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Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: PepperMediaDeviceManager* PepperPlatformVideoCapture::GetMediaDeviceManager() {
RenderFrameImpl* const render_frame =
RenderFrameImpl::FromRoutingID(render_frame_id_);
return render_frame ?
PepperMediaDeviceManager::GetForRenderFrame(render_frame) : NULL;
}
Commit Message: Pepper: Access PepperMediaDeviceManager through a WeakPtr
Its lifetime is scoped to the RenderFrame, and it might go away before the
hosts that refer to it.
BUG=423030
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/653243003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299897}
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void b43_dma_tx_suspend_ring(struct b43_dmaring *ring)
{
B43_WARN_ON(!ring->tx);
ring->ops->tx_suspend(ring);
}
Commit Message: b43: allocate receive buffers big enough for max frame len + offset
Otherwise, skb_put inside of dma_rx can fail...
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32042
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Larry Finger <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: test_size(png_modifier* PNG_CONST pm, png_byte PNG_CONST colour_type,
int bdlo, int PNG_CONST bdhi)
{
/* Run the tests on each combination.
*
* NOTE: on my 32 bit x86 each of the following blocks takes
* a total of 3.5 seconds if done across every combo of bit depth
* width and height. This is a waste of time in practice, hence the
* hinc and winc stuff:
*/
static PNG_CONST png_byte hinc[] = {1, 3, 11, 1, 5};
static PNG_CONST png_byte winc[] = {1, 9, 5, 7, 1};
for (; bdlo <= bdhi; ++bdlo)
{
png_uint_32 h, w;
for (h=1; h<=16; h+=hinc[bdlo]) for (w=1; w<=16; w+=winc[bdlo])
{
/* First test all the 'size' images against the sequential
* reader using libpng to deinterlace (where required.) This
* validates the write side of libpng. There are four possibilities
* to validate.
*/
standard_test(&pm->this, FILEID(colour_type, DEPTH(bdlo), 0/*palette*/,
PNG_INTERLACE_NONE, w, h, 0), 0/*do_interlace*/,
pm->use_update_info);
if (fail(pm))
return 0;
standard_test(&pm->this, FILEID(colour_type, DEPTH(bdlo), 0/*palette*/,
PNG_INTERLACE_NONE, w, h, 1), 0/*do_interlace*/,
pm->use_update_info);
if (fail(pm))
return 0;
# ifdef PNG_WRITE_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED
standard_test(&pm->this, FILEID(colour_type, DEPTH(bdlo), 0/*palette*/,
PNG_INTERLACE_ADAM7, w, h, 0), 0/*do_interlace*/,
pm->use_update_info);
if (fail(pm))
return 0;
standard_test(&pm->this, FILEID(colour_type, DEPTH(bdlo), 0/*palette*/,
PNG_INTERLACE_ADAM7, w, h, 1), 0/*do_interlace*/,
pm->use_update_info);
if (fail(pm))
return 0;
# endif
/* Now validate the interlaced read side - do_interlace true,
* in the progressive case this does actually make a difference
* to the code used in the non-interlaced case too.
*/
standard_test(&pm->this, FILEID(colour_type, DEPTH(bdlo), 0/*palette*/,
PNG_INTERLACE_NONE, w, h, 0), 1/*do_interlace*/,
pm->use_update_info);
if (fail(pm))
return 0;
# ifdef PNG_WRITE_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED
standard_test(&pm->this, FILEID(colour_type, DEPTH(bdlo), 0/*palette*/,
PNG_INTERLACE_ADAM7, w, h, 0), 1/*do_interlace*/,
pm->use_update_info);
if (fail(pm))
return 0;
# endif
}
}
return 1; /* keep going */
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void SystemClipboard::WriteImage(Image* image,
const KURL& url,
const String& title) {
DCHECK(image);
PaintImage paint_image = image->PaintImageForCurrentFrame();
SkBitmap bitmap;
if (sk_sp<SkImage> sk_image = paint_image.GetSkImage())
sk_image->asLegacyBitmap(&bitmap);
if (bitmap.isNull())
return;
if (!bitmap.getPixels())
return;
clipboard_->WriteImage(mojom::ClipboardBuffer::kStandard, bitmap);
if (url.IsValid() && !url.IsEmpty()) {
#if !defined(OS_MACOSX)
clipboard_->WriteBookmark(mojom::ClipboardBuffer::kStandard,
url.GetString(), NonNullString(title));
#endif
clipboard_->WriteHtml(mojom::ClipboardBuffer::kStandard,
URLToImageMarkup(url, title), KURL());
}
clipboard_->CommitWrite(mojom::ClipboardBuffer::kStandard);
}
Commit Message: System Clipboard: Remove extraneous check for bitmap.getPixels()
Bug 369621 originally led to this check being introduced via
https://codereview.chromium.org/289573002/patch/40001/50002, but after
https://crrev.com/c/1345809, I'm not sure that it's still necessary.
This change succeeds when tested against the "minimized test case" provided in
crbug.com/369621 's description, but I'm unsure how to make the minimized test
case fail, so this doesn't prove that the change would succeed against the
fuzzer's test case (which originally filed the bug).
As I'm unable to view the relevant fuzzer test case, (see crbug.com/918705),
I don't know exactly what may have caused the fuzzer to fail. Therefore,
I've added a CHECK for the time being, so that we will be notified in canary
if my assumption was incorrect.
Bug: 369621
Change-Id: Ie9b47a4b38ba1ed47624de776015728e541d27f7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1393436
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kai Ninomiya <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#619591}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: bool X86_lockrep(MCInst *MI, SStream *O)
{
unsigned int opcode;
bool res = false;
switch(MI->x86_prefix[0]) {
default:
break;
case 0xf0:
#ifndef CAPSTONE_DIET
SStream_concat(O, "lock|");
#endif
break;
case 0xf2: // repne
opcode = MCInst_getOpcode(MI);
#ifndef CAPSTONE_DIET // only care about memonic in standard (non-diet) mode
if (valid_repne(MI->csh, opcode)) {
SStream_concat(O, "repne|");
add_cx(MI);
} else {
MI->x86_prefix[0] = 0;
#ifndef CAPSTONE_X86_REDUCE
if (opcode == X86_MULPDrr) {
MCInst_setOpcode(MI, X86_MULSDrr);
SStream_concat(O, "mulsd\t");
res = true;
}
#endif
}
#else // diet mode -> only patch opcode in special cases
if (!valid_repne(MI->csh, opcode)) {
MI->x86_prefix[0] = 0;
}
#ifndef CAPSTONE_X86_REDUCE
if (opcode == X86_MULPDrr) {
MCInst_setOpcode(MI, X86_MULSDrr);
}
#endif
#endif
break;
case 0xf3:
opcode = MCInst_getOpcode(MI);
#ifndef CAPSTONE_DIET // only care about memonic in standard (non-diet) mode
if (valid_rep(MI->csh, opcode)) {
SStream_concat(O, "rep|");
add_cx(MI);
} else if (valid_repe(MI->csh, opcode)) {
SStream_concat(O, "repe|");
add_cx(MI);
} else {
MI->x86_prefix[0] = 0;
#ifndef CAPSTONE_X86_REDUCE
if (opcode == X86_MULPDrr) {
MCInst_setOpcode(MI, X86_MULSSrr);
SStream_concat(O, "mulss\t");
res = true;
}
#endif
}
#else // diet mode -> only patch opcode in special cases
if (!valid_rep(MI->csh, opcode) && !valid_repe(MI->csh, opcode)) {
MI->x86_prefix[0] = 0;
}
#ifndef CAPSTONE_X86_REDUCE
if (opcode == X86_MULPDrr) {
MCInst_setOpcode(MI, X86_MULSSrr);
}
#endif
#endif
break;
}
if (MI->csh->detail)
memcpy(MI->flat_insn->detail->x86.prefix, MI->x86_prefix, ARR_SIZE(MI->x86_prefix));
return res;
}
Commit Message: x86: fast path checking for X86_insn_reg_intel()
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void FrameFetchContext::AddResourceTiming(const ResourceTimingInfo& info) {
if (!document_)
return;
LocalFrame* frame = document_->GetFrame();
if (!frame)
return;
if (info.IsMainResource()) {
DCHECK(frame->Owner());
frame->Owner()->AddResourceTiming(info);
frame->DidSendResourceTimingInfoToParent();
return;
}
DOMWindowPerformance::performance(*document_->domWindow())
->GenerateAndAddResourceTiming(info);
}
Commit Message: Do not forward resource timing to parent frame after back-forward navigation
LocalFrame has |should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent_| flag not to
send timing info to parent except for the first navigation. This flag is
cleared when the first timing is sent to parent, however this does not happen
if iframe's first navigation was by back-forward navigation. For such
iframes, we shouldn't send timings to parent at all.
Bug: 876822
Change-Id: I128b51a82ef278c439548afc8283ae63abdef5c5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1186215
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585736}
CWE ID: CWE-200
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static MagickBooleanType ReadDXT5(Image *image, DDSInfo *dds_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
DDSColors
colors;
ssize_t
j,
y;
MagickSizeType
alpha_bits;
PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
unsigned char
a0,
a1;
size_t
alpha,
bits,
code,
alpha_code;
unsigned short
c0,
c1;
for (y = 0; y < (ssize_t) dds_info->height; y += 4)
{
for (x = 0; x < (ssize_t) dds_info->width; x += 4)
{
/* Get 4x4 patch of pixels to write on */
q = QueueAuthenticPixels(image, x, y, Min(4, dds_info->width - x),
Min(4, dds_info->height - y),exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
return MagickFalse;
/* Read alpha values (8 bytes) */
a0 = (unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
a1 = (unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
alpha_bits = (MagickSizeType)ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
alpha_bits = alpha_bits | ((MagickSizeType)ReadBlobLSBShort(image) << 32);
/* Read 8 bytes of data from the image */
c0 = ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
c1 = ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
bits = ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
CalculateColors(c0, c1, &colors, MagickTrue);
/* Write the pixels */
for (j = 0; j < 4; j++)
{
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
{
if ((x + i) < (ssize_t) dds_info->width && (y + j) < (ssize_t) dds_info->height)
{
code = (bits >> ((4*j+i)*2)) & 0x3;
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.r[code]));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.g[code]));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.b[code]));
/* Extract alpha value */
alpha_code = (size_t) (alpha_bits >> (3*(4*j+i))) & 0x7;
if (alpha_code == 0)
alpha = a0;
else if (alpha_code == 1)
alpha = a1;
else if (a0 > a1)
alpha = ((8-alpha_code) * a0 + (alpha_code-1) * a1) / 7;
else if (alpha_code == 6)
alpha = 0;
else if (alpha_code == 7)
alpha = 255;
else
alpha = (((6-alpha_code) * a0 + (alpha_code-1) * a1) / 5);
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
alpha));
q++;
}
}
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
return MagickFalse;
}
}
SkipDXTMipmaps(image, dds_info, 16);
return MagickTrue;
}
Commit Message: Added extra EOF check and some minor refactoring.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void PluginObserver::OnMissingPluginStatus(int status) {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (status == webkit::npapi::default_plugin::MISSING_PLUGIN_AVAILABLE) {
tab_contents_->AddInfoBar(
new PluginInstallerInfoBarDelegate(tab_contents()));
return;
}
DCHECK_EQ(webkit::npapi::default_plugin::MISSING_PLUGIN_USER_STARTED_DOWNLOAD,
status);
for (size_t i = 0; i < tab_contents_->infobar_count(); ++i) {
InfoBarDelegate* delegate = tab_contents_->GetInfoBarDelegateAt(i);
if (delegate->AsPluginInstallerInfoBarDelegate() != NULL) {
tab_contents_->RemoveInfoBar(delegate);
return;
}
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: Infobar Windows Media Player plug-in by default.
BUG=51464
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7080048
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87500 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void SVGDocumentExtensions::addPendingResource(const AtomicString& id, Element* element)
{
ASSERT(element);
ASSERT(element->inDocument());
if (id.isEmpty())
return;
HashMap<AtomicString, OwnPtr<SVGPendingElements> >::AddResult result = m_pendingResources.add(id, nullptr);
if (result.isNewEntry)
result.storedValue->value = adoptPtr(new SVGPendingElements);
result.storedValue->value->add(element);
element->setHasPendingResources();
}
Commit Message: SVG: Moving animating <svg> to other iframe should not crash.
Moving SVGSVGElement with its SMILTimeContainer already started caused crash before this patch.
|SVGDocumentExtentions::startAnimations()| calls begin() against all SMILTimeContainers in the document, but the SMILTimeContainer for <svg> moved from other document may be already started.
BUG=369860
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/290353002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@174338 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: ssh_packet_get_state(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
u_char *p;
size_t slen, rlen;
int r, ssh1cipher;
if (!compat20) {
ssh1cipher = cipher_ctx_get_number(state->receive_context);
slen = cipher_get_keyiv_len(state->send_context);
rlen = cipher_get_keyiv_len(state->receive_context);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->remote_protocol_flags)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ssh1cipher)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(m, state->ssh1_key, state->ssh1_keylen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, slen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_reserve(m, slen, &p)) != 0 ||
(r = cipher_get_keyiv(state->send_context, p, slen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, rlen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_reserve(m, rlen, &p)) != 0 ||
(r = cipher_get_keyiv(state->receive_context, p, rlen)) != 0)
return r;
} else {
if ((r = kex_to_blob(m, ssh->kex)) != 0 ||
(r = newkeys_to_blob(m, ssh, MODE_OUT)) != 0 ||
(r = newkeys_to_blob(m, ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->rekey_limit)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->rekey_interval)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_send.seqnr)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_send.blocks)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_send.packets)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_send.bytes)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_read.seqnr)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_read.blocks)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_read.packets)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_read.bytes)) != 0)
return r;
}
slen = cipher_get_keycontext(state->send_context, NULL);
rlen = cipher_get_keycontext(state->receive_context, NULL);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, slen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_reserve(m, slen, &p)) != 0)
return r;
if (cipher_get_keycontext(state->send_context, p) != (int)slen)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, rlen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_reserve(m, rlen, &p)) != 0)
return r;
if (cipher_get_keycontext(state->receive_context, p) != (int)rlen)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if ((r = ssh_packet_get_compress_state(m, ssh)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, state->input)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, state->output)) != 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int ktime2ts(ktime_t kt, struct timespec *ts)
{
if (kt.tv64) {
*ts = ktime_to_timespec(kt);
return 1;
} else {
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix order of arguments to compat_put_time[spec|val]
Commit 644595f89620 ("compat: Handle COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME in
net/socket.c") introduced a bug where the helper functions to take
either a 64-bit or compat time[spec|val] got the arguments in the wrong
order, passing the kernel stack pointer off as a user pointer (and vice
versa).
Because of the user address range check, that in turn then causes an
EFAULT due to the user pointer range checking failing for the kernel
address. Incorrectly resuling in a failed system call for 32-bit
processes with a 64-bit kernel.
On odder architectures like HP-PA (with separate user/kernel address
spaces), it can be used read kernel memory.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int packet_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
int len;
int val;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(sk);
void *data;
struct tpacket_stats st;
if (level != SOL_PACKET)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
if (get_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if (len < 0)
return -EINVAL;
switch (optname) {
case PACKET_STATISTICS:
if (len > sizeof(struct tpacket_stats))
len = sizeof(struct tpacket_stats);
spin_lock_bh(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
st = po->stats;
memset(&po->stats, 0, sizeof(st));
spin_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
st.tp_packets += st.tp_drops;
data = &st;
break;
case PACKET_AUXDATA:
if (len > sizeof(int))
len = sizeof(int);
val = po->auxdata;
data = &val;
break;
case PACKET_ORIGDEV:
if (len > sizeof(int))
len = sizeof(int);
val = po->origdev;
data = &val;
break;
case PACKET_VNET_HDR:
if (len > sizeof(int))
len = sizeof(int);
val = po->has_vnet_hdr;
data = &val;
break;
case PACKET_VERSION:
if (len > sizeof(int))
len = sizeof(int);
val = po->tp_version;
data = &val;
break;
case PACKET_HDRLEN:
if (len > sizeof(int))
len = sizeof(int);
if (copy_from_user(&val, optval, len))
return -EFAULT;
switch (val) {
case TPACKET_V1:
val = sizeof(struct tpacket_hdr);
break;
case TPACKET_V2:
val = sizeof(struct tpacket2_hdr);
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
data = &val;
break;
case PACKET_RESERVE:
if (len > sizeof(unsigned int))
len = sizeof(unsigned int);
val = po->tp_reserve;
data = &val;
break;
case PACKET_LOSS:
if (len > sizeof(unsigned int))
len = sizeof(unsigned int);
val = po->tp_loss;
data = &val;
break;
case PACKET_TIMESTAMP:
if (len > sizeof(int))
len = sizeof(int);
val = po->tp_tstamp;
data = &val;
break;
default:
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
if (put_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(optval, data, len))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: af_packet: prevent information leak
In 2.6.27, commit 393e52e33c6c2 (packet: deliver VLAN TCI to userspace)
added a small information leak.
Add padding field and make sure its zeroed before copy to user.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
CC: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: int ip6_fragment(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
int (*output)(struct net *, struct sock *, struct sk_buff *))
{
struct sk_buff *frag;
struct rt6_info *rt = (struct rt6_info *)skb_dst(skb);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = skb->sk && !dev_recursion_level() ?
inet6_sk(skb->sk) : NULL;
struct ipv6hdr *tmp_hdr;
struct frag_hdr *fh;
unsigned int mtu, hlen, left, len;
int hroom, troom;
__be32 frag_id;
int ptr, offset = 0, err = 0;
u8 *prevhdr, nexthdr = 0;
hlen = ip6_find_1stfragopt(skb, &prevhdr);
nexthdr = *prevhdr;
mtu = ip6_skb_dst_mtu(skb);
/* We must not fragment if the socket is set to force MTU discovery
* or if the skb it not generated by a local socket.
*/
if (unlikely(!skb->ignore_df && skb->len > mtu))
goto fail_toobig;
if (IP6CB(skb)->frag_max_size) {
if (IP6CB(skb)->frag_max_size > mtu)
goto fail_toobig;
/* don't send fragments larger than what we received */
mtu = IP6CB(skb)->frag_max_size;
if (mtu < IPV6_MIN_MTU)
mtu = IPV6_MIN_MTU;
}
if (np && np->frag_size < mtu) {
if (np->frag_size)
mtu = np->frag_size;
}
if (mtu < hlen + sizeof(struct frag_hdr) + 8)
goto fail_toobig;
mtu -= hlen + sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
frag_id = ipv6_select_ident(net, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr,
&ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr);
if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL &&
(err = skb_checksum_help(skb)))
goto fail;
hroom = LL_RESERVED_SPACE(rt->dst.dev);
if (skb_has_frag_list(skb)) {
unsigned int first_len = skb_pagelen(skb);
struct sk_buff *frag2;
if (first_len - hlen > mtu ||
((first_len - hlen) & 7) ||
skb_cloned(skb) ||
skb_headroom(skb) < (hroom + sizeof(struct frag_hdr)))
goto slow_path;
skb_walk_frags(skb, frag) {
/* Correct geometry. */
if (frag->len > mtu ||
((frag->len & 7) && frag->next) ||
skb_headroom(frag) < (hlen + hroom + sizeof(struct frag_hdr)))
goto slow_path_clean;
/* Partially cloned skb? */
if (skb_shared(frag))
goto slow_path_clean;
BUG_ON(frag->sk);
if (skb->sk) {
frag->sk = skb->sk;
frag->destructor = sock_wfree;
}
skb->truesize -= frag->truesize;
}
err = 0;
offset = 0;
/* BUILD HEADER */
*prevhdr = NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT;
tmp_hdr = kmemdup(skb_network_header(skb), hlen, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!tmp_hdr) {
IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb)),
IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGFAILS);
err = -ENOMEM;
goto fail;
}
frag = skb_shinfo(skb)->frag_list;
skb_frag_list_init(skb);
__skb_pull(skb, hlen);
fh = (struct frag_hdr *)__skb_push(skb, sizeof(struct frag_hdr));
__skb_push(skb, hlen);
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
memcpy(skb_network_header(skb), tmp_hdr, hlen);
fh->nexthdr = nexthdr;
fh->reserved = 0;
fh->frag_off = htons(IP6_MF);
fh->identification = frag_id;
first_len = skb_pagelen(skb);
skb->data_len = first_len - skb_headlen(skb);
skb->len = first_len;
ipv6_hdr(skb)->payload_len = htons(first_len -
sizeof(struct ipv6hdr));
dst_hold(&rt->dst);
for (;;) {
/* Prepare header of the next frame,
* before previous one went down. */
if (frag) {
frag->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
skb_reset_transport_header(frag);
fh = (struct frag_hdr *)__skb_push(frag, sizeof(struct frag_hdr));
__skb_push(frag, hlen);
skb_reset_network_header(frag);
memcpy(skb_network_header(frag), tmp_hdr,
hlen);
offset += skb->len - hlen - sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
fh->nexthdr = nexthdr;
fh->reserved = 0;
fh->frag_off = htons(offset);
if (frag->next)
fh->frag_off |= htons(IP6_MF);
fh->identification = frag_id;
ipv6_hdr(frag)->payload_len =
htons(frag->len -
sizeof(struct ipv6hdr));
ip6_copy_metadata(frag, skb);
}
err = output(net, sk, skb);
if (!err)
IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(&rt->dst),
IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGCREATES);
if (err || !frag)
break;
skb = frag;
frag = skb->next;
skb->next = NULL;
}
kfree(tmp_hdr);
if (err == 0) {
IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(&rt->dst),
IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGOKS);
ip6_rt_put(rt);
return 0;
}
kfree_skb_list(frag);
IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(&rt->dst),
IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGFAILS);
ip6_rt_put(rt);
return err;
slow_path_clean:
skb_walk_frags(skb, frag2) {
if (frag2 == frag)
break;
frag2->sk = NULL;
frag2->destructor = NULL;
skb->truesize += frag2->truesize;
}
}
slow_path:
left = skb->len - hlen; /* Space per frame */
ptr = hlen; /* Where to start from */
/*
* Fragment the datagram.
*/
troom = rt->dst.dev->needed_tailroom;
/*
* Keep copying data until we run out.
*/
while (left > 0) {
u8 *fragnexthdr_offset;
len = left;
/* IF: it doesn't fit, use 'mtu' - the data space left */
if (len > mtu)
len = mtu;
/* IF: we are not sending up to and including the packet end
then align the next start on an eight byte boundary */
if (len < left) {
len &= ~7;
}
/* Allocate buffer */
frag = alloc_skb(len + hlen + sizeof(struct frag_hdr) +
hroom + troom, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!frag) {
IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb)),
IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGFAILS);
err = -ENOMEM;
goto fail;
}
/*
* Set up data on packet
*/
ip6_copy_metadata(frag, skb);
skb_reserve(frag, hroom);
skb_put(frag, len + hlen + sizeof(struct frag_hdr));
skb_reset_network_header(frag);
fh = (struct frag_hdr *)(skb_network_header(frag) + hlen);
frag->transport_header = (frag->network_header + hlen +
sizeof(struct frag_hdr));
/*
* Charge the memory for the fragment to any owner
* it might possess
*/
if (skb->sk)
skb_set_owner_w(frag, skb->sk);
/*
* Copy the packet header into the new buffer.
*/
skb_copy_from_linear_data(skb, skb_network_header(frag), hlen);
fragnexthdr_offset = skb_network_header(frag);
fragnexthdr_offset += prevhdr - skb_network_header(skb);
*fragnexthdr_offset = NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT;
/*
* Build fragment header.
*/
fh->nexthdr = nexthdr;
fh->reserved = 0;
fh->identification = frag_id;
/*
* Copy a block of the IP datagram.
*/
BUG_ON(skb_copy_bits(skb, ptr, skb_transport_header(frag),
len));
left -= len;
fh->frag_off = htons(offset);
if (left > 0)
fh->frag_off |= htons(IP6_MF);
ipv6_hdr(frag)->payload_len = htons(frag->len -
sizeof(struct ipv6hdr));
ptr += len;
offset += len;
/*
* Put this fragment into the sending queue.
*/
err = output(net, sk, frag);
if (err)
goto fail;
IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb)),
IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGCREATES);
}
IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb)),
IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGOKS);
consume_skb(skb);
return err;
fail_toobig:
if (skb->sk && dst_allfrag(skb_dst(skb)))
sk_nocaps_add(skb->sk, NETIF_F_GSO_MASK);
skb->dev = skb_dst(skb)->dev;
icmpv6_send(skb, ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG, 0, mtu);
err = -EMSGSIZE;
fail:
IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb)),
IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGFAILS);
kfree_skb(skb);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: Prevent overrun when parsing v6 header options
The KASAN warning repoted below was discovered with a syzkaller
program. The reproducer is basically:
int s = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_RAW, NEXTHDR_HOP);
send(s, &one_byte_of_data, 1, MSG_MORE);
send(s, &more_than_mtu_bytes_data, 2000, 0);
The socket() call sets the nexthdr field of the v6 header to
NEXTHDR_HOP, the first send call primes the payload with a non zero
byte of data, and the second send call triggers the fragmentation path.
The fragmentation code tries to parse the header options in order
to figure out where to insert the fragment option. Since nexthdr points
to an invalid option, the calculation of the size of the network header
can made to be much larger than the linear section of the skb and data
is read outside of it.
This fix makes ip6_find_1stfrag return an error if it detects
running out-of-bounds.
[ 42.361487] ==================================================================
[ 42.364412] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730
[ 42.365471] Read of size 840 at addr ffff88000969e798 by task ip6_fragment-oo/3789
[ 42.366469]
[ 42.366696] CPU: 1 PID: 3789 Comm: ip6_fragment-oo Not tainted 4.11.0+ #41
[ 42.367628] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.1-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 42.368824] Call Trace:
[ 42.369183] dump_stack+0xb3/0x10b
[ 42.369664] print_address_description+0x73/0x290
[ 42.370325] kasan_report+0x252/0x370
[ 42.370839] ? ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730
[ 42.371396] check_memory_region+0x13c/0x1a0
[ 42.371978] memcpy+0x23/0x50
[ 42.372395] ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730
[ 42.372920] ? nf_ct_expect_unregister_notifier+0x110/0x110
[ 42.373681] ? ip6_copy_metadata+0x7f0/0x7f0
[ 42.374263] ? ip6_forward+0x2e30/0x2e30
[ 42.374803] ip6_finish_output+0x584/0x990
[ 42.375350] ip6_output+0x1b7/0x690
[ 42.375836] ? ip6_finish_output+0x990/0x990
[ 42.376411] ? ip6_fragment+0x3730/0x3730
[ 42.376968] ip6_local_out+0x95/0x160
[ 42.377471] ip6_send_skb+0xa1/0x330
[ 42.377969] ip6_push_pending_frames+0xb3/0xe0
[ 42.378589] rawv6_sendmsg+0x2051/0x2db0
[ 42.379129] ? rawv6_bind+0x8b0/0x8b0
[ 42.379633] ? _copy_from_user+0x84/0xe0
[ 42.380193] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290
[ 42.380878] ? ___sys_sendmsg+0x162/0x930
[ 42.381427] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa3/0x120
[ 42.382074] ? sock_has_perm+0x1f6/0x290
[ 42.382614] ? ___sys_sendmsg+0x167/0x930
[ 42.383173] ? lock_downgrade+0x660/0x660
[ 42.383727] inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500
[ 42.384226] ? inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500
[ 42.384748] ? inet_recvmsg+0x540/0x540
[ 42.385263] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110
[ 42.385758] SYSC_sendto+0x217/0x380
[ 42.386249] ? SYSC_connect+0x310/0x310
[ 42.386783] ? __might_fault+0x110/0x1d0
[ 42.387324] ? lock_downgrade+0x660/0x660
[ 42.387880] ? __fget_light+0xa1/0x1f0
[ 42.388403] ? __fdget+0x18/0x20
[ 42.388851] ? sock_common_setsockopt+0x95/0xd0
[ 42.389472] ? SyS_setsockopt+0x17f/0x260
[ 42.390021] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x5/0xbe
[ 42.390650] SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50
[ 42.391103] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
[ 42.391731] RIP: 0033:0x7fbbb711e383
[ 42.392217] RSP: 002b:00007ffff4d34f28 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
[ 42.393235] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fbbb711e383
[ 42.394195] RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: 00007ffff4d34f60 RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 42.395145] RBP: 0000000000000046 R08: 00007ffff4d34f40 R09: 0000000000000018
[ 42.396056] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400aad
[ 42.396598] R13: 0000000000000066 R14: 00007ffff4d34ee0 R15: 00007fbbb717af00
[ 42.397257]
[ 42.397411] Allocated by task 3789:
[ 42.397702] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
[ 42.398005] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 42.398267] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
[ 42.398548] kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20
[ 42.398848] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xcb/0x380
[ 42.399224] __kmalloc_reserve.isra.32+0x41/0xe0
[ 42.399654] __alloc_skb+0xf8/0x580
[ 42.400003] sock_wmalloc+0xab/0xf0
[ 42.400346] __ip6_append_data.isra.41+0x2472/0x33d0
[ 42.400813] ip6_append_data+0x1a8/0x2f0
[ 42.401122] rawv6_sendmsg+0x11ee/0x2db0
[ 42.401505] inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500
[ 42.401860] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110
[ 42.402209] ___sys_sendmsg+0x7cb/0x930
[ 42.402582] __sys_sendmsg+0xd9/0x190
[ 42.402941] SyS_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50
[ 42.403273] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
[ 42.403718]
[ 42.403871] Freed by task 1794:
[ 42.404146] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
[ 42.404515] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 42.404827] kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0
[ 42.405167] kfree+0xe8/0x2b0
[ 42.405462] skb_free_head+0x74/0xb0
[ 42.405806] skb_release_data+0x30e/0x3a0
[ 42.406198] skb_release_all+0x4a/0x60
[ 42.406563] consume_skb+0x113/0x2e0
[ 42.406910] skb_free_datagram+0x1a/0xe0
[ 42.407288] netlink_recvmsg+0x60d/0xe40
[ 42.407667] sock_recvmsg+0xd7/0x110
[ 42.408022] ___sys_recvmsg+0x25c/0x580
[ 42.408395] __sys_recvmsg+0xd6/0x190
[ 42.408753] SyS_recvmsg+0x2d/0x50
[ 42.409086] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
[ 42.409513]
[ 42.409665] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88000969e780
[ 42.409665] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512
[ 42.410846] The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of
[ 42.410846] 512-byte region [ffff88000969e780, ffff88000969e980)
[ 42.411941] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 42.412405] page:ffffea000025a780 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping: (null) index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
[ 42.413298] flags: 0x100000000008100(slab|head)
[ 42.413729] raw: 0100000000008100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001800c000c
[ 42.414387] raw: ffffea00002a9500 0000000900000007 ffff88000c401280 0000000000000000
[ 42.415074] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 42.415604]
[ 42.415757] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 42.416222] ffff88000969e880: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 42.416904] ffff88000969e900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 42.417591] >ffff88000969e980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 42.418273] ^
[ 42.418588] ffff88000969ea00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 42.419273] ffff88000969ea80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 42.419882] ==================================================================
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Craig Gallek <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void virtio_gpu_set_features(VirtIODevice *vdev, uint64_t features)
{
static const uint32_t virgl = (1 << VIRTIO_GPU_F_VIRGL);
VirtIOGPU *g = VIRTIO_GPU(vdev);
g->use_virgl_renderer = ((features & virgl) == virgl);
trace_virtio_gpu_features(g->use_virgl_renderer);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: bool RTCPeerConnectionHandler::AddICECandidate(
scoped_refptr<blink::WebRTCICECandidate> candidate) {
DCHECK(task_runner_->RunsTasksInCurrentSequence());
TRACE_EVENT0("webrtc", "RTCPeerConnectionHandler::addICECandidate");
std::unique_ptr<webrtc::IceCandidateInterface> native_candidate(
dependency_factory_->CreateIceCandidate(candidate->SdpMid().Utf8(),
candidate->SdpMLineIndex(),
candidate->Candidate().Utf8()));
bool return_value = false;
if (native_candidate) {
return_value =
native_peer_connection_->AddIceCandidate(native_candidate.get());
LOG_IF(ERROR, !return_value) << "Error processing ICE candidate.";
} else {
LOG(ERROR) << "Could not create native ICE candidate.";
}
if (peer_connection_tracker_) {
peer_connection_tracker_->TrackAddIceCandidate(
this, std::move(candidate), PeerConnectionTracker::SOURCE_REMOTE,
return_value);
}
return return_value;
}
Commit Message: Check weak pointers in RTCPeerConnectionHandler::WebRtcSetDescriptionObserverImpl
Bug: 912074
Change-Id: I8ba86751f5d5bf12db51520f985ef0d3dae63ed8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1411916
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#622945}
CWE ID: CWE-416
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: BufferMeta(const sp<GraphicBuffer> &graphicBuffer, OMX_U32 portIndex)
: mGraphicBuffer(graphicBuffer),
mIsBackup(false),
mPortIndex(portIndex) {
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: IOMX: work against metadata buffer spoofing
- Prohibit direct set/getParam/Settings for extensions meant for
OMXNodeInstance alone. This disallows enabling metadata mode
without the knowledge of OMXNodeInstance.
- Use a backup buffer for metadata mode buffers and do not directly
share with clients.
- Disallow setting up metadata mode/tunneling/input surface
after first sendCommand.
- Disallow store-meta for input cross process.
- Disallow emptyBuffer for surface input (via IOMX).
- Fix checking for input surface.
Bug: 29422020
Change-Id: I801c77b80e703903f62e42d76fd2e76a34e4bc8e
(cherry picked from commit 7c3c2fa3e233c656fc8c2fc2a6634b3ecf8a23e8)
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void RenderThreadImpl::Shutdown() {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(
RenderProcessObserver, observers_, OnRenderProcessShutdown());
ChildThread::Shutdown();
if (memory_observer_) {
message_loop()->RemoveTaskObserver(memory_observer_.get());
memory_observer_.reset();
}
if (webkit_platform_support_) {
WebView::willEnterModalLoop();
webkit_platform_support_->web_database_observer_impl()->
WaitForAllDatabasesToClose();
WebView::didExitModalLoop();
}
if (devtools_agent_message_filter_.get()) {
RemoveFilter(devtools_agent_message_filter_.get());
devtools_agent_message_filter_ = NULL;
}
RemoveFilter(audio_input_message_filter_.get());
audio_input_message_filter_ = NULL;
#if defined(ENABLE_WEBRTC)
RTCPeerConnectionHandler::DestructAllHandlers();
peer_connection_factory_.reset();
#endif
RemoveFilter(vc_manager_->video_capture_message_filter());
vc_manager_.reset();
RemoveFilter(db_message_filter_.get());
db_message_filter_ = NULL;
if (file_thread_)
file_thread_->Stop();
if (compositor_output_surface_filter_.get()) {
RemoveFilter(compositor_output_surface_filter_.get());
compositor_output_surface_filter_ = NULL;
}
media_thread_.reset();
RemoveFilter(audio_message_filter_.get());
audio_message_filter_ = NULL;
compositor_thread_.reset();
input_handler_manager_.reset();
if (input_event_filter_.get()) {
RemoveFilter(input_event_filter_.get());
input_event_filter_ = NULL;
}
embedded_worker_dispatcher_.reset();
main_thread_indexed_db_dispatcher_.reset();
main_thread_compositor_task_runner_ = NULL;
main_message_loop_.reset();
if (webkit_platform_support_)
blink::shutdown();
lazy_tls.Pointer()->Set(NULL);
#if defined(OS_WIN)
NPChannelBase::CleanupChannels();
#endif
}
Commit Message: Disable forwarding tasks to the Blink scheduler
Disable forwarding tasks to the Blink scheduler to avoid some
regressions which it has introduced.
BUG=391005,415758,415478,412714,416362,416827,417608
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/609483002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#296916}
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: trace (const char *format, ...)
#else
trace (format, va_alist)
const char *format;
va_dcl
#endif
{
va_list args;
static FILE *tracefp = (FILE *)NULL;
if (tracefp == NULL)
tracefp = fopen("/tmp/bash-trace.log", "a+");
if (tracefp == NULL)
tracefp = stderr;
else
fcntl (fileno (tracefp), F_SETFD, 1); /* close-on-exec */
fprintf(tracefp, "TRACE: pid %ld: ", (long)getpid());
SH_VA_START (args, format);
vfprintf (tracefp, format, args);
fprintf (tracefp, "\n");
va_end (args);
fflush(tracefp);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: check_mountpoint(const char *progname, char *mountpoint)
{
int err;
struct stat statbuf;
/* does mountpoint exist and is it a directory? */
err = stat(mountpoint, &statbuf);
if (err) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: failed to stat %s: %s\n", progname,
mountpoint, strerror(errno));
return EX_USAGE;
}
if (!S_ISDIR(statbuf.st_mode)) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s is not a directory!", progname,
mountpoint);
return EX_USAGE;
}
#if CIFS_LEGACY_SETUID_CHECK
/* do extra checks on mountpoint for legacy setuid behavior */
if (!getuid() || geteuid())
return 0;
if (statbuf.st_uid != getuid()) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s is not owned by user\n", progname,
mountpoint);
return EX_USAGE;
}
if ((statbuf.st_mode & S_IRWXU) != S_IRWXU) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid permissions on %s\n", progname,
mountpoint);
return EX_USAGE;
}
#endif /* CIFS_LEGACY_SETUID_CHECK */
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-59
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: namePop(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt)
{
const xmlChar *ret;
if ((ctxt == NULL) || (ctxt->nameNr <= 0))
return (NULL);
ctxt->nameNr--;
if (ctxt->nameNr > 0)
ctxt->name = ctxt->nameTab[ctxt->nameNr - 1];
else
ctxt->name = NULL;
ret = ctxt->nameTab[ctxt->nameNr];
ctxt->nameTab[ctxt->nameNr] = NULL;
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: std::unique_ptr<JSONObject> ClipPaintPropertyNode::ToJSON() const {
auto json = JSONObject::Create();
if (Parent())
json->SetString("parent", String::Format("%p", Parent()));
json->SetString("localTransformSpace",
String::Format("%p", state_.local_transform_space.get()));
json->SetString("rect", state_.clip_rect.ToString());
if (state_.clip_rect_excluding_overlay_scrollbars) {
json->SetString("rectExcludingOverlayScrollbars",
state_.clip_rect_excluding_overlay_scrollbars->ToString());
}
if (state_.clip_path) {
json->SetBoolean("hasClipPath", true);
}
if (state_.direct_compositing_reasons != CompositingReason::kNone) {
json->SetString(
"directCompositingReasons",
CompositingReason::ToString(state_.direct_compositing_reasons));
}
return json;
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <[email protected]>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> [email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID:
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: authentic_process_fci(struct sc_card *card, struct sc_file *file,
const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen)
{
struct sc_context *ctx = card->ctx;
size_t taglen;
int rv;
unsigned ii;
const unsigned char *tag = NULL;
unsigned char ops_DF[8] = {
SC_AC_OP_CREATE, SC_AC_OP_DELETE, SC_AC_OP_CRYPTO, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF
};
unsigned char ops_EF[8] = {
SC_AC_OP_READ, SC_AC_OP_DELETE, SC_AC_OP_UPDATE, SC_AC_OP_RESIZE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF
};
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(ctx);
tag = sc_asn1_find_tag(card->ctx, buf, buflen, 0x6F, &taglen);
if (tag != NULL) {
sc_log(ctx, " FCP length %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u", taglen);
buf = tag;
buflen = taglen;
}
tag = sc_asn1_find_tag(card->ctx, buf, buflen, 0x62, &taglen);
if (tag != NULL) {
sc_log(ctx, " FCP length %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u", taglen);
buf = tag;
buflen = taglen;
}
rv = iso_ops->process_fci(card, file, buf, buflen);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "ISO parse FCI failed");
if (!file->sec_attr_len) {
sc_log_hex(ctx, "ACLs not found in data", buf, buflen);
sc_log(ctx, "Path:%s; Type:%X; PathType:%X", sc_print_path(&file->path), file->type, file->path.type);
if (file->path.type == SC_PATH_TYPE_DF_NAME || file->type == SC_FILE_TYPE_DF) {
file->type = SC_FILE_TYPE_DF;
}
else {
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, SC_ERROR_OBJECT_NOT_FOUND, "ACLs tag missing");
}
}
sc_log_hex(ctx, "ACL data", file->sec_attr, file->sec_attr_len);
for (ii = 0; ii < file->sec_attr_len / 2; ii++) {
unsigned char op = file->type == SC_FILE_TYPE_DF ? ops_DF[ii] : ops_EF[ii];
unsigned char acl = *(file->sec_attr + ii*2);
unsigned char cred_id = *(file->sec_attr + ii*2 + 1);
unsigned sc = acl * 0x100 + cred_id;
sc_log(ctx, "ACL(%i) op 0x%X, acl %X:%X", ii, op, acl, cred_id);
if (op == 0xFF)
;
else if (!acl && !cred_id)
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, op, SC_AC_NONE, 0);
else if (acl == 0xFF)
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, op, SC_AC_NEVER, 0);
else if (acl & AUTHENTIC_AC_SM_MASK)
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, op, SC_AC_SCB, sc);
else if (cred_id)
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, op, SC_AC_CHV, cred_id);
else
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, op, SC_AC_NEVER, 0);
}
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, 0);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void ocfs2_write_end_inline(struct inode *inode, loff_t pos,
unsigned len, unsigned *copied,
struct ocfs2_dinode *di,
struct ocfs2_write_ctxt *wc)
{
void *kaddr;
if (unlikely(*copied < len)) {
if (!PageUptodate(wc->w_target_page)) {
*copied = 0;
return;
}
}
kaddr = kmap_atomic(wc->w_target_page);
memcpy(di->id2.i_data.id_data + pos, kaddr + pos, *copied);
kunmap_atomic(kaddr);
trace_ocfs2_write_end_inline(
(unsigned long long)OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_blkno,
(unsigned long long)pos, *copied,
le16_to_cpu(di->id2.i_data.id_count),
le16_to_cpu(di->i_dyn_features));
}
Commit Message: ocfs2: ip_alloc_sem should be taken in ocfs2_get_block()
ip_alloc_sem should be taken in ocfs2_get_block() when reading file in
DIRECT mode to prevent concurrent access to extent tree with
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write(), which may cause BUGON in the following
situation:
read file 'A' end_io of writing file 'A'
vfs_read
__vfs_read
ocfs2_file_read_iter
generic_file_read_iter
ocfs2_direct_IO
__blockdev_direct_IO
do_blockdev_direct_IO
do_direct_IO
get_more_blocks
ocfs2_get_block
ocfs2_extent_map_get_blocks
ocfs2_get_clusters
ocfs2_get_clusters_nocache()
ocfs2_search_extent_list
return the index of record which
contains the v_cluster, that is
v_cluster > rec[i]->e_cpos.
ocfs2_dio_end_io
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write
down_write(&oi->ip_alloc_sem);
ocfs2_mark_extent_written
ocfs2_change_extent_flag
ocfs2_split_extent
...
--> modify the rec[i]->e_cpos, resulting
in v_cluster < rec[i]->e_cpos.
BUG_ON(v_cluster < le32_to_cpu(rec->e_cpos))
[[email protected]: v3]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: c15471f79506 ("ocfs2: fix sparse file & data ordering issue in direct io")
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Gang He <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Changwei Ge <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <[email protected]>
Cc: Joel Becker <[email protected]>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void hns_rcb_get_ring_regs(struct hnae_queue *queue, void *data)
{
u32 *regs = data;
struct ring_pair_cb *ring_pair
= container_of(queue, struct ring_pair_cb, q);
u32 i = 0;
/*rcb ring registers */
regs[0] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_RX_RING_BASEADDR_L_REG);
regs[1] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_RX_RING_BASEADDR_H_REG);
regs[2] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_RX_RING_BD_NUM_REG);
regs[3] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_RX_RING_BD_LEN_REG);
regs[4] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_RX_RING_PKTLINE_REG);
regs[5] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_RX_RING_TAIL_REG);
regs[6] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_RX_RING_HEAD_REG);
regs[7] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_RX_RING_FBDNUM_REG);
regs[8] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_RX_RING_PKTNUM_RECORD_REG);
regs[9] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_TX_RING_BASEADDR_L_REG);
regs[10] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_TX_RING_BASEADDR_H_REG);
regs[11] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_TX_RING_BD_NUM_REG);
regs[12] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_TX_RING_BD_LEN_REG);
regs[13] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_TX_RING_PKTLINE_REG);
regs[15] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_TX_RING_TAIL_REG);
regs[16] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_TX_RING_HEAD_REG);
regs[17] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_TX_RING_FBDNUM_REG);
regs[18] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_TX_RING_OFFSET_REG);
regs[19] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_TX_RING_PKTNUM_RECORD_REG);
regs[20] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_PREFETCH_EN_REG);
regs[21] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_CFG_VF_NUM_REG);
regs[22] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_ASID_REG);
regs[23] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_RX_VM_REG);
regs[24] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_T0_BE_RST);
regs[25] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_COULD_BE_RST);
regs[26] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_WRR_WEIGHT_REG);
regs[27] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_INTMSK_RXWL_REG);
regs[28] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_INTSTS_RX_RING_REG);
regs[29] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_INTMSK_TXWL_REG);
regs[30] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_INTSTS_TX_RING_REG);
regs[31] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_INTMSK_RX_OVERTIME_REG);
regs[32] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_INTSTS_RX_OVERTIME_REG);
regs[33] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_INTMSK_TX_OVERTIME_REG);
regs[34] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_INTSTS_TX_OVERTIME_REG);
/* mark end of ring regs */
for (i = 35; i < 40; i++)
regs[i] = 0xcccccc00 + ring_pair->index;
}
Commit Message: net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
hns_get_sset_count() returns HNS_NET_STATS_CNT and the data space allocated
is not enough for ethtool_get_strings(), which will cause random memory
corruption.
When SLAB and DEBUG_SLAB are both enabled, memory corruptions like the
the following can be observed without this patch:
[ 43.115200] Slab corruption (Not tainted): Acpi-ParseExt start=ffff801fb0b69030, len=80
[ 43.115206] Redzone: 0x9f911029d006462/0x5f78745f31657070.
[ 43.115208] Last user: [<5f7272655f746b70>](0x5f7272655f746b70)
[ 43.115214] 010: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 00 6b 6b 6b 6b ppe1_tx_pkt.kkkk
[ 43.115217] 030: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 5f 6f 6b 00 6b ppe1_tx_pkt_ok.k
[ 43.115218] Next obj: start=ffff801fb0b69098, len=80
[ 43.115220] Redzone: 0x706d655f6f666966/0x9f911029d74e35b.
[ 43.115229] Last user: [<ffff0000084b11b0>](acpi_os_release_object+0x28/0x38)
[ 43.115231] 000: 74 79 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f ty.kkkkkppe1_tx_
[ 43.115232] 010: 70 6b 74 5f 65 72 72 5f 63 73 75 6d 5f 66 61 69 pkt_err_csum_fai
Signed-off-by: Timmy Li <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: gss_wrap_aead (minor_status,
context_handle,
conf_req_flag,
qop_req,
input_assoc_buffer,
input_payload_buffer,
conf_state,
output_message_buffer)
OM_uint32 * minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle;
int conf_req_flag;
gss_qop_t qop_req;
gss_buffer_t input_assoc_buffer;
gss_buffer_t input_payload_buffer;
int * conf_state;
gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer;
{
OM_uint32 status;
gss_mechanism mech;
gss_union_ctx_id_t ctx;
status = val_wrap_aead_args(minor_status, context_handle,
conf_req_flag, qop_req,
input_assoc_buffer, input_payload_buffer,
conf_state, output_message_buffer);
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
return (status);
/*
* select the approprate underlying mechanism routine and
* call it.
*/
ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
mech = gssint_get_mechanism (ctx->mech_type);
if (!mech)
return (GSS_S_BAD_MECH);
return gssint_wrap_aead(mech, minor_status, ctx,
conf_req_flag, qop_req,
input_assoc_buffer, input_payload_buffer,
conf_state, output_message_buffer);
}
Commit Message: Preserve GSS context on init/accept failure
After gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() has created a
context, don't delete the mechglue context on failures from subsequent
calls, even if the mechanism deletes the mech-specific context (which
is allowed by RFC 2744 but not preferred). Check for union contexts
with no mechanism context in each GSS function which accepts a
gss_ctx_id_t.
CVE-2017-11462:
RFC 2744 permits a GSS-API implementation to delete an existing
security context on a second or subsequent call to
gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() if the call results
in an error. This API behavior has been found to be dangerous,
leading to the possibility of memory errors in some callers. For
safety, GSS-API implementations should instead preserve existing
security contexts on error until the caller deletes them.
All versions of MIT krb5 prior to this change may delete acceptor
contexts on error. Versions 1.13.4 through 1.13.7, 1.14.1 through
1.14.5, and 1.15 through 1.15.1 may also delete initiator contexts on
error.
ticket: 8598 (new)
target_version: 1.15-next
target_version: 1.14-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-415
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int mqueue_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
{
struct inode *inode;
struct ipc_namespace *ns = sb->s_fs_info;
sb->s_iflags |= SB_I_NOEXEC | SB_I_NODEV;
sb->s_blocksize = PAGE_SIZE;
sb->s_blocksize_bits = PAGE_SHIFT;
sb->s_magic = MQUEUE_MAGIC;
sb->s_op = &mqueue_super_ops;
inode = mqueue_get_inode(sb, ns, S_IFDIR | S_ISVTX | S_IRWXUGO, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(inode))
return PTR_ERR(inode);
sb->s_root = d_make_root(inode);
if (!sb->s_root)
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mqueue: fix a use-after-free in sys_mq_notify()
The retry logic for netlink_attachskb() inside sys_mq_notify()
is nasty and vulnerable:
1) The sock refcnt is already released when retry is needed
2) The fd is controllable by user-space because we already
release the file refcnt
so we when retry but the fd has been just closed by user-space
during this small window, we end up calling netlink_detachskb()
on the error path which releases the sock again, later when
the user-space closes this socket a use-after-free could be
triggered.
Setting 'sock' to NULL here should be sufficient to fix it.
Reported-by: GeneBlue <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: const Block* Track::EOSBlock::GetBlock() const
{
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: bool AXNodeObject::isMultiSelectable() const {
const AtomicString& ariaMultiSelectable =
getAttribute(aria_multiselectableAttr);
if (equalIgnoringCase(ariaMultiSelectable, "true"))
return true;
if (equalIgnoringCase(ariaMultiSelectable, "false"))
return false;
return isHTMLSelectElement(getNode()) &&
toHTMLSelectElement(*getNode()).isMultiple();
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void nci_core_conn_credits_ntf_packet(struct nci_dev *ndev,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct nci_core_conn_credit_ntf *ntf = (void *) skb->data;
int i;
pr_debug("num_entries %d\n", ntf->num_entries);
if (ntf->num_entries > NCI_MAX_NUM_CONN)
ntf->num_entries = NCI_MAX_NUM_CONN;
/* update the credits */
for (i = 0; i < ntf->num_entries; i++) {
ntf->conn_entries[i].conn_id =
nci_conn_id(&ntf->conn_entries[i].conn_id);
pr_debug("entry[%d]: conn_id %d, credits %d\n",
i, ntf->conn_entries[i].conn_id,
ntf->conn_entries[i].credits);
if (ntf->conn_entries[i].conn_id == NCI_STATIC_RF_CONN_ID) {
/* found static rf connection */
atomic_add(ntf->conn_entries[i].credits,
&ndev->credits_cnt);
}
}
/* trigger the next tx */
if (!skb_queue_empty(&ndev->tx_q))
queue_work(ndev->tx_wq, &ndev->tx_work);
}
Commit Message: NFC: Prevent multiple buffer overflows in NCI
Fix multiple remotely-exploitable stack-based buffer overflows due to
the NCI code pulling length fields directly from incoming frames and
copying too much data into statically-sized arrays.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Lauro Ramos Venancio <[email protected]>
Cc: Aloisio Almeida Jr <[email protected]>
Cc: Samuel Ortiz <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Ilan Elias <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Samuel Ortiz <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void __init proc_root_init(void)
{
struct vfsmount *mnt;
int err;
proc_init_inodecache();
err = register_filesystem(&proc_fs_type);
if (err)
return;
mnt = kern_mount_data(&proc_fs_type, &init_pid_ns);
if (IS_ERR(mnt)) {
unregister_filesystem(&proc_fs_type);
return;
}
init_pid_ns.proc_mnt = mnt;
proc_symlink("mounts", NULL, "self/mounts");
proc_net_init();
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSVIPC
proc_mkdir("sysvipc", NULL);
#endif
proc_mkdir("fs", NULL);
proc_mkdir("driver", NULL);
proc_mkdir("fs/nfsd", NULL); /* somewhere for the nfsd filesystem to be mounted */
#if defined(CONFIG_SUN_OPENPROMFS) || defined(CONFIG_SUN_OPENPROMFS_MODULE)
/* just give it a mountpoint */
proc_mkdir("openprom", NULL);
#endif
proc_tty_init();
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_DEVICETREE
proc_device_tree_init();
#endif
proc_mkdir("bus", NULL);
proc_sys_init();
}
Commit Message: procfs: fix a vfsmount longterm reference leak
kern_mount() doesn't pair with plain mntput()...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static void unix_detach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int i;
scm->fp = UNIXCB(skb).fp;
UNIXCB(skb).fp = NULL;
for (i = scm->fp->count-1; i >= 0; i--)
unix_notinflight(scm->fp->fp[i]);
}
Commit Message: unix: correctly track in-flight fds in sending process user_struct
The commit referenced in the Fixes tag incorrectly accounted the number
of in-flight fds over a unix domain socket to the original opener
of the file-descriptor. This allows another process to arbitrary
deplete the original file-openers resource limit for the maximum of
open files. Instead the sending processes and its struct cred should
be credited.
