an order of abatement snau ue entered as a part of the judgment in the case, which order shall direct the removal from the place of all personal property and contents used in conducting the nuisance, and not already released under authority of the court as provided in section 3767.04 of the Revised Code, and shall direct the sale of such thereof as belong to the defendants notified or appearing, in the manner provided for the sale of chattels under execution. Such order shall also require the renewal for one year of any bond furnished by the owner of the real property, as provided in section 3767.04 of the Revised Code, or, if not so furnished shall continue for one year any closing order issued at the time of granting the temporary injunction, or, if no such closing order was then issued, shall include an order directing the effectual closing of the place against its use for any purpose, and keeping it closed for a period of one year unless sooner released. The owner of any place closed and not released under bond may then appear and obtain such release in the manner and upon fulfilling the requirements provided in section 3767.04 of the Revised Code. The release of the property under this section shall not release it from any judgment, lien, penalty, or liability to which it may be subject. Owners of unsold personal property and contents so seized must appear and claim the same within ten days after such order of abatement is made and prove innocence, to the satisfaction of the court, of any knowledge of said use thereof and that with reasonable care and diligence they could not have known thereof. Every defendant in the action is presumed to have had knowledge of the general reputation of the place. If such innocence is established, such unsold personal property and contents shall be delivered to the owner, otherwise it shall be sold as provided in this section. For removing and selling the personal property and contents, the officer shall be entitled to charge and receive the same fees as he would for levying upon and selling like property on execution; and for closing the place and keeping it closed, a reasonable sum shall be allowed by the court.”
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §3767.04 (1971).
§3767.06 (1971), supra, n. 5.
Ibid. The referenced portion of §3767.04 (1971) provides:
“The owner of any real or personal property closed or restrained or to be closed or restrained may appear between the filing of the petition and the hearing on the application for a permanent injunction and, upon payment of all costs incurred and upon the filing of a bond by the owner of the real property with sureties to be approved by the clerk in the full value of the property to be ascertained by the court, or, in vacation, by the judge, conditioned that such owner will immediately abate the nuisance and prevent the same from being established or kept until the decision of the court or judge is rendered on the application for a permanent injunction, then the court, or judge in vacation, if satisfied of the good faith of the owner of the real property and of innocence on the part of any owner of the personal property of any knowledge of the use of such personal property as a nuisance and that, with reasonable care and diligence, such owner could not have known thereof, shall deliver such real or personal property, or both, to the respective owners thereof, and discharge or refrain from issuing at the time of the hearing on the application for the temporary injunction any order closing such real property or restraining the removal or interference with such personal property. The release of any real or personal property, under this section, shall not release it from any judgment, lien, penalty, or liability to which it may be subjected.”
State ex rel. Huffman v. Dakota, No. 72 CIV 0326 (Ct. Com. Pleas, Allen County, Ohio, Nov. 30, 1972).
Because the state-court judgment was primarily directed against a property interest to which Pursue had succeeded, the District Court concluded that Pursue had standing to challenge the nuisance statute. Similarly, counsel for Pursue conceded at oral argument that Pursue could have appealed the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas within the Ohio court system.
Pending the convening of the three-judge court, a single judge of the Northern District of Ohio stayed the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, except insofar as that judgment applied to films which had been declared obscene in a prior adversary hearing. The stay order was entered on the day that the action was filed, one day after entry of judgment by the Court of Common Pleas.
No. C 72-432 (ND Ohio, Apr. 20, 1973).
Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U. S. 66 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U. S. 77 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U. S. 200 (1971); Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U. S. 216 (1971).
See, e. g., Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U. S. 89 (1935); Beal v. Missouri P. R. Co., 312 U. S. 45 (1941); Watson v. Buck, 313 U. S. 387 (1941); Williams v. Miller, 317 U. S. 599 (1942); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U. S. 157 (1943).
Title 28 U. S. C. §2283 provides: “A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.” We held in Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U. S. 225 (1972), that 42 U. S. C. § 1983 contained an expressly authorized congressional exception. Thus, while the statute does express the general congressional attitude which was recognized in Younger, it does not control the case before us today.
While these standards governing federal interference were largely shaped in the context of prayers for federal injunctions against state proceedings, it is clear that with respect to pending prosecutions the same standards apply to interference in the form of declaratory relief. See Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U. S. 66 (1971).
The relation of a proceeding which is nominally “civil” to a State’s criminal laws has been relied on by lower federal courts in resolving Younger problems. See MTM, Inc. v. Baxley, 365 F. Supp. 1182 (ND Ala. 1973), probable jurisdiction noted, 415 U. S. 975 (1974); Palaio v. McAulifie, 466 F. 2d 1230 (CA5 1972).
We in no way intend to suggest that there is a right of access to a federal forum for the disposition of aE federal issues, or that the normal rules of res judicata and judicial estoppel do not operate to bar relitigation in actions under 42 U; S. C. § 1983 of federal issues arising in state court proceedings. Cf. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475, 497 (1973). Our assumption is made solely as a means of disposing of appellee’s contentions without confronting issues which have not been briefed or argued in this case.
It would ordinarily be difficult to consider this problem, that of the duration of Younger’s restrictions after entry of a state trial court judgment, without also considering the res judicata implications of such a judgment. However, appellants did not plead res judicata in the District Court, and it "is therefore not available to them here. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8 (c); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. at 396-397, n. 3.
That a state judicial system may retain undisturbed jurisdiction despite possibly erroneous trial court disposition of constitutional issues was recognized in Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479, 484-485 (1965), where we stated: “[T]he mere possibility of erroneous initial application of constitutional standards will usually not amount to the irreparable injury necessary to justify a disruption of orderly state proceedings.”
By requiring exhaustion of state appellate remedies for the purposes of applying Younger, we in no way undermine Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961). There we held that one seeking redress under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 for a deprivation of federal rights need not first initiate state proceedings based on related state causes of action. 365 U. S., at 183. Monroe v. Pape had nothing to do with the problem presently before us, that of the deference to be accorded state proceedings which have already been initiated and which afford a competent tribunal for the resolution of federal issues.
Our exhaustion requirement is likewise not inconsistent with such cases as City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Schnader, 291 U. S. 24 (1934), and Bacon v. Rutland R. Co., 232 U. S. 134 (1914), which expressed the doctrine that a federal equity
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petition for certiorari filed by the United States in this criminal case presented a single question: whether evidence suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful search .and seizure may nevertheless be used to impeach a defendant's false trial testimony, given in response to proper cross-examination, where the evidence does not squarely contradict the defendant's testimony on direct examination. We issued the writ, 444 U. S. 962 (1979).
I
Respondent was convicted of importing, conspiring to import, and intentionally possessing a controlled substance, cocaine. According to the evidence at his trial, Havens and John McLeroth, both attorneys from Ft. Wayne, Ind., boarded a flight from Lima, Peru, to Miami, Fla. In Miami, a customs officer searched McLeroth and found cocaine sewed into makeshift pockets in a T-shirt he was wearing under his outer clothing. McLeroth implicated respondent, who had previously cleared customs and who was then arrested. His luggage was seized and searched without a warrant. The officers found no drugs but seized a T-shirt from which pieces had been cut that matched the pieces that had been sewn to McLeroth’s T-shirt. The T-shirt and other evidence seized in the course of the search were suppressed on motion prior to trial.
Both men were charged in a three-count indictment, but McLeroth pleaded guilty to one count and testified against Havens. Among other things, he asserted that Havens had supplied him with the altered T-shirt and had sewed the makeshift pockets shut. Havens took the stand in his own defense and denied involvement in smuggling cocaine. His direct testimony included the following:
“Q. And you heard Mr. McLeroth testify earlier as to something to the effect that this material was taped or draped around his body and so on, you heard that testimony?
“A. Yes, I did.
“Q. Did you ever engage in that kind of activity with Mr. McLeroth and Augusto or Mr. McLeroth and anyone else on that fourth visit to Lima, Peru?
“A. I did not.” App. 34.
On cross-examination, Havens testified as follows:
“Q. Now, on direct examination, sir, you testified that on the fourth trip you had absolutely nothing to do with the wrapping of any bandages or tee shirts or anything involving Mr. McLeroth; is that correct?
“A. I don’t — I said I had nothing to do with any wrapping or bandages or anything, yes. I had nothing to do with anything with McLeroth in connection with this cocaine matter.
“Q. And your testimony is that you had nothing to do with the sewing of the cotton swatches to make pockets on that tee shirt?
“A. Absolutely not.
“Q. Sir, when you came through Customs, the Miami International Airport, on October 2, 1977, did you have in your suitcase Size 38-40 medium tee shirts?” Id., at 35.
An objection to the latter question was overruled and questioning continued:
“Q. On that day, sir, did you have in your luggage a Size 38-40 medium man’s tee shirt with swatches of clothing missing from the tail of that tee shirt?
“A. Not to my knowledge.
“Q. Mr. Havens, I’m going to hand you what is Government’s Exhibit 9 for. identification and ask you if this tee shirt was in your luggage on October 2nd, 1975 [sic] ?
“A. Not to my knowledge. No.” Id., at 46.
Respondent Havens also denied having told a Government agent that the T-shirts found in his luggage belonged to McLeroth.
On rebuttal, a Government agent testified that Exhibit 9 had been found in respondent’s suitcase and that Havens claimed the T-shirts found in his bag, including Exhibit 9, belonged to McLeroth. Over objection, the T-shirt was then admitted into evidence, the jury being instructed that the rebuttal evidence should be considered only for impeaching Havens’ credibility.
The Court of Appeals reversed, relying on Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20 (1925), and Walder v. United States, 347 U. S. 62 (1954). The court held that illegally seized evidence may be used for impeachment only if the evidence contradicts a particular statement made by a defendant in the course of his direct examination. 592 F. 2d 848 (CA5 1979). We reverse.
II
In Agnello v. United States, supra, a defendant charged with conspiracy to sell a package, of cocaine testified on direct examination that he had possessed the packages involved but did not know what was in them. On cross-examination, he denied ever having seen narcotics and ever having seen a can of cocaine which was exhibited to him and which had been illegally seized from his apartment. The can of cocaine was permitted into evidence on rebuttal. Agnello was convicted and his conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. This Court reversed, holding that the Fourth Amendment required exclusion of the evidence. The Court pointed out that “[i]n his direct examination, Agnello was not asked and did not testify concerning the can of cocaine” and “did nothing to waive his constitutional protection or to justify cross-examination in respect of the evidence claimed to have been obtained by the search.” 269 U. S., at 35. The Court also said, quoting from Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385, 392 (1920), that the exclusionary rule not only commands that illegally seized evidence “shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all.” 269 U. S., at 35.
The latter statement has been rejected in our later cases, however, and Agnello otherwise limited. In Walder v. United States, supra, the use of evidence obtained in an illegal search and inadmissible in the Government’s case in chief was admitted to impeach the direct testimony of the defendant. This Court approved, saying that it would pervert the rule of Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914), to hold otherwise. Similarly, in Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222 (1971), and Oregon v. Hass, 420 U. S. 714 (1975), statements taken in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), and unusable by the prosecution as part of its own case, were held admissible to impeach statements made by the defendant in the course of his direct testimony. Harris also made clear that the permitted impeachment by otherwise inadmissible evidence is not limited to collateral matters. 401 U. S., at 225.
These cases were understood by the Court of Appeals to hold that tainted evidence, inadmissible when offered as part of the Government’s main case, may not be used as rebuttal evidence to impeach a defendant’s credibility unless the evidence is offered to contradict a particular statement made by a defendant during his direct examination; a statement made for the first time on cross-examination may not be so impeached. This approach required the exclusion of the T-shirt taken from Havens’ luggage because, as the Court of Appeals read the record, Havens was asked nothing on his direct testimony about the incriminating T-shirt or about the contents of his luggage; the testimony about the T-shirt, which the Government desired to impeach first appeared on cross-examination, not on direct.
It is true that Agnello involved the impeachment of testimony first brought out on cross-examination and that in Walder, Harris, and Hass, the testimony impeached was given by the defendant while testifying on direct examination. In our view, however, a flat rule permitting only statements on direct examination to be impeached misapprehends the underlying rationale of Walder, Harris, and Hass. These cases repudiated the statement in Agnello that no use at all may be made of illegally obtained evidence. - Furthermore, in Walder, the Court said that in Agnello, the Government had “smuggled in” the impeaching opportunity in the course of cross-examination. The Court also relied on the statement in Agnello, supra, at 35, that Agnello had done nothing “to justify cross-examination in respect of the evidence claimed to have been obtained by the search.” The implication of Walder is that Agnello was a case of cross-examination having too tenuous a connection with any subject opened upon direct examination to permit impeachment by tainted evidence.
In reversing the District Court in the case before us, the Court of Appeals did not stop to consider how closely the cross-examination about the T-shirt and the luggage was connected with matters gone into in direct examination. If these questions would have been suggested to a reasonably competent cross-examiner by Havens’ direct testimony, they were not “smuggled in”; and forbidding the Government to impeach the answers to these questions by using contrary and reliable evidence in its possession fails to take account of our cases, particularly Harris and Hass. In both cases, the Court stressed the importance of arriving at the truth in criminal trials, as well as the defendant’s obligation to speak the truth in response to proper questions. We rejected the notion that the defendant’s constitutional shield against having illegally seized evidence used against him could be “perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.” 401 U. S., at 226. See also Oregon v. Hass, supra, at 722, 723. Both cases also held that the deterrent function of the rules excluding unconstitutionally obtained evidence is sufficiently served by denying its use to the government on its direct case. It was only a “speculative possibility” that also making it unavailable to the government for otherwise proper impeachment would contribute substantially in this respect. Harris v. New York, supra, at 225. Oregon v. Hass, supra, at 723.
Neither Harris nor Hass involved the impeachment of assertedly false testimony first given on cross-examination, but the reasoning of those cases controls this one. There is no gainsaying that arriving at the truth is a fundamental goal of our legal system. Oregon v. Hass, supra, at 722. We have repeatedly insisted that when defendants testify, they must testify truthfully or suffer the consequences. This is true even though a defendant is compelled to testify against his will. Bryson v. United States, 396 U. S. 64, 72 (1969); United States v. Knox, 396 U. S. 77 (1969). It is essential, therefore, to the proper functioning of the adversary system that when a defendant takes the stand, the government be permitted proper and effective cross-examination in an attempt to elicit the truth. The defendant’s obligation to testify truthfully is fully binding on him when he is cross-examined. His privilege against self-incrimination does not shield him from proper questioning. Brown v. United States, 356 U. S. 148, 154-155 (1958). He would unquestionably be subject to a perjury prosecution if he knowingly lies on cross-examination. Cf. United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U. S. 115 (1980); Bryson v. United States, supra; United States v. Knox, supra; United States v. Wong, 431 U. S. 174 (1977). In terms of impeaching a defendant’s seemingly false statements with his prior inconsistent utterances or with other reliable evidence available to the government, we see no difference of constitutional magnitude between the defendant’s statements on direct examination and his answers to questions put to him on cross-examination that are plainly within the scope of the defendant’s direct examination. Without this opportunity, the normal function of cross-examination would be severely impeded.
We also think that the policies of the exclusionary rule no more bar impeachment here than they did in Walder, Harris, and Hass. In those cases, the ends of the exclusionary rules were thought adequately implemented by denying the government the use of the challenged evidence to make out its ease in chief. The incremental furthering of those ends by forbidding impeachment of the defendant who testifies was deemed insufficient to permit or require that false testimony go unchallenged, with the resulting impairment of the integrity of the factfinding goals of the criminal trial. We reaffirm this assessment of the competing interests, and hold that a defendant’s statements made in response to proper cross-examination reasonably suggested by the defendant’s direct examination are subject to otherwise proper impeachment by the government, albeit by evidence that has been illegally obtained and that is inadmissible on the government’s direct case, or otherwise, as substantive evidence of guilt.
In arriving at its judgment, the Court of Appeals noted that in response to defense counsel’s objection to the impeaching evidence on the ground that the matter had not been “covered on direct,” the trial court had remarked that “[i]t does not have to be covered on direct.” The Court of Appeals thought this was error since in its view illegally seized evidence could be used only to impeach a statement made on direct examination. As we have indicated, we hold a contrary view; and we do not understand the District Court to have indicated that the Government’s question, the answer to which is sought to be impeached, need not be proper cross-examination in the first instance. The Court of Appeals did not suggest that either the cross-examination or the impeachment of Havens would have been improper absent the use of illegally seized evidence, and we cannot accept respondent’s suggestions that because of the illegal search and seizure, the Government’s questions about the T-shirt were improper cross-examination. McLeroth testified that Havens had assisted him in preparing the T-shirt for smuggling. Havens, in his direct testimony, acknowledged McLeroth’s prior testimony that the cocaine “was taped or draped around his body and so on” but denied that he had “ever engage [d] in that kind of activity with Mr. McLeroth. . . .” This testimony could easily be understood as a denial of any connection with McLeroth’s T-shirt and as a contradiction of McLeroth’s testimony. Quite reasonably, it seems to us, the Government on cross-examination called attention to his answers on direct and then asked whether he had anything to do with sewing the cotton swatches on McLeroth’s T-shirt. This was cross-examination growing out of Havens’ direct testimony; and, as we hold above, the ensuing impeachment did not violate Havens’ constitutional rights.
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice O’Connor
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case, like Bennett v. New Jersey, ante, p. 632, concerns an effort by the Federal Government to recover Title I funds that were allegedly misused by a State. There is no contention here that changes in statutory provisions should apply to previous grants. Instead, the dispute is whether the Secretary correctly demanded repayment based on a determination that Kentucky violated requirements that Title I funds be used to supplement, and not to supplant, state and local expenditures for education. Although the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found that the Secretary’s determination was based on a reasonable interpretation of Title I and its implementing regulations, the court nonetheless excused the State from repayment on the grounds that there was no evidence of bad faith and the State’s programs complied with a reasonable interpretation of the law. Kentucky v. Secretary of Education, 717 F. 2d 943, 948 (1983). We granted certiorari, 469 U. S. 814 (1984), and because we disagree with the standard adopted by the Court of Appeals, we reverse.
H-1
As explained more fully in Bennett v. New Jersey, ante, at 634-636, Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27, as amended, 20 U. S. C. §2701 et seq., provided federal grants to support compensatory education programs for disadvantaged children. In order to assure that federal funds would be used to support additional services that would not otherwise be available, the Title I program from the outset prohibited the use of federal grants merely to replace state and local expenditures. This prohibition initially was contained in regulations, see 45 CFR § 116.17(f) (1966); 45 CFR § 116.17(h) (1968), and explained in a program guide distributed to state education agencies. Office of Education, Title I Program Guide No. 44, ¶¶ 4.1, 7.1 (1968). Despite the regulations, the Office of Education received public complaints that Title I funds were being used to replace state and local funds that otherwise would have been spent for participating children. See S. Rep. No. 91-634, pp. 9-10 (1970). Congress responded by amending Title I in 1970 to add a provision that specifically prohibited supplanting. Id., at 9-10, 14-15. That provision, in effect when the grants involved in this case were made, required that Title I funds be used
“(i) as to supplement and, to the extent practical, increase the level of funds that would, in the absence of such Federal funds, be made available from non-Federal sources for the education of pupils participating in programs and projects assisted under this subchapter, and (ii) in no case, as to supplant such funds from non-Federal sources.” 20 U. S. C. § 241e(a)(3)(B) (1970 ed.).
Title I regulations elaborated upon the statutory prohibition on the use of federal funds to supplant state and local funds:
“Each application for a grant . . . shall contain an assurance that the use of the grant funds will not result in a decrease in the use for educationally deprived children residing in that project area of State or local funds, which, in the absence of funds under Title I of the Act, would be made available for that project area and that neither the project area nor the educationally deprived children residing therein will otherwise be penalized in the application of State and local funds because of such a use of funds under Title I of the Act. . . . Federal funds made available ... (1) will be used to supplement, and to the extent practical increase, the level of State and local funds that would, in the absence of such Federal funds, be made available for the education of pupils participating in that project; (2) will not be used to supplant State and local funds available for the education of such pupils.” 45 CFR § 116.17(h) (1974).
In 1976, federal auditors found that Kentucky had approved Title I programs for fiscal year 1974 that violated the prohibitions on supplanting. App. 11-21. The disputed programs involved “readiness classes” offered by 50 local education agencies for educationally disadvantaged children in place of regular first- and second-grade classes. App. to Pet. for Cert. 22a. Participating students received their entire academic instruction in the readiness classes, and a substantial number of the students were expected to be promoted to the next higher grade level the following year. App. 16-17. Title I funds were used to pay all the instructional salaries and a portion of the administrative support costs for the readiness classes. App. to Pet. for Cert. 22a. Students in these classes did receive locally funded “enrichment services,” i. e., art, physical education, music, and library, that were available to students enrolled in regular classes. Ibid. It is not disputed, however, that Title I funds defrayed substantially all the costs of educating students in the readiness classes. App. 15, 17. The auditors concluded that supplanting of state and local expenditures had occurred for children in readiness classes who were promoted to the next higher regular grade. Id., at 17, 19; App. to Pet. for Cert. 30a. Based on this finding, the auditors estimated that $704,237 in Title I funds had been misused, and the Department issued a final determination letter demanding repayment. App. 22-23.
Kentucky sought further administrative review. The Education Appeal Board (Board), after extensive proceedings, issued an initial decision in 1981 sustaining the auditors’ findings. App. to Pet. for Cert. 17a-32a. The Board rejected the State’s argument that the supplanting provisions were satisfied because state and local funding was not reduced for the school districts, schools, or grade levels involved. Id., at 24a. The statutory and regulatory provisions, the Board concluded, clearly required that state and local expenditures be maintained for pupils participating in programs supported by Title I. Id., at 24a-25a. On remand from the Secretary, id., at 33a-35a, the Board reaffirmed its initial decision. Id., at 36a-37a. The Secretary subsequently affirmed the Board’s finding that supplanting had occurred, but reduced the demanded repayment to $338,034 to reflect the benefits presumed to result from smaller pupil-teacher ratios in the readiness classes. Id., at 38a-42a.
In reviewing the final order demanding repayment, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that the Secretary’s interpretation of the supplanting prohibition was reasonable and would govern subsequent grants. 717 F. 2d, at 946-947, 948. Nonetheless, the court concluded that Kentucky was not liable for misusing Title I funds during fiscal year 1974. The Court of Appeals viewed the issue to be “the fairness of imposing sanctions upon the Commonwealth of Kentucky for its ‘failure to substantially comply’ with the requirements [of Title I].” Id., at 947, quoting 20 U. S. C. §§1234b(a), 1234c(a). The statute and regulations concerning supplanting, the court maintained, were not “unambiguous.” 717 F. 2d, at 948. Moreover, Congress specifically gave state and local officials discretion to develop particular programs to be supported by Title I funds. Ibid. In these circumstances, the Court of Appeals concluded that it would be unfair to assess a penalty against Kentucky where there was no evidence of bad faith and the disputed programs complied with a reasonable interpretation of the law. Ibid. Relying on Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 17 (1981), the court further reasoned that the State did not accept Title I funds with “knowing acceptance” of the condition the Secretary now seeks to impose, and therefore the Federal Government was not justified in demanding repayment. 717 F. 2d, at 950.
II
We note initially that the Court of Appeals erred in.characterizing the issue to be the fairness of imposing sanctions against the State for its failure to comply substantially with the requirements of Title I. Although recovery of misused Title I funds clearly is intended to promote compliance with the requirements of the grant program, a demand for repayment is more in the nature of an effort to collect upon a debt than a penal sanction. See Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U. S. 773, 782 (1983). The State gave certain assurances as a condition for receiving the federal funds, and if those assurances were not complied with, the Federal Government is entitled to recover amounts spent contrary to the terms of the grant agreement. Id., at 791. More specifically, the State gave assurances that Title I funds would be used only for programs which had been reviewed and approved by the state education agency and which met applicable statutory and regulatory requirements. 20 U. S. C. §241f(a)(l) (1976 ed.). The issue in this case is not the fairness of imposing punitive measures, but instead whether the Secretary properly determined that Kentucky failed to fulfill its assurances by approving programs that violated the requirements of Title I.
Because of the nature of the obligation to repay misused funds, we also disagree with the suggestion by the court below that substantial compliance with applicable legal requirements affects liability. The Court of Appeals relied on provisions which authorize the Secretary, pursuant to specified procedures, to withhold funds or to issue cease-and-desist orders if a recipient fails to comply substantially with the law. 20 U. S. C. §§ 1234b(a), 1234c(a). Cf. §2836 (specific authority to withhold Title I funds). These references to substantial compliance in provisions governing prospective relief do not by their own terms apply to the recovery of misused funds. Cf. § 1234a(c) (filing of application by recipient for review of audit determination does not affect authority of Secretary to take other adverse actions); 124 Cong. Rec. 20612 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Corrada) (noting that post-audit recovery and withholding are distinct enforcement mechanisms). Other provisions that address the Secretary’s authority to demand repayment do not limit liability to instances where there is failure to comply substantially with grant obligations. See §§1226a-l, 1234a, 2835(b). This silence cannot be ascribed to legislative inattention to the details concerning recovery of misused funds. Congress specifically limited liability for repayment to expenditures made in the five years preceding the final written notice of liability and also authorized the Secretary, in certain circumstances, to settle claims involving less than $50,000. §§1234a(f), 1234a(g). Given the detailed provisions concerning audit determinations contained in § 1234a, we do not believe that Congress intended impliedly to engraft upon that section the “substantial compliance” standard expressly stated in §§ 1234b and 1234c for prospective relief.
Nor do we think that the absence of bad faith absolves a State from liability if funds were in fact spent contrary to the terms of the grant agreement. In Bell v. New Jersey we explained that where a State obtains grants by providing assurances that the funds will be used on programs that comply with Title I, the State has no right to retain funds that are in fact misused, 461 U. S., at 787, 790-791. See also S. Rep. No. 91-634, at 10,. 84 (assurances must be enforced and misused funds recovered). Our discussion in no way suggested that the “misuse” of Title I funds depended on any subjective intent attributable to grant recipients. Instead, Bell v. New Jersey indicates that funds were misused if the State did not fulfill its assurances that it would abide by the conditions of Title I. 461 U. S., at 790-791. Provisions of the 1978 Amendments clarifying the Secretary’s right to recover misused funds also do not condition that right on a recipient’s bad faith. Indeed, Congress expressly placed on the grantees the burden of “demonstrat[ing] the allowability of [disputed] expenditures” in proceedings before the Education Appeal Board. 20 U. S. C. § 1234a(b). There is no indication that grantees may avoid repayment by showing that improper expenditures were made in good faith.
Finally, we do not agree that Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981), bars recovery of misused Title I funds because the State did not accept the grant with “knowing acceptance” of its terms. In Pennhurst, we rejected the argument that acceptance of federal grants under the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. §6000 et seq., required States to provide mentally handicapped persons with appropriate treatment in the least restrictive environment. Such a requirement, we noted, would have imposed a “massive” and “largely indeterminate” financial obligation on the States. 451 U. S., at 24. We observed: “Congress must express clearly its intent to impose conditions on the grant of federal funds so that the States can knowingly decide whether or not to accept those funds.” Ibid. The requisite clarity in this case is provided by Title I; States that chose to participate in the program agreed to abide by the requirements of Title I as a condition for receiving funds. Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U. S., at 790, and n. 17. There was no ambiguity with respect to this condition, and Pennhurst does not suggest that the Federal Government may recover misused federal funds only if every improper expenditure has been specifically identified and proscribed in advance.
J — I I — I I — (
In reviewing a determination by the Secretary that a State has misused Title I funds, a court should consider whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence and reflect an application of the proper legal standards. Bennett v. New Jersey, ante, at 646; Bell v. New Jersey, supra, at 792. The disagreement in this case concerns whether the Secretary properly determined that the readiness programs approved by Kentucky violated assurances that Title I funds would be used to supplement state and local expenditures. The Government argues that a reviewing court should simply defer to the Secretary’s interpretation of the requirements of Title I so long as it is reasonable. Without disputing the reasonableness of the interpretation advanced by the Secretary, Kentucky contends that because the grant program was in the nature of a contract, any ambiguities with respect to the obligations of the State must be resolved against the party who drafted the agreement, i. e., the Federal Government. Thus, the parties dispute the fundamental nature of the obligations assumed under Title I: the Government suggests that the State guaranteed that the use of the funds would satisfy whatever interpretation of the program requirements the Secretary might reasonably adopt; the State argues that liability for the misuse of funds results only if grants were spent in violation of an unambiguous requirement.
The contentions of the parties can be properly evaluated only against the background of the actual operation of Title I. The grant program provided federal aid for compensatory education for disadvantaged children, but expressly left the selection and development of particular projects to local control. State education agencies approved program applications and monitored compliance by local school districts, obtained funds from the Federal Government, and subsequently channeled the money back to the local level. Thus, the States essentially served as conduits for what became a massive flow of federal funds. Title I grew from an annual appropriation of $959 million in 1966 to more than $3 billion by 1981, and assisted compensatory education programs in every State and in more than 14,000 school districts. See 2 U. S. Dept, of Education, Fiscal Year 1981 Annual Evaluation Report 3 (1981); National Institute of Education, Administration of Compensatory Education xiii (1977) (hereinafter NIE Report). During the period involved in this case, fiscal year 1974, Kentucky received more than $32 million in Title I funds. App. 11.
Although Congress in 1965 articulated the general goals of Title I, the statute and the initial regulations did not precisely outline the permissible means for implementing those goals. Uncertainty in this regard was compounded by the fact that during the first years following the passage of Title I, the Office of Education did not vigorously enforce the requirements of the program. See L. McDonnell & M. McLaughlin, Education Policy and the Role of the States 13, 90-91 (1982); Murphy, Title I of ESEA: The Politics of Implementing Federal Education Reform, 41 Harv. Ed. Rev. 35, 41-45 (1971). In 1970, Congress acknowledged that funds had been misused because of weaknesses in administration, and directed the Office of Education to strengthen its monitoring of the program requirements. S. Rep. No. 91-634, at 8-10. Management of Title I by the Office of Education improved during the 1970’s, but problems in clarifying the program requirements remained. See J. Berke & M. Kirst, Federal Aid to Education: Who Benefits? Who Governs? 377-378 (1972). Congress in 1974 directed the NIE to conduct a comprehensive 3-year study of federal compensatory education programs, including Title I. Pub. L. 93-380, §821, 88 Stat. 599.
The NIE study was the primary impetus for the Education Amendments of 1978. In considering those Amendments, Congress noted evidence that the Office of Education was “implementing administrative requirements in a manner which is neither clear nor consistent, and that this inconsistency is confusing States and local education agencies about their obligations.” H. R. Rep. No. 95-1137, p. 49, (1978); S. Rep. No. 95-856, p. 27 (1978). This confusion, Congress observed, resulted in part from the diffuse legal framework for Title I. In addition to the statutory provisions and the regulations, the Office of Education sent program guides to state education agencies explaining the requirements and their application to particular situations. Id., at 34; H. R. Rep. No. 95-1137, at 55. Office of Education Program Review teams visited local Title I projects and provided advice, and the Office also sent interpretative letters in response to state and local inquiries. NIE Report 18, 27; Office of Education, Title I Program Guide No. 24 (1968) (compilation of interpretative letters).
Congress accepted the NIE’s conclusion that many of the questions concerning the requirements of Title I would be resolved if the various materials prepared by the Office of Education were “assembled, summarized, and interrelated.” S. Rep. No. 95-856, at 34; H. R. Rep. No. 95-1137, at 55. Accordingly, the 1978 Amendments directed the agency to prepare a policy manual compiling the applicable statutes, regulations, advisory opinions, and other materials. 20 U. S. C. §2837. Congress indicated that such a manual would help to “ensure that federal officials uniformly interpret, apply, and enforce Title I requirements throughout the country.” S. Rep. No. 95-856, at 138; H. R. Rep. No. 95-1137, at 161. The NIE study and the extensive review of Title I’s administration by Congress indicate that the requirements of the program, while not always clear, evolved and became more specific over time and were explained in materials beyond the statute and its implementing regulations.
Although we agree with the State that Title I grant agreements had a contractual aspect, see Bennett v. New Jersey, ante, at 638, the program cannot be viewed in the same manner as a bilateral contract governing a discrete transaction. Cf. United States v. Seckinger, 397 U. S. 203, 210 (1970) (“[A] contract should be construed most strongly against the drafter, which in this case was the United States”). Unlike normal contractual undertakings, federal grant programs originate in and remain governed by statutory provisions expressing the judgment of Congress concerning desirable public policy. See R. Cappalli, Rights and Remedies Under Federal Grants 53-55 (1979). Title I, for example, involved multiple levels of government in a cooperative effort to use federal funds to support compensatory education for disadvantaged children. The Federal Government established general guidelines for the allocation and use of funds, and the States agreed to follow those guidelines in approving and monitoring specific projects developed and operated at the local level. Given the structure of the grant program, the Federal Government simply could not prospectively resolve every possible ambiguity concerning particular applications of the requirements of Title I. Cf. Heckler v. Community Health Services of Crawford County, Inc., 467 U. S. 51, 64 (1984). Moreover, the fact that Title I was an ongoing, cooperative program meant that grant recipients had an opportunity to seek clarification of the program requirements. Accordingly, we do not believe that ambiguities in the requirements should invariably be resolved against the Federal Government as the drafter of the grant agreement.
We find it unnecessary here to adopt the Government’s suggestion that the Secretary may rely on any reasonable interpretation of the requirements of Title I to determine that previous expenditures violated the grant conditions. Our review of the operation of Title I explains how the States assumed an intermediary role in monitoring compliance with requirements that were not always clear. In this particular context, we are reluctant to conclude that the States guaranteed that their performance under the grant agreements would satisfy whatever interpretation of the terms might later be adopted by the Secretary, so long as that interpretation is not “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to [Title I].” Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 844 (1984). As we noted in Bennett v. New Jersey, ante, at 639, 646, the State agreed to comply with, and its liability is determined by, the legal requirements in place when the grants were made. Consequently, in evaluating past expenditures, the Secretary’s interpretation of the requirements of Title I should be informed by the statutory provisions, regulations, and other guidelines provided by the Department at that time. As explained infra, we have no occasion in this case to address the circumstances, if any, in which the Secretary could impose liability for expenditures made in reliance upon an earlier interpretation provided by the Department, cf. Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U. S., at 794 (White, J., concurring), or to decide if a State may be held liable where its interpretation of an ambiguous requirement is more reasonable than an interpretation advanced by the Secretary after the grants were made.
We agree with the Secretary that the readiness classes approved by Kentucky clearly violated existing statutory and regulatory provisions that prohibited supplanting. It is undisputed that Title I funds were used to pay substantially all
I — I <1 the costs for the basic education of students in the readiness classes. Absent these classes funded by Title I, the participating students would have received instruction in regular classes supported by state and local funds. Both the statutory provision and the implementing regulations expressly required that Title I funds not be used to supplant state and local funds for the pupils participating in Title I programs. The statute declared that Title I funds must be used “to supplement. . . the level of funds that would, in the absence of such Federal funds, be made available from non-Federal sources for the education of pupils participating in programs and projects assisted under this subchapter, and ... in no case, ... to supplant such funds from non-Federal sources.” 20 U. S. C. § 241e(a)(3)(B) (1970 ed.). The applicable regulation similarly provided: “Federal funds made available . . . will be used to supplement, and to the extent practical increase, the level of State and local funds that would ... be made available for the education of pupils participating in that project [and] will not be used to supplant State and local funds available for the education of such pupils.” 45 CFR § 116.17(h) (1974).
Based on the language of the statute and the regulation, we cannot agree that there was an ambiguity whether the supplanting prohibition would be satisfied if state and local funding was maintained at the level of the school district, school, or grade. Separate statutory provisions required that state and local spending not be reduced at the level of school districts, 20 U. S. C. §241g(c)(2) (1970 ed.); 45 CFR § 116.45 (1974), or individual schools. 20 U. S. C. §241e(a)(3)(C) (1970 ed.); 45 CFR § 116.26 (1974). See generally NIE Report 9-10 (explaining relationship of various provisions). Although funding was maintained at the level of particular grades, because Title I students were placed in separate classes supported by federal funds, the consequence was to increase per-pupil state and local expenditures for students who remained in regular first- and second-grade classes. No plausible reading of the statute or regulations suggests that this result comports with the prohibitions on supplanting. As noted by the Board, if the State was uncertain on this point, it could have sought clarification from the Office of Education. App. to Pet. for Cert. 27a. In fact, the grant applications approved by the State expressly required the local school districts to explain:
“How will you organize the program to assure that children participating in the component activity will receive this Title I service in addition to services to which they are ordinarily entitled from state and local school funds?” Ibid.
