prompt
stringlengths 1.19k
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|---|---|
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: RGBA32 AXNodeObject::colorValue() const {
if (!isHTMLInputElement(getNode()) || !isColorWell())
return AXObject::colorValue();
HTMLInputElement* input = toHTMLInputElement(getNode());
const AtomicString& type = input->getAttribute(typeAttr);
if (!equalIgnoringCase(type, "color"))
return AXObject::colorValue();
Color color;
bool success = color.setFromString(input->value());
DCHECK(success);
return color.rgb();
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void reds_on_main_mouse_mode_request(void *message, size_t size)
{
switch (((SpiceMsgcMainMouseModeRequest *)message)->mode) {
case SPICE_MOUSE_MODE_CLIENT:
if (reds->is_client_mouse_allowed) {
reds_set_mouse_mode(SPICE_MOUSE_MODE_CLIENT);
} else {
spice_info("client mouse is disabled");
}
break;
case SPICE_MOUSE_MODE_SERVER:
reds_set_mouse_mode(SPICE_MOUSE_MODE_SERVER);
break;
default:
spice_warning("unsupported mouse mode");
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static Image *ReadRGFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
bit,
byte;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
*data;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read RGF header.
*/
image->columns = (unsigned long) ReadBlobByte(image);
image->rows = (unsigned long) ReadBlobByte(image);
image->depth=8;
image->storage_class=PseudoClass;
image->colors=2;
/*
Initialize image structure.
*/
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
/*
Initialize colormap.
*/
image->colormap[0].red=QuantumRange;
image->colormap[0].green=QuantumRange;
image->colormap[0].blue=QuantumRange;
image->colormap[1].red=(Quantum) 0;
image->colormap[1].green=(Quantum) 0;
image->colormap[1].blue=(Quantum) 0;
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
/*
Read hex image data.
*/
data=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->rows,image->columns*
sizeof(*data));
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
p=data;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) (image->columns * image->rows); i++)
{
*p++=ReadBlobByte(image);
}
/*
Convert RGF image to pixel packets.
*/
p=data;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
bit=0;
byte=0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (bit == 0)
byte=(size_t) (*p++);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,(Quantum) ((byte & 0x01) != 0 ? 0x01 : 0x00));
bit++;
byte>>=1;
if (bit == 8)
bit=0;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(data);
(void) SyncImage(image);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: bool VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::VaapiH264Accelerator::SubmitFrameMetadata(
const H264SPS* sps,
const H264PPS* pps,
const H264DPB& dpb,
const H264Picture::Vector& ref_pic_listp0,
const H264Picture::Vector& ref_pic_listb0,
const H264Picture::Vector& ref_pic_listb1,
const scoped_refptr<H264Picture>& pic) {
VAPictureParameterBufferH264 pic_param;
memset(&pic_param, 0, sizeof(pic_param));
#define FROM_SPS_TO_PP(a) pic_param.a = sps->a
#define FROM_SPS_TO_PP2(a, b) pic_param.b = sps->a
FROM_SPS_TO_PP2(pic_width_in_mbs_minus1, picture_width_in_mbs_minus1);
FROM_SPS_TO_PP2(pic_height_in_map_units_minus1, picture_height_in_mbs_minus1);
FROM_SPS_TO_PP(bit_depth_luma_minus8);
FROM_SPS_TO_PP(bit_depth_chroma_minus8);
#undef FROM_SPS_TO_PP
#undef FROM_SPS_TO_PP2
#define FROM_SPS_TO_PP_SF(a) pic_param.seq_fields.bits.a = sps->a
#define FROM_SPS_TO_PP_SF2(a, b) pic_param.seq_fields.bits.b = sps->a
FROM_SPS_TO_PP_SF(chroma_format_idc);
FROM_SPS_TO_PP_SF2(separate_colour_plane_flag,
residual_colour_transform_flag);
FROM_SPS_TO_PP_SF(gaps_in_frame_num_value_allowed_flag);
FROM_SPS_TO_PP_SF(frame_mbs_only_flag);
FROM_SPS_TO_PP_SF(mb_adaptive_frame_field_flag);
FROM_SPS_TO_PP_SF(direct_8x8_inference_flag);
pic_param.seq_fields.bits.MinLumaBiPredSize8x8 = (sps->level_idc >= 31);
FROM_SPS_TO_PP_SF(log2_max_frame_num_minus4);
FROM_SPS_TO_PP_SF(pic_order_cnt_type);
FROM_SPS_TO_PP_SF(log2_max_pic_order_cnt_lsb_minus4);
FROM_SPS_TO_PP_SF(delta_pic_order_always_zero_flag);
#undef FROM_SPS_TO_PP_SF
#undef FROM_SPS_TO_PP_SF2
#define FROM_PPS_TO_PP(a) pic_param.a = pps->a
FROM_PPS_TO_PP(pic_init_qp_minus26);
FROM_PPS_TO_PP(pic_init_qs_minus26);
FROM_PPS_TO_PP(chroma_qp_index_offset);
FROM_PPS_TO_PP(second_chroma_qp_index_offset);
#undef FROM_PPS_TO_PP
#define FROM_PPS_TO_PP_PF(a) pic_param.pic_fields.bits.a = pps->a
#define FROM_PPS_TO_PP_PF2(a, b) pic_param.pic_fields.bits.b = pps->a
FROM_PPS_TO_PP_PF(entropy_coding_mode_flag);
FROM_PPS_TO_PP_PF(weighted_pred_flag);
FROM_PPS_TO_PP_PF(weighted_bipred_idc);
FROM_PPS_TO_PP_PF(transform_8x8_mode_flag);
pic_param.pic_fields.bits.field_pic_flag = 0;
FROM_PPS_TO_PP_PF(constrained_intra_pred_flag);
FROM_PPS_TO_PP_PF2(bottom_field_pic_order_in_frame_present_flag,
pic_order_present_flag);
FROM_PPS_TO_PP_PF(deblocking_filter_control_present_flag);
FROM_PPS_TO_PP_PF(redundant_pic_cnt_present_flag);
pic_param.pic_fields.bits.reference_pic_flag = pic->ref;
#undef FROM_PPS_TO_PP_PF
#undef FROM_PPS_TO_PP_PF2
pic_param.frame_num = pic->frame_num;
InitVAPicture(&pic_param.CurrPic);
FillVAPicture(&pic_param.CurrPic, pic);
for (int i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
InitVAPicture(&pic_param.ReferenceFrames[i]);
FillVARefFramesFromDPB(dpb, pic_param.ReferenceFrames,
arraysize(pic_param.ReferenceFrames));
pic_param.num_ref_frames = sps->max_num_ref_frames;
if (!vaapi_wrapper_->SubmitBuffer(VAPictureParameterBufferType,
sizeof(pic_param), &pic_param))
return false;
VAIQMatrixBufferH264 iq_matrix_buf;
memset(&iq_matrix_buf, 0, sizeof(iq_matrix_buf));
if (pps->pic_scaling_matrix_present_flag) {
for (int i = 0; i < 6; ++i) {
for (int j = 0; j < 16; ++j)
iq_matrix_buf.ScalingList4x4[i][kZigzagScan4x4[j]] =
pps->scaling_list4x4[i][j];
}
for (int i = 0; i < 2; ++i) {
for (int j = 0; j < 64; ++j)
iq_matrix_buf.ScalingList8x8[i][kZigzagScan8x8[j]] =
pps->scaling_list8x8[i][j];
}
} else {
for (int i = 0; i < 6; ++i) {
for (int j = 0; j < 16; ++j)
iq_matrix_buf.ScalingList4x4[i][kZigzagScan4x4[j]] =
sps->scaling_list4x4[i][j];
}
for (int i = 0; i < 2; ++i) {
for (int j = 0; j < 64; ++j)
iq_matrix_buf.ScalingList8x8[i][kZigzagScan8x8[j]] =
sps->scaling_list8x8[i][j];
}
}
return vaapi_wrapper_->SubmitBuffer(VAIQMatrixBufferType,
sizeof(iq_matrix_buf), &iq_matrix_buf);
}
Commit Message: vaapi vda: Delete owned objects on worker thread in Cleanup()
This CL adds a SEQUENCE_CHECKER to Vaapi*Accelerator classes, and
posts the destruction of those objects to the appropriate thread on
Cleanup().
Also makes {H264,VP8,VP9}Picture RefCountedThreadSafe, see miu@
comment in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/794091#message-a64bed985cfaf8a19499a517bb110a7ce581dc0f
TEST=play back VP9/VP8/H264 w/ simplechrome on soraka, Release build
unstripped, let video play for a few seconds then navigate back; no
crashes. Unittests as before:
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp9:320:240:250:250:35:150:12
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp8:320:240:250:250:35:150:11
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.h264:320:240:250:258:35:150:1
Bug: 789160
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I7d96aaf89c92bf46f00c8b8b36798e057a842ed2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/794091
Reviewed-by: Pawel Osciak <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Miguel Casas <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523372}
CWE ID: CWE-362
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: DEFINE_TRACE(AXObjectCacheImpl) {
visitor->trace(m_document);
visitor->trace(m_nodeObjectMapping);
visitor->trace(m_objects);
visitor->trace(m_notificationsToPost);
AXObjectCache::trace(visitor);
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static void nfs4_open_confirm_release(void *calldata)
{
struct nfs4_opendata *data = calldata;
struct nfs4_state *state = NULL;
/* If this request hasn't been cancelled, do nothing */
if (data->cancelled == 0)
goto out_free;
/* In case of error, no cleanup! */
if (!data->rpc_done)
goto out_free;
state = nfs4_opendata_to_nfs4_state(data);
if (!IS_ERR(state))
nfs4_close_state(&data->path, state, data->o_arg.open_flags);
out_free:
nfs4_opendata_put(data);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void xmlrpc_char_encode(char *outbuffer, const char *s1)
{
long unsigned int i;
unsigned char c;
char buf2[15];
mowgli_string_t *s = mowgli_string_create();
*buf2 = '\0';
*outbuffer = '\0';
if ((!(s1) || (*(s1) == '\0')))
{
return;
}
for (i = 0; s1[i] != '\0'; i++)
{
c = s1[i];
if (c > 127)
{
snprintf(buf2, sizeof buf2, "&#%d;", c);
s->append(s, buf2, strlen(buf2));
}
else if (c == '&')
{
s->append(s, "&", 5);
}
else if (c == '<')
{
s->append(s, "<", 4);
}
else if (c == '>')
{
s->append(s, ">", 4);
}
else if (c == '"')
{
s->append(s, """, 6);
}
else
{
s->append_char(s, c);
}
}
memcpy(outbuffer, s->str, XMLRPC_BUFSIZE);
}
Commit Message: Do not copy more bytes than were allocated
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: ChromeContentBrowserClient::OverrideRequestContextForURL(
const GURL& url, content::ResourceContext* context) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
if (url.SchemeIs(extensions::kExtensionScheme)) {
ProfileIOData* io_data = ProfileIOData::FromResourceContext(context);
return io_data->extensions_request_context();
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void SoftAMR::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
if (mSignalledError || mOutputPortSettingsChange != NONE) {
return;
}
while (!inQueue.empty() && !outQueue.empty()) {
BufferInfo *inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
outHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
return;
}
if (inHeader->nOffset == 0) {
mAnchorTimeUs = inHeader->nTimeStamp;
mNumSamplesOutput = 0;
}
const uint8_t *inputPtr = inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset;
int32_t numBytesRead;
if (mMode == MODE_NARROW) {
if (outHeader->nAllocLen < kNumSamplesPerFrameNB * sizeof(int16_t)) {
ALOGE("b/27662364: NB expected output buffer %zu bytes vs %u",
kNumSamplesPerFrameNB * sizeof(int16_t), outHeader->nAllocLen);
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "27662364");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorOverflow, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
numBytesRead =
AMRDecode(mState,
(Frame_Type_3GPP)((inputPtr[0] >> 3) & 0x0f),
(UWord8 *)&inputPtr[1],
reinterpret_cast<int16_t *>(outHeader->pBuffer),
MIME_IETF);
if (numBytesRead == -1) {
ALOGE("PV AMR decoder AMRDecode() call failed");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
++numBytesRead; // Include the frame type header byte.
if (static_cast<size_t>(numBytesRead) > inHeader->nFilledLen) {
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
} else {
if (outHeader->nAllocLen < kNumSamplesPerFrameWB * sizeof(int16_t)) {
ALOGE("b/27662364: WB expected output buffer %zu bytes vs %u",
kNumSamplesPerFrameWB * sizeof(int16_t), outHeader->nAllocLen);
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "27662364");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorOverflow, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
int16 mode = ((inputPtr[0] >> 3) & 0x0f);
if (mode >= 10 && mode <= 13) {
ALOGE("encountered illegal frame type %d in AMR WB content.",
mode);
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
size_t frameSize = getFrameSize(mode);
CHECK_GE(inHeader->nFilledLen, frameSize);
int16_t *outPtr = (int16_t *)outHeader->pBuffer;
if (mode >= 9) {
memset(outPtr, 0, kNumSamplesPerFrameWB * sizeof(int16_t));
} else if (mode < 9) {
int16 frameType;
RX_State_wb rx_state;
mime_unsorting(
const_cast<uint8_t *>(&inputPtr[1]),
mInputSampleBuffer,
&frameType, &mode, 1, &rx_state);
int16_t numSamplesOutput;
pvDecoder_AmrWb(
mode, mInputSampleBuffer,
outPtr,
&numSamplesOutput,
mDecoderBuf, frameType, mDecoderCookie);
CHECK_EQ((int)numSamplesOutput, (int)kNumSamplesPerFrameWB);
for (int i = 0; i < kNumSamplesPerFrameWB; ++i) {
/* Delete the 2 LSBs (14-bit output) */
outPtr[i] &= 0xfffC;
}
}
numBytesRead = frameSize;
}
inHeader->nOffset += numBytesRead;
inHeader->nFilledLen -= numBytesRead;
outHeader->nFlags = 0;
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
if (mMode == MODE_NARROW) {
outHeader->nFilledLen = kNumSamplesPerFrameNB * sizeof(int16_t);
outHeader->nTimeStamp =
mAnchorTimeUs
+ (mNumSamplesOutput * 1000000ll) / kSampleRateNB;
mNumSamplesOutput += kNumSamplesPerFrameNB;
} else {
outHeader->nFilledLen = kNumSamplesPerFrameWB * sizeof(int16_t);
outHeader->nTimeStamp =
mAnchorTimeUs
+ (mNumSamplesOutput * 1000000ll) / kSampleRateWB;
mNumSamplesOutput += kNumSamplesPerFrameWB;
}
if (inHeader->nFilledLen == 0) {
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
}
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
++mInputBufferCount;
}
}
Commit Message: SoftAMR: check input buffer size to avoid overflow.
Bug: 27662364
Change-Id: I47380545ea7d85845e141e722b0d84f498d27145
CWE ID: CWE-264
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static Image *ReadFITSImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
typedef struct _FITSInfo
{
MagickBooleanType
extend,
simple;
int
bits_per_pixel,
columns,
rows,
number_axes,
number_planes;
double
min_data,
max_data,
zero,
scale;
EndianType
endian;
} FITSInfo;
char
*comment,
keyword[9],
property[MaxTextExtent],
value[73];
double
pixel,
scale;
FITSInfo
fits_info;
Image
*image;
int
c;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
ssize_t
count,
scene,
y;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Initialize image header.
*/
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&fits_info,0,sizeof(fits_info));
fits_info.extend=MagickFalse;
fits_info.simple=MagickFalse;
fits_info.bits_per_pixel=8;
fits_info.columns=1;
fits_info.rows=1;
fits_info.rows=1;
fits_info.number_planes=1;
fits_info.min_data=0.0;
fits_info.max_data=0.0;
fits_info.zero=0.0;
fits_info.scale=1.0;
fits_info.endian=MSBEndian;
/*
Decode image header.
*/
for (comment=(char *) NULL; EOFBlob(image) == MagickFalse; )
{
for ( ; EOFBlob(image) == MagickFalse; )
{
register char
*p;
count=ReadBlob(image,8,(unsigned char *) keyword);
if (count != 8)
break;
for (i=0; i < 8; i++)
{
if (isspace((int) ((unsigned char) keyword[i])) != 0)
break;
keyword[i]=tolower((int) ((unsigned char) keyword[i]));
}
keyword[i]='\0';
count=ReadBlob(image,72,(unsigned char *) value);
value[72]='\0';
if (count != 72)
break;
p=value;
if (*p == '=')
{
p+=2;
while (isspace((int) ((unsigned char) *p)) != 0)
p++;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"end") == 0)
break;
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"extend") == 0)
fits_info.extend=(*p == 'T') || (*p == 't') ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"simple") == 0)
fits_info.simple=(*p == 'T') || (*p == 't') ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"bitpix") == 0)
fits_info.bits_per_pixel=StringToLong(p);
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"naxis") == 0)
fits_info.number_axes=StringToLong(p);
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"naxis1") == 0)
fits_info.columns=StringToLong(p);
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"naxis2") == 0)
fits_info.rows=StringToLong(p);
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"naxis3") == 0)
fits_info.number_planes=StringToLong(p);
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"datamax") == 0)
fits_info.max_data=StringToDouble(p,(char **) NULL);
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"datamin") == 0)
fits_info.min_data=StringToDouble(p,(char **) NULL);
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"bzero") == 0)
fits_info.zero=StringToDouble(p,(char **) NULL);
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"bscale") == 0)
fits_info.scale=StringToDouble(p,(char **) NULL);
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"comment") == 0)
{
if (comment == (char *) NULL)
comment=ConstantString(p);
else
(void) ConcatenateString(&comment,p);
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"xendian") == 0)
{
if (LocaleNCompare(p,"big",3) == 0)
fits_info.endian=MSBEndian;
else
fits_info.endian=LSBEndian;
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(property,MaxTextExtent,"fits:%s",keyword);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,property,p);
}
c=0;
while (((TellBlob(image) % FITSBlocksize) != 0) && (c != EOF))
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (fits_info.extend == MagickFalse)
break;
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) fits_info.columns*fits_info.rows;
if ((fits_info.simple != MagickFalse) && (fits_info.number_axes >= 1) &&
(fits_info.number_axes <= 4) && (number_pixels != 0))
break;
}
/*
Verify that required image information is defined.
*/
if (comment != (char *) NULL)
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"comment",comment);
comment=DestroyString(comment);
}
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) fits_info.columns*fits_info.rows;
if ((fits_info.simple == MagickFalse) || (fits_info.number_axes < 1) ||
(fits_info.number_axes > 4) || (number_pixels == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImageTypeNotSupported");
for (scene=0; scene < (ssize_t) fits_info.number_planes; scene++)
{
image->columns=(size_t) fits_info.columns;
image->rows=(size_t) fits_info.rows;
image->depth=(size_t) (fits_info.bits_per_pixel < 0 ? -1 : 1)*
fits_info.bits_per_pixel;
image->endian=fits_info.endian;
image->scene=(size_t) scene;
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
/*
Initialize image structure.
*/
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace);
if ((fits_info.min_data == 0.0) && (fits_info.max_data == 0.0))
{
if (fits_info.zero == 0.0)
(void) GetFITSPixelExtrema(image,fits_info.bits_per_pixel,
&fits_info.min_data,&fits_info.max_data);
else
fits_info.max_data=GetFITSPixelRange((size_t)
fits_info.bits_per_pixel);
}
else
fits_info.max_data=GetFITSPixelRange((size_t) fits_info.bits_per_pixel);
/*
Convert FITS pixels to pixel packets.
*/
scale=QuantumRange/(fits_info.max_data-fits_info.min_data);
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=GetFITSPixel(image,fits_info.bits_per_pixel);
if ((image->depth == 16) || (image->depth == 32) ||
(image->depth == 64))
SetFITSUnsignedPixels(1,image->depth,image->endian,(unsigned char *)
&pixel);
SetPixelRed(q,ClampToQuantum(scale*(fits_info.scale*(pixel-
fits_info.min_data)+fits_info.zero)));
SetPixelGreen(q,GetPixelRed(q));
SetPixelBlue(q,GetPixelRed(q));
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
if (scene < (ssize_t) (fits_info.number_planes-1))
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static bool blk_pm_allow_request(struct request *rq)
{
switch (rq->q->rpm_status) {
case RPM_RESUMING:
case RPM_SUSPENDING:
return rq->rq_flags & RQF_PM;
case RPM_SUSPENDED:
return false;
default:
return true;
}
}
Commit Message: block: blk_init_allocated_queue() set q->fq as NULL in the fail case
We find the memory use-after-free issue in __blk_drain_queue()
on the kernel 4.14. After read the latest kernel 4.18-rc6 we
think it has the same problem.
Memory is allocated for q->fq in the blk_init_allocated_queue().
If the elevator init function called with error return, it will
run into the fail case to free the q->fq.
Then the __blk_drain_queue() uses the same memory after the free
of the q->fq, it will lead to the unpredictable event.
The patch is to set q->fq as NULL in the fail case of
blk_init_allocated_queue().
Fixes: commit 7c94e1c157a2 ("block: introduce blk_flush_queue to drive flush machinery")
Cc: <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: xiao jin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static JSValue getDataViewMember(ExecState* exec, DataView* imp, DataViewAccessType type)
{
if (exec->argumentCount() < 1)
return throwError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
unsigned byteOffset = exec->argument(0).toUInt32(exec);
if (exec->hadException())
return jsUndefined();
bool littleEndian = false;
if (exec->argumentCount() > 1 && (type == AccessDataViewMemberAsFloat32 || type == AccessDataViewMemberAsFloat64)) {
littleEndian = exec->argument(1).toBoolean(exec);
if (exec->hadException())
return jsUndefined();
}
JSC::JSValue result;
switch (type) {
case AccessDataViewMemberAsInt8:
result = jsNumber(imp->getInt8(byteOffset, ec));
break;
case AccessDataViewMemberAsUint8:
result = jsNumber(imp->getUint8(byteOffset, ec));
break;
case AccessDataViewMemberAsFloat32:
case AccessDataViewMemberAsFloat64: {
double value = (type == AccessDataViewMemberAsFloat32) ? imp->getFloat32(byteOffset, littleEndian, ec) : imp->getFloat64(byteOffset, littleEndian, ec);
result = isnan(value) ? jsNaN() : jsNumber(value);
break;
} default:
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
break;
}
setDOMException(exec, ec);
return result;
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int asn1_find_indefinite_length(const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
size_t *_dp, size_t *_len,
const char **_errmsg)
{
unsigned char tag, tmp;
size_t dp = *_dp, len, n;
int indef_level = 1;
next_tag:
if (unlikely(datalen - dp < 2)) {
if (datalen == dp)
goto missing_eoc;
goto data_overrun_error;
}
/* Extract a tag from the data */
tag = data[dp++];
if (tag == 0) {
/* It appears to be an EOC. */
if (data[dp++] != 0)
goto invalid_eoc;
if (--indef_level <= 0) {
*_len = dp - *_dp;
*_dp = dp;
return 0;
}
goto next_tag;
}
if (unlikely((tag & 0x1f) == ASN1_LONG_TAG)) {
do {
if (unlikely(datalen - dp < 2))
goto data_overrun_error;
tmp = data[dp++];
} while (tmp & 0x80);
}
/* Extract the length */
len = data[dp++];
if (len <= 0x7f) {
dp += len;
goto next_tag;
}
if (unlikely(len == ASN1_INDEFINITE_LENGTH)) {
/* Indefinite length */
if (unlikely((tag & ASN1_CONS_BIT) == ASN1_PRIM << 5))
goto indefinite_len_primitive;
indef_level++;
goto next_tag;
}
n = len - 0x80;
if (unlikely(n > sizeof(size_t) - 1))
goto length_too_long;
if (unlikely(n > datalen - dp))
goto data_overrun_error;
for (len = 0; n > 0; n--) {
len <<= 8;
len |= data[dp++];
}
dp += len;
goto next_tag;
length_too_long:
*_errmsg = "Unsupported length";
goto error;
indefinite_len_primitive:
*_errmsg = "Indefinite len primitive not permitted";
goto error;
invalid_eoc:
*_errmsg = "Invalid length EOC";
goto error;
data_overrun_error:
*_errmsg = "Data overrun error";
goto error;
missing_eoc:
*_errmsg = "Missing EOC in indefinite len cons";
error:
*_dp = dp;
return -1;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix ASN.1 indefinite length object parsing
This fixes CVE-2016-0758.
In the ASN.1 decoder, when the length field of an ASN.1 value is extracted,
it isn't validated against the remaining amount of data before being added
to the cursor. With a sufficiently large size indicated, the check:
datalen - dp < 2
may then fail due to integer overflow.
Fix this by checking the length indicated against the amount of remaining
data in both places a definite length is determined.
Whilst we're at it, make the following changes:
(1) Check the maximum size of extended length does not exceed the capacity
of the variable it's being stored in (len) rather than the type that
variable is assumed to be (size_t).
(2) Compare the EOC tag to the symbolic constant ASN1_EOC rather than the
integer 0.
(3) To reduce confusion, move the initialisation of len outside of:
for (len = 0; n > 0; n--) {
since it doesn't have anything to do with the loop counter n.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Acked-by: David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Peter Jones <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: GBool RunLengthEncoder::fillBuf() {
int c, c1, c2;
int n;
if (eof)
return gFalse;
if (nextEnd < bufEnd + 1) {
if ((c1 = str->getChar()) == EOF) {
eof = gTrue;
return gFalse;
}
} else {
c1 = bufEnd[0] & 0xff;
}
if (nextEnd < bufEnd + 2) {
if ((c2 = str->getChar()) == EOF) {
eof = gTrue;
buf[0] = 0;
buf[1] = c1;
bufPtr = buf;
bufEnd = &buf[2];
return gTrue;
}
} else {
c2 = bufEnd[1] & 0xff;
}
c = 0; // make gcc happy
if (c1 == c2) {
n = 2;
while (n < 128 && (c = str->getChar()) == c1)
++n;
buf[0] = (char)(257 - n);
buf[1] = c1;
bufEnd = &buf[2];
if (c == EOF) {
eof = gTrue;
} else if (n < 128) {
buf[2] = c;
nextEnd = &buf[3];
} else {
nextEnd = bufEnd;
}
} else {
buf[1] = c1;
buf[2] = c2;
n = 2;
while (n < 128) {
if ((c = str->getChar()) == EOF) {
eof = gTrue;
break;
}
++n;
buf[n] = c;
if (buf[n] == buf[n-1])
break;
}
if (buf[n] == buf[n-1]) {
buf[0] = (char)(n-2-1);
bufEnd = &buf[n-1];
nextEnd = &buf[n+1];
} else {
buf[0] = (char)(n-1);
bufEnd = nextEnd = &buf[n+1];
}
}
bufPtr = buf;
return gTrue;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: ScriptPromise BluetoothRemoteGATTServer::getPrimaryServicesImpl(
ScriptState* scriptState,
mojom::blink::WebBluetoothGATTQueryQuantity quantity,
String servicesUUID) {
if (!connected()) {
return ScriptPromise::rejectWithDOMException(
scriptState,
DOMException::create(NetworkError, kGATTServerNotConnected));
}
ScriptPromiseResolver* resolver = ScriptPromiseResolver::create(scriptState);
ScriptPromise promise = resolver->promise();
AddToActiveAlgorithms(resolver);
mojom::blink::WebBluetoothService* service = m_device->bluetooth()->service();
WTF::Optional<String> uuid = WTF::nullopt;
if (!servicesUUID.isEmpty())
uuid = servicesUUID;
service->RemoteServerGetPrimaryServices(
device()->id(), quantity, uuid,
convertToBaseCallback(
WTF::bind(&BluetoothRemoteGATTServer::GetPrimaryServicesCallback,
wrapPersistent(this), quantity, wrapPersistent(resolver))));
return promise;
}
Commit Message: Allow serialization of empty bluetooth uuids.
This change allows the passing WTF::Optional<String> types as
bluetooth.mojom.UUID optional parameter without needing to ensure the passed
object isn't empty.
BUG=None
R=juncai, dcheng
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2646613003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#445809}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: my_object_increment_val (MyObject *obj, GError **error)
{
obj->val++;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: SPL_METHOD(SplObjectStorage, offsetGet)
{
zval *obj;
spl_SplObjectStorageElement *element;
spl_SplObjectStorage *intern = Z_SPLOBJSTORAGE_P(getThis());
zend_string *hash;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "o", &obj) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
hash = spl_object_storage_get_hash(intern, getThis(), obj);
if (!hash) {
return;
}
element = spl_object_storage_get(intern, hash);
spl_object_storage_free_hash(intern, hash);
if (!element) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0, "Object not found");
} else {
zval *value = &element->inf;
ZVAL_DEREF(value);
ZVAL_COPY(return_value, value);
}
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto bool SplObjectStorage::addAll(SplObjectStorage $os)
Commit Message: Fix bug #73257 and bug #73258 - SplObjectStorage unserialize allows use of non-object as key
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void WebInspectorProxy::platformAttach()
{
GRefPtr<GtkWidget> inspectorView = m_inspectorView;
if (m_inspectorWindow) {
gtk_container_remove(GTK_CONTAINER(m_inspectorWindow), m_inspectorView);
gtk_widget_destroy(m_inspectorWindow);
m_inspectorWindow = 0;
}
if (m_client.attach(this))
return;
gtk_container_add(GTK_CONTAINER(m_page->viewWidget()), m_inspectorView);
gtk_widget_show(m_inspectorView);
}
Commit Message: [GTK] Inspector should set a default attached height before being attached
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90767
Reviewed by Xan Lopez.
We are currently using the minimum attached height in
WebKitWebViewBase as the default height for the inspector when
attached. It would be easier for WebKitWebViewBase and embedders
implementing attach() if the inspector already had an attached
height set when it's being attached.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/WebKitWebViewBase.cpp:
(webkitWebViewBaseContainerAdd): Don't initialize
inspectorViewHeight.
(webkitWebViewBaseSetInspectorViewHeight): Allow to set the
inspector view height before having an inpector view, but only
queue a resize when the view already has an inspector view.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/tests/TestInspector.cpp:
(testInspectorDefault):
(testInspectorManualAttachDetach):
* UIProcess/gtk/WebInspectorProxyGtk.cpp:
(WebKit::WebInspectorProxy::platformAttach): Set the default
attached height before attach the inspector view.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124479 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: virtual void SetUp() {
old_browser_client_ = content::GetContentClient()->browser();
content::GetContentClient()->set_browser(&browser_client_);
url_util::AddStandardScheme(kPrivilegedScheme);
url_util::AddStandardScheme(chrome::kChromeUIScheme);
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleRegisterSharedIdsCHROMIUM(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const cmds::RegisterSharedIdsCHROMIUM& c) {
GLuint namespace_id = static_cast<GLuint>(c.namespace_id);
GLsizei n = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.n);
uint32 data_size;
if (!SafeMultiplyUint32(n, sizeof(GLuint), &data_size)) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
GLuint* ids = GetSharedMemoryAs<GLuint*>(
c.ids_shm_id, c.ids_shm_offset, data_size);
if (n < 0) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "RegisterSharedIdsCHROMIUM", "n < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (ids == NULL) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
DoRegisterSharedIdsCHROMIUM(namespace_id, n, ids);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
[email protected],[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: cmsBool DataSection (cmsIT8* it8)
{
int iField = 0;
int iSet = 0;
char Buffer[256];
TABLE* t = GetTable(it8);
InSymbol(it8); // Eats "BEGIN_DATA"
CheckEOLN(it8);
if (!t->Data)
AllocateDataSet(it8);
while (it8->sy != SEND_DATA && it8->sy != SEOF)
{
if (iField >= t -> nSamples) {
iField = 0;
iSet++;
}
if (it8->sy != SEND_DATA && it8->sy != SEOF) {
if (!GetVal(it8, Buffer, 255, "Sample data expected"))
return FALSE;
if (!SetData(it8, iSet, iField, Buffer))
return FALSE;
iField++;
InSymbol(it8);
SkipEOLN(it8);
}
}
SkipEOLN(it8);
Skip(it8, SEND_DATA);
SkipEOLN(it8);
if ((iSet+1) != t -> nPatches)
return SynError(it8, "Count mismatch. NUMBER_OF_SETS was %d, found %d\n", t ->nPatches, iSet+1);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Upgrade Visual studio 2017 15.8
- Upgrade to 15.8
- Add check on CGATS memory allocation (thanks to Quang Nguyen for
pointing out this)
CWE ID: CWE-190
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int bin_symbols(RCore *r, int mode, ut64 laddr, int va, ut64 at, const char *name, bool exponly, const char *args) {
RBinInfo *info = r_bin_get_info (r->bin);
RList *entries = r_bin_get_entries (r->bin);
RBinSymbol *symbol;
RBinAddr *entry;
RListIter *iter;
bool firstexp = true;
bool printHere = false;
int i = 0, lastfs = 's';
bool bin_demangle = r_config_get_i (r->config, "bin.demangle");
if (!info) {
return 0;
}
if (args && *args == '.') {
printHere = true;
}
bool is_arm = info && info->arch && !strncmp (info->arch, "arm", 3);
const char *lang = bin_demangle ? r_config_get (r->config, "bin.lang") : NULL;
RList *symbols = r_bin_get_symbols (r->bin);
r_spaces_push (&r->anal->meta_spaces, "bin");
if (IS_MODE_JSON (mode) && !printHere) {
r_cons_printf ("[");
} else if (IS_MODE_SET (mode)) {
r_flag_space_set (r->flags, R_FLAGS_FS_SYMBOLS);
} else if (!at && exponly) {
if (IS_MODE_RAD (mode)) {
r_cons_printf ("fs exports\n");
} else if (IS_MODE_NORMAL (mode)) {
r_cons_printf (printHere ? "" : "[Exports]\n");
}
} else if (!at && !exponly) {
if (IS_MODE_RAD (mode)) {
r_cons_printf ("fs symbols\n");
} else if (IS_MODE_NORMAL (mode)) {
r_cons_printf (printHere ? "" : "[Symbols]\n");
}
}
if (IS_MODE_NORMAL (mode)) {
r_cons_printf ("Num Paddr Vaddr Bind Type Size Name\n");
}
size_t count = 0;
r_list_foreach (symbols, iter, symbol) {
if (!symbol->name) {
continue;
}
char *r_symbol_name = r_str_escape_utf8 (symbol->name, false, true);
ut64 addr = compute_addr (r->bin, symbol->paddr, symbol->vaddr, va);
int len = symbol->size ? symbol->size : 32;
SymName sn = {0};
if (exponly && !isAnExport (symbol)) {
free (r_symbol_name);
continue;
}
if (name && strcmp (r_symbol_name, name)) {
free (r_symbol_name);
continue;
}
if (at && (!symbol->size || !is_in_range (at, addr, symbol->size))) {
free (r_symbol_name);
continue;
}
if ((printHere && !is_in_range (r->offset, symbol->paddr, len))
&& (printHere && !is_in_range (r->offset, addr, len))) {
free (r_symbol_name);
continue;
}
count ++;
snInit (r, &sn, symbol, lang);
if (IS_MODE_SET (mode) && (is_section_symbol (symbol) || is_file_symbol (symbol))) {
/*
* Skip section symbols because they will have their own flag.
* Skip also file symbols because not useful for now.
*/
} else if (IS_MODE_SET (mode) && is_special_symbol (symbol)) {
if (is_arm) {
handle_arm_special_symbol (r, symbol, va);
}
} else if (IS_MODE_SET (mode)) {
if (is_arm) {
handle_arm_symbol (r, symbol, info, va);
}
select_flag_space (r, symbol);
/* If that's a Classed symbol (method or so) */
if (sn.classname) {
RFlagItem *fi = r_flag_get (r->flags, sn.methflag);
if (r->bin->prefix) {
char *prname = r_str_newf ("%s.%s", r->bin->prefix, sn.methflag);
r_name_filter (sn.methflag, -1);
free (sn.methflag);
sn.methflag = prname;
}
if (fi) {
r_flag_item_set_realname (fi, sn.methname);
if ((fi->offset - r->flags->base) == addr) {
r_flag_unset (r->flags, fi);
}
} else {
fi = r_flag_set (r->flags, sn.methflag, addr, symbol->size);
char *comment = fi->comment ? strdup (fi->comment) : NULL;
if (comment) {
r_flag_item_set_comment (fi, comment);
R_FREE (comment);
}
}
} else {
const char *n = sn.demname ? sn.demname : sn.name;
const char *fn = sn.demflag ? sn.demflag : sn.nameflag;
char *fnp = (r->bin->prefix) ?
r_str_newf ("%s.%s", r->bin->prefix, fn):
strdup (fn);
RFlagItem *fi = r_flag_set (r->flags, fnp, addr, symbol->size);
if (fi) {
r_flag_item_set_realname (fi, n);
fi->demangled = (bool)(size_t)sn.demname;
} else {
if (fn) {
eprintf ("[Warning] Can't find flag (%s)\n", fn);
}
}
free (fnp);
}
if (sn.demname) {
r_meta_add (r->anal, R_META_TYPE_COMMENT,
addr, symbol->size, sn.demname);
}
r_flag_space_pop (r->flags);
} else if (IS_MODE_JSON (mode)) {
char *str = r_str_escape_utf8_for_json (r_symbol_name, -1);
r_cons_printf ("%s{\"name\":\"%s\","
"\"demname\":\"%s\","
"\"flagname\":\"%s\","
"\"ordinal\":%d,"
"\"bind\":\"%s\","
"\"size\":%d,"
"\"type\":\"%s\","
"\"vaddr\":%"PFMT64d","
"\"paddr\":%"PFMT64d"}",
((exponly && firstexp) || printHere) ? "" : (iter->p ? "," : ""),
str,
sn.demname? sn.demname: "",
sn.nameflag,
symbol->ordinal,
symbol->bind,
(int)symbol->size,
symbol->type,
(ut64)addr, (ut64)symbol->paddr);
free (str);
} else if (IS_MODE_SIMPLE (mode)) {
const char *name = sn.demname? sn.demname: r_symbol_name;
r_cons_printf ("0x%08"PFMT64x" %d %s\n",
addr, (int)symbol->size, name);
} else if (IS_MODE_SIMPLEST (mode)) {
const char *name = sn.demname? sn.demname: r_symbol_name;
r_cons_printf ("%s\n", name);
} else if (IS_MODE_RAD (mode)) {
/* Skip special symbols because we do not flag them and
* they shouldn't be printed in the rad format either */
if (is_special_symbol (symbol)) {
goto next;
}
RBinFile *binfile;
RBinPlugin *plugin;
const char *name = sn.demname? sn.demname: r_symbol_name;
if (!name) {
goto next;
}
if (!strncmp (name, "imp.", 4)) {
if (lastfs != 'i') {
r_cons_printf ("fs imports\n");
}
lastfs = 'i';
} else {
if (lastfs != 's') {
const char *fs = exponly? "exports": "symbols";
r_cons_printf ("fs %s\n", fs);
}
lastfs = 's';
}
if (r->bin->prefix || *name) { // we don't want unnamed symbol flags
char *flagname = construct_symbol_flagname ("sym", name, MAXFLAG_LEN_DEFAULT);
if (!flagname) {
goto next;
}
r_cons_printf ("\"f %s%s%s %u 0x%08" PFMT64x "\"\n",
r->bin->prefix ? r->bin->prefix : "", r->bin->prefix ? "." : "",
flagname, symbol->size, addr);
free (flagname);
}
binfile = r_bin_cur (r->bin);
plugin = r_bin_file_cur_plugin (binfile);
if (plugin && plugin->name) {
if (r_str_startswith (plugin->name, "pe")) {
char *module = strdup (r_symbol_name);
char *p = strstr (module, ".dll_");
if (p && strstr (module, "imp.")) {
char *symname = __filterShell (p + 5);
char *m = __filterShell (module);
*p = 0;
if (r->bin->prefix) {
r_cons_printf ("k bin/pe/%s/%d=%s.%s\n",
module, symbol->ordinal, r->bin->prefix, symname);
} else {
r_cons_printf ("k bin/pe/%s/%d=%s\n",
module, symbol->ordinal, symname);
}
free (symname);
free (m);
}
free (module);
}
}
} else {
const char *bind = symbol->bind? symbol->bind: "NONE";
const char *type = symbol->type? symbol->type: "NONE";
const char *name = r_str_get (sn.demname? sn.demname: r_symbol_name);
r_cons_printf ("%03u", symbol->ordinal);
if (symbol->paddr == UT64_MAX) {
r_cons_printf (" ----------");
} else {
r_cons_printf (" 0x%08"PFMT64x, symbol->paddr);
}
r_cons_printf (" 0x%08"PFMT64x" %6s %6s %4d%s%s\n",
addr, bind, type, symbol->size, *name? " ": "", name);
}
next:
snFini (&sn);
i++;
free (r_symbol_name);
if (exponly && firstexp) {
firstexp = false;
}
if (printHere) {
break;
}
}
if (count == 0 && IS_MODE_JSON (mode)) {
r_cons_printf ("{}");
}
if (is_arm) {
r_list_foreach (entries, iter, entry) {
if (IS_MODE_SET (mode)) {
handle_arm_entry (r, entry, info, va);
}
}
}
if (IS_MODE_JSON (mode) && !printHere) {
r_cons_printf ("]");
}
r_spaces_pop (&r->anal->meta_spaces);
return true;
}
Commit Message: More fixes for the CVE-2019-14745
CWE ID: CWE-78
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void credssp_free(rdpCredssp* credssp)
{
if (credssp != NULL)
{
if (credssp->table)
credssp->table->DeleteSecurityContext(&credssp->context);
sspi_SecBufferFree(&credssp->PublicKey);
sspi_SecBufferFree(&credssp->ts_credentials);
free(credssp->ServicePrincipalName);
free(credssp->identity.User);
free(credssp->identity.Domain);
free(credssp->identity.Password);
free(credssp);
}
}
Commit Message: nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished.
CWE ID: CWE-476
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt(WebPage* webPage)
: LayerTreeHost(webPage)
, m_notifyAfterScheduledLayerFlush(false)
, m_isValid(true)
#if USE(TILED_BACKING_STORE)
, m_waitingForUIProcess(false)
, m_isSuspended(false)
, m_contentsScale(1)
#endif
, m_shouldSyncFrame(false)
, m_shouldSyncRootLayer(true)
, m_layerFlushTimer(this, &LayerTreeHostQt::layerFlushTimerFired)
, m_layerFlushSchedulingEnabled(true)
{
m_rootLayer = GraphicsLayer::create(this);
WebGraphicsLayer* webRootLayer = toWebGraphicsLayer(m_rootLayer.get());
webRootLayer->setRootLayer(true);
#ifndef NDEBUG
m_rootLayer->setName("LayerTreeHostQt root layer");
#endif
m_rootLayer->setDrawsContent(false);
m_rootLayer->setSize(m_webPage->size());
m_layerTreeContext.webLayerID = toWebGraphicsLayer(webRootLayer)->id();
m_nonCompositedContentLayer = GraphicsLayer::create(this);
#if USE(TILED_BACKING_STORE)
toWebGraphicsLayer(m_rootLayer.get())->setWebGraphicsLayerClient(this);
#endif
#ifndef NDEBUG
m_nonCompositedContentLayer->setName("LayerTreeHostQt non-composited content");
#endif
m_nonCompositedContentLayer->setDrawsContent(true);
m_nonCompositedContentLayer->setContentsOpaque(m_webPage->drawsBackground() && !m_webPage->drawsTransparentBackground());
m_nonCompositedContentLayer->setSize(m_webPage->size());
m_rootLayer->addChild(m_nonCompositedContentLayer.get());
if (m_webPage->hasPageOverlay())
createPageOverlayLayer();
scheduleLayerFlush();
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-189
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: kg_unseal(minor_status, context_handle, input_token_buffer,
message_buffer, conf_state, qop_state, toktype)
OM_uint32 *minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle;
gss_buffer_t input_token_buffer;
gss_buffer_t message_buffer;
int *conf_state;
gss_qop_t *qop_state;
int toktype;
{
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
unsigned char *ptr;
unsigned int bodysize;
int err;
int toktype2;
int vfyflags = 0;
OM_uint32 ret;
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *) context_handle;
if (! ctx->established) {
*minor_status = KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE;
return(GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
}
/* parse the token, leave the data in message_buffer, setting conf_state */
/* verify the header */
ptr = (unsigned char *) input_token_buffer->value;
err = g_verify_token_header(ctx->mech_used,
&bodysize, &ptr, -1,
input_token_buffer->length,
vfyflags);
if (err) {
*minor_status = err;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
if (bodysize < 2) {
*minor_status = (OM_uint32)G_BAD_TOK_HEADER;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
toktype2 = load_16_be(ptr);
ptr += 2;
bodysize -= 2;
switch (toktype2) {
case KG2_TOK_MIC_MSG:
case KG2_TOK_WRAP_MSG:
case KG2_TOK_DEL_CTX:
ret = gss_krb5int_unseal_token_v3(&ctx->k5_context, minor_status, ctx,
ptr, bodysize, message_buffer,
conf_state, qop_state, toktype);
break;
case KG_TOK_MIC_MSG:
case KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG:
case KG_TOK_DEL_CTX:
ret = kg_unseal_v1(ctx->k5_context, minor_status, ctx, ptr, bodysize,
message_buffer, conf_state, qop_state,
toktype);
break;
default:
*minor_status = (OM_uint32)G_BAD_TOK_HEADER;
ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
break;
}
if (ret != 0)
save_error_info (*minor_status, ctx->k5_context);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix gss_process_context_token() [CVE-2014-5352]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] The krb5 gss_process_context_token() should not
actually delete the context; that leaves the caller with a dangling
pointer and no way to know that it is invalid. Instead, mark the
context as terminated, and check for terminated contexts in the GSS
functions which expect established contexts. Also add checks in
export_sec_context and pseudo_random, and adjust t_prf.c for the
pseudo_random check.
ticket: 8055 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: EXPORTED strarray_t *mboxlist_sublist(const char *userid)
{
struct db *subs = NULL;
strarray_t *list = strarray_new();
int r;
/* open subs DB */
r = mboxlist_opensubs(userid, &subs);
if (r) goto done;
/* faster to do it all in a single slurp! */
r = cyrusdb_foreach(subs, "", 0, subsadd_cb, NULL, list, 0);
mboxlist_closesubs(subs);
done:
if (r) {
strarray_free(list);
return NULL;
}
return list;
}
Commit Message: mboxlist: fix uninitialised memory use where pattern is "Other Users"
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int llc_ui_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int flags)
{
struct sockaddr_llc *uaddr = (struct sockaddr_llc *)msg->msg_name;
const int nonblock = flags & MSG_DONTWAIT;
struct sk_buff *skb = NULL;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct llc_sock *llc = llc_sk(sk);
unsigned long cpu_flags;
size_t copied = 0;
u32 peek_seq = 0;
u32 *seq;
unsigned long used;
int target; /* Read at least this many bytes */
long timeo;
lock_sock(sk);
copied = -ENOTCONN;
if (unlikely(sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM && sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN))
goto out;
timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, nonblock);
seq = &llc->copied_seq;
if (flags & MSG_PEEK) {
peek_seq = llc->copied_seq;
seq = &peek_seq;
}
target = sock_rcvlowat(sk, flags & MSG_WAITALL, len);
copied = 0;
do {
u32 offset;
/*
* We need to check signals first, to get correct SIGURG
* handling. FIXME: Need to check this doesn't impact 1003.1g
* and move it down to the bottom of the loop
*/
if (signal_pending(current)) {
if (copied)
break;
copied = timeo ? sock_intr_errno(timeo) : -EAGAIN;
break;
}
/* Next get a buffer. */
skb = skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
if (skb) {
offset = *seq;
goto found_ok_skb;
}
/* Well, if we have backlog, try to process it now yet. */
if (copied >= target && !sk->sk_backlog.tail)
break;
if (copied) {
if (sk->sk_err ||
sk->sk_state == TCP_CLOSE ||
(sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN) ||
!timeo ||
(flags & MSG_PEEK))
break;
} else {
if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DONE))
break;
if (sk->sk_err) {
copied = sock_error(sk);
break;
}
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
break;
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM && sk->sk_state == TCP_CLOSE) {
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DONE)) {
/*
* This occurs when user tries to read
* from never connected socket.
*/
copied = -ENOTCONN;
break;
}
break;
}
if (!timeo) {
copied = -EAGAIN;
break;
}
}
if (copied >= target) { /* Do not sleep, just process backlog. */
release_sock(sk);
lock_sock(sk);
} else
sk_wait_data(sk, &timeo);
if ((flags & MSG_PEEK) && peek_seq != llc->copied_seq) {
net_dbg_ratelimited("LLC(%s:%d): Application bug, race in MSG_PEEK\n",
current->comm,
task_pid_nr(current));
peek_seq = llc->copied_seq;
}
continue;
found_ok_skb:
/* Ok so how much can we use? */
used = skb->len - offset;
if (len < used)
used = len;
if (!(flags & MSG_TRUNC)) {
int rc = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, offset,
msg->msg_iov, used);
if (rc) {
/* Exception. Bailout! */
if (!copied)
copied = -EFAULT;
break;
}
}
*seq += used;
copied += used;
len -= used;
/* For non stream protcols we get one packet per recvmsg call */
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_STREAM)
goto copy_uaddr;
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) {
spin_lock_irqsave(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock, cpu_flags);
sk_eat_skb(sk, skb, false);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock, cpu_flags);
*seq = 0;
}
/* Partial read */
if (used + offset < skb->len)
continue;
} while (len > 0);
out:
release_sock(sk);
return copied;
copy_uaddr:
if (uaddr != NULL && skb != NULL) {
memcpy(uaddr, llc_ui_skb_cb(skb), sizeof(*uaddr));
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(*uaddr);
}
if (llc_sk(sk)->cmsg_flags)
llc_cmsg_rcv(msg, skb);
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) {
spin_lock_irqsave(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock, cpu_flags);
sk_eat_skb(sk, skb, false);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock, cpu_flags);
*seq = 0;
}
goto out;
}
Commit Message: llc: Fix missing msg_namelen update in llc_ui_recvmsg()
For stream sockets the code misses to update the msg_namelen member
to 0 and therefore makes net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized
sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack
memory. The msg_namelen update is also missing for datagram sockets
in case the socket is shutting down during receive.
Fix both issues by setting msg_namelen to 0 early. It will be
updated later if we're going to fill the msg_name member.
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void RenderMessageFilter::OnCreateWindow(
const ViewHostMsg_CreateWindow_Params& params,
int* route_id,
int* surface_id,
int64* cloned_session_storage_namespace_id) {
bool no_javascript_access;
bool can_create_window =
GetContentClient()->browser()->CanCreateWindow(
GURL(params.opener_url),
GURL(params.opener_security_origin),
params.window_container_type,
resource_context_,
render_process_id_,
&no_javascript_access);
if (!can_create_window) {
*route_id = MSG_ROUTING_NONE;
*surface_id = 0;
return;
}
scoped_refptr<SessionStorageNamespaceImpl> cloned_namespace =
new SessionStorageNamespaceImpl(dom_storage_context_,
params.session_storage_namespace_id);
*cloned_session_storage_namespace_id = cloned_namespace->id();
render_widget_helper_->CreateNewWindow(params,
no_javascript_access,
peer_handle(),
route_id,
surface_id,
cloned_namespace);
}
Commit Message: Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: bool V4L2JpegEncodeAccelerator::EncodedInstanceDmaBuf::SetUpJpegParameters(
int quality,
gfx::Size coded_size) {
DCHECK(parent_->encoder_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
struct v4l2_ext_controls ctrls;
struct v4l2_ext_control ctrl;
memset(&ctrls, 0, sizeof(ctrls));
memset(&ctrl, 0, sizeof(ctrl));
ctrls.ctrl_class = V4L2_CTRL_CLASS_JPEG;
ctrls.controls = &ctrl;
ctrls.count = 1;
switch (output_buffer_pixelformat_) {
case V4L2_PIX_FMT_JPEG_RAW:
FillQuantizationTable(quality, kDefaultQuantTable[0].value,
quantization_table_[0].value);
FillQuantizationTable(quality, kDefaultQuantTable[1].value,
quantization_table_[1].value);
ctrl.id = V4L2_CID_JPEG_LUMA_QUANTIZATION;
ctrl.size = kDctSize;
ctrl.ptr = quantization_table_[0].value;
IOCTL_OR_ERROR_RETURN_FALSE(VIDIOC_S_EXT_CTRLS, &ctrls);
ctrl.id = V4L2_CID_JPEG_CHROMA_QUANTIZATION;
ctrl.size = kDctSize;
ctrl.ptr = quantization_table_[1].value;
IOCTL_OR_ERROR_RETURN_FALSE(VIDIOC_S_EXT_CTRLS, &ctrls);
PrepareJpegMarkers(coded_size);
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: media: remove base::SharedMemoryHandle usage in v4l2 encoder
This replaces a use of the legacy UnalignedSharedMemory ctor
taking a SharedMemoryHandle with the current ctor taking a
PlatformSharedMemoryRegion.
Bug: 849207
Change-Id: Iea24ebdcd941cf2fa97e19cf2aeac1a18f9773d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1697602
Commit-Queue: Matthew Cary (CET) <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ricky Liang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#681740}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static bool nested_vmx_exit_handled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
u32 intr_info = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO);
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
u32 exit_reason = vmx->exit_reason;
if (vmx->nested.nested_run_pending)
return 0;
if (unlikely(vmx->fail)) {
pr_info_ratelimited("%s failed vm entry %x\n", __func__,
vmcs_read32(VM_INSTRUCTION_ERROR));
return 1;
}
switch (exit_reason) {
case EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI:
if (!is_exception(intr_info))
return 0;
else if (is_page_fault(intr_info))
return enable_ept;
return vmcs12->exception_bitmap &
(1u << (intr_info & INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK));
case EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT:
return 0;
case EXIT_REASON_TRIPLE_FAULT:
return 1;
case EXIT_REASON_PENDING_INTERRUPT:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_VIRTUAL_INTR_PENDING);
case EXIT_REASON_NMI_WINDOW:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMI_PENDING);
case EXIT_REASON_TASK_SWITCH:
return 1;
case EXIT_REASON_CPUID:
return 1;
case EXIT_REASON_HLT:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_HLT_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_INVD:
return 1;
case EXIT_REASON_INVLPG:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_INVLPG_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_RDPMC:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_RDPMC_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_RDTSC:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_RDTSC_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_VMCALL: case EXIT_REASON_VMCLEAR:
case EXIT_REASON_VMLAUNCH: case EXIT_REASON_VMPTRLD:
case EXIT_REASON_VMPTRST: case EXIT_REASON_VMREAD:
case EXIT_REASON_VMRESUME: case EXIT_REASON_VMWRITE:
case EXIT_REASON_VMOFF: case EXIT_REASON_VMON:
/*
* VMX instructions trap unconditionally. This allows L1 to
* emulate them for its L2 guest, i.e., allows 3-level nesting!
*/
return 1;
case EXIT_REASON_CR_ACCESS:
return nested_vmx_exit_handled_cr(vcpu, vmcs12);
case EXIT_REASON_DR_ACCESS:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_MOV_DR_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_IO_INSTRUCTION:
return nested_vmx_exit_handled_io(vcpu, vmcs12);
case EXIT_REASON_MSR_READ:
case EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE:
return nested_vmx_exit_handled_msr(vcpu, vmcs12, exit_reason);
case EXIT_REASON_INVALID_STATE:
return 1;
case EXIT_REASON_MWAIT_INSTRUCTION:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_MWAIT_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_MONITOR_INSTRUCTION:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_MONITOR_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_PAUSE_INSTRUCTION:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_PAUSE_EXITING) ||
nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12,
SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY:
return 0;
case EXIT_REASON_TPR_BELOW_THRESHOLD:
return 1;
case EXIT_REASON_APIC_ACCESS:
return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12,
SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES);
case EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION:
case EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG:
return 0;
case EXIT_REASON_PREEMPTION_TIMER:
return vmcs12->pin_based_vm_exec_control &
PIN_BASED_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER;
case EXIT_REASON_WBINVD:
return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_WBINVD_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_XSETBV:
return 1;
default:
return 1;
}
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static void diff_bytes_c(uint8_t *dst, const uint8_t *src1, const uint8_t *src2, int w){
long i;
#if !HAVE_FAST_UNALIGNED
if((long)src2 & (sizeof(long)-1)){
for(i=0; i+7<w; i+=8){
dst[i+0] = src1[i+0]-src2[i+0];
dst[i+1] = src1[i+1]-src2[i+1];
dst[i+2] = src1[i+2]-src2[i+2];
dst[i+3] = src1[i+3]-src2[i+3];
dst[i+4] = src1[i+4]-src2[i+4];
dst[i+5] = src1[i+5]-src2[i+5];
dst[i+6] = src1[i+6]-src2[i+6];
dst[i+7] = src1[i+7]-src2[i+7];
}
}else
#endif
for(i=0; i<=w-sizeof(long); i+=sizeof(long)){
long a = *(long*)(src1+i);
long b = *(long*)(src2+i);
*(long*)(dst+i) = ((a|pb_80) - (b&pb_7f)) ^ ((a^b^pb_80)&pb_80);
}
for(; i<w; i++)
dst[i+0] = src1[i+0]-src2[i+0];
}
Commit Message: avcodec/dsputil: fix signedness in sizeof() comparissions
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: PersonalDataManager* GetPersonalDataManager() {
return PersonalDataManagerFactory::GetForProfile(browser()->profile());
}
Commit Message: Disable AutofillInteractiveTest.OnChangeAfterAutofill test.
Failing due to http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=revision&revision=170278.
BUG=353691
[email protected], [email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/216853002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260106 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void GDataFileSystem::RunAndNotifyInitialLoadFinished(
const FindEntryCallback& callback,
GDataFileError error,
GDataEntry* entry) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
if (!callback.is_null())
callback.Run(error, entry);
DVLOG(1) << "RunAndNotifyInitialLoadFinished";
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(GDataFileSystemInterface::Observer, observers_,
OnInitialLoadFinished());
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: get_cred_handler(Service * /*service*/, int /*i*/, Stream *stream) {
char * name = NULL;
int rtnVal = FALSE;
bool found_cred=false;
CredentialWrapper * cred = NULL;
char * owner = NULL;
const char * user = NULL;
void * data = NULL;
ReliSock * socket = (ReliSock*)stream;
if (!socket->triedAuthentication()) {
CondorError errstack;
if( ! SecMan::authenticate_sock(socket, READ, &errstack) ) {
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Unable to authenticate, qutting\n");
goto EXIT;
}
}
socket->decode();
if (!socket->code(name)) {
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Error receiving credential name\n");
goto EXIT;
}
user = socket->getFullyQualifiedUser();
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Authenticated as %s\n", user);
if (strchr (name, ':')) {
owner = strdup (name);
char * pColon = strchr (owner, ':');
*pColon = '\0';
sprintf (name, (char*)(pColon+sizeof(char)));
if (strcmp (owner, user) != 0) {
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Requesting another user's (%s) credential %s\n", owner, name);
if (!isSuperUser (user)) {
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "User %s is NOT super user, request DENIED\n", user);
goto EXIT;
} else {
dprintf (D_FULLDEBUG, "User %s is super user, request GRANTED\n", user);
}
}
} else {
owner = strdup (user);
}
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "sending cred %s for user %s\n", name, owner);
credentials.Rewind();
while (credentials.Next(cred)) {
if (cred->cred->GetType() == X509_CREDENTIAL_TYPE) {
if ((strcmp(cred->cred->GetName(), name) == 0) &&
(strcmp(cred->cred->GetOwner(), owner) == 0)) {
found_cred=true;
break; // found it
}
}
}
socket->encode();
if (found_cred) {
dprintf (D_FULLDEBUG, "Found cred %s\n", cred->GetStorageName());
int data_size;
int rc = LoadData (cred->GetStorageName(), data, data_size);
dprintf (D_FULLDEBUG, "Credential::LoadData returned %d\n", rc);
if (rc == 0) {
goto EXIT;
}
socket->code (data_size);
socket->code_bytes (data, data_size);
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Credential name %s for owner %s returned to user %s\n",
name, owner, user);
}
else {
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Cannot find cred %s\n", name);
int rc = CREDD_CREDENTIAL_NOT_FOUND;
socket->code (rc);
}
rtnVal = TRUE;
EXIT:
if ( name != NULL) {
free (name);
}
if ( owner != NULL) {
free (owner);
}
if ( data != NULL) {
free (data);
}
return rtnVal;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void kvm_arch_hardware_unsetup(void)
{
kvm_x86_ops->hardware_unsetup();
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: bool PermissionsData::CanCaptureVisiblePage(int tab_id,
std::string* error) const {
const URLPattern all_urls(URLPattern::SCHEME_ALL,
URLPattern::kAllUrlsPattern);
base::AutoLock auto_lock(runtime_lock_);
if (active_permissions_unsafe_->explicit_hosts().ContainsPattern(all_urls))
return true;
if (tab_id >= 0) {
const PermissionSet* tab_permissions = GetTabSpecificPermissions(tab_id);
if (tab_permissions &&
tab_permissions->HasAPIPermission(APIPermission::kTab)) {
return true;
}
if (error)
*error = manifest_errors::kActiveTabPermissionNotGranted;
return false;
}
if (error)
*error = manifest_errors::kAllURLOrActiveTabNeeded;
return false;
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Restrict tabs.captureVisibleTab()
Modify the permissions for tabs.captureVisibleTab(). Instead of just
checking for <all_urls> and assuming its safe, do the following:
- If the page is a "normal" web page (e.g., http/https), allow the
capture if the extension has activeTab granted or <all_urls>.
- If the page is a file page (file:///), allow the capture if the
extension has file access *and* either of the <all_urls> or
activeTab permissions.
- If the page is a chrome:// page, allow the capture only if the
extension has activeTab granted.
Bug: 810220
Change-Id: I1e2f71281e2f331d641ba0e435df10d66d721304
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/981195
Commit-Queue: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Karan Bhatia <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#548891}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: BlobDataHandle::~BlobDataHandle()
{
ThreadableBlobRegistry::unregisterBlobURL(m_internalURL);
}
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int tg3_power_up(struct tg3 *tp)
{
int err;
tg3_enable_register_access(tp);
err = pci_set_power_state(tp->pdev, PCI_D0);
if (!err) {
/* Switch out of Vaux if it is a NIC */
tg3_pwrsrc_switch_to_vmain(tp);
} else {
netdev_err(tp->dev, "Transition to D0 failed\n");
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Matt Carlson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: BuildTestPacket(uint16_t id, uint16_t off, int mf, const char content,
int content_len)
{
Packet *p = NULL;
int hlen = 20;
int ttl = 64;
uint8_t *pcontent;
IPV4Hdr ip4h;
p = SCCalloc(1, sizeof(*p) + default_packet_size);
if (unlikely(p == NULL))
return NULL;
PACKET_INITIALIZE(p);
gettimeofday(&p->ts, NULL);
ip4h.ip_verhl = 4 << 4;
ip4h.ip_verhl |= hlen >> 2;
ip4h.ip_len = htons(hlen + content_len);
ip4h.ip_id = htons(id);
ip4h.ip_off = htons(off);
if (mf)
ip4h.ip_off = htons(IP_MF | off);
else
ip4h.ip_off = htons(off);
ip4h.ip_ttl = ttl;
ip4h.ip_proto = IPPROTO_ICMP;
ip4h.s_ip_src.s_addr = 0x01010101; /* 1.1.1.1 */
ip4h.s_ip_dst.s_addr = 0x02020202; /* 2.2.2.2 */
/* copy content_len crap, we need full length */
PacketCopyData(p, (uint8_t *)&ip4h, sizeof(ip4h));
p->ip4h = (IPV4Hdr *)GET_PKT_DATA(p);
SET_IPV4_SRC_ADDR(p, &p->src);
SET_IPV4_DST_ADDR(p, &p->dst);
pcontent = SCCalloc(1, content_len);
if (unlikely(pcontent == NULL))
return NULL;
memset(pcontent, content, content_len);
PacketCopyDataOffset(p, hlen, pcontent, content_len);
SET_PKT_LEN(p, hlen + content_len);
SCFree(pcontent);
p->ip4h->ip_csum = IPV4CalculateChecksum((uint16_t *)GET_PKT_DATA(p), hlen);
/* Self test. */
if (IPV4_GET_VER(p) != 4)
goto error;
if (IPV4_GET_HLEN(p) != hlen)
goto error;
if (IPV4_GET_IPLEN(p) != hlen + content_len)
goto error;
if (IPV4_GET_IPID(p) != id)
goto error;
if (IPV4_GET_IPOFFSET(p) != off)
goto error;
if (IPV4_GET_MF(p) != mf)
goto error;
if (IPV4_GET_IPTTL(p) != ttl)
goto error;
if (IPV4_GET_IPPROTO(p) != IPPROTO_ICMP)
goto error;
return p;
error:
if (p != NULL)
SCFree(p);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host.
CWE ID: CWE-358
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: v8::Handle<v8::Value> V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.WebGLRenderingContext.getExtensionCallback()");
WebGLRenderingContext* imp = V8WebGLRenderingContext::toNative(args.Holder());
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
STRING_TO_V8PARAMETER_EXCEPTION_BLOCK(V8Parameter<>, name, args[0]);
WebGLExtension* extension = imp->getExtension(name);
return toV8Object(extension, args.Holder(), args.GetIsolate());
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void PrintingMessageFilter::OnGetDefaultPrintSettingsReply(
scoped_refptr<printing::PrinterQuery> printer_query,
IPC::Message* reply_msg) {
PrintMsg_Print_Params params;
if (!printer_query.get() ||
printer_query->last_status() != printing::PrintingContext::OK) {
params.Reset();
} else {
RenderParamsFromPrintSettings(printer_query->settings(), ¶ms);
params.document_cookie = printer_query->cookie();
}
PrintHostMsg_GetDefaultPrintSettings::WriteReplyParams(reply_msg, params);
Send(reply_msg);
if (printer_query.get()) {
if (printer_query->cookie() && printer_query->settings().dpi()) {
print_job_manager_->QueuePrinterQuery(printer_query.get());
} else {
printer_query->StopWorker();
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static Image *ReadGIFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define BitSet(byte,bit) (((byte) & (bit)) == (bit))
#define LSBFirstOrder(x,y) (((y) << 8) | (x))
Image
*image,
*meta_image;
int
number_extensionss=0;
MagickBooleanType
status;
RectangleInfo
page;
register ssize_t
i;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
delay,
dispose,
duration,
global_colors,
image_count,
iterations,
one;
ssize_t
count,
opacity;
unsigned char
background,
c,
flag,
*global_colormap,
buffer[257];
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Determine if this a GIF file.
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,6,buffer);
if ((count != 6) || ((LocaleNCompare((char *) buffer,"GIF87",5) != 0) &&
(LocaleNCompare((char *) buffer,"GIF89",5) != 0)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
page.width=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
page.height=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
flag=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
background=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
c=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image); /* reserved */
one=1;
global_colors=one << (((size_t) flag & 0x07)+1);
global_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)
MagickMax(global_colors,256),3UL*sizeof(*global_colormap));
if (global_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (BitSet((int) flag,0x80) != 0)
{
count=ReadBlob(image,(size_t) (3*global_colors),global_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) (3*global_colors))
{
global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
global_colormap);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
}
}
delay=0;
dispose=0;
duration=0;
iterations=1;
opacity=(-1);
image_count=0;
meta_image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception); /* metadata container */
for ( ; ; )
{
count=ReadBlob(image,1,&c);
if (count != 1)
break;
if (c == (unsigned char) ';')
break; /* terminator */
if (c == (unsigned char) '!')
{
/*
GIF Extension block.
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,1,&c);
if (count != 1)
{
global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
global_colormap);
meta_image=DestroyImage(meta_image);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"UnableToReadExtensionBlock");
}
switch (c)
{
case 0xf9:
{
/*
Read graphics control extension.
*/
while (ReadBlobBlock(image,buffer) != 0) ;
dispose=(size_t) (buffer[0] >> 2);
delay=(size_t) ((buffer[2] << 8) | buffer[1]);
if ((ssize_t) (buffer[0] & 0x01) == 0x01)
opacity=(ssize_t) buffer[3];
break;
}
case 0xfe:
{
char
*comments;
size_t
length;
/*
Read comment extension.
*/
comments=AcquireString((char *) NULL);
for (length=0; ; length+=count)
{
count=(ssize_t) ReadBlobBlock(image,buffer);
if (count == 0)
break;
buffer[count]='\0';
(void) ConcatenateString(&comments,(const char *) buffer);
}
(void) SetImageProperty(meta_image,"comment",comments,exception);
comments=DestroyString(comments);
break;
}
case 0xff:
{
MagickBooleanType
loop;
/*
Read Netscape Loop extension.