To do so, we add a reference counted struct user_struct pointer to the
scm_fp_list and use it to account for the number of inflight unix fds.
Fixes: 712f4aad406bb1 ("unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets")
Reported-by: David Herrmann <[email protected]>
Cc: David Herrmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: std::string context_language() { return context_language_; }
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: tsize_t t2p_readwrite_pdf_image(T2P* t2p, TIFF* input, TIFF* output){
tsize_t written=0;
unsigned char* buffer=NULL;
unsigned char* samplebuffer=NULL;
tsize_t bufferoffset=0;
tsize_t samplebufferoffset=0;
tsize_t read=0;
tstrip_t i=0;
tstrip_t j=0;
tstrip_t stripcount=0;
tsize_t stripsize=0;
tsize_t sepstripcount=0;
tsize_t sepstripsize=0;
#ifdef OJPEG_SUPPORT
toff_t inputoffset=0;
uint16 h_samp=1;
uint16 v_samp=1;
uint16 ri=1;
uint32 rows=0;
#endif /* ifdef OJPEG_SUPPORT */
#ifdef JPEG_SUPPORT
unsigned char* jpt;
float* xfloatp;
uint64* sbc;
unsigned char* stripbuffer;
tsize_t striplength=0;
uint32 max_striplength=0;
#endif /* ifdef JPEG_SUPPORT */
/* Fail if prior error (in particular, can't trust tiff_datasize) */
if (t2p->t2p_error != T2P_ERR_OK)
return(0);
if(t2p->pdf_transcode == T2P_TRANSCODE_RAW){
#ifdef CCITT_SUPPORT
if(t2p->pdf_compression == T2P_COMPRESS_G4){
buffer = (unsigned char*)
_TIFFmalloc(t2p->tiff_datasize);
if (buffer == NULL) {
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory for "
"t2p_readwrite_pdf_image, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
TIFFReadRawStrip(input, 0, (tdata_t) buffer,
t2p->tiff_datasize);
if (t2p->tiff_fillorder==FILLORDER_LSB2MSB){
/*
* make sure is lsb-to-msb
* bit-endianness fill order
*/
TIFFReverseBits(buffer,
t2p->tiff_datasize);
}
t2pWriteFile(output, (tdata_t) buffer,
t2p->tiff_datasize);
_TIFFfree(buffer);
return(t2p->tiff_datasize);
}
#endif /* ifdef CCITT_SUPPORT */
#ifdef ZIP_SUPPORT
if (t2p->pdf_compression == T2P_COMPRESS_ZIP) {
buffer = (unsigned char*)
_TIFFmalloc(t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(buffer == NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
memset(buffer, 0, t2p->tiff_datasize);
TIFFReadRawStrip(input, 0, (tdata_t) buffer,
t2p->tiff_datasize);
if (t2p->tiff_fillorder==FILLORDER_LSB2MSB) {
TIFFReverseBits(buffer,
t2p->tiff_datasize);
}
t2pWriteFile(output, (tdata_t) buffer,
t2p->tiff_datasize);
_TIFFfree(buffer);
return(t2p->tiff_datasize);
}
#endif /* ifdef ZIP_SUPPORT */
#ifdef OJPEG_SUPPORT
if(t2p->tiff_compression == COMPRESSION_OJPEG) {
if(t2p->tiff_dataoffset != 0) {
buffer = (unsigned char*)
_TIFFmalloc(t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(buffer == NULL) {
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
memset(buffer, 0, t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(t2p->pdf_ojpegiflength==0){
inputoffset=t2pSeekFile(input, 0,
SEEK_CUR);
t2pSeekFile(input,
t2p->tiff_dataoffset,
SEEK_SET);
t2pReadFile(input, (tdata_t) buffer,
t2p->tiff_datasize);
t2pSeekFile(input, inputoffset,
SEEK_SET);
t2pWriteFile(output, (tdata_t) buffer,
t2p->tiff_datasize);
_TIFFfree(buffer);
return(t2p->tiff_datasize);
} else {
inputoffset=t2pSeekFile(input, 0,
SEEK_CUR);
t2pSeekFile(input,
t2p->tiff_dataoffset,
SEEK_SET);
bufferoffset = t2pReadFile(input,
(tdata_t) buffer,
t2p->pdf_ojpegiflength);
t2p->pdf_ojpegiflength = 0;
t2pSeekFile(input, inputoffset,
SEEK_SET);
TIFFGetField(input,
TIFFTAG_YCBCRSUBSAMPLING,
&h_samp, &v_samp);
buffer[bufferoffset++]= 0xff;
buffer[bufferoffset++]= 0xdd;
buffer[bufferoffset++]= 0x00;
buffer[bufferoffset++]= 0x04;
h_samp*=8;
v_samp*=8;
ri=(t2p->tiff_width+h_samp-1) / h_samp;
TIFFGetField(input,
TIFFTAG_ROWSPERSTRIP,
&rows);
ri*=(rows+v_samp-1)/v_samp;
buffer[bufferoffset++]= (ri>>8) & 0xff;
buffer[bufferoffset++]= ri & 0xff;
stripcount=TIFFNumberOfStrips(input);
for(i=0;i<stripcount;i++){
if(i != 0 ){
buffer[bufferoffset++]=0xff;
buffer[bufferoffset++]=(0xd0 | ((i-1)%8));
}
bufferoffset+=TIFFReadRawStrip(input,
i,
(tdata_t) &(((unsigned char*)buffer)[bufferoffset]),
-1);
}
t2pWriteFile(output, (tdata_t) buffer, bufferoffset);
_TIFFfree(buffer);
return(bufferoffset);
}
} else {
if(! t2p->pdf_ojpegdata){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"No support for OJPEG image %s with bad tables",
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
buffer = (unsigned char*)
_TIFFmalloc(t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(buffer==NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
memset(buffer, 0, t2p->tiff_datasize);
_TIFFmemcpy(buffer, t2p->pdf_ojpegdata, t2p->pdf_ojpegdatalength);
bufferoffset=t2p->pdf_ojpegdatalength;
stripcount=TIFFNumberOfStrips(input);
for(i=0;i<stripcount;i++){
if(i != 0){
buffer[bufferoffset++]=0xff;
buffer[bufferoffset++]=(0xd0 | ((i-1)%8));
}
bufferoffset+=TIFFReadRawStrip(input,
i,
(tdata_t) &(((unsigned char*)buffer)[bufferoffset]),
-1);
}
if( ! ( (buffer[bufferoffset-1]==0xd9) && (buffer[bufferoffset-2]==0xff) ) ){
buffer[bufferoffset++]=0xff;
buffer[bufferoffset++]=0xd9;
}
t2pWriteFile(output, (tdata_t) buffer, bufferoffset);
_TIFFfree(buffer);
return(bufferoffset);
#if 0
/*
This hunk of code removed code is clearly
mis-placed and we are not sure where it
should be (if anywhere)
*/
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"No support for OJPEG image %s with no JPEG File Interchange offset",
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
#endif
}
}
#endif /* ifdef OJPEG_SUPPORT */
#ifdef JPEG_SUPPORT
if(t2p->tiff_compression == COMPRESSION_JPEG) {
uint32 count = 0;
buffer = (unsigned char*)
_TIFFmalloc(t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(buffer==NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
memset(buffer, 0, t2p->tiff_datasize);
if (TIFFGetField(input, TIFFTAG_JPEGTABLES, &count, &jpt) != 0) {
if(count > 4) {
_TIFFmemcpy(buffer, jpt, count);
bufferoffset += count - 2;
}
}
stripcount=TIFFNumberOfStrips(input);
TIFFGetField(input, TIFFTAG_STRIPBYTECOUNTS, &sbc);
for(i=0;i<stripcount;i++){
if(sbc[i]>max_striplength) max_striplength=sbc[i];
}
stripbuffer = (unsigned char*)
_TIFFmalloc(max_striplength);
if(stripbuffer==NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %u bytes of memory for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image, %s",
max_striplength,
TIFFFileName(input));
_TIFFfree(buffer);
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
for(i=0;i<stripcount;i++){
striplength=TIFFReadRawStrip(input, i, (tdata_t) stripbuffer, -1);
if(!t2p_process_jpeg_strip(
stripbuffer,
&striplength,
buffer,
&bufferoffset,
i,
t2p->tiff_length)){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't process JPEG data in input file %s",
TIFFFileName(input));
_TIFFfree(samplebuffer);
_TIFFfree(buffer);
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
}
buffer[bufferoffset++]=0xff;
buffer[bufferoffset++]=0xd9;
t2pWriteFile(output, (tdata_t) buffer, bufferoffset);
_TIFFfree(stripbuffer);
_TIFFfree(buffer);
return(bufferoffset);
}
#endif /* ifdef JPEG_SUPPORT */
(void)0;
}
if(t2p->pdf_sample==T2P_SAMPLE_NOTHING){
buffer = (unsigned char*) _TIFFmalloc(t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(buffer==NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
memset(buffer, 0, t2p->tiff_datasize);
stripsize=TIFFStripSize(input);
stripcount=TIFFNumberOfStrips(input);
for(i=0;i<stripcount;i++){
read =
TIFFReadEncodedStrip(input,
i,
(tdata_t) &buffer[bufferoffset],
TIFFmin(stripsize, t2p->tiff_datasize - bufferoffset));
if(read==-1){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Error on decoding strip %u of %s",
i,
TIFFFileName(input));
_TIFFfree(buffer);
t2p->t2p_error=T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
bufferoffset+=read;
}
} else {
if(t2p->pdf_sample & T2P_SAMPLE_PLANAR_SEPARATE_TO_CONTIG){
sepstripsize=TIFFStripSize(input);
sepstripcount=TIFFNumberOfStrips(input);
stripsize=sepstripsize*t2p->tiff_samplesperpixel;
stripcount=sepstripcount/t2p->tiff_samplesperpixel;
buffer = (unsigned char*) _TIFFmalloc(t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(buffer==NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
memset(buffer, 0, t2p->tiff_datasize);
samplebuffer = (unsigned char*) _TIFFmalloc(stripsize);
if(samplebuffer==NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
_TIFFfree(buffer);
return(0);
}
for(i=0;i<stripcount;i++){
samplebufferoffset=0;
for(j=0;j<t2p->tiff_samplesperpixel;j++){
read =
TIFFReadEncodedStrip(input,
i + j*stripcount,
(tdata_t) &(samplebuffer[samplebufferoffset]),
TIFFmin(sepstripsize, stripsize - samplebufferoffset));
if(read==-1){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Error on decoding strip %u of %s",
i + j*stripcount,
TIFFFileName(input));
_TIFFfree(buffer);
t2p->t2p_error=T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
samplebufferoffset+=read;
}
t2p_sample_planar_separate_to_contig(
t2p,
&(buffer[bufferoffset]),
samplebuffer,
samplebufferoffset);
bufferoffset+=samplebufferoffset;
}
_TIFFfree(samplebuffer);
goto dataready;
}
buffer = (unsigned char*) _TIFFmalloc(t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(buffer==NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
memset(buffer, 0, t2p->tiff_datasize);
stripsize=TIFFStripSize(input);
stripcount=TIFFNumberOfStrips(input);
for(i=0;i<stripcount;i++){
read =
TIFFReadEncodedStrip(input,
i,
(tdata_t) &buffer[bufferoffset],
TIFFmin(stripsize, t2p->tiff_datasize - bufferoffset));
if(read==-1){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Error on decoding strip %u of %s",
i,
TIFFFileName(input));
_TIFFfree(samplebuffer);
_TIFFfree(buffer);
t2p->t2p_error=T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
bufferoffset+=read;
}
if(t2p->pdf_sample & T2P_SAMPLE_REALIZE_PALETTE){
samplebuffer=(unsigned char*)_TIFFrealloc(
(tdata_t) buffer,
t2p->tiff_datasize * t2p->tiff_samplesperpixel);
if(samplebuffer==NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
_TIFFfree(buffer);
return(0);
} else {
buffer=samplebuffer;
t2p->tiff_datasize *= t2p->tiff_samplesperpixel;
}
t2p_sample_realize_palette(t2p, buffer);
}
if(t2p->pdf_sample & T2P_SAMPLE_RGBA_TO_RGB){
t2p->tiff_datasize=t2p_sample_rgba_to_rgb(
(tdata_t)buffer,
t2p->tiff_width*t2p->tiff_length);
}
if(t2p->pdf_sample & T2P_SAMPLE_RGBAA_TO_RGB){
t2p->tiff_datasize=t2p_sample_rgbaa_to_rgb(
(tdata_t)buffer,
t2p->tiff_width*t2p->tiff_length);
}
if(t2p->pdf_sample & T2P_SAMPLE_YCBCR_TO_RGB){
samplebuffer=(unsigned char*)_TIFFrealloc(
(tdata_t)buffer,
t2p->tiff_width*t2p->tiff_length*4);
if(samplebuffer==NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
_TIFFfree(buffer);
return(0);
} else {
buffer=samplebuffer;
}
if(!TIFFReadRGBAImageOriented(
input,
t2p->tiff_width,
t2p->tiff_length,
(uint32*)buffer,
ORIENTATION_TOPLEFT,
0)){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't use TIFFReadRGBAImageOriented to extract RGB image from %s",
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
t2p->tiff_datasize=t2p_sample_abgr_to_rgb(
(tdata_t) buffer,
t2p->tiff_width*t2p->tiff_length);
}
if(t2p->pdf_sample & T2P_SAMPLE_LAB_SIGNED_TO_UNSIGNED){
t2p->tiff_datasize=t2p_sample_lab_signed_to_unsigned(
(tdata_t)buffer,
t2p->tiff_width*t2p->tiff_length);
}
}
dataready:
t2p_disable(output);
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_PHOTOMETRIC, t2p->tiff_photometric);
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE, t2p->tiff_bitspersample);
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_SAMPLESPERPIXEL, t2p->tiff_samplesperpixel);
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_IMAGEWIDTH, t2p->tiff_width);
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_IMAGELENGTH, t2p->tiff_length);
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_ROWSPERSTRIP, t2p->tiff_length);
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_PLANARCONFIG, PLANARCONFIG_CONTIG);
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_FILLORDER, FILLORDER_MSB2LSB);
switch(t2p->pdf_compression){
case T2P_COMPRESS_NONE:
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_COMPRESSION, COMPRESSION_NONE);
break;
#ifdef CCITT_SUPPORT
case T2P_COMPRESS_G4:
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_COMPRESSION, COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX4);
break;
#endif /* ifdef CCITT_SUPPORT */
#ifdef JPEG_SUPPORT
case T2P_COMPRESS_JPEG:
if(t2p->tiff_photometric==PHOTOMETRIC_YCBCR) {
uint16 hor = 0, ver = 0;
if (TIFFGetField(input, TIFFTAG_YCBCRSUBSAMPLING, &hor, &ver) !=0 ) {
if(hor != 0 && ver != 0){
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_YCBCRSUBSAMPLING, hor, ver);
}
}
if(TIFFGetField(input, TIFFTAG_REFERENCEBLACKWHITE, &xfloatp)!=0){
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_REFERENCEBLACKWHITE, xfloatp);
}
}
if(TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_COMPRESSION, COMPRESSION_JPEG)==0){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Unable to use JPEG compression for input %s and output %s",
TIFFFileName(input),
TIFFFileName(output));
_TIFFfree(buffer);
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_JPEGTABLESMODE, 0);
if(t2p->pdf_colorspace & (T2P_CS_RGB | T2P_CS_LAB)){
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_PHOTOMETRIC, PHOTOMETRIC_YCBCR);
if(t2p->tiff_photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_YCBCR){
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_JPEGCOLORMODE, JPEGCOLORMODE_RGB);
} else {
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_JPEGCOLORMODE, JPEGCOLORMODE_RAW);
}
}
if(t2p->pdf_colorspace & T2P_CS_GRAY){
(void)0;
}
if(t2p->pdf_colorspace & T2P_CS_CMYK){
(void)0;
}
if(t2p->pdf_defaultcompressionquality != 0){
TIFFSetField(output,
TIFFTAG_JPEGQUALITY,
t2p->pdf_defaultcompressionquality);
}
break;
#endif /* ifdef JPEG_SUPPORT */
#ifdef ZIP_SUPPORT
case T2P_COMPRESS_ZIP:
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_COMPRESSION, COMPRESSION_DEFLATE);
if(t2p->pdf_defaultcompressionquality%100 != 0){
TIFFSetField(output,
TIFFTAG_PREDICTOR,
t2p->pdf_defaultcompressionquality % 100);
}
if(t2p->pdf_defaultcompressionquality/100 != 0){
TIFFSetField(output,
TIFFTAG_ZIPQUALITY,
(t2p->pdf_defaultcompressionquality / 100));
}
break;
#endif /* ifdef ZIP_SUPPORT */
default:
break;
}
t2p_enable(output);
t2p->outputwritten = 0;
#ifdef JPEG_SUPPORT
if(t2p->pdf_compression == T2P_COMPRESS_JPEG
&& t2p->tiff_photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_YCBCR){
bufferoffset = TIFFWriteEncodedStrip(output, (tstrip_t)0,
buffer,
stripsize * stripcount);
} else
#endif /* ifdef JPEG_SUPPORT */
{
bufferoffset = TIFFWriteEncodedStrip(output, (tstrip_t)0,
buffer,
t2p->tiff_datasize);
}
if (buffer != NULL) {
_TIFFfree(buffer);
buffer=NULL;
}
if (bufferoffset == (tsize_t)-1) {
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Error writing encoded strip to output PDF %s",
TIFFFileName(output));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
written = t2p->outputwritten;
return(written);
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix various out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap or stack allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35093,
MSVR 35096 and MSVR 35097. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal
Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* tools/tiff2pdf.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities in
heap allocate buffer in t2p_process_jpeg_strip(). Reported as MSVR
35098. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC
Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35094. Discovered by
Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities &
Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_write.c: fix issue in error code path of TIFFFlushData1()
that didn't reset the tif_rawcc and tif_rawcp members. I'm not
completely sure if that could happen in practice outside of the odd
behaviour of t2p_seekproc() of tiff2pdf). The report points that a
better fix could be to check the return value of TIFFFlushData1() in
places where it isn't done currently, but it seems this patch is enough.
Reported as MSVR 35095. Discovered by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan &
Suha Can from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-787
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: bool Track::VetEntry(const BlockEntry* pBlockEntry) const
{
assert(pBlockEntry);
const Block* const pBlock = pBlockEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
assert(pBlock->GetTrackNumber() == m_info.number);
if (!pBlock || pBlock->GetTrackNumber() != m_info.number)
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: PassRefPtr<Attr> Element::removeAttributeNode(Attr* attr, ExceptionCode& ec)
{
if (!attr) {
ec = TYPE_MISMATCH_ERR;
return 0;
}
if (attr->ownerElement() != this) {
ec = NOT_FOUND_ERR;
return 0;
}
ASSERT(document() == attr->document());
synchronizeAttribute(attr->qualifiedName());
size_t index = elementData()->getAttrIndex(attr);
if (index == notFound) {
ec = NOT_FOUND_ERR;
return 0;
}
RefPtr<Attr> guard(attr);
detachAttrNodeAtIndex(attr, index);
return guard.release();
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static inline int btif_hl_select_wakeup(void){
char sig_on = btif_hl_signal_select_wakeup;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("btif_hl_select_wakeup");
return send(signal_fds[1], &sig_on, sizeof(sig_on), 0);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: ext4_xattr_release_block(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
struct buffer_head *bh)
{
struct mb_cache_entry *ce = NULL;
int error = 0;
struct mb_cache *ext4_mb_cache = EXT4_GET_MB_CACHE(inode);
ce = mb_cache_entry_get(ext4_mb_cache, bh->b_bdev, bh->b_blocknr);
BUFFER_TRACE(bh, "get_write_access");
error = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, bh);
if (error)
goto out;
lock_buffer(bh);
if (BHDR(bh)->h_refcount == cpu_to_le32(1)) {
ea_bdebug(bh, "refcount now=0; freeing");
if (ce)
mb_cache_entry_free(ce);
get_bh(bh);
unlock_buffer(bh);
ext4_free_blocks(handle, inode, bh, 0, 1,
EXT4_FREE_BLOCKS_METADATA |
EXT4_FREE_BLOCKS_FORGET);
} else {
le32_add_cpu(&BHDR(bh)->h_refcount, -1);
if (ce)
mb_cache_entry_release(ce);
/*
* Beware of this ugliness: Releasing of xattr block references
* from different inodes can race and so we have to protect
* from a race where someone else frees the block (and releases
* its journal_head) before we are done dirtying the buffer. In
* nojournal mode this race is harmless and we actually cannot
* call ext4_handle_dirty_xattr_block() with locked buffer as
* that function can call sync_dirty_buffer() so for that case
* we handle the dirtying after unlocking the buffer.
*/
if (ext4_handle_valid(handle))
error = ext4_handle_dirty_xattr_block(handle, inode,
bh);
unlock_buffer(bh);
if (!ext4_handle_valid(handle))
error = ext4_handle_dirty_xattr_block(handle, inode,
bh);
if (IS_SYNC(inode))
ext4_handle_sync(handle);
dquot_free_block(inode, EXT4_C2B(EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb), 1));
ea_bdebug(bh, "refcount now=%d; releasing",
le32_to_cpu(BHDR(bh)->h_refcount));
}
out:
ext4_std_error(inode->i_sb, error);
return;
}
Commit Message: ext4: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. The only tricky part is
that xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed
before we get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether
the entry is still valid after getting buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-19
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void NavigateAndCheckDownload(const GURL& url) {
const GURL original_url(shell()->web_contents()->GetLastCommittedURL());
DownloadManager* download_manager = BrowserContext::GetDownloadManager(
shell()->web_contents()->GetBrowserContext());
DownloadTestObserverTerminal download_observer(
download_manager, 1, DownloadTestObserver::ON_DANGEROUS_DOWNLOAD_FAIL);
NavigateToURL(shell(), url);
download_observer.WaitForFinished();
EXPECT_EQ(original_url, shell()->web_contents()->GetLastCommittedURL());
}
Commit Message: Do not use NavigationEntry to block history navigations.
This is no longer necessary after r477371.
BUG=777419
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: I701e4d4853858281b43e3743b12274dbeadfbf18
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/733959
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511942}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int su_pam_conv(int num_msg, const struct pam_message **msg,
struct pam_response **resp, void *appdata_ptr)
{
if (suppress_pam_info
&& num_msg == 1
&& msg
&& msg[0]->msg_style == PAM_TEXT_INFO)
return PAM_SUCCESS;
#ifdef HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_MISC_H
return misc_conv(num_msg, msg, resp, appdata_ptr);
#elif defined(HAVE_SECURITY_OPENPAM_H)
return openpam_ttyconv(num_msg, msg, resp, appdata_ptr);
#endif
}
Commit Message: su: properly clear child PID
Reported-by: Tobias Stöckmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int setup_ttydir_console(const struct lxc_rootfs *rootfs,
const struct lxc_console *console,
char *ttydir)
{
char path[MAXPATHLEN], lxcpath[MAXPATHLEN];
int ret;
/* create rootfs/dev/<ttydir> directory */
ret = snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/dev/%s", rootfs->mount,
ttydir);
if (ret >= sizeof(path))
return -1;
ret = mkdir(path, 0755);
if (ret && errno != EEXIST) {
SYSERROR("failed with errno %d to create %s", errno, path);
return -1;
}
INFO("created %s", path);
ret = snprintf(lxcpath, sizeof(lxcpath), "%s/dev/%s/console",
rootfs->mount, ttydir);
if (ret >= sizeof(lxcpath)) {
ERROR("console path too long");
return -1;
}
snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/dev/console", rootfs->mount);
ret = unlink(path);
if (ret && errno != ENOENT) {
SYSERROR("error unlinking %s", path);
return -1;
}
ret = creat(lxcpath, 0660);
if (ret==-1 && errno != EEXIST) {
SYSERROR("error %d creating %s", errno, lxcpath);
return -1;
}
if (ret >= 0)
close(ret);
if (console->master < 0) {
INFO("no console");
return 0;
}
if (mount(console->name, lxcpath, "none", MS_BIND, 0)) {
ERROR("failed to mount '%s' on '%s'", console->name, lxcpath);
return -1;
}
/* create symlink from rootfs/dev/console to 'lxc/console' */
ret = snprintf(lxcpath, sizeof(lxcpath), "%s/console", ttydir);
if (ret >= sizeof(lxcpath)) {
ERROR("lxc/console path too long");
return -1;
}
ret = symlink(lxcpath, path);
if (ret) {
SYSERROR("failed to create symlink for console");
return -1;
}
INFO("console has been setup on %s", lxcpath);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-59
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: PHP_MINFO_FUNCTION(radius)
{
php_info_print_table_start();
php_info_print_table_header(2, "radius support", "enabled");
php_info_print_table_row(2, "version", PHP_RADIUS_VERSION);
php_info_print_table_end();
}
Commit Message: Fix a security issue in radius_get_vendor_attr().
The underlying rad_get_vendor_attr() function assumed that it would always be
given valid VSA data. Indeed, the buffer length wasn't even passed in; the
assumption was that the length field within the VSA structure would be valid.
This could result in denial of service by providing a length that would be
beyond the memory limit, or potential arbitrary memory access by providing a
length greater than the actual data given.
rad_get_vendor_attr() has been changed to require the raw data length be
provided, and this is then used to check that the VSA is valid.
Conflicts:
radlib_vs.h
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, offsetSet)
{
char *fname, *cont_str = NULL;
size_t fname_len, cont_len;
zval *zresource;
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (PHAR_G(readonly) && !phar_obj->archive->is_data) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "Write operations disabled by the php.ini setting phar.readonly");
return;
}
if (zend_parse_parameters_ex(ZEND_PARSE_PARAMS_QUIET, ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "sr", &fname, &fname_len, &zresource) == FAILURE
&& zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "ss", &fname, &fname_len, &cont_str, &cont_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (fname_len == sizeof(".phar/stub.php")-1 && !memcmp(fname, ".phar/stub.php", sizeof(".phar/stub.php")-1)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "Cannot set stub \".phar/stub.php\" directly in phar \"%s\", use setStub", phar_obj->archive->fname);
return;
}
if (fname_len == sizeof(".phar/alias.txt")-1 && !memcmp(fname, ".phar/alias.txt", sizeof(".phar/alias.txt")-1)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "Cannot set alias \".phar/alias.txt\" directly in phar \"%s\", use setAlias", phar_obj->archive->fname);
return;
}
if (fname_len >= sizeof(".phar")-1 && !memcmp(fname, ".phar", sizeof(".phar")-1)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "Cannot set any files or directories in magic \".phar\" directory", phar_obj->archive->fname);
return;
}
phar_add_file(&(phar_obj->archive), fname, fname_len, cont_str, cont_len, zresource);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: LinkChangeSerializerMarkupAccumulator::LinkChangeSerializerMarkupAccumulator(PageSerializer* serializer, Document* document, Vector<Node*>* nodes, LinkLocalPathMap* links, String directoryName)
: SerializerMarkupAccumulator(serializer, document, nodes)
, m_replaceLinks(links)
, m_directoryName(directoryName)
{
}
Commit Message: Revert 162155 "This review merges the two existing page serializ..."
Change r162155 broke the world even though it was landed using the CQ.
> This review merges the two existing page serializers, WebPageSerializerImpl and
> PageSerializer, into one, PageSerializer. In addition to this it moves all
> the old tests from WebPageNewSerializerTest and WebPageSerializerTest to the
> PageSerializerTest structure and splits out one test for MHTML into a new
> MHTMLTest file.
>
> Saving as 'Webpage, Complete', 'Webpage, HTML Only' and as MHTML when the
> 'Save Page as MHTML' flag is enabled now uses the same code, and should thus
> have the same feature set. Meaning that both modes now should be a bit better.
>
> Detailed list of changes:
>
> - PageSerializerTest: Prepare for more DTD test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove now unneccesary input image test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove unused WebPageSerializer/Impl code
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI morph test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move namespace test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move SVG Image test
> - MHTMLTest: Move MHTML specific test to own test file
> - PageSerializerTest: Delete duplicate XML header test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move blank frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move CSS test
> - PageSerializerTest: Add frameset/frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old iframe test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old elements test
> - Use PageSerizer for saving web pages
> - PageSerializerTest: Test for rewriting links
> - PageSerializer: Add rewrite link accumulator
> - PageSerializer: Serialize images in iframes/frames src
> - PageSerializer: XHTML fix for meta tags
> - PageSerializer: Add presentation CSS
> - PageSerializer: Rename out parameter
>
> BUG=
> [email protected]
>
> Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/68613003
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73673003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162156 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: bool ShouldQuicAllowServerMigration(
const VariationParameters& quic_trial_params) {
return base::LowerCaseEqualsASCII(
GetVariationParam(quic_trial_params, "allow_server_migration"), "true");
}
Commit Message: Fix a bug in network_session_configurator.cc in which support for HTTPS URLS in QUIC proxies was always set to false.
BUG=914497
Change-Id: I56ad16088168302598bb448553ba32795eee3756
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1417356
Auto-Submit: Ryan Hamilton <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Zhongyi Shi <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Zhongyi Shi <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#623763}
CWE ID: CWE-310
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_venc::set_parameter(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_IN OMX_INDEXTYPE paramIndex,
OMX_IN OMX_PTR paramData)
{
(void)hComp;
OMX_ERRORTYPE eRet = OMX_ErrorNone;
if (m_state == OMX_StateInvalid) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Set Param in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorInvalidState;
}
if (paramData == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Get Param in Invalid paramData");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
/*set_parameter can be called in loaded state
or disabled port */
if (m_state == OMX_StateLoaded
|| m_sInPortDef.bEnabled == OMX_FALSE
|| m_sOutPortDef.bEnabled == OMX_FALSE) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Set Parameter called in valid state");
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Set Parameter called in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateOperation;
}
switch ((int)paramIndex) {
case OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE);
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *portDefn;
portDefn = (OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition H= %d, W = %d",
(int)portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight,
(int)portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth);
if (PORT_INDEX_IN == portDefn->nPortIndex) {
if (!dev_is_video_session_supported(portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth,
portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("video session not supported");
omx_report_unsupported_setting();
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("i/p actual cnt requested = %u", (unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountActual);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("i/p min cnt requested = %u", (unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountMin);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("i/p buffersize requested = %u", (unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferSize);
if (portDefn->nBufferCountMin > portDefn->nBufferCountActual) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: (In_PORT) Min buffers (%u) > actual count (%u)",
(unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountMin, (unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountActual);
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
if (handle->venc_set_param(paramData,OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: venc_set_param input failed");
return handle->hw_overload ? OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources :
OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("i/p previous actual cnt = %u", (unsigned int)m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("i/p previous min cnt = %u", (unsigned int)m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountMin);
memcpy(&m_sInPortDef, portDefn,sizeof(OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE));
#ifdef _ANDROID_ICS_
if (portDefn->format.video.eColorFormat ==
(OMX_COLOR_FORMATTYPE)QOMX_COLOR_FormatAndroidOpaque) {
m_sInPortDef.format.video.eColorFormat = (OMX_COLOR_FORMATTYPE)
QOMX_COLOR_FORMATYUV420PackedSemiPlanar32m;
if (!mUseProxyColorFormat) {
if (!c2d_conv.init()) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("C2D init failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("C2D init is successful");
}
mUseProxyColorFormat = true;
m_input_msg_id = OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_ETB_OPQ;
} else
mUseProxyColorFormat = false;
#endif
/*Query Input Buffer Requirements*/
dev_get_buf_req (&m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountMin,
&m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual,
&m_sInPortDef.nBufferSize,
m_sInPortDef.nPortIndex);
/*Query ouput Buffer Requirements*/
dev_get_buf_req (&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountMin,
&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual,
&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferSize,
m_sOutPortDef.nPortIndex);
m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual = portDefn->nBufferCountActual;
} else if (PORT_INDEX_OUT == portDefn->nPortIndex) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("o/p actual cnt requested = %u", (unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountActual);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("o/p min cnt requested = %u", (unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountMin);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("o/p buffersize requested = %u", (unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferSize);
if (portDefn->nBufferCountMin > portDefn->nBufferCountActual) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: (Out_PORT) Min buffers (%u) > actual count (%u)",
(unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountMin, (unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountActual);
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
if (handle->venc_set_param(paramData,OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: venc_set_param output failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
#ifdef _MSM8974_
/*Query ouput Buffer Requirements*/
dev_get_buf_req(&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountMin,
&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual,
&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferSize,
m_sOutPortDef.nPortIndex);
#endif
memcpy(&m_sOutPortDef,portDefn,sizeof(struct OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE));
update_profile_level(); //framerate , bitrate
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("o/p previous actual cnt = %u", (unsigned int)m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("o/p previous min cnt = %u", (unsigned int)m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountMin);
m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual = portDefn->nBufferCountActual;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Set_parameter: Bad Port idx %d",
(int)portDefn->nPortIndex);
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
m_sConfigFramerate.xEncodeFramerate = portDefn->format.video.xFramerate;
m_sConfigBitrate.nEncodeBitrate = portDefn->format.video.nBitrate;
m_sParamBitrate.nTargetBitrate = portDefn->format.video.nBitrate;
}
break;
case OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE);
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *portFmt =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat %d",
portFmt->eColorFormat);
if (PORT_INDEX_IN == portFmt->nPortIndex) {
if (handle->venc_set_param(paramData,OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat) != true) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat %d",
portFmt->eColorFormat);
update_profile_level(); //framerate
#ifdef _ANDROID_ICS_
if (portFmt->eColorFormat ==
(OMX_COLOR_FORMATTYPE)QOMX_COLOR_FormatAndroidOpaque) {
m_sInPortFormat.eColorFormat = (OMX_COLOR_FORMATTYPE)
QOMX_COLOR_FORMATYUV420PackedSemiPlanar32m;
if (!mUseProxyColorFormat) {
if (!c2d_conv.init()) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("C2D init failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("C2D init is successful");
}
mUseProxyColorFormat = true;
m_input_msg_id = OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_ETB_OPQ;
} else
#endif
{
m_sInPortFormat.eColorFormat = portFmt->eColorFormat;
m_sInPortDef.format.video.eColorFormat = portFmt->eColorFormat;
m_input_msg_id = OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_ETB;
mUseProxyColorFormat = false;
}
m_sInPortFormat.xFramerate = portFmt->xFramerate;
}
}
break;
case OMX_IndexParamVideoInit:
{ //TODO, do we need this index set param
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_PORT_PARAM_TYPE);
OMX_PORT_PARAM_TYPE* pParam = (OMX_PORT_PARAM_TYPE*)(paramData);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Set OMX_IndexParamVideoInit called");
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoBitrate:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE);
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE* pParam = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE*)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoBitrate");
if (handle->venc_set_param(paramData,OMX_IndexParamVideoBitrate) != true) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
m_sParamBitrate.nTargetBitrate = pParam->nTargetBitrate;
m_sParamBitrate.eControlRate = pParam->eControlRate;
update_profile_level(); //bitrate
m_sConfigBitrate.nEncodeBitrate = pParam->nTargetBitrate;
m_sInPortDef.format.video.nBitrate = pParam->nTargetBitrate;
m_sOutPortDef.format.video.nBitrate = pParam->nTargetBitrate;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("bitrate = %u", (unsigned int)m_sOutPortDef.format.video.nBitrate);
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoMpeg4:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_MPEG4TYPE);
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_MPEG4TYPE* pParam = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_MPEG4TYPE*)paramData;
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_MPEG4TYPE mp4_param;
memcpy(&mp4_param, pParam, sizeof(struct OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_MPEG4TYPE));
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoMpeg4");
if (pParam->eProfile == OMX_VIDEO_MPEG4ProfileAdvancedSimple) {
#ifdef MAX_RES_1080P
if (pParam->nBFrames) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("INFO: Only 1 Bframe is supported");
mp4_param.nBFrames = 1;
}
#else
if (pParam->nBFrames) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Warning: B frames not supported");
mp4_param.nBFrames = 0;
}
#endif
#ifdef _MSM8974_
if (pParam->nBFrames || bframes)
mp4_param.nBFrames = (pParam->nBFrames > (unsigned int) bframes)? pParam->nBFrames : bframes;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("MPEG4: %u BFrames are being set", (unsigned int)mp4_param.nBFrames);
#endif
} else {
if (pParam->nBFrames) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Warning: B frames not supported");
mp4_param.nBFrames = 0;
}
}
if (handle->venc_set_param(&mp4_param,OMX_IndexParamVideoMpeg4) != true) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sParamMPEG4,pParam, sizeof(struct OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_MPEG4TYPE));
m_sIntraperiod.nPFrames = m_sParamMPEG4.nPFrames;
if (pParam->nBFrames || bframes)
m_sIntraperiod.nBFrames = m_sParamMPEG4.nBFrames = mp4_param.nBFrames;
else
m_sIntraperiod.nBFrames = m_sParamMPEG4.nBFrames;
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoH263:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_H263TYPE* pParam = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_H263TYPE*)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoH263");
if (handle->venc_set_param(paramData,OMX_IndexParamVideoH263) != true) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sParamH263,pParam, sizeof(struct OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_H263TYPE));
m_sIntraperiod.nPFrames = m_sParamH263.nPFrames;
m_sIntraperiod.nBFrames = m_sParamH263.nBFrames;
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoAvc:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE);
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE* pParam = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE*)paramData;
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE avc_param;
memcpy(&avc_param, pParam, sizeof( struct OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE));
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoAvc");
if ((pParam->eProfile == OMX_VIDEO_AVCProfileHigh)||
(pParam->eProfile == OMX_VIDEO_AVCProfileMain)) {
#ifdef MAX_RES_1080P
if (pParam->nBFrames) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("INFO: Only 1 Bframe is supported");
avc_param.nBFrames = 1;
}
if (pParam->nRefFrames != 2) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Warning: 2 RefFrames are needed, changing RefFrames from %u to 2", (unsigned int)pParam->nRefFrames);
avc_param.nRefFrames = 2;
}
#else
if (pParam->nBFrames) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Warning: B frames not supported");
avc_param.nBFrames = 0;
}
if (pParam->nRefFrames != 1) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Warning: Only 1 RefFrame is supported, changing RefFrame from %u to 1)", (unsigned int)pParam->nRefFrames);
avc_param.nRefFrames = 1;
}
#endif
#ifdef _MSM8974_
if (pParam->nBFrames || bframes) {
avc_param.nBFrames = (pParam->nBFrames > (unsigned int) bframes)? pParam->nBFrames : bframes;
avc_param.nRefFrames = (avc_param.nBFrames < 4)? avc_param.nBFrames + 1 : 4;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("AVC: RefFrames: %u, BFrames: %u", (unsigned int)avc_param.nRefFrames, (unsigned int)avc_param.nBFrames);
avc_param.bEntropyCodingCABAC = (OMX_BOOL)(avc_param.bEntropyCodingCABAC && entropy);
avc_param.nCabacInitIdc = entropy ? avc_param.nCabacInitIdc : 0;
#endif
} else {
if (pParam->nRefFrames != 1) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Warning: Only 1 RefFrame is supported, changing RefFrame from %u to 1)", (unsigned int)pParam->nRefFrames);
avc_param.nRefFrames = 1;
}
if (pParam->nBFrames) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Warning: B frames not supported");
avc_param.nBFrames = 0;
}
}
if (handle->venc_set_param(&avc_param,OMX_IndexParamVideoAvc) != true) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sParamAVC,pParam, sizeof(struct OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE));
m_sIntraperiod.nPFrames = m_sParamAVC.nPFrames;
if (pParam->nBFrames || bframes)
m_sIntraperiod.nBFrames = m_sParamAVC.nBFrames = avc_param.nBFrames;
else
m_sIntraperiod.nBFrames = m_sParamAVC.nBFrames;
break;
}
case (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_IndexParamVideoVp8:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_VP8TYPE);
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_VP8TYPE* pParam = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_VP8TYPE*)paramData;
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_VP8TYPE vp8_param;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoVp8");
if (pParam->nDCTPartitions != m_sParamVP8.nDCTPartitions ||
pParam->bErrorResilientMode != m_sParamVP8.bErrorResilientMode) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("VP8 doesn't support nDCTPartitions or bErrorResilientMode");
}
memcpy(&vp8_param, pParam, sizeof( struct OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_VP8TYPE));
if (handle->venc_set_param(&vp8_param, (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_IndexParamVideoVp8) != true) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sParamVP8,pParam, sizeof(struct OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_VP8TYPE));
break;
}
case (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_IndexParamVideoHevc:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_HEVCTYPE);
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_HEVCTYPE* pParam = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_HEVCTYPE*)paramData;
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_HEVCTYPE hevc_param;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoHevc");
memcpy(&hevc_param, pParam, sizeof( struct OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_HEVCTYPE));
if (handle->venc_set_param(&hevc_param, (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_IndexParamVideoHevc) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed : set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoHevc");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sParamHEVC, pParam, sizeof(struct OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_HEVCTYPE));
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelCurrent:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PROFILELEVELTYPE);
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PROFILELEVELTYPE* pParam = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PROFILELEVELTYPE*)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelCurrent");
if (handle->venc_set_param(pParam,OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelCurrent) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelCurrent failed for Profile: %u "
"Level :%u", (unsigned int)pParam->eProfile, (unsigned int)pParam->eLevel);
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
m_sParamProfileLevel.eProfile = pParam->eProfile;
m_sParamProfileLevel.eLevel = pParam->eLevel;
if (!strncmp((char *)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.mpeg4",\
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
m_sParamMPEG4.eProfile = (OMX_VIDEO_MPEG4PROFILETYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eProfile;
m_sParamMPEG4.eLevel = (OMX_VIDEO_MPEG4LEVELTYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eLevel;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("MPEG4 profile = %d, level = %d", m_sParamMPEG4.eProfile,
m_sParamMPEG4.eLevel);
} else if (!strncmp((char *)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.h263",\
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
m_sParamH263.eProfile = (OMX_VIDEO_H263PROFILETYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eProfile;
m_sParamH263.eLevel = (OMX_VIDEO_H263LEVELTYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eLevel;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("H263 profile = %d, level = %d", m_sParamH263.eProfile,
m_sParamH263.eLevel);
} else if (!strncmp((char *)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.avc",\
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
m_sParamAVC.eProfile = (OMX_VIDEO_AVCPROFILETYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eProfile;
m_sParamAVC.eLevel = (OMX_VIDEO_AVCLEVELTYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eLevel;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("AVC profile = %d, level = %d", m_sParamAVC.eProfile,
m_sParamAVC.eLevel);
} else if (!strncmp((char *)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.avc.secure",\
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
m_sParamAVC.eProfile = (OMX_VIDEO_AVCPROFILETYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eProfile;
m_sParamAVC.eLevel = (OMX_VIDEO_AVCLEVELTYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eLevel;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("\n AVC profile = %d, level = %d", m_sParamAVC.eProfile,
m_sParamAVC.eLevel);
}
else if (!strncmp((char*)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.vp8",\
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
m_sParamVP8.eProfile = (OMX_VIDEO_VP8PROFILETYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eProfile;
m_sParamVP8.eLevel = (OMX_VIDEO_VP8LEVELTYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eLevel;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("VP8 profile = %d, level = %d", m_sParamVP8.eProfile,
m_sParamVP8.eLevel);
}
else if (!strncmp((char*)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.hevc",\
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
m_sParamHEVC.eProfile = (OMX_VIDEO_HEVCPROFILETYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eProfile;
m_sParamHEVC.eLevel = (OMX_VIDEO_HEVCLEVELTYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eLevel;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("HEVC profile = %d, level = %d", m_sParamHEVC.eProfile,
m_sParamHEVC.eLevel);
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE);
OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *comp_role;
comp_role = (OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole %s",
comp_role->cRole);
if ((m_state == OMX_StateLoaded)&&
!BITMASK_PRESENT(&m_flags,OMX_COMPONENT_IDLE_PENDING)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Set Parameter called in valid state");
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Set Parameter called in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateOperation;
}
if (!strncmp((char*)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.avc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_encoder.avc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_encoder.avc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet =OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else if (!strncmp((char*)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.avc.secure",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_encoder.avc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_encoder.avc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setparameter: unknown Index %s\n", comp_role->cRole);
eRet =OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else if (!strncmp((char*)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.mpeg4",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((const char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_encoder.mpeg4",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_encoder.mpeg4",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else if (!strncmp((char*)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.h263",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((const char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_encoder.h263",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_encoder.h263",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet =OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
}
#ifdef _MSM8974_
else if (!strncmp((char*)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.vp8",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((const char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_encoder.vp8",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_encoder.vp8",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet =OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
}
#endif
else if (!strncmp((char*)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.hevc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((const char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_encoder.hevc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_encoder.hevc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
}
else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setparameter: unknown param %s", m_nkind);
eRet = OMX_ErrorInvalidComponentName;
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamPriorityMgmt:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_PRIORITYMGMTTYPE);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamPriorityMgmt");
if (m_state != OMX_StateLoaded) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Set Parameter called in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateOperation;
}
OMX_PRIORITYMGMTTYPE *priorityMgmtype = (OMX_PRIORITYMGMTTYPE*) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamPriorityMgmt %u",
(unsigned int)priorityMgmtype->nGroupID);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: priorityMgmtype %u",
(unsigned int)priorityMgmtype->nGroupPriority);
m_sPriorityMgmt.nGroupID = priorityMgmtype->nGroupID;
m_sPriorityMgmt.nGroupPriority = priorityMgmtype->nGroupPriority;
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamCompBufferSupplier:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_PARAM_BUFFERSUPPLIERTYPE);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamCompBufferSupplier");
OMX_PARAM_BUFFERSUPPLIERTYPE *bufferSupplierType = (OMX_PARAM_BUFFERSUPPLIERTYPE*) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamCompBufferSupplier %d",
bufferSupplierType->eBufferSupplier);
if (bufferSupplierType->nPortIndex == 0 || bufferSupplierType->nPortIndex ==1)
m_sInBufSupplier.eBufferSupplier = bufferSupplierType->eBufferSupplier;
else
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoQuantization:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_QUANTIZATIONTYPE);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoQuantization");
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_QUANTIZATIONTYPE *session_qp = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_QUANTIZATIONTYPE*) paramData;
if (session_qp->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if (handle->venc_set_param(paramData, OMX_IndexParamVideoQuantization) != true) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
m_sSessionQuantization.nQpI = session_qp->nQpI;
m_sSessionQuantization.nQpP = session_qp->nQpP;
m_sSessionQuantization.nQpB = session_qp->nQpB;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Unsupported port Index for Session QP setting");
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoQPRange:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_PARAM_QPRANGETYPE);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoQPRange");
OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_PARAM_QPRANGETYPE *qp_range = (OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_PARAM_QPRANGETYPE*) paramData;
if (qp_range->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if (handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoQPRange) != true) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
m_sSessionQPRange.minQP= qp_range->minQP;
m_sSessionQPRange.maxQP= qp_range->maxQP;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Unsupported port Index for QP range setting");
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexPortDefn:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_QCOM_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE);
OMX_QCOM_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE* pParam =
(OMX_QCOM_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE*)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_QcomIndexPortDefn");
if (pParam->nPortIndex == (OMX_U32)PORT_INDEX_IN) {
if (pParam->nMemRegion > OMX_QCOM_MemRegionInvalid &&
pParam->nMemRegion < OMX_QCOM_MemRegionMax) {
m_use_input_pmem = OMX_TRUE;
} else {
m_use_input_pmem = OMX_FALSE;
}
} else if (pParam->nPortIndex == (OMX_U32)PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if (pParam->nMemRegion > OMX_QCOM_MemRegionInvalid &&
pParam->nMemRegion < OMX_QCOM_MemRegionMax) {
m_use_output_pmem = OMX_TRUE;
} else {
m_use_output_pmem = OMX_FALSE;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: SetParameter called on unsupported Port Index for QcomPortDefn");
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoErrorCorrection:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_ERRORCORRECTIONTYPE);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("OMX_IndexParamVideoErrorCorrection");
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_ERRORCORRECTIONTYPE* pParam =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_ERRORCORRECTIONTYPE*)paramData;
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData, OMX_IndexParamVideoErrorCorrection)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Request for setting Error Resilience failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sErrorCorrection,pParam, sizeof(m_sErrorCorrection));
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoIntraRefresh:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_INTRAREFRESHTYPE);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_param:OMX_IndexParamVideoIntraRefresh");
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_INTRAREFRESHTYPE* pParam =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_INTRAREFRESHTYPE*)paramData;
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,OMX_IndexParamVideoIntraRefresh)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Request for setting intra refresh failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sIntraRefresh, pParam, sizeof(m_sIntraRefresh));
break;
}
#ifdef _ANDROID_ICS_
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoMetaBufferMode:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, StoreMetaDataInBuffersParams);
StoreMetaDataInBuffersParams *pParam =
(StoreMetaDataInBuffersParams*)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_parameter:OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoMetaBufferMode: "
"port_index = %u, meta_mode = %d", (unsigned int)pParam->nPortIndex, pParam->bStoreMetaData);
if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_IN) {
if (pParam->bStoreMetaData != meta_mode_enable) {
if (!handle->venc_set_meta_mode(pParam->bStoreMetaData)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: set Metabuffer mode %d fail",
pParam->bStoreMetaData);
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
meta_mode_enable = pParam->bStoreMetaData;
if (meta_mode_enable) {
m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual = m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountMin;
if (handle->venc_set_param(&m_sInPortDef,OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: venc_set_param input failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else {
/*TODO: reset encoder driver Meta mode*/
dev_get_buf_req (&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountMin,
&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual,
&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferSize,
m_sOutPortDef.nPortIndex);
}
}
} else if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT && secure_session) {
if (pParam->bStoreMetaData != meta_mode_enable) {
if (!handle->venc_set_meta_mode(pParam->bStoreMetaData)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("\nERROR: set Metabuffer mode %d fail",
pParam->bStoreMetaData);
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
meta_mode_enable = pParam->bStoreMetaData;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("set_parameter: metamode is "
"valid for input port only");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
}
break;
#endif
#if !defined(MAX_RES_720P) || defined(_MSM8974_)
case OMX_QcomIndexParamIndexExtraDataType:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_INDEXEXTRADATATYPE);
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_parameter: OMX_QcomIndexParamIndexExtraDataType");
QOMX_INDEXEXTRADATATYPE *pParam = (QOMX_INDEXEXTRADATATYPE *)paramData;
bool enable = false;
OMX_U32 mask = 0;
if (pParam->nIndex == (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_ExtraDataVideoEncoderSliceInfo) {
if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
mask = VEN_EXTRADATA_SLICEINFO;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("SliceInfo extradata %s",
((pParam->bEnabled == OMX_TRUE) ? "enabled" : "disabled"));
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("set_parameter: Slice information is "
"valid for output port only");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
break;
}
} else if (pParam->nIndex == (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_ExtraDataVideoEncoderMBInfo) {
if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
mask = VEN_EXTRADATA_MBINFO;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("MBInfo extradata %s",
((pParam->bEnabled == OMX_TRUE) ? "enabled" : "disabled"));
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("set_parameter: MB information is "
"valid for output port only");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
break;
}
}
#ifndef _MSM8974_
else if (pParam->nIndex == (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_ExtraDataVideoLTRInfo) {
if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if (pParam->bEnabled == OMX_TRUE)
mask = VEN_EXTRADATA_LTRINFO;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("LTRInfo extradata %s",
((pParam->bEnabled == OMX_TRUE) ? "enabled" : "disabled"));
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("set_parameter: LTR information is "
"valid for output port only");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
break;
}
}
#endif
else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("set_parameter: unsupported extrdata index (%x)",
pParam->nIndex);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
break;
}
if (pParam->bEnabled == OMX_TRUE)
m_sExtraData |= mask;
else
m_sExtraData &= ~mask;
enable = !!(m_sExtraData & mask);
if (handle->venc_set_param(&enable,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE)pParam->nIndex) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting Extradata (%x) failed", pParam->nIndex);
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
} else {
m_sOutPortDef.nPortIndex = PORT_INDEX_OUT;
dev_get_buf_req(&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountMin,
&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual,
&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferSize,
m_sOutPortDef.nPortIndex);
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("updated out_buf_req: buffer cnt=%u, "
"count min=%u, buffer size=%u",
(unsigned int)m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual,
(unsigned int)m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountMin,
(unsigned int)m_sOutPortDef.nBufferSize);
}
break;
}
case QOMX_IndexParamVideoLTRMode:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_VIDEO_PARAM_LTRMODE_TYPE);
QOMX_VIDEO_PARAM_LTRMODE_TYPE* pParam =
(QOMX_VIDEO_PARAM_LTRMODE_TYPE*)paramData;
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData, (OMX_INDEXTYPE)QOMX_IndexParamVideoLTRMode)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting LTR mode failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sParamLTRMode, pParam, sizeof(m_sParamLTRMode));
break;
}
case QOMX_IndexParamVideoLTRCount:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_VIDEO_PARAM_LTRCOUNT_TYPE);
QOMX_VIDEO_PARAM_LTRCOUNT_TYPE* pParam =
(QOMX_VIDEO_PARAM_LTRCOUNT_TYPE*)paramData;
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData, (OMX_INDEXTYPE)QOMX_IndexParamVideoLTRCount)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting LTR count failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sParamLTRCount, pParam, sizeof(m_sParamLTRCount));
break;
}
#endif
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoMaxAllowedBitrateCheck:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_EXTNINDEX_PARAMTYPE);
QOMX_EXTNINDEX_PARAMTYPE* pParam =
(QOMX_EXTNINDEX_PARAMTYPE*)paramData;
if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
handle->m_max_allowed_bitrate_check =
((pParam->bEnable == OMX_TRUE) ? true : false);
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_parameter: max allowed bitrate check %s",
((pParam->bEnable == OMX_TRUE) ? "enabled" : "disabled"));
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoMaxAllowedBitrateCheck "
" called on wrong port(%u)", (unsigned int)pParam->nPortIndex);
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
break;
}
#ifdef MAX_RES_1080P
case OMX_QcomIndexEnableSliceDeliveryMode:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_EXTNINDEX_PARAMTYPE);
QOMX_EXTNINDEX_PARAMTYPE* pParam =
(QOMX_EXTNINDEX_PARAMTYPE*)paramData;
if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_QcomIndexEnableSliceDeliveryMode)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Request for setting slice delivery mode failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: OMX_QcomIndexEnableSliceDeliveryMode "
"called on wrong port(%u)", (unsigned int)pParam->nPortIndex);
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
break;
}
#endif
case OMX_QcomIndexEnableH263PlusPType:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_EXTNINDEX_PARAMTYPE);
QOMX_EXTNINDEX_PARAMTYPE* pParam =
(QOMX_EXTNINDEX_PARAMTYPE*)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("OMX_QcomIndexEnableH263PlusPType");
if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_QcomIndexEnableH263PlusPType)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Request for setting PlusPType failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: OMX_QcomIndexEnableH263PlusPType "
"called on wrong port(%u)", (unsigned int)pParam->nPortIndex);
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamSequenceHeaderWithIDR:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, PrependSPSPPSToIDRFramesParams);
if(!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_QcomIndexParamSequenceHeaderWithIDR)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("%s: %s",
"OMX_QComIndexParamSequenceHeaderWithIDR:",
"request for inband sps/pps failed.");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamH264AUDelimiter:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_CONFIG_H264_AUD);
if(!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_QcomIndexParamH264AUDelimiter)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("%s: %s",
"OMX_QComIndexParamh264AUDelimiter:",
"request for AU Delimiters failed.");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexHierarchicalStructure:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_VIDEO_HIERARCHICALLAYERS);
QOMX_VIDEO_HIERARCHICALLAYERS* pParam =
(QOMX_VIDEO_HIERARCHICALLAYERS*)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("OMX_QcomIndexHierarchicalStructure");
if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_QcomIndexHierarchicalStructure)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Request for setting PlusPType failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
if((pParam->eHierarchicalCodingType == QOMX_HIERARCHICALCODING_B) && pParam->nNumLayers)
hier_b_enabled = true;
m_sHierLayers.nNumLayers = pParam->nNumLayers;
m_sHierLayers.eHierarchicalCodingType = pParam->eHierarchicalCodingType;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: OMX_QcomIndexHierarchicalStructure called on wrong port(%u)",
(unsigned int)pParam->nPortIndex);
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamPerfLevel:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_PARAM_PERF_LEVEL);
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE) OMX_QcomIndexParamPerfLevel)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting performance level");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamH264VUITimingInfo:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_PARAM_VUI_TIMING_INFO);
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE) OMX_QcomIndexParamH264VUITimingInfo)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting VUI timing info");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamPeakBitrate:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_PARAM_PEAK_BITRATE);
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE) OMX_QcomIndexParamPeakBitrate)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting peak bitrate");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
break;
}
case QOMX_IndexParamVideoInitialQp:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_EXTNINDEX_VIDEO_INITIALQP);
if(!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE)QOMX_IndexParamVideoInitialQp)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Request to Enable initial QP failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sParamInitqp, paramData, sizeof(m_sParamInitqp));
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamSetMVSearchrange:
{
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE) OMX_QcomIndexParamSetMVSearchrange)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting Searchrange");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoHybridHierpMode:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_EXTNINDEX_VIDEO_HYBRID_HP_MODE);
if(!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoHybridHierpMode)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Request to Enable Hybrid Hier-P failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoSliceFMO:
default:
{
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setparameter: unknown param %d", paramIndex);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
break;
}
}
return eRet;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add safety checks for freeing buffers
Allow only up to 64 buffers on input/output port (since the
allocation bitmap is only 64-wide).