Kentucky, moreover, has not shown that the position now taken by the Secretary is inconsistent with earlier guidelines provided by the Department. The State notes that Office of Education Program Review teams visited schools in Kentucky in which the readiness classes were offered and made no objection to the classes. Nonetheless, Kentucky does not challenge the finding by the Education Appeal Board, see id., at 23a, that there is no evidence in the record that the teams reviewed the financing of the readiness classes. Kentucky further contends that the ambiguity of the supplanting provisions is demonstrated by the fact that the Secretary modified the Board’s order to reduce the demanded repayment. This argument is unpersuasive. The modification reflects the Secretary’s determination that Title I funds provided some additional benefits to the students in the readiness classes because the classes had smaller pupil-teacher ratios, but it does not cast any doubt on the Board’s finding that supplanting occurred.
We note, finally, that the possibility that application of the supplanting provisions might be unclear-in other contexts does not affect our resolution of this case. Congress, in considering the 1978 Amendments, observed that the supplanting regulations had been applied in an unclear and inconsistent manner. See H. R. Rep. No. 95-1137, at 29, 49; S. Rep. No. 95-856, at 15, 27. This situation resulted in part from debate within the Office of Education concerning the desirability and practicality of measuring supplanting at the level of expenditures upon individual students. See NIE Report 29-38. Difficult questions of interpretation may well arise in determining if a particular program violated the supplanting provisions, and we do not suggest that the prior position of the Department is irrelevant in this regard. We conclude, however, that the programs approved by Kentucky for fiscal year 1974 clearly violated then-existing requirements for Title I, and therefore neither ambiguity in the application of those requirements to other situations nor the policy debates that later arose within the Office of Education avail the State here.
V
We hold that the Secretary properly determined that Kentucky violated its assurances by approving the readiness classes and thereby misused funds received under Title I. Before the Court of Appeals, Kentucky also challenged the calculation of the amount to be repaid. The Court of Appeals did not address this argument, 717 F. 2d, at 950, and the State may renew its contentions in this regard on remand. Accordingly, the judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Justice White and Justice Blackmun join only Parts I, II, IV, and V of this opinion.
The Office of Education was the predecessor to the present Department of Education and was responsible for the administration of Title I until 1980. See Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U. S. 773, 776, n. 1 (1983). Unless the distinction is significant, we will refer to both the Office of Education and the Department of Education as the Department. Ibid.
In Bell v. New Jersey we held that provisions in the 1978 Amendments expressly authorizing judicial review of final decisions by the Secretary or the Board applied retroactively. 461 U. S., at 777-778, and n. 3. We declined to decide, however, whether the provisions allowing the Secretary to recover misused funds were also retroactive, id., at 782, because we held that § 415 of the General Education Provisions Act, Pub. L. 91-230, 84 Stat. 170, 20 U. S. C. § 1226a-1, created a right to impose liability on the States. 461 U. S., at 784, 791. Neither the language of § 415 nor Bell v. New Jersey suggests that the Secretary’s right to recover is affected by a recipient’s substantial compliance with the law. Given our conclusion that the references to substantial compliance in §§ 1234b and 1234c do not limit the right to repayment provided in § 1234a, we need not decide whether the latter section is remedial, rather than substantive, and thus retroactive. Cf. Bennett v. New Jersey, ante, at 637 (substantive standards of 1978 Amendments are not retroactive).
Although the view of a later Congress does not definitively establish the meaning of an earlier enactment, it does have some persuasive value. Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U. S., at 784-785. Accordingly, we note that Congress has rejected a proposal to amend the audit provisions to add a substantial compliance standard. See 130 Cong. Rec. H7902-H7903 (July 26, 1984) (§ 808(a) of H. R. 11); id., at H10756 (Oct. 2, 1984) (deletion of § 808(a) in conference). Similarly, when a proposal to excuse liability for funds misused before 1978 was debated and ultimately defeated on a point of order, Members of Congress noted that the Department had sought repayment notwithstanding the absence of bad faith or fraud on the part of recipients. See 127 Cong. Rec. 10644 (1981) (remarks of Sen. Thurmond); id., at 10646 (remarks of Sen. Stennis). These actions suggest that later Congresses understood that liability is not conditioned on substantial compliance or bad faith.
At oral argument before the Board, the State argued that some “measure of estoppel” should operate against the Department and moved to reopen the record to present additional evidence. The Board ruled that estoppel would not apply absent affirmative misconduct by the Government, and because Kentucky had not alleged such misconduct, it declined to reopen the record. App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a. The Court of Appeals did not discuss estoppel arguments, and Kentucky acknowledged before this Court that it was not making any estoppel claim. Tr. of Oral Arg. 39, 43. Accordingly, we do not address the application of the defense of estoppel. Cf. Heckler v. Community Health Services of Crawford County, Inc., 467 U. S. 51, 60 (1984) (reserving issue of assertion by private party of estoppel against Government).
Because the disputed expenditures violated a substantive requirement concerning the use of Title I funds, we do not address in this case whether the Secretary could demand repayment for no more than a technical violation of a grant agreement. Cf. Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U. S., at 794 (White, J., concurring).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | J | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Powell
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether a passive enforcement policy under which the Government prosecutes only those who report themselves as having violated the law, or who are reported by others, violates the First and Fifth Amendments.
I — I
On July 2, 1980, pursuant to his authority under § 3 of the Military Selective Service Act, 62 Stat. 605, as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. §453, the President issued Presidential Proclamation No. 4771, 3 CFR 82 (1981). This Proclamation directed male citizens and certain male residents born during 1960 to register with the Selective Service System during the week of July 21, 1980. Petitioner fell within that class but did not register. Instead, he wrote several letters to Government officials, including the President, stating that he had not registered and did not intend to do so.
Petitioner’s letters were added to a Selective Service file of young men who advised that they had failed to register or who were reported by others as having failed to register. For reasons we discuss, infra, at 612-613, Selective Service adopted a policy of passive enforcement under which it would investigate and prosecute only the cases of nonregistration contained in this file. In furtherance of this policy, Selective Service sent a letter on June 17, 1981, to each reported violator who had not registered and for whom it had an address. The letter explained the duty to register, stated that Selective Service had information that the person was required to register but had not done so, requested that he either comply with the law by filling out an enclosed registration card or explain why he was not subject to registration, and warned that a violation could result in criminal prosecution and specified penalties. Petitioner received a copy of this letter but did not respond.
On July 20, 1981, Selective Service transmitted to the Department of Justice, for investigation and potential prosecution, the names of petitioner and 133 other young men identified under its passive enforcement system — all of whom had not registered in response to the Service’s June letter. At two later dates, it referred the names of 152 more young men similarly identified. After screening out the names of those who appeared not to be in the class required to register, the Department of Justice referred the remaining names to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for additional inquiry and to the United States Attorneys for the districts in which the nonregistrants resided. Petitioner’s name was one of those referred.
Pursuant to Department of Justice policy, those referred were not immediately prosecuted. Instead, the appropriate United States Attorney was required to notify identified non-registrants by registered mail that, unless they registered within a specified time, prosecution would be considered. In addition, an FBI agent was usually sent to interview the nonregistrant before prosecution was instituted. This effort to persuade nonregistrants to change their minds became known as the “beg” policy. Under it, young men who registered late were not prosecuted, while those who never registered were investigated further by the Government. Pursuant to the “beg” policy, the United States Attorney for the Central District of California sent petitioner a letter on October 15, 1981, urging him to register or face possible prosecution. Again petitioner failed to respond.
On December 9, 1981, the Department of Justice instructed all United States Attorneys not to begin seeking indictments against nonregistrants until further notice. On January 7, 1982, the President announced a grace period to afford nonregistrants a further opportunity to register without penalty. This grace period extended until February 28, 1982. Petitioner still did not register.
Over the next few months, the Department decided to begin prosecuting those young men who, despite the grace period and “beg” policy, continued to refuse to register. It recognized that under the passive enforcement system those prosecuted were “liable to be vocal proponents of non-registration” or persons “with religious or moral objections.” Memorandum of March 17, 1982, from Lawrence Lippe, Chief, General Litigation and Legal Advice Section, Criminal Division, Department of Justice, to D. Lowell Jensen, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, App. 301. It also recognized that prosecutions would “undoubtedly result in allegations that the [case was] brought in retribution for the nonregistrant’s exercise of his first amendment rights.” Ibid. The Department was advised, however, that Selective Service could not develop a more “active” enforcement system for quite some time. See infra, at 613. Because of this, the Department decided to begin seeking indictments under the passive system without further delay. On May 21, 1982, United States Attorneys were notified to begin prosecution of nonregistrants. On June 28, 1982, FBI agents interviewed petitioner, and he continued to refuse to register. Accordingly, on July 22, 1982, an indictment was returned against him for knowingly and willfully failing to register with the Selective Service in violation of §§3 and 12(a) of the Military Selective Service Act, 62 Stat. 605 and 622, as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. §§453 and 462(a). This was one of the first indictments returned against any individual under the passive policy.
I — I HH
Petitioner moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground of selective prosecution. He contended that he and the other indicted nonregistrants were “vocal” opponents of the registration program who had been impermissibly targeted (out of an estimated 674,000 nonregistrants) for prosecution on the basis of their exercise of First Amendment rights. After a hearing, the District Court for the Central District of California granted petitioner’s broad request for discovery and directed the Government to produce certain documents and make certain officials available to testify. The Government produced some documents and agreed to make some Government officials available but, citing executive privilege, it withheld other documents and testimony. On October 29, 1982, the District Court ordered the Government to produce the disputed documents and witness. The Government declined to comply and on November 5, 1982, asked the District Court to dismiss the indictment in order to allow an appeal challenging the discovery order. Petitioner asked for dismissal on several grounds, including discriminatory prosecution.
On November 15, 1982, the District Court dismissed the indictment on the ground that the Government had failed to rebut petitioner’s prima facie case of selective prosecution. Following precedents of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the District Court found that in order to establish a prima facie case petitioner had to prove that (i) others similarly situated generally had not been prosecuted for conduct similar to petitioner’s and (ii) the Government’s discriminatory selection was based on impermissible grounds such as race, religion, or exercise of First Amendment rights. 549 F. Supp. 1376, 1380 (1982). Petitioner satisfied the first requirement, the District Court held, because he had shown that all those prosecuted were “vocal” nonregistrants and because “[t]he inference is strong that the Government could have located non-vocal non-registrants, but chose not to.” Id., at 1381. The District Court found the second requirement satisfied for three reasons. First, the passive enforcement program was “ ‘inherently suspect’ ” because “ ‘it focuse[d] upon the vocal offender . . . [and was] vulnerable to the charge that those chosen for prosecution [were] being punished for their expression of ideas, a constitutionally protected right.’” Ibid., quoting United States v. Steele, 461 F. 2d 1148, 1152 (CA9 1972). Second, the Government’s awareness that a disproportionate number of vocal nonregis-trants would be prosecuted under the passive enforcement system indicated that petitioner was prosecuted because of his exercise of First Amendment rights. 549 F. Supp., at 1382. Finally, the involvement of high Government officials in the prosecution decisions “strongly suggested] impermissible selective prosecution.” Id., at 1383. The District Court then held that the Government had failed to rebut the prima facie case.
The Court of Appeals reversed. 710 F. 2d 1385 (CA9 1983). Applying the same test, it found the first requirement satisfied but not the second. The first was satisfied by petitioner’s showing that out of the estimated 674,000 nonregis-trants the 13 indicted had all been vocal nonregistrants. Id., at 1387. As to the second requirement, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner had to show that the Government focused its investigation on him because of his protest activities. Ibid. Petitioner’s evidence, however, showed only that the Government was aware that the passive enforcement system would result in prosecutions primarily of two types of men — religious and moral objectors and vocal objectors — and that the Government recognized that the latter type would probably make claims of selective prosecution. Finding no evidence of impermissible governmental motivation, the court held that the District Court’s finding of a prima facie case of selective prosecution was clearly erroneous. Id., at 1388. The Court of Appeals also found two legitimate explanations for the Government’s passive enforcement system: (i) the identities of nonreported nonregistrants were not known, and (ii) nonregistrants who expressed their refusal to register made clear their willful violation of the law.
Recognizing both the importance of the question presented and a division in the Circuits, we granted certiorari on the question of selective prosecution. 467 U. S. 1214 (1984). We now affirm.
In our criminal justice system, the Government retains “broad discretion” as to whom to prosecute. United States v. Goodwin, 457 U. S. 368, 380, n. 11 (1982); accord, Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U. S. 238, 248 (1980). “[S]o long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.” Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U. S. 357, 364 (1978). This broad discretion rests largely on the recognition that the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review. Such factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution’s general deterrence value, the Government’s enforcement priorities, and the case’s relationship to the Government’s overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake. Judicial supervision in this area, moreover, entails systemic costs of particular concern. Examining the basis of a prosecution delays the criminal proceeding, threatens to chill law enforcement by subjecting the prosecutor’s motives and decisionmaking to outside inquiry, and may undermine pros-ecutorial effectiveness by revealing the Government’s enforcement policy. All these are substantial concerns that make the courts properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute.
As we have noted in a slightly different context, however, although prosecutorial discretion is broad, it is not “ ‘unfettered.’ Selectivity in the enforcement of criminal laws is ... subject to constitutional constraints.” United States v. Batchelder, 442 U. S. 114, 125 (1979) (footnote omitted). In particular, the decision to prosecute may not be “‘deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification,”’ Bordenkircher v. Hayes, supra, at 364, quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U. S. 448, 456 (1962), including the exercise of protected statutory and constitutional rights, see United States v. Goodwin, supra, at 372.
It is appropriate to judge selective prosecution claims according to ordinary equal protection standards. See Oyler v. Boles, supra. Under our prior cases, these standards require petitioner to show both that the passive enforcement system had a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose. Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256 (1979); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229 (1976). All petitioner has shown here is that those eventually prosecuted, along with many not prosecuted, reported themselves as having violated the law. He has not shown that the enforcement policy selected nonregistrants for prosecution on the basis of their speech. Indeed, he could not have done so given the way the “beg” policy was carried out. The Government did not prosecute those who reported themselves but later registered. Nor did it prosecute those who protested registration but did not report themselves or were not reported by others. In fact, the Government did not even investigate those who wrote letters to Selective Service criticizing registration unless their letters stated affirmatively that they had refused to comply with the law. Affidavit of Edward A. Frankie, Special Assistant to the Director of Selective Service for Compliance, App. 635. The Government, on the other hand, did prosecute people who reported themselves or were reported by others but who did not publicly protest. These facts demonstrate that the Government treated all reported nonregistrants similarly. It did not subject vocal nonregistrants to any special burden. Indeed, those prosecuted in effect selected themselves for prosecution by refusing to register after being reported and warned by the Government.
Even if the passive policy had a discriminatory effect, petitioner has not shown that the Government intended such a result. The evidence he presented demonstrated only that the Government was aware that the passive enforcement policy would result in prosecution of vocal objectors and that they would probably make selective prosecution claims. As we have noted, however: “ ‘Discriminatory purpose’ . . . implies more than . . . intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, supra, at 279 (footnotes and citations omitted). In the present case, petitioner has not shown that the Government prosecuted him because of his protest activities. Absent such a showing, his claim of selective prosecution fails.
I — I <1
Petitioner also challenges the passive enforcement policy directly on First Amendment grounds. In particular, he claims that “[e]ven though the [Government’s passive] enforcement policy did not overtly punish protected speech as such, it inevitably created a content-based regulatory system with a concomitantly disparate, content-based impact on non-registrants.” Brief for Petitioner 23. This Court has held that when, as here, “‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.” United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 376 (1968). Government regulation is justified
“if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.” Id., at 377.
Accord, Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U. S. 20, 32 (1984); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 413 (1974). In the present case, neither the first nor third condition is disputed.
There can be no doubt that the passive enforcement policy meets the second condition. Few interests can be more compelling than a nation’s need to ensure its own security. It is well to remember that freedom as we know it has been suppressed in many countries. Unless a society has the capability and will to defend itself from the aggressions of others, constitutional protections of any sort have little meaning. Recognizing this fact, the Framers listed “pro-vid[ing] for the common defence,” U. S. Const., Preamble, as a motivating purpose for the Constitution and granted Congress the power to “provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States,” Art. I, §8, cl. 1. See also The Federalist Nos. 4, 24, and 25. This Court, moreover, has long held that the power “to raise and support armies ... is broad and sweeping,” United States v. O’Brien, supra, at 377; accord, Lichter v. United States, 334 U. S. 742, 755-758 (1948); Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366 (1918), and that the “power ... to classify and conscript manpower for military service is ‘beyond question,’” United States v. O’Brien, supra, at 377, quoting Lichter v. United States, supra, at 756; accord, Selective Draft Law Cases, supra. With these principles in mind, the three reasons the Government offers in defense of this particular enforcement policy are sufficiently compelling to satisfy the second O’Brien requirement — as to either those who reported themselves or those who were reported by others.
First, by relying on reports of nonregistration, the Government was able to identify and prosecute violators without further delay. Although it still was necessary to investigate those reported to make sure that they were required to register and had not, the Government did not have to search actively for the names of these likely violators. Such a search would have been difficult and costly at that time. Indeed, it would be a costly step in any “active” prosecution system involving thousands of nonregistrants. The passive enforcement program thus promoted prosecutorial efficiency. Second, the letters written to Selective Service provided strong, perhaps conclusive evidence of the nonregistrant’s intent not to comply — one of the elements of the offense. Third, prosecuting visible nonregistrants was thought to be an effective way to promote general deterrence, especially since failing to proceed against publicly known offenders would encourage others to violate the law.
The passive enforcement policy also meets the final requirement of the O’Brien test, for it placed no more limitation on speech than was necessary to ensure registration for the national defense. Passive enforcement not only did not subject “vocal” nonregistrants to any special burden, supra, at 609-610, but also was intended to be only an interim enforcement system. Although Selective Service was engaged in developing an active enforcement program when it investigated petitioner, it had by then found no practicable way of obtaining the names and current addresses of likely non-registrants. Eventually, it obtained them by matching state driver’s license records with Social Security files. It took some time, however, to obtain the necessary authorizations and to set up this system. Passive enforcement was the only effective interim solution available to carry out the Government’s compelling interest.
We think it important to note as a final matter how far the implications of petitioner’s First Amendment argument would extend. Strictly speaking, his argument does not concern passive enforcement but self-reporting. The concerns he identifies would apply to all nonregistrants who report themselves even if the Selective Service engaged only in active enforcement. For example, a nonregistrant who wrote a letter informing Selective Service of his failure to register could, when prosecuted under an active system, claim that the Selective Service was prosecuting him only because of his “protest.” Just as in this case, he could have some justification for believing that his letter had focused inquiry upon him. Prosecution in either context would equally “burden” his exercise of First Amendment rights. Under the petitioner’s view, then, the Government could not constitutionally prosecute a self-reporter — even in an active enforcement system — unless perhaps it could prove that it would have prosecuted him without his letter. On principle, such a view would allow any criminal to obtain immunity from prosecution simply by reporting himself and claiming that he did so in order to “protest” the law. The First Amendment confers no such immunity from prosecution.
y
We conclude that the Government’s passive enforcement system together with its “beg” policy violated neither the First nor Fifth Amendment. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
It is so ordered.
Section 3 provides in pertinent part:
“[I]t shall be the duty of every male citizen of the United States, and every other male person residing in the United States, who, on the day or days fixed for the first or any subsequent registration, is between the ages of eighteen and twenty-six, to present himself for and submit to registration at such time or times and place or places, and in such manner, as shall be determined by proclamation of the President and by rules and regulations prescribed hereunder.”
The United States requires only that young men register for military service while most other major countries of the world require actual service. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1983-1984 (1983); see Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public Service Research Group, 468 U. S. 841, 860, n. 2 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
On August 4, 1980, for example, petitioner wrote to both the President and the Selective Service System. In his letter to the President, he stated:
“I decided to obey my conscience rather than your law. I did not register for your draft. I will never register for your draft. Nor will I ever cooperate with yours or any other military system, despite the laws I might break or the consequences which may befall me.” App. 714.
In his letter to the Selective Service System, he similarly stated: “I have not registered for the draft. I plan never to register. I realize the possible consequences of my action, and I accept them.” Id., at 716.
Six months later, petitioner sent a second letter to Selective Service:
“Last August I wrote to inform you of my intention not to register for the draft. Well, I did not register, and still plan never to do so, but thus far I have received no reply to my letter, much less any news about your much-threatened prosecutions.
“I must interpret your silence as meaning that you are too busy or disorganized to respond to letters or keep track of us draft-age youth. So I will keep you posted of my whereabouts.” Id., at 710.
He also stated that, although he would “be traveling the nation.. . encouraging resistance and spreading the word about peace and disarmament,” he could be reached at his home address in Pasadena, California. Id., at 710-711.
The record indicates that only 13 of the 286 young men Selective Service referred to the Department of Justice had been indicted at the time the District Court considered this case. As of March 31, 1984, three more men had been indicted. The approximately 270 not indicted either registered, were found not to be subject to registration requirements, could not be found, or were under continuing investigation. The record does not indicate how many fell into each category.
On July 28, 1982, Selective Service stated that 8,365,000 young men had registered out of the estimated 9,039,000 who were required to do so. Selective Service Prosecutions: Oversight Hearing before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 10 (1982). This amounted to a nonregistration rate of approximately 7.5 percent.
The District Court also decided various statutory and regulatory claims. In particular, it held that Presidential Proclamation No. 4771 had been improperly promulgated and dismissed the indictment on this ground as well. 549 F. Supp. 1376, 1391 (1982). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed this particular holding and affirmed the District Court’s rejection of the remaining regulatory claims. 710 F. 2d 1385, 1388-1389 (1983). Only the constitutional claim is now at issue.
We do not decide the issue the dissent sees as central to this case: “whether Wayte has earned the right to discover Government documents relevant to his claim of selective prosecution.” Post, at 614-615. Even if there were substance to this discovery issue, it was neither raised in the petition for certiorari, briefed on the merits, nor raised at oral argument. Wayte has simply not asserted such a claim before this Court.
This term is misleading insofar as it suggests that all those indicted had made public statements opposing registration. In some cases, the only statement made by the nonregistrant prior to indictment was hisjetter to the Government declaring his refusal to register.
One judge dissented on the ground that the passive enforcement system represented a “deliberate policy. . . designed to punish only those, who had communicated their violation of the law to others.” 710 F. 2d, at 1389 (Schroeder, J., dissenting). Finding “an enforcement procedure focusing solely upon vocal offenders . . . inherently suspect,” id., at 1390, she would have shifted the burden of persuasion on discriminatory intent to the Government.
Compare United States v. Eklund, 733 F. 2d 1287 (CA8 1984) (en banc) (upholding criminal conviction under passive enforcement scheme), cert, pending, No. 83-1959, with United States v. Schmucker, 721 F. 2d 1046 (CA6 1983) (ordering hearing on selective prosecution claim), cert. pending, No. 83-2035.
Although the Fifth Amendment, unlike the Fourteenth, does not contain an equal protection clause, it does contain an equal protection component. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497, 499 (1954). “[Our] approach to Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has . . . been precisely the same as to equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636, 638, n. 2 (1975).
A showing of discriminatory intent is not necessary when the equal protection claim is based on an overtly discriminatory classification. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1880). No such claim is presented here, for petitioner cannot argue that the passive policy discriminated on its face.
The dissent argues that Wayte made a nonfrivolous showing of all three elements of a prima facie case as established in the context of grand jury selection. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U. S. 482, 494-495 (1977). Neither the parties nor the courts below, however, discussed the prima facie ease in these terms. Rather, they used the phrase to refer to whether Wayte had made a showing, which, if unrebutted, would directly establish discriminatory effect and purpose. Even applying standards from the grand jury selection context, however, we believe that Wayte has failed to establish a prima facie case. For example, although the dissent describes the first element as merely whether the individual “is a member of a recognizable, distinct class,” post, at 626, it is clear for reasons we discuss, infra, at this page and 610, that Wayte has not established the first element as actually defined by Castaneda: whether the individual is a member of an “identifiable group” that is “a recognizable, distinct class, singled out for different treatment under the laws, as mitten or as applied.” 430 U. S., at 494 (emphasis added). For these same reasons, we believe Wayte has failed to establish the other Castaneda elements, particularly the third. Furthermore, even assuming that Wayte did make out this kind of prima facie ease, the “beg” policy would rebut it.
The dissent also argues that Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886), would have been decided differently under the approach we take today. Post, at 630-631. This misunderstanding stems from its belief that “the Government intentionally discriminated in defining the pool of potential proseeutees” in this case. Post, at 630. This premise, however, mistakes the facts. The prosecution pool consisted of all reported nonregistrants, not just “vocal” nonregistrants, and there is no evidence of Government intent to prosecute individuals because of their exercise of First Amendment rights.
Petitioner alleges that the passive enforcement policy violated both his right to free speech and his right to petition. Because he does not argue that it burdened each right differently, we view these claims as essentially the same. Although the right to petition and the right to free speech are separate guarantees, they are related and generally subject to the same constitutional analysis. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U. S. 886, 911-915 (1982).
As an initial matter, we note doubt that petitioner has demonstrated injury to his First Amendment rights. The Government’s “beg” policy removed most, if not all, of any burden passive enforcement placed on free expression. Because of this policy, nonregistrants could protest registration and still avoid any danger of prosecution. By simply registering after they had reported themselves to the Selective Service, nonregistrants satisfied their obligation and could thereafter continue to protest registration. No matter how strong their protest, registration immunized them from prosecution. Strictly speaking, then, the passive enforcement system penalized continued violation of the Military Selective Service Act, not speech. The only right it burdened was the asserted “right” not to register, a “right” without foundation either in the Constitution or the history of our country. See Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366 (1918).
Section 12(a) of the Military Selective Service Act, 62 Stat. 622, as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. § 462(a), provides that a criminal nonregistrant must “evad[e] or refus[e]” to register. For conviction, the courts have uniformly required the Government to prove that the failure to register was knowing. E. g., United States v. Boucher, 509 F. 2d 991 (CA8 1975); United States v. Rabb, 394 F. 2d 230 (CA3 1968). Neither party contests this requirement here.
Selective Service had tried to use Social Security records but found that the addresses there were hopelessly stale. And under the law, 26 U. S. C. § 6103, it could gain no useful access to Internal Revenue Service records — the only other recognized federal source of generally accurate information.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | C | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Minton
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1941, one Joseph R. Hutton applied to the Interstate Commerce Commission for a permit to operate as a contract carrier by water between points on Long Island Sound, New York Harbor, the Hudson River, the New York State Barge Canal System, the Niagara River, and contiguous ports. In the alternative, he prayed a certificate of convenience and necessity if he be found to be a common carrier. The application was a “grandfather” clause proceeding under § 309 of Part III, Water Carriers, of the Interstate Commerce Act, 54 Stat. 941, 49 U. S. C. (1946 ed.) § 909.
The Commission, after hearing and investigation, made findings of fact and conclusions of law thereon to the effect that for 37 years Hutton had been in operation; that “ [h] e owns and manages 1 steam power boat of about 240 horsepower, and 4 barges, all of which are operated as a unit. The power boat is used to tow the barges but also carries about 150 gross tons of freight. On occasion other barges are rented or chartered for operation in applicant’s fleet.” It was further found that during and since 1939 and 1940, “applicant’s operation has been that of a common carrier of commodities generally between points on New York Harbor, the Hudson River below its junction with the New York State Barge Canal, the New York State Barge Canal between the Hudson River and the Niagara River including the Oswego branch, and the Niagara River.” The Commission further found that the applicant was in operation January 1, 1940, the critical date provided in § 309 for “grandfather” proceedings, and by reason of his long, continuous operation, public convenience and necessity would be served by continuance of such operation, and specifically found:
“We find that applicant is a common carrier by water; that public convenience and necessity require operation by applicant as a common carrier in interstate or foreign commerce, of commodities generally, between points on New York Harbor as determined in Ex Parte No. 140, points on the Hudson River below its junction with the New York State Barge Canal, the New York State Barge Canal between the Hudson River and the Niagara River including the Oswego branch, and the Niagara River; that applicant is fit, willing and able properly to perform said transportation; and that applicant is entitled to a certificate authorizing such operation, subject, however, to general conditions which are necessary to carry out, with respect to such operation, the requirements of Part III of the act and the orders, rules, and regulations of the Commission thereunder.”
The Commission entered an order on July 17, 1942, effective October 5, 1942, granting the certificate of convenience and necessity to Hutton. This order recited the fact of the above findings and incorporated them by reference. 250 I. C. C. 804.
Thus it will be seen that the Commission found the operations of Hutton to be those of a common carrier by water of commodities generally in self-propelled vessels which he owned and which he also used to tow barges he owned, rented, or chartered. There is no finding that his operations included the towing of barges which he did not own, rent, or charter. The certificate was accepted by Hutton, and, as far as appears on this record, he operated under it until March 7, 1944, in the same manner as he had before.
On March 7, 1944, the Commission of its own motion opened the record in Hutton’s original application and, after reconsidering its former findings, specified the type of vessels to be used in the exercise of its authority theretofore granted. 260 I. C. C. 804. The Commission’s order of March 7,1944, in pertinent part reads as follows:
“That public convenience and necessity require the continuance of operation by applicant as a common carrier by water, by self-propelled vessels and by non-self-propelled vessels with the use of separate towing vessels in interstate or foreign commerce, in the transportation of commodities generally between points in the area defined by the order of the Commission . . . .”
This amended certificate, which limited Hutton to the identical operations he had long carried on and upon which his § 309 rights were authorized, was accepted by him without question, and he continued to operate under it until his death several months later.
The Callanan Road Improvement Company, the appellant here, sought to purchase the amended certificate from Hutton’s administratrix for operations limited to the Hudson River and New York Harbor. By § 312 of the Interstate Commerce Act, 54 Stat. 944, 49 U. S. C. (1946 ed.) § 912, the Interstate Commerce Commission’s authorization is required for such a transfer. An application for approval was filed before the Commission by the appellant and the administratrix. After hearing, the Commission by order dated August 18, 1947 (265 I. C. C. 813), authorized the transfer of the amended certificate to the appellant in the following words:
“It is further ordered, That, following consummation of the sale to the transferee of the operating rights covered by said amended certificate, said transferee may perform to the extent above described, the water-carrier service heretofore authorized under said amended certificate dated March 7, 1944, in No. W-103.”
On February 5, 1948, the Commission issued an amended certificate to the appellant, pursuant to its order of August 18, 1947. Thus, the appellant sought and received a transfer of the amended certificate of March 7, 1944, limited by consent as to waters to be operated upon.
On January 5, 1951, the appellant filed a petition with the Commission for interpretation of the amended certificate it had purchased from Hutton’s administratrix. Cornell Steamboat Company, engaged only in towing on the waters in question, appeared and offered evidence against the appellant. In this proceeding, the appellant claimed the right under its certificate to engage in towing service as distinguished from freighting service. It is and was the contention of the appellant that under the original certificate issued to Hutton in 1942, the latter was a common carrier of goods generally, and that the limitations or modification of this certificate by the order of the Commission of March 7, 1944, which denied Hutton the right to engage in towing services was unauthorized, and, as transferee, the appellant was entitled to engage in towing service and to promulgate and file tariffs therefor. The Commission after hearing held the appellant was not entitled to engage in the service of towing and cancelled the tariffs filed by the appellant covering towing services. 285 I. C. C. 75.
The appellant filed a complaint in the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of New York to set aside that order. A statutory three-judge court refused to set it aside, 107 F. Supp. 184, and this appeal followed.
We need not go into the differences between towage and freightage. It is admitted for the purposes of this case that the limitations placed by the order of March 7, 1944, upon the original certificate issued Hutton in 1942, had the effect of restricting his operations to freightage and denied him the right to engage in towage. The appellant cannot now raise the question of the power of the Commission to modify the original certificate of July 17, 1942, by the limitations contained in the order of March 7, 1944. Whether the Commission’s action in reopening the 1942 proceedings and placing the limitations on the certificate theretofore issued was right or wrong, the jurisdiction of the Commission was not destroyed thereby. A direct attack in such circumstances was the remedy.
Hutton not only did not object. He accepted the modified certificate and operated under it, just as he had always operated. His operation was not cut down by the limitations placed upon the certificate. The appellant, as transferee of that modified certificate, stands in no better position than Hutton stood. Cf. Gregg Cartage & Storage Co. v. United States, 316 U. S. 74, 82-83. Indeed, in the 1947 transfer proceedings before the Commission when the appellant sought to acquire Hutton’s amended certificate of March 7, 1944, the appellant objected that the protestant there could not raise the question of the Commission’s power to modify the certificate, as this would be a collateral attack on the Commission’s order. That is exactly what the appellant seeks to do here. It cannot in this collateral proceeding attack the validity of the Commission’s order of March 7, 1944. Securities & Exchange Comm’n v. Central-Illinois Sec. Corp., 338 U. S. 96, 143; Stanley v. Supervisors, 121 U. S. 535, 550; Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Lightsey, 185 F. 2d 167; City of Tulsa v. Midland Valley R. Co., 168 F. 2d 252, 254; Brown Co. v. Atlantic Pipe Line, 91 F. 2d 394, 398. The appellant must take the certificate as it stood at the time it sought and received the Commission’s approval for its transfer.
Furthermore, the appellant, having invoked the power of the Commission to approve the transfer of the amended certificate to it, is now estopped to deny the Commission’s power to issue the certificate in its present form and as it existed prior to the time the appellant sought its transfer. United Fuel Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm’n, 278 U. S. 300, 307-308; St. Louis Malleable Casting Co. v. Prendergast Construction Co., 260 U. S. 469. This is especially true in view of the appellant’s contention at the 1947 transfer hearing that the protestant in that hearing could not raise the question there which the appellant seeks to raise here, as it would constitute a collateral attack on the order of the Commission. The appellant cannot blow hot and cold and take now a position contrary to that taken in the proceedings it invoked to obtain the Commission’s approval. If the appellant then had taken the position it seeks now, the Commission might conceivably have refused its approval of the transfer. The appellant accepted the transfer with the limitations contained in the certificate. The appellant now will not be heard to say it is entitled to receive more than its transferor had or the certificate transferred gave.
The judgment of the District Court is
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Black concurs in the result.
Mr. Justice Douglas dissents.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court.
To address pressing issues related to the large number of aliens within its borders who do not have a lawful right to be in this country, the State of Arizona in 2010 enacted a statute called the Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act. The law is often referred to as S. B. 1070, the version introduced in the State Senate. See also H. B. 2162, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (2010) (amending S. B. 1070). Its stated purpose is to “discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens and economic activity by persons unlawfully present in the United States.” Note following Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-1051 (West 2012). The law’s provisions establish an official state policy of “attrition through enforcement.” Ibid. The question before the Court is whether federal law pre-empts and renders invalid four separate provisions of the state law.
I
The United States filed this suit against Arizona, seeking to enjoin S. B. 1070 as pre-empted.- Four provisions of the law are at issue here. Two create new state offenses. Section 3 makes failure to comply with federal alien-registration requirements a state misdemeanor. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1509 (West Supp. 2011). Section 5, in relevant part, makes it a misdemeanor for an unauthorized alien to seek or engage in work in the State; this provision is referred to as § 5(C). See § 13-2928(C). Two other provisions give specific arrest authority and investigative duties with respect to certain aliens to state and local law enforcement officers. Section 6 authorizes officers to arrest without a warrant a person “the officer has probable cause to believe... has committed any public offense that makes the person removable from the United States.” § 13-3883(A)(5). Section 2(B) provides that officers who conduct a stop, detention, or arrest must in some circumstances make efforts to verify the person’s immigration status with the Federal Government. See § 11-1051(B) (West 2012).