*/
loop=MagickFalse;
if (ReadBlobBlock(image,buffer) != 0)
loop=LocaleNCompare((char *) buffer,"NETSCAPE2.0",11) == 0 ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if (loop != MagickFalse)
{
while (ReadBlobBlock(image,buffer) != 0)
iterations=(size_t) ((buffer[2] << 8) | buffer[1]);
break;
}
else
{
char
name[MagickPathExtent];
int
block_length,
info_length,
reserved_length;
MagickBooleanType
i8bim,
icc,
iptc,
magick;
StringInfo
*profile;
unsigned char
*info;
/*
Store GIF application extension as a generic profile.
*/
icc=LocaleNCompare((char *) buffer,"ICCRGBG1012",11) == 0 ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
magick=LocaleNCompare((char *) buffer,"ImageMagick",11) == 0 ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
i8bim=LocaleNCompare((char *) buffer,"MGK8BIM0000",11) == 0 ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
iptc=LocaleNCompare((char *) buffer,"MGKIPTC0000",11) == 0 ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
number_extensionss++;
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading GIF application extension");
info=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(255UL,
sizeof(*info));
if (info == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
meta_image=DestroyImage(meta_image);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
reserved_length=255;
for (info_length=0; ; )
{
block_length=(int) ReadBlobBlock(image,&info[info_length]);
if (block_length == 0)
break;
info_length+=block_length;
if (info_length > (reserved_length-255))
{
reserved_length+=4096;
info=(unsigned char *) ResizeQuantumMemory(info,(size_t)
reserved_length,sizeof(*info));
if (info == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
meta_image=DestroyImage(meta_image);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
}
}
profile=BlobToStringInfo(info,(size_t) info_length);
if (profile == (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
meta_image=DestroyImage(meta_image);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
if (i8bim != MagickFalse)
(void) CopyMagickString(name,"8bim",sizeof(name));
else if (icc != MagickFalse)
(void) CopyMagickString(name,"icc",sizeof(name));
else if (iptc != MagickFalse)
(void) CopyMagickString(name,"iptc",sizeof(name));
else if (magick != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CopyMagickString(name,"magick",sizeof(name));
meta_image->gamma=StringToDouble((char *) info+6,
(char **) NULL);
}
else
(void) FormatLocaleString(name,sizeof(name),"gif:%.11s",
buffer);
info=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(info);
if (magick == MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageProfile(meta_image,name,profile,exception);
profile=DestroyStringInfo(profile);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" profile name=%s",name);
}
break;
}
default:
{
while (ReadBlobBlock(image,buffer) != 0) ;
break;
}
}
}
if (c != (unsigned char) ',')
continue;
if (image_count != 0)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
global_colormap);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
}
image_count++;
/*
Read image attributes.
*/
meta_image->scene=image->scene;
(void) CloneImageProperties(image,meta_image);
DestroyImageProperties(meta_image);
(void) CloneImageProfiles(image,meta_image);
DestroyImageProfiles(meta_image);
image->storage_class=PseudoClass;
image->compression=LZWCompression;
page.x=(ssize_t) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
page.y=(ssize_t) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->columns=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->rows=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->depth=8;
flag=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
image->interlace=BitSet((int) flag,0x40) != 0 ? GIFInterlace : NoInterlace;
image->colors=BitSet((int) flag,0x80) == 0 ? global_colors : one <<
((size_t) (flag & 0x07)+1);
if (opacity >= (ssize_t) image->colors)
opacity=(-1);
image->page.width=page.width;
image->page.height=page.height;
image->page.y=page.y;
image->page.x=page.x;
image->delay=delay;
image->ticks_per_second=100;
image->dispose=(DisposeType) dispose;
image->iterations=iterations;
image->alpha_trait=opacity >= 0 ? BlendPixelTrait : UndefinedPixelTrait;
delay=0;
dispose=0;
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
{
global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
global_colormap);
meta_image=DestroyImage(meta_image);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NegativeOrZeroImageSize");
}
/*
Inititialize colormap.
*/
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
{
global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
global_colormap);
meta_image=DestroyImage(meta_image);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
if (BitSet((int) flag,0x80) == 0)
{
/*
Use global colormap.
*/
p=global_colormap;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=(double) ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
image->colormap[i].green=(double) ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
image->colormap[i].blue=(double) ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
if (i == opacity)
{
image->colormap[i].alpha=(double) TransparentAlpha;
image->transparent_color=image->colormap[opacity];
}
}
image->background_color=image->colormap[MagickMin((ssize_t) background,
(ssize_t) image->colors-1)];
}
else
{
unsigned char
*colormap;
/*
Read local colormap.
*/
colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->colors,3*
sizeof(*colormap));
if (colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
global_colormap);
meta_image=DestroyImage(meta_image);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
count=ReadBlob(image,(3*image->colors)*sizeof(*colormap),colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) (3*image->colors))
{
global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
global_colormap);
colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colormap);
meta_image=DestroyImage(meta_image);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
}
p=colormap;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=(double) ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
image->colormap[i].green=(double) ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
image->colormap[i].blue=(double) ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
if (i == opacity)
image->colormap[i].alpha=(double) TransparentAlpha;
}
colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colormap);
}
if (image->gamma == 1.0)
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
if (IsPixelInfoGray(image->colormap+i) == MagickFalse)
break;
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,i == (ssize_t) image->colors ?
GRAYColorspace : RGBColorspace,exception);
}
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
/*
Decode image.
*/
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
status=PingGIFImage(image,exception);
else
status=DecodeImage(image,opacity,exception);
if ((image_info->ping == MagickFalse) && (status == MagickFalse))
{
global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
global_colormap);
meta_image=DestroyImage(meta_image);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
}
duration+=image->delay*image->iterations;
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
opacity=(-1);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) image->scene-
1,image->scene);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
image->duration=duration;
meta_image=DestroyImage(meta_image);
global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(global_colormap);
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NegativeOrZeroImageSize");
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/592
CWE ID: CWE-200
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static void nsc_encode_argb_to_aycocg(NSC_CONTEXT* context, const BYTE* data,
UINT32 scanline)
{
UINT16 x;
UINT16 y;
UINT16 rw;
BYTE ccl;
const BYTE* src;
BYTE* yplane = NULL;
BYTE* coplane = NULL;
BYTE* cgplane = NULL;
BYTE* aplane = NULL;
INT16 r_val;
INT16 g_val;
INT16 b_val;
BYTE a_val;
UINT32 tempWidth;
tempWidth = ROUND_UP_TO(context->width, 8);
rw = (context->ChromaSubsamplingLevel ? tempWidth : context->width);
ccl = context->ColorLossLevel;
for (y = 0; y < context->height; y++)
{
src = data + (context->height - 1 - y) * scanline;
yplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[0] + y * rw;
coplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[1] + y * rw;
cgplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[2] + y * rw;
aplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[3] + y * context->width;
for (x = 0; x < context->width; x++)
{
switch (context->format)
{
case PIXEL_FORMAT_BGRX32:
b_val = *src++;
g_val = *src++;
r_val = *src++;
src++;
a_val = 0xFF;
break;
case PIXEL_FORMAT_BGRA32:
b_val = *src++;
g_val = *src++;
r_val = *src++;
a_val = *src++;
break;
case PIXEL_FORMAT_RGBX32:
r_val = *src++;
g_val = *src++;
b_val = *src++;
src++;
a_val = 0xFF;
break;
case PIXEL_FORMAT_RGBA32:
r_val = *src++;
g_val = *src++;
b_val = *src++;
a_val = *src++;
break;
case PIXEL_FORMAT_BGR24:
b_val = *src++;
g_val = *src++;
r_val = *src++;
a_val = 0xFF;
break;
case PIXEL_FORMAT_RGB24:
r_val = *src++;
g_val = *src++;
b_val = *src++;
a_val = 0xFF;
break;
case PIXEL_FORMAT_BGR16:
b_val = (INT16)(((*(src + 1)) & 0xF8) | ((*(src + 1)) >> 5));
g_val = (INT16)((((*(src + 1)) & 0x07) << 5) | (((*src) & 0xE0) >> 3));
r_val = (INT16)((((*src) & 0x1F) << 3) | (((*src) >> 2) & 0x07));
a_val = 0xFF;
src += 2;
break;
case PIXEL_FORMAT_RGB16:
r_val = (INT16)(((*(src + 1)) & 0xF8) | ((*(src + 1)) >> 5));
g_val = (INT16)((((*(src + 1)) & 0x07) << 5) | (((*src) & 0xE0) >> 3));
b_val = (INT16)((((*src) & 0x1F) << 3) | (((*src) >> 2) & 0x07));
a_val = 0xFF;
src += 2;
break;
case PIXEL_FORMAT_A4:
{
int shift;
BYTE idx;
shift = (7 - (x % 8));
idx = ((*src) >> shift) & 1;
idx |= (((*(src + 1)) >> shift) & 1) << 1;
idx |= (((*(src + 2)) >> shift) & 1) << 2;
idx |= (((*(src + 3)) >> shift) & 1) << 3;
idx *= 3;
r_val = (INT16) context->palette[idx];
g_val = (INT16) context->palette[idx + 1];
b_val = (INT16) context->palette[idx + 2];
if (shift == 0)
src += 4;
}
a_val = 0xFF;
break;
case PIXEL_FORMAT_RGB8:
{
int idx = (*src) * 3;
r_val = (INT16) context->palette[idx];
g_val = (INT16) context->palette[idx + 1];
b_val = (INT16) context->palette[idx + 2];
src++;
}
a_val = 0xFF;
break;
default:
r_val = g_val = b_val = a_val = 0;
break;
}
*yplane++ = (BYTE)((r_val >> 2) + (g_val >> 1) + (b_val >> 2));
/* Perform color loss reduction here */
*coplane++ = (BYTE)((r_val - b_val) >> ccl);
*cgplane++ = (BYTE)((-(r_val >> 1) + g_val - (b_val >> 1)) >> ccl);
*aplane++ = a_val;
}
if (context->ChromaSubsamplingLevel && (x % 2) == 1)
{
*yplane = *(yplane - 1);
*coplane = *(coplane - 1);
*cgplane = *(cgplane - 1);
}
}
if (context->ChromaSubsamplingLevel && (y % 2) == 1)
{
yplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[0] + y * rw;
coplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[1] + y * rw;
cgplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[2] + y * rw;
CopyMemory(yplane, yplane - rw, rw);
CopyMemory(coplane, coplane - rw, rw);
CopyMemory(cgplane, cgplane - rw, rw);
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8788
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-787
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: NavigationControllerHistoryTest()
: url0("http://foo1"),
url1("http://foo1"),
url2("http://foo1"),
profile_manager_(NULL) {
}
Commit Message: Ensure URL is updated after a cross-site navigation is pre-empted by
an "ignored" navigation.
BUG=77507
TEST=NavigationControllerTest.LoadURL_IgnorePreemptsPending
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6826015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@81307 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static IntRect getNodeWindowRect(Node* node)
{
if (Frame* frame = frameForNode(node)) {
if (FrameView* view = frame->view())
return view->contentsToWindow(node->getRect());
}
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
return IntRect();
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: is_link_trusted (NautilusFile *file,
gboolean is_launcher)
{
GFile *location;
gboolean res;
if (!is_launcher)
{
return TRUE;
}
if (nautilus_file_can_execute (file))
{
return TRUE;
}
res = FALSE;
if (nautilus_file_is_local (file))
{
location = nautilus_file_get_location (file);
res = nautilus_is_in_system_dir (location);
g_object_unref (location);
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static zend_object *spl_object_storage_new_ex(zend_class_entry *class_type, zval *orig) /* {{{ */
{
spl_SplObjectStorage *intern;
zend_class_entry *parent = class_type;
intern = emalloc(sizeof(spl_SplObjectStorage) + zend_object_properties_size(parent));
memset(intern, 0, sizeof(spl_SplObjectStorage) - sizeof(zval));
intern->pos = HT_INVALID_IDX;
zend_object_std_init(&intern->std, class_type);
object_properties_init(&intern->std, class_type);
zend_hash_init(&intern->storage, 0, NULL, spl_object_storage_dtor, 0);
intern->std.handlers = &spl_handler_SplObjectStorage;
while (parent) {
if (parent == spl_ce_SplObjectStorage) {
if (class_type != spl_ce_SplObjectStorage) {
intern->fptr_get_hash = zend_hash_str_find_ptr(&class_type->function_table, "gethash", sizeof("gethash") - 1);
if (intern->fptr_get_hash->common.scope == spl_ce_SplObjectStorage) {
intern->fptr_get_hash = NULL;
}
}
break;
}
parent = parent->parent;
}
if (orig) {
spl_SplObjectStorage *other = Z_SPLOBJSTORAGE_P(orig);
spl_object_storage_addall(intern, orig, other);
}
return &intern->std;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #73257 and bug #73258 - SplObjectStorage unserialize allows use of non-object as key
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_vdec::component_deinit(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp)
{
(void) hComp;
#ifdef _ANDROID_
if (iDivXDrmDecrypt) {
delete iDivXDrmDecrypt;
iDivXDrmDecrypt=NULL;
}
#endif //_ANDROID_
unsigned i = 0;
if (OMX_StateLoaded != m_state) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("WARNING:Rxd DeInit,OMX not in LOADED state %d",\
m_state);
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Playback Ended - FAILED");
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Playback Ended - PASSED");
}
/*Check if the output buffers have to be cleaned up*/
if (m_out_mem_ptr) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Freeing the Output Memory");
for (i = 0; i < drv_ctx.op_buf.actualcount; i++ ) {
free_output_buffer (&m_out_mem_ptr[i]);
}
#ifdef _ANDROID_ICS_
memset(&native_buffer, 0, (sizeof(nativebuffer) * MAX_NUM_INPUT_OUTPUT_BUFFERS));
#endif
}
/*Check if the input buffers have to be cleaned up*/
if (m_inp_mem_ptr || m_inp_heap_ptr) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Freeing the Input Memory");
for (i = 0; i<drv_ctx.ip_buf.actualcount; i++ ) {
if (m_inp_mem_ptr)
free_input_buffer (i,&m_inp_mem_ptr[i]);
else
free_input_buffer (i,NULL);
}
}
free_input_buffer_header();
free_output_buffer_header();
if (h264_scratch.pBuffer) {
free(h264_scratch.pBuffer);
h264_scratch.pBuffer = NULL;
}
if (h264_parser) {
delete h264_parser;
h264_parser = NULL;
}
if (m_frame_parser.mutils) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Free utils parser");
delete (m_frame_parser.mutils);
m_frame_parser.mutils = NULL;
}
if (m_platform_list) {
free(m_platform_list);
m_platform_list = NULL;
}
if (m_vendor_config.pData) {
free(m_vendor_config.pData);
m_vendor_config.pData = NULL;
}
m_ftb_q.m_size=0;
m_cmd_q.m_size=0;
m_etb_q.m_size=0;
m_ftb_q.m_read = m_ftb_q.m_write =0;
m_cmd_q.m_read = m_cmd_q.m_write =0;
m_etb_q.m_read = m_etb_q.m_write =0;
#ifdef _ANDROID_
if (m_debug_timestamp) {
m_timestamp_list.reset_ts_list();
}
#endif
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Calling VDEC_IOCTL_STOP_NEXT_MSG");
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Close the driver instance");
if (m_debug.infile) {
fclose(m_debug.infile);
m_debug.infile = NULL;
}
if (m_debug.outfile) {
fclose(m_debug.outfile);
m_debug.outfile = NULL;
}
#ifdef OUTPUT_EXTRADATA_LOG
if (outputExtradataFile)
fclose (outputExtradataFile);
#endif
DEBUG_PRINT_INFO("omx_vdec::component_deinit() complete");
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: add safety checks for freeing buffers
Allow only up to 64 buffers on input/output port (since the
allocation bitmap is only 64-wide).
Do not allow changing theactual buffer count while still
holding allocation (Client can technically negotiate
buffer count on a free/disabled port)
Add safety checks to free only as many buffers were allocated.
Fixes: Security Vulnerability - Heap Overflow and Possible Local
Privilege Escalation in MediaServer (libOmxVdec problem #3)
Bug: 27532282 27661749
Change-Id: I06dd680d43feaef3efdc87311e8a6703e234b523
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: FT_Bitmap_Convert( FT_Library library,
const FT_Bitmap *source,
FT_Bitmap *target,
FT_Int alignment )
{
FT_Error error = FT_Err_Ok;
FT_Memory memory;
FT_Int source_pitch, target_pitch;
if ( !library )
return FT_THROW( Invalid_Library_Handle );
memory = library->memory;
switch ( source->pixel_mode )
{
case FT_PIXEL_MODE_MONO:
case FT_PIXEL_MODE_GRAY:
case FT_PIXEL_MODE_GRAY2:
case FT_PIXEL_MODE_GRAY4:
case FT_PIXEL_MODE_LCD:
case FT_PIXEL_MODE_LCD_V:
case FT_PIXEL_MODE_LCD_V:
case FT_PIXEL_MODE_BGRA:
{
FT_Int pad, old_target_pitch;
FT_Long old_size;
old_target_pitch = target->pitch;
old_target_pitch = -old_target_pitch;
old_size = target->rows * old_target_pitch;
target->pixel_mode = FT_PIXEL_MODE_GRAY;
target->rows = source->rows;
target->width = source->width;
pad = 0;
if ( alignment > 0 )
{
pad = source->width % alignment;
if ( pad != 0 )
pad = alignment - pad;
}
target_pitch = source->width + pad;
if ( target_pitch > 0 &&
(FT_ULong)target->rows > FT_ULONG_MAX / target_pitch )
return FT_THROW( Invalid_Argument );
if ( target->rows * target_pitch > old_size &&
FT_QREALLOC( target->buffer,
old_size, target->rows * target_pitch ) )
return error;
target->pitch = target->pitch < 0 ? -target_pitch : target_pitch;
}
break;
default:
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_Argument );
}
source_pitch = source->pitch;
if ( source_pitch < 0 )
source_pitch = -source_pitch;
switch ( source->pixel_mode )
{
case FT_PIXEL_MODE_MONO:
{
FT_Byte* s = source->buffer;
FT_Byte* t = target->buffer;
FT_Int i;
target->num_grays = 2;
for ( i = source->rows; i > 0; i-- )
{
FT_Byte* ss = s;
FT_Byte* tt = t;
FT_Int j;
/* get the full bytes */
for ( j = source->width >> 3; j > 0; j-- )
{
FT_Int val = ss[0]; /* avoid a byte->int cast on each line */
tt[0] = (FT_Byte)( ( val & 0x80 ) >> 7 );
tt[1] = (FT_Byte)( ( val & 0x40 ) >> 6 );
tt[2] = (FT_Byte)( ( val & 0x20 ) >> 5 );
tt[3] = (FT_Byte)( ( val & 0x10 ) >> 4 );
tt[4] = (FT_Byte)( ( val & 0x08 ) >> 3 );
tt[5] = (FT_Byte)( ( val & 0x04 ) >> 2 );
tt[6] = (FT_Byte)( ( val & 0x02 ) >> 1 );
tt[7] = (FT_Byte)( val & 0x01 );
tt += 8;
ss += 1;
}
/* get remaining pixels (if any) */
j = source->width & 7;
if ( j > 0 )
{
FT_Int val = *ss;
for ( ; j > 0; j-- )
{
tt[0] = (FT_Byte)( ( val & 0x80 ) >> 7);
val <<= 1;
tt += 1;
}
}
s += source_pitch;
t += target_pitch;
}
}
break;
case FT_PIXEL_MODE_GRAY:
case FT_PIXEL_MODE_LCD:
case FT_PIXEL_MODE_LCD_V:
{
FT_Int width = source->width;
FT_Byte* s = source->buffer;
FT_Byte* t = target->buffer;
FT_Int i;
target->num_grays = 256;
for ( i = source->rows; i > 0; i-- )
{
FT_ARRAY_COPY( t, s, width );
s += source_pitch;
t += target_pitch;
}
}
break;
case FT_PIXEL_MODE_GRAY2:
{
FT_Byte* s = source->buffer;
FT_Byte* t = target->buffer;
FT_Int i;
target->num_grays = 4;
for ( i = source->rows; i > 0; i-- )
{
FT_Byte* ss = s;
FT_Byte* tt = t;
FT_Int j;
/* get the full bytes */
for ( j = source->width >> 2; j > 0; j-- )
{
FT_Int val = ss[0];
tt[0] = (FT_Byte)( ( val & 0xC0 ) >> 6 );
tt[1] = (FT_Byte)( ( val & 0x30 ) >> 4 );
tt[2] = (FT_Byte)( ( val & 0x0C ) >> 2 );
tt[3] = (FT_Byte)( ( val & 0x03 ) );
ss += 1;
tt += 4;
}
j = source->width & 3;
if ( j > 0 )
{
FT_Int val = ss[0];
for ( ; j > 0; j-- )
{
tt[0] = (FT_Byte)( ( val & 0xC0 ) >> 6 );
val <<= 2;
tt += 1;
}
}
s += source_pitch;
t += target_pitch;
}
}
break;
case FT_PIXEL_MODE_GRAY4:
{
FT_Byte* s = source->buffer;
FT_Byte* t = target->buffer;
FT_Int i;
target->num_grays = 16;
for ( i = source->rows; i > 0; i-- )
{
FT_Byte* ss = s;
FT_Byte* tt = t;
FT_Int j;
/* get the full bytes */
for ( j = source->width >> 1; j > 0; j-- )
{
FT_Int val = ss[0];
tt[0] = (FT_Byte)( ( val & 0xF0 ) >> 4 );
tt[1] = (FT_Byte)( ( val & 0x0F ) );
ss += 1;
tt += 2;
}
if ( source->width & 1 )
tt[0] = (FT_Byte)( ( ss[0] & 0xF0 ) >> 4 );
s += source_pitch;
t += target_pitch;
}
}
break;
case FT_PIXEL_MODE_BGRA:
{
FT_Byte* s = source->buffer;
FT_Byte* t = target->buffer;
FT_Int i;
target->num_grays = 256;
for ( i = source->rows; i > 0; i-- )
{
FT_Byte* ss = s;
FT_Byte* tt = t;
FT_Int j;
for ( j = source->width; j > 0; j-- )
{
tt[0] = ft_gray_for_premultiplied_srgb_bgra( ss );
ss += 4;
tt += 1;
}
s += source_pitch;
t += target_pitch;
}
}
break;
default:
;
}
return error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static __le32 ext4_dirent_csum(struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_dir_entry *dirent, int size)
{
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb);
struct ext4_inode_info *ei = EXT4_I(inode);
__u32 csum;
csum = ext4_chksum(sbi, ei->i_csum_seed, (__u8 *)dirent, size);
return cpu_to_le32(csum);
}
Commit Message: ext4: avoid hang when mounting non-journal filesystems with orphan list
When trying to mount a file system which does not contain a journal,
but which does have a orphan list containing an inode which needs to
be truncated, the mount call with hang forever in
ext4_orphan_cleanup() because ext4_orphan_del() will return
immediately without removing the inode from the orphan list, leading
to an uninterruptible loop in kernel code which will busy out one of
the CPU's on the system.
This can be trivially reproduced by trying to mount the file system
found in tests/f_orphan_extents_inode/image.gz from the e2fsprogs
source tree. If a malicious user were to put this on a USB stick, and
mount it on a Linux desktop which has automatic mounts enabled, this
could be considered a potential denial of service attack. (Not a big
deal in practice, but professional paranoids worry about such things,
and have even been known to allocate CVE numbers for such problems.)
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Zheng Liu <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void CallbackAndDie(bool succeeded) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = context_->isolate();
v8::HandleScope handle_scope(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Value> args[] = {v8::Boolean::New(isolate, succeeded)};
context_->CallFunction(v8::Local<v8::Function>::New(isolate, callback_),
arraysize(args), args);
delete this;
}
Commit Message: Fix re-entrancy and lifetime issue in RenderFrameObserverNatives::OnDocumentElementCreated
BUG=585268,568130
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1684953002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374758}
CWE ID:
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void ImageLoader::DoUpdateFromElement(BypassMainWorldBehavior bypass_behavior,
UpdateFromElementBehavior update_behavior,
const KURL& url,
ReferrerPolicy referrer_policy,
UpdateType update_type) {
pending_task_.reset();
std::unique_ptr<IncrementLoadEventDelayCount> load_delay_counter;
load_delay_counter.swap(delay_until_do_update_from_element_);
Document& document = element_->GetDocument();
if (!document.IsActive())
return;
AtomicString image_source_url = element_->ImageSourceURL();
ImageResourceContent* new_image_content = nullptr;
if (!url.IsNull() && !url.IsEmpty()) {
ResourceLoaderOptions resource_loader_options;
resource_loader_options.initiator_info.name = GetElement()->localName();
ResourceRequest resource_request(url);
if (update_behavior == kUpdateForcedReload) {
resource_request.SetCacheMode(mojom::FetchCacheMode::kBypassCache);
resource_request.SetPreviewsState(WebURLRequest::kPreviewsNoTransform);
}
if (referrer_policy != kReferrerPolicyDefault) {
resource_request.SetHTTPReferrer(SecurityPolicy::GenerateReferrer(
referrer_policy, url, document.OutgoingReferrer()));
}
if (IsHTMLPictureElement(GetElement()->parentNode()) ||
!GetElement()->FastGetAttribute(HTMLNames::srcsetAttr).IsNull())
resource_request.SetRequestContext(
WebURLRequest::kRequestContextImageSet);
bool page_is_being_dismissed =
document.PageDismissalEventBeingDispatched() != Document::kNoDismissal;
if (page_is_being_dismissed) {
resource_request.SetHTTPHeaderField(HTTPNames::Cache_Control,
"max-age=0");
resource_request.SetKeepalive(true);
resource_request.SetRequestContext(WebURLRequest::kRequestContextPing);
}
FetchParameters params(resource_request, resource_loader_options);
ConfigureRequest(params, bypass_behavior, *element_,
document.GetClientHintsPreferences());
if (update_behavior != kUpdateForcedReload && document.GetFrame())
document.GetFrame()->MaybeAllowImagePlaceholder(params);
new_image_content = ImageResourceContent::Fetch(params, document.Fetcher());
if (page_is_being_dismissed)
new_image_content = nullptr;
ClearFailedLoadURL();
} else {
if (!image_source_url.IsNull()) {
DispatchErrorEvent();
}
NoImageResourceToLoad();
}
ImageResourceContent* old_image_content = image_content_.Get();
if (old_image_content != new_image_content)
RejectPendingDecodes(update_type);
if (update_behavior == kUpdateSizeChanged && element_->GetLayoutObject() &&
element_->GetLayoutObject()->IsImage() &&
new_image_content == old_image_content) {
ToLayoutImage(element_->GetLayoutObject())->IntrinsicSizeChanged();
} else {
if (pending_load_event_.IsActive())
pending_load_event_.Cancel();
if (pending_error_event_.IsActive() && new_image_content)
pending_error_event_.Cancel();
UpdateImageState(new_image_content);
UpdateLayoutObject();
if (new_image_content) {
new_image_content->AddObserver(this);
}
if (old_image_content) {
old_image_content->RemoveObserver(this);
}
}
if (LayoutImageResource* image_resource = GetLayoutImageResource())
image_resource->ResetAnimation();
}
Commit Message: Use correct Request Context when EMBED or OBJECT requests an image
When an OBJECT or EMBED element requests an image, it does so using
an ImageLoader. To ensure that Content-Security-Policy restrictions
are applied correctly in this scenario, we must adjust the request's
context to indicate the originating element.
Bug: 811691
Change-Id: I0fd8010970a12e68e845a54310695acc0b3f7625
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/924589
Commit-Queue: Eric Lawrence <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#537846}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static netdev_tx_t ipip6_tunnel_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct net_device *dev)
{
struct ip_tunnel *tunnel = netdev_priv(dev);
struct net_device_stats *stats = &dev->stats;
struct netdev_queue *txq = netdev_get_tx_queue(dev, 0);
struct iphdr *tiph = &tunnel->parms.iph;
struct ipv6hdr *iph6 = ipv6_hdr(skb);
u8 tos = tunnel->parms.iph.tos;
__be16 df = tiph->frag_off;
struct rtable *rt; /* Route to the other host */
struct net_device *tdev; /* Device to other host */
struct iphdr *iph; /* Our new IP header */
unsigned int max_headroom; /* The extra header space needed */
__be32 dst = tiph->daddr;
int mtu;
struct in6_addr *addr6;
int addr_type;
if (skb->protocol != htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
goto tx_error;
/* ISATAP (RFC4214) - must come before 6to4 */
if (dev->priv_flags & IFF_ISATAP) {
struct neighbour *neigh = NULL;
if (skb_dst(skb))
neigh = skb_dst(skb)->neighbour;
if (neigh == NULL) {
if (net_ratelimit())
printk(KERN_DEBUG "sit: nexthop == NULL\n");
goto tx_error;
}
addr6 = (struct in6_addr*)&neigh->primary_key;
addr_type = ipv6_addr_type(addr6);
if ((addr_type & IPV6_ADDR_UNICAST) &&
ipv6_addr_is_isatap(addr6))
dst = addr6->s6_addr32[3];
else
goto tx_error;
}
if (!dst)
dst = try_6rd(&iph6->daddr, tunnel);
if (!dst) {
struct neighbour *neigh = NULL;
if (skb_dst(skb))
neigh = skb_dst(skb)->neighbour;
if (neigh == NULL) {
if (net_ratelimit())
printk(KERN_DEBUG "sit: nexthop == NULL\n");
goto tx_error;
}
addr6 = (struct in6_addr*)&neigh->primary_key;
addr_type = ipv6_addr_type(addr6);
if (addr_type == IPV6_ADDR_ANY) {
addr6 = &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr;
addr_type = ipv6_addr_type(addr6);
}
if ((addr_type & IPV6_ADDR_COMPATv4) == 0)
goto tx_error_icmp;
dst = addr6->s6_addr32[3];
}
{
struct flowi fl = { .nl_u = { .ip4_u =
{ .daddr = dst,
.saddr = tiph->saddr,
.tos = RT_TOS(tos) } },
.oif = tunnel->parms.link,
.proto = IPPROTO_IPV6 };
if (ip_route_output_key(dev_net(dev), &rt, &fl)) {
stats->tx_carrier_errors++;
goto tx_error_icmp;
}
}
if (rt->rt_type != RTN_UNICAST) {
ip_rt_put(rt);
stats->tx_carrier_errors++;
goto tx_error_icmp;
}
tdev = rt->u.dst.dev;
if (tdev == dev) {
ip_rt_put(rt);
stats->collisions++;
goto tx_error;
}
if (df) {
mtu = dst_mtu(&rt->u.dst) - sizeof(struct iphdr);
if (mtu < 68) {
stats->collisions++;
ip_rt_put(rt);
goto tx_error;
}
if (mtu < IPV6_MIN_MTU) {
mtu = IPV6_MIN_MTU;
df = 0;
}
if (tunnel->parms.iph.daddr && skb_dst(skb))
skb_dst(skb)->ops->update_pmtu(skb_dst(skb), mtu);
if (skb->len > mtu) {
icmpv6_send(skb, ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG, 0, mtu, dev);
ip_rt_put(rt);
goto tx_error;
}
}
if (tunnel->err_count > 0) {
if (time_before(jiffies,
tunnel->err_time + IPTUNNEL_ERR_TIMEO)) {
tunnel->err_count--;
dst_link_failure(skb);
} else
tunnel->err_count = 0;
}
/*
* Okay, now see if we can stuff it in the buffer as-is.
*/
max_headroom = LL_RESERVED_SPACE(tdev)+sizeof(struct iphdr);
if (skb_headroom(skb) < max_headroom || skb_shared(skb) ||
(skb_cloned(skb) && !skb_clone_writable(skb, 0))) {
struct sk_buff *new_skb = skb_realloc_headroom(skb, max_headroom);
if (!new_skb) {
ip_rt_put(rt);
txq->tx_dropped++;
dev_kfree_skb(skb);
return NETDEV_TX_OK;
}
if (skb->sk)
skb_set_owner_w(new_skb, skb->sk);
dev_kfree_skb(skb);
skb = new_skb;
iph6 = ipv6_hdr(skb);
}
skb->transport_header = skb->network_header;
skb_push(skb, sizeof(struct iphdr));
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
memset(&(IPCB(skb)->opt), 0, sizeof(IPCB(skb)->opt));
IPCB(skb)->flags = 0;
skb_dst_drop(skb);
skb_dst_set(skb, &rt->u.dst);
/*
* Push down and install the IPIP header.
*/
iph = ip_hdr(skb);
iph->version = 4;
iph->ihl = sizeof(struct iphdr)>>2;
iph->frag_off = df;
iph->protocol = IPPROTO_IPV6;
iph->tos = INET_ECN_encapsulate(tos, ipv6_get_dsfield(iph6));
iph->daddr = rt->rt_dst;
iph->saddr = rt->rt_src;
if ((iph->ttl = tiph->ttl) == 0)
iph->ttl = iph6->hop_limit;
nf_reset(skb);
IPTUNNEL_XMIT();
return NETDEV_TX_OK;
tx_error_icmp:
dst_link_failure(skb);
tx_error:
stats->tx_errors++;
dev_kfree_skb(skb);
return NETDEV_TX_OK;
}
Commit Message: tunnels: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
Same stuff as in ip_gre patch: receive hook can be called before netns
setup is done, oopsing in net_generic().
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static __inline__ int scm_check_creds(struct ucred *creds)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
kuid_t uid = make_kuid(cred->user_ns, creds->uid);
kgid_t gid = make_kgid(cred->user_ns, creds->gid);
if (!uid_valid(uid) || !gid_valid(gid))
return -EINVAL;
if ((creds->pid == task_tgid_vnr(current) || nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) &&
((uid_eq(uid, cred->uid) || uid_eq(uid, cred->euid) ||
uid_eq(uid, cred->suid)) || nsown_capable(CAP_SETUID)) &&
((gid_eq(gid, cred->gid) || gid_eq(gid, cred->egid) ||
gid_eq(gid, cred->sgid)) || nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID))) {
return 0;
}
return -EPERM;
}
Commit Message: scm: Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN over the current pidns to spoof pids.
Don't allow spoofing pids over unix domain sockets in the corner
cases where a user has created a user namespace but has not yet
created a pid namespace.
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int store_xauthority(void) {
fs_build_mnt_dir();
char *src;
char *dest = RUN_XAUTHORITY_FILE;
FILE *fp = fopen(dest, "w");
if (fp) {
fprintf(fp, "\n");
SET_PERMS_STREAM(fp, getuid(), getgid(), 0600);
fclose(fp);
}
if (asprintf(&src, "%s/.Xauthority", cfg.homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(src, &s) == 0) {
if (is_link(src)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Warning: invalid .Xauthority file\n");
return 0;
}
copy_file_as_user(src, dest, getuid(), getgid(), 0600);
fs_logger2("clone", dest);
return 1; // file copied
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: security fix
CWE ID: CWE-269
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int decode_frame_png(AVCodecContext *avctx,
void *data, int *got_frame,
AVPacket *avpkt)
{
PNGDecContext *const s = avctx->priv_data;
const uint8_t *buf = avpkt->data;
int buf_size = avpkt->size;
AVFrame *p;
int64_t sig;
int ret;
ff_thread_release_buffer(avctx, &s->last_picture);
FFSWAP(ThreadFrame, s->picture, s->last_picture);
p = s->picture.f;
bytestream2_init(&s->gb, buf, buf_size);
/* check signature */
sig = bytestream2_get_be64(&s->gb);
if (sig != PNGSIG &&
sig != MNGSIG) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Invalid PNG signature 0x%08"PRIX64".\n", sig);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
s->y = s->state = s->has_trns = 0;
/* init the zlib */
s->zstream.zalloc = ff_png_zalloc;
s->zstream.zfree = ff_png_zfree;
s->zstream.opaque = NULL;
ret = inflateInit(&s->zstream);
if (ret != Z_OK) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "inflateInit returned error %d\n", ret);
return AVERROR_EXTERNAL;
}
if ((ret = decode_frame_common(avctx, s, p, avpkt)) < 0)
goto the_end;
if (avctx->skip_frame == AVDISCARD_ALL) {
*got_frame = 0;
ret = bytestream2_tell(&s->gb);
goto the_end;
}
if ((ret = av_frame_ref(data, s->picture.f)) < 0)
return ret;
*got_frame = 1;
ret = bytestream2_tell(&s->gb);
the_end:
inflateEnd(&s->zstream);
s->crow_buf = NULL;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/pngdec: Fix off by 1 size in decode_zbuf()
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 444/fuzz-2-ffmpeg_VIDEO_AV_CODEC_ID_PNG_fuzzer
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-787
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int ext4_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
{
char *orig_data = kstrdup(data, GFP_KERNEL);
struct buffer_head *bh;
struct ext4_super_block *es = NULL;
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi;
ext4_fsblk_t block;
ext4_fsblk_t sb_block = get_sb_block(&data);
ext4_fsblk_t logical_sb_block;
unsigned long offset = 0;
unsigned long journal_devnum = 0;
unsigned long def_mount_opts;
struct inode *root;
const char *descr;
int ret = -ENOMEM;
int blocksize, clustersize;
unsigned int db_count;
unsigned int i;
int needs_recovery, has_huge_files, has_bigalloc;
__u64 blocks_count;
int err = 0;
unsigned int journal_ioprio = DEFAULT_JOURNAL_IOPRIO;
ext4_group_t first_not_zeroed;
sbi = kzalloc(sizeof(*sbi), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sbi)
goto out_free_orig;
sbi->s_blockgroup_lock =
kzalloc(sizeof(struct blockgroup_lock), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sbi->s_blockgroup_lock) {
kfree(sbi);
goto out_free_orig;
}
sb->s_fs_info = sbi;
sbi->s_sb = sb;
sbi->s_inode_readahead_blks = EXT4_DEF_INODE_READAHEAD_BLKS;
sbi->s_sb_block = sb_block;
if (sb->s_bdev->bd_part)
sbi->s_sectors_written_start =
part_stat_read(sb->s_bdev->bd_part, sectors[1]);
/* Cleanup superblock name */
strreplace(sb->s_id, '/', '!');
/* -EINVAL is default */
ret = -EINVAL;
blocksize = sb_min_blocksize(sb, EXT4_MIN_BLOCK_SIZE);
if (!blocksize) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "unable to set blocksize");
goto out_fail;
}
/*
* The ext4 superblock will not be buffer aligned for other than 1kB
* block sizes. We need to calculate the offset from buffer start.
*/
if (blocksize != EXT4_MIN_BLOCK_SIZE) {
logical_sb_block = sb_block * EXT4_MIN_BLOCK_SIZE;
offset = do_div(logical_sb_block, blocksize);
} else {
logical_sb_block = sb_block;
}
if (!(bh = sb_bread_unmovable(sb, logical_sb_block))) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "unable to read superblock");
goto out_fail;
}
/*
* Note: s_es must be initialized as soon as possible because
* some ext4 macro-instructions depend on its value
*/
es = (struct ext4_super_block *) (bh->b_data + offset);
sbi->s_es = es;
sb->s_magic = le16_to_cpu(es->s_magic);
if (sb->s_magic != EXT4_SUPER_MAGIC)
goto cantfind_ext4;
sbi->s_kbytes_written = le64_to_cpu(es->s_kbytes_written);
/* Warn if metadata_csum and gdt_csum are both set. */
if (ext4_has_feature_metadata_csum(sb) &&
ext4_has_feature_gdt_csum(sb))
ext4_warning(sb, "metadata_csum and uninit_bg are "
"redundant flags; please run fsck.");
/* Check for a known checksum algorithm */
if (!ext4_verify_csum_type(sb, es)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "VFS: Found ext4 filesystem with "
"unknown checksum algorithm.");
silent = 1;
goto cantfind_ext4;
}
/* Load the checksum driver */
if (ext4_has_feature_metadata_csum(sb)) {
sbi->s_chksum_driver = crypto_alloc_shash("crc32c", 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(sbi->s_chksum_driver)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Cannot load crc32c driver.");
ret = PTR_ERR(sbi->s_chksum_driver);
sbi->s_chksum_driver = NULL;
goto failed_mount;
}
}
/* Check superblock checksum */
if (!ext4_superblock_csum_verify(sb, es)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "VFS: Found ext4 filesystem with "
"invalid superblock checksum. Run e2fsck?");
silent = 1;
ret = -EFSBADCRC;
goto cantfind_ext4;
}
/* Precompute checksum seed for all metadata */
if (ext4_has_feature_csum_seed(sb))
sbi->s_csum_seed = le32_to_cpu(es->s_checksum_seed);
else if (ext4_has_metadata_csum(sb))
sbi->s_csum_seed = ext4_chksum(sbi, ~0, es->s_uuid,
sizeof(es->s_uuid));
/* Set defaults before we parse the mount options */
def_mount_opts = le32_to_cpu(es->s_default_mount_opts);
set_opt(sb, INIT_INODE_TABLE);
if (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_DEBUG)
set_opt(sb, DEBUG);
if (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_BSDGROUPS)
set_opt(sb, GRPID);
if (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_UID16)
set_opt(sb, NO_UID32);
/* xattr user namespace & acls are now defaulted on */
set_opt(sb, XATTR_USER);
#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_POSIX_ACL
set_opt(sb, POSIX_ACL);
#endif
/* don't forget to enable journal_csum when metadata_csum is enabled. */
if (ext4_has_metadata_csum(sb))
set_opt(sb, JOURNAL_CHECKSUM);
if ((def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_JMODE) == EXT4_DEFM_JMODE_DATA)
set_opt(sb, JOURNAL_DATA);
else if ((def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_JMODE) == EXT4_DEFM_JMODE_ORDERED)
set_opt(sb, ORDERED_DATA);
else if ((def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_JMODE) == EXT4_DEFM_JMODE_WBACK)
set_opt(sb, WRITEBACK_DATA);
if (le16_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_errors) == EXT4_ERRORS_PANIC)
set_opt(sb, ERRORS_PANIC);
else if (le16_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_errors) == EXT4_ERRORS_CONTINUE)
set_opt(sb, ERRORS_CONT);
else
set_opt(sb, ERRORS_RO);
/* block_validity enabled by default; disable with noblock_validity */
set_opt(sb, BLOCK_VALIDITY);
if (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_DISCARD)
set_opt(sb, DISCARD);
sbi->s_resuid = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, le16_to_cpu(es->s_def_resuid));
sbi->s_resgid = make_kgid(&init_user_ns, le16_to_cpu(es->s_def_resgid));
sbi->s_commit_interval = JBD2_DEFAULT_MAX_COMMIT_AGE * HZ;
sbi->s_min_batch_time = EXT4_DEF_MIN_BATCH_TIME;
sbi->s_max_batch_time = EXT4_DEF_MAX_BATCH_TIME;
if ((def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_NOBARRIER) == 0)
set_opt(sb, BARRIER);
/*
* enable delayed allocation by default
* Use -o nodelalloc to turn it off
*/
if (!IS_EXT3_SB(sb) && !IS_EXT2_SB(sb) &&
((def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_NODELALLOC) == 0))
set_opt(sb, DELALLOC);
/*
* set default s_li_wait_mult for lazyinit, for the case there is
* no mount option specified.
*/
sbi->s_li_wait_mult = EXT4_DEF_LI_WAIT_MULT;
if (!parse_options((char *) sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts, sb,
&journal_devnum, &journal_ioprio, 0)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING,
"failed to parse options in superblock: %s",
sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts);
}
sbi->s_def_mount_opt = sbi->s_mount_opt;
if (!parse_options((char *) data, sb, &journal_devnum,
&journal_ioprio, 0))
goto failed_mount;
if (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) == EXT4_MOUNT_JOURNAL_DATA) {
printk_once(KERN_WARNING "EXT4-fs: Warning: mounting "
"with data=journal disables delayed "
"allocation and O_DIRECT support!\n");
if (test_opt2(sb, EXPLICIT_DELALLOC)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "can't mount with "
"both data=journal and delalloc");
goto failed_mount;
}
if (test_opt(sb, DIOREAD_NOLOCK)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "can't mount with "
"both data=journal and dioread_nolock");
goto failed_mount;
}
if (test_opt(sb, DAX)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "can't mount with "
"both data=journal and dax");
goto failed_mount;
}
if (test_opt(sb, DELALLOC))
clear_opt(sb, DELALLOC);
} else {
sb->s_iflags |= SB_I_CGROUPWB;
}
sb->s_flags = (sb->s_flags & ~MS_POSIXACL) |
(test_opt(sb, POSIX_ACL) ? MS_POSIXACL : 0);
if (le32_to_cpu(es->s_rev_level) == EXT4_GOOD_OLD_REV &&
(ext4_has_compat_features(sb) ||
ext4_has_ro_compat_features(sb) ||
ext4_has_incompat_features(sb)))
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING,
"feature flags set on rev 0 fs, "
"running e2fsck is recommended");
if (es->s_creator_os == cpu_to_le32(EXT4_OS_HURD)) {
set_opt2(sb, HURD_COMPAT);
if (ext4_has_feature_64bit(sb)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"The Hurd can't support 64-bit file systems");
goto failed_mount;
}
}
if (IS_EXT2_SB(sb)) {
if (ext2_feature_set_ok(sb))
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "mounting ext2 file system "
"using the ext4 subsystem");
else {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "couldn't mount as ext2 due "
"to feature incompatibilities");
goto failed_mount;
}
}
if (IS_EXT3_SB(sb)) {
if (ext3_feature_set_ok(sb))
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "mounting ext3 file system "
"using the ext4 subsystem");
else {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "couldn't mount as ext3 due "
"to feature incompatibilities");
goto failed_mount;
}
}
/*
* Check feature flags regardless of the revision level, since we
* previously didn't change the revision level when setting the flags,
* so there is a chance incompat flags are set on a rev 0 filesystem.
*/
if (!ext4_feature_set_ok(sb, (sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY)))
goto failed_mount;
blocksize = BLOCK_SIZE << le32_to_cpu(es->s_log_block_size);
if (blocksize < EXT4_MIN_BLOCK_SIZE ||
blocksize > EXT4_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Unsupported filesystem blocksize %d", blocksize);
goto failed_mount;
}
if (sbi->s_mount_opt & EXT4_MOUNT_DAX) {
if (blocksize != PAGE_SIZE) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"error: unsupported blocksize for dax");
goto failed_mount;
}
if (!sb->s_bdev->bd_disk->fops->direct_access) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"error: device does not support dax");
goto failed_mount;
}
}
if (ext4_has_feature_encrypt(sb) && es->s_encryption_level) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Unsupported encryption level %d",
es->s_encryption_level);
goto failed_mount;
}
if (sb->s_blocksize != blocksize) {
/* Validate the filesystem blocksize */
if (!sb_set_blocksize(sb, blocksize)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "bad block size %d",
blocksize);
goto failed_mount;
}
brelse(bh);
logical_sb_block = sb_block * EXT4_MIN_BLOCK_SIZE;
offset = do_div(logical_sb_block, blocksize);
bh = sb_bread_unmovable(sb, logical_sb_block);
if (!bh) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Can't read superblock on 2nd try");
goto failed_mount;
}
es = (struct ext4_super_block *)(bh->b_data + offset);
sbi->s_es = es;
if (es->s_magic != cpu_to_le16(EXT4_SUPER_MAGIC)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Magic mismatch, very weird!");
goto failed_mount;
}
}
has_huge_files = ext4_has_feature_huge_file(sb);
sbi->s_bitmap_maxbytes = ext4_max_bitmap_size(sb->s_blocksize_bits,
has_huge_files);
sb->s_maxbytes = ext4_max_size(sb->s_blocksize_bits, has_huge_files);
if (le32_to_cpu(es->s_rev_level) == EXT4_GOOD_OLD_REV) {
sbi->s_inode_size = EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE;
sbi->s_first_ino = EXT4_GOOD_OLD_FIRST_INO;
} else {
sbi->s_inode_size = le16_to_cpu(es->s_inode_size);
sbi->s_first_ino = le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_ino);
if ((sbi->s_inode_size < EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE) ||
(!is_power_of_2(sbi->s_inode_size)) ||
(sbi->s_inode_size > blocksize)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"unsupported inode size: %d",
sbi->s_inode_size);
goto failed_mount;
}
if (sbi->s_inode_size > EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE)
sb->s_time_gran = 1 << (EXT4_EPOCH_BITS - 2);
}
sbi->s_desc_size = le16_to_cpu(es->s_desc_size);
if (ext4_has_feature_64bit(sb)) {
if (sbi->s_desc_size < EXT4_MIN_DESC_SIZE_64BIT ||
sbi->s_desc_size > EXT4_MAX_DESC_SIZE ||
!is_power_of_2(sbi->s_desc_size)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"unsupported descriptor size %lu",
sbi->s_desc_size);
goto failed_mount;
}
} else
sbi->s_desc_size = EXT4_MIN_DESC_SIZE;
sbi->s_blocks_per_group = le32_to_cpu(es->s_blocks_per_group);
sbi->s_inodes_per_group = le32_to_cpu(es->s_inodes_per_group);
if (EXT4_INODE_SIZE(sb) == 0 || EXT4_INODES_PER_GROUP(sb) == 0)
goto cantfind_ext4;
sbi->s_inodes_per_block = blocksize / EXT4_INODE_SIZE(sb);
if (sbi->s_inodes_per_block == 0)
goto cantfind_ext4;
sbi->s_itb_per_group = sbi->s_inodes_per_group /
sbi->s_inodes_per_block;
sbi->s_desc_per_block = blocksize / EXT4_DESC_SIZE(sb);
sbi->s_sbh = bh;
sbi->s_mount_state = le16_to_cpu(es->s_state);
sbi->s_addr_per_block_bits = ilog2(EXT4_ADDR_PER_BLOCK(sb));
sbi->s_desc_per_block_bits = ilog2(EXT4_DESC_PER_BLOCK(sb));
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
sbi->s_hash_seed[i] = le32_to_cpu(es->s_hash_seed[i]);
sbi->s_def_hash_version = es->s_def_hash_version;
if (ext4_has_feature_dir_index(sb)) {
i = le32_to_cpu(es->s_flags);
if (i & EXT2_FLAGS_UNSIGNED_HASH)
sbi->s_hash_unsigned = 3;
else if ((i & EXT2_FLAGS_SIGNED_HASH) == 0) {
#ifdef __CHAR_UNSIGNED__
if (!(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY))
es->s_flags |=
cpu_to_le32(EXT2_FLAGS_UNSIGNED_HASH);
sbi->s_hash_unsigned = 3;
#else
if (!(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY))
es->s_flags |=
cpu_to_le32(EXT2_FLAGS_SIGNED_HASH);
#endif
}
}
/* Handle clustersize */
clustersize = BLOCK_SIZE << le32_to_cpu(es->s_log_cluster_size);
has_bigalloc = ext4_has_feature_bigalloc(sb);
if (has_bigalloc) {
if (clustersize < blocksize) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"cluster size (%d) smaller than "
"block size (%d)", clustersize, blocksize);
goto failed_mount;
}
sbi->s_cluster_bits = le32_to_cpu(es->s_log_cluster_size) -
le32_to_cpu(es->s_log_block_size);
sbi->s_clusters_per_group =
le32_to_cpu(es->s_clusters_per_group);
if (sbi->s_clusters_per_group > blocksize * 8) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"#clusters per group too big: %lu",
sbi->s_clusters_per_group);
goto failed_mount;
}
if (sbi->s_blocks_per_group !=
(sbi->s_clusters_per_group * (clustersize / blocksize))) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "blocks per group (%lu) and "
"clusters per group (%lu) inconsistent",
sbi->s_blocks_per_group,
sbi->s_clusters_per_group);
goto failed_mount;
}
} else {
if (clustersize != blocksize) {
ext4_warning(sb, "fragment/cluster size (%d) != "
"block size (%d)", clustersize,
blocksize);
clustersize = blocksize;
}
if (sbi->s_blocks_per_group > blocksize * 8) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"#blocks per group too big: %lu",
sbi->s_blocks_per_group);
goto failed_mount;
}
sbi->s_clusters_per_group = sbi->s_blocks_per_group;
sbi->s_cluster_bits = 0;
}
sbi->s_cluster_ratio = clustersize / blocksize;
if (sbi->s_inodes_per_group > blocksize * 8) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"#inodes per group too big: %lu",
sbi->s_inodes_per_group);
goto failed_mount;
}
/* Do we have standard group size of clustersize * 8 blocks ? */
if (sbi->s_blocks_per_group == clustersize << 3)
set_opt2(sb, STD_GROUP_SIZE);
/*
* Test whether we have more sectors than will fit in sector_t,
* and whether the max offset is addressable by the page cache.
*/
err = generic_check_addressable(sb->s_blocksize_bits,
ext4_blocks_count(es));
if (err) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "filesystem"
" too large to mount safely on this system");
if (sizeof(sector_t) < 8)
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "CONFIG_LBDAF not enabled");
goto failed_mount;
}
if (EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb) == 0)
goto cantfind_ext4;
/* check blocks count against device size */
blocks_count = sb->s_bdev->bd_inode->i_size >> sb->s_blocksize_bits;
if (blocks_count && ext4_blocks_count(es) > blocks_count) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "bad geometry: block count %llu "
"exceeds size of device (%llu blocks)",
ext4_blocks_count(es), blocks_count);
goto failed_mount;
}
/*
* It makes no sense for the first data block to be beyond the end
* of the filesystem.
*/
if (le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_data_block) >= ext4_blocks_count(es)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "bad geometry: first data "
"block %u is beyond end of filesystem (%llu)",
le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_data_block),
ext4_blocks_count(es));
goto failed_mount;
}
blocks_count = (ext4_blocks_count(es) -
le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_data_block) +
EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb) - 1);
do_div(blocks_count, EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb));
if (blocks_count > ((uint64_t)1<<32) - EXT4_DESC_PER_BLOCK(sb)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "groups count too large: %u "
"(block count %llu, first data block %u, "
"blocks per group %lu)", sbi->s_groups_count,
ext4_blocks_count(es),
le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_data_block),
EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb));
goto failed_mount;
}
sbi->s_groups_count = blocks_count;
sbi->s_blockfile_groups = min_t(ext4_group_t, sbi->s_groups_count,
(EXT4_MAX_BLOCK_FILE_PHYS / EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb)));
db_count = (sbi->s_groups_count + EXT4_DESC_PER_BLOCK(sb) - 1) /
EXT4_DESC_PER_BLOCK(sb);
sbi->s_group_desc = ext4_kvmalloc(db_count *
sizeof(struct buffer_head *),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (sbi->s_group_desc == NULL) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "not enough memory");
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto failed_mount;
}
bgl_lock_init(sbi->s_blockgroup_lock);
for (i = 0; i < db_count; i++) {
block = descriptor_loc(sb, logical_sb_block, i);
sbi->s_group_desc[i] = sb_bread_unmovable(sb, block);
if (!sbi->s_group_desc[i]) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"can't read group descriptor %d", i);
db_count = i;
goto failed_mount2;
}
}
if (!ext4_check_descriptors(sb, &first_not_zeroed)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "group descriptors corrupted!");
ret = -EFSCORRUPTED;
goto failed_mount2;
}
sbi->s_gdb_count = db_count;
get_random_bytes(&sbi->s_next_generation, sizeof(u32));
spin_lock_init(&sbi->s_next_gen_lock);
setup_timer(&sbi->s_err_report, print_daily_error_info,
(unsigned long) sb);
/* Register extent status tree shrinker */
if (ext4_es_register_shrinker(sbi))
goto failed_mount3;
sbi->s_stripe = ext4_get_stripe_size(sbi);
sbi->s_extent_max_zeroout_kb = 32;
/*
* set up enough so that it can read an inode
*/
sb->s_op = &ext4_sops;
sb->s_export_op = &ext4_export_ops;
sb->s_xattr = ext4_xattr_handlers;
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
sb->dq_op = &ext4_quota_operations;
if (ext4_has_feature_quota(sb))
sb->s_qcop = &dquot_quotactl_sysfile_ops;
else
sb->s_qcop = &ext4_qctl_operations;
sb->s_quota_types = QTYPE_MASK_USR | QTYPE_MASK_GRP | QTYPE_MASK_PRJ;
#endif
memcpy(sb->s_uuid, es->s_uuid, sizeof(es->s_uuid));
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbi->s_orphan); /* unlinked but open files */
mutex_init(&sbi->s_orphan_lock);
sb->s_root = NULL;
needs_recovery = (es->s_last_orphan != 0 ||
ext4_has_feature_journal_needs_recovery(sb));
if (ext4_has_feature_mmp(sb) && !(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY))
if (ext4_multi_mount_protect(sb, le64_to_cpu(es->s_mmp_block)))
goto failed_mount3a;
/*
* The first inode we look at is the journal inode. Don't try
* root first: it may be modified in the journal!
*/
if (!test_opt(sb, NOLOAD) && ext4_has_feature_journal(sb)) {
if (ext4_load_journal(sb, es, journal_devnum))
goto failed_mount3a;
} else if (test_opt(sb, NOLOAD) && !(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY) &&
ext4_has_feature_journal_needs_recovery(sb)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "required journal recovery "
"suppressed and not mounted read-only");
goto failed_mount_wq;
} else {
/* Nojournal mode, all journal mount options are illegal */
if (test_opt2(sb, EXPLICIT_JOURNAL_CHECKSUM)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "can't mount with "
"journal_checksum, fs mounted w/o journal");
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
if (test_opt(sb, JOURNAL_ASYNC_COMMIT)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "can't mount with "
"journal_async_commit, fs mounted w/o journal");
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
if (sbi->s_commit_interval != JBD2_DEFAULT_MAX_COMMIT_AGE*HZ) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "can't mount with "
"commit=%lu, fs mounted w/o journal",
sbi->s_commit_interval / HZ);
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
if (EXT4_MOUNT_DATA_FLAGS &
(sbi->s_mount_opt ^ sbi->s_def_mount_opt)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "can't mount with "
"data=, fs mounted w/o journal");
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
sbi->s_def_mount_opt &= EXT4_MOUNT_JOURNAL_CHECKSUM;
clear_opt(sb, JOURNAL_CHECKSUM);
clear_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS);
sbi->s_journal = NULL;
needs_recovery = 0;
goto no_journal;
}
if (ext4_has_feature_64bit(sb) &&
!jbd2_journal_set_features(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_journal, 0, 0,
JBD2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_64BIT)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Failed to set 64-bit journal feature");
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
if (!set_journal_csum_feature_set(sb)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Failed to set journal checksum "
"feature set");
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
/* We have now updated the journal if required, so we can
* validate the data journaling mode. */
switch (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS)) {
case 0:
/* No mode set, assume a default based on the journal
* capabilities: ORDERED_DATA if the journal can
* cope, else JOURNAL_DATA
*/
if (jbd2_journal_check_available_features
(sbi->s_journal, 0, 0, JBD2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_REVOKE))
set_opt(sb, ORDERED_DATA);
else
set_opt(sb, JOURNAL_DATA);
break;
case EXT4_MOUNT_ORDERED_DATA:
case EXT4_MOUNT_WRITEBACK_DATA:
if (!jbd2_journal_check_available_features
(sbi->s_journal, 0, 0, JBD2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_REVOKE)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Journal does not support "
"requested data journaling mode");
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
default:
break;
}
set_task_ioprio(sbi->s_journal->j_task, journal_ioprio);
sbi->s_journal->j_commit_callback = ext4_journal_commit_callback;
no_journal:
if (ext4_mballoc_ready) {
sbi->s_mb_cache = ext4_xattr_create_cache(sb->s_id);
if (!sbi->s_mb_cache) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Failed to create an mb_cache");
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
}
if ((DUMMY_ENCRYPTION_ENABLED(sbi) || ext4_has_feature_encrypt(sb)) &&
(blocksize != PAGE_CACHE_SIZE)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Unsupported blocksize for fs encryption");
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
if (DUMMY_ENCRYPTION_ENABLED(sbi) && !(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY) &&
!ext4_has_feature_encrypt(sb)) {
ext4_set_feature_encrypt(sb);
ext4_commit_super(sb, 1);
}
/*
* Get the # of file system overhead blocks from the
* superblock if present.
*/
if (es->s_overhead_clusters)
sbi->s_overhead = le32_to_cpu(es->s_overhead_clusters);
else {
err = ext4_calculate_overhead(sb);
if (err)
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
/*
* The maximum number of concurrent works can be high and
* concurrency isn't really necessary. Limit it to 1.
*/
EXT4_SB(sb)->rsv_conversion_wq =
alloc_workqueue("ext4-rsv-conversion", WQ_MEM_RECLAIM | WQ_UNBOUND, 1);
if (!EXT4_SB(sb)->rsv_conversion_wq) {
printk(KERN_ERR "EXT4-fs: failed to create workqueue\n");
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto failed_mount4;
}
/*
* The jbd2_journal_load will have done any necessary log recovery,
* so we can safely mount the rest of the filesystem now.
*/
root = ext4_iget(sb, EXT4_ROOT_INO);
if (IS_ERR(root)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "get root inode failed");
ret = PTR_ERR(root);
root = NULL;
goto failed_mount4;
}
if (!S_ISDIR(root->i_mode) || !root->i_blocks || !root->i_size) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "corrupt root inode, run e2fsck");
iput(root);
goto failed_mount4;
}
sb->s_root = d_make_root(root);
if (!sb->s_root) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "get root dentry failed");
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto failed_mount4;
}
if (ext4_setup_super(sb, es, sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY))
sb->s_flags |= MS_RDONLY;
/* determine the minimum size of new large inodes, if present */
if (sbi->s_inode_size > EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE) {
sbi->s_want_extra_isize = sizeof(struct ext4_inode) -
EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE;
if (ext4_has_feature_extra_isize(sb)) {
if (sbi->s_want_extra_isize <
le16_to_cpu(es->s_want_extra_isize))
sbi->s_want_extra_isize =
le16_to_cpu(es->s_want_extra_isize);
if (sbi->s_want_extra_isize <
le16_to_cpu(es->s_min_extra_isize))
sbi->s_want_extra_isize =
le16_to_cpu(es->s_min_extra_isize);
}
}
/* Check if enough inode space is available */
if (EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE + sbi->s_want_extra_isize >
sbi->s_inode_size) {
sbi->s_want_extra_isize = sizeof(struct ext4_inode) -
EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE;
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "required extra inode space not"
"available");
}
ext4_set_resv_clusters(sb);
err = ext4_setup_system_zone(sb);
if (err) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "failed to initialize system "
"zone (%d)", err);
goto failed_mount4a;
}
ext4_ext_init(sb);
err = ext4_mb_init(sb);
if (err) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "failed to initialize mballoc (%d)",
err);
goto failed_mount5;
}
block = ext4_count_free_clusters(sb);
ext4_free_blocks_count_set(sbi->s_es,
EXT4_C2B(sbi, block));
err = percpu_counter_init(&sbi->s_freeclusters_counter, block,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!err) {
unsigned long freei = ext4_count_free_inodes(sb);
sbi->s_es->s_free_inodes_count = cpu_to_le32(freei);
err = percpu_counter_init(&sbi->s_freeinodes_counter, freei,
GFP_KERNEL);
}
if (!err)
err = percpu_counter_init(&sbi->s_dirs_counter,
ext4_count_dirs(sb), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!err)
err = percpu_counter_init(&sbi->s_dirtyclusters_counter, 0,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (err) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "insufficient memory");
goto failed_mount6;
}
if (ext4_has_feature_flex_bg(sb))
if (!ext4_fill_flex_info(sb)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"unable to initialize "
"flex_bg meta info!");
goto failed_mount6;
}
err = ext4_register_li_request(sb, first_not_zeroed);
if (err)
goto failed_mount6;
err = ext4_register_sysfs(sb);
if (err)
goto failed_mount7;
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
/* Enable quota usage during mount. */
if (ext4_has_feature_quota(sb) && !(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY)) {
err = ext4_enable_quotas(sb);
if (err)
goto failed_mount8;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_QUOTA */
EXT4_SB(sb)->s_mount_state |= EXT4_ORPHAN_FS;
ext4_orphan_cleanup(sb, es);
EXT4_SB(sb)->s_mount_state &= ~EXT4_ORPHAN_FS;
if (needs_recovery) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "recovery complete");
ext4_mark_recovery_complete(sb, es);
}
if (EXT4_SB(sb)->s_journal) {
if (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) == EXT4_MOUNT_JOURNAL_DATA)
descr = " journalled data mode";
else if (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) == EXT4_MOUNT_ORDERED_DATA)
descr = " ordered data mode";
else
descr = " writeback data mode";
} else
descr = "out journal";
if (test_opt(sb, DISCARD)) {
struct request_queue *q = bdev_get_queue(sb->s_bdev);
if (!blk_queue_discard(q))
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING,
"mounting with \"discard\" option, but "
"the device does not support discard");
}
if (___ratelimit(&ext4_mount_msg_ratelimit, "EXT4-fs mount"))
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "mounted filesystem with%s. "
"Opts: %s%s%s", descr, sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts,
*sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts ? "; " : "", orig_data);
if (es->s_error_count)
mod_timer(&sbi->s_err_report, jiffies + 300*HZ); /* 5 minutes */
/* Enable message ratelimiting. Default is 10 messages per 5 secs. */
ratelimit_state_init(&sbi->s_err_ratelimit_state, 5 * HZ, 10);
ratelimit_state_init(&sbi->s_warning_ratelimit_state, 5 * HZ, 10);
ratelimit_state_init(&sbi->s_msg_ratelimit_state, 5 * HZ, 10);
kfree(orig_data);
return 0;
cantfind_ext4:
if (!silent)
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "VFS: Can't find ext4 filesystem");
goto failed_mount;
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
failed_mount8:
ext4_unregister_sysfs(sb);
#endif
failed_mount7:
ext4_unregister_li_request(sb);
failed_mount6:
ext4_mb_release(sb);
if (sbi->s_flex_groups)
kvfree(sbi->s_flex_groups);
percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_freeclusters_counter);
percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_freeinodes_counter);
percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_dirs_counter);
percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_dirtyclusters_counter);
failed_mount5:
ext4_ext_release(sb);
ext4_release_system_zone(sb);
failed_mount4a:
dput(sb->s_root);
sb->s_root = NULL;
failed_mount4:
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "mount failed");
if (EXT4_SB(sb)->rsv_conversion_wq)
destroy_workqueue(EXT4_SB(sb)->rsv_conversion_wq);
failed_mount_wq:
if (sbi->s_journal) {
jbd2_journal_destroy(sbi->s_journal);
sbi->s_journal = NULL;
}
failed_mount3a:
ext4_es_unregister_shrinker(sbi);
failed_mount3:
del_timer_sync(&sbi->s_err_report);
if (sbi->s_mmp_tsk)
kthread_stop(sbi->s_mmp_tsk);
failed_mount2:
for (i = 0; i < db_count; i++)
brelse(sbi->s_group_desc[i]);
kvfree(sbi->s_group_desc);
failed_mount:
if (sbi->s_chksum_driver)
crypto_free_shash(sbi->s_chksum_driver);
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
for (i = 0; i < EXT4_MAXQUOTAS; i++)
kfree(sbi->s_qf_names[i]);
#endif
ext4_blkdev_remove(sbi);
brelse(bh);
out_fail:
sb->s_fs_info = NULL;
kfree(sbi->s_blockgroup_lock);
kfree(sbi);
out_free_orig:
kfree(orig_data);
return err ? err : ret;
}
Commit Message: ext4: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. The only tricky part is
that xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed
before we get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether
the entry is still valid after getting buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-19
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void Huff_offsetTransmit (huff_t *huff, int ch, byte *fout, int *offset) {
bloc = *offset;
send(huff->loc[ch], NULL, fout);
*offset = bloc;
}
Commit Message: Fix/improve buffer overflow in MSG_ReadBits/MSG_WriteBits
Prevent reading past end of message in MSG_ReadBits. If read past
end of msg->data buffer (16348 bytes) the engine could SEGFAULT.