Add safety checks to free only as many buffers were allocated.
Fixes: Heap Overflow and Possible Local Privilege Escalation in
MediaServer (libOmxVenc problem)
Bug: 27532497
Change-Id: I31e576ef9dc542df73aa6b0ea113d72724b50fc6
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static ssize_t generic_perform_write(struct file *file,
struct iov_iter *i, loff_t pos)
{
struct address_space *mapping = file->f_mapping;
const struct address_space_operations *a_ops = mapping->a_ops;
long status = 0;
ssize_t written = 0;
unsigned int flags = 0;
/*
* Copies from kernel address space cannot fail (NFSD is a big user).
*/
if (segment_eq(get_fs(), KERNEL_DS))
flags |= AOP_FLAG_UNINTERRUPTIBLE;
do {
struct page *page;
pgoff_t index; /* Pagecache index for current page */
unsigned long offset; /* Offset into pagecache page */
unsigned long bytes; /* Bytes to write to page */
size_t copied; /* Bytes copied from user */
void *fsdata;
offset = (pos & (PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - 1));
index = pos >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
bytes = min_t(unsigned long, PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - offset,
iov_iter_count(i));
again:
/*
* Bring in the user page that we will copy from _first_.
* Otherwise there's a nasty deadlock on copying from the
* same page as we're writing to, without it being marked
* up-to-date.
*
* Not only is this an optimisation, but it is also required
* to check that the address is actually valid, when atomic
* usercopies are used, below.
*/
if (unlikely(iov_iter_fault_in_readable(i, bytes))) {
status = -EFAULT;
break;
}
status = a_ops->write_begin(file, mapping, pos, bytes, flags,
&page, &fsdata);
if (unlikely(status))
break;
pagefault_disable();
copied = iov_iter_copy_from_user_atomic(page, i, offset, bytes);
pagefault_enable();
flush_dcache_page(page);
status = a_ops->write_end(file, mapping, pos, bytes, copied,
page, fsdata);
if (unlikely(status < 0))
break;
copied = status;
cond_resched();
if (unlikely(copied == 0)) {
/*
* If we were unable to copy any data at all, we must
* fall back to a single segment length write.
*
* If we didn't fallback here, we could livelock
* because not all segments in the iov can be copied at
* once without a pagefault.
*/
bytes = min_t(unsigned long, PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - offset,
iov_iter_single_seg_count(i));
goto again;
}
iov_iter_advance(i, copied);
pos += copied;
written += copied;
balance_dirty_pages_ratelimited(mapping);
} while (iov_iter_count(i));
return written ? written : status;
}
Commit Message: fix writev regression: pan hanging unkillable and un-straceable
Frederik Himpe reported an unkillable and un-straceable pan process.
Zero length iovecs can go into an infinite loop in writev, because the
iovec iterator does not always advance over them.
The sequence required to trigger this is not trivial. I think it
requires that a zero-length iovec be followed by a non-zero-length iovec
which causes a pagefault in the atomic usercopy. This causes the writev
code to drop back into single-segment copy mode, which then tries to
copy the 0 bytes of the zero-length iovec; a zero length copy looks like
a failure though, so it loops.
Put a test into iov_iter_advance to catch zero-length iovecs. We could
just put the test in the fallback path, but I feel it is more robust to
skip over zero-length iovecs throughout the code (iovec iterator may be
used in filesystems too, so it should be robust).
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: PrintMsg_Print_Params::~PrintMsg_Print_Params() {}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: struct buffer_head *isofs_bread(struct inode *inode, sector_t block)
{
sector_t blknr = isofs_bmap(inode, block);
if (!blknr)
return NULL;
return sb_bread(inode->i_sb, blknr);
}
Commit Message: isofs: Fix unbounded recursion when processing relocated directories
We did not check relocated directory in any way when processing Rock
Ridge 'CL' tag. Thus a corrupted isofs image can possibly have a CL
entry pointing to another CL entry leading to possibly unbounded
recursion in kernel code and thus stack overflow or deadlocks (if there
is a loop created from CL entries).
Fix the problem by not allowing CL entry to point to a directory entry
with CL entry (such use makes no good sense anyway) and by checking
whether CL entry doesn't point to itself.
CC: [email protected]
Reported-by: Chris Evans <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: bool PrintWebViewHelper::UpdatePrintSettings(
WebKit::WebFrame* frame, const WebKit::WebNode& node,
const DictionaryValue& passed_job_settings) {
DCHECK(is_preview_enabled_);
const DictionaryValue* job_settings = &passed_job_settings;
DictionaryValue modified_job_settings;
if (job_settings->empty()) {
if (!print_for_preview_)
print_preview_context_.set_error(PREVIEW_ERROR_BAD_SETTING);
return false;
}
bool source_is_html = true;
if (print_for_preview_) {
if (!job_settings->GetBoolean(printing::kSettingPreviewModifiable,
&source_is_html)) {
NOTREACHED();
}
} else {
source_is_html = !PrintingNodeOrPdfFrame(frame, node);
}
if (print_for_preview_ || !source_is_html) {
modified_job_settings.MergeDictionary(job_settings);
modified_job_settings.SetBoolean(printing::kSettingHeaderFooterEnabled,
false);
modified_job_settings.SetInteger(printing::kSettingMarginsType,
printing::NO_MARGINS);
job_settings = &modified_job_settings;
}
int cookie = print_pages_params_.get() ?
print_pages_params_->params.document_cookie : 0;
PrintMsg_PrintPages_Params settings;
Send(new PrintHostMsg_UpdatePrintSettings(routing_id(),
cookie, *job_settings, &settings));
print_pages_params_.reset(new PrintMsg_PrintPages_Params(settings));
if (!PrintMsg_Print_Params_IsValid(settings.params)) {
if (!print_for_preview_) {
print_preview_context_.set_error(PREVIEW_ERROR_INVALID_PRINTER_SETTINGS);
} else {
WebKit::WebFrame* print_frame = NULL;
GetPrintFrame(&print_frame);
if (print_frame) {
render_view()->RunModalAlertDialog(
print_frame,
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_PRINT_PREVIEW_INVALID_PRINTER_SETTINGS));
}
}
return false;
}
if (settings.params.dpi < kMinDpi || !settings.params.document_cookie) {
print_preview_context_.set_error(PREVIEW_ERROR_UPDATING_PRINT_SETTINGS);
return false;
}
if (!print_for_preview_) {
if (!job_settings->GetString(printing::kPreviewUIAddr,
&(settings.params.preview_ui_addr)) ||
!job_settings->GetInteger(printing::kPreviewRequestID,
&(settings.params.preview_request_id)) ||
!job_settings->GetBoolean(printing::kIsFirstRequest,
&(settings.params.is_first_request))) {
NOTREACHED();
print_preview_context_.set_error(PREVIEW_ERROR_BAD_SETTING);
return false;
}
settings.params.print_to_pdf = IsPrintToPdfRequested(*job_settings);
UpdateFrameMarginsCssInfo(*job_settings);
settings.params.print_scaling_option = GetPrintScalingOption(
source_is_html, *job_settings, settings.params);
if (settings.params.display_header_footer) {
header_footer_info_.reset(new DictionaryValue());
header_footer_info_->SetString(printing::kSettingHeaderFooterDate,
settings.params.date);
header_footer_info_->SetString(printing::kSettingHeaderFooterURL,
settings.params.url);
header_footer_info_->SetString(printing::kSettingHeaderFooterTitle,
settings.params.title);
}
}
print_pages_params_.reset(new PrintMsg_PrintPages_Params(settings));
Send(new PrintHostMsg_DidGetDocumentCookie(routing_id(),
settings.params.document_cookie));
return true;
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void kvm_destroy_dirty_bitmap(struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot)
{
if (!memslot->dirty_bitmap)
return;
kvm_kvfree(memslot->dirty_bitmap);
memslot->dirty_bitmap = NULL;
}
Commit Message: KVM: perform an invalid memslot step for gpa base change
PPC must flush all translations before the new memory slot
is visible.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void FeatureInfo::InitializeFeatures() {
std::string extensions_string(gl::GetGLExtensionsFromCurrentContext());
gfx::ExtensionSet extensions(gfx::MakeExtensionSet(extensions_string));
const char* version_str =
reinterpret_cast<const char*>(glGetString(GL_VERSION));
const char* renderer_str =
reinterpret_cast<const char*>(glGetString(GL_RENDERER));
gl_version_info_.reset(
new gl::GLVersionInfo(version_str, renderer_str, extensions));
bool enable_es3 = IsWebGL2OrES3OrHigherContext();
bool has_pixel_buffers =
gl_version_info_->is_es3 || gl_version_info_->is_desktop_core_profile ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_pixel_buffer_object") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_NV_pixel_buffer_object");
ScopedPixelUnpackBufferOverride scoped_pbo_override(has_pixel_buffers, 0);
AddExtensionString("GL_ANGLE_translated_shader_source");
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_async_pixel_transfers");
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_bind_uniform_location");
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_color_space_metadata");
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_command_buffer_query");
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_command_buffer_latency_query");
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_copy_texture");
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_deschedule");
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_get_error_query");
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_lose_context");
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_pixel_transfer_buffer_object");
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_rate_limit_offscreen_context");
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_resize");
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_resource_safe");
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_strict_attribs");
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_texture_mailbox");
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_trace_marker");
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_debug_marker");
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_unpack_subimage");
AddExtensionString("GL_OES_vertex_array_object");
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ANGLE_translated_shader_source")) {
feature_flags_.angle_translated_shader_source = true;
}
bool enable_dxt1 = false;
bool enable_dxt3 = false;
bool enable_dxt5 = false;
bool have_s3tc =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_texture_compression_s3tc");
bool have_dxt3 =
have_s3tc ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ANGLE_texture_compression_dxt3");
bool have_dxt5 =
have_s3tc ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ANGLE_texture_compression_dxt5");
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_texture_compression_dxt1") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ANGLE_texture_compression_dxt1") ||
have_s3tc) {
enable_dxt1 = true;
}
if (have_dxt3) {
enable_dxt3 = true;
}
if (have_dxt5) {
enable_dxt5 = true;
}
if (enable_dxt1) {
feature_flags_.ext_texture_format_dxt1 = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_ANGLE_texture_compression_dxt1");
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_RGB_S3TC_DXT1_EXT);
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_S3TC_DXT1_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_RGB_S3TC_DXT1_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_S3TC_DXT1_EXT);
}
if (enable_dxt3) {
AddExtensionString("GL_ANGLE_texture_compression_dxt3");
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_S3TC_DXT3_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_S3TC_DXT3_EXT);
}
if (enable_dxt5) {
feature_flags_.ext_texture_format_dxt5 = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_ANGLE_texture_compression_dxt5");
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_S3TC_DXT5_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_S3TC_DXT5_EXT);
}
bool have_astc =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_KHR_texture_compression_astc_ldr");
if (have_astc) {
feature_flags_.ext_texture_format_astc = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_KHR_texture_compression_astc_ldr");
GLint astc_format_it = GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_ASTC_4x4_KHR;
GLint astc_format_max = GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_ASTC_12x12_KHR;
for (; astc_format_it <= astc_format_max; astc_format_it++) {
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(astc_format_it);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(astc_format_it);
}
astc_format_it = GL_COMPRESSED_SRGB8_ALPHA8_ASTC_4x4_KHR;
astc_format_max = GL_COMPRESSED_SRGB8_ALPHA8_ASTC_12x12_KHR;
for (; astc_format_it <= astc_format_max; astc_format_it++) {
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(astc_format_it);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(astc_format_it);
}
}
bool have_atc =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_AMD_compressed_ATC_texture") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ATI_texture_compression_atitc");
if (have_atc) {
feature_flags_.ext_texture_format_atc = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_AMD_compressed_ATC_texture");
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(GL_ATC_RGB_AMD);
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(
GL_ATC_RGBA_INTERPOLATED_ALPHA_AMD);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(GL_ATC_RGB_AMD);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(
GL_ATC_RGBA_INTERPOLATED_ALPHA_AMD);
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_texture_filter_anisotropic")) {
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_texture_filter_anisotropic");
validators_.texture_parameter.AddValue(GL_TEXTURE_MAX_ANISOTROPY_EXT);
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_MAX_TEXTURE_MAX_ANISOTROPY_EXT);
}
bool enable_depth_texture = false;
GLenum depth_texture_format = GL_NONE;
if (!workarounds_.disable_depth_texture &&
(gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_depth_texture") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_OES_depth_texture") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ANGLE_depth_texture") ||
gl_version_info_->is_desktop_core_profile)) {
enable_depth_texture = true;
depth_texture_format = GL_DEPTH_COMPONENT;
feature_flags_.angle_depth_texture =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ANGLE_depth_texture");
}
if (enable_depth_texture) {
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_depth_texture");
AddExtensionString("GL_GOOGLE_depth_texture");
validators_.texture_internal_format.AddValue(GL_DEPTH_COMPONENT);
validators_.texture_format.AddValue(GL_DEPTH_COMPONENT);
validators_.pixel_type.AddValue(GL_UNSIGNED_SHORT);
validators_.pixel_type.AddValue(GL_UNSIGNED_INT);
validators_.texture_depth_renderable_internal_format.AddValue(
GL_DEPTH_COMPONENT);
}
GLenum depth_stencil_texture_format = GL_NONE;
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_packed_depth_stencil") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_OES_packed_depth_stencil") ||
gl_version_info_->is_es3 || gl_version_info_->is_desktop_core_profile) {
AddExtensionString("GL_OES_packed_depth_stencil");
feature_flags_.packed_depth24_stencil8 = true;
if (enable_depth_texture) {
if (gl_version_info_->is_es3) {
depth_stencil_texture_format = GL_DEPTH24_STENCIL8;
} else {
depth_stencil_texture_format = GL_DEPTH_STENCIL;
}
validators_.texture_internal_format.AddValue(GL_DEPTH_STENCIL);
validators_.texture_format.AddValue(GL_DEPTH_STENCIL);
validators_.pixel_type.AddValue(GL_UNSIGNED_INT_24_8);
validators_.texture_depth_renderable_internal_format.AddValue(
GL_DEPTH_STENCIL);
validators_.texture_stencil_renderable_internal_format.AddValue(
GL_DEPTH_STENCIL);
}
validators_.render_buffer_format.AddValue(GL_DEPTH24_STENCIL8);
if (context_type_ == CONTEXT_TYPE_WEBGL1) {
validators_.attachment.AddValue(GL_DEPTH_STENCIL_ATTACHMENT);
validators_.attachment_query.AddValue(GL_DEPTH_STENCIL_ATTACHMENT);
}
}
if (gl_version_info_->is_es3 || gl_version_info_->is_desktop_core_profile ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_OES_vertex_array_object") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_vertex_array_object") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_APPLE_vertex_array_object")) {
feature_flags_.native_vertex_array_object = true;
}
if (workarounds_.use_client_side_arrays_for_stream_buffers) {
feature_flags_.native_vertex_array_object = false;
}
if (gl_version_info_->is_es3 ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_OES_element_index_uint") ||
gl::HasDesktopGLFeatures()) {
AddExtensionString("GL_OES_element_index_uint");
validators_.index_type.AddValue(GL_UNSIGNED_INT);
}
bool has_srgb_framebuffer_support = false;
if (gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGL(3, 2) ||
(gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGL(2, 0) &&
(gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_framebuffer_sRGB") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_framebuffer_sRGB")))) {
feature_flags_.desktop_srgb_support = true;
has_srgb_framebuffer_support = true;
}
if ((((gl_version_info_->is_es3 ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_OES_rgb8_rgba8")) &&
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_sRGB")) ||
feature_flags_.desktop_srgb_support) &&
IsWebGL1OrES2Context()) {
feature_flags_.ext_srgb = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_sRGB");
validators_.texture_internal_format.AddValue(GL_SRGB_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format.AddValue(GL_SRGB_ALPHA_EXT);
validators_.texture_format.AddValue(GL_SRGB_EXT);
validators_.texture_format.AddValue(GL_SRGB_ALPHA_EXT);
validators_.render_buffer_format.AddValue(GL_SRGB8_ALPHA8_EXT);
validators_.framebuffer_attachment_parameter.AddValue(
GL_FRAMEBUFFER_ATTACHMENT_COLOR_ENCODING_EXT);
validators_.texture_unsized_internal_format.AddValue(GL_SRGB_EXT);
validators_.texture_unsized_internal_format.AddValue(GL_SRGB_ALPHA_EXT);
has_srgb_framebuffer_support = true;
}
if (gl_version_info_->is_es3)
has_srgb_framebuffer_support = true;
if (has_srgb_framebuffer_support && !IsWebGLContext()) {
if (feature_flags_.desktop_srgb_support ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_sRGB_write_control")) {
feature_flags_.ext_srgb_write_control = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_sRGB_write_control");
validators_.capability.AddValue(GL_FRAMEBUFFER_SRGB_EXT);
}
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_texture_sRGB_decode") &&
!IsWebGLContext()) {
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_texture_sRGB_decode");
validators_.texture_parameter.AddValue(GL_TEXTURE_SRGB_DECODE_EXT);
}
bool have_s3tc_srgb = false;
if (gl_version_info_->is_es) {
have_s3tc_srgb =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_NV_sRGB_formats") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_texture_compression_s3tc_srgb");
} else {
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_texture_sRGB") ||
gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGL(4, 1)) {
have_s3tc_srgb =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_texture_compression_s3tc");
}
}
if (have_s3tc_srgb) {
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_texture_compression_s3tc_srgb");
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_SRGB_S3TC_DXT1_EXT);
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_SRGB_ALPHA_S3TC_DXT1_EXT);
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_SRGB_ALPHA_S3TC_DXT3_EXT);
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_SRGB_ALPHA_S3TC_DXT5_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_SRGB_S3TC_DXT1_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_SRGB_ALPHA_S3TC_DXT1_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_SRGB_ALPHA_S3TC_DXT3_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_SRGB_ALPHA_S3TC_DXT5_EXT);
}
bool has_apple_bgra =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_APPLE_texture_format_BGRA8888");
bool has_ext_bgra =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_texture_format_BGRA8888");
bool enable_texture_format_bgra8888 =
has_ext_bgra || has_apple_bgra || !gl_version_info_->is_es;
bool has_ext_texture_storage =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_texture_storage");
bool has_arb_texture_storage =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_texture_storage");
bool has_texture_storage =
!workarounds_.disable_texture_storage &&
(has_ext_texture_storage || has_arb_texture_storage ||
gl_version_info_->is_es3 || gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGL(4, 2));
bool enable_texture_storage = has_texture_storage;
bool texture_storage_incompatible_with_bgra =
gl_version_info_->is_es3 && !has_ext_texture_storage && !has_apple_bgra;
if (texture_storage_incompatible_with_bgra &&
enable_texture_format_bgra8888 && enable_texture_storage) {
switch (context_type_) {
case CONTEXT_TYPE_OPENGLES2:
enable_texture_storage = false;
break;
case CONTEXT_TYPE_OPENGLES3:
enable_texture_format_bgra8888 = false;
break;
case CONTEXT_TYPE_WEBGL1:
case CONTEXT_TYPE_WEBGL2:
case CONTEXT_TYPE_WEBGL2_COMPUTE:
case CONTEXT_TYPE_WEBGPU:
break;
}
}
if (enable_texture_storage) {
feature_flags_.ext_texture_storage = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_texture_storage");
validators_.texture_parameter.AddValue(GL_TEXTURE_IMMUTABLE_FORMAT_EXT);
}
if (enable_texture_format_bgra8888) {
feature_flags_.ext_texture_format_bgra8888 = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_texture_format_BGRA8888");
validators_.texture_internal_format.AddValue(GL_BGRA_EXT);
validators_.texture_format.AddValue(GL_BGRA_EXT);
validators_.texture_unsized_internal_format.AddValue(GL_BGRA_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(GL_BGRA8_EXT);
validators_.texture_sized_color_renderable_internal_format.AddValue(
GL_BGRA8_EXT);
validators_.texture_sized_texture_filterable_internal_format.AddValue(
GL_BGRA8_EXT);
feature_flags_.gpu_memory_buffer_formats.Add(gfx::BufferFormat::BGRA_8888);
feature_flags_.gpu_memory_buffer_formats.Add(gfx::BufferFormat::BGRX_8888);
}
bool enable_render_buffer_bgra =
gl_version_info_->is_angle || !gl_version_info_->is_es;
if (enable_render_buffer_bgra) {
feature_flags_.ext_render_buffer_format_bgra8888 = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_renderbuffer_format_BGRA8888");
validators_.render_buffer_format.AddValue(GL_BGRA8_EXT);
}
bool enable_read_format_bgra =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_read_format_bgra") ||
!gl_version_info_->is_es;
if (enable_read_format_bgra) {
feature_flags_.ext_read_format_bgra = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_read_format_bgra");
validators_.read_pixel_format.AddValue(GL_BGRA_EXT);
}
feature_flags_.arb_es3_compatibility =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_ES3_compatibility") &&
!gl_version_info_->is_es;
feature_flags_.ext_disjoint_timer_query =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_disjoint_timer_query");
if (feature_flags_.ext_disjoint_timer_query ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_timer_query") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_timer_query")) {
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_disjoint_timer_query");
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_OES_rgb8_rgba8") ||
gl::HasDesktopGLFeatures()) {
AddExtensionString("GL_OES_rgb8_rgba8");
validators_.render_buffer_format.AddValue(GL_RGB8_OES);
validators_.render_buffer_format.AddValue(GL_RGBA8_OES);
}
if (!disallowed_features_.npot_support &&
(gl_version_info_->is_es3 || gl_version_info_->is_desktop_core_profile ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_texture_non_power_of_two") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_OES_texture_npot"))) {
AddExtensionString("GL_OES_texture_npot");
feature_flags_.npot_ok = true;
}
InitializeFloatAndHalfFloatFeatures(extensions);
if (!workarounds_.disable_chromium_framebuffer_multisample) {
bool ext_has_multisample =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_framebuffer_object") ||
(gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_framebuffer_multisample") &&
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_framebuffer_blit")) ||
gl_version_info_->is_es3 || gl_version_info_->is_desktop_core_profile;
if (gl_version_info_->is_angle || gl_version_info_->is_swiftshader) {
ext_has_multisample |=
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ANGLE_framebuffer_multisample");
}
if (ext_has_multisample) {
feature_flags_.chromium_framebuffer_multisample = true;
validators_.framebuffer_target.AddValue(GL_READ_FRAMEBUFFER_EXT);
validators_.framebuffer_target.AddValue(GL_DRAW_FRAMEBUFFER_EXT);
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_READ_FRAMEBUFFER_BINDING_EXT);
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_MAX_SAMPLES_EXT);
validators_.render_buffer_parameter.AddValue(GL_RENDERBUFFER_SAMPLES_EXT);
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_framebuffer_multisample");
}
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_multisampled_render_to_texture")) {
feature_flags_.multisampled_render_to_texture = true;
} else if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions,
"GL_IMG_multisampled_render_to_texture")) {
feature_flags_.multisampled_render_to_texture = true;
feature_flags_.use_img_for_multisampled_render_to_texture = true;
}
if (feature_flags_.multisampled_render_to_texture) {
validators_.render_buffer_parameter.AddValue(GL_RENDERBUFFER_SAMPLES_EXT);
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_MAX_SAMPLES_EXT);
validators_.framebuffer_attachment_parameter.AddValue(
GL_FRAMEBUFFER_ATTACHMENT_TEXTURE_SAMPLES_EXT);
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_multisampled_render_to_texture");
}
if (!gl_version_info_->is_es ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_multisample_compatibility")) {
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_multisample_compatibility");
feature_flags_.ext_multisample_compatibility = true;
validators_.capability.AddValue(GL_MULTISAMPLE_EXT);
validators_.capability.AddValue(GL_SAMPLE_ALPHA_TO_ONE_EXT);
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_INTEL_framebuffer_CMAA")) {
feature_flags_.chromium_screen_space_antialiasing = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_screen_space_antialiasing");
} else if (gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGLES(3, 1) ||
(gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGL(3, 0) &&
gfx::HasExtension(extensions,
"GL_ARB_shading_language_420pack") &&
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_texture_storage") &&
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_texture_gather") &&
gfx::HasExtension(extensions,
"GL_ARB_explicit_uniform_location") &&
gfx::HasExtension(extensions,
"GL_ARB_explicit_attrib_location") &&
gfx::HasExtension(extensions,
"GL_ARB_shader_image_load_store"))) {
feature_flags_.chromium_screen_space_antialiasing = true;
feature_flags_.use_chromium_screen_space_antialiasing_via_shaders = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_screen_space_antialiasing");
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_OES_depth24") ||
gl::HasDesktopGLFeatures() || gl_version_info_->is_es3) {
AddExtensionString("GL_OES_depth24");
feature_flags_.oes_depth24 = true;
validators_.render_buffer_format.AddValue(GL_DEPTH_COMPONENT24);
}
if (gl_version_info_->is_es3 ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_OES_standard_derivatives") ||
gl::HasDesktopGLFeatures()) {
AddExtensionString("GL_OES_standard_derivatives");
feature_flags_.oes_standard_derivatives = true;
validators_.hint_target.AddValue(GL_FRAGMENT_SHADER_DERIVATIVE_HINT_OES);
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_FRAGMENT_SHADER_DERIVATIVE_HINT_OES);
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_CHROMIUM_texture_filtering_hint")) {
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_texture_filtering_hint");
feature_flags_.chromium_texture_filtering_hint = true;
validators_.hint_target.AddValue(GL_TEXTURE_FILTERING_HINT_CHROMIUM);
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_TEXTURE_FILTERING_HINT_CHROMIUM);
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_OES_EGL_image_external")) {
AddExtensionString("GL_OES_EGL_image_external");
feature_flags_.oes_egl_image_external = true;
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_NV_EGL_stream_consumer_external")) {
AddExtensionString("GL_NV_EGL_stream_consumer_external");
feature_flags_.nv_egl_stream_consumer_external = true;
}
if (feature_flags_.oes_egl_image_external ||
feature_flags_.nv_egl_stream_consumer_external) {
validators_.texture_bind_target.AddValue(GL_TEXTURE_EXTERNAL_OES);
validators_.get_tex_param_target.AddValue(GL_TEXTURE_EXTERNAL_OES);
validators_.texture_parameter.AddValue(GL_REQUIRED_TEXTURE_IMAGE_UNITS_OES);
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_TEXTURE_BINDING_EXTERNAL_OES);
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_OES_compressed_ETC1_RGB8_texture") &&
!gl_version_info_->is_angle) {
AddExtensionString("GL_OES_compressed_ETC1_RGB8_texture");
feature_flags_.oes_compressed_etc1_rgb8_texture = true;
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(GL_ETC1_RGB8_OES);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(GL_ETC1_RGB8_OES);
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_CHROMIUM_compressed_texture_etc") ||
(gl_version_info_->is_es3 && !gl_version_info_->is_angle)) {
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_compressed_texture_etc");
validators_.UpdateETCCompressedTextureFormats();
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_AMD_compressed_ATC_texture")) {
AddExtensionString("GL_AMD_compressed_ATC_texture");
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(GL_ATC_RGB_AMD);
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(
GL_ATC_RGBA_EXPLICIT_ALPHA_AMD);
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(
GL_ATC_RGBA_INTERPOLATED_ALPHA_AMD);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(GL_ATC_RGB_AMD);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(
GL_ATC_RGBA_EXPLICIT_ALPHA_AMD);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(
GL_ATC_RGBA_INTERPOLATED_ALPHA_AMD);
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_IMG_texture_compression_pvrtc")) {
AddExtensionString("GL_IMG_texture_compression_pvrtc");
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_RGB_PVRTC_4BPPV1_IMG);
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_RGB_PVRTC_2BPPV1_IMG);
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_PVRTC_4BPPV1_IMG);
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_PVRTC_2BPPV1_IMG);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_RGB_PVRTC_4BPPV1_IMG);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_RGB_PVRTC_2BPPV1_IMG);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_PVRTC_4BPPV1_IMG);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_PVRTC_2BPPV1_IMG);
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_texture_rectangle") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ANGLE_texture_rectangle") ||
gl_version_info_->is_desktop_core_profile) {
AddExtensionString("GL_ARB_texture_rectangle");
feature_flags_.arb_texture_rectangle = true;
validators_.texture_bind_target.AddValue(GL_TEXTURE_RECTANGLE_ARB);
validators_.texture_target.AddValue(GL_TEXTURE_RECTANGLE_ARB);
validators_.get_tex_param_target.AddValue(GL_TEXTURE_RECTANGLE_ARB);
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_TEXTURE_BINDING_RECTANGLE_ARB);
}
#if defined(OS_MACOSX) || defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_ycbcr_420v_image");
feature_flags_.chromium_image_ycbcr_420v = true;
#endif
if (feature_flags_.chromium_image_ycbcr_420v) {
feature_flags_.gpu_memory_buffer_formats.Add(
gfx::BufferFormat::YUV_420_BIPLANAR);
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_APPLE_ycbcr_422")) {
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_ycbcr_422_image");
feature_flags_.chromium_image_ycbcr_422 = true;
feature_flags_.gpu_memory_buffer_formats.Add(gfx::BufferFormat::UYVY_422);
}
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
feature_flags_.chromium_image_xr30 = base::mac::IsAtLeastOS10_13();
#elif !defined(OS_WIN)
feature_flags_.chromium_image_xb30 =
gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGL(3, 3) ||
gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGLES(3, 0) ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_texture_type_2_10_10_10_REV");
#endif
if (feature_flags_.chromium_image_xr30 ||
feature_flags_.chromium_image_xb30) {
validators_.texture_internal_format.AddValue(GL_RGB10_A2_EXT);
validators_.render_buffer_format.AddValue(GL_RGB10_A2_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(GL_RGB10_A2_EXT);
validators_.pixel_type.AddValue(GL_UNSIGNED_INT_2_10_10_10_REV);
}
if (feature_flags_.chromium_image_xr30) {
feature_flags_.gpu_memory_buffer_formats.Add(
gfx::BufferFormat::BGRX_1010102);
}
if (feature_flags_.chromium_image_xb30) {
feature_flags_.gpu_memory_buffer_formats.Add(
gfx::BufferFormat::RGBX_1010102);
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ANGLE_texture_usage")) {
feature_flags_.angle_texture_usage = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_ANGLE_texture_usage");
validators_.texture_parameter.AddValue(GL_TEXTURE_USAGE_ANGLE);
}
bool have_occlusion_query = gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGLES(3, 0) ||
gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGL(3, 3);
bool have_ext_occlusion_query_boolean =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_occlusion_query_boolean");
bool have_arb_occlusion_query2 =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_occlusion_query2");
bool have_arb_occlusion_query =
(gl_version_info_->is_desktop_core_profile &&
gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGL(1, 5)) ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_occlusion_query");
if (have_occlusion_query || have_ext_occlusion_query_boolean ||
have_arb_occlusion_query2 || have_arb_occlusion_query) {
feature_flags_.occlusion_query = have_arb_occlusion_query;
if (context_type_ == CONTEXT_TYPE_OPENGLES2) {
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_occlusion_query_boolean");
}
feature_flags_.occlusion_query_boolean = true;
feature_flags_.use_arb_occlusion_query2_for_occlusion_query_boolean =
!have_ext_occlusion_query_boolean &&
(have_arb_occlusion_query2 || (gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGL(3, 3) &&
gl_version_info_->IsLowerThanGL(4, 3)));
feature_flags_.use_arb_occlusion_query_for_occlusion_query_boolean =
!have_ext_occlusion_query_boolean && have_arb_occlusion_query &&
!have_arb_occlusion_query2;
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ANGLE_instanced_arrays") ||
(gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_instanced_arrays") &&
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_draw_instanced")) ||
gl_version_info_->is_es3 || gl_version_info_->is_desktop_core_profile) {
AddExtensionString("GL_ANGLE_instanced_arrays");
feature_flags_.angle_instanced_arrays = true;
validators_.vertex_attribute.AddValue(GL_VERTEX_ATTRIB_ARRAY_DIVISOR_ANGLE);
}
bool have_es2_draw_buffers_vendor_agnostic =
gl_version_info_->is_desktop_core_profile ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_draw_buffers") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_draw_buffers");
bool can_emulate_es2_draw_buffers_on_es3_nv =
gl_version_info_->is_es3 &&
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_NV_draw_buffers");
bool is_webgl_compatibility_context =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ANGLE_webgl_compatibility");
bool have_es2_draw_buffers =
!workarounds_.disable_ext_draw_buffers &&
(have_es2_draw_buffers_vendor_agnostic ||
can_emulate_es2_draw_buffers_on_es3_nv) &&
(context_type_ == CONTEXT_TYPE_OPENGLES2 ||
(context_type_ == CONTEXT_TYPE_WEBGL1 &&
IsWebGLDrawBuffersSupported(is_webgl_compatibility_context,
depth_texture_format,
depth_stencil_texture_format)));
if (have_es2_draw_buffers) {
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_draw_buffers");
feature_flags_.ext_draw_buffers = true;
feature_flags_.nv_draw_buffers = can_emulate_es2_draw_buffers_on_es3_nv &&
!have_es2_draw_buffers_vendor_agnostic;
}
if (IsWebGL2OrES3OrHigherContext() || have_es2_draw_buffers) {
GLint max_color_attachments = 0;
glGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_COLOR_ATTACHMENTS_EXT, &max_color_attachments);
for (GLenum i = GL_COLOR_ATTACHMENT1_EXT;
i < static_cast<GLenum>(GL_COLOR_ATTACHMENT0 + max_color_attachments);
++i) {
validators_.attachment.AddValue(i);
validators_.attachment_query.AddValue(i);
}
static_assert(GL_COLOR_ATTACHMENT0_EXT == GL_COLOR_ATTACHMENT0,
"GL_COLOR_ATTACHMENT0_EXT should equal GL_COLOR_ATTACHMENT0");
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_MAX_COLOR_ATTACHMENTS_EXT);
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_MAX_DRAW_BUFFERS_ARB);
GLint max_draw_buffers = 0;
glGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_DRAW_BUFFERS_ARB, &max_draw_buffers);
for (GLenum i = GL_DRAW_BUFFER0_ARB;
i < static_cast<GLenum>(GL_DRAW_BUFFER0_ARB + max_draw_buffers); ++i) {
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(i);
}
}
if (gl_version_info_->is_es3 ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_blend_minmax") ||
gl::HasDesktopGLFeatures()) {
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_blend_minmax");
validators_.equation.AddValue(GL_MIN_EXT);
validators_.equation.AddValue(GL_MAX_EXT);
static_assert(GL_MIN_EXT == GL_MIN && GL_MAX_EXT == GL_MAX,
"min & max variations must match");
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_frag_depth") ||
gl::HasDesktopGLFeatures()) {
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_frag_depth");
feature_flags_.ext_frag_depth = true;
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_shader_texture_lod") ||
gl::HasDesktopGLFeatures()) {
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_shader_texture_lod");
feature_flags_.ext_shader_texture_lod = true;
}
bool ui_gl_fence_works = gl::GLFence::IsSupported();
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("GPU.FenceSupport", ui_gl_fence_works);
feature_flags_.map_buffer_range =
gl_version_info_->is_es3 || gl_version_info_->is_desktop_core_profile ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_map_buffer_range") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_map_buffer_range");
if (has_pixel_buffers && ui_gl_fence_works &&
!workarounds_.disable_async_readpixels) {
feature_flags_.use_async_readpixels = true;
}
if (gl_version_info_->is_es3 ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_sampler_objects")) {
feature_flags_.enable_samplers = true;
}
if ((gl_version_info_->is_es3 ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_discard_framebuffer")) &&
!workarounds_.disable_discard_framebuffer) {
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_discard_framebuffer");
feature_flags_.ext_discard_framebuffer = true;
}
if (ui_gl_fence_works) {
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_sync_query");
feature_flags_.chromium_sync_query = true;
}
if (!workarounds_.disable_blend_equation_advanced) {
bool blend_equation_advanced_coherent =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions,
"GL_NV_blend_equation_advanced_coherent") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions,
"GL_KHR_blend_equation_advanced_coherent");
if (blend_equation_advanced_coherent ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_NV_blend_equation_advanced") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_KHR_blend_equation_advanced")) {
const GLenum equations[] = {
GL_MULTIPLY_KHR, GL_SCREEN_KHR, GL_OVERLAY_KHR,
GL_DARKEN_KHR, GL_LIGHTEN_KHR, GL_COLORDODGE_KHR,
GL_COLORBURN_KHR, GL_HARDLIGHT_KHR, GL_SOFTLIGHT_KHR,
GL_DIFFERENCE_KHR, GL_EXCLUSION_KHR, GL_HSL_HUE_KHR,
GL_HSL_SATURATION_KHR, GL_HSL_COLOR_KHR, GL_HSL_LUMINOSITY_KHR};
for (GLenum equation : equations)
validators_.equation.AddValue(equation);
if (blend_equation_advanced_coherent)
AddExtensionString("GL_KHR_blend_equation_advanced_coherent");
AddExtensionString("GL_KHR_blend_equation_advanced");
feature_flags_.blend_equation_advanced = true;
feature_flags_.blend_equation_advanced_coherent =
blend_equation_advanced_coherent;
}
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_NV_framebuffer_mixed_samples")) {
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_framebuffer_mixed_samples");
feature_flags_.chromium_framebuffer_mixed_samples = true;
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_COVERAGE_MODULATION_CHROMIUM);
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_NV_path_rendering")) {
bool has_dsa = gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGL(4, 5) ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_direct_state_access");
bool has_piq =
gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGL(4, 3) ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_program_interface_query");
bool has_fms = feature_flags_.chromium_framebuffer_mixed_samples;
if ((gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGLES(3, 1) ||
(gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGL(3, 2) && has_dsa && has_piq)) &&
has_fms) {
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_path_rendering");
feature_flags_.chromium_path_rendering = true;
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_PATH_MODELVIEW_MATRIX_CHROMIUM);
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_PATH_PROJECTION_MATRIX_CHROMIUM);
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_PATH_STENCIL_FUNC_CHROMIUM);
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_PATH_STENCIL_REF_CHROMIUM);
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_PATH_STENCIL_VALUE_MASK_CHROMIUM);
}
}
if ((gl_version_info_->is_es3 || gl_version_info_->is_desktop_core_profile ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_texture_rg") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_texture_rg")) &&
IsGL_REDSupportedOnFBOs()) {
feature_flags_.ext_texture_rg = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_texture_rg");
validators_.texture_format.AddValue(GL_RED_EXT);
validators_.texture_format.AddValue(GL_RG_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format.AddValue(GL_RED_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format.AddValue(GL_R8_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format.AddValue(GL_RG_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format.AddValue(GL_RG8_EXT);
validators_.read_pixel_format.AddValue(GL_RED_EXT);
validators_.read_pixel_format.AddValue(GL_RG_EXT);
validators_.render_buffer_format.AddValue(GL_R8_EXT);
validators_.render_buffer_format.AddValue(GL_RG8_EXT);
validators_.texture_unsized_internal_format.AddValue(GL_RED_EXT);
validators_.texture_unsized_internal_format.AddValue(GL_RG_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(GL_R8_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(GL_RG8_EXT);
feature_flags_.gpu_memory_buffer_formats.Add(gfx::BufferFormat::R_8);
feature_flags_.gpu_memory_buffer_formats.Add(gfx::BufferFormat::RG_88);
}
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("GPU.TextureRG", feature_flags_.ext_texture_rg);
if (gl_version_info_->is_desktop_core_profile ||
(gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGL(2, 1) &&
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_texture_rg")) ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_texture_norm16")) {
feature_flags_.ext_texture_norm16 = true;
g_r16_is_present = true;
validators_.pixel_type.AddValue(GL_UNSIGNED_SHORT);
validators_.texture_format.AddValue(GL_RED_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format.AddValue(GL_R16_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format.AddValue(GL_RED_EXT);
validators_.texture_unsized_internal_format.AddValue(GL_RED_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(GL_R16_EXT);
feature_flags_.gpu_memory_buffer_formats.Add(gfx::BufferFormat::R_16);
}
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(
"GPU.TextureR16Ext_LuminanceF16", GpuTextureUMAHelper(),
static_cast<int>(GpuTextureResultR16_L16::kMax) + 1);
if (enable_es3 && gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_window_rectangles")) {
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_window_rectangles");
feature_flags_.ext_window_rectangles = true;
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_WINDOW_RECTANGLE_MODE_EXT);
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_MAX_WINDOW_RECTANGLES_EXT);
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_NUM_WINDOW_RECTANGLES_EXT);
validators_.indexed_g_l_state.AddValue(GL_WINDOW_RECTANGLE_EXT);
}
bool has_opengl_dual_source_blending =
gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGL(3, 3) ||
(gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGL(3, 2) &&
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_blend_func_extended"));
if (!disable_shader_translator_ && !workarounds_.get_frag_data_info_bug &&
((gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGL(3, 2) &&
has_opengl_dual_source_blending) ||
(gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGLES(3, 0) &&
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_blend_func_extended")))) {
feature_flags_.ext_blend_func_extended = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_blend_func_extended");
validators_.dst_blend_factor.AddValue(GL_SRC_ALPHA_SATURATE_EXT);
validators_.src_blend_factor.AddValue(GL_SRC1_ALPHA_EXT);
validators_.dst_blend_factor.AddValue(GL_SRC1_ALPHA_EXT);
validators_.src_blend_factor.AddValue(GL_SRC1_COLOR_EXT);
validators_.dst_blend_factor.AddValue(GL_SRC1_COLOR_EXT);
validators_.src_blend_factor.AddValue(GL_ONE_MINUS_SRC1_COLOR_EXT);
validators_.dst_blend_factor.AddValue(GL_ONE_MINUS_SRC1_COLOR_EXT);
validators_.src_blend_factor.AddValue(GL_ONE_MINUS_SRC1_ALPHA_EXT);
validators_.dst_blend_factor.AddValue(GL_ONE_MINUS_SRC1_ALPHA_EXT);
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_MAX_DUAL_SOURCE_DRAW_BUFFERS_EXT);
}
#if !defined(OS_MACOSX)
if (workarounds_.ignore_egl_sync_failures) {
gl::GLFenceEGL::SetIgnoreFailures();
}
#endif
if (workarounds_.avoid_egl_image_target_texture_reuse) {
TextureDefinition::AvoidEGLTargetTextureReuse();
}
if (gl_version_info_->IsLowerThanGL(4, 3)) {
feature_flags_.emulate_primitive_restart_fixed_index = true;
}
feature_flags_.angle_robust_client_memory =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ANGLE_robust_client_memory");
feature_flags_.khr_debug = gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGL(4, 3) ||
gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGLES(3, 2) ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_KHR_debug");
feature_flags_.chromium_gpu_fence = gl::GLFence::IsGpuFenceSupported();
if (feature_flags_.chromium_gpu_fence)
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_gpu_fence");
feature_flags_.chromium_bind_generates_resource =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_CHROMIUM_bind_generates_resource");
feature_flags_.angle_webgl_compatibility = is_webgl_compatibility_context;
feature_flags_.chromium_copy_texture =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_CHROMIUM_copy_texture");
feature_flags_.chromium_copy_compressed_texture =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_CHROMIUM_copy_compressed_texture");
feature_flags_.angle_client_arrays =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ANGLE_client_arrays");
feature_flags_.angle_request_extension =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ANGLE_request_extension");
feature_flags_.ext_debug_marker =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_debug_marker");
feature_flags_.arb_robustness =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_robustness");
feature_flags_.khr_robustness =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_KHR_robustness");
feature_flags_.ext_robustness =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_robustness");
feature_flags_.ext_pixel_buffer_object =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_pixel_buffer_object") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_NV_pixel_buffer_object");
feature_flags_.ext_unpack_subimage =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_unpack_subimage");
feature_flags_.oes_rgb8_rgba8 =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_OES_rgb8_rgba8");
feature_flags_.angle_robust_resource_initialization =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ANGLE_robust_resource_initialization");
feature_flags_.nv_fence = gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_NV_fence");
feature_flags_.unpremultiply_and_dither_copy = !is_passthrough_cmd_decoder_;
if (feature_flags_.unpremultiply_and_dither_copy)
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_unpremultiply_and_dither_copy");
feature_flags_.separate_stencil_ref_mask_writemask =
!(gl_version_info_->is_d3d) && !IsWebGLContext();
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_MESA_framebuffer_flip_y")) {
feature_flags_.mesa_framebuffer_flip_y = true;
validators_.framebuffer_parameter.AddValue(GL_FRAMEBUFFER_FLIP_Y_MESA);
AddExtensionString("GL_MESA_framebuffer_flip_y");
}
if (is_passthrough_cmd_decoder_ &&
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_OVR_multiview2")) {
AddExtensionString("GL_OVR_multiview2");
feature_flags_.ovr_multiview2 = true;
}
if (is_passthrough_cmd_decoder_ &&
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_KHR_parallel_shader_compile")) {
AddExtensionString("GL_KHR_parallel_shader_compile");
feature_flags_.khr_parallel_shader_compile = true;
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_MAX_SHADER_COMPILER_THREADS_KHR);
validators_.shader_parameter.AddValue(GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR);
validators_.program_parameter.AddValue(GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR);
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_KHR_robust_buffer_access_behavior")) {
AddExtensionString("GL_KHR_robust_buffer_access_behavior");
feature_flags_.khr_robust_buffer_access_behavior = true;
}
if (!is_passthrough_cmd_decoder_ ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ANGLE_multi_draw")) {
feature_flags_.webgl_multi_draw = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_WEBGL_multi_draw");
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ANGLE_instanced_arrays") ||
feature_flags_.angle_instanced_arrays || gl_version_info_->is_es3 ||
gl_version_info_->is_desktop_core_profile) {
feature_flags_.webgl_multi_draw_instanced = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_WEBGL_multi_draw_instanced");
}
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_NV_internalformat_sample_query")) {
feature_flags_.nv_internalformat_sample_query = true;
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions,
"GL_AMD_framebuffer_multisample_advanced")) {
feature_flags_.amd_framebuffer_multisample_advanced = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_AMD_framebuffer_multisample_advanced");
}
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: bool IsTraceEventArgsWhitelisted(const char* category_group_name,
const char* event_name) {
if (base::MatchPattern(category_group_name, "benchmark") &&
base::MatchPattern(event_name, "whitelisted")) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Tracing: Add support for PII whitelisting of individual trace event arguments
R=dsinclair,shatch
BUG=546093
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1415013003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356690}
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int check_firmware(struct dvb_frontend *fe, unsigned int type,
v4l2_std_id std, __u16 int_freq)
{
struct xc2028_data *priv = fe->tuner_priv;
struct firmware_properties new_fw;
int rc, retry_count = 0;
u16 version, hwmodel;
v4l2_std_id std0;
tuner_dbg("%s called\n", __func__);
rc = check_device_status(priv);
if (rc < 0)
return rc;
if (priv->ctrl.mts && !(type & FM))
type |= MTS;
retry:
new_fw.type = type;
new_fw.id = std;
new_fw.std_req = std;
new_fw.scode_table = SCODE | priv->ctrl.scode_table;
new_fw.scode_nr = 0;
new_fw.int_freq = int_freq;
tuner_dbg("checking firmware, user requested type=");
if (debug) {
dump_firm_type(new_fw.type);
printk("(%x), id %016llx, ", new_fw.type,
(unsigned long long)new_fw.std_req);
if (!int_freq) {
printk("scode_tbl ");
dump_firm_type(priv->ctrl.scode_table);
printk("(%x), ", priv->ctrl.scode_table);
} else
printk("int_freq %d, ", new_fw.int_freq);
printk("scode_nr %d\n", new_fw.scode_nr);
}
/*
* No need to reload base firmware if it matches and if the tuner
* is not at sleep mode
*/
if ((priv->state == XC2028_ACTIVE) &&
(((BASE | new_fw.type) & BASE_TYPES) ==
(priv->cur_fw.type & BASE_TYPES))) {
tuner_dbg("BASE firmware not changed.\n");
goto skip_base;
}
/* Updating BASE - forget about all currently loaded firmware */
memset(&priv->cur_fw, 0, sizeof(priv->cur_fw));
/* Reset is needed before loading firmware */
rc = do_tuner_callback(fe, XC2028_TUNER_RESET, 0);
if (rc < 0)
goto fail;
/* BASE firmwares are all std0 */
std0 = 0;
rc = load_firmware(fe, BASE | new_fw.type, &std0);
if (rc < 0) {
tuner_err("Error %d while loading base firmware\n",
rc);
goto fail;
}
/* Load INIT1, if needed */
tuner_dbg("Load init1 firmware, if exists\n");
rc = load_firmware(fe, BASE | INIT1 | new_fw.type, &std0);
if (rc == -ENOENT)
rc = load_firmware(fe, (BASE | INIT1 | new_fw.type) & ~F8MHZ,
&std0);
if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENOENT) {
tuner_err("Error %d while loading init1 firmware\n",
rc);
goto fail;
}
skip_base:
/*
* No need to reload standard specific firmware if base firmware
* was not reloaded and requested video standards have not changed.