The United States District Court for the District of Arizona issued a preliminary injunction preventing the four provisions at issue from taking effect. 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1008 (2010). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 641 F. 3d 339, 366 (2011). It agreed that the United States had established a likelihood of success on its pre-emption claims. The Court of Appeals was unanimous in its conclusion that §§ 3 and 5(C) were likely pre-empted. Judge Bea dissented from the decision to uphold the preliminary injunction against §§ 2(B) and 6. This Court granted certiorari to resolve important questions concerning the interaction of state and federal power with respect to the law of immigration and alien status. 565 U. S. 1092 (2011).
nH I
A
The Government of the United States has broad, undoubted power over the subject of immigration and the status of aliens. See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U. S. 1, 10 (1982); see generally S. Legomsky & C. Rodriguez, Immigration and Refugee Law and Policy 115-132 (5th ed. 2009). This authority rests, in part, on the National Government’s constitutional power to “establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,” Art. I, § 8, cl. 4, and its inherent power as sovereign to control and conduct relations with foreign nations, see Toll, supra, at 10 (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 318 (1936)).
The federal power to determine immigration policy is well settled. Immigration policy can affect trade, investment, tourism, and diplomatic relations for the entire Nation, as well as the perceptions and expectations of aliens in this country who seek the full protection of its laws. See, e. g., Brief for United Mexican States as Amicus Curiae; see also Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580, 588-589 (1952). Perceived mistreatment of aliens in the United States may lead to harmful reciprocal treatment of American citizens abroad. See Brief for Madeleine K. Albright et al. as Amici Curiae 24-30.
It is fundamental that foreign countries concerned about the status, safety, and security of their nationals in the United States must be able to confer and communicate on this subject with one national sovereign, not the 50 separate States. See Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U. S. 275, 279-280 (1876); see also The Federalist No. 3, p. 39 (C. Rossiter ed. 2003) (J. Jay) (observing that federal power would be necessary in part because “bordering States... under the impulse of sudden irritation, and a quick sense of apparent interest or injury” might take action that would undermine foreign relations). This Court has reaffirmed that “[o]ne of the most important and delicate of all international relationships... has to do with the protection of the just rights of a country’s own nationals when those nationals are in another country.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 64 (1941).
Federal governance of immigration and alien status is extensive and complex. Congress has specified categories of aliens who may not be admitted to the United States. See 8 U. S. C. § 1182. Unlawful entry and unlawful reentry into the country are federal offenses. §§ 1325, 1326. Once here, aliens are required to register with the Federal Government and to carry proof of status on their person. See §§ 1301-1306. Failure to do so is a federal misdemeanor. §§ 1304(e), 1306(a). Federal law also authorizes States to deny nonciti-zens a range of public benefits, § 1622; and it imposes sanctions on employers who hire unauthorized workers, § 1324a.
Congress has specified which aliens may be removed from the United States and the procedures for doing so. Aliens may be removed if they were inadmissible at the time of entry, have been convicted of certain crimes, or meet other criteria set by federal law. See § 1227. Removal is a civil, not criminal, matter. A principal feature of the removal system is the broad discretion exercised by immigration officials. See Brief for Former Commissioners of the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service as Amici Curiae 8-13 (hereinafter Brief for Former INS Commissioners). Federal officials, as an initial matter, must decide whether it makes sense to pursue removal at all. If removal proceedings commence, aliens may seek asylum and other discretionary relief allowing them to remain in the country or at least to leave without formal removal. See § 1229a(c)(4); see also, e.g., §§ 1158 (asylum), 1229b (cancellation of removal), 1229c (voluntary departure).
Discretion in the enforcement of immigration law embraces immediate human concerns. Unauthorized workers trying to support their families, for example, likely pose less danger than alien smugglers or aliens who commit a serious crime. The equities of an individual ease may turn on many factors, including whether the alien has children born in the United States, long ties to the community, or a record of distinguished military service. Some discretionary decisions involve policy choices that bear on this Nation’s international relations. Returning an alien tq his own country may be deemed inappropriate even where he has committed a removable offense or fails to meet the criteria for admission. The foreign state may be mired in civil war, complicit in political persecution, or enduring conditions that create a real risk that the alien or his family will be harmed upon return. The dynamic nature of relations with other countries requires the Executive Branch to ensure that enforcement policies are consistent with this Nation’s foreign policy with respect to these and other realities.
Agencies in the Department of Homeland Security play a major role in enforcing the country’s immigration laws. United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is responsible for determining the admissibility of aliens and securing the country’s borders. See Dept, of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, Immigration Enforcement Actions: 2010, p. 1 (2011). In 2010, CBP’s Border Patrol apprehended almost half a million people. Id., at 3. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), a second agency, “conducts criminal investigations involving the enforcement of immigration-related statutes.” Id., at 2. ICE also operates the Law Enforcement Support Center. LESC, as the Center is known, provides immigration status information to federal, state, and local officials around the clock. See App. 91. ICE officers are responsible “for the identification, apprehension, and removal of illegal aliens from the United States.” Immigration Enforcement Actions, at 2. Hundreds of thousands of aliens are removed by the Federal Government every year. See id., at 4 (reporting there were 387,242 removals, and 476,405 returns without a removal order, in 2010).
B
The pervasiveness of federal regulation does not diminish the importance of immigration policy to the States. Arizona bears many of the consequences of unlawful immigration. Hundreds of thousands of deportable aliens are apprehended in Arizona each year. Dept, of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, 2010 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 93 (2011) (Table 35). Unauthorized aliens who remain in the State constitute, by one estimate, almost 6% of the population. See J. Passel & D. Cohn, Pew Hispanic Center, U. S. Unauthorized Immigration Flows Are Down Sharply Since Mid-Decade 3 (2010). And in the State’s most populous county, these aliens are reported to be responsible for a disproportionate share of serious crime. See, e. g., S. Camarota & J. Vaughan, Center for Immigration Studies, Immigration and Crime: Assessing a Conflicted Issue 16 (2009) (Table 3) (estimating that unauthorized aliens constitute 8.9% of the population and are responsible for 21.8% of the felonies in Maricopa County, which includes Phoenix).
Statistics alone do not capture the full extent of Arizona’s concerns. Accounts in the record suggest there is an “epidemic of crime, safety risks, serious property damage, and environmental problems” associated with the influx of illegal migration across private land near the Mexican border. Brief for Petitioners 6. Phoenix is a major city of the United States, yet signs along an interstate highway 30 miles to the south warn the public to stay away. One reads, “DANGER—PUBLIC WARNING—TRAVEL NOT RECOMMENDED / Active Drug and Human Smuggling Area / Visitors May Encounter Armed Criminals and Smuggling Vehicles Traveling at High Rates of Speed.” App. 170 (punctuation altered); see also Brief for Petitioners 5-6. The problems posed to the State by illegal immigration must not be underestimated.
These concerns are the background for the formal legal analysis that follows. The issue is whether, under preemption principles, federal law permits Arizona to implement the state-law provisions in dispute.
J-H b-i I—I
Federalism, central to the constitutional design, adopts the principle that both the National and State Governments have elements of sovereignty the other is bound to respect. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 457 (1991); U. S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U. S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). From the existence of two sovereigns follows the possibility that laws can be in conflict or at cross-purposes. The Supremacy Clause provides a clear rule that federal law “shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.” Art. VI, cl. 2. Under this principle, Congress has the power to pre-empt state law. See Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U. S. 363, 372 (2000); Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 210-211 (1824). There is no doubt that Congress may withdraw specified powers from the States by enacting a statute containing an express preemption provision. See, e. g., Chamber of Commerce of United States of America v. Whiting, 563 U. S. 582, 592 (2011).
State law must also give way to federal law in at least two other circumstances. First, the States are precluded from regulating conduct in a field that Congress, acting within its proper authority, has determined must be regulated by its exclusive governance. See Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Assn., 505 U. S. 88, 115 (1992) (Souter, J., dissenting). The intent to displace state law altogether can be inferred from a framework of regulation “so pervasive... that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it” or where there is a “federal interest... so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.” Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947); see English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U. S. 72, 79 (1990).
Second, state laws are pre-empted when they conflict with federal law. Crosby, supra, at 372. This includes cases where “compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,” Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 142-143 (1963), and those instances where the challenged state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,” Hines, 312 U. S., at 67; see also Crosby, supra, at 373 (“What is a sufficient obstacle is a matter of judgment, to be informed by examining the federal statute as a whole and identifying its purpose and intended effects”)- In pre-emption analysis, courts should assume that “the historic police powers of the States” are not superseded “unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Rice, supra, at 230; see Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U. S. 555, 565 (2009).
The four challenged provisions of the state law each must be examined under these pre-emption principles.
IV
A
Section S
Section 3 of S. B. 1070 creates a new state misdemeanor. It forbids the “willful failure to complete or carry an alien registration document... in violation of 8 United States Code § 1304(e) or 1306(a).” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13— 1509(A). In effect, § 3 adds a state-law penalty for conduct proscribed by federal law. The United States contends that this state enforcement mechanism intrudes on the field of alien registration, a field in which Congress has left no room for States to regulate. See Brief for United States 27, 31.
The Court discussed federal alien-registration requirements in Hines, supra. In 1940, as international conflict spread, Congress added to federal immigration law a “complete system for alien registration.” Id., at 70. The new federal law struck a careful balance. It punished an alien’s willful failure to register but did not require aliens to carry identification cards. There were also limits on the sharing of registration records and fingerprints. The Court found that Congress intended the federal plan for registration to be a “single integrated and all-embracing system.” Id., at 74. Because this “complete scheme... for the registration of aliens” touched on foreign relations, it did not allow the States to “curtail or complement” federal law or to “enforce additional or auxiliary regulations.” Id., at 66-67. As a consequence, the Court ruled that Pennsylvania could not enforce its own alien-registration program. See id., at 59, 74.
The present regime of federal regulation is not identical to the statutory framework considered in Hines, but it remains comprehensive. Federal law now includes a requirement that aliens carry proof of registration. 8 U. S. C. § 1804(e). Other aspects, however, have stayed the same. Aliens who remain in the country for more than 30 days must apply for registration and be fingerprinted. Compare § 1302(a) with § 452(a) (1940 ed.). Detailed information is required, and any change of address has to be reported to the Federal Government. Compare §§ 1304(a), 1305(a) (2006 ed.) with §§ 455(a), 456 (1940 ed.). The statute continues to provide penalties for the willful failure to register. Compare § 1306(a) (2006 ed.) with §457 (1940 ed.).
The framework enacted by Congress leads to the conclusion here, as it did in Hines, that the Federal Government has occupied the field of alien registration. See American Ins. Assn. v. Garamendi, 539 U. S. 396, 419, n. 11 (2003) (characterizing Hines as a field pre-emption case); Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U. S. 497, 504 (1956) (same); see also Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 Geo. L. J. 2085, 2098-2099, 2107 (2000) (same). The federal statutory directives provide a full set of standards governing alien registration, including the punishment for noncompliance. It was designed as a “‘harmonious whole.’” Hines, supra, at 72. Where Congress occupies an entire field, as it has in the field of alien registration, even complementary state regulation is impermissible. Field pre-emption reflects a congressional decision to foreclose any state regulation in the area, even if it is parallel to federal standards. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U. S. 238, 249 (1984).
Federal law makes a single sovereign responsible for maintaining a comprehensive and unified system to keep track of aliens within the Nation’s borders. If §3 of the Arizona statute were valid, every State could give itself independent authority to prosecute federal registration violations, “diminish[ing] the [Federal Government] ⅛ control over enforcement” and “detracting] from the ‘integrated scheme of regulation’ created by Congress.” Wisconsin Dept. of Industry v. Gould Inc., 475 U. S. 282, 288-289 (1986). Even if a State may make violation of federal law a crime in some instances, it cannot do so in a field (like the field of alien registration) that has been occupied by federal law. See California v. Zook, 336 U. S. 725, 730-731, 733 (1949); see also In re Loney, 134 U. S. 372, 375-376 (1890) (States may not impose their own punishment for perjury in federal courts).
Arizona contends that § 3 can survive pre-emption because the provision has the same aim as federal law and adopts its substantive standards. This argument not only ignores the basic premise of field pre-emption—that States may not enter, in any respect, an area the Federal Government has reserved for itself—but also is unpersuasive on its own terms. Permitting the State to impose its own penalties for the federal offenses here would conflict with the careful framework Congress adopted. Cf. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U. S. 341, 347-348 (2001) (States may not impose their own punishment for fraud on the Food and Drug Administration); Wisconsin Dept., supra, at 288 (States may not impose their own punishment for repeat violations of the National Labor Relations Act). Were §3 to come into force, the State would have the power to bring criminal charges against individuals for violating a federal law even in circumstances where federal officials in charge of the comprehensive scheme determine that prosecution would fi-ustrate federal policies.
There is a further intrusion upon the federal scheme. Even where federal authorities believe prosecution is appropriate, there is an inconsistency between § 3 and federal law with respect to penalties. Under federal law, the failure to carry registration papers is a misdemeanor that may be punished by a fine, imprisonment, or a term of probation. See 8 U. S. C. § 1304(e) (2006 ed.); 18 U. S. C. § 3561. State law, by contrast, rules out probation as a possible sentence (and also eliminates the possibility of a pardon). See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1509(D). This state framework of sanctions creates a conflict with the plan Congress put in place. See Wisconsin Dept., supra, at 286 (“[C]onflict is imminent whenever two separate remedies are brought to bear on the same activity” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
These specific conflicts between state and federal law simply underscore the reason for field pre-emption. As it did in Hines, the Court now concludes that, with respect to the subject of alien registration, Congress intended to preclude States from “complement[ing] the federal law, or enforcing] additional or auxiliary regulations.” 312 U. S., at 66-67. Section 3 is pre-empted by federal law.
B
Section 5(C)
Unlike §3, which replicates federal statutory requirements, §5(C) enacts a state criminal prohibition where no federal counterpart exists. The provision makes it a state misdemeanor for “an unauthorized alien to knowingly apply for work, solicit work in a public place or perform work as an employee or independent contractor” in Arizona. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13-2928(C). Violations can be punished by a $2,500 fine and incarceration for up to six months. See § 13-2928(F); see also §§ 13-707(A)(1) (West 2010); 13-802(A); 13-902(A)(5) (West Supp. 2011). The United States contends that the provision upsets the balance struck by the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) and must be pre-empted as an obstacle to the federal plan of regulation and control.
When there was no comprehensive federal program regulating the employment of unauthorized aliens, this Court found that a State had authority to pass its own laws on the subject. In 1971, for example, California passed a law imposing civil penalties on the employment of aliens who were “not entitled to lawful residence in the United States if such employment would have an adverse effect on lawful resident workers.” 1971 Cal. Stats. ch. 1442, § 1(a). The law was upheld against a pre-emption challenge in De Canas v. Bica, 424 U. S. 351 (1976). De Canas recognized that “States possess broad authority under their police powers to regulate the employment relationship to protect workers within the State.” Id., at 356. At that point, however, the Federal Government had expressed no more than “a peripheral concern with [the] employment of illegal entrants.” Id., at 360; see Whiting, 563 U. S., at 588.
Current federal law is substantially different from the regime that prevailed when De Canas was decided. Congress enacted IRCA as a comprehensive framework for “combating the employment of illegal aliens.” Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U. S. 137, 147 (2002). The law makes it illegal for employers to knowingly hire, recruit, refer, or continue to employ unauthorized workers. See 8 U. S. C. §§ 1324a(a)(1)(A), (a)(2). It also requires every employer to verify the employment authorization status of prospective employees. See §§ 1324a(a)(1)(B), (b); 8 CFR § 274a.2(b) (2012). These requirements are enforced through criminal penalties and an escalating series of civil penalties tied to the number of times an employer has violated the provisions. See 8 U. S. C. §§ 1324a(e)(4), (f); 8 CFR § 274a.10.
This comprehensive framework does not impose federal criminal sanctions on the employee side (i. e., penalties on aliens who seek or engage in unauthorized work). Under federal law some civil penalties are imposed instead. With certain exceptions, aliens who accept unlawful employment are not eligible to have their status adjusted to that of a lawful permanent resident. See 8 U. S. C. §§ 1255(c)(2), (c)(8). Aliens also may be removed from the country for having engaged in unauthorized work. See § 1227(a)(1) (C)(i); 8 CFR § 214.1(e). In addition to specifying these civil consequences, federal law makes it a crime for unauthorized workers to obtain employment through fraudulent means. See 18 U. S. C. § 1546(b). Congress has made clear, however, that any information employees submit to indicate their work status “may not be used” for purposes other than prosecution under specified federal criminal statutes for fraud, perjury, and related conduct. See 8 U. S. C. §§ 1324a(b)(5), (d)(2)(F)-(G).
The legislative background of IRCA underscores the fact that Congress made a deliberate choice not to impose criminal penalties on aliens who seek, or engage in, unauthorized employment. A commission established by Congress to study immigration policy and to make recommendations concluded these penalties would be “unnecessary and unworkable.” U. S. Immigration Policy and the National Interest: The Final Report and Recommendations of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy With Supplemental Views by Commissioners 65-66 (1981); see § 4, 92 Stat. 907. Proposals to make unauthorized work a criminal offense were debated and discussed during the long process of drafting IRCA. See Brief for Service Employees International Union et al. as Amici Curiae 9-12. But Congress rejected them. See, e. g., 119 Cong. Rec. 14184 (1973) (statement of Rep. Dennis). In the end, IRCA’s framework reflects a considered judgment that making criminals out of aliens engaged in unauthorized work—aliens who already face the possibility of employer exploitation because of their removable status—would be inconsistent with federal policy and objectives. See, e. g., Hearings before Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, pp. 919-920 (1972) (statement of Rep. Rodino, the eventual sponsor of IRCA in the House of Representatives).
IRCA’s express pre-emption provision, which in most instances bars States from imposing penalties on employers of unauthorized aliens, is silent about whether additional penalties may be imposed against the employees themselves. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2); Whiting, supra, at 587-588. But the existence of an “express pre-emption provisio[n] does not bar the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles” or impose a “ ‘special burden’ ” that would make it more difficult to establish the pre-emption of laws falling outside the clause. Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U. S. 861, 869-872 (2000); see Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U. S. 51, 65 (2002).
The ordinary principles of pre-emption include the well-settled proposition that a state law is pre-empted where it “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Hines, 312 U. S., at 67. Under § 5(C) of S. B. 1070, Arizona law would interfere with the careful balance struck by Congress with respect to unauthorized employment of aliens. Although § 5(C) attempts to achieve one of the same goals as federal law—the deterrence of unlawful employment—it involves a conflict in the method of enforcement. The Court has recognized that a “[cjonflict in technique can be fully as disruptive to the system Congress erected as conflict in overt policy.” Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U. S. 274, 287 (1971). The correct instruction to draw from the text, structure, and history of IRCA is that Congress decided it would be inappropriate to impose criminal penalties on aliens who seek or engage in unauthorized employment. It follows that a state law to the contrary is an obstacle to the regulatory system Congress chose. See Puerto Rico Dept. of Consumer Affairs v. ISLA Petroleum Corp., 485 U. S. 495, 503 (1988) (“Where a comprehensive federal scheme intentionally leaves a portion of the regulated field without controls, then the pre-emptive inference can be drawn—not from federal inaction alone, but from inaction joined with action”). Section 5(C) is pre-empted by federal law.
C
Section 6
Section 6 of S. B. 1070 provides that a state officer, “without a warrant, may arrest a person if the officer has probable cause to believe... [the person] has committed any public offense that makes [him] removable from the United States.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3883(A)(5). The United States argues that arrests authorized by this statute would be an obstacle to the removal system Congress created.
As a general rule, it is not a crime for a removable alien to remain present in the United States. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U. S. 1032, 1038 (1984). If the police stop someone based on nothing more than possible removability, the usual predicate for an arrest is absent. When an alien is suspected of being removable, a federal official issues an administrative document called a “Notice to Appear.” See 8 U. S. C. § 1229(a); 8 CFR § 239.1(a). The form does not authorize an arrest. Instead, it gives the alien information about the proceedings, including the time and date of the removal hearing. See 8 U. S. C. § 1229(a)(1). If an alien fails to appear, an in absentia order may direct removal. § 1229a(b)(5)(A).
The federal statutory structure instructs when it is appropriate to arrest an alien during the removal process. For example, the Attorney General can exercise discretion to issue a warrant for an alien’s arrest and detention “pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” § 1226(a); see Memorandum from John Morton, Director, ICE, to All Field Office Directors et al., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent With the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (June 17, 2011) (hereinafter 2011 ICE Memorandum) (describing factors informing this and related decisions). And if an alien is ordered removed after a hearing, the Attorney General will issue a warrant. See 8 CFR § 241.2(a)(1). In both instances, the warrants are executed by federal officers who have received training in the enforcement of immigration law. See §§ 241.2(b), 287.5(e)(3). If no federal warrant has been issued, those officers have more limited authority. See 8 U. S. C. § 1357(a). They may arrest an alien for being “in the United States in violation of any [immigration] law or regulation,” for example, but only where the alien “is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained.” § 1357(a)(2).
Section 6 attempts to provide state officers even greater authority to arrest aliens on the basis of possible removability than Congress has given to trained federal immigration officers. Under state law, officers who believe an alien is removable by reason of some “public offense” would have the power to conduct an arrest on that basis regardless of whether a federal warrant has issued or the alien is likely to escape. This state authority could be exercised without any input from the Federal Government about whether an arrest is warranted in a particular case. This would allow the State to achieve its own immigration policy. The result could be unnecessary harassment of some aliens (for instance, a veteran, college student, or someone assisting with a criminal investigation) who federal officials determine should not be removed.
This is not the system Congress created. Federal law specifies limited circumstances in which state officers may perform the functions of an immigration officer. A principal example is when the Attorney General has granted that authority to specific officers in a formal agreement with a state or local government. See § 1357(g)(1); see also § 1103(a)(10) (authority may be extended in the event of an “imminent mass influx of aliens arriving off the coast of the United States”); § 1252c (authority to arrest in specific circumstance after consultation with the Federal Government); § 1324(c) (authority to arrest for bringing in and harboring certain aliens). Officers covered by these agreements are subject to the Attorney General’s direction and supervision. § 1357(g)(3). There are significant complexities involved in enforcing federal immigration law, including the determination whether a person is removable. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U. S. 356, 379-380 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring in judgment). As a result, the agreements reached with the Attorney General must contain written certification that officers have received adequate training to carry out the duties of an immigration officer. See 11357(g)(2); cf. 8 CFR §§ 287.5(c) (arrest power contingent on training), 287.1(g) (defining the training).
By authorizing state officers to decide whether an alien should be detained for being removable, § 6 violates the principle that the removal process is entrusted to the discretion of the Federal Government. See, e. g., Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U. S. 471, 483-484 (1999); see also Brief for Former INS Commissioners 8-13. A decision on removability requires a determination whether it is appropriate to allow a foreign national to continue living in the United States. Decisions of this nature touch on foreign relations and must be made with one voice. See Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 543 U. S. 335, 348 (2005) (“Removal decisions, including the selection of a removed alien’s destination, may implicate [the Nation’s] relations with foreign powers and require consideration of changing political and economic circumstances” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Galvan v. Press, 347 U. S. 522, 531 (1954) (“Policies pertaining to the entry of aliens and their right to remain here are... entrusted exclusively to Congress... ”); Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 42 (1915) (“The authority to control immigration—to admit or exclude aliens—is vested solely in the Federal Government”).
In defense of § 6, Arizona notes a federal statute permitting
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | J | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Harlan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case, involving California’s second rejection of petitioner’s application for admission to the state bar, is a sequel to Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U. S. 252, in which this Court reversed the State’s initial refusal of his application.
Under California law the State Supreme Court may admit to the practice of law any applicant whose qualifications have been certified to it by the California Committee of Bar Examiners. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6064. To qualify for certification an applicant must, among other things, be of “good moral character,” id., § 6060 (c), and no person may be certified “who advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States or of this State by force, violence, or other unconstitutional means....”' Id., § 6064.1. The Committee is empowered and required to ascertain the qualifications of all candidates. Id., § 6046. Under rules prescribed by the Board of Governors of the State Bar, an applicant before the Committee has “the burden of proving that he is possessed of good moral character, of removing any and all reasonable suspicion of moral unfitness, and that he is entitled to the high regard and confidence of the public.” Id., Div. 3, c. 4, Rule X, § 101. Any applicant denied certification may have the Committee’s action reviewed by the State Supreme Court. Id., § 6066.
In 1953 petitioner, having successfully passed the California bar examinations, applied for certification for bar membership. The Committee, after interrogating Konigsberg and receiving considerable evidence as to his qualifications, declined to certify him on the ground that he had failed to meet the burden of proving his eligibility under the two statutory requirements relating to good moral character and nonadvocacy of violent overthrow. That determination centered largely around Konigsberg’s repeated refusals to answer Committee questions as to his present or past membership in the Communist Party. The California Supreme Court denied review without opinion. See 52 Cal. 2d 769, 770, 344 P. 2d 777, 778.
On certiorari this Court, after reviewing the record, held the state determination to have been without rational support in the evidence and therefore offensive to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Konigsberg v. State Bar, supra. At the same time the Court declined to decide whether Konigsberg’s refusals to answer could constitutionally afford “an independent ground for exclusion from the Bar,” considering that such an issue was not before it. Id., 259-262. The case was remanded to the State Supreme Court “for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.” Id., 274.
On remand petitioner moved the California Supreme Court for immediate admission to the bar. The court vacated its previous order denying review and referred the matter to the Bar Committee for further consideration. At the ensuing Committee hearings Konigsberg introduced further evidence as to his good moral character (none of which was rebutted), reiterated unequivocally his disbelief in violent overthrow, and stated that he had never knowingly been a member of any organization which advocated such action. He persisted, however, in his refusals to answer any questions relating to his membership in the Communist Party. The Committee again declined to certify him, this time on the ground that his refusals to answer had obstructed a full investigation into his qualifications. The California Supreme Court, by a divided vote, refused review, and also denied Konigsberg’s motion for direct admission to practice. 52 Cal. 2d 769, 344 P. 2d 777. We again brought the case here. 362 U. S. 910.
Petitioner’s contentions in this Court in support of reversal of the California Supreme Court’s order are reducible to three propositions: (1) the State’s action was inconsistent with this Court’s decision in the earlier Konigsberg case; (2) assuming the Committee’s inquiries into Konigsberg’s possible Communist Party membership were permissible, it was unconstitutionally arbitrary for the State to deny him admission because of his refusals to answer; and (3) in any event, Konigsberg was constitutionally justified in refusing to answer these questions.
I.
Consideration of petitioner’s contentions as to the effect of this Court’s decision in the former Konigsberg case requires that there be kept clearly in mind what is entailed in California’s rule, comparable to that in many States, that an applicant for admission to the bar bears the burden of proof of “good moral character” — a requirement whose validity is not, nor could well be, drawn in question here.
Under such a rule an applicant must initially furnish enough evidence of good character to make a prima facie case. The examining Committee then has the opportunity to rebut that showing with evidence of bad character. Such evidence may result from the Committee’s own independent investigation, from an applicant’s responses to questions on his application form, or from Committee interrogation of the applicant himself. This interrogation may well be of decisive importance for, as all familiar with bar admission proceedings know, exclusion of unworthy candidates frequently depends upon the thoroughness of the Committee’s questioning, revealing as it may infirmities in an otherwise satisfactory showing on his part. This is especially so where a bar committee, as is not infrequently the case, has no means of conducting an independent investigation of its own into an applicant’s qualifications. If at the conclusion of the proceedings the evidence of good character and that of bad character are found in even balance, the State may refuse admission to the applicant, just as in an ordinary suit a plaintiff may fail in his case because he has not met his burden of proof.
In the first Konigsberg case this Court was concerned solely with the question whether the balance between the favorable and unfavorable evidence as to Konigsberg’s qualifications had been struck in accordance with the requirements of due process. It was there held, first, that Konigsberg had made out a prima facie case of good character and of nonadvocacy of violent overthrow, and, second, that the other evidence in the record could not, even with the aid of all reasonable inferences flowing therefrom, cast such doubts upon petitioner’s prima facie case as to justify any finding other than that these two California qualification requirements had been satisfied. In assessing the significance of Konigsberg’s refusal to answer questions as to Communist Party membership, the Court dealt only with the fact that this refusal could not provide any reasonable indication of a character not meeting these two standards for admission. The Court did not consider, but reserved for later decision, all questions as to the permissibility of the State treating Konigsberg’s refusal to answer as a ground for exclusion, not because it was evidence from which substantive conclusions might be drawn, but because the refusal had thwarted a full investigation into his qualifications. See 353 U. S., at 259-262. The State now asserts that ground for exclusion, an issue that is not foreclosed by anything in this Court’s earlier opinion which decided a quite different question.
It is equally clear that the State’s ordering of the rehearing which led to petitioner’s exclusion manifested no disrespect of the effect of the mandate in that case, which expressly left the matter open for further state proceedings “not inconsistent with” the Court’s opinion. There is no basis for any suggestion that the State in so proceeding has adopted unusual or discriminatory procedures to avoid the normal consequences of this Court’s earlier determination. In its earlier proceeding, the California Bar Committee may have found further investigation and questioning of petitioner unnecessary when, in its view, the applicant’s prima facie case of qualifications had been sufficiently rebutted by evidence already in the record. While in its former opinion this Court held that the State could not constitutionally so conclude, it did not undertake to preclude the state agency from asking any questions or from conducting any investigation that it might have thought necessary had it known that the basis of its then decision would be overturned. In recalling Konigsberg for further testimony, the Committee did only what this Court has consistently held that federal administrative tribunals may do on remand after a reviewing court has set aside agency orders as unsupported by requisite findings of fact. Federal Communications Comm’n v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134; Fly v. Heitmeyer, 309 U. S. 146.
In the absence of the slightest indication of any purpose on the part of the State to evade the Court’s prior decision, principles of finality protecting the parties to this state litigation are, within broad limits of fundamental fairness, solely the concern of California law. Such limits are broad even in a criminal case, see Bryan v. United States, 338 U. S. 552; Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U. S. 464; cf. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 328. In this instance they certainly have not been transgressed by the State’s merely taking further action in this essentially administrative type of proceeding.
II.
We think it clear that the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection against arbitrary state action does not forbid a State from denying admission to a bar applicant so long as he refuses to provide unprivileged answers to questions having a substantial relevance to his qualifications. An investigation of this character, like a civil suit, requires procedural as well as substantive rules. It is surely not doubtful that a State could validly adopt an administrative rule analogous to Rule 37 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that that refusal, after due warning, to answer relevant questions may result in “the matters regarding which the questions were asked” being considered for the purposes of the proceeding to be answered in a way unfavorable to the refusing party, or even that such refusal may result in “dismissing the action or proceeding” of the party asking affirmative relief.
The state procedural rule involved here is a less broad one, for all that California has in effect said is that in cases where, on matters material to an applicant’s qualifications, there are gaps in the evidence presented by him which the agency charged with certification considers should be filled in the appropriate exercise of its responsibilities, an applicant will not be admitted to practice unless and until he cooperates with the agency’s efforts to fill those gaps. The fact that this rule finds its source in the supervisory powers of the California Supreme Court over admissions to the bar, rather than in legislation, is not constitutionally significant. Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Browning, 310 U. S. 362. Nor in the absence of a showing of arbitrary or discriminatory application in a particular case, is it a matter of federal concern whether such a rule requires the rejection of all applicants refusing to answer material questions, or only in instances where the examining committee deems that a refusal has materially obstructed its investigation. Compare Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U. S. 399, with Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U. S. 1.
In the context of the entire record of these proceedings, the application of the California rule in this instance cannot be said to be arbitrary or discriminatory. In the first Konigsberg case this Court held that neither the somewhat weak but uncontradicted testimony, that petitioner had been a Communist Party member in 1941, nor his refusal to answer questions relating to Party membership, could rationally support any substantive adverse inferences as to petitioner’s character qualifications, 353 U. S., at 266-274. That was not to say, however, that these factors, singly or together, could not be regarded as leaving the investigatory record in sufficient uncertainty as constitutionally to permit application of the procedural rule which the State has now invoked, provided that Konigsberg had been first given due warning of the consequences of his continuing refusal to respond to the Committee’s questions. Cf. 353 U. S., at 261.
It is no answer to say that petitioner has made out a prima facie case of qualifications, for this is precisely the posture of a proceeding in which the Committee’s right to examine and cross-examine becomes significant. Assuming, as we do for the moment, that there is no privilege here to refuse to answer, petitioner could no more insist that his prima facie case makes improper further questioning of him than he could insist that such circumstance made improper the introduction of other forms of rebutting evidence.
We likewise regard as untenable petitioner’s contentions that the questions as to Communist Party membership were made irrelevant either by the fact that bare, innocent membership is not a ground of disqualification or by petitioner’s willingness to answer such ultimate questions as whether he himself believed in violent overthrow or knowingly belonged to an organization advocating violent overthrow. The Committee Chairman’s answer to the former contention was entirely correct:
“If you answered the question, for example, that you had been a member of the Communist Party during some period since 1951 or that you were presently a member of the Communist Party, the Committee would then be in a position to ask you what acts you engaged in to carry out the functions and purposes of that party, what the aims and purposes of the party were, to your knowledge, and questions of that type. You see by failing to answer the initial question there certainly is no basis and no opportunity for us to investigate with respect to the other matters to which the initial question might very well be considered preliminary.”
And the explanation given to petitioner’s counsel by another Committee member as to why Konigsberg’s testimony about ultimate facts was not dispositive was also sound:
“Mr. Mosk, you realize that if Mr. Konigsberg had answered the question that he refused to answer, an entirely new area of investigation might be opened up, and this Committee might be able to ascertain from Mr. Konigsberg that perhaps he is now and for many years past has been an active member of the Communist Party, and from finding out who his associates were in that enterprise we might discover that he does advocate the overthrow of this government by force and violence. I am not saying that he would do that, but it is a possibility, and we don’t have to take any witness’ testimony as precluding us from trying to discover if he is telling the truth. That is the point.”
Petitioner’s further miscellaneous contentions that the State’s exclusion of him was capricious are all also insubstantial.
There remains the question as to whether Konigsberg was adequately warned of the consequences of his refusal to answer. At the outset of the renewed hearings the Chairman of the Committee stated:
“As a result of our two-fold purpose [to investigate and reach determinations], particularly our function of investigation, we believe it will be necessary for you, Mr. Konigsberg, to answer our material questions or our investigation will be obstructed. We would not then as a result be able to certify you for admission.”
After petitioner had refused to answer questions on Communist Party membership, the Chairman asked:
“Mr. Konigsberg, I think you will recall that I initially advised you a failure to answer our material questions would obstruct our investigation and result in our failure to certify you. With this in mind do you wish to answer any of the questions which you heretofore up to now have refused to answer?”
At the conclusion of the proceeding another Committee member stated:
“I would like to make this statement so that there will be no misunderstanding on the part of any court that may review this record in the future, that I feel that as a member of the Committee that the failure of Mr. Konigsberg to answer the question as to whether or not he is now a member of the Communist Party is an obstruction of the function of this Committee, not a frustration if that word has been used. I think it would be an obstruction. There are phases of his moral character that we haven’t been able to investigate simply because we have been stopped at this point, and I for one could not certify to the Supreme Court that he was a proper person to be admitted to practice law in this State until he answers the question about his Communist affiliation.”
The record thus leaves no room for doubt on the score of “warning,” and petitioner does not indeed contend to the contrary.
III.
Finally, petitioner argues that, in any event, he was privileged not to respond to questions dealing with Communist Party membership because they unconstitutionally impinged upon rights of free speech and association protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
At the outset we reject the view that freedom of speech and association (N. A. A. C. P. v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449, 460), as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, are “absolutes,” not only in the undoubted sense that where the constitutional protection exists it must prevail, but also in the sense that the scope of that protection must be gathered solely from a literal reading of the First Amendment. Throughout its history this Court has consistently recognized at least two ways in which constitutionally protected freedom of speech is narrower than an unlimited license to talk. On the one hand, certain forms of speech, or speech in certain contexts, has been considered outside the scope of constitutional protection. See, e. g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568; Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494; Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U. S. 250; Yates v. United States, 354 U. S. 298; Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476. On the other hand, general regulatory statutes, not intended to control the content of speech but incidentally limiting its unfettered exercise, have not been regarded as the type of law the First or Fourteenth Amendment forbade Congress or the States to pass, when they have been found justified by subordinating valid governmental interests, a prerequisite to constitutionality which has necessarily involved a weighing of the governmental interest involved. See, e. g., Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 161; Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158; Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77; American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382; Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U. S. 622. It is in the latter class of cases that this Court has always placed rules compelling disclosure of prior association as an incident of the informed exercise of a valid governmental function. Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516, 524. Whenever, in such a context, these constitutional protections are asserted against the exercise of valid governmental powers a reconciliation must be effected, and that perforce requires an appropriate weighing of the respective interests involved. Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178, 198; N. A. A. C. P. v. Alabama, supra; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U. S. 109, 126-127; Bates v. Little Rock, supra; Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U. S. 399; Braden v. United States, 365 U. S. 431. With more particular reference to the present context of a state decision as to character qualifications, it is difficult, indeed, to imagine a view of the constitutional protections of speech and association which would automatically and without consideration of the extent of the deterrence of speech and association and of the importance of the state function, exclude all reference to prior speech or association on such issues as character, purpose, credibility, or intent. On the basis of these considerations we now judge petitioner’s contentions in the present case.