Make MSG_WriteBits use an exact buffer overflow check instead of
possibly failing with a few bytes left.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: xsltExtStyleShutdownTest(xsltStylesheetPtr style ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
const xmlChar * URI, void *data)
{
if (testStyleData == NULL) {
xsltGenericError(xsltGenericErrorContext,
"xsltExtShutdownTest: not initialized\n");
return;
}
if (data != testStyleData) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
"xsltExtShutdownTest: wrong data\n");
}
testStyleData = NULL;
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"Unregistered test module : %s\n", URI);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_error_string)
{
char buf[512];
unsigned long val;
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
val = ERR_get_error();
if (val) {
RETURN_STRING(ERR_error_string(val, buf));
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-754
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int find_high_bit(unsigned int x)
{
int i;
for(i=31;i>=0;i--) {
if(x&(1<<i)) return i;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Trying to fix some invalid left shift operations
Fixes issue #16
CWE ID: CWE-682
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void ParseModalias(const dbus::ObjectPath& object_path,
uint16 *vendor_id,
uint16 *product_id,
uint16 *device_id) {
chromeos::BluetoothDeviceClient::Properties* properties =
chromeos::DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetBluetoothDeviceClient()->
GetProperties(object_path);
DCHECK(properties);
std::string modalias = properties->modalias.value();
if (StartsWithASCII(modalias, "usb:", false) && modalias.length() == 19) {
if (modalias[4] == 'v' && vendor_id != NULL) {
uint64 component = 0;
base::HexStringToUInt64(modalias.substr(5, 4), &component);
*vendor_id = component;
}
if (modalias[9] == 'p' && product_id != NULL) {
uint64 component = 0;
base::HexStringToUInt64(modalias.substr(10, 4), &component);
*product_id = component;
}
if (modalias[14] == 'd' && device_id != NULL) {
uint64 component = 0;
base::HexStringToUInt64(modalias.substr(15, 4), &component);
*device_id = component;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: jas_image_t *jp2_decode(jas_stream_t *in, char *optstr)
{
jp2_box_t *box;
int found;
jas_image_t *image;
jp2_dec_t *dec;
bool samedtype;
int dtype;
unsigned int i;
jp2_cmap_t *cmapd;
jp2_pclr_t *pclrd;
jp2_cdef_t *cdefd;
unsigned int channo;
int newcmptno;
int_fast32_t *lutents;
#if 0
jp2_cdefchan_t *cdefent;
int cmptno;
#endif
jp2_cmapent_t *cmapent;
jas_icchdr_t icchdr;
jas_iccprof_t *iccprof;
dec = 0;
box = 0;
image = 0;
if (!(dec = jp2_dec_create())) {
goto error;
}
/* Get the first box. This should be a JP box. */
if (!(box = jp2_box_get(in))) {
jas_eprintf("error: cannot get box\n");
goto error;
}
if (box->type != JP2_BOX_JP) {
jas_eprintf("error: expecting signature box\n");
goto error;
}
if (box->data.jp.magic != JP2_JP_MAGIC) {
jas_eprintf("incorrect magic number\n");
goto error;
}
jp2_box_destroy(box);
box = 0;
/* Get the second box. This should be a FTYP box. */
if (!(box = jp2_box_get(in))) {
goto error;
}
if (box->type != JP2_BOX_FTYP) {
jas_eprintf("expecting file type box\n");
goto error;
}
jp2_box_destroy(box);
box = 0;
/* Get more boxes... */
found = 0;
while ((box = jp2_box_get(in))) {
if (jas_getdbglevel() >= 1) {
jas_eprintf("got box type %s\n", box->info->name);
}
switch (box->type) {
case JP2_BOX_JP2C:
found = 1;
break;
case JP2_BOX_IHDR:
if (!dec->ihdr) {
dec->ihdr = box;
box = 0;
}
break;
case JP2_BOX_BPCC:
if (!dec->bpcc) {
dec->bpcc = box;
box = 0;
}
break;
case JP2_BOX_CDEF:
if (!dec->cdef) {
dec->cdef = box;
box = 0;
}
break;
case JP2_BOX_PCLR:
if (!dec->pclr) {
dec->pclr = box;
box = 0;
}
break;
case JP2_BOX_CMAP:
if (!dec->cmap) {
dec->cmap = box;
box = 0;
}
break;
case JP2_BOX_COLR:
if (!dec->colr) {
dec->colr = box;
box = 0;
}
break;
}
if (box) {
jp2_box_destroy(box);
box = 0;
}
if (found) {
break;
}
}
if (!found) {
jas_eprintf("error: no code stream found\n");
goto error;
}
if (!(dec->image = jpc_decode(in, optstr))) {
jas_eprintf("error: cannot decode code stream\n");
goto error;
}
/* An IHDR box must be present. */
if (!dec->ihdr) {
jas_eprintf("error: missing IHDR box\n");
goto error;
}
/* Does the number of components indicated in the IHDR box match
the value specified in the code stream? */
if (dec->ihdr->data.ihdr.numcmpts != JAS_CAST(uint,
jas_image_numcmpts(dec->image))) {
jas_eprintf("warning: number of components mismatch\n");
}
/* At least one component must be present. */
if (!jas_image_numcmpts(dec->image)) {
jas_eprintf("error: no components\n");
goto error;
}
/* Determine if all components have the same data type. */
samedtype = true;
dtype = jas_image_cmptdtype(dec->image, 0);
for (i = 1; i < JAS_CAST(uint, jas_image_numcmpts(dec->image)); ++i) {
if (jas_image_cmptdtype(dec->image, i) != dtype) {
samedtype = false;
break;
}
}
/* Is the component data type indicated in the IHDR box consistent
with the data in the code stream? */
if ((samedtype && dec->ihdr->data.ihdr.bpc != JP2_DTYPETOBPC(dtype)) ||
(!samedtype && dec->ihdr->data.ihdr.bpc != JP2_IHDR_BPCNULL)) {
jas_eprintf("warning: component data type mismatch\n");
}
/* Is the compression type supported? */
if (dec->ihdr->data.ihdr.comptype != JP2_IHDR_COMPTYPE) {
jas_eprintf("error: unsupported compression type\n");
goto error;
}
if (dec->bpcc) {
/* Is the number of components indicated in the BPCC box
consistent with the code stream data? */
if (dec->bpcc->data.bpcc.numcmpts != JAS_CAST(uint, jas_image_numcmpts(
dec->image))) {
jas_eprintf("warning: number of components mismatch\n");
}
/* Is the component data type information indicated in the BPCC
box consistent with the code stream data? */
if (!samedtype) {
for (i = 0; i < JAS_CAST(uint, jas_image_numcmpts(dec->image));
++i) {
if (jas_image_cmptdtype(dec->image, i) !=
JP2_BPCTODTYPE(dec->bpcc->data.bpcc.bpcs[i])) {
jas_eprintf("warning: component data type mismatch\n");
}
}
} else {
jas_eprintf("warning: superfluous BPCC box\n");
}
}
/* A COLR box must be present. */
if (!dec->colr) {
jas_eprintf("error: no COLR box\n");
goto error;
}
switch (dec->colr->data.colr.method) {
case JP2_COLR_ENUM:
jas_image_setclrspc(dec->image, jp2_getcs(&dec->colr->data.colr));
break;
case JP2_COLR_ICC:
iccprof = jas_iccprof_createfrombuf(dec->colr->data.colr.iccp,
dec->colr->data.colr.iccplen);
if (!iccprof) {
jas_eprintf("error: failed to parse ICC profile\n");
goto error;
}
jas_iccprof_gethdr(iccprof, &icchdr);
jas_eprintf("ICC Profile CS %08x\n", icchdr.colorspc);
jas_image_setclrspc(dec->image, fromiccpcs(icchdr.colorspc));
dec->image->cmprof_ = jas_cmprof_createfromiccprof(iccprof);
assert(dec->image->cmprof_);
jas_iccprof_destroy(iccprof);
break;
}
/* If a CMAP box is present, a PCLR box must also be present. */
if (dec->cmap && !dec->pclr) {
jas_eprintf("warning: missing PCLR box or superfluous CMAP box\n");
jp2_box_destroy(dec->cmap);
dec->cmap = 0;
}
/* If a CMAP box is not present, a PCLR box must not be present. */
if (!dec->cmap && dec->pclr) {
jas_eprintf("warning: missing CMAP box or superfluous PCLR box\n");
jp2_box_destroy(dec->pclr);
dec->pclr = 0;
}
/* Determine the number of channels (which is essentially the number
of components after any palette mappings have been applied). */
dec->numchans = dec->cmap ? dec->cmap->data.cmap.numchans :
JAS_CAST(uint, jas_image_numcmpts(dec->image));
/* Perform a basic sanity check on the CMAP box if present. */
if (dec->cmap) {
for (i = 0; i < dec->numchans; ++i) {
/* Is the component number reasonable? */
if (dec->cmap->data.cmap.ents[i].cmptno >= JAS_CAST(uint,
jas_image_numcmpts(dec->image))) {
jas_eprintf("error: invalid component number in CMAP box\n");
goto error;
}
/* Is the LUT index reasonable? */
if (dec->cmap->data.cmap.ents[i].pcol >=
dec->pclr->data.pclr.numchans) {
jas_eprintf("error: invalid CMAP LUT index\n");
goto error;
}
}
}
/* Allocate space for the channel-number to component-number LUT. */
if (!(dec->chantocmptlut = jas_alloc2(dec->numchans,
sizeof(uint_fast16_t)))) {
jas_eprintf("error: no memory\n");
goto error;
}
if (!dec->cmap) {
for (i = 0; i < dec->numchans; ++i) {
dec->chantocmptlut[i] = i;
}
} else {
cmapd = &dec->cmap->data.cmap;
pclrd = &dec->pclr->data.pclr;
cdefd = &dec->cdef->data.cdef;
for (channo = 0; channo < cmapd->numchans; ++channo) {
cmapent = &cmapd->ents[channo];
if (cmapent->map == JP2_CMAP_DIRECT) {
dec->chantocmptlut[channo] = channo;
} else if (cmapent->map == JP2_CMAP_PALETTE) {
lutents = jas_alloc2(pclrd->numlutents, sizeof(int_fast32_t));
for (i = 0; i < pclrd->numlutents; ++i) {
lutents[i] = pclrd->lutdata[cmapent->pcol + i * pclrd->numchans];
}
newcmptno = jas_image_numcmpts(dec->image);
jas_image_depalettize(dec->image, cmapent->cmptno,
pclrd->numlutents, lutents,
JP2_BPCTODTYPE(pclrd->bpc[cmapent->pcol]), newcmptno);
dec->chantocmptlut[channo] = newcmptno;
jas_free(lutents);
#if 0
if (dec->cdef) {
cdefent = jp2_cdef_lookup(cdefd, channo);
if (!cdefent) {
abort();
}
jas_image_setcmpttype(dec->image, newcmptno, jp2_getct(jas_image_clrspc(dec->image), cdefent->type, cdefent->assoc));
} else {
jas_image_setcmpttype(dec->image, newcmptno, jp2_getct(jas_image_clrspc(dec->image), 0, channo + 1));
}
#endif
}
}
}
/* Mark all components as being of unknown type. */
for (i = 0; i < JAS_CAST(uint, jas_image_numcmpts(dec->image)); ++i) {
jas_image_setcmpttype(dec->image, i, JAS_IMAGE_CT_UNKNOWN);
}
/* Determine the type of each component. */
if (dec->cdef) {
for (i = 0; i < dec->numchans; ++i) {
/* Is the channel number reasonable? */
if (dec->cdef->data.cdef.ents[i].channo >= dec->numchans) {
jas_eprintf("error: invalid channel number in CDEF box\n");
goto error;
}
jas_image_setcmpttype(dec->image,
dec->chantocmptlut[dec->cdef->data.cdef.ents[i].channo],
jp2_getct(jas_image_clrspc(dec->image),
dec->cdef->data.cdef.ents[i].type,
dec->cdef->data.cdef.ents[i].assoc));
}
} else {
for (i = 0; i < dec->numchans; ++i) {
jas_image_setcmpttype(dec->image, dec->chantocmptlut[i],
jp2_getct(jas_image_clrspc(dec->image), 0, i + 1));
}
}
/* Delete any components that are not of interest. */
for (i = jas_image_numcmpts(dec->image); i > 0; --i) {
if (jas_image_cmpttype(dec->image, i - 1) == JAS_IMAGE_CT_UNKNOWN) {
jas_image_delcmpt(dec->image, i - 1);
}
}
/* Ensure that some components survived. */
if (!jas_image_numcmpts(dec->image)) {
jas_eprintf("error: no components\n");
goto error;
}
#if 0
jas_eprintf("no of components is %d\n", jas_image_numcmpts(dec->image));
#endif
/* Prevent the image from being destroyed later. */
image = dec->image;
dec->image = 0;
jp2_dec_destroy(dec);
return image;
error:
if (box) {
jp2_box_destroy(box);
}
if (dec) {
jp2_dec_destroy(dec);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void DisconnectWindowLinux::Show(remoting::ChromotingHost* host,
const std::string& username) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
}
Commit Message: Initial implementation of DisconnectWindow on Linux.
BUG=None
TEST=Manual
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7089016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88889 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static u32 cdc_ncm_max_dgram_size(struct usbnet *dev)
{
struct cdc_ncm_ctx *ctx = (struct cdc_ncm_ctx *)dev->data[0];
if (cdc_ncm_comm_intf_is_mbim(dev->intf->cur_altsetting) && ctx->mbim_desc)
return le16_to_cpu(ctx->mbim_desc->wMaxSegmentSize);
if (ctx->ether_desc)
return le16_to_cpu(ctx->ether_desc->wMaxSegmentSize);
return CDC_NCM_MAX_DATAGRAM_SIZE;
}
Commit Message: cdc_ncm: do not call usbnet_link_change from cdc_ncm_bind
usbnet_link_change will call schedule_work and should be
avoided if bind is failing. Otherwise we will end up with
scheduled work referring to a netdev which has gone away.
Instead of making the call conditional, we can just defer
it to usbnet_probe, using the driver_info flag made for
this purpose.
Fixes: 8a34b0ae8778 ("usbnet: cdc_ncm: apply usbnet_link_change")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
X509 *x509 = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
int i;
if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
/* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
if (i < 0) {
s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
return WORK_MORE_A;
}
if (i == 0) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return 0;
}
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
}
if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
/* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
wst = WORK_MORE_B;
}
/* We need to get a client cert */
if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
/*
* If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
* return(-1); We then get retied later
*/
i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
if (i < 0) {
s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
return WORK_MORE_B;
}
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
i = 0;
} else if (i == 1) {
i = 0;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
}
X509_free(x509);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
i = 0;
if (i == 0) {
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
} else {
s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return 0;
}
}
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
}
/* Shouldn't ever get here */
return WORK_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Fix missing NULL checks in CKE processing
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: gssrpc__svcauth_gss(struct svc_req *rqst, struct rpc_msg *msg,
bool_t *no_dispatch)
{
enum auth_stat retstat;
XDR xdrs;
SVCAUTH *auth;
struct svc_rpc_gss_data *gd;
struct rpc_gss_cred *gc;
struct rpc_gss_init_res gr;
int call_stat, offset;
OM_uint32 min_stat;
log_debug("in svcauth_gss()");
/* Initialize reply. */
rqst->rq_xprt->xp_verf = gssrpc__null_auth;
/* Allocate and set up server auth handle. */
if (rqst->rq_xprt->xp_auth == NULL ||
rqst->rq_xprt->xp_auth == &svc_auth_none) {
if ((auth = calloc(sizeof(*auth), 1)) == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "svcauth_gss: out_of_memory\n");
return (AUTH_FAILED);
}
if ((gd = calloc(sizeof(*gd), 1)) == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "svcauth_gss: out_of_memory\n");
return (AUTH_FAILED);
}
auth->svc_ah_ops = &svc_auth_gss_ops;
SVCAUTH_PRIVATE(auth) = gd;
rqst->rq_xprt->xp_auth = auth;
}
else gd = SVCAUTH_PRIVATE(rqst->rq_xprt->xp_auth);
log_debug("xp_auth=%p, gd=%p", rqst->rq_xprt->xp_auth, gd);
/* Deserialize client credentials. */
if (rqst->rq_cred.oa_length <= 0)
return (AUTH_BADCRED);
gc = (struct rpc_gss_cred *)rqst->rq_clntcred;
memset(gc, 0, sizeof(*gc));
log_debug("calling xdrmem_create()");
log_debug("oa_base=%p, oa_length=%u", rqst->rq_cred.oa_base,
rqst->rq_cred.oa_length);
xdrmem_create(&xdrs, rqst->rq_cred.oa_base,
rqst->rq_cred.oa_length, XDR_DECODE);
log_debug("xdrmem_create() returned");
if (!xdr_rpc_gss_cred(&xdrs, gc)) {
log_debug("xdr_rpc_gss_cred() failed");
XDR_DESTROY(&xdrs);
return (AUTH_BADCRED);
}
XDR_DESTROY(&xdrs);
retstat = AUTH_FAILED;
#define ret_freegc(code) do { retstat = code; goto freegc; } while (0)
/* Check version. */
if (gc->gc_v != RPCSEC_GSS_VERSION)
ret_freegc (AUTH_BADCRED);
/* Check RPCSEC_GSS service. */
if (gc->gc_svc != RPCSEC_GSS_SVC_NONE &&
gc->gc_svc != RPCSEC_GSS_SVC_INTEGRITY &&
gc->gc_svc != RPCSEC_GSS_SVC_PRIVACY)
ret_freegc (AUTH_BADCRED);
/* Check sequence number. */
if (gd->established) {
if (gc->gc_seq > MAXSEQ)
ret_freegc (RPCSEC_GSS_CTXPROBLEM);
if ((offset = gd->seqlast - gc->gc_seq) < 0) {
gd->seqlast = gc->gc_seq;
offset = 0 - offset;
gd->seqmask <<= offset;
offset = 0;
} else if ((u_int)offset >= gd->win ||
(gd->seqmask & (1 << offset))) {
*no_dispatch = 1;
ret_freegc (RPCSEC_GSS_CTXPROBLEM);
}
gd->seq = gc->gc_seq;
gd->seqmask |= (1 << offset);
}
if (gd->established) {
rqst->rq_clntname = (char *)gd->client_name;
rqst->rq_svccred = (char *)gd->ctx;
}
/* Handle RPCSEC_GSS control procedure. */
switch (gc->gc_proc) {
case RPCSEC_GSS_INIT:
case RPCSEC_GSS_CONTINUE_INIT:
if (rqst->rq_proc != NULLPROC)
ret_freegc (AUTH_FAILED); /* XXX ? */
if (!svcauth_gss_acquire_cred())
ret_freegc (AUTH_FAILED);
if (!svcauth_gss_accept_sec_context(rqst, &gr))
ret_freegc (AUTH_REJECTEDCRED);
if (!svcauth_gss_nextverf(rqst, htonl(gr.gr_win))) {
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &gr.gr_token);
mem_free(gr.gr_ctx.value,
sizeof(gss_union_ctx_id_desc));
ret_freegc (AUTH_FAILED);
}
*no_dispatch = TRUE;
call_stat = svc_sendreply(rqst->rq_xprt, xdr_rpc_gss_init_res,
(caddr_t)&gr);
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &gr.gr_token);
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &gd->checksum);
mem_free(gr.gr_ctx.value, sizeof(gss_union_ctx_id_desc));
if (!call_stat)
ret_freegc (AUTH_FAILED);
if (gr.gr_major == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
gd->established = TRUE;
break;
case RPCSEC_GSS_DATA:
if (!svcauth_gss_validate(rqst, gd, msg))
ret_freegc (RPCSEC_GSS_CREDPROBLEM);
if (!svcauth_gss_nextverf(rqst, htonl(gc->gc_seq)))
ret_freegc (AUTH_FAILED);
break;
case RPCSEC_GSS_DESTROY:
if (rqst->rq_proc != NULLPROC)
ret_freegc (AUTH_FAILED); /* XXX ? */
if (!svcauth_gss_validate(rqst, gd, msg))
ret_freegc (RPCSEC_GSS_CREDPROBLEM);
if (!svcauth_gss_nextverf(rqst, htonl(gc->gc_seq)))
ret_freegc (AUTH_FAILED);
*no_dispatch = TRUE;
call_stat = svc_sendreply(rqst->rq_xprt,
xdr_void, (caddr_t)NULL);
log_debug("sendreply in destroy: %d", call_stat);
if (!svcauth_gss_release_cred())
ret_freegc (AUTH_FAILED);
SVCAUTH_DESTROY(rqst->rq_xprt->xp_auth);
rqst->rq_xprt->xp_auth = &svc_auth_none;
break;
default:
ret_freegc (AUTH_REJECTEDCRED);
break;
}
retstat = AUTH_OK;
freegc:
xdr_free(xdr_rpc_gss_cred, gc);
log_debug("returning %d from svcauth_gss()", retstat);
return (retstat);
}
Commit Message: Fix gssrpc data leakage [CVE-2014-9423]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] In svcauth_gss_accept_sec_context(), do not copy
bytes from the union context into the handle field we send to the
client. We do not use this handle field, so just supply a fixed
string of "xxxx".
In gss_union_ctx_id_struct, remove the unused "interposer" field which
was causing part of the union context to remain uninitialized.
ticket: 8058 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: c14nExcWithoutCommentTest(const char *filename,
const char *resul ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
const char *err ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
int options ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED) {
return(c14nCommonTest(filename, 0, XML_C14N_EXCLUSIVE_1_0, "exc-without-comments"));
}
Commit Message: Fix handling of parameter-entity references
There were two bugs where parameter-entity references could lead to an
unexpected change of the input buffer in xmlParseNameComplex and
xmlDictLookup being called with an invalid pointer.
Percent sign in DTD Names
=========================
The NEXTL macro used to call xmlParserHandlePEReference. When parsing
"complex" names inside the DTD, this could result in entity expansion
which created a new input buffer. The fix is to simply remove the call
to xmlParserHandlePEReference from the NEXTL macro. This is safe because
no users of the macro require expansion of parameter entities.
- xmlParseNameComplex
- xmlParseNCNameComplex
- xmlParseNmtoken
The percent sign is not allowed in names, which are grammatical tokens.
- xmlParseEntityValue
Parameter-entity references in entity values are expanded but this
happens in a separate step in this function.
- xmlParseSystemLiteral
Parameter-entity references are ignored in the system literal.
- xmlParseAttValueComplex
- xmlParseCharDataComplex
- xmlParseCommentComplex
- xmlParsePI
- xmlParseCDSect
Parameter-entity references are ignored outside the DTD.
- xmlLoadEntityContent
This function is only called from xmlStringLenDecodeEntities and
entities are replaced in a separate step immediately after the function
call.
This bug could also be triggered with an internal subset and double
entity expansion.
This fixes bug 766956 initially reported by Wei Lei and independently by
Chromium's ClusterFuzz, Hanno Böck, and Marco Grassi. Thanks to everyone
involved.
xmlParseNameComplex with XML_PARSE_OLD10
========================================
When parsing Names inside an expanded parameter entity with the
XML_PARSE_OLD10 option, xmlParseNameComplex would call xmlGROW via the
GROW macro if the input buffer was exhausted. At the end of the
parameter entity's replacement text, this function would then call
xmlPopInput which invalidated the input buffer.
There should be no need to invoke GROW in this situation because the
buffer is grown periodically every XML_PARSER_CHUNK_SIZE characters and,
at least for UTF-8, in xmlCurrentChar. This also matches the code path
executed when XML_PARSE_OLD10 is not set.
This fixes bugs 781205 (CVE-2017-9049) and 781361 (CVE-2017-9050).
Thanks to Marcel Böhme and Thuan Pham for the report.
Additional hardening
====================
A separate check was added in xmlParseNameComplex to validate the
buffer size.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void server_process_native_message(
Server *s,
const void *buffer, size_t buffer_size,
struct ucred *ucred,
struct timeval *tv,
const char *label, size_t label_len) {
struct iovec *iovec = NULL;
unsigned n = 0, m = 0, j, tn = (unsigned) -1;
const char *p;
size_t remaining;
int priority = LOG_INFO;
char *identifier = NULL, *message = NULL;
assert(s);
assert(buffer || buffer_size == 0);
p = buffer;
remaining = buffer_size;
while (remaining > 0) {
const char *e, *q;
e = memchr(p, '\n', remaining);
if (!e) {
/* Trailing noise, let's ignore it, and flush what we collected */
log_debug("Received message with trailing noise, ignoring.");
break;
}
if (e == p) {
/* Entry separator */
server_dispatch_message(s, iovec, n, m, ucred, tv, label, label_len, NULL, priority);
n = 0;
priority = LOG_INFO;
p++;
remaining--;
continue;
}
if (*p == '.' || *p == '#') {
/* Ignore control commands for now, and
* comments too. */
remaining -= (e - p) + 1;
p = e + 1;
continue;
}
/* A property follows */
if (n+N_IOVEC_META_FIELDS >= m) {
struct iovec *c;
unsigned u;
u = MAX((n+N_IOVEC_META_FIELDS+1) * 2U, 4U);
c = realloc(iovec, u * sizeof(struct iovec));
if (!c) {
log_oom();
break;
}
iovec = c;
m = u;
}
q = memchr(p, '=', e - p);
if (q) {
if (valid_user_field(p, q - p)) {
size_t l;
l = e - p;
/* If the field name starts with an
* underscore, skip the variable,
* since that indidates a trusted
* field */
iovec[n].iov_base = (char*) p;
iovec[n].iov_len = l;
n++;
/* We need to determine the priority
* of this entry for the rate limiting
* logic */
if (l == 10 &&
memcmp(p, "PRIORITY=", 9) == 0 &&
p[9] >= '0' && p[9] <= '9')
priority = (priority & LOG_FACMASK) | (p[9] - '0');
else if (l == 17 &&
memcmp(p, "SYSLOG_FACILITY=", 16) == 0 &&
p[16] >= '0' && p[16] <= '9')
priority = (priority & LOG_PRIMASK) | ((p[16] - '0') << 3);
else if (l == 18 &&
memcmp(p, "SYSLOG_FACILITY=", 16) == 0 &&
p[16] >= '0' && p[16] <= '9' &&
p[17] >= '0' && p[17] <= '9')
priority = (priority & LOG_PRIMASK) | (((p[16] - '0')*10 + (p[17] - '0')) << 3);
else if (l >= 19 &&
memcmp(p, "SYSLOG_IDENTIFIER=", 18) == 0) {
char *t;
t = strndup(p + 18, l - 18);
if (t) {
free(identifier);
identifier = t;
}
} else if (l >= 8 &&
memcmp(p, "MESSAGE=", 8) == 0) {
char *t;
t = strndup(p + 8, l - 8);
if (t) {
free(message);
message = t;
}
}
}
remaining -= (e - p) + 1;
p = e + 1;
continue;
} else {
le64_t l_le;
uint64_t l;
char *k;
if (remaining < e - p + 1 + sizeof(uint64_t) + 1) {
log_debug("Failed to parse message, ignoring.");
break;
}
memcpy(&l_le, e + 1, sizeof(uint64_t));
memcpy(&l_le, e + 1, sizeof(uint64_t));
l = le64toh(l_le);
if (remaining < e - p + 1 + sizeof(uint64_t) + l + 1 ||
e[1+sizeof(uint64_t)+l] != '\n') {
log_debug("Failed to parse message, ignoring.");
break;
}
memcpy(k, p, e - p);
k[e - p] = '=';
memcpy(k + (e - p) + 1, e + 1 + sizeof(uint64_t), l);
if (valid_user_field(p, e - p)) {
iovec[n].iov_base = k;
iovec[n].iov_len = (e - p) + 1 + l;
n++;
} else
free(k);
remaining -= (e - p) + 1 + sizeof(uint64_t) + l + 1;
p = e + 1 + sizeof(uint64_t) + l + 1;
}
}
if (n <= 0)
goto finish;
tn = n++;
IOVEC_SET_STRING(iovec[tn], "_TRANSPORT=journal");
if (message) {
if (s->forward_to_syslog)
server_forward_syslog(s, priority, identifier, message, ucred, tv);
if (s->forward_to_kmsg)
server_forward_kmsg(s, priority, identifier, message, ucred);
if (s->forward_to_console)
server_forward_console(s, priority, identifier, message, ucred);
}
server_dispatch_message(s, iovec, n, m, ucred, tv, label, label_len, NULL, priority);
finish:
for (j = 0; j < n; j++) {
if (j == tn)
continue;
if (iovec[j].iov_base < buffer ||
(const uint8_t*) iovec[j].iov_base >= (const uint8_t*) buffer + buffer_size)
free(iovec[j].iov_base);
}
free(iovec);
free(identifier);
free(message);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: restore_page_device(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p, const gs_gstate * pgs_old, const gs_gstate * pgs_new)
{
gx_device *dev_old = gs_currentdevice(pgs_old);
gx_device *dev_new;
gx_device *dev_t1;
gx_device *dev_t2;
bool samepagedevice = obj_eq(dev_old->memory, &gs_int_gstate(pgs_old)->pagedevice,
&gs_int_gstate(pgs_new)->pagedevice);
bool LockSafetyParams = dev_old->LockSafetyParams;
if ((dev_t1 = (*dev_proc(dev_old, get_page_device)) (dev_old)) == 0)
return 0;
/* If we are going to putdeviceparams in a callout, we need to */
/* unlock temporarily. The device will be re-locked as needed */
/* by putdeviceparams from the pgs_old->pagedevice dict state. */
if (!samepagedevice)
dev_old->LockSafetyParams = false;
dev_new = gs_currentdevice(pgs_new);
if (dev_old != dev_new) {
if ((dev_t2 = (*dev_proc(dev_new, get_page_device)) (dev_new)) == 0)
samepagedevice = true;
else if (dev_t1 != dev_t2)
samepagedevice = false;
}
if (LockSafetyParams && !samepagedevice) {
const int required_ops = 512;
const int required_es = 32;
/* The %grestorepagedevice must complete: the biggest danger
is operand stack overflow. As we use get/putdeviceparams
that means pushing all the device params onto the stack,
pdfwrite having by far the largest number of parameters
at (currently) 212 key/value pairs - thus needing (currently)
424 entries on the op stack. Allowing for working stack
space, and safety margin.....
*/
if (required_ops + ref_stack_count(&o_stack) >= ref_stack_max_count(&o_stack)) {
gs_currentdevice(pgs_old)->LockSafetyParams = LockSafetyParams;
return_error(gs_error_stackoverflow);
}
/* We also want enough exec stack space - 32 is an overestimate of
what we need to complete the Postscript call out.
*/
if (required_es + ref_stack_count(&e_stack) >= ref_stack_max_count(&e_stack)) {
gs_currentdevice(pgs_old)->LockSafetyParams = LockSafetyParams;
return_error(gs_error_execstackoverflow);
}
}
/*
* The current implementation of setpagedevice just sets new
* parameters in the same device object, so we have to check
* whether the page device dictionaries are the same.
*/
return samepagedevice ? 0 : 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: iperf_set_verbose(struct iperf_test *ipt, int verbose)
{
ipt->verbose = verbose;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: sec_hash_sha1_16(uint8 * out, uint8 * in, uint8 * salt1)
{
RDSSL_SHA1 sha1;
rdssl_sha1_init(&sha1);
rdssl_sha1_update(&sha1, in, 16);
rdssl_sha1_update(&sha1, salt1, 16);
rdssl_sha1_final(&sha1, out);
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: bool ExtensionViewGuest::NavigateGuest(const std::string& src,
bool force_navigation) {
GURL url = extension_url_.Resolve(src);
bool url_not_allowed = (url != GURL(url::kAboutBlankURL)) &&
(url.GetOrigin() != extension_url_.GetOrigin());
if (!url.is_valid() || url_not_allowed)
return NavigateGuest(url::kAboutBlankURL, true /* force_navigation */);
if (!force_navigation && (url_ == url))
return false;
web_contents()->GetRenderProcessHost()->FilterURL(false, &url);
web_contents()->GetController().LoadURL(url, content::Referrer(),
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_AUTO_TOPLEVEL,
std::string());
url_ = url;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Make extensions use a correct same-origin check.
GURL::GetOrigin does not do the right thing for all types of URLs.
BUG=573317
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1658913002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373381}
CWE ID: CWE-284
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: IW_IMPL(void*) iw_malloc(struct iw_context *ctx, size_t n)
{
return iw_malloc_ex(ctx,0,n);
}
Commit Message: Trying to fix some invalid left shift operations
Fixes issue #16
CWE ID: CWE-682
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: char *curl_easy_escape(CURL *handle, const char *string, int inlength)
{
size_t alloc = (inlength?(size_t)inlength:strlen(string))+1;
char *ns;
char *testing_ptr = NULL;
unsigned char in; /* we need to treat the characters unsigned */
size_t newlen = alloc;
int strindex=0;
size_t length;
CURLcode res;
ns = malloc(alloc);
if(!ns)
return NULL;
length = alloc-1;
while(length--) {
in = *string;
if(Curl_isunreserved(in))
/* just copy this */
ns[strindex++]=in;
else {
/* encode it */
newlen += 2; /* the size grows with two, since this'll become a %XX */
if(newlen > alloc) {
alloc *= 2;
testing_ptr = realloc(ns, alloc);
if(!testing_ptr) {
free( ns );
return NULL;
}
else {
ns = testing_ptr;
}
}
res = Curl_convert_to_network(handle, &in, 1);
if(res) {
/* Curl_convert_to_network calls failf if unsuccessful */
free(ns);
return NULL;
}
snprintf(&ns[strindex], 4, "%%%02X", in);
strindex+=3;
}
string++;
}
ns[strindex]=0; /* terminate it */
return ns;
}
Commit Message: URL sanitize: reject URLs containing bad data
Protocols (IMAP, POP3 and SMTP) that use the path part of a URL in a
decoded manner now use the new Curl_urldecode() function to reject URLs
with embedded control codes (anything that is or decodes to a byte value
less than 32).
URLs containing such codes could easily otherwise be used to do harm and
allow users to do unintended actions with otherwise innocent tools and
applications. Like for example using a URL like
pop3://pop3.example.com/1%0d%0aDELE%201 when the app wants a URL to get
a mail and instead this would delete one.
This flaw is considered a security vulnerability: CVE-2012-0036
Security advisory at: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20120124.html
Reported by: Dan Fandrich
CWE ID: CWE-89
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static long ec_device_ioctl_xcmd(struct cros_ec_dev *ec, void __user *arg)
{
long ret;
struct cros_ec_command u_cmd;
struct cros_ec_command *s_cmd;
if (copy_from_user(&u_cmd, arg, sizeof(u_cmd)))
return -EFAULT;
if ((u_cmd.outsize > EC_MAX_MSG_BYTES) ||
(u_cmd.insize > EC_MAX_MSG_BYTES))
return -EINVAL;
s_cmd = kmalloc(sizeof(*s_cmd) + max(u_cmd.outsize, u_cmd.insize),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!s_cmd)
return -ENOMEM;
if (copy_from_user(s_cmd, arg, sizeof(*s_cmd) + u_cmd.outsize)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto exit;
}
s_cmd->command += ec->cmd_offset;
ret = cros_ec_cmd_xfer(ec->ec_dev, s_cmd);
/* Only copy data to userland if data was received. */
if (ret < 0)
goto exit;
if (copy_to_user(arg, s_cmd, sizeof(*s_cmd) + u_cmd.insize))
ret = -EFAULT;
exit:
kfree(s_cmd);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: platform/chrome: cros_ec_dev - double fetch bug in ioctl
We verify "u_cmd.outsize" and "u_cmd.insize" but we need to make sure
that those values have not changed between the two copy_from_user()
calls. Otherwise it could lead to a buffer overflow.
Additionally, cros_ec_cmd_xfer() can set s_cmd->insize to a lower value.
We should use the new smaller value so we don't copy too much data to
the user.
Reported-by: Pengfei Wang <[email protected]>
Fixes: a841178445bb ('mfd: cros_ec: Use a zero-length array for command data')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Gwendal Grignou <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.2+
Signed-off-by: Olof Johansson <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int opt;
char *line;
progname = basename(argv[0]);
#if POSIXLY_CORRECT
cmd_line_options = POSIXLY_CMD_LINE_OPTIONS;
#else
if (getenv(POSIXLY_CORRECT_STR))
posixly_correct = 1;
if (!posixly_correct)
cmd_line_options = CMD_LINE_OPTIONS;
else
cmd_line_options = POSIXLY_CMD_LINE_OPTIONS;
#endif
setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "");
setlocale(LC_MESSAGES, "");
bindtextdomain(PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR);
textdomain(PACKAGE);
/* Align `#effective:' comments to column 40 for tty's */
if (!posixly_correct && isatty(fileno(stdout)))
print_options |= TEXT_SMART_INDENT;
while ((opt = getopt_long(argc, argv, cmd_line_options,
long_options, NULL)) != -1) {
switch (opt) {
case 'a': /* acl only */
if (posixly_correct)
goto synopsis;
opt_print_acl = 1;
break;
case 'd': /* default acl only */
opt_print_default_acl = 1;
break;
case 'c': /* no comments */
if (posixly_correct)
goto synopsis;
opt_comments = 0;
break;
case 'e': /* all #effective comments */
if (posixly_correct)
goto synopsis;
print_options |= TEXT_ALL_EFFECTIVE;
break;
case 'E': /* no #effective comments */
if (posixly_correct)
goto synopsis;
print_options &= ~(TEXT_SOME_EFFECTIVE |
TEXT_ALL_EFFECTIVE);
break;
case 'R': /* recursive */
if (posixly_correct)
goto synopsis;
walk_flags |= WALK_TREE_RECURSIVE;
break;
case 'L': /* follow all symlinks */
if (posixly_correct)
goto synopsis;
walk_flags |= WALK_TREE_LOGICAL;
walk_flags &= ~WALK_TREE_PHYSICAL;
break;
case 'P': /* skip all symlinks */
if (posixly_correct)
goto synopsis;
walk_flags |= WALK_TREE_PHYSICAL;
walk_flags &= ~WALK_TREE_LOGICAL;
break;
case 's': /* skip files with only base entries */
if (posixly_correct)
goto synopsis;
opt_skip_base = 1;
break;
case 'p':
if (posixly_correct)
goto synopsis;
opt_strip_leading_slash = 0;
break;
case 't':
if (posixly_correct)
goto synopsis;
opt_tabular = 1;
break;
case 'n': /* numeric */
opt_numeric = 1;
print_options |= TEXT_NUMERIC_IDS;
break;
case 'v': /* print version */
printf("%s " VERSION "\n", progname);
return 0;
case 'h': /* help */
help();
return 0;
case ':': /* option missing */
case '?': /* unknown option */
default:
goto synopsis;
}
}
if (!(opt_print_acl || opt_print_default_acl)) {
opt_print_acl = 1;
if (!posixly_correct)
opt_print_default_acl = 1;
}
if ((optind == argc) && !posixly_correct)
goto synopsis;
do {
if (optind == argc ||
strcmp(argv[optind], "-") == 0) {
while ((line = next_line(stdin)) != NULL) {
if (*line == '\0')
continue;
had_errors += walk_tree(line, walk_flags, 0,
do_print, NULL);
}
if (!feof(stdin)) {
fprintf(stderr, _("%s: Standard input: %s\n"),
progname, strerror(errno));
had_errors++;
}
} else
had_errors += walk_tree(argv[optind], walk_flags, 0,
do_print, NULL);
optind++;
} while (optind < argc);
return had_errors ? 1 : 0;
synopsis:
fprintf(stderr, _("Usage: %s [-%s] file ...\n"),
progname, cmd_line_options);
fprintf(stderr, _("Try `%s --help' for more information.\n"),
progname);
return 2;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static __le32 ext4_extent_block_csum(struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_extent_header *eh)
{
struct ext4_inode_info *ei = EXT4_I(inode);
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb);
__u32 csum;
csum = ext4_chksum(sbi, ei->i_csum_seed, (__u8 *)eh,
EXT4_EXTENT_TAIL_OFFSET(eh));
return cpu_to_le32(csum);
}
Commit Message: ext4: race-condition protection for ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio
We assumed that at the time we call ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio()
extent in question is fully inside [map.m_lblk, map->m_len] because
it was already split during submission. But this may not be true due to
a race between writeback vs fallocate.
If extent in question is larger than requested we will split it again.
Special precautions should being done if zeroout required because
[map.m_lblk, map->m_len] already contains valid data.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Monakhov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
CWE ID: CWE-362
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: smb_send_rqst(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, struct smb_rqst *rqst)
{
int rc;
struct kvec *iov = rqst->rq_iov;
int n_vec = rqst->rq_nvec;
unsigned int smb_buf_length = get_rfc1002_length(iov[0].iov_base);
unsigned int i;
size_t total_len = 0, sent;
struct socket *ssocket = server->ssocket;
int val = 1;
cFYI(1, "Sending smb: smb_len=%u", smb_buf_length);
dump_smb(iov[0].iov_base, iov[0].iov_len);
/* cork the socket */
kernel_setsockopt(ssocket, SOL_TCP, TCP_CORK,
(char *)&val, sizeof(val));
rc = smb_send_kvec(server, iov, n_vec, &sent);
if (rc < 0)
goto uncork;
total_len += sent;
/* now walk the page array and send each page in it */
for (i = 0; i < rqst->rq_npages; i++) {
struct kvec p_iov;
cifs_rqst_page_to_kvec(rqst, i, &p_iov);
rc = smb_send_kvec(server, &p_iov, 1, &sent);
kunmap(rqst->rq_pages[i]);
if (rc < 0)
break;
total_len += sent;
}
uncork:
/* uncork it */
val = 0;
kernel_setsockopt(ssocket, SOL_TCP, TCP_CORK,
(char *)&val, sizeof(val));
if ((total_len > 0) && (total_len != smb_buf_length + 4)) {
cFYI(1, "partial send (wanted=%u sent=%zu): terminating "
"session", smb_buf_length + 4, total_len);
/*
* If we have only sent part of an SMB then the next SMB could
* be taken as the remainder of this one. We need to kill the
* socket so the server throws away the partial SMB
*/
server->tcpStatus = CifsNeedReconnect;
}
if (rc < 0 && rc != -EINTR)
cERROR(1, "Error %d sending data on socket to server", rc);
else
rc = 0;
return rc;
}
Commit Message: cifs: move check for NULL socket into smb_send_rqst
Cai reported this oops:
[90701.616664] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000028
[90701.625438] IP: [<ffffffff814a343e>] kernel_setsockopt+0x2e/0x60
[90701.632167] PGD fea319067 PUD 103fda4067 PMD 0
[90701.637255] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[90701.640878] Modules linked in: des_generic md4 nls_utf8 cifs dns_resolver binfmt_misc tun sg igb iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support lpc_ich pcspkr i2c_i801 i2c_core i7core_edac edac_core ioatdma dca mfd_core coretemp kvm_intel kvm crc32c_intel microcode sr_mod cdrom ata_generic sd_mod pata_acpi crc_t10dif ata_piix libata megaraid_sas dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod
[90701.677655] CPU 10
[90701.679808] Pid: 9627, comm: ls Tainted: G W 3.7.1+ #10 QCI QSSC-S4R/QSSC-S4R
[90701.688950] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814a343e>] [<ffffffff814a343e>] kernel_setsockopt+0x2e/0x60
[90701.698383] RSP: 0018:ffff88177b431bb8 EFLAGS: 00010206
[90701.704309] RAX: ffff88177b431fd8 RBX: 00007ffffffff000 RCX: ffff88177b431bec
[90701.712271] RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: 0000000000000000
[90701.720223] RBP: ffff88177b431bc8 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 0000000000000000
[90701.728185] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001
[90701.736147] R13: ffff88184ef92000 R14: 0000000000000023 R15: ffff88177b431c88
[90701.744109] FS: 00007fd56a1a47c0(0000) GS:ffff88105fc40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[90701.753137] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[90701.759550] CR2: 0000000000000028 CR3: 000000104f15f000 CR4: 00000000000007e0
[90701.767512] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[90701.775465] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[90701.783428] Process ls (pid: 9627, threadinfo ffff88177b430000, task ffff88185ca4cb60)
[90701.792261] Stack:
[90701.794505] 0000000000000023 ffff88177b431c50 ffff88177b431c38 ffffffffa014fcb1
[90701.802809] ffff88184ef921bc 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff ffff88184ef921c0
[90701.811123] ffff88177b431c08 ffffffff815ca3d9 ffff88177b431c18 ffff880857758000
[90701.819433] Call Trace:
[90701.822183] [<ffffffffa014fcb1>] smb_send_rqst+0x71/0x1f0 [cifs]
[90701.828991] [<ffffffff815ca3d9>] ? schedule+0x29/0x70
[90701.834736] [<ffffffffa014fe6d>] smb_sendv+0x3d/0x40 [cifs]
[90701.841062] [<ffffffffa014fe96>] smb_send+0x26/0x30 [cifs]
[90701.847291] [<ffffffffa015801f>] send_nt_cancel+0x6f/0xd0 [cifs]
[90701.854102] [<ffffffffa015075e>] SendReceive+0x18e/0x360 [cifs]
[90701.860814] [<ffffffffa0134a78>] CIFSFindFirst+0x1a8/0x3f0 [cifs]
[90701.867724] [<ffffffffa013f731>] ? build_path_from_dentry+0xf1/0x260 [cifs]
[90701.875601] [<ffffffffa013f731>] ? build_path_from_dentry+0xf1/0x260 [cifs]
[90701.883477] [<ffffffffa01578e6>] cifs_query_dir_first+0x26/0x30 [cifs]
[90701.890869] [<ffffffffa015480d>] initiate_cifs_search+0xed/0x250 [cifs]
[90701.898354] [<ffffffff81195970>] ? fillonedir+0x100/0x100
[90701.904486] [<ffffffffa01554cb>] cifs_readdir+0x45b/0x8f0 [cifs]
[90701.911288] [<ffffffff81195970>] ? fillonedir+0x100/0x100
[90701.917410] [<ffffffff81195970>] ? fillonedir+0x100/0x100
[90701.923533] [<ffffffff81195970>] ? fillonedir+0x100/0x100
[90701.929657] [<ffffffff81195848>] vfs_readdir+0xb8/0xe0
[90701.935490] [<ffffffff81195b9f>] sys_getdents+0x8f/0x110
[90701.941521] [<ffffffff815d3b99>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[90701.948222] Code: 66 90 55 65 48 8b 04 25 f0 c6 00 00 48 89 e5 53 48 83 ec 08 83 fe 01 48 8b 98 48 e0 ff ff 48 c7 80 48 e0 ff ff ff ff ff ff 74 22 <48> 8b 47 28 ff 50 68 65 48 8b 14 25 f0 c6 00 00 48 89 9a 48 e0
[90701.970313] RIP [<ffffffff814a343e>] kernel_setsockopt+0x2e/0x60
[90701.977125] RSP <ffff88177b431bb8>
[90701.981018] CR2: 0000000000000028
[90701.984809] ---[ end trace 24bd602971110a43 ]---
This is likely due to a race vs. a reconnection event.
The current code checks for a NULL socket in smb_send_kvec, but that's
too late. By the time that check is done, the socket will already have
been passed to kernel_setsockopt. Move the check into smb_send_rqst, so
that it's checked earlier.
In truth, this is a bit of a half-assed fix. The -ENOTSOCK error
return here looks like it could bubble back up to userspace. The locking
rules around the ssocket pointer are really unclear as well. There are
cases where the ssocket pointer is changed without holding the srv_mutex,
but I'm not clear whether there's a potential race here yet or not.
This code seems like it could benefit from some fundamental re-think of
how the socket handling should behave. Until then though, this patch
should at least fix the above oops in most cases.
Cc: <[email protected]> # 3.7+
Reported-and-Tested-by: CAI Qian <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void Dispatcher::OnUpdatePermissions(
const ExtensionMsg_UpdatePermissions_Params& params) {
const Extension* extension =
RendererExtensionRegistry::Get()->GetByID(params.extension_id);
if (!extension)
return;
scoped_ptr<const PermissionSet> active =
params.active_permissions.ToPermissionSet();
scoped_ptr<const PermissionSet> withheld =
params.withheld_permissions.ToPermissionSet();
UpdateOriginPermissions(
extension->url(),
extension->permissions_data()->GetEffectiveHostPermissions(),
active->effective_hosts());
extension->permissions_data()->SetPermissions(std::move(active),
std::move(withheld));
UpdateBindings(extension->id());
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void PageRequestSummary::UpdateOrAddToOrigins(
const content::mojom::ResourceLoadInfo& resource_load_info) {
for (const auto& redirect_info : resource_load_info.redirect_info_chain)
UpdateOrAddToOrigins(redirect_info->url, redirect_info->network_info);
UpdateOrAddToOrigins(resource_load_info.url, resource_load_info.network_info);
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void SetManualFallbacksForFilling(bool enabled) {
if (enabled) {
scoped_feature_list_.InitAndEnableFeature(
password_manager::features::kEnableManualFallbacksFilling);
} else {
scoped_feature_list_.InitAndDisableFeature(
password_manager::features::kEnableManualFallbacksFilling);
}
}
Commit Message: Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature.
Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature
as per the naming convention.
Bug: 785953
Change-Id: I4a4baa1649fe9f02c3783a5e4c40bc75e717cc03
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/900566
Reviewed-by: Vaclav Brozek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: NIKHIL SAHNI <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#534923}
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void nr_remove_socket(struct sock *sk)
{
spin_lock_bh(&nr_list_lock);
sk_del_node_init(sk);
spin_unlock_bh(&nr_list_lock);
}
Commit Message: netrom: fix info leak via msg_name in nr_recvmsg()
In case msg_name is set the sockaddr info gets filled out, as
requested, but the code fails to initialize the padding bytes of
struct sockaddr_ax25 inserted by the compiler for alignment. Also
the sax25_ndigis member does not get assigned, leaking four more
bytes.
Both issues lead to the fact that the code will leak uninitialized
kernel stack bytes in net/socket.c.
Fix both issues by initializing the memory with memset(0).
Cc: Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: R_API int r_bin_list_plugin(RBin *bin, const char* name, int json) {
RListIter *it;
RBinPlugin *bp;
RBinXtrPlugin *bx;
r_list_foreach (bin->plugins, it, bp) {
if (!r_str_cmp (name, bp->name, strlen (name))) {
continue;
}
return r_bin_print_plugin_details (bin, bp, json);
}
r_list_foreach (bin->binxtrs, it, bx) {
if (!r_str_cmp (name, bx->name, strlen (name))) {
continue;
}
return r_bin_print_xtrplugin_details (bin, bx, json);
}
eprintf ("cannot find plugin %s\n", name);
return false;
}
Commit Message: Fix #8748 - Fix oobread on string search
CWE ID: CWE-125
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static Image *ReadMAPImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
IndexPacket
index;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
i;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
depth,
packet_size,
quantum;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
*colormap,
*pixels;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
ThrowReaderException(OptionError,"MustSpecifyImageSize");
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Initialize image structure.
*/
image->storage_class=PseudoClass;
status=AcquireImageColormap(image,(size_t)
(image->offset != 0 ? image->offset : 256));
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
depth=GetImageQuantumDepth(image,MagickTrue);
packet_size=(size_t) (depth/8);
pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->columns,packet_size*
sizeof(*pixels));
packet_size=(size_t) (image->colors > 256 ? 6UL : 3UL);
colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->colors,packet_size*
sizeof(*colormap));
if ((pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL) ||
(colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL))
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
/*
Read image colormap.
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,packet_size*image->colors,colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) (packet_size*image->colors))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
p=colormap;
if (image->depth <= 8)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
}
else
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
quantum=(*p++ << 8);
quantum|=(*p++);
image->colormap[i].red=(Quantum) quantum;
quantum=(*p++ << 8);
quantum|=(*p++);
image->colormap[i].green=(Quantum) quantum;
quantum=(*p++ << 8);
quantum|=(*p++);
image->colormap[i].blue=(Quantum) quantum;
}
colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colormap);
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
/*
Read image pixels.
*/
packet_size=(size_t) (depth/8);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=pixels;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
count=ReadBlob(image,(size_t) packet_size*image->columns,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) (packet_size*image->columns))
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,*p);
p++;
if (image->colors > 256)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,((size_t) index << 8)+(*p));
p++;
}
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
if (y < (ssize_t) image->rows)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
raptor_world *world;
const char *program = raptor_basename(argv[0]);
raptor_iostream *iostr;
raptor_namespace_stack *nstack;
raptor_namespace* ex_ns;
raptor_turtle_writer* turtle_writer;
raptor_uri* base_uri;
raptor_qname* el_name;
unsigned long count;
raptor_uri* datatype;
/* for raptor_new_iostream_to_string */
void *string = NULL;
size_t string_len = 0;
world = raptor_new_world();
if(!world || raptor_world_open(world))
exit(1);
iostr = raptor_new_iostream_to_string(world, &string, &string_len, NULL);
if(!iostr) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: Failed to create iostream to string\n", program);
exit(1);
}
nstack = raptor_new_namespaces(world, 1);
base_uri = raptor_new_uri(world, base_uri_string);
turtle_writer = raptor_new_turtle_writer(world, base_uri, 1, nstack, iostr);
if(!turtle_writer) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: Failed to create turtle_writer to iostream\n", program);
exit(1);
}
raptor_turtle_writer_set_option(turtle_writer,
RAPTOR_OPTION_WRITER_AUTO_INDENT, 1);
ex_ns = raptor_new_namespace(nstack,
(const unsigned char*)"ex",
(const unsigned char*)"http://example.org/ns#",
0);
raptor_turtle_writer_namespace_prefix(turtle_writer, ex_ns);
raptor_turtle_writer_reference(turtle_writer, base_uri);
raptor_turtle_writer_increase_indent(turtle_writer);
raptor_turtle_writer_newline(turtle_writer);
raptor_turtle_writer_raw(turtle_writer, (const unsigned char*)"ex:foo ");
raptor_turtle_writer_quoted_counted_string(turtle_writer, longstr,
strlen((const char*)longstr));
raptor_turtle_writer_raw_counted(turtle_writer,
(const unsigned char*)" ;", 2);
raptor_turtle_writer_newline(turtle_writer);
el_name = raptor_new_qname_from_namespace_local_name(world,
ex_ns,
(const unsigned char*)"bar",
NULL);
raptor_turtle_writer_qname(turtle_writer, el_name);
raptor_free_qname(el_name);
raptor_turtle_writer_raw_counted(turtle_writer, (const unsigned char*)" ", 1);
datatype = raptor_new_uri(world, (const unsigned char*)"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#decimal");
raptor_turtle_writer_literal(turtle_writer, nstack,
(const unsigned char*)"10.0", NULL,
datatype);
raptor_free_uri(datatype);
raptor_turtle_writer_newline(turtle_writer);
raptor_turtle_writer_decrease_indent(turtle_writer);
raptor_turtle_writer_raw_counted(turtle_writer, (const unsigned char*)".", 1);
raptor_turtle_writer_newline(turtle_writer);
raptor_free_turtle_writer(turtle_writer);
raptor_free_namespace(ex_ns);
raptor_free_namespaces(nstack);
raptor_free_uri(base_uri);
count = raptor_iostream_tell(iostr);
#if defined(RAPTOR_DEBUG) && RAPTOR_DEBUG > 1
fprintf(stderr, "%s: Freeing iostream\n", program);
#endif
raptor_free_iostream(iostr);
if(count != OUT_BYTES_COUNT) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: I/O stream wrote %d bytes, expected %d\n", program,
(int)count, (int)OUT_BYTES_COUNT);
fputs("[[", stderr);
(void)fwrite(string, 1, string_len, stderr);
fputs("]]\n", stderr);
return 1;
}
if(!string) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: I/O stream failed to create a string\n", program);
return 1;
}
string_len = strlen((const char*)string);
if(string_len != count) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: I/O stream created a string length %d, expected %d\n", program, (int)string_len, (int)count);
return 1;
}
#if defined(RAPTOR_DEBUG) && RAPTOR_DEBUG > 1
fprintf(stderr, "%s: Made Turtle string of %d bytes\n", program, (int)string_len);
fputs("[[", stderr);
(void)fwrite(string, 1, string_len, stderr);
fputs("]]\n", stderr);
#endif
raptor_free_memory(string);
raptor_free_world(world);
/* keep gcc -Wall happy */
return(0);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2012-0037
Enforce entity loading policy in raptor_libxml_resolveEntity
and raptor_libxml_getEntity by checking for file URIs and network URIs.
Add RAPTOR_OPTION_LOAD_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES / loadExternalEntities for
turning on loading of XML external entity loading, disabled by default.
This affects all the parsers that use SAX2: rdfxml, rss-tag-soup (and
aliases) and rdfa.
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: bool RenderProcessHostImpl::OnMessageReceived(const IPC::Message& msg) {
if (deleting_soon_ || fast_shutdown_started_)
return false;
mark_child_process_activity_time();
if (msg.routing_id() == MSG_ROUTING_CONTROL) {
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP(RenderProcessHostImpl, msg)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewHostMsg_UserMetricsRecordAction,
OnUserMetricsRecordAction)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewHostMsg_Close_ACK, OnCloseACK)
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_WEBRTC)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(AecDumpMsg_RegisterAecDumpConsumer,
OnRegisterAecDumpConsumer)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(AecDumpMsg_UnregisterAecDumpConsumer,
OnUnregisterAecDumpConsumer)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(AudioProcessingMsg_Aec3Enabled, OnAec3Enabled)
#endif
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
return true;
}
IPC::Listener* listener = listeners_.Lookup(msg.routing_id());
if (!listener) {
if (msg.is_sync()) {
IPC::Message* reply = IPC::SyncMessage::GenerateReply(&msg);
reply->set_reply_error();
Send(reply);
}
return true;
}
return listener->OnMessageReceived(msg);
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: base::string16 GetAppForProtocolUsingAssocQuery(const GURL& url) {
base::string16 url_scheme = base::ASCIIToUTF16(url.scheme());
if (url_scheme.empty())
return base::string16();
wchar_t out_buffer[1024];
DWORD buffer_size = arraysize(out_buffer);
HRESULT hr = AssocQueryString(ASSOCF_IS_PROTOCOL,
ASSOCSTR_FRIENDLYAPPNAME,
url_scheme.c_str(),
NULL,
out_buffer,
&buffer_size);
if (FAILED(hr)) {
DLOG(WARNING) << "AssocQueryString failed!";
return base::string16();
}
return base::string16(out_buffer);
}
Commit Message: Validate external protocols before launching on Windows
Bug: 889459
Change-Id: Id33ca6444bff1e6dd71b6000823cf6fec09746ef
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1256208
Reviewed-by: Greg Thompson <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Mustafa Emre Acer <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597611}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: nfsd4_decode_setattr(struct nfsd4_compoundargs *argp, struct nfsd4_setattr *setattr)
{
__be32 status;
status = nfsd4_decode_stateid(argp, &setattr->sa_stateid);
if (status)
return status;
return nfsd4_decode_fattr(argp, setattr->sa_bmval, &setattr->sa_iattr,
&setattr->sa_acl, &setattr->sa_label, NULL);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: GBool SplashFTFont::makeGlyph(int c, int xFrac, int yFrac,
SplashGlyphBitmap *bitmap, int x0, int y0, SplashClip *clip, SplashClipResult *clipRes) {
SplashFTFontFile *ff;
FT_Vector offset;
FT_GlyphSlot slot;
FT_UInt gid;
int rowSize;
Guchar *p, *q;
int i;
ff = (SplashFTFontFile *)fontFile;
ff->face->size = sizeObj;
offset.x = (FT_Pos)(int)((SplashCoord)xFrac * splashFontFractionMul * 64);
offset.y = 0;
FT_Set_Transform(ff->face, &matrix, &offset);
slot = ff->face->glyph;
if (ff->codeToGID && c < ff->codeToGIDLen) {
gid = (FT_UInt)ff->codeToGID[c];
} else {
gid = (FT_UInt)c;
}
if (ff->trueType && gid == 0) {
return gFalse;
}
#ifdef TT_CONFIG_OPTION_BYTECODE_INTERPRETER
if (FT_Load_Glyph(ff->face, gid,
aa ? FT_LOAD_NO_BITMAP : FT_LOAD_DEFAULT)) {
return gFalse;
}
#else
if (FT_Load_Glyph(ff->face, gid,
aa ? FT_LOAD_NO_HINTING | FT_LOAD_NO_BITMAP
: FT_LOAD_DEFAULT)) {
return gFalse;
}
#endif
FT_Glyph_Metrics *glyphMetrics = &(ff->face->glyph->metrics);
bitmap->x = splashRound(-glyphMetrics->horiBearingX / 64.0);
bitmap->y = splashRound(glyphMetrics->horiBearingY / 64.0);
bitmap->w = splashRound(glyphMetrics->width / 64.0);
bitmap->h = splashRound(glyphMetrics->height / 64.0);
*clipRes = clip->testRect(x0 - bitmap->x,
y0 - bitmap->y,
x0 - bitmap->x + bitmap->w,
y0 - bitmap->y + bitmap->h);
if (*clipRes == splashClipAllOutside) {
bitmap->freeData = gFalse;
return gTrue;
}
if (FT_Render_Glyph(slot, aa ? ft_render_mode_normal
: ft_render_mode_mono)) {
return gFalse;
}
bitmap->x = -slot->bitmap_left;
bitmap->y = slot->bitmap_top;
bitmap->w = slot->bitmap.width;
bitmap->h = slot->bitmap.rows;
bitmap->aa = aa;
if (aa) {
rowSize = bitmap->w;
} else {
rowSize = (bitmap->w + 7) >> 3;
}
bitmap->data = (Guchar *)gmalloc(rowSize * bitmap->h);
bitmap->freeData = gTrue;
for (i = 0, p = bitmap->data, q = slot->bitmap.buffer;
i < bitmap->h;
++i, p += rowSize, q += slot->bitmap.pitch) {
memcpy(p, q, rowSize);
}
return gTrue;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage::~AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage() {
if (original_skia_image_) {
std::unique_ptr<gpu::SyncToken> sync_token =
base::WrapUnique(new gpu::SyncToken(texture_holder_->GetSyncToken()));
if (original_skia_image_thread_id_ !=
Platform::Current()->CurrentThread()->ThreadId()) {
PostCrossThreadTask(
*original_skia_image_task_runner_, FROM_HERE,
CrossThreadBind(
&DestroySkImageOnOriginalThread, std::move(original_skia_image_),
std::move(original_skia_image_context_provider_wrapper_),
WTF::Passed(std::move(sync_token))));
} else {
DestroySkImageOnOriginalThread(
std::move(original_skia_image_),
std::move(original_skia_image_context_provider_wrapper_),
std::move(sync_token));
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix *StaticBitmapImage ThreadChecker and unaccelerated SkImage destroy
- AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage was misusing ThreadChecker by having its
own detach logic. Using proper DetachThread is simpler, cleaner and
correct.
- UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage didn't destroy the SkImage in the
proper thread, leading to GrContext/SkSp problems.
Bug: 890576
Change-Id: Ic71e7f7322b0b851774628247aa5256664bc0723
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1307775
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Charette <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Roman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604427}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: struct mempolicy *__mpol_dup(struct mempolicy *old)
{
struct mempolicy *new = kmem_cache_alloc(policy_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
/* task's mempolicy is protected by alloc_lock */
if (old == current->mempolicy) {
task_lock(current);
*new = *old;
task_unlock(current);
} else
*new = *old;
if (current_cpuset_is_being_rebound()) {
nodemask_t mems = cpuset_mems_allowed(current);
if (new->flags & MPOL_F_REBINDING)
mpol_rebind_policy(new, &mems, MPOL_REBIND_STEP2);
else
mpol_rebind_policy(new, &mems, MPOL_REBIND_ONCE);
}
atomic_set(&new->refcnt, 1);
return new;
}
Commit Message: mm/mempolicy.c: fix error handling in set_mempolicy and mbind.
In the case that compat_get_bitmap fails we do not want to copy the
bitmap to the user as it will contain uninitialized stack data and leak
sensitive data.
Signed-off-by: Chris Salls <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-388
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void PrintDialogGtk::SendDocumentToPrinter(const string16& document_name) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
if (!printer_) {
Release();
return;
}
GtkPrintJob* print_job = gtk_print_job_new(
UTF16ToUTF8(document_name).c_str(),
printer_,
gtk_settings_,
page_setup_);
gtk_print_job_set_source_file(print_job, path_to_pdf_.value().c_str(), NULL);
gtk_print_job_send(print_job, OnJobCompletedThunk, this, NULL);
}
Commit Message: Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: int install_process_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *new)
{
struct key *keyring;
if (new->process_keyring)
return -EEXIST;
keyring = keyring_alloc("_pid", new->uid, new->gid, new,
KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW,
KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN,
NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring))
return PTR_ERR(keyring);
new->process_keyring = keyring;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: fix keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring() to not leak thread keyrings
This fixes CVE-2017-7472.
Running the following program as an unprivileged user exhausts kernel
memory by leaking thread keyrings:
#include <keyutils.h>
int main()
{
for (;;)
keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING);
}
Fix it by only creating a new thread keyring if there wasn't one before.
To make things more consistent, make install_thread_keyring_to_cred()
and install_process_keyring_to_cred() both return 0 if the corresponding
keyring is already present.
Fixes: d84f4f992cbd ("CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials")
Cc: [email protected] # 2.6.29+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-404
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: NaClSubprocess* Plugin::LoadHelperNaClModule(nacl::DescWrapper* wrapper,
const Manifest* manifest,
ErrorInfo* error_info) {
nacl::scoped_ptr<NaClSubprocess> nacl_subprocess(
new NaClSubprocess("helper module", NULL, NULL));
if (NULL == nacl_subprocess.get()) {
error_info->SetReport(ERROR_SEL_LDR_INIT,
"unable to allocate helper subprocess.");
return NULL;
}
if (!LoadNaClModuleCommon(wrapper, nacl_subprocess.get(), manifest,
false, error_info,
pp::BlockUntilComplete(),
pp::BlockUntilComplete())) {
return NULL;
}
if (!nacl_subprocess->StartSrpcServices()) {
error_info->SetReport(ERROR_SRPC_CONNECTION_FAIL,
"SRPC connection failure for " +
nacl_subprocess->description());
return NULL;
}
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::LoadHelperNaClModule (%s)\n",
nacl_subprocess.get()->detailed_description().c_str()));
return nacl_subprocess.release();
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int btrfs_set_inode_index_count(struct inode *inode)
{
struct btrfs_root *root = BTRFS_I(inode)->root;
struct btrfs_key key, found_key;
struct btrfs_path *path;
struct extent_buffer *leaf;
int ret;
key.objectid = btrfs_ino(inode);
key.type = BTRFS_DIR_INDEX_KEY;
key.offset = (u64)-1;
path = btrfs_alloc_path();
if (!path)
return -ENOMEM;
ret = btrfs_search_slot(NULL, root, &key, path, 0, 0);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
/* FIXME: we should be able to handle this */
if (ret == 0)
goto out;
ret = 0;
/*
* MAGIC NUMBER EXPLANATION:
* since we search a directory based on f_pos we have to start at 2
* since '.' and '..' have f_pos of 0 and 1 respectively, so everybody
* else has to start at 2
*/
if (path->slots[0] == 0) {
BTRFS_I(inode)->index_cnt = 2;
goto out;
}
path->slots[0]--;
leaf = path->nodes[0];
btrfs_item_key_to_cpu(leaf, &found_key, path->slots[0]);
if (found_key.objectid != btrfs_ino(inode) ||
found_key.type != BTRFS_DIR_INDEX_KEY) {
BTRFS_I(inode)->index_cnt = 2;
goto out;
}
BTRFS_I(inode)->index_cnt = found_key.offset + 1;
out:
btrfs_free_path(path);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix truncation of compressed and inlined extents
When truncating a file to a smaller size which consists of an inline
extent that is compressed, we did not discard (or made unusable) the
data between the new file size and the old file size, wasting metadata
space and allowing for the truncated data to be leaked and the data
corruption/loss mentioned below.
We were also not correctly decrementing the number of bytes used by the
inode, we were setting it to zero, giving a wrong report for callers of
the stat(2) syscall. The fsck tool also reported an error about a mismatch
between the nbytes of the file versus the real space used by the file.
Now because we weren't discarding the truncated region of the file, it
was possible for a caller of the clone ioctl to actually read the data
that was truncated, allowing for a security breach without requiring root
access to the system, using only standard filesystem operations. The
scenario is the following:
1) User A creates a file which consists of an inline and compressed
extent with a size of 2000 bytes - the file is not accessible to
any other users (no read, write or execution permission for anyone
else);
2) The user truncates the file to a size of 1000 bytes;
3) User A makes the file world readable;
4) User B creates a file consisting of an inline extent of 2000 bytes;
5) User B issues a clone operation from user A's file into its own
file (using a length argument of 0, clone the whole range);
6) User B now gets to see the 1000 bytes that user A truncated from
its file before it made its file world readbale. User B also lost
the bytes in the range [1000, 2000[ bytes from its own file, but
that might be ok if his/her intention was reading stale data from
user A that was never supposed to be public.