*/
if (priv->cur_fw.type == (BASE | new_fw.type) &&
priv->cur_fw.std_req == std) {
tuner_dbg("Std-specific firmware already loaded.\n");
goto skip_std_specific;
}
/* Reloading std-specific firmware forces a SCODE update */
priv->cur_fw.scode_table = 0;
rc = load_firmware(fe, new_fw.type, &new_fw.id);
if (rc == -ENOENT)
rc = load_firmware(fe, new_fw.type & ~F8MHZ, &new_fw.id);
if (rc < 0)
goto fail;
skip_std_specific:
if (priv->cur_fw.scode_table == new_fw.scode_table &&
priv->cur_fw.scode_nr == new_fw.scode_nr) {
tuner_dbg("SCODE firmware already loaded.\n");
goto check_device;
}
if (new_fw.type & FM)
goto check_device;
/* Load SCODE firmware, if exists */
tuner_dbg("Trying to load scode %d\n", new_fw.scode_nr);
rc = load_scode(fe, new_fw.type | new_fw.scode_table, &new_fw.id,
new_fw.int_freq, new_fw.scode_nr);
check_device:
if (xc2028_get_reg(priv, 0x0004, &version) < 0 ||
xc2028_get_reg(priv, 0x0008, &hwmodel) < 0) {
tuner_err("Unable to read tuner registers.\n");
goto fail;
}
tuner_dbg("Device is Xceive %d version %d.%d, "
"firmware version %d.%d\n",
hwmodel, (version & 0xf000) >> 12, (version & 0xf00) >> 8,
(version & 0xf0) >> 4, version & 0xf);
if (priv->ctrl.read_not_reliable)
goto read_not_reliable;
/* Check firmware version against what we downloaded. */
if (priv->firm_version != ((version & 0xf0) << 4 | (version & 0x0f))) {
if (!priv->ctrl.read_not_reliable) {
tuner_err("Incorrect readback of firmware version.\n");
goto fail;
} else {
tuner_err("Returned an incorrect version. However, "
"read is not reliable enough. Ignoring it.\n");
hwmodel = 3028;
}
}
/* Check that the tuner hardware model remains consistent over time. */
if (priv->hwmodel == 0 && (hwmodel == 2028 || hwmodel == 3028)) {
priv->hwmodel = hwmodel;
priv->hwvers = version & 0xff00;
} else if (priv->hwmodel == 0 || priv->hwmodel != hwmodel ||
priv->hwvers != (version & 0xff00)) {
tuner_err("Read invalid device hardware information - tuner "
"hung?\n");
goto fail;
}
read_not_reliable:
priv->cur_fw = new_fw;
/*
* By setting BASE in cur_fw.type only after successfully loading all
* firmwares, we can:
* 1. Identify that BASE firmware with type=0 has been loaded;
* 2. Tell whether BASE firmware was just changed the next time through.
*/
priv->cur_fw.type |= BASE;
priv->state = XC2028_ACTIVE;
return 0;
fail:
priv->state = XC2028_NO_FIRMWARE;
memset(&priv->cur_fw, 0, sizeof(priv->cur_fw));
if (retry_count < 8) {
msleep(50);
retry_count++;
tuner_dbg("Retrying firmware load\n");
goto retry;
}
/* Firmware didn't load. Put the device to sleep */
xc2028_sleep(fe);
if (rc == -ENOENT)
rc = -EINVAL;
return rc;
}
Commit Message: [media] xc2028: avoid use after free
If struct xc2028_config is passed without a firmware name,
the following trouble may happen:
[11009.907205] xc2028 5-0061: type set to XCeive xc2028/xc3028 tuner
[11009.907491] ==================================================================
[11009.907750] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in strcmp+0x96/0xb0 at addr ffff8803bd78ab40
[11009.907992] Read of size 1 by task modprobe/28992
[11009.907994] =============================================================================
[11009.907997] BUG kmalloc-16 (Tainted: G W ): kasan: bad access detected
[11009.907999] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
[11009.908008] INFO: Allocated in xhci_urb_enqueue+0x214/0x14c0 [xhci_hcd] age=0 cpu=3 pid=28992
[11009.908012] ___slab_alloc+0x581/0x5b0
[11009.908014] __slab_alloc+0x51/0x90
[11009.908017] __kmalloc+0x27b/0x350
[11009.908022] xhci_urb_enqueue+0x214/0x14c0 [xhci_hcd]
[11009.908026] usb_hcd_submit_urb+0x1e8/0x1c60
[11009.908029] usb_submit_urb+0xb0e/0x1200
[11009.908032] usb_serial_generic_write_start+0xb6/0x4c0
[11009.908035] usb_serial_generic_write+0x92/0xc0
[11009.908039] usb_console_write+0x38a/0x560
[11009.908045] call_console_drivers.constprop.14+0x1ee/0x2c0
[11009.908051] console_unlock+0x40d/0x900
[11009.908056] vprintk_emit+0x4b4/0x830
[11009.908061] vprintk_default+0x1f/0x30
[11009.908064] printk+0x99/0xb5
[11009.908067] kasan_report_error+0x10a/0x550
[11009.908070] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x43/0x50
[11009.908074] INFO: Freed in xc2028_set_config+0x90/0x630 [tuner_xc2028] age=1 cpu=3 pid=28992
[11009.908077] __slab_free+0x2ec/0x460
[11009.908080] kfree+0x266/0x280
[11009.908083] xc2028_set_config+0x90/0x630 [tuner_xc2028]
[11009.908086] xc2028_attach+0x310/0x8a0 [tuner_xc2028]
[11009.908090] em28xx_attach_xc3028.constprop.7+0x1f9/0x30d [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908094] em28xx_dvb_init.part.3+0x8e4/0x5cf4 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908098] em28xx_dvb_init+0x81/0x8a [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908101] em28xx_register_extension+0xd9/0x190 [em28xx]
[11009.908105] em28xx_dvb_register+0x10/0x1000 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908108] do_one_initcall+0x141/0x300
[11009.908111] do_init_module+0x1d0/0x5ad
[11009.908114] load_module+0x6666/0x9ba0
[11009.908117] SyS_finit_module+0x108/0x130
[11009.908120] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x76
[11009.908123] INFO: Slab 0xffffea000ef5e280 objects=25 used=25 fp=0x (null) flags=0x2ffff8000004080
[11009.908126] INFO: Object 0xffff8803bd78ab40 @offset=2880 fp=0x0000000000000001
[11009.908130] Bytes b4 ffff8803bd78ab30: 01 00 00 00 2a 07 00 00 9d 28 00 00 01 00 00 00 ....*....(......
[11009.908133] Object ffff8803bd78ab40: 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 b0 1d c3 6a 00 88 ff ff ...........j....
[11009.908137] CPU: 3 PID: 28992 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G B W 4.5.0-rc1+ #43
[11009.908140] Hardware name: /NUC5i7RYB, BIOS RYBDWi35.86A.0350.2015.0812.1722 08/12/2015
[11009.908142] ffff8803bd78a000 ffff8802c273f1b8 ffffffff81932007 ffff8803c6407a80
[11009.908148] ffff8802c273f1e8 ffffffff81556759 ffff8803c6407a80 ffffea000ef5e280
[11009.908153] ffff8803bd78ab40 dffffc0000000000 ffff8802c273f210 ffffffff8155ccb4
[11009.908158] Call Trace:
[11009.908162] [<ffffffff81932007>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x64
[11009.908165] [<ffffffff81556759>] print_trailer+0xf9/0x150
[11009.908168] [<ffffffff8155ccb4>] object_err+0x34/0x40
[11009.908171] [<ffffffff8155f260>] kasan_report_error+0x230/0x550
[11009.908175] [<ffffffff81237d71>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x21/0x290
[11009.908179] [<ffffffff8155e926>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50
[11009.908182] [<ffffffff8155f5c3>] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x43/0x50
[11009.908185] [<ffffffff8155ea00>] ? __asan_register_globals+0x50/0xa0
[11009.908189] [<ffffffff8194cea6>] ? strcmp+0x96/0xb0
[11009.908192] [<ffffffff8194cea6>] strcmp+0x96/0xb0
[11009.908196] [<ffffffffa13ba4ac>] xc2028_set_config+0x15c/0x630 [tuner_xc2028]
[11009.908200] [<ffffffffa13bac90>] xc2028_attach+0x310/0x8a0 [tuner_xc2028]
[11009.908203] [<ffffffff8155ea78>] ? memset+0x28/0x30
[11009.908206] [<ffffffffa13ba980>] ? xc2028_set_config+0x630/0x630 [tuner_xc2028]
[11009.908211] [<ffffffffa157a59a>] em28xx_attach_xc3028.constprop.7+0x1f9/0x30d [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908215] [<ffffffffa157aa2a>] ? em28xx_dvb_init.part.3+0x37c/0x5cf4 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908219] [<ffffffffa157a3a1>] ? hauppauge_hvr930c_init+0x487/0x487 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908222] [<ffffffffa01795ac>] ? lgdt330x_attach+0x1cc/0x370 [lgdt330x]
[11009.908226] [<ffffffffa01793e0>] ? i2c_read_demod_bytes.isra.2+0x210/0x210 [lgdt330x]
[11009.908230] [<ffffffff812e87d0>] ? ref_module.part.15+0x10/0x10
[11009.908233] [<ffffffff812e56e0>] ? module_assert_mutex_or_preempt+0x80/0x80
[11009.908238] [<ffffffffa157af92>] em28xx_dvb_init.part.3+0x8e4/0x5cf4 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908242] [<ffffffffa157a6ae>] ? em28xx_attach_xc3028.constprop.7+0x30d/0x30d [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908245] [<ffffffff8195222d>] ? string+0x14d/0x1f0
[11009.908249] [<ffffffff8195381f>] ? symbol_string+0xff/0x1a0
[11009.908253] [<ffffffff81953720>] ? uuid_string+0x6f0/0x6f0
[11009.908257] [<ffffffff811a775e>] ? __kernel_text_address+0x7e/0xa0
[11009.908260] [<ffffffff8104b02f>] ? print_context_stack+0x7f/0xf0
[11009.908264] [<ffffffff812e9846>] ? __module_address+0xb6/0x360
[11009.908268] [<ffffffff8137fdc9>] ? is_ftrace_trampoline+0x99/0xe0
[11009.908271] [<ffffffff811a775e>] ? __kernel_text_address+0x7e/0xa0
[11009.908275] [<ffffffff81240a70>] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290
[11009.908278] [<ffffffff8104a24b>] ? dump_trace+0x11b/0x300
[11009.908282] [<ffffffffa13e8143>] ? em28xx_register_extension+0x23/0x190 [em28xx]
[11009.908285] [<ffffffff81237d71>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x21/0x290
[11009.908289] [<ffffffff8123ff56>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x16/0x590
[11009.908292] [<ffffffff812404dd>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[11009.908296] [<ffffffffa13e8143>] ? em28xx_register_extension+0x23/0x190 [em28xx]
[11009.908299] [<ffffffff822dcbb0>] ? mutex_trylock+0x400/0x400
[11009.908302] [<ffffffff810021a1>] ? do_one_initcall+0x131/0x300
[11009.908306] [<ffffffff81296dc7>] ? call_rcu_sched+0x17/0x20
[11009.908309] [<ffffffff8159e708>] ? put_object+0x48/0x70
[11009.908314] [<ffffffffa1579f11>] em28xx_dvb_init+0x81/0x8a [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908317] [<ffffffffa13e81f9>] em28xx_register_extension+0xd9/0x190 [em28xx]
[11009.908320] [<ffffffffa0150000>] ? 0xffffffffa0150000
[11009.908324] [<ffffffffa0150010>] em28xx_dvb_register+0x10/0x1000 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908327] [<ffffffff810021b1>] do_one_initcall+0x141/0x300
[11009.908330] [<ffffffff81002070>] ? try_to_run_init_process+0x40/0x40
[11009.908333] [<ffffffff8123ff56>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x16/0x590
[11009.908337] [<ffffffff8155e926>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50
[11009.908340] [<ffffffff8155e926>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50
[11009.908343] [<ffffffff8155e926>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50
[11009.908346] [<ffffffff8155ea37>] ? __asan_register_globals+0x87/0xa0
[11009.908350] [<ffffffff8144da7b>] do_init_module+0x1d0/0x5ad
[11009.908353] [<ffffffff812f2626>] load_module+0x6666/0x9ba0
[11009.908356] [<ffffffff812e9c90>] ? symbol_put_addr+0x50/0x50
[11009.908361] [<ffffffffa1580037>] ? em28xx_dvb_init.part.3+0x5989/0x5cf4 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908366] [<ffffffff812ebfc0>] ? module_frob_arch_sections+0x20/0x20
[11009.908369] [<ffffffff815bc940>] ? open_exec+0x50/0x50
[11009.908374] [<ffffffff811671bb>] ? ns_capable+0x5b/0xd0
[11009.908377] [<ffffffff812f5e58>] SyS_finit_module+0x108/0x130
[11009.908379] [<ffffffff812f5d50>] ? SyS_init_module+0x1f0/0x1f0
[11009.908383] [<ffffffff81004044>] ? lockdep_sys_exit_thunk+0x12/0x14
[11009.908394] [<ffffffff822e6936>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x76
[11009.908396] Memory state around the buggy address:
[11009.908398] ffff8803bd78aa00: 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[11009.908401] ffff8803bd78aa80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[11009.908403] >ffff8803bd78ab00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc
[11009.908405] ^
[11009.908407] ffff8803bd78ab80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[11009.908409] ffff8803bd78ac00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[11009.908411] ==================================================================
In order to avoid it, let's set the cached value of the firmware
name to NULL after freeing it. While here, return an error if
the memory allocation fails.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void XMLHttpRequest::didFailRedirectCheck()
{
networkError();
}
Commit Message: Don't dispatch events when XHR is set to sync mode
Any of readystatechange, progress, abort, error, timeout and loadend
event are not specified to be dispatched in sync mode in the latest
spec. Just an exception corresponding to the failure is thrown.
Clean up for readability done in this CL
- factor out dispatchEventAndLoadEnd calling code
- make didTimeout() private
- give error handling methods more descriptive names
- set m_exceptionCode in failure type specific methods
-- Note that for didFailRedirectCheck, m_exceptionCode was not set
in networkError(), but was set at the end of createRequest()
This CL is prep for fixing crbug.com/292422
BUG=292422
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24225002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@158046 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: null_if_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, const u_char *p)
{
u_int length = h->len;
u_int caplen = h->caplen;
u_int family;
if (caplen < NULL_HDRLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|null]"));
return (NULL_HDRLEN);
}
memcpy((char *)&family, (const char *)p, sizeof(family));
/*
* This isn't necessarily in our host byte order; if this is
* a DLT_LOOP capture, it's in network byte order, and if
* this is a DLT_NULL capture from a machine with the opposite
* byte-order, it's in the opposite byte order from ours.
*
* If the upper 16 bits aren't all zero, assume it's byte-swapped.
*/
if ((family & 0xFFFF0000) != 0)
family = SWAPLONG(family);
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
null_hdr_print(ndo, family, length);
length -= NULL_HDRLEN;
caplen -= NULL_HDRLEN;
p += NULL_HDRLEN;
switch (family) {
case BSD_AFNUM_INET:
ip_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case BSD_AFNUM_INET6_BSD:
case BSD_AFNUM_INET6_FREEBSD:
case BSD_AFNUM_INET6_DARWIN:
ip6_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case BSD_AFNUM_ISO:
isoclns_print(ndo, p, length, caplen);
break;
case BSD_AFNUM_APPLETALK:
atalk_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case BSD_AFNUM_IPX:
ipx_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
default:
/* unknown AF_ value */
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag)
null_hdr_print(ndo, family, length + NULL_HDRLEN);
if (!ndo->ndo_suppress_default_print)
ND_DEFAULTPRINT(p, caplen);
}
return (NULL_HDRLEN);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we
were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST().
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void vmw_user_surface_free(struct vmw_resource *res)
{
struct vmw_surface *srf = vmw_res_to_srf(res);
struct vmw_user_surface *user_srf =
container_of(srf, struct vmw_user_surface, srf);
struct vmw_private *dev_priv = srf->res.dev_priv;
uint32_t size = user_srf->size;
if (user_srf->master)
drm_master_put(&user_srf->master);
kfree(srf->offsets);
kfree(srf->sizes);
kfree(srf->snooper.image);
ttm_prime_object_kfree(user_srf, prime);
ttm_mem_global_free(vmw_mem_glob(dev_priv), size);
}
Commit Message: drm/vmwgfx: Make sure backup_handle is always valid
When vmw_gb_surface_define_ioctl() is called with an existing buffer,
we end up returning an uninitialized variable in the backup_handle.
The fix is to first initialize backup_handle to 0 just to be sure, and
second, when a user-provided buffer is found, we will use the
req->buffer_handle as the backup_handle.
Cc: <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Murray McAllister <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sinclair Yeh <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Deepak Rawat <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static void cluster_finish(void)
{
hash_clean(cluster_hash, (void (*)(void *))cluster_free);
hash_free(cluster_hash);
cluster_hash = NULL;
}
Commit Message: bgpd: don't use BGP_ATTR_VNC(255) unless ENABLE_BGP_VNC_ATTR is defined
Signed-off-by: Lou Berger <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE6(sendto, int, fd, void __user *, buff, size_t, len,
unsigned int, flags, struct sockaddr __user *, addr,
int, addr_len)
{
struct socket *sock;
struct sockaddr_storage address;
int err;
struct msghdr msg;
struct iovec iov;
int fput_needed;
if (len > INT_MAX)
len = INT_MAX;
sock = sockfd_lookup_light(fd, &err, &fput_needed);
if (!sock)
goto out;
iov.iov_base = buff;
iov.iov_len = len;
msg.msg_name = NULL;
iov_iter_init(&msg.msg_iter, WRITE, &iov, 1, len);
msg.msg_control = NULL;
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
msg.msg_namelen = 0;
if (addr) {
err = move_addr_to_kernel(addr, addr_len, &address);
if (err < 0)
goto out_put;
msg.msg_name = (struct sockaddr *)&address;
msg.msg_namelen = addr_len;
}
if (sock->file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)
flags |= MSG_DONTWAIT;
msg.msg_flags = flags;
err = sock_sendmsg(sock, &msg, len);
out_put:
fput_light(sock->file, fput_needed);
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: validate the range we feed to iov_iter_init() in sys_sendto/sys_recvfrom
Cc: [email protected] # v3.19
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void AutomationProvider::SaveAsAsync(int tab_handle) {
NavigationController* tab = NULL;
TabContents* tab_contents = GetTabContentsForHandle(tab_handle, &tab);
if (tab_contents)
tab_contents->OnSavePage();
}
Commit Message: Rename the TabContentWrapper pieces to be "TabHelper"s. (Except for the PasswordManager... for now.) Also, just pre-create them up-front. It saves us effort, as they're all going to be eventually created anyway, so being lazy saves us nothing and creates headaches since the rules about what can be lazy differ from feature to feature.
BUG=71097
TEST=zero visible change
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6480117
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@75170 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: bool V8TestEventTarget::HasInstance(v8::Handle<v8::Value> value)
{
return GetRawTemplate()->HasInstance(value);
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: bool ExtensionTtsController::IsSpeaking() const {
return current_utterance_ != NULL;
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: ofputil_decode_ofp10_table_stats(struct ofpbuf *msg,
struct ofputil_table_stats *stats,
struct ofputil_table_features *features)
{
struct ofp10_table_stats *ots;
ots = ofpbuf_try_pull(msg, sizeof *ots);
if (!ots) {
return OFPERR_OFPBRC_BAD_LEN;
}
features->table_id = ots->table_id;
ovs_strlcpy(features->name, ots->name, sizeof features->name);
features->max_entries = ntohl(ots->max_entries);
features->match = features->wildcard = mf_bitmap_from_of10(ots->wildcards);
stats->table_id = ots->table_id;
stats->active_count = ntohl(ots->active_count);
stats->lookup_count = ntohll(get_32aligned_be64(&ots->lookup_count));
stats->matched_count = ntohll(get_32aligned_be64(&ots->matched_count));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-617
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void PaymentRequest::Complete(mojom::PaymentComplete result) {
if (!client_.is_bound())
return;
if (result == mojom::PaymentComplete::FAIL) {
delegate_->ShowErrorMessage();
} else {
DCHECK(!has_recorded_completion_);
journey_logger_.SetCompleted();
has_recorded_completion_ = true;
delegate_->GetPrefService()->SetBoolean(kPaymentsFirstTransactionCompleted,
true);
client_->OnComplete();
state_->RecordUseStats();
}
}
Commit Message: [Payment Request][Desktop] Prevent use after free.
Before this patch, a compromised renderer on desktop could make IPC
methods into Payment Request in an unexpected ordering and cause use
after free in the browser.
This patch will disconnect the IPC pipes if:
- Init() is called more than once.
- Any other method is called before Init().
- Show() is called more than once.
- Retry(), UpdateWith(), NoupdatedPaymentDetails(), Abort(), or
Complete() are called before Show().
This patch re-orders the IPC methods in payment_request.cc to match the
order in payment_request.h, which eases verifying correctness of their
error handling.
This patch prints more errors to the developer console, if available, to
improve debuggability by web developers, who rarely check where LOG
prints.
After this patch, unexpected ordering of calls into the Payment Request
IPC from the renderer to the browser on desktop will print an error in
the developer console and disconnect the IPC pipes. The binary might
increase slightly in size because more logs are included in the release
version instead of being stripped at compile time.
Bug: 912947
Change-Id: Iac2131181c64cd49b4e5ec99f4b4a8ae5d8df57a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1370198
Reviewed-by: anthonyvd <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Rouslan Solomakhin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616822}
CWE ID: CWE-189
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static void test_show_object(struct object *object,
struct strbuf *path,
const char *last, void *data)
{
struct bitmap_test_data *tdata = data;
int bitmap_pos;
bitmap_pos = bitmap_position(object->oid.hash);
if (bitmap_pos < 0)
die("Object not in bitmap: %s\n", oid_to_hex(&object->oid));
bitmap_set(tdata->base, bitmap_pos);
display_progress(tdata->prg, ++tdata->seen);
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int sha1_neon_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
{
struct sha1_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
*sctx = (struct sha1_state){
.state = { SHA1_H0, SHA1_H1, SHA1_H2, SHA1_H3, SHA1_H4 },
};
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static NOINLINE int send_select(uint32_t xid, uint32_t server, uint32_t requested)
{
struct dhcp_packet packet;
struct in_addr temp_addr;
/*
* RFC 2131 4.3.2 DHCPREQUEST message
* ...
* If the DHCPREQUEST message contains a 'server identifier'
* option, the message is in response to a DHCPOFFER message.
* Otherwise, the message is a request to verify or extend an
* existing lease. If the client uses a 'client identifier'
* in a DHCPREQUEST message, it MUST use that same 'client identifier'
* in all subsequent messages. If the client included a list
* of requested parameters in a DHCPDISCOVER message, it MUST
* include that list in all subsequent messages.
*/
/* Fill in: op, htype, hlen, cookie, chaddr fields,
* random xid field (we override it below),
* client-id option (unless -C), message type option:
*/
init_packet(&packet, DHCPREQUEST);
packet.xid = xid;
udhcp_add_simple_option(&packet, DHCP_REQUESTED_IP, requested);
udhcp_add_simple_option(&packet, DHCP_SERVER_ID, server);
/* Add options: maxsize,
* optionally: hostname, fqdn, vendorclass,
* "param req" option according to -O, and options specified with -x
*/
add_client_options(&packet);
temp_addr.s_addr = requested;
bb_error_msg("sending select for %s", inet_ntoa(temp_addr));
return raw_bcast_from_client_config_ifindex(&packet, INADDR_ANY);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: WORD32 ih264d_parse_nal_unit(iv_obj_t *dec_hdl,
ivd_video_decode_op_t *ps_dec_op,
UWORD8 *pu1_buf,
UWORD32 u4_length)
{
dec_bit_stream_t *ps_bitstrm;
dec_struct_t *ps_dec = (dec_struct_t *)dec_hdl->pv_codec_handle;
ivd_video_decode_ip_t *ps_dec_in =
(ivd_video_decode_ip_t *)ps_dec->pv_dec_in;
dec_slice_params_t * ps_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice;
UWORD8 u1_first_byte, u1_nal_ref_idc;
UWORD8 u1_nal_unit_type;
WORD32 i_status = OK;
ps_bitstrm = ps_dec->ps_bitstrm;
if(pu1_buf)
{
if(u4_length)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
ih264d_process_nal_unit(ps_dec->ps_bitstrm, pu1_buf,
u4_length);
SWITCHOFFTRACE;
u1_first_byte = ih264d_get_bits_h264(ps_bitstrm, 8);
if(NAL_FORBIDDEN_BIT(u1_first_byte))
{
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("\nForbidden bit set in Nal Unit, Let's try\n");
}
u1_nal_unit_type = NAL_UNIT_TYPE(u1_first_byte);
if ((ps_dec->u4_slice_start_code_found == 1)
&& (ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done != 1)
&& (u1_nal_unit_type > IDR_SLICE_NAL))
{
return ERROR_INCOMPLETE_FRAME;
}
ps_dec->u1_nal_unit_type = u1_nal_unit_type;
u1_nal_ref_idc = (UWORD8)(NAL_REF_IDC(u1_first_byte));
switch(u1_nal_unit_type)
{
case SLICE_DATA_PARTITION_A_NAL:
case SLICE_DATA_PARTITION_B_NAL:
case SLICE_DATA_PARTITION_C_NAL:
if(!ps_dec->i4_decode_header)
ih264d_parse_slice_partition(ps_dec, ps_bitstrm);
break;
case IDR_SLICE_NAL:
case SLICE_NAL:
/* ! */
DEBUG_THREADS_PRINTF("Decoding a slice NAL\n");
if(!ps_dec->i4_decode_header)
{
if(ps_dec->i4_header_decoded == 3)
{
/* ! */
ps_dec->u4_slice_start_code_found = 1;
ih264d_rbsp_to_sodb(ps_dec->ps_bitstrm);
i_status = ih264d_parse_decode_slice(
(UWORD8)(u1_nal_unit_type
== IDR_SLICE_NAL),
u1_nal_ref_idc, ps_dec);
if((ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic != 0)&&
((ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u1_err_flag & REJECT_CUR_PIC) == 0))
{
/* if the first slice header was not valid set to 1 */
ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic = 1;
}
if(i_status != OK)
{
return i_status;
}
}
else
{
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT(
"\nSlice NAL Supplied but no header has been supplied\n");
}
}
break;
case SEI_NAL:
if(!ps_dec->i4_decode_header)
{
ih264d_rbsp_to_sodb(ps_dec->ps_bitstrm);
i_status = ih264d_parse_sei_message(ps_dec, ps_bitstrm);
if(i_status != OK)
return i_status;
ih264d_parse_sei(ps_dec, ps_bitstrm);
}
break;
case SEQ_PARAM_NAL:
/* ! */
ih264d_rbsp_to_sodb(ps_dec->ps_bitstrm);
i_status = ih264d_parse_sps(ps_dec, ps_bitstrm);
if(i_status == ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T)
return i_status;
if(!i_status)
ps_dec->i4_header_decoded |= 0x1;
break;
case PIC_PARAM_NAL:
/* ! */
ih264d_rbsp_to_sodb(ps_dec->ps_bitstrm);
i_status = ih264d_parse_pps(ps_dec, ps_bitstrm);
if(i_status == ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T)
return i_status;
if(!i_status)
ps_dec->i4_header_decoded |= 0x2;
break;
case ACCESS_UNIT_DELIMITER_RBSP:
if(!ps_dec->i4_decode_header)
{
ih264d_access_unit_delimiter_rbsp(ps_dec);
}
break;
case END_OF_STREAM_RBSP:
if(!ps_dec->i4_decode_header)
{
ih264d_parse_end_of_stream(ps_dec);
}
break;
case FILLER_DATA_NAL:
if(!ps_dec->i4_decode_header)
{
ih264d_parse_filler_data(ps_dec, ps_bitstrm);
}
break;
default:
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("\nUnknown NAL type %d\n", u1_nal_unit_type);
break;
}
}
}
return i_status;
}
Commit Message: Decoder: Fixed initialization of first_slice_in_pic
To handle some errors, first_slice_in_pic was being set to 2.
This is now cleaned up and first_slice_in_pic is set to 1 only once per pic.
This will ensure picture level initializations are done only once even in case
of error clips
Bug: 33717589
Bug: 33551775
Bug: 33716442
Bug: 33677995
Change-Id: If341436b3cbaa724017eedddd88c2e6fac36d8ba
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: Shader* CreateShader(
GLuint client_id,
GLuint service_id,
GLenum shader_type) {
return shader_manager()->CreateShader(
client_id, service_id, shader_type);
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
[email protected],[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: BGD_DECLARE(gdImagePtr) gdImageScale(const gdImagePtr src, const unsigned int new_width, const unsigned int new_height)
{
gdImagePtr im_scaled = NULL;
if (src == NULL || (uintmax_t)src->interpolation_id >= GD_METHOD_COUNT) {
return NULL;
}
if (new_width == 0 || new_height == 0) {
return NULL;
}
if (new_width == gdImageSX(src) && new_height == gdImageSY(src)) {
return gdImageClone(src);
}
switch (src->interpolation_id) {
/*Special cases, optimized implementations */
case GD_NEAREST_NEIGHBOUR:
im_scaled = gdImageScaleNearestNeighbour(src, new_width, new_height);
break;
case GD_BILINEAR_FIXED:
case GD_LINEAR:
im_scaled = gdImageScaleBilinear(src, new_width, new_height);
break;
case GD_BICUBIC_FIXED:
case GD_BICUBIC:
im_scaled = gdImageScaleBicubicFixed(src, new_width, new_height);
break;
/* generic */
default:
if (src->interpolation == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
im_scaled = gdImageScaleTwoPass(src, new_width, new_height);
break;
}
return im_scaled;
}
Commit Message: Fix potential unsigned underflow
No need to decrease `u`, so we don't do it. While we're at it, we also factor
out the overflow check of the loop, what improves performance and readability.
This issue has been reported by Stefan Esser to [email protected].
CWE ID: CWE-191
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: long long Cluster::GetLastTime() const
{
const BlockEntry* pEntry;
const long status = GetLast(pEntry);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
if (pEntry == NULL) //empty cluster
return GetTime();
const Block* const pBlock = pEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
return pBlock->GetTime(this);
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void reclaim_dma_bufs(void)
{
unsigned long flags;
struct port_buffer *buf, *tmp;
LIST_HEAD(tmp_list);
if (list_empty(&pending_free_dma_bufs))
return;
/* Create a copy of the pending_free_dma_bufs while holding the lock */
spin_lock_irqsave(&dma_bufs_lock, flags);
list_cut_position(&tmp_list, &pending_free_dma_bufs,
pending_free_dma_bufs.prev);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dma_bufs_lock, flags);
/* Release the dma buffers, without irqs enabled */
list_for_each_entry_safe(buf, tmp, &tmp_list, list) {
list_del(&buf->list);
free_buf(buf, true);
}
}
Commit Message: virtio-console: avoid DMA from stack
put_chars() stuffs the buffer it gets into an sg, but that buffer may be
on the stack. This breaks with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y (for me, it
manifested as printks getting turned into NUL bytes).
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Amit Shah <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static void init_predictor_decoder(APEContext *ctx)
{
APEPredictor *p = &ctx->predictor;
/* Zero the history buffers */
memset(p->historybuffer, 0, PREDICTOR_SIZE * sizeof(*p->historybuffer));
p->buf = p->historybuffer;
/* Initialize and zero the coefficients */
if (ctx->fileversion < 3930) {
if (ctx->compression_level == COMPRESSION_LEVEL_FAST) {
memcpy(p->coeffsA[0], initial_coeffs_fast_3320,
sizeof(initial_coeffs_fast_3320));
memcpy(p->coeffsA[1], initial_coeffs_fast_3320,
sizeof(initial_coeffs_fast_3320));
} else {
memcpy(p->coeffsA[0], initial_coeffs_a_3800,
sizeof(initial_coeffs_a_3800));
memcpy(p->coeffsA[1], initial_coeffs_a_3800,
sizeof(initial_coeffs_a_3800));
}
} else {
memcpy(p->coeffsA[0], initial_coeffs_3930, sizeof(initial_coeffs_3930));
memcpy(p->coeffsA[1], initial_coeffs_3930, sizeof(initial_coeffs_3930));
}
memset(p->coeffsB, 0, sizeof(p->coeffsB));
if (ctx->fileversion < 3930) {
memcpy(p->coeffsB[0], initial_coeffs_b_3800,
sizeof(initial_coeffs_b_3800));
memcpy(p->coeffsB[1], initial_coeffs_b_3800,
sizeof(initial_coeffs_b_3800));
}
p->filterA[0] = p->filterA[1] = 0;
p->filterB[0] = p->filterB[1] = 0;
p->lastA[0] = p->lastA[1] = 0;
p->sample_pos = 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/apedec: Fix integer overflow
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: PoC.ape and others
Found-by: Bingchang, Liu@VARAS of IIE
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-125
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static void chase_port(struct edgeport_port *port, unsigned long timeout,
int flush)
{
int baud_rate;
struct tty_struct *tty = tty_port_tty_get(&port->port->port);
struct usb_serial *serial = port->port->serial;
wait_queue_t wait;
unsigned long flags;
if (!timeout)
timeout = (HZ * EDGE_CLOSING_WAIT)/100;
/* wait for data to drain from the buffer */
spin_lock_irqsave(&port->ep_lock, flags);
init_waitqueue_entry(&wait, current);
add_wait_queue(&tty->write_wait, &wait);
for (;;) {
set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
if (kfifo_len(&port->write_fifo) == 0
|| timeout == 0 || signal_pending(current)
|| serial->disconnected)
/* disconnect */
break;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&port->ep_lock, flags);
timeout = schedule_timeout(timeout);
spin_lock_irqsave(&port->ep_lock, flags);
}
set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
remove_wait_queue(&tty->write_wait, &wait);
if (flush)
kfifo_reset_out(&port->write_fifo);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&port->ep_lock, flags);
tty_kref_put(tty);
/* wait for data to drain from the device */
timeout += jiffies;
while ((long)(jiffies - timeout) < 0 && !signal_pending(current)
&& !serial->disconnected) {
/* not disconnected */
if (!tx_active(port))
break;
msleep(10);
}
/* disconnected */
if (serial->disconnected)
return;
/* wait one more character time, based on baud rate */
/* (tx_active doesn't seem to wait for the last byte) */
baud_rate = port->baud_rate;
if (baud_rate == 0)
baud_rate = 50;
msleep(max(1, DIV_ROUND_UP(10000, baud_rate)));
}
Commit Message: USB: io_ti: Fix NULL dereference in chase_port()
The tty is NULL when the port is hanging up.
chase_port() needs to check for this.
This patch is intended for stable series.
The behavior was observed and tested in Linux 3.2 and 3.7.1.
Johan Hovold submitted a more elaborate patch for the mainline kernel.
[ 56.277883] usb 1-1: edge_bulk_in_callback - nonzero read bulk status received: -84
[ 56.278811] usb 1-1: USB disconnect, device number 3
[ 56.278856] usb 1-1: edge_bulk_in_callback - stopping read!
[ 56.279562] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000001c8
[ 56.280536] IP: [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.281212] PGD 1dc1b067 PUD 1e0f7067 PMD 0
[ 56.282085] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
[ 56.282744] Modules linked in:
[ 56.283512] CPU 1
[ 56.283512] Pid: 25, comm: khubd Not tainted 3.7.1 #1 innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox
[ 56.283512] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8144e62a>] [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.283512] RSP: 0018:ffff88001fa99ab0 EFLAGS: 00010046
[ 56.283512] RAX: 0000000000000046 RBX: 00000000000001c8 RCX: 0000000000640064
[ 56.283512] RDX: 0000000000010000 RSI: ffff88001fa99b20 RDI: 00000000000001c8
[ 56.283512] RBP: ffff88001fa99b20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff812fcb4c R12: ffff88001ddf53c0
[ 56.283512] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000000001c8 R15: ffff88001e19b9f4
[ 56.283512] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88001fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[ 56.283512] CR2: 00000000000001c8 CR3: 000000001dc51000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 56.283512] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 56.283512] Process khubd (pid: 25, threadinfo ffff88001fa98000, task ffff88001fa94f80)
[ 56.283512] Stack:
[ 56.283512] 0000000000000046 00000000000001c8 ffffffff810578ec ffffffff812fcb4c
[ 56.283512] ffff88001e19b980 0000000000002710 ffffffff812ffe81 0000000000000001
[ 56.283512] ffff88001fa94f80 0000000000000202 ffffffff00000001 0000000000000296
[ 56.283512] Call Trace:
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810578ec>] ? add_wait_queue+0x12/0x3c
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fcb4c>] ? usb_serial_port_work+0x28/0x28
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812ffe81>] ? chase_port+0x84/0x2d6
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81063f27>] ? try_to_wake_up+0x199/0x199
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81263a5c>] ? tty_ldisc_hangup+0x222/0x298
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81300171>] ? edge_close+0x64/0x129
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810612f7>] ? __wake_up+0x35/0x46
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8106135b>] ? should_resched+0x5/0x23
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81264916>] ? tty_port_shutdown+0x39/0x44
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fcb4c>] ? usb_serial_port_work+0x28/0x28
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8125d38c>] ? __tty_hangup+0x307/0x351
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e6ddc>] ? usb_hcd_flush_endpoint+0xde/0xed
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8144e625>] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x14/0x35
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fd361>] ? usb_serial_disconnect+0x57/0xc2
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812ea99b>] ? usb_unbind_interface+0x5c/0x131
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d738>] ? __device_release_driver+0x7f/0xd5
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d9cd>] ? device_release_driver+0x1a/0x25
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d393>] ? bus_remove_device+0xd2/0xe7
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128b7a3>] ? device_del+0x119/0x167
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e8d9d>] ? usb_disable_device+0x6a/0x180
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e2ae0>] ? usb_disconnect+0x81/0xe6
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e4435>] ? hub_thread+0x577/0xe82
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8144daa7>] ? __schedule+0x490/0x4be
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8105798f>] ? abort_exclusive_wait+0x79/0x79
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e3ebe>] ? usb_remote_wakeup+0x2f/0x2f
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e3ebe>] ? usb_remote_wakeup+0x2f/0x2f
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810570b4>] ? kthread+0x81/0x89
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81057033>] ? __kthread_parkme+0x5c/0x5c
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8145387c>] ? ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81057033>] ? __kthread_parkme+0x5c/0x5c
[ 56.283512] Code: 8b 7c 24 08 e8 17 0b c3 ff 48 8b 04 24 48 83 c4 10 c3 53 48 89 fb 41 50 e8 e0 0a c3 ff 48 89 04 24 e8 e7 0a c3 ff ba 00 00 01 00
<f0> 0f c1 13 48 8b 04 24 89 d1 c1 ea 10 66 39 d1 74 07 f3 90 66
[ 56.283512] RIP [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.283512] RSP <ffff88001fa99ab0>
[ 56.283512] CR2: 00000000000001c8
[ 56.283512] ---[ end trace 49714df27e1679ce ]---
Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Frisch <[email protected]>
Cc: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: base::TimeTicks TabLifecycleUnitSource::TabLifecycleUnit::GetLastFocusedTime()
const {
return last_focused_time_;
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE3(mincore, unsigned long, start, size_t, len,
unsigned char __user *, vec)
{
long retval;
unsigned long pages;
unsigned char *tmp;
/* Check the start address: needs to be page-aligned.. */
if (start & ~PAGE_MASK)
return -EINVAL;
/* ..and we need to be passed a valid user-space range */
if (!access_ok((void __user *) start, len))
return -ENOMEM;
/* This also avoids any overflows on PAGE_ALIGN */
pages = len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
pages += (offset_in_page(len)) != 0;
if (!access_ok(vec, pages))
return -EFAULT;
tmp = (void *) __get_free_page(GFP_USER);
if (!tmp)
return -EAGAIN;
retval = 0;
while (pages) {
/*
* Do at most PAGE_SIZE entries per iteration, due to
* the temporary buffer size.
*/
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
retval = do_mincore(start, min(pages, PAGE_SIZE), tmp);
up_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
if (retval <= 0)
break;
if (copy_to_user(vec, tmp, retval)) {
retval = -EFAULT;
break;
}
pages -= retval;
vec += retval;
start += retval << PAGE_SHIFT;
retval = 0;
}
free_page((unsigned long) tmp);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: Change mincore() to count "mapped" pages rather than "cached" pages
The semantics of what "in core" means for the mincore() system call are
somewhat unclear, but Linux has always (since 2.3.52, which is when
mincore() was initially done) treated it as "page is available in page
cache" rather than "page is mapped in the mapping".
The problem with that traditional semantic is that it exposes a lot of
system cache state that it really probably shouldn't, and that users
shouldn't really even care about.
So let's try to avoid that information leak by simply changing the
semantics to be that mincore() counts actual mapped pages, not pages
that might be cheaply mapped if they were faulted (note the "might be"
part of the old semantics: being in the cache doesn't actually guarantee
that you can access them without IO anyway, since things like network
filesystems may have to revalidate the cache before use).
In many ways the old semantics were somewhat insane even aside from the
information leak issue. From the very beginning (and that beginning is
a long time ago: 2.3.52 was released in March 2000, I think), the code
had a comment saying
Later we can get more picky about what "in core" means precisely.
and this is that "later". Admittedly it is much later than is really
comfortable.
NOTE! This is a real semantic change, and it is for example known to
change the output of "fincore", since that program literally does a
mmmap without populating it, and then doing "mincore()" on that mapping
that doesn't actually have any pages in it.
I'm hoping that nobody actually has any workflow that cares, and the
info leak is real.
We may have to do something different if it turns out that people have
valid reasons to want the old semantics, and if we can limit the
information leak sanely.
Cc: Kevin Easton <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
Cc: Masatake YAMATO <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Greg KH <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: header_put_le_int (SF_PRIVATE *psf, int x)
{ if (psf->headindex < SIGNED_SIZEOF (psf->header) - 4)
{ psf->header [psf->headindex++] = x ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 8) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 16) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 24) ;
} ;
} /* header_put_le_int */
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void smtp_to_smtps(struct connectdata *conn)
{
/* Change the connection handler */
conn->handler = &Curl_handler_smtps;
/* Set the connection's upgraded to TLS flag */
conn->tls_upgraded = TRUE;
}
Commit Message: smtp: use the upload buffer size for scratch buffer malloc
... not the read buffer size, as that can be set smaller and thus cause
a buffer overflow! CVE-2018-0500
Reported-by: Peter Wu
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_2018-70a2.html
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: gs_pdf14_clist_device_push(gs_memory_t *mem, gs_gstate *pgs, gx_device **pcdev,
gx_device *dev, const gs_pdf14trans_t *pdf14pct)
{
int code;
pdf14_clist_device *p14dev;
gx_device_clist_writer * const cdev = &((gx_device_clist *)dev)->writer;
code = pdf14_create_clist_device(mem, pgs, pcdev, dev, pdf14pct);
/*
* Set the color_info of the clist device to match the compositing
* device. We will restore it when the compositor is popped.
* See pdf14_clist_create_compositor for the restore. Do the
* same with the gs_gstate's get_cmap_procs. We do not want
* the gs_gstate to use transfer functions on our color values.
* The transfer functions will be applied at the end after we
* have done our PDF 1.4 blend operations.
*/
p14dev = (pdf14_clist_device *)(*pcdev);
p14dev->saved_target_color_info = dev->color_info;
dev->color_info = (*pcdev)->color_info;
/* Make sure that we keep the anti-alias information though */
dev->color_info.anti_alias = p14dev->saved_target_color_info.anti_alias;
p14dev->color_info.anti_alias = dev->color_info.anti_alias;
/* adjust the clist_color_info now */
cdev->clist_color_info.depth = p14dev->color_info.depth;
cdev->clist_color_info.polarity = p14dev->color_info.polarity;
cdev->clist_color_info.num_components = p14dev->color_info.num_components;
cdev->clist_color_info.max_color = p14dev->color_info.max_color;
cdev->clist_color_info.max_gray = p14dev->color_info.max_gray;
p14dev->saved_target_encode_color = dev->procs.encode_color;
p14dev->saved_target_decode_color = dev->procs.decode_color;
dev->procs.encode_color = p14dev->procs.encode_color =
p14dev->my_encode_color;
dev->procs.decode_color = p14dev->procs.decode_color =
p14dev->my_decode_color;
p14dev->saved_target_get_color_mapping_procs =
dev->procs.get_color_mapping_procs;
p14dev->saved_target_get_color_comp_index =
dev->procs.get_color_comp_index;
dev->procs.get_color_mapping_procs =
p14dev->procs.get_color_mapping_procs =
p14dev->my_get_color_mapping_procs;
dev->procs.get_color_comp_index =
p14dev->procs.get_color_comp_index =
p14dev->my_get_color_comp_index;
p14dev->save_get_cmap_procs = pgs->get_cmap_procs;
pgs->get_cmap_procs = pdf14_get_cmap_procs;
gx_set_cmap_procs(pgs, dev);
return code;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int tcp_v6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
const struct tcphdr *th;
const struct ipv6hdr *hdr;
bool refcounted;
struct sock *sk;
int ret;
struct net *net = dev_net(skb->dev);
if (skb->pkt_type != PACKET_HOST)
goto discard_it;
/*
* Count it even if it's bad.
*/
__TCP_INC_STATS(net, TCP_MIB_INSEGS);
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct tcphdr)))
goto discard_it;
th = (const struct tcphdr *)skb->data;
if (unlikely(th->doff < sizeof(struct tcphdr)/4))
goto bad_packet;
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, th->doff*4))
goto discard_it;
if (skb_checksum_init(skb, IPPROTO_TCP, ip6_compute_pseudo))
goto csum_error;
th = (const struct tcphdr *)skb->data;
hdr = ipv6_hdr(skb);
lookup:
sk = __inet6_lookup_skb(&tcp_hashinfo, skb, __tcp_hdrlen(th),
th->source, th->dest, inet6_iif(skb),
&refcounted);
if (!sk)
goto no_tcp_socket;
process:
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_TIME_WAIT)
goto do_time_wait;
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV) {
struct request_sock *req = inet_reqsk(sk);
struct sock *nsk;
sk = req->rsk_listener;
tcp_v6_fill_cb(skb, hdr, th);
if (tcp_v6_inbound_md5_hash(sk, skb)) {
sk_drops_add(sk, skb);
reqsk_put(req);
goto discard_it;
}
if (unlikely(sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN)) {
inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop_and_put(sk, req);
goto lookup;
}
sock_hold(sk);
refcounted = true;
nsk = tcp_check_req(sk, skb, req, false);
if (!nsk) {
reqsk_put(req);
goto discard_and_relse;
}
if (nsk == sk) {
reqsk_put(req);
tcp_v6_restore_cb(skb);
} else if (tcp_child_process(sk, nsk, skb)) {
tcp_v6_send_reset(nsk, skb);
goto discard_and_relse;
} else {
sock_put(sk);
return 0;
}
}
if (hdr->hop_limit < inet6_sk(sk)->min_hopcount) {
__NET_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_TCPMINTTLDROP);
goto discard_and_relse;
}
if (!xfrm6_policy_check(sk, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb))
goto discard_and_relse;
tcp_v6_fill_cb(skb, hdr, th);
if (tcp_v6_inbound_md5_hash(sk, skb))
goto discard_and_relse;
if (sk_filter(sk, skb))
goto discard_and_relse;
skb->dev = NULL;
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) {
ret = tcp_v6_do_rcv(sk, skb);
goto put_and_return;
}
sk_incoming_cpu_update(sk);
bh_lock_sock_nested(sk);
tcp_segs_in(tcp_sk(sk), skb);
ret = 0;
if (!sock_owned_by_user(sk)) {
if (!tcp_prequeue(sk, skb))
ret = tcp_v6_do_rcv(sk, skb);
} else if (tcp_add_backlog(sk, skb)) {
goto discard_and_relse;
}
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
put_and_return:
if (refcounted)
sock_put(sk);
return ret ? -1 : 0;
no_tcp_socket:
if (!xfrm6_policy_check(NULL, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb))
goto discard_it;
tcp_v6_fill_cb(skb, hdr, th);
if (tcp_checksum_complete(skb)) {
csum_error:
__TCP_INC_STATS(net, TCP_MIB_CSUMERRORS);
bad_packet:
__TCP_INC_STATS(net, TCP_MIB_INERRS);
} else {
tcp_v6_send_reset(NULL, skb);
}
discard_it:
kfree_skb(skb);
return 0;
discard_and_relse:
sk_drops_add(sk, skb);
if (refcounted)
sock_put(sk);
goto discard_it;
do_time_wait:
if (!xfrm6_policy_check(NULL, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb)) {
inet_twsk_put(inet_twsk(sk));
goto discard_it;
}
tcp_v6_fill_cb(skb, hdr, th);
if (tcp_checksum_complete(skb)) {
inet_twsk_put(inet_twsk(sk));
goto csum_error;
}
switch (tcp_timewait_state_process(inet_twsk(sk), skb, th)) {
case TCP_TW_SYN:
{
struct sock *sk2;
sk2 = inet6_lookup_listener(dev_net(skb->dev), &tcp_hashinfo,
skb, __tcp_hdrlen(th),
&ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr, th->source,
&ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr,
ntohs(th->dest), tcp_v6_iif(skb));
if (sk2) {
struct inet_timewait_sock *tw = inet_twsk(sk);
inet_twsk_deschedule_put(tw);
sk = sk2;
tcp_v6_restore_cb(skb);
refcounted = false;
goto process;
}
/* Fall through to ACK */
}
case TCP_TW_ACK:
tcp_v6_timewait_ack(sk, skb);
break;
case TCP_TW_RST:
tcp_v6_restore_cb(skb);
tcp_v6_send_reset(sk, skb);
inet_twsk_deschedule_put(inet_twsk(sk));
goto discard_it;
case TCP_TW_SUCCESS:
;
}
goto discard_it;
}
Commit Message: tcp: take care of truncations done by sk_filter()
With syzkaller help, Marco Grassi found a bug in TCP stack,
crashing in tcp_collapse()
Root cause is that sk_filter() can truncate the incoming skb,
but TCP stack was not really expecting this to happen.
It probably was expecting a simple DROP or ACCEPT behavior.
We first need to make sure no part of TCP header could be removed.
Then we need to adjust TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq
Many thanks to syzkaller team and Marco for giving us a reproducer.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-284
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void ChromotingInstance::PauseVideo(bool pause) {
if (!IsConnected()) {
return;
}
protocol::VideoControl video_control;
video_control.set_enable(!pause);
host_connection_->host_stub()->ControlVideo(video_control);
}
Commit Message: Restrict the Chromoting client plugin to use by extensions & apps.