Petitioner does not challenge the constitutionality of § 6064.1 of the California Business and Professions Code forbidding certification for admission to practice of those advocating the violent overthrow of government. It would indeed be difficult to argue that a belief, firm enough to be carried over into advocacy, in the use of illegal means to change the form of the State or Federal Government is an unimportant consideration in determining the fitness of applicants for membership in a profession in whose hands so largely lies the safekeeping of this country’s legal and political institutions. Cf. Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U. S. 716. Nor is the state interest in this respect insubstantially related to the right which California claims to inquire about Communist Party membership. This Court has long since recognized the legitimacy of a statutory finding that membership in the Communist Party is not unrelated to the danger of use for such illegal ends of powers given for limited purposes. See American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382; see also Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U. S. 109, 128-129; cf. Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U. S. 399; Braden v. United States, 365 U. S. 431.
As regards the questioning of public employees relative to Communist Party membership it has already been held that the interest in not subjecting speech and ássociation to the deterrence of subsequent disclosure is outweighed by the State’s interest in ascertaining the fitness of the employee for the post he holds, and hence that such questioning does not infringe constitutional protections. Beilan v. Board of Public Education, 357 U. S. 399; Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U. S. 716. With respect to this same question of Communist Party membership, we regard the State’s interest in having lawyers who are devoted to the law in its broadest sense, including not only its substantive provisions, but also its procedures for orderly change, as clearly sufficient to outweigh the minimal effect upon free association occasioned by compulsory disclosure in the circumstances here presented.
There is here no likelihood that deterrence of association may result from foreseeable private action, see N. A. A. C. P. v. Alabama, supra, at 462, for bar committee interrogations such as this are conducted in private. See Rule 58, Section X, Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Supreme Court of Illinois; cf. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code, Rules of Procedure of the State Bar of California, Rule 8; Anonymous v. Baker, 360 U. S. 287, 291-292. Nor is there the possibility that the State may be afforded the opportunity for imposing undetectable arbitrary consequences upon protected association, see Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 486, for a bar applicant’s exclusion by reason of Communist Party membership is subject to judicial review, including ultimate review by this Court, should it appear that such exclusion has rested on substantive or procedural factors that do not comport with the Federal Constitution. See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U. S. 252; Schware v. Board of Examiners of New Mexico, 353 U. S. 232; cf. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183. In these circumstances it is difficult indeed to perceive any solid basis for a claim of unconstitutional intrusion into rights assured by the Fourteenth Amendment.
If this were all there was to petitioner’s claim of a privilege to refuse to answer, we would regard the Beilan case as controlling. There is, however, a further aspect of the matter. In Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, we held unconstitutional a state procedural rule that in order to obtain an exemption a taxpayer must bear the burden of proof, including both the burdens of establishing a prima facie case and of ultimate persuasion, that he did not advocate the violent overthrow of government. We said (p. 526):
“The vice of the present procedure is that, where particular speech falls close to the line separating the lawful and the unlawful, the possibility of mistaken factfinding — -inherent in all litigation — will create the danger that the legitimate utterance will be penalized. The man who knows that he must bring forth proof and persuade another of the lawfulness of his conduct necessarily must steer far wider of the unlawful zone than if the State must bear these burdens. This is especially to be feared when the complexity of the proofs and the generality of the standards applied, cf. Dennis v. United States, supra, provide but shifting sands on which the litigant must maintain his position. How can a claimant whose declaration is rejected possibly sustain the burden of proving the negative of these complex factual elements? In practical operation, therefore, this procedural device must necessarily ■ produce a result which the State could not command directly. It can only result in a deterrence of speech which the Constitution makes free.”
It would be a sufficient answer to any suggestion of the applicability of that holding to the present proceeding to observe that Speiser was explicitly limited so as not to reach cases where, as here, there is no showing of an intent to penalize political beliefs. Distinguishing Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U. S. 716; Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U. S. 56, and American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, the Court said (p. 527):
“In these cases... there was no attempt directly to control speech but rather to protect, from an evil shown to be grave, some interest clearly within the sphere of governmental concern.... Each case concerned a limited class of persons in or aspiring to public positions by virtue of which they could, if evilly motivated, create serious danger to the public safety. The principal aim of those statutes was not to penalize political beliefs but to deny positions to persons supposed to be dangerous because the position might be misused to the detriment of the public.”
But there are also additional factors making the rationale of Speiser inapplicable to the case before us. There is no unequivocal indication that California in this proceeding has placed upon petitioner the burden of proof of nonadvocacy of violent overthrow, as distinguished from its other requirement of “good moral character.” All it has presently required is an applicant’s cooperation with the Committee’s search for evidence of forbidden advocacy. Petitioner has been denied admission to the California bar for obstructing the Committee in the performance of its necessary functions of examination and cross-examination, a ruling which indeed presupposes that the burden of producing substantial evidence on the issue of advocacy was not upon petitioner but upon the Committee. Requiring a defendant in a civil proceeding to testify or to submit to discovery has never been thought to shift the burden of proof to him. Moreover, when this Court has allowed a State to comment upon a criminal defendant’s failure to testify it has been careful to note that this does not result in placing upon him the burden of proving his innocence. Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 58.
In contrast to our knowledge with respect to the burden of establishing a prima facie case, we do not now know where, under California law, would rest the ultimate burden of persuasion on the issue of advocacy of violent overthrow. But it is for the Supreme Court of California first to decide this question. Only if and when that burden is placed by the State upon a bar applicant can there be drawn in question the distinction made in the Speiser case between penalizing statutes and those merely denying access to positions where unfitness may lead to the abuse of state-given powers or privileges. The issue is not now before us.
Thus as matters now stand, there is nothing involved here which is contrary to the reasoning of Speiser, for despite compelled testimony the prospective bar applicant need not “steer far wider of the unlawful zone” (357 U. S., at 526) for fear of mistaken judgment or fact finding declaring unlawful speech which is in fact protected by the Constitution. This is so as to the ultimate burden of persuasion for, notwithstanding his duty to testify, the loss resulting from a failure of proof may, for all we now know, still fall upon the State. It is likewise so as to the initial burden of production, for there is no indication in the proceeding on rehearing of petitioner’s application that the Bar Committee expected petitioner to “sustain the burden of proving the negative” (357 U. S., at 526) of those complex factual elements which amount to forbidden advocacy of violent overthrow. To the contrary it is clear that the Committee had assumed the burden of proving the affirmative of those elements, but was prevented from attempting to discharge that burden by petitioner’s refusal to answer relevant questions.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of California is
Affirmed.
Konigsberg rested his refusals, not on any claim of privilege against self-incrimination, but on the ground that such inquiries were beyond the purview of the Committee’s authority, and infringed rights of free thought, association, and expression assured him under the State and Federal Constitutions. He affirmatively asserted, however, his disbelief in violent overthrow of government.
The Committee made the following findings relevant to the issues now before us:
“(1) That the questions put to the applicant by the Committee concerning past or present membership in or affiliation with the Communist Party are material to a proper and complete investigation of his qualifications for admission to practice law in the State of California.
“(2) That the refusal of applicant to answer sai4 questions has obstructed a proper and complete investigation of applicant’s qualifications for admission to practice law in the State of California.”
The essence of the state court’s decision 'appears in the following extracts from its opinion:
"... The committee action now before us contains no findings or conclusion that petitioner had failed to establish either his good moral character or his abstention from advocacy of overthrow of the government.
“Here it is the refusal to answer material questions which is the basis for denial of certification....
“... [T]o admit applicants who refuse to answer the committee’s questions upon these subjects would nullify the concededly valid legislative direction to the committee. Such a rule would effectively stifle committee inquiry upon issues legislatively declared to be relevant to that issue.” Id., at 772, 774, 344 P. 2d, at 779, 780.
Justice Traynor dissented on the ground that the California Supreme Court, not being required by statute to exclude bar applicants on the sole ground of their refusal to answer questions concerning possible advocacy of the overthrow of government, should not adopt such an exclusionary rule, at least where the Committee of Bar Examiners has not come forward with some evidence of advocacy. He declined to reach constitutional issues. Justice Peters dissented on federal constitutional grounds and in the belief that this Court’s decision in the first Konigsberg case required immediate admission of the applicant. Chief Justice Gibson did not participate in the decision.
All of the 50 States, as well as Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia, prescribe qualifications of moral character as preconditions for admission to the practice of law. See West Publishing Co., Rules for Admission'to the Bar (35th ed. 1957); Survey of the Legal Profession, Bar Examinations and Requirements for Admission to the Bar (1952); Jackson, Character Requirements for Admission to the Bar, 20 Fordham L. Rev. 305 (1951); Annot., 64 A. L. R. 2d 301 (1959).
The burden of demonstrating good moral character is regularly placed upon the bar applicant. Ex parte Montgomery, 249 Ala. 378, 31 So. 2d 85; In re Stephenson, 243 Ala. 342, 10 So. 2d 1; Application of Courtney, 83 Ariz. 231, 319 P. 2d 991; Ark. Stat. Ann., 1947, §§ 25-101, 25-103; Spears v. State Bar, 211 Cal. 183, 294 P. 697; O’Brien’s Petition, 79 Conn. 46, 63 A. 777; In re Durant, 80 Conn. 140, 147, 67 A. 497; Del. Sup. Ct. Rule 31 (1)(A)(a), (2)(A)(a); Coleman v. Watts, 81 So. 2d 650 (Fla.) (burden of proof on applicant; prima facie showing shifts burden of going forward to Examiners); Gordon v. Clinkscales, 215 Ga. 843, 114 S. E. 2d 15; In re Latimer, 11 Ill. 2d 327, 143 N. E. 2d 20 (semble); Rosencranz v. Tidrington, 193 Ind. 472, 141 N. E. 58; In re Meredith, 272 S. W. 2d 456 (Ky.); In re Meyerson, 190 Md. 671, 59 A. 2d 489 (semble); Matter of Keenan, 313 Mass. 186, 47 N. E. 2d 12; Application of Smith, 220 Minn. 197, 19 N. W. 2d 324 (semble); On Application for Attorney’s License, 21 N. J. L. 345; Application of Cassidy, 268 App. Div. 282, 51 N. Y. S. 2d 202, aff’d, 296 N. Y. 926, 73 N. E. 2d 41; Application of Farmer, 191 N. C. 235, 131 S. E. 661; In re Weinstein, 150 Ore. 1, 42 P. 2d 744; State ex rel. Board v. Poyntz, 152 Ore. 592, 52 P. 2d 1141 (burden of proof on applicant; prima facie showing shifts burden of going forward to Examiners); In the Matter of Eary, 134 W. Va. 204, 58 S. E. 2d 647 (semble).
For reasons given later (pp. 55-56, infra), we need not decide whether California’s burden-of-proof rule could constitutionally be applied, as it was by the Committee after the first Konigsberg proceedings, to the requirement of nonadvocacy of violent overthrow.
The Court assumed, but did not discuss, the constitutionality of California’s burden-of-proof rule as applied to the nonadvocacyof-forcible-overthrow requirement of the California statute.
Moreover, even if there could be debate as to whether this Court’s prior decision prevented new hearings on matters that had already transpired at the time of the first state hearings, there can be no doubt that such decision did not prevent California from investigating petitioner’s actions during the period subsequent to the first hearing. Therefore we would in any case be presented with the question of the constitutionality of the State’s refusing to admit petitioner to the practice of law because of his declining to answer whether he has been a member of the Communist Party since the termination of the first set of hearings.
The transcript of the original hearings before the Committee has been made part of the record before us in the present case. ■
There is no basis for any intimation that the California Supreme Court fashioned a special procedural rule for the purposes of this particular case. The California Bar Committee has in the past declined to certify applicants who refused to answer pertinent questions. See Farley (Secretary, Committee of Bar Examiners), Character Investigation of Applicants for Admission, 29 Cal. State Bar Journal, 454, 457, 466 (1954). No more does the State’s action bear any of the hallmarks of a bill of attainder or of an ex post facto regulation, see Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277; cf. United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303, especially in light of the fact that petitioner was explicitly warned in advance of the consequences of his refusal to answer. Likewise, there is no room for attributing to the Committee a surreptitious purpose to exclude Konigsberg by the device of putting to him questions which it was known in advance he would not answer, and then justifying exclusion on the premise of his refusal to respond. So far as this record shows Konigsberg was excluded only because his
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | C | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Thomas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case involves an employer’s claims against a local union and the union’s international parent for economic damages arising out of a 2004 strike. The claims turn in part on whether a collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) containing a no-strike provision was validly formed during the strike period. The employer contends that it was, while the unions contend that it was not. Because the CBA contains an arbitration clause, we first address whether the parties’ dispute over the CBA’s ratification date was a matter for the District Court or an arbitrator to resolve. We conclude that it was a matter for judicial resolution. Next, we address whether the Court of Appeals erred in declining the employer’s request to recognize a new federal cause of action under § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA), 61 Stat. 156, 29 U. S. C. § 185(a), for the international union’s alleged tortious interference with the CBA. The Court of Appeals did not err in declining this request.
I
Petitioner Granite Rock Company is a concrete and building materials company that has operated in California since 1900. Granite Rock employs approximately 800 employees under different labor contracts with several unions, including respondent International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 287' (Local). Granite Rock and Local were parties to a 1999 CBA that expired in April 2004. The parties’ attempt to negotiate a new CBA hit. an impasse and, on June 9, 2004, Local members initiated a strike in support of their contract demands.
The strike continued until July 2, 2004, when the parties reached agreement on the terms of a new CBA. The CBA contained a no-strike clause but did not directly address union members’ liability for any strike-related damages Granite Rock may have incurred before the new CBA was negotiated but after the prior CBA had expired. At the end of the negotiating session on the new CBA, Local’s business representative, George Netto, approached Granite Rock about executing a separate “back-to-work” agreement that would, among other things, hold union members harmless for damages incurred during the June 2004 strike. Netto did not make execution of such an agreement a condition of Local’s ratification of the CBA, or of Local’s decision to cease picketing. Thus, Local did not have a back-to-work or hold-harmless agreement in place when it voted to ratify the CBA on July 2, 2004.
Respondent IBT, which had advised Local throughout the CBA negotiations and whose leadership and.members supported the June strike, opposed Local’s decision to return to work without a back-to-work agreement shielding both Local and IBT members from liability for strike-related damages. In an effort to secure such an agreement, IBT instructed Local’s members not to honor their agreement to return to work on July 5, and instructed Local’s leaders to continue the work stoppage until Granite Rock agreed to hold Local and IBT members free from liability for the June strike. Netto demanded such an agreement on July 6, but Granite Rock refused the request and informed Local that the company would view any continued strike activity as a violation of the new CBA’s no-strike clause. IBT and Local responded by announcing a companywide strike that involved numerous facilities and hundreds of workers, including members of IBT locals besides Local 287.
According to Granite Rock, IBT not only instigated this strike; it supported and directed it. IBT provided pay and benefits to union members who refused to return to work, directed Local’s negotiations with Granite Rock, supported Local financially during the strike period with a $1.2 million loan, and represented to Granite Rock that IBT had unilateral authority to end the work stoppage in exchange for a hold-harmless agreement covering IBT members within and outside Local’s bargaining unit.
On July 9, 2004, Granite Rock sued IBT and Local in the District Court, seeking an injunction against the ongoing strike and strike-related damages. Granite Rock’s complaint, originally and as amended, invoked federal jurisdiction under LMRA § 301(a), alleged that the July 6 strike violated Local’s obligations under the CBA’s no-strike provision, and asked the District Court to enjoin the strike because the hold-harmless dispute giving rise to the strike was an arbitrable grievance. See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 398 U. S. 235, 237-238, 253-254 (1970) (holding that federal courts may enjoin a strike where a CBA contemplates arbitration of the dispute that occasions the strike). The unions conceded that LMRA § 301(a) gave the District Court jurisdiction over the suit but opposed Granite Rock’s complaint, asserting that the CBA was not validly ratified on July 2 (or at any other time relevant to the July 2004 strike) and, thus, its no-strike clause did not provide a basis for Granite Rock’s claims challenging the strike.
The District Court initially denied Granite Rock’s request to enforce the CBA’s no-strike provision because Granite Rock was unable to produce evidence that the CBA was ratified on July 2. App. 203-213. Shortly after the District Court ruled, however, a Local member testified that Netto had put the new CBA to a ratification vote on July 2, and that the voting Local members unanimously approved the agreement. Based on this statement and supporting testimony from 12 other employees, Granite Rock moved for a new trial on its injunction and damages claims.
On August 22, while that motion was pending, Local conducted a second successful “ratification” vote on the CBA, and on September 13, the day the District Court was scheduled to hear Granite Rock’s motion, the unions called off their strike. Although their return to work mooted Granite Rock’s request for an injunction, the District Court proceeded with the hearing and granted Granite Rock a new trial on its damages claims. The parties proceeded with discovery, and Granite Rock amended its complaint, which already alleged federal claims for breach of the CBA against both Local and IBT, to add federal inducement of breach and interference with contract (hereinafter tortious interference) claims against IBT.
IBT and Local both moved to dismiss. Among other things, IBT argued that Granite Rock could not plead a federal tort claim under § 301(a) because that provision supports a federal cause of action only for breach of contract. The District Court agreed and dismissed Granite Rock’s tortious interference claims. The District Court did not, however, grant Local’s separate motion to send the parties’ dispute over the CBA’s ratification date to arbitration. The District Court held that whether the CBA was ratified on July 2 or August 22 was an issue for the court to decide, and submitted the question to a jury. The jury reached a unanimous verdict that Local ratified the CBA on July 2, 2004. The District Court entered the verdict and ordered the parties to proceed with arbitration on Granite Rock’s breach-of-contract claims for strike-related damages.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. See 546 F. 3d 1169 (2008). The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of Granite Rock’s tortious interference claims against IBT. See id., at 1170-1175. But it disagreed with the District Court’s determination that the date of the CBA’s ratification was a matter for judicial resolution. See id., at 1176-1178. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the parties’ dispute over this issue was governed by the CBA’s arbitration clause because the clause clearly covered the related strike claims,, the “national policy favoring arbitration” required that any ambiguity about the scope of the parties’ arbitration clause be resolved in favor of arbitrability, and, in any event, Granite Rock had “implicitly” consented to arbitrate the ratification-date dispute “by suing under the contract.” Id., at 1178 (internal quotation marks omitted). We granted certiorari. 557 U. S. 933 (2009).
II
It is well settled in both commercial and labor cases that whether parties have agreed to “submi[t] a particular dispute to arbitration” is typically an “ ‘issue for judicial determination.’” Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U. S. 79, 83 (2002) (quoting AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U. S. 643, 649 (1986)); see John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U. S. 543, 546-547 (1964). It is similarly well settled that where the dispute at issue concerns contract formation, the dispute is generally for courts to decide. See, e. g., First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U. S. 938, 944 (1995) (“When deciding whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a certain matter... courts generally... should apply ordinary... principles that govern the formation of contracts”); AT&T Technologies, supra, at 648-649 (explaining the settled rule in labor cases that “ ‘arbitration is a matter of contract’” and “arbitrators derive their authority to resolve disputes only because the parties have agreed in advance to submit such grievances to arbitration”); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U. S. 440, 444, n. 1 (2006) (distinguishing treatment of the generally nonarbitral question whether an arbitration agreement was “ever concluded” from the question whether a-contract containing an arbitration clause was illegal when formed, which question we held to be arbitrable in certain circumstances).
These principles would neatly dispose of this case if the formation dispute here were typical. But it is not. It is based on when (not whether) the CBA that contains the parties’ arbitration clause was ratified and thereby formed. And at the time the District Court considered Local’s demand to send this issue to an arbitrator, Granite Rock, the party resisting arbitration, conceded both the formation and the validity of the CBA’s arbitration clause.
These unusual facts require us to reemphasize the proper framework for deciding when disputes are arbitrable under our precedents. Under that framework, a court may order arbitration of a particular dispute only where the court is satisfied that the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute. See First Options, supra, at 943; AT&T Technologies, supra, at 648-649. To satisfy itself that such agreement exists, the court must resolve any issue that calls into question the formation or applicability of the specific arbitration clause that a party seeks to have the court enforce. See, e.g., Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, ante, at 68-70. Where there is no provision validly committing them to an arbitrator, see ante, at 71, these issues typically concern the scope of the arbitration clause and its enforceability. In addition, these issues always include whether the clause was agreed to, and may include when that agreement was formed.
A
The parties agree that it was proper for the District Court to decide whether their ratification dispute was arbitrable. They disagree about whether the District Court answered the question correctly. Local contends that the District Court erred in holding that the CBA’s ratification date was an issue for the court to decide. The Court of Appeals agreed, holding that the District Court’s refusal to send that dispute to arbitration violated two principles of arbitrability set forth in our precedents. See 546 F. 3d, at 1177-1178. The first principle is that where, as here, parties concede that they have agreed to arbitrate some matters pursuant to an arbitration clause, the “law’s permissive policies in respect to arbitration” counsel that “'any doubts concerning the scope of arbitral issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.’” First Options, supra, at 945 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U. S. 614, 626 (1985)); see 546 F. 3d, at 1177, n. 4, 1178 (citing this principle and the “national policy favoring arbitration” in concluding that arbitration clauses “are to be construed very broadly” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The second principle the Court of Appeals invoked is that this presumption of arbitrability applies even to disputes about the enforceability of the entire contract containing the arbitration clause, because at least in cases governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U. S. C. § 1 et seq., courts must treat the arbitration clause as severable from the contract in which it appears, and thus apply the clause to all disputes within its scope “‘[ujnless the [validity] challenge is to the arbitration clause itself’ ” or the party “disputes the formation of [the] contract,” 546 F. 3d, at 1176 (quoting Buckeye, 546 U. S., at 445-446); 546 F. 3d, at 1177, and n. 4 (explaining that it would treat the parties’ arbitration clause as enforceable with respect to the ratification-date dispute because no party argued that the “clause is invalid in any way”).
Local contends that our precedents, particularly those applying the “‘federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes,”’ permit no other result. Brief for Respondent Local, p. 15 (quoting Gateway Coal Co. v. Mine Workers, 414 U. S. 368, 377 (1974)); see Brief for Respondent Local, at 10-13, 16-25. Local, like the Court of Appeals, overreads our precedents. The language and holdings on which Local and the Court of Appeals rely cannot be divorced from the first principle that underscores all of our arbitration decisions: Arbitration is strictly “a matter of consent,” Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U. S. 468, 479 (1989), and thus “is a way to resolve those disputes — but only those disputes— that the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration,” First Options, 514 U. S., at 943 (emphasis added). Applying this principle, our precedents hold that courts should order arbitration of a dispute only where the court is satisfied that neither the formation of the parties’ arbitration agreement nor (absent a valid provision specifically committing such disputes to an arbitrator) its enforceability or applicability to the dispute is in issue. Ibid. Where a party contests either or both matters, “the court” must resolve the disagreement. Ibid.
Local nonetheless interprets some of our opinions to depart from this framework and to require arbitration of certain disputes, particularly- labor disputes, based on policy grounds even where evidence of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate the dispute in question is lacking. See Brief for Respondent Local, at 16 (citing cases emphasizing the policy favoring arbitration generally and the “impressive policy considerations favoring arbitration” in LMRA cases (internal quotation marks omitted)). That is not a fair reading of the opinions, all of which compelled arbitration of a dispute only after the Court was persuaded that the parties’ arbitration agreement was validly formed and that it covered the dispute in question and was legally enforceable. See, e. g., First Options, supra, at 944-945. That Buckeye and some of our cases applying a presumption of arbitrability to certain disputes do not discuss each of these requirements merely reflects the fact that in those cases some of the requirements were so obviously satisfied that no discussion was needed.
In Buckeye, the formation of the parties’ arbitration agreement was not at issue because the parties agreed that they had “concluded” an agreement to arbitrate and memorialized it as an arbitration clause in their loan contract. 546 U. S., at 444, n. 1. The arbitration clause’s scope was also not at issue, because the provision expressly applied to “‘[ajny claim, dispute, or controversy... arising from or relating to... the validity, enforceability, or scope of this Arbitration Provision or the entire Agreement.’ ” Id., at 442. The parties resisting arbitration (customers who agreed to the broad arbitration clause as a condition of using Buckeye’s loan service) claimed only that a usurious interest provision in the loan agreement invalidated the entire contract, including the arbitration clause, and thus precluded the Court from relying on the clause as evidence of the parties’ consent to arbitrate matters within its scope. See id., at 443. In rejecting this argument, we simply applied the requirement in §2 of the FAA that courts treat an arbitration clause as severable from the contract in which it appears and enforce it according to its terms unless the party resisting arbitration specifically challenges the enforceability of the arbitration clause itself, see id., at 443-445 (citing 9 U. S. C. § 2; Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U. S. 1, 4-5 (1984); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U. S. 395, 402-404 (1967)), or claims that the agreement to arbitrate was “[njever concluded,” 546 U. S., at 444, n. 1; see also Rent-A-Center, ante, at 70-71, and n. 2.
Our cases invoking the federal “policy favoring arbitration” of commercial and labor disputes apply the same framework. They recognize that, except where “the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise,” AT&T Technologies, 475 U. S., at 649, it is “the court’s duty to interpret the agreement and to determine whether the parties intended to arbitrate grievances concerning” a particular matter, id., at 651. They then discharge this duty by: (1) applying the presumption of arbitrability only where a validly formed and enforceable arbitration agreement is ambiguous about whether it covers the dispute at hand; and (2) adhering to the presumption and ordering arbitration only where the presumption is not rebutted. See id., at 651-652; Prima Paint Corp., supra, at 396-398; Gateway Coal, supra, at 374-377; Drake Bakeries Inc. v. Bakery Workers, 370 U. S. 254, 256-257 (1962); Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U. S. 238, 241-242 (1962); Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U. S. 574, 576 (1960).
Local is thus wrong to suggest that the presumption of arbitrability we sometimes apply takes courts outside our settled framework for deciding arbitrability. The presumption simply assists in resolving arbitrability disputes within that framework. Confining the presumption to this role reflects its foundation in “the federal policy favoring arbitration.” As we have explained, this “policy” is merely an acknowledgment of the FAA’s commitment to “overrule the judiciary’s longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate and to place such agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.” Volt, 489 U. S., at 478 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, we have never held that this policy overrides the principle that a court may submit to arbitration “only those disputes... that the parties have agreed to submit.” First Options, 514 U. S., at 948; see also Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U. S. 52, 57 (1995) (“[T]he FAA’s proarbitration policy does not operate without regard to the wishes of the contracting parties”); AT&T Technologies, 475 U. S., at 650-651 (applying the same rule to the “presumption of arbitrability for labor disputes”)- Nor have we held that courts may use policy considerations as a substitute for party agreement. See, e. g., id., at 648-651; Volt, supra, at 478. We have applied the presumption favoring arbitration, in FAA and in labor cases, only where it reflects, and derives its legitimacy from, a judicial conclusion that arbitration of a particular dispute is what the parties intended because their express agreement to arbitrate was validly formed and (absent a provision clearly and validly committing such issues to an arbitrator) is legally enforceable and best construed to encompass the dispute. See First Options, supra, at 944-945 (citing Mitsubishi, 473 U. S., at 626); Howsam, 537 U. S., at 83-84; AT&T Technologies, supra, at 650 (citing Warrior & Gulf, supra, at 582-583); Drake Bakeries, supra, at 259-260. This simple framework compels reversal of the Court of Appeals’ judgment because it requires judicial resolution of two questions central to Local’s arbitration demand: when the CBA was formed, and whether its arbitration clause covers the matters Local wishes to arbitrate.
B
We begin by addressing the grounds on which the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s decision to decide the parties’ ratification-date dispute, which the parties characterize as a formation dispute because a union vote ratifying the CBA’s terms was necessary to form the contract. See App. 351. For purposes of determining arbitrability, when a contract is formed can be as critical as whether it was formed. That is the case where, as here, the date on which an agreement was ratified determines the date the agreement was formed, and thus determines whether the agreement’s provisions were enforceable during the period relevant to the parties’ dispute.
This formation-date question requires judicial resolution here because it relates to Local’s arbitration demand in such a way that the District Court was required to decide the CBA’s ratification date in order to determine whether the parties consented to arbitrate the matters covered by the demand. The parties agree that the CBA’s arbitration clause pertains only to disputes that “arise under” the agreement. Accordingly, to hold the parties’ ratification-date dispute arbitrable, the Court of Appeals had to decide whether that dispute could be characterized as “arising under” the CBA. In answering this question in the affirmative, both Local and the Court of Appeals tied the arbitrability of the ratification-date issue — which Local raised as a defense to Granite Rock’s strike claims — to the arbitrability of the strike claims themselves. See id., at 347. They did so because the CBA’s arbitration clause, which pertains only to disputes “arising under” the CBA and thus presupposes the CBA’s existence, would seem plainly to cover a dispute that “arises under” a specific substantive provision of the CBA, but does not so obviously cover disputes about the CBA’s own formation. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals relied upon the ratification dispute’s relationship to Granite Rock’s claim that Local breached the CBA’s no-strike clause (a claim the Court of Appeals viewed as clearly “arising under” the CBA) to conclude that “the arbitration clause is certainly ‘susceptible of an interpretation’ that covers” Local’s formation-date defense. 546 F. 3d, at 1177, n. 4.
The Court of Appeals overlooked the fact that this theory of the ratification dispute’s arbitrability fails if the CBA was not formed at the time the unions engaged in the acts that gave rise to Granite Rock’s strike claims. The unions began their strike on July 6, 2004, and Granite Rock filed its suit on July 9. If, as Local asserts, the CBA containing the parties’ arbitration clause was not ratified, and thus not formed, until August 22, there was no CBA for the July no-strike dispute to “arise under,” and thus no valid basis for the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that Granite Rock’s July 9 claims arose under the CBA and were thus arbitrable along with, by extension, Local’s formation-date defense to those claims. See ibid. For the foregoing reasons, resolution of the parties’ dispute about whether the CBA was ratified in July or August was central to deciding Local’s arbitration demand. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it was not necessary for the District Court to determine the CBA’s ratification date in order to decide whether the parties agreed to arbitrate Granite Rock’s no-strike claim or the ratification-date dispute Local raised as a defense to that claim.
Local seeks to address this flaw in the Court of Appeals’ decision by arguing that in December 2004 the parties executed a document that rendered the CBA effective as of May 1, 2004 (the date, the prior CBA expired), and that this effective-date language rendered the CBA’s arbitration clause (but not its no-strike clause) applicable to the July strike period notwithstanding Local’s view that the agreement was ratified in August (which ratification date Local continues to argue controls the period during which the no-strike clause applies). See Brief for Respondent Local, at 26-27; Tr. of Oral Arg. 32, 37-39. The Court of Appeals did not rule on the merits of this claim (i. e., it did not decide whether the CBA’s effective-date language indeed renders some or all of the agreement’s provisions retroactively applicable to May 2004), and we need not do so either. Even accepting Local’s assertion that it raised this retroactivity argument in the District Court, see Brief for Respondent Local, at 26, Local did not raise this argument in the Court of Appeals. Nor, more importantly, did Local’s brief in opposition to Granite Rock’s petition for certiorari raise the argument as an alternative ground on which this Court could or should affirm the Court of Appeals’ judgment finding the ratification-date dispute arbitrable for the reasons discussed above. Accordingly, the argument is properly “deemed waived.” This Court’s Rule 15.2; Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U. S. 379, 396 (2009).
c
Although the foregoing is sufficient to reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment, there is an additional reason to do so: The dispute here, whether labeled a formation dispute or not, falls outside the scope of the parties’ arbitration clause on grounds the presumption favoring arbitration cannot cure. Section 20 of the CBA provides in relevant part that “[a]ll disputes arising under this agreement shall be resolved in accordance with the [Grievance] procedure,” which includes arbitration. App. 434 (emphasis added); see also id., at 434-437. The parties’ ratification-date dispute cannot properly be characterized as falling within the (relatively narrow, cf., e. g., Drake Bakeries Inc., 370 U. S., at 256-257) scope of this provision for at least two reasons. First, we do not think the question whether the CBA was validly ratified on July 2, 2004 — a question that concerns the CBA’s very existence— can fairly be said to “arise under” the CBA. Second, even if the “arising under” language could in isolation be construed to cover this dispute, § 20’s remaining provisions all but foreclose such a reading by describing that section’s arbitration requirement as applicable to labor disagreements that are addressed in the CBA and are subject to its requirement of mandatory mediation. See App. 434-437 (requiring arbitration of disputes “arising under” the CBA, but only after the union and employer have exhausted mandatory mediation, and limiting any arbitration decision under this provision to those “within the scope and terms of this agreement and... specifically limited to the matter submitted”).
The Court of Appeals’ contrary conclusion does not find support in the text of § 20. The Court of Appeals’ only effort to grapple with that text misses the point because it focuses on whether Granite Rock’s claim to enforce the CBA’s no-strike provisions could be characterized as “arising under” the agreement. See 546 F. 3d, at 1177, n. 4. Even assuming that claim can be characterized as “arising under” the CBA, it is not the issue here. The issue is whether the formation-date defense that Local raised in response to Granite Rock’s no-strike suit can be characterized as “arising under” the CBA. It cannot for the reasons we have explained, namely, the CBA provision requiring arbitration of disputes “arising under” the CBA is not fairly read to include a dispute about when the CBA came into existence. The Court of Appeals erred in failing to address this question and holding instead that the arbitration clause is “susceptible of an interpretation” that covers Local’s formation-date defense to Granite Rock’s suit “[b]ecause Granite Rock is suing ‘under’ the alleged new CBA” and “[a]rbitration clauses are to be construed very broadly.” Ibid.; see also id., at 1178.
D
Local’s remaining argument in support of the Court of Appeals’ judgment is similarly unavailing. Local reiterates the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that Granite Rock “implicitly” consented to arbitration when it sued to enforce the CBA’s no-strike and arbitrable grievance provisions. See Brief for Respondent Local, at 17-18. We do not agree that by seeking an injunction against the strike so the parties could arbitrate the labor grievance that gave rise to it, Granite Rock also consented to arbitrate the ratification- (formation-) date dispute we address above. See 564 F. 3d, at 1178. It is of course true that when Granite Rock sought that injunction it viewed the CBA (and all of its provisions) as enforceable. But Granite Rock’s decision to sue for compliance with the CBA’s grievance procedures on strike-related matters does not establish an agreement, “implicit” or otherwise, to arbitrate an issue (the CBA’s formation date) that Granite Rock did not raise, and that Granite Rock has always (and rightly, see Part II-C, supra) characterized as beyond the scope of the CBA’s arbitration clause. The mere fact that Local raised the formation-date dispute as a defense to Granite Rock’s suit does not make that dispute attributable to Granite Rock in the waiver or estoppel sense the Court of Appeals suggested, see 546 P. 3d, at 1178, much less establish that Granite Rock agreed to arbitrate it by suing to enforce the CBA as to other matters. Accordingly, we hold that the parties’ dispute over the CBA’s formation date was for the District Court, not an arbitrator, to resolve, and remand for proceedings consistent with that conclusion.
Ill
We turn now to the claims available on remand. The parties agree that Granite Rock can bring a breach-of-contract claim under LMRA § 301(a) against Local as a CBA signatory, and against IBT as Local’s agent or alter ego. See Brief for Respondent IBT 10-13; Reply Brief for Petitioner 12-13, and n. II. The question is whether Granite Rock may also bring a federal tort claim under § 301(a) for IBT’s alleged interference with the CBA. Brief for Petitioner 32. The Court of Appeals joined virtually all other Circuits in holding that it would not recognize such a claim under § 301(a).