Note that this contrasts with the case where we truncate a file from 2000
bytes to 1000 bytes and then truncate it back from 1000 to 2000 bytes. In
this case reading any byte from the range [1000, 2000[ will return a value
of 0x00, instead of the original data.
This problem exists since the clone ioctl was added and happens both with
and without my recent data loss and file corruption fixes for the clone
ioctl (patch "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents").
So fix this by truncating the compressed inline extents as we do for the
non-compressed case, which involves decompressing, if the data isn't already
in the page cache, compressing the truncated version of the extent, writing
the compressed content into the inline extent and then truncate it.
The following test case for fstests reproduces the problem. In order for
the test to pass both this fix and my previous fix for the clone ioctl
that forbids cloning a smaller inline extent into a larger one,
which is titled "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents", are needed. Without that other fix the test fails in a
different way that does not leak the truncated data, instead part of
destination file gets replaced with zeroes (because the destination file
has a larger inline extent than the source).
seq=`basename $0`
seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
echo "QA output created by $seq"
tmp=/tmp/$$
status=1 # failure is the default!
trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
_cleanup()
{
rm -f $tmp.*
}
# get standard environment, filters and checks
. ./common/rc
. ./common/filter
# real QA test starts here
_need_to_be_root
_supported_fs btrfs
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch
_require_cloner
rm -f $seqres.full
_scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1
_scratch_mount "-o compress"
# Create our test files. File foo is going to be the source of a clone operation
# and consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of 512 bytes,
# while file bar consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of
# 256 bytes. For our test's purpose, it's important that file bar has an inline
# extent with a size smaller than foo's inline extent.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xa1 0 128" \
-c "pwrite -S 0x2a 128 384" \
$SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 256" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_xfs_io
# Now durably persist all metadata and data. We do this to make sure that we get
# on disk an inline extent with a size of 512 bytes for file foo.
sync
# Now truncate our file foo to a smaller size. Because it consists of a
# compressed and inline extent, btrfs did not shrink the inline extent to the
# new size (if the extent was not compressed, btrfs would shrink it to 128
# bytes), it only updates the inode's i_size to 128 bytes.
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "truncate 128" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
# Now clone foo's inline extent into bar.
# This clone operation should fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP because the source
# file consists only of an inline extent and the file's size is smaller than
# the inline extent of the destination (128 bytes < 256 bytes). However the
# clone ioctl was not prepared to deal with a file that has a size smaller
# than the size of its inline extent (something that happens only for compressed
# inline extents), resulting in copying the full inline extent from the source
# file into the destination file.
#
# Note that btrfs' clone operation for inline extents consists of removing the
# inline extent from the destination inode and copy the inline extent from the
# source inode into the destination inode, meaning that if the destination
# inode's inline extent is larger (N bytes) than the source inode's inline
# extent (M bytes), some bytes (N - M bytes) will be lost from the destination
# file. Btrfs could copy the source inline extent's data into the destination's
# inline extent so that we would not lose any data, but that's currently not
# done due to the complexity that would be needed to deal with such cases
# (specially when one or both extents are compressed), returning EOPNOTSUPP, as
# it's normally not a very common case to clone very small files (only case
# where we get inline extents) and copying inline extents does not save any
# space (unlike for normal, non-inlined extents).
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Now because the above clone operation used to succeed, and due to foo's inline
# extent not being shinked by the truncate operation, our file bar got the whole
# inline extent copied from foo, making us lose the last 128 bytes from bar
# which got replaced by the bytes in range [128, 256[ from foo before foo was
# truncated - in other words, data loss from bar and being able to read old and
# stale data from foo that should not be possible to read anymore through normal
# filesystem operations. Contrast with the case where we truncate a file from a
# size N to a smaller size M, truncate it back to size N and then read the range
# [M, N[, we should always get the value 0x00 for all the bytes in that range.
# We expected the clone operation to fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP and therefore
# not modify our file's bar data/metadata. So its content should be 256 bytes
# long with all bytes having the value 0xbb.
#
# Without the btrfs bug fix, the clone operation succeeded and resulted in
# leaking truncated data from foo, the bytes that belonged to its range
# [128, 256[, and losing data from bar in that same range. So reading the
# file gave us the following content:
#
# 0000000 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1
# *
# 0000200 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a
# *
# 0000400
echo "File bar's content after the clone operation:"
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Also because the foo's inline extent was not shrunk by the truncate
# operation, btrfs' fsck, which is run by the fstests framework everytime a
# test completes, failed reporting the following error:
#
# root 5 inode 257 errors 400, nbytes wrong
status=0
exit
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, getCsvControl)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
char delimiter[2], enclosure[2];
array_init(return_value);
delimiter[0] = intern->u.file.delimiter;
delimiter[1] = '\0';
enclosure[0] = intern->u.file.enclosure;
enclosure[1] = '\0';
add_next_index_string(return_value, delimiter, 1);
add_next_index_string(return_value, enclosure, 1);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void StopWorker(int document_cookie) {
if (document_cookie <= 0)
return;
scoped_refptr<PrintQueriesQueue> queue =
g_browser_process->print_job_manager()->queue();
scoped_refptr<PrinterQuery> printer_query =
queue->PopPrinterQuery(document_cookie);
if (printer_query.get()) {
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&PrinterQuery::StopWorker, printer_query));
}
}
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
[email protected]
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
CWE ID: CWE-254
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int try_to_unmap_cluster(unsigned long cursor, unsigned int *mapcount,
struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct page *check_page)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
pmd_t *pmd;
pte_t *pte;
pte_t pteval;
spinlock_t *ptl;
struct page *page;
unsigned long address;
unsigned long mmun_start; /* For mmu_notifiers */
unsigned long mmun_end; /* For mmu_notifiers */
unsigned long end;
int ret = SWAP_AGAIN;
int locked_vma = 0;
address = (vma->vm_start + cursor) & CLUSTER_MASK;
end = address + CLUSTER_SIZE;
if (address < vma->vm_start)
address = vma->vm_start;
if (end > vma->vm_end)
end = vma->vm_end;
pmd = mm_find_pmd(mm, address);
if (!pmd)
return ret;
mmun_start = address;
mmun_end = end;
mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start(mm, mmun_start, mmun_end);
/*
* If we can acquire the mmap_sem for read, and vma is VM_LOCKED,
* keep the sem while scanning the cluster for mlocking pages.
*/
if (down_read_trylock(&vma->vm_mm->mmap_sem)) {
locked_vma = (vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED);
if (!locked_vma)
up_read(&vma->vm_mm->mmap_sem); /* don't need it */
}
pte = pte_offset_map_lock(mm, pmd, address, &ptl);
/* Update high watermark before we lower rss */
update_hiwater_rss(mm);
for (; address < end; pte++, address += PAGE_SIZE) {
if (!pte_present(*pte))
continue;
page = vm_normal_page(vma, address, *pte);
BUG_ON(!page || PageAnon(page));
if (locked_vma) {
mlock_vma_page(page); /* no-op if already mlocked */
if (page == check_page)
ret = SWAP_MLOCK;
continue; /* don't unmap */
}
if (ptep_clear_flush_young_notify(vma, address, pte))
continue;
/* Nuke the page table entry. */
flush_cache_page(vma, address, pte_pfn(*pte));
pteval = ptep_clear_flush(vma, address, pte);
/* If nonlinear, store the file page offset in the pte. */
if (page->index != linear_page_index(vma, address)) {
pte_t ptfile = pgoff_to_pte(page->index);
if (pte_soft_dirty(pteval))
pte_file_mksoft_dirty(ptfile);
set_pte_at(mm, address, pte, ptfile);
}
/* Move the dirty bit to the physical page now the pte is gone. */
if (pte_dirty(pteval))
set_page_dirty(page);
page_remove_rmap(page);
page_cache_release(page);
dec_mm_counter(mm, MM_FILEPAGES);
(*mapcount)--;
}
pte_unmap_unlock(pte - 1, ptl);
mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_end(mm, mmun_start, mmun_end);
if (locked_vma)
up_read(&vma->vm_mm->mmap_sem);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: mm: try_to_unmap_cluster() should lock_page() before mlocking
A BUG_ON(!PageLocked) was triggered in mlock_vma_page() by Sasha Levin
fuzzing with trinity. The call site try_to_unmap_cluster() does not lock
the pages other than its check_page parameter (which is already locked).
The BUG_ON in mlock_vma_page() is not documented and its purpose is
somewhat unclear, but apparently it serializes against page migration,
which could otherwise fail to transfer the PG_mlocked flag. This would
not be fatal, as the page would be eventually encountered again, but
NR_MLOCK accounting would become distorted nevertheless. This patch adds
a comment to the BUG_ON in mlock_vma_page() and munlock_vma_page() to that
effect.
The call site try_to_unmap_cluster() is fixed so that for page !=
check_page, trylock_page() is attempted (to avoid possible deadlocks as we
already have check_page locked) and mlock_vma_page() is performed only
upon success. If the page lock cannot be obtained, the page is left
without PG_mlocked, which is again not a problem in the whole unevictable
memory design.
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Bob Liu <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <[email protected]>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <[email protected]>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static void parse_hid_report_descriptor(struct gtco *device, char * report,
int length)
{
struct device *ddev = &device->intf->dev;
int x, i = 0;
/* Tag primitive vars */
__u8 prefix;
__u8 size;
__u8 tag;
__u8 type;
__u8 data = 0;
__u16 data16 = 0;
__u32 data32 = 0;
/* For parsing logic */
int inputnum = 0;
__u32 usage = 0;
/* Global Values, indexed by TAG */
__u32 globalval[TAG_GLOB_MAX];
__u32 oldval[TAG_GLOB_MAX];
/* Debug stuff */
char maintype = 'x';
char globtype[12];
int indent = 0;
char indentstr[10] = "";
dev_dbg(ddev, "======>>>>>>PARSE<<<<<<======\n");
/* Walk this report and pull out the info we need */
while (i < length) {
prefix = report[i];
/* Skip over prefix */
i++;
/* Determine data size and save the data in the proper variable */
size = PREF_SIZE(prefix);
switch (size) {
case 1:
data = report[i];
break;
case 2:
data16 = get_unaligned_le16(&report[i]);
break;
case 3:
size = 4;
data32 = get_unaligned_le32(&report[i]);
break;
}
/* Skip size of data */
i += size;
/* What we do depends on the tag type */
tag = PREF_TAG(prefix);
type = PREF_TYPE(prefix);
switch (type) {
case TYPE_MAIN:
strcpy(globtype, "");
switch (tag) {
case TAG_MAIN_INPUT:
/*
* The INPUT MAIN tag signifies this is
* information from a report. We need to
* figure out what it is and store the
* min/max values
*/
maintype = 'I';
if (data == 2)
strcpy(globtype, "Variable");
else if (data == 3)
strcpy(globtype, "Var|Const");
dev_dbg(ddev, "::::: Saving Report: %d input #%d Max: 0x%X(%d) Min:0x%X(%d) of %d bits\n",
globalval[TAG_GLOB_REPORT_ID], inputnum,
globalval[TAG_GLOB_LOG_MAX], globalval[TAG_GLOB_LOG_MAX],
globalval[TAG_GLOB_LOG_MIN], globalval[TAG_GLOB_LOG_MIN],
globalval[TAG_GLOB_REPORT_SZ] * globalval[TAG_GLOB_REPORT_CNT]);
/*
We can assume that the first two input items
are always the X and Y coordinates. After
that, we look for everything else by
local usage value
*/
switch (inputnum) {
case 0: /* X coord */
dev_dbg(ddev, "GER: X Usage: 0x%x\n", usage);
if (device->max_X == 0) {
device->max_X = globalval[TAG_GLOB_LOG_MAX];
device->min_X = globalval[TAG_GLOB_LOG_MIN];
}
break;
case 1: /* Y coord */
dev_dbg(ddev, "GER: Y Usage: 0x%x\n", usage);
if (device->max_Y == 0) {
device->max_Y = globalval[TAG_GLOB_LOG_MAX];
device->min_Y = globalval[TAG_GLOB_LOG_MIN];
}
break;
default:
/* Tilt X */
if (usage == DIGITIZER_USAGE_TILT_X) {
if (device->maxtilt_X == 0) {
device->maxtilt_X = globalval[TAG_GLOB_LOG_MAX];
device->mintilt_X = globalval[TAG_GLOB_LOG_MIN];
}
}
/* Tilt Y */
if (usage == DIGITIZER_USAGE_TILT_Y) {
if (device->maxtilt_Y == 0) {
device->maxtilt_Y = globalval[TAG_GLOB_LOG_MAX];
device->mintilt_Y = globalval[TAG_GLOB_LOG_MIN];
}
}
/* Pressure */
if (usage == DIGITIZER_USAGE_TIP_PRESSURE) {
if (device->maxpressure == 0) {
device->maxpressure = globalval[TAG_GLOB_LOG_MAX];
device->minpressure = globalval[TAG_GLOB_LOG_MIN];
}
}
break;
}
inputnum++;
break;
case TAG_MAIN_OUTPUT:
maintype = 'O';
break;
case TAG_MAIN_FEATURE:
maintype = 'F';
break;
case TAG_MAIN_COL_START:
maintype = 'S';
if (data == 0) {
dev_dbg(ddev, "======>>>>>> Physical\n");
strcpy(globtype, "Physical");
} else
dev_dbg(ddev, "======>>>>>>\n");
/* Indent the debug output */
indent++;
for (x = 0; x < indent; x++)
indentstr[x] = '-';
indentstr[x] = 0;
/* Save global tags */
for (x = 0; x < TAG_GLOB_MAX; x++)
oldval[x] = globalval[x];
break;
case TAG_MAIN_COL_END:
dev_dbg(ddev, "<<<<<<======\n");
maintype = 'E';
indent--;
for (x = 0; x < indent; x++)
indentstr[x] = '-';
indentstr[x] = 0;
/* Copy global tags back */
for (x = 0; x < TAG_GLOB_MAX; x++)
globalval[x] = oldval[x];
break;
}
switch (size) {
case 1:
dev_dbg(ddev, "%sMAINTAG:(%d) %c SIZE: %d Data: %s 0x%x\n",
indentstr, tag, maintype, size, globtype, data);
break;
case 2:
dev_dbg(ddev, "%sMAINTAG:(%d) %c SIZE: %d Data: %s 0x%x\n",
indentstr, tag, maintype, size, globtype, data16);
break;
case 4:
dev_dbg(ddev, "%sMAINTAG:(%d) %c SIZE: %d Data: %s 0x%x\n",
indentstr, tag, maintype, size, globtype, data32);
break;
}
break;
case TYPE_GLOBAL:
switch (tag) {
case TAG_GLOB_USAGE:
/*
* First time we hit the global usage tag,
* it should tell us the type of device
*/
if (device->usage == 0)
device->usage = data;
strcpy(globtype, "USAGE");
break;
case TAG_GLOB_LOG_MIN:
strcpy(globtype, "LOG_MIN");
break;
case TAG_GLOB_LOG_MAX:
strcpy(globtype, "LOG_MAX");
break;
case TAG_GLOB_PHYS_MIN:
strcpy(globtype, "PHYS_MIN");
break;
case TAG_GLOB_PHYS_MAX:
strcpy(globtype, "PHYS_MAX");
break;
case TAG_GLOB_UNIT_EXP:
strcpy(globtype, "EXP");
break;
case TAG_GLOB_UNIT:
strcpy(globtype, "UNIT");
break;
case TAG_GLOB_REPORT_SZ:
strcpy(globtype, "REPORT_SZ");
break;
case TAG_GLOB_REPORT_ID:
strcpy(globtype, "REPORT_ID");
/* New report, restart numbering */
inputnum = 0;
break;
case TAG_GLOB_REPORT_CNT:
strcpy(globtype, "REPORT_CNT");
break;
case TAG_GLOB_PUSH:
strcpy(globtype, "PUSH");
break;
case TAG_GLOB_POP:
strcpy(globtype, "POP");
break;
}
/* Check to make sure we have a good tag number
so we don't overflow array */
if (tag < TAG_GLOB_MAX) {
switch (size) {
case 1:
dev_dbg(ddev, "%sGLOBALTAG:%s(%d) SIZE: %d Data: 0x%x\n",
indentstr, globtype, tag, size, data);
globalval[tag] = data;
break;
case 2:
dev_dbg(ddev, "%sGLOBALTAG:%s(%d) SIZE: %d Data: 0x%x\n",
indentstr, globtype, tag, size, data16);
globalval[tag] = data16;
break;
case 4:
dev_dbg(ddev, "%sGLOBALTAG:%s(%d) SIZE: %d Data: 0x%x\n",
indentstr, globtype, tag, size, data32);
globalval[tag] = data32;
break;
}
} else {
dev_dbg(ddev, "%sGLOBALTAG: ILLEGAL TAG:%d SIZE: %d\n",
indentstr, tag, size);
}
break;
case TYPE_LOCAL:
switch (tag) {
case TAG_GLOB_USAGE:
strcpy(globtype, "USAGE");
/* Always 1 byte */
usage = data;
break;
case TAG_GLOB_LOG_MIN:
strcpy(globtype, "MIN");
break;
case TAG_GLOB_LOG_MAX:
strcpy(globtype, "MAX");
break;
default:
strcpy(globtype, "UNKNOWN");
break;
}
switch (size) {
case 1:
dev_dbg(ddev, "%sLOCALTAG:(%d) %s SIZE: %d Data: 0x%x\n",
indentstr, tag, globtype, size, data);
break;
case 2:
dev_dbg(ddev, "%sLOCALTAG:(%d) %s SIZE: %d Data: 0x%x\n",
indentstr, tag, globtype, size, data16);
break;
case 4:
dev_dbg(ddev, "%sLOCALTAG:(%d) %s SIZE: %d Data: 0x%x\n",
indentstr, tag, globtype, size, data32);
break;
}
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Input: gtco - fix potential out-of-bound access
parse_hid_report_descriptor() has a while (i < length) loop, which
only guarantees that there's at least 1 byte in the buffer, but the
loop body can read multiple bytes which causes out-of-bounds access.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void CallOnDraw() {
if (!TestEnded()) {
bool resourceless_software_draw = false;
ImplThreadTaskRunner()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::Bind(&OnDrawCompositorFrameSink::OnDraw,
base::Unretained(compositor_frame_sink_),
resourceless_software_draw));
}
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
[email protected], [email protected]
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: chunk_grow(chunk_t *chunk, size_t sz)
{
off_t offset;
size_t memlen_orig = chunk->memlen;
tor_assert(sz > chunk->memlen);
offset = chunk->data - chunk->mem;
chunk = tor_realloc(chunk, CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(sz));
chunk->memlen = sz;
chunk->data = chunk->mem + offset;
#ifdef DEBUG_CHUNK_ALLOC
tor_assert(chunk->DBG_alloc == CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(memlen_orig));
chunk->DBG_alloc = CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(sz);
#endif
total_bytes_allocated_in_chunks +=
CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(sz) - CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(memlen_orig);
return chunk;
}
Commit Message: Add a one-word sentinel value of 0x0 at the end of each buf_t chunk
This helps protect against bugs where any part of a buf_t's memory
is passed to a function that expects a NUL-terminated input.
It also closes TROVE-2016-10-001 (aka bug 20384).
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: SMB2_read(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_io_parms *io_parms,
unsigned int *nbytes, char **buf, int *buf_type)
{
struct smb_rqst rqst;
int resp_buftype, rc = -EACCES;
struct smb2_read_plain_req *req = NULL;
struct smb2_read_rsp *rsp = NULL;
struct kvec iov[1];
struct kvec rsp_iov;
unsigned int total_len;
int flags = CIFS_LOG_ERROR;
struct cifs_ses *ses = io_parms->tcon->ses;
*nbytes = 0;
rc = smb2_new_read_req((void **)&req, &total_len, io_parms, NULL, 0, 0);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (smb3_encryption_required(io_parms->tcon))
flags |= CIFS_TRANSFORM_REQ;
iov[0].iov_base = (char *)req;
iov[0].iov_len = total_len;
memset(&rqst, 0, sizeof(struct smb_rqst));
rqst.rq_iov = iov;
rqst.rq_nvec = 1;
rc = cifs_send_recv(xid, ses, &rqst, &resp_buftype, flags, &rsp_iov);
cifs_small_buf_release(req);
rsp = (struct smb2_read_rsp *)rsp_iov.iov_base;
if (rc) {
if (rc != -ENODATA) {
cifs_stats_fail_inc(io_parms->tcon, SMB2_READ_HE);
cifs_dbg(VFS, "Send error in read = %d\n", rc);
trace_smb3_read_err(xid, req->PersistentFileId,
io_parms->tcon->tid, ses->Suid,
io_parms->offset, io_parms->length,
rc);
} else
trace_smb3_read_done(xid, req->PersistentFileId,
io_parms->tcon->tid, ses->Suid,
io_parms->offset, 0);
free_rsp_buf(resp_buftype, rsp_iov.iov_base);
return rc == -ENODATA ? 0 : rc;
} else
trace_smb3_read_done(xid, req->PersistentFileId,
io_parms->tcon->tid, ses->Suid,
io_parms->offset, io_parms->length);
*nbytes = le32_to_cpu(rsp->DataLength);
if ((*nbytes > CIFS_MAX_MSGSIZE) ||
(*nbytes > io_parms->length)) {
cifs_dbg(FYI, "bad length %d for count %d\n",
*nbytes, io_parms->length);
rc = -EIO;
*nbytes = 0;
}
if (*buf) {
memcpy(*buf, (char *)rsp + rsp->DataOffset, *nbytes);
free_rsp_buf(resp_buftype, rsp_iov.iov_base);
} else if (resp_buftype != CIFS_NO_BUFFER) {
*buf = rsp_iov.iov_base;
if (resp_buftype == CIFS_SMALL_BUFFER)
*buf_type = CIFS_SMALL_BUFFER;
else if (resp_buftype == CIFS_LARGE_BUFFER)
*buf_type = CIFS_LARGE_BUFFER;
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: cifs: Fix use-after-free in SMB2_read
There is a KASAN use-after-free:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in SMB2_read+0x1136/0x1190
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880b4e45e50 by task ln/1009
Should not release the 'req' because it will use in the trace.
Fixes: eccb4422cf97 ("smb3: Add ftrace tracepoints for improved SMB3 debugging")
Signed-off-by: ZhangXiaoxu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]>
CC: Stable <[email protected]> 4.18+
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static struct sock *dn_socket_get_next(struct seq_file *seq,
struct sock *n)
{
struct dn_iter_state *state = seq->private;
n = sk_next(n);
try_again:
if (n)
goto out;
if (++state->bucket >= DN_SK_HASH_SIZE)
goto out;
n = sk_head(&dn_sk_hash[state->bucket]);
goto try_again;
out:
return n;
}
Commit Message: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static void array_cleanup( char* arr[] , int arr_size)
{
int i=0;
for( i=0; i< arr_size; i++ ){
if( arr[i*2] ){
efree( arr[i*2]);
}
}
efree(arr);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read
CWE ID: CWE-125
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: int generic_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
{
int ret;
/*
* Do the basic permission checks.
*/
ret = acl_permission_check(inode, mask);
if (ret != -EACCES)
return ret;
if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
/* DACs are overridable for directories */
if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
return 0;
if (!(mask & MAY_WRITE))
if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
return 0;
return -EACCES;
}
/*
* Read/write DACs are always overridable.
* Executable DACs are overridable when there is
* at least one exec bit set.
*/
if (!(mask & MAY_EXEC) || (inode->i_mode & S_IXUGO))
if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
return 0;
/*
* Searching includes executable on directories, else just read.
*/
mask &= MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC;
if (mask == MAY_READ)
if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
return 0;
return -EACCES;
}
Commit Message: fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int srp_done(Sg_fd *sfp, Sg_request *srp)
{
unsigned long flags;
int ret;
read_lock_irqsave(&sfp->rq_list_lock, flags);
ret = srp->done;
read_unlock_irqrestore(&sfp->rq_list_lock, flags);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: sg_start_req(): make sure that there's not too many elements in iovec
unfortunately, allowing an arbitrary 16bit value means a possibility of
overflow in the calculation of total number of pages in bio_map_user_iov() -
we rely on there being no more than PAGE_SIZE members of sum in the
first loop there. If that sum wraps around, we end up allocating
too small array of pointers to pages and it's easy to overflow it in
the second loop.
X-Coverup: TINC (and there's no lumber cartel either)
Cc: [email protected] # way, way back
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: inline static PassRefPtr<CSSPrimitiveValue> zoomAdjustedNumberValue(double value, const RenderStyle* style)
{
return cssValuePool().createValue(value / style->effectiveZoom(), CSSPrimitiveValue::CSS_NUMBER);
}
Commit Message: Rename isPositioned to isOutOfFlowPositioned for clarity
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=89836
Reviewed by Antti Koivisto.
RenderObject and RenderStyle had an isPositioned() method that was
confusing, because it excluded relative positioning. Rename to
isOutOfFlowPositioned(), which makes it clearer that it only applies
to absolute and fixed positioning.
Simple rename; no behavior change.
Source/WebCore:
* css/CSSComputedStyleDeclaration.cpp:
(WebCore::getPositionOffsetValue):
* css/StyleResolver.cpp:
(WebCore::StyleResolver::collectMatchingRulesForList):
* dom/Text.cpp:
(WebCore::Text::rendererIsNeeded):
* editing/DeleteButtonController.cpp:
(WebCore::isDeletableElement):
* editing/TextIterator.cpp:
(WebCore::shouldEmitNewlinesBeforeAndAfterNode):
* rendering/AutoTableLayout.cpp:
(WebCore::shouldScaleColumns):
* rendering/InlineFlowBox.cpp:
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::addToLine):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::placeBoxesInInlineDirection):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::requiresIdeographicBaseline):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::adjustMaxAscentAndDescent):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeLogicalBoxHeights):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::placeBoxesInBlockDirection):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::flipLinesInBlockDirection):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeOverflow):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeOverAnnotationAdjustment):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeUnderAnnotationAdjustment):
* rendering/InlineIterator.h:
(WebCore::isIteratorTarget):
* rendering/LayoutState.cpp:
(WebCore::LayoutState::LayoutState):
* rendering/RenderBlock.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBlock::MarginInfo::MarginInfo):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::styleWillChange):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::styleDidChange):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildToContinuation):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildToAnonymousColumnBlocks):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::containingColumnsBlock):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::columnsBlockForSpanningElement):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildIgnoringAnonymousColumnBlocks):
(WebCore::getInlineRun):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::isSelfCollapsingBlock):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::layoutBlock):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addOverflowFromBlockChildren):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::expandsToEncloseOverhangingFloats):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::handlePositionedChild):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::moveRunInUnderSiblingBlockIfNeeded):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::collapseMargins):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::clearFloatsIfNeeded):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::simplifiedNormalFlowLayout):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::isSelectionRoot):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::blockSelectionGaps):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::clearFloats):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::markAllDescendantsWithFloatsForLayout):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::markSiblingsWithFloatsForLayout):
(WebCore::isChildHitTestCandidate):
(WebCore::InlineMinMaxIterator::next):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::computeBlockPreferredLogicalWidths):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::firstLineBoxBaseline):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::lastLineBoxBaseline):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::updateFirstLetter):
(WebCore::shouldCheckLines):
(WebCore::getHeightForLineCount):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::adjustForBorderFit):
(WebCore::inNormalFlow):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::adjustLinePositionForPagination):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::adjustBlockChildForPagination):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::renderName):
* rendering/RenderBlock.h:
(WebCore::RenderBlock::shouldSkipCreatingRunsForObject):
* rendering/RenderBlockLineLayout.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBlock::setMarginsForRubyRun):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::computeInlineDirectionPositionsForLine):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::computeBlockDirectionPositionsForLine):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::layoutInlineChildren):
(WebCore::requiresLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::LineBreaker::skipTrailingWhitespace):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::LineBreaker::skipLeadingWhitespace):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::LineBreaker::nextLineBreak):
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::removeFloatingOrPositionedChildFromBlockLists):
(WebCore::RenderBox::styleWillChange):
(WebCore::RenderBox::styleDidChange):
(WebCore::RenderBox::updateBoxModelInfoFromStyle):
(WebCore::RenderBox::offsetFromContainer):
(WebCore::RenderBox::positionLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeRectForRepaint):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeLogicalWidthInRegion):
(WebCore::RenderBox::renderBoxRegionInfo):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeLogicalHeight):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computePercentageLogicalHeight):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeReplacedLogicalWidthUsing):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeReplacedLogicalHeightUsing):
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
(WebCore::percentageLogicalHeightIsResolvable):
* rendering/RenderBox.h:
(WebCore::RenderBox::stretchesToViewport):
(WebCore::RenderBox::isDeprecatedFlexItem):
* rendering/RenderBoxModelObject.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBoxModelObject::adjustedPositionRelativeToOffsetParent):
(WebCore::RenderBoxModelObject::mapAbsoluteToLocalPoint):
* rendering/RenderBoxModelObject.h:
(WebCore::RenderBoxModelObject::requiresLayer):
* rendering/RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox.cpp:
(WebCore::childDoesNotAffectWidthOrFlexing):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::layoutBlock):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::layoutHorizontalBox):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::layoutVerticalBox):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::renderName):
* rendering/RenderFieldset.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderFieldset::findLegend):
* rendering/RenderFlexibleBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::computePreferredLogicalWidths):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::autoMarginOffsetInMainAxis):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::availableAlignmentSpaceForChild):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::computeMainAxisPreferredSizes):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::computeNextFlexLine):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::resolveFlexibleLengths):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::prepareChildForPositionedLayout):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::layoutAndPlaceChildren):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::layoutColumnReverse):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::adjustAlignmentForChild):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::flipForRightToLeftColumn):
* rendering/RenderGrid.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderGrid::renderName):
* rendering/RenderImage.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderImage::computeIntrinsicRatioInformation):
* rendering/RenderInline.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderInline::addChildIgnoringContinuation):
(WebCore::RenderInline::addChildToContinuation):
(WebCore::RenderInline::generateCulledLineBoxRects):
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RenderInline::culledInlineFirstLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderInline::culledInlineLastLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderInline::culledInlineVisualOverflowBoundingBox):
(WebCore::RenderInline::computeRectForRepaint):
(WebCore::RenderInline::dirtyLineBoxes):
* rendering/RenderLayer.cpp:
(WebCore::checkContainingBlockChainForPagination):
(WebCore::RenderLayer::updateLayerPosition):
(WebCore::isPositionedContainer):
(WebCore::RenderLayer::calculateClipRects):
(WebCore::RenderLayer::shouldBeNormalFlowOnly):
* rendering/RenderLayerCompositor.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderLayerCompositor::requiresCompositingForPosition):
* rendering/RenderLineBoxList.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderLineBoxList::dirtyLinesFromChangedChild):
* rendering/RenderListItem.cpp:
(WebCore::getParentOfFirstLineBox):
* rendering/RenderMultiColumnBlock.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderMultiColumnBlock::renderName):
* rendering/RenderObject.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderObject::markContainingBlocksForLayout):
(WebCore::RenderObject::setPreferredLogicalWidthsDirty):
(WebCore::RenderObject::invalidateContainerPreferredLogicalWidths):
(WebCore::RenderObject::styleWillChange):
(WebCore::RenderObject::offsetParent):
* rendering/RenderObject.h:
(WebCore::RenderObject::isOutOfFlowPositioned):
(WebCore::RenderObject::isInFlowPositioned):
(WebCore::RenderObject::hasClip):
(WebCore::RenderObject::isFloatingOrOutOfFlowPositioned):
* rendering/RenderObjectChildList.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderObjectChildList::removeChildNode):
* rendering/RenderReplaced.cpp:
(WebCore::hasAutoHeightOrContainingBlockWithAutoHeight):
* rendering/RenderRubyRun.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderRubyRun::rubyText):
* rendering/RenderTable.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderTable::addChild):
(WebCore::RenderTable::computeLogicalWidth):
(WebCore::RenderTable::layout):
* rendering/style/RenderStyle.h:
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::isPositionedContainer):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::isNonRenderViewFixedPositionedContainer):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::isFixedPositionedContainer):
Source/WebKit2:
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::updateOffsetFromViewportForSelf):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@121123 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: FileReaderLoader::FileReaderLoader(ReadType read_type,
FileReaderLoaderClient* client)
: read_type_(read_type),
client_(client),
handle_watcher_(FROM_HERE, mojo::SimpleWatcher::ArmingPolicy::AUTOMATIC),
binding_(this) {}
Commit Message: Fix use-after-free in FileReaderLoader.
Anything that calls out to client_ can cause FileReaderLoader to be
destroyed, so make sure to check for that situation.
Bug: 835639
Change-Id: I57533d41b7118c06da17abec28bbf301e1f50646
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1024450
Commit-Queue: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Murphy <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#552807}
CWE ID: CWE-416
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static char *parse_and_add_kcmdline_module_options(char *options, const char *modulename)
{
char *kcmdline_buf;
char *kcmdline;
char *kptr;
int len;
kcmdline_buf = xmalloc_open_read_close("/proc/cmdline", NULL);
if (!kcmdline_buf)
return options;
kcmdline = kcmdline_buf;
len = strlen(modulename);
while ((kptr = strsep(&kcmdline, "\n\t ")) != NULL) {
if (strncmp(modulename, kptr, len) != 0)
continue;
kptr += len;
if (*kptr != '.')
continue;
/* It is "modulename.xxxx" */
kptr++;
if (strchr(kptr, '=') != NULL) {
/* It is "modulename.opt=[val]" */
options = gather_options_str(options, kptr);
}
}
free(kcmdline_buf);
return options;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int spl_array_it_valid(zend_object_iterator *iter TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
spl_array_it *iterator = (spl_array_it *)iter;
spl_array_object *object = iterator->object;
HashTable *aht = spl_array_get_hash_table(object, 0 TSRMLS_CC);
if (object->ar_flags & SPL_ARRAY_OVERLOADED_VALID) {
return zend_user_it_valid(iter TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
if (spl_array_object_verify_pos_ex(object, aht, "ArrayIterator::valid(): " TSRMLS_CC) == FAILURE) {
return FAILURE;
}
return zend_hash_has_more_elements_ex(aht, &object->pos);
}
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: uch *readpng_get_image(double display_exponent, int *pChannels, ulg *pRowbytes)
{
ulg rowbytes;
/* expand palette images to RGB, low-bit-depth grayscale images to 8 bits,
* transparency chunks to full alpha channel; strip 16-bit-per-sample
* images to 8 bits per sample; and convert grayscale to RGB[A] */
/* GRR WARNING: grayscale needs to be expanded and channels reset! */
*pRowbytes = rowbytes = channels*width;
*pChannels = channels;
if ((image_data = (uch *)malloc(rowbytes*height)) == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
Trace((stderr, "readpng_get_image: rowbytes = %ld, height = %ld\n", rowbytes, height));
/* now we can go ahead and just read the whole image */
fread(image_data, 1L, rowbytes*height, saved_infile);
return image_data;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static UINT8 btif_hl_get_app_id(int channel_id){
UINT8 app_id =(UINT8) (channel_id >> 16);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s channel_id=0x%08x, app_id=0x%02x ", __FUNCTION__,channel_id, app_id);
return app_id;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void FindBarController::Observe(NotificationType type,
const NotificationSource& source,
const NotificationDetails& details) {
FindManager* find_manager = tab_contents_->GetFindManager();
if (type == NotificationType::FIND_RESULT_AVAILABLE) {
if (Source<TabContents>(source).ptr() == tab_contents_->tab_contents()) {
UpdateFindBarForCurrentResult();
if (find_manager->find_result().final_update() &&
find_manager->find_result().number_of_matches() == 0) {
const string16& last_search = find_manager->previous_find_text();
const string16& current_search = find_manager->find_text();
if (last_search.find(current_search) != 0)
find_bar_->AudibleAlert();
}
}
} else if (type == NotificationType::NAV_ENTRY_COMMITTED) {
NavigationController* source_controller =
Source<NavigationController>(source).ptr();
if (source_controller == &tab_contents_->controller()) {
NavigationController::LoadCommittedDetails* commit_details =
Details<NavigationController::LoadCommittedDetails>(details).ptr();
PageTransition::Type transition_type =
commit_details->entry->transition_type();
if (find_bar_->IsFindBarVisible()) {
if (PageTransition::StripQualifier(transition_type) !=
PageTransition::RELOAD) {
EndFindSession(kKeepSelection);
} else {
find_manager->set_find_op_aborted(true);
}
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: Rename the TabContentWrapper pieces to be "TabHelper"s. (Except for the PasswordManager... for now.) Also, just pre-create them up-front. It saves us effort, as they're all going to be eventually created anyway, so being lazy saves us nothing and creates headaches since the rules about what can be lazy differ from feature to feature.
BUG=71097
TEST=zero visible change
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6480117
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@75170 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: dophn_core(struct magic_set *ms, int clazz, int swap, int fd, off_t off,
int num, size_t size, off_t fsize, int *flags)
{
Elf32_Phdr ph32;
Elf64_Phdr ph64;
size_t offset, len;
unsigned char nbuf[BUFSIZ];
ssize_t bufsize;
if (size != xph_sizeof) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", corrupted program header size") == -1)
return -1;
return 0;
}
/*
* Loop through all the program headers.
*/
for ( ; num; num--) {
if (pread(fd, xph_addr, xph_sizeof, off) < (ssize_t)xph_sizeof) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
off += size;
if (fsize != SIZE_UNKNOWN && xph_offset > fsize) {
/* Perhaps warn here */
continue;
}
if (xph_type != PT_NOTE)
continue;
/*
* This is a PT_NOTE section; loop through all the notes
* in the section.
*/
len = xph_filesz < sizeof(nbuf) ? xph_filesz : sizeof(nbuf);
if ((bufsize = pread(fd, nbuf, len, xph_offset)) == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
offset = 0;
for (;;) {
if (offset >= (size_t)bufsize)
break;
offset = donote(ms, nbuf, offset, (size_t)bufsize,
clazz, swap, 4, flags);
if (offset == 0)
break;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: - Add a limit to the number of ELF notes processed (Suggested by Alexander
Cherepanov)
- Restructure ELF note printing so that we don't print the same message
multiple times on repeated notes of the same kind.
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: GF_Err trik_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
u32 i;
GF_TrickPlayBox *p = (GF_TrickPlayBox *) a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "TrickPlayBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
for (i=0; i<p->entry_count; i++) {
fprintf(trace, "<TrickPlayBoxEntry pic_type=\"%d\" dependency_level=\"%d\"/>\n", p->entries[i].pic_type, p->entries[i].dependency_level);
}
if (!p->size)
fprintf(trace, "<TrickPlayBoxEntry pic_type=\"\" dependency_level=\"\"/>\n");
gf_isom_box_dump_done("TrickPlayBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: GfxCalRGBColorSpace::~GfxCalRGBColorSpace() {
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void WebURLLoaderImpl::Context::OnReceivedResponse(
const ResourceResponseInfo& info) {
if (!client_)
return;
WebURLResponse response;
response.initialize();
PopulateURLResponse(request_.url(), info, &response);
bool show_raw_listing = (GURL(request_.url()).query() == "raw");
if (info.mime_type == "text/vnd.chromium.ftp-dir") {
if (show_raw_listing) {
response.setMIMEType("text/plain");
} else {
response.setMIMEType("text/html");
}
}
client_->didReceiveResponse(loader_, response);
if (!client_)
return;
DCHECK(!ftp_listing_delegate_.get());
DCHECK(!multipart_delegate_.get());
if (info.headers && info.mime_type == "multipart/x-mixed-replace") {
std::string content_type;
info.headers->EnumerateHeader(NULL, "content-type", &content_type);
std::string mime_type;
std::string charset;
bool had_charset = false;
std::string boundary;
net::HttpUtil::ParseContentType(content_type, &mime_type, &charset,
&had_charset, &boundary);
TrimString(boundary, " \"", &boundary);
if (!boundary.empty()) {
multipart_delegate_.reset(
new MultipartResponseDelegate(client_, loader_, response, boundary));
}
} else if (info.mime_type == "text/vnd.chromium.ftp-dir" &&
!show_raw_listing) {
ftp_listing_delegate_.reset(
new FtpDirectoryListingResponseDelegate(client_, loader_, response));
}
}
Commit Message: Protect WebURLLoaderImpl::Context while receiving responses.
A client's didReceiveResponse can cancel a request; by protecting the
Context we avoid a use after free in this case.
Interestingly, we really had very good warning about this problem, see
https://codereview.chromium.org/11900002/ back in January.
R=darin
BUG=241139
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15738007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@202821 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void BrowserWindowGtk::ShowBookmarkBubble(const GURL& url,
bool already_bookmarked) {
toolbar_->GetLocationBarView()->ShowStarBubble(url, !already_bookmarked);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static void sk_update_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
{
if (mem_cgroup_sockets_enabled && sk->sk_cgrp)
sock_update_memcg(newsk);
}
Commit Message: net: sock: validate data_len before allocating skb in sock_alloc_send_pskb()
We need to validate the number of pages consumed by data_len, otherwise frags
array could be overflowed by userspace. So this patch validate data_len and
return -EMSGSIZE when data_len may occupies more frags than MAX_SKB_FRAGS.
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: gfx::Size CardUnmaskPromptViews::GetPreferredSize() const {
const int kWidth = 375;
return gfx::Size(kWidth, GetHeightForWidth(kWidth));
}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: php_mysqlnd_prepare_free_mem(void * _packet, zend_bool stack_allocation TSRMLS_DC)
{
MYSQLND_PACKET_PREPARE_RESPONSE *p= (MYSQLND_PACKET_PREPARE_RESPONSE *) _packet;
if (!stack_allocation) {
mnd_pefree(p, p->header.persistent);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72293 - Heap overflow in mysqlnd related to BIT fields
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: content::JavaScriptDialogManager* DevToolsWindow::GetJavaScriptDialogManager(
WebContents* source) {
return app_modal::JavaScriptDialogManager::GetInstance();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
CWE ID: CWE-200
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: virDomainGetTime(virDomainPtr dom,
long long *seconds,
unsigned int *nseconds,
unsigned int flags)
{
VIR_DOMAIN_DEBUG(dom, "seconds=%p, nseconds=%p, flags=%x",
seconds, nseconds, flags);
virResetLastError();
virCheckDomainReturn(dom, -1);
if (dom->conn->driver->domainGetTime) {
int ret = dom->conn->driver->domainGetTime(dom, seconds,
nseconds, flags);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
error:
virDispatchError(dom->conn);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: virDomainGetTime: Deny on RO connections
We have a policy that if API may end up talking to a guest agent
it should require RW connection. We don't obey the rule in
virDomainGetTime().
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-254
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out, unsigned int *outlen, void *arg), void *arg)
{
ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb = cb;
ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg = arg;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static void __init vmx_check_processor_compat(void *rtn)
{
struct vmcs_config vmcs_conf;
*(int *)rtn = 0;
if (setup_vmcs_config(&vmcs_conf) < 0)
*(int *)rtn = -EIO;
nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs(&vmcs_conf.nested, enable_apicv);
if (memcmp(&vmcs_config, &vmcs_conf, sizeof(struct vmcs_config)) != 0) {
printk(KERN_ERR "kvm: CPU %d feature inconsistency!\n",
smp_processor_id());
*(int *)rtn = -EIO;
}
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: htmlInitParserCtxt(htmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt)
{
htmlSAXHandler *sax;
if (ctxt == NULL) return(-1);
memset(ctxt, 0, sizeof(htmlParserCtxt));
ctxt->dict = xmlDictCreate();
if (ctxt->dict == NULL) {
htmlErrMemory(NULL, "htmlInitParserCtxt: out of memory\n");
return(-1);
}
sax = (htmlSAXHandler *) xmlMalloc(sizeof(htmlSAXHandler));
if (sax == NULL) {
htmlErrMemory(NULL, "htmlInitParserCtxt: out of memory\n");
return(-1);
}
else
memset(sax, 0, sizeof(htmlSAXHandler));
/* Allocate the Input stack */
ctxt->inputTab = (htmlParserInputPtr *)
xmlMalloc(5 * sizeof(htmlParserInputPtr));
if (ctxt->inputTab == NULL) {
htmlErrMemory(NULL, "htmlInitParserCtxt: out of memory\n");
ctxt->inputNr = 0;
ctxt->inputMax = 0;
ctxt->input = NULL;
return(-1);
}
ctxt->inputNr = 0;
ctxt->inputMax = 5;
ctxt->input = NULL;
ctxt->version = NULL;
ctxt->encoding = NULL;
ctxt->standalone = -1;
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_START;
/* Allocate the Node stack */
ctxt->nodeTab = (htmlNodePtr *) xmlMalloc(10 * sizeof(htmlNodePtr));
if (ctxt->nodeTab == NULL) {
htmlErrMemory(NULL, "htmlInitParserCtxt: out of memory\n");
ctxt->nodeNr = 0;
ctxt->nodeMax = 0;
ctxt->node = NULL;
ctxt->inputNr = 0;
ctxt->inputMax = 0;
ctxt->input = NULL;
return(-1);
}
ctxt->nodeNr = 0;
ctxt->nodeMax = 10;
ctxt->node = NULL;
/* Allocate the Name stack */
ctxt->nameTab = (const xmlChar **) xmlMalloc(10 * sizeof(xmlChar *));
if (ctxt->nameTab == NULL) {
htmlErrMemory(NULL, "htmlInitParserCtxt: out of memory\n");
ctxt->nameNr = 0;
ctxt->nameMax = 0;
ctxt->name = NULL;
ctxt->nodeNr = 0;
ctxt->nodeMax = 0;
ctxt->node = NULL;
ctxt->inputNr = 0;
ctxt->inputMax = 0;
ctxt->input = NULL;
return(-1);
}
ctxt->nameNr = 0;
ctxt->nameMax = 10;
ctxt->name = NULL;
ctxt->nodeInfoTab = NULL;
ctxt->nodeInfoNr = 0;
ctxt->nodeInfoMax = 0;
if (sax == NULL) ctxt->sax = (xmlSAXHandlerPtr) &htmlDefaultSAXHandler;
else {
ctxt->sax = sax;
memcpy(sax, &htmlDefaultSAXHandler, sizeof(xmlSAXHandlerV1));
}
ctxt->userData = ctxt;
ctxt->myDoc = NULL;
ctxt->wellFormed = 1;
ctxt->replaceEntities = 0;
ctxt->linenumbers = xmlLineNumbersDefaultValue;
ctxt->html = 1;
ctxt->vctxt.finishDtd = XML_CTXT_FINISH_DTD_0;
ctxt->vctxt.userData = ctxt;
ctxt->vctxt.error = xmlParserValidityError;
ctxt->vctxt.warning = xmlParserValidityWarning;
ctxt->record_info = 0;
ctxt->validate = 0;
ctxt->nbChars = 0;
ctxt->checkIndex = 0;
ctxt->catalogs = NULL;
xmlInitNodeInfoSeq(&ctxt->node_seq);
return(0);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxml to 3939178e4cb797417ff033b1e04ab4b038e224d9
Removes a few patches fixed upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=e26630548e7d138d2c560844c43820b6767251e3
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=94691dc884d1a8ada39f073408b4bb92fe7fe882
Stops using the NOXXE flag which was reverted upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=030b1f7a27c22f9237eddca49ec5e620b6258d7d
Changes the patch to uri.c to not add limits.h, which is included
upstream.
Bug: 722079
Change-Id: I4b8449ed33f95de23c54c2cde99970c2df2781ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535233
Reviewed-by: Scott Graham <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Dominic Cooney <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480755}
CWE ID: CWE-787
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void PrintViewManager::OnShowScriptedPrintPreview(content::RenderFrameHost* rfh,
bool source_is_modifiable) {
DCHECK(print_preview_rfh_);
if (rfh != print_preview_rfh_)
return;
PrintPreviewDialogController* dialog_controller =
PrintPreviewDialogController::GetInstance();
if (!dialog_controller) {
PrintPreviewDone();
return;
}
dialog_controller->PrintPreview(web_contents());
PrintHostMsg_RequestPrintPreview_Params params;
params.is_modifiable = source_is_modifiable;
PrintPreviewUI::SetInitialParams(
dialog_controller->GetPrintPreviewForContents(web_contents()), params);
}
Commit Message: Properly clean up in PrintViewManager::RenderFrameCreated().
BUG=694382,698622
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2742853003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#457363}
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void PageRequestSummary::UpdateOrAddToOrigins(
const GURL& url,
const content::mojom::CommonNetworkInfoPtr& network_info) {
GURL origin = url.GetOrigin();
if (!origin.is_valid())
return;
auto it = origins.find(origin);
if (it == origins.end()) {
OriginRequestSummary summary;
summary.origin = origin;
summary.first_occurrence = origins.size();
it = origins.insert({origin, summary}).first;
}
it->second.always_access_network |= network_info->always_access_network;
it->second.accessed_network |= network_info->network_accessed;
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: int sock_queue_err_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
if (atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) + skb->truesize >=
(unsigned int)sk->sk_rcvbuf)
return -ENOMEM;
skb_orphan(skb);
skb->sk = sk;
skb->destructor = sock_rmem_free;
atomic_add(skb->truesize, &sk->sk_rmem_alloc);
/* before exiting rcu section, make sure dst is refcounted */
skb_dst_force(skb);
skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_error_queue, skb);
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD))
sk->sk_data_ready(sk);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tcp: fix SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS for normal skbs
__sock_recv_timestamp can be called for both normal skbs (for
receive timestamps) and for skbs on the error queue (for transmit
timestamps).
Commit 1c885808e456
(tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING)
assumes any skb passed to __sock_recv_timestamp are from
the error queue, containing OPT_STATS in the content of the skb.
This results in accessing invalid memory or generating junk
data.
To fix this, set skb->pkt_type to PACKET_OUTGOING for packets
on the error queue. This is safe because on the receive path
on local sockets skb->pkt_type is never set to PACKET_OUTGOING.
With that, copy OPT_STATS from a packet, only if its pkt_type
is PACKET_OUTGOING.
Fixes: 1c885808e456 ("tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING")
Reported-by: JongHwan Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: icmp6_rrenum_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *bp, const u_char *ep)
{
const struct icmp6_router_renum *rr6;
const char *cp;
const struct rr_pco_match *match;
const struct rr_pco_use *use;
char hbuf[NI_MAXHOST];
int n;
if (ep < bp)
return;
rr6 = (const struct icmp6_router_renum *)bp;
cp = (const char *)(rr6 + 1);
ND_TCHECK(rr6->rr_reserved);
switch (rr6->rr_code) {
case ICMP6_ROUTER_RENUMBERING_COMMAND:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"router renum: command"));
break;
case ICMP6_ROUTER_RENUMBERING_RESULT:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"router renum: result"));
break;
case ICMP6_ROUTER_RENUMBERING_SEQNUM_RESET:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"router renum: sequence number reset"));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"router renum: code-#%d", rr6->rr_code));
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,", seq=%u", EXTRACT_32BITS(&rr6->rr_seqnum)));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
#define F(x, y) ((rr6->rr_flags) & (x) ? (y) : "")
ND_PRINT((ndo,"[")); /*]*/
if (rr6->rr_flags) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s%s%s%s%s,", F(ICMP6_RR_FLAGS_TEST, "T"),
F(ICMP6_RR_FLAGS_REQRESULT, "R"),
F(ICMP6_RR_FLAGS_FORCEAPPLY, "A"),
F(ICMP6_RR_FLAGS_SPECSITE, "S"),
F(ICMP6_RR_FLAGS_PREVDONE, "P")));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,"seg=%u,", rr6->rr_segnum));
ND_PRINT((ndo,"maxdelay=%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&rr6->rr_maxdelay)));
if (rr6->rr_reserved)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"rsvd=0x%x", EXTRACT_32BITS(&rr6->rr_reserved)));
/*[*/
ND_PRINT((ndo,"]"));
#undef F
}
if (rr6->rr_code == ICMP6_ROUTER_RENUMBERING_COMMAND) {
match = (const struct rr_pco_match *)cp;
cp = (const char *)(match + 1);
ND_TCHECK(match->rpm_prefix);
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"\n\t"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
ND_PRINT((ndo,"match(")); /*)*/
switch (match->rpm_code) {
case RPM_PCO_ADD: ND_PRINT((ndo,"add")); break;
case RPM_PCO_CHANGE: ND_PRINT((ndo,"change")); break;
case RPM_PCO_SETGLOBAL: ND_PRINT((ndo,"setglobal")); break;
default: ND_PRINT((ndo,"#%u", match->rpm_code)); break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,",ord=%u", match->rpm_ordinal));
ND_PRINT((ndo,",min=%u", match->rpm_minlen));
ND_PRINT((ndo,",max=%u", match->rpm_maxlen));
}
if (addrtostr6(&match->rpm_prefix, hbuf, sizeof(hbuf)))
ND_PRINT((ndo,",%s/%u", hbuf, match->rpm_matchlen));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo,",?/%u", match->rpm_matchlen));
/*(*/
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
n = match->rpm_len - 3;
if (n % 4)
goto trunc;
n /= 4;
while (n-- > 0) {
use = (const struct rr_pco_use *)cp;
cp = (const char *)(use + 1);
ND_TCHECK(use->rpu_prefix);
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"\n\t"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
ND_PRINT((ndo,"use(")); /*)*/
if (use->rpu_flags) {
#define F(x, y) ((use->rpu_flags) & (x) ? (y) : "")
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s%s,",
F(ICMP6_RR_PCOUSE_FLAGS_DECRVLTIME, "V"),
F(ICMP6_RR_PCOUSE_FLAGS_DECRPLTIME, "P")));
#undef F
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,"mask=0x%x,", use->rpu_ramask));
ND_PRINT((ndo,"raflags=0x%x,", use->rpu_raflags));
if (~use->rpu_vltime == 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"vltime=infty,"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo,"vltime=%u,",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&use->rpu_vltime)));
if (~use->rpu_pltime == 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"pltime=infty,"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo,"pltime=%u,",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&use->rpu_pltime)));
}
if (addrtostr6(&use->rpu_prefix, hbuf, sizeof(hbuf)))
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s/%u/%u", hbuf, use->rpu_uselen,
use->rpu_keeplen));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo,"?/%u/%u", use->rpu_uselen,
use->rpu_keeplen));
/*(*/
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
}
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"[|icmp6]"));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13041/ICMP6: Add more bounds checks.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kim Gwan Yeong.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static void pmcraid_internal_done(struct pmcraid_cmd *cmd)
{
pmcraid_info("response internal cmd CDB[0] = %x ioasc = %x\n",
cmd->ioa_cb->ioarcb.cdb[0],
le32_to_cpu(cmd->ioa_cb->ioasa.ioasc));
/* Some of the internal commands are sent with callers blocking for the
* response. Same will be indicated as part of cmd->completion_req
* field. Response path needs to wake up any waiters waiting for cmd
* completion if this flag is set.
*/
if (cmd->completion_req) {
cmd->completion_req = 0;
complete(&cmd->wait_for_completion);
}
/* most of the internal commands are completed by caller itself, so
* no need to return the command block back to free pool until we are
* required to do so (e.g once done with initialization).
*/
if (cmd->release) {
cmd->release = 0;
pmcraid_return_cmd(cmd);
}
}
Commit Message: [SCSI] pmcraid: reject negative request size
There's a code path in pmcraid that can be reached via device ioctl that
causes all sorts of ugliness, including heap corruption or triggering the
OOM killer due to consecutive allocation of large numbers of pages.
First, the user can call pmcraid_chr_ioctl(), with a type
PMCRAID_PASSTHROUGH_IOCTL. This calls through to
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough(). Next, a pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer
is copied in, and the request_size variable is set to
buffer->ioarcb.data_transfer_length, which is an arbitrary 32-bit
signed value provided by the user. If a negative value is provided
here, bad things can happen. For example,
pmcraid_build_passthrough_ioadls() is called with this request_size,
which immediately calls pmcraid_alloc_sglist() with a negative size.
The resulting math on allocating a scatter list can result in an
overflow in the kzalloc() call (if num_elem is 0, the sglist will be
smaller than expected), or if num_elem is unexpectedly large the
subsequent loop will call alloc_pages() repeatedly, a high number of
pages will be allocated and the OOM killer might be invoked.
It looks like preventing this value from being negative in
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough() would be sufficient.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void BaseMultipleFieldsDateAndTimeInputType::didBlurFromControl()
{
RefPtr<HTMLInputElement> protector(element());
element()->setFocus(false);
}
Commit Message: Fix reentrance of BaseMultipleFieldsDateAndTimeInputType::destroyShadowSubtree.
destroyShadowSubtree could dispatch 'blur' event unexpectedly because
element()->focused() had incorrect information. We make sure it has
correct information by checking if the UA shadow root contains the
focused element.
BUG=257353
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/19067004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@154086 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void *timers_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
{
struct timers_private *tp = m->private;
tp->task = get_pid_task(tp->pid, PIDTYPE_PID);
if (!tp->task)
return ERR_PTR(-ESRCH);
tp->sighand = lock_task_sighand(tp->task, &tp->flags);
if (!tp->sighand)
return ERR_PTR(-ESRCH);
return seq_list_start(&tp->task->signal->posix_timers, *pos);
}
Commit Message: proc: prevent accessing /proc/<PID>/environ until it's ready
If /proc/<PID>/environ gets read before the envp[] array is fully set up
in create_{aout,elf,elf_fdpic,flat}_tables(), we might end up trying to
read more bytes than are actually written, as env_start will already be
set but env_end will still be zero, making the range calculation
underflow, allowing to read beyond the end of what has been written.
Fix this as it is done for /proc/<PID>/cmdline by testing env_end for
zero. It is, apparently, intentionally set last in create_*_tables().
This bug was found by the PaX size_overflow plugin that detected the
arithmetic underflow of 'this_len = env_end - (env_start + src)' when
env_end is still zero.
The expected consequence is that userland trying to access
/proc/<PID>/environ of a not yet fully set up process may get
inconsistent data as we're in the middle of copying in the environment
variables.
Fixes: https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=4363
Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116461
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Cc: Emese Revfy <[email protected]>
Cc: Pax Team <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <[email protected]>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: PlatformSensor::PlatformSensor(mojom::SensorType type,
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping mapping,
PlatformSensorProvider* provider)
: task_runner_(base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()),
shared_buffer_mapping_(std::move(mapping)),
type_(type),
provider_(provider),
weak_factory_(this) {}
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607}
CWE ID: CWE-732
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: xmlParseStartTag2(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar **pref,
const xmlChar **URI, int *tlen) {
const xmlChar *localname;
const xmlChar *prefix;
const xmlChar *attname;
const xmlChar *aprefix;
const xmlChar *nsname;
xmlChar *attvalue;
const xmlChar **atts = ctxt->atts;
int maxatts = ctxt->maxatts;
int nratts, nbatts, nbdef;
int i, j, nbNs, attval, oldline, oldcol;
const xmlChar *base;
unsigned long cur;
int nsNr = ctxt->nsNr;
if (RAW != '<') return(NULL);
NEXT1;
/*
* NOTE: it is crucial with the SAX2 API to never call SHRINK beyond that
* point since the attribute values may be stored as pointers to
* the buffer and calling SHRINK would destroy them !
* The Shrinking is only possible once the full set of attribute
* callbacks have been done.
*/
reparse:
SHRINK;
base = ctxt->input->base;
cur = ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base;
oldline = ctxt->input->line;
oldcol = ctxt->input->col;
nbatts = 0;
nratts = 0;
nbdef = 0;
nbNs = 0;
attval = 0;
/* Forget any namespaces added during an earlier parse of this element. */
ctxt->nsNr = nsNr;
localname = xmlParseQName(ctxt, &prefix);
if (localname == NULL) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_REQUIRED,
"StartTag: invalid element name\n");
return(NULL);
}
*tlen = ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base - cur;
/*
* Now parse the attributes, it ends up with the ending
*
* (S Attribute)* S?
*/
SKIP_BLANKS;
GROW;
if (ctxt->input->base != base) goto base_changed;
while ((RAW != '>') &&
((RAW != '/') || (NXT(1) != '>')) &&
(IS_BYTE_CHAR(RAW))) {
const xmlChar *q = CUR_PTR;
unsigned int cons = ctxt->input->consumed;
int len = -1, alloc = 0;
attname = xmlParseAttribute2(ctxt, prefix, localname,
&aprefix, &attvalue, &len, &alloc);
if (ctxt->input->base != base) {
if ((attvalue != NULL) && (alloc != 0))
xmlFree(attvalue);
attvalue = NULL;
goto base_changed;
}
if ((attname != NULL) && (attvalue != NULL)) {
if (len < 0) len = xmlStrlen(attvalue);
if ((attname == ctxt->str_xmlns) && (aprefix == NULL)) {
const xmlChar *URL = xmlDictLookup(ctxt->dict, attvalue, len);
xmlURIPtr uri;
if (*URL != 0) {
uri = xmlParseURI((const char *) URL);
if (uri == NULL) {
xmlNsErr(ctxt, XML_WAR_NS_URI,
"xmlns: '%s' is not a valid URI\n",
URL, NULL, NULL);
} else {
if (uri->scheme == NULL) {
xmlNsWarn(ctxt, XML_WAR_NS_URI_RELATIVE,
"xmlns: URI %s is not absolute\n",
URL, NULL, NULL);
}
xmlFreeURI(uri);
}
if (URL == ctxt->str_xml_ns) {
if (attname != ctxt->str_xml) {
xmlNsErr(ctxt, XML_NS_ERR_XML_NAMESPACE,
"xml namespace URI cannot be the default namespace\n",
NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
goto skip_default_ns;
}
if ((len == 29) &&
(xmlStrEqual(URL,
BAD_CAST "http://www.w3.org/2000/xmlns/"))) {
xmlNsErr(ctxt, XML_NS_ERR_XML_NAMESPACE,
"reuse of the xmlns namespace name is forbidden\n",
NULL, NULL, NULL);
goto skip_default_ns;
}
}
/*
* check that it's not a defined namespace
*/
for (j = 1;j <= nbNs;j++)
if (ctxt->nsTab[ctxt->nsNr - 2 * j] == NULL)
break;
if (j <= nbNs)
xmlErrAttributeDup(ctxt, NULL, attname);
else
if (nsPush(ctxt, NULL, URL) > 0) nbNs++;
skip_default_ns:
if (alloc != 0) xmlFree(attvalue);
SKIP_BLANKS;
continue;
}
if (aprefix == ctxt->str_xmlns) {
const xmlChar *URL = xmlDictLookup(ctxt->dict, attvalue, len);
xmlURIPtr uri;
if (attname == ctxt->str_xml) {
if (URL != ctxt->str_xml_ns) {
xmlNsErr(ctxt, XML_NS_ERR_XML_NAMESPACE,
"xml namespace prefix mapped to wrong URI\n",
NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
/*
* Do not keep a namespace definition node
*/
goto skip_ns;
}
if (URL == ctxt->str_xml_ns) {
if (attname != ctxt->str_xml) {
xmlNsErr(ctxt, XML_NS_ERR_XML_NAMESPACE,
"xml namespace URI mapped to wrong prefix\n",
NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
goto skip_ns;
}
if (attname == ctxt->str_xmlns) {
xmlNsErr(ctxt, XML_NS_ERR_XML_NAMESPACE,
"redefinition of the xmlns prefix is forbidden\n",
NULL, NULL, NULL);
goto skip_ns;
}
if ((len == 29) &&
(xmlStrEqual(URL,
BAD_CAST "http://www.w3.org/2000/xmlns/"))) {
xmlNsErr(ctxt, XML_NS_ERR_XML_NAMESPACE,
"reuse of the xmlns namespace name is forbidden\n",
NULL, NULL, NULL);
goto skip_ns;
}
if ((URL == NULL) || (URL[0] == 0)) {
xmlNsErr(ctxt, XML_NS_ERR_XML_NAMESPACE,
"xmlns:%s: Empty XML namespace is not allowed\n",
attname, NULL, NULL);
goto skip_ns;
} else {
uri = xmlParseURI((const char *) URL);
if (uri == NULL) {
xmlNsErr(ctxt, XML_WAR_NS_URI,
"xmlns:%s: '%s' is not a valid URI\n",
attname, URL, NULL);
} else {
if ((ctxt->pedantic) && (uri->scheme == NULL)) {
xmlNsWarn(ctxt, XML_WAR_NS_URI_RELATIVE,
"xmlns:%s: URI %s is not absolute\n",
attname, URL, NULL);
}
xmlFreeURI(uri);
}
}
/*
* check that it's not a defined namespace
*/
for (j = 1;j <= nbNs;j++)
if (ctxt->nsTab[ctxt->nsNr - 2 * j] == attname)
break;
if (j <= nbNs)
xmlErrAttributeDup(ctxt, aprefix, attname);
else
if (nsPush(ctxt, attname, URL) > 0) nbNs++;
skip_ns:
if (alloc != 0) xmlFree(attvalue);
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (ctxt->input->base != base) goto base_changed;
continue;
}
/*
* Add the pair to atts
*/
if ((atts == NULL) || (nbatts + 5 > maxatts)) {
if (xmlCtxtGrowAttrs(ctxt, nbatts + 5) < 0) {
if (attvalue[len] == 0)
xmlFree(attvalue);
goto failed;
}
maxatts = ctxt->maxatts;
atts = ctxt->atts;
}
ctxt->attallocs[nratts++] = alloc;
atts[nbatts++] = attname;
atts[nbatts++] = aprefix;
atts[nbatts++] = NULL; /* the URI will be fetched later */
atts[nbatts++] = attvalue;
attvalue += len;
atts[nbatts++] = attvalue;
/*
* tag if some deallocation is needed
*/
if (alloc != 0) attval = 1;
} else {
if ((attvalue != NULL) && (attvalue[len] == 0))
xmlFree(attvalue);
}
failed:
GROW
if (ctxt->input->base != base) goto base_changed;
if ((RAW == '>') || (((RAW == '/') && (NXT(1) == '>'))))
break;
if (!IS_BLANK_CH(RAW)) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_SPACE_REQUIRED,
"attributes construct error\n");
break;
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
if ((cons == ctxt->input->consumed) && (q == CUR_PTR) &&
(attname == NULL) && (attvalue == NULL)) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"xmlParseStartTag: problem parsing attributes\n");
break;
}
GROW;
if (ctxt->input->base != base) goto base_changed;
}
/*
* The attributes defaulting
*/
if (ctxt->attsDefault != NULL) {
xmlDefAttrsPtr defaults;
defaults = xmlHashLookup2(ctxt->attsDefault, localname, prefix);
if (defaults != NULL) {
for (i = 0;i < defaults->nbAttrs;i++) {
attname = defaults->values[5 * i];
aprefix = defaults->values[5 * i + 1];
/*
* special work for namespaces defaulted defs
*/
if ((attname == ctxt->str_xmlns) && (aprefix == NULL)) {
/*
* check that it's not a defined namespace
*/
for (j = 1;j <= nbNs;j++)
if (ctxt->nsTab[ctxt->nsNr - 2 * j] == NULL)
break;
if (j <= nbNs) continue;
nsname = xmlGetNamespace(ctxt, NULL);
if (nsname != defaults->values[5 * i + 2]) {
if (nsPush(ctxt, NULL,
defaults->values[5 * i + 2]) > 0)
nbNs++;
}
} else if (aprefix == ctxt->str_xmlns) {
/*
* check that it's not a defined namespace
*/
for (j = 1;j <= nbNs;j++)
if (ctxt->nsTab[ctxt->nsNr - 2 * j] == attname)
break;
if (j <= nbNs) continue;
nsname = xmlGetNamespace(ctxt, attname);
if (nsname != defaults->values[2]) {
if (nsPush(ctxt, attname,
defaults->values[5 * i + 2]) > 0)
nbNs++;
}
} else {
/*
* check that it's not a defined attribute
*/
for (j = 0;j < nbatts;j+=5) {
if ((attname == atts[j]) && (aprefix == atts[j+1]))
break;
}
if (j < nbatts) continue;
if ((atts == NULL) || (nbatts + 5 > maxatts)) {
if (xmlCtxtGrowAttrs(ctxt, nbatts + 5) < 0) {
return(NULL);
}
maxatts = ctxt->maxatts;
atts = ctxt->atts;
}
atts[nbatts++] = attname;
atts[nbatts++] = aprefix;
if (aprefix == NULL)
atts[nbatts++] = NULL;
else
atts[nbatts++] = xmlGetNamespace(ctxt, aprefix);
atts[nbatts++] = defaults->values[5 * i + 2];
atts[nbatts++] = defaults->values[5 * i + 3];
if ((ctxt->standalone == 1) &&
(defaults->values[5 * i + 4] != NULL)) {
xmlValidityError(ctxt, XML_DTD_STANDALONE_DEFAULTED,
"standalone: attribute %s on %s defaulted from external subset\n",
attname, localname);
}
nbdef++;
}
}
}
}
/*
* The attributes checkings
*/
for (i = 0; i < nbatts;i += 5) {
/*
* The default namespace does not apply to attribute names.