BUG=160456
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11365276
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@168289 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: dispatch_cmd(conn c)
{
int r, i, timeout = -1;
size_t z;
unsigned int count;
job j;
unsigned char type;
char *size_buf, *delay_buf, *ttr_buf, *pri_buf, *end_buf, *name;
unsigned int pri, body_size;
usec delay, ttr;
uint64_t id;
tube t = NULL;
/* NUL-terminate this string so we can use strtol and friends */
c->cmd[c->cmd_len - 2] = '\0';
/* check for possible maliciousness */
if (strlen(c->cmd) != c->cmd_len - 2) {
return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
}
type = which_cmd(c);
dprintf("got %s command: \"%s\"\n", op_names[(int) type], c->cmd);
switch (type) {
case OP_PUT:
r = read_pri(&pri, c->cmd + 4, &delay_buf);
if (r) return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
r = read_delay(&delay, delay_buf, &ttr_buf);
if (r) return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
r = read_ttr(&ttr, ttr_buf, &size_buf);
if (r) return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
errno = 0;
body_size = strtoul(size_buf, &end_buf, 10);
if (errno) return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
if (body_size > job_data_size_limit) {
return reply_msg(c, MSG_JOB_TOO_BIG);
}
/* don't allow trailing garbage */
if (end_buf[0] != '\0') return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
conn_set_producer(c);
c->in_job = make_job(pri, delay, ttr ? : 1, body_size + 2, c->use);
/* OOM? */
if (!c->in_job) {
/* throw away the job body and respond with OUT_OF_MEMORY */
twarnx("server error: " MSG_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
return skip(c, body_size + 2, MSG_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
}
fill_extra_data(c);
/* it's possible we already have a complete job */
maybe_enqueue_incoming_job(c);
break;
case OP_PEEK_READY:
/* don't allow trailing garbage */
if (c->cmd_len != CMD_PEEK_READY_LEN + 2) {
return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
}
op_ct[type]++;
j = job_copy(pq_peek(&c->use->ready));
if (!j) return reply(c, MSG_NOTFOUND, MSG_NOTFOUND_LEN, STATE_SENDWORD);
reply_job(c, j, MSG_FOUND);
break;
case OP_PEEK_DELAYED:
/* don't allow trailing garbage */
if (c->cmd_len != CMD_PEEK_DELAYED_LEN + 2) {
return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
}
op_ct[type]++;
j = job_copy(pq_peek(&c->use->delay));
if (!j) return reply(c, MSG_NOTFOUND, MSG_NOTFOUND_LEN, STATE_SENDWORD);
reply_job(c, j, MSG_FOUND);
break;
case OP_PEEK_BURIED:
/* don't allow trailing garbage */
if (c->cmd_len != CMD_PEEK_BURIED_LEN + 2) {
return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
}
op_ct[type]++;
j = job_copy(buried_job_p(c->use)? j = c->use->buried.next : NULL);
if (!j) return reply(c, MSG_NOTFOUND, MSG_NOTFOUND_LEN, STATE_SENDWORD);
reply_job(c, j, MSG_FOUND);
break;
case OP_PEEKJOB:
errno = 0;
id = strtoull(c->cmd + CMD_PEEKJOB_LEN, &end_buf, 10);
if (errno) return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
op_ct[type]++;
/* So, peek is annoying, because some other connection might free the
* job while we are still trying to write it out. So we copy it and
* then free the copy when it's done sending. */
j = job_copy(peek_job(id));
if (!j) return reply(c, MSG_NOTFOUND, MSG_NOTFOUND_LEN, STATE_SENDWORD);
reply_job(c, j, MSG_FOUND);
break;
case OP_RESERVE_TIMEOUT:
errno = 0;
timeout = strtol(c->cmd + CMD_RESERVE_TIMEOUT_LEN, &end_buf, 10);
if (errno) return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
case OP_RESERVE: /* FALLTHROUGH */
/* don't allow trailing garbage */
if (type == OP_RESERVE && c->cmd_len != CMD_RESERVE_LEN + 2) {
return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
}
op_ct[type]++;
conn_set_worker(c);
if (conn_has_close_deadline(c) && !conn_ready(c)) {
return reply_msg(c, MSG_DEADLINE_SOON);
}
/* try to get a new job for this guy */
wait_for_job(c, timeout);
process_queue();
break;
case OP_DELETE:
errno = 0;
id = strtoull(c->cmd + CMD_DELETE_LEN, &end_buf, 10);
if (errno) return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
op_ct[type]++;
j = job_find(id);
j = remove_reserved_job(c, j) ? :
remove_ready_job(j) ? :
remove_buried_job(j);
if (!j) return reply(c, MSG_NOTFOUND, MSG_NOTFOUND_LEN, STATE_SENDWORD);
j->state = JOB_STATE_INVALID;
r = binlog_write_job(j);
job_free(j);
if (!r) return reply_serr(c, MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR);
reply(c, MSG_DELETED, MSG_DELETED_LEN, STATE_SENDWORD);
break;
case OP_RELEASE:
errno = 0;
id = strtoull(c->cmd + CMD_RELEASE_LEN, &pri_buf, 10);
if (errno) return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
r = read_pri(&pri, pri_buf, &delay_buf);
if (r) return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
r = read_delay(&delay, delay_buf, NULL);
if (r) return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
op_ct[type]++;
j = remove_reserved_job(c, job_find(id));
if (!j) return reply(c, MSG_NOTFOUND, MSG_NOTFOUND_LEN, STATE_SENDWORD);
/* We want to update the delay deadline on disk, so reserve space for
* that. */
if (delay) {
z = binlog_reserve_space_update(j);
if (!z) return reply_serr(c, MSG_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
j->reserved_binlog_space += z;
}
j->pri = pri;
j->delay = delay;
j->release_ct++;
r = enqueue_job(j, delay, !!delay);
if (r < 0) return reply_serr(c, MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR);
if (r == 1) {
return reply(c, MSG_RELEASED, MSG_RELEASED_LEN, STATE_SENDWORD);
}
/* out of memory trying to grow the queue, so it gets buried */
bury_job(j, 0);
reply(c, MSG_BURIED, MSG_BURIED_LEN, STATE_SENDWORD);
break;
case OP_BURY:
errno = 0;
id = strtoull(c->cmd + CMD_BURY_LEN, &pri_buf, 10);
if (errno) return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
r = read_pri(&pri, pri_buf, NULL);
if (r) return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
op_ct[type]++;
j = remove_reserved_job(c, job_find(id));
if (!j) return reply(c, MSG_NOTFOUND, MSG_NOTFOUND_LEN, STATE_SENDWORD);
j->pri = pri;
r = bury_job(j, 1);
if (!r) return reply_serr(c, MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR);
reply(c, MSG_BURIED, MSG_BURIED_LEN, STATE_SENDWORD);
break;
case OP_KICK:
errno = 0;
count = strtoul(c->cmd + CMD_KICK_LEN, &end_buf, 10);
if (end_buf == c->cmd + CMD_KICK_LEN) {
return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
}
if (errno) return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
op_ct[type]++;
i = kick_jobs(c->use, count);
return reply_line(c, STATE_SENDWORD, "KICKED %u\r\n", i);
case OP_TOUCH:
errno = 0;
id = strtoull(c->cmd + CMD_TOUCH_LEN, &end_buf, 10);
if (errno) return twarn("strtoull"), reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
op_ct[type]++;
j = touch_job(c, job_find(id));
if (j) {
reply(c, MSG_TOUCHED, MSG_TOUCHED_LEN, STATE_SENDWORD);
} else {
return reply(c, MSG_NOTFOUND, MSG_NOTFOUND_LEN, STATE_SENDWORD);
}
break;
case OP_STATS:
/* don't allow trailing garbage */
if (c->cmd_len != CMD_STATS_LEN + 2) {
return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
}
op_ct[type]++;
do_stats(c, fmt_stats, NULL);
break;
case OP_JOBSTATS:
errno = 0;
id = strtoull(c->cmd + CMD_JOBSTATS_LEN, &end_buf, 10);
if (errno) return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
op_ct[type]++;
j = peek_job(id);
if (!j) return reply(c, MSG_NOTFOUND, MSG_NOTFOUND_LEN, STATE_SENDWORD);
if (!j->tube) return reply_serr(c, MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR);
do_stats(c, (fmt_fn) fmt_job_stats, j);
break;
case OP_STATS_TUBE:
name = c->cmd + CMD_STATS_TUBE_LEN;
if (!name_is_ok(name, 200)) return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
op_ct[type]++;
t = tube_find(name);
if (!t) return reply_msg(c, MSG_NOTFOUND);
do_stats(c, (fmt_fn) fmt_stats_tube, t);
t = NULL;
break;
case OP_LIST_TUBES:
/* don't allow trailing garbage */
if (c->cmd_len != CMD_LIST_TUBES_LEN + 2) {
return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
}
op_ct[type]++;
do_list_tubes(c, &tubes);
break;
case OP_LIST_TUBE_USED:
/* don't allow trailing garbage */
if (c->cmd_len != CMD_LIST_TUBE_USED_LEN + 2) {
return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
}
op_ct[type]++;
reply_line(c, STATE_SENDWORD, "USING %s\r\n", c->use->name);
break;
case OP_LIST_TUBES_WATCHED:
/* don't allow trailing garbage */
if (c->cmd_len != CMD_LIST_TUBES_WATCHED_LEN + 2) {
return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
}
op_ct[type]++;
do_list_tubes(c, &c->watch);
break;
case OP_USE:
name = c->cmd + CMD_USE_LEN;
if (!name_is_ok(name, 200)) return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
op_ct[type]++;
TUBE_ASSIGN(t, tube_find_or_make(name));
if (!t) return reply_serr(c, MSG_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
c->use->using_ct--;
TUBE_ASSIGN(c->use, t);
TUBE_ASSIGN(t, NULL);
c->use->using_ct++;
reply_line(c, STATE_SENDWORD, "USING %s\r\n", c->use->name);
break;
case OP_WATCH:
name = c->cmd + CMD_WATCH_LEN;
if (!name_is_ok(name, 200)) return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
op_ct[type]++;
TUBE_ASSIGN(t, tube_find_or_make(name));
if (!t) return reply_serr(c, MSG_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
r = 1;
if (!ms_contains(&c->watch, t)) r = ms_append(&c->watch, t);
TUBE_ASSIGN(t, NULL);
if (!r) return reply_serr(c, MSG_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
reply_line(c, STATE_SENDWORD, "WATCHING %d\r\n", c->watch.used);
break;
case OP_IGNORE:
name = c->cmd + CMD_IGNORE_LEN;
if (!name_is_ok(name, 200)) return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
op_ct[type]++;
t = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < c->watch.used; i++) {
t = c->watch.items[i];
if (strncmp(t->name, name, MAX_TUBE_NAME_LEN) == 0) break;
t = NULL;
}
if (t && c->watch.used < 2) return reply_msg(c, MSG_NOT_IGNORED);
if (t) ms_remove(&c->watch, t); /* may free t if refcount => 0 */
t = NULL;
reply_line(c, STATE_SENDWORD, "WATCHING %d\r\n", c->watch.used);
break;
case OP_QUIT:
conn_close(c);
break;
case OP_PAUSE_TUBE:
op_ct[type]++;
r = read_tube_name(&name, c->cmd + CMD_PAUSE_TUBE_LEN, &delay_buf);
if (r) return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
r = read_delay(&delay, delay_buf, NULL);
if (r) return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
*delay_buf = '\0';
t = tube_find(name);
if (!t) return reply_msg(c, MSG_NOTFOUND);
t->deadline_at = now_usec() + delay;
t->pause = delay;
t->stat.pause_ct++;
set_main_delay_timeout();
reply_line(c, STATE_SENDWORD, "PAUSED\r\n");
break;
default:
return reply_msg(c, MSG_UNKNOWN_COMMAND);
}
}
Commit Message: Discard job body bytes if the job is too big.
Previously, a malicious user could craft a job payload and inject
beanstalk commands without the client application knowing. (An
extra-careful client library could check the size of the job body before
sending the put command, but most libraries do not do this, nor should
they have to.)
Reported by Graham Barr.
CWE ID:
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void PlatformSensorProviderAndroid::CreateAbsoluteOrientationEulerAnglesSensor(
JNIEnv* env,
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping mapping,
const CreateSensorCallback& callback) {
if (static_cast<bool>(Java_PlatformSensorProvider_hasSensorType(
env, j_object_,
static_cast<jint>(
mojom::SensorType::ABSOLUTE_ORIENTATION_QUATERNION)))) {
auto sensor_fusion_algorithm =
std::make_unique<OrientationEulerAnglesFusionAlgorithmUsingQuaternion>(
true /* absolute */);
PlatformSensorFusion::Create(std::move(mapping), this,
std::move(sensor_fusion_algorithm), callback);
} else {
auto sensor_fusion_algorithm = std::make_unique<
AbsoluteOrientationEulerAnglesFusionAlgorithmUsingAccelerometerAndMagnetometer>();
PlatformSensorFusion::Create(std::move(mapping), this,
std::move(sensor_fusion_algorithm), callback);
}
}
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607}
CWE ID: CWE-732
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: xfs_da_grow_inode_int(
struct xfs_da_args *args,
xfs_fileoff_t *bno,
int count)
{
struct xfs_trans *tp = args->trans;
struct xfs_inode *dp = args->dp;
int w = args->whichfork;
xfs_drfsbno_t nblks = dp->i_d.di_nblocks;
struct xfs_bmbt_irec map, *mapp;
int nmap, error, got, i, mapi;
/*
* Find a spot in the file space to put the new block.
*/
error = xfs_bmap_first_unused(tp, dp, count, bno, w);
if (error)
return error;
/*
* Try mapping it in one filesystem block.
*/
nmap = 1;
ASSERT(args->firstblock != NULL);
error = xfs_bmapi_write(tp, dp, *bno, count,
xfs_bmapi_aflag(w)|XFS_BMAPI_METADATA|XFS_BMAPI_CONTIG,
args->firstblock, args->total, &map, &nmap,
args->flist);
if (error)
return error;
ASSERT(nmap <= 1);
if (nmap == 1) {
mapp = ↦
mapi = 1;
} else if (nmap == 0 && count > 1) {
xfs_fileoff_t b;
int c;
/*
* If we didn't get it and the block might work if fragmented,
* try without the CONTIG flag. Loop until we get it all.
*/
mapp = kmem_alloc(sizeof(*mapp) * count, KM_SLEEP);
for (b = *bno, mapi = 0; b < *bno + count; ) {
nmap = MIN(XFS_BMAP_MAX_NMAP, count);
c = (int)(*bno + count - b);
error = xfs_bmapi_write(tp, dp, b, c,
xfs_bmapi_aflag(w)|XFS_BMAPI_METADATA,
args->firstblock, args->total,
&mapp[mapi], &nmap, args->flist);
if (error)
goto out_free_map;
if (nmap < 1)
break;
mapi += nmap;
b = mapp[mapi - 1].br_startoff +
mapp[mapi - 1].br_blockcount;
}
} else {
mapi = 0;
mapp = NULL;
}
/*
* Count the blocks we got, make sure it matches the total.
*/
for (i = 0, got = 0; i < mapi; i++)
got += mapp[i].br_blockcount;
if (got != count || mapp[0].br_startoff != *bno ||
mapp[mapi - 1].br_startoff + mapp[mapi - 1].br_blockcount !=
*bno + count) {
error = XFS_ERROR(ENOSPC);
goto out_free_map;
}
/* account for newly allocated blocks in reserved blocks total */
args->total -= dp->i_d.di_nblocks - nblks;
out_free_map:
if (mapp != &map)
kmem_free(mapp);
return error;
}
Commit Message: xfs: fix directory hash ordering bug
Commit f5ea1100 ("xfs: add CRCs to dir2/da node blocks") introduced
in 3.10 incorrectly converted the btree hash index array pointer in
xfs_da3_fixhashpath(). It resulted in the the current hash always
being compared against the first entry in the btree rather than the
current block index into the btree block's hash entry array. As a
result, it was comparing the wrong hashes, and so could misorder the
entries in the btree.
For most cases, this doesn't cause any problems as it requires hash
collisions to expose the ordering problem. However, when there are
hash collisions within a directory there is a very good probability
that the entries will be ordered incorrectly and that actually
matters when duplicate hashes are placed into or removed from the
btree block hash entry array.
This bug results in an on-disk directory corruption and that results
in directory verifier functions throwing corruption warnings into
the logs. While no data or directory entries are lost, access to
them may be compromised, and attempts to remove entries from a
directory that has suffered from this corruption may result in a
filesystem shutdown. xfs_repair will fix the directory hash
ordering without data loss occuring.
[dchinner: wrote useful a commit message]
cc: <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mark Tinguely <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ben Myers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: nsPluginInstance::NewStream(NPMIMEType /*type*/, NPStream* stream,
NPBool /*seekable*/, uint16_t* /*stype*/)
{
if (_childpid) {
return NPERR_GENERIC_ERROR;
}
_swf_url = stream->url;
if (!_swf_url.empty() && _window) {
return startProc();
}
return NPERR_NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: bool CanCommitURL(const GURL& url) {
SchemeMap::const_iterator judgment(scheme_policy_.find(url.scheme()));
if (judgment != scheme_policy_.end())
return judgment->second;
if (url.SchemeIs(url::kFileScheme)) {
base::FilePath path;
if (net::FileURLToFilePath(url, &path))
return ContainsKey(request_file_set_, path);
}
return false; // Unmentioned schemes are disallowed.
}
Commit Message: This patch implements a mechanism for more granular link URL permissions (filtering on scheme/host). This fixes the bug that allowed PDFs to have working links to any "chrome://" URLs.
BUG=528505,226927
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1362433002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351705}
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static enum TIFFReadDirEntryErr TIFFReadDirEntryLong8Array(TIFF* tif, TIFFDirEntry* direntry, uint64** value)
{
enum TIFFReadDirEntryErr err;
uint32 count;
void* origdata;
uint64* data;
switch (direntry->tdir_type)
{
case TIFF_BYTE:
case TIFF_SBYTE:
case TIFF_SHORT:
case TIFF_SSHORT:
case TIFF_LONG:
case TIFF_SLONG:
case TIFF_LONG8:
case TIFF_SLONG8:
break;
default:
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrType);
}
err=TIFFReadDirEntryArray(tif,direntry,&count,8,&origdata);
if ((err!=TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk)||(origdata==0))
{
*value=0;
return(err);
}
switch (direntry->tdir_type)
{
case TIFF_LONG8:
*value=(uint64*)origdata;
if (tif->tif_flags&TIFF_SWAB)
TIFFSwabArrayOfLong8(*value,count);
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk);
case TIFF_SLONG8:
{
int64* m;
uint32 n;
m=(int64*)origdata;
for (n=0; n<count; n++)
{
if (tif->tif_flags&TIFF_SWAB)
TIFFSwabLong8((uint64*)m);
err=TIFFReadDirEntryCheckRangeLong8Slong8(*m);
if (err!=TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk)
{
_TIFFfree(origdata);
return(err);
}
m++;
}
*value=(uint64*)origdata;
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk);
}
}
data=(uint64*)_TIFFmalloc(count*8);
if (data==0)
{
_TIFFfree(origdata);
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrAlloc);
}
switch (direntry->tdir_type)
{
case TIFF_BYTE:
{
uint8* ma;
uint64* mb;
uint32 n;
ma=(uint8*)origdata;
mb=data;
for (n=0; n<count; n++)
*mb++=(uint64)(*ma++);
}
break;
case TIFF_SBYTE:
{
int8* ma;
uint64* mb;
uint32 n;
ma=(int8*)origdata;
mb=data;
for (n=0; n<count; n++)
{
err=TIFFReadDirEntryCheckRangeLong8Sbyte(*ma);
if (err!=TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk)
break;
*mb++=(uint64)(*ma++);
}
}
break;
case TIFF_SHORT:
{
uint16* ma;
uint64* mb;
uint32 n;
ma=(uint16*)origdata;
mb=data;
for (n=0; n<count; n++)
{
if (tif->tif_flags&TIFF_SWAB)
TIFFSwabShort(ma);
*mb++=(uint64)(*ma++);
}
}
break;
case TIFF_SSHORT:
{
int16* ma;
uint64* mb;
uint32 n;
ma=(int16*)origdata;
mb=data;
for (n=0; n<count; n++)
{
if (tif->tif_flags&TIFF_SWAB)
TIFFSwabShort((uint16*)ma);
err=TIFFReadDirEntryCheckRangeLong8Sshort(*ma);
if (err!=TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk)
break;
*mb++=(uint64)(*ma++);
}
}
break;
case TIFF_LONG:
{
uint32* ma;
uint64* mb;
uint32 n;
ma=(uint32*)origdata;
mb=data;
for (n=0; n<count; n++)
{
if (tif->tif_flags&TIFF_SWAB)
TIFFSwabLong(ma);
*mb++=(uint64)(*ma++);
}
}
break;
case TIFF_SLONG:
{
int32* ma;
uint64* mb;
uint32 n;
ma=(int32*)origdata;
mb=data;
for (n=0; n<count; n++)
{
if (tif->tif_flags&TIFF_SWAB)
TIFFSwabLong((uint32*)ma);
err=TIFFReadDirEntryCheckRangeLong8Slong(*ma);
if (err!=TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk)
break;
*mb++=(uint64)(*ma++);
}
}
break;
}
_TIFFfree(origdata);
if (err!=TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk)
{
_TIFFfree(data);
return(err);
}
*value=data;
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_dirread.c: modify ChopUpSingleUncompressedStrip() to
instanciate compute ntrips as TIFFhowmany_32(td->td_imagelength, rowsperstrip),
instead of a logic based on the total size of data. Which is faulty is
the total size of data is not sufficient to fill the whole image, and thus
results in reading outside of the StripByCounts/StripOffsets arrays when
using TIFFReadScanline().
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2608.
* libtiff/tif_strip.c: revert the change in TIFFNumberOfStrips() done
for http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2587 / CVE-2016-9273 since
the above change is a better fix that makes it unnecessary.
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: GLboolean WebGLRenderingContextBase::isProgram(WebGLProgram* program) {
if (!program || isContextLost())
return 0;
return ContextGL()->IsProgram(program->Object());
}
Commit Message: Validate all incoming WebGLObjects.
A few entry points were missing the correct validation.
Tested with improved conformance tests in
https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2654 .
Bug: 848914
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ib98a61cc5bf378d1b3338b04acd7e1bc4c2fe008
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1086718
Reviewed-by: Kai Ninomiya <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#565016}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: InspectorResourceAgent::InspectorResourceAgent(InspectorPageAgent* pageAgent, InspectorClient* client)
: InspectorBaseAgent<InspectorResourceAgent>("Network")
, m_pageAgent(pageAgent)
, m_client(client)
, m_frontend(0)
, m_resourcesData(adoptPtr(new NetworkResourcesData()))
, m_isRecalculatingStyle(false)
{
}
Commit Message: [4/4] Process clearBrowserCahce/cookies commands in browser.
BUG=366585
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/251183005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172984 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void usbnet_tx_timeout (struct net_device *net)
{
struct usbnet *dev = netdev_priv(net);
unlink_urbs (dev, &dev->txq);
tasklet_schedule (&dev->bh);
/* this needs to be handled individually because the generic layer
* doesn't know what is sufficient and could not restore private
* information if a remedy of an unconditional reset were used.
*/
if (dev->driver_info->recover)
(dev->driver_info->recover)(dev);
}
Commit Message: usbnet: cleanup after bind() in probe()
In case bind() works, but a later error forces bailing
in probe() in error cases work and a timer may be scheduled.
They must be killed. This fixes an error case related to
the double free reported in
http://www.spinics.net/lists/netdev/msg367669.html
and needs to go on top of Linus' fix to cdc-ncm.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void kvm_arch_hardware_disable(void *garbage)
{
}
Commit Message: ARM: KVM: prevent NULL pointer dereferences with KVM VCPU ioctl
Some ARM KVM VCPU ioctls require the vCPU to be properly initialized
with the KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT ioctl before being used with further
requests. KVM_RUN checks whether this initialization has been
done, but other ioctls do not.
Namely KVM_GET_REG_LIST will dereference an array with index -1
without initialization and thus leads to a kernel oops.
Fix this by adding checks before executing the ioctl handlers.
[ Removed superflous comment from static function - Christoffer ]
Changes from v1:
* moved check into a static function with a meaningful name
Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void CrosLibrary::TestApi::SetNetworkLibrary(
NetworkLibrary* library, bool own) {
library_->network_lib_.SetImpl(library, own);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: generic_load_microcode_early(struct microcode_intel **mc_saved_p,
unsigned int mc_saved_count,
struct ucode_cpu_info *uci)
{
struct microcode_intel *ucode_ptr, *new_mc = NULL;
int new_rev = uci->cpu_sig.rev;
enum ucode_state state = UCODE_OK;
unsigned int mc_size;
struct microcode_header_intel *mc_header;
unsigned int csig = uci->cpu_sig.sig;
unsigned int cpf = uci->cpu_sig.pf;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < mc_saved_count; i++) {
ucode_ptr = mc_saved_p[i];
mc_header = (struct microcode_header_intel *)ucode_ptr;
mc_size = get_totalsize(mc_header);
if (get_matching_microcode(csig, cpf, ucode_ptr, new_rev)) {
new_rev = mc_header->rev;
new_mc = ucode_ptr;
}
}
if (!new_mc) {
state = UCODE_NFOUND;
goto out;
}
uci->mc = (struct microcode_intel *)new_mc;
out:
return state;
}
Commit Message: x86/microcode/intel: Guard against stack overflow in the loader
mc_saved_tmp is a static array allocated on the stack, we need to make
sure mc_saved_count stays within its bounds, otherwise we're overflowing
the stack in _save_mc(). A specially crafted microcode header could lead
to a kernel crash or potentially kernel execution.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Casasnovas <[email protected]>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static void set_own_dir(const char *argv0) {
size_t l = strlen(argv0);
while(l && argv0[l - 1] != '/')
l--;
if(l == 0)
memcpy(own_dir, ".", 2);
else {
memcpy(own_dir, argv0, l - 1);
own_dir[l] = 0;
}
}
Commit Message: fix for CVE-2015-3887
closes #60
CWE ID: CWE-426
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void DownloadItemImpl::OnDownloadRenamedToFinalName(
DownloadFileManager* file_manager,
const FilePath& full_path) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
VLOG(20) << __FUNCTION__ << "()"
<< " full_path = \"" << full_path.value() << "\""
<< " needed rename = " << NeedsRename()
<< " " << DebugString(false);
DCHECK(NeedsRename());
if (!full_path.empty()) {
target_path_ = full_path;
SetFullPath(full_path);
delegate_->DownloadRenamedToFinalName(this);
if (delegate_->ShouldOpenDownload(this))
Completed();
else
delegate_delayed_complete_ = true;
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::FILE, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&DownloadFileManager::CompleteDownload,
file_manager, GetGlobalId()));
}
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void DevToolsWindow::StopIndexing(int request_id) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
IndexingJobsMap::iterator it = indexing_jobs_.find(request_id);
if (it == indexing_jobs_.end())
return;
it->second->Stop();
indexing_jobs_.erase(it);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: handle devtools renderer unresponsiveness during beforeunload event interception
This patch fixes the crash which happenes under the following conditions:
1. DevTools window is in undocked state
2. DevTools renderer is unresponsive
3. User attempts to close inspected page
BUG=322380
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/84883002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@237611 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int ext4_split_extent_at(handle_t *handle,
struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_ext_path *path,
ext4_lblk_t split,
int split_flag,
int flags)
{
ext4_fsblk_t newblock;
ext4_lblk_t ee_block;
struct ext4_extent *ex, newex, orig_ex;
struct ext4_extent *ex2 = NULL;
unsigned int ee_len, depth;
int err = 0;
ext_debug("ext4_split_extents_at: inode %lu, logical"
"block %llu\n", inode->i_ino, (unsigned long long)split);
ext4_ext_show_leaf(inode, path);
depth = ext_depth(inode);
ex = path[depth].p_ext;
ee_block = le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block);
ee_len = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex);
newblock = split - ee_block + ext4_ext_pblock(ex);
BUG_ON(split < ee_block || split >= (ee_block + ee_len));
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode, path + depth);
if (err)
goto out;
if (split == ee_block) {
/*
* case b: block @split is the block that the extent begins with
* then we just change the state of the extent, and splitting
* is not needed.
*/
if (split_flag & EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNINIT2)
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(ex);
else
ext4_ext_mark_initialized(ex);
if (!(flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_PRE_IO))
ext4_ext_try_to_merge(handle, inode, path, ex);
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + path->p_depth);
goto out;
}
/* case a */
memcpy(&orig_ex, ex, sizeof(orig_ex));
ex->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(split - ee_block);
if (split_flag & EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNINIT1)
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(ex);
/*
* path may lead to new leaf, not to original leaf any more
* after ext4_ext_insert_extent() returns,
*/
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
ex2 = &newex;
ex2->ee_block = cpu_to_le32(split);
ex2->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(ee_len - (split - ee_block));
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex2, newblock);
if (split_flag & EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNINIT2)
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(ex2);
err = ext4_ext_insert_extent(handle, inode, path, &newex, flags);
if (err == -ENOSPC && (EXT4_EXT_MAY_ZEROOUT & split_flag)) {
err = ext4_ext_zeroout(inode, &orig_ex);
if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
/* update the extent length and mark as initialized */
ex->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(ee_len);
ext4_ext_try_to_merge(handle, inode, path, ex);
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + path->p_depth);
goto out;
} else if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
out:
ext4_ext_show_leaf(inode, path);
return err;
fix_extent_len:
ex->ee_len = orig_ex.ee_len;
ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ext4: race-condition protection for ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio
We assumed that at the time we call ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio()
extent in question is fully inside [map.m_lblk, map->m_len] because
it was already split during submission. But this may not be true due to
a race between writeback vs fallocate.
If extent in question is larger than requested we will split it again.
Special precautions should being done if zeroout required because
[map.m_lblk, map->m_len] already contains valid data.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Monakhov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
CWE ID: CWE-362
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: v8::Local<v8::Value> V8Debugger::collectionEntries(v8::Local<v8::Context> context, v8::Local<v8::Object> object)
{
if (!enabled()) {
NOTREACHED();
return v8::Undefined(m_isolate);
}
v8::Local<v8::Value> argv[] = { object };
v8::Local<v8::Value> entriesValue = callDebuggerMethod("getCollectionEntries", 1, argv).ToLocalChecked();
if (!entriesValue->IsArray())
return v8::Undefined(m_isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Array> entries = entriesValue.As<v8::Array>();
if (!markArrayEntriesAsInternal(context, entries, V8InternalValueType::kEntry))
return v8::Undefined(m_isolate);
if (!entries->SetPrototype(context, v8::Null(m_isolate)).FromMaybe(false))
return v8::Undefined(m_isolate);
return entries;
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
CWE ID: CWE-79
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: unsigned short js_touint16(js_State *J, int idx)
{
return jsV_numbertouint16(jsV_tonumber(J, stackidx(J, idx)));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void ResetVLogInitialized() {
UninitializeStatisticsRecorder();
StatisticsRecorder::is_vlog_initialized_ = false;
}
Commit Message: Remove UMA.CreatePersistentHistogram.Result
This histogram isn't showing anything meaningful and the problems it
could show are better observed by looking at the allocators directly.
Bug: 831013
Change-Id: Ibe968597758230192e53a7675e7390e968c9e5b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1008047
Commit-Queue: Brian White <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexei Svitkine <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#549986}
CWE ID: CWE-264
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: main (int argc,
char **argv)
{
mode_t old_umask;
cleanup_free char *base_path = NULL;
int clone_flags;
char *old_cwd = NULL;
pid_t pid;
int event_fd = -1;
int child_wait_fd = -1;
const char *new_cwd;
uid_t ns_uid;
gid_t ns_gid;
struct stat sbuf;
uint64_t val;
int res UNUSED;
real_uid = getuid ();
real_gid = getgid ();
/* Get the (optional) privileges we need */
acquire_privs ();
/* Never gain any more privs during exec */
if (prctl (PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) < 0)
die_with_error ("prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_CAPS) failed");
/* The initial code is run with high permissions
(i.e. CAP_SYS_ADMIN), so take lots of care. */
read_overflowids ();
argv0 = argv[0];
if (isatty (1))
host_tty_dev = ttyname (1);
argv++;
argc--;
if (argc == 0)
usage (EXIT_FAILURE, stderr);
parse_args (&argc, &argv);
/* We have to do this if we weren't installed setuid (and we're not
* root), so let's just DWIM */
if (!is_privileged && getuid () != 0)
opt_unshare_user = TRUE;
if (opt_unshare_user_try &&
stat ("/proc/self/ns/user", &sbuf) == 0)
{
bool disabled = FALSE;
/* RHEL7 has a kernel module parameter that lets you enable user namespaces */
if (stat ("/sys/module/user_namespace/parameters/enable", &sbuf) == 0)
{
cleanup_free char *enable = NULL;
enable = load_file_at (AT_FDCWD, "/sys/module/user_namespace/parameters/enable");
if (enable != NULL && enable[0] == 'N')
disabled = TRUE;
}
/* Debian lets you disable *unprivileged* user namespaces. However this is not
a problem if we're privileged, and if we're not opt_unshare_user is TRUE
already, and there is not much we can do, its just a non-working setup. */
if (!disabled)
opt_unshare_user = TRUE;
}
if (argc == 0)
usage (EXIT_FAILURE, stderr);
__debug__ (("Creating root mount point\n"));
if (opt_sandbox_uid == -1)
opt_sandbox_uid = real_uid;
if (opt_sandbox_gid == -1)
opt_sandbox_gid = real_gid;
if (!opt_unshare_user && opt_sandbox_uid != real_uid)
die ("Specifying --uid requires --unshare-user");
if (!opt_unshare_user && opt_sandbox_gid != real_gid)
die ("Specifying --gid requires --unshare-user");
if (!opt_unshare_uts && opt_sandbox_hostname != NULL)
die ("Specifying --hostname requires --unshare-uts");
/* We need to read stuff from proc during the pivot_root dance, etc.
Lets keep a fd to it open */
proc_fd = open ("/proc", O_RDONLY | O_PATH);
if (proc_fd == -1)
die_with_error ("Can't open /proc");
/* We need *some* mountpoint where we can mount the root tmpfs.
We first try in /run, and if that fails, try in /tmp. */
base_path = xasprintf ("/run/user/%d/.bubblewrap", real_uid);
if (mkdir (base_path, 0755) && errno != EEXIST)
{
free (base_path);
base_path = xasprintf ("/tmp/.bubblewrap-%d", real_uid);
if (mkdir (base_path, 0755) && errno != EEXIST)
die_with_error ("Creating root mountpoint failed");
}
__debug__ (("creating new namespace\n"));
if (opt_unshare_pid)
{
event_fd = eventfd (0, EFD_CLOEXEC | EFD_NONBLOCK);
if (event_fd == -1)
die_with_error ("eventfd()");
}
/* We block sigchild here so that we can use signalfd in the monitor. */
block_sigchild ();
clone_flags = SIGCHLD | CLONE_NEWNS;
if (opt_unshare_user)
clone_flags |= CLONE_NEWUSER;
if (opt_unshare_pid)
clone_flags |= CLONE_NEWPID;
if (opt_unshare_net)
clone_flags |= CLONE_NEWNET;
if (opt_unshare_ipc)
clone_flags |= CLONE_NEWIPC;
if (opt_unshare_uts)
clone_flags |= CLONE_NEWUTS;
if (opt_unshare_cgroup)
{
if (stat ("/proc/self/ns/cgroup", &sbuf))
{
if (errno == ENOENT)
die ("Cannot create new cgroup namespace because the kernel does not support it");
else
die_with_error ("stat on /proc/self/ns/cgroup failed");
}
clone_flags |= CLONE_NEWCGROUP;
}
if (opt_unshare_cgroup_try)
if (!stat ("/proc/self/ns/cgroup", &sbuf))
clone_flags |= CLONE_NEWCGROUP;
child_wait_fd = eventfd (0, EFD_CLOEXEC);
if (child_wait_fd == -1)
die_with_error ("eventfd()");
pid = raw_clone (clone_flags, NULL);
if (pid == -1)
{
if (opt_unshare_user)
{
if (errno == EINVAL)
die ("Creating new namespace failed, likely because the kernel does not support user namespaces. bwrap must be installed setuid on such systems.");
else if (errno == EPERM && !is_privileged)
die ("No permissions to creating new namespace, likely because the kernel does not allow non-privileged user namespaces. On e.g. debian this can be enabled with 'sysctl kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone=1'.");
}
die_with_error ("Creating new namespace failed");
}
ns_uid = opt_sandbox_uid;
ns_gid = opt_sandbox_gid;
if (pid != 0)
{
/* Parent, outside sandbox, privileged (initially) */
if (is_privileged && opt_unshare_user)
{
/* We're running as euid 0, but the uid we want to map is
* not 0. This means we're not allowed to write this from
* the child user namespace, so we do it from the parent.
*
* Also, we map uid/gid 0 in the namespace (to overflowuid)
* if opt_needs_devpts is true, because otherwise the mount
* of devpts fails due to root not being mapped.
*/
write_uid_gid_map (ns_uid, real_uid,
ns_gid, real_gid,
pid, TRUE, opt_needs_devpts);
}
/* Initial launched process, wait for exec:ed command to exit */
/* We don't need any privileges in the launcher, drop them immediately. */
drop_privs ();
/* Let child run now that the uid maps are set up */
val = 1;
res = write (child_wait_fd, &val, 8);
/* Ignore res, if e.g. the child died and closed child_wait_fd we don't want to error out here */
close (child_wait_fd);
if (opt_info_fd != -1)
{
cleanup_free char *output = xasprintf ("{\n \"child-pid\": %i\n}\n", pid);
size_t len = strlen (output);
if (write (opt_info_fd, output, len) != len)
die_with_error ("Write to info_fd");
close (opt_info_fd);
}
monitor_child (event_fd);
exit (0); /* Should not be reached, but better safe... */
}
/* Child, in sandbox, privileged in the parent or in the user namespace (if --unshare-user).
*
* Note that for user namespaces we run as euid 0 during clone(), so
* the child user namespace is owned by euid 0., This means that the
* regular user namespace parent (with uid != 0) doesn't have any
* capabilities in it, which is nice as we can't exploit those. In
* particular the parent user namespace doesn't have CAP_PTRACE
* which would otherwise allow the parent to hijack of the child
* after this point.
*
* Unfortunately this also means you can't ptrace the final
* sandboxed process from outside the sandbox either.
*/
if (opt_info_fd != -1)
close (opt_info_fd);
/* Wait for the parent to init uid/gid maps and drop caps */
res = read (child_wait_fd, &val, 8);
close (child_wait_fd);
/* At this point we can completely drop root uid, but retain the
* required permitted caps. This allow us to do full setup as
* the user uid, which makes e.g. fuse access work.
*/
switch_to_user_with_privs ();
if (opt_unshare_net && loopback_setup () != 0)
die ("Can't create loopback device");
ns_uid = opt_sandbox_uid;
ns_gid = opt_sandbox_gid;
if (!is_privileged && opt_unshare_user)
{
/* In the unprivileged case we have to write the uid/gid maps in
* the child, because we have no caps in the parent */
if (opt_needs_devpts)
{
/* This is a bit hacky, but we need to first map the real uid/gid to
0, otherwise we can't mount the devpts filesystem because root is
not mapped. Later we will create another child user namespace and
map back to the real uid */
ns_uid = 0;
ns_gid = 0;
}
write_uid_gid_map (ns_uid, real_uid,
ns_gid, real_gid,
-1, TRUE, FALSE);
}
old_umask = umask (0);
/* Need to do this before the chroot, but after we're the real uid */
resolve_symlinks_in_ops ();
/* Mark everything as slave, so that we still
* receive mounts from the real root, but don't
* propagate mounts to the real root. */
if (mount (NULL, "/", NULL, MS_SLAVE | MS_REC, NULL) < 0)
die_with_error ("Failed to make / slave");
/* Create a tmpfs which we will use as / in the namespace */
if (mount ("", base_path, "tmpfs", MS_NODEV | MS_NOSUID, NULL) != 0)
die_with_error ("Failed to mount tmpfs");
old_cwd = get_current_dir_name ();
/* Chdir to the new root tmpfs mount. This will be the CWD during
the entire setup. Access old or new root via "oldroot" and "newroot". */
if (chdir (base_path) != 0)
die_with_error ("chdir base_path");
/* We create a subdir "$base_path/newroot" for the new root, that
* way we can pivot_root to base_path, and put the old root at
* "$base_path/oldroot". This avoids problems accessing the oldroot
* dir if the user requested to bind mount something over / */
if (mkdir ("newroot", 0755))
die_with_error ("Creating newroot failed");
if (mkdir ("oldroot", 0755))
die_with_error ("Creating oldroot failed");
if (pivot_root (base_path, "oldroot"))
die_with_error ("pivot_root");
if (chdir ("/") != 0)
die_with_error ("chdir / (base path)");
if (is_privileged)
{
pid_t child;
int privsep_sockets[2];
if (socketpair (AF_UNIX, SOCK_SEQPACKET | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0, privsep_sockets) != 0)
die_with_error ("Can't create privsep socket");
child = fork ();
if (child == -1)
die_with_error ("Can't fork unprivileged helper");
if (child == 0)
{
/* Unprivileged setup process */
drop_privs ();
close (privsep_sockets[0]);
setup_newroot (opt_unshare_pid, privsep_sockets[1]);
exit (0);
}
else
{
int status;
uint32_t buffer[2048]; /* 8k, but is int32 to guarantee nice alignment */
uint32_t op, flags;
const char *arg1, *arg2;
cleanup_fd int unpriv_socket = -1;
unpriv_socket = privsep_sockets[0];
close (privsep_sockets[1]);
do
{
op = read_priv_sec_op (unpriv_socket, buffer, sizeof (buffer),
&flags, &arg1, &arg2);
privileged_op (-1, op, flags, arg1, arg2);
if (write (unpriv_socket, buffer, 1) != 1)
die ("Can't write to op_socket");
}
while (op != PRIV_SEP_OP_DONE);
waitpid (child, &status, 0);
/* Continue post setup */
}
}
else
{
setup_newroot (opt_unshare_pid, -1);
}
/* The old root better be rprivate or we will send unmount events to the parent namespace */
if (mount ("oldroot", "oldroot", NULL, MS_REC | MS_PRIVATE, NULL) != 0)
die_with_error ("Failed to make old root rprivate");
if (umount2 ("oldroot", MNT_DETACH))
die_with_error ("unmount old root");
if (opt_unshare_user &&
(ns_uid != opt_sandbox_uid || ns_gid != opt_sandbox_gid))
{
/* Now that devpts is mounted and we've no need for mount
permissions we can create a new userspace and map our uid
1:1 */
if (unshare (CLONE_NEWUSER))
die_with_error ("unshare user ns");
write_uid_gid_map (opt_sandbox_uid, ns_uid,
opt_sandbox_gid, ns_gid,
-1, FALSE, FALSE);
}
/* Now make /newroot the real root */
if (chdir ("/newroot") != 0)
die_with_error ("chdir newroot");
if (chroot ("/newroot") != 0)
die_with_error ("chroot /newroot");
if (chdir ("/") != 0)
die_with_error ("chdir /");
/* All privileged ops are done now, so drop it */
drop_privs ();
if (opt_block_fd != -1)
{
char b[1];
read (opt_block_fd, b, 1);
close (opt_block_fd);
}
if (opt_seccomp_fd != -1)
{
cleanup_free char *seccomp_data = NULL;
size_t seccomp_len;
struct sock_fprog prog;
seccomp_data = load_file_data (opt_seccomp_fd, &seccomp_len);
if (seccomp_data == NULL)
die_with_error ("Can't read seccomp data");
if (seccomp_len % 8 != 0)
die ("Invalid seccomp data, must be multiple of 8");
prog.len = seccomp_len / 8;
prog.filter = (struct sock_filter *) seccomp_data;
close (opt_seccomp_fd);
if (prctl (PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog) != 0)
die_with_error ("prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP)");
}
umask (old_umask);
new_cwd = "/";
if (opt_chdir_path)
{
if (chdir (opt_chdir_path))
die_with_error ("Can't chdir to %s", opt_chdir_path);
new_cwd = opt_chdir_path;
}
else if (chdir (old_cwd) == 0)
{
/* If the old cwd is mapped in the sandbox, go there */
new_cwd = old_cwd;
}
else
{
/* If the old cwd is not mapped, go to home */
const char *home = getenv ("HOME");
if (home != NULL &&
chdir (home) == 0)
new_cwd = home;
}
xsetenv ("PWD", new_cwd, 1);
free (old_cwd);
__debug__ (("forking for child\n"));
if (opt_unshare_pid || lock_files != NULL || opt_sync_fd != -1)
{
/* We have to have a pid 1 in the pid namespace, because
* otherwise we'll get a bunch of zombies as nothing reaps
* them. Alternatively if we're using sync_fd or lock_files we
* need some process to own these.
*/
pid = fork ();
if (pid == -1)
die_with_error ("Can't fork for pid 1");
if (pid != 0)
{
/* Close fds in pid 1, except stdio and optionally event_fd
(for syncing pid 2 lifetime with monitor_child) and
opt_sync_fd (for syncing sandbox lifetime with outside
process).
Any other fds will been passed on to the child though. */
{
int dont_close[3];
int j = 0;
if (event_fd != -1)
dont_close[j++] = event_fd;
if (opt_sync_fd != -1)
dont_close[j++] = opt_sync_fd;
dont_close[j++] = -1;
fdwalk (proc_fd, close_extra_fds, dont_close);
}
return do_init (event_fd, pid);
}
}
__debug__ (("launch executable %s\n", argv[0]));
if (proc_fd != -1)
close (proc_fd);
if (opt_sync_fd != -1)
close (opt_sync_fd);
/* We want sigchild in the child */
unblock_sigchild ();
if (label_exec (opt_exec_label) == -1)
die_with_error ("label_exec %s", argv[0]);
if (execvp (argv[0], argv) == -1)
die_with_error ("execvp %s", argv[0]);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Call setsid() before executing sandboxed code (CVE-2017-5226)
This prevents the sandboxed code from getting a controlling tty,
which in turn prevents it from accessing the TIOCSTI ioctl and hence
faking terminal input.
Fixes: #142
Closes: #143
Approved by: cgwalters
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: FLAC__StreamDecoderTellStatus FLACParser::tell_callback(
const FLAC__StreamDecoder * /* decoder */,
FLAC__uint64 *absolute_byte_offset, void *client_data)
{
return ((FLACParser *) client_data)->tellCallback(absolute_byte_offset);
}
Commit Message: FLACExtractor: copy protect mWriteBuffer
Bug: 30895578
Change-Id: I4cba36bbe3502678210e5925181683df9726b431
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void ProcessStateChangesPlanB(WebRtcSetDescriptionObserver::States states) {
DCHECK_EQ(sdp_semantics_, webrtc::SdpSemantics::kPlanB);
std::vector<RTCRtpReceiver*> removed_receivers;
for (auto it = handler_->rtp_receivers_.begin();
it != handler_->rtp_receivers_.end(); ++it) {
if (ReceiverWasRemoved(*(*it), states.transceiver_states))
removed_receivers.push_back(it->get());
}
for (auto& transceiver_state : states.transceiver_states) {
if (ReceiverWasAdded(transceiver_state)) {
handler_->OnAddReceiverPlanB(transceiver_state.MoveReceiverState());
}
}
for (auto* removed_receiver : removed_receivers) {
handler_->OnRemoveReceiverPlanB(RTCRtpReceiver::getId(
removed_receiver->state().webrtc_receiver().get()));
}
}
Commit Message: Check weak pointers in RTCPeerConnectionHandler::WebRtcSetDescriptionObserverImpl
Bug: 912074
Change-Id: I8ba86751f5d5bf12db51520f985ef0d3dae63ed8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1411916
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#622945}
CWE ID: CWE-416
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: ShellContentUtilityClient::ShellContentUtilityClient() {
if (base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->GetSwitchValueASCII(
switches::kProcessType) == switches::kUtilityProcess)
network_service_test_helper_ = std::make_unique<NetworkServiceTestHelper>();
}
Commit Message: Fix content_shell with network service enabled not loading pages.
This regressed in my earlier cl r528763.
This is a reland of r547221.
Bug: 833612
Change-Id: I4c2649414d42773f2530e1abe5912a04fcd0ed9b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1064702
Reviewed-by: Jay Civelli <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560011}
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int muscle_delete_mscfs_file(sc_card_t *card, mscfs_file_t *file_data)
{
mscfs_t *fs = MUSCLE_FS(card);
msc_id id = file_data->objectId;
u8* oid = id.id;
int r;
if(!file_data->ef) {
int x;
mscfs_file_t *childFile;
/* Delete children */
mscfs_check_cache(fs);
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"DELETING Children of: %02X%02X%02X%02X\n",
oid[0],oid[1],oid[2],oid[3]);
for(x = 0; x < fs->cache.size; x++) {
msc_id objectId;
childFile = &fs->cache.array[x];
objectId = childFile->objectId;
if(0 == memcmp(oid + 2, objectId.id, 2)) {
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"DELETING: %02X%02X%02X%02X\n",
objectId.id[0],objectId.id[1],
objectId.id[2],objectId.id[3]);
r = muscle_delete_mscfs_file(card, childFile);
if(r < 0) SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE,r);
}
}
oid[0] = oid[2];
oid[1] = oid[3];
oid[2] = oid[3] = 0;
/* ??? objectId = objectId >> 16; */
}
if((0 == memcmp(oid, "\x3F\x00\x00\x00", 4))
|| (0 == memcmp(oid, "\x3F\x00\x3F\x00", 4))) {
}
r = msc_delete_object(card, id, 1);
/* Check if its the root... this file generally is virtual
* So don't return an error if it fails */
if((0 == memcmp(oid, "\x3F\x00\x00\x00", 4))
|| (0 == memcmp(oid, "\x3F\x00\x3F\x00", 4)))
return 0;
if(r < 0) {
printf("ID: %02X%02X%02X%02X\n",
oid[0],oid[1],oid[2],oid[3]);
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE,r);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: bool RenderFrameImpl::UniqueNameFrameAdapter::IsCandidateUnique(
base::StringPiece name) const {
DCHECK(!name.empty());
for (blink::WebFrame* frame = GetWebFrame()->Top(); frame;
frame = frame->TraverseNext()) {
if (UniqueNameForWebFrame(frame) == name)
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: produce_output()
{
char *str;
FILE *mailer;
MyString subject,szTmp;
subject.sprintf("condor_preen results %s: %d old file%s found",
my_full_hostname(), BadFiles->number(),
(BadFiles->number() > 1)?"s":"");
if( MailFlag ) {
if( (mailer=email_open(PreenAdmin, subject.Value())) == NULL ) {
EXCEPT( "Can't do email_open(\"%s\", \"%s\")\n",PreenAdmin,subject.Value());
}
} else {
mailer = stdout;
}
szTmp.sprintf("The condor_preen process has found the following stale condor files on <%s>:\n\n", get_local_hostname().Value());
dprintf(D_ALWAYS, szTmp.Value());
if( MailFlag ) {
fprintf( mailer, "\n" );
fprintf( mailer, szTmp.Value());
}
for( BadFiles->rewind(); (str = BadFiles->next()); ) {
szTmp.sprintf(" %s\n", str);
dprintf(D_ALWAYS, szTmp.Value() );
fprintf( mailer, szTmp.Value() );
}
if( MailFlag ) {
const char *explanation = "\n\nWhat is condor_preen?\n\n"
"The condor_preen tool examines the directories belonging to Condor, and\n"
"removes extraneous files and directories which may be left over from Condor\n"
"processes which terminated abnormally either due to internal errors or a\n"
"system crash. The directories checked are the LOG, EXECUTE, and SPOOL\n"
"directories as defined in the Condor configuration files. The condor_preen\n"
"tool is intended to be run as user root (or user condor) periodically as a\n"
"backup method to ensure reasonable file system cleanliness in the face of\n"
"errors. This is done automatically by default by the condor_master daemon.\n"
"It may also be explicitly invoked on an as needed basis.\n\n"
"See the Condor manual section on condor_preen for more details.\n";
fprintf( mailer, "%s\n", explanation );
email_close( mailer );
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: bool CSSPaintValue::Equals(const CSSPaintValue& other) const {
return GetName() == other.GetName() &&
CustomCSSText() == other.CustomCSSText();
}
Commit Message: [PaintWorklet] Do not paint when paint target is associated with a link
When the target element of a paint worklet has an associated link, then
the 'paint' function will be invoked when the link's href is changed
from a visited URL to an unvisited URL (or vice versa).
This CL changes the behavior by detecting whether the target element
of a paint worklet has an associated link or not. If it does, then don't
paint.
[email protected]
Bug: 835589
Change-Id: I5fdf85685f863c960a6f48cc9a345dda787bece1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1035524
Reviewed-by: Xida Chen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ian Kilpatrick <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stephen McGruer <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Xida Chen <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#555788}
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: io_set_process_status(mrb_state *mrb, pid_t pid, int status)
{
struct RClass *c_process, *c_status;
mrb_value v;
c_status = NULL;
if (mrb_class_defined(mrb, "Process")) {
c_process = mrb_module_get(mrb, "Process");
if (mrb_const_defined(mrb, mrb_obj_value(c_process), mrb_intern_cstr(mrb, "Status"))) {
c_status = mrb_class_get_under(mrb, c_process, "Status");
}
}
if (c_status != NULL) {
v = mrb_funcall(mrb, mrb_obj_value(c_status), "new", 2, mrb_fixnum_value(pid), mrb_fixnum_value(status));
} else {
v = mrb_fixnum_value(WEXITSTATUS(status));
}
mrb_gv_set(mrb, mrb_intern_cstr(mrb, "$?"), v);
}
Commit Message: Fix `use after free in File#initilialize_copy`; fix #4001
The bug and the fix were reported by https://hackerone.com/pnoltof
CWE ID: CWE-416
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int _gd2GetHeader(gdIOCtxPtr in, int *sx, int *sy, int *cs, int *vers, int *fmt, int *ncx, int *ncy, t_chunk_info ** chunkIdx)
{
int i;
int ch;
char id[5];
t_chunk_info *cidx;
int sidx;
int nc;
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Reading gd2 header info"));
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
ch = gdGetC(in);
if (ch == EOF) {
goto fail1;
}
id[i] = ch;
}
id[4] = 0;
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Got file code: %s", id));
/* Equiv. of 'magick'. */
if (strcmp(id, GD2_ID) != 0) {
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Not a valid gd2 file"));
goto fail1;
}
/* Version */
if (gdGetWord(vers, in) != 1) {
goto fail1;
}
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Version: %d", *vers));
if ((*vers != 1) && (*vers != 2)) {
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Bad version: %d", *vers));
goto fail1;
}
/* Image Size */
if (!gdGetWord(sx, in)) {
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Could not get x-size"));
goto fail1;
}
if (!gdGetWord(sy, in)) {
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Could not get y-size"));
goto fail1;
}
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Image is %dx%d", *sx, *sy));
/* Chunk Size (pixels, not bytes!) */
if (gdGetWord(cs, in) != 1) {
goto fail1;
}
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("ChunkSize: %d", *cs));
if ((*cs < GD2_CHUNKSIZE_MIN) || (*cs > GD2_CHUNKSIZE_MAX)) {
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Bad chunk size: %d", *cs));
goto fail1;
}
/* Data Format */
if (gdGetWord(fmt, in) != 1) {
goto fail1;
}
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Format: %d", *fmt));
if ((*fmt != GD2_FMT_RAW) && (*fmt != GD2_FMT_COMPRESSED) && (*fmt != GD2_FMT_TRUECOLOR_RAW) && (*fmt != GD2_FMT_TRUECOLOR_COMPRESSED)) {
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Bad data format: %d", *fmt));
goto fail1;
}
/* # of chunks wide */
if (gdGetWord(ncx, in) != 1) {
goto fail1;
}
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("%d Chunks Wide", *ncx));
/* # of chunks high */
if (gdGetWord(ncy, in) != 1) {
goto fail1;
}
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("%d Chunks vertically", *ncy));
if (gd2_compressed(*fmt)) {
nc = (*ncx) * (*ncy);
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Reading %d chunk index entries", nc));
sidx = sizeof(t_chunk_info) * nc;
if (sidx <= 0) {
goto fail1;
}
cidx = gdCalloc(sidx, 1);
for (i = 0; i < nc; i++) {
if (gdGetInt(&cidx[i].offset, in) != 1) {
gdFree(cidx);
goto fail1;
}
if (gdGetInt(&cidx[i].size, in) != 1) {
gdFree(cidx);
goto fail1;
}
if (cidx[i].offset < 0 || cidx[i].size < 0) {
gdFree(cidx);
goto fail1;
}
}
*chunkIdx = cidx;
}
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("gd2 header complete"));
return 1;
fail1:
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed #72339 Integer Overflow in _gd2GetHeader() resulting in heap overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void InspectorNetworkAgent::DetachClientRequest(
ThreadableLoaderClient* client) {
if (pending_request_ == client) {
pending_request_ = nullptr;
if (pending_request_type_ == InspectorPageAgent::kXHRResource) {
pending_xhr_replay_data_.Clear();
}
}
known_request_id_map_.erase(client);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<DocumentParser> Document::implicitOpen(ParserSynchronizationPolicy parserSyncPolicy)
{
cancelParsing();
removeChildren();
ASSERT(!m_focusedElement);
setCompatibilityMode(NoQuirksMode);
m_parserSyncPolicy = parserSyncPolicy;
m_parser = createParser();
setParsingState(Parsing);
setReadyState(Loading);
return m_parser;
}
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-254
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: int ext4_collapse_range(struct inode *inode, loff_t offset, loff_t len)
{
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
ext4_lblk_t punch_start, punch_stop;
handle_t *handle;
unsigned int credits;
loff_t new_size, ioffset;
int ret;
/*
* We need to test this early because xfstests assumes that a
* collapse range of (0, 1) will return EOPNOTSUPP if the file
* system does not support collapse range.