Granite Rock asks us to reject this position as inconsistent with federal labor law’s goal of promoting industrial peace and economic stability through judicial enforcement of CBAs, as well as with our precedents holding that a federal common law of labor contracts is necessary to further this goal. See id., at 31; see also, e. g., Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U. S. 448, 451 (1957). Explaining that IBT’s conduct in this case undermines the very core of the bargaining relationship federal labor laws exist to protect, Granite Rock argues that a federal common-law tort remedy for IBT’s conduct is necessary because other potential avenues for deterring and redressing such conduct are either unavailable or insufficient. See Brief for Petitioner 32-33; Reply Brief for Petitioner 19-20. On the unavailable side of the ledger Granite Rock lists state-law tort claims, some of which this Court has held § 301(a) pre-empts, as well as administrative (unfair labor practices) claims, which Granite Rock says the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) cannot entertain against international unions that (like IBT) are not part of the certified local bargaining unit they allegedly control. On the insufficient side of the ledger Granite Rock lists federal common-law breach-of-contract claims, which Granite Rock says are difficult to prove against non-CBA signatories like IBT because international unions structure their relationships with local unions in a way that makes agency or alter ego difficult to establish. Based on these assessments, Granite Rock suggests that this case presents us with the choice of either recognizing the federal common-law tort claim Granite Rock seeks or sanctioning conduct inconsistent with federal labor statutes and our own precedents. See Brief for Petitioner 13-14.
We do not believe the choice is as stark as Granite Rock implies. It is of course true that we have construed “[election 301 [to] authoriz[e] federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements.” Lewis v. Benedict Goal Corp., 361 U. S. 459, 470 (1960) (citing Lincoln Mills, supra). But we have also emphasized that in developing this common law we “did not envision any freewheeling inquiry into what the federal courts might find to be the most desirable rule.” Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel Employees, 417 U. S. 249, 255 (1974). The balance federal statutes strike between employer and union relations in the collective-bargaining arena is carefully calibrated, see, e. g., NLRB v. Drivers, 362 U. S. 274, 289-290 (1960), and as the parties’ briefs illustrate, creating a federal common-law tort cause of action would require a host of policy choices that could easily upset this balance, see Brief for Respondent IBT 42-44; Reply Brief for Petitioner 22-25. It is thus no surprise that virtually all Courts of Appeals have held that federal courts’ authority to “create a federal common law of collective bargaining agreements under section 301” should be confined to “a common law of contracts, not a source of independent rights, let alone tort rights; for section 301 is... a grant of jurisdiction only to enforce contracts.” Brazinski v. Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 6 F. 3d 1176, 1180 (CA7 1993). We see no reason for a different result here because it would be premature to recognize the federal common-law tort Granite Rock requests in this case even assuming that § 301(a) authorizes us to do so.
In reaching this conclusion, we emphasize that the question before us is a narrow one. It is not whether the conduct Granite Rock challenges is remediable, but whether we should augment the claims already available to Granite Rock by creating a new federal common-law cause of action under' § 301(a). That we decline to do so does not mean that we approve of IBT’s alleged actions. Granite Rock describes a course of conduct that does indeed seem to strike at the heart of the collective-bargaining process federal labor laws were designed to protect. As the record in this case demonstrates, however, a new federal tort claim is not the only possible remedy for this conduct. Granite Rock’s allegations have prompted favorable judgments not only from a federal jury, but also from the NLRB. In proceedings that predated those in which the District Court entered judgment for Granite Rock on the CBA’s formation date, the NLRB concluded that a “
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | G | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a suit by the United States to enjoin respondent companies from depositing industrial solids in the Calumet River (which flows out of Lake Michigan and connects eventually with the Mississippi) without first obtaining a permit from the Chief of Engineers of the Army providing conditions for the removal of the deposits and to order and direct them to restore the depth of the channel to 21 feet by removing portions of existing deposits.
The District Court found that the Calumet was used by vessels requiring a 21-foot draft, and that that depth has been maintained by the Corps of Engineers. Respondents, who operate mills on the banks of the river for the production of iron and related products, use large quantities of the water from the river, returning it through numerous sewers. The processes they use create industrial waste containing various solids. A substantial quantity of these solids is recovered in settling basins but, according to the findings, many fine particles are discharged into the river and they flocculate into larger units and are deposited in the river, bottom. Soundings show a progressive decrease in the depth of the river in the vicinity of respondents’ mills. But respondents have refused, since 1951, the demand of the Corps of Engineers that they dredge that portion of the river. The shoaling conditions being created in the vicinity of these plants were found by the District Court to be created by the waste discharged from the mills of respondents. This shoaling was found to have reduced the depth of the channel to 17 feet in some places and to 12 feet in others. The District Court made findings which credited respondents with 81.5% of the waste deposited in the channel, and it allocated that in various proportions among the three respondents. See 155 F. Supp. 442.
The Court of Appeals did not review the sufficiency of evidence. It dealt only with questions of law and directed that the complaint be dismissed. 264 F. 2d 289. The case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari which we granted because of the public importance of the questions tendered. 359 U. S. 1010.
Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 30 Stat. 1121, 1151, as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 403, provides in part:
“That the creation of any obstruction not affirmatively authorized by Congress, to the navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United States is hereby prohibited; . . .” (Italics added.)
The section goes on to outlaw various structures “in” any navigable waters except those initiated by plans recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the Army. Section 10 then states that “it shall not be lawful to excavate or fill, or in any manner to alter or modify the . . . capacity of . . . the channel of any navigable water of the United States, unless the work has been recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the Army prior to beginning the same.”
A criminal penalty is added by § 12; and § 12 further provides that the United States may sue to have “any structures or parts of structures erected” in violation of the Act removed. Section 17 directs the Department of Justice to “conduct the legal proceedings necessary to enforce” the provisions of the Act, including § 10.
Section 13 forbids the discharge of “any refuse matter of any kind or description whatever other than that flow.-ing from streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state, into any navigable water of the United States”; but § 13 grants authority to the Secretary of the Army to permit such deposits under conditions prescribed by him.
Our conclusions are that the industrial deposits placed by respondents in the Calumet have, on the findings of the District Court, created an “obstruction” within the meaning of § 10 of the Act and are discharges not exempt under § 13. We also conclude that the District Court was authorized to grant the relief.
The history of federal control over obstructions to the navigable capacity of our rivers and harbors goes back to Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U. S. 1, 8, where the Court held “there is no common law of the United States” which prohibits “obstructions” in our navigable rivers. Congress acted promptly, forbidding by § 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1890, 26 Stat. 426, 454, “the creation of any obstruction, not affirmatively authorized by law, to the navigable capacity” of any waters of the United States. The 1899 Act followed a report to Congress by the Secretary of War, which at the direction of Congress, 29 Stat. 234, contained a compilation and revision of existing laws relating to navigable waters. The 1899 Act was said to contain “no essential changes in the existing law.” Certainly so far as outlawry of any “obstructions” in navigable rivers is concerned there was no change relevant to our present problem.
It is argued that “obstruction” means some kind of structure. The design of § 10 should be enough to refute that argument, since the ban of “any obstruction,” unless approved by Congress, appears in the first part of § 10, followed by a semicolon and another provision which bans various kinds of structures unless authorized by the Secretary of the Army.
The reach of § 10 seems plain. Certain types of structures, enumerated in the second clause, may not be erected “in” any navigable river without approval by the Secretary of the Army. Nor may excavations or fills, described in the third clause, that alter or modify “the course, location, condition, or capacity of” a navigable river be made unless “the work” has been approved by the Secretary of the Army. There is, apart from these particularized invasions of navigable rivers, which the Secretary of the Army may approve, the generalized first clause which prohibits “the creation of any obstruction not affirmatively authorized by Congress, to the navigable capacity” of such rivers. We can only conclude that Congress planned to ban any type of “obstruction,” not merely those specifically made subject to approval by the Secretary of the Army. It seems, moreover, that the first clause being specifically aimed at “navigable capacity” serves an end that may at times be broader than those served by the other clauses. Some structures mentioned in the second clause may only deter movements in commerce, falling short of adversely affecting navigable capacity. And navigable capacity of a waterway may conceivably be affected by means other than the excavations and fills mentioned in the third clause. We would need to strain hard to conclude that the only obstructions banned by § 10 are those enumerated in the second and third clauses. In short, the first clause is aimed at protecting “navigable capacity,” though it is adversely affected in ways other than those specified in the other clauses.
There is an argument that § 10 of the 1890 Act, 26 Stat. 454, which was the predecessor of the section with which we are now concerned, used the words “any obstruction” in the narrow sense, embracing only the prior enumeration of obstructions in the preceding sections of the Act. The argument is a labored one which we do not stop to refute step by step. It is unnecessary to do so, for the Court in United States v. Rio Grande Irrigation Co., 174 U. S. 690, 708, decided not long after the 1890 Act became effective, gave the concept of “obstruction,” as used in § 10, a broad sweep: “It is not a prohibition of any obstruction to the navigation, but any obstruction to the navigable capacity, and anything, wherever done or however done, within the limits of the jurisdiction of the United States which tends to destroy the navigable capacity of one of the navigable waters of the United States, is within the terms of the prohibition.” This broad construction given § 10 of the 1890 Act was carried over to § 10 of the 1899 Act in Sanitary District v. United States, 266 U. S. 405, 429, the Court citing United States v. Rio Grande Irrigation Co., supra, with approval and saying that § 10 of the 1899 Act was “a broad expression of policy in unmistakable terms, advancing upon” § 10 of the 1890 Act.
The decision in Sanitary District v. United States, supra, seems to us to be decisive. There the Court affirmed a decree enjoining the diversion of water from Lake Michigan through this same river. Mr. Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, did not read § 10 narrowly but in the spirit in which Congress moved to fill the gap created by Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, supra. That which affects the water level may, he said, amount to an “obstruction” within the meaning of § 10:
“Evidence is sufficient, if evidence is necessary, to show that a withdrawal of water on the scale directed by the statute of Illinois threatens and will affect the level of the Lakes, and that is a matter which cannot be done without the consent of the United States, even were there no international covenant in the case.” Sanitary District v. United States, supra, 426.
“There is neither reason nor opportunity for a construction that would not cover the present case. As now applied it concerns a change in the condition of the Lakes and the Chicago River, admitted to be navigable, and, if that be necessary, an obstruction to their navigable capacity . . . .” Id., at 429.
It is said that that case is distinguishable because it involved the erections of “structures,” prohibited by the second clause of § 10. The “structures” erected, however, were not “in” navigable waters. The Sanitary District had reversed the flow of the Chicago River, “formerly a little stream flowing into Lake Michigan,” 266 U. S., at 424, and used it as a sluiceway to draw down the waters of the Great Lakes to a dangerous degree. Moreover, the Court did not rely on the second clause of § 10 but on the first and the third. Id., at 428. The decree in that case did not run against any “structure”; it merely enjoined the diversion of water from Lake Michigan in excess of 250,000 cubic feet per minute.
That broad construction of § 10 was reaffirmed in Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U. S. 367, 414, another case involving the reduction of the water level of the Great Lakes by means of withdrawals through the Chicago River. And the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Taft (id., at 406, 414, 417), made clear that it adhered to what Mr. Justice Holmes had earlier said, “This withdrawal is prohibited by Congress, except so far as it may be authorized by the Secretary of War.” Satnitary District v. United States, supra, at 429.
The teaching of those cases is that the term “obstruction” as used in § 10 is broad enough to include diminution of the navigable capacity of a waterway by means not included in the second or third clauses. In the Sanitary District case it was caused by lowering the water level. Here it is caused by clogging the channel with deposits of inorganic solids. Each affected the navigable “capacity” of the river. The concept of “obstruction” which was broad enough to include the former seems to us plainly adequate to include the latter.
As noted, § 13 bans the discharge in any navigable water of “any refuse matter of any kind or description whatever other than that flowing from streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state.” The materials carried here are “industrial solids,” as the District Court found. The particles creating the present obstruction were in suspension, not in solution. Articles in suspension, such as organic matter in sewage, may undergo chemical change. Others settle out. All matter in suspension is not saved by the exception clause in § 13. Refuse flowing from “sewers” in a “liquid state” means to us “sewage.” Any doubts are resolved by a consistent administrative construction which refused to give immunity to industrial wastes resulting in the deposit of solids in the very river in question. The fact that discharges from streets and sewers may contain some articles in suspension that settle out and potentially impair navigability is no reason for us to enlarge the group to include these industrial discharges. We follow the line Congress has drawn and cannot accept the invitation to broaden the exception in § 13 because other matters “in a liquid state” might logically have been treated as favorably as sewage is treated. We read the 1899 Act charitably in light of the purpose to be served. The philosophy of the statement of Mr. Justice Holmes in New Jersey v. New York, 283 U. S. 336, 342, that “A river is more than an amenity, it is a treasure,” forbids a narrow, cramped reading either of § 13 or of § 10.
The Court of Appeals concluded that even if violations were shown, no relief by injunction is permitted. Yet § 17 provides, as we have seen, that “the Department of Justice shall conduct the legal proceedings necessary to enforce” the provisions of the Act, including § 10. It is true that § 12 in specifically providing for relief by injunction refers only to the removal of “structures” erected in violation of the Act (see United States v. Bigan, 274 F. 2d 729), while § 10 of the 1890 Act provided for the enjoining of any “obstruction.” Here again Sanitary District v. United States, supra, is answer enough. It was argued in that case that relief by injunction was restricted to removal of “structures.” See 266 U. S., at 408. But the Court replied, “The Attorney General by virtue of his office may bring this proceeding and no statute is necessary to authorize the suit.” Id., at 426. The authority cited was United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U. S. 273, where a suit was brought by the Attorney General to set aside a fraudulent patent to public lands. The Court held that the Attorney General could bring suit, even though Congress had not given specific authority. The test was whether the United States had an interest to protect or defend. Section 10 of the present Act defines the interest of the United States which the injunction serves. Protection of the water level of the Great Lakes through injunctive relief, Sanitary District v. United States, supra, is precedent enough for ordering that the navigable capacity of the Calumet River be restored. The void which was left by Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, supra, need not be filled by detailed codes which provide for every contingency. Congress has legislated and made its purpose clear; it has provided enough federal law in § 10 from which appropriate remedies may be fashioned even though they rest on inferences. Otherwise we impute to Congress a futility inconsistent with the great design of this legislation. This is for us the meaning of Sanitary District v. United States, supra, on this procedural point.
Since the Court of Appeals dealt only with these questions of law and not with subsidiary questions raised by the appeal, we remand the case to it for proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
Reversed.
Memorandum of
A House Report contains similar animadversions. H. R. Rep. No. 1345, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 10.
Section 10 provides in full:
“That the creation of any obstruction not affirmatively authorized by Congress, to the navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United States is hereby prohibited; and if shall not be lawful to build or commence the building of any wharf, pier, dolphin, boom, weir, breakwater, bulkhead, jetty, or other structures in any port, roadstead, haven, harbor, canal, navigable river, or other water of the United States, outside established harbor lines, or where no harbor lines have been established, except on plans recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the Army; and it shall not be lawful to excavate or fill, or in any manner to alter or modify the course, location, condition, or capacity of, any port, roadstead, haven, harbor, canal, lake, harbor of refuge, or inclosure within the limits of any breakwater, or of the channel of any navigable water of the United States, unless the work has been recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the Army prior to beginning the same.”
H. R. Doc. No. 293, 54th Cong., 2d Sess.
32 Cong. Rec., Pt. 3, p. 2923, which reports the statement by the House Conferees. For the discussion in the Senate see 32 Cong. Rec. 2296-2298.
We have a rather precise history of administrative construction of the 1899 Act as it applies to the deposit of solids in the Calumet River by mills located on it. The Army Engineers, beginning in 1909, warned a steel company of the accumulation of solids from industrial wastes being poured into the Calumet. In 1918, 1920, 1924, 1927, 1928, 1931, and 1937 the District Engineer required these deposits to be removed. An improvement in the Calumet was authorized by the Act of August 30, 1935, 49 Stat. 1028, 1036, on the basis of a report from the Army Engineers. See H. R. Doc. No. 494, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. The costs were computed on the basis that shoals created by the deposit of solids would be removed by the company creating them. The report states, at p. 24, “It is assumed, in this estimate, that the shoal adjacent to the outer bulkhead of the Illinois Steel Co. will be removed by that company to the depth of 21 feet originally provided by the United States.”
This long-standing administrative construction, while not conclusive of course, is entitled to “great weight” even though it arose out of cases “settled by consent rather than in litigation.” Federal Trade Comm’n v. Mandel Brothers, Inc., 359 U. S. 385, 391.
For references in public documents to this administrative construction see H. R. Doc. No. 237, 63d Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 77, 160; S. Rep. No. 66, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2; H. R. Doc. No. 494, 72d Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 24, 34; S. Rep. No. 2225, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2; Hearings, Civil Functions, Department of the Army Appropriations for 1955, Subcommittee of House Committee on Appropriations, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. 1, pp. 695-696; H. R. Rep. No. 1345, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 10.
H. R. Doc. No. 417, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 9, states:
“In some instances the organic solid matter in sewage and wastes causes temporary shoaling in the vicinity of the point of discharge, but in most cases of this kind nature eventually decomposes this organic matter and rectifies the condition. In a few instances, where large quantities of sewage are discharged into sluggish and restricted waters, overpollution results and the oxygen content remains insufficient to enable nature to break up the solids. In such cases permanent shoaling in the vicinity of the point of discharge results and dredging must be resorted to. As a rule such dredging is well attended to by municipal authorities.”
The “main ground” advanced was the interest of the United States in removing obstructions to commerce. 266 U. S., at 426. Another ground was a treaty with Great Britain. Id., at 425-426. But these were alternative grounds, the treaty rights being treated as lesser or subordinate interests. Id., at 426.
See Comment, Substantive and Remedial Problems in Preventing Interferences with Navigation: The Republic Steel Case, 59 Col. L. Rev. 1065, 1079.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The questions presented in this case are first, whether the Clean Air Act, 42 U. S. C. §7401 et seq., authorizes attorney’s fees awards for time spent by counsel participating in regulatory proceedings; second, whether a court may enhance an award to reflect superior quality of representation rendered by plaintiff’s counsel; and third, whether enhancement of the fee is proper because of plaintiff’s risk of not prevailing on the merits.
I
In 1977, the Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air (Delaware Valley) and the United States each filed suit to compel the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to implement a vehicle emission inspection and maintenance program (I/M program) as required by the Clean Air Act. See 42 U. S. C. § 7410. Pursuant to a consent decree approved in 1978, the Commonwealth agreed to establish an I/M program for 10 counties in the Philadelphia and Pittsburgh areas by August 1, 1980. The decree called for the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT) to seek legislation instituting a franchise I/M system under which the Commonwealth would contract with garage owners for the establishment of inspection stations. If the legislature failed to approve such a system, then the decree required PennDOT to promulgate regulations allowing Pennsylvania to certify a number of private garage facilities to perform the inspections. In addition, the decree provided for Pennsylvania to pay Delaware Valley $30,000 for attorney’s fees and costs incurred prior to the entry of the consent decree.
Entry of the consent decree marked only the beginning of this story, for implementation of the I/M program did not proceed smoothly. For simplicity’s sake, we will summarize the relevant factual developments into nine phases, with each phase relating to a different aspect of the litigation. Not only is this the method used by the parties and followed by both lower courts, but it is a system for analyzing requests for attorney’s fees and costs that appears to be useful in protracted litigation.
Phase I. After entry of the consent decree, the Pennsylvania Legislature refused to enact a franchise system. Under the decree, PennDOT then, had until July 1, 1979 to publish the necessary regulations. When PennDOT failed to comply, Delaware Valley moved to have the Commonwealth held in contempt; PennDOT published the proposed regulations, however, before the scheduled hearing on the motion. The court thus refrained from finding the Commonwealth in contempt, but ordered the parties to establish a revised schedule for implementation of the I/M program approved by the consent decree.
Phase II. After PennDOT published the proposed I/M program regulations, Delaware Valley continued to monitor the Commonwealth’s performance under the consent decree, and submitted comments on the regulations which were published in the Pennsylvania Bulletin.
Phase III. In late 1979, the Commonwealth requested a modification of the decree delaying implementation of the I/M program until May 1981. With Delaware Valley’s approval, the District Court approved the extension in March 1980.
Phase TV. By February 1981, the Commonwealth still had not published final regulations covering the type of equipment which private garages needed to have in order to become certified inspection stations. The Commonwealth thus asked Delaware Valley to consent to a further postponement of the implementation date to January 1, 1983. The Commonwealth argued that the United States Environmental Protection Agency had recommended a type of emission analyzer different from the one required under the consent decree, but at that time no manufacturer had produced even a prototype of such machinery.
After extensive negotiations over this extension request, the parties failed to reach an agreement. The Commonwealth then filed a motion asking the District Court to grant the second extension and delay the starting date of the I/M program until January 1, 1983. In response, Delaware Valley sought to have the court declare the Commonwealth to be in violation of the consent decree, and requested numerous modifications to the consent decree. On May 20, 1981, the court issued an order finding the Commonwealth in violation of the decree, denying the motion for a further extension, and denying the modifications submitted by Delaware Valley. App. 25a-28a. On June 16, the court denied the Commonwealth’s motion for reconsideration, but approved May 1, 1982, as the new deadline for implementation of the I/M program. Id., at 44a-49a. The Commonwealth appealed both the May 20 and June 16 orders, both of which were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air v. Commonwealth, 674 F. 2d 976 (CA3), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 905 (1982).
Phase V. Following the District Court’s order of June 16, the Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted a statute, H. B. 456, over the Governor’s veto, which prohibited the expenditure of state funds by the Executive Branch for the implementation of the I/M program. Act of Oct. 5, 1981, No. 99, 1981 Pa. Laws 4. PennDOT and the remainder of the Executive Branch promptly ceased all activities related to implementing the I/M program, except for publication of the final regulations establishing specifications for the emissions analysis equipment to be used by garage owners wishing to participate as inspection locations. 11 Pa. Bull. 3519 (Oct. 10, 1981).
The Commonwealth moved to stay implementation of the consent decree in light of H. B. 456. Delaware Valley opposed that motion, and sought to have the court declare the Commonwealth in contempt and apply sanctions. The court denied the Commonwealth’s motion for a stay and held the Commonwealth in civil contempt. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air v. Commonwealth, 533 F. Supp. 869 (ED Pa. 1982). As a sanction, the court ordered the United States Secretary of Transportation to refrain from approving any projects, or awarding any grants, for highways in the two areas covered by the consent decree, except for projects required for purposes of safety, mass transit, or air quality improvement. Id., at 884-885. Once again, the Commonwealth appealed, and once again, the Court of Appeals upheld the District Court’s orders. 678 F. 2d 470 (CA3), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 969 (1982).
Phase VI. After the filing of the consent decree, the city of Pittsburgh and several groups of Pennsylvania legislators attempted to intervene in the litigation. Delaware Valley successfully opposed all of these attempts. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air v. Commonwealth, 674 F. 2d 970 (CA3), stay denied, 458 U. S. 1125 (1982).
Phase VII. As noted above, a portion of the District Court’s contempt order prevented the United States Secretary of Transportation from authorizing the expenditure of any federal funds for federal highway projects in Pennsylvania that did not fall into certain categories. In late 1982, the United States approved seven projects for funding, certifying that they would either improve safety or improve air quality. These certifications were submitted to both Delaware Valley and the District Court. The court found that five of the projects did not qualify as exemptions under the terms of its prior order, and only approved two proposals for federal funding. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air v. Commonwealth, 551 F. Supp. 827 (ED Pa. 1982).
Phase VIII. On May 3, 1983, the Pennsylvania General Assembly finally passed legislation authorizing the Commonwealth to proceed with implementation of the I/M program, and the Governor signed the bill into law the next day. 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§4706-4707 (1984). Subsequently, Delaware Valley and the Commonwealth negotiated a new compliance schedule, under which the I/M program would begin by June 1, 1984. The District Court approved of this new schedule, and vacated its earlier contempt sanctions.
Phase IX. This phase includes work done by Delaware Valley in hearings before the Environmental Protection Agency, during which, inter alia, the Commonwealth unsuccessfully sought that agency’s approval of an I/M program covering a smaller geographic area.
Delaware Valley then sought attorney’s fees and costs for the work performed after issuance of the consent decree in 1978. App. 50a-86a. The District Court awarded Delaware Valley $209,813 in attorney’s fees and an additional $6,675.03 in costs. 581 F. Supp. 1412, 1433 (ED Pa. 1984). To calculate the legal fee award, the District Court first determined:
“[T]he number of hours reasonably necessary to perform the legal services for which compensation is sought. The reasonable number of hours is then multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate for the attorney providing the services, the latter being based on the court’s determination of the attorney’s reputation, status and type of activity for which the attorney is seeking compensation. The sum of the two figures is the ‘lodestar’ which can then be adjusted upward or downward based on the contingency of success, and the quality of an attorney’s work. In all instances plaintiffs have the burden of establishing entitlement to the award claimed and any adjustment to the 'lodestar/” Id., at 1419 [citations omitted].
The court used three separate hourly rates in making its award. Work which the court found to be “most difficult” was compensated at an hourly rate of $100. For work that could have been done “by an attorney working at the associate level,” the hourly rate was set at $65. And for work “which required little or no legal ability,” the court allowed an hourly rate of $25. Id., at 1422.
For the most part, the hours for which Delaware Valley sought compensation were those spent on the postdecree litigation itself. In Phases II and IX, however, Pennsylvania objected that Delaware Valley was seeking compensation for work done in only tangentially related state and federal administrative proceedings. The District Court rejected this argument, and found that because the proposed regulations would have affected Delaware Valley’s rights under the consent decree, it had a unique interest in the proceedings that made its work sufficiently related to the litigation to be com-pensable. See id., at 1423, 1429-1430.
After determining the “lodestar” amounts for all phases of the litigation, the court next considered Delaware Valley’s request for “multipliers” to adjust these figures for “the contingent nature of the case, the quality of the work performed and the results obtained.” Id., at 1431, citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424, 434-435 (1983). Given that the case involved new legal theories with little precedent, and that Delaware Valley was forced to go up against both the Federal Government and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to obtain the consent decree initially and then to protect it from being overturned, the court found “[t]he contingent nature of [Delaware Valley’s] success [to have] been apparent throughout this litigation.” 581 Supp., at 1431. The court also found that Delaware Valley’s work during Phase V was “superior,” and that an “[a]n increase based on the quality of work which culminated in an outstanding result is fully justified.” Ibid, (citation omitted).
Accordingly, the District Court applied a multiplier of two to the awards in Phases IV, V, and VII to reflect the low likelihood of success Delaware Valley faced in those stages of the litigation. In addition, the court added a separate multiplier of two to Phase V to adjust the lodestar for the high quality of representation provided in that phase. The court’s final calculation of the fee award for each of the nine phases was as follows:
Multiplier Total Lodestar
Phase I $ 4,478.50 $ 4,478.50
Phase II 1,722.50 1.722.50 I
Phase III 1,745.00 1,745.00 I
Phase IV 36.711.50 2 73,423.00
Phase V 27.372.50 4 109,490.00
Phase I — I 1,820.00 1,820.00
Phase hH H 5.370.50 2 10,741.00
Phase I — I H 1,560.00 1,560.00
Phase 1,453.00 1,453.00
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. 762 F. 2d 272 (1985). The court analogized § 304(d) of the Clean Air Act, which provides for counsels’ fees, to other statutory-attorney’s fee provisions, and held that “the jurisprudence regarding the calculation of reasonable attorneys fees developed in connection with other attorneys fees statutes — particularly [42 U. S. C.] §1988 — is applicable to cases brought pursuant to § 304(d).” 762 F. 2d, at 275.
The court affirmed the award of fees for time spent commenting on the Commonwealth’s proposed regulations in Phase II for the reasons stated by the District Court. Id., at 276-277. The Court of Appeals also agreed that the fee award for the time devoted by Delaware Valley in Phase IX was proper “because adoption of the state plan modification would have impaired the rights won by [Delaware Valley] in the consent decree.” Id., at 277. The court took note of Webb v. Board of Ed. of Dyer County, 471 U. S. 234 (1985), in which this Court held that time spent on “optional administrative proceedings” may be compensable under § 1988 if the work was “both useful and of a type ordinarily necessary to advance the... litigation” to the point where the party succeeded. Id., at 243. The Court of Appeals found that the work of counsel in Phases II and IX “was useful and necessary for securing full enforcement of the decree,” and that the District Court’s fee awards for these two phases were consistent with Webb. 762 F. 2d., at 277, n. 7.
With respect to the use of multipliers, the Court of Appeals concluded that “this was The rare case where the fee applicant offer[ed] specific evidence to show that the quality of service rendered was superior to that one reasonably should expect in light of the hourly rates charged and that the success was “exceptional.”’” Id., at 280, quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U. S. 886, 899 (1984). The court also approved the use of “contingency” multipliers to compensate Delaware Valley for the risk of not prevailing. The court stated:
“Unlike Blum, [Delaware Valley] specifically identified the risks inherent in this litigation in its brief to the district court and, although the Supreme Court considers it an open question whether contingency of success can properly justify a lodestar increase, we have resolved the question in this court. See Hall v. Borough of Roselle, 747 F. 2d 838 (3d Cir.1984); Lindy [Brothers Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.], 540 F. 2d [102,] 117 [(CA3 1976) (en banc)].” 762 F. 2d, at 282.
The court also rejected the Commonwealth’s arguments that the District Court failed to make specific findings of fact in awarding the multipliers, and that the court abused its discretion in determining the size of the multipliers. Ibid. We granted certiorari, 474 U. S. 815 (1985), and now affirm in part and reverse in part.
I — I I — I
Section 304(d) of the Clean Air Act, 84 Stat. 1706, 42 U. S. C. § 7604(d), provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
‘The court, in issuing any final order in any action brought pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, may award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any party, whenever the court determines such award is appropriate. ”
The Commonwealth argues that the plain language of the statute clearly limits the award of fees to “costs of litigation” for “action[s] brought” under the Act, and that the lower courts erred in awarding attorney’s fees for Delaware Valley’s activities in Phases II and IX, both of which involved the submission of comments on draft regulations to administrative agencies. The United States echoes these assertions, and contends that the “actions” contemplated by § 304(d) are judicial actions, not administrative proceedings. We reject these limiting constructions on the scope of § 304(d).
Although it is true that the proceedings involved in Phases II and IX were not “judicial” in the sense that they did not occur in a courtroom or involve “traditional” legal work such as examination of witnesses or selection of jurors for trial, the work done by counsel in these two phases was as necessary to the attainment of adequate relief for their client as was all of their earlier work in the courtroom which secured Delaware Valley’s initial success in obtaining the consent decree. This case did not involve a single tortious act by the Commonwealth that resulted in a discrete injury to Delaware Valley, nor was the harm alleged the kind that could be remedied by a mere award of damages or the entry of declaratory relief. Instead, Delaware Valley filed suit to force the Commonwealth to comply with its obligations under the Clean Air Act to develop and implement an emissions inspection and maintenance program covering 10 counties surrounding two major metropolitan areas. To this end, the consent decree provided detailed instructions as to how the program was to be developed and the specific dates by which these tasks were to be accomplished.
Protection of the full scope of relief afforded by the consent decree was thus crucial to safeguard the interests asserted by Delaware Valley; and enforcement of the decree, whether in the courtroom before a judge, or in front of a regulatory agency with power to modify the substance of the program ordered by the court, involved the type of work which is properly compensable as a cost of litigation under § 304. In a case of this kind, measures necessary to enforce the remedy ordered by the District Court cannot be divorced from the matters upon which Delaware Valley prevailed in securing the consent decree.
Several courts have held that, in the context of the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U. S. C. § 1988, postjudgment monitoring of a consent decree is a com-pensable activity for which counsel is entitled to a reasonable fee. See, e. g., Garrity v. Sununu, 752 F. 2d 727, 738-739 (CA1 1984); Bond v. Stanton, 630 F. 2d 1231, 1233 (CA7 1980); Miller v. Carson, 628 F. 2d 346, 348 (CA5 1980); Northcross v. Board of Ed. of Memphis City Schools, 611 F. 2d 624, 637 (CA6 1979), cert. denied, 447 U. S. 911 (1980). Although § 1988 authorizes fees in “any action or proceeding” brought to enforce the Civil Rights Acts, and § 304(d) applies only to “any action” brought under the Clean Air Act, this distinction is not a sufficient indication that Congress intended § 304(d) to apply only to judicial, and not administrative, proceedings.
First, in several instances in the legislative history of this section, Congress used the words “action” and “proceeding” interchangeably. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 91-1196, p. 37 (1970); 1 Legislative History of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 (Committee Print compiled for the Senate Committee on Public Works by the Library of Congress), Ser. No. 93-18, p. 136 (1974) (Senate Consideration of the Report of the Conference Committee, Dec. 18, 1970) (Leg. Hist.). The lack of the phrase “or proceedings” on the face of § 304(d) is not necessarily indicative of the intended scope of the section.
Second, and more importantly, the purposes behind both § 304(d) and § 1988 are nearly identical, which lends credence to the idea that they should be interpreted in a similar manner. Northcross v. Memphis Board of Ed., 412 U. S. 427, 428 (1973). Section 1988 was enacted to insure that private citizens have a meaningful opportunity to vindicate their rights protected by the Civil Rights Acts. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S., at 429. See S. Rep. No. 94-1011, p. 2 (1976). “The effective enforcement of Federal civil rights statutes depends largely on the efforts of private citizens,” and unless reasonable attorney’s fees could be awarded for bringing these actions, Congress found that many legitimate claims would not be redressed. H. R. Rep. No. 94-1568, p. 1 (1976).
Similarly, § 304(a) authorizes private citizens to sue any person violating the Clean Air Act, and § 304(d) provides for reasonable attorney’s fees whenever appropriate. Congress enacted § 304 specifically to encourage “citizen participation in the enforcement of standards and regulations established under this Act,” S. Rep. No. 91-1196, p. 36 (1970), and intended the section “to afford... citizens... very broad opportunities to participate in the effort to prevent and abate air pollution.” 1 Leg. Hist., p. 138 (SenateConsideration of the Report of the Conference Committee, Dec. 18, 1970) (remarks of Sen. Eagleton). Congress found that “Government initiative in seeking enforcement under the Clean Air Act has been restrained,” S. Rep. No. 91-1196, at 36, and urged the courts to “recognize that in bringing legitimate actions under this section citizens would be performing a public service and in such instances the courts should award costs of litigation to such party.” Id., at 38.
Given the common purpose of both § 304(d) and § 1988 to promote citizen enforcement of important federal policies, we find no reason not to interpret both provisions governing attorney’s fees in the same manner. We hold, therefore, that the fact that the work done by counsel in Phases II and IX did not occur in the context of traditional judicial litigation does not preclude an award of reasonable attorney’s fees under § 304(d) for the work done during these portions of the present action.
This conclusion is consistent with our opinion in Webb v. Board of Ed. of Dyer County, 471 U. S. 234 (1985). There, we noted that for the time spent pursuing optional administrative proceedings properly to be included in the calculation of a reasonable attorney’s fee, the work must be “useful and of a type ordinarily necessary” to secure the final result obtained from the litigation. Id., at 243. Application of this standard is left to the discretion of the district court. Id., at 243-244.
Here, the District Court found that, as for Phase II, Delaware Valley had a unique interest in the proposed regulation “based on a desire to ensure compliance with the consent decree and to protect [its] rights thereunder. The usefulness of [Delaware Valley’s] comments was manifested in the revisions that were made to the original regulations.” 581 F. Supp., at 1423. Similarly, the court found that counsel’s work during Phase IX helped to protect the relief awarded under the consent decree, as any modification of the I/M program by the Environmental Protection Agency would have adversely affected Delaware Valley’s rights under the decree. Id., at 1430. We agree that participation in these administrative proceedings was crucial to the vindication of Delaware Valley’s rights under the consent decree and find that compensation for these activities was entirely proper and well within the “zone of discretion” afforded the District Court. Hensley, supra, at 442 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). We thus affirm the award of fees for work done in Phases II and IX.
I — I HH h — (
A
It is well established that, under the American Rule, “the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys’ fee from the loser.” Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S. 240, 247 (1975). There are exceptions to this principle, the major one being congressional authorization for the courts to require one party to award attorney’s fees to the other. There are over 100 separate statutes providing for the award of attorney’s fees; and although these provisions cover a wide variety of contexts and causes of action, the benchmark for the awards under nearly all of these statutes is that the attorney’s fee must be “reasonable.”