*/
if (atts[i + 1] != NULL) {
nsname = xmlGetNamespace(ctxt, atts[i + 1]);
if (nsname == NULL) {
xmlNsErr(ctxt, XML_NS_ERR_UNDEFINED_NAMESPACE,
"Namespace prefix %s for %s on %s is not defined\n",
atts[i + 1], atts[i], localname);
}
atts[i + 2] = nsname;
} else
nsname = NULL;
/*
* [ WFC: Unique Att Spec ]
* No attribute name may appear more than once in the same
* start-tag or empty-element tag.
* As extended by the Namespace in XML REC.
*/
for (j = 0; j < i;j += 5) {
if (atts[i] == atts[j]) {
if (atts[i+1] == atts[j+1]) {
xmlErrAttributeDup(ctxt, atts[i+1], atts[i]);
break;
}
if ((nsname != NULL) && (atts[j + 2] == nsname)) {
xmlNsErr(ctxt, XML_NS_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_REDEFINED,
"Namespaced Attribute %s in '%s' redefined\n",
atts[i], nsname, NULL);
break;
}
}
}
}
nsname = xmlGetNamespace(ctxt, prefix);
if ((prefix != NULL) && (nsname == NULL)) {
xmlNsErr(ctxt, XML_NS_ERR_UNDEFINED_NAMESPACE,
"Namespace prefix %s on %s is not defined\n",
prefix, localname, NULL);
}
*pref = prefix;
*URI = nsname;
/*
* SAX: Start of Element !
*/
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (ctxt->sax->startElementNs != NULL) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX)) {
if (nbNs > 0)
ctxt->sax->startElementNs(ctxt->userData, localname, prefix,
nsname, nbNs, &ctxt->nsTab[ctxt->nsNr - 2 * nbNs],
nbatts / 5, nbdef, atts);
else
ctxt->sax->startElementNs(ctxt->userData, localname, prefix,
nsname, 0, NULL, nbatts / 5, nbdef, atts);
}
/*
* Free up attribute allocated strings if needed
*/
if (attval != 0) {
for (i = 3,j = 0; j < nratts;i += 5,j++)
if ((ctxt->attallocs[j] != 0) && (atts[i] != NULL))
xmlFree((xmlChar *) atts[i]);
}
return(localname);
base_changed:
/*
* the attribute strings are valid iif the base didn't changed
*/
if (attval != 0) {
for (i = 3,j = 0; j < nratts;i += 5,j++)
if ((ctxt->attallocs[j] != 0) && (atts[i] != NULL))
xmlFree((xmlChar *) atts[i]);
}
ctxt->input->cur = ctxt->input->base + cur;
ctxt->input->line = oldline;
ctxt->input->col = oldcol;
if (ctxt->wellFormed == 1) {
goto reparse;
}
return(NULL);
}
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: isofile_connect_hardlink_files(struct iso9660 *iso9660)
{
struct archive_rb_node *n;
struct hardlink *hl;
struct isofile *target, *nf;
ARCHIVE_RB_TREE_FOREACH(n, &(iso9660->hardlink_rbtree)) {
hl = (struct hardlink *)n;
/* The first entry must be a hardlink target. */
target = hl->file_list.first;
archive_entry_set_nlink(target->entry, hl->nlink);
/* Set a hardlink target to reference entries. */
for (nf = target->hlnext;
nf != NULL; nf = nf->hlnext) {
nf->hardlink_target = target;
archive_entry_set_nlink(nf->entry, hl->nlink);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Issue 711: Be more careful about verifying filename lengths when writing ISO9660 archives
* Don't cast size_t to int, since this can lead to overflow
on machines where sizeof(int) < sizeof(size_t)
* Check a + b > limit by writing it as
a > limit || b > limit || a + b > limit
to avoid problems when a + b wraps around.
CWE ID: CWE-190
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static bool ga_create_file(const char *path)
{
int fd = open(path, O_CREAT | O_WRONLY, S_IWUSR | S_IRUSR);
if (fd == -1) {
g_warning("unable to open/create file %s: %s", path, strerror(errno));
return false;
}
close(fd);
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestObj::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestObj::s_info);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 1)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
b* (tob(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
impl->convert2();
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: bool NavigationControllerImpl::IsRedirect(
const ViewHostMsg_FrameNavigate_Params& params) {
if (PageTransitionIsMainFrame(params.transition)) {
return PageTransitionIsRedirect(params.transition);
}
return params.redirects.size() > 1;
}
Commit Message: Delete unneeded pending entries in DidFailProvisionalLoad to prevent a spoof.
BUG=280512
BUG=278899
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23978003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@222146 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static void tcp_mtup_probe_success(struct sock *sk)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
/* FIXME: breaks with very large cwnd */
tp->prior_ssthresh = tcp_current_ssthresh(sk);
tp->snd_cwnd = tp->snd_cwnd *
tcp_mss_to_mtu(sk, tp->mss_cache) /
icsk->icsk_mtup.probe_size;
tp->snd_cwnd_cnt = 0;
tp->snd_cwnd_stamp = tcp_time_stamp;
tp->snd_ssthresh = tcp_current_ssthresh(sk);
icsk->icsk_mtup.search_low = icsk->icsk_mtup.probe_size;
icsk->icsk_mtup.probe_size = 0;
tcp_sync_mss(sk, icsk->icsk_pmtu_cookie);
NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPMTUPSUCCESS);
}
Commit Message: tcp: make challenge acks less predictable
Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS
(RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker
to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic
paper.
This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds
some randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack
sessions without spending a considerable amount of probes.
Based on initial analysis and patch from Linus.
Note that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting
to remove the host limit in the future.
v2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period.
Fixes: 282f23c6ee34 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2")
Reported-by: Yue Cao <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <[email protected]>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: UINT32 UIPC_Read(tUIPC_CH_ID ch_id, UINT16 *p_msg_evt, UINT8 *p_buf, UINT32 len)
{
int n;
int n_read = 0;
int fd = uipc_main.ch[ch_id].fd;
struct pollfd pfd;
UNUSED(p_msg_evt);
if (ch_id >= UIPC_CH_NUM)
{
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("UIPC_Read : invalid ch id %d", ch_id);
return 0;
}
if (fd == UIPC_DISCONNECTED)
{
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("UIPC_Read : channel %d closed", ch_id);
return 0;
}
while (n_read < (int)len)
{
pfd.fd = fd;
pfd.events = POLLIN|POLLHUP;
/* make sure there is data prior to attempting read to avoid blocking
a read for more than poll timeout */
if (poll(&pfd, 1, uipc_main.ch[ch_id].read_poll_tmo_ms) == 0)
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("poll timeout (%d ms)", uipc_main.ch[ch_id].read_poll_tmo_ms);
break;
}
if (pfd.revents & (POLLHUP|POLLNVAL) )
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("poll : channel detached remotely");
UIPC_LOCK();
uipc_close_locked(ch_id);
UIPC_UNLOCK();
return 0;
}
n = recv(fd, p_buf+n_read, len-n_read, 0);
if (n == 0)
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("UIPC_Read : channel detached remotely");
UIPC_LOCK();
uipc_close_locked(ch_id);
UIPC_UNLOCK();
return 0;
}
if (n < 0)
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("UIPC_Read : read failed (%s)", strerror(errno));
return 0;
}
n_read+=n;
}
return n_read;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void CreateSearchContextAndRequestSearchTerm(
const std::string& selected_text,
const base::string16& surrounding_text,
int start_offset,
int end_offset) {
test_context_ = new ContextualSearchContext(
selected_text, true, GURL(kSomeSpecificBasePage), "utf-8");
delegate_->set_context_for_testing(test_context_);
test_context_->start_offset = start_offset;
test_context_->end_offset = end_offset;
test_context_->surrounding_text = surrounding_text;
delegate_->ContinueSearchTermResolutionRequest();
fetcher_ = test_factory_.GetFetcherByID(
ContextualSearchDelegate::kContextualSearchURLFetcherID);
ASSERT_TRUE(fetcher_);
ASSERT_TRUE(fetcher());
}
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int ip_setup_cork(struct sock *sk, struct inet_cork *cork,
struct ipcm_cookie *ipc, struct rtable **rtp)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct ip_options *opt;
struct rtable *rt;
/*
* setup for corking.
*/
opt = ipc->opt;
if (opt) {
if (cork->opt == NULL) {
cork->opt = kmalloc(sizeof(struct ip_options) + 40,
sk->sk_allocation);
if (unlikely(cork->opt == NULL))
return -ENOBUFS;
}
memcpy(cork->opt, opt, sizeof(struct ip_options) + opt->optlen);
cork->flags |= IPCORK_OPT;
cork->addr = ipc->addr;
}
rt = *rtp;
if (unlikely(!rt))
return -EFAULT;
/*
* We steal reference to this route, caller should not release it
*/
*rtp = NULL;
cork->fragsize = inet->pmtudisc == IP_PMTUDISC_PROBE ?
rt->dst.dev->mtu : dst_mtu(rt->dst.path);
cork->dst = &rt->dst;
cork->length = 0;
cork->tx_flags = ipc->tx_flags;
cork->page = NULL;
cork->off = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static pngquant_error rwpng_read_image24_libpng(FILE *infile, png24_image *mainprog_ptr, int verbose)
{
png_structp png_ptr = NULL;
png_infop info_ptr = NULL;
png_size_t rowbytes;
int color_type, bit_depth;
png_ptr = png_create_read_struct(PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING, mainprog_ptr,
rwpng_error_handler, verbose ? rwpng_warning_stderr_handler : rwpng_warning_silent_handler);
if (!png_ptr) {
return PNG_OUT_OF_MEMORY_ERROR; /* out of memory */
}
info_ptr = png_create_info_struct(png_ptr);
if (!info_ptr) {
png_destroy_read_struct(&png_ptr, NULL, NULL);
return PNG_OUT_OF_MEMORY_ERROR; /* out of memory */
}
/* setjmp() must be called in every function that calls a non-trivial
* libpng function */
if (setjmp(mainprog_ptr->jmpbuf)) {
png_destroy_read_struct(&png_ptr, &info_ptr, NULL);
return LIBPNG_FATAL_ERROR; /* fatal libpng error (via longjmp()) */
}
#if defined(PNG_SKIP_sRGB_CHECK_PROFILE) && defined(PNG_SET_OPTION_SUPPORTED)
png_set_option(png_ptr, PNG_SKIP_sRGB_CHECK_PROFILE, PNG_OPTION_ON);
#endif
#if PNG_LIBPNG_VER >= 10500 && defined(PNG_UNKNOWN_CHUNKS_SUPPORTED)
/* copy standard chunks too */
png_set_keep_unknown_chunks(png_ptr, PNG_HANDLE_CHUNK_IF_SAFE, (png_const_bytep)"pHYs\0iTXt\0tEXt\0zTXt", 4);
#endif
png_set_read_user_chunk_fn(png_ptr, &mainprog_ptr->chunks, read_chunk_callback);
struct rwpng_read_data read_data = {infile, 0};
png_set_read_fn(png_ptr, &read_data, user_read_data);
png_read_info(png_ptr, info_ptr); /* read all PNG info up to image data */
/* alternatively, could make separate calls to png_get_image_width(),
* etc., but want bit_depth and color_type for later [don't care about
* compression_type and filter_type => NULLs] */
png_get_IHDR(png_ptr, info_ptr, &mainprog_ptr->width, &mainprog_ptr->height,
&bit_depth, &color_type, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (mainprog_ptr->width > INT_MAX/mainprog_ptr->height) {
png_destroy_read_struct(&png_ptr, &info_ptr, NULL);
return PNG_OUT_OF_MEMORY_ERROR; /* not quite true, but whatever */
}
/* expand palette images to RGB, low-bit-depth grayscale images to 8 bits,
* transparency chunks to full alpha channel; strip 16-bit-per-sample
* images to 8 bits per sample; and convert grayscale to RGB[A] */
/* GRR TO DO: preserve all safe-to-copy ancillary PNG chunks */
if (!(color_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_ALPHA)) {
#ifdef PNG_READ_FILLER_SUPPORTED
png_set_expand(png_ptr);
png_set_filler(png_ptr, 65535L, PNG_FILLER_AFTER);
#else
fprintf(stderr, "pngquant readpng: image is neither RGBA nor GA\n");
png_destroy_read_struct(&png_ptr, &info_ptr, NULL);
mainprog_ptr->retval = WRONG_INPUT_COLOR_TYPE;
return mainprog_ptr->retval;
#endif
}
if (bit_depth == 16) {
png_set_strip_16(png_ptr);
}
if (!(color_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR)) {
png_set_gray_to_rgb(png_ptr);
}
/* get source gamma for gamma correction, or use sRGB default */
double gamma = 0.45455;
if (png_get_valid(png_ptr, info_ptr, PNG_INFO_sRGB)) {
mainprog_ptr->input_color = RWPNG_SRGB;
mainprog_ptr->output_color = RWPNG_SRGB;
} else {
png_get_gAMA(png_ptr, info_ptr, &gamma);
if (gamma > 0 && gamma <= 1.0) {
mainprog_ptr->input_color = RWPNG_GAMA_ONLY;
mainprog_ptr->output_color = RWPNG_GAMA_ONLY;
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "pngquant readpng: ignored out-of-range gamma %f\n", gamma);
mainprog_ptr->input_color = RWPNG_NONE;
mainprog_ptr->output_color = RWPNG_NONE;
gamma = 0.45455;
}
}
mainprog_ptr->gamma = gamma;
png_set_interlace_handling(png_ptr);
/* all transformations have been registered; now update info_ptr data,
* get rowbytes and channels, and allocate image memory */
png_read_update_info(png_ptr, info_ptr);
rowbytes = png_get_rowbytes(png_ptr, info_ptr);
if ((mainprog_ptr->rgba_data = malloc(rowbytes * mainprog_ptr->height)) == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "pngquant readpng: unable to allocate image data\n");
png_destroy_read_struct(&png_ptr, &info_ptr, NULL);
return PNG_OUT_OF_MEMORY_ERROR;
}
png_bytepp row_pointers = rwpng_create_row_pointers(info_ptr, png_ptr, mainprog_ptr->rgba_data, mainprog_ptr->height, 0);
/* now we can go ahead and just read the whole image */
png_read_image(png_ptr, row_pointers);
/* and we're done! (png_read_end() can be omitted if no processing of
* post-IDAT text/time/etc. is desired) */
png_read_end(png_ptr, NULL);
#if USE_LCMS
#if PNG_LIBPNG_VER < 10500
png_charp ProfileData;
#else
png_bytep ProfileData;
#endif
png_uint_32 ProfileLen;
cmsHPROFILE hInProfile = NULL;
/* color_type is read from the image before conversion to RGBA */
int COLOR_PNG = color_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR;
/* embedded ICC profile */
if (png_get_iCCP(png_ptr, info_ptr, &(png_charp){0}, &(int){0}, &ProfileData, &ProfileLen)) {
hInProfile = cmsOpenProfileFromMem(ProfileData, ProfileLen);
cmsColorSpaceSignature colorspace = cmsGetColorSpace(hInProfile);
/* only RGB (and GRAY) valid for PNGs */
if (colorspace == cmsSigRgbData && COLOR_PNG) {
mainprog_ptr->input_color = RWPNG_ICCP;
mainprog_ptr->output_color = RWPNG_SRGB;
} else {
if (colorspace == cmsSigGrayData && !COLOR_PNG) {
mainprog_ptr->input_color = RWPNG_ICCP_WARN_GRAY;
mainprog_ptr->output_color = RWPNG_SRGB;
}
cmsCloseProfile(hInProfile);
hInProfile = NULL;
}
}
/* build RGB profile from cHRM and gAMA */
if (hInProfile == NULL && COLOR_PNG &&
!png_get_valid(png_ptr, info_ptr, PNG_INFO_sRGB) &&
png_get_valid(png_ptr, info_ptr, PNG_INFO_gAMA) &&
png_get_valid(png_ptr, info_ptr, PNG_INFO_cHRM)) {
cmsCIExyY WhitePoint;
cmsCIExyYTRIPLE Primaries;
png_get_cHRM(png_ptr, info_ptr, &WhitePoint.x, &WhitePoint.y,
&Primaries.Red.x, &Primaries.Red.y,
&Primaries.Green.x, &Primaries.Green.y,
&Primaries.Blue.x, &Primaries.Blue.y);
WhitePoint.Y = Primaries.Red.Y = Primaries.Green.Y = Primaries.Blue.Y = 1.0;
cmsToneCurve *GammaTable[3];
GammaTable[0] = GammaTable[1] = GammaTable[2] = cmsBuildGamma(NULL, 1/gamma);
hInProfile = cmsCreateRGBProfile(&WhitePoint, &Primaries, GammaTable);
cmsFreeToneCurve(GammaTable[0]);
mainprog_ptr->input_color = RWPNG_GAMA_CHRM;
mainprog_ptr->output_color = RWPNG_SRGB;
}
/* transform image to sRGB colorspace */
if (hInProfile != NULL) {
cmsHPROFILE hOutProfile = cmsCreate_sRGBProfile();
cmsHTRANSFORM hTransform = cmsCreateTransform(hInProfile, TYPE_RGBA_8,
hOutProfile, TYPE_RGBA_8,
INTENT_PERCEPTUAL,
omp_get_max_threads() > 1 ? cmsFLAGS_NOCACHE : 0);
#pragma omp parallel for \
if (mainprog_ptr->height*mainprog_ptr->width > 8000) \
schedule(static)
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < mainprog_ptr->height; i++) {
/* It is safe to use the same block for input and output,
when both are of the same TYPE. */
cmsDoTransform(hTransform, row_pointers[i],
row_pointers[i],
mainprog_ptr->width);
}
cmsDeleteTransform(hTransform);
cmsCloseProfile(hOutProfile);
cmsCloseProfile(hInProfile);
mainprog_ptr->gamma = 0.45455;
}
#endif
png_destroy_read_struct(&png_ptr, &info_ptr, NULL);
mainprog_ptr->file_size = read_data.bytes_read;
mainprog_ptr->row_pointers = (unsigned char **)row_pointers;
return SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow in rwpng.h (CVE-2016-5735)
Reported by Choi Jaeseung
Found with Sparrow (http://ropas.snu.ac.kr/sparrow)
CWE ID: CWE-190
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: bool RenderFlexibleBox::isMultiline() const
{
return style()->flexWrap() != FlexNoWrap;
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int nr_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t size, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sockaddr_ax25 *sax = (struct sockaddr_ax25 *)msg->msg_name;
size_t copied;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int er;
/*
* This works for seqpacket too. The receiver has ordered the queue for
* us! We do one quick check first though
*/
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED) {
release_sock(sk);
return -ENOTCONN;
}
/* Now we can treat all alike */
if ((skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags & ~MSG_DONTWAIT, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &er)) == NULL) {
release_sock(sk);
return er;
}
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
copied = skb->len;
if (copied > size) {
copied = size;
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
}
er = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (er < 0) {
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
release_sock(sk);
return er;
}
if (sax != NULL) {
memset(sax, 0, sizeof(*sax));
sax->sax25_family = AF_NETROM;
skb_copy_from_linear_data_offset(skb, 7, sax->sax25_call.ax25_call,
AX25_ADDR_LEN);
}
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(*sax);
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
release_sock(sk);
return copied;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: int read_header_tga(gdIOCtx *ctx, oTga *tga)
{
unsigned char header[18];
if (gdGetBuf(header, sizeof(header), ctx) < 18) {
gd_error("fail to read header");
return -1;
}
tga->identsize = header[0];
tga->colormaptype = header[1];
tga->imagetype = header[2];
tga->colormapstart = header[3] + (header[4] << 8);
tga->colormaplength = header[5] + (header[6] << 8);
tga->colormapbits = header[7];
tga->xstart = header[8] + (header[9] << 8);
tga->ystart = header[10] + (header[11] << 8);
tga->width = header[12] + (header[13] << 8);
tga->height = header[14] + (header[15] << 8);
tga->bits = header[16];
tga->alphabits = header[17] & 0x0f;
tga->fliph = (header[17] & 0x10) ? 1 : 0;
tga->flipv = (header[17] & 0x20) ? 0 : 1;
#if DEBUG
printf("format bps: %i\n", tga->bits);
printf("flip h/v: %i / %i\n", tga->fliph, tga->flipv);
printf("alpha: %i\n", tga->alphabits);
printf("wxh: %i %i\n", tga->width, tga->height);
#endif
switch(tga->bits) {
case 8:
case 16:
case 24:
case 32:
break;
default:
gd_error("bps %i not supported", tga->bits);
return -1;
break;
}
tga->ident = NULL;
if (tga->identsize > 0) {
tga->ident = (char *) gdMalloc(tga->identsize * sizeof(char));
if(tga->ident == NULL) {
return -1;
}
gdGetBuf(tga->ident, tga->identsize, ctx);
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Unsupported TGA bpp/alphabit combinations should error gracefully
Currently, only 24bpp without alphabits and 32bpp with 8 alphabits are
really supported. All other combinations will be rejected with a warning.
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: bool LayerTreeHostImpl::IsUIResourceOpaque(UIResourceId uid) const {
UIResourceMap::const_iterator iter = ui_resource_map_.find(uid);
DCHECK(iter != ui_resource_map_.end());
return iter->second.opaque;
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
[email protected], [email protected]
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static void ide_dummy_transfer_stop(IDEState *s)
{
s->data_ptr = s->io_buffer;
s->data_end = s->io_buffer;
s->io_buffer[0] = 0xff;
s->io_buffer[1] = 0xff;
s->io_buffer[2] = 0xff;
s->io_buffer[3] = 0xff;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: size_t NormalPage::objectPayloadSizeForTesting() {
size_t objectPayloadSize = 0;
Address headerAddress = payload();
markAsSwept();
ASSERT(headerAddress != payloadEnd());
do {
HeapObjectHeader* header =
reinterpret_cast<HeapObjectHeader*>(headerAddress);
if (!header->isFree()) {
ASSERT(header->checkHeader());
objectPayloadSize += header->payloadSize();
}
ASSERT(header->size() < blinkPagePayloadSize());
headerAddress += header->size();
ASSERT(headerAddress <= payloadEnd());
} while (headerAddress < payloadEnd());
return objectPayloadSize;
}
Commit Message: Call HeapObjectHeader::checkHeader solely for its side-effect.
This requires changing its signature. This is a preliminary stage to making it
private.
BUG=633030
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2698673003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#460489}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int lua_apr_sha1(lua_State *L)
{
unsigned char digest[APR_SHA1_DIGESTSIZE];
apr_sha1_ctx_t sha1;
const char *buffer;
char *result;
size_t len;
request_rec *r;
r = ap_lua_check_request_rec(L, 1);
luaL_checktype(L, 2, LUA_TSTRING);
result = apr_pcalloc(r->pool, sizeof(digest) * 2 + 1);
buffer = lua_tolstring(L, 2, &len);
apr_sha1_init(&sha1);
apr_sha1_update(&sha1, buffer, len);
apr_sha1_final(digest, &sha1);
ap_bin2hex(digest, sizeof(digest), result);
lua_pushstring(L, result);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0228 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: A maliciously crafted websockets PING after a script
calls r:wsupgrade() can cause a child process crash.
[Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Discovered by Guido Vranken <guidovranken gmail.com>
Submitted by: Edward Lu
Committed by: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1657261 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void CMSEXPORT cmsDictFree(cmsHANDLE hDict)
{
_cmsDICT* dict = (_cmsDICT*) hDict;
cmsDICTentry *entry, *next;
_cmsAssert(dict != NULL);
entry = dict ->head;
while (entry != NULL) {
if (entry ->DisplayName != NULL) cmsMLUfree(entry ->DisplayName);
if (entry ->DisplayValue != NULL) cmsMLUfree(entry ->DisplayValue);
if (entry ->Name != NULL) _cmsFree(dict ->ContextID, entry -> Name);
if (entry ->Value != NULL) _cmsFree(dict ->ContextID, entry -> Value);
next = entry ->Next;
_cmsFree(dict ->ContextID, entry);
entry = next;
}
_cmsFree(dict ->ContextID, dict);
}
Commit Message: Non happy-path fixes
CWE ID:
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void ZLIB_INTERNAL inflate_fast(strm, start)
z_streamp strm;
unsigned start; /* inflate()'s starting value for strm->avail_out */
{
struct inflate_state FAR *state;
z_const unsigned char FAR *in; /* local strm->next_in */
z_const unsigned char FAR *last; /* have enough input while in < last */
unsigned char FAR *out; /* local strm->next_out */
unsigned char FAR *beg; /* inflate()'s initial strm->next_out */
unsigned char FAR *end; /* while out < end, enough space available */
#ifdef INFLATE_STRICT
unsigned dmax; /* maximum distance from zlib header */
#endif
unsigned wsize; /* window size or zero if not using window */
unsigned whave; /* valid bytes in the window */
unsigned wnext; /* window write index */
unsigned char FAR *window; /* allocated sliding window, if wsize != 0 */
unsigned long hold; /* local strm->hold */
unsigned bits; /* local strm->bits */
code const FAR *lcode; /* local strm->lencode */
code const FAR *dcode; /* local strm->distcode */
unsigned lmask; /* mask for first level of length codes */
unsigned dmask; /* mask for first level of distance codes */
code here; /* retrieved table entry */
unsigned op; /* code bits, operation, extra bits, or */
/* window position, window bytes to copy */
unsigned len; /* match length, unused bytes */
unsigned dist; /* match distance */
unsigned char FAR *from; /* where to copy match from */
/* copy state to local variables */
state = (struct inflate_state FAR *)strm->state;
in = strm->next_in - OFF;
last = in + (strm->avail_in - 5);
out = strm->next_out - OFF;
beg = out - (start - strm->avail_out);
end = out + (strm->avail_out - 257);
#ifdef INFLATE_STRICT
dmax = state->dmax;
#endif
wsize = state->wsize;
whave = state->whave;
wnext = state->wnext;
window = state->window;
hold = state->hold;
bits = state->bits;
lcode = state->lencode;
dcode = state->distcode;
lmask = (1U << state->lenbits) - 1;
dmask = (1U << state->distbits) - 1;
/* decode literals and length/distances until end-of-block or not enough
input data or output space */
do {
if (bits < 15) {
hold += (unsigned long)(PUP(in)) << bits;
bits += 8;
hold += (unsigned long)(PUP(in)) << bits;
bits += 8;
}
here = lcode[hold & lmask];
dolen:
op = (unsigned)(here.bits);
hold >>= op;
bits -= op;
op = (unsigned)(here.op);
if (op == 0) { /* literal */
Tracevv((stderr, here.val >= 0x20 && here.val < 0x7f ?
"inflate: literal '%c'\n" :
"inflate: literal 0x%02x\n", here.val));
PUP(out) = (unsigned char)(here.val);
}
else if (op & 16) { /* length base */
len = (unsigned)(here.val);
op &= 15; /* number of extra bits */
if (op) {
if (bits < op) {
hold += (unsigned long)(PUP(in)) << bits;
bits += 8;
}
len += (unsigned)hold & ((1U << op) - 1);
hold >>= op;
bits -= op;
}
Tracevv((stderr, "inflate: length %u\n", len));
if (bits < 15) {
hold += (unsigned long)(PUP(in)) << bits;
bits += 8;
hold += (unsigned long)(PUP(in)) << bits;
bits += 8;
}
here = dcode[hold & dmask];
dodist:
op = (unsigned)(here.bits);
hold >>= op;
bits -= op;
op = (unsigned)(here.op);
if (op & 16) { /* distance base */
dist = (unsigned)(here.val);
op &= 15; /* number of extra bits */
if (bits < op) {
hold += (unsigned long)(PUP(in)) << bits;
bits += 8;
if (bits < op) {
hold += (unsigned long)(PUP(in)) << bits;
bits += 8;
}
}
dist += (unsigned)hold & ((1U << op) - 1);
#ifdef INFLATE_STRICT
if (dist > dmax) {
strm->msg = (char *)"invalid distance too far back";
state->mode = BAD;
break;
}
#endif
hold >>= op;
bits -= op;
Tracevv((stderr, "inflate: distance %u\n", dist));
op = (unsigned)(out - beg); /* max distance in output */
if (dist > op) { /* see if copy from window */
op = dist - op; /* distance back in window */
if (op > whave) {
if (state->sane) {
strm->msg =
(char *)"invalid distance too far back";
state->mode = BAD;
break;
}
#ifdef INFLATE_ALLOW_INVALID_DISTANCE_TOOFAR_ARRR
if (len <= op - whave) {
do {
PUP(out) = 0;
} while (--len);
continue;
}
len -= op - whave;
do {
PUP(out) = 0;
} while (--op > whave);
if (op == 0) {
from = out - dist;
do {
PUP(out) = PUP(from);
} while (--len);
continue;
}
#endif
}
from = window - OFF;
if (wnext == 0) { /* very common case */
from += wsize - op;
if (op < len) { /* some from window */
len -= op;
do {
PUP(out) = PUP(from);
} while (--op);
from = out - dist; /* rest from output */
}
}
else if (wnext < op) { /* wrap around window */
from += wsize + wnext - op;
op -= wnext;
if (op < len) { /* some from end of window */
len -= op;
do {
PUP(out) = PUP(from);
} while (--op);
from = window - OFF;
if (wnext < len) { /* some from start of window */
op = wnext;
len -= op;
do {
PUP(out) = PUP(from);
} while (--op);
from = out - dist; /* rest from output */
}
}
}
else { /* contiguous in window */
from += wnext - op;
if (op < len) { /* some from window */
len -= op;
do {
PUP(out) = PUP(from);
} while (--op);
from = out - dist; /* rest from output */
}
}
while (len > 2) {
PUP(out) = PUP(from);
PUP(out) = PUP(from);
PUP(out) = PUP(from);
len -= 3;
}
if (len) {
PUP(out) = PUP(from);
if (len > 1)
PUP(out) = PUP(from);
}
}
else {
from = out - dist; /* copy direct from output */
do { /* minimum length is three */
PUP(out) = PUP(from);
PUP(out) = PUP(from);
PUP(out) = PUP(from);
len -= 3;
} while (len > 2);
if (len) {
PUP(out) = PUP(from);
if (len > 1)
PUP(out) = PUP(from);
}
}
}
else if ((op & 64) == 0) { /* 2nd level distance code */
here = dcode[here.val + (hold & ((1U << op) - 1))];
goto dodist;
}
else {
strm->msg = (char *)"invalid distance code";
state->mode = BAD;
break;
}
}
else if ((op & 64) == 0) { /* 2nd level length code */
here = lcode[here.val + (hold & ((1U << op) - 1))];
goto dolen;
}
else if (op & 32) { /* end-of-block */
Tracevv((stderr, "inflate: end of block\n"));
state->mode = TYPE;
break;
}
else {
strm->msg = (char *)"invalid literal/length code";
state->mode = BAD;
break;
}
} while (in < last && out < end);
/* return unused bytes (on entry, bits < 8, so in won't go too far back) */
len = bits >> 3;
in -= len;
bits -= len << 3;
hold &= (1U << bits) - 1;
/* update state and return */
strm->next_in = in + OFF;
strm->next_out = out + OFF;
strm->avail_in = (unsigned)(in < last ? 5 + (last - in) : 5 - (in - last));
strm->avail_out = (unsigned)(out < end ?
257 + (end - out) : 257 - (out - end));
state->hold = hold;
state->bits = bits;
return;
}
Commit Message: Use post-increment only in inffast.c.
An old inffast.c optimization turns out to not be optimal anymore
with modern compilers, and furthermore was not compliant with the
C standard, for which decrementing a pointer before its allocated
memory is undefined. Per the recommendation of a security audit of
the zlib code by Trail of Bits and TrustInSoft, in support of the
Mozilla Foundation, this "optimization" was removed, in order to
avoid the possibility of undefined behavior.
CWE ID: CWE-189
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void *dn_socket_seq_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *pos)
{
return *pos ? dn_socket_get_idx(seq, *pos - 1) : SEQ_START_TOKEN;
}
Commit Message: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: swabHorAcc32(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
uint32* wp = (uint32*) cp0;
tmsize_t wc = cc / 4;
TIFFSwabArrayOfLong(wp, wc);
horAcc32(tif, cp0, cc);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predict.h, libtiff/tif_predict.c:
Replace assertions by runtime checks to avoid assertions in debug mode,
or buffer overflows in release mode. Can happen when dealing with
unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105
by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations
team.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void Microtask::performCheckpoint()
{
v8::Isolate* isolate = v8::Isolate::GetCurrent();
V8PerIsolateData* isolateData = V8PerIsolateData::from(isolate);
ASSERT(isolateData);
if (isolateData->recursionLevel() || isolateData->performingMicrotaskCheckpoint() || isolateData->destructionPending() || ScriptForbiddenScope::isScriptForbidden())
return;
isolateData->setPerformingMicrotaskCheckpoint(true);
{
V8RecursionScope recursionScope(isolate);
isolate->RunMicrotasks();
}
isolateData->setPerformingMicrotaskCheckpoint(false);
}
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-254
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: bool isAllowedByAll(const CSPDirectiveListVector& policies,
const CSPHashValue& hashValue,
ContentSecurityPolicy::InlineType type) {
bool isAllowed = true;
for (const auto& policy : policies)
isAllowed &= (policy.get()->*allowed)(hashValue, type);
return isAllowed;
}
Commit Message: CSP: Strip the fragment from reported URLs.
We should have been stripping the fragment from the URL we report for
CSP violations, but we weren't. Now we are, by running the URLs through
`stripURLForUseInReport()`, which implements the stripping algorithm
from CSP2: https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#strip-uri-for-reporting
Eventually, we will migrate more completely to the CSP3 world that
doesn't require such detailed stripping, as it exposes less data to the
reports, but we're not there yet.
BUG=678776
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2619783002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#458045}
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: ContentEncoding::ContentEncoding()
: compression_entries_(NULL),
compression_entries_end_(NULL),
encryption_entries_(NULL),
encryption_entries_end_(NULL),
encoding_order_(0),
encoding_scope_(1),
encoding_type_(0) {
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static BlockAIOCB *iscsi_aio_ioctl(BlockDriverState *bs,
unsigned long int req, void *buf,
BlockCompletionFunc *cb, void *opaque)
{
IscsiLun *iscsilun = bs->opaque;
struct iscsi_context *iscsi = iscsilun->iscsi;
struct iscsi_data data;
IscsiAIOCB *acb;
acb = qemu_aio_get(&iscsi_aiocb_info, bs, cb, opaque);
acb->iscsilun = iscsilun;
acb->bh = NULL;
acb->status = -EINPROGRESS;
acb->buf = NULL;
acb->ioh = buf;
if (req != SG_IO) {
iscsi_ioctl_handle_emulated(acb, req, buf);
return &acb->common;
}
acb->task = malloc(sizeof(struct scsi_task));
if (acb->task == NULL) {
error_report("iSCSI: Failed to allocate task for scsi command. %s",
case SG_DXFER_TO_DEV:
acb->task->xfer_dir = SCSI_XFER_WRITE;
break;
case SG_DXFER_FROM_DEV:
acb->task->xfer_dir = SCSI_XFER_READ;
break;
default:
acb->task->xfer_dir = SCSI_XFER_NONE;
break;
}
acb->task->cdb_size = acb->ioh->cmd_len;
memcpy(&acb->task->cdb[0], acb->ioh->cmdp, acb->ioh->cmd_len);
acb->task->expxferlen = acb->ioh->dxfer_len;
data.size = 0;
if (acb->task->xfer_dir == SCSI_XFER_WRITE) {
if (acb->ioh->iovec_count == 0) {
data.data = acb->ioh->dxferp;
data.size = acb->ioh->dxfer_len;
} else {
scsi_task_set_iov_out(acb->task,
(struct scsi_iovec *) acb->ioh->dxferp,
acb->ioh->iovec_count);
}
}
if (iscsi_scsi_command_async(iscsi, iscsilun->lun, acb->task,
iscsi_aio_ioctl_cb,
(data.size > 0) ? &data : NULL,
acb) != 0) {
scsi_free_scsi_task(acb->task);
qemu_aio_unref(acb);
return NULL;
}
/* tell libiscsi to read straight into the buffer we got from ioctl */
if (acb->task->xfer_dir == SCSI_XFER_READ) {
if (acb->ioh->iovec_count == 0) {
scsi_task_add_data_in_buffer(acb->task,
acb->ioh->dxfer_len,
acb->ioh->dxferp);
} else {
scsi_task_set_iov_in(acb->task,
(struct scsi_iovec *) acb->ioh->dxferp,
acb->ioh->iovec_count);
}
}
iscsi_set_events(iscsilun);
return &acb->common;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void free_rootdomain(struct root_domain *rd)
{
synchronize_sched();
cpupri_cleanup(&rd->cpupri);
free_cpumask_var(rd->rto_mask);
free_cpumask_var(rd->online);
free_cpumask_var(rd->span);
kfree(rd);
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
LKML-Reference: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: setElementTypePrefix(XML_Parser parser, ELEMENT_TYPE *elementType)
{
DTD * const dtd = parser->m_dtd; /* save one level of indirection */
const XML_Char *name;
for (name = elementType->name; *name; name++) {
if (*name == XML_T(ASCII_COLON)) {
PREFIX *prefix;
const XML_Char *s;
for (s = elementType->name; s != name; s++) {
if (!poolAppendChar(&dtd->pool, *s))
return 0;
}
if (!poolAppendChar(&dtd->pool, XML_T('\0')))
return 0;
prefix = (PREFIX *)lookup(parser, &dtd->prefixes, poolStart(&dtd->pool),
sizeof(PREFIX));
if (!prefix)
return 0;
if (prefix->name == poolStart(&dtd->pool))
poolFinish(&dtd->pool);
else
poolDiscard(&dtd->pool);
elementType->prefix = prefix;
}
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Fix extraction of namespace prefix from XML name (#186)
CWE ID: CWE-611
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: smb_flush_file(struct smb_request *sr, struct smb_ofile *ofile)
{
sr->user_cr = smb_ofile_getcred(ofile);
if ((ofile->f_node->flags & NODE_FLAGS_WRITE_THROUGH) == 0)
(void) smb_fsop_commit(sr, sr->user_cr, ofile->f_node);
}
Commit Message: 7483 SMB flush on pipe triggers NULL pointer dereference in module smbsrv
Reviewed by: Gordon Ross <[email protected]>
Reviewed by: Matt Barden <[email protected]>
Reviewed by: Evan Layton <[email protected]>
Reviewed by: Dan McDonald <[email protected]>
Approved by: Gordon Ross <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: Document& DocumentThreadableLoader::document() const
{
ASSERT(m_document);
return *m_document;
}
Commit Message: DocumentThreadableLoader: Add guards for sync notifyFinished() in setResource()
In loadRequest(), setResource() can call clear() synchronously:
DocumentThreadableLoader::clear()
DocumentThreadableLoader::handleError()
Resource::didAddClient()
RawResource::didAddClient()
and thus |m_client| can be null while resource() isn't null after setResource(),
causing crashes (Issue 595964).
This CL checks whether |*this| is destructed and
whether |m_client| is null after setResource().
BUG=595964
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1902683002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#391001}
CWE ID: CWE-189
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: bool AppCacheBackendImpl::MarkAsForeignEntry(
int host_id,
const GURL& document_url,
int64 cache_document_was_loaded_from) {
AppCacheHost* host = GetHost(host_id);
if (!host)
return false;
host->MarkAsForeignEntry(document_url, cache_document_was_loaded_from);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix possible map::end() dereference in AppCacheUpdateJob triggered by a compromised renderer.
BUG=551044
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1418783005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#358815}
CWE ID:
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void ChromeOSCancelHandwriting(InputMethodStatusConnection* connection,
int n_strokes) {
g_return_if_fail(connection);
connection->CancelHandwriting(n_strokes);
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static struct fpm_child_s *fpm_child_alloc() /* {{{ */
{
struct fpm_child_s *ret;
ret = malloc(sizeof(struct fpm_child_s));
if (!ret) {
return 0;
}
memset(ret, 0, sizeof(*ret));
ret->scoreboard_i = -1;
return ret;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fixed bug #73342
Directly listen on socket, instead of duping it to STDIN and
listening on that.
CWE ID: CWE-400
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void SerializedScriptValue::transferArrayBuffers(v8::Isolate* isolate, const ArrayBufferArray& arrayBuffers, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
if (!arrayBuffers.size())
return;
for (size_t i = 0; i < arrayBuffers.size(); ++i) {
if (arrayBuffers[i]->isNeutered()) {
exceptionState.throwDOMException(DataCloneError, "ArrayBuffer at index " + String::number(i) + " is already neutered.");
return;
}
}
OwnPtr<ArrayBufferContentsArray> contents = adoptPtr(new ArrayBufferContentsArray(arrayBuffers.size()));
HeapHashSet<Member<DOMArrayBufferBase>> visited;
for (size_t i = 0; i < arrayBuffers.size(); ++i) {
if (visited.contains(arrayBuffers[i]))
continue;
visited.add(arrayBuffers[i]);
if (arrayBuffers[i]->isShared()) {
bool result = arrayBuffers[i]->shareContentsWith(contents->at(i));
if (!result) {
exceptionState.throwDOMException(DataCloneError, "SharedArrayBuffer at index " + String::number(i) + " could not be transferred.");
return;
}
} else {
Vector<v8::Local<v8::ArrayBuffer>, 4> bufferHandles;
v8::HandleScope handleScope(isolate);
acculumateArrayBuffersForAllWorlds(isolate, static_cast<DOMArrayBuffer*>(arrayBuffers[i].get()), bufferHandles);
bool isNeuterable = true;
for (size_t j = 0; j < bufferHandles.size(); ++j)
isNeuterable &= bufferHandles[j]->IsNeuterable();
DOMArrayBufferBase* toTransfer = arrayBuffers[i];
if (!isNeuterable)
toTransfer = DOMArrayBuffer::create(arrayBuffers[i]->buffer());
bool result = toTransfer->transfer(contents->at(i));
if (!result) {
exceptionState.throwDOMException(DataCloneError, "ArrayBuffer at index " + String::number(i) + " could not be transferred.");
return;
}
if (isNeuterable)
for (size_t j = 0; j < bufferHandles.size(); ++j)
bufferHandles[j]->Neuter();
}
}
m_arrayBufferContentsArray = contents.release();
}
Commit Message: When we can't neuter ArrayBuffers, we can't transfer them
Instead, we need to copy
BUG=603987
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1904913002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#388719}
CWE ID:
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int sdp_parse_fmtp_config_h264(AVFormatContext *s,
AVStream *stream,
PayloadContext *h264_data,
const char *attr, const char *value)
{
AVCodecParameters *par = stream->codecpar;
if (!strcmp(attr, "packetization-mode")) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "RTP Packetization Mode: %d\n", atoi(value));
h264_data->packetization_mode = atoi(value);
/*
* Packetization Mode:
* 0 or not present: Single NAL mode (Only nals from 1-23 are allowed)
* 1: Non-interleaved Mode: 1-23, 24 (STAP-A), 28 (FU-A) are allowed.
* 2: Interleaved Mode: 25 (STAP-B), 26 (MTAP16), 27 (MTAP24), 28 (FU-A),
* and 29 (FU-B) are allowed.
*/
if (h264_data->packetization_mode > 1)
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Interleaved RTP mode is not supported yet.\n");
} else if (!strcmp(attr, "profile-level-id")) {
if (strlen(value) == 6)
parse_profile_level_id(s, h264_data, value);
} else if (!strcmp(attr, "sprop-parameter-sets")) {
int ret;
if (value[strlen(value) - 1] == ',') {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Missing PPS in sprop-parameter-sets, ignoring\n");
return 0;
}
par->extradata_size = 0;
av_freep(&par->extradata);
ret = ff_h264_parse_sprop_parameter_sets(s, &par->extradata,
&par->extradata_size, value);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Extradata set to %p (size: %d)\n",
par->extradata, par->extradata_size);
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/rtpdec_h264: Fix heap-buffer-overflow
Fixes: rtp_sdp/poc.sdp
Found-by: Bingchang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void _WM_do_meta_smpteoffset(struct _mdi *mdi, struct _event_data *data) {
/* placeholder function so we can record tempo in the event stream
* for conversion function _WM_Event2Midi */
#ifdef DEBUG_MIDI
uint8_t ch = data->channel;
MIDI_EVENT_DEBUG(__FUNCTION__, ch, data->data.value);
#else
UNUSED(data);
#endif
UNUSED(mdi);
return;
}
Commit Message: Add a new size parameter to _WM_SetupMidiEvent() so that it knows
where to stop reading, and adjust its users properly. Fixes bug #175
(CVE-2017-11661, CVE-2017-11662, CVE-2017-11663, CVE-2017-11664.)
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: int fixup_user_fault(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm,
unsigned long address, unsigned int fault_flags)
{
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
int ret;
vma = find_extend_vma(mm, address);
if (!vma || address < vma->vm_start)
return -EFAULT;
ret = handle_mm_fault(mm, vma, address, fault_flags);
if (ret & VM_FAULT_ERROR) {
if (ret & VM_FAULT_OOM)
return -ENOMEM;
if (ret & (VM_FAULT_HWPOISON | VM_FAULT_HWPOISON_LARGE))
return -EHWPOISON;
if (ret & VM_FAULT_SIGBUS)
return -EFAULT;
BUG();
}
if (tsk) {
if (ret & VM_FAULT_MAJOR)
tsk->maj_flt++;
else
tsk->min_flt++;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[[email protected]: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Jones <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Salter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> methodCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestMediaQueryListListener.method");
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
TestMediaQueryListListener* imp = V8TestMediaQueryListListener::toNative(args.Holder());
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(RefPtr<MediaQueryListListener>, listener, MediaQueryListListener::create(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
imp->method(listener);
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: Color Document::themeColor() const
{
for (HTMLMetaElement* metaElement = head() ? Traversal<HTMLMetaElement>::firstChild(*head()) : 0; metaElement; metaElement = Traversal<HTMLMetaElement>::nextSibling(*metaElement)) {
Color color = Color::transparent;
if (equalIgnoringCase(metaElement->name(), "theme-color") && CSSParser::parseColor(color, metaElement->content().string().stripWhiteSpace(), true))
return color;
}
return Color();
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: mrb_init_kernel(mrb_state *mrb)
{
struct RClass *krn;
mrb->kernel_module = krn = mrb_define_module(mrb, "Kernel"); /* 15.3.1 */
mrb_define_class_method(mrb, krn, "block_given?", mrb_f_block_given_p_m, MRB_ARGS_NONE()); /* 15.3.1.2.2 */
mrb_define_class_method(mrb, krn, "global_variables", mrb_f_global_variables, MRB_ARGS_NONE()); /* 15.3.1.2.4 */
mrb_define_class_method(mrb, krn, "iterator?", mrb_f_block_given_p_m, MRB_ARGS_NONE()); /* 15.3.1.2.5 */
mrb_define_class_method(mrb, krn, "local_variables", mrb_local_variables, MRB_ARGS_NONE()); /* 15.3.1.2.7 */
; /* 15.3.1.2.11 */
mrb_define_class_method(mrb, krn, "raise", mrb_f_raise, MRB_ARGS_OPT(2)); /* 15.3.1.2.12 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, krn, "singleton_class", mrb_singleton_class, MRB_ARGS_NONE());
mrb_define_method(mrb, krn, "===", mrb_equal_m, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1)); /* 15.3.1.3.2 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, krn, "block_given?", mrb_f_block_given_p_m, MRB_ARGS_NONE()); /* 15.3.1.3.6 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, krn, "class", mrb_obj_class_m, MRB_ARGS_NONE()); /* 15.3.1.3.7 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, krn, "clone", mrb_obj_clone, MRB_ARGS_NONE()); /* 15.3.1.3.8 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, krn, "dup", mrb_obj_dup, MRB_ARGS_NONE()); /* 15.3.1.3.9 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, krn, "eql?", mrb_obj_equal_m, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1)); /* 15.3.1.3.10 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, krn, "equal?", mrb_obj_equal_m, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1)); /* 15.3.1.3.11 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, krn, "extend", mrb_obj_extend_m, MRB_ARGS_ANY()); /* 15.3.1.3.13 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, krn, "freeze", mrb_obj_freeze, MRB_ARGS_NONE());
mrb_define_method(mrb, krn, "frozen?", mrb_obj_frozen, MRB_ARGS_NONE());
mrb_define_method(mrb, krn, "global_variables", mrb_f_global_variables, MRB_ARGS_NONE()); /* 15.3.1.3.14 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, krn, "hash", mrb_obj_hash, MRB_ARGS_NONE()); /* 15.3.1.3.15 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, krn, "initialize_copy", mrb_obj_init_copy, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1)); /* 15.3.1.3.16 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, krn, "inspect", mrb_obj_inspect, MRB_ARGS_NONE()); /* 15.3.1.3.17 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, krn, "instance_of?", obj_is_instance_of, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1)); /* 15.3.1.3.19 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, krn, "instance_variable_defined?", mrb_obj_ivar_defined, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1)); /* 15.3.1.3.20 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, krn, "instance_variable_get", mrb_obj_ivar_get, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1)); /* 15.3.1.3.21 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, krn, "instance_variable_set", mrb_obj_ivar_set, MRB_ARGS_REQ(2)); /* 15.3.1.3.22 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, krn, "instance_variables", mrb_obj_instance_variables, MRB_ARGS_NONE()); /* 15.3.1.3.23 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, krn, "is_a?", mrb_obj_is_kind_of_m, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1)); /* 15.3.1.3.24 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, krn, "iterator?", mrb_f_block_given_p_m, MRB_ARGS_NONE()); /* 15.3.1.3.25 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, krn, "kind_of?", mrb_obj_is_kind_of_m, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1)); /* 15.3.1.3.26 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, krn, "local_variables", mrb_local_variables, MRB_ARGS_NONE()); /* 15.3.1.3.28 */
#ifdef MRB_DEFAULT_METHOD_MISSING
mrb_define_method(mrb, krn, "method_missing", mrb_obj_missing, MRB_ARGS_ANY()); /* 15.3.1.3.30 */
#endif
mrb_define_method(mrb, krn, "methods", mrb_obj_methods_m, MRB_ARGS_OPT(1)); /* 15.3.1.3.31 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, krn, "nil?", mrb_false, MRB_ARGS_NONE()); /* 15.3.1.3.32 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, krn, "object_id", mrb_obj_id_m, MRB_ARGS_NONE()); /* 15.3.1.3.33 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, krn, "private_methods", mrb_obj_private_methods, MRB_ARGS_OPT(1)); /* 15.3.1.3.36 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, krn, "protected_methods", mrb_obj_protected_methods, MRB_ARGS_OPT(1)); /* 15.3.1.3.37 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, krn, "public_methods", mrb_obj_public_methods, MRB_ARGS_OPT(1)); /* 15.3.1.3.38 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, krn, "raise", mrb_f_raise, MRB_ARGS_ANY()); /* 15.3.1.3.40 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, krn, "remove_instance_variable", mrb_obj_remove_instance_variable,MRB_ARGS_REQ(1)); /* 15.3.1.3.41 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, krn, "respond_to?", obj_respond_to, MRB_ARGS_ANY()); /* 15.3.1.3.43 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, krn, "send", mrb_f_send, MRB_ARGS_ANY()); /* 15.3.1.3.44 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, krn, "singleton_methods", mrb_obj_singleton_methods_m, MRB_ARGS_OPT(1)); /* 15.3.1.3.45 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, krn, "define_singleton_method", mod_define_singleton_method, MRB_ARGS_ANY());
mrb_define_method(mrb, krn, "to_s", mrb_any_to_s, MRB_ARGS_NONE()); /* 15.3.1.3.46 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, krn, "__case_eqq", mrb_obj_ceqq, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1)); /* internal */
mrb_define_method(mrb, krn, "class_defined?", mrb_krn_class_defined, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1));
mrb_include_module(mrb, mrb->object_class, mrb->kernel_module);
mrb_alias_method(mrb, mrb->module_class, mrb_intern_lit(mrb, "dup"), mrb_intern_lit(mrb, "clone"));
}
Commit Message: Allow `Object#clone` to copy frozen status only; fix #4036
Copying all flags from the original object may overwrite the clone's
flags e.g. the embedded flag.
CWE ID: CWE-476
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int read_public_key(RSA *rsa)
{
int r;
sc_path_t path;
sc_file_t *file;
u8 buf[2048], *p = buf;
size_t bufsize, keysize;
r = select_app_df();
if (r)
return 1;
sc_format_path("I1012", &path);
r = sc_select_file(card, &path, &file);
if (r) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to select public key file: %s\n", sc_strerror(r));
return 2;
}
bufsize = file->size;
sc_file_free(file);
r = sc_read_binary(card, 0, buf, bufsize, 0);
if (r < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to read public key file: %s\n", sc_strerror(r));
return 2;
}
bufsize = r;
do {
if (bufsize < 4)
return 3;
keysize = (p[0] << 8) | p[1];
if (keysize == 0)
break;
if (keysize < 3)
return 3;
if (p[2] == opt_key_num)
break;
p += keysize;
bufsize -= keysize;
} while (1);
if (keysize == 0) {
printf("Key number %d not found.\n", opt_key_num);
return 2;
}
return parse_public_key(p, keysize, rsa);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static __net_init int pppoe_init_net(struct net *net)
{
struct pppoe_net *pn = pppoe_pernet(net);
struct proc_dir_entry *pde;
rwlock_init(&pn->hash_lock);
pde = proc_create("pppoe", S_IRUGO, net->proc_net, &pppoe_seq_fops);
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
if (!pde)
return -ENOMEM;
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: int main(int argc, char **argv) {
if (!parse_args(argc, argv)) {
usage(argv[0]);
}
if (bond && discoverable) {
fprintf(stderr, "Can only select either bond or discoverable, not both\n");
usage(argv[0]);
}
if (sco_listen && sco_connect) {
fprintf(stderr, "Can only select either sco_listen or sco_connect, not both\n");
usage(argv[0]);
}
if (!bond && !discover && !discoverable && !up && !get_name && !set_name && !sco_listen && !sco_connect) {
fprintf(stderr, "Must specify one command\n");
usage(argv[0]);
}
if (signal(SIGINT, sig_handler) == SIG_ERR) {
fprintf(stderr, "Will be unable to catch signals\n");
}
fprintf(stdout, "Bringing up bluetooth adapter\n");
if (!hal_open(callbacks_get_adapter_struct())) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to open Bluetooth HAL.\n");
return 1;
}
if (discover) {
CALL_AND_WAIT(bt_interface->enable(), adapter_state_changed);
fprintf(stdout, "BT adapter is up\n");
fprintf(stdout, "Starting to start discovery\n");
CALL_AND_WAIT(bt_interface->start_discovery(), discovery_state_changed);
fprintf(stdout, "Started discovery for %d seconds\n", timeout_in_sec);
sleep(timeout_in_sec);
fprintf(stdout, "Starting to cancel discovery\n");
CALL_AND_WAIT(bt_interface->cancel_discovery(), discovery_state_changed);
fprintf(stdout, "Cancelled discovery after %d seconds\n", timeout_in_sec);
}
if (discoverable) {
CALL_AND_WAIT(bt_interface->enable(), adapter_state_changed);
fprintf(stdout, "BT adapter is up\n");
bt_property_t *property = property_new_scan_mode(BT_SCAN_MODE_CONNECTABLE_DISCOVERABLE);
int rc = bt_interface->set_adapter_property(property);
fprintf(stdout, "Set rc:%d device as discoverable for %d seconds\n", rc, timeout_in_sec);
sleep(timeout_in_sec);
property_free(property);
}
if (bond) {
if (bdaddr_is_empty(&bt_remote_bdaddr)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Must specify a remote device address [ --bdaddr=xx:yy:zz:aa:bb:cc ]\n");
exit(1);
}
CALL_AND_WAIT(bt_interface->enable(), adapter_state_changed);
fprintf(stdout, "BT adapter is up\n");
int rc = bt_interface->create_bond(&bt_remote_bdaddr, 0 /* UNKNOWN; Currently not documented :( */);
fprintf(stdout, "Started bonding:%d for %d seconds\n", rc, timeout_in_sec);
sleep(timeout_in_sec);
}
if (up) {
CALL_AND_WAIT(bt_interface->enable(), adapter_state_changed);
fprintf(stdout, "BT adapter is up\n");
fprintf(stdout, "Waiting for %d seconds\n", timeout_in_sec);
sleep(timeout_in_sec);
}
if (get_name) {
CALL_AND_WAIT(bt_interface->enable(), adapter_state_changed);
fprintf(stdout, "BT adapter is up\n");
int error;
CALL_AND_WAIT(error = bt_interface->get_adapter_property(BT_PROPERTY_BDNAME), adapter_properties);
if (error != BT_STATUS_SUCCESS) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to get adapter property\n");
exit(1);
}
bt_property_t *property = adapter_get_property(BT_PROPERTY_BDNAME);
const bt_bdname_t *name = property_as_name(property);
if (name)
printf("Queried bluetooth device name:%s\n", name->name);
else
printf("No name\n");
}
if (set_name) {
CALL_AND_WAIT(bt_interface->enable(), adapter_state_changed);
fprintf(stdout, "BT adapter is up\n");
bt_property_t *property = property_new_name(bd_name);
printf("Setting bluetooth device name to:%s\n", bd_name);
int error;
CALL_AND_WAIT(error = bt_interface->set_adapter_property(property), adapter_properties);
if (error != BT_STATUS_SUCCESS) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to set adapter property\n");
exit(1);
}
CALL_AND_WAIT(error = bt_interface->get_adapter_property(BT_PROPERTY_BDNAME), adapter_properties);
if (error != BT_STATUS_SUCCESS) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to get adapter property\n");
exit(1);
}
property_free(property);
sleep(timeout_in_sec);
}
if (sco_listen) {
CALL_AND_WAIT(bt_interface->enable(), adapter_state_changed);
fprintf(stdout, "BT adapter is up\n");
bt_property_t *property = property_new_scan_mode(BT_SCAN_MODE_CONNECTABLE_DISCOVERABLE);
CALL_AND_WAIT(bt_interface->set_adapter_property(property), adapter_properties);
property_free(property);
const btsock_interface_t *sock = bt_interface->get_profile_interface(BT_PROFILE_SOCKETS_ID);
int rfcomm_fd = INVALID_FD;
int error = sock->listen(BTSOCK_RFCOMM, "meow", (const uint8_t *)&HFP_AG_UUID, 0, &rfcomm_fd, 0);
if (error != BT_STATUS_SUCCESS) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to listen for incoming RFCOMM socket: %d\n", error);
exit(1);
}
int sock_fd = INVALID_FD;
error = sock->listen(BTSOCK_SCO, NULL, NULL, 5, &sock_fd, 0);
if (error != BT_STATUS_SUCCESS) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to listen for incoming SCO sockets: %d\n", error);
exit(1);
}
fprintf(stdout, "Waiting for incoming SCO connections...\n");
sleep(timeout_in_sec);
}
if (sco_connect) {
if (bdaddr_is_empty(&bt_remote_bdaddr)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Must specify a remote device address [ --bdaddr=xx:yy:zz:aa:bb:cc ]\n");
exit(1);
}
CALL_AND_WAIT(bt_interface->enable(), adapter_state_changed);
fprintf(stdout, "BT adapter is up\n");
const btsock_interface_t *sock = bt_interface->get_profile_interface(BT_PROFILE_SOCKETS_ID);
int rfcomm_fd = INVALID_FD;
int error = sock->connect(&bt_remote_bdaddr, BTSOCK_RFCOMM, (const uint8_t *)&HFP_AG_UUID, 0, &rfcomm_fd, 0);
if (error != BT_STATUS_SUCCESS) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to connect to RFCOMM socket: %d.\n", error);
exit(1);
}
WAIT(acl_state_changed);
fprintf(stdout, "Establishing SCO connection...\n");
int sock_fd = INVALID_FD;
error = sock->connect(&bt_remote_bdaddr, BTSOCK_SCO, NULL, 5, &sock_fd, 0);
if (error != BT_STATUS_SUCCESS) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to connect to SCO socket: %d.\n", error);
exit(1);
}
sleep(timeout_in_sec);
}
CALL_AND_WAIT(bt_interface->disable(), adapter_state_changed);
fprintf(stdout, "BT adapter is down\n");
}
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (2/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: I8f23d28ef0aa3a8df13d469c73005c8e1b894d19
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: xsltGetQNameProperty(xsltStylesheetPtr style, xmlNodePtr inst,
const xmlChar *propName,
int mandatory,
int *hasProp, const xmlChar **nsName,
const xmlChar** localName)
{
const xmlChar *prop;
if (nsName)
*nsName = NULL;
if (localName)
*localName = NULL;
if (hasProp)
*hasProp = 0;
prop = xsltGetCNsProp(style, inst, propName, XSLT_NAMESPACE);
if (prop == NULL) {
if (mandatory) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, inst,
"The attribute '%s' is missing.\n", propName);
style->errors++;
return;
}
} else {
const xmlChar *URI;
if (xmlValidateQName(prop, 0)) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, inst,
"The value '%s' of the attribute "
"'%s' is not a valid QName.\n", prop, propName);
style->errors++;
return;
} else {
/*
* @prop will be in the string dict afterwards, @URI not.
*/
URI = xsltGetQNameURI2(style, inst, &prop);
if (prop == NULL) {
style->errors++;
} else {
*localName = prop;
if (hasProp)
*hasProp = 1;
if (URI != NULL) {
/*
* Fixes bug #308441: Put the ns-name in the dict
* in order to pointer compare names during XPath's
* variable lookup.
*/
if (nsName)
*nsName = xmlDictLookup(style->dict, URI, -1);
/* comp->has_ns = 1; */
}
}
}
}
return;
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void destroy_device_list(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < sbi->s_ndevs; i++) {
blkdev_put(FDEV(i).bdev, FMODE_EXCL);
#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_ZONED
kfree(FDEV(i).blkz_type);
#endif
}
kfree(sbi->devs);
}
Commit Message: f2fs: sanity check checkpoint segno and blkoff
Make sure segno and blkoff read from raw image are valid.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jin Qian <[email protected]>
[Jaegeuk Kim: adjust minor coding style]
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-129
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int mboxlist_do_find(struct find_rock *rock, const strarray_t *patterns)
{
const char *userid = rock->userid;
int isadmin = rock->isadmin;
int crossdomains = config_getswitch(IMAPOPT_CROSSDOMAINS);
char inbox[MAX_MAILBOX_BUFFER];
size_t inboxlen = 0;
size_t prefixlen, len;
size_t domainlen = 0;
size_t userlen = userid ? strlen(userid) : 0;
char domainpat[MAX_MAILBOX_BUFFER]; /* do intra-domain fetches only */
char commonpat[MAX_MAILBOX_BUFFER];
int r = 0;
int i;
const char *p;
if (patterns->count < 1) return 0; /* nothing to do */
for (i = 0; i < patterns->count; i++) {
glob *g = glob_init(strarray_nth(patterns, i), rock->namespace->hier_sep);
ptrarray_append(&rock->globs, g);
}
if (config_virtdomains && userid && (p = strchr(userid, '@'))) {
userlen = p - userid;
domainlen = strlen(p); /* includes separator */
snprintf(domainpat, sizeof(domainpat), "%s!", p+1);
}
else
domainpat[0] = '\0';
/* calculate the inbox (with trailing .INBOX. for later use) */
if (userid && (!(p = strchr(userid, rock->namespace->hier_sep)) ||
((p - userid) > (int)userlen)) &&
strlen(userid)+7 < MAX_MAILBOX_BUFFER) {
char *t, *tmpuser = NULL;
const char *inboxuser;
if (domainlen)
snprintf(inbox, sizeof(inbox), "%s!", userid+userlen+1);
if (rock->namespace->hier_sep == '/' && (p = strchr(userid, '.'))) {
tmpuser = xmalloc(userlen);
memcpy(tmpuser, userid, userlen);
t = tmpuser + (p - userid);
while(t < (tmpuser + userlen)) {
if (*t == '.')
*t = '^';
t++;
}
inboxuser = tmpuser;
} else
inboxuser = userid;
snprintf(inbox+domainlen, sizeof(inbox)-domainlen,
"user.%.*s.INBOX.", (int)userlen, inboxuser);
free(tmpuser);
inboxlen = strlen(inbox) - 7;
}
else {
userid = 0;
}
/* Find the common search prefix of all patterns */
const char *firstpat = strarray_nth(patterns, 0);
for (prefixlen = 0; firstpat[prefixlen]; prefixlen++) {
if (prefixlen >= MAX_MAILBOX_NAME) {
r = IMAP_MAILBOX_BADNAME;
goto done;
}
char c = firstpat[prefixlen];
for (i = 1; i < patterns->count; i++) {
const char *pat = strarray_nth(patterns, i);
if (pat[prefixlen] != c) break;
}
if (i < patterns->count) break;
if (c == '*' || c == '%' || c == '?') break;
commonpat[prefixlen] = c;
}
commonpat[prefixlen] = '\0';
if (patterns->count == 1) {
/* Skip pattern which matches shared namespace prefix */
if (!strcmp(firstpat+prefixlen, "%"))
rock->singlepercent = 2;
/* output prefix regardless */
if (!strcmp(firstpat+prefixlen, "*%"))
rock->singlepercent = 1;
}
/*
* Personal (INBOX) namespace (only if not admin)
*/
if (userid && !isadmin) {
/* first the INBOX */
rock->mb_category = MBNAME_INBOX;
r = cyrusdb_forone(rock->db, inbox, inboxlen, &find_p, &find_cb, rock, NULL);
if (r == CYRUSDB_DONE) r = 0;
if (r) goto done;
if (rock->namespace->isalt) {
/* do exact INBOX subs before resetting the namebuffer */
rock->mb_category = MBNAME_INBOXSUB;
r = cyrusdb_foreach(rock->db, inbox, inboxlen+7, &find_p, &find_cb, rock, NULL);
if (r == CYRUSDB_DONE) r = 0;
if (r) goto done;
/* reset the the namebuffer */
r = (*rock->proc)(NULL, rock->procrock);
if (r) goto done;
}
/* iterate through all the mailboxes under the user's inbox */
rock->mb_category = MBNAME_OWNER;
r = cyrusdb_foreach(rock->db, inbox, inboxlen+1, &find_p, &find_cb, rock, NULL);
if (r == CYRUSDB_DONE) r = 0;
if (r) goto done;
/* "Alt Prefix" folders */
if (rock->namespace->isalt) {
/* reset the the namebuffer */
r = (*rock->proc)(NULL, rock->procrock);
if (r) goto done;
rock->mb_category = MBNAME_ALTINBOX;
/* special case user.foo.INBOX. If we're singlepercent == 2, this could
return DONE, in which case we don't need to foreach the rest of the
altprefix space */
r = cyrusdb_forone(rock->db, inbox, inboxlen+6, &find_p, &find_cb, rock, NULL);
if (r == CYRUSDB_DONE) goto skipalt;
if (r) goto done;
/* special case any other altprefix stuff */
rock->mb_category = MBNAME_ALTPREFIX;
r = cyrusdb_foreach(rock->db, inbox, inboxlen+1, &find_p, &find_cb, rock, NULL);
skipalt: /* we got a done, so skip out of the foreach early */
if (r == CYRUSDB_DONE) r = 0;
if (r) goto done;
}
}
/*
* Other Users namespace
*
* If "Other Users*" can match pattern, search for those mailboxes next
*/
if (isadmin || rock->namespace->accessible[NAMESPACE_USER]) {
len = strlen(rock->namespace->prefix[NAMESPACE_USER]);
if (len) len--; // trailing separator
if (!strncmp(rock->namespace->prefix[NAMESPACE_USER], commonpat, MIN(len, prefixlen))) {
if (prefixlen < len) {
/* we match all users */
strlcpy(domainpat+domainlen, "user.", sizeof(domainpat)-domainlen);
}
else {
/* just those in this prefix */
strlcpy(domainpat+domainlen, "user.", sizeof(domainpat)-domainlen);
strlcpy(domainpat+domainlen+5, commonpat+len+1, sizeof(domainpat)-domainlen-5);
}
rock->mb_category = MBNAME_OTHERUSER;
/* because of how domains work, with crossdomains or admin you can't prefix at all :( */
size_t thislen = (isadmin || crossdomains) ? 0 : strlen(domainpat);
/* reset the the namebuffer */
r = (*rock->proc)(NULL, rock->procrock);
if (r) goto done;
r = mboxlist_find_category(rock, domainpat, thislen);
if (r) goto done;
}
}
/*
* Shared namespace
*
* search for all remaining mailboxes.