*/
if (!ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
/* Collapse range works only on fs block size aligned offsets. */
if (offset & (EXT4_CLUSTER_SIZE(sb) - 1) ||
len & (EXT4_CLUSTER_SIZE(sb) - 1))
return -EINVAL;
if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return -EINVAL;
trace_ext4_collapse_range(inode, offset, len);
punch_start = offset >> EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb);
punch_stop = (offset + len) >> EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb);
/* Call ext4_force_commit to flush all data in case of data=journal. */
if (ext4_should_journal_data(inode)) {
ret = ext4_force_commit(inode->i_sb);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
/*
* Need to round down offset to be aligned with page size boundary
* for page size > block size.
*/
ioffset = round_down(offset, PAGE_SIZE);
/* Write out all dirty pages */
ret = filemap_write_and_wait_range(inode->i_mapping, ioffset,
LLONG_MAX);
if (ret)
return ret;
/* Take mutex lock */
mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
/*
* There is no need to overlap collapse range with EOF, in which case
* it is effectively a truncate operation
*/
if (offset + len >= i_size_read(inode)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_mutex;
}
/* Currently just for extent based files */
if (!ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS)) {
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out_mutex;
}
truncate_pagecache(inode, ioffset);
/* Wait for existing dio to complete */
ext4_inode_block_unlocked_dio(inode);
inode_dio_wait(inode);
credits = ext4_writepage_trans_blocks(inode);
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, EXT4_HT_TRUNCATE, credits);
if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(handle);
goto out_dio;
}
down_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
ext4_discard_preallocations(inode);
ret = ext4_es_remove_extent(inode, punch_start,
EXT_MAX_BLOCKS - punch_start);
if (ret) {
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
goto out_stop;
}
ret = ext4_ext_remove_space(inode, punch_start, punch_stop - 1);
if (ret) {
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
goto out_stop;
}
ext4_discard_preallocations(inode);
ret = ext4_ext_shift_extents(inode, handle, punch_stop,
punch_stop - punch_start, SHIFT_LEFT);
if (ret) {
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
goto out_stop;
}
new_size = i_size_read(inode) - len;
i_size_write(inode, new_size);
EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize = new_size;
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
if (IS_SYNC(inode))
ext4_handle_sync(handle);
inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = ext4_current_time(inode);
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
out_stop:
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
out_dio:
ext4_inode_resume_unlocked_dio(inode);
out_mutex:
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int do_maps_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,
const struct seq_operations *ops)
{
return proc_maps_open(inode, file, ops,
sizeof(struct proc_maps_private));
}
Commit Message: pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace
As pointed by recent post[1] on exploiting DRAM physical imperfection,
/proc/PID/pagemap exposes sensitive information which can be used to do
attacks.
This disallows anybody without CAP_SYS_ADMIN to read the pagemap.
[1] http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/03/exploiting-dram-rowhammer-bug-to-gain.html
[ Eventually we might want to do anything more finegrained, but for now
this is the simple model. - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Seaborn <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType SetImageProfile(Image *image,const char *name,
const StringInfo *profile,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
return(SetImageProfileInternal(image,name,profile,MagickFalse,exception));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/280
CWE ID: CWE-125
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: ft_var_readpackedpoints( FT_Stream stream,
FT_UInt *point_cnt )
{
FT_UShort *points;
FT_Int n;
FT_Int runcnt;
FT_Int i;
FT_Int j;
FT_Int first;
FT_Memory memory = stream->memory;
FT_Error error = TT_Err_Ok;
FT_UNUSED( error );
*point_cnt = n = FT_GET_BYTE();
if ( n == 0 )
return ALL_POINTS;
if ( n & GX_PT_POINTS_ARE_WORDS )
n = FT_GET_BYTE() | ( ( n & GX_PT_POINT_RUN_COUNT_MASK ) << 8 );
if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( points, n ) )
return NULL;
i = 0;
while ( i < n )
{
runcnt = FT_GET_BYTE();
if ( runcnt & GX_PT_POINTS_ARE_WORDS )
{
runcnt = runcnt & GX_PT_POINT_RUN_COUNT_MASK;
first = points[i++] = FT_GET_USHORT();
if ( runcnt < 1 )
goto Exit;
/* first point not included in runcount */
for ( j = 0; j < runcnt; ++j )
points[i++] = (FT_UShort)( first += FT_GET_USHORT() );
}
else
{
first = points[i++] = FT_GET_BYTE();
if ( runcnt < 1 )
goto Exit;
for ( j = 0; j < runcnt; ++j )
points[i++] = (FT_UShort)( first += FT_GET_BYTE() );
}
}
Exit:
return points;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: QuarantineLinuxTest()
: source_url_("http://www.source.com"),
referrer_url_("http://www.referrer.com"),
is_xattr_supported_(false) {}
Commit Message: Disable setxattr calls from quarantine subsystem on Chrome OS.
BUG=733943
Change-Id: I6e743469a8dc91536e180ecf4ff0df0cf427037c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1380571
Commit-Queue: Will Harris <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Thiemo Nagel <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#617961}
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: bool LoadsFromCacheOnly(const ResourceRequest& request) {
switch (request.GetCachePolicy()) {
case WebCachePolicy::kUseProtocolCachePolicy:
case WebCachePolicy::kValidatingCacheData:
case WebCachePolicy::kBypassingCache:
case WebCachePolicy::kReturnCacheDataElseLoad:
return false;
case WebCachePolicy::kReturnCacheDataDontLoad:
case WebCachePolicy::kReturnCacheDataIfValid:
case WebCachePolicy::kBypassCacheLoadOnlyFromCache:
return true;
}
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: ContentEncoding::~ContentEncoding() {
ContentCompression** comp_i = compression_entries_;
ContentCompression** const comp_j = compression_entries_end_;
while (comp_i != comp_j) {
ContentCompression* const comp = *comp_i++;
delete comp;
}
delete [] compression_entries_;
ContentEncryption** enc_i = encryption_entries_;
ContentEncryption** const enc_j = encryption_entries_end_;
while (enc_i != enc_j) {
ContentEncryption* const enc = *enc_i++;
delete enc;
}
delete [] encryption_entries_;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: hook_fd_set (fd_set *read_fds, fd_set *write_fds, fd_set *exception_fds)
{
struct t_hook *ptr_hook;
int max_fd;
max_fd = 0;
for (ptr_hook = weechat_hooks[HOOK_TYPE_FD]; ptr_hook;
ptr_hook = ptr_hook->next_hook)
{
if (!ptr_hook->deleted)
{
/* skip invalid file descriptors */
if ((fcntl (HOOK_FD(ptr_hook,fd), F_GETFD) == -1)
&& (errno == EBADF))
{
if (HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, error) == 0)
{
HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, error) = errno;
gui_chat_printf (NULL,
_("%sError: bad file descriptor (%d) "
"used in hook_fd"),
gui_chat_prefix[GUI_CHAT_PREFIX_ERROR],
HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, fd));
}
}
else
{
if (HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, flags) & HOOK_FD_FLAG_READ)
{
FD_SET (HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, fd), read_fds);
if (HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, fd) > max_fd)
max_fd = HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, fd);
}
if (HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, flags) & HOOK_FD_FLAG_WRITE)
{
FD_SET (HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, fd), write_fds);
if (HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, fd) > max_fd)
max_fd = HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, fd);
}
if (HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, flags) & HOOK_FD_FLAG_EXCEPTION)
{
FD_SET (HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, fd), exception_fds);
if (HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, fd) > max_fd)
max_fd = HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, fd);
}
}
}
}
return max_fd;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static bool ExecuteMoveToBeginningOfParagraphAndModifySelection(
LocalFrame& frame,
Event*,
EditorCommandSource,
const String&) {
frame.Selection().Modify(
SelectionModifyAlteration::kExtend, SelectionModifyDirection::kBackward,
TextGranularity::kParagraphBoundary, SetSelectionBy::kUser);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID:
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: ssize_t nbd_receive_reply(QIOChannel *ioc, NBDReply *reply)
{
uint8_t buf[NBD_REPLY_SIZE];
uint32_t magic;
ssize_t ret;
ret = read_sync(ioc, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (ret < 0) {
return ret;
}
if (ret != sizeof(buf)) {
LOG("read failed");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* Reply
[ 0 .. 3] magic (NBD_REPLY_MAGIC)
[ 4 .. 7] error (0 == no error)
[ 7 .. 15] handle
*/
magic = ldl_be_p(buf);
reply->error = ldl_be_p(buf + 4);
reply->handle = ldq_be_p(buf + 8);
reply->error = nbd_errno_to_system_errno(reply->error);
if (reply->error == ESHUTDOWN) {
/* This works even on mingw which lacks a native ESHUTDOWN */
LOG("server shutting down");
return -EINVAL;
}
TRACE("Got reply: { magic = 0x%" PRIx32 ", .error = % " PRId32
", handle = %" PRIu64" }",
magic, reply->error, reply->handle);
if (magic != NBD_REPLY_MAGIC) {
LOG("invalid magic (got 0x%" PRIx32 ")", magic);
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void __init evm_init_config(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_EVM_ATTR_FSUUID
evm_hmac_attrs |= EVM_ATTR_FSUUID;
#endif
pr_info("HMAC attrs: 0x%x\n", evm_hmac_attrs);
}
Commit Message: EVM: Use crypto_memneq() for digest comparisons
This patch fixes vulnerability CVE-2016-2085. The problem exists
because the vm_verify_hmac() function includes a use of memcmp().
Unfortunately, this allows timing side channel attacks; specifically
a MAC forgery complexity drop from 2^128 to 2^12. This patch changes
the memcmp() to the cryptographically safe crypto_memneq().
Reported-by: Xiaofei Rex Guo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ryan Ware <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-19
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: xmlParseAttValueComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int *attlen, int normalize) {
xmlChar limit = 0;
xmlChar *buf = NULL;
xmlChar *rep = NULL;
int len = 0;
int buf_size = 0;
int c, l, in_space = 0;
xmlChar *current = NULL;
xmlEntityPtr ent;
if (NXT(0) == '"') {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE;
limit = '"';
NEXT;
} else if (NXT(0) == '\'') {
limit = '\'';
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE;
NEXT;
} else {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_NOT_STARTED, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
/*
* allocate a translation buffer.
*/
buf_size = XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE;
buf = (xmlChar *) xmlMallocAtomic(buf_size * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (buf == NULL) goto mem_error;
/*
* OK loop until we reach one of the ending char or a size limit.
*/
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
while ((NXT(0) != limit) && /* checked */
(IS_CHAR(c)) && (c != '<')) {
if (c == 0) break;
if (c == '&') {
in_space = 0;
if (NXT(1) == '#') {
int val = xmlParseCharRef(ctxt);
if (val == '&') {
if (ctxt->replaceEntities) {
if (len > buf_size - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, 10);
}
buf[len++] = '&';
} else {
/*
* The reparsing will be done in xmlStringGetNodeList()
* called by the attribute() function in SAX.c
*/
if (len > buf_size - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, 10);
}
buf[len++] = '&';
buf[len++] = '#';
buf[len++] = '3';
buf[len++] = '8';
buf[len++] = ';';
}
} else if (val != 0) {
if (len > buf_size - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, 10);
}
len += xmlCopyChar(0, &buf[len], val);
}
} else {
ent = xmlParseEntityRef(ctxt);
ctxt->nbentities++;
if (ent != NULL)
ctxt->nbentities += ent->owner;
if ((ent != NULL) &&
(ent->etype == XML_INTERNAL_PREDEFINED_ENTITY)) {
if (len > buf_size - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, 10);
}
if ((ctxt->replaceEntities == 0) &&
(ent->content[0] == '&')) {
buf[len++] = '&';
buf[len++] = '#';
buf[len++] = '3';
buf[len++] = '8';
buf[len++] = ';';
} else {
buf[len++] = ent->content[0];
}
} else if ((ent != NULL) &&
(ctxt->replaceEntities != 0)) {
if (ent->etype != XML_INTERNAL_PREDEFINED_ENTITY) {
rep = xmlStringDecodeEntities(ctxt, ent->content,
XML_SUBSTITUTE_REF,
0, 0, 0);
if (rep != NULL) {
current = rep;
while (*current != 0) { /* non input consuming */
if ((*current == 0xD) || (*current == 0xA) ||
(*current == 0x9)) {
buf[len++] = 0x20;
current++;
} else
buf[len++] = *current++;
if (len > buf_size - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, 10);
}
}
xmlFree(rep);
rep = NULL;
}
} else {
if (len > buf_size - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, 10);
}
if (ent->content != NULL)
buf[len++] = ent->content[0];
}
} else if (ent != NULL) {
int i = xmlStrlen(ent->name);
const xmlChar *cur = ent->name;
/*
* This may look absurd but is needed to detect
* entities problems
*/
if ((ent->etype != XML_INTERNAL_PREDEFINED_ENTITY) &&
(ent->content != NULL)) {
rep = xmlStringDecodeEntities(ctxt, ent->content,
XML_SUBSTITUTE_REF, 0, 0, 0);
if (rep != NULL) {
xmlFree(rep);
rep = NULL;
}
}
/*
* Just output the reference
*/
buf[len++] = '&';
while (len > buf_size - i - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, i + 10);
}
for (;i > 0;i--)
buf[len++] = *cur++;
buf[len++] = ';';
}
}
} else {
if ((c == 0x20) || (c == 0xD) || (c == 0xA) || (c == 0x9)) {
if ((len != 0) || (!normalize)) {
if ((!normalize) || (!in_space)) {
COPY_BUF(l,buf,len,0x20);
while (len > buf_size - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, 10);
}
}
in_space = 1;
}
} else {
in_space = 0;
COPY_BUF(l,buf,len,c);
if (len > buf_size - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, 10);
}
}
NEXTL(l);
}
GROW;
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
}
if ((in_space) && (normalize)) {
while ((len > 0) && (buf[len - 1] == 0x20)) len--;
}
buf[len] = 0;
if (RAW == '<') {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_LT_IN_ATTRIBUTE, NULL);
} else if (RAW != limit) {
if ((c != 0) && (!IS_CHAR(c))) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_INVALID_CHAR,
"invalid character in attribute value\n");
} else {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_NOT_FINISHED,
"AttValue: ' expected\n");
}
} else
NEXT;
if (attlen != NULL) *attlen = len;
return(buf);
mem_error:
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
if (buf != NULL)
xmlFree(buf);
if (rep != NULL)
xmlFree(rep);
return(NULL);
}
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: struct task_struct * __cpuinit fork_idle(int cpu)
{
struct task_struct *task;
struct pt_regs regs;
task = copy_process(CLONE_VM, 0, idle_regs(®s), 0, NULL,
&init_struct_pid, 0);
if (!IS_ERR(task))
init_idle(task, cpu);
return task;
}
Commit Message: pids: fix fork_idle() to setup ->pids correctly
copy_process(pid => &init_struct_pid) doesn't do attach_pid/etc.
It shouldn't, but this means that the idle threads run with the wrong
pids copied from the caller's task_struct. In x86 case the caller is
either kernel_init() thread or keventd.
In particular, this means that after the series of cpu_up/cpu_down an
idle thread (which never exits) can run with .pid pointing to nowhere.
Change fork_idle() to initialize idle->pids[] correctly. We only set
.pid = &init_struct_pid but do not add .node to list, INIT_TASK() does
the same for the boot-cpu idle thread (swapper).
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: Cedric Le Goater <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric Biederman <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Poetzl <[email protected]>
Cc: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Cc: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::DispatchBeforeUnload(BeforeUnloadType type,
bool is_reload) {
bool for_navigation =
type == BeforeUnloadType::BROWSER_INITIATED_NAVIGATION ||
type == BeforeUnloadType::RENDERER_INITIATED_NAVIGATION;
DCHECK(for_navigation || !is_reload);
DCHECK(type == BeforeUnloadType::BROWSER_INITIATED_NAVIGATION ||
type == BeforeUnloadType::RENDERER_INITIATED_NAVIGATION ||
frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame());
if (!for_navigation) {
if (frame_tree_node_->navigation_request() &&
frame_tree_node_->navigation_request()->navigation_handle()) {
frame_tree_node_->navigation_request()
->navigation_handle()
->set_net_error_code(net::ERR_ABORTED);
}
frame_tree_node_->ResetNavigationRequest(false, true);
}
bool check_subframes_only =
type == BeforeUnloadType::RENDERER_INITIATED_NAVIGATION;
if (!ShouldDispatchBeforeUnload(check_subframes_only)) {
DCHECK(!for_navigation);
base::OnceClosure task = base::BindOnce(
[](base::WeakPtr<RenderFrameHostImpl> self) {
if (!self)
return;
self->frame_tree_node_->render_manager()->OnBeforeUnloadACK(
true, base::TimeTicks::Now());
},
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr());
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(FROM_HERE, std::move(task));
return;
}
TRACE_EVENT_ASYNC_BEGIN1("navigation", "RenderFrameHostImpl BeforeUnload",
this, "&RenderFrameHostImpl", (void*)this);
if (is_waiting_for_beforeunload_ack_) {
unload_ack_is_for_navigation_ =
unload_ack_is_for_navigation_ && for_navigation;
} else {
is_waiting_for_beforeunload_ack_ = true;
beforeunload_dialog_request_cancels_unload_ = false;
unload_ack_is_for_navigation_ = for_navigation;
send_before_unload_start_time_ = base::TimeTicks::Now();
if (render_view_host_->GetDelegate()->IsJavaScriptDialogShowing()) {
SimulateBeforeUnloadAck(type != BeforeUnloadType::DISCARD);
} else {
if (beforeunload_timeout_)
beforeunload_timeout_->Start(beforeunload_timeout_delay_);
beforeunload_pending_replies_.clear();
beforeunload_dialog_request_cancels_unload_ =
(type == BeforeUnloadType::DISCARD);
CheckOrDispatchBeforeUnloadForSubtree(check_subframes_only,
true /* send_ipc */, is_reload);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: InspectorFileReaderLoaderClient(
RefPtr<BlobDataHandle> blob,
const String& mime_type,
const String& text_encoding_name,
std::unique_ptr<GetResponseBodyCallback> callback)
: blob_(std::move(blob)),
mime_type_(mime_type),
text_encoding_name_(text_encoding_name),
callback_(std::move(callback)) {
loader_ = FileReaderLoader::Create(FileReaderLoader::kReadByClient, this);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: int HttpProxyClientSocket::DoReadHeadersComplete(int result) {
if (result < 0)
return result;
if (response_.headers->GetParsedHttpVersion() < HttpVersion(1, 0))
return ERR_TUNNEL_CONNECTION_FAILED;
net_log_.AddEvent(
NetLog::TYPE_HTTP_TRANSACTION_READ_TUNNEL_RESPONSE_HEADERS,
base::Bind(&HttpResponseHeaders::NetLogCallback, response_.headers));
if (proxy_delegate_) {
proxy_delegate_->OnTunnelHeadersReceived(
HostPortPair::FromURL(request_.url),
proxy_server_,
*response_.headers);
}
switch (response_.headers->response_code()) {
case 200: // OK
if (http_stream_parser_->IsMoreDataBuffered())
return ERR_TUNNEL_CONNECTION_FAILED;
next_state_ = STATE_DONE;
return OK;
case 302: // Found / Moved Temporarily
if (is_https_proxy_ && SanitizeProxyRedirect(&response_, request_.url)) {
bool is_connection_reused = http_stream_parser_->IsConnectionReused();
redirect_has_load_timing_info_ =
transport_->GetLoadTimingInfo(
is_connection_reused, &redirect_load_timing_info_);
transport_.reset();
http_stream_parser_.reset();
return ERR_HTTPS_PROXY_TUNNEL_RESPONSE;
}
LogBlockedTunnelResponse();
return ERR_TUNNEL_CONNECTION_FAILED;
case 407: // Proxy Authentication Required
return HandleProxyAuthChallenge(auth_.get(), &response_, net_log_);
default:
LogBlockedTunnelResponse();
return ERR_TUNNEL_CONNECTION_FAILED;
}
}
Commit Message: Sanitize headers in Proxy Authentication Required responses
BUG=431504
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/769043003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#310014}
CWE ID: CWE-19
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: ChromeExtensionsAPIClient::CreateMimeHandlerViewGuestDelegate(
MimeHandlerViewGuest* guest) const {
return base::MakeUnique<ChromeMimeHandlerViewGuestDelegate>();
}
Commit Message: Hide DevTools frontend from webRequest API
Prevent extensions from observing requests for remote DevTools frontends
and add regression tests.
And update ExtensionTestApi to support initializing the embedded test
server and port from SetUpCommandLine (before SetUpOnMainThread).
BUG=797497,797500
TEST=browser_test --gtest_filter=DevToolsFrontendInWebRequestApiTest.HiddenRequests
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: Ic8f44b5771f2d5796f8c3de128f0a7ab88a77735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/844316
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528187}
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: circle_box(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
CIRCLE *circle = PG_GETARG_CIRCLE_P(0);
BOX *box;
double delta;
box = (BOX *) palloc(sizeof(BOX));
delta = circle->radius / sqrt(2.0);
box->high.x = circle->center.x + delta;
box->low.x = circle->center.x - delta;
box->high.y = circle->center.y + delta;
box->low.y = circle->center.y - delta;
PG_RETURN_BOX_P(box);
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static opj_bool pi_next_rpcl(opj_pi_iterator_t * pi)
{
opj_pi_comp_t *comp = NULL;
opj_pi_resolution_t *res = NULL;
long index = 0;
if (!pi->first) {
goto LABEL_SKIP;
} else {
int compno, resno;
pi->first = 0;
pi->dx = 0;
pi->dy = 0;
for (compno = 0; compno < pi->numcomps; compno++) {
comp = &pi->comps[compno];
for (resno = 0; resno < comp->numresolutions; resno++) {
int dx, dy;
res = &comp->resolutions[resno];
dx = comp->dx * (1 << (res->pdx + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
dy = comp->dy * (1 << (res->pdy + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
pi->dx = !pi->dx ? dx : int_min(pi->dx, dx);
pi->dy = !pi->dy ? dy : int_min(pi->dy, dy);
}
}
}
if (!pi->tp_on) {
pi->poc.ty0 = pi->ty0;
pi->poc.tx0 = pi->tx0;
pi->poc.ty1 = pi->ty1;
pi->poc.tx1 = pi->tx1;
}
for (pi->resno = pi->poc.resno0; pi->resno < pi->poc.resno1; pi->resno++) {
for (pi->y = pi->poc.ty0; pi->y < pi->poc.ty1;
pi->y += pi->dy - (pi->y % pi->dy)) {
for (pi->x = pi->poc.tx0; pi->x < pi->poc.tx1;
pi->x += pi->dx - (pi->x % pi->dx)) {
for (pi->compno = pi->poc.compno0; pi->compno < pi->poc.compno1; pi->compno++) {
int levelno;
int trx0, try0;
int trx1, try1;
int rpx, rpy;
int prci, prcj;
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
if (pi->resno >= comp->numresolutions) {
continue;
}
res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno];
levelno = comp->numresolutions - 1 - pi->resno;
trx0 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx0, comp->dx << levelno);
try0 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty0, comp->dy << levelno);
trx1 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx1, comp->dx << levelno);
try1 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty1, comp->dy << levelno);
rpx = res->pdx + levelno;
rpy = res->pdy + levelno;
if (!((pi->y % (comp->dy << rpy) == 0) || ((pi->y == pi->ty0) &&
((try0 << levelno) % (1 << rpy))))) {
continue;
}
if (!((pi->x % (comp->dx << rpx) == 0) || ((pi->x == pi->tx0) &&
((trx0 << levelno) % (1 << rpx))))) {
continue;
}
if ((res->pw == 0) || (res->ph == 0)) {
continue;
}
if ((trx0 == trx1) || (try0 == try1)) {
continue;
}
prci = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->x, comp->dx << levelno), res->pdx)
- int_floordivpow2(trx0, res->pdx);
prcj = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->y, comp->dy << levelno), res->pdy)
- int_floordivpow2(try0, res->pdy);
pi->precno = prci + prcj * res->pw;
for (pi->layno = pi->poc.layno0; pi->layno < pi->poc.layno1; pi->layno++) {
index = pi->layno * pi->step_l + pi->resno * pi->step_r + pi->compno *
pi->step_c + pi->precno * pi->step_p;
if (!pi->include[index]) {
pi->include[index] = 1;
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
LABEL_SKIP:
;
}
}
}
}
}
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
Commit Message: [MJ2] To avoid divisions by zero / undefined behaviour on shift
Signed-off-by: Young_X <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-369
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void vhost_net_tx_packet(struct vhost_net *net)
{
++net->tx_packets;
if (net->tx_packets < 1024)
return;
net->tx_packets = 0;
net->tx_zcopy_err = 0;
}
Commit Message: vhost-net: fix use-after-free in vhost_net_flush
vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait has a confusing name:
it will actually also free it's argument.
Thus since commit 1280c27f8e29acf4af2da914e80ec27c3dbd5c01
"vhost-net: flush outstanding DMAs on memory change"
vhost_net_flush tries to use the argument after passing it
to vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait, this results
in use after free.
To fix, don't free the argument in vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait,
add an new API for callers that want to free ubufs.
Acked-by: Asias He <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: int virtio_load(VirtIODevice *vdev, QEMUFile *f)
{
int i, ret;
uint32_t num;
uint32_t features;
uint32_t supported_features;
VirtioBusClass *k = VIRTIO_BUS_GET_CLASS(qbus);
if (k->load_config) {
ret = k->load_config(qbus->parent, f);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
qemu_get_8s(f, &vdev->status);
qemu_get_8s(f, &vdev->isr);
qemu_get_be16s(f, &vdev->queue_sel);
if (vdev->queue_sel >= VIRTIO_PCI_QUEUE_MAX) {
return -1;
}
qemu_get_be32s(f, &features);
if (virtio_set_features(vdev, features) < 0) {
supported_features = k->get_features(qbus->parent);
error_report("Features 0x%x unsupported. Allowed features: 0x%x",
features, supported_features);
features, supported_features);
return -1;
}
vdev->config_len = qemu_get_be32(f);
qemu_get_buffer(f, vdev->config, vdev->config_len);
num = qemu_get_be32(f);
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
vdev->vq[i].vring.num = qemu_get_be32(f);
if (k->has_variable_vring_alignment) {
vdev->vq[i].vring.align = qemu_get_be32(f);
}
vdev->vq[i].pa = qemu_get_be64(f);
qemu_get_be16s(f, &vdev->vq[i].last_avail_idx);
vdev->vq[i].signalled_used_valid = false;
vdev->vq[i].notification = true;
if (vdev->vq[i].pa) {
uint16_t nheads;
virtqueue_init(&vdev->vq[i]);
nheads = vring_avail_idx(&vdev->vq[i]) - vdev->vq[i].last_avail_idx;
/* Check it isn't doing very strange things with descriptor numbers. */
if (nheads > vdev->vq[i].vring.num) {
error_report("VQ %d size 0x%x Guest index 0x%x "
"inconsistent with Host index 0x%x: delta 0x%x",
i, vdev->vq[i].vring.num,
vring_avail_idx(&vdev->vq[i]),
vdev->vq[i].last_avail_idx, nheads);
return -1;
}
} else if (vdev->vq[i].last_avail_idx) {
error_report("VQ %d address 0x0 "
"inconsistent with Host index 0x%x",
i, vdev->vq[i].last_avail_idx);
return -1;
}
if (k->load_queue) {
ret = k->load_queue(qbus->parent, i, f);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
}
virtio_notify_vector(vdev, VIRTIO_NO_VECTOR);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::SetSurfaceNotInUseByCompositor(ui::Compositor*) {
if (current_surface_ || !host_->is_hidden())
return;
current_surface_in_use_by_compositor_ = false;
AdjustSurfaceProtection();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int mov_preroll_write_stbl_atoms(AVIOContext *pb, MOVTrack *track)
{
struct sgpd_entry {
int count;
int16_t roll_distance;
int group_description_index;
};
struct sgpd_entry *sgpd_entries = NULL;
int entries = -1;
int group = 0;
int i, j;
const int OPUS_SEEK_PREROLL_MS = 80;
int roll_samples = av_rescale_q(OPUS_SEEK_PREROLL_MS,
(AVRational){1, 1000},
(AVRational){1, 48000});
if (!track->entry)
return 0;
sgpd_entries = av_malloc_array(track->entry, sizeof(*sgpd_entries));
if (!sgpd_entries)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
av_assert0(track->par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_OPUS || track->par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_AAC);
if (track->par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_OPUS) {
for (i = 0; i < track->entry; i++) {
int roll_samples_remaining = roll_samples;
int distance = 0;
for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
roll_samples_remaining -= get_cluster_duration(track, j);
distance++;
if (roll_samples_remaining <= 0)
break;
}
/* We don't have enough preceeding samples to compute a valid
roll_distance here, so this sample can't be independently
decoded. */
if (roll_samples_remaining > 0)
distance = 0;
/* Verify distance is a minimum of 2 (60ms) packets and a maximum of
32 (2.5ms) packets. */
av_assert0(distance == 0 || (distance >= 2 && distance <= 32));
if (i && distance == sgpd_entries[entries].roll_distance) {
sgpd_entries[entries].count++;
} else {
entries++;
sgpd_entries[entries].count = 1;
sgpd_entries[entries].roll_distance = distance;
sgpd_entries[entries].group_description_index = distance ? ++group : 0;
}
}
} else {
entries++;
sgpd_entries[entries].count = track->sample_count;
sgpd_entries[entries].roll_distance = 1;
sgpd_entries[entries].group_description_index = ++group;
}
entries++;
if (!group) {
av_free(sgpd_entries);
return 0;
}
/* Write sgpd tag */
avio_wb32(pb, 24 + (group * 2)); /* size */
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "sgpd");
avio_wb32(pb, 1 << 24); /* fullbox */
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "roll");
avio_wb32(pb, 2); /* default_length */
avio_wb32(pb, group); /* entry_count */
for (i = 0; i < entries; i++) {
if (sgpd_entries[i].group_description_index) {
avio_wb16(pb, -sgpd_entries[i].roll_distance); /* roll_distance */
}
}
/* Write sbgp tag */
avio_wb32(pb, 20 + (entries * 8)); /* size */
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "sbgp");
avio_wb32(pb, 0); /* fullbox */
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "roll");
avio_wb32(pb, entries); /* entry_count */
for (i = 0; i < entries; i++) {
avio_wb32(pb, sgpd_entries[i].count); /* sample_count */
avio_wb32(pb, sgpd_entries[i].group_description_index); /* group_description_index */
}
av_free(sgpd_entries);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-369
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: long long VideoTrack::GetHeight() const
{
return m_height;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void DevToolsAgentHostImpl::ForceAttachClient(DevToolsAgentHostClient* client) {
if (SessionByClient(client))
return;
scoped_refptr<DevToolsAgentHostImpl> protect(this);
if (!sessions_.empty())
ForceDetachAllClients();
DCHECK(sessions_.empty());
InnerAttachClient(client);
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow chrome.debugger to attach to web ui pages
If the page navigates to web ui, we force detach the debugger extension.
[email protected]
Bug: 798222
Change-Id: Idb46c2f59e839388397a8dfa6ce2e2a897698df3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/935961
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540916}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: GF_Err name_Write(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_Err e;
GF_NameBox *ptr = (GF_NameBox *)s;
if (ptr == NULL) return GF_BAD_PARAM;
e = gf_isom_box_write_header(s, bs);
if (e) return e;
if (ptr->string) {
gf_bs_write_data(bs, ptr->string, (u32) strlen(ptr->string) + 1);
}
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: NO_INLINE JsVar *jspeFactor() {
if (lex->tk==LEX_ID) {
JsVar *a = jspGetNamedVariable(jslGetTokenValueAsString(lex));
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_ID);
#ifndef SAVE_ON_FLASH
if (lex->tk==LEX_TEMPLATE_LITERAL)
jsExceptionHere(JSET_SYNTAXERROR, "Tagged template literals not supported");
else if (lex->tk==LEX_ARROW_FUNCTION && jsvIsName(a)) {
JsVar *funcVar = jspeArrowFunction(0,a);
jsvUnLock(a);
a=funcVar;
}
#endif
return a;
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_INT) {
JsVar *v = 0;
if (JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE) {
v = jsvNewFromLongInteger(stringToInt(jslGetTokenValueAsString(lex)));
}
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_INT);
return v;
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_FLOAT) {
JsVar *v = 0;
if (JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE) {
v = jsvNewFromFloat(stringToFloat(jslGetTokenValueAsString(lex)));
}
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_FLOAT);
return v;
} else if (lex->tk=='(') {
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH('(');
if (!jspCheckStackPosition()) return 0;
#ifdef SAVE_ON_FLASH
JsVar *a = jspeExpression();
if (!JSP_SHOULDNT_PARSE) JSP_MATCH_WITH_RETURN(')',a);
return a;
#else
return jspeExpressionOrArrowFunction();
#endif
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_TRUE) {
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_TRUE);
return JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE ? jsvNewFromBool(true) : 0;
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_FALSE) {
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_FALSE);
return JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE ? jsvNewFromBool(false) : 0;
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_NULL) {
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_NULL);
return JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE ? jsvNewWithFlags(JSV_NULL) : 0;
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_UNDEFINED) {
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_UNDEFINED);
return 0;
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_STR) {
JsVar *a = 0;
if (JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE)
a = jslGetTokenValueAsVar(lex);
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_STR);
return a;
#ifndef SAVE_ON_FLASH
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_TEMPLATE_LITERAL) {
return jspeTemplateLiteral();
#endif
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_REGEX) {
JsVar *a = 0;
#ifdef SAVE_ON_FLASH
jsExceptionHere(JSET_SYNTAXERROR, "RegEx are not supported in this version of Espruino\n");
#else
JsVar *regex = jslGetTokenValueAsVar(lex);
size_t regexEnd = 0, regexLen = 0;
JsvStringIterator it;
jsvStringIteratorNew(&it, regex, 0);
while (jsvStringIteratorHasChar(&it)) {
regexLen++;
if (jsvStringIteratorGetChar(&it)=='/')
regexEnd = regexLen;
jsvStringIteratorNext(&it);
}
jsvStringIteratorFree(&it);
JsVar *flags = 0;
if (regexEnd < regexLen)
flags = jsvNewFromStringVar(regex, regexEnd, JSVAPPENDSTRINGVAR_MAXLENGTH);
JsVar *regexSource = jsvNewFromStringVar(regex, 1, regexEnd-2);
a = jswrap_regexp_constructor(regexSource, flags);
jsvUnLock3(regex, flags, regexSource);
#endif
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_REGEX);
return a;
} else if (lex->tk=='{') {
if (!jspCheckStackPosition()) return 0;
return jspeFactorObject();
} else if (lex->tk=='[') {
if (!jspCheckStackPosition()) return 0;
return jspeFactorArray();
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_FUNCTION) {
if (!jspCheckStackPosition()) return 0;
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_FUNCTION);
return jspeFunctionDefinition(true);
#ifndef SAVE_ON_FLASH
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_CLASS) {
if (!jspCheckStackPosition()) return 0;
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_CLASS);
return jspeClassDefinition(true);
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_SUPER) {
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_SUPER);
/* This is kind of nasty, since super appears to do
three different things.
* In the constructor it references the extended class's constructor
* in a method it references the constructor's prototype.
* in a static method it references the extended class's constructor (but this is different)
*/
if (jsvIsObject(execInfo.thisVar)) {
JsVar *proto1 = jsvObjectGetChild(execInfo.thisVar, JSPARSE_INHERITS_VAR, 0); // if we're in a method, get __proto__ first
JsVar *proto2 = jsvIsObject(proto1) ? jsvObjectGetChild(proto1, JSPARSE_INHERITS_VAR, 0) : 0; // still in method, get __proto__.__proto__
jsvUnLock(proto1);
if (!proto2) {
jsExceptionHere(JSET_SYNTAXERROR, "Calling 'super' outside of class");
return 0;
}
if (lex->tk=='(') return proto2; // eg. used in a constructor
JsVar *proto3 = jsvIsFunction(proto2) ? jsvObjectGetChild(proto2, JSPARSE_PROTOTYPE_VAR, 0) : 0;
jsvUnLock(proto2);
return proto3;
} else if (jsvIsFunction(execInfo.thisVar)) {
JsVar *proto1 = jsvObjectGetChild(execInfo.thisVar, JSPARSE_PROTOTYPE_VAR, 0);
JsVar *proto2 = jsvIsObject(proto1) ? jsvObjectGetChild(proto1, JSPARSE_INHERITS_VAR, 0) : 0;
jsvUnLock(proto1);
if (!proto2) {
jsExceptionHere(JSET_SYNTAXERROR, "Calling 'super' outside of class");
return 0;
}
return proto2;
}
jsExceptionHere(JSET_SYNTAXERROR, "Calling 'super' outside of class");
return 0;
#endif
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_THIS) {
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_THIS);
return jsvLockAgain( execInfo.thisVar ? execInfo.thisVar : execInfo.root );
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_DELETE) {
if (!jspCheckStackPosition()) return 0;
return jspeFactorDelete();
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_TYPEOF) {
if (!jspCheckStackPosition()) return 0;
return jspeFactorTypeOf();
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_VOID) {
if (!jspCheckStackPosition()) return 0;
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_VOID);
jsvUnLock(jspeUnaryExpression());
return 0;
}
JSP_MATCH(LEX_EOF);
jsExceptionHere(JSET_SYNTAXERROR, "Unexpected end of Input\n");
return 0;
}
NO_INLINE JsVar *__jspePostfixExpression(JsVar *a) {
while (lex->tk==LEX_PLUSPLUS || lex->tk==LEX_MINUSMINUS) {
int op = lex->tk;
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(op);
if (JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE) {
JsVar *one = jsvNewFromInteger(1);
JsVar *oldValue = jsvAsNumberAndUnLock(jsvSkipName(a)); // keep the old value (but convert to number)
JsVar *res = jsvMathsOpSkipNames(oldValue, one, op==LEX_PLUSPLUS ? '+' : '-');
jsvUnLock(one);
jsvReplaceWith(a, res);
jsvUnLock(res);
jsvUnLock(a);
a = oldValue;
}
}
return a;
}
NO_INLINE JsVar *jspePostfixExpression() {
JsVar *a;
if (lex->tk==LEX_PLUSPLUS || lex->tk==LEX_MINUSMINUS) {
int op = lex->tk;
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(op);
a = jspePostfixExpression();
if (JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE) {
JsVar *one = jsvNewFromInteger(1);
JsVar *res = jsvMathsOpSkipNames(a, one, op==LEX_PLUSPLUS ? '+' : '-');
jsvUnLock(one);
jsvReplaceWith(a, res);
jsvUnLock(res);
}
} else
a = jspeFactorFunctionCall();
return __jspePostfixExpression(a);
}
NO_INLINE JsVar *jspeUnaryExpression() {
if (lex->tk=='!' || lex->tk=='~' || lex->tk=='-' || lex->tk=='+') {
short tk = lex->tk;
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(tk);
if (!JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE) {
return jspeUnaryExpression();
}
if (tk=='!') { // logical not
return jsvNewFromBool(!jsvGetBoolAndUnLock(jsvSkipNameAndUnLock(jspeUnaryExpression())));
} else if (tk=='~') { // bitwise not
return jsvNewFromInteger(~jsvGetIntegerAndUnLock(jsvSkipNameAndUnLock(jspeUnaryExpression())));
} else if (tk=='-') { // unary minus
return jsvNegateAndUnLock(jspeUnaryExpression()); // names already skipped
} else if (tk=='+') { // unary plus (convert to number)
JsVar *v = jsvSkipNameAndUnLock(jspeUnaryExpression());
JsVar *r = jsvAsNumber(v); // names already skipped
jsvUnLock(v);
return r;
}
assert(0);
return 0;
} else
return jspePostfixExpression();
}
unsigned int jspeGetBinaryExpressionPrecedence(int op) {
switch (op) {
case LEX_OROR: return 1; break;
case LEX_ANDAND: return 2; break;
case '|' : return 3; break;
case '^' : return 4; break;
case '&' : return 5; break;
case LEX_EQUAL:
case LEX_NEQUAL:
case LEX_TYPEEQUAL:
case LEX_NTYPEEQUAL: return 6;
case LEX_LEQUAL:
case LEX_GEQUAL:
case '<':
case '>':
case LEX_R_INSTANCEOF: return 7;
case LEX_R_IN: return (execInfo.execute&EXEC_FOR_INIT)?0:7;
case LEX_LSHIFT:
case LEX_RSHIFT:
case LEX_RSHIFTUNSIGNED: return 8;
case '+':
case '-': return 9;
case '*':
case '/':
case '%': return 10;
default: return 0;
}
}
NO_INLINE JsVar *__jspeBinaryExpression(JsVar *a, unsigned int lastPrecedence) {
/* This one's a bit strange. Basically all the ops have their own precedence, it's not
* like & and | share the same precedence. We don't want to recurse for each one,
* so instead we do this.
*
* We deal with an expression in recursion ONLY if it's of higher precedence
* than the current one, otherwise we stick in the while loop.