Courts have struggled to formulate the proper measure for determining the “reasonableness” of a particular fee award. One method, first employed by the Fifth Circuit in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F. 2d 714 (1974), involved consideration of 12 factors. Johnson was widely followed by other courts, and was cited with approval by both the House and the Senate when § 1988 was enacted into law. H. R. Rep. No. 94-1558, p. 8 (1976); S. Rep. No. 94-1011, p. 6 (1976).
This approach required trial courts to consider the elements that go into determining the propriety of legal fees and was intended to provide appellate courts with more substantial and objective records on which to review trial court determinations. See Johnson, supra, at 717. This mode of analysis, however, was not without its shortcomings. Its major fault was that it gave very little actual guidance to district courts. Setting attorney’s fees by reference to a series of sometimes subjective factors placed unlimited discretion in trial judges and produced disparate results.
For this reason, the Third Circuit developed another method of calculating “reasonable” attorney’s fees. This method, known as the “lodestar” approach, involved two steps. First, the court was to calculate the “lodestar,” determined by multiplying the hours spent on a case by a reasonable hourly rate of compensation for each attorney involved. Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. of Philadelphia v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F. 2d 161, 167 (CA3 1973) (Lindy I). Second, using the lodestar figure as a starting point, the court could then make adjustments to this figure, in light of “(1) the contingent nature of the case, reflecting the likelihood that hours were invested and expenses incurred without assurance of compensation; and (2) the quality of the work performed as evidenced by the work observed, the complexity of the issues and the recovery obtained.” Merola v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 515 F. 2d 165, 168 (CA3 1975); Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. of Philadelphia v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F. 2d 102, 117 (CA3 1976) (Lindy II). This formulation emphasized the amount of time expended by the attorneys, and provided a more analytical framework for lower courts to follow than the unguided “factors” approach provided by Johnson. On the other hand, allowing the courts to adjust the lodestar amount based on considerations of the “riskiness” of the lawsuit and the quality of the attorney’s work could still produce inconsistent and arbitrary fee awards.
We first addressed the question of the proper manner in which to determine a “reasonable” attorney’s fee in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424 (1983). We there adopted a hybrid approach that shared elements of both Johnson and the lodestar method of calculation. “The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. This calculation provides an objective basis on which to make an initial estimate of the value of a lawyer’s services.” 461 U. S., at 433. To this extent, the method endorsed in Hensley follows the Third Circuit’s description of the first step of the lodestar approach. Moreover, we went on to state: “The product of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate does not end the inquiry. There remain other considerations that may lead the district court to adjust the fee upward or downward....” Id., at 434. We then took a more expansive view of what those “other considerations” might be, however, noting that “[t]he district court also may consider [the] factors identified in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F. 2d 714, 717-719 (CA5 1974), though it should note that many of these factors usually are subsumed within the initial calculation of hours reasonably expended at a reasonable hourly rate.” Id., at 434, n. 9 (citation omitted).
We further refined our views in Blum v. Stenson, 465 U. S. 886 (1984). Blum restated that the proper first step in determining a reasonable attorney’s fee is to multiply “the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate.” Id., at 888. We emphasized, however, that the figure resulting from this calculation is more than a mere “rough guess” or initial approximation of the final award to made. Instead, we found that “[w]hen... the applicant for a fee has carried his burden of showing that the claimed rate and number of hours are reasonable, the resulting product is presumed to be the reasonable fee” to which counsel is entitled. Id., at 897 (emphasis added).
Blum also limited the factors which a district court may consider in determining whether to make adjustments to the lodestar amount. Expanding on our earlier finding in Hensley that many of the Johnson factors “are subsumed within the initial calculation” of the lodestar, we specifically held in Blum that the “novelty [and] complexity of the issues,” “the special skill and experience of counsel,” the “quality of representation,” and the “results obtained” from the litigation are presumably fully reflected in the lodestar amount, and thus cannot serve as independent bases for increasing the basic fee award. 465 U. S., at 898-900. Although upward adjustments of the lodestar figure are still permissible, id., at 901, such modifications are proper only in certain “rare” and “exceptional” cases, supported by both “specific evidence” on the record and detailed findings by the lower courts. See id., at 898-901.
A strong presumption that the lodestar figure — the product of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate — represents a “reasonable” fee is wholly consistent with the rationale behind the usual fee-shifting statute, including the one in the present case. These statutes were not designed as a form of economic relief to improve the financial lot of attorneys, nor were they intended to replicate exactly the fee an attorney could earn through a private fee arrangement with his client. Instead, the aim of such statutes was to enable private parties to obtain legal help in seeking redress for injuries resulting from the actual or threatened violation of specific federal laws. Hence, if plaintiffs, such as Delaware Valley, find it possible to engage a lawyer based on the statutory assurance that he will be paid a “reasonable fee,” the purpose behind the fee-shifting statute has been satisfied.
Moreover, when an attorney first accepts a case and agrees to represent the client, he obligates himself to perform to the best of his ability and to produce the best possible results commensurate with his skill and his client’s interests. Calculating the fee award in a manner that accounts for these factors, either in determining the reasonable number of hours expended on the litigation or in setting the reasonable hourly rate, thus adequately compensates the attorney, and leaves very little room for enhancing the award based on his post-engagement performance. In short, the lodestar figure includes most, if not all, of the relevant factors constituting a “reasonable” attorney’s fee, and it is unnecessary to enhance the fee for superior performance in order to serve the statutory purpose of enabling plaintiffs to secure legal assistance.
B
With this teaching from our prior cases in mind, we sustain the Commonwealth’s contention that the lower courts erred in increasing the fee award to Delaware Valley in Phase V based on the “superior quality” of counsel’s performance. Relying on the statement in Blum that an upward adjustment may be justified in the rare case where the fee applicant offers specific evidence to show that the quality of service rendered was superior to that one reasonably should expect in light of the hourly rates charged and that the success was “exceptional,” the Third Circuit affirmed both the District Court’s findings concerning the “superior quality” of Delaware Valley’s counsel’s work in Phase V, and the “outstanding result” obtained in this phase and its holding that an increase in this portion of the lodestar by a factor of two was appropriate. 762 F. 2d, at 280-282.
We cannot agree. Because considerations concerning the quality of a prevailing party’s counsel’s representation normally are reflected in the reasonable hourly rate, the overall quality of performance ordinarily should not be used to adjust the lodestar, thus removing any danger of “double counting.”
Furthermore, we are unpersuaded that the lodestar amount determined for Phase V in this case did not fully reflect the quality and competence of the legal services rendered by Delaware Valley’s lawyers. For this portion of the litigation, counsel sought compensation for approximately 620 hours of work. 581 F. Supp., at 1427. Of these, the District Court allowed compensation for 324 hours. The District Court’s elimination of a large number of hours on the grounds that they were unnecessary, unreasonable, or unproductive is not supportive of the court’s later conclusion that the remaining hours represented work of “superior quality.”
We also note that of the 324 hours compensated, 26 hours were compensated at $25 per hour, 88 hours were billed at an hourly rate of $65, and the remaining 210 hours were paid at $100 per hour. Id., at 1427-1428. By the court’s own definition, the $25 rate was applied to work “which required little or no legal ability,” and the $65 rate was proper for work “that could have been done by an attorney working at the associate level.” Id., at 1422. Given that nearly one-third of all of the hours reasonably spent on this phase were not compensated at the hourly rate for work which the court found to be “most difficult,” it is hard to see what made the quality of representation for those hours so “superior” that it was not reflected in the hourly rate used to determine the lodestar amount. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the Third Circuit expressly found that the $100 hourly rate for the attorney compensated for the 210 hours was “plainly appropriate” given that he was an “inexperienced attorne[y]” without “any prior significant litigation experience.” 762 F. 2d, at 279, n. 10. See also 581 F. Supp., at 1422 (District Court set fees based on evaluation of “the status, reputation and experience of the individual attorneys who performed the activity”).
In sum, viewing the evidence submitted by Delaware Valley to support its petition for attorney’s fees, there is no indication as to why the lodestar did not provide a reasonable fee award reflecting the quality of representation provided during Phase V of the litigation. Clearly, Delaware Valley was able to obtain counsel without any promise of reward for extraordinary performance. Furthermore, Delaware Valley presented no specific evidence as to what made the results it obtained during this phase so “outstanding,” nor did it provide any indication that the lodestar figure for this portion of the case was far below awards made in similar cases where the court found equally superior quality of performance. Finally
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | F | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
We granted certiorari to review the constitutionality of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1914 (1964) under which the Nebraska Supreme Court dismissed this indigent petitioner’s appeal for his failure to deposit the $75 cash or bond security for costs required of appellants by the statute. 404 U. S. 990 (1971). The judgment appealed from annulled petitioner’s marriage to respondent and dismissed his countersuit claiming paternity and custody of a child born to respondent. After our grant of certiorari, Nebraska enacted Legislative Bill 1120 providing, among other things, that the Nebraska courts “shall authorize . . . [an] appeal . . . without prepayment of . . . security, by a person who makes an affidavit that he is unable to . . . give security . . . ,” except that “[a]n appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies in writing that it is not taken in good faith.” Counsel for both parties were of the opinion on oral argument here that this new statute is applicable to the instant case. Counsel for respondent also conceded that petitioner’s appeal on the paternity issue has merit. Accordingly, the judgment is vacated and the cause remanded to the Nebraska Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of the supervening statute.
It is so ordered.
“On appeal in any case taken from the district court to the Supreme Court the appellant . . . shall, within one month next after the rendition of the judgment or decree . . . sought to be reversed, vacated or modified, ... file in the district court a bond or undertaking in the sum of seventy-five dollars to be approved by the clerk of the district court, conditioned that the appellant shall pay all costs adjudged against him in the Supreme Court; or, in lieu thereof, shall make a cash deposit with said clerk of at least seventy-five dollars for the same purpose . . . .”
“Q. You told us today that you concede that the determination of the paternity question was insufficient, invalid I think is the word you used.
“Mr. Dowding. Yes, I’m willing to agree that [petitioner] did not have his day in court on the paternity issue.
“Q. And we could say so on a remand.
“Mr. Dowding. Yes. So stipulate.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 40.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | B | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
DECREE
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT:
1. The boundary line between the States of Tennessee and Arkansas in the area in controversy is fixed as geodetically described in Exhibit A, appended hereto, and as shown on Appendix E to the Special Master’s Report filed with this Court on April 13, 1981. Said Exhibit E is incorporated by reference herein.
2. The costs of this proceeding shall be divided equally between the parties.
EXHIBIT “A”
TENNESSEE-ARKANSAS STATE BOUNDARY IN THE ELMOT BAR-ISLAND 30 SECTOR OF THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER
The following is a description, by geodetic position (North American Datum) of the locus of the Tennessee-Arkansas State Boundary that became fixed in the abandoned Fletcher Bend Channel that bounds Elmot Bar-Island 30 on the North and West. This boundary, lying between North Latitude 35° 40' 30.8" and North 35° 45' 34.6" and West Longitude 89° 52' 35" and West Longitude 89° 57' 31.5", begins at the head of Elmot Bar-Island 30 Chute Channel and thence runs Northwestward, Southwestward, Southward and Southeastward, along fixed (dead) thalweg and last steamboat navigation course in the abandoned Fletcher Bend Channel to the foot of Elmot Bar-Island 30 Chute Channel.
The Locus of the said Tennessee-Arkansas State Boundary is depicted on the 1973-1975 Mississippi River Hydrographic Survey and is described as beginning at the head of the Elmot Bar-Island 30 Chute Channel at Point P-1 at North Latitude 35° 44' 30.8" and West Longitude 89° 52' 35";
Thence North to Point P-2, Lat. 35° 44' 16.8" and Long. 89° 52' 35";
Thence Northward to Point P-3, Lat. 35° 44' 28.7" and Long. 89° 52' 38";
Thence Northwestward to Point-4,, Lat. 35° 44' 42" and Long. 89° 53';
Thence Northwestward to Point-5, Lat. 35° 45' and Long. 89° 53' 22";
Thence Northwestward to Point-6, Lat. 35° 45' 10" and Long. 89° 53' 35";
Thence Northwestward to Point-7, Lat. 35° 45' 17.8" and Long. 89° 53' 47";
Thence Northwestward to Point-8, Lat. 35° 45' 25.5" and Long. 89° 54';
Thence Northwestward to Point-9, Lat. 35° 45' 34.6" and Long. 89° 54' 18";
Thence Westward to Point-10, Lat. 35° 45' 33.5" and Long. 89° 54' 30";
Thence Southwestward to Point-11, Lat. 35° 45' 29.7" and Long. 89° 54' 40";
Thence Southwestward to Point-12, Lat. 35° 45' 23.8" and Long. 89° 54' 47";
Thence Southwestward to Point-13, Lat. 35° 45' 15.6" and Long. 89° 55';
Thence Southwestward to Point-14,, Lat. 35° 45' and Long. 89° 55' 30";
Thence Southwestward to Point-15, Lat. 35° 44' 46.5" and Long. 89° 56';
Thence Southwestward to Point-16, Lat. 35° 44' 36.6" and Long. 89° 56' 20";
Thence Southwestward to Point-17, Lat. 35° 44' 27.9" and Long. 89° 56' 40";
Thence Southwestward to Point-18, Lat. 35° 44' 18.9" and Long. 89° 57';
Thence Southwestward to Point-19, Lat. 35° 44' 10.1" and Long. 89° 57' 14";
Thence Southwestward to Point-20, Lat. 35° 44' and Long. 89° 57' 23";
Thence Southwestward to Point-21, Lat. 35° 43' 39.2" and Long. 89° 57' 31";
Thence Southward to Point-22, Lat. 35° 43' 23.9" and Long. 89° 57' 31.5";
Thence Southward to Point-28, Lat. 35° 43' and Long. 89° 57' 28.5";
Thence Southward to Point-24, Lat. 35° 42' 42.6" and Long. 89° 57' 25";
Thence South to Point-25, Lat. 35° 42' 21.3" and Long. 89° 57' 25";
Thence Southward to Point-26, Lat. 35° 42' and Long. 89° 57' 23";
Thence Southward to Point-27, Lat. 35° 41' 43.6" and Long. 89° 57' 23.5";
Thence Southward to Point-28, Lat. 35° 41' 26.1" and Long. 89° 57' 21";
Thence Southeastward to Point-29, Lat. 35° 41' 11.4" and Long. 89° 57' 12";
Thence Southeastward to Point-80, Lat. 35° 41' and Long. 89° 57' 03.5";
Thence Southeastward to Point-31, Lat. 35° 40' 56.4" and Long. 89° 57';
Thence Southeastward to Point-32, Lat. 35° 40' 30.8" and Long. 89° 56' 34" at the foot of the Elmot Bar-Island 30 Chute Channel.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | K | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U. S. 652 (1945) (Hooven I), this Court passed upon the constitutionality of Ohio’s application of a nondiscriminatory ad valorem personal property tax to imported fibers still in their original packages. The result there was unfavorable to the State. In this case, the Tax Commissioner of Ohio asks us to sustain the application of the same nondiscriminatory ad valorem personal property tax to like fibers, still in their original packages, imported by the same manufacturer. The case thus presents, primarily, an issue of preclusion framed in terms of collateral estoppel.
I
The Hooven & Allison Company (Hooven) is a domestic manufacturer of cordage products made from natural fibers. These fibers — hemp, sisal, jute, manila, and the like — are not grown in the United States and must be imported. Upon their arrival in this country, the imported fibers are transported by rail to Hooven’s plant in Xenia, Ohio, where they are stored in their original packages for future use in Hooven’s manufacturing process.
In accord with Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §5711.16 (1980), Hooven timely filed personal property tax returns for 1976 and 1977. In those returns, Hooven listed these original-package imported fibers as “imports,” but deducted their value from the total value of its manufacturing inventory. The following written explanation was given:
“The inventories represent fibers imported by the taxpayer from foreign countries, held in the original packages in its warehouses in Xenia prior to being used in manufacturing cordage, and when they are removed therefrom or placed in the production line in the factory, such imported fibers so used, or removed from the original package, are thereupon transferred to the Goods in Process and are included in the taxable inventories in Xenia City.” Joint Record in the Supreme Court of Ohio 11.
In taking this deduction, Hooven relied expressly on this Court’s 1945 decision in Hooven 1. In that decision, the Court, by a closely divided vote, ruled that subjecting Hooven’s imported original-package raw materials to Ohio personal property taxation would be in violation of the Import-Export Clause of the United States Constitution, Art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
The Tax Commissioner of Ohio, however, for each of the two years in question, disallowed the deduction and added back into Hooven’s taxable manufacturing inventory the imported raw materials held for future use in manufacturing. Hooven’s asserted property tax liability for each of those years, accordingly, was increased.
Upon application for review, the Tax Commissioner sustained the increased assessments. She rejected federal constitutional arguments advanced by Hooven, as well as an additional argument that, by the decision in Hooven I, she was collaterally estopped from levying the increased assessments. The Tax Commissioner in so ruling relied on Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U. S. 276 (1976).
Hooven then appealed to the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals, advancing the same collateral-estoppel and federal constitutional issues. That Board reversed the Tax Commissioner. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-10. It ruled that the Commissioner was collaterally estopped by the decision in Hooven I. It noted that the parties were the same as those in Hooven I; that the issue as to the taxability of original-package raw materials was also the issue in Hooven I; that the raw materials and the type of taxation were identical to those involved in Hooven I; that Hooven I has not been “reversed” by this Court “and thus, has the force and effect of law”; and that, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, litigation of the issue was barred “and the exemption from taxation was improperly held to be unavailable.” App. to Pet. for Cert. A-23. The Board rejected the Tax Commissioner’s argument that the decision in Michelin implicitly had overruled Hooven I. The Board did not reach or consider the constitutional issues, observing that it lacked jurisdiction to do so. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-20; see S. S. Kresge Co. v. Bowers, 170 Ohio St. 405, 166 N. E. 2d 139 (1960), appeal dism’d, 365 U. S. 466 (1961).
Hooven and the Tax Commissioner each filed a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio, the taxpayer doing so in order to preserve the constitutional issues, and the Tax Commissioner pressing the collateral-estoppel issue. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the ruling of the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals. Hooven & Allison Co. v. Lindley, 4 Ohio St. 3d 169, 447 N. E. 2d 1295 (1983). That court, in a unanimous per curiam opinion, ruled that principles of collateral estoppel prohibited the Tax Commissioner from assessing personal property taxes upon Hooven’s imported raw materials held in the original containers for future use in manufacturing. It acknowledged the presence of Michelin but noted that this Court had not overruled Hooven I in Michelin, although it had not hesitated expressly to overrule Low v. Austin, 13 Wall. 29 (1872). Thus, the Ohio court observed, this Court’s “action — or inaction — must be accorded conclusive effect, at least in regard to its intent in reappraising its earlier ruling in Hooven 4 Ohio St. 3d, at 172, 447 N. E. 2d, at 1298. The court then “decline[d] to address the [federal] constitutional issues raised by Hooven in its appeal.” Id., at 173, 447 N. E. 2d, at 1299.
We granted certiorari. 464 U. S. 813 (1983).
HH HH
In Low v. Austin, supra, this Court, in an opinion by Justice Field, unanimously enunciated the “original-package” doctrine, although perhaps not for the first time, see Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 442 (1827). It held that, under the Import-Export Clause, goods imported from a foreign country are not subject to state ad valorem property taxation while remaining in their original packages, unbroken and unsold, in the hands of the importer.
In Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, supra, an importer challenged the assessment of Georgia’s nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax upon an inventory of imported tires and tubes maintained at a wholesale distribution warehouse. This Court rejected the challenge to the state tax on the imported tires. It found that in the history of the Import-Export Clause, there was nothing to suggest that a tax of the kind imposed on goods that were no longer in import transit was the type of exaction that was regarded as objectionable by the Framers. The tax could not affect the Federal Government’s exclusive regulation of foreign commerce since it did not fall on imports as such. Neither did the tax interfere with the free flow of imported goods among the States. The Clause, while not specifically excepting nondiscriminatory taxes that had some impact on imports, was not couched in terms of a broad prohibition of every tax, but prohibited States only from laying “Imposts or Duties,” which historically connoted exactions directed only at imports or commercial activities as such. The Court concluded that its reliance a century earlier in Low v. Austin “upon the Brown dictum . . . was misplaced.” 423 U. S., at 283. Chief Justice Taney’s opinion in the License Cases, 5 How. 504 (1847), was carefully analyzed, with the Court concluding that that opinion had been misread in Low. “[Precisely contrary” to the reading it was given in Low, Chief Justice Taney’s License Cases opinion was authority “that nondiscriminatory ad valorem property taxes are not prohibited by the Import-Export Clause.” 423 U. S., at 301. It followed, this Court concluded, that “Low v. Austin was wrongly decided” and “therefore must be, and is, overruled.” Ibid. Hooven I was directly cited only once in Michelin, and then only in a footnote in which the Court stated that it found it unnecessary to address the assertion in Hooven I that Congress could consent to state nondiscriminatory taxation of imports even were such taxes within the prohibition of the Import-Export Clause. See 423 U. S., at 301, n. 13. While we acknowledge that Hooven I was not expressly overruled in Michelin, the latter case strongly implies that the foundation of the former had been seriously undermined.
It is apparent, and indeed clear, that Michelin, with its overruling of Low v. Austin, adopted a fundamentally different approach to cases claiming the protection of the Import-Export Clause. We said precisely as much in Washington Revenue Dept. v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U. S. 734 (1978):
“Previous cases had assumed that all taxes on imports and exports and on the importing and exporting processes were banned by the Clause. ... So long as the goods retained their status as imports by remaining in their import packages, they enjoyed immunity from state taxation. . . .
“Michelin initiated a different approach to Import-Export Clause cases. It ignored the simple question whether the tires and tubes were imports. Instead, it analyzed the nature of the tax to determine whether it was an ‘Impost or Duty.’ 423 U. S., at 279, 290-294. Specifically, the analysis examined whether the exaction offended any of the three policy considerations leading to the presence of the Clause:
‘The Framers of the Constitution thus sought to alleviate three main concerns . . . : the Federal Government must speak with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments, and tariffs, which might affect foreign relations, could not be implemented by the States consistently with that exclusive power; import revenues were to be the major source of revenue of the Federal Government and should not be diverted to the States; and harmony among the States might be disturbed unless seaboard States, with their crucial ports of entry, were prohibited from levying taxes on citizens of other States by taxing goods merely flowing through their ports to the other States not situated as favorably geographically.’ Id., at 285-286 (footnotes omitted).
“The ad valorem property tax there at issue offended none of these policies.... The Court therefore concluded that the Georgia ad valorem property tax was not an ‘Impost or Duty,’ within the meaning of the Import-Export Clause . . . .” Id., at 752-754.
See also id., at 762 (opinion concurring in part and concurring in result).
To repeat: we think it clear that this Court in Michelin specifically abandoned the concept that the Import-Export Clause constituted a broad prohibition against all forms of state taxation that fell on imports. Michelin changed the focus of Import-Export Clause cases from the nature of the goods as imports to the nature of the tax at issue. The new focus is not on whether the goods have lost their status as imports but is, instead, on whether the tax sought to be imposed is an “Impost or Duty.” See P. Hartman, Federal Limitations on State and Local Taxation, § 5:4 (1981); Hellerstein, State Taxation and the Supreme Court: Toward a More Unified Approach to Constitutional Adjudication?, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1426, 1427-1434 (1977). Cf. Montana v. United States, 440 U. S. 147 (1979).
Hooven I held that, under the Clause, a nondiscriminatory state ad valorem personal property tax could not be imposed until the imported goods had lost their status as imports by being removed from their original packages. This decision was among the progeny of Low v. Austin for it, too, was decided on the original-package doctrine. Thus, Hooven I is inconsistent with the later ruling in Michelin that such a tax is not an “Impost or Duty” and therefore is not prohibited by the Clause. Although Hooven I was not expressly overruled in Michelin, it must be regarded as retaining no vitality since the Michelin decision. The conclusion of the Supreme Court of Ohio that Hooven I retains current validity in this respect is therefore in error. A contrary ruling would return us to the original-package doctrine. So that there may be no misunderstanding, Hooven I, to the extent it espouses that doctrine, is not to be regarded as authority and is overruled.
J — I
A
Respondent Hooven, however, argues that because the Court in Michelin did not expressly overrule Hooven I, it must follow that state-law principles of collateral estoppel bar the imposition of an ad valorem tax upon Hooven’s raw materials inventory.
We reject the suggestion that we are confronted, in the present posture of the case, with a claim of collateral estoppel under state, as distinguished from federal, law. Hooven I was a decision concerned with the application and impact of the Import-Export Clause upon the Ohio tax. The issue, thus, was one of a federal constitutional barrier. The Supreme Court of Ohio certainly so viewed it. It referred to both Hooven I and Michelin in federal constitutional terms and it described the issue before it as whether the contested tax “may constitutionally be assessed” in light of the Import-Export Clause. 4 Ohio St. 3d, at 171, 447 N. E. 2d, at 1297. And it viewed collateral estoppel in the light of precepts set forth in Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U. S. 591 (1948), a federal income tax case. From this premise, the Ohio court moved to its judgment that the levy of the tax was “barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.” 4 Ohio St. 3d, at 173, 447 N. E. 2d, at 1299.
Collateral estoppel, therefore, was applied as a matter of federal, not state, law. We perceive in this case no state-law overtones that, by any stretch of the imagination, could serve to insulate the case from review here. We are concerned with federal issues and a contention that a state court disregarded a federal constitutional ruling of this Court. The issue, then, is reviewable here. See Deposit Bank v. Frankfort,, 191 U. S. 499 (1903); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 165 (1938); Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U. S. 118, 129, n. 1 (1941).
B
We move on to respondent’s collateral-estoppel argument. It is true, of course, that the parties in Hooven I were the same parties as those before us in the present case. It is true that the property sought to be taxed for 1976 and 1977 identifies with the property sought to be taxed for 1938, 1939, and 1940 in Hooven I. And it is true that the tax involved is the same Ohio nondiscriminatory ad valorem personal property tax. The parties, the tax, and the goods imported and their containers are the same. The Tax Commissioner does not dispute this. Tr. of Oral Arg. 12. Collateral-estoppel concepts, therefore, might have an initial appeal.
The years involved in this tax case, however, are not the same tax years at issue in Hooven I. Because of this, Commissioner v. Sunnen, supra, is pertinent and, indeed, is controlling. That case concerned licenses granted by a patent owner and his assignment of interests in the royalty agreements to his wife. An earlier decision of the Board of Tax Appeals, involving the same facts, questions, and parties but different tax years, was held not to be conclusive under the doctrine of collateral estoppel because certain intervening decisions of this Court made manifest the error of the result that had been reached by the Board. 333 U. S., at 602-607. The reason for not applying the collateral-estoppel doctrine in the present case is even stronger than that in Sunnen, for here the constitutional analysis of the earlier case is repudiated by this Court’s intervening pronouncement.
Because the Supreme Court of Ohio did not apply the principles of Sunnen, its judgment must be vacated and the case remanded. Failure to follow Sunnen’s dictates would lead to the very tax inequality that the admonition of that case was designed to avoid. Hooven then would be immune forever from tax on its imported goods because of an early decision based upon a now repudiated legal doctrine, while all other taxpayers would have their tax liabilities determined upon the basis of the fundamentally different approach adopted in Michelin. See Sunnen, 333 U. S., at 599.
Petitioner, therefore, is not barred by collateral estoppel in asserting the increases in tax for 1976 and 1977.
IV
The case is before us without a developed factual record. Hooven takes the position that it is entitled to an opportunity to demonstrate that the facts of this case are significantly different from those of Michelin, so that the result in that case is not controlling here. Hooven suggests that in Michelin, the tires had been mingled with domestically manufactured tires and had been arranged and stored for sale and delivery; moreover, the tires were finished goods. Here, according to Hooven, its imported fibers are not for sale, are not finished goods, and are destined for incorporation into a manufacturing process. Hooven further asserts that, once a factual record has been developed, a court will be in a position to examine the case in the light of any other constitutional provision respondent is then in a position to invoke, including the Foreign Commerce Clause.
Any development of the record, of course, should take place in the state courts and first be evaluated there. Accordingly, we make no judgment on the merits of Hooven’s constitutional claims. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio is therefore vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Because the respondents there, the county Tax Commissioner and Tax Assessors, did not cross-petition for certiorari, the Georgia courts’ ruling that tubes still in corrugated shipping cartons were immune from the tax was not before this Court for review. Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U. S., at 279. n. 2.
Since Michelin, Hooven I has been cited by this Court only twice. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97, 111 (1980), and Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U. S. 529, 540 (1976). Neither citation bears upon the issue before us in the present case.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
MR. Chief Justice Warren
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case involves the competing claims of the Federal Government and certain subcontractors to a sum of money owed to the taxpayers under a general construction contract.
The taxpayers, Michael & Embree, were general contractors doing business at Durham, North Carolina. Early in 1954, they agreed to construct certain buildings for persons herein referred to as the “owners.” This work was completed on July 15, 1954, but because the owners disputed the amount due under the contract, payment to the taxpayers was delayed.
In completing the construction work, the taxpayers had utilized the services and materials of numerous subcontractors, most of whom had not been compensated. The respondents are two such subcontractors, who in January and February 1955, gave the owners notice of their respective claims against the taxpayers.
On January 18, 1955, the taxpayers were adjudicated bankrupts. At that time, there was an unpaid balance of $5,250 due from the owners under the construction contract. After extensive negotiations between the owners, the trustee in bankruptcy, and the subcontractors, it was agreed that the owners would absolve themselves from further liability by paying the $5,250 to the trustee, and that the subcontractors could thereafter assert the same rights against the trustee as they could have asserted against the owners. This arrangement was approved by both the Superior Court for Durham County, North Carolina, and the federal bankruptcy court.
Another claimant of the money deposited with the trustee was the Federal Government, which on August 13, 1954, and November 22, 1954, had assessed the taxpayers for uncollected withholding and unemployment insurance taxes. By virtue of Séctions 6321 and 6322 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, a federal tax lien attached to all “property and rights to property” belonging to the taxpayers at the time the assessments were made. The Government contended that the money owing under the construction contract was property of the taxpayers to which the tax lien attached.
The referee in bankruptcy, attempting to resolve the competing claims against the fund as if the parties were before a state court, decided that the rights of the Federal Government under its tax lien were superior to those of the respondents. The District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina disagreed, and held that the respondents were entitled to payment of their claims before the Government could satisfy its tax lien. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, 257 F. 2d 570. We granted certiorari. 359 U. S. 905.
In affirming the judgment of the District Court, the Court of Appeals stated that the nature and extent of the general contractors’ property rights, to which the tax lien attached, must be ascertained under state law. The court then undertook an extensive analysis of the relevant North Carolina statutes and cases. It found that the North Carolina law provides as follows: Subcontractors who have not been paid by the general contractor have a direct, independent cause of action against the owner to the extent of any amount due under the general construction contract, and any money owed by the owner under the construction contract must first be used to satisfy subcontractors’ claims of which the owner has notice. Moreover, to insure that the owner will receive notice of outstanding subcontractors’ claims, the North Carolina statute, N. C. Gen. Stat., 1950, § 44-8, requires the general contractor, before receiving any payment, to furnish the owner with a statement of all sums due subcontractors, and if the general contractor fails to supply the required statement, he is guilty of a misdemeanor. N. C Gen. Stat., 1950, § 44-12. Finally, the court found further evidence of the direct and independent nature of the subcontractors’ claims against the owner in N. C. Gen. Stat., 1950, § 44-9, which provides that should the owner pay the general contractor after receiving notice of a subcontractor’s claim, he will nevertheless be liable to the subcontractor to the extent of the amount which was due under the construction contract at the time notice was received.
Based upon these considerations, the Court of Appeals held that, under North Carolina law, the general contractor did not have a property interest in the face amount, as such, of the general construction contract. Specifically, the court said that “except to the extent the claim of the general contractor exceeds the aggregate of the claims of the subcontractors, the general contractor has no right which is subject to seizure under the tax lien.” Id., at 574. Therefore, concluded the court, since under North Carolina law the taxpayers possessed merely a right to the residue of the fund, and since the Government’s tax lien attached to the property interests of the taxpayers as defined by state law, the Government can recover only “so much of the construction price as will remain unpaid after the owners have deducted a sum sufficient to pay the subcontractors.” Id., at 575.
The Court of Appeals was correct in asserting that the Government’s tax lien attached to the taxpayers’ property interests in the fund as defined by North Carolina law. Aquilino v. United States, ante, pp. 509, 513; United States v. Bess, 357 U. S. 51, 55; cf. Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U. S. 78, 82. It is suggested that the courts of North Carolina have never specifically described the nature of the property rights created by the North Carolina statutes involved in this case, and that the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of those statutes is probably incorrect. However, where “[t]he precise issue of state law involved ... is one which has not been decided by the . . . [state] courts,” this Court has said that, “[i]n dealing with issues of state law that enter into judgments of federal courts, we are hesitant to overrule decisions by federal courts skilled in the law of particular states unless their conclusions are shown to be unreasonable.” Propper v. Clark, 337 U. S. 472, 486-487. Since the Court of Appeals is much closer to North Carolina law than we are, and since we cannot say that the court’s characterization of the taxpayers’ property interests under that law is clearly erroneous or unreasonable, the judgment is
Affirmed.
[For dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, concurred in by Mr. Justice Black, see ante, p. 516.]
Section 6321. Lien for taxes:
“If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount (including any interest, additional amount, addition to tax, or assessable penalty, together with any costs that may accrue in addition thereto) shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person.”
Section 6322. Period of lien:
“Unless another date is specifically fixed by law, the lien imposed by section 6321 shall arise at the time the assessment is made and shall continue until the liability for the amount so assessed is satisfied or becomes unenforceable by reason of lapse of time.”
N. C. Gen. Stat., 1950, §§44-6 to 44-12.
This case points up the distinction we drew in Aquilino. The facts here show how it simply begs the question to suggest that the principle of the lien-priority cases is somehow subverted or evaded by recognizing that what constitutes the taxpayer’s property in the first place is a question of state law. The facts show, too, that it does not promote clarity to substitute, for the property interests created by state law, a rule of federal property law, the main feature of which seems to be an inquiry into what the consequences would be if state law were different from what it in fact is. It is said that we should regard-the subcontractor’s interest as equivalent to a lien on the general contractor’s claim against the owner, overlooking the fact that the law of North Carolina, as interpreted by the Court of Appeals, indicates that there is no such claim. If we are to equate the subcontractor’s interest with something it is not, it would be much more appropriate, in terms of similarity, to equate it with the usual mechanic’s lien of a subcontractor on the owner’s property being improved — which of course is not the general contractor’s property, and which could not be taken by the United States under a lien against the general contractor. This only points up the lack of precision and content in the proposed federal definition of property. See also Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. New York City Housing Auth., 241 F. 2d 142 (C. A. 2d Cir.), cited with approval in United States v. Bess, 357 U. S. 51, 55.
See Sims v. United States, 359 U. S. 108, 114; Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U. S. 530, 534; Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335 U. S. 701, 707-708.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | L | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted limited to Question 1 presented by the petition.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | F | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question in this case is whether the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the State of Illinois (State) from prosecuting for involuntary manslaughter the driver of an automobile involved in a fatal accident, who previously has been convicted for failing to reduce speed to avoid the collision.
I
On November 24, 1974, an automobile driven by respondent John Vitale, a juvenile, struck two small children. One of the children died almost immediately; the other died the following day. A police officer at the scene of the accident issued a trafile citation charging Vitale with failing to reduce speed to avoid an accident in violation of § 11-601 (a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 951-2, § 11-601 (a) (1979). This statute provides in part that “[s]peed must be decreased as may be necessary to avoid colliding with any person or vehicle on or entering the highway in compliance with legal requirements and the duty of all persons to use due care.”
On December 23, 1974, Vitale appeared in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Ill., and entered a plea of not guilty to the charge of failing to reduce speed. After a trial without a jury, Vitale was convicted and sentenced to pay a fine of $15.
On the following day, December 24, 1974, a petition for adjudication of wardship was filed in the juvenile division of the Circuit Court of Cook County, charging Vitale with two counts of involuntary manslaughter. The petition, which was signed by the police officer who issued the traffic citation, alleged that Vitale “without lawful justification while recklessly driving a motor vehicle caused the death of” the two children killed in the November 20, 1974, accident. App. 2-4.