* just bother looking at the ones that have the same pattern prefix.
*/
if (isadmin || rock->namespace->accessible[NAMESPACE_SHARED]) {
len = strlen(rock->namespace->prefix[NAMESPACE_SHARED]);
if (len) len--; // trailing separator
if (!strncmp(rock->namespace->prefix[NAMESPACE_SHARED], commonpat, MIN(len, prefixlen))) {
rock->mb_category = MBNAME_SHARED;
/* reset the the namebuffer */
r = (*rock->proc)(NULL, rock->procrock);
if (r) goto done;
/* iterate through all the non-user folders on the server */
r = mboxlist_find_category(rock, domainpat, domainlen);
if (r) goto done;
}
}
/* finish with a reset call always */
r = (*rock->proc)(NULL, rock->procrock);
done:
for (i = 0; i < rock->globs.count; i++) {
glob *g = ptrarray_nth(&rock->globs, i);
glob_free(&g);
}
ptrarray_fini(&rock->globs);
return r;
}
Commit Message: mboxlist: fix uninitialised memory use where pattern is "Other Users"
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static __init int sctp_init(void)
{
int i;
int status = -EINVAL;
unsigned long goal;
unsigned long limit;
int max_share;
int order;
sock_skb_cb_check_size(sizeof(struct sctp_ulpevent));
/* Allocate bind_bucket and chunk caches. */
status = -ENOBUFS;
sctp_bucket_cachep = kmem_cache_create("sctp_bind_bucket",
sizeof(struct sctp_bind_bucket),
0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN,
NULL);
if (!sctp_bucket_cachep)
goto out;
sctp_chunk_cachep = kmem_cache_create("sctp_chunk",
sizeof(struct sctp_chunk),
0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN,
NULL);
if (!sctp_chunk_cachep)
goto err_chunk_cachep;
status = percpu_counter_init(&sctp_sockets_allocated, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
if (status)
goto err_percpu_counter_init;
/* Implementation specific variables. */
/* Initialize default stream count setup information. */
sctp_max_instreams = SCTP_DEFAULT_INSTREAMS;
sctp_max_outstreams = SCTP_DEFAULT_OUTSTREAMS;
/* Initialize handle used for association ids. */
idr_init(&sctp_assocs_id);
limit = nr_free_buffer_pages() / 8;
limit = max(limit, 128UL);
sysctl_sctp_mem[0] = limit / 4 * 3;
sysctl_sctp_mem[1] = limit;
sysctl_sctp_mem[2] = sysctl_sctp_mem[0] * 2;
/* Set per-socket limits to no more than 1/128 the pressure threshold*/
limit = (sysctl_sctp_mem[1]) << (PAGE_SHIFT - 7);
max_share = min(4UL*1024*1024, limit);
sysctl_sctp_rmem[0] = SK_MEM_QUANTUM; /* give each asoc 1 page min */
sysctl_sctp_rmem[1] = 1500 * SKB_TRUESIZE(1);
sysctl_sctp_rmem[2] = max(sysctl_sctp_rmem[1], max_share);
sysctl_sctp_wmem[0] = SK_MEM_QUANTUM;
sysctl_sctp_wmem[1] = 16*1024;
sysctl_sctp_wmem[2] = max(64*1024, max_share);
/* Size and allocate the association hash table.
* The methodology is similar to that of the tcp hash tables.
*/
if (totalram_pages >= (128 * 1024))
goal = totalram_pages >> (22 - PAGE_SHIFT);
else
goal = totalram_pages >> (24 - PAGE_SHIFT);
for (order = 0; (1UL << order) < goal; order++)
;
do {
sctp_assoc_hashsize = (1UL << order) * PAGE_SIZE /
sizeof(struct sctp_hashbucket);
if ((sctp_assoc_hashsize > (64 * 1024)) && order > 0)
continue;
sctp_assoc_hashtable = (struct sctp_hashbucket *)
__get_free_pages(GFP_ATOMIC|__GFP_NOWARN, order);
} while (!sctp_assoc_hashtable && --order > 0);
if (!sctp_assoc_hashtable) {
pr_err("Failed association hash alloc\n");
status = -ENOMEM;
goto err_ahash_alloc;
}
for (i = 0; i < sctp_assoc_hashsize; i++) {
rwlock_init(&sctp_assoc_hashtable[i].lock);
INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&sctp_assoc_hashtable[i].chain);
}
/* Allocate and initialize the endpoint hash table. */
sctp_ep_hashsize = 64;
sctp_ep_hashtable =
kmalloc(64 * sizeof(struct sctp_hashbucket), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sctp_ep_hashtable) {
pr_err("Failed endpoint_hash alloc\n");
status = -ENOMEM;
goto err_ehash_alloc;
}
for (i = 0; i < sctp_ep_hashsize; i++) {
rwlock_init(&sctp_ep_hashtable[i].lock);
INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&sctp_ep_hashtable[i].chain);
}
/* Allocate and initialize the SCTP port hash table. */
do {
sctp_port_hashsize = (1UL << order) * PAGE_SIZE /
sizeof(struct sctp_bind_hashbucket);
if ((sctp_port_hashsize > (64 * 1024)) && order > 0)
continue;
sctp_port_hashtable = (struct sctp_bind_hashbucket *)
__get_free_pages(GFP_ATOMIC|__GFP_NOWARN, order);
} while (!sctp_port_hashtable && --order > 0);
if (!sctp_port_hashtable) {
pr_err("Failed bind hash alloc\n");
status = -ENOMEM;
goto err_bhash_alloc;
}
for (i = 0; i < sctp_port_hashsize; i++) {
spin_lock_init(&sctp_port_hashtable[i].lock);
INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&sctp_port_hashtable[i].chain);
}
pr_info("Hash tables configured (established %d bind %d)\n",
sctp_assoc_hashsize, sctp_port_hashsize);
sctp_sysctl_register();
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sctp_address_families);
sctp_v4_pf_init();
sctp_v6_pf_init();
status = sctp_v4_protosw_init();
if (status)
goto err_protosw_init;
status = sctp_v6_protosw_init();
if (status)
goto err_v6_protosw_init;
status = register_pernet_subsys(&sctp_net_ops);
if (status)
goto err_register_pernet_subsys;
status = sctp_v4_add_protocol();
if (status)
goto err_add_protocol;
/* Register SCTP with inet6 layer. */
status = sctp_v6_add_protocol();
if (status)
goto err_v6_add_protocol;
out:
return status;
err_v6_add_protocol:
sctp_v4_del_protocol();
err_add_protocol:
unregister_pernet_subsys(&sctp_net_ops);
err_register_pernet_subsys:
sctp_v6_protosw_exit();
err_v6_protosw_init:
sctp_v4_protosw_exit();
err_protosw_init:
sctp_v4_pf_exit();
sctp_v6_pf_exit();
sctp_sysctl_unregister();
free_pages((unsigned long)sctp_port_hashtable,
get_order(sctp_port_hashsize *
sizeof(struct sctp_bind_hashbucket)));
err_bhash_alloc:
kfree(sctp_ep_hashtable);
err_ehash_alloc:
free_pages((unsigned long)sctp_assoc_hashtable,
get_order(sctp_assoc_hashsize *
sizeof(struct sctp_hashbucket)));
err_ahash_alloc:
percpu_counter_destroy(&sctp_sockets_allocated);
err_percpu_counter_init:
kmem_cache_destroy(sctp_chunk_cachep);
err_chunk_cachep:
kmem_cache_destroy(sctp_bucket_cachep);
goto out;
}
Commit Message: sctp: fix race on protocol/netns initialization
Consider sctp module is unloaded and is being requested because an user
is creating a sctp socket.
During initialization, sctp will add the new protocol type and then
initialize pernet subsys:
status = sctp_v4_protosw_init();
if (status)
goto err_protosw_init;
status = sctp_v6_protosw_init();
if (status)
goto err_v6_protosw_init;
status = register_pernet_subsys(&sctp_net_ops);
The problem is that after those calls to sctp_v{4,6}_protosw_init(), it
is possible for userspace to create SCTP sockets like if the module is
already fully loaded. If that happens, one of the possible effects is
that we will have readers for net->sctp.local_addr_list list earlier
than expected and sctp_net_init() does not take precautions while
dealing with that list, leading to a potential panic but not limited to
that, as sctp_sock_init() will copy a bunch of blank/partially
initialized values from net->sctp.
The race happens like this:
CPU 0 | CPU 1
socket() |
__sock_create | socket()
inet_create | __sock_create
list_for_each_entry_rcu( |
answer, &inetsw[sock->type], |
list) { | inet_create
/* no hits */ |
if (unlikely(err)) { |
... |
request_module() |
/* socket creation is blocked |
* the module is fully loaded |
*/ |
sctp_init |
sctp_v4_protosw_init |
inet_register_protosw |
list_add_rcu(&p->list, |
last_perm); |
| list_for_each_entry_rcu(
| answer, &inetsw[sock->type],
sctp_v6_protosw_init | list) {
| /* hit, so assumes protocol
| * is already loaded
| */
| /* socket creation continues
| * before netns is initialized
| */
register_pernet_subsys |
Simply inverting the initialization order between
register_pernet_subsys() and sctp_v4_protosw_init() is not possible
because register_pernet_subsys() will create a control sctp socket, so
the protocol must be already visible by then. Deferring the socket
creation to a work-queue is not good specially because we loose the
ability to handle its errors.
So, as suggested by Vlad, the fix is to split netns initialization in
two moments: defaults and control socket, so that the defaults are
already loaded by when we register the protocol, while control socket
initialization is kept at the same moment it is today.
Fixes: 4db67e808640 ("sctp: Make the address lists per network namespace")
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void IDNSpoofChecker::RestoreTopDomainGraphToDefault() {
g_graph = kDafsa;
g_graph_length = sizeof(kDafsa);
}
Commit Message: Add more entries to the confusability mapping
U+014B (ŋ) => n
U+1004 (င) => c
U+100c (ဌ) => g
U+1042 (၂) => j
U+1054 (ၔ) => e
Bug: 811117,808316
Test: components_unittests -gtest_filter=*IDN*
Change-Id: I29f73c48d665bd9070050bd7f0080563635b9c63
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/919423
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Jungshik Shin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536955}
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: userauth_kbdint(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
static int attempt = 0;
if (attempt++ >= options.number_of_password_prompts)
return 0;
/* disable if no SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST has been seen */
if (attempt > 1 && !authctxt->info_req_seen) {
debug3("userauth_kbdint: disable: no info_req_seen");
dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST, NULL);
return 0;
}
debug2("userauth_kbdint");
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
packet_put_cstring(""); /* lang */
packet_put_cstring(options.kbd_interactive_devices ?
options.kbd_interactive_devices : "");
packet_send();
dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST, &input_userauth_info_req);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static void nfs4_return_incompatible_delegation(struct inode *inode, mode_t open_flags)
{
struct nfs_delegation *delegation;
rcu_read_lock();
delegation = rcu_dereference(NFS_I(inode)->delegation);
if (delegation == NULL || (delegation->type & open_flags) == open_flags) {
rcu_read_unlock();
return;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
nfs_inode_return_delegation(inode);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void set_cpus_allowed_common(struct task_struct *p, const struct cpumask *new_mask)
{
cpumask_copy(&p->cpus_allowed, new_mask);
p->nr_cpus_allowed = cpumask_weight(new_mask);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <[email protected]>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static Range* FindRangeOfStringAlgorithm(
Document& document,
const String& target,
const EphemeralRangeTemplate<Strategy>& reference_range,
FindOptions options) {
if (target.IsEmpty())
return nullptr;
EphemeralRangeTemplate<Strategy> document_range =
EphemeralRangeTemplate<Strategy>::RangeOfContents(document);
EphemeralRangeTemplate<Strategy> search_range(document_range);
bool forward = !(options & kBackwards);
bool start_in_reference_range = false;
if (reference_range.IsNotNull()) {
start_in_reference_range = options & kStartInSelection;
if (forward && start_in_reference_range)
search_range = EphemeralRangeTemplate<Strategy>(
reference_range.StartPosition(), document_range.EndPosition());
else if (forward)
search_range = EphemeralRangeTemplate<Strategy>(
reference_range.EndPosition(), document_range.EndPosition());
else if (start_in_reference_range)
search_range = EphemeralRangeTemplate<Strategy>(
document_range.StartPosition(), reference_range.EndPosition());
else
search_range = EphemeralRangeTemplate<Strategy>(
document_range.StartPosition(), reference_range.StartPosition());
}
Range* result_range =
FindStringBetweenPositions(target, search_range, options);
if (result_range && start_in_reference_range &&
NormalizeRange(EphemeralRangeTemplate<Strategy>(result_range)) ==
reference_range) {
if (forward)
search_range = EphemeralRangeTemplate<Strategy>(
FromPositionInDOMTree<Strategy>(result_range->EndPosition()),
search_range.EndPosition());
else
search_range = EphemeralRangeTemplate<Strategy>(
search_range.StartPosition(),
FromPositionInDOMTree<Strategy>(result_range->StartPosition()));
result_range = FindStringBetweenPositions(target, search_range, options);
}
if (!result_range && options & kWrapAround)
return FindStringBetweenPositions(target, document_range, options);
return result_range;
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: explicit RemoveDownloadsTester(TestingProfile* testing_profile)
: download_manager_(new content::MockDownloadManager()),
chrome_download_manager_delegate_(testing_profile) {
content::BrowserContext::SetDownloadManagerForTesting(
testing_profile, base::WrapUnique(download_manager_));
EXPECT_EQ(download_manager_,
content::BrowserContext::GetDownloadManager(testing_profile));
EXPECT_CALL(*download_manager_, GetDelegate())
.WillOnce(Return(&chrome_download_manager_delegate_));
EXPECT_CALL(*download_manager_, Shutdown());
}
Commit Message: Don't downcast DownloadManagerDelegate to ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate.
DownloadManager has public SetDelegate method and tests and or other subsystems
can install their own implementations of the delegate.
Bug: 805905
Change-Id: Iecf1e0aceada0e1048bed1e2d2ceb29ca64295b8
TBR: tests updated to follow the API change.
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/894702
Reviewed-by: David Vallet <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Min Qin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533515}
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: bool MediaStreamManager::SetupTabCaptureRequest(DeviceRequest* request) {
DCHECK(request->audio_type() == MEDIA_TAB_AUDIO_CAPTURE ||
request->video_type() == MEDIA_TAB_VIDEO_CAPTURE);
std::string capture_device_id;
if (!request->controls.audio.device_id.empty()) {
capture_device_id = request->controls.audio.device_id;
} else if (!request->controls.video.device_id.empty()) {
capture_device_id = request->controls.video.device_id;
} else {
return false;
}
WebContentsMediaCaptureId web_id;
bool has_valid_device_id =
WebContentsMediaCaptureId::Parse(capture_device_id, &web_id);
if (!has_valid_device_id ||
(request->audio_type() != MEDIA_TAB_AUDIO_CAPTURE &&
request->audio_type() != MEDIA_NO_SERVICE) ||
(request->video_type() != MEDIA_TAB_VIDEO_CAPTURE &&
request->video_type() != MEDIA_NO_SERVICE)) {
return false;
}
web_id.disable_local_echo = request->controls.disable_local_echo;
request->tab_capture_device_id = web_id.ToString();
request->CreateTabCaptureUIRequest(web_id.render_process_id,
web_id.main_render_frame_id);
DVLOG(3) << "SetupTabCaptureRequest "
<< ", {capture_device_id = " << capture_device_id << "}"
<< ", {target_render_process_id = " << web_id.render_process_id
<< "}"
<< ", {target_render_frame_id = " << web_id.main_render_frame_id
<< "}";
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix MediaObserver notifications in MediaStreamManager.
This CL fixes the stream type used to notify MediaObserver about
cancelled MediaStream requests.
Before this CL, NUM_MEDIA_TYPES was used as stream type to indicate
that all stream types should be cancelled.
However, the MediaObserver end does not interpret NUM_MEDIA_TYPES this
way and the request to update the UI is ignored.
This CL sends a separate notification for each stream type so that the
UI actually gets updated for all stream types in use.
Bug: 816033
Change-Id: Ib7d3b3046d1dd0976627f8ab38abf086eacc9405
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/939630
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540122}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int do_send_NPPrintData(rpc_message_t *message, void *p_value)
{
NPPrintData *printData = (NPPrintData *)p_value;
int error;
if ((error = rpc_message_send_uint32(message, printData->size)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_send_bytes(message, printData->data, printData->size)) < 0)
return error;
return RPC_ERROR_NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: xps_select_best_font_encoding(xps_font_t *font)
{
static struct { int pid, eid; } xps_cmap_list[] =
{
{ 3, 10 }, /* Unicode with surrogates */
{ 3, 1 }, /* Unicode without surrogates */
{ 3, 5 }, /* Wansung */
{ 3, 4 }, /* Big5 */
{ 3, 3 }, /* Prc */
{ 3, 2 }, /* ShiftJis */
{ 3, 0 }, /* Symbol */
{ 1, 0 },
{ -1, -1 },
};
int i, k, n, pid, eid;
n = xps_count_font_encodings(font);
for (k = 0; xps_cmap_list[k].pid != -1; k++)
{
for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
{
xps_identify_font_encoding(font, i, &pid, &eid);
if (pid == xps_cmap_list[k].pid && eid == xps_cmap_list[k].eid)
{
xps_select_font_encoding(font, i);
return;
}
}
}
gs_warn("could not find a suitable cmap");
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: const base::Closure& callback() const { return callback_; }
Commit Message: Disable crashing test
BUG=121487
TBR=sky
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9950076
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@130276 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void OnCallback(mojom::PdfCompositor::Status status,
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferHandle handle) {
if (status == mojom::PdfCompositor::Status::SUCCESS)
CallbackOnSuccess(handle.get());
else
CallbackOnError(status);
run_loop_->Quit();
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static void copyStereo8(
short *dst,
const int *const *src,
unsigned nSamples,
unsigned /* nChannels */) {
for (unsigned i = 0; i < nSamples; ++i) {
*dst++ = src[0][i] << 8;
*dst++ = src[1][i] << 8;
}
}
Commit Message: FLACExtractor: copy protect mWriteBuffer
Bug: 30895578
Change-Id: I4cba36bbe3502678210e5925181683df9726b431
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void IndexedDBDispatcher::RequestIDBObjectStoreCount(
const WebIDBKeyRange& idb_key_range,
WebIDBCallbacks* callbacks_ptr,
int32 idb_object_store_id,
const WebIDBTransaction& transaction,
WebExceptionCode* ec) {
ResetCursorPrefetchCaches();
scoped_ptr<WebIDBCallbacks> callbacks(callbacks_ptr);
IndexedDBHostMsg_ObjectStoreCount_Params params;
params.thread_id = CurrentWorkerId();
params.response_id = pending_callbacks_.Add(callbacks.release());
params.lower_key.Set(idb_key_range.lower());
params.upper_key.Set(idb_key_range.upper());
params.lower_open = idb_key_range.lowerOpen();
params.upper_open = idb_key_range.upperOpen();
params.idb_object_store_id = idb_object_store_id;
params.transaction_id = TransactionId(transaction);
Send(new IndexedDBHostMsg_ObjectStoreCount(params, ec));
if (*ec)
pending_callbacks_.Remove(params.response_id);
}
Commit Message: Add DCHECK to ensure IndexedDBDispatcher doesn't get re-created.
This could happen if there are IDB objects that survive the call to
didStopWorkerRunLoop.
BUG=121734
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9999035
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@131679 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: _PUBLIC_ codepoint_t next_codepoint_handle_ext(
struct smb_iconv_handle *ic,
const char *str, charset_t src_charset,
size_t *bytes_consumed)
{
/* it cannot occupy more than 4 bytes in UTF16 format */
smb_iconv_t descriptor;
size_t ilen_orig;
size_t ilen;
size_t olen;
char *outbuf;
if ((str[0] & 0x80) == 0) {
*bytes_consumed = 1;
return (codepoint_t)str[0];
}
/*
* we assume that no multi-byte character can take more than 5 bytes.
* we assume that no multi-byte character can take more than 5 bytes.
* This is OK as we only support codepoints up to 1M (U+100000)
*/
ilen_orig = strnlen(str, 5);
ilen = ilen_orig;
descriptor = get_conv_handle(ic, src_charset, CH_UTF16);
*bytes_consumed = 1;
return INVALID_CODEPOINT;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: BufferMeta(size_t size, OMX_U32 portIndex)
: mSize(size),
mIsBackup(false),
mPortIndex(portIndex) {
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: IOMX: work against metadata buffer spoofing
- Prohibit direct set/getParam/Settings for extensions meant for
OMXNodeInstance alone. This disallows enabling metadata mode
without the knowledge of OMXNodeInstance.
- Use a backup buffer for metadata mode buffers and do not directly
share with clients.
- Disallow setting up metadata mode/tunneling/input surface
after first sendCommand.
- Disallow store-meta for input cross process.
- Disallow emptyBuffer for surface input (via IOMX).
- Fix checking for input surface.
Bug: 29422020
Change-Id: I801c77b80e703903f62e42d76fd2e76a34e4bc8e
(cherry picked from commit 7c3c2fa3e233c656fc8c2fc2a6634b3ecf8a23e8)
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: perf_cgroup_match(struct perf_event *event)
{
return true;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: jbig2_sd_list_referred(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, Jbig2Segment *segment)
{
int index;
Jbig2Segment *rsegment;
Jbig2SymbolDict **dicts;
int n_dicts = jbig2_sd_count_referred(ctx, segment);
int dindex = 0;
dicts = jbig2_new(ctx, Jbig2SymbolDict *, n_dicts);
if (dicts == NULL) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "failed to allocate referred list of symbol dictionaries");
return NULL;
}
for (index = 0; index < segment->referred_to_segment_count; index++) {
rsegment = jbig2_find_segment(ctx, segment->referred_to_segments[index]);
if (rsegment && ((rsegment->flags & 63) == 0) && rsegment->result &&
(((Jbig2SymbolDict *) rsegment->result)->n_symbols > 0) && ((*((Jbig2SymbolDict *) rsegment->result)->glyphs) != NULL)) {
/* add this referred to symbol dictionary */
dicts[dindex++] = (Jbig2SymbolDict *) rsegment->result;
}
}
if (dindex != n_dicts) {
/* should never happen */
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "counted %d symbol dictionaries but built a list with %d.\n", n_dicts, dindex);
}
return (dicts);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: my_object_recursive1 (MyObject *obj, GArray *array, guint32 *len_ret, GError **error)
{
*len_ret = array->len;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: bool RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RemoveTrackPlanB(
blink::WebRTCRtpSender* web_sender) {
DCHECK_EQ(configuration_.sdp_semantics, webrtc::SdpSemantics::kPlanB);
auto web_track = web_sender->Track();
auto it = FindSender(web_sender->Id());
if (it == rtp_senders_.end())
return false;
if (!(*it)->RemoveFromPeerConnection(native_peer_connection_.get()))
return false;
track_metrics_.RemoveTrack(MediaStreamTrackMetrics::Direction::kSend,
MediaStreamTrackMetricsKind(web_track),
web_track.Id().Utf8());
if (peer_connection_tracker_) {
auto sender_only_transceiver =
std::make_unique<RTCRtpSenderOnlyTransceiver>(
std::make_unique<RTCRtpSender>(*it->get()));
size_t sender_index = GetTransceiverIndex(*sender_only_transceiver);
peer_connection_tracker_->TrackRemoveTransceiver(
this, PeerConnectionTracker::TransceiverUpdatedReason::kRemoveTrack,
*sender_only_transceiver.get(), sender_index);
}
std::vector<std::string> stream_ids = (*it)->state().stream_ids();
rtp_senders_.erase(it);
for (const auto& stream_id : stream_ids) {
if (GetLocalStreamUsageCount(rtp_senders_, stream_id) == 0u) {
PerSessionWebRTCAPIMetrics::GetInstance()->DecrementStreamCounter();
}
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Check weak pointers in RTCPeerConnectionHandler::WebRtcSetDescriptionObserverImpl
Bug: 912074
Change-Id: I8ba86751f5d5bf12db51520f985ef0d3dae63ed8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1411916
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#622945}
CWE ID: CWE-416
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: QString WebContext::userAgent() const {
if (IsInitialized()) {
return QString::fromStdString(
UserAgentSettings::Get(context_.get())->GetUserAgent());
}
return QString::fromStdString(construct_props_->user_agent);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: Segment::~Segment()
{
const long count = m_clusterCount + m_clusterPreloadCount;
Cluster** i = m_clusters;
Cluster** j = m_clusters + count;
while (i != j)
{
Cluster* const p = *i++;
assert(p);
delete p;
}
delete[] m_clusters;
delete m_pTracks;
delete m_pInfo;
delete m_pCues;
delete m_pChapters;
delete m_pSeekHead;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int handle_truncate(FsContext *ctx, V9fsPath *fs_path, off_t size)
{
int fd, ret;
struct handle_data *data = (struct handle_data *)ctx->private;
fd = open_by_handle(data->mountfd, fs_path->data, O_NONBLOCK | O_WRONLY);
if (fd < 0) {
return fd;
}
ret = ftruncate(fd, size);
close(fd);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-400
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void OfflinePageModelImpl::OnDeleteOldPagesWithSameURL(
DeletePageResult result) {
PostClearStorageIfNeededTask(false /* delayed */);
}
Commit Message: Add the method to check if offline archive is in internal dir
Bug: 758690
Change-Id: I8bb4283fc40a87fa7a87df2c7e513e2e16903290
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/828049
Reviewed-by: Filip Gorski <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Jian Li <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#524232}
CWE ID: CWE-787
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: QuicErrorCode QuicStreamSequencerBuffer::OnStreamData(
QuicStreamOffset starting_offset,
QuicStringPiece data,
QuicTime timestamp,
size_t* const bytes_buffered,
std::string* error_details) {
CHECK_EQ(destruction_indicator_, 123456) << "This object has been destructed";
*bytes_buffered = 0;
QuicStreamOffset offset = starting_offset;
size_t size = data.size();
if (size == 0) {
*error_details = "Received empty stream frame without FIN.";
return QUIC_EMPTY_STREAM_FRAME_NO_FIN;
}
std::list<Gap>::iterator current_gap = gaps_.begin();
while (current_gap != gaps_.end() && current_gap->end_offset <= offset) {
++current_gap;
}
DCHECK(current_gap != gaps_.end());
if (offset < current_gap->begin_offset &&
offset + size <= current_gap->begin_offset) {
QUIC_DVLOG(1) << "Duplicated data at offset: " << offset
<< " length: " << size;
return QUIC_NO_ERROR;
}
if (offset < current_gap->begin_offset &&
offset + size > current_gap->begin_offset) {
string prefix(data.data(), data.length() < 128 ? data.length() : 128);
*error_details =
QuicStrCat("Beginning of received data overlaps with buffered data.\n",
"New frame range [", offset, ", ", offset + size,
") with first 128 bytes: ", prefix, "\n",
"Currently received frames: ", GapsDebugString(), "\n",
"Current gaps: ", ReceivedFramesDebugString());
return QUIC_OVERLAPPING_STREAM_DATA;
}
if (offset + size > current_gap->end_offset) {
string prefix(data.data(), data.length() < 128 ? data.length() : 128);
*error_details = QuicStrCat(
"End of received data overlaps with buffered data.\nNew frame range [",
offset, ", ", offset + size, ") with first 128 bytes: ", prefix, "\n",
"Currently received frames: ", ReceivedFramesDebugString(), "\n",
"Current gaps: ", GapsDebugString());
return QUIC_OVERLAPPING_STREAM_DATA;
}
if (offset + size > total_bytes_read_ + max_buffer_capacity_bytes_) {
*error_details = "Received data beyond available range.";
return QUIC_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
if (current_gap->begin_offset != starting_offset &&
current_gap->end_offset != starting_offset + data.length() &&
gaps_.size() >= kMaxNumGapsAllowed) {
*error_details = "Too many gaps created for this stream.";
return QUIC_TOO_MANY_FRAME_GAPS;
}
size_t total_written = 0;
size_t source_remaining = size;
const char* source = data.data();
while (source_remaining > 0) {
const size_t write_block_num = GetBlockIndex(offset);
const size_t write_block_offset = GetInBlockOffset(offset);
DCHECK_GT(blocks_count_, write_block_num);
size_t block_capacity = GetBlockCapacity(write_block_num);
size_t bytes_avail = block_capacity - write_block_offset;
if (offset + bytes_avail > total_bytes_read_ + max_buffer_capacity_bytes_) {
bytes_avail = total_bytes_read_ + max_buffer_capacity_bytes_ - offset;
}
if (blocks_ == nullptr) {
blocks_.reset(new BufferBlock*[blocks_count_]());
for (size_t i = 0; i < blocks_count_; ++i) {
blocks_[i] = nullptr;
}
}
if (write_block_num >= blocks_count_) {
*error_details = QuicStrCat(
"QuicStreamSequencerBuffer error: OnStreamData() exceed array bounds."
"write offset = ",
offset, " write_block_num = ", write_block_num,
" blocks_count_ = ", blocks_count_);
return QUIC_STREAM_SEQUENCER_INVALID_STATE;
}
if (blocks_ == nullptr) {
*error_details =
"QuicStreamSequencerBuffer error: OnStreamData() blocks_ is null";
return QUIC_STREAM_SEQUENCER_INVALID_STATE;
}
if (blocks_[write_block_num] == nullptr) {
blocks_[write_block_num] = new BufferBlock();
}
const size_t bytes_to_copy =
std::min<size_t>(bytes_avail, source_remaining);
char* dest = blocks_[write_block_num]->buffer + write_block_offset;
QUIC_DVLOG(1) << "Write at offset: " << offset
<< " length: " << bytes_to_copy;
if (dest == nullptr || source == nullptr) {
*error_details = QuicStrCat(
"QuicStreamSequencerBuffer error: OnStreamData()"
" dest == nullptr: ",
(dest == nullptr), " source == nullptr: ", (source == nullptr),
" Writing at offset ", offset, " Gaps: ", GapsDebugString(),
" Remaining frames: ", ReceivedFramesDebugString(),
" total_bytes_read_ = ", total_bytes_read_);
return QUIC_STREAM_SEQUENCER_INVALID_STATE;
}
memcpy(dest, source, bytes_to_copy);
source += bytes_to_copy;
source_remaining -= bytes_to_copy;
offset += bytes_to_copy;
total_written += bytes_to_copy;
}
DCHECK_GT(total_written, 0u);
*bytes_buffered = total_written;
UpdateGapList(current_gap, starting_offset, total_written);
frame_arrival_time_map_.insert(
std::make_pair(starting_offset, FrameInfo(size, timestamp)));
num_bytes_buffered_ += total_written;
return QUIC_NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Fix OOB Write in QuicStreamSequencerBuffer::OnStreamData
BUG=778505
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_cronet_tester;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I1dfd1d26a2c7ee8fe047f7fe6e4ac2e9b97efa52
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/748282
Commit-Queue: Ryan Hamilton <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Zhongyi Shi <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513144}
CWE ID: CWE-787
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void GDataFileSystem::OnGetEntryInfoCompleteForGetFileByPath(
const FilePath& file_path,
const GetFileCallback& get_file_callback,
const GetDownloadDataCallback& get_download_data_callback,
GDataFileError error,
scoped_ptr<GDataEntryProto> entry_proto) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
DCHECK(error != GDATA_FILE_OK ||
(entry_proto.get() && !entry_proto->resource_id().empty()));
GetResolvedFileByPath(file_path,
get_file_callback,
get_download_data_callback,
error,
entry_proto.get());
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: SQLRETURN SQLSetDescFieldW( SQLHDESC descriptor_handle,
SQLSMALLINT rec_number,
SQLSMALLINT field_identifier,
SQLPOINTER value,
SQLINTEGER buffer_length )
{
/*
* not quite sure how the descriptor can be
* allocated to a statement, all the documentation talks
* about state transitions on statement states, but the
* descriptor may be allocated with more than one statement
* at one time. Which one should I check ?
*/
DMHDESC descriptor = (DMHDESC) descriptor_handle;
SQLRETURN ret;
SQLCHAR s1[ 100 + LOG_MESSAGE_LEN ];
int isStrField = 0;
/*
* check descriptor
*/
if ( !__validate_desc( descriptor ))
{
dm_log_write( __FILE__,
__LINE__,
LOG_INFO,
LOG_INFO,
"Error: SQL_INVALID_HANDLE" );
#ifdef WITH_HANDLE_REDIRECT
{
DMHDESC parent_desc;
parent_desc = find_parent_handle( descriptor, SQL_HANDLE_DESC );
if ( parent_desc ) {
dm_log_write( __FILE__,
__LINE__,
LOG_INFO,
LOG_INFO,
"Info: found parent handle" );
if ( CHECK_SQLSETDESCFIELDW( parent_desc -> connection ))
{
dm_log_write( __FILE__,
__LINE__,
LOG_INFO,
LOG_INFO,
"Info: calling redirected driver function" );
return SQLSETDESCFIELDW( parent_desc -> connection,
descriptor,
rec_number,
field_identifier,
value,
buffer_length );
}
}
}
#endif
return SQL_INVALID_HANDLE;
}
function_entry( descriptor );
if ( log_info.log_flag )
{
sprintf( descriptor -> msg, "\n\t\tEntry:\
\n\t\t\tDescriptor = %p\
\n\t\t\tRec Number = %d\
\n\t\t\tField Ident = %s\
\n\t\t\tValue = %p\
\n\t\t\tBuffer Length = %d",
descriptor,
rec_number,
__desc_attr_as_string( s1, field_identifier ),
value,
(int)buffer_length );
dm_log_write( __FILE__,
__LINE__,
LOG_INFO,
LOG_INFO,
descriptor -> msg );
}
thread_protect( SQL_HANDLE_DESC, descriptor );
if ( descriptor -> connection -> state < STATE_C4 )
{
dm_log_write( __FILE__,
__LINE__,
LOG_INFO,
LOG_INFO,
"Error: HY010" );
__post_internal_error( &descriptor -> error,
ERROR_HY010, NULL,
descriptor -> connection -> environment -> requested_version );
return function_return_nodrv( SQL_HANDLE_DESC, descriptor, SQL_ERROR );
}
/*
* check status of statements associated with this descriptor
*/
if( __check_stmt_from_desc( descriptor, STATE_S8 ) ||
__check_stmt_from_desc( descriptor, STATE_S9 ) ||
__check_stmt_from_desc( descriptor, STATE_S10 ) ||
__check_stmt_from_desc( descriptor, STATE_S11 ) ||
__check_stmt_from_desc( descriptor, STATE_S12 ) ||
__check_stmt_from_desc( descriptor, STATE_S13 ) ||
__check_stmt_from_desc( descriptor, STATE_S14 ) ||
__check_stmt_from_desc( descriptor, STATE_S15 )) {
dm_log_write( __FILE__,
__LINE__,
LOG_INFO,
LOG_INFO,
"Error: HY010" );
__post_internal_error( &descriptor -> error,
ERROR_HY010, NULL,
descriptor -> connection -> environment -> requested_version );
return function_return_nodrv( SQL_HANDLE_DESC, descriptor, SQL_ERROR );
}
if ( rec_number < 0 )
{
__post_internal_error( &descriptor -> error,
ERROR_07009, NULL,
descriptor -> connection -> environment -> requested_version );
return function_return_nodrv( SQL_HANDLE_DESC, descriptor, SQL_ERROR );
}
switch ( field_identifier )
{
/* Fixed-length fields: buffer_length is ignored */
case SQL_DESC_ALLOC_TYPE:
case SQL_DESC_ARRAY_SIZE:
case SQL_DESC_ARRAY_STATUS_PTR:
case SQL_DESC_BIND_OFFSET_PTR:
case SQL_DESC_BIND_TYPE:
case SQL_DESC_COUNT:
case SQL_DESC_ROWS_PROCESSED_PTR:
case SQL_DESC_AUTO_UNIQUE_VALUE:
case SQL_DESC_CASE_SENSITIVE:
case SQL_DESC_CONCISE_TYPE:
case SQL_DESC_DATA_PTR:
case SQL_DESC_DATETIME_INTERVAL_CODE:
case SQL_DESC_DATETIME_INTERVAL_PRECISION:
case SQL_DESC_DISPLAY_SIZE:
case SQL_DESC_FIXED_PREC_SCALE:
case SQL_DESC_INDICATOR_PTR:
case SQL_DESC_LENGTH:
case SQL_DESC_NULLABLE:
case SQL_DESC_NUM_PREC_RADIX:
case SQL_DESC_OCTET_LENGTH:
case SQL_DESC_OCTET_LENGTH_PTR:
case SQL_DESC_PARAMETER_TYPE:
case SQL_DESC_PRECISION:
case SQL_DESC_ROWVER:
case SQL_DESC_SCALE:
case SQL_DESC_SEARCHABLE:
case SQL_DESC_TYPE:
case SQL_DESC_UNNAMED:
case SQL_DESC_UNSIGNED:
case SQL_DESC_UPDATABLE:
isStrField = 0;
break;
/* Pointer to data: buffer_length must be valid */
case SQL_DESC_BASE_COLUMN_NAME:
case SQL_DESC_BASE_TABLE_NAME:
case SQL_DESC_CATALOG_NAME:
case SQL_DESC_LABEL:
case SQL_DESC_LITERAL_PREFIX:
case SQL_DESC_LITERAL_SUFFIX:
case SQL_DESC_LOCAL_TYPE_NAME:
case SQL_DESC_NAME:
case SQL_DESC_SCHEMA_NAME:
case SQL_DESC_TABLE_NAME:
case SQL_DESC_TYPE_NAME:
isStrField = 1;
break;
default:
isStrField = buffer_length != SQL_IS_POINTER && buffer_length != SQL_IS_INTEGER
&& buffer_length != SQL_IS_UINTEGER && buffer_length != SQL_IS_SMALLINT &&
buffer_length != SQL_IS_USMALLINT;
}
if ( isStrField && buffer_length < 0 && buffer_length != SQL_NTS)
{
__post_internal_error( &descriptor -> error,
ERROR_HY090, NULL,
descriptor -> connection -> environment -> requested_version );
return function_return_nodrv( SQL_HANDLE_DESC, descriptor, SQL_ERROR );
}
if ( field_identifier == SQL_DESC_COUNT && (SQLINTEGER)value < 0 )
{
__post_internal_error( &descriptor -> error,
ERROR_07009, NULL,
descriptor -> connection -> environment -> requested_version );
return function_return_nodrv( SQL_HANDLE_DESC, descriptor, SQL_ERROR );
}
if ( field_identifier == SQL_DESC_PARAMETER_TYPE && value != SQL_PARAM_INPUT
&& value != SQL_PARAM_OUTPUT && value != SQL_PARAM_INPUT_OUTPUT &&
value != SQL_PARAM_INPUT_OUTPUT_STREAM && value != SQL_PARAM_OUTPUT_STREAM )
{
__post_internal_error( &descriptor -> error,
ERROR_HY105, NULL,
descriptor -> connection -> environment -> requested_version );
return function_return_nodrv( SQL_HANDLE_DESC, descriptor, SQL_ERROR );
}
if ( descriptor -> connection -> unicode_driver ||
CHECK_SQLSETDESCFIELDW( descriptor -> connection ))
{
if ( !CHECK_SQLSETDESCFIELDW( descriptor -> connection ))
{
dm_log_write( __FILE__,
__LINE__,
LOG_INFO,
LOG_INFO,
"Error: IM001" );
__post_internal_error( &descriptor -> error,
ERROR_IM001, NULL,
descriptor -> connection -> environment -> requested_version );
return function_return_nodrv( SQL_HANDLE_DESC, descriptor, SQL_ERROR );
}
ret = SQLSETDESCFIELDW( descriptor -> connection,
descriptor -> driver_desc,
rec_number,
field_identifier,
value,
buffer_length );
if ( log_info.log_flag )
{
sprintf( descriptor -> msg,
"\n\t\tExit:[%s]",
__get_return_status( ret, s1 ));
dm_log_write( __FILE__,
__LINE__,
LOG_INFO,
LOG_INFO,
descriptor -> msg );
}
}
else
{
SQLCHAR *ascii_str = NULL;
if ( !CHECK_SQLSETDESCFIELD( descriptor -> connection ))
{
dm_log_write( __FILE__,
__LINE__,
LOG_INFO,
LOG_INFO,
"Error: IM001" );
__post_internal_error( &descriptor -> error,
ERROR_IM001, NULL,
descriptor -> connection -> environment -> requested_version );
return function_return_nodrv( SQL_HANDLE_DESC, descriptor, SQL_ERROR );
}
/*
* is it a char arg...
*/
switch ( field_identifier )
{
case SQL_DESC_NAME: /* This is the only R/W SQLCHAR* type */
ascii_str = (SQLCHAR*) unicode_to_ansi_alloc( value, buffer_length, descriptor -> connection, NULL );
value = ascii_str;
buffer_length = strlen((char*) ascii_str );
break;
default:
break;
}
ret = SQLSETDESCFIELD( descriptor -> connection,
descriptor -> driver_desc,
rec_number,
field_identifier,
value,
buffer_length );
if ( log_info.log_flag )
{
sprintf( descriptor -> msg,
"\n\t\tExit:[%s]",
__get_return_status( ret, s1 ));
dm_log_write( __FILE__,
__LINE__,
LOG_INFO,
LOG_INFO,
descriptor -> msg );
}
if ( ascii_str )
{
free( ascii_str );
}
}
return function_return( SQL_HANDLE_DESC, descriptor, ret );
}
Commit Message: New Pre Source
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: __u32 secure_ipv6_id(const __be32 daddr[4])
{
const struct keydata *keyptr;
__u32 hash[4];
keyptr = get_keyptr();
hash[0] = (__force __u32)daddr[0];
hash[1] = (__force __u32)daddr[1];
hash[2] = (__force __u32)daddr[2];
hash[3] = (__force __u32)daddr[3];
return half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
}
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void bitplanar2chunky(CDXLVideoContext *c, int linesize, uint8_t *out)
{
GetBitContext gb;
int x, y, plane;
if (init_get_bits8(&gb, c->video, c->video_size) < 0)
return;
for (plane = 0; plane < c->bpp; plane++) {
for (y = 0; y < c->avctx->height; y++) {
for (x = 0; x < c->avctx->width; x++)
out[linesize * y + x] |= get_bits1(&gb) << plane;
skip_bits(&gb, c->padded_bits);
}
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/cdxl: Check format for BGR24
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1427/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-5020737339392000
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int userfaultfd_register(struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx,
unsigned long arg)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = ctx->mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma, *prev, *cur;
int ret;
struct uffdio_register uffdio_register;
struct uffdio_register __user *user_uffdio_register;
unsigned long vm_flags, new_flags;
bool found;
bool basic_ioctls;
unsigned long start, end, vma_end;
user_uffdio_register = (struct uffdio_register __user *) arg;
ret = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&uffdio_register, user_uffdio_register,
sizeof(uffdio_register)-sizeof(__u64)))
goto out;
ret = -EINVAL;
if (!uffdio_register.mode)
goto out;
if (uffdio_register.mode & ~(UFFDIO_REGISTER_MODE_MISSING|
UFFDIO_REGISTER_MODE_WP))
goto out;
vm_flags = 0;
if (uffdio_register.mode & UFFDIO_REGISTER_MODE_MISSING)
vm_flags |= VM_UFFD_MISSING;
if (uffdio_register.mode & UFFDIO_REGISTER_MODE_WP) {
vm_flags |= VM_UFFD_WP;
/*
* FIXME: remove the below error constraint by
* implementing the wprotect tracking mode.
*/
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
ret = validate_range(mm, uffdio_register.range.start,
uffdio_register.range.len);
if (ret)
goto out;
start = uffdio_register.range.start;
end = start + uffdio_register.range.len;
ret = -ENOMEM;
if (!mmget_not_zero(mm))
goto out;
down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
vma = find_vma_prev(mm, start, &prev);
if (!vma)
goto out_unlock;
/* check that there's at least one vma in the range */
ret = -EINVAL;
if (vma->vm_start >= end)
goto out_unlock;
/*
* If the first vma contains huge pages, make sure start address
* is aligned to huge page size.
*/
if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma)) {
unsigned long vma_hpagesize = vma_kernel_pagesize(vma);
if (start & (vma_hpagesize - 1))
goto out_unlock;
}
/*
* Search for not compatible vmas.
*/
found = false;
basic_ioctls = false;
for (cur = vma; cur && cur->vm_start < end; cur = cur->vm_next) {
cond_resched();
BUG_ON(!!cur->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx ^
!!(cur->vm_flags & (VM_UFFD_MISSING | VM_UFFD_WP)));
/* check not compatible vmas */
ret = -EINVAL;
if (!vma_can_userfault(cur))
goto out_unlock;
/*
* If this vma contains ending address, and huge pages
* check alignment.
*/
if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(cur) && end <= cur->vm_end &&
end > cur->vm_start) {
unsigned long vma_hpagesize = vma_kernel_pagesize(cur);
ret = -EINVAL;
if (end & (vma_hpagesize - 1))
goto out_unlock;
}
/*
* Check that this vma isn't already owned by a
* different userfaultfd. We can't allow more than one
* userfaultfd to own a single vma simultaneously or we
* wouldn't know which one to deliver the userfaults to.
*/
ret = -EBUSY;
if (cur->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx &&
cur->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx != ctx)
goto out_unlock;
/*
* Note vmas containing huge pages
*/
if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(cur))
basic_ioctls = true;
found = true;
}
BUG_ON(!found);
if (vma->vm_start < start)
prev = vma;
ret = 0;
do {
cond_resched();
BUG_ON(!vma_can_userfault(vma));
BUG_ON(vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx &&
vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx != ctx);
/*
* Nothing to do: this vma is already registered into this
* userfaultfd and with the right tracking mode too.
*/
if (vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx == ctx &&
(vma->vm_flags & vm_flags) == vm_flags)
goto skip;
if (vma->vm_start > start)
start = vma->vm_start;
vma_end = min(end, vma->vm_end);
new_flags = (vma->vm_flags & ~vm_flags) | vm_flags;
prev = vma_merge(mm, prev, start, vma_end, new_flags,
vma->anon_vma, vma->vm_file, vma->vm_pgoff,
vma_policy(vma),
((struct vm_userfaultfd_ctx){ ctx }));
if (prev) {
vma = prev;
goto next;
}
if (vma->vm_start < start) {
ret = split_vma(mm, vma, start, 1);
if (ret)
break;
}
if (vma->vm_end > end) {
ret = split_vma(mm, vma, end, 0);
if (ret)
break;
}
next:
/*
* In the vma_merge() successful mprotect-like case 8:
* the next vma was merged into the current one and
* the current one has not been updated yet.
*/
vma->vm_flags = new_flags;
vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx = ctx;
skip:
prev = vma;
start = vma->vm_end;
vma = vma->vm_next;
} while (vma && vma->vm_start < end);
out_unlock:
up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
mmput(mm);
if (!ret) {
/*
* Now that we scanned all vmas we can already tell
* userland which ioctls methods are guaranteed to
* succeed on this range.
*/
if (put_user(basic_ioctls ? UFFD_API_RANGE_IOCTLS_BASIC :
UFFD_API_RANGE_IOCTLS,
&user_uffdio_register->ioctls))
ret = -EFAULT;
}
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: userfaultfd: shmem/hugetlbfs: only allow to register VM_MAYWRITE vmas
After the VMA to register the uffd onto is found, check that it has
VM_MAYWRITE set before allowing registration. This way we inherit all
common code checks before allowing to fill file holes in shmem and
hugetlbfs with UFFDIO_COPY.
The userfaultfd memory model is not applicable for readonly files unless
it's a MAP_PRIVATE.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: ff62a3421044 ("hugetlb: implement memfd sealing")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Fixes: 4c27fe4c4c84 ("userfaultfd: shmem: add shmem_mcopy_atomic_pte for userfaultfd support")
Cc: <[email protected]>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Xu <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: int cg_write(const char *path, const char *buf, size_t size, off_t offset,
struct fuse_file_info *fi)
{
struct fuse_context *fc = fuse_get_context();
char *localbuf = NULL;
struct cgfs_files *k = NULL;
struct file_info *f = (struct file_info *)fi->fh;
bool r;
if (f->type != LXC_TYPE_CGFILE) {
fprintf(stderr, "Internal error: directory cache info used in cg_write\n");
return -EIO;
}
if (offset)
return 0;
if (!fc)
return -EIO;
localbuf = alloca(size+1);
localbuf[size] = '\0';
memcpy(localbuf, buf, size);
if ((k = cgfs_get_key(f->controller, f->cgroup, f->file)) == NULL) {
size = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (!fc_may_access(fc, f->controller, f->cgroup, f->file, O_WRONLY)) {
size = -EACCES;
goto out;
}
if (strcmp(f->file, "tasks") == 0 ||
strcmp(f->file, "/tasks") == 0 ||
strcmp(f->file, "/cgroup.procs") == 0 ||
strcmp(f->file, "cgroup.procs") == 0)
r = do_write_pids(fc->pid, f->controller, f->cgroup, f->file, localbuf);
else
r = cgfs_set_value(f->controller, f->cgroup, f->file, localbuf);
if (!r)
size = -EINVAL;
out:
free_key(k);
return size;
}
Commit Message: Implement privilege check when moving tasks
When writing pids to a tasks file in lxcfs, lxcfs was checking
for privilege over the tasks file but not over the pid being
moved. Since the cgm_movepid request is done as root on the host,
not with the requestor's credentials, we must copy the check which
cgmanager was doing to ensure that the requesting task is allowed
to change the victim task's cgroup membership.
This is CVE-2015-1344
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/lxcfs/+bug/1512854
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: ReturnOpenvpnOutput(HANDLE pipe, HANDLE ovpn_output, DWORD count, LPHANDLE events)
{
WCHAR *wide_output = NULL;
CHAR output[512];
DWORD size;
ReadFile(ovpn_output, output, sizeof(output), &size, NULL);
if (size == 0)
{
return;
}
wide_output = malloc((size) * sizeof(WCHAR));
if (wide_output)
{
MultiByteToWideChar(CP_UTF8, 0, output, size, wide_output, size);
wide_output[size - 1] = 0;
}
ReturnError(pipe, ERROR_OPENVPN_STARTUP, wide_output, count, events);
free(wide_output);
}
Commit Message: Fix potential double-free() in Interactive Service (CVE-2018-9336)
Malformed input data on the service pipe towards the OpenVPN interactive
service (normally used by the OpenVPN GUI to request openvpn instances
from the service) can result in a double free() in the error handling code.
This usually only leads to a process crash (DoS by an unprivileged local
account) but since it could possibly lead to memory corruption if
happening while multiple other threads are active at the same time,
CVE-2018-9336 has been assigned to acknowledge this risk.
Fix by ensuring that sud->directory is set to NULL in GetStartUpData()
for all error cases (thus not being free()ed in FreeStartupData()).
Rewrite control flow to use explicit error label for error exit.
Discovered and reported by Jacob Baines <[email protected]>.
CVE: 2018-9336
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Selva Nair <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/search?l=mid&[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-415
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: virtual InputMethodDescriptor previous_input_method() const {
return previous_input_method_;
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int sctp_setsockopt_auto_asconf(struct sock *sk, char __user *optval,
unsigned int optlen)
{
int val;
struct sctp_sock *sp = sctp_sk(sk);
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
return -EINVAL;
if (get_user(val, (int __user *)optval))
return -EFAULT;
if (!sctp_is_ep_boundall(sk) && val)
return -EINVAL;
if ((val && sp->do_auto_asconf) || (!val && !sp->do_auto_asconf))
return 0;
if (val == 0 && sp->do_auto_asconf) {
list_del(&sp->auto_asconf_list);
sp->do_auto_asconf = 0;
} else if (val && !sp->do_auto_asconf) {
list_add_tail(&sp->auto_asconf_list,
&sock_net(sk)->sctp.auto_asconf_splist);
sp->do_auto_asconf = 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: sctp: fix ASCONF list handling
->auto_asconf_splist is per namespace and mangled by functions like
sctp_setsockopt_auto_asconf() which doesn't guarantee any serialization.
Also, the call to inet_sk_copy_descendant() was backuping
->auto_asconf_list through the copy but was not honoring
->do_auto_asconf, which could lead to list corruption if it was
different between both sockets.
This commit thus fixes the list handling by using ->addr_wq_lock
spinlock to protect the list. A special handling is done upon socket
creation and destruction for that. Error handlig on sctp_init_sock()
will never return an error after having initialized asconf, so
sctp_destroy_sock() can be called without addrq_wq_lock. The lock now
will be take on sctp_close_sock(), before locking the socket, so we
don't do it in inverse order compared to sctp_addr_wq_timeout_handler().
Instead of taking the lock on sctp_sock_migrate() for copying and
restoring the list values, it's preferred to avoid rewritting it by
implementing sctp_copy_descendant().
Issue was found with a test application that kept flipping sysctl
default_auto_asconf on and off, but one could trigger it by issuing
simultaneous setsockopt() calls on multiple sockets or by
creating/destroying sockets fast enough. This is only triggerable
locally.
Fixes: 9f7d653b67ae ("sctp: Add Auto-ASCONF support (core).")
Reported-by: Ji Jianwen <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int next_getadapter_fib(struct aac_dev * dev, void __user *arg)
{
struct fib_ioctl f;
struct fib *fib;
struct aac_fib_context *fibctx;
int status;
struct list_head * entry;
unsigned long flags;
if(copy_from_user((void *)&f, arg, sizeof(struct fib_ioctl)))
return -EFAULT;
/*
* Verify that the HANDLE passed in was a valid AdapterFibContext
*
* Search the list of AdapterFibContext addresses on the adapter
* to be sure this is a valid address
*/
spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->fib_lock, flags);
entry = dev->fib_list.next;
fibctx = NULL;
while (entry != &dev->fib_list) {
fibctx = list_entry(entry, struct aac_fib_context, next);
/*
* Extract the AdapterFibContext from the Input parameters.
*/
if (fibctx->unique == f.fibctx) { /* We found a winner */
break;
}
entry = entry->next;
fibctx = NULL;
}
if (!fibctx) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->fib_lock, flags);
dprintk ((KERN_INFO "Fib Context not found\n"));
return -EINVAL;
}
if((fibctx->type != FSAFS_NTC_GET_ADAPTER_FIB_CONTEXT) ||
(fibctx->size != sizeof(struct aac_fib_context))) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->fib_lock, flags);
dprintk ((KERN_INFO "Fib Context corrupt?\n"));
return -EINVAL;
}
status = 0;
/*
* If there are no fibs to send back, then either wait or return
* -EAGAIN
*/
return_fib:
if (!list_empty(&fibctx->fib_list)) {
/*
* Pull the next fib from the fibs
*/
entry = fibctx->fib_list.next;
list_del(entry);
fib = list_entry(entry, struct fib, fiblink);
fibctx->count--;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->fib_lock, flags);
if (copy_to_user(f.fib, fib->hw_fib_va, sizeof(struct hw_fib))) {
kfree(fib->hw_fib_va);
kfree(fib);
return -EFAULT;
}
/*
* Free the space occupied by this copy of the fib.
*/
kfree(fib->hw_fib_va);
kfree(fib);
status = 0;
} else {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->fib_lock, flags);
/* If someone killed the AIF aacraid thread, restart it */
status = !dev->aif_thread;
if (status && !dev->in_reset && dev->queues && dev->fsa_dev) {
/* Be paranoid, be very paranoid! */
kthread_stop(dev->thread);
ssleep(1);
dev->aif_thread = 0;
dev->thread = kthread_run(aac_command_thread, dev,
"%s", dev->name);
ssleep(1);
}
if (f.wait) {
if(down_interruptible(&fibctx->wait_sem) < 0) {
status = -ERESTARTSYS;
} else {
/* Lock again and retry */
spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->fib_lock, flags);
goto return_fib;
}
} else {
status = -EAGAIN;
}
}
fibctx->jiffies = jiffies/HZ;
return status;
}
Commit Message: aacraid: prevent invalid pointer dereference
It appears that driver runs into a problem here if fibsize is too small
because we allocate user_srbcmd with fibsize size only but later we
access it until user_srbcmd->sg.count to copy it over to srbcmd.
It is not correct to test (fibsize < sizeof(*user_srbcmd)) because this
structure already includes one sg element and this is not needed for
commands without data. So, we would recommend to add the following
(instead of test for fibsize == 0).
Signed-off-by: Mahesh Rajashekhara <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: gfx::Image* SessionCrashedInfoBarDelegate::GetIcon() const {
return &ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance().GetNativeImageNamed(
IDR_INFOBAR_RESTORE_SESSION);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: xfs_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, int type)
{
int error = 0;
if (!acl)
goto set_acl;
error = -E2BIG;
if (acl->a_count > XFS_ACL_MAX_ENTRIES(XFS_M(inode->i_sb)))
return error;
if (type == ACL_TYPE_ACCESS) {
umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
error = posix_acl_equiv_mode(acl, &mode);
if (error <= 0) {
acl = NULL;
if (error < 0)
return error;
}
error = xfs_set_mode(inode, mode);
if (error)
return error;
}
set_acl:
return __xfs_set_acl(inode, type, acl);
}
Commit Message: posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-285
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void SyncBackendHost::Core::OnInitializationComplete(
const WeakHandle<JsBackend>& js_backend,
bool success) {
DCHECK_EQ(MessageLoop::current(), sync_loop_);
host_.Call(
FROM_HERE,
&SyncBackendHost::HandleInitializationCompletedOnFrontendLoop,
js_backend, success);
if (success) {
sync_loop_->PostTask(FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&Core::StartSavingChanges, this));
}
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: v8::Local<v8::Value> ModuleSystem::LoadModule(const std::string& module_name) {
v8::EscapableHandleScope handle_scope(GetIsolate());
v8::Local<v8::Context> v8_context = context()->v8_context();
v8::Context::Scope context_scope(v8_context);
v8::Local<v8::Value> source(GetSource(module_name));
if (source.IsEmpty() || source->IsUndefined()) {
Fatal(context_, "No source for require(" + module_name + ")");
return v8::Undefined(GetIsolate());
}
v8::Local<v8::String> wrapped_source(
WrapSource(v8::Local<v8::String>::Cast(source)));
v8::Local<v8::String> v8_module_name;
if (!ToV8String(GetIsolate(), module_name.c_str(), &v8_module_name)) {
NOTREACHED() << "module_name is too long";
return v8::Undefined(GetIsolate());
}
v8::Local<v8::Value> func_as_value =
RunString(wrapped_source, v8_module_name);
if (func_as_value.IsEmpty() || func_as_value->IsUndefined()) {
Fatal(context_, "Bad source for require(" + module_name + ")");
return v8::Undefined(GetIsolate());
}
v8::Local<v8::Function> func = v8::Local<v8::Function>::Cast(func_as_value);
v8::Local<v8::Object> define_object = v8::Object::New(GetIsolate());
gin::ModuleRegistry::InstallGlobals(GetIsolate(), define_object);
v8::Local<v8::Value> exports = v8::Object::New(GetIsolate());
v8::Local<v8::Object> natives(NewInstance());
CHECK(!natives.IsEmpty()); // this can fail if v8 has issues
v8::Local<v8::Value> args[] = {
GetPropertyUnsafe(v8_context, define_object, "define"),
GetPropertyUnsafe(v8_context, natives, "require",
v8::NewStringType::kInternalized),
GetPropertyUnsafe(v8_context, natives, "requireNative",
v8::NewStringType::kInternalized),
GetPropertyUnsafe(v8_context, natives, "requireAsync",
v8::NewStringType::kInternalized),
exports,
console::AsV8Object(GetIsolate()),
GetPropertyUnsafe(v8_context, natives, "privates",
v8::NewStringType::kInternalized),
context_->safe_builtins()->GetArray(),
context_->safe_builtins()->GetFunction(),
context_->safe_builtins()->GetJSON(),
context_->safe_builtins()->GetObjekt(),
context_->safe_builtins()->GetRegExp(),
context_->safe_builtins()->GetString(),
context_->safe_builtins()->GetError(),
};
{
v8::TryCatch try_catch(GetIsolate());
try_catch.SetCaptureMessage(true);
context_->CallFunction(func, arraysize(args), args);
if (try_catch.HasCaught()) {
HandleException(try_catch);
return v8::Undefined(GetIsolate());
}
}
return handle_scope.Escape(exports);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Don't allow built-in extensions code to be overridden
BUG=546677
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417513003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356654}
CWE ID: CWE-264
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void AppCache::ToDatabaseRecords(
const AppCacheGroup* group,
AppCacheDatabase::CacheRecord* cache_record,
std::vector<AppCacheDatabase::EntryRecord>* entries,
std::vector<AppCacheDatabase::NamespaceRecord>* intercepts,
std::vector<AppCacheDatabase::NamespaceRecord>* fallbacks,
std::vector<AppCacheDatabase::OnlineWhiteListRecord>* whitelists) {
DCHECK(group && cache_record && entries && fallbacks && whitelists);
DCHECK(entries->empty() && fallbacks->empty() && whitelists->empty());
cache_record->cache_id = cache_id_;
cache_record->group_id = group->group_id();
cache_record->online_wildcard = online_whitelist_all_;
cache_record->update_time = update_time_;
cache_record->cache_size = cache_size_;
for (const auto& pair : entries_) {
entries->push_back(AppCacheDatabase::EntryRecord());
AppCacheDatabase::EntryRecord& record = entries->back();
record.url = pair.first;
record.cache_id = cache_id_;
record.flags = pair.second.types();
record.response_id = pair.second.response_id();
record.response_size = pair.second.response_size();
}
const url::Origin origin = url::Origin::Create(group->manifest_url());
for (size_t i = 0; i < intercept_namespaces_.size(); ++i) {
intercepts->push_back(AppCacheDatabase::NamespaceRecord());
AppCacheDatabase::NamespaceRecord& record = intercepts->back();
record.cache_id = cache_id_;
record.origin = origin;
record.namespace_ = intercept_namespaces_[i];
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < fallback_namespaces_.size(); ++i) {
fallbacks->push_back(AppCacheDatabase::NamespaceRecord());
AppCacheDatabase::NamespaceRecord& record = fallbacks->back();
record.cache_id = cache_id_;
record.origin = origin;
record.namespace_ = fallback_namespaces_[i];
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < online_whitelist_namespaces_.size(); ++i) {
whitelists->push_back(AppCacheDatabase::OnlineWhiteListRecord());
AppCacheDatabase::OnlineWhiteListRecord& record = whitelists->back();
record.cache_id = cache_id_;
record.namespace_url = online_whitelist_namespaces_[i].namespace_url;
record.is_pattern = online_whitelist_namespaces_[i].is_pattern;
}
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: bool AppCacheBackendImpl::SwapCacheWithCallback(
int host_id, const SwapCacheCallback& callback, void* callback_param) {
AppCacheHost* host = GetHost(host_id);
if (!host)
return false;
host->SwapCacheWithCallback(callback, callback_param);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix possible map::end() dereference in AppCacheUpdateJob triggered by a compromised renderer.
BUG=551044
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1418783005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#358815}
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void SharedWorkerDevToolsAgentHost::WorkerDestroyed() {
DCHECK_NE(WORKER_TERMINATED, state_);
DCHECK(worker_host_);
state_ = WORKER_TERMINATED;
for (auto* inspector : protocol::InspectorHandler::ForAgentHost(this))
inspector->TargetCrashed();
for (DevToolsSession* session : sessions())
session->SetRenderer(nullptr, nullptr);
worker_host_ = nullptr;
agent_ptr_.reset();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewGtk::AcceleratedSurfacePostSubBuffer(
const GpuHostMsg_AcceleratedSurfacePostSubBuffer_Params& params,
int gpu_host_id) {
RenderWidgetHostImpl::AcknowledgeBufferPresent(
params.route_id, gpu_host_id, true, 0);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void activityLoggingGetterForIsolatedWorldsPerWorldBindingsLongAttributeAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::SetterContext, "activityLoggingGetterForIsolatedWorldsPerWorldBindingsLongAttribute", "TestObjectPython", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_EXCEPTION_VOID(int, cppValue, toInt32(jsValue, exceptionState), exceptionState);
imp->setActivityLoggingGetterForIsolatedWorldsPerWorldBindingsLongAttribute(cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: bool omx_video::execute_omx_flush(OMX_U32 flushType)
{
bool bRet = false;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("execute_omx_flush - %u", (unsigned int)flushType);
#ifdef _MSM8974_
/* XXX: The driver/hardware does not support flushing of individual ports
* in all states. So we pretty much need to flush both ports internally,
* but client should only get the FLUSH_(INPUT|OUTPUT)_DONE for the one it
* requested. Since OMX_COMPONENT_(OUTPUT|INPUT)_FLUSH_PENDING isn't set,
* we automatically omit sending the FLUSH done for the "opposite" port. */
input_flush_progress = true;
output_flush_progress = true;
bRet = execute_flush_all();
#else
if (flushType == 0 || flushType == OMX_ALL) {
input_flush_progress = true;
bRet = execute_input_flush();
}
if (flushType == 1 || flushType == OMX_ALL) {
output_flush_progress = true;
bRet = execute_output_flush();
}
#endif
return bRet;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int jpc_siz_getparms(jpc_ms_t *ms, jpc_cstate_t *cstate,
jas_stream_t *in)
{
jpc_siz_t *siz = &ms->parms.siz;
unsigned int i;
uint_fast8_t tmp;
/* Eliminate compiler warning about unused variables. */
cstate = 0;
if (jpc_getuint16(in, &siz->caps) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->width) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->height) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->xoff) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->yoff) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->tilewidth) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->tileheight) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->tilexoff) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->tileyoff) ||
jpc_getuint16(in, &siz->numcomps)) {
return -1;
}
if (!siz->width || !siz->height || !siz->tilewidth ||
!siz->tileheight || !siz->numcomps || siz->numcomps > 16384) {
return -1;
}
if (!(siz->comps = jas_alloc2(siz->numcomps, sizeof(jpc_sizcomp_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < siz->numcomps; ++i) {
if (jpc_getuint8(in, &tmp) ||
jpc_getuint8(in, &siz->comps[i].hsamp) ||
jpc_getuint8(in, &siz->comps[i].vsamp)) {
jas_free(siz->comps);
return -1;
}
if (siz->comps[i].hsamp == 0 || siz->comps[i].hsamp > 255) {
jas_eprintf("invalid XRsiz value %d\n", siz->comps[i].hsamp);
jas_free(siz->comps);
return -1;
}
if (siz->comps[i].vsamp == 0 || siz->comps[i].vsamp > 255) {
jas_eprintf("invalid YRsiz value %d\n", siz->comps[i].vsamp);
jas_free(siz->comps);
return -1;
}
siz->comps[i].sgnd = (tmp >> 7) & 1;
siz->comps[i].prec = (tmp & 0x7f) + 1;
}
if (jas_stream_eof(in)) {
jas_free(siz->comps);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Ensure that not all tiles lie outside the image area.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: nfs4_async_handle_error(struct rpc_task *task, const struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs4_state *state)
{
struct nfs_client *clp = server->nfs_client;
if (!clp || task->tk_status >= 0)
return 0;
switch(task->tk_status) {
case -NFS4ERR_ADMIN_REVOKED:
case -NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID:
case -NFS4ERR_OPENMODE:
if (state == NULL)
break;
nfs4_state_mark_reclaim_nograce(clp, state);
case -NFS4ERR_STALE_CLIENTID:
case -NFS4ERR_STALE_STATEID:
case -NFS4ERR_EXPIRED:
rpc_sleep_on(&clp->cl_rpcwaitq, task, NULL);
nfs4_schedule_state_recovery(clp);
if (test_bit(NFS4CLNT_MANAGER_RUNNING, &clp->cl_state) == 0)
rpc_wake_up_queued_task(&clp->cl_rpcwaitq, task);
task->tk_status = 0;
return -EAGAIN;
case -NFS4ERR_DELAY:
nfs_inc_server_stats(server, NFSIOS_DELAY);
case -NFS4ERR_GRACE:
rpc_delay(task, NFS4_POLL_RETRY_MAX);
task->tk_status = 0;
return -EAGAIN;
case -NFS4ERR_OLD_STATEID:
task->tk_status = 0;
return -EAGAIN;
}
task->tk_status = nfs4_map_errors(task->tk_status);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void DocumentLoader::NotifyFinished(Resource* resource) {
DCHECK_EQ(main_resource_, resource);
DCHECK(main_resource_);
if (!main_resource_->ErrorOccurred() && !main_resource_->WasCanceled()) {
FinishedLoading(main_resource_->LoadFinishTime());
return;
}
if (application_cache_host_)
application_cache_host_->FailedLoadingMainResource();
if (main_resource_->GetResourceError().WasBlockedByResponse()) {
probe::CanceledAfterReceivedResourceResponse(
frame_, this, MainResourceIdentifier(), resource->GetResponse(),
main_resource_.Get());
}
LoadFailed(main_resource_->GetResourceError());
ClearMainResourceHandle();
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: xlate_to_uni(const unsigned char *name, int len, unsigned char *outname,
int *longlen, int *outlen, int escape, int utf8,
struct nls_table *nls)
{
const unsigned char *ip;
unsigned char nc;
unsigned char *op;
unsigned int ec;
int i, k, fill;
int charlen;
if (utf8) {
*outlen = utf8s_to_utf16s(name, len, (wchar_t *)outname);
if (*outlen < 0)
return *outlen;
else if (*outlen > FAT_LFN_LEN)
return -ENAMETOOLONG;
op = &outname[*outlen * sizeof(wchar_t)];
} else {
if (nls) {
for (i = 0, ip = name, op = outname, *outlen = 0;
i < len && *outlen <= FAT_LFN_LEN;
*outlen += 1)
{
if (escape && (*ip == ':')) {
if (i > len - 5)
return -EINVAL;
ec = 0;
for (k = 1; k < 5; k++) {
nc = ip[k];
ec <<= 4;
if (nc >= '0' && nc <= '9') {
ec |= nc - '0';
continue;
}
if (nc >= 'a' && nc <= 'f') {
ec |= nc - ('a' - 10);
continue;
}
if (nc >= 'A' && nc <= 'F') {
ec |= nc - ('A' - 10);
continue;
}
return -EINVAL;
}
*op++ = ec & 0xFF;
*op++ = ec >> 8;
ip += 5;
i += 5;
} else {
if ((charlen = nls->char2uni(ip, len - i, (wchar_t *)op)) < 0)
return -EINVAL;
ip += charlen;
i += charlen;
op += 2;
}
}
if (i < len)
return -ENAMETOOLONG;
} else {
for (i = 0, ip = name, op = outname, *outlen = 0;
i < len && *outlen <= FAT_LFN_LEN;
i++, *outlen += 1)
{
*op++ = *ip++;
*op++ = 0;
}
if (i < len)
return -ENAMETOOLONG;
}
}
*longlen = *outlen;
if (*outlen % 13) {
*op++ = 0;
*op++ = 0;
*outlen += 1;
if (*outlen % 13) {
fill = 13 - (*outlen % 13);
for (i = 0; i < fill; i++) {
*op++ = 0xff;
*op++ = 0xff;
}
*outlen += fill;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: NLS: improve UTF8 -> UTF16 string conversion routine
The utf8s_to_utf16s conversion routine needs to be improved. Unlike
its utf16s_to_utf8s sibling, it doesn't accept arguments specifying
the maximum length of the output buffer or the endianness of its
16-bit output.