*/
unsigned int precedence = jspeGetBinaryExpressionPrecedence(lex->tk);
while (precedence && precedence>lastPrecedence) {
int op = lex->tk;
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(op);
if (op==LEX_ANDAND || op==LEX_OROR) {
bool aValue = jsvGetBoolAndUnLock(jsvSkipName(a));
if ((!aValue && op==LEX_ANDAND) ||
(aValue && op==LEX_OROR)) {
JSP_SAVE_EXECUTE();
jspSetNoExecute();
jsvUnLock(__jspeBinaryExpression(jspeUnaryExpression(),precedence));
JSP_RESTORE_EXECUTE();
} else {
jsvUnLock(a);
a = __jspeBinaryExpression(jspeUnaryExpression(),precedence);
}
} else { // else it's a more 'normal' logical expression - just use Maths
JsVar *b = __jspeBinaryExpression(jspeUnaryExpression(),precedence);
if (JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE) {
if (op==LEX_R_IN) {
JsVar *av = jsvSkipName(a); // needle
JsVar *bv = jsvSkipName(b); // haystack
if (jsvIsArray(bv) || jsvIsObject(bv)) { // search keys, NOT values
av = jsvAsArrayIndexAndUnLock(av);
JsVar *varFound = jspGetVarNamedField( bv, av, true);
jsvUnLock(a);
a = jsvNewFromBool(varFound!=0);
jsvUnLock(varFound);
} else {// else it will be undefined
jsExceptionHere(JSET_ERROR, "Cannot use 'in' operator to search a %t", bv);
jsvUnLock(a);
a = 0;
}
jsvUnLock2(av, bv);
} else if (op==LEX_R_INSTANCEOF) {
bool inst = false;
JsVar *av = jsvSkipName(a);
JsVar *bv = jsvSkipName(b);
if (!jsvIsFunction(bv)) {
jsExceptionHere(JSET_ERROR, "Expecting a function on RHS in instanceof check, got %t", bv);
} else {
if (jsvIsObject(av) || jsvIsFunction(av)) {
JsVar *bproto = jspGetNamedField(bv, JSPARSE_PROTOTYPE_VAR, false);
JsVar *proto = jsvObjectGetChild(av, JSPARSE_INHERITS_VAR, 0);
while (proto) {
if (proto == bproto) inst=true;
JsVar *childProto = jsvObjectGetChild(proto, JSPARSE_INHERITS_VAR, 0);
jsvUnLock(proto);
proto = childProto;
}
if (jspIsConstructor(bv, "Object")) inst = true;
jsvUnLock(bproto);
}
if (!inst) {
const char *name = jswGetBasicObjectName(av);
if (name) {
inst = jspIsConstructor(bv, name);
}
if (!inst && (jsvIsArray(av) || jsvIsArrayBuffer(av)) &&
jspIsConstructor(bv, "Object"))
inst = true;
}
}
jsvUnLock3(av, bv, a);
a = jsvNewFromBool(inst);
} else { // --------------------------------------------- NORMAL
JsVar *res = jsvMathsOpSkipNames(a, b, op);
jsvUnLock(a); a = res;
}
}
jsvUnLock(b);
}
precedence = jspeGetBinaryExpressionPrecedence(lex->tk);
}
return a;
}
JsVar *jspeBinaryExpression() {
return __jspeBinaryExpression(jspeUnaryExpression(),0);
}
NO_INLINE JsVar *__jspeConditionalExpression(JsVar *lhs) {
if (lex->tk=='?') {
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH('?');
if (!JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE) {
jsvUnLock(jspeAssignmentExpression());
JSP_MATCH(':');
jsvUnLock(jspeAssignmentExpression());
} else {
bool first = jsvGetBoolAndUnLock(jsvSkipName(lhs));
jsvUnLock(lhs);
if (first) {
lhs = jspeAssignmentExpression();
JSP_MATCH(':');
JSP_SAVE_EXECUTE();
jspSetNoExecute();
jsvUnLock(jspeAssignmentExpression());
JSP_RESTORE_EXECUTE();
} else {
JSP_SAVE_EXECUTE();
jspSetNoExecute();
jsvUnLock(jspeAssignmentExpression());
JSP_RESTORE_EXECUTE();
JSP_MATCH(':');
lhs = jspeAssignmentExpression();
}
}
}
return lhs;
}
JsVar *jspeConditionalExpression() {
return __jspeConditionalExpression(jspeBinaryExpression());
}
NO_INLINE JsVar *__jspeAssignmentExpression(JsVar *lhs) {
if (lex->tk=='=' || lex->tk==LEX_PLUSEQUAL || lex->tk==LEX_MINUSEQUAL ||
lex->tk==LEX_MULEQUAL || lex->tk==LEX_DIVEQUAL || lex->tk==LEX_MODEQUAL ||
lex->tk==LEX_ANDEQUAL || lex->tk==LEX_OREQUAL ||
lex->tk==LEX_XOREQUAL || lex->tk==LEX_RSHIFTEQUAL ||
lex->tk==LEX_LSHIFTEQUAL || lex->tk==LEX_RSHIFTUNSIGNEDEQUAL) {
JsVar *rhs;
int op = lex->tk;
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(op);
rhs = jspeAssignmentExpression();
rhs = jsvSkipNameAndUnLock(rhs); // ensure we get rid of any references on the RHS
if (JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE && lhs) {
if (op=='=') {
jsvReplaceWithOrAddToRoot(lhs, rhs);
} else {
if (op==LEX_PLUSEQUAL) op='+';
else if (op==LEX_MINUSEQUAL) op='-';
else if (op==LEX_MULEQUAL) op='*';
else if (op==LEX_DIVEQUAL) op='/';
else if (op==LEX_MODEQUAL) op='%';
else if (op==LEX_ANDEQUAL) op='&';
else if (op==LEX_OREQUAL) op='|';
else if (op==LEX_XOREQUAL) op='^';
else if (op==LEX_RSHIFTEQUAL) op=LEX_RSHIFT;
else if (op==LEX_LSHIFTEQUAL) op=LEX_LSHIFT;
else if (op==LEX_RSHIFTUNSIGNEDEQUAL) op=LEX_RSHIFTUNSIGNED;
if (op=='+' && jsvIsName(lhs)) {
JsVar *currentValue = jsvSkipName(lhs);
if (jsvIsString(currentValue) && !jsvIsFlatString(currentValue) && jsvGetRefs(currentValue)==1 && rhs!=currentValue) {
/* A special case for string += where this is the only use of the string
* and we're not appending to ourselves. In this case we can do a
* simple append (rather than clone + append)*/
JsVar *str = jsvAsString(rhs, false);
jsvAppendStringVarComplete(currentValue, str);
jsvUnLock(str);
op = 0;
}
jsvUnLock(currentValue);
}
if (op) {
/* Fallback which does a proper add */
JsVar *res = jsvMathsOpSkipNames(lhs,rhs,op);
jsvReplaceWith(lhs, res);
jsvUnLock(res);
}
}
}
jsvUnLock(rhs);
}
return lhs;
}
JsVar *jspeAssignmentExpression() {
return __jspeAssignmentExpression(jspeConditionalExpression());
}
NO_INLINE JsVar *jspeExpression() {
while (!JSP_SHOULDNT_PARSE) {
JsVar *a = jspeAssignmentExpression();
if (lex->tk!=',') return a;
jsvCheckReferenceError(a);
jsvUnLock(a);
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(',');
}
return 0;
}
/** Parse a block `{ ... }` */
NO_INLINE void jspeSkipBlock() {
int brackets = 1;
while (lex->tk && brackets) {
if (lex->tk == '{') brackets++;
else if (lex->tk == '}') {
brackets--;
if (!brackets) return;
}
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(lex->tk);
}
}
/** Parse a block `{ ... }` but assume brackets are already parsed */
NO_INLINE void jspeBlockNoBrackets() {
if (JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE) {
while (lex->tk && lex->tk!='}') {
JsVar *a = jspeStatement();
jsvCheckReferenceError(a);
jsvUnLock(a);
if (JSP_HAS_ERROR) {
if (lex && !(execInfo.execute&EXEC_ERROR_LINE_REPORTED)) {
execInfo.execute = (JsExecFlags)(execInfo.execute | EXEC_ERROR_LINE_REPORTED);
JsVar *stackTrace = jsvObjectGetChild(execInfo.hiddenRoot, JSPARSE_STACKTRACE_VAR, JSV_STRING_0);
if (stackTrace) {
jsvAppendPrintf(stackTrace, "at ");
jspAppendStackTrace(stackTrace);
jsvUnLock(stackTrace);
}
}
}
if (JSP_SHOULDNT_PARSE)
return;
if (!JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE) {
jspeSkipBlock();
return;
}
}
} else {
jspeSkipBlock();
}
return;
}
Commit Message: Fix stack overflow if interpreting a file full of '{' (fix #1448)
CWE ID: CWE-674
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name)
{
int fd1,fd2;
STRUCT_STAT st;
int iflags, xlen;
char *fname, fbuf[MAXPATHLEN];
char xname[MAXPATHLEN];
char fnametmp[MAXPATHLEN];
char *fnamecmp, *partialptr;
char fnamecmpbuf[MAXPATHLEN];
uchar fnamecmp_type;
struct file_struct *file;
int itemizing = am_server ? logfile_format_has_i : stdout_format_has_i;
enum logcode log_code = log_before_transfer ? FLOG : FINFO;
int max_phase = protocol_version >= 29 ? 2 : 1;
int dflt_perms = (ACCESSPERMS & ~orig_umask);
#ifdef SUPPORT_ACLS
const char *parent_dirname = "";
#endif
int ndx, recv_ok;
if (DEBUG_GTE(RECV, 1))
rprintf(FINFO, "recv_files(%d) starting\n", cur_flist->used);
if (delay_updates)
delayed_bits = bitbag_create(cur_flist->used + 1);
while (1) {
cleanup_disable();
/* This call also sets cur_flist. */
ndx = read_ndx_and_attrs(f_in, f_out, &iflags, &fnamecmp_type,
xname, &xlen);
if (ndx == NDX_DONE) {
if (!am_server && INFO_GTE(PROGRESS, 2) && cur_flist) {
set_current_file_index(NULL, 0);
end_progress(0);
}
if (inc_recurse && first_flist) {
if (read_batch) {
ndx = first_flist->used + first_flist->ndx_start;
gen_wants_ndx(ndx, first_flist->flist_num);
}
flist_free(first_flist);
if (first_flist)
continue;
} else if (read_batch && first_flist) {
ndx = first_flist->used;
gen_wants_ndx(ndx, first_flist->flist_num);
}
if (++phase > max_phase)
break;
if (DEBUG_GTE(RECV, 1))
rprintf(FINFO, "recv_files phase=%d\n", phase);
if (phase == 2 && delay_updates)
handle_delayed_updates(local_name);
write_int(f_out, NDX_DONE);
continue;
}
if (ndx - cur_flist->ndx_start >= 0)
file = cur_flist->files[ndx - cur_flist->ndx_start];
else
file = dir_flist->files[cur_flist->parent_ndx];
fname = local_name ? local_name : f_name(file, fbuf);
if (daemon_filter_list.head
&& check_filter(&daemon_filter_list, FLOG, fname, 0) < 0) {
rprintf(FERROR, "attempt to hack rsync failed.\n");
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
}
if (DEBUG_GTE(RECV, 1))
rprintf(FINFO, "recv_files(%s)\n", fname);
#ifdef SUPPORT_XATTRS
if (preserve_xattrs && iflags & ITEM_REPORT_XATTR && do_xfers
&& !(want_xattr_optim && BITS_SET(iflags, ITEM_XNAME_FOLLOWS|ITEM_LOCAL_CHANGE)))
recv_xattr_request(file, f_in);
#endif
if (!(iflags & ITEM_TRANSFER)) {
maybe_log_item(file, iflags, itemizing, xname);
#ifdef SUPPORT_XATTRS
if (preserve_xattrs && iflags & ITEM_REPORT_XATTR && do_xfers
&& !BITS_SET(iflags, ITEM_XNAME_FOLLOWS|ITEM_LOCAL_CHANGE))
set_file_attrs(fname, file, NULL, fname, 0);
#endif
if (iflags & ITEM_IS_NEW) {
stats.created_files++;
if (S_ISREG(file->mode)) {
/* Nothing further to count. */
} else if (S_ISDIR(file->mode))
stats.created_dirs++;
#ifdef SUPPORT_LINKS
else if (S_ISLNK(file->mode))
stats.created_symlinks++;
#endif
else if (IS_DEVICE(file->mode))
stats.created_devices++;
else
stats.created_specials++;
}
continue;
}
if (phase == 2) {
rprintf(FERROR,
"got transfer request in phase 2 [%s]\n",
who_am_i());
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
}
if (file->flags & FLAG_FILE_SENT) {
if (csum_length == SHORT_SUM_LENGTH) {
if (keep_partial && !partial_dir)
make_backups = -make_backups; /* prevents double backup */
if (append_mode)
sparse_files = -sparse_files;
append_mode = -append_mode;
csum_length = SUM_LENGTH;
redoing = 1;
}
} else {
if (csum_length != SHORT_SUM_LENGTH) {
if (keep_partial && !partial_dir)
make_backups = -make_backups;
if (append_mode)
sparse_files = -sparse_files;
append_mode = -append_mode;
csum_length = SHORT_SUM_LENGTH;
redoing = 0;
}
if (iflags & ITEM_IS_NEW)
stats.created_files++;
}
if (!am_server && INFO_GTE(PROGRESS, 1))
set_current_file_index(file, ndx);
stats.xferred_files++;
stats.total_transferred_size += F_LENGTH(file);
cleanup_got_literal = 0;
if (read_batch) {
int wanted = redoing
? we_want_redo(ndx)
: gen_wants_ndx(ndx, cur_flist->flist_num);
if (!wanted) {
rprintf(FINFO,
"(Skipping batched update for%s \"%s\")\n",
redoing ? " resend of" : "",
fname);
discard_receive_data(f_in, F_LENGTH(file));
file->flags |= FLAG_FILE_SENT;
continue;
}
}
remember_initial_stats();
if (!do_xfers) { /* log the transfer */
log_item(FCLIENT, file, iflags, NULL);
if (read_batch)
discard_receive_data(f_in, F_LENGTH(file));
continue;
}
if (write_batch < 0) {
log_item(FCLIENT, file, iflags, NULL);
if (!am_server)
discard_receive_data(f_in, F_LENGTH(file));
if (inc_recurse)
send_msg_int(MSG_SUCCESS, ndx);
continue;
}
partialptr = partial_dir ? partial_dir_fname(fname) : fname;
if (protocol_version >= 29) {
switch (fnamecmp_type) {
case FNAMECMP_FNAME:
fnamecmp = fname;
break;
case FNAMECMP_PARTIAL_DIR:
fnamecmp = partialptr;
break;
case FNAMECMP_BACKUP:
fnamecmp = get_backup_name(fname);
break;
case FNAMECMP_FUZZY:
if (file->dirname) {
pathjoin(fnamecmpbuf, sizeof fnamecmpbuf, file->dirname, xname);
fnamecmp = fnamecmpbuf;
} else
fnamecmp = xname;
break;
default:
if (fnamecmp_type > FNAMECMP_FUZZY && fnamecmp_type-FNAMECMP_FUZZY <= basis_dir_cnt) {
fnamecmp_type -= FNAMECMP_FUZZY + 1;
if (file->dirname) {
stringjoin(fnamecmpbuf, sizeof fnamecmpbuf,
basis_dir[fnamecmp_type], "/", file->dirname, "/", xname, NULL);
} else
pathjoin(fnamecmpbuf, sizeof fnamecmpbuf, basis_dir[fnamecmp_type], xname);
} else if (fnamecmp_type >= basis_dir_cnt) {
rprintf(FERROR,
"invalid basis_dir index: %d.\n",
fnamecmp_type);
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
} else
pathjoin(fnamecmpbuf, sizeof fnamecmpbuf, basis_dir[fnamecmp_type], fname);
fnamecmp = fnamecmpbuf;
break;
}
if (!fnamecmp || (daemon_filter_list.head
&& check_filter(&daemon_filter_list, FLOG, fname, 0) < 0)) {
fnamecmp = fname;
fnamecmp_type = FNAMECMP_FNAME;
}
} else {
/* Reminder: --inplace && --partial-dir are never
* enabled at the same time. */
if (inplace && make_backups > 0) {
if (!(fnamecmp = get_backup_name(fname)))
fnamecmp = fname;
else
fnamecmp_type = FNAMECMP_BACKUP;
} else if (partial_dir && partialptr)
fnamecmp = partialptr;
else
fnamecmp = fname;
}
/* open the file */
fd1 = do_open(fnamecmp, O_RDONLY, 0);
if (fd1 == -1 && protocol_version < 29) {
if (fnamecmp != fname) {
fnamecmp = fname;
fd1 = do_open(fnamecmp, O_RDONLY, 0);
}
if (fd1 == -1 && basis_dir[0]) {
/* pre-29 allowed only one alternate basis */
pathjoin(fnamecmpbuf, sizeof fnamecmpbuf,
basis_dir[0], fname);
fnamecmp = fnamecmpbuf;
fd1 = do_open(fnamecmp, O_RDONLY, 0);
}
}
updating_basis_or_equiv = inplace
&& (fnamecmp == fname || fnamecmp_type == FNAMECMP_BACKUP);
if (fd1 == -1) {
st.st_mode = 0;
st.st_size = 0;
} else if (do_fstat(fd1,&st) != 0) {
rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno, "fstat %s failed",
full_fname(fnamecmp));
discard_receive_data(f_in, F_LENGTH(file));
close(fd1);
if (inc_recurse)
send_msg_int(MSG_NO_SEND, ndx);
continue;
}
if (fd1 != -1 && S_ISDIR(st.st_mode) && fnamecmp == fname) {
/* this special handling for directories
* wouldn't be necessary if robust_rename()
* and the underlying robust_unlink could cope
* with directories
*/
rprintf(FERROR_XFER, "recv_files: %s is a directory\n",
full_fname(fnamecmp));
discard_receive_data(f_in, F_LENGTH(file));
close(fd1);
if (inc_recurse)
send_msg_int(MSG_NO_SEND, ndx);
continue;
}
if (fd1 != -1 && !S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
close(fd1);
fd1 = -1;
}
/* If we're not preserving permissions, change the file-list's
* mode based on the local permissions and some heuristics. */
if (!preserve_perms) {
int exists = fd1 != -1;
#ifdef SUPPORT_ACLS
const char *dn = file->dirname ? file->dirname : ".";
if (parent_dirname != dn
&& strcmp(parent_dirname, dn) != 0) {
dflt_perms = default_perms_for_dir(dn);
parent_dirname = dn;
}
#endif
file->mode = dest_mode(file->mode, st.st_mode,
dflt_perms, exists);
}
/* We now check to see if we are writing the file "inplace" */
if (inplace) {
fd2 = do_open(fname, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, 0600);
if (fd2 == -1) {
rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno, "open %s failed",
full_fname(fname));
} else if (updating_basis_or_equiv)
cleanup_set(NULL, NULL, file, fd1, fd2);
} else {
fd2 = open_tmpfile(fnametmp, fname, file);
if (fd2 != -1)
cleanup_set(fnametmp, partialptr, file, fd1, fd2);
}
if (fd2 == -1) {
discard_receive_data(f_in, F_LENGTH(file));
if (fd1 != -1)
close(fd1);
if (inc_recurse)
send_msg_int(MSG_NO_SEND, ndx);
continue;
}
/* log the transfer */
if (log_before_transfer)
log_item(FCLIENT, file, iflags, NULL);
else if (!am_server && INFO_GTE(NAME, 1) && INFO_EQ(PROGRESS, 1))
rprintf(FINFO, "%s\n", fname);
/* recv file data */
recv_ok = receive_data(f_in, fnamecmp, fd1, st.st_size,
fname, fd2, F_LENGTH(file));
log_item(log_code, file, iflags, NULL);
if (fd1 != -1)
close(fd1);
if (close(fd2) < 0) {
rsyserr(FERROR, errno, "close failed on %s",
full_fname(fnametmp));
exit_cleanup(RERR_FILEIO);
}
if ((recv_ok && (!delay_updates || !partialptr)) || inplace) {
if (partialptr == fname)
partialptr = NULL;
if (!finish_transfer(fname, fnametmp, fnamecmp,
partialptr, file, recv_ok, 1))
recv_ok = -1;
else if (fnamecmp == partialptr) {
do_unlink(partialptr);
handle_partial_dir(partialptr, PDIR_DELETE);
}
} else if (keep_partial && partialptr) {
if (!handle_partial_dir(partialptr, PDIR_CREATE)) {
rprintf(FERROR,
"Unable to create partial-dir for %s -- discarding %s.\n",
local_name ? local_name : f_name(file, NULL),
recv_ok ? "completed file" : "partial file");
do_unlink(fnametmp);
recv_ok = -1;
} else if (!finish_transfer(partialptr, fnametmp, fnamecmp, NULL,
file, recv_ok, !partial_dir))
recv_ok = -1;
else if (delay_updates && recv_ok) {
bitbag_set_bit(delayed_bits, ndx);
recv_ok = 2;
} else
partialptr = NULL;
} else
do_unlink(fnametmp);
cleanup_disable();
if (read_batch)
file->flags |= FLAG_FILE_SENT;
switch (recv_ok) {
case 2:
break;
case 1:
if (remove_source_files || inc_recurse
|| (preserve_hard_links && F_IS_HLINKED(file)))
send_msg_int(MSG_SUCCESS, ndx);
break;
case 0: {
enum logcode msgtype = redoing ? FERROR_XFER : FWARNING;
if (msgtype == FERROR_XFER || INFO_GTE(NAME, 1)) {
char *errstr, *redostr, *keptstr;
if (!(keep_partial && partialptr) && !inplace)
keptstr = "discarded";
else if (partial_dir)
keptstr = "put into partial-dir";
else
keptstr = "retained";
if (msgtype == FERROR_XFER) {
errstr = "ERROR";
redostr = "";
} else {
errstr = "WARNING";
redostr = read_batch ? " (may try again)"
: " (will try again)";
}
rprintf(msgtype,
"%s: %s failed verification -- update %s%s.\n",
errstr, local_name ? f_name(file, NULL) : fname,
keptstr, redostr);
}
if (!redoing) {
if (read_batch)
flist_ndx_push(&batch_redo_list, ndx);
send_msg_int(MSG_REDO, ndx);
file->flags |= FLAG_FILE_SENT;
} else if (inc_recurse)
send_msg_int(MSG_NO_SEND, ndx);
break;
}
case -1:
if (inc_recurse)
send_msg_int(MSG_NO_SEND, ndx);
break;
}
}
if (make_backups < 0)
make_backups = -make_backups;
if (phase == 2 && delay_updates) /* for protocol_version < 29 */
handle_delayed_updates(local_name);
if (DEBUG_GTE(RECV, 1))
rprintf(FINFO,"recv_files finished\n");
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: DispatchResponse NetworkHandler::SetRequestInterception(
std::unique_ptr<protocol::Array<protocol::Network::RequestPattern>>
patterns) {
WebContents* web_contents = WebContents::FromRenderFrameHost(host_);
if (!web_contents)
return Response::InternalError();
DevToolsInterceptorController* interceptor =
DevToolsInterceptorController::FromBrowserContext(
web_contents->GetBrowserContext());
if (!interceptor)
return Response::Error("Interception not supported");
if (!patterns->length()) {
interception_handle_.reset();
return Response::OK();
}
std::vector<DevToolsURLRequestInterceptor::Pattern> interceptor_patterns;
for (size_t i = 0; i < patterns->length(); ++i) {
base::flat_set<ResourceType> resource_types;
std::string resource_type = patterns->get(i)->GetResourceType("");
if (!resource_type.empty()) {
if (!AddInterceptedResourceType(resource_type, &resource_types)) {
return Response::InvalidParams(base::StringPrintf(
"Cannot intercept resources of type '%s'", resource_type.c_str()));
}
}
interceptor_patterns.push_back(DevToolsURLRequestInterceptor::Pattern(
patterns->get(i)->GetUrlPattern("*"), std::move(resource_types),
ToInterceptorStage(patterns->get(i)->GetInterceptionStage(
protocol::Network::InterceptionStageEnum::Request))));
}
if (interception_handle_) {
interception_handle_->UpdatePatterns(std::move(interceptor_patterns));
} else {
interception_handle_ = interceptor->StartInterceptingRequests(
host_->frame_tree_node(), std::move(interceptor_patterns),
base::Bind(&NetworkHandler::RequestIntercepted,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
return Response::OK();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: insert_hIST(png_structp png_ptr, png_infop info_ptr, int nparams, png_charpp params)
{
int i;
png_uint_16 freq[256];
/* libpng takes the count from the PLTE count; we don't check it here but we
* do set the array to 0 for unspecified entries.
*/
memset(freq, 0, sizeof freq);
for (i=0; i<nparams; ++i)
{
char *endptr = NULL;
unsigned long int l = strtoul(params[i], &endptr, 0/*base*/);
if (params[i][0] && *endptr == 0 && l <= 65535)
freq[i] = (png_uint_16)l;
else
{
fprintf(stderr, "hIST[%d]: %s: invalid frequency\n", i, params[i]);
exit(1);
}
}
png_set_hIST(png_ptr, info_ptr, freq);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void NavigationObserver::PromptToEnableExtensionIfNecessary(
NavigationController* nav_controller) {
if (!in_progress_prompt_extension_id_.empty())
return;
NavigationEntry* nav_entry = nav_controller->GetVisibleEntry();
if (!nav_entry)
return;
const GURL& url = (nav_entry->GetPageType() == content::PAGE_TYPE_ERROR &&
nav_entry->GetURL() == url::kAboutBlankURL &&
nav_entry->GetVirtualURL().SchemeIs(kExtensionScheme))
? nav_entry->GetVirtualURL()
: nav_entry->GetURL();
if (!url.SchemeIs(kExtensionScheme))
return;
const Extension* extension = ExtensionRegistry::Get(profile_)
->disabled_extensions()
.GetExtensionOrAppByURL(url);
if (!extension)
return;
if (!prompted_extensions_.insert(extension->id()).second &&
!g_repeat_prompting) {
return;
}
ExtensionPrefs* extension_prefs = ExtensionPrefs::Get(profile_);
if (extension_prefs->DidExtensionEscalatePermissions(extension->id())) {
in_progress_prompt_extension_id_ = extension->id();
in_progress_prompt_navigation_controller_ = nav_controller;
extension_install_prompt_.reset(
new ExtensionInstallPrompt(nav_controller->GetWebContents()));
ExtensionInstallPrompt::PromptType type =
ExtensionInstallPrompt::GetReEnablePromptTypeForExtension(profile_,
extension);
extension_install_prompt_->ShowDialog(
base::Bind(&NavigationObserver::OnInstallPromptDone,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()),
extension, nullptr,
base::MakeUnique<ExtensionInstallPrompt::Prompt>(type),
ExtensionInstallPrompt::GetDefaultShowDialogCallback());
}
}
Commit Message: Do not use NavigationEntry to block history navigations.
This is no longer necessary after r477371.
BUG=777419
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: I701e4d4853858281b43e3743b12274dbeadfbf18
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/733959
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511942}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void xmlGROW (xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
unsigned long curEnd = ctxt->input->end - ctxt->input->cur;
unsigned long curBase = ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base;
if (((curEnd > (unsigned long) XML_MAX_LOOKUP_LIMIT) ||
(curBase > (unsigned long) XML_MAX_LOOKUP_LIMIT)) &&
((ctxt->input->buf) && (ctxt->input->buf->readcallback != (xmlInputReadCallback) xmlNop)) &&
((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "Huge input lookup");
xmlHaltParser(ctxt);
return;
}
xmlParserInputGrow(ctxt->input, INPUT_CHUNK);
if ((ctxt->input->cur > ctxt->input->end) ||
(ctxt->input->cur < ctxt->input->base)) {
xmlHaltParser(ctxt);
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "cur index out of bound");
return;
}
if ((ctxt->input->cur != NULL) && (*ctxt->input->cur == 0) &&
(xmlParserInputGrow(ctxt->input, INPUT_CHUNK) <= 0))
xmlPopInput(ctxt);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: struct key *key_get_instantiation_authkey(key_serial_t target_id)
{
char description[16];
struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
.index_key.type = &key_type_request_key_auth,
.index_key.description = description,
.cred = current_cred(),
.match_data.cmp = user_match,
.match_data.raw_data = description,
.match_data.lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
};
struct key *authkey;
key_ref_t authkey_ref;
sprintf(description, "%x", target_id);
authkey_ref = search_process_keyrings(&ctx);
if (IS_ERR(authkey_ref)) {
authkey = ERR_CAST(authkey_ref);
if (authkey == ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN))
authkey = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
goto error;
}
authkey = key_ref_to_ptr(authkey_ref);
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &authkey->flags)) {
key_put(authkey);
authkey = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);
}
error:
return authkey;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is
allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm.
Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of
the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse
to override it as needed.
The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the
user_match() function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void ReportRequestHeaders(std::map<std::string, std::string>* request_headers,
const std::string& url,
const std::string& headers) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
EXPECT_FALSE(base::ContainsKey(*request_headers, url));
(*request_headers)[url] = headers;
}
Commit Message: Fix ChromeResourceDispatcherHostDelegateMirrorBrowserTest.MirrorRequestHeader with network service.
The functionality worked, as part of converting DICE, however the test code didn't work since it
depended on accessing the net objects directly. Switch the tests to use the EmbeddedTestServer, to
better match production, which removes the dependency on net/.
Also:
-make GetFilePathWithReplacements replace strings in the mock headers if they're present
-add a global to google_util to ignore ports; that way other tests can be converted without having
to modify each callsite to google_util
Bug: 881976
Change-Id: Ic52023495c1c98c1248025c11cdf37f433fef058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1328142
Commit-Queue: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ramin Halavati <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Maks Orlovich <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607652}
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: Browser::~Browser() {
if (profile_->GetProfileSyncService())
profile_->GetProfileSyncService()->RemoveObserver(this);
BrowserList::RemoveBrowser(this);
#if !defined(OS_MACOSX)
if (!BrowserList::HasBrowserWithProfile(profile_)) {
TabRestoreServiceFactory::ResetForProfile(profile_);
}
#endif
SessionService* session_service =
SessionServiceFactory::GetForProfile(profile_);
if (session_service)
session_service->WindowClosed(session_id_);
TabRestoreService* tab_restore_service =
TabRestoreServiceFactory::GetForProfile(profile());
if (tab_restore_service)
tab_restore_service->BrowserClosed(tab_restore_service_delegate());
profile_pref_registrar_.RemoveAll();
local_pref_registrar_.RemoveAll();
encoding_auto_detect_.Destroy();
use_vertical_tabs_.Destroy();
use_compact_navigation_bar_.Destroy();
if (profile_->IsOffTheRecord() &&
!BrowserList::IsOffTheRecordSessionActiveForProfile(profile_)) {
profile_->GetOriginalProfile()->DestroyOffTheRecordProfile();
}
if (select_file_dialog_.get())
select_file_dialog_->ListenerDestroyed();
TabRestoreServiceDestroyed(tab_restore_service_);
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static void DeprecateAsOverloadedMethod2Method(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
ExceptionState exception_state(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionState::kExecutionContext, "TestObject", "DeprecateAsOverloadedMethod");
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
int32_t arg;
arg = NativeValueTraits<IDLLong>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), info[0], exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
impl->DeprecateAsOverloadedMethod(arg);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void cJSON_AddItemReferenceToArray( cJSON *array, cJSON *item )
{
cJSON_AddItemToArray( array, create_reference( item ) );
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void tls1_free(SSL *s)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
{
OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
ssl3_free(s);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: DefragIPv4NoDataTest(void)
{
DefragContext *dc = NULL;
Packet *p = NULL;
int id = 12;
int ret = 0;
DefragInit();
dc = DefragContextNew();
if (dc == NULL)
goto end;
/* This packet has an offset > 0, more frags set to 0 and no data. */
p = BuildTestPacket(id, 1, 0, 'A', 0);
if (p == NULL)
goto end;
/* We do not expect a packet returned. */
if (Defrag(NULL, NULL, p, NULL) != NULL)
goto end;
/* The fragment should have been ignored so no fragments should
* have been allocated from the pool. */
if (dc->frag_pool->outstanding != 0)
return 0;
ret = 1;
end:
if (dc != NULL)
DefragContextDestroy(dc);
if (p != NULL)
SCFree(p);
DefragDestroy();
return ret;
}
Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host.
CWE ID: CWE-358
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: int mif_validate(jas_stream_t *in)
{
uchar buf[MIF_MAGICLEN];
uint_fast32_t magic;
int i;
int n;
assert(JAS_STREAM_MAXPUTBACK >= MIF_MAGICLEN);
/* Read the validation data (i.e., the data used for detecting
the format). */
if ((n = jas_stream_read(in, buf, MIF_MAGICLEN)) < 0) {
return -1;
}
/* Put the validation data back onto the stream, so that the
stream position will not be changed. */
for (i = n - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
if (jas_stream_ungetc(in, buf[i]) == EOF) {
return -1;
}
}
/* Was enough data read? */
if (n < MIF_MAGICLEN) {
return -1;
}
/* Compute the signature value. */
magic = (JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, buf[0]) << 24) |
(JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, buf[1]) << 16) |
(JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, buf[2]) << 8) |
buf[3];
/* Ensure that the signature is correct for this format. */
if (magic != MIF_MAGIC) {
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: const Extension* ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension(
const std::string& id) const {
return GetExtensionByIdInternal(id, true, true, true);
}
Commit Message: Limit extent of webstore app to just chrome.google.com/webstore.
BUG=93497
TEST=Try installing extensions and apps from the webstore, starting both being
initially logged in, and not.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7719003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void LayoutNonRecursiveForTestingViewportIntersection(
WebContents* web_contents) {
static const char* script =
"function relayoutNonRecursiveForTestingViewportIntersection() {\
var width = window.innerWidth;\
var height = window.innerHeight * 0.75;\
for (var i = 0; i < window.frames.length; i++) {\
child = document.getElementById(\"child-\" + i);\
child.width = width;\
child.height = height;\
}\
}\
relayoutNonRecursiveForTestingViewportIntersection();";
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecuteScript(web_contents, script));
}
Commit Message: Add a check for disallowing remote frame navigations to local resources.
Previously, RemoteFrame navigations did not perform any renderer-side
checks and relied solely on the browser-side logic to block disallowed
navigations via mechanisms like FilterURL. This means that blocked
remote frame navigations were silently navigated to about:blank
without any console error message.
This CL adds a CanDisplay check to the remote navigation path to match
an equivalent check done for local frame navigations. This way, the
renderer can consistently block disallowed navigations in both cases
and output an error message.
Bug: 894399
Change-Id: I172f68f77c1676f6ca0172d2a6c78f7edc0e3b7a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1282390
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601022}
CWE ID: CWE-732
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int do_remount(struct path *path, int flags, int mnt_flags,
void *data)
{
int err;
struct super_block *sb = path->mnt->mnt_sb;
struct mount *mnt = real_mount(path->mnt);
if (!check_mnt(mnt))
return -EINVAL;
if (path->dentry != path->mnt->mnt_root)
return -EINVAL;
/* Don't allow changing of locked mnt flags.
*
* No locks need to be held here while testing the various
* MNT_LOCK flags because those flags can never be cleared
* once they are set.
*/
if ((mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCK_READONLY) &&
!(mnt_flags & MNT_READONLY)) {
return -EPERM;
}
err = security_sb_remount(sb, data);
if (err)
return err;
down_write(&sb->s_umount);
if (flags & MS_BIND)
err = change_mount_flags(path->mnt, flags);
else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
err = -EPERM;
else
err = do_remount_sb(sb, flags, data, 0);
if (!err) {
lock_mount_hash();
mnt_flags |= mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & ~MNT_USER_SETTABLE_MASK;
mnt->mnt.mnt_flags = mnt_flags;
touch_mnt_namespace(mnt->mnt_ns);
unlock_mount_hash();
}
up_write(&sb->s_umount);
return err;
}
Commit Message: mnt: Correct permission checks in do_remount
While invesgiating the issue where in "mount --bind -oremount,ro ..."
would result in later "mount --bind -oremount,rw" succeeding even if
the mount started off locked I realized that there are several
additional mount flags that should be locked and are not.
In particular MNT_NOSUID, MNT_NODEV, MNT_NOEXEC, and the atime
flags in addition to MNT_READONLY should all be locked. These
flags are all per superblock, can all be changed with MS_BIND,
and should not be changable if set by a more privileged user.
The following additions to the current logic are added in this patch.
- nosuid may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- nodev may not be clearable by a less privielged user.
- noexec may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- atime flags may not be changeable by a less privileged user.
The logic with atime is that always setting atime on access is a
global policy and backup software and auditing software could break if
atime bits are not updated (when they are configured to be updated),
and serious performance degradation could result (DOS attack) if atime
updates happen when they have been explicitly disabled. Therefore an
unprivileged user should not be able to mess with the atime bits set
by a more privileged user.
The additional restrictions are implemented with the addition of
MNT_LOCK_NOSUID, MNT_LOCK_NODEV, MNT_LOCK_NOEXEC, and MNT_LOCK_ATIME
mnt flags.
Taken together these changes and the fixes for MNT_LOCK_READONLY
should make it safe for an unprivileged user to create a user
namespace and to call "mount --bind -o remount,... ..." without
the danger of mount flags being changed maliciously.
Cc: [email protected]
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int snd_seq_ioctl_get_client_pool(struct snd_seq_client *client,
void *arg)
{
struct snd_seq_client_pool *info = arg;
struct snd_seq_client *cptr;
cptr = snd_seq_client_use_ptr(info->client);
if (cptr == NULL)
return -ENOENT;
memset(info, 0, sizeof(*info));
info->client = cptr->number;
info->output_pool = cptr->pool->size;
info->output_room = cptr->pool->room;
info->output_free = info->output_pool;
info->output_free = snd_seq_unused_cells(cptr->pool);
if (cptr->type == USER_CLIENT) {
info->input_pool = cptr->data.user.fifo_pool_size;
info->input_free = info->input_pool;
if (cptr->data.user.fifo)
info->input_free = snd_seq_unused_cells(cptr->data.user.fifo->pool);
} else {
info->input_pool = 0;
info->input_free = 0;
}
snd_seq_client_unlock(cptr);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: seq: Fix use-after-free at creating a port
There is a potential race window opened at creating and deleting a
port via ioctl, as spotted by fuzzing. snd_seq_create_port() creates
a port object and returns its pointer, but it doesn't take the
refcount, thus it can be deleted immediately by another thread.
Meanwhile, snd_seq_ioctl_create_port() still calls the function
snd_seq_system_client_ev_port_start() with the created port object
that is being deleted, and this triggers use-after-free like:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq] at addr ffff8801f2241cb1
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-512 (Tainted: G B ): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
INFO: Allocated in snd_seq_create_port+0x94/0x9b0 [snd_seq] age=1 cpu=3 pid=4511
___slab_alloc+0x425/0x460
__slab_alloc+0x20/0x40
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x150/0x190
snd_seq_create_port+0x94/0x9b0 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0xd1/0x630 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x75
INFO: Freed in port_delete+0x136/0x1a0 [snd_seq] age=1 cpu=2 pid=4717
__slab_free+0x204/0x310
kfree+0x15f/0x180
port_delete+0x136/0x1a0 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_delete_port+0x235/0x350 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl_delete_port+0xc8/0x180 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x75
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81b03781>] dump_stack+0x63/0x82
[<ffffffff81531b3b>] print_trailer+0xfb/0x160
[<ffffffff81536db4>] object_err+0x34/0x40
[<ffffffff815392d3>] kasan_report.part.2+0x223/0x520
[<ffffffffa07aadf4>] ? snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff815395fe>] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x2e/0x30
[<ffffffffa07aadf4>] snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffffa07aa8f0>] ? snd_seq_ioctl_delete_port+0x180/0x180 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff8136be50>] ? taskstats_exit+0xbc0/0xbc0
[<ffffffffa07abc5c>] snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffffa07abd10>] snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff8136d433>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x63/0x80
[<ffffffff815b515b>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
.....
We may fix this in a few different ways, and in this patch, it's fixed
simply by taking the refcount properly at snd_seq_create_port() and
letting the caller unref the object after use. Also, there is another
potential use-after-free by sprintf() call in snd_seq_create_port(),
and this is moved inside the lock.
This fix covers CVE-2017-15265.
Reported-and-tested-by: Michael23 Yu <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void GetSuggestions(const autofill::PasswordFormFillData& fill_data,
const base::string16& current_username,
std::vector<autofill::Suggestion>* suggestions,
bool show_all,
bool is_password_field) {
AppendSuggestionIfMatching(fill_data.username_field.value, current_username,
fill_data.preferred_realm, show_all,
is_password_field, suggestions);
for (const auto& login : fill_data.additional_logins) {
AppendSuggestionIfMatching(login.first, current_username,
login.second.realm, show_all, is_password_field,
suggestions);
}
for (const auto& usernames : fill_data.other_possible_usernames) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < usernames.second.size(); ++i) {
AppendSuggestionIfMatching(usernames.second[i], current_username,
usernames.first.realm, show_all,
is_password_field, suggestions);
}
}
if (autofill::IsFeatureSubstringMatchEnabled()) {
std::sort(suggestions->begin(), suggestions->end(),
[](const autofill::Suggestion& a, const autofill::Suggestion& b) {
return a.match < b.match;
});
}
}
Commit Message: Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature.
Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature
as per the naming convention.
Bug: 785953
Change-Id: I4a4baa1649fe9f02c3783a5e4c40bc75e717cc03
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/900566
Reviewed-by: Vaclav Brozek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: NIKHIL SAHNI <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#534923}
CWE ID: CWE-264
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void dtls1_free(SSL *s)
{
DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_free(&s->rlayer);
{
pqueue *buffered_messages;
pqueue *sent_messages;
unsigned int mtu;
unsigned int link_mtu;
DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(&s->rlayer);
if (s->d1) {
buffered_messages = s->d1->buffered_messages;
sent_messages = s->d1->sent_messages;
mtu = s->d1->mtu;
link_mtu = s->d1->link_mtu;
dtls1_clear_queues(s);
memset(s->d1, 0, sizeof(*s->d1));
if (s->server) {
s->d1->cookie_len = sizeof(s->d1->cookie);
}
if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU) {
s->d1->mtu = mtu;
s->d1->link_mtu = link_mtu;
}
s->d1->buffered_messages = buffered_messages;
s->d1->sent_messages = sent_messages;
}
ssl3_clear(s);
if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
s->version = DTLS_MAX_VERSION;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_METHOD
else if (s->options & SSL_OP_CISCO_ANYCONNECT)
s->client_version = s->version = DTLS1_BAD_VER;
#endif
else
s->version = s->method->version;
}
long dtls1_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
{
int ret = 0;
switch (cmd) {
case DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT:
if (dtls1_get_timeout(s, (struct timeval *)parg) != NULL) {
ret = 1;
}
break;
case DTLS_CTRL_HANDLE_TIMEOUT:
ret = dtls1_handle_timeout(s);
break;
case DTLS_CTRL_SET_LINK_MTU:
if (larg < (long)dtls1_link_min_mtu())
return 0;
s->d1->link_mtu = larg;
return 1;
case DTLS_CTRL_GET_LINK_MIN_MTU:
return (long)dtls1_link_min_mtu();
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU:
/*
* We may not have a BIO set yet so can't call dtls1_min_mtu()
* We'll have to make do with dtls1_link_min_mtu() and max overhead
*/
if (larg < (long)dtls1_link_min_mtu() - DTLS1_MAX_MTU_OVERHEAD)
return 0;
s->d1->mtu = larg;
return larg;
default:
ret = ssl3_ctrl(s, cmd, larg, parg);
break;
}
return (ret);
}
void dtls1_start_timer(SSL *s)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* Disable timer for SCTP */
if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
memset(&s->d1->next_timeout, 0, sizeof(s->d1->next_timeout));
return;
}
#endif
/* If timer is not set, initialize duration with 1 second */
if (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec == 0 && s->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec == 0) {
s->d1->timeout_duration = 1;
}
/* Set timeout to current time */
get_current_time(&(s->d1->next_timeout));
/* Add duration to current time */
s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec += s->d1->timeout_duration;
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT, 0,
&(s->d1->next_timeout));
}
struct timeval *dtls1_get_timeout(SSL *s, struct timeval *timeleft)
{
struct timeval timenow;
/* If no timeout is set, just return NULL */
if (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec == 0 && s->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec == 0) {
return NULL;
}
/* Get current time */
get_current_time(&timenow);
/* If timer already expired, set remaining time to 0 */
if (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec < timenow.tv_sec ||
(s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec == timenow.tv_sec &&
s->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec <= timenow.tv_usec)) {
memset(timeleft, 0, sizeof(*timeleft));
return timeleft;
}
/* Calculate time left until timer expires */
memcpy(timeleft, &(s->d1->next_timeout), sizeof(struct timeval));
timeleft->tv_sec -= timenow.tv_sec;
timeleft->tv_usec -= timenow.tv_usec;
if (timeleft->tv_usec < 0) {
timeleft->tv_sec--;
timeleft->tv_usec += 1000000;
}
/*
* If remaining time is less than 15 ms, set it to 0 to prevent issues
* because of small divergences with socket timeouts.
*/
if (timeleft->tv_sec == 0 && timeleft->tv_usec < 15000) {
memset(timeleft, 0, sizeof(*timeleft));
}
return timeleft;
}
int dtls1_is_timer_expired(SSL *s)
{
struct timeval timeleft;
/* Get time left until timeout, return false if no timer running */
if (dtls1_get_timeout(s, &timeleft) == NULL) {
return 0;
}
/* Return false if timer is not expired yet */
if (timeleft.tv_sec > 0 || timeleft.tv_usec > 0) {
return 0;
}
/* Timer expired, so return true */
return 1;
}
void dtls1_double_timeout(SSL *s)
{
s->d1->timeout_duration *= 2;
if (s->d1->timeout_duration > 60)
s->d1->timeout_duration = 60;
dtls1_start_timer(s);
}
void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *s)
{
/* Reset everything */
memset(&s->d1->timeout, 0, sizeof(s->d1->timeout));
memset(&s->d1->next_timeout, 0, sizeof(s->d1->next_timeout));
s->d1->timeout_duration = 1;
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT, 0,
&(s->d1->next_timeout));
/* Clear retransmission buffer */
dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
}
int dtls1_check_timeout_num(SSL *s)
{
unsigned int mtu;
s->d1->timeout.num_alerts++;
/* Reduce MTU after 2 unsuccessful retransmissions */
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT, 0,
&(s->d1->next_timeout));
/* Clear retransmission buffer */
dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
}
int dtls1_check_timeout_num(SSL *s)
if (s->d1->timeout.num_alerts > DTLS1_TMO_ALERT_COUNT) {
/* fail the connection, enough alerts have been sent */
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CHECK_TIMEOUT_NUM, SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: int perf_register_guest_info_callbacks(struct perf_guest_info_callbacks *cbs)
{
perf_guest_cbs = cbs;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: KioskNextHomeInterfaceBrokerImpl::KioskNextHomeInterfaceBrokerImpl(
content::BrowserContext* context)
: connector_(content::BrowserContext::GetConnectorFor(context)->Clone()),
app_controller_(std::make_unique<AppControllerImpl>(
Profile::FromBrowserContext(context))) {}
Commit Message: Refactor the AppController implementation into a KeyedService.
This is necessary to guarantee that the AppController will not outlive
the AppServiceProxy, which could happen before during Profile destruction.
Bug: 945427
Change-Id: I9e2089799e38d5a70a4a9aa66df5319113e7809e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1542336
Reviewed-by: Michael Giuffrida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Lucas Tenório <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#645122}
CWE ID: CWE-416
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: check_acl(pam_handle_t *pamh,
const char *sense, const char *this_user, const char *other_user,
int noent_code, int debug)
{
struct passwd *pwd;
FILE *fp = NULL;
int i, fd = -1, save_errno;
uid_t fsuid;
struct stat st;
/* Check this user's <sense> file. */
pwd = pam_modutil_getpwnam(pamh, this_user);
if (pwd == NULL) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
"error determining home directory for '%s'",
this_user);
return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
}
/* Figure out what that file is really named. */
i = snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/.xauth/%s", pwd->pw_dir, sense);
if ((i >= (int)sizeof(path)) || (i < 0)) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
"name of user's home directory is too long");
return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
}
fsuid = setfsuid(pwd->pw_uid);
if (!stat(path, &st)) {
if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode))
errno = EINVAL;
fd = open(path, O_RDONLY | O_NOCTTY);
fd = open(path, O_RDONLY | O_NOCTTY);
}
save_errno = errno;
setfsuid(fsuid);
if (fd >= 0) {
if (!fstat(fd, &st)) {
if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode))
save_errno = errno;
close(fd);
}
}
if (fp) {
char buf[LINE_MAX], *tmp;
/* Scan the file for a list of specs of users to "trust". */
while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), fp) != NULL) {
tmp = memchr(buf, '\r', sizeof(buf));
if (tmp != NULL) {
*tmp = '\0';
}
tmp = memchr(buf, '\n', sizeof(buf));
if (tmp != NULL) {
*tmp = '\0';
}
if (fnmatch(buf, other_user, 0) == 0) {
if (debug) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
"%s %s allowed by %s",
other_user, sense, path);
}
fclose(fp);
return PAM_SUCCESS;
}
}
/* If there's no match in the file, we fail. */
if (debug) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "%s not listed in %s",
other_user, path);
}
fclose(fp);
return PAM_PERM_DENIED;
} else {
/* Default to okay if the file doesn't exist. */
errno = save_errno;
switch (errno) {
case ENOENT:
if (noent_code == PAM_SUCCESS) {
if (debug) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
"%s does not exist, ignoring",
path);
}
} else {
if (debug) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
"%s does not exist, failing",
path);
}
}
return noent_code;
default:
if (debug) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
"error opening %s: %m", path);
}
return PAM_PERM_DENIED;
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void send_packet_to_relay(struct dhcp_packet *dhcp_pkt)
{
log1("forwarding packet to relay");
udhcp_send_kernel_packet(dhcp_pkt,
server_config.server_nip, SERVER_PORT,
dhcp_pkt->gateway_nip, SERVER_PORT);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: PageGroupLoadDeferrer::PageGroupLoadDeferrer(Page* page, bool deferSelf)
{
const HashSet<Page*>& pages = page->group().pages();
HashSet<Page*>::const_iterator end = pages.end();
for (HashSet<Page*>::const_iterator it = pages.begin(); it != end; ++it) {
Page* otherPage = *it;
if ((deferSelf || otherPage != page)) {
if (!otherPage->defersLoading()) {
m_deferredFrames.append(otherPage->mainFrame());
for (Frame* frame = otherPage->mainFrame(); frame; frame = frame->tree()->traverseNext())
frame->document()->suspendScheduledTasks(ActiveDOMObject::WillDeferLoading);
}
}
}
size_t count = m_deferredFrames.size();
for (size_t i = 0; i < count; ++i)
if (Page* page = m_deferredFrames[i]->page())
page->setDefersLoading(true);
}
Commit Message: Don't wait to notify client of spoof attempt if a modal dialog is created.
BUG=281256
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23620020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157196 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void PageHandler::PrintToPDF(Maybe<bool> landscape,
Maybe<bool> display_header_footer,
Maybe<bool> print_background,
Maybe<double> scale,
Maybe<double> paper_width,
Maybe<double> paper_height,
Maybe<double> margin_top,
Maybe<double> margin_bottom,
Maybe<double> margin_left,
Maybe<double> margin_right,
Maybe<String> page_ranges,
Maybe<bool> ignore_invalid_page_ranges,
std::unique_ptr<PrintToPDFCallback> callback) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::Error("PrintToPDF is not implemented"));
return;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: allow styling the page number element when printing over the protocol.
Bug: none
Change-Id: I13e6afbd86a7c6bcdedbf0645183194b9de7cfb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/809759
Commit-Queue: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jianzhou Feng <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523966}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: EdgeStateSignatureType Signature(GestureState gesture_state,
unsigned int touch_id,
ui::EventType type,
bool touch_handled) {
CHECK((touch_id & 0xfff) == touch_id);
TouchState touch_state = TouchEventTypeToTouchState(type);
return static_cast<EdgeStateSignatureType>
(G(gesture_state, touch_id, touch_state, touch_handled));
}
Commit Message: Add setters for the aura gesture recognizer constants.
BUG=113227
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9372040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@122586 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: HeapObjectHeader* NormalPage::findHeaderFromAddress(Address address) {
if (address < payload())
return nullptr;
if (!m_objectStartBitMapComputed)
populateObjectStartBitMap();
size_t objectOffset = address - payload();
size_t objectStartNumber = objectOffset / allocationGranularity;
size_t mapIndex = objectStartNumber / 8;
ASSERT(mapIndex < objectStartBitMapSize);
size_t bit = objectStartNumber & 7;
uint8_t byte = m_objectStartBitMap[mapIndex] & ((1 << (bit + 1)) - 1);
while (!byte) {
ASSERT(mapIndex > 0);
byte = m_objectStartBitMap[--mapIndex];
}
int leadingZeroes = numberOfLeadingZeroes(byte);
objectStartNumber = (mapIndex * 8) + 7 - leadingZeroes;
objectOffset = objectStartNumber * allocationGranularity;
Address objectAddress = objectOffset + payload();
HeapObjectHeader* header = reinterpret_cast<HeapObjectHeader*>(objectAddress);
if (header->isFree())
return nullptr;
ASSERT(header->checkHeader());
return header;
}
Commit Message: Call HeapObjectHeader::checkHeader solely for its side-effect.
This requires changing its signature. This is a preliminary stage to making it
private.
BUG=633030
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2698673003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#460489}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int l2cap_sock_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr, int alen, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sockaddr_l2 la;
int len, err = 0;
BT_DBG("sk %p", sk);
if (!addr || addr->sa_family != AF_BLUETOOTH)
return -EINVAL;
memset(&la, 0, sizeof(la));
len = min_t(unsigned int, sizeof(la), alen);
memcpy(&la, addr, len);
if (la.l2_cid)
return -EINVAL;
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_SEQPACKET && !la.l2_psm) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto done;
}
switch (l2cap_pi(sk)->mode) {
case L2CAP_MODE_BASIC:
break;
case L2CAP_MODE_ERTM:
if (enable_ertm)
break;
/* fall through */
default:
err = -ENOTSUPP;
goto done;
}
switch (sk->sk_state) {
case BT_CONNECT:
case BT_CONNECT2:
case BT_CONFIG:
/* Already connecting */
goto wait;
case BT_CONNECTED:
/* Already connected */
goto done;
case BT_OPEN:
case BT_BOUND:
/* Can connect */
break;
default:
err = -EBADFD;
goto done;
}
/* Set destination address and psm */
bacpy(&bt_sk(sk)->dst, &la.l2_bdaddr);
l2cap_pi(sk)->psm = la.l2_psm;
err = l2cap_do_connect(sk);
if (err)
goto done;
wait:
err = bt_sock_wait_state(sk, BT_CONNECTED,
sock_sndtimeo(sk, flags & O_NONBLOCK));
done:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: Add configuration support for ERTM and Streaming mode
Add support to config_req and config_rsp to configure ERTM and Streaming
mode. If the remote device specifies ERTM or Streaming mode, then the
same mode is proposed. Otherwise ERTM or Basic mode is used. And in case
of a state 2 device, the remote device should propose the same mode. If
not, then the channel gets disconnected.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void overloadedPerWorldBindingsMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::overloadedPerWorldBindingsMethodMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestEventTarget::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestEventTarget* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestEventTarget*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestEventTarget::s_info);
TestEventTarget* impl = static_cast<TestEventTarget*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 1)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
int index(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined).toUInt32(exec));
if (index < 0) {
setDOMException(exec, INDEX_SIZE_ERR);
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
JSC::JSValue result = toJS(exec, castedThis->globalObject(), WTF::getPtr(impl->item(index)));
return JSValue::encode(result);
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void __ip_select_ident(struct net *net, struct iphdr *iph, int segs)
{
static u32 ip_idents_hashrnd __read_mostly;
u32 hash, id;
net_get_random_once(&ip_idents_hashrnd, sizeof(ip_idents_hashrnd));
hash = jhash_3words((__force u32)iph->daddr,
(__force u32)iph->saddr,
iph->protocol ^ net_hash_mix(net),
ip_idents_hashrnd);
id = ip_idents_reserve(hash, segs);
iph->id = htons(id);
}
Commit Message: inet: switch IP ID generator to siphash
According to Amit Klein and Benny Pinkas, IP ID generation is too weak
and might be used by attackers.
Even with recent net_hash_mix() fix (netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix())
having 64bit key and Jenkins hash is risky.
It is time to switch to siphash and its 128bit keys.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Amit Klein <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Benny Pinkas <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void qcow2_invalidate_cache(BlockDriverState *bs, Error **errp)
{
BDRVQcowState *s = bs->opaque;
int flags = s->flags;
AES_KEY aes_encrypt_key;
AES_KEY aes_decrypt_key;
uint32_t crypt_method = 0;
QDict *options;
Error *local_err = NULL;
int ret;
/*
* Backing files are read-only which makes all of their metadata immutable,
* that means we don't have to worry about reopening them here.
*/
if (s->crypt_method) {
crypt_method = s->crypt_method;
memcpy(&aes_encrypt_key, &s->aes_encrypt_key, sizeof(aes_encrypt_key));
memcpy(&aes_decrypt_key, &s->aes_decrypt_key, sizeof(aes_decrypt_key));
}
qcow2_close(bs);
bdrv_invalidate_cache(bs->file, &local_err);
if (local_err) {
error_propagate(errp, local_err);
return;
}
memset(s, 0, sizeof(BDRVQcowState));
options = qdict_clone_shallow(bs->options);
ret = qcow2_open(bs, options, flags, &local_err);
if (local_err) {
error_setg(errp, "Could not reopen qcow2 layer: %s",
error_get_pretty(local_err));
error_free(local_err);
return;
} else if (ret < 0) {
error_setg_errno(errp, -ret, "Could not reopen qcow2 layer");
return;
}
QDECREF(options);
if (crypt_method) {
s->crypt_method = crypt_method;
memcpy(&s->aes_encrypt_key, &aes_encrypt_key, sizeof(aes_encrypt_key));
memcpy(&s->aes_decrypt_key, &aes_decrypt_key, sizeof(aes_decrypt_key));
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: GC_API void GC_CALL GC_incr_bytes_allocd(size_t n)
{
GC_bytes_allocd += n;
}
Commit Message: Fix allocation size overflows due to rounding.
* malloc.c (GC_generic_malloc): Check if the allocation size is
rounded to a smaller value.
* mallocx.c (GC_generic_malloc_ignore_off_page): Likewise.
CWE ID: CWE-189
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: GDataFile::GDataFile(GDataDirectory* parent,
GDataDirectoryService* directory_service)
: GDataEntry(parent, directory_service),
kind_(DocumentEntry::UNKNOWN),
is_hosted_document_(false) {
file_info_.is_directory = false;
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static bool seq_nr_after(u16 a, u16 b)
{
/* Remove inconsistency where
* seq_nr_after(a, b) == seq_nr_before(a, b)
*/
if ((int) b - a == 32768)
return false;
return (((s16) (b - a)) < 0);
}
Commit Message: net: hsr: fix memory leak in hsr_dev_finalize()
If hsr_add_port(hsr, hsr_dev, HSR_PT_MASTER) failed to
add port, it directly returns res and forgets to free the node
that allocated in hsr_create_self_node(), and forgets to delete
the node->mac_list linked in hsr->self_node_db.
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff8881cfa0c780 (size 64):
comm "syz-executor.0", pid 2077, jiffies 4294717969 (age 2415.377s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
e0 c7 a0 cf 81 88 ff ff 00 02 00 00 00 00 ad de ................
00 e6 49 cd 81 88 ff ff c0 9b 87 d0 81 88 ff ff ..I.............
backtrace:
[<00000000e2ff5070>] hsr_dev_finalize+0x736/0x960 [hsr]
[<000000003ed2e597>] hsr_newlink+0x2b2/0x3e0 [hsr]
[<000000003fa8c6b6>] __rtnl_newlink+0xf1f/0x1600 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3182
[<000000001247a7ad>] rtnl_newlink+0x66/0x90 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3240
[<00000000e7d1b61d>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x54e/0xb90 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5130
[<000000005556bd3a>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x129/0x340 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477
[<00000000741d5ee6>] netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1310 [inline]
[<00000000741d5ee6>] netlink_unicast+0x49a/0x650 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1336
[<000000009d56f9b7>] netlink_sendmsg+0x88b/0xdf0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917
[<0000000046b35c59>] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline]
[<0000000046b35c59>] sock_sendmsg+0xc3/0x100 net/socket.c:631
[<00000000d208adc9>] __sys_sendto+0x33e/0x560 net/socket.c:1786
[<00000000b582837a>] __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1798 [inline]
[<00000000b582837a>] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1794 [inline]
[<00000000b582837a>] __x64_sys_sendto+0xdd/0x1b0 net/socket.c:1794
[<00000000c866801d>] do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
[<00000000fea382d9>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[<00000000e01dacb3>] 0xffffffffffffffff
Fixes: c5a759117210 ("net/hsr: Use list_head (and rcu) instead of array for slave devices.")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mao Wenan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-772
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int peer_has_ufo(VirtIONet *n)
{
if (!peer_has_vnet_hdr(n))
return 0;
n->has_ufo = qemu_has_ufo(qemu_get_queue(n->nic)->peer);
return n->has_ufo;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: char *strstr(char *s1, char *s2)
{ /* from libiberty */
char *p;
int len = strlen(s2);
if (*s2 == '\0') /* everything matches empty string */
return s1;
for (p = s1; (p = strchr(p, *s2)) != NULL; p = strchr(p + 1, *s2)) {
if (strncmp(p, s2, len) == 0)
return (p);
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: misc oom and possible memory leak fix
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int ftrace_function_set_regexp(struct ftrace_ops *ops, int filter,
int reset, char *re, int len)
{
int ret;
if (filter)
ret = ftrace_set_filter(ops, re, len, reset);
else
ret = ftrace_set_notrace(ops, re, len, reset);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: ModuleExport size_t RegisterPCXImage(void)
{
MagickInfo
*entry;
entry=SetMagickInfo("DCX");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadPCXImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WritePCXImage;
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsDCX;
entry->description=ConstantString("ZSoft IBM PC multi-page Paintbrush");
entry->module=ConstantString("PCX");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("PCX");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadPCXImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WritePCXImage;
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsPCX;
entry->adjoin=MagickFalse;
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
entry->description=ConstantString("ZSoft IBM PC Paintbrush");
entry->module=ConstantString("PCX");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/575
CWE ID: CWE-772
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE4(osf_wait4, pid_t, pid, int __user *, ustatus, int, options,
struct rusage32 __user *, ur)
{
struct rusage r;
long ret, err;
mm_segment_t old_fs;
if (!ur)
return sys_wait4(pid, ustatus, options, NULL);
old_fs = get_fs();
set_fs (KERNEL_DS);
ret = sys_wait4(pid, ustatus, options, (struct rusage __user *) &r);
set_fs (old_fs);
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, ur, sizeof(*ur)))
return -EFAULT;
err = 0;
err |= __put_user(r.ru_utime.tv_sec, &ur->ru_utime.tv_sec);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_utime.tv_usec, &ur->ru_utime.tv_usec);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_stime.tv_sec, &ur->ru_stime.tv_sec);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_stime.tv_usec, &ur->ru_stime.tv_usec);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_maxrss, &ur->ru_maxrss);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_ixrss, &ur->ru_ixrss);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_idrss, &ur->ru_idrss);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_isrss, &ur->ru_isrss);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_minflt, &ur->ru_minflt);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_majflt, &ur->ru_majflt);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_nswap, &ur->ru_nswap);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_inblock, &ur->ru_inblock);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_oublock, &ur->ru_oublock);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_msgsnd, &ur->ru_msgsnd);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_msgrcv, &ur->ru_msgrcv);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_nsignals, &ur->ru_nsignals);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_nvcsw, &ur->ru_nvcsw);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_nivcsw, &ur->ru_nivcsw);
return err ? err : ret;
}
Commit Message: alpha: fix several security issues
Fix several security issues in Alpha-specific syscalls. Untested, but
mostly trivial.
1. Signedness issue in osf_getdomainname allows copying out-of-bounds
kernel memory to userland.
2. Signedness issue in osf_sysinfo allows copying large amounts of
kernel memory to userland.
3. Typo (?) in osf_getsysinfo bounds minimum instead of maximum copy
size, allowing copying large amounts of kernel memory to userland.