Vitale’s counsel filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds, among others, that the manslaughter prosecution was “viola-tive of statutory and/or constitutional double jeopardy,” id., at 7, because of Vitale’s previous conviction for failing to reduce speed to avoid the accident. The juvenile court found it unnecessary to reach a constitutional question because it held that the manslaughter prosecution was barred by Illinois statutes requiring, with certain nonpertinent exceptions, that all offenses based on the same conduct be prosecuted in a single -prosecution. Ill. Rev. Stat., eh. 38, §§ 3-3 and 3-4 (b)(1) (1979). The juvenile court dismissed the petition for adjudication of wardship and the State appealed. The Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, In re Vitale, 44 Ill. App. 3d 1030, 358 N. E. 2d 1288 (1976), affirmed the holding that the manslaughter prosecution was barred by the state compulsory joinder statutes. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, §§ 3-3 and 3-4 (b)(1) (1979).
The Supreme Court of Illinois, with two justices dissenting, affirmed on other grounds. In re Vitale, 71 Ill. 2d 229, 375 N. E. 2d 87 (1978). The court did not reach the state statutory question for it found “a more compelling reason why respondent cannot be prosecuted for the offense of involuntary manslaughter”: the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as applied to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. After analyzing the elements of each offense, the court held that because “the lesser offense, failing to reduce speed, requires no proof beyond that which is necessary for conviction of the greater, involuntary manslaughter, ... for purposes of the double jeopardy clause, the greater offense is by definition the 'same’ as the lesser offense included within it.” Id., at 239, 375 N. E. 2d, at 91. Thus the court concluded that the manslaughter prosecution was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The dissenting justices argued that the manslaughter prosecution was not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause because the homicide charge could be proved by showing one or more reckless acts other than the failure to reduce speed. Id., at 242, 251-253, 375 N. E. 2d, at 93, 96-97 (Underwood, J., joined by Ryan, J., dissenting).
On November 27, 1978, we granted the State’s petition for certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case to the Supreme Court of Illinois to consider whether its judgment was based upon federal or state constitutional-grounds. 439 U. S. 974 (1978). After the Supreme Court of Illinois, on remand, certified that its judgment was based upon federal constitutional grounds, we again granted a writ of certiorari. 444 U.S. 823 (1979).
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” This constitutional guarantee is applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784 (1969), and it applies not only in traditional criminal proceedings but also in the kind of juvenile proceedings Vitale faced. Breed v. Jones, 421 U. S. 519 (1975).
The constitutional prohibition of double jeopardy has been held to consist of three separate guarantees: (1) “It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. [(2) I] t protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction. [(3)] And it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.” North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U. S. 711, 717 (1969) (footnotes omitted). Because Vitale asserts that his former conviction for failing to reduce speed bars his manslaughter prosecution, we are concerned with only the second of these three guarantees in the instant case. The sole question before us is whether the offense of failing to reduce speed to avoid an accident is the “same offense” for double jeopardy purposes as the manslaughter charges brought against Vitale.
In Brown v. Ohio, 432 U. S. 161 (1977), we stated the principal test for determining whether two offenses are the same for purposes of barring successsive prosecutions. Quoting from Blockburger v. United States, 284 U. S. 299, 304 (1932), which in turn relied on Gavieres v. United States, 220 U. S. 338, 342-343 (1911), we held that
“‘[t]he applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.’ ” 432 TJ. S., at 166.
We recognized that the Blockburger test focuses on the proof necessary to prove the statutory elements of each offense, rather than on the actual evidence to be presented at trial. Thus we stated that if “ ‘each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not,’ Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433, 434 (1871),” the offenses are not the same under the Blockburger test. 432 U. S., at 166 (emphasis supplied); Iannelli v. United States, 420 U. S. 770, 785, n. 17 (1975).
III
We accept, as we must, the Supreme Court of Illinois’ identification of the elements of the offenses involved here. Under Illinois law, involuntary manslaughter with a motor vehicle involves a homicide by the “reckless operation of a motor vehicle in a manner likely to cause death or great bodily harm.” In re Vitale, 71 Ill. 2d, at 239, 375 N. E. 2d, .at 91. The charge of failing to reduce speed on which respondent was convicted requires proof “that the defendant drove carelessly and failed to reduce speed to avoid colliding with a person.” Id., at 238, 375 N. E. 2d, at 91. The Illinois court, after specifying these elements, then stated that “the lesser offense, failing to reduce speed, requires no proof beyond that which is necessary for conviction of the greater, involuntary manslaughter” and concluded, as a matter of federal law, that “the greater offense is by definition the 'same’ as the lesser offense included within it.” Id., at 239, 375 N. E. 2d, at 91.
The Illinois court relied upon our holding in Brown v. Ohio, supra, that a conviction for a lesser-included offense precludes later prosecution for the greater offense. There, Brown was first convicted of joyriding in violation of an Ohio statute under which it was a crime to “take, operate, or keep any motor vehicle without the consent of its owner.” He was then convicted under another statute of stealing the same motor vehicle. The Ohio courts had held that every element of the joyriding “is also an element of the crime of auto theft,” and that to prove auto theft one need prove in addition to joyriding only the intent permanently to deprive the owner of possession. Holding that the second prosecution was barred, by the Double Jeopardy Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment, we observed that “the prosecutor who has established joyriding need only prove the requisite intent in order to establish auto theft.” Id., at 167. But we also noted that “the prosecutor who has established auto theft necessarily has established joyriding as well.” Id., at 168.
Both observations were essential to the Brown holding. Had the State been able to prove auto theft, without also proving that the defendant took, operated, or kept the auto without the consent of the owner — if proof of the auto theft had not necessarily involved proof of joyriding — the successive prosecutions would not have been for the “same offense” within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Vitale does not dispute this proposition, but insists that the Illinois court fully satisfied Brown when it held that the lesser offense of failure to reduce speed “requires no proof beyond that which is necessary for a conviction of the greater, involuntary manslaughter.” It is clear enough from the opinion below that manslaughter by motor vehicle could be proved against Vitale by showing a death caused by his recklessly failing to slow his vehicle to avoid a collision with the victim. Proving manslaughter in this way would also prove careless failure to slow; nothing more would be needed to prove the latter offense, an offense for which Vitale has already been convicted.
The State, however, does not concede that its manslaughter charge will or must rest on proof of a reckless failure to slow; it insists that manslaughter by automobile need not involve any element of failing to reduce speed. The petition for wardship charging manslaughter alleged only that Vitale “without lawful justification, while recklessly driving a motor vehicle, caused [two] death [s]” in violation of the manslaughter statute. Further, the dissenting justices relied upon the absence of any showing that the manslaughter charge on which respondent had not been tried, would rest upon his reckless failure to reduce speed. Nor could it be known, in their view, what particular reckless acts might be relied upon to prove the homicide charge. The State agrees, and submits that because it is not necessary to prove a failure to slow to establish manslaughter, the rule of Brown v. Ohio does not bar its homicide case against Vitale.
The Illinois Supreme Court did not expressly address the contentions that manslaughter by automobile could be proved without also proving a careless failure to reduce speed, and we are reluctant to accept its rather cryptic remarks about the relationship between the two offenses involved here as an authoritative holding that under Illinois law proof of manslaughter by automobile would always involve a careless failure to reduce speed to avoid a collision.
Of course, any collision between two automobiles or between an automobile and a person involves a moving automobile and in that sense a “failure” to slow sufficiently to avoid the accident. But such a “failure” may not be reckless or even careless, if, when the danger arose, slowing as much as reasonably possible would not alone have avoided the accident. Yet, reckless driving causing death might still be proved if, for example, a driver who had not been paying attention could have avoided the accident at the last second, had he been paying attention, by simply swerving his car. The point is that if manslaughter by automobile does not always entail proof of a failure to slow, then the two offenses are not the “same” under the Blockburger test. The mere possibility that the State will seek to rely on all of the ingredients necessarily included in the traffic offense to establish an element of its manslaughter case would not be sufficient to bar the latter prosecution.
IV
If, as a matter of Illinois law, a careless failure to slow is always a necessary element of manslaughter by automobile, then the two offenses are the “same” under Blockburger and Vitale’s trial on the latter charge would constitute double jeopardy under Brown v. Ohio. In any event, it may be that to sustain its manslaughter case the State may find it necessary to prove a failure to slow or to rely on conduct necessarily involving such failure; it may concede as much prior to trial. In that case, because Vitale has already been convicted for conduct that is a necessary element of the more serious crime for which he has been charged, his claim of double jeopardy would be substantial under Brown and our later decision in Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U. S. 682 (1977).
In Harris, we held, without dissent, that a defendant’s conviction for felony murder based on a killing in the course of an armed robbery barred a subsequent prosecution against the same defendant for the robbery. The Oklahoma felony-murder statute on its face did not require proof of a robbery to establish felony murder; other felonies could underlie a felony-murder prosecution. But for the purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, we did not consider the crime generally described as felony murder as a separate offense distinct from its various elements. Rather, we treated a killing in the course of a robbery as itself a separate statutory offense, and the robbery as a species of lesser-included offense. The State conceded that the robbery for which petitioner had been indicted was in fact the underlying felony, all elements of which had been proved in the murder prosecution. We held the subsequent robbery prosecution barred under the Double Jeopardy Clause, since under In re Nielsen, 131 U. S. 176 (1889), a person who has been convicted of a crime having several elements included in it may not subsequently be tried for a lesser-included offense — an offense consisting solely of one or more of the elements of the crime for which he has already been convicted. Under Brown, the reverse is also true; a conviction on a lesser-included offense bars subsequent trial on the greater offense.
By analogy, if in the pending manslaughter prosecution Illinois relies on and proves a failure to slow to avoid an accident as the reckless act necessary to prove manslaughter, Vitale would have a substantial claim of double jeopardy under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
V
Because of our doubts about the relationship under Illinois law between the crimes of manslaughter and a careless failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident, and because the reckless act or acts the State will rely on to prove manslaughter are still unknown, we vacate the judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court and remand the case to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
Section 11-601 (a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code, Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 95%, §11-601 (a) (1979), provides:
“No vehicle may be driven upon any highway of this State at a speed which is greater than is reasonable and proper with regard to traffic conditions and the use of the highway, or endangers the safety of any person or property. The fact that the speed of a vehicle does not exceed the applicable maximum speed limit does not relieve the driver from the duty to decrease speed when approaching and crossing an intersection, when approaching and going around a curve, when approaching a hill crest, when traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway, or when special hazard exists with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of weather or highway conditions. Speed must be decreased as may be necessary to avoid colliding with any person or vehicle on or entering the highway in compliance with legal requirements and the duty of all persons to use due care.”
With respect to the traffic offense, the record contains a copy of the complaint, which charged that respondent on “Wednesday, November 20, 1974, 12:29 p. m., did then and there operate a certain motor vehicle upon a public highway of this State, to wit 170th and Ingleside in Thornton, situated in Cook County, Illinois, and did then and there violate section 11-601 (a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code by failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident.” (Record 66-67.) Notations on the back of thé complaint indicate that Vitale pleaded not guilty, waived a jury trial, was found guilty, and fined.
Failing to reduce speed to avoid an accident is punishable by no more than 30 days in jail or by a fine of no more than $500. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 95%, § 16-104 (a) (1975), and ch. 38, §§1005-9-1 and 1005-8-3 (1979).
At the time Vitale was prosecuted, § 9-3 of the Illinois Criminal Code, Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, § 9-3 (1973), provided:
“(a) A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits involuntary manslaughter if his acts whether lawful or unlawful which cause the death are such as are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some individual, and he performs them recklessly, (b) If the acts which cause the death consist of the driving of a motor vehicle, the person may be prosecuted for reckless homicide or if he is prosecuted for involuntary manslaughter, he may be found guilty of the included offense of reckless homicide.”
Section 3-3 of the Illinois Criminal Code, Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, § 3-3 (1979), provides:
“(a) When the same conduct of a defendant may establish the commission of more than one offense, the defendant may be prosecuted for each such offense, (b) If the several offenses are known to the proper prosecuting officer at the time of commencing the prosecution and are within the jurisdiction of a single court, they must be prosecuted in a single prosecution, except as provided in Subsection (c), if they are based on the same act. (c) When 2 or more offenses are charged as required by Subsection (b), the court in the interest of justice may order that one or more of such charges be tried separately.”
Section 3-4 (b) of the Illinois Criminal Code, Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, §3-4 (b) (1979), provides in pertinent part:
“A prosecution is barred if the defendant was formerly prosecuted for a different offense, ... if such former prosecution: (1) Resulted in either a conviction or an acquittal, and the subsequent prosecution . . . was for an offense with which the defendant should have been charged on the former prosecution, as provided in Section 3-3 of this Code (unless the court ordered a separate trial of such charge). . .
The juvenile court held that because the prosecution knew at the time the traffic offense was prosecuted that the automobile accident had resulted in the deaths that were the basis of the manslaughter charges, § 3-3 required that the traffic offense and the manslaughter charges be prosecuted in a single prosecution. The court therefore concluded that the manslaughter prosecution was barred by § 3-4 (b) (1).
In Iannelli v. United States, 420 U. S., at 785, n. 17, we stated: “[T]he Court’s application of the test focuses on the statutory elements of the offense. If each requires proof of a fact that the other does not, the Blockburger test is satisfied, notwithstanding a substantial overlap in the proof offered to establish the crimes.”
“The petition for wardship may have been based on Vitale’s acts in permitting his attention to be diverted while driving at a high rate of speed, failing to appropriately maintain the vehicle’s braking system, failing to note the seven school zone and speed warning signs, initially raising the speed of his auto to a dangerous level, or by disobeying the commands of the crossing guard. While we do not now know which of that series of acts the State intended to rely on at trial, one certainly cannot now say that it would rely solely upon Vitale’s failure to reduce speed to the exclusion of his other misconduct.” In re Vitale, 71 Ill. 2d 229, 251, 375 N. E. 2d 87, 97 (1978) (Underwood, J., dissenting).
The police report concerning Vitale’s accident noted that the brakes on the automobile were defective and that there had been a school crossing guard and a stop sign at the intersection where the accident occurred. (Record 29, 30.)
We recognized in Brown v. Ohio, 432 U. S., at 169, n. 7 that “[a]n exception may exist where the State is unable to proceed on the more serious charge at the outset because the additional facts necessary to sustain that charge have not occurred or have not been discovered despite the exercise of due diligence.” This exception is not applicable here because the trial court found that the prosecution was aware that Vitale’s accident had resulted in two deaths at the time he was prosecuted for failing to reduce speed.
The Oklahoma felony-murder statute under which Harris was convicted, Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, § 701 (3) (1971), provided that homicide is murder “[w]hen perpetrated without any design to elfect death by a person engaged in the commission of any felony.”
We note also that the Illinois Supreme Court did not reach the question whether the lower Illinois courts were correct in dismissing the manslaughter case under the State’s compulsory joinder statute.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Alito
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Due Process and Commerce Clauses forbid the States to tax “‘extraterritorial values.’” Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U. S. 159,164 (1983); see also Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 504 U. S. 768, 777 (1992); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vt, 445 U. S. 425, 441-442 (1980). A State may, however, tax an apportioned share of the value generated by the intrastate and extrastate activities of a multistate enterprise if those activities form part of a “‘unitary business.’” Hunt-Wesson, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 528 U. S. 458, 460 (2000); Mobil Oil Corp., supra, at 438. We have been asked in this case to decide whether the State of Illinois constitutionally taxed an apportioned share of the capital gain realized by an out-of-state corporation on the sale of one of its business divisions. The Appellate Court of Illinois upheld the tax and affirmed a judgment in the State’s favor. Because we conclude that the state courts misapprehended the principles that we have developed for determining whether a multistate business is unitary, we vacate the decision of the Appellate Court of Illinois.
I
A
Mead Corporation (Mead), an Ohio corporation, is the predecessor in interest and a wholly owned subsidiary of petitioner MeadWestvaco Corporation. From its founding in 1846, Mead has been in the business of producing and selling paper, packaging, and school and office supplies. In 1968, Mead paid $6 million to acquire a company called Data Corporation, which owned an inkjet printing technology and a full-text information retrieval system, the latter of which had originally been developed for the U. S. Air Force. Mead was interested in the inkjet printing technology because it would have complemented Mead’s paper business, but the information retrieval system proved to be the more valuable asset. Over the course of many years, Mead developed that asset into the electronic research service now known as Lexis/Nexis (Lexis). In 1994, it sold Lexis to a third party for approximately $1.5 billion, realizing just over $1 billion in capital gain, which Mead used to repurchase stock, retire debt, and pay taxes.
Mead did not report any of this gain as business income on its Illinois tax returns for 1994. It took the position that the gain qualified as nonbusiness income that should be allocated to Mead’s domiciliary State, Ohio, under Illinois’ Income Tax Act (ITA). See Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 35, § 5/303(a) (West 1994). The State audited Mead’s returns and issued a notice of deficiency. According to the State, the ITA required Mead to treat the capital gain as business income subject to apportionment by Illinois. The State assessed Mead with approximately $4 million in additional tax and penalties. Mead paid that amount under protest and then filed this lawsuit in state court.
The case was tried to the bench. Although the court admitted expert testimony, reports, and other exhibits into evidence, see App. D to Pet. for Cert. 29a-34a, the parties’ stipulations supplied most of the evidence of record regarding Mead’s relationship with Lexis, see App. 9-20. We summarize those stipulations here.
B
Lexis was launched in 1973. For the first few years it was in business, it lost money, and Mead had to keep it afloat with additional capital contributions. By the late 1970’s, as more attorneys began to use Lexis, the service finally turned a profit. That profit quickly became substantial. Between 1988 and 1993, Lexis made more than $800 million of the $3.8 billion in Illinois income that Mead reported. Lexis also accounted for $680 million of the $4.5 billion in business expense deductions that Mead claimed from Illinois during that period.
Lexis was subject to Mead’s oversight, but Mead did not manage its day-to-day affairs. Mead was headquartered in Ohio, while a separate management team ran Lexis out of its headquarters in Illinois. The two businesses maintained separate manufacturing, sales, and distribution facilities, as well as separate accounting, legal, human resources, credit and collections, purchasing, and marketing departments. Mead’s involvement was generally limited to approving Lexis’ annual business plan and any significant corporate transactions (such as capital expenditures, financings, mergers and acquisitions, or joint ventures) that Lexis wished to undertake. In at least one case, Mead procured new equipment for Lexis by purchasing the equipment for its own account and then leasing it to Lexis. Mead also managed Lexis’ free cash, which was swept nightly from Lexis’ bank accounts into an account maintained by Mead. The cash was reinvested in Lexis’ business, but Mead decided how to invest it.
Neither business was required to purchase goods or services from the other. Lexis, for example, was not required to purchase its paper supply from Mead, and indeed Lexis purchased most of its paper from other suppliers. Neither received any discount on goods or services purchased from the other, and neither was a significant customer of the other.
Lexis was incorporated as one of Mead’s wholly owned subsidiaries until 1980, when it was merged into Mead and became one of Mead’s divisions. Mead engineered the merger so that it could offset its income with Lexis’ net operating loss carryforwards. Lexis was separately reincorporated in 1985 before being merged back into Mead in 1993. Once again, tax considerations motivated each transaction. Mead also treated Lexis as a unitary business in its consolidated Illinois returns for the years 1988 through 1994, though it did so at the State’s insistence and then only to avoid litigation.
Lexis was listed as one of Mead’s “business segment[s]” in at least some of its annual reports and regulatory filings. Mead described itself in those reports and filings as “engaged in the electronic publishing business” and touted itself as the “developer of the world’s leading electronic information retrieval services for law, patents, accounting, finance, news and business information.” Id., at 93, 59; App. D to Pet. for Cert. 38a.
c
Based on the stipulated facts and the other exhibits and expert testimony received into evidence, the Circuit Court of Cook County concluded that Lexis and Mead did not constitute a unitary business. The trial court reasoned that Lexis and Mead could not be unitary because they were not functionally integrated or centrally managed and enjoyed no economies of scale. Id., at 35a-36a, 39a. The court nevertheless concluded that the State could tax an apportioned share of Mead’s capital gain because Lexis served an “operational purpose” in Mead’s business:
“Lexis/Nexis was considered in the strategic planning of Mead, particularly in the allocation of resources. The operational purpose allowed Mead to limit the growth of Lexis/Nexis if only to limit its ability to expand or to contract through its control of its capital investment.” Id., at 38a-39a.
The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed. Mead Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 371 Ill. App. 3d 108, 861 N. E. 2d 1131 (2007). The court cited several factors as evidence that Lexis served an operational function in Mead’s business: (1) Lexis was wholly owned by Mead; (2) Mead had exercised its control over Lexis in various ways, such as manipulating its corporate form, approving significant capital expenditures, and retaining tax benefits and control over Lexis’ free cash; and (3) Mead had described itself in its annual reports and regulatory filings as engaged in electronic publishing and as the developer of the world’s leading information retrieval service. See id., at 111-112, 861 N. E. 2d, at 1135-1136. Because the court found that Lexis served an operational function in Mead’s business, it did not address the question whether Mead and Lexis formed a unitary business. See id., at 117-118, 861 N. E. 2d, at 1140.
The Supreme Court of Illinois denied review in January 2007. Mead Corp. v. Illinois Dept. of Revenue, 222 Ill. 2d 609, 862 N. E. 2d 235 (Table). We granted certiorari. 551 U. S. 1189 (2007).
II
Petitioner contends that the trial court properly found that Lexis and Mead were not unitary and that the Appellate Court of Illinois erred in concluding that Lexis served an operational function in Mead’s business. According to petitioner, the exception for apportionment of income from non-unitary businesses serving an operational function is a narrow one that does not reach a purely passive investment such as Lexis. We perceive a more fundamental error in the state courts’ reasoning. In our view, the state courts erred in considering whether Lexis served an “operational purpose” in Mead’s business after determining that Lexis and Mead were not unitary.
A
The Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause impose distinct but parallel limitations on a State’s power to tax out-of-state activities. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U. S. 298, 305-306 (1992); Mobil Oil Corp., 445 U. S., at 451, n. 4 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Missouri Tax Comm’n, 390 U. S. 317, 325, n. 5 (1968). The Due Process Clause demands that there exist “ ‘some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax,’” as well as a rational relationship between the tax and the “ ‘ “values connected with the taxing State.” ’ ” Quill Corp., supra, at 306 (quoting Miller Brothers Co. v. Maryland, 347 U. S. 340,344-345 (1954), and Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U. S. 267, 273 (1978)). The Commerce Clause forbids the States to levy taxes that discriminate against interstate commerce or that burden it by subjecting activities to multiple or unfairly apportioned taxation. See Container Corp., 463 U. S., at 170-171; Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U. S. 638, 644 (1984). The “broad inquiry” subsumed in both constitutional requirements is “ ‘whether the taxing power exerted by the state bears fiscal relation to protection, opportunities and benefits given by the state’ ” — that is, “ ‘whether the state has given anything for which it can ask return.’” ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho Tax Comm’n, 458 U. S. 307, 315 (1982) (quoting Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U. S. 435, 444 (1940)).
Where, as here, there is no dispute that the taxpayer has done some business in the taxing State, the inquiry shifts from whether the State may tax to what it may tax. Cf. Allied-Signal, 504 U. S., at 778 (distinguishing Quill Corp., supra). To answer that question, we have developed the unitary business principle. Under that principle, a State need not “isolate the intrastate income-producing activities from the rest of the business” but “may tax an apportioned sum of the corporation’s multistate business if the business is unitary.” Allied-Signal, supra, at 772; accord, HuntWesson, 528 U. S., at 460; Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue of Wis., 447 U. S. 207, 224 (1980); Mobil Oil Corp., supra, at 442; cf. 1 J. Hellerstein & W. Hellerstein, State Taxation ¶ 8.07[1], p. 8-61 (3d ed. 2001-2005) (hereinafter Hellerstein & Hellerstein). The court must determine whether “intrastate and extrastate activities formed part of a single unitary business,” Mobil Oil Corp., supra, at 438-439, or whether the out-of-state values that the State seeks to tax “‘derive[d] from “unrelated business activity” which constitutes a “discrete business enterprise,”’” Allied-Signal, supra, at 773 (quoting Exxon Corp., supra, at 224, in turn quoting Mobil Oil Corp., supra, at 439, 442; alteration in original). We traced the history of this venerable principle in Allied-Signal, supra, at 778-783, and, because it figures prominently in this case, we retrace it briefly here.
B
With the coming of the Industrial Revolution in the 19th century, the United States witnessed the emergence of its first truly multistate business enterprises. These railroad, telegraph, and express companies presented state taxing authorities with a novel problem: A State often cannot tax its fair share of the value of a multistate business by simply taxing the capital within its borders. The whole of the enterprise is generally more valuable than the sum of its parts; were it not, its owners would simply liquidate it and sell it off in pieces. As we observed in 1876, “[t]he track of the road is but one track from one end of it to the other, and, except in its use as one track, is of little value.” State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575, 608.
The unitary business principle addressed this problem by shifting the constitutional inquiry from the niceties of geographic accounting to the determination of the taxpayer’s business unit. If the value the State wished to tax derived from a “unitary business” operated within and without the State, the State could tax an apportioned share of the value of that business instead of isolating the value attributable to the operation of the business within the State. E. g., Exxon Corp., supra, at 223 (citing Moorman Mfg. Co., supra, at 273). Conversely, if the value the State wished to tax derived from a “discrete business enterprise,” Mobil Oil Corp., supra, at 439, then the State could not tax even an apportioned share of that value. E. g., Container Corp., supra, at 165-166.
We recognized as early as 1876 that the Due Process Clause did not require the States to assess trackage “in each county where it lies according to its value there.” State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S., at 608. We went so far as to opine that “[i]t may well be doubted whether any better mode of determining the value of that portion of the track within any one county has been devised than to ascertain the value of the whole road, and apportion the value within the county by its relative length to the whole.” Ibid. We generalized the rule of the State Railroad Tax Cases in Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U. S. 194 (1897). There we held that apportionment could permissibly be applied to a multistate business lacking the “physical unity” of wires or rails but exhibiting the “same unity in the use of the entire property for the specific purpose,” with “the same elements of value arising from such use.” Id., at 221. We extended the reach of the unitary business principle further still in later cases, when we relied on it to justify the taxation by apportionment of net income, dividends, capital gain, and other intangibles. See Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113, 117, 120-121 (1920) (net income tax); Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm’n, 266 U. S. 271, 277, 280, 282-283 (1924) (franchise tax); J. C. Penney Co., supra, at 443-445 (tax on the “privilege of declaring dividends”); cf. Allied-Signal, supra, at 780 (“[F]or constitutional purposes capital gains should be treated as no different from dividends”); see also 1 Hellerstein & Hellerstein ¶ 8.07[1] (summarizing this history).
As the unitary business principle has evolved in step with American enterprise, courts have sometimes found it difficult to identify exactly when a business is unitary. We confronted this problem most recently in Allied-Signal. The taxpayer there, a multistate enterprise, had realized capital gain on the disposition of its minority investment in another business. The parties’ stipulation left little doubt that the taxpayer and its investee were not unitary. See 504 U. S., at 774 (observing that “the question whether the business can be called ‘unitary’ ... is all but controlled by the terms of a stipulation”). The record revealed, however, that the taxpayer had used the proceeds from the liquidated investment in an ultimately unsuccessful bid to purchase a new asset that would have been used in its unitary business. See id., at 776-777. From that wrinkle in the record, the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that the taxpayer’s minority interest had represented nothing more than a temporary investment of working capital awaiting deployment in the taxpayer’s unitary business. See Bendix Corp. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 125 N. J. 20, 37, 592 A. 2d 536, 545 (1991). The State went even further. It argued that, because there could be “no logical distinction between short-term investment of working capital, which all concede is apportionable,.. . and all other investments,” the unitary business principle was outdated and should be jettisoned. 504 U. S., at 784.
We rejected both contentions. We concluded that “the unitary business principle is not so inflexible that as new methods of finance and new forms of business evolve it cannot be modified or supplemented where appropriate.” Id., at 786; see also id., at 785 (“If lower courts have reached divergent results in applying the unitary business principle to different factual circumstances, that is because, as we have said, any number of variations on the unitary business theme 'are logically consistent with the underlying principles motivating the approach’” (quoting Container Corp., 463 U. S., at 167)). We explained that situations could occur in which apportionment might be constitutional even though “the payee and the payor [were] not... engaged in the same unitary business.” 504 U. S., at 787. It was in that context that we observed that an asset could form part of a taxpayer’s unitary business if it served an “operational rather than an investment function” in that business. Ibid. “Hence, for example, a State may include within the apportionable income of a nondomiciliary corporation the interest earned on short-term deposits in a bank located in another State if that income forms part of the working capital of the corporation’s unitary business, notwithstanding the absence of a unitary relationship between the corporation and the bank.” Id., at 787-788. We observed that we had made the same point in Container Corp., where we noted that “capital transactions can serve either an investment function or an operational function.” 46.3 U. S., at 180, n. 19; cf. Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U. S. 46, 50 (1955) (concluding that corn futures contracts in the hands of a corn refiner seeking to hedge itself against increases in corn prices are operational rather than capital assets), cited in Container Corp., supra, at 180, n. 19.
C
As the foregoing history confirms, our references to “operational function” in Container Corp. and Allied-Signal were not intended to modify the unitary business principle by adding a new ground for apportionment. The concept of operational function simply recognizes that an asset can be a part of a taxpayer’s unitary business even if what we may term a “unitary relationship” does not exist between the “payor and payee.” See Allied-Signal, supra, at 791-792 (O’Con-nor, J., dissenting); Hellerstein, State Taxation of Corporate Income From Intangibles: Allied-Signal and Beyond, 48 Tax L. Rev. 739, 790 (1993) (hereinafter Hellerstein). In the example given in Allied-Signal, the taxpayer was not unitary with its banker, but the taxpayer’s deposits (which represented working capital and thus operational assets) were clearly unitary with the taxpayer’s business. In Corn Products, the taxpayer was not unitary with the counterparty to its hedge, but the taxpayer’s futures contracts (which served to hedge against the risk of an increase in the price of a key cost input) were likewise clearly unitary with the taxpayer’s business. In each case, the “payor” was not a unitary part of the taxpayer’s business, but the relevant asset was. The conclusion that the asset served an operational function was merely instrumental to the constitutionally relevant conclusion that the asset was a unitary part of the business being conducted in the taxing State rather than a discrete asset to which the State had no claim. Our decisions in Container Corp. and AUied-Signal did not announce a new ground for the constitutional apportionment of extrastate values in the absence of a unitary business. Because the Appellate Court of Illinois interpreted those decisions to the contrary, it erred.
Where, as here, the asset in question is another business, we have described the “hallmarks” of a unitary relationship as functional integration, centralized management, and economies of scale. See Mobil Oil Corp., 445 U. S., at 438 (citing Butler Brothers v. McColgan, 315 U. S. 501, 506-508 (1942)); see also Allied-Signal, supra, at 783 (same); Container Corp., supra, at 179 (same); F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Dept. of N. M., 458 U. S. 354, 364 (1982) (same). The trial court found each of these hallmarks lacking and concluded that Lexis was not a unitary part of Mead’s business. The appellate court, however, made no such determination. Relying on its operational function test, it reserved judgment on whether Mead and Lexis formed a unitary business. The appellate court may take up that question on remand, and we express no opinion on it now.
Ill
The State and its amici argue that vacatur is not required because the judgment of the Appellate Court of Illinois may be affirmed on an alternative ground. They contend that the record amply demonstrates that Lexis did substantial business in Illinois and that Lexis’ own contacts with the State suffice to justify the apportionment of Mead’s capital gain. See Brief for Respondents 18-25, 46-49; Brief for Multistate Tax Commission as Amicus Curiae 19-29. The State and its amici invite us to recognize a new ground for the constitutional apportionment of intangibles based on the taxing State’s contacts with the capital asset rather than the taxpayer.
We decline this invitation because the question that the State and its amici call upon us to answer was neither raised nor passed upon in the state courts. It also was not addressed in the State’s brief in opposition to the petition. We typically will not address a question under these circumstances even if the answer would afford an alternative ground for affirmance. See Glover v. United States, 531 U. S. 198, 205 (2001) (citing Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U. S. 638, 646 (1992)); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U. S. 525,578 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
The case for restraint is particularly compelling here, since the question may impact the law of other jurisdictions. The States of Ohio and New York, for example, have both adopted the rationale for apportionment that respondents urge us to recognize today. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§5733.051(E)-(F) (West 2007); N. Y. Tax Law Ann. §210, subd. 3, par. (b) (West Supp. 2008); see also Allied-Signal Inc. v. Department of Taxation & Finance, 229 App. Div. 2d 759, 762, 645 N. Y. S. 2d 895, 898 (3d Dept. 1996) (finding that a “sufficient nexus existed between New York and the dividend and capital gain income” of the nondomiciliary parent because “the corporations generating the income taxed . . . each have their own connection with the taxing jurisdiction”); 1 Hellerstein & Hellerstein ¶ 9.11[2][a]. Neither Ohio nor New York has appeared as an amicus in this case, and neither was on notice that the constitutionality of its tax scheme was at issue, the question having been raised for the first time in the State’s brief on the merits. So postured, the question is best left for another day.
IV
The judgment of the Appellate Court of Illinois is vacated, and this case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
See Prospectus of MeadWestvaco Corporation S-3 (Mar. 19,2003), online at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1159297/000119312503085265/ d424b5.htm (as visited Apr. 1, 2008, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file); App. 9.
When the sale of Lexis occurred in 1994, the ITA defined “business income” as “income arising from transactions and activity in the regular course of the taxpayer’s trade or business,” as well as “income from tangible and intangible property if the acquisition, management, and disposition of the property constitute integral parts of the taxpayer’s regular trade or business operations.” 111. Comp. Stat., ch. 35, § 5/1501(a)(l) (West 1994). This language mirrors the definition of “business income” in the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA). See UDITPA § 1(a) (2002); see also §9 (subjecting “[a]ll business income” to apportionment). In 2004, the Illinois General Assembly amended the definition of “business income” to “all income that may be treated as apportionable business income under the Constitution of the United States.” Pub. Act 93-840, Art. 25, § 25-5 (codified at Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 35, § 5/1501(a)(l) (West 2004)); cf. Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 504 U. S. 768,786 (1992) (declining to adopt UDITPA’s “business income” test as the constitutional standard for apportionment).
The dissent agreed that the unitary business principle remained sound, 504 U. S., at 790 (opinion of O’Connor, J.), but found merit in New Jersey’s premise (and the New Jersey Supreme Court’s conclusion) that no logical distinction could be drawn between short- or long-term investments for purposes of unitary analysis, id., at 793 (“Any distinction between short-term and long-term investments cannot be of constitutional dimension”). We need not revisit that question here.
Resolving this question now probably would not spare the State a remand. The State calculated petitioner’s tax liability by applying the State’s tax rate to Mead’s apportioned business income, which in turn was calculated by applying Mead’s apportionment percentage to its apportion-able business income. See App. 28; Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 35, § 57304(a) (West 1994). But if a constitutionally sufficient link between the State and the value it wished to tax is founded on the State’s contacts with Lexis rather than Mead, then presumably the apportioned tax base should be determined by applying the State’s four-factor apportionment formula not to Mead but to Lexis. Naturally, applying the formula to Lexis rather than Mead would yield a different apportionment percentage. See Brief for Multistate Tax Commission as Amicus Curiae 18-19, and n. 9; see also Hellerstein 802-803.
The Multistate Tax Commission seems to argue that the difference would not affect the result because application of the formula to Lexis would have yielded a higher apportionment percentage. See Brief for Multistate Tax Commission 18-19. Amicus argues, in other words, that petitioner has no cause to complain because it caught a break in the incorrect application of a lower apportionment percentage. Amicus’ argument assumes what we are in no position to decide: that Lexis’ own apportioned tax base was properly calculated. Had petitioner been on notice that Lexis, rather than Mead, would supply the relevant apportionment percentage, it might have persuaded the state courts that Lexis’ apportionment percentage should have been even lower than Mead’s. The State’s untimely resort to an alternative ground for affirmance may have denied petitioner a fair opportunity to make that argument.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
In these two cases, two panels of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that sentencing courts could not consider conduct of the defendants underlying charges of which they had been acquitted. United States v. Watts, 67 F. 3d 790 (CA9 1995) (Watts); United States v. Putra, 78 F. 3d 1386 (CA9 1996) (Putra). Every other Court of Appeals has held that a sentencing court may do so, if the Government establishes that conduct by a preponderance of the evidence. The Government filed a single petition for cer-tiorari seeking review of both cases, pursuant to this Court’s Rule 12.4, to resolve this split. Because the panels’ holdings conflict with the clear implications of 18 U. S. C. §3661, the Sentencing Guidelines, and this Court’s decisions, particularly Witte v. United States, 515 U. S. 389 (1995), we grant the petition and reverse in both cases.