This patch (as1501) adds the two missing arguments, and adjusts the
only two places in the kernel where the function is called. A
follow-on patch will add a third caller that does utilize the new
capabilities.
The two conversion routines are still annoyingly inconsistent in the
way they handle invalid byte combinations. But that's a subject for a
different patch.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <[email protected]>
CC: Clemens Ladisch <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: Vector<SerializedResource>& getResources()
{
return m_resources;
}
Commit Message: Revert 162155 "This review merges the two existing page serializ..."
Change r162155 broke the world even though it was landed using the CQ.
> This review merges the two existing page serializers, WebPageSerializerImpl and
> PageSerializer, into one, PageSerializer. In addition to this it moves all
> the old tests from WebPageNewSerializerTest and WebPageSerializerTest to the
> PageSerializerTest structure and splits out one test for MHTML into a new
> MHTMLTest file.
>
> Saving as 'Webpage, Complete', 'Webpage, HTML Only' and as MHTML when the
> 'Save Page as MHTML' flag is enabled now uses the same code, and should thus
> have the same feature set. Meaning that both modes now should be a bit better.
>
> Detailed list of changes:
>
> - PageSerializerTest: Prepare for more DTD test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove now unneccesary input image test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove unused WebPageSerializer/Impl code
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI morph test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move namespace test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move SVG Image test
> - MHTMLTest: Move MHTML specific test to own test file
> - PageSerializerTest: Delete duplicate XML header test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move blank frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move CSS test
> - PageSerializerTest: Add frameset/frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old iframe test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old elements test
> - Use PageSerizer for saving web pages
> - PageSerializerTest: Test for rewriting links
> - PageSerializer: Add rewrite link accumulator
> - PageSerializer: Serialize images in iframes/frames src
> - PageSerializer: XHTML fix for meta tags
> - PageSerializer: Add presentation CSS
> - PageSerializer: Rename out parameter
>
> BUG=
> [email protected]
>
> Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/68613003
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73673003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162156 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static void perf_free_event(struct perf_event *event,
struct perf_event_context *ctx)
{
struct perf_event *parent = event->parent;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!parent))
return;
mutex_lock(&parent->child_mutex);
list_del_init(&event->child_list);
mutex_unlock(&parent->child_mutex);
put_event(parent);
perf_group_detach(event);
list_del_event(event, ctx);
free_event(event);
}
Commit Message: perf: Treat attr.config as u64 in perf_swevent_init()
Trinity discovered that we fail to check all 64 bits of
attr.config passed by user space, resulting to out-of-bounds
access of the perf_swevent_enabled array in
sw_perf_event_destroy().
Introduced in commit b0a873ebb ("perf: Register PMU
implementations").
Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void ff_h264_free_tables(H264Context *h, int free_rbsp)
{
int i;
H264Context *hx;
av_freep(&h->intra4x4_pred_mode);
av_freep(&h->chroma_pred_mode_table);
av_freep(&h->cbp_table);
av_freep(&h->mvd_table[0]);
av_freep(&h->mvd_table[1]);
av_freep(&h->direct_table);
av_freep(&h->non_zero_count);
av_freep(&h->slice_table_base);
h->slice_table = NULL;
av_freep(&h->list_counts);
av_freep(&h->mb2b_xy);
av_freep(&h->mb2br_xy);
av_buffer_pool_uninit(&h->qscale_table_pool);
av_buffer_pool_uninit(&h->mb_type_pool);
av_buffer_pool_uninit(&h->motion_val_pool);
av_buffer_pool_uninit(&h->ref_index_pool);
if (free_rbsp && h->DPB) {
for (i = 0; i < H264_MAX_PICTURE_COUNT; i++)
ff_h264_unref_picture(h, &h->DPB[i]);
av_freep(&h->DPB);
} else if (h->DPB) {
for (i = 0; i < H264_MAX_PICTURE_COUNT; i++)
h->DPB[i].needs_realloc = 1;
}
h->cur_pic_ptr = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < H264_MAX_THREADS; i++) {
hx = h->thread_context[i];
if (!hx)
continue;
av_freep(&hx->top_borders[1]);
av_freep(&hx->top_borders[0]);
av_freep(&hx->bipred_scratchpad);
av_freep(&hx->edge_emu_buffer);
av_freep(&hx->dc_val_base);
av_freep(&hx->er.mb_index2xy);
av_freep(&hx->er.error_status_table);
av_freep(&hx->er.er_temp_buffer);
av_freep(&hx->er.mbintra_table);
av_freep(&hx->er.mbskip_table);
if (free_rbsp) {
av_freep(&hx->rbsp_buffer[1]);
av_freep(&hx->rbsp_buffer[0]);
hx->rbsp_buffer_size[0] = 0;
hx->rbsp_buffer_size[1] = 0;
}
if (i)
av_freep(&h->thread_context[i]);
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/h264: Clear delayed_pic on deallocation
Fixes use of freed memory
Fixes: case5_av_frame_copy_props.mp4
Found-by: Michal Zalewski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: snmp_rfcv2_handler(__attribute__((unused)) vector_t *strvec)
{
global_data->enable_snmp_rfcv2 = true;
}
Commit Message: Add command line and configuration option to set umask
Issue #1048 identified that files created by keepalived are created
with mode 0666. This commit changes the default to 0644, and also
allows the umask to be specified in the configuration or as a command
line option.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int sd_ioctl(struct block_device *bdev, fmode_t mode,
unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct gendisk *disk = bdev->bd_disk;
struct scsi_disk *sdkp = scsi_disk(disk);
struct scsi_device *sdp = sdkp->device;
void __user *p = (void __user *)arg;
int error;
SCSI_LOG_IOCTL(1, sd_printk(KERN_INFO, sdkp, "sd_ioctl: disk=%s, "
"cmd=0x%x\n", disk->disk_name, cmd));
/*
* If we are in the middle of error recovery, don't let anyone
* else try and use this device. Also, if error recovery fails, it
* may try and take the device offline, in which case all further
* access to the device is prohibited.
*/
error = scsi_nonblockable_ioctl(sdp, cmd, p,
(mode & FMODE_NDELAY) != 0);
if (!scsi_block_when_processing_errors(sdp) || !error)
goto out;
/*
* Send SCSI addressing ioctls directly to mid level, send other
* ioctls to block level and then onto mid level if they can't be
* resolved.
*/
switch (cmd) {
case SCSI_IOCTL_GET_IDLUN:
case SCSI_IOCTL_GET_BUS_NUMBER:
error = scsi_ioctl(sdp, cmd, p);
break;
default:
error = scsi_cmd_blk_ioctl(bdev, mode, cmd, p);
if (error != -ENOTTY)
break;
error = scsi_ioctl(sdp, cmd, p);
break;
}
out:
return error;
}
Commit Message: block: fail SCSI passthrough ioctls on partition devices
Linux allows executing the SG_IO ioctl on a partition or LVM volume, and
will pass the command to the underlying block device. This is
well-known, but it is also a large security problem when (via Unix
permissions, ACLs, SELinux or a combination thereof) a program or user
needs to be granted access only to part of the disk.
This patch lets partitions forward a small set of harmless ioctls;
others are logged with printk so that we can see which ioctls are
actually sent. In my tests only CDROM_GET_CAPABILITY actually occurred.
Of course it was being sent to a (partition on a) hard disk, so it would
have failed with ENOTTY and the patch isn't changing anything in
practice. Still, I'm treating it specially to avoid spamming the logs.
In principle, this restriction should include programs running with
CAP_SYS_RAWIO. If for example I let a program access /dev/sda2 and
/dev/sdb, it still should not be able to read/write outside the
boundaries of /dev/sda2 independent of the capabilities. However, for
now programs with CAP_SYS_RAWIO will still be allowed to send the
ioctls. Their actions will still be logged.
This patch does not affect the non-libata IDE driver. That driver
however already tests for bd != bd->bd_contains before issuing some
ioctl; it could be restricted further to forbid these ioctls even for
programs running with CAP_SYS_ADMIN/CAP_SYS_RAWIO.
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Cc: James Bottomley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
[ Make it also print the command name when warning - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: validGlxScreen(ClientPtr client, int screen, __GLXscreen **pGlxScreen, int *err)
{
/*
** Check if screen exists.
*/
if (screen >= screenInfo.numScreens) {
client->errorValue = screen;
*err = BadValue;
return FALSE;
}
*pGlxScreen = glxGetScreen(screenInfo.screens[screen]);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int read_data(void *opaque, uint8_t *buf, int buf_size)
{
struct playlist *v = opaque;
HLSContext *c = v->parent->priv_data;
int ret, i;
int just_opened = 0;
restart:
if (!v->needed)
return AVERROR_EOF;
if (!v->input) {
int64_t reload_interval;
struct segment *seg;
/* Check that the playlist is still needed before opening a new
* segment. */
if (v->ctx && v->ctx->nb_streams) {
v->needed = 0;
for (i = 0; i < v->n_main_streams; i++) {
if (v->main_streams[i]->discard < AVDISCARD_ALL) {
v->needed = 1;
break;
}
}
}
if (!v->needed) {
av_log(v->parent, AV_LOG_INFO, "No longer receiving playlist %d\n",
v->index);
return AVERROR_EOF;
}
/* If this is a live stream and the reload interval has elapsed since
* the last playlist reload, reload the playlists now. */
reload_interval = default_reload_interval(v);
reload:
if (!v->finished &&
av_gettime_relative() - v->last_load_time >= reload_interval) {
if ((ret = parse_playlist(c, v->url, v, NULL)) < 0) {
av_log(v->parent, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Failed to reload playlist %d\n",
v->index);
return ret;
}
/* If we need to reload the playlist again below (if
* there's still no more segments), switch to a reload
* interval of half the target duration. */
reload_interval = v->target_duration / 2;
}
if (v->cur_seq_no < v->start_seq_no) {
av_log(NULL, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"skipping %d segments ahead, expired from playlists\n",
v->start_seq_no - v->cur_seq_no);
v->cur_seq_no = v->start_seq_no;
}
if (v->cur_seq_no >= v->start_seq_no + v->n_segments) {
if (v->finished)
return AVERROR_EOF;
while (av_gettime_relative() - v->last_load_time < reload_interval) {
if (ff_check_interrupt(c->interrupt_callback))
return AVERROR_EXIT;
av_usleep(100*1000);
}
/* Enough time has elapsed since the last reload */
goto reload;
}
seg = current_segment(v);
/* load/update Media Initialization Section, if any */
ret = update_init_section(v, seg);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = open_input(c, v, seg);
if (ret < 0) {
if (ff_check_interrupt(c->interrupt_callback))
return AVERROR_EXIT;
av_log(v->parent, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Failed to open segment of playlist %d\n",
v->index);
v->cur_seq_no += 1;
goto reload;
}
just_opened = 1;
}
if (v->init_sec_buf_read_offset < v->init_sec_data_len) {
/* Push init section out first before first actual segment */
int copy_size = FFMIN(v->init_sec_data_len - v->init_sec_buf_read_offset, buf_size);
memcpy(buf, v->init_sec_buf, copy_size);
v->init_sec_buf_read_offset += copy_size;
return copy_size;
}
ret = read_from_url(v, current_segment(v), buf, buf_size, READ_NORMAL);
if (ret > 0) {
if (just_opened && v->is_id3_timestamped != 0) {
/* Intercept ID3 tags here, elementary audio streams are required
* to convey timestamps using them in the beginning of each segment. */
intercept_id3(v, buf, buf_size, &ret);
}
return ret;
}
ff_format_io_close(v->parent, &v->input);
v->cur_seq_no++;
c->cur_seq_no = v->cur_seq_no;
goto restart;
}
Commit Message: avformat/hls: Check local file extensions
This reduces the attack surface of local file-system
information leaking.
It prevents the existing exploit leading to an information leak. As
well as similar hypothetical attacks.
Leaks of information from files and symlinks ending in common multimedia extensions
are still possible. But files with sensitive information like private keys and passwords
generally do not use common multimedia filename extensions.
It does not stop leaks via remote addresses in the LAN.
The existing exploit depends on a specific decoder as well.
It does appear though that the exploit should be possible with any decoder.
The problem is that as long as sensitive information gets into the decoder,
the output of the decoder becomes sensitive as well.
The only obvious solution is to prevent access to sensitive information. Or to
disable hls or possibly some of its feature. More complex solutions like
checking the path to limit access to only subdirectories of the hls path may
work as an alternative. But such solutions are fragile and tricky to implement
portably and would not stop every possible attack nor would they work with all
valid hls files.
Developers have expressed their dislike / objected to disabling hls by default as well
as disabling hls with local files. There also where objections against restricting
remote url file extensions. This here is a less robust but also lower
inconvenience solution.
It can be applied stand alone or together with other solutions.
limiting the check to local files was suggested by nevcairiel
This recommits the security fix without the author name joke which was
originally requested by Nicolas.
Found-by: Emil Lerner and Pavel Cheremushkin
Reported-by: Thierry Foucu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void raw_icmp_error(struct sk_buff *skb, int protocol, u32 info)
{
int hash;
struct sock *raw_sk;
const struct iphdr *iph;
struct net *net;
hash = protocol & (RAW_HTABLE_SIZE - 1);
read_lock(&raw_v4_hashinfo.lock);
raw_sk = sk_head(&raw_v4_hashinfo.ht[hash]);
if (raw_sk) {
int dif = skb->dev->ifindex;
int sdif = inet_sdif(skb);
iph = (const struct iphdr *)skb->data;
net = dev_net(skb->dev);
while ((raw_sk = __raw_v4_lookup(net, raw_sk, protocol,
iph->daddr, iph->saddr,
dif, sdif)) != NULL) {
raw_err(raw_sk, skb, info);
raw_sk = sk_next(raw_sk);
iph = (const struct iphdr *)skb->data;
}
}
read_unlock(&raw_v4_hashinfo.lock);
}
Commit Message: net: ipv4: fix for a race condition in raw_sendmsg
inet->hdrincl is racy, and could lead to uninitialized stack pointer
usage, so its value should be read only once.
Fixes: c008ba5bdc9f ("ipv4: Avoid reading user iov twice after raw_probe_proto_opt")
Signed-off-by: Mohamed Ghannam <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear()
{
m_successCallback.clear();
m_errorCallback.clear();
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: int Downmix_GetDescriptor(effect_handle_t self, effect_descriptor_t *pDescriptor)
{
downmix_module_t *pDwnmxModule = (downmix_module_t *) self;
if (pDwnmxModule == NULL ||
pDwnmxModule->context.state == DOWNMIX_STATE_UNINITIALIZED) {
return -EINVAL;
}
memcpy(pDescriptor, &gDownmixDescriptor, sizeof(effect_descriptor_t));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int rngapi_reset(struct crypto_rng *tfm, const u8 *seed,
unsigned int slen)
{
u8 *buf = NULL;
u8 *src = (u8 *)seed;
int err;
if (slen) {
buf = kmalloc(slen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
memcpy(buf, seed, slen);
src = buf;
}
err = crypto_old_rng_alg(tfm)->rng_reset(tfm, src, slen);
kzfree(buf);
return err;
}
Commit Message: crypto: rng - Remove old low-level rng interface
Now that all rng implementations have switched over to the new
interface, we can remove the old low-level interface.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int exif_process_IFD_in_JPEG(image_info_type *ImageInfo, char *dir_start, char *offset_base, size_t IFDlength, size_t displacement, int section_index TSRMLS_DC)
{
int de;
int NumDirEntries;
int NextDirOffset;
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_NOTICE, "Process %s (x%04X(=%d))", exif_get_sectionname(section_index), IFDlength, IFDlength);
#endif
ImageInfo->sections_found |= FOUND_IFD0;
NumDirEntries = php_ifd_get16u(dir_start, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
if ((dir_start+2+NumDirEntries*12) > (offset_base+IFDlength)) {
if (!exif_process_IFD_TAG(ImageInfo, dir_start + 2 + 12 * de,
offset_base, IFDlength, displacement, section_index, 1, exif_get_tag_table(section_index) TSRMLS_CC)) {
return FALSE;
}
}
/*
* Ignore IFD2 if it purportedly exists
*/
if (section_index == SECTION_THUMBNAIL) {
return TRUE;
}
/*
* Hack to make it process IDF1 I hope
* There are 2 IDFs, the second one holds the keys (0x0201 and 0x0202) to the thumbnail
*/
NextDirOffset = php_ifd_get32u(dir_start+2+12*de, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
if (NextDirOffset) {
* Hack to make it process IDF1 I hope
* There are 2 IDFs, the second one holds the keys (0x0201 and 0x0202) to the thumbnail
*/
NextDirOffset = php_ifd_get32u(dir_start+2+12*de, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
if (NextDirOffset) {
/* the next line seems false but here IFDlength means length of all IFDs */
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_NOTICE, "Thumbnail size: 0x%04X", ImageInfo->Thumbnail.size);
#endif
if (ImageInfo->Thumbnail.filetype != IMAGE_FILETYPE_UNKNOWN
&& ImageInfo->Thumbnail.size
&& ImageInfo->Thumbnail.offset
&& ImageInfo->read_thumbnail
) {
exif_thumbnail_extract(ImageInfo, offset_base, IFDlength TSRMLS_CC);
}
return TRUE;
} else {
return FALSE;
}
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::SynthesizeGLError(
GLenum error,
const char* function_name,
const char* description,
ConsoleDisplayPreference display) {
String error_type = GetErrorString(error);
if (synthesized_errors_to_console_ && display == kDisplayInConsole) {
String message = String("WebGL: ") + error_type + ": " +
String(function_name) + ": " + String(description);
PrintGLErrorToConsole(message);
}
if (!isContextLost()) {
if (!synthetic_errors_.Contains(error))
synthetic_errors_.push_back(error);
} else {
if (!lost_context_errors_.Contains(error))
lost_context_errors_.push_back(error);
}
probe::DidFireWebGLError(canvas(), error_type);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static inline __maybe_unused void h2_skip_frame_hdr(struct buffer *b)
{
bi_del(b, 9);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: nlmsvc_grant_reply(struct nlm_cookie *cookie, __be32 status)
{
struct nlm_block *block;
dprintk("grant_reply: looking for cookie %x, s=%d \n",
*(unsigned int *)(cookie->data), status);
if (!(block = nlmsvc_find_block(cookie)))
return;
if (block) {
if (status == nlm_lck_denied_grace_period) {
/* Try again in a couple of seconds */
nlmsvc_insert_block(block, 10 * HZ);
} else {
/* Lock is now held by client, or has been rejected.
* In both cases, the block should be removed. */
nlmsvc_unlink_block(block);
}
}
nlmsvc_release_block(block);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void WebMediaPlayerImpl::ScheduleRestart() {
if (pipeline_controller_.IsPipelineRunning() &&
!pipeline_controller_.IsPipelineSuspended()) {
pending_suspend_resume_cycle_ = true;
UpdatePlayState();
}
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: status_t BnDrm::onTransact(
uint32_t code, const Parcel &data, Parcel *reply, uint32_t flags) {
switch (code) {
case INIT_CHECK:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
reply->writeInt32(initCheck());
return OK;
}
case IS_CRYPTO_SUPPORTED:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
uint8_t uuid[16];
data.read(uuid, sizeof(uuid));
String8 mimeType = data.readString8();
reply->writeInt32(isCryptoSchemeSupported(uuid, mimeType));
return OK;
}
case CREATE_PLUGIN:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
uint8_t uuid[16];
data.read(uuid, sizeof(uuid));
reply->writeInt32(createPlugin(uuid));
return OK;
}
case DESTROY_PLUGIN:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
reply->writeInt32(destroyPlugin());
return OK;
}
case OPEN_SESSION:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> sessionId;
status_t result = openSession(sessionId);
writeVector(reply, sessionId);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return OK;
}
case CLOSE_SESSION:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> sessionId;
readVector(data, sessionId);
reply->writeInt32(closeSession(sessionId));
return OK;
}
case GET_KEY_REQUEST:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> sessionId, initData;
readVector(data, sessionId);
readVector(data, initData);
String8 mimeType = data.readString8();
DrmPlugin::KeyType keyType = (DrmPlugin::KeyType)data.readInt32();
KeyedVector<String8, String8> optionalParameters;
uint32_t count = data.readInt32();
for (size_t i = 0; i < count; ++i) {
String8 key, value;
key = data.readString8();
value = data.readString8();
optionalParameters.add(key, value);
}
Vector<uint8_t> request;
String8 defaultUrl;
DrmPlugin::KeyRequestType keyRequestType;
status_t result = getKeyRequest(sessionId, initData, mimeType,
keyType, optionalParameters, request, defaultUrl,
&keyRequestType);
writeVector(reply, request);
reply->writeString8(defaultUrl);
reply->writeInt32(static_cast<int32_t>(keyRequestType));
reply->writeInt32(result);
return OK;
}
case PROVIDE_KEY_RESPONSE:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> sessionId, response, keySetId;
readVector(data, sessionId);
readVector(data, response);
uint32_t result = provideKeyResponse(sessionId, response, keySetId);
writeVector(reply, keySetId);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return OK;
}
case REMOVE_KEYS:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> keySetId;
readVector(data, keySetId);
reply->writeInt32(removeKeys(keySetId));
return OK;
}
case RESTORE_KEYS:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> sessionId, keySetId;
readVector(data, sessionId);
readVector(data, keySetId);
reply->writeInt32(restoreKeys(sessionId, keySetId));
return OK;
}
case QUERY_KEY_STATUS:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> sessionId;
readVector(data, sessionId);
KeyedVector<String8, String8> infoMap;
status_t result = queryKeyStatus(sessionId, infoMap);
size_t count = infoMap.size();
reply->writeInt32(count);
for (size_t i = 0; i < count; ++i) {
reply->writeString8(infoMap.keyAt(i));
reply->writeString8(infoMap.valueAt(i));
}
reply->writeInt32(result);
return OK;
}
case GET_PROVISION_REQUEST:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
String8 certType = data.readString8();
String8 certAuthority = data.readString8();
Vector<uint8_t> request;
String8 defaultUrl;
status_t result = getProvisionRequest(certType, certAuthority,
request, defaultUrl);
writeVector(reply, request);
reply->writeString8(defaultUrl);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return OK;
}
case PROVIDE_PROVISION_RESPONSE:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> response;
Vector<uint8_t> certificate;
Vector<uint8_t> wrappedKey;
readVector(data, response);
status_t result = provideProvisionResponse(response, certificate, wrappedKey);
writeVector(reply, certificate);
writeVector(reply, wrappedKey);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return OK;
}
case UNPROVISION_DEVICE:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
status_t result = unprovisionDevice();
reply->writeInt32(result);
return OK;
}
case GET_SECURE_STOPS:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
List<Vector<uint8_t> > secureStops;
status_t result = getSecureStops(secureStops);
size_t count = secureStops.size();
reply->writeInt32(count);
List<Vector<uint8_t> >::iterator iter = secureStops.begin();
while(iter != secureStops.end()) {
size_t size = iter->size();
reply->writeInt32(size);
reply->write(iter->array(), iter->size());
iter++;
}
reply->writeInt32(result);
return OK;
}
case GET_SECURE_STOP:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> ssid, secureStop;
readVector(data, ssid);
status_t result = getSecureStop(ssid, secureStop);
writeVector(reply, secureStop);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return OK;
}
case RELEASE_SECURE_STOPS:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> ssRelease;
readVector(data, ssRelease);
reply->writeInt32(releaseSecureStops(ssRelease));
return OK;
}
case RELEASE_ALL_SECURE_STOPS:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
reply->writeInt32(releaseAllSecureStops());
return OK;
}
case GET_PROPERTY_STRING:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
String8 name = data.readString8();
String8 value;
status_t result = getPropertyString(name, value);
reply->writeString8(value);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return OK;
}
case GET_PROPERTY_BYTE_ARRAY:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
String8 name = data.readString8();
Vector<uint8_t> value;
status_t result = getPropertyByteArray(name, value);
writeVector(reply, value);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return OK;
}
case SET_PROPERTY_STRING:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
String8 name = data.readString8();
String8 value = data.readString8();
reply->writeInt32(setPropertyString(name, value));
return OK;
}
case SET_PROPERTY_BYTE_ARRAY:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
String8 name = data.readString8();
Vector<uint8_t> value;
readVector(data, value);
reply->writeInt32(setPropertyByteArray(name, value));
return OK;
}
case SET_CIPHER_ALGORITHM:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> sessionId;
readVector(data, sessionId);
String8 algorithm = data.readString8();
reply->writeInt32(setCipherAlgorithm(sessionId, algorithm));
return OK;
}
case SET_MAC_ALGORITHM:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> sessionId;
readVector(data, sessionId);
String8 algorithm = data.readString8();
reply->writeInt32(setMacAlgorithm(sessionId, algorithm));
return OK;
}
case ENCRYPT:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> sessionId, keyId, input, iv, output;
readVector(data, sessionId);
readVector(data, keyId);
readVector(data, input);
readVector(data, iv);
uint32_t result = encrypt(sessionId, keyId, input, iv, output);
writeVector(reply, output);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return OK;
}
case DECRYPT:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> sessionId, keyId, input, iv, output;
readVector(data, sessionId);
readVector(data, keyId);
readVector(data, input);
readVector(data, iv);
uint32_t result = decrypt(sessionId, keyId, input, iv, output);
writeVector(reply, output);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return OK;
}
case SIGN:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> sessionId, keyId, message, signature;
readVector(data, sessionId);
readVector(data, keyId);
readVector(data, message);
uint32_t result = sign(sessionId, keyId, message, signature);
writeVector(reply, signature);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return OK;
}
case VERIFY:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> sessionId, keyId, message, signature;
readVector(data, sessionId);
readVector(data, keyId);
readVector(data, message);
readVector(data, signature);
bool match;
uint32_t result = verify(sessionId, keyId, message, signature, match);
reply->writeInt32(match);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return OK;
}
case SIGN_RSA:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> sessionId, message, wrappedKey, signature;
readVector(data, sessionId);
String8 algorithm = data.readString8();
readVector(data, message);
readVector(data, wrappedKey);
uint32_t result = signRSA(sessionId, algorithm, message, wrappedKey, signature);
writeVector(reply, signature);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return OK;
}
case SET_LISTENER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
sp<IDrmClient> listener =
interface_cast<IDrmClient>(data.readStrongBinder());
reply->writeInt32(setListener(listener));
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
default:
return BBinder::onTransact(code, data, reply, flags);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix info leak vulnerability of IDrm
bug: 26323455
Change-Id: I25bb30d3666ab38d5150496375ed2f55ecb23ba8
CWE ID: CWE-264
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int kempf_decode_tile(G2MContext *c, int tile_x, int tile_y,
const uint8_t *src, int src_size)
{
int width, height;
int hdr, zsize, npal, tidx = -1, ret;
int i, j;
const uint8_t *src_end = src + src_size;
uint8_t pal[768], transp[3];
uLongf dlen = (c->tile_width + 1) * c->tile_height;
int sub_type;
int nblocks, cblocks, bstride;
int bits, bitbuf, coded;
uint8_t *dst = c->framebuf + tile_x * c->tile_width * 3 +
tile_y * c->tile_height * c->framebuf_stride;
if (src_size < 2)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
width = FFMIN(c->width - tile_x * c->tile_width, c->tile_width);
height = FFMIN(c->height - tile_y * c->tile_height, c->tile_height);
hdr = *src++;
sub_type = hdr >> 5;
if (sub_type == 0) {
int j;
memcpy(transp, src, 3);
src += 3;
for (j = 0; j < height; j++, dst += c->framebuf_stride)
for (i = 0; i < width; i++)
memcpy(dst + i * 3, transp, 3);
return 0;
} else if (sub_type == 1) {
return jpg_decode_data(&c->jc, width, height, src, src_end - src,
dst, c->framebuf_stride, NULL, 0, 0, 0);
}
if (sub_type != 2) {
memcpy(transp, src, 3);
src += 3;
}
npal = *src++ + 1;
memcpy(pal, src, npal * 3); src += npal * 3;
if (sub_type != 2) {
for (i = 0; i < npal; i++) {
if (!memcmp(pal + i * 3, transp, 3)) {
tidx = i;
break;
}
}
}
if (src_end - src < 2)
return 0;
zsize = (src[0] << 8) | src[1]; src += 2;
if (src_end - src < zsize)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
ret = uncompress(c->kempf_buf, &dlen, src, zsize);
if (ret)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
src += zsize;
if (sub_type == 2) {
kempf_restore_buf(c->kempf_buf, dlen, dst, c->framebuf_stride,
NULL, 0, width, height, pal, npal, tidx);
return 0;
}
nblocks = *src++ + 1;
cblocks = 0;
bstride = FFALIGN(width, 16) >> 4;
bits = 0;
for (i = 0; i < (FFALIGN(height, 16) >> 4); i++) {
for (j = 0; j < (FFALIGN(width, 16) >> 4); j++) {
if (!bits) {
bitbuf = *src++;
bits = 8;
}
coded = bitbuf & 1;
bits--;
bitbuf >>= 1;
cblocks += coded;
if (cblocks > nblocks)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
c->kempf_flags[j + i * bstride] = coded;
}
}
memset(c->jpeg_tile, 0, c->tile_stride * height);
jpg_decode_data(&c->jc, width, height, src, src_end - src,
c->jpeg_tile, c->tile_stride,
c->kempf_flags, bstride, nblocks, 0);
kempf_restore_buf(c->kempf_buf, dlen, dst, c->framebuf_stride,
c->jpeg_tile, c->tile_stride,
width, height, pal, npal, tidx);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/g2meet: fix src pointer checks in kempf_decode_tile()
Fixes Ticket2842
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static SelectionInFlatTree AdjustEndpointsAtBidiBoundary(
const VisiblePositionInFlatTree& visible_base,
const VisiblePositionInFlatTree& visible_extent) {
DCHECK(visible_base.IsValid());
DCHECK(visible_extent.IsValid());
RenderedPosition base(visible_base);
RenderedPosition extent(visible_extent);
const SelectionInFlatTree& unchanged_selection =
SelectionInFlatTree::Builder()
.SetBaseAndExtent(visible_base.DeepEquivalent(),
visible_extent.DeepEquivalent())
.Build();
if (base.IsNull() || extent.IsNull() || base.IsEquivalent(extent))
return unchanged_selection;
if (base.AtLeftBoundaryOfBidiRun()) {
if (!extent.AtRightBoundaryOfBidiRun(base.BidiLevelOnRight()) &&
base.IsEquivalent(
extent.LeftBoundaryOfBidiRun(base.BidiLevelOnRight()))) {
return SelectionInFlatTree::Builder()
.SetBaseAndExtent(
CreateVisiblePosition(
ToPositionInFlatTree(base.PositionAtLeftBoundaryOfBiDiRun()))
.DeepEquivalent(),
visible_extent.DeepEquivalent())
.Build();
}
return unchanged_selection;
}
if (base.AtRightBoundaryOfBidiRun()) {
if (!extent.AtLeftBoundaryOfBidiRun(base.BidiLevelOnLeft()) &&
base.IsEquivalent(
extent.RightBoundaryOfBidiRun(base.BidiLevelOnLeft()))) {
return SelectionInFlatTree::Builder()
.SetBaseAndExtent(
CreateVisiblePosition(
ToPositionInFlatTree(base.PositionAtRightBoundaryOfBiDiRun()))
.DeepEquivalent(),
visible_extent.DeepEquivalent())
.Build();
}
return unchanged_selection;
}
if (extent.AtLeftBoundaryOfBidiRun() &&
extent.IsEquivalent(
base.LeftBoundaryOfBidiRun(extent.BidiLevelOnRight()))) {
return SelectionInFlatTree::Builder()
.SetBaseAndExtent(
visible_base.DeepEquivalent(),
CreateVisiblePosition(
ToPositionInFlatTree(extent.PositionAtLeftBoundaryOfBiDiRun()))
.DeepEquivalent())
.Build();
}
if (extent.AtRightBoundaryOfBidiRun() &&
extent.IsEquivalent(
base.RightBoundaryOfBidiRun(extent.BidiLevelOnLeft()))) {
return SelectionInFlatTree::Builder()
.SetBaseAndExtent(
visible_base.DeepEquivalent(),
CreateVisiblePosition(
ToPositionInFlatTree(extent.PositionAtRightBoundaryOfBiDiRun()))
.DeepEquivalent())
.Build();
}
return unchanged_selection;
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int pf_start(struct pf_unit *pf, int cmd, int b, int c)
{
int i;
char io_cmd[12] = { cmd, pf->lun << 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 };
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
io_cmd[5 - i] = b & 0xff;
b = b >> 8;
}
io_cmd[8] = c & 0xff;
io_cmd[7] = (c >> 8) & 0xff;
i = pf_command(pf, io_cmd, c * 512, "start i/o");
mdelay(1);
return i;
}
Commit Message: paride/pf: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference
Syzkaller report this:
pf: pf version 1.04, major 47, cluster 64, nice 0
pf: No ATAPI disk detected
kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 9887 Comm: syz-executor.0 Tainted: G C 5.1.0-rc3+ #8
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:pf_init+0x7af/0x1000 [pf]
Code: 46 77 d2 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 80 3c 28 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 03 25 a6 d2 4c 8b 23 49 8d bc 24 80 05 00 00 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <80> 3c 28 00 74 05 e8 e6 24 a6 d2 49 8b bc 24 80 05 00 00 e8 79 34
RSP: 0018:ffff8881abcbf998 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 00000000000000b0 RBX: ffffffffc1e4a8a8 RCX: ffffffffaec50788
RDX: 0000000000039b10 RSI: ffffc9000153c000 RDI: 0000000000000580
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffffed103ee44e59 R09: ffffed103ee44e59
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed103ee44e58 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffffffc1e4b028 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000020
FS: 00007f1b78a91700(0000) GS:ffff8881f7200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f6d72b207f8 CR3: 00000001d5790004 CR4: 00000000007606f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
? 0xffffffffc1e50000
do_one_initcall+0xbc/0x47d init/main.c:901
do_init_module+0x1b5/0x547 kernel/module.c:3456
load_module+0x6405/0x8c10 kernel/module.c:3804
__do_sys_finit_module+0x162/0x190 kernel/module.c:3898
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f1b78a90c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000180 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f1b78a90c70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f1b78a916bc
R13: 00000000004bcefa R14: 00000000006f6fb0 R15: 0000000000000004
Modules linked in: pf(+) paride gpio_tps65218 tps65218 i2c_cht_wc ati_remote dc395x act_meta_skbtcindex act_ife ife ecdh_generic rc_xbox_dvd sky81452_regulator v4l2_fwnode leds_blinkm snd_usb_hiface comedi(C) aes_ti slhc cfi_cmdset_0020 mtd cfi_util sx8654 mdio_gpio of_mdio fixed_phy mdio_bitbang libphy alcor_pci matrix_keymap hid_uclogic usbhid scsi_transport_fc videobuf2_v4l2 videobuf2_dma_sg snd_soc_pcm179x_spi snd_soc_pcm179x_codec i2c_demux_pinctrl mdev snd_indigodj isl6405 mii enc28j60 cmac adt7316_i2c(C) adt7316(C) fmc_trivial fmc nf_reject_ipv4 authenc rc_dtt200u rtc_ds1672 dvb_usb_dibusb_mc dvb_usb_dibusb_mc_common dib3000mc dibx000_common dvb_usb_dibusb_common dvb_usb dvb_core videobuf2_common videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops regulator_haptic adf7242 mac802154 ieee802154 s5h1409 da9034_ts snd_intel8x0m wmi cx24120 usbcore sdhci_cadence sdhci_pltfm sdhci mmc_core joydev i2c_algo_bit scsi_transport_iscsi iscsi_boot_sysfs ves1820 lockd grace nfs_acl auth_rpcgss sunrp
c
ip_vs snd_soc_adau7002 snd_cs4281 snd_rawmidi gameport snd_opl3_lib snd_seq_device snd_hwdep snd_ac97_codec ad7418 hid_primax hid snd_soc_cs4265 snd_soc_core snd_pcm_dmaengine snd_pcm snd_timer ac97_bus snd_compress snd soundcore ti_adc108s102 eeprom_93cx6 i2c_algo_pca mlxreg_hotplug st_pressure st_sensors industrialio_triggered_buffer kfifo_buf industrialio v4l2_common videodev media snd_soc_adau_utils rc_pinnacle_grey rc_core pps_gpio leds_lm3692x nandcore ledtrig_pattern iptable_security iptable_raw iptable_mangle iptable_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 iptable_filter bpfilter ip6_vti ip_vti ip_gre ipip sit tunnel4 ip_tunnel hsr veth netdevsim vxcan batman_adv cfg80211 rfkill chnl_net caif nlmon dummy team bonding vcan bridge stp llc ip6_gre gre ip6_tunnel tunnel6 tun mousedev ppdev tpm kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel ide_pci_generic aes_x86_64 piix crypto_simd input_leds psmouse cryp
td
glue_helper ide_core intel_agp serio_raw intel_gtt agpgart ata_generic i2c_piix4 pata_acpi parport_pc parport rtc_cmos floppy sch_fq_codel ip_tables x_tables sha1_ssse3 sha1_generic ipv6 [last unloaded: paride]
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
---[ end trace 7a818cf5f210d79e ]---
If alloc_disk fails in pf_init_units, pf->disk will be
NULL, however in pf_detect and pf_exit, it's not check
this before free.It may result a NULL pointer dereference.
Also when register_blkdev failed, blk_cleanup_queue() and
blk_mq_free_tag_set() should be called to free resources.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]>
Fixes: 6ce59025f118 ("paride/pf: cleanup queues when detection fails")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: Response PageHandler::SetDownloadBehavior(const std::string& behavior,
Maybe<std::string> download_path) {
WebContentsImpl* web_contents = GetWebContents();
if (!web_contents)
return Response::InternalError();
if (behavior == Page::SetDownloadBehavior::BehaviorEnum::Allow &&
!download_path.isJust())
return Response::Error("downloadPath not provided");
if (behavior == Page::SetDownloadBehavior::BehaviorEnum::Default) {
DevToolsDownloadManagerHelper::RemoveFromWebContents(web_contents);
download_manager_delegate_ = nullptr;
return Response::OK();
}
content::BrowserContext* browser_context = web_contents->GetBrowserContext();
DCHECK(browser_context);
content::DownloadManager* download_manager =
content::BrowserContext::GetDownloadManager(browser_context);
download_manager_delegate_ =
DevToolsDownloadManagerDelegate::TakeOver(download_manager);
DevToolsDownloadManagerHelper::CreateForWebContents(web_contents);
DevToolsDownloadManagerHelper* download_helper =
DevToolsDownloadManagerHelper::FromWebContents(web_contents);
download_helper->SetDownloadBehavior(
DevToolsDownloadManagerHelper::DownloadBehavior::DENY);
if (behavior == Page::SetDownloadBehavior::BehaviorEnum::Allow) {
download_helper->SetDownloadBehavior(
DevToolsDownloadManagerHelper::DownloadBehavior::ALLOW);
download_helper->SetDownloadPath(download_path.fromJust());
}
return Response::OK();
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow Page.setDownloadBehavior for extensions
Bug: 866426
Change-Id: I71b672978e1a8ec779ede49da16b21198567d3a4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1270007
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598004}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void bin_list_sasl_mechs(conn *c) {
if (!settings.sasl) {
write_bin_error(c, PROTOCOL_BINARY_RESPONSE_UNKNOWN_COMMAND,
c->binary_header.request.bodylen
- c->binary_header.request.keylen);
return;
}
init_sasl_conn(c);
const char *result_string = NULL;
unsigned int string_length = 0;
int result=sasl_listmech(c->sasl_conn, NULL,
"", /* What to prepend the string with */
" ", /* What to separate mechanisms with */
"", /* What to append to the string */
&result_string, &string_length,
NULL);
if (result != SASL_OK) {
/* Perhaps there's a better error for this... */
if (settings.verbose) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to list SASL mechanisms.\n");
}
write_bin_error(c, PROTOCOL_BINARY_RESPONSE_AUTH_ERROR, 0);
return;
}
write_bin_response(c, (char*)result_string, 0, 0, string_length);
}
Commit Message: Use strncmp when checking for large ascii multigets.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: Bool PVDecodeVopBody(VideoDecControls *decCtrl, int32 buffer_size[])
{
PV_STATUS status = PV_FAIL;
VideoDecData *video = (VideoDecData *) decCtrl->videoDecoderData;
int target_layer = video->currLayer;
Vol *currVol = video->vol[target_layer];
Vop *currVop = video->currVop;
Vop *prevVop = video->prevVop;
Vop *tempVopPtr;
int bytes_consumed = 0; /* Record how many bits we used in the buffer. 04/24/2001 */
int idx;
if (currVop->vopCoded == 0) /* 07/03/2001 */
{
PV_BitstreamByteAlign(currVol->bitstream);
/* We should always clear up bitstream buffer. 10/10/2000 */
bytes_consumed = (getPointer(currVol->bitstream) + 7) >> 3;
if (bytes_consumed > currVol->bitstream->data_end_pos)
{
bytes_consumed = currVol->bitstream->data_end_pos;
}
if (bytes_consumed < buffer_size[target_layer])
{
/* If we only consume part of the bits in the buffer, take those */
/* out. 04/24/2001 */
/* oscl_memcpy(buffer[target_layer], buffer[target_layer]+bytes_consumed,
(buffer_size[target_layer]-=bytes_consumed)); */
buffer_size[target_layer] -= bytes_consumed;
}
else
{
buffer_size[target_layer] = 0;
}
#ifdef PV_MEMORY_POOL
if (target_layer)
{
if (video->prevEnhcVop->timeStamp > video->prevVop->timeStamp)
{
video->prevVop = video->prevEnhcVop;
}
}
oscl_memcpy(currVop->yChan, video->prevVop->yChan, (decCtrl->size*3) / 2);
video->prevVop = prevVop;
video->concealFrame = currVop->yChan; /* 07/07/2001 */
video->vop_coding_type = currVop->predictionType; /* 07/09/01 */
decCtrl->outputFrame = currVop->yChan;
/* Swap VOP pointers. No enhc. frame oscl_memcpy() anymore! 04/24/2001 */
if (target_layer)
{
tempVopPtr = video->prevEnhcVop;
video->prevEnhcVop = video->currVop;
video->currVop = tempVopPtr;
}
else
{
tempVopPtr = video->prevVop;
video->prevVop = video->currVop;
video->currVop = tempVopPtr;
}
#else
if (target_layer) /* this is necessary to avoid flashback problems 06/21/2002*/
{
video->prevEnhcVop->timeStamp = currVop->timeStamp;
}
else
{
video->prevVop->timeStamp = currVop->timeStamp;
}
#endif
video->vop_coding_type = currVop->predictionType; /* 07/09/01 */
/* the following is necessary to avoid displaying an notCoded I-VOP at the beginning of a session
or after random positioning 07/03/02*/
if (currVop->predictionType == I_VOP)
{
video->vop_coding_type = P_VOP;
}
return PV_TRUE;
}
/* ======================================================= */
/* Decode vop body (if there is no error in the header!) */
/* ======================================================= */
/* first, we need to select a reference frame */
if (decCtrl->nLayers > 1)
{
if (currVop->predictionType == I_VOP)
{
/* do nothing here */
}
else if (currVop->predictionType == P_VOP)
{
switch (currVop->refSelectCode)
{
case 0 : /* most recently decoded enhancement vop */
/* Setup video->prevVop before we call PV_DecodeVop(). 04/24/2001 */
if (video->prevEnhcVop->timeStamp >= video->prevVop->timeStamp)
video->prevVop = video->prevEnhcVop;
break;
case 1 : /* most recently displayed base-layer vop */
if (target_layer)
{
if (video->prevEnhcVop->timeStamp > video->prevVop->timeStamp)
video->prevVop = video->prevEnhcVop;
}
break;
case 2 : /* next base-layer vop in display order */
break;
case 3 : /* temporally coincident base-layer vop (no MV's) */
break;
}
}
else /* we have a B-Vop */
{
mp4dec_log("DecodeVideoFrame(): B-VOP not supported.\n");
}
}
/* This is for the calculation of the frame rate and bitrate. */
idx = ++video->frame_idx % BITRATE_AVERAGE_WINDOW;
/* Calculate bitrate for this layer. 08/23/2000 */
status = PV_DecodeVop(video);
video->nBitsPerVop[idx] = getPointer(currVol->bitstream);
video->prevTimestamp[idx] = currVop->timeStamp;
/* restore video->prevVop after PV_DecodeVop(). 04/24/2001 */
video->prevVop = prevVop;
/* Estimate the frame rate. 08/23/2000 */
video->duration = video->prevTimestamp[idx];
video->duration -= video->prevTimestamp[(++idx)%BITRATE_AVERAGE_WINDOW];
if (video->duration > 0)
{ /* Only update framerate when the timestamp is right */
video->frameRate = (int)(FRAMERATE_SCALE) / video->duration;
}
/* We should always clear up bitstream buffer. 10/10/2000 */
bytes_consumed = (getPointer(currVol->bitstream) + 7) >> 3; /* 11/4/03 */
if (bytes_consumed > currVol->bitstream->data_end_pos)
{
bytes_consumed = currVol->bitstream->data_end_pos;
}
if (bytes_consumed < buffer_size[target_layer])
{
/* If we only consume part of the bits in the buffer, take those */
/* out. 04/24/2001 */
/* oscl_memcpy(buffer[target_layer], buffer[target_layer]+bytes_consumed,
(buffer_size[target_layer]-=bytes_consumed)); */
buffer_size[target_layer] -= bytes_consumed;
}
else
{
buffer_size[target_layer] = 0;
}
switch (status)
{
case PV_FAIL :
return PV_FALSE; /* this will take care of concealment if we lose whole frame */
case PV_END_OF_VOP :
/* we may want to differenciate PV_END_OF_VOP and PV_SUCCESS */
/* in the future. 05/10/2000 */
case PV_SUCCESS :
/* Nohting is wrong :). */
video->concealFrame = video->currVop->yChan; /* 07/07/2001 */
video->vop_coding_type = video->currVop->predictionType; /* 07/09/01 */
decCtrl->outputFrame = video->currVop->yChan;
/* Swap VOP pointers. No enhc. frame oscl_memcpy() anymore! 04/24/2001 */
if (target_layer)
{
tempVopPtr = video->prevEnhcVop;
video->prevEnhcVop = video->currVop;
video->currVop = tempVopPtr;
}
else
{
tempVopPtr = video->prevVop;
video->prevVop = video->currVop;
video->currVop = tempVopPtr;
}
break;
default :
/* This will never happen */
break;
}
return PV_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fix NPDs in h263 decoder
Bug: 35269635
Test: decoded PoC with and without patch
Change-Id: I636a14360c7801cc5bca63c9cb44d1d235df8fd8
(cherry picked from commit 2ad2a92318a3b9daf78ebcdc597085adbf32600d)
CWE ID:
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: sctp_chunk_length_valid(struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
__u16 required_length)
{
__u16 chunk_length = ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length);
if (unlikely(chunk_length < required_length))
return 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: net: sctp: fix remote memory pressure from excessive queueing
This scenario is not limited to ASCONF, just taken as one
example triggering the issue. When receiving ASCONF probes
in the form of ...
-------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
<----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
---- ASCONF_a; [ASCONF_b; ...; ASCONF_n;] JUNK ------>
[...]
---- ASCONF_m; [ASCONF_o; ...; ASCONF_z;] JUNK ------>
... where ASCONF_a, ASCONF_b, ..., ASCONF_z are good-formed
ASCONFs and have increasing serial numbers, we process such
ASCONF chunk(s) marked with !end_of_packet and !singleton,
since we have not yet reached the SCTP packet end. SCTP does
only do verification on a chunk by chunk basis, as an SCTP
packet is nothing more than just a container of a stream of
chunks which it eats up one by one.
We could run into the case that we receive a packet with a
malformed tail, above marked as trailing JUNK. All previous
chunks are here goodformed, so the stack will eat up all
previous chunks up to this point. In case JUNK does not fit
into a chunk header and there are no more other chunks in
the input queue, or in case JUNK contains a garbage chunk
header, but the encoded chunk length would exceed the skb
tail, or we came here from an entirely different scenario
and the chunk has pdiscard=1 mark (without having had a flush
point), it will happen, that we will excessively queue up
the association's output queue (a correct final chunk may
then turn it into a response flood when flushing the
queue ;)): I ran a simple script with incremental ASCONF
serial numbers and could see the server side consuming
excessive amount of RAM [before/after: up to 2GB and more].
The issue at heart is that the chunk train basically ends
with !end_of_packet and !singleton markers and since commit
2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding
with 1 packet") therefore preventing an output queue flush
point in sctp_do_sm() -> sctp_cmd_interpreter() on the input
chunk (chunk = event_arg) even though local_cork is set,
but its precedence has changed since then. In the normal
case, the last chunk with end_of_packet=1 would trigger the
queue flush to accommodate possible outgoing bundling.
In the input queue, sctp_inq_pop() seems to do the right thing
in terms of discarding invalid chunks. So, above JUNK will
not enter the state machine and instead be released and exit
the sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() chunk processing loop. It's simply
the flush point being missing at loop exit. Adding a try-flush
approach on the output queue might not work as the underlying
infrastructure might be long gone at this point due to the
side-effect interpreter run.
One possibility, albeit a bit of a kludge, would be to defer
invalid chunk freeing into the state machine in order to
possibly trigger packet discards and thus indirectly a queue
flush on error. It would surely be better to discard chunks
as in the current, perhaps better controlled environment, but
going back and forth, it's simply architecturally not possible.
I tried various trailing JUNK attack cases and it seems to
look good now.
Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.
Fixes: 2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static ssize_t hung_up_tty_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tty: Fix unsafe ldisc reference via ioctl(TIOCGETD)
ioctl(TIOCGETD) retrieves the line discipline id directly from the
ldisc because the line discipline id (c_line) in termios is untrustworthy;
userspace may have set termios via ioctl(TCSETS*) without actually
changing the line discipline via ioctl(TIOCSETD).
However, directly accessing the current ldisc via tty->ldisc is
unsafe; the ldisc ptr dereferenced may be stale if the line discipline
is changing via ioctl(TIOCSETD) or hangup.
Wait for the line discipline reference (just like read() or write())
to retrieve the "current" line discipline id.
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: ext4_xattr_cmp(struct ext4_xattr_header *header1,
struct ext4_xattr_header *header2)
{
struct ext4_xattr_entry *entry1, *entry2;
entry1 = ENTRY(header1+1);
entry2 = ENTRY(header2+1);
while (!IS_LAST_ENTRY(entry1)) {
if (IS_LAST_ENTRY(entry2))
return 1;
if (entry1->e_hash != entry2->e_hash ||
entry1->e_name_index != entry2->e_name_index ||
entry1->e_name_len != entry2->e_name_len ||
entry1->e_value_size != entry2->e_value_size ||
memcmp(entry1->e_name, entry2->e_name, entry1->e_name_len))
return 1;
if (entry1->e_value_block != 0 || entry2->e_value_block != 0)
return -EFSCORRUPTED;
if (memcmp((char *)header1 + le16_to_cpu(entry1->e_value_offs),
(char *)header2 + le16_to_cpu(entry2->e_value_offs),
le32_to_cpu(entry1->e_value_size)))
return 1;
entry1 = EXT4_XATTR_NEXT(entry1);
entry2 = EXT4_XATTR_NEXT(entry2);
}
if (!IS_LAST_ENTRY(entry2))
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ext4: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. The only tricky part is
that xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed
before we get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether
the entry is still valid after getting buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-19
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: ppp_hdlc(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *p, int length)
{
u_char *b, *s, *t, c;
int i, proto;
const void *se;
if (length <= 0)
return;
b = (uint8_t *)malloc(length);
if (b == NULL)
return;
/*
* Unescape all the data into a temporary, private, buffer.
* Do this so that we dont overwrite the original packet
* contents.
*/
for (s = (u_char *)p, t = b, i = length; i > 0; i--) {
c = *s++;
if (c == 0x7d) {
if (i > 1) {
i--;
c = *s++ ^ 0x20;
} else
continue;
}
*t++ = c;
}
se = ndo->ndo_snapend;
ndo->ndo_snapend = t;
length = t - b;
/* now lets guess about the payload codepoint format */
if (length < 1)
goto trunc;
proto = *b; /* start with a one-octet codepoint guess */
switch (proto) {
case PPP_IP:
ip_print(ndo, b + 1, length - 1);
goto cleanup;
case PPP_IPV6:
ip6_print(ndo, b + 1, length - 1);
goto cleanup;
default: /* no luck - try next guess */
break;
}
if (length < 2)
goto trunc;
proto = EXTRACT_16BITS(b); /* next guess - load two octets */
switch (proto) {
case (PPP_ADDRESS << 8 | PPP_CONTROL): /* looks like a PPP frame */
if (length < 4)
goto trunc;
proto = EXTRACT_16BITS(b+2); /* load the PPP proto-id */
handle_ppp(ndo, proto, b + 4, length - 4);
break;
default: /* last guess - proto must be a PPP proto-id */
handle_ppp(ndo, proto, b + 2, length - 2);
break;
}
cleanup:
ndo->ndo_snapend = se;
free(b);
return;
trunc:
ndo->ndo_snapend = se;
free(b);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|ppp]"));
}
Commit Message: Do bounds checking when unescaping PPP.
Clean up a const issue while we're at it.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int hns_nic_net_stop(struct net_device *ndev)
{
hns_nic_net_down(ndev);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: hns: Fix a skb used after free bug
skb maybe freed in hns_nic_net_xmit_hw() and return NETDEV_TX_OK,
which cause hns_nic_net_xmit to use a freed skb.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hns_nic_net_xmit_hw+0x62c/0x940...
[17659.112635] alloc_debug_processing+0x18c/0x1a0
[17659.117208] __slab_alloc+0x52c/0x560
[17659.120909] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0xac/0x2c0
[17659.125309] __alloc_skb+0x6c/0x260
[17659.128837] tcp_send_ack+0x8c/0x280
[17659.132449] __tcp_ack_snd_check+0x9c/0xf0
[17659.136587] tcp_rcv_established+0x5a4/0xa70
[17659.140899] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x27c/0x620
[17659.144687] tcp_prequeue_process+0x108/0x170
[17659.149085] tcp_recvmsg+0x940/0x1020
[17659.152787] inet_recvmsg+0x124/0x180
[17659.156488] sock_recvmsg+0x64/0x80
[17659.160012] SyS_recvfrom+0xd8/0x180
[17659.163626] __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x4
[17659.167506] INFO: Freed in kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0 age=23 cpu=1 pid=13
[17659.174000] free_debug_processing+0x1d4/0x2c0
[17659.178486] __slab_free+0x240/0x390
[17659.182100] kmem_cache_free+0x24c/0x270
[17659.186062] kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0
[17659.189587] __kfree_skb+0x28/0x40
[17659.193025] napi_gro_receive+0x168/0x1c0
[17659.197074] hns_nic_rx_up_pro+0x58/0x90
[17659.201038] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x518/0xbc0
[17659.205352] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17659.209576] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17659.213363] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17659.217062] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17659.220679] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17659.224821] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17659.228084] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hns_nic_net_xmit+0x8c/0xc0...
[17751.080490] __slab_alloc+0x52c/0x560
[17751.084188] kmem_cache_alloc+0x244/0x280
[17751.088238] __build_skb+0x40/0x150
[17751.091764] build_skb+0x28/0x100
[17751.095115] __alloc_rx_skb+0x94/0x150
[17751.098900] __napi_alloc_skb+0x34/0x90
[17751.102776] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x180/0xbc0
[17751.107097] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17751.111333] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17751.115123] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17751.118823] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17751.122437] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17751.126575] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17751.129838] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
[17751.133454] INFO: Freed in kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0 age=19 cpu=7 pid=43
[17751.139951] free_debug_processing+0x1d4/0x2c0
[17751.144436] __slab_free+0x240/0x390
[17751.148051] kmem_cache_free+0x24c/0x270
[17751.152014] kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0
[17751.155543] __kfree_skb+0x28/0x40
[17751.159022] napi_gro_receive+0x168/0x1c0
[17751.163074] hns_nic_rx_up_pro+0x58/0x90
[17751.167041] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x518/0xbc0
[17751.171358] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17751.175585] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17751.179373] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17751.183076] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17751.186691] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17751.190826] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17751.194093] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
Fixes: 13ac695e7ea1 ("net:hns: Add support of Hip06 SoC to the Hislicon Network Subsystem")
Signed-off-by: Yunsheng Lin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: lipeng <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jun He <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void GM2TabStyle::PaintTabBackgroundFill(gfx::Canvas* canvas,
bool active,
bool paint_hover_effect,
SkColor active_color,
SkColor inactive_color,
int fill_id,
int y_inset) const {
const SkPath fill_path =
GetPath(PathType::kFill, canvas->image_scale(), active);
gfx::ScopedCanvas scoped_canvas(canvas);
const float scale = canvas->UndoDeviceScaleFactor();
canvas->ClipPath(fill_path, true);
if (active || !fill_id) {
cc::PaintFlags flags;
flags.setAntiAlias(true);
flags.setColor(active ? active_color : inactive_color);
canvas->DrawRect(gfx::ScaleToEnclosingRect(tab_->GetLocalBounds(), scale),
flags);
}
if (fill_id) {
gfx::ScopedCanvas scale_scoper(canvas);
canvas->sk_canvas()->scale(scale, scale);
canvas->TileImageInt(*tab_->GetThemeProvider()->GetImageSkiaNamed(fill_id),
tab_->GetMirroredX() + tab_->background_offset(), 0, 0,
y_inset, tab_->width(), tab_->height());
}
if (paint_hover_effect) {
SkPoint hover_location(gfx::PointToSkPoint(hover_controller_->location()));
hover_location.scale(SkFloatToScalar(scale));
const SkScalar kMinHoverRadius = 16;
const SkScalar radius =
std::max(SkFloatToScalar(tab_->width() / 4.f), kMinHoverRadius);
DrawHighlight(canvas, hover_location, radius * scale,
SkColorSetA(active_color, hover_controller_->GetAlpha()));
}
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: StateBase* writeBlob(v8::Handle<v8::Value> value, StateBase* next)
{
Blob* blob = V8Blob::toNative(value.As<v8::Object>());
if (!blob)
return 0;
if (blob->hasBeenClosed())
return handleError(DataCloneError, "A Blob object has been closed, and could therefore not be cloned.", next);
int blobIndex = -1;
m_blobDataHandles.add(blob->uuid(), blob->blobDataHandle());
if (appendBlobInfo(blob->uuid(), blob->type(), blob->size(), &blobIndex))
m_writer.writeBlobIndex(blobIndex);
else
m_writer.writeBlob(blob->uuid(), blob->type(), blob->size());
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void AssertCBIsNull() {
ASSERT_TRUE(cb.is_null());
cb_already_run = true;
}
Commit Message: Convert Uses of base::RepeatingCallback<>::Equals to Use == or != in //base
Staging this change because some conversions will have semantic changes.
BUG=937566
Change-Id: I2d4950624c0fab00e107814421a161e43da965cc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1507245
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Charette <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Gabriel Charette <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#639702}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void smb2cli_conn_set_cc_chunk_len(struct smbXcli_conn *conn,
uint32_t chunk_len)
{
conn->smb2.cc_chunk_len = chunk_len;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: off_t HFSForkReadStream::Seek(off_t offset, int whence) {
DCHECK_EQ(SEEK_SET, whence);
DCHECK_GE(offset, 0);
DCHECK_LT(static_cast<uint64_t>(offset), fork_.logicalSize);
size_t target_block = offset / hfs_->block_size();
size_t block_count = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(fork_.extents); ++i) {
const HFSPlusExtentDescriptor* extent = &fork_.extents[i];
if (extent->startBlock == 0 && extent->blockCount == 0)
break;
base::CheckedNumeric<size_t> new_block_count(block_count);
new_block_count += extent->blockCount;
if (!new_block_count.IsValid()) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Seek offset block count overflows";
return false;
}
if (target_block < new_block_count.ValueOrDie()) {
if (current_extent_ != i) {
read_current_extent_ = false;
current_extent_ = i;
}
auto iterator_block_offset =
base::CheckedNumeric<size_t>(block_count) * hfs_->block_size();
if (!iterator_block_offset.IsValid()) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Seek block offset overflows";
return false;
}
fork_logical_offset_ = offset;
return offset;
}
block_count = new_block_count.ValueOrDie();
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: Add the SandboxedDMGParser and wire it up to the DownloadProtectionService.
BUG=496898,464083
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1299223006 .
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344876}
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void TextTrackLoader::newRegionsParsed()
{
m_client->newRegionsAvailable(this);
}
Commit Message: Check CORS policy on redirect in TextTrackLoader
BUG=633885
TEST=new case in http/tests/security/text-track-crossorigin.html
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2367583002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421919}
CWE ID: CWE-284
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType GammaImage(Image *image,const double gamma,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define GammaCorrectImageTag "GammaCorrect/Image"
CacheView
*image_view;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
progress;
Quantum
*gamma_map;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
y;
/*
Allocate and initialize gamma maps.
*/
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
if (gamma == 1.0)
return(MagickTrue);
gamma_map=(Quantum *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MaxMap+1UL,sizeof(*gamma_map));
if (gamma_map == (Quantum *) NULL)
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
(void) ResetMagickMemory(gamma_map,0,(MaxMap+1)*sizeof(*gamma_map));
if (gamma != 0.0)
for (i=0; i <= (ssize_t) MaxMap; i++)
gamma_map[i]=ScaleMapToQuantum((double) (MaxMap*pow((double) i/
MaxMap,1.0/gamma)));
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
/*
Gamma-correct colormap.
*/
#if !defined(MAGICKCORE_HDRI_SUPPORT)
if ((GetPixelRedTraits(image) & UpdatePixelTrait) != 0)
image->colormap[i].red=(double) gamma_map[ScaleQuantumToMap(
ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[i].red))];
if ((GetPixelGreenTraits(image) & UpdatePixelTrait) != 0)
image->colormap[i].green=(double) gamma_map[ScaleQuantumToMap(
ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[i].green))];
if ((GetPixelBlueTraits(image) & UpdatePixelTrait) != 0)
image->colormap[i].blue=(double) gamma_map[ScaleQuantumToMap(
ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[i].blue))];
if ((GetPixelAlphaTraits(image) & UpdatePixelTrait) != 0)
image->colormap[i].alpha=(double) gamma_map[ScaleQuantumToMap(
ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[i].alpha))];
#else
if ((GetPixelRedTraits(image) & UpdatePixelTrait) != 0)
image->colormap[i].red=QuantumRange*gamma_pow(QuantumScale*
image->colormap[i].red,1.0/gamma);
if ((GetPixelGreenTraits(image) & UpdatePixelTrait) != 0)
image->colormap[i].green=QuantumRange*gamma_pow(QuantumScale*
image->colormap[i].green,1.0/gamma);
if ((GetPixelBlueTraits(image) & UpdatePixelTrait) != 0)
image->colormap[i].blue=QuantumRange*gamma_pow(QuantumScale*
image->colormap[i].blue,1.0/gamma);
if ((GetPixelAlphaTraits(image) & UpdatePixelTrait) != 0)
image->colormap[i].alpha=QuantumRange*gamma_pow(QuantumScale*
image->colormap[i].alpha,1.0/gamma);
#endif
}
/*
Gamma-correct image.
*/
status=MagickTrue;
progress=0;
image_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(image,exception);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp parallel for schedule(static,4) shared(progress,status) \
magick_threads(image,image,image->rows,1)
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
register ssize_t
j;
if (GetPixelReadMask(image,q) == 0)
{
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
continue;
}
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) GetPixelChannels(image); j++)
{
PixelChannel channel=GetPixelChannelChannel(image,j);
PixelTrait traits=GetPixelChannelTraits(image,channel);
if ((traits & UpdatePixelTrait) == 0)
continue;
#if !defined(MAGICKCORE_HDRI_SUPPORT)
q[j]=gamma_map[ScaleQuantumToMap(q[j])];
#else
q[j]=QuantumRange*gamma_pow(QuantumScale*q[j],1.0/gamma);
#endif
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,exception) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
if (image->progress_monitor != (MagickProgressMonitor) NULL)
{
MagickBooleanType
proceed;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp critical (MagickCore_GammaImage)
#endif
proceed=SetImageProgress(image,GammaCorrectImageTag,progress++,
image->rows);
if (proceed == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
}
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
gamma_map=(Quantum *) RelinquishMagickMemory(gamma_map);
if (image->gamma != 0.0)
image->gamma*=gamma;
return(status);
}
Commit Message: Evaluate lazy pixel cache morphology to prevent buffer overflow (bug report from Ibrahim M. El-Sayed)
CWE ID: CWE-125
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static void kiocb_batch_free(struct kiocb_batch *batch)
{
struct kiocb *req, *n;
list_for_each_entry_safe(req, n, &batch->head, ki_batch) {
list_del(&req->ki_batch);
kmem_cache_free(kiocb_cachep, req);
}
}
Commit Message: Unused iocbs in a batch should not be accounted as active.
commit 69e4747ee9727d660b88d7e1efe0f4afcb35db1b upstream.
Since commit 080d676de095 ("aio: allocate kiocbs in batches") iocbs are
allocated in a batch during processing of first iocbs. All iocbs in a
batch are automatically added to ctx->active_reqs list and accounted in
ctx->reqs_active.