In Watts, police discovered cocaine base in a kitchen cabinet and two loaded guns and ammunition hidden in a bedroom closet of Watts’ house. A jury convicted Watts of possessing cocaine base with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 841(a)(1), but acquitted him of using a firearm in relation to a drug offense, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 924(c). Despite Watts’ acquittal on the firearms count, the District Court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Watts had possessed the guns in connection with the drug offense. In calculating Watts’ sentence, the court therefore added two points to his base offense level under United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual §2D1.1(b)(1) (Nov. 1995) (USSG). The Court of Appeals vacated the sentence, holding that “a sentencing judge may not, 'under any standard of proof,’ rely on facts of which the defendant was acquitted.” 67 F. 3d, at 797 (quoting United States v. Brady, 928 F. 2d 844, 851, and n. 12 (CA9 1991), abrogated on other grounds, Nichols v. United States, 511 U. S. 738 (1994)) (emphasis added in Watts). The Government argued that the District Court could have enhanced Watts’ sentence without considering facts “necessarily rejected” by the jury’s acquittal on the § 924(c) charge because the sentencing enhancement did not require a connection between the firearm and the predicate offense, whereas § 924(c) did. The court rejected this argument, stated that both the enhancement and § 924(c) involved such a connection, and held that the District Court had impermissibly “reconsider[ed] facts that the jury necessarily rejected by its acquittal of the defendant on another count.” 67 F. 3d, at 796.
In Putra, authorities had videotaped two transactions in which Putra and a codefendant (a major drug dealer) sold cocaine to a Government informant. The indictment charged Putra with, among other things, one count of aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute one ounce of cocaine on May 8, 1992; and a second count of aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute five ounces of cocaine on May 9, 1992, both in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U. S. C. § 2. The jury convicted Putra on the first count but acquitted her on the second. At sentencing, however, the District Court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Putra had indeed been involved in the May 9 transaction. The District Court explained that the second sale was relevant conduct under USSG § 1B1.3, and it therefore calculated Putra’s base offense level under the Guidelines by aggregating the amounts of both sales. As in Watts, the Court of Appeals vacated and remanded for resentencing. Reasoning that the jury’s verdict of acquittal manifested an “explicit rejection” of Putra’s involvement in the May 9 transaction, the Court of Appeals held that “allowing an increase in Putra’s sentence would be effectively punishing her for an offense for which she has been acquitted.” 78 F. 3d, at 1389. The panel explained that it was imposing “a judicial limitation on the facts the district court may consider at sentencing, beyond any limitation imposed by the Guidelines.” Ibid. Then-Chief Judge Wallace dissented, arguing that the panel’s “sweeping language contradicts the Guidelines, our practice prior to enactment of the Guidelines, decisions of other circuits, and recent Supreme Court authority.” Id., at 1390.
We begin our analysis with 18 U. S. C. § 3661, which codifies the longstanding principle that sentencing courts have broad discretion to consider various kinds of information. The statute states:
“No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.”
We reiterated this principle in Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241 (1949), in which a defendant convicted of murder and sentenced to death challenged the sentencing court’s reliance on information that the defendant had been involved in 30 burglaries of which he had not been convicted. We contrasted the different limitations on presentation of evidence at trial and at sentencing: “Highly relevant — if not essential — to [the judge’s] selection of an appropriate sentence is the possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant’s life and characteristics.” Id., at 247 (footnote omitted); see Nichols, supra, at 747 (noting that sentencing courts have traditionally and constitutionally “considered a defendant’s past criminal behavior, even if no conviction resulted from that behavior”) (citing Williams, supra); BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U. S. 559, 573, n. 19 (1996) (“A sentencing judge may even consider past criminal behavior which did not result in a conviction”) (citing Williams, supra). Neither the broad language of § 3661 nor our holding in Williams suggests any basis for the courts to invent a blanket prohibition against considering certain types of evidence at sentencing. Indeed, under the pre-Guidelines sentencing regime, it was “well established that a sentencing judge may take into account facts introduced at trial relating to other charges, even ones of which the defendant has been acquitted.” United States v. Donelson, 695 F. 2d 583, 590 (CADC 1982) (Scalia, J.).
The Guidelines did not alter this aspect of the sentencing court’s discretion. “ ‘[V]ery roughly speaking, [relevant conduct] corresponds to those actions and circumstances that courts typically took into account when sentencing prior to the Guidelines’ enactment.’ ” Witte, supra, at 402 (quoting United States v. Wright, 873 F. 2d 437, 441 (CA1 1989) (Breyer, J.)). Section IB 1.4 of the Guidelines reflects the policy set forth in 18 U. S. C. § 3661:
“In determining the sentence to impose within the guideline range, or whether a departure from the guidelines is warranted, the court may consider, without limitation, any information concerning the background, character and conduct of the defendant, unless otherwise prohibited by law. See 18 U. S. C. §3661.”
Section 1B1.3, in turn, describes in sweeping language the conduct that a sentencing court may consider in determining the applicable guideline range. The commentary to that section states: “Conduct that is not formally charged or is not an element of the offense of conviction may enter into the determination of the applicable guideline sentencing range.” USSG § 1B1.3, comment., backg’d. With respect to certain offenses, such as Putra’s drug conviction, USSG § lB1.3(a)(2) requires the sentencing court to consider “all acts and omissions . . . that were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction.” Application Note 3 explains that “[application of this provision does not require the defendant, in fact, to have been convicted of multiple counts.” The Note also gives the following example:
“[Wjhere the defendant engaged in three drug sales of 10, 15, and 20 grams of cocaine, as part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan, subsection (a)(2) provides that the total quantity of cocaine involved (45 grams) is to be used to determine the offense level even if the defendant is convicted of a single count charging only one of the sales.”
Accordingly, the Guidelines conclude that “[r]elying on the entire range of conduct, regardless of the number of counts that are alleged or on which a conviction is obtained, appears to be the most reasonable approach to writing workable guidelines for these offenses.” USSG §1B1.3, comment., backg’d (emphasis added).
Although Justice Stevens’ dissent concedes that a district court may properly consider “evidence adduced in a trial that resulted in an acquittal” when choosing a particular sentence within a guideline range, it argues that the court must close its eyes to acquitted conduct at earlier stages of the sentencing process because the “broadly inclusive language of §3661” is incorporated only into §1B1.4 of the Guidelines. Post, at 162. This argument ignores §1B1.3 which, as we have noted, directs sentencing courts to consider all other related conduct, whether or not it resulted in a conviction. Justice Stevens also contends that because Congress instructed the Sentencing Commission, in 28 U. S. C. § 994(7), to ensure that the Guidelines provide incremental punishment for a defendant who is convicted of multiple offenses, it could not have meant for the Guidelines to increase a sentence based on offenses of which a defendant has been acquitted. Post, at 168. The statute is not, however, “cast in restrictive or exclusive terms.” United States v. Ebbole, 917 F. 2d 1495, 1501 (CA7 1990). Far from limiting a sentencing court’s power to consider uncharged or acquitted conduct, § 994(7) simply ensures that, at a minimum, the Guidelines provide additional penalties when defendants are convicted of multiple offenses. Ibid. If we accepted Justice Stevens’ logic, §994(J) would prohibit a district court from considering acquitted conduct for any sentencing purposes, whether for setting the guidelines range or for choosing a sentence within that range — a novel proposition that Justice Stevens does not defend. Post, at 162. In short, we are convinced that a sentencing court may consider conduct of which a defendant has been acquitted.
The Court of Appeals’ position to the contrary not only conflicts with the implications of the Guidelines, but it also seems to be based on erroneous views of our double jeopardy jurisprudence. The Court of Appeals asserted that, when a sentencing court considers facts underlying a charge on which the jury returned a verdict of not guilty, the defendant “ ‘suffer[s] punishment for a criminal charge for which he or she was acquitted.’ ” Watts, 67 F. 3d, at 797 (quoting Brady, 928 F. 2d, at 851). As we explained in Witte, however, sentencing enhancements do not punish a defendant for crimes of which he was not convicted, but rather increase his sentence because of the manner in which he committed the crime of conviction. 515 U. S., at 402-403. In Witte, we held that a sentencing court could, consistent with the Double Jeopardy Clause, consider uncharged cocaine importation in imposing a sentence on marijuana charges that was within the statutory range, without precluding the defendant’s subsequent prosecution for the cocaine offense. We concluded that “consideration of information about the defendant’s character and conduct at sentencing does not result in ‘punishment’ for any offense other than the one of which the defendant was convicted.” Id., at 401. Rather, the defendant is “punished only for the fact that the present offense was carried out in a manner that warrants increased punishment . . . .” Id., at 403; see also Nichols, 511 U. S., at 747.
The Court of Appeals likewise misunderstood the preclu-sive effect of an acquittal, when it asserted that a jury “ ‘reject[s]’ ” some facts when it returns a general verdict of not guilty. Putra, 78 F. 3d, at 1389 (quoting Brady, supra, at 851). The Court of Appeals failed to appreciate the significance of the different standards of proof that govern at trial and sentencing. We have explained that “acquittal on criminal charges does not prove that the defendant is innocent; it merely proves the existence of a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.” United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U. S. 354, 361 (1984). As then-Chief Judge Wallace pointed out in his dissent in Putra, it is impossible to know exactly why a jury found a defendant not guilty on a certain charge.
“[A]n acquittal is not a finding of any fact. An acquittal can only be an acknowledgment that the government failed to prove an essential element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Without specific jury findings, no one can logically or realistically draw any factual finding inferences ....” 78 F. 3d, at 1394.
Thus, contrary to the Court of Appeals’ assertion in Brady, supra, at 851, the jury cannot be said to have “necessarily rejected” any facts when it returns a general verdict of not guilty.
For these reasons, “an acquittal in a criminal case does not preclude the Government from relitigating an issue when it is presented in a subsequent action governed by a lower standard of proof.” Dowling v. United States, 493 U. S. 342, 349 (1990). The Guidelines state that it is “appropriate” that facts relevant to sentencing be proved by a preponderance of the evidence, USSG §6A1.3, comment., and we have held that application of the preponderance standard at sentencing generally satisfies due process. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U. S. 79, 91-92 (1986); Nichols, supra, at 747-748. We acknowledge a divergence of opinion among the Circuits as to whether, in extreme circumstances, relevant conduct that would dramatically increase the sentence must be based on clear and convincing evidence. The cases before us today do not present such exceptional circumstances, and we therefore do not address that issue. We therefore hold that a jury’s verdict of acquittal does not prevent the sentencing court from considering conduct underlying the acquitted charge, so long as that conduct has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred in both cases before us today. In Putra, the jury simply found that the prosecution had not proved the defendant’s complicity in the May 9 sale beyond a reasonable doubt. The acquittal sheds no light on whether a preponderance of the evidence established Putra’s participation in that transaction. Likewise, in Watts, the jury acquitted the defendant of using or carrying a firearm during or in relation to the drug offense. That verdict does not preclude a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant did, in fact, use or carry such a weapon, much less that he simply possessed the weapon in connection with a drug offense.
The petition for certiorari is granted, the judgments of the Court of Appeals are reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Respondent Putra’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. The motion of Morris L. Whitman for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae is granted.
It is so ordered.
United States v. Boney, 977 F. 2d 624, 635-636 (CADC 1992); United States v. Mocciola, 891 F. 2d 13, 16-17 (CA1 1989) (criticized in dicta in United States v. Lanoue, 71 F. 3d 966, 984 (CA1 1995)); United States v. Rodriguez-Gonzalez, 899 F. 2d 177, 180-182 (CA2), cert. denied, 498 U. S. 844 (1990); United States v. Ryan, 866 F. 2d 604, 608-609 (CA3 1989); United States v. Isom, 886 F. 2d 736, 738-739 (CA4 1989); United States v. Juarez-Ortega, 866 F. 2d 747, 748-749 (CA5 1989) (per curiam); United States v. Milton, 27 F. 3d 203, 208-209 (CA6 1994), cert. denied, 513 U. S. 1085 (1995); United States v. Fonner, 920 F. 2d 1330, 1332-1333 (CA7 1990); United States v. Dawn, 897 F. 2d 1444, 1449-1450 (CA8), cert. denied, 498 U. S. 960 (1990); United States v. Coleman, 947 F. 2d 1424, 1428-1429 (CA10 1991), cert. denied, 503 U. S. 972 (1992); United States v. Averi, 922 F. 2d 765, 765-766 (CA11 1991) (per curiam).
See McMillan, 477 U. S., at 88 (upholding use of preponderance standard where there was no allegation that the sentencing enhancement was “a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense”); Kinder v. United States, 504 U. S. 946, 948-949 (1992) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (acknowledging split); United States v. Kikumura, 918 F. 2d 1084, 1102 (CA3 1990) (holding that clear-and-convincing standard is implicit in 18 U. S. C. § 3553(b), which requires a sentencing court to “find” certain facts in order to justify certain large upward departures; not reaching the due process issue); United States v. Gigante, 39 F. 3d 42, 48 (CA2 1994), as amended, 94 F. 3d 53, 56 (1996) (not reaching due process issue; “In our view, the preponderance standard is no more than a threshold basis for adjustments and departures, and the weight of the evidence, at some point along a continuum of sentence severity, should be considered with regard to both upward adjustments and upward departures. . . . Where a higher standard, appropriate to a substantially enhanced sentence range, is not met, the court should depart downwardly”); United States v. Lombard, 72 F. 3d 170, 186-187 (CA1 1995) (authorizing downward departure in “an unusual and perhaps a singular case” that may have “exceeded” constitutional limits, where acquitted conduct calling for an “enormous” sentence enhancement “is itself very serious conduct,” “where the ultimate sentence is itself enormous, and where the judge is seemingly mandated to impose that sentence”); see also United States v. Townley, 929 F. 2d 365, 369 (CA8 1991) (“At the very least, McMillan allows for the possibility that the preponderance standard the Court approved for garden variety sentencing determinations may fail to comport with dqe process where, as here, a sentencing enhancement factor becomes ‘a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense’ ”) (quoting McMillan, supra, at 88); United States v. Restrepo, 946 F. 2d 654, 656, n. 1 (CA9 1991) (en bane) (suggesting that clear-and-convincing evidence might be required for extraordinary upward adjustments or departures), cert. denied, 503 U. S. 961 (1992); United States v. Lam Kwong-Wah, 966 F. 2d 682, 688 (CADC) (same), cert. denied, 506 U. S. 901 (1992); United States v. Trujillo, 959 F. 2d 1377, 1382 (CA7) (same), cert. denied, 506 U. S. 897 (1992). But see United States v. Washington, 11 F. 3d 1510, 1516 (CA10 1993) (“At least as concerns making guideline calculations the issue of a higher than a preponderance standard is foreclosed in this circuit”), cert. denied, 511 U. S. 1020 (1994).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Opinion of the Court by
Mr. Justice Douglas,
announced by Mr. Justice Reed.
Petitioners were adjudged guilty of constructive criminal contempt by the County Court of Nueces County, Texas, and sentenced to jail for three days. They sought to challenge the legality of their confinement by applying to the Court of Criminal Appeals for a writ of habeas corpus. That court by a divided vote denied the writ and remanded petitioners to the custody of the county sheriff. 149 Tex. Cr. —, 193 S. W. 2d 178. The case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari which we granted because of the importance of the problem and because the ruling of the Texas court raised doubts whether it conformed to the principles announced in Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, and Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U. S. 331.
Petitioners are a publisher, an editorial writer, and a news reporter of newspapers published in Corpus Christi, Texas. The County Court had before it a forcible de-tainer case, Jackson v. Mayes, whereby Jackson sought to regain possession from Mayes of a business building in Corpus Christi which Mayes (who was at the time in the armed services and whose affairs were being handled by an agent, one Burchard) claimed under a lease. That case turned on whether Mayes’ lease was forfeited because of non-payment of rent. At the close of the testimony each side moved for an instructed verdict. The judge instructed the jury to return a verdict for Jackson. That was on May 26, 1945. The jury returned with a verdict for Mayes. The judge refused to accept it and again instructed the jury to return a verdict for Jackson. The jury returned a second time with a verdict for Mayes. Once more the judge refused to accept it and repeated his prior instruction. It being the evening of May 26th and the jury not having complied, the judge recessed the court until the morning of May 27th. Again the jury balked at returning the instructed verdict. But finally it complied, stating that it acted under coercion of the court and against its conscience.
On May 29th Mayes moved for a new trial. That motion was denied on June 6th. On June 4th an officer of the County Court filed with that court a complaint charging petitioners with contempt by publication. The publications referred to were an editorial and news stories published on May 26, 27, 28, 30, and 31 in the newspapers with which petitioners are connected. We have set forth the relevant parts of the publications in the appendix to this opinion. Browning, the judge, who is a layman and who holds an elective office, was criticised for taking the case from the jury. That ruling was called “arbitrary action” and a “travesty on justice.” It was deplored that a layman, rather than a lawyer, sat as judge. Groups of local citizens were reported as petitioning the judge to grant Mayes a new trial and it was said that one group had labeled the judge’s ruling as a “gross miscarriage of justice.” It was also said that the judge’s behavior had properly brought down “the wrath of public opinion upon his head,” that the people were aroused because a service man “seems to be getting a raw deal,” and that there was “no way of knowing whether justice was done, because the first rule of justice, giving both sides an opportunity to be heard, was repudiated.” And the fact that there could be no appeal from the judge’s ruling to a court “familiar with proper procedure and able to interpret and weigh motions and arguments by opposing counsel” was deplored.
The trial judge concluded that the reports and editorial were designed falsely to represent to the public the nature of the proceedings and to prejudice and influence the court in its ruling on the motion for a new trial then pending. Petitioners contended at the hearing that all that was reported did no more than to create the same impression that would have been created upon the mind of an average intelligent layman who sat through the trial. They disclaimed any purpose to impute unworthy motives to the judge or to advise him how the case should be decided or to bring the court into disrepute. The purpose was to “quicken the conscience of the judge” and to “make him more careful in discharging his duty.”
The Court of Criminal Appeals, in denying the writ of habeas corpus, stated that the “issue before us” is “whether the publications . . . were reasonably calculated to interfere with the due administration of justice” in the pending case. 193 S. W. 2d p. 186. It held that “there is no escape from the conclusion that it was the purpose and intent of the publishers ... to force, compel, and coerce Judge Browning to grant Mayes a new trial. The only reason or motive for so doing was because the publishers did not agree with Judge Browning’s decision or conduct of the case. According to their viewpoint, Judge Browning was wrong and they took it upon themselves to make him change his decision.” Id.., pp. 188-189. The court went on to say that “It is hard to conceive how the public press could have been more forcibly or substantially used or applied to make, force, and compel a judge to change a ruling or decision in a case pending before him than was here done.” Id., p. 189. The court distinguished the Bridges case, noting that there the published statements carried threats of future adverse criticism and action on the part of the publisher if the pending matter was not disposed of in accordance with the views of the publisher, that the views of the publisher in the matter were already well-known, and that the Bridges case was not private litigation but a suit in the outcome of which the public had an interest. Id., p. 188. It concluded that the facts of this case satisfied the “clear and present danger” rule of the Bridges case. That test was, in the view of the court, satisfied “because the publications and their purpose were to impress upon Judge Browning (a) that unless he granted the motion for a new trial he would be subjected to suspicion as to his integrity and fairness and to odium and hatred in the public mind; (b) that the safe and secure course to avoid the criticism of the press and public opinion would be to grant the motion and disqualify himself from again presiding at the trial of the case; and (c) that if he overruled the motion for a new trial, there would be produced in the public mind such a disregard for the court over which he presided as to give rise to a purpose in practice to refuse to respect and obey any order, judgment, or decree which he might render in conflict with the views of the public press.” Id., p. 189.
The court’s statement of the issue before it and the reasons it gave for holding that the “clear and present danger” test was satisfied have a striking resemblance to the findings which the Court in Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U. S. 402, held adequate to sustain an adjudication of contempt by publication. That case held that comment on a pending case in a federal court was punishable by contempt if it had a “reasonable tendency” to obstruct the administration of justice. We revisited that case in Nye v. United States, 313 U. S. 33, 52, and disapproved it. And in Bridges v. California, supra, we held that the compulsion of the Eirst Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth (Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U. S. 147; Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105, 108) forbade the punishment by contempt for comment on pending cases in absence of a showing that the utterances created a “clear and present danger” to the administration of justice. 314 17. S. pp. 260-264. We reaffirmed and reapplied that standard in Pennekamp v. Florida, supra, which also involved comment on matters pending before the court. We stated, p. 347:
“Courts must have power to protect the interests of prisoners and litigants before them from unseemly efforts to pervert judicial action. In the borderline instances where it is difficult to say upon which side the alleged offense falls, we think the specific freedom of public comment should weigh heavily against a possible tendency to influence pending cases. Freedom of discussion should be given the widest range compatible with the essential requirement of the fair and orderly administration of justice.”
Neither those eases nor the present one raises questions concerning the full reach of the power of the state to protect the administration of justice by its courts. The problem presented is only a narrow, albeit important, phase of that problem — the power of a court promptly and without a jury trial to punish for comment on cases pending before it and awaiting disposition. The history of the power to punish for contempt (see Nye v. United States, supra; Bridges v. California, supra) and the unequivocal command of the First Amendment serve as constant reminders that freedom of speech and of the press should not be impaired through the exercise of that power, unless there is no doubt that the utterances in question are a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice.
In a case where it is asserted that a person has been deprived by a state court of a fundamental right secured by the Constitution, an independent examination of the facts by this Court is often required to be made. See Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587, 590; Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354, 358; Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227, 228-229; Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219, 237-238; Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143, 147-148. This is such a case.
We start with the news articles. A trial is a public event. What transpires in the court room is public property. If a transcript of the court proceedings had been published, we suppose none would claim that the judge could punish the publisher for contempt. And we can see no difference though the conduct of the attorneys, of the jury, or even of the judge himself, may have reflected on the court. Those who see and hear what transpired can report it with impunity. There is no special perquisite of the judiciary which enables it, as distinguished from other institutions of democratic government, to suppress, edit, or censor events which transpire in proceedings before it.
The articles of May 26, 27, and 28 were partial reports of what transpired at the trial. They did not reflect good reporting, for they failed to reveal the precise issue before the judge. They said that Mayes, the tenant, had tendered a rental check. They did not disclose that the rental check was post-dated and hence, in the opinion of the judge, not a valid tender. In that sense the news articles were by any standard an unfair report of what transpired. But inaccuracies in reporting are commonplace. Certainly a reporter could not be laid by the heels for contempt because he missed the essential point in a trial or failed to summarize the issues to accord with the views of the judge who sat on the case. Conceivably, a plan of reporting on a case could be so designed and executed as to poison the public mind, to cause a march on the court house, or otherwise so disturb the delicate balance in a highly wrought situation as to imperil the fair and orderly functioning of the judicial process. But it takes more imagination than we possess to find in this rather sketchy and one-sided report of a case any imminent or serious threat to a judge of reasonable fortitude. See Pennekamp v. Florida, supra.
The accounts of May 30 and 31 dealt with the news of what certain groups of citizens proposed to do about the judge’s ruling in the case. So far as we are advised, it was a fact that they planned to take the proposed action. The episodes were community events of legitimate interest. Whatever might be the responsibility of the group which took the action, those who reported it stand in a different position. Even if the former were guilty of contempt, freedom of the press may not be denied a newspaper which brings their conduct to the public eye.
The only substantial question raised pertains to the editorial. It called the judge’s refusal to hear both sides “high handed,” a “travesty on justice,” and the reason that public opinion was “outraged.” It said that his ruling properly “brought down the wrath of public opinion upon his head” since a service man “seems to be getting a raw deal.” The fact that there was no appeal from his decision to a “judge who is familiar with proper procedure and able to interpret and weigh motions and arguments by opposing counsel and to make his decisions accordingly” was a “tragedy.” It deplored the fact that the judge was a “layman” and not a “competent attorney.” It concluded that the “first rule of justice” was to give both sides an opportunity to be heard and when that rule was “repudiated,” there was “no way of knowing whether justice was done.”
This was strong language, intemperate language, and, we assume, an unfair criticism. But a judge may not hold in contempt one “who ventures to publish anything that tends to make him unpopular or to belittle him . . . .” See Craig v. Hecht, 263 U. S. 255, 281, Mr. Justice Holmes dissenting. The vehemence of the language used is not alone the measure of the power to punish for contempt. The fires which it kindles must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat to the administration of justice. The danger must not be remote or even probable; it must immediately imperil.
We agree with the court below that the editorial must be appraised in the setting of the news articles which both preceded and followed it. It must also be appraised in light of the community environment which prevailed at that time. The fact that the jury was recalcitrant and balked, the fact that it acted under coercion and contrary to its conscience and said so were some index of popular opinion. A judge who is part of such a dramatic episode can hardly help but know that his decision is apt to be unpopular. But the law of contempt is not made for the protection of judges who may be sensitive to the winds of public opinion. Judges are supposed to be men of fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy climate. Conceivably a campaign could be so managed and so aimed at the sensibilities of a particular judge and the matter pending before him as to cross the forbidden line. But the episodes we have here do not fall in that category. Nor can we assume that the trial judge was not a man of fortitude.
The editorial’s complaint was two-fold. One objection or criticism was that a layman rather than a lawyer sat on the bench. That is legitimate comment; and its relevancy could hardly be denied at least where judges are elected. In the circumstances of the present case, it amounts at the very most to an intimation that come the next election the newspaper in question will not support the incumbent. But it contained no threat to oppose him in the campaign if the decision on the merits was not overruled, nor any implied reward if it was changed. Judges who stand for reelection run on their records. That may be a rugged environment. Criticism is expected. Discussion of their conduct is appropriate, if not necessary. The fact that the discussion at this particular point of time was not in good taste falls far short of meeting the clear and present danger test.
The other complaint of the editorial was directed at the court’s procedure — its failure to hear both sides before the case was decided. There was no attempt to pass on the merits of the case. The editorial, indeed, stated that there was no way of knowing whether justice was done. That criticism of the court’s procedure — that it decided the case without giving both sides a chance to be heard— reduces the salient point of the case to a narrow issue. If the point had been made in a petition for rehearing, and reduced to lawyer’s language, it would be of trifling consequence. The fact that it was put in layman’s language, colorfully phrased for popular consumption, and printed in a newspaper does not seem to us to elevate it to the criminal level. It might well have a tendency to lower the standing of the judge in the public eye. But it is hard to see on these facts how it could obstruct the course of justice in the case before the court. The only demand was for a hearing. There was no demand that the judge reverse his position — or else.
“Legal trials are not^ like elections, to be won through the use of the meeting-hall, the radio, and the newspaper.” Bridges v. California, supra, p. 271. But there was here no threat or menace to the integrity of the trial. The editorial challenged the propriety of the court's procedure, not the merits of its ruling. Any such challenge, whether made prior or subsequent to the final disposition of a case, would likely reflect on the competence of the judge in handling cases. But as we have said, the power to punish for contempt depends on a more substantial showing. Giving the editorial all of the vehemence which the court below found in it we fail to see how it could in any realistic sense create an imminent and serious threat to the ability of the court to give fair consideration to the motion for rehearing.
There is a suggestion that the case is different from Bridges v. California, supra, in that we have here only private litigation, while in the Bridges case labor controversies were involved, some of them being criminal cases. The thought apparently is that the range of permissible comment is greater where the pending case generates a public concern. The nature of the case may, of course, be relevant in determining whether the clear and present danger test is satisfied. But, the rule of the Bridges and Pennekamp cases is fashioned to serve the needs of all litigation, not merely select types of pending cases.
Reversed.
[For concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Murphy, see post, p. 383. For dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Jackson, see post, pp. 384, 394.]
APPENDIX.
On May 26,1945, a news item stated:
“Burehard further claimed that although he had not known of the option clause, when he learned of it he had immediately proffered a check for $275 rental.”
On May 27,1945, there was a news item which stated:
“At 7 p. m. Browning, without listening to argument from counsel for either side on a plaintiff’s motion presented by Dudley Tarlton for Jackson, and without giving the six-man jury opportunity to weigh the evidence, instructed the jury to find against Mayes.
“Walter M. Lewright, Mayes’ attorney, protested that the court’s arbitrary action had ruled that Tarl-ton’s ‘one-page motion’ did not need supporting argument and citation of authorities.”
On May 28,1945, an article said:
“Browning accepted Tarlton’s one-page motion, and without permitting argument or citation of authorities to support the motion, ruled that it be granted. The effect of this ruling was that Browning took the matter from the jury.”
That article also included the following statement made by Mayes’ attorney to the jury on May 27,1945:
“However, I now advise you that under the law, Judge Browning has the right to compel you, even against the dictates of your conscience, to sign the verdict he has ordered.
“As a matter of fact, it is probable that he has the power to put you in jail until such time as you do sign it, and I rather imagine, from what has heretofore taken place in this trial, that unless you do sign the verdict, he will cause you to be put in jail.
“As I and my clients feel that you have done all in your power to register your protest and revulsion of feeling at the effect of this decision reached by Judge Browning; as you are helpless to do anything further; and as making you suffer by remaining locked up will not do us a bit of good, I suggest that you sign the verdict and return to your homes with a clear conscience of having done all that you could to.protect the rights of a man whom I feel, and evidently you feel, has been done a gross injustice.
“While we have no appeal from the court’s decision in this case, we do have the right again to appeal to his conscience by presenting a motion for new trial in this action — and which motion we will file and argue strenuously with the hope that in the meantime he will see the error committed and will rectify the same.
“There cannot be any doubt but that the action of you men in registering your protest against this decision, as you have done, will affect him. At least, I can only hope that it will. I sincerely thank you.”
On May 30,1945, an editorial stated:
“Browning’s behavior and attitude has brought down the wrath of public opinion upon his head, properly so. Emotions have been aggravated. American people simply don’t like the idea of such goings on, especially when a man in the service of his country seems to be getting a raw deal . . . Then the plaintiff’s counsel offered a motion for an instructed verdict for his client. It was granted immediately, without having him cite his authority or without giving the defendant’s attorney a chance to argue against it.
“That was the travesty on justice, the judge’s refusal to hear both sides. That’s where a legal background would have served him in good stead. It is difficult to believe that any lawyer, even a hack, would have followed such high handed procedure in instructing a jury. It’s no wonder that the jury balked and public opinion is outraged.
“The fact that a serviceman is involved lends drama to the event. But it could have happened to anyone, it can happen to anyone, with a layman sitting as judge in a case where fine points of law are involved. True, the idea that only lawyers are qualified to occupy most public offices has been run into the ground, and in most instances a competent layman would be better qualified, but the county judge’s office is an exception. He should be a competent attorney as well as a competent businessman.
“It’s the tragedy in a case of this sort that the court where the controversial decision was handed down is the court of last resort. It’s too bad that appeal can’t be made to a district court and heard by a judge who is familiar with proper procedure and able to interpret and weigh motions and arguments by opposing counsel and to make his decisions accordingly . . . There is no way of knowing whether justice was done, because the first rule of justice, giving both sides an opportunity to be heard, was repudiated.”
On May 30,1945, there appeared a report of a resolution passed by the Sailor’s and Soldier’s Advisory Council of Corpus Christi “labeling County Judge Joe D. Browning’s order for a directed verdict against Mayes a ‘gross miscarriage of justice.’ ” That article further stated:
“The council’s resolution called on Browning to grant Mayes a new trial on the grounds that he had committed an error in instructing the jury to find for the plaintiff. The petition asked that Browning, upon granting the new trial, should disqualify himself to further sit as judge in the trial, and should permit the trial to be retried before another judge and jury . . . The trial reached a climax Saturday night when Browning, on motion of Dudley Tarlton, Jackson’s counsel, and without argument or citation of authority, instructed the six-man County Court jury to find for Jackson. The jury twice refused, both times bringing in verdicts in favor of Mayes and against Jackson.
“Browning had the jury confined to the court house jury room all Saturday night. Sunday morning, when the court convened, the jury reported that it still had not signed the verdict in favor of Jackson.
“Browning announced that he would lock the jury up again until Monday morning. However, Walter M. Lewright advised the jurymen that they should not continue to 'suffer’ any longer, and should sign the verdict, since Browning had the legal right to force them to do so. The jury signed the verdict, but appended a statement asserting that they did so under pressure.”
On May 31, 1945, a news story said:
“Three local groups were reported last night to be preparing petitions requesting County Judge Joe D. Browning to grant Pvt. Joe L. Mayes a new trial in the Playboy Cafe ouster suit.
“One petition is reported being drawn by a parents and teachers’ group, another by a service mothers’ group, and the third is being drawn for independent circulation among parents of men in service.
“The new petitions are said to follow the general outline of a petition adopted by the Corpus Christi Soldier’s and Sailor’s Advisory Council Tuesday night. This petition called on Browning to grant a new trial and upon doing so to disqualify himself and permit the trial to go on under another judge and jury. Action on the petitions is expected shortly.
“The council’s petition, drawn up by five veterans’ organizations with a membership of more than 1,000, followed by a few hours the filing of a motion for a new trial by Walter M. Lewright and LeGrand Woods, Mayes’ counsels ... It came to a climax Sunday when Browning Saturday night accepted without argument or citation of authority a motion by Dudley Tarlton Jackson’s lawyer, for an instructed verdict . . . The jury was kept Saturday night in the Court House. Sunday morning, following a threat by Browning to keep the jury together until they did sign, the jurymen signed the verdict, appending a statement that they did so against the dictates of their conscience.”
That appears to be the appropriate remedy in Texas in this type of case. Ex parte Miller, 91 Texas Cr. Rep. 607, 240 S. W. 944. As to the Texas procedure where there is an adjudication of contempt for violating an order in a civil cause, see Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516.
The findings which the Court in that case sustained were as follows:
“(a) Because . . . their manifest purpose was to create the impression on the mind of the court that it could not decide in the matter before it in any but the one way without giving rise to such a state of suspicion as to the integrity or fairness of its purpose and motives as might engender a shrinking from so doing, (b) Because the publications directly tended to incite to such a condition of the public mind as would leave no room for doubt that if the court, acting according to its convictions, awarded relief, it would be subject to such odium and hatred as to restrain it from doing so. (c) Because the publications also obviously were intended to produce the impression that any order which might be rendered by the court in the discharge of its duty, if not in accord with the conceptions which the publications were sustaining, would be disregarded and cause a shrinking from performing duty to avoid the turmoil and violence which the publications, it may be only by covert insinuation, but none the less assuredly, invited. And (d) because the publications were of a character, not merely because of their intemperance but because of their general tendency, to produce in the popular mind a condition which would give rise to a purpose in practice to refuse to respect any order which the court might render if it conflicted with the supposed rights of the city espoused by the publications.”
247 U. S. pp. 414-415.
The charge against petitioners also set forth other allegedly false statements: (1) that Mayes was not an ex-insurance man but in the insurance business at the time; (2) that terms of the contract on which Jackson sued were not disclosed; (3) that the arrangements under which the premises had been operated for some months before Mayes was inducted into the armed services were not disclosed; (4) that the articles failed to state the legal grounds on which Jackson’s motion for an instructed verdict was argued and granted; (5) that much material evidence was omitted which would have enabled the public to form a fair estimate of the nature of the controversy; (6) that the principal plaintiffs who were highly respected business and professional men of Corpus Christi were not named.
These omissions, though reflecting on the quality of the reporting, do not seem to us to be of importance here.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | C | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The judgment is reversed. The instrument involved being inchoate and unperfected, the provisions of § 3672 (a), Revenue Act of 1939, 53 Stat. 449, as amended, 53 Stat. 882, 56 Stat. 957, do not apply. See United States v. Security Trust & Savings Bank, 340 U. S. 47; United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U. S. 81, 86-87. The claim of the interpleader for its costs is controlled by United States v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., 348 U. S. 215.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | F | sc_issuearea |
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