If one (not the last one) of iocbs submitted by an user fails, further
iocbs are not processed, but they are still present in ctx->active_reqs
and accounted in ctx->reqs_active. This causes process to stuck in a D
state in wait_for_all_aios() on exit since ctx->reqs_active will never
go down to zero. Furthermore since kiocb_batch_free() frees iocb
without removing it from active_reqs list the list become corrupted
which may cause oops.
Fix this by removing iocb from ctx->active_reqs and updating
ctx->reqs_active in kiocb_batch_free().
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Moyer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void tun_poll_controller(struct net_device *dev)
{
/*
* Tun only receives frames when:
* 1) the char device endpoint gets data from user space
* 2) the tun socket gets a sendmsg call from user space
* Since both of those are synchronous operations, we are guaranteed
* never to have pending data when we poll for it
* so there is nothing to do here but return.
* We need this though so netpoll recognizes us as an interface that
* supports polling, which enables bridge devices in virt setups to
* still use netconsole
*/
return;
}
Commit Message: tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: int WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl::GetGPUProcessID() {
return host_ ? host_->gpu_process_id() : 0;
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static void copyMono8(
short *dst,
const int *const *src,
unsigned nSamples,
unsigned /* nChannels */) {
for (unsigned i = 0; i < nSamples; ++i) {
*dst++ = src[0][i] << 8;
}
}
Commit Message: FLACExtractor: copy protect mWriteBuffer
Bug: 30895578
Change-Id: I4cba36bbe3502678210e5925181683df9726b431
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int ipgre_tunnel_validate(struct nlattr *tb[], struct nlattr *data[])
{
__be16 flags;
if (!data)
return 0;
flags = 0;
if (data[IFLA_GRE_IFLAGS])
flags |= nla_get_be16(data[IFLA_GRE_IFLAGS]);
if (data[IFLA_GRE_OFLAGS])
flags |= nla_get_be16(data[IFLA_GRE_OFLAGS]);
if (flags & (GRE_VERSION|GRE_ROUTING))
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: gre: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
GRE protocol receive hook can be called right after protocol addition is done.
If netns stuff is not yet initialized, we're going to oops in
net_generic().
This is remotely oopsable if ip_gre is compiled as module and packet
comes at unfortunate moment of module loading.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: bool DefaultTabHandler::CanRestoreTab() {
return delegate_->AsBrowser()->CanRestoreTab();
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static PixelChannels **AcquirePixelThreadSet(const Image *image)
{
PixelChannels
**pixels;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
number_threads;
number_threads=(size_t) GetMagickResourceLimit(ThreadResource);
pixels=(PixelChannels **) AcquireQuantumMemory(number_threads,
sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (PixelChannels **) NULL)
return((PixelChannels **) NULL);
(void) memset(pixels,0,number_threads*sizeof(*pixels));
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_threads; i++)
{
register ssize_t
j;
pixels[i]=(PixelChannels *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->columns,
sizeof(**pixels));
if (pixels[i] == (PixelChannels *) NULL)
return(DestroyPixelThreadSet(pixels));
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) image->columns; j++)
{
register ssize_t
k;
for (k=0; k < MaxPixelChannels; k++)
pixels[i][j].channel[k]=0.0;
}
}
return(pixels);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1586
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: ShouldSwapBrowsingInstancesForNavigation(SiteInstance* site_instance,
const GURL& current_url,
const GURL& new_url) {
ExtensionRegistry* registry =
ExtensionRegistry::Get(site_instance->GetBrowserContext());
if (!registry)
return false;
const Extension* current_extension =
registry->enabled_extensions().GetExtensionOrAppByURL(current_url);
bool is_current_url_for_web_store =
current_extension && current_extension->id() == kWebStoreAppId;
const Extension* new_extension =
registry->enabled_extensions().GetExtensionOrAppByURL(new_url);
bool is_new_url_for_web_store =
new_extension && new_extension->id() == kWebStoreAppId;
ProcessMap* process_map = ProcessMap::Get(site_instance->GetBrowserContext());
if (is_new_url_for_web_store && site_instance->HasProcess() &&
!process_map->Contains(new_extension->id(),
site_instance->GetProcess()->GetID()))
return true;
return is_current_url_for_web_store != is_new_url_for_web_store;
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Update navigations across hypothetical extension extents
Update code to treat navigations across hypothetical extension extents
(e.g. for nonexistent extensions) the same as we do for navigations
crossing installed extension extents.
Bug: 598265
Change-Id: Ibdf2f563ce1fd108ead279077901020a24de732b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/617180
Commit-Queue: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#495779}
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: status_t StreamingProcessor::processRecordingFrame() {
ATRACE_CALL();
status_t res;
sp<Camera2Heap> recordingHeap;
size_t heapIdx = 0;
nsecs_t timestamp;
sp<Camera2Client> client = mClient.promote();
if (client == 0) {
BufferItem imgBuffer;
res = mRecordingConsumer->acquireBuffer(&imgBuffer, 0);
if (res != OK) {
if (res != BufferItemConsumer::NO_BUFFER_AVAILABLE) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Can't acquire recording buffer: %s (%d)",
__FUNCTION__, mId, strerror(-res), res);
}
return res;
}
mRecordingConsumer->releaseBuffer(imgBuffer);
return OK;
}
{
/* acquire SharedParameters before mMutex so we don't dead lock
with Camera2Client code calling into StreamingProcessor */
SharedParameters::Lock l(client->getParameters());
Mutex::Autolock m(mMutex);
BufferItem imgBuffer;
res = mRecordingConsumer->acquireBuffer(&imgBuffer, 0);
if (res != OK) {
if (res != BufferItemConsumer::NO_BUFFER_AVAILABLE) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Can't acquire recording buffer: %s (%d)",
__FUNCTION__, mId, strerror(-res), res);
}
return res;
}
timestamp = imgBuffer.mTimestamp;
mRecordingFrameCount++;
ALOGVV("OnRecordingFrame: Frame %d", mRecordingFrameCount);
if (l.mParameters.state != Parameters::RECORD &&
l.mParameters.state != Parameters::VIDEO_SNAPSHOT) {
ALOGV("%s: Camera %d: Discarding recording image buffers "
"received after recording done", __FUNCTION__,
mId);
mRecordingConsumer->releaseBuffer(imgBuffer);
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
if (mRecordingHeap == 0) {
size_t payloadSize = sizeof(VideoNativeMetadata);
ALOGV("%s: Camera %d: Creating recording heap with %zu buffers of "
"size %zu bytes", __FUNCTION__, mId,
mRecordingHeapCount, payloadSize);
mRecordingHeap = new Camera2Heap(payloadSize, mRecordingHeapCount,
"Camera2Client::RecordingHeap");
if (mRecordingHeap->mHeap->getSize() == 0) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Unable to allocate memory for recording",
__FUNCTION__, mId);
mRecordingConsumer->releaseBuffer(imgBuffer);
return NO_MEMORY;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < mRecordingBuffers.size(); i++) {
if (mRecordingBuffers[i].mBuf !=
BufferItemConsumer::INVALID_BUFFER_SLOT) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Non-empty recording buffers list!",
__FUNCTION__, mId);
}
}
mRecordingBuffers.clear();
mRecordingBuffers.setCapacity(mRecordingHeapCount);
mRecordingBuffers.insertAt(0, mRecordingHeapCount);
mRecordingHeapHead = 0;
mRecordingHeapFree = mRecordingHeapCount;
}
if (mRecordingHeapFree == 0) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: No free recording buffers, dropping frame",
__FUNCTION__, mId);
mRecordingConsumer->releaseBuffer(imgBuffer);
return NO_MEMORY;
}
heapIdx = mRecordingHeapHead;
mRecordingHeapHead = (mRecordingHeapHead + 1) % mRecordingHeapCount;
mRecordingHeapFree--;
ALOGVV("%s: Camera %d: Timestamp %lld",
__FUNCTION__, mId, timestamp);
ssize_t offset;
size_t size;
sp<IMemoryHeap> heap =
mRecordingHeap->mBuffers[heapIdx]->getMemory(&offset,
&size);
VideoNativeMetadata *payload = reinterpret_cast<VideoNativeMetadata*>(
(uint8_t*)heap->getBase() + offset);
payload->eType = kMetadataBufferTypeANWBuffer;
payload->pBuffer = imgBuffer.mGraphicBuffer->getNativeBuffer();
payload->nFenceFd = -1;
ALOGVV("%s: Camera %d: Sending out ANWBuffer %p",
__FUNCTION__, mId, payload->pBuffer);
mRecordingBuffers.replaceAt(imgBuffer, heapIdx);
recordingHeap = mRecordingHeap;
}
Camera2Client::SharedCameraCallbacks::Lock l(client->mSharedCameraCallbacks);
if (l.mRemoteCallback != 0) {
l.mRemoteCallback->dataCallbackTimestamp(timestamp,
CAMERA_MSG_VIDEO_FRAME,
recordingHeap->mBuffers[heapIdx]);
} else {
ALOGW("%s: Camera %d: Remote callback gone", __FUNCTION__, mId);
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Camera: Adjust pointers to ANW buffers to avoid infoleak
Subtract address of a random static object from pointers being routed
through app process.
Bug: 28466701
Change-Id: Idcbfe81e9507433769672f3dc6d67db5eeed4e04
CWE ID: CWE-200
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void opj_get_all_encoding_parameters( const opj_image_t *p_image,
const opj_cp_t *p_cp,
OPJ_UINT32 tileno,
OPJ_INT32 * p_tx0,
OPJ_INT32 * p_tx1,
OPJ_INT32 * p_ty0,
OPJ_INT32 * p_ty1,
OPJ_UINT32 * p_dx_min,
OPJ_UINT32 * p_dy_min,
OPJ_UINT32 * p_max_prec,
OPJ_UINT32 * p_max_res,
OPJ_UINT32 ** p_resolutions )
{
/* loop*/
OPJ_UINT32 compno, resno;
/* pointers*/
const opj_tcp_t *tcp = 00;
const opj_tccp_t * l_tccp = 00;
const opj_image_comp_t * l_img_comp = 00;
/* to store l_dx, l_dy, w and h for each resolution and component.*/
OPJ_UINT32 * lResolutionPtr;
/* position in x and y of tile*/
OPJ_UINT32 p, q;
/* preconditions in debug*/
assert(p_cp != 00);
assert(p_image != 00);
assert(tileno < p_cp->tw * p_cp->th);
/* initializations*/
tcp = &p_cp->tcps [tileno];
l_tccp = tcp->tccps;
l_img_comp = p_image->comps;
/* position in x and y of tile*/
p = tileno % p_cp->tw;
q = tileno / p_cp->tw;
/* here calculation of tx0, tx1, ty0, ty1, maxprec, l_dx and l_dy */
*p_tx0 = opj_int_max((OPJ_INT32)(p_cp->tx0 + p * p_cp->tdx), (OPJ_INT32)p_image->x0);
*p_tx1 = opj_int_min((OPJ_INT32)(p_cp->tx0 + (p + 1) * p_cp->tdx), (OPJ_INT32)p_image->x1);
*p_ty0 = opj_int_max((OPJ_INT32)(p_cp->ty0 + q * p_cp->tdy), (OPJ_INT32)p_image->y0);
*p_ty1 = opj_int_min((OPJ_INT32)(p_cp->ty0 + (q + 1) * p_cp->tdy), (OPJ_INT32)p_image->y1);
/* max precision and resolution is 0 (can only grow)*/
*p_max_prec = 0;
*p_max_res = 0;
/* take the largest value for dx_min and dy_min*/
*p_dx_min = 0x7fffffff;
*p_dy_min = 0x7fffffff;
for (compno = 0; compno < p_image->numcomps; ++compno) {
/* aritmetic variables to calculate*/
OPJ_UINT32 l_level_no;
OPJ_INT32 l_rx0, l_ry0, l_rx1, l_ry1;
OPJ_INT32 l_px0, l_py0, l_px1, py1;
OPJ_UINT32 l_product;
OPJ_INT32 l_tcx0, l_tcy0, l_tcx1, l_tcy1;
OPJ_UINT32 l_pdx, l_pdy , l_pw , l_ph;
lResolutionPtr = p_resolutions[compno];
l_tcx0 = opj_int_ceildiv(*p_tx0, (OPJ_INT32)l_img_comp->dx);
l_tcy0 = opj_int_ceildiv(*p_ty0, (OPJ_INT32)l_img_comp->dy);
l_tcx1 = opj_int_ceildiv(*p_tx1, (OPJ_INT32)l_img_comp->dx);
l_tcy1 = opj_int_ceildiv(*p_ty1, (OPJ_INT32)l_img_comp->dy);
if (l_tccp->numresolutions > *p_max_res) {
*p_max_res = l_tccp->numresolutions;
}
/* use custom size for precincts*/
l_level_no = l_tccp->numresolutions - 1;
for (resno = 0; resno < l_tccp->numresolutions; ++resno) {
OPJ_UINT32 l_dx, l_dy;
/* precinct width and height*/
l_pdx = l_tccp->prcw[resno];
l_pdy = l_tccp->prch[resno];
*lResolutionPtr++ = l_pdx;
*lResolutionPtr++ = l_pdy;
l_dx = l_img_comp->dx * (1u << (l_pdx + l_level_no));
l_dy = l_img_comp->dy * (1u << (l_pdy + l_level_no));
/* take the minimum size for l_dx for each comp and resolution*/
*p_dx_min = (OPJ_UINT32)opj_int_min((OPJ_INT32)*p_dx_min, (OPJ_INT32)l_dx);
*p_dy_min = (OPJ_UINT32)opj_int_min((OPJ_INT32)*p_dy_min, (OPJ_INT32)l_dy);
/* various calculations of extents*/
l_rx0 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_tcx0, (OPJ_INT32)l_level_no);
l_ry0 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_tcy0, (OPJ_INT32)l_level_no);
l_rx1 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_tcx1, (OPJ_INT32)l_level_no);
l_ry1 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_tcy1, (OPJ_INT32)l_level_no);
l_px0 = opj_int_floordivpow2(l_rx0, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdx) << l_pdx;
l_py0 = opj_int_floordivpow2(l_ry0, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdy) << l_pdy;
l_px1 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_rx1, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdx) << l_pdx;
py1 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_ry1, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdy) << l_pdy;
l_pw = (l_rx0==l_rx1)?0:(OPJ_UINT32)((l_px1 - l_px0) >> l_pdx);
l_ph = (l_ry0==l_ry1)?0:(OPJ_UINT32)((py1 - l_py0) >> l_pdy);
*lResolutionPtr++ = l_pw;
*lResolutionPtr++ = l_ph;
l_product = l_pw * l_ph;
/* update precision*/
if (l_product > *p_max_prec) {
*p_max_prec = l_product;
}
--l_level_no;
}
++l_tccp;
++l_img_comp;
}
}
Commit Message: [trunk] fixed a buffer overflow in opj_tcd_init_decode_tile
Update issue 431
CWE ID: CWE-190
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: GF_Err tpyl_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_NTYLBox *p;
p = (GF_NTYLBox *)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "LargeTotalMediaBytesBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, "BytesSent=\""LLD"\">\n", LLD_CAST p->nbBytes);
gf_isom_box_dump_done("LargeTotalMediaBytesBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: flx_set_palette_vector (FlxColorSpaceConverter * flxpal, guint start, guint num,
guchar * newpal, gint scale)
{
guint grab;
g_return_if_fail (flxpal != NULL);
g_return_if_fail (start < 0x100);
grab = ((start + num) > 0x100 ? 0x100 - start : num);
if (scale) {
gint i = 0;
start *= 3;
while (grab) {
flxpal->palvec[start++] = newpal[i++] << scale;
flxpal->palvec[start++] = newpal[i++] << scale;
flxpal->palvec[start++] = newpal[i++] << scale;
grab--;
}
} else {
memcpy (&flxpal->palvec[start * 3], newpal, grab * 3);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: int ParseDsdiffHeaderConfig (FILE *infile, char *infilename, char *fourcc, WavpackContext *wpc, WavpackConfig *config)
{
int64_t infilesize, total_samples;
DFFFileHeader dff_file_header;
DFFChunkHeader dff_chunk_header;
uint32_t bcount;
infilesize = DoGetFileSize (infile);
memcpy (&dff_file_header, fourcc, 4);
if ((!DoReadFile (infile, ((char *) &dff_file_header) + 4, sizeof (DFFFileHeader) - 4, &bcount) ||
bcount != sizeof (DFFFileHeader) - 4) || strncmp (dff_file_header.formType, "DSD ", 4)) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, &dff_file_header, sizeof (DFFFileHeader))) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
#if 1 // this might be a little too picky...
WavpackBigEndianToNative (&dff_file_header, DFFFileHeaderFormat);
if (infilesize && !(config->qmode & QMODE_IGNORE_LENGTH) &&
dff_file_header.ckDataSize && dff_file_header.ckDataSize + 1 && dff_file_header.ckDataSize + 12 != infilesize) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file (by total size)!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("file header indicated length = %lld", dff_file_header.ckDataSize);
#endif
while (1) {
if (!DoReadFile (infile, &dff_chunk_header, sizeof (DFFChunkHeader), &bcount) ||
bcount != sizeof (DFFChunkHeader)) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, &dff_chunk_header, sizeof (DFFChunkHeader))) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
WavpackBigEndianToNative (&dff_chunk_header, DFFChunkHeaderFormat);
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("chunk header indicated length = %lld", dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize);
if (!strncmp (dff_chunk_header.ckID, "FVER", 4)) {
uint32_t version;
if (dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize != sizeof (version) ||
!DoReadFile (infile, &version, sizeof (version), &bcount) ||
bcount != sizeof (version)) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, &version, sizeof (version))) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
WavpackBigEndianToNative (&version, "L");
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("dsdiff file version = 0x%08x", version);
}
else if (!strncmp (dff_chunk_header.ckID, "PROP", 4)) {
char *prop_chunk;
if (dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize < 4 || dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize > 1024) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("got PROP chunk of %d bytes total", (int) dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize);
prop_chunk = malloc ((size_t) dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize);
if (!DoReadFile (infile, prop_chunk, (uint32_t) dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize, &bcount) ||
bcount != dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file!", infilename);
free (prop_chunk);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, prop_chunk, (uint32_t) dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize)) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
free (prop_chunk);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
if (!strncmp (prop_chunk, "SND ", 4)) {
char *cptr = prop_chunk + 4, *eptr = prop_chunk + dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize;
uint16_t numChannels, chansSpecified, chanMask = 0;
uint32_t sampleRate;
while (eptr - cptr >= sizeof (dff_chunk_header)) {
memcpy (&dff_chunk_header, cptr, sizeof (dff_chunk_header));
cptr += sizeof (dff_chunk_header);
WavpackBigEndianToNative (&dff_chunk_header, DFFChunkHeaderFormat);
if (dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize > 0 && dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize <= eptr - cptr) {
if (!strncmp (dff_chunk_header.ckID, "FS ", 4) && dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize == 4) {
memcpy (&sampleRate, cptr, sizeof (sampleRate));
WavpackBigEndianToNative (&sampleRate, "L");
cptr += dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize;
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("got sample rate of %u Hz", sampleRate);
}
else if (!strncmp (dff_chunk_header.ckID, "CHNL", 4) && dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize >= 2) {
memcpy (&numChannels, cptr, sizeof (numChannels));
WavpackBigEndianToNative (&numChannels, "S");
cptr += sizeof (numChannels);
chansSpecified = (int)(dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize - sizeof (numChannels)) / 4;
if (numChannels < chansSpecified || numChannels < 1) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file!", infilename);
free (prop_chunk);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
while (chansSpecified--) {
if (!strncmp (cptr, "SLFT", 4) || !strncmp (cptr, "MLFT", 4))
chanMask |= 0x1;
else if (!strncmp (cptr, "SRGT", 4) || !strncmp (cptr, "MRGT", 4))
chanMask |= 0x2;
else if (!strncmp (cptr, "LS ", 4))
chanMask |= 0x10;
else if (!strncmp (cptr, "RS ", 4))
chanMask |= 0x20;
else if (!strncmp (cptr, "C ", 4))
chanMask |= 0x4;
else if (!strncmp (cptr, "LFE ", 4))
chanMask |= 0x8;
else
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("undefined channel ID %c%c%c%c", cptr [0], cptr [1], cptr [2], cptr [3]);
cptr += 4;
}
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("%d channels, mask = 0x%08x", numChannels, chanMask);
}
else if (!strncmp (dff_chunk_header.ckID, "CMPR", 4) && dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize >= 4) {
if (strncmp (cptr, "DSD ", 4)) {
error_line ("DSDIFF files must be uncompressed, not \"%c%c%c%c\"!",
cptr [0], cptr [1], cptr [2], cptr [3]);
free (prop_chunk);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
cptr += dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize;
}
else {
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("got PROP/SND chunk type \"%c%c%c%c\" of %d bytes", dff_chunk_header.ckID [0],
dff_chunk_header.ckID [1], dff_chunk_header.ckID [2], dff_chunk_header.ckID [3], dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize);
cptr += dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize;
}
}
else {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file!", infilename);
free (prop_chunk);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
}
if (chanMask && (config->channel_mask || (config->qmode & QMODE_CHANS_UNASSIGNED))) {
error_line ("this DSDIFF file already has channel order information!");
free (prop_chunk);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (chanMask)
config->channel_mask = chanMask;
config->bits_per_sample = 8;
config->bytes_per_sample = 1;
config->num_channels = numChannels;
config->sample_rate = sampleRate / 8;
config->qmode |= QMODE_DSD_MSB_FIRST;
}
else if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("got unknown PROP chunk type \"%c%c%c%c\" of %d bytes",
prop_chunk [0], prop_chunk [1], prop_chunk [2], prop_chunk [3], dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize);
free (prop_chunk);
}
else if (!strncmp (dff_chunk_header.ckID, "DSD ", 4)) {
total_samples = dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize / config->num_channels;
break;
}
else { // just copy unknown chunks to output file
int bytes_to_copy = (int)(((dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize) + 1) & ~(int64_t)1);
char *buff;
if (bytes_to_copy < 0 || bytes_to_copy > 4194304) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
buff = malloc (bytes_to_copy);
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("extra unknown chunk \"%c%c%c%c\" of %d bytes",
dff_chunk_header.ckID [0], dff_chunk_header.ckID [1], dff_chunk_header.ckID [2],
dff_chunk_header.ckID [3], dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize);
if (!DoReadFile (infile, buff, bytes_to_copy, &bcount) ||
bcount != bytes_to_copy ||
(!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, buff, bytes_to_copy))) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
free (buff);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
free (buff);
}
}
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("setting configuration with %lld samples", total_samples);
if (!WavpackSetConfiguration64 (wpc, config, total_samples, NULL)) {
error_line ("%s: %s", infilename, WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
return WAVPACK_NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: issue #65: make sure DSDIFF files have a valid channel count
CWE ID: CWE-369
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: JSValue jsTestObjCONST_VALUE_11(ExecState* exec, JSValue, const Identifier&)
{
UNUSED_PARAM(exec);
return jsNumber(static_cast<int>(0xffffffff));
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: tgs_build_reply(krb5_context context,
krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
KDC_REQ *req,
KDC_REQ_BODY *b,
hdb_entry_ex *krbtgt,
krb5_enctype krbtgt_etype,
const krb5_keyblock *replykey,
int rk_is_subkey,
krb5_ticket *ticket,
krb5_data *reply,
const char *from,
const char **e_text,
AuthorizationData **auth_data,
const struct sockaddr *from_addr)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_principal cp = NULL, sp = NULL, rsp = NULL, tp = NULL, dp = NULL;
krb5_principal krbtgt_out_principal = NULL;
char *spn = NULL, *cpn = NULL, *tpn = NULL, *dpn = NULL, *krbtgt_out_n = NULL;
hdb_entry_ex *server = NULL, *client = NULL, *s4u2self_impersonated_client = NULL;
HDB *clientdb, *s4u2self_impersonated_clientdb;
krb5_realm ref_realm = NULL;
EncTicketPart *tgt = &ticket->ticket;
krb5_principals spp = NULL;
const EncryptionKey *ekey;
krb5_keyblock sessionkey;
krb5_kvno kvno;
krb5_data rspac;
const char *our_realm = /* Realm of this KDC */
krb5_principal_get_comp_string(context, krbtgt->entry.principal, 1);
char **capath = NULL;
size_t num_capath = 0;
hdb_entry_ex *krbtgt_out = NULL;
METHOD_DATA enc_pa_data;
PrincipalName *s;
Realm r;
EncTicketPart adtkt;
char opt_str[128];
int signedpath = 0;
Key *tkey_check;
Key *tkey_sign;
int flags = HDB_F_FOR_TGS_REQ;
memset(&sessionkey, 0, sizeof(sessionkey));
memset(&adtkt, 0, sizeof(adtkt));
krb5_data_zero(&rspac);
memset(&enc_pa_data, 0, sizeof(enc_pa_data));
s = b->sname;
r = b->realm;
/*
* Always to do CANON, see comment below about returned server principal (rsp).
*/
flags |= HDB_F_CANON;
if(b->kdc_options.enc_tkt_in_skey){
Ticket *t;
hdb_entry_ex *uu;
krb5_principal p;
Key *uukey;
krb5uint32 second_kvno = 0;
krb5uint32 *kvno_ptr = NULL;
if(b->additional_tickets == NULL ||
b->additional_tickets->len == 0){
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION; /* ? */
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"No second ticket present in request");
goto out;
}
t = &b->additional_tickets->val[0];
if(!get_krbtgt_realm(&t->sname)){
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Additional ticket is not a ticket-granting ticket");
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
goto out;
}
_krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(context, &p, t->sname, t->realm);
if(t->enc_part.kvno){
second_kvno = *t->enc_part.kvno;
kvno_ptr = &second_kvno;
}
ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, p,
HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT, kvno_ptr,
NULL, &uu);
krb5_free_principal(context, p);
if(ret){
if (ret == HDB_ERR_NOENTRY)
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto out;
}
ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &uu->entry, NULL,
t->enc_part.etype, &uukey);
if(ret){
_kdc_free_ent(context, uu);
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP; /* XXX */
goto out;
}
ret = krb5_decrypt_ticket(context, t, &uukey->key, &adtkt, 0);
_kdc_free_ent(context, uu);
if(ret)
goto out;
ret = verify_flags(context, config, &adtkt, spn);
if (ret)
goto out;
s = &adtkt.cname;
r = adtkt.crealm;
}
_krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(context, &sp, *s, r);
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, sp, &spn);
if (ret)
goto out;
_krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(context, &cp, tgt->cname, tgt->crealm);
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, cp, &cpn);
if (ret)
goto out;
unparse_flags (KDCOptions2int(b->kdc_options),
asn1_KDCOptions_units(),
opt_str, sizeof(opt_str));
if(*opt_str)
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"TGS-REQ %s from %s for %s [%s]",
cpn, from, spn, opt_str);
else
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"TGS-REQ %s from %s for %s", cpn, from, spn);
/*
* Fetch server
*/
server_lookup:
ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, sp, HDB_F_GET_SERVER | flags,
NULL, NULL, &server);
if (ret == HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE) {
kdc_log(context, config, 5, "target %s does not have secrets at this KDC, need to proxy", sp);
goto out;
} else if (ret == HDB_ERR_WRONG_REALM) {
free(ref_realm);
ref_realm = strdup(server->entry.principal->realm);
if (ref_realm == NULL) {
ret = krb5_enomem(context);
goto out;
}
kdc_log(context, config, 5,
"Returning a referral to realm %s for "
"server %s.",
ref_realm, spn);
krb5_free_principal(context, sp);
sp = NULL;
ret = krb5_make_principal(context, &sp, r, KRB5_TGS_NAME,
ref_realm, NULL);
if (ret)
goto out;
free(spn);
spn = NULL;
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, sp, &spn);
if (ret)
goto out;
goto server_lookup;
} else if (ret) {
const char *new_rlm, *msg;
Realm req_rlm;
krb5_realm *realms;
if ((req_rlm = get_krbtgt_realm(&sp->name)) != NULL) {
if (capath == NULL) {
/* With referalls, hierarchical capaths are always enabled */
ret = _krb5_find_capath(context, tgt->crealm, our_realm,
req_rlm, TRUE, &capath, &num_capath);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
new_rlm = num_capath > 0 ? capath[--num_capath] : NULL;
if (new_rlm) {
kdc_log(context, config, 5, "krbtgt from %s via %s for "
"realm %s not found, trying %s", tgt->crealm,
our_realm, req_rlm, new_rlm);
free(ref_realm);
ref_realm = strdup(new_rlm);
if (ref_realm == NULL) {
ret = krb5_enomem(context);
goto out;
}
krb5_free_principal(context, sp);
sp = NULL;
krb5_make_principal(context, &sp, r,
KRB5_TGS_NAME, ref_realm, NULL);
free(spn);
spn = NULL;
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, sp, &spn);
if (ret)
goto out;
goto server_lookup;
}
} else if (need_referral(context, config, &b->kdc_options, sp, &realms)) {
if (strcmp(realms[0], sp->realm) != 0) {
kdc_log(context, config, 5,
"Returning a referral to realm %s for "
"server %s that was not found",
realms[0], spn);
krb5_free_principal(context, sp);
sp = NULL;
krb5_make_principal(context, &sp, r, KRB5_TGS_NAME,
realms[0], NULL);
free(spn);
spn = NULL;
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, sp, &spn);
if (ret) {
krb5_free_host_realm(context, realms);
goto out;
}
free(ref_realm);
ref_realm = strdup(realms[0]);
krb5_free_host_realm(context, realms);
goto server_lookup;
}
krb5_free_host_realm(context, realms);
}
msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Server not found in database: %s: %s", spn, msg);
krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
if (ret == HDB_ERR_NOENTRY)
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto out;
}
/* the name returned to the client depend on what was asked for,
* return canonical name if kdc_options.canonicalize was set, the
* client wants the true name of the principal, if not it just
* wants the name its asked for.
*/
if (b->kdc_options.canonicalize)
rsp = server->entry.principal;
else
rsp = sp;
/*
* Select enctype, return key and kvno.
*/
{
krb5_enctype etype;
if(b->kdc_options.enc_tkt_in_skey) {
size_t i;
ekey = &adtkt.key;
for(i = 0; i < b->etype.len; i++)
if (b->etype.val[i] == adtkt.key.keytype)
break;
if(i == b->etype.len) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Addition ticket have not matching etypes");
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
goto out;
}
etype = b->etype.val[i];
kvno = 0;
} else {
Key *skey;
ret = _kdc_find_etype(context,
krb5_principal_is_krbtgt(context, sp) ?
config->tgt_use_strongest_session_key :
config->svc_use_strongest_session_key, FALSE,
server, b->etype.val, b->etype.len, &etype,
NULL);
if(ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Server (%s) has no support for etypes", spn);
goto out;
}
ret = _kdc_get_preferred_key(context, config, server, spn,
NULL, &skey);
if(ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Server (%s) has no supported etypes", spn);
goto out;
}
ekey = &skey->key;
kvno = server->entry.kvno;
}
ret = krb5_generate_random_keyblock(context, etype, &sessionkey);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
/*
* Check that service is in the same realm as the krbtgt. If it's
* not the same, it's someone that is using a uni-directional trust
* backward.
*/
/*
* Validate authoriation data
*/
ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &krbtgt->entry, NULL, /* XXX use the right kvno! */
krbtgt_etype, &tkey_check);
if(ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Failed to find key for krbtgt PAC check");
goto out;
}
/*
* Now refetch the primary krbtgt, and get the current kvno (the
* sign check may have been on an old kvno, and the server may
* have been an incoming trust)
*/
ret = krb5_make_principal(context,
&krbtgt_out_principal,
our_realm,
KRB5_TGS_NAME,
our_realm,
NULL);
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Failed to make krbtgt principal name object for "
"authz-data signatures");
goto out;
}
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, krbtgt_out_principal, &krbtgt_out_n);
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Failed to make krbtgt principal name object for "
"authz-data signatures");
goto out;
}
ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, krbtgt_out_principal,
HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT, NULL, NULL, &krbtgt_out);
if (ret) {
char *ktpn = NULL;
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, krbtgt->entry.principal, &ktpn);
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"No such principal %s (needed for authz-data signature keys) "
"while processing TGS-REQ for service %s with krbtg %s",
krbtgt_out_n, spn, (ret == 0) ? ktpn : "<unknown>");
free(ktpn);
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US;
goto out;
}
/*
* The first realm is the realm of the service, the second is
* krbtgt/<this>/@REALM component of the krbtgt DN the request was
* encrypted to. The redirection via the krbtgt_out entry allows
* the DB to possibly correct the case of the realm (Samba4 does
* this) before the strcmp()
*/
if (strcmp(krb5_principal_get_realm(context, server->entry.principal),
krb5_principal_get_realm(context, krbtgt_out->entry.principal)) != 0) {
char *ktpn;
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, krbtgt_out->entry.principal, &ktpn);
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Request with wrong krbtgt: %s",
(ret == 0) ? ktpn : "<unknown>");
if(ret == 0)
free(ktpn);
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US;
goto out;
}
ret = _kdc_get_preferred_key(context, config, krbtgt_out, krbtgt_out_n,
NULL, &tkey_sign);
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Failed to find key for krbtgt PAC signature");
goto out;
}
ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &krbtgt_out->entry, NULL,
tkey_sign->key.keytype, &tkey_sign);
if(ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Failed to find key for krbtgt PAC signature");
goto out;
}
ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, cp, HDB_F_GET_CLIENT | flags,
NULL, &clientdb, &client);
if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE) {
/* This is OK, we are just trying to find out if they have
* been disabled or deleted in the meantime, missing secrets
* is OK */
} else if(ret){
const char *krbtgt_realm, *msg;
/*
* If the client belongs to the same realm as our krbtgt, it
* should exist in the local database.
*
*/
krbtgt_realm = krb5_principal_get_realm(context, krbtgt_out->entry.principal);
if(strcmp(krb5_principal_get_realm(context, cp), krbtgt_realm) == 0) {
if (ret == HDB_ERR_NOENTRY)
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
kdc_log(context, config, 1, "Client no longer in database: %s",
cpn);
goto out;
}
msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
kdc_log(context, config, 1, "Client not found in database: %s", msg);
krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
}
ret = check_PAC(context, config, cp, NULL,
client, server, krbtgt,
&tkey_check->key,
ekey, &tkey_sign->key,
tgt, &rspac, &signedpath);
if (ret) {
const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Verify PAC failed for %s (%s) from %s with %s",
spn, cpn, from, msg);
krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
goto out;
}
/* also check the krbtgt for signature */
ret = check_KRB5SignedPath(context,
config,
krbtgt,
cp,
tgt,
&spp,
&signedpath);
if (ret) {
const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"KRB5SignedPath check failed for %s (%s) from %s with %s",
spn, cpn, from, msg);
krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
goto out;
}
/*
* Process request
*/
/* by default the tgt principal matches the client principal */
tp = cp;
tpn = cpn;
if (client) {
const PA_DATA *sdata;
int i = 0;
sdata = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_FOR_USER);
if (sdata) {
krb5_crypto crypto;
krb5_data datack;
PA_S4U2Self self;
const char *str;
ret = decode_PA_S4U2Self(sdata->padata_value.data,
sdata->padata_value.length,
&self, NULL);
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to decode PA-S4U2Self");
goto out;
}
ret = _krb5_s4u2self_to_checksumdata(context, &self, &datack);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, &tgt->key, 0, &crypto);
if (ret) {
const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
free_PA_S4U2Self(&self);
krb5_data_free(&datack);
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg);
krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
goto out;
}
ret = krb5_verify_checksum(context,
crypto,
KRB5_KU_OTHER_CKSUM,
datack.data,
datack.length,
&self.cksum);
krb5_data_free(&datack);
krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
if (ret) {
const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
free_PA_S4U2Self(&self);
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"krb5_verify_checksum failed for S4U2Self: %s", msg);
krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
goto out;
}
ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(context,
&tp,
self.name,
self.realm);
free_PA_S4U2Self(&self);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, tp, &tpn);
if (ret)
goto out;
/* If we were about to put a PAC into the ticket, we better fix it to be the right PAC */
if(rspac.data) {
krb5_pac p = NULL;
krb5_data_free(&rspac);
ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, tp, HDB_F_GET_CLIENT | flags,
NULL, &s4u2self_impersonated_clientdb, &s4u2self_impersonated_client);
if (ret) {
const char *msg;
/*
* If the client belongs to the same realm as our krbtgt, it
* should exist in the local database.
*
*/
if (ret == HDB_ERR_NOENTRY)
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
kdc_log(context, config, 1,
"S2U4Self principal to impersonate %s not found in database: %s",
tpn, msg);
krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
goto out;
}
ret = _kdc_pac_generate(context, s4u2self_impersonated_client, &p);
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "PAC generation failed for -- %s",
tpn);
goto out;
}
if (p != NULL) {
ret = _krb5_pac_sign(context, p, ticket->ticket.authtime,
s4u2self_impersonated_client->entry.principal,
ekey, &tkey_sign->key,
&rspac);
krb5_pac_free(context, p);
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "PAC signing failed for -- %s",
tpn);
goto out;
}
}
}
/*
* Check that service doing the impersonating is
* requesting a ticket to it-self.
*/
ret = check_s4u2self(context, config, clientdb, client, sp);
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "S4U2Self: %s is not allowed "
"to impersonate to service "
"(tried for user %s to service %s)",
cpn, tpn, spn);
goto out;
}
/*
* If the service isn't trusted for authentication to
* delegation, remove the forward flag.
*/
if (client->entry.flags.trusted_for_delegation) {
str = "[forwardable]";
} else {
b->kdc_options.forwardable = 0;
str = "";
}
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "s4u2self %s impersonating %s to "
"service %s %s", cpn, tpn, spn, str);
}
}
/*
* Constrained delegation
*/
if (client != NULL
&& b->additional_tickets != NULL
&& b->additional_tickets->len != 0
&& b->kdc_options.enc_tkt_in_skey == 0)
{
int ad_signedpath = 0;
Key *clientkey;
Ticket *t;
/*
* Require that the KDC have issued the service's krbtgt (not
* self-issued ticket with kimpersonate(1).
*/
if (!signedpath) {
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Constrained delegation done on service ticket %s/%s",
cpn, spn);
goto out;
}
t = &b->additional_tickets->val[0];
ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &client->entry,
hdb_kvno2keys(context, &client->entry,
t->enc_part.kvno ? * t->enc_part.kvno : 0),
t->enc_part.etype, &clientkey);
if(ret){
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP; /* XXX */
goto out;
}
ret = krb5_decrypt_ticket(context, t, &clientkey->key, &adtkt, 0);
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"failed to decrypt ticket for "
"constrained delegation from %s to %s ", cpn, spn);
goto out;
}
ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(context,
&tp,
adtkt.cname,
adtkt.crealm);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, tp, &tpn);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(context,
&dp,
t->sname,
t->realm);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, dp, &dpn);
if (ret)
goto out;
/* check that ticket is valid */
if (adtkt.flags.forwardable == 0) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Missing forwardable flag on ticket for "
"constrained delegation from %s (%s) as %s to %s ",
cpn, dpn, tpn, spn);
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
goto out;
}
ret = check_constrained_delegation(context, config, clientdb,
client, server, sp);
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"constrained delegation from %s (%s) as %s to %s not allowed",
cpn, dpn, tpn, spn);
goto out;
}
ret = verify_flags(context, config, &adtkt, tpn);
if (ret) {
goto out;
}
krb5_data_free(&rspac);
/*
* generate the PAC for the user.
*
* TODO: pass in t->sname and t->realm and build
* a S4U_DELEGATION_INFO blob to the PAC.
*/
ret = check_PAC(context, config, tp, dp,
client, server, krbtgt,
&clientkey->key,
ekey, &tkey_sign->key,
&adtkt, &rspac, &ad_signedpath);
if (ret) {
const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Verify delegated PAC failed to %s for client"
"%s (%s) as %s from %s with %s",
spn, cpn, dpn, tpn, from, msg);
krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
goto out;
}
/*
* Check that the KDC issued the user's ticket.
*/
ret = check_KRB5SignedPath(context,
config,
krbtgt,
cp,
&adtkt,
NULL,
&ad_signedpath);
if (ret) {
const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"KRB5SignedPath check from service %s failed "
"for delegation to %s for client %s (%s)"
"from %s failed with %s",
spn, tpn, dpn, cpn, from, msg);
krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
goto out;
}
if (!ad_signedpath) {
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Ticket not signed with PAC nor SignedPath service %s failed "
"for delegation to %s for client %s (%s)"
"from %s",
spn, tpn, dpn, cpn, from);
goto out;
}
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "constrained delegation for %s "
"from %s (%s) to %s", tpn, cpn, dpn, spn);
}
/*
* Check flags
*/
ret = kdc_check_flags(context, config,
client, cpn,
server, spn,
FALSE);
if(ret)
goto out;
if((b->kdc_options.validate || b->kdc_options.renew) &&
!krb5_principal_compare(context,
krbtgt->entry.principal,
server->entry.principal)){
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Inconsistent request.");
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH;
goto out;
}
/* check for valid set of addresses */
if(!_kdc_check_addresses(context, config, tgt->caddr, from_addr)) {
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR;
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Request from wrong address");
goto out;
}
/*
* If this is an referral, add server referral data to the
* auth_data reply .
*/
if (ref_realm) {
PA_DATA pa;
krb5_crypto crypto;
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Adding server referral to %s", ref_realm);
ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, &sessionkey, 0, &crypto);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = build_server_referral(context, config, crypto, ref_realm,
NULL, s, &pa.padata_value);
krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Failed building server referral");
goto out;
}
pa.padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_SERVER_REFERRAL;
ret = add_METHOD_DATA(&enc_pa_data, &pa);
krb5_data_free(&pa.padata_value);
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Add server referral METHOD-DATA failed");
goto out;
}
}
/*
*
*/
ret = tgs_make_reply(context,
config,
b,
tp,
tgt,
replykey,
rk_is_subkey,
ekey,
&sessionkey,
kvno,
*auth_data,
server,
rsp,
spn,
client,
cp,
krbtgt_out,
tkey_sign->key.keytype,
spp,
&rspac,
&enc_pa_data,
e_text,
reply);
out:
if (tpn != cpn)
free(tpn);
free(spn);
free(cpn);
free(dpn);
free(krbtgt_out_n);
_krb5_free_capath(context, capath);
krb5_data_free(&rspac);
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &sessionkey);
if(krbtgt_out)
_kdc_free_ent(context, krbtgt_out);
if(server)
_kdc_free_ent(context, server);
if(client)
_kdc_free_ent(context, client);
if(s4u2self_impersonated_client)
_kdc_free_ent(context, s4u2self_impersonated_client);
if (tp && tp != cp)
krb5_free_principal(context, tp);
krb5_free_principal(context, cp);
krb5_free_principal(context, dp);
krb5_free_principal(context, sp);
krb5_free_principal(context, krbtgt_out_principal);
free(ref_realm);
free_METHOD_DATA(&enc_pa_data);
free_EncTicketPart(&adtkt);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix transit path validation CVE-2017-6594
Commit f469fc6 (2010-10-02) inadvertently caused the previous hop realm
to not be added to the transit path of issued tickets. This may, in
some cases, enable bypass of capath policy in Heimdal versions 1.5
through 7.2.
Note, this may break sites that rely on the bug. With the bug some
incomplete [capaths] worked, that should not have. These may now break
authentication in some cross-realm configurations.
CWE ID: CWE-295
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int _c2s_sx_sasl_callback(int cb, void *arg, void **res, sx_t s, void *cbarg) {
c2s_t c2s = (c2s_t) cbarg;
const char *my_realm, *mech;
sx_sasl_creds_t creds;
static char buf[3072];
char mechbuf[256];
struct jid_st jid;
jid_static_buf jid_buf;
int i, r;
sess_t sess;
char skey[44];
host_t host;
/* init static jid */
jid_static(&jid,&jid_buf);
/* retrieve our session */
assert(s != NULL);
sprintf(skey, "%d", s->tag);
/*
* Retrieve the session, note that depending on the operation,
* session may be null.
*/
sess = xhash_get(c2s->sessions, skey);
switch(cb) {
case sx_sasl_cb_GET_REALM:
if(s->req_to == NULL) /* this shouldn't happen */
my_realm = "";
else {
/* get host for request */
host = xhash_get(c2s->hosts, s->req_to);
if(host == NULL) {
log_write(c2s->log, LOG_ERR, "SASL callback for non-existing host: %s", s->req_to);
*res = (void *)NULL;
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
}
my_realm = host->realm;
if(my_realm == NULL)
my_realm = s->req_to;
}
strncpy(buf, my_realm, 256);
*res = (void *)buf;
log_debug(ZONE, "sx sasl callback: get realm: realm is '%s'", buf);
return sx_sasl_ret_OK;
break;
case sx_sasl_cb_GET_PASS:
assert(sess != NULL);
creds = (sx_sasl_creds_t) arg;
log_debug(ZONE, "sx sasl callback: get pass (authnid=%s, realm=%s)", creds->authnid, creds->realm);
if(sess->host->ar->get_password && (sess->host->ar->get_password)(
sess->host->ar, sess, (char *)creds->authnid, (creds->realm != NULL) ? (char *)creds->realm: "", buf) == 0) {
*res = buf;
return sx_sasl_ret_OK;
}
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
case sx_sasl_cb_CHECK_PASS:
assert(sess != NULL);
creds = (sx_sasl_creds_t) arg;
log_debug(ZONE, "sx sasl callback: check pass (authnid=%s, realm=%s)", creds->authnid, creds->realm);
if(sess->host->ar->check_password != NULL) {
if ((sess->host->ar->check_password)(
sess->host->ar, sess, (char *)creds->authnid, (creds->realm != NULL) ? (char *)creds->realm : "", (char *)creds->pass) == 0)
return sx_sasl_ret_OK;
else
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
}
if(sess->host->ar->get_password != NULL) {
if ((sess->host->ar->get_password)(sess->host->ar, sess, (char *)creds->authnid, (creds->realm != NULL) ? (char *)creds->realm : "", buf) != 0)
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
if (strcmp(creds->pass, buf)==0)
return sx_sasl_ret_OK;
}
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
break;
case sx_sasl_cb_CHECK_AUTHZID:
assert(sess != NULL);
creds = (sx_sasl_creds_t) arg;
/* we need authzid to validate */
if(creds->authzid == NULL || creds->authzid[0] == '\0')
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
/* authzid must be a valid jid */
if(jid_reset(&jid, creds->authzid, -1) == NULL)
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
/* and have domain == stream to addr */
if(!s->req_to || (strcmp(jid.domain, s->req_to) != 0))
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
/* and have no resource */
if(jid.resource[0] != '\0')
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
/* and user has right to authorize as */
if (sess->host->ar->user_authz_allowed) {
if (sess->host->ar->user_authz_allowed(sess->host->ar, sess, (char *)creds->authnid, (char *)creds->realm, (char *)creds->authzid))
return sx_sasl_ret_OK;
} else {
if (strcmp(creds->authnid, jid.node) == 0 &&
(sess->host->ar->user_exists)(sess->host->ar, sess, jid.node, jid.domain))
return sx_sasl_ret_OK;
}
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
case sx_sasl_cb_GEN_AUTHZID:
/* generate a jid for SASL ANONYMOUS */
jid_reset(&jid, s->req_to, -1);
/* make node a random string */
jid_random_part(&jid, jid_NODE);
strcpy(buf, jid.node);
*res = (void *)buf;
return sx_sasl_ret_OK;
break;
case sx_sasl_cb_CHECK_MECH:
mech = (char *)arg;
strncpy(mechbuf, mech, sizeof(mechbuf));
mechbuf[sizeof(mechbuf)-1]='\0';
for(i = 0; mechbuf[i]; i++) mechbuf[i] = tolower(mechbuf[i]);
/* get host for request */
host = xhash_get(c2s->hosts, s->req_to);
if(host == NULL) {
log_write(c2s->log, LOG_WARNING, "SASL callback for non-existing host: %s", s->req_to);
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
}
/* Determine if our configuration will let us use this mechanism.
* We support different mechanisms for both SSL and normal use */
if (strcmp(mechbuf, "digest-md5") == 0) {
/* digest-md5 requires that our authreg support get_password */
if (host->ar->get_password == NULL)
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
} else if (strcmp(mechbuf, "plain") == 0) {
/* plain requires either get_password or check_password */
if (host->ar->get_password == NULL && host->ar->check_password == NULL)
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
}
/* Using SSF is potentially dangerous, as SASL can also set the
* SSF of the connection. However, SASL shouldn't do so until after
* we've finished mechanism establishment
*/
if (s->ssf>0) {
r = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "authreg.ssl-mechanisms.sasl.%s",mechbuf);
if (r < -1 || r > sizeof(buf))
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
if(config_get(c2s->config,buf) != NULL)
return sx_sasl_ret_OK;
}
r = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "authreg.mechanisms.sasl.%s",mechbuf);
if (r < -1 || r > sizeof(buf))
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
/* Work out if our configuration will let us use this mechanism */
if(config_get(c2s->config,buf) != NULL)
return sx_sasl_ret_OK;
else
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
default:
break;
}
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
}
Commit Message: Fixed offered SASL mechanism check
CWE ID: CWE-287
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: smb_errstr(int class, int num)
{
static char ret[128];
int i, j;
ret[0] = 0;
for (i = 0; err_classes[i].class; i++)
if (err_classes[i].code == class) {
if (err_classes[i].err_msgs) {
const err_code_struct *err = err_classes[i].err_msgs;
for (j = 0; err[j].name; j++)
if (num == err[j].code) {
snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "%s - %s (%s)",
err_classes[i].class, err[j].name, err[j].message);
return ret;
}
}
snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "%s - %d", err_classes[i].class, num);
return ret;
}
snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "ERROR: Unknown error (%d,%d)", class, num);
return(ret);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12893/SMB/CIFS: Add a bounds check in name_len().
After we advance the pointer by the length value in the buffer, make
sure it points to something in the captured data.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: sec_hash_48(uint8 * out, uint8 * in, uint8 * salt1, uint8 * salt2, uint8 salt)
{
uint8 shasig[20];
uint8 pad[4];
RDSSL_SHA1 sha1;
RDSSL_MD5 md5;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
{
memset(pad, salt + i, i + 1);
rdssl_sha1_init(&sha1);
rdssl_sha1_update(&sha1, pad, i + 1);
rdssl_sha1_update(&sha1, in, 48);
rdssl_sha1_update(&sha1, salt1, 32);
rdssl_sha1_update(&sha1, salt2, 32);
rdssl_sha1_final(&sha1, shasig);
rdssl_md5_init(&md5);
rdssl_md5_update(&md5, in, 48);
rdssl_md5_update(&md5, shasig, 20);
rdssl_md5_final(&md5, &out[i * 16]);
}
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: file_tryelf(struct magic_set *ms, int fd, const unsigned char *buf,
size_t nbytes)
{
union {
int32_t l;
char c[sizeof (int32_t)];
} u;
int clazz;
int swap;
struct stat st;
off_t fsize;
int flags = 0;
Elf32_Ehdr elf32hdr;
Elf64_Ehdr elf64hdr;
uint16_t type, phnum, shnum;
if (ms->flags & (MAGIC_MIME|MAGIC_APPLE))
return 0;
/*
* ELF executables have multiple section headers in arbitrary
* file locations and thus file(1) cannot determine it from easily.
* Instead we traverse thru all section headers until a symbol table
* one is found or else the binary is stripped.
* Return immediately if it's not ELF (so we avoid pipe2file unless needed).
*/
if (buf[EI_MAG0] != ELFMAG0
|| (buf[EI_MAG1] != ELFMAG1 && buf[EI_MAG1] != OLFMAG1)
|| buf[EI_MAG2] != ELFMAG2 || buf[EI_MAG3] != ELFMAG3)
return 0;
/*
* If we cannot seek, it must be a pipe, socket or fifo.
*/
if((lseek(fd, (off_t)0, SEEK_SET) == (off_t)-1) && (errno == ESPIPE))
fd = file_pipe2file(ms, fd, buf, nbytes);
if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) || st.st_size != 0)
fsize = st.st_size;
else
fsize = SIZE_UNKNOWN;
clazz = buf[EI_CLASS];
switch (clazz) {
case ELFCLASS32:
#undef elf_getu
#define elf_getu(a, b) elf_getu32(a, b)
#undef elfhdr
#define elfhdr elf32hdr
#include "elfclass.h"
case ELFCLASS64:
#undef elf_getu
#define elf_getu(a, b) elf_getu64(a, b)
#undef elfhdr
#define elfhdr elf64hdr
#include "elfclass.h"
default:
if (file_printf(ms, ", unknown class %d", clazz) == -1)
return -1;
break;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: - Add a limit to the number of ELF notes processed (Suggested by Alexander
Cherepanov)
- Restructure ELF note printing so that we don't print the same message
multiple times on repeated notes of the same kind.
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static size_t GLTargetToFaceIndex(GLenum target) {
switch (target) {
case GL_TEXTURE_2D:
case GL_TEXTURE_EXTERNAL_OES:
case GL_TEXTURE_RECTANGLE_ARB:
return 0;
case GL_TEXTURE_CUBE_MAP_POSITIVE_X:
return 0;
case GL_TEXTURE_CUBE_MAP_NEGATIVE_X:
return 1;
case GL_TEXTURE_CUBE_MAP_POSITIVE_Y:
return 2;
case GL_TEXTURE_CUBE_MAP_NEGATIVE_Y:
return 3;
case GL_TEXTURE_CUBE_MAP_POSITIVE_Z:
return 4;
case GL_TEXTURE_CUBE_MAP_NEGATIVE_Z:
return 5;
default:
NOTREACHED();
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void AddInputMethodNames(const GList* engines, InputMethodDescriptors* out) {
DCHECK(out);
for (; engines; engines = g_list_next(engines)) {
IBusEngineDesc* engine_desc = IBUS_ENGINE_DESC(engines->data);
const gchar* name = ibus_engine_desc_get_name(engine_desc);
const gchar* longname = ibus_engine_desc_get_longname(engine_desc);
const gchar* layout = ibus_engine_desc_get_layout(engine_desc);
const gchar* language = ibus_engine_desc_get_language(engine_desc);
if (InputMethodIdIsWhitelisted(name)) {
out->push_back(CreateInputMethodDescriptor(name,
longname,
layout,
language));
DLOG(INFO) << name << " (preloaded)";
}
}
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int key_notify_policy_flush(const struct km_event *c)
{
struct sk_buff *skb_out;
struct sadb_msg *hdr;
skb_out = alloc_skb(sizeof(struct sadb_msg) + 16, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb_out)
return -ENOBUFS;
hdr = (struct sadb_msg *) skb_put(skb_out, sizeof(struct sadb_msg));
hdr->sadb_msg_type = SADB_X_SPDFLUSH;
hdr->sadb_msg_seq = c->seq;
hdr->sadb_msg_pid = c->portid;
hdr->sadb_msg_version = PF_KEY_V2;
hdr->sadb_msg_errno = (uint8_t) 0;
hdr->sadb_msg_satype = SADB_SATYPE_UNSPEC;
hdr->sadb_msg_len = (sizeof(struct sadb_msg) / sizeof(uint64_t));
pfkey_broadcast(skb_out, GFP_ATOMIC, BROADCAST_ALL, NULL, c->net);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: af_key: fix info leaks in notify messages
key_notify_sa_flush() and key_notify_policy_flush() miss to initialize
the sadb_msg_reserved member of the broadcasted message and thereby
leak 2 bytes of heap memory to listeners. Fix that.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void TIFF_MetaHandler::UpdateFile ( bool doSafeUpdate )
{
XMP_Assert ( ! doSafeUpdate ); // This should only be called for "unsafe" updates.
XMP_IO* destRef = this->parent->ioRef;
XMP_AbortProc abortProc = this->parent->abortProc;
void * abortArg = this->parent->abortArg;
XMP_Int64 oldPacketOffset = this->packetInfo.offset;
XMP_Int32 oldPacketLength = this->packetInfo.length;
if ( oldPacketOffset == kXMPFiles_UnknownOffset ) oldPacketOffset = 0; // ! Simplify checks.
if ( oldPacketLength == kXMPFiles_UnknownLength ) oldPacketLength = 0;
bool fileHadXMP = ((oldPacketOffset != 0) && (oldPacketLength != 0));
ExportPhotoData ( kXMP_TIFFFile, &this->xmpObj, &this->tiffMgr, this->iptcMgr, this->psirMgr );
try {
XMP_OptionBits options = kXMP_UseCompactFormat;
if ( fileHadXMP ) options |= kXMP_ExactPacketLength;
this->xmpObj.SerializeToBuffer ( &this->xmpPacket, options, oldPacketLength );
} catch ( ... ) {
this->xmpObj.SerializeToBuffer ( &this->xmpPacket, kXMP_UseCompactFormat );
}
bool doInPlace = (fileHadXMP && (this->xmpPacket.size() <= (size_t)oldPacketLength));
if ( this->tiffMgr.IsLegacyChanged() ) doInPlace = false;
bool localProgressTracking = false;
XMP_ProgressTracker* progressTracker = this->parent->progressTracker;
if ( ! doInPlace ) {
#if GatherPerformanceData
sAPIPerf->back().extraInfo += ", TIFF append update";
#endif
if ( (progressTracker != 0) && (! progressTracker->WorkInProgress()) ) {
localProgressTracking = true;
progressTracker->BeginWork();
}
this->tiffMgr.SetTag ( kTIFF_PrimaryIFD, kTIFF_XMP, kTIFF_UndefinedType, (XMP_Uns32)this->xmpPacket.size(), this->xmpPacket.c_str() );
this->tiffMgr.UpdateFileStream ( destRef, progressTracker );
} else {
#if GatherPerformanceData
sAPIPerf->back().extraInfo += ", TIFF in-place update";
#endif
if ( this->xmpPacket.size() < (size_t)this->packetInfo.length ) {
size_t extraSpace = (size_t)this->packetInfo.length - this->xmpPacket.size();
this->xmpPacket.append ( extraSpace, ' ' );
}
XMP_IO* liveFile = this->parent->ioRef;
XMP_Assert ( this->xmpPacket.size() == (size_t)oldPacketLength ); // ! Done by common PutXMP logic.
if ( progressTracker != 0 ) {
if ( progressTracker->WorkInProgress() ) {
progressTracker->AddTotalWork ( this->xmpPacket.size() );
} else {
localProgressTracking = true;
progressTracker->BeginWork ( this->xmpPacket.size() );
}
}
liveFile->Seek ( oldPacketOffset, kXMP_SeekFromStart );
liveFile->Write ( this->xmpPacket.c_str(), (XMP_Int32)this->xmpPacket.size() );
}
if ( localProgressTracking ) progressTracker->WorkComplete();
this->needsUpdate = false;
} // TIFF_MetaHandler::UpdateFile
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: remove_leading_slash(const char *p)
{
const char *rp;
/* Remove leading "//./" or "//?/" or "//?/UNC/"
* (absolute path prefixes used by Windows API) */
if ((p[0] == '/' || p[0] == '\\') &&
(p[1] == '/' || p[1] == '\\') &&
(p[2] == '.' || p[2] == '?') &&
(p[3] == '/' || p[3] == '\\'))
{
if (p[2] == '?' &&
(p[4] == 'U' || p[4] == 'u') &&
(p[5] == 'N' || p[5] == 'n') &&
(p[6] == 'C' || p[6] == 'c') &&
(p[7] == '/' || p[7] == '\\'))
p += 8;
else
p += 4;
}
do {
rp = p;
/* Remove leading drive letter from archives created
* on Windows. */
if (((p[0] >= 'a' && p[0] <= 'z') ||
(p[0] >= 'A' && p[0] <= 'Z')) &&
p[1] == ':') {
p += 2;
}
/* Remove leading "/../", "//", etc. */
while (p[0] == '/' || p[0] == '\\') {
if (p[1] == '.' && p[2] == '.' &&
(p[3] == '/' || p[3] == '\\')) {
p += 3; /* Remove "/..", leave "/"
* for next pass. */
} else
p += 1; /* Remove "/". */
}
} while (rp != p);
return (p);
}
Commit Message: Add ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS option
This fixes a directory traversal in the cpio tool.
CWE ID: CWE-22
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void SplitString(const std::wstring& str,
wchar_t c,
std::vector<std::wstring>* r) {
SplitStringT(str, c, true, r);
}
Commit Message: wstring: remove wstring version of SplitString
Retry of r84336.
BUG=23581
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6930047
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@84355 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int ip_vs_genl_dump_services(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
int idx = 0, i;
int start = cb->args[0];
struct ip_vs_service *svc;
mutex_lock(&__ip_vs_mutex);
for (i = 0; i < IP_VS_SVC_TAB_SIZE; i++) {
list_for_each_entry(svc, &ip_vs_svc_table[i], s_list) {
if (++idx <= start)
continue;
if (ip_vs_genl_dump_service(skb, svc, cb) < 0) {
idx--;
goto nla_put_failure;
}
}
}
for (i = 0; i < IP_VS_SVC_TAB_SIZE; i++) {
list_for_each_entry(svc, &ip_vs_svc_fwm_table[i], f_list) {
if (++idx <= start)
continue;
if (ip_vs_genl_dump_service(skb, svc, cb) < 0) {
idx--;
goto nla_put_failure;
}
}
}
nla_put_failure:
mutex_unlock(&__ip_vs_mutex);
cb->args[0] = idx;
return skb->len;
}
Commit Message: ipvs: Add boundary check on ioctl arguments
The ipvs code has a nifty system for doing the size of ioctl command
copies; it defines an array with values into which it indexes the cmd
to find the right length.
Unfortunately, the ipvs code forgot to check if the cmd was in the
range that the array provides, allowing for an index outside of the
array, which then gives a "garbage" result into the length, which
then gets used for copying into a stack buffer.
Fix this by adding sanity checks on these as well as the copy size.
[ [email protected]: adjusted limit to IP_VS_SO_GET_MAX ]
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: int crypto_hash_walk_first_compat(struct hash_desc *hdesc,
struct crypto_hash_walk *walk,
struct scatterlist *sg, unsigned int len)
{
walk->total = len;
if (!walk->total)
return 0;
walk->alignmask = crypto_hash_alignmask(hdesc->tfm);
walk->sg = sg;
walk->flags = hdesc->flags;
return hash_walk_new_entry(walk);
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-310
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: bool RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::AttachSession(DevToolsSession* session) {
if (session->restricted() && !IsFrameHostAllowedForRestrictedSessions())
return false;
session->SetRenderer(frame_host_ ? frame_host_->GetProcess()->GetID()
: ChildProcessHost::kInvalidUniqueID,
frame_host_);
protocol::EmulationHandler* emulation_handler =
new protocol::EmulationHandler();
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::BrowserHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::DOMHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(emulation_handler));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::InputHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::InspectorHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::IOHandler(
GetIOContext())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::MemoryHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::NetworkHandler(GetId())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::SchemaHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::ServiceWorkerHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::StorageHandler()));
session->AddHandler(
base::WrapUnique(new protocol::TargetHandler(false /* browser_only */)));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::TracingHandler(
protocol::TracingHandler::Renderer,
frame_tree_node_ ? frame_tree_node_->frame_tree_node_id() : 0,
GetIOContext())));
session->AddHandler(
base::WrapUnique(new protocol::PageHandler(emulation_handler)));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::SecurityHandler()));
if (EnsureAgent())
session->AttachToAgent(agent_ptr_);
if (sessions().size() == 1) {
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kVizDisplayCompositor) &&
!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
features::kUseVideoCaptureApiForDevToolsSnapshots)) {
frame_trace_recorder_.reset(new DevToolsFrameTraceRecorder());
}
GrantPolicy();
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
GetWakeLock()->RequestWakeLock();
#endif
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not create target handler for restricted sessions
Bug: 805224
Change-Id: I08528e44e79d0a097cfe72ab4949dda538efd098
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/988695
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547496}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void netdev_freemem(struct net_device *dev)
{
char *addr = (char *)dev - dev->padded;
kvfree(addr);
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-400
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static void nfs4_xdr_enc_getacl(struct rpc_rqst *req, struct xdr_stream *xdr,
struct nfs_getaclargs *args)
{
struct compound_hdr hdr = {
.minorversion = nfs4_xdr_minorversion(&args->seq_args),
};
uint32_t replen;
encode_compound_hdr(xdr, req, &hdr);
encode_sequence(xdr, &args->seq_args, &hdr);
encode_putfh(xdr, args->fh, &hdr);
replen = hdr.replen + op_decode_hdr_maxsz + nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz + 1;
encode_getattr_two(xdr, FATTR4_WORD0_ACL, 0, &hdr);
xdr_inline_pages(&req->rq_rcv_buf, replen << 2,
args->acl_pages, args->acl_pgbase, args->acl_len);
encode_nops(&hdr);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: WebContents* TabsCaptureVisibleTabFunction::GetWebContentsForID(
int window_id,
std::string* error) {
Browser* browser = NULL;
if (!GetBrowserFromWindowID(chrome_details_, window_id, &browser, error))
return nullptr;
WebContents* contents = browser->tab_strip_model()->GetActiveWebContents();
if (!contents) {
*error = "No active web contents to capture";
return nullptr;
}
if (!extension()->permissions_data()->CanCaptureVisiblePage(
SessionTabHelper::IdForTab(contents).id(), error)) {
return nullptr;
}
return contents;
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Restrict tabs.captureVisibleTab()
Modify the permissions for tabs.captureVisibleTab(). Instead of just
checking for <all_urls> and assuming its safe, do the following:
- If the page is a "normal" web page (e.g., http/https), allow the
capture if the extension has activeTab granted or <all_urls>.
- If the page is a file page (file:///), allow the capture if the
extension has file access *and* either of the <all_urls> or
activeTab permissions.
- If the page is a chrome:// page, allow the capture only if the
extension has activeTab granted.
Bug: 810220
Change-Id: I1e2f71281e2f331d641ba0e435df10d66d721304
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/981195
Commit-Queue: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Karan Bhatia <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#548891}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int unix_scm_to_skb(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb, bool send_fds)
{
int err = 0;
UNIXCB(skb).pid = get_pid(scm->pid);
if (scm->cred)
UNIXCB(skb).cred = get_cred(scm->cred);
UNIXCB(skb).fp = NULL;
if (scm->fp && send_fds)
err = unix_attach_fds(scm, skb);
skb->destructor = unix_destruct_scm;
return err;
}
Commit Message: af_netlink: force credentials passing [CVE-2012-3520]
Pablo Neira Ayuso discovered that avahi and
potentially NetworkManager accept spoofed Netlink messages because of a
kernel bug. The kernel passes all-zero SCM_CREDENTIALS ancillary data
to the receiver if the sender did not provide such data, instead of not
including any such data at all or including the correct data from the
peer (as it is the case with AF_UNIX).
This bug was introduced in commit 16e572626961
(af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default)
This patch forces passing credentials for netlink, as
before the regression.
Another fix would be to not add SCM_CREDENTIALS in
netlink messages if not provided by the sender, but it
might break some programs.
With help from Florian Weimer & Petr Matousek
This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3520
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Petr Matousek <[email protected]>
Cc: Florian Weimer <[email protected]>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-287
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static void perf_output_wakeup(struct perf_output_handle *handle)
{
atomic_set(&handle->rb->poll, POLL_IN);
if (handle->nmi) {
handle->event->pending_wakeup = 1;
irq_work_queue(&handle->event->pending);
} else
perf_event_wakeup(handle->event);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: unsigned long long Track::GetSeekPreRoll() const
{
return m_info.seekPreRoll;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void OmniboxViewWin::OnChar(TCHAR ch, UINT repeat_count, UINT flags) {
if (ch == VK_RETURN && (flags & KF_ALTDOWN))
return;
if (ch == VK_ESCAPE && !(flags & KF_ALTDOWN))
return;
if (ch == VK_TAB) {
return;
}
HandleKeystroke(GetCurrentMessage()->message, ch, repeat_count, flags);
}
Commit Message: Change omnibox behavior when stripping javascript schema to navigate after stripping the schema on drag drop.
BUG=109245
TEST=N/A
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9116016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116692 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void SoundPool::done_l(SoundChannel* channel)
{
ALOGV("done_l(%d)", channel->channelID());
if (channel->nextChannelID() != 0) {
ALOGV("add to restart list");
addToRestartList(channel);
}
else {
ALOGV("move to front");
moveToFront_l(channel);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE SoundPool: add lock for findSample access from SoundPoolThread
Sample decoding still occurs in SoundPoolThread
without holding the SoundPool lock.
Bug: 25781119
Change-Id: I11fde005aa9cf5438e0390a0d2dfe0ec1dd282e8
CWE ID: CWE-264
Output: | 0 |
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