4. Usage of user pointer in osf_wait4 while under KERNEL_DS allows
privilege escalation via writing return value of sys_wait4 to kernel
memory.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>
Cc: Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <[email protected]>
Cc: Matt Turner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: bool HTMLMediaElement::isGestureNeededForPlaybackIfPendingUserGestureIsLocked()
const {
if (loadType() == WebMediaPlayer::LoadTypeMediaStream)
return false;
if (isHTMLVideoElement() && muted() &&
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::autoplayMutedVideosEnabled() &&
!(document().settings() &&
document().settings()->getDataSaverEnabled()) &&
!(document().settings() &&
document().settings()->getForcePreloadNoneForMediaElements()) &&
isAutoplayAllowedPerSettings()) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::storeMetaDataInBuffers_l(
OMX_U32 portIndex, OMX_BOOL enable, MetadataBufferType *type) {
if (portIndex != kPortIndexInput && portIndex != kPortIndexOutput) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "26324358");
if (type != NULL) {
*type = kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid;
}
return BAD_VALUE;
}
OMX_INDEXTYPE index;
OMX_STRING name = const_cast<OMX_STRING>(
"OMX.google.android.index.storeMetaDataInBuffers");
OMX_STRING nativeBufferName = const_cast<OMX_STRING>(
"OMX.google.android.index.storeANWBufferInMetadata");
MetadataBufferType negotiatedType;
MetadataBufferType requestedType = type != NULL ? *type : kMetadataBufferTypeANWBuffer;
StoreMetaDataInBuffersParams params;
InitOMXParams(¶ms);
params.nPortIndex = portIndex;
params.bStoreMetaData = enable;
OMX_ERRORTYPE err =
requestedType == kMetadataBufferTypeANWBuffer
? OMX_GetExtensionIndex(mHandle, nativeBufferName, &index)
: OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
OMX_ERRORTYPE xerr = err;
if (err == OMX_ErrorNone) {
err = OMX_SetParameter(mHandle, index, ¶ms);
if (err == OMX_ErrorNone) {
name = nativeBufferName; // set name for debugging
negotiatedType = requestedType;
}
}
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
err = OMX_GetExtensionIndex(mHandle, name, &index);
xerr = err;
if (err == OMX_ErrorNone) {
negotiatedType =
requestedType == kMetadataBufferTypeANWBuffer
? kMetadataBufferTypeGrallocSource : requestedType;
err = OMX_SetParameter(mHandle, index, ¶ms);
}
}
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
if (err == OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex && portIndex == kPortIndexOutput) {
CLOGW("component does not support metadata mode; using fallback");
} else if (xerr != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(getExtensionIndex, xerr, "%s", name);
} else {
CLOG_ERROR(setParameter, err, "%s(%#x): %s:%u en=%d type=%d", name, index,
portString(portIndex), portIndex, enable, negotiatedType);
}
negotiatedType = mMetadataType[portIndex];
} else {
if (!enable) {
negotiatedType = kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid;
}
mMetadataType[portIndex] = negotiatedType;
}
CLOG_CONFIG(storeMetaDataInBuffers, "%s:%u %srequested %s:%d negotiated %s:%d",
portString(portIndex), portIndex, enable ? "" : "UN",
asString(requestedType), requestedType, asString(negotiatedType), negotiatedType);
if (type != NULL) {
*type = negotiatedType;
}
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: IOMX: work against metadata buffer spoofing
- Prohibit direct set/getParam/Settings for extensions meant for
OMXNodeInstance alone. This disallows enabling metadata mode
without the knowledge of OMXNodeInstance.
- Use a backup buffer for metadata mode buffers and do not directly
share with clients.
- Disallow setting up metadata mode/tunneling/input surface
after first sendCommand.
- Disallow store-meta for input cross process.
- Disallow emptyBuffer for surface input (via IOMX).
- Fix checking for input surface.
Bug: 29422020
Change-Id: I801c77b80e703903f62e42d76fd2e76a34e4bc8e
(cherry picked from commit 7c3c2fa3e233c656fc8c2fc2a6634b3ecf8a23e8)
CWE ID: CWE-200
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: ext2_xattr_delete_inode(struct inode *inode)
{
struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
struct mb_cache_entry *ce;
down_write(&EXT2_I(inode)->xattr_sem);
if (!EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl)
goto cleanup;
bh = sb_bread(inode->i_sb, EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
if (!bh) {
ext2_error(inode->i_sb, "ext2_xattr_delete_inode",
"inode %ld: block %d read error", inode->i_ino,
EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
goto cleanup;
}
ea_bdebug(bh, "b_count=%d", atomic_read(&(bh->b_count)));
if (HDR(bh)->h_magic != cpu_to_le32(EXT2_XATTR_MAGIC) ||
HDR(bh)->h_blocks != cpu_to_le32(1)) {
ext2_error(inode->i_sb, "ext2_xattr_delete_inode",
"inode %ld: bad block %d", inode->i_ino,
EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
goto cleanup;
}
ce = mb_cache_entry_get(ext2_xattr_cache, bh->b_bdev, bh->b_blocknr);
lock_buffer(bh);
if (HDR(bh)->h_refcount == cpu_to_le32(1)) {
if (ce)
mb_cache_entry_free(ce);
ext2_free_blocks(inode, EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl, 1);
get_bh(bh);
bforget(bh);
unlock_buffer(bh);
} else {
le32_add_cpu(&HDR(bh)->h_refcount, -1);
if (ce)
mb_cache_entry_release(ce);
ea_bdebug(bh, "refcount now=%d",
le32_to_cpu(HDR(bh)->h_refcount));
unlock_buffer(bh);
mark_buffer_dirty(bh);
if (IS_SYNC(inode))
sync_dirty_buffer(bh);
dquot_free_block_nodirty(inode, 1);
}
EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl = 0;
cleanup:
brelse(bh);
up_write(&EXT2_I(inode)->xattr_sem);
}
Commit Message: ext2: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. We convert filesystem from
a global cache to per-fs one. Similarly to ext4 the tricky part is that
xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed before we
get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether the entry is
still valid after getting the buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-19
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: sort_dir_list(struct fixup_entry *p)
{
struct fixup_entry *a, *b, *t;
if (p == NULL)
return (NULL);
/* A one-item list is already sorted. */
if (p->next == NULL)
return (p);
/* Step 1: split the list. */
t = p;
a = p->next->next;
while (a != NULL) {
/* Step a twice, t once. */
a = a->next;
if (a != NULL)
a = a->next;
t = t->next;
}
/* Now, t is at the mid-point, so break the list here. */
b = t->next;
t->next = NULL;
a = p;
/* Step 2: Recursively sort the two sub-lists. */
a = sort_dir_list(a);
b = sort_dir_list(b);
/* Step 3: Merge the returned lists. */
/* Pick the first element for the merged list. */
if (strcmp(a->name, b->name) > 0) {
t = p = a;
a = a->next;
} else {
t = p = b;
b = b->next;
}
/* Always put the later element on the list first. */
while (a != NULL && b != NULL) {
if (strcmp(a->name, b->name) > 0) {
t->next = a;
a = a->next;
} else {
t->next = b;
b = b->next;
}
t = t->next;
}
/* Only one list is non-empty, so just splice it on. */
if (a != NULL)
t->next = a;
if (b != NULL)
t->next = b;
return (p);
}
Commit Message: Add ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS option
This fixes a directory traversal in the cpio tool.
CWE ID: CWE-22
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int nfs4_xdr_enc_delegreturn(struct rpc_rqst *req, __be32 *p, const struct nfs4_delegreturnargs *args)
{
struct xdr_stream xdr;
struct compound_hdr hdr = {
.nops = 3,
};
int status;
xdr_init_encode(&xdr, &req->rq_snd_buf, p);
encode_compound_hdr(&xdr, &hdr);
status = encode_putfh(&xdr, args->fhandle);
if (status != 0)
goto out;
status = encode_delegreturn(&xdr, args->stateid);
if (status != 0)
goto out;
status = encode_getfattr(&xdr, args->bitmask);
out:
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: ieee802_11_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *p, u_int length, u_int orig_caplen, int pad,
u_int fcslen)
{
uint16_t fc;
u_int caplen, hdrlen, meshdrlen;
struct lladdr_info src, dst;
int llc_hdrlen;
caplen = orig_caplen;
/* Remove FCS, if present */
if (length < fcslen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return caplen;
}
length -= fcslen;
if (caplen > length) {
/* Amount of FCS in actual packet data, if any */
fcslen = caplen - length;
caplen -= fcslen;
ndo->ndo_snapend -= fcslen;
}
if (caplen < IEEE802_11_FC_LEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return orig_caplen;
}
fc = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p);
hdrlen = extract_header_length(ndo, fc);
if (hdrlen == 0) {
/* Unknown frame type or control frame subtype; quit. */
return (0);
}
if (pad)
hdrlen = roundup2(hdrlen, 4);
if (ndo->ndo_Hflag && FC_TYPE(fc) == T_DATA &&
DATA_FRAME_IS_QOS(FC_SUBTYPE(fc))) {
meshdrlen = extract_mesh_header_length(p+hdrlen);
hdrlen += meshdrlen;
} else
meshdrlen = 0;
if (caplen < hdrlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return hdrlen;
}
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ieee_802_11_hdr_print(ndo, fc, p, hdrlen, meshdrlen);
/*
* Go past the 802.11 header.
*/
length -= hdrlen;
caplen -= hdrlen;
p += hdrlen;
src.addr_string = etheraddr_string;
dst.addr_string = etheraddr_string;
switch (FC_TYPE(fc)) {
case T_MGMT:
get_mgmt_src_dst_mac(p - hdrlen, &src.addr, &dst.addr);
if (!mgmt_body_print(ndo, fc, src.addr, p, length)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return hdrlen;
}
break;
case T_CTRL:
if (!ctrl_body_print(ndo, fc, p - hdrlen)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return hdrlen;
}
break;
case T_DATA:
if (DATA_FRAME_IS_NULL(FC_SUBTYPE(fc)))
return hdrlen; /* no-data frame */
/* There may be a problem w/ AP not having this bit set */
if (FC_PROTECTED(fc)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Data"));
if (!wep_print(ndo, p)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return hdrlen;
}
} else {
get_data_src_dst_mac(fc, p - hdrlen, &src.addr, &dst.addr);
llc_hdrlen = llc_print(ndo, p, length, caplen, &src, &dst);
if (llc_hdrlen < 0) {
/*
* Some kinds of LLC packet we cannot
* handle intelligently
*/
if (!ndo->ndo_suppress_default_print)
ND_DEFAULTPRINT(p, caplen);
llc_hdrlen = -llc_hdrlen;
}
hdrlen += llc_hdrlen;
}
break;
default:
/* We shouldn't get here - we should already have quit */
break;
}
return hdrlen;
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-16227/IEEE 802.11: add a missing bounds check
ieee802_11_print() tried to access the Mesh Flags subfield of the Mesh
Control field to find the size of the latter and increment the expected
802.11 header length before checking it is fully present in the input
buffer. Add an intermediate bounds check to make it safe.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Ryan Ackroyd.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::OnSignedExchangeCertificateResponseReceived(
FrameTreeNode* frame_tree_node,
const base::UnguessableToken& request_id,
const base::UnguessableToken& loader_id,
const GURL& url,
const network::ResourceResponseHead& head) {
DispatchToAgents(frame_tree_node, &protocol::NetworkHandler::ResponseReceived,
request_id.ToString(), loader_id.ToString(), url,
protocol::Network::ResourceTypeEnum::Other, head,
protocol::Maybe<std::string>());
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow Page.setDownloadBehavior for extensions
Bug: 866426
Change-Id: I71b672978e1a8ec779ede49da16b21198567d3a4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1270007
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598004}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: long Chapters::Edition::Parse(
IMkvReader* pReader,
long long pos,
long long size)
{
const long long stop = pos + size;
while (pos < stop)
{
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(
pReader,
pos,
stop,
id,
size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (size == 0) // weird
continue;
if (id == 0x36) // Atom ID
{
status = ParseAtom(pReader, pos, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
}
pos += size;
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: ScriptPromise BluetoothRemoteGATTService::getCharacteristicsImpl(
ScriptState* scriptState,
mojom::blink::WebBluetoothGATTQueryQuantity quantity,
const String& characteristicsUUID) {
if (!device()->gatt()->connected()) {
return ScriptPromise::rejectWithDOMException(
scriptState,
DOMException::create(NetworkError, kGATTServerNotConnected));
}
if (!device()->isValidService(m_service->instance_id)) {
return ScriptPromise::rejectWithDOMException(
scriptState, DOMException::create(InvalidStateError, kInvalidService));
}
ScriptPromiseResolver* resolver = ScriptPromiseResolver::create(scriptState);
ScriptPromise promise = resolver->promise();
device()->gatt()->AddToActiveAlgorithms(resolver);
mojom::blink::WebBluetoothService* service = m_device->bluetooth()->service();
WTF::Optional<String> uuid = WTF::nullopt;
if (!characteristicsUUID.isEmpty())
uuid = characteristicsUUID;
service->RemoteServiceGetCharacteristics(
m_service->instance_id, quantity, uuid,
convertToBaseCallback(
WTF::bind(&BluetoothRemoteGATTService::GetCharacteristicsCallback,
wrapPersistent(this), m_service->instance_id, quantity,
wrapPersistent(resolver))));
return promise;
}
Commit Message: Allow serialization of empty bluetooth uuids.
This change allows the passing WTF::Optional<String> types as
bluetooth.mojom.UUID optional parameter without needing to ensure the passed
object isn't empty.
BUG=None
R=juncai, dcheng
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2646613003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#445809}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: linux_md_create_data_new (DBusGMethodInvocation *context,
Daemon *daemon,
const char *first_component_objpath)
{
LinuxMdCreateData *data;
data = g_new0 (LinuxMdCreateData, 1);
data->refcount = 1;
data->context = context;
data->daemon = g_object_ref (daemon);
data->first_component_objpath = g_strdup (first_component_objpath);
return data;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static ssize_t lbs_rdmac_read(struct file *file, char __user *userbuf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct lbs_private *priv = file->private_data;
ssize_t pos = 0;
int ret;
unsigned long addr = get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
char *buf = (char *)addr;
u32 val = 0;
if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
ret = lbs_get_reg(priv, CMD_MAC_REG_ACCESS, priv->mac_offset, &val);
mdelay(10);
if (!ret) {
pos = snprintf(buf, len, "MAC[0x%x] = 0x%08x\n",
priv->mac_offset, val);
ret = simple_read_from_buffer(userbuf, count, ppos, buf, pos);
}
free_page(addr);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: libertas: potential oops in debugfs
If we do a zero size allocation then it will oops. Also we can't be
sure the user passes us a NUL terminated string so I've added a
terminator.
This code can only be triggered by root.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: l_strnstart(const char *tstr1, u_int tl1, const char *str2, u_int l2)
{
if (tl1 > l2)
return 0;
return (strncmp(tstr1, str2, tl1) == 0 ? 1 : 0);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13010/BEEP: Do bounds checking when comparing strings.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Brian 'geeknik' Carpenter.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: ofputil_uninit_group_desc(struct ofputil_group_desc *gd)
{
ofputil_bucket_list_destroy(&gd->buckets);
ofputil_group_properties_destroy(&gd->props);
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-617
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void AudioInputRendererHost::OnCreateStream(
int stream_id, const media::AudioParameters& params,
const std::string& device_id, bool automatic_gain_control) {
VLOG(1) << "AudioInputRendererHost::OnCreateStream(stream_id="
<< stream_id << ")";
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
DCHECK(LookupById(stream_id) == NULL);
media::AudioParameters audio_params(params);
if (media_stream_manager_->audio_input_device_manager()->
ShouldUseFakeDevice()) {
audio_params.Reset(media::AudioParameters::AUDIO_FAKE,
params.channel_layout(), params.sample_rate(),
params.bits_per_sample(), params.frames_per_buffer());
} else if (WebContentsCaptureUtil::IsWebContentsDeviceId(device_id)) {
audio_params.Reset(media::AudioParameters::AUDIO_VIRTUAL,
params.channel_layout(), params.sample_rate(),
params.bits_per_sample(), params.frames_per_buffer());
}
DCHECK_GT(audio_params.frames_per_buffer(), 0);
uint32 buffer_size = audio_params.GetBytesPerBuffer();
scoped_ptr<AudioEntry> entry(new AudioEntry());
uint32 mem_size = sizeof(media::AudioInputBufferParameters) + buffer_size;
if (!entry->shared_memory.CreateAndMapAnonymous(mem_size)) {
SendErrorMessage(stream_id);
return;
}
scoped_ptr<AudioInputSyncWriter> writer(
new AudioInputSyncWriter(&entry->shared_memory));
if (!writer->Init()) {
SendErrorMessage(stream_id);
return;
}
entry->writer.reset(writer.release());
entry->controller = media::AudioInputController::CreateLowLatency(
audio_manager_,
this,
audio_params,
device_id,
entry->writer.get());
if (!entry->controller) {
SendErrorMessage(stream_id);
return;
}
if (params.format() == media::AudioParameters::AUDIO_PCM_LOW_LATENCY)
entry->controller->SetAutomaticGainControl(automatic_gain_control);
entry->stream_id = stream_id;
audio_entries_.insert(std::make_pair(stream_id, entry.release()));
}
Commit Message: Improve validation when creating audio streams.
BUG=166795
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11647012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173981 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static Image *ReadPWPImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
filename[MagickPathExtent];
FILE
*file;
Image
*image,
*next_image,
*pwp_image;
ImageInfo
*read_info;
int
c,
unique_file;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register Image
*p;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
filesize,
length;
ssize_t
count;
unsigned char
magick[MagickPathExtent];
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImage(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
pwp_image=image;
memset(magick,0,sizeof(magick));
count=ReadBlob(pwp_image,5,magick);
if ((count != 5) || (LocaleNCompare((char *) magick,"SFW95",5) != 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
read_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
(void) SetImageInfoProgressMonitor(read_info,(MagickProgressMonitor) NULL,
(void *) NULL);
SetImageInfoBlob(read_info,(void *) NULL,0);
unique_file=AcquireUniqueFileResource(filename);
(void) FormatLocaleString(read_info->filename,MagickPathExtent,"sfw:%s",
filename);
for ( ; ; )
{
(void) memset(magick,0,sizeof(magick));
for (c=ReadBlobByte(pwp_image); c != EOF; c=ReadBlobByte(pwp_image))
{
for (i=0; i < 17; i++)
magick[i]=magick[i+1];
magick[17]=(unsigned char) c;
if (LocaleNCompare((char *) (magick+12),"SFW94A",6) == 0)
break;
}
if (c == EOF)
{
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(filename);
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
}
if (LocaleNCompare((char *) (magick+12),"SFW94A",6) != 0)
{
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(filename);
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
/*
Dump SFW image to a temporary file.
*/
file=(FILE *) NULL;
if (unique_file != -1)
file=fdopen(unique_file,"wb");
if ((unique_file == -1) || (file == (FILE *) NULL))
{
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(filename);
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
ThrowFileException(exception,FileOpenError,"UnableToWriteFile",
image->filename);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
length=fwrite("SFW94A",1,6,file);
(void) length;
filesize=65535UL*magick[2]+256L*magick[1]+magick[0];
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) filesize; i++)
{
c=ReadBlobByte(pwp_image);
if (c == EOF)
break;
(void) fputc(c,file);
}
(void) fclose(file);
if (c == EOF)
{
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(filename);
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
}
next_image=ReadImage(read_info,exception);
if (next_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
(void) FormatLocaleString(next_image->filename,MagickPathExtent,
"slide_%02ld.sfw",(long) next_image->scene);
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
image=next_image;
else
{
/*
Link image into image list.
*/
for (p=image; p->next != (Image *) NULL; p=GetNextImageInList(p)) ;
next_image->previous=p;
next_image->scene=p->scene+1;
p->next=next_image;
}
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (next_image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(pwp_image),
GetBlobSize(pwp_image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (unique_file != -1)
(void) close(unique_file);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(filename);
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
if (image != (Image *) NULL)
{
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
char
*message;
message=GetExceptionMessage(errno);
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile","`%s': %s",image->filename,
message);
message=DestroyString(message);
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
}
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1199
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int setciedefgspace(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p, ref *r, int *stage, int *cont, int CIESubst)
{
int code = 0;
ref CIEDict, *nocie;
ulong dictkey;
gs_md5_state_t md5;
byte key[16];
if (i_ctx_p->language_level < 3)
return_error(gs_error_undefined);
code = dict_find_string(systemdict, "NOCIE", &nocie);
if (code > 0) {
if (!r_has_type(nocie, t_boolean))
return_error(gs_error_typecheck);
if (nocie->value.boolval)
return setcmykspace(i_ctx_p, r, stage, cont, 1);
}
*cont = 0;
code = array_get(imemory, r, 1, &CIEDict);
if (code < 0)
return code;
if ((*stage) > 0) {
gs_client_color cc;
int i;
cc.pattern = 0x00;
for (i=0;i<4;i++)
cc.paint.values[i] = 0;
code = gs_setcolor(igs, &cc);
*stage = 0;
return code;
}
gs_md5_init(&md5);
/* If the hash (dictkey) is 0, we don't check for an existing
* ICC profile dor this space. So if we get an error hashing
* the space, we construct a new profile.
*/
dictkey = 0;
if (hashciedefgspace(i_ctx_p, r, &md5)) {
/* Ideally we would use the whole md5 hash, but the ICC code only
* expects a long. I'm 'slightly' concerned about collisions here
* but I think its unlikely really. If it ever becomes a problem
* we could add the hash bytes up, or modify the ICC cache to store
* the full 16 byte hashs.
*/
gs_md5_finish(&md5, key);
dictkey = *(ulong *)&key[sizeof(key) - sizeof(ulong)];
} else {
gs_md5_finish(&md5, key);
}
code = ciedefgspace(i_ctx_p, &CIEDict,dictkey);
*cont = 1;
(*stage)++;
return code;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: int svc_rdma_handle_bc_reply(struct rpc_xprt *xprt, struct rpcrdma_msg *rmsgp,
struct xdr_buf *rcvbuf)
{
struct rpcrdma_xprt *r_xprt = rpcx_to_rdmax(xprt);
struct kvec *dst, *src = &rcvbuf->head[0];
struct rpc_rqst *req;
unsigned long cwnd;
u32 credits;
size_t len;
__be32 xid;
__be32 *p;
int ret;
p = (__be32 *)src->iov_base;
len = src->iov_len;
xid = rmsgp->rm_xid;
#ifdef SVCRDMA_BACKCHANNEL_DEBUG
pr_info("%s: xid=%08x, length=%zu\n",
__func__, be32_to_cpu(xid), len);
pr_info("%s: RPC/RDMA: %*ph\n",
__func__, (int)RPCRDMA_HDRLEN_MIN, rmsgp);
pr_info("%s: RPC: %*ph\n",
__func__, (int)len, p);
#endif
ret = -EAGAIN;
if (src->iov_len < 24)
goto out_shortreply;
spin_lock_bh(&xprt->transport_lock);
req = xprt_lookup_rqst(xprt, xid);
if (!req)
goto out_notfound;
dst = &req->rq_private_buf.head[0];
memcpy(&req->rq_private_buf, &req->rq_rcv_buf, sizeof(struct xdr_buf));
if (dst->iov_len < len)
goto out_unlock;
memcpy(dst->iov_base, p, len);
credits = be32_to_cpu(rmsgp->rm_credit);
if (credits == 0)
credits = 1; /* don't deadlock */
else if (credits > r_xprt->rx_buf.rb_bc_max_requests)
credits = r_xprt->rx_buf.rb_bc_max_requests;
cwnd = xprt->cwnd;
xprt->cwnd = credits << RPC_CWNDSHIFT;
if (xprt->cwnd > cwnd)
xprt_release_rqst_cong(req->rq_task);
ret = 0;
xprt_complete_rqst(req->rq_task, rcvbuf->len);
rcvbuf->len = 0;
out_unlock:
spin_unlock_bh(&xprt->transport_lock);
out:
return ret;
out_shortreply:
dprintk("svcrdma: short bc reply: xprt=%p, len=%zu\n",
xprt, src->iov_len);
goto out;
out_notfound:
dprintk("svcrdma: unrecognized bc reply: xprt=%p, xid=%08x\n",
xprt, be32_to_cpu(xid));
goto out_unlock;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int add_ballooned_pages(int nr_pages)
{
enum bp_state st;
if (xen_hotplug_unpopulated) {
st = reserve_additional_memory();
if (st != BP_ECANCELED) {
mutex_unlock(&balloon_mutex);
wait_event(balloon_wq,
!list_empty(&ballooned_pages));
mutex_lock(&balloon_mutex);
return 0;
}
}
st = decrease_reservation(nr_pages, GFP_USER);
if (st != BP_DONE)
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: xen: let alloc_xenballooned_pages() fail if not enough memory free
commit a1078e821b605813b63bf6bca414a85f804d5c66 upstream.
Instead of trying to allocate pages with GFP_USER in
add_ballooned_pages() check the available free memory via
si_mem_available(). GFP_USER is far less limiting memory exhaustion
than the test via si_mem_available().
This will avoid dom0 running out of memory due to excessive foreign
page mappings especially on ARM and on x86 in PVH mode, as those don't
have a pre-ballooned area which can be used for foreign mappings.
As the normal ballooning suffers from the same problem don't balloon
down more than si_mem_available() pages in one iteration. At the same
time limit the default maximum number of retries.
This is part of XSA-300.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-400
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int tg_schedulable(struct task_group *tg, void *data)
{
struct rt_schedulable_data *d = data;
struct task_group *child;
unsigned long total, sum = 0;
u64 period, runtime;
period = ktime_to_ns(tg->rt_bandwidth.rt_period);
runtime = tg->rt_bandwidth.rt_runtime;
if (tg == d->tg) {
period = d->rt_period;
runtime = d->rt_runtime;
}
/*
* Cannot have more runtime than the period.
*/
if (runtime > period && runtime != RUNTIME_INF)
return -EINVAL;
/*
* Ensure we don't starve existing RT tasks.
*/
if (rt_bandwidth_enabled() && !runtime && tg_has_rt_tasks(tg))
return -EBUSY;
total = to_ratio(period, runtime);
/*
* Nobody can have more than the global setting allows.
*/
if (total > to_ratio(global_rt_period(), global_rt_runtime()))
return -EINVAL;
/*
* The sum of our children's runtime should not exceed our own.
*/
list_for_each_entry_rcu(child, &tg->children, siblings) {
period = ktime_to_ns(child->rt_bandwidth.rt_period);
runtime = child->rt_bandwidth.rt_runtime;
if (child == d->tg) {
period = d->rt_period;
runtime = d->rt_runtime;
}
sum += to_ratio(period, runtime);
}
if (sum > total)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
LKML-Reference: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: encode_layoutcommit(struct xdr_stream *xdr,
struct inode *inode,
const struct nfs4_layoutcommit_args *args,
struct compound_hdr *hdr)
{
__be32 *p;
dprintk("%s: lbw: %llu type: %d\n", __func__, args->lastbytewritten,
NFS_SERVER(args->inode)->pnfs_curr_ld->id);
p = reserve_space(xdr, 44 + NFS4_STATEID_SIZE);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(OP_LAYOUTCOMMIT);
/* Only whole file layouts */
p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, 0); /* offset */
p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, args->lastbytewritten + 1); /* length */
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(0); /* reclaim */
p = xdr_encode_opaque_fixed(p, args->stateid.data, NFS4_STATEID_SIZE);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(1); /* newoffset = TRUE */
p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, args->lastbytewritten);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(0); /* Never send time_modify_changed */
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(NFS_SERVER(args->inode)->pnfs_curr_ld->id);/* type */
if (NFS_SERVER(inode)->pnfs_curr_ld->encode_layoutcommit)
NFS_SERVER(inode)->pnfs_curr_ld->encode_layoutcommit(
NFS_I(inode)->layout, xdr, args);
else {
p = reserve_space(xdr, 4);
*p = cpu_to_be32(0); /* no layout-type payload */
}
hdr->nops++;
hdr->replen += decode_layoutcommit_maxsz;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int dccp_error(struct net *net, struct nf_conn *tmpl,
struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int dataoff,
enum ip_conntrack_info *ctinfo,
u_int8_t pf, unsigned int hooknum)
{
struct dccp_hdr _dh, *dh;
unsigned int dccp_len = skb->len - dataoff;
unsigned int cscov;
const char *msg;
dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, dataoff, sizeof(_dh), &dh);
if (dh == NULL) {
msg = "nf_ct_dccp: short packet ";
goto out_invalid;
}
if (dh->dccph_doff * 4 < sizeof(struct dccp_hdr) ||
dh->dccph_doff * 4 > dccp_len) {
msg = "nf_ct_dccp: truncated/malformed packet ";
goto out_invalid;
}
cscov = dccp_len;
if (dh->dccph_cscov) {
cscov = (dh->dccph_cscov - 1) * 4;
if (cscov > dccp_len) {
msg = "nf_ct_dccp: bad checksum coverage ";
goto out_invalid;
}
}
if (net->ct.sysctl_checksum && hooknum == NF_INET_PRE_ROUTING &&
nf_checksum_partial(skb, hooknum, dataoff, cscov, IPPROTO_DCCP,
pf)) {
msg = "nf_ct_dccp: bad checksum ";
goto out_invalid;
}
if (dh->dccph_type >= DCCP_PKT_INVALID) {
msg = "nf_ct_dccp: reserved packet type ";
goto out_invalid;
}
return NF_ACCEPT;
out_invalid:
if (LOG_INVALID(net, IPPROTO_DCCP))
nf_log_packet(net, pf, 0, skb, NULL, NULL, NULL, "%s", msg);
return -NF_ACCEPT;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_conntrack_dccp: fix skb_header_pointer API usages
Some occurences in the netfilter tree use skb_header_pointer() in
the following way ...
struct dccp_hdr _dh, *dh;
...
skb_header_pointer(skb, dataoff, sizeof(_dh), &dh);
... where dh itself is a pointer that is being passed as the copy
buffer. Instead, we need to use &_dh as the forth argument so that
we're copying the data into an actual buffer that sits on the stack.
Currently, we probably could overwrite memory on the stack (e.g.
with a possibly mal-formed DCCP packet), but unintentionally, as
we only want the buffer to be placed into _dh variable.
Fixes: 2bc780499aa3 ("[NETFILTER]: nf_conntrack: add DCCP protocol support")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void mcryptd_hash_init(struct crypto_async_request *req_async, int err)
{
struct mcryptd_hash_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(req_async->tfm);
struct crypto_shash *child = ctx->child;
struct ahash_request *req = ahash_request_cast(req_async);
struct mcryptd_hash_request_ctx *rctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
struct shash_desc *desc = &rctx->desc;
if (unlikely(err == -EINPROGRESS))
goto out;
desc->tfm = child;
desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
err = crypto_shash_init(desc);
req->base.complete = rctx->complete;
out:
local_bh_disable();
rctx->complete(&req->base, err);
local_bh_enable();
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static void ikev2_parent_inI1outR1_continue(struct pluto_crypto_req_cont *pcrc,
struct pluto_crypto_req *r,
err_t ugh)
{
struct ke_continuation *ke = (struct ke_continuation *)pcrc;
struct msg_digest *md = ke->md;
struct state *const st = md->st;
stf_status e;
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("ikev2 parent inI1outR1: calculated ke+nonce, sending R1"));
if (st == NULL) {
loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
"%s: Request was disconnected from state",
__FUNCTION__);
if (ke->md)
release_md(ke->md);
return;
}
/* XXX should check out ugh */
passert(ugh == NULL);
passert(cur_state == NULL);
passert(st != NULL);
passert(st->st_suspended_md == ke->md);
set_suspended(st, NULL); /* no longer connected or suspended */
set_cur_state(st);
st->st_calculating = FALSE;
e = ikev2_parent_inI1outR1_tail(pcrc, r);
if (ke->md != NULL) {
complete_v2_state_transition(&ke->md, e);
if (ke->md)
release_md(ke->md);
}
reset_globals();
passert(GLOBALS_ARE_RESET());
}
Commit Message: SECURITY: Properly handle IKEv2 I1 notification packet without KE payload
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static Image *ReadSVGImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
filename[MaxTextExtent];
FILE
*file;
Image
*image;
int
status,
unique_file;
ssize_t
n;
SVGInfo
*svg_info;
unsigned char
message[MaxTextExtent];
xmlSAXHandler
sax_modules;
xmlSAXHandlerPtr
sax_handler;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if ((image->x_resolution < MagickEpsilon) ||
(image->y_resolution < MagickEpsilon))
{
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
int
flags;
flags=ParseGeometry(SVGDensityGeometry,&geometry_info);
image->x_resolution=geometry_info.rho;
image->y_resolution=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
image->y_resolution=image->x_resolution;
}
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"MSVG") != 0)
{
const DelegateInfo
*delegate_info;
delegate_info=GetDelegateInfo("svg:decode",(char *) NULL,exception);
if (delegate_info != (const DelegateInfo *) NULL)
{
char
background[MaxTextExtent],
command[MaxTextExtent],
density[MaxTextExtent],
input_filename[MaxTextExtent],
opacity[MaxTextExtent],
output_filename[MaxTextExtent],
unique[MaxTextExtent];
int
status;
struct stat
attributes;
/*
Our best hope for compliance to the SVG standard.
*/
status=AcquireUniqueSymbolicLink(image->filename,input_filename);
(void) AcquireUniqueFilename(output_filename);
(void) AcquireUniqueFilename(unique);
(void) FormatLocaleString(density,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g,%.20g",
image->x_resolution,image->y_resolution);
(void) FormatLocaleString(background,MaxTextExtent,
"rgb(%.20g%%,%.20g%%,%.20g%%)",
100.0*QuantumScale*image->background_color.red,
100.0*QuantumScale*image->background_color.green,
100.0*QuantumScale*image->background_color.blue);
(void) FormatLocaleString(opacity,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g",QuantumScale*
(QuantumRange-image->background_color.opacity));
(void) FormatLocaleString(command,MaxTextExtent,GetDelegateCommands(
delegate_info),input_filename,output_filename,density,background,
opacity,unique);
status=ExternalDelegateCommand(MagickFalse,image_info->verbose,
command,(char *) NULL,exception);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(unique);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(input_filename);
if ((status == 0) && (stat(output_filename,&attributes) == 0) &&
(attributes.st_size != 0))
{
ImageInfo
*read_info;
read_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
(void) CopyMagickString(read_info->filename,output_filename,
MaxTextExtent);
image=ReadImage(read_info,exception);
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(output_filename);
if (image != (Image *) NULL)
return(image);
}
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(output_filename);
}
{
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_RSVG_DELEGATE)
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_CAIRO_DELEGATE)
cairo_surface_t
*cairo_surface;
cairo_t
*cairo_image;
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
register unsigned char
*p;
RsvgDimensionData
dimension_info;
unsigned char
*pixels;
#else
GdkPixbuf
*pixel_buffer;
register const guchar
*p;
#endif
GError
*error;
ssize_t
y;
PixelPacket
fill_color;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
RsvgHandle
*svg_handle;
svg_handle=rsvg_handle_new();
if (svg_handle == (RsvgHandle *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
rsvg_handle_set_base_uri(svg_handle,image_info->filename);
if ((image->x_resolution != 90.0) && (image->y_resolution != 90.0))
rsvg_handle_set_dpi_x_y(svg_handle,image->x_resolution,
image->y_resolution);
while ((n=ReadBlob(image,MaxTextExtent,message)) != 0)
{
error=(GError *) NULL;
(void) rsvg_handle_write(svg_handle,message,n,&error);
if (error != (GError *) NULL)
g_error_free(error);
}
error=(GError *) NULL;
rsvg_handle_close(svg_handle,&error);
if (error != (GError *) NULL)
g_error_free(error);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_CAIRO_DELEGATE)
rsvg_handle_get_dimensions(svg_handle,&dimension_info);
image->columns=image->x_resolution*dimension_info.width/90.0;
image->rows=image->y_resolution*dimension_info.height/90.0;
pixel_info=(MemoryInfo *) NULL;
#else
pixel_buffer=rsvg_handle_get_pixbuf(svg_handle);
rsvg_handle_free(svg_handle);
image->columns=gdk_pixbuf_get_width(pixel_buffer);
image->rows=gdk_pixbuf_get_height(pixel_buffer);
#endif
image->matte=MagickTrue;
SetImageProperty(image,"svg:base-uri",
rsvg_handle_get_base_uri(svg_handle));
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
{
#if !defined(MAGICKCORE_CAIRO_DELEGATE)
g_object_unref(G_OBJECT(pixel_buffer));
#endif
g_object_unref(svg_handle);
ThrowReaderException(MissingDelegateError,
"NoDecodeDelegateForThisImageFormat");
}
if (image_info->ping == MagickFalse)
{
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_CAIRO_DELEGATE)
size_t
stride;
stride=4*image->columns;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_PANGOCAIRO_DELEGATE)
stride=(size_t) cairo_format_stride_for_width(CAIRO_FORMAT_ARGB32,
(int) image->columns);
#endif
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(stride,image->rows*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
{
g_object_unref(svg_handle);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
#endif
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_CAIRO_DELEGATE)
cairo_surface=cairo_image_surface_create_for_data(pixels,
CAIRO_FORMAT_ARGB32,(int) image->columns,(int) image->rows, (int)
stride);
if (cairo_surface == (cairo_surface_t *) NULL)
{
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
g_object_unref(svg_handle);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
cairo_image=cairo_create(cairo_surface);
cairo_set_operator(cairo_image,CAIRO_OPERATOR_CLEAR);
cairo_paint(cairo_image);
cairo_set_operator(cairo_image,CAIRO_OPERATOR_OVER);
cairo_scale(cairo_image,image->x_resolution/90.0,
image->y_resolution/90.0);
rsvg_handle_render_cairo(svg_handle,cairo_image);
cairo_destroy(cairo_image);
cairo_surface_destroy(cairo_surface);
g_object_unref(svg_handle);
p=pixels;
#else
p=gdk_pixbuf_get_pixels(pixel_buffer);
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_CAIRO_DELEGATE)
fill_color.blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
fill_color.green=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
fill_color.red=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
#else
fill_color.red=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
fill_color.green=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
fill_color.blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
#endif
fill_color.opacity=QuantumRange-ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_CAIRO_DELEGATE)
{
double
gamma;
gamma=1.0-QuantumScale*fill_color.opacity;
gamma=PerceptibleReciprocal(gamma);
fill_color.blue*=gamma;
fill_color.green*=gamma;
fill_color.red*=gamma;
}
#endif
MagickCompositeOver(&fill_color,fill_color.opacity,q,
(MagickRealType) q->opacity,q);
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_CAIRO_DELEGATE)
if (pixel_info != (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
#else
g_object_unref(G_OBJECT(pixel_buffer));
#endif
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
#endif
}
}
/*
Open draw file.
*/
file=(FILE *) NULL;
unique_file=AcquireUniqueFileResource(filename);
if (unique_file != -1)
file=fdopen(unique_file,"w");
if ((unique_file == -1) || (file == (FILE *) NULL))
{
(void) CopyMagickString(image->filename,filename,MaxTextExtent);
ThrowFileException(exception,FileOpenError,"UnableToCreateTemporaryFile",
image->filename);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Parse SVG file.
*/
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
return((Image *) NULL);
svg_info=AcquireSVGInfo();
if (svg_info == (SVGInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) fclose(file);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
svg_info->file=file;
svg_info->exception=exception;
svg_info->image=image;
svg_info->image_info=image_info;
svg_info->bounds.width=image->columns;
svg_info->bounds.height=image->rows;
if (image_info->size != (char *) NULL)
(void) CloneString(&svg_info->size,image_info->size);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"begin SAX");
(void) xmlSubstituteEntitiesDefault(1);
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&sax_modules,0,sizeof(sax_modules));
sax_modules.internalSubset=SVGInternalSubset;
sax_modules.isStandalone=SVGIsStandalone;
sax_modules.hasInternalSubset=SVGHasInternalSubset;
sax_modules.hasExternalSubset=SVGHasExternalSubset;
sax_modules.resolveEntity=SVGResolveEntity;
sax_modules.getEntity=SVGGetEntity;
sax_modules.entityDecl=SVGEntityDeclaration;
sax_modules.notationDecl=SVGNotationDeclaration;
sax_modules.attributeDecl=SVGAttributeDeclaration;
sax_modules.elementDecl=SVGElementDeclaration;
sax_modules.unparsedEntityDecl=SVGUnparsedEntityDeclaration;
sax_modules.setDocumentLocator=SVGSetDocumentLocator;
sax_modules.startDocument=SVGStartDocument;
sax_modules.endDocument=SVGEndDocument;
sax_modules.startElement=SVGStartElement;
sax_modules.endElement=SVGEndElement;
sax_modules.reference=SVGReference;
sax_modules.characters=SVGCharacters;
sax_modules.ignorableWhitespace=SVGIgnorableWhitespace;
sax_modules.processingInstruction=SVGProcessingInstructions;
sax_modules.comment=SVGComment;
sax_modules.warning=SVGWarning;
sax_modules.error=SVGError;
sax_modules.fatalError=SVGError;
sax_modules.getParameterEntity=SVGGetParameterEntity;
sax_modules.cdataBlock=SVGCDataBlock;
sax_modules.externalSubset=SVGExternalSubset;
sax_handler=(&sax_modules);
n=ReadBlob(image,MaxTextExtent,message);
if (n > 0)
{
svg_info->parser=xmlCreatePushParserCtxt(sax_handler,svg_info,(char *)
message,n,image->filename);
while ((n=ReadBlob(image,MaxTextExtent,message)) != 0)
{
status=xmlParseChunk(svg_info->parser,(char *) message,(int) n,0);
if (status != 0)
break;
}
}
(void) xmlParseChunk(svg_info->parser,(char *) message,0,1);
xmlFreeParserCtxt(svg_info->parser);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"end SAX");
(void) fclose(file);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
image->columns=svg_info->width;
image->rows=svg_info->height;
if (exception->severity >= ErrorException)
{
image=DestroyImage(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (image_info->ping == MagickFalse)
{
ImageInfo
*read_info;
/*
Draw image.
*/
image=DestroyImage(image);
image=(Image *) NULL;
read_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
SetImageInfoBlob(read_info,(void *) NULL,0);
if (read_info->density != (char *) NULL)
read_info->density=DestroyString(read_info->density);
(void) FormatLocaleString(read_info->filename,MaxTextExtent,"mvg:%s",
filename);
image=ReadImage(read_info,exception);
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
if (image != (Image *) NULL)
(void) CopyMagickString(image->filename,image_info->filename,
MaxTextExtent);
}
/*
Relinquish resources.
*/
if (image != (Image *) NULL)
{
if (svg_info->title != (char *) NULL)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"svg:title",svg_info->title);
if (svg_info->comment != (char *) NULL)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"svg:comment",svg_info->comment);
}
svg_info=DestroySVGInfo(svg_info);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(filename);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int __init userfaultfd_init(void)
{
userfaultfd_ctx_cachep = kmem_cache_create("userfaultfd_ctx_cache",
sizeof(struct userfaultfd_ctx),
0,
SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC,
init_once_userfaultfd_ctx);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: userfaultfd: shmem/hugetlbfs: only allow to register VM_MAYWRITE vmas
After the VMA to register the uffd onto is found, check that it has
VM_MAYWRITE set before allowing registration. This way we inherit all
common code checks before allowing to fill file holes in shmem and
hugetlbfs with UFFDIO_COPY.
The userfaultfd memory model is not applicable for readonly files unless
it's a MAP_PRIVATE.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: ff62a3421044 ("hugetlb: implement memfd sealing")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Fixes: 4c27fe4c4c84 ("userfaultfd: shmem: add shmem_mcopy_atomic_pte for userfaultfd support")
Cc: <[email protected]>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Xu <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: int pdf_load_xrefs(FILE *fp, pdf_t *pdf)
{
int i, ver, is_linear;
long pos, pos_count;
char x, *c, buf[256];
c = NULL;
/* Count number of xrefs */
pdf->n_xrefs = 0;
fseek(fp, 0, SEEK_SET);
while (get_next_eof(fp) >= 0)
++pdf->n_xrefs;
if (!pdf->n_xrefs)
return 0;
/* Load in the start/end positions */
fseek(fp, 0, SEEK_SET);
pdf->xrefs = calloc(1, sizeof(xref_t) * pdf->n_xrefs);
ver = 1;
for (i=0; i<pdf->n_xrefs; i++)
{
/* Seek to %%EOF */
if ((pos = get_next_eof(fp)) < 0)
break;
/* Set and increment the version */
pdf->xrefs[i].version = ver++;
/* Rewind until we find end of "startxref" */
pos_count = 0;
while (SAFE_F(fp, ((x = fgetc(fp)) != 'f')))
fseek(fp, pos - (++pos_count), SEEK_SET);
/* Suck in end of "startxref" to start of %%EOF */
if (pos_count >= sizeof(buf)) {
ERR("Failed to locate the startxref token. "
"This might be a corrupt PDF.\n");
return -1;
}
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
SAFE_E(fread(buf, 1, pos_count, fp), pos_count,
"Failed to read startxref.\n");
c = buf;
while (*c == ' ' || *c == '\n' || *c == '\r')
++c;
/* xref start position */
pdf->xrefs[i].start = atol(c);
/* If xref is 0 handle linear xref table */
if (pdf->xrefs[i].start == 0)
get_xref_linear_skipped(fp, &pdf->xrefs[i]);
/* Non-linear, normal operation, so just find the end of the xref */
else
{
/* xref end position */
pos = ftell(fp);
fseek(fp, pdf->xrefs[i].start, SEEK_SET);
pdf->xrefs[i].end = get_next_eof(fp);
/* Look for next EOF and xref data */
fseek(fp, pos, SEEK_SET);
}
/* Check validity */
if (!is_valid_xref(fp, pdf, &pdf->xrefs[i]))
{
is_linear = pdf->xrefs[i].is_linear;
memset(&pdf->xrefs[i], 0, sizeof(xref_t));
pdf->xrefs[i].is_linear = is_linear;
rewind(fp);
get_next_eof(fp);
continue;
}
/* Load the entries from the xref */
load_xref_entries(fp, &pdf->xrefs[i]);
}
/* Now we have all xref tables, if this is linearized, we need
* to make adjustments so that things spit out properly
*/
if (pdf->xrefs[0].is_linear)
resolve_linearized_pdf(pdf);
/* Ok now we have all xref data. Go through those versions of the
* PDF and try to obtain creator information
*/
load_creator(fp, pdf);
return pdf->n_xrefs;
}
Commit Message: Zero and sanity check all dynamic allocs.
This addresses the memory issues in Issue #6 expressed in
calloc_some.pdf and malloc_some.pdf
CWE ID: CWE-787
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: GDataFileError GDataWapiFeedProcessor::FeedToFileResourceMap(
const std::vector<DocumentFeed*>& feed_list,
FileResourceIdMap* file_map,
int64* feed_changestamp,
FeedToFileResourceMapUmaStats* uma_stats) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
DCHECK(uma_stats);
GDataFileError error = GDATA_FILE_OK;
uma_stats->num_regular_files = 0;
uma_stats->num_hosted_documents = 0;
uma_stats->num_files_with_entry_kind.clear();
for (size_t i = 0; i < feed_list.size(); ++i) {
const DocumentFeed* feed = feed_list[i];
if (i == 0) {
const Link* root_feed_upload_link =
feed->GetLinkByType(Link::RESUMABLE_CREATE_MEDIA);
if (root_feed_upload_link)
directory_service_->root()->set_upload_url(
root_feed_upload_link->href());
*feed_changestamp = feed->largest_changestamp();
DCHECK_GE(*feed_changestamp, 0);
}
for (ScopedVector<DocumentEntry>::const_iterator iter =
feed->entries().begin();
iter != feed->entries().end(); ++iter) {
DocumentEntry* doc = *iter;
GDataEntry* entry = GDataEntry::FromDocumentEntry(
NULL, doc, directory_service_);
if (!entry)
continue;
GDataFile* as_file = entry->AsGDataFile();
if (as_file) {
if (as_file->is_hosted_document())
++uma_stats->num_hosted_documents;
else
++uma_stats->num_regular_files;
++uma_stats->num_files_with_entry_kind[as_file->kind()];
}
FileResourceIdMap::iterator map_entry =
file_map->find(entry->resource_id());
if (map_entry != file_map->end()) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Found duplicate file "
<< map_entry->second->base_name();
delete map_entry->second;
file_map->erase(map_entry);
}
file_map->insert(
std::pair<std::string, GDataEntry*>(entry->resource_id(), entry));
}
}
if (error != GDATA_FILE_OK) {
STLDeleteValues(file_map);
}
return error;
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: TemplateURLRef::~TemplateURLRef() {
}
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: fiber_switch(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value self, mrb_int len, const mrb_value *a, mrb_bool resume, mrb_bool vmexec)
{
struct mrb_context *c = fiber_check(mrb, self);
struct mrb_context *old_c = mrb->c;
mrb_value value;
fiber_check_cfunc(mrb, c);
if (resume && c->status == MRB_FIBER_TRANSFERRED) {
mrb_raise(mrb, E_FIBER_ERROR, "resuming transferred fiber");
}
if (c->status == MRB_FIBER_RUNNING || c->status == MRB_FIBER_RESUMED) {
mrb_raise(mrb, E_FIBER_ERROR, "double resume (fib)");
}
if (c->status == MRB_FIBER_TERMINATED) {
mrb_raise(mrb, E_FIBER_ERROR, "resuming dead fiber");
}
mrb->c->status = resume ? MRB_FIBER_RESUMED : MRB_FIBER_TRANSFERRED;
c->prev = resume ? mrb->c : (c->prev ? c->prev : mrb->root_c);
if (c->status == MRB_FIBER_CREATED) {
mrb_value *b, *e;
if (len >= c->stend - c->stack) {
mrb_raise(mrb, E_FIBER_ERROR, "too many arguments to fiber");
}
b = c->stack+1;
e = b + len;
while (b<e) {
*b++ = *a++;
}
c->cibase->argc = (int)len;
value = c->stack[0] = MRB_PROC_ENV(c->ci->proc)->stack[0];
}
else {
value = fiber_result(mrb, a, len);
}
fiber_switch_context(mrb, c);
if (vmexec) {
c->vmexec = TRUE;
value = mrb_vm_exec(mrb, c->ci[-1].proc, c->ci->pc);
mrb->c = old_c;
}
else {
MARK_CONTEXT_MODIFY(c);
}
return value;
}
Commit Message: Extend stack when pushing arguments that does not fit in; fix #4038
CWE ID: CWE-125
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: bool InputWindowInfo::isTrustedOverlay() const {
return layoutParamsType == TYPE_INPUT_METHOD
|| layoutParamsType == TYPE_INPUT_METHOD_DIALOG
|| layoutParamsType == TYPE_MAGNIFICATION_OVERLAY
|| layoutParamsType == TYPE_SECURE_SYSTEM_OVERLAY;
}
Commit Message: Add new MotionEvent flag for partially obscured windows.
Due to more complex window layouts resulting in lots of overlapping
windows, the policy around FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED has changed to
only be set when the point at which the window was touched is
obscured. Unfortunately, this doesn't prevent tapjacking attacks that
overlay the dialog's text, making a potentially dangerous operation
seem innocuous. To avoid this on particularly sensitive dialogs,
introduce a new flag that really does tell you when your window is
being even partially overlapped.
We aren't exposing this as API since we plan on making the original
flag more robust. This is really a workaround for system dialogs
since we generally know their layout and screen position, and that
they're unlikely to be overlapped by other applications.
Bug: 26677796
Change-Id: I9e336afe90f262ba22015876769a9c510048fd47
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void TabsDetectLanguageFunction::GotLanguage(const std::string& language) {
Respond(OneArgument(std::make_unique<base::Value>(language)));
Release(); // Balanced in Run()
}
Commit Message: Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void AppCacheUpdateJob::OnResponseInfoLoaded(
AppCacheResponseInfo* response_info,
int64_t response_id) {
const net::HttpResponseInfo* http_info =
response_info ? &response_info->http_response_info() : nullptr;
if (internal_state_ == FETCH_MANIFEST) {
if (http_info)
manifest_fetcher_->set_existing_response_headers(
http_info->headers.get());
manifest_fetcher_->Start();
return;
}
auto found = loading_responses_.find(response_id);
DCHECK(found != loading_responses_.end());
const GURL& url = found->second;
if (!http_info) {
LoadFromNewestCacheFailed(url, nullptr); // no response found
} else if (!CanUseExistingResource(http_info)) {
LoadFromNewestCacheFailed(url, response_info);
} else {
DCHECK(group_->newest_complete_cache());
AppCacheEntry* copy_me = group_->newest_complete_cache()->GetEntry(url);
DCHECK(copy_me);
DCHECK_EQ(copy_me->response_id(), response_id);
auto it = url_file_list_.find(url);
DCHECK(it != url_file_list_.end());
AppCacheEntry& entry = it->second;
entry.set_response_id(response_id);
entry.set_response_size(copy_me->response_size());
inprogress_cache_->AddOrModifyEntry(url, entry);
NotifyAllProgress(url);
++url_fetches_completed_;
}
loading_responses_.erase(found);
MaybeCompleteUpdate();
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void sock_release(struct socket *sock)
{
if (sock->ops) {
struct module *owner = sock->ops->owner;
sock->ops->release(sock);
sock->ops = NULL;
module_put(owner);
}
if (rcu_dereference_protected(sock->wq, 1)->fasync_list)
pr_err("%s: fasync list not empty!\n", __func__);
if (!sock->file) {
iput(SOCK_INODE(sock));
return;
}
sock->file = NULL;
}
Commit Message: socket: close race condition between sock_close() and sockfs_setattr()
fchownat() doesn't even hold refcnt of fd until it figures out
fd is really needed (otherwise is ignored) and releases it after
it resolves the path. This means sock_close() could race with
sockfs_setattr(), which leads to a NULL pointer dereference
since typically we set sock->sk to NULL in ->release().
As pointed out by Al, this is unique to sockfs. So we can fix this
in socket layer by acquiring inode_lock in sock_close() and
checking against NULL in sockfs_setattr().
sock_release() is called in many places, only the sock_close()
path matters here. And fortunately, this should not affect normal
sock_close() as it is only called when the last fd refcnt is gone.
It only affects sock_close() with a parallel sockfs_setattr() in
progress, which is not common.
Fixes: 86741ec25462 ("net: core: Add a UID field to struct sock.")
Reported-by: shankarapailoor <[email protected]>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void coroutine_fn v9fs_getlock(void *opaque)
{
size_t offset = 7;
struct stat stbuf;
V9fsFidState *fidp;
V9fsGetlock glock;
int32_t fid, err = 0;
V9fsPDU *pdu = opaque;
v9fs_string_init(&glock.client_id);
err = pdu_unmarshal(pdu, offset, "dbqqds", &fid, &glock.type,
&glock.start, &glock.length, &glock.proc_id,
&glock.client_id);
if (err < 0) {
goto out_nofid;
}
trace_v9fs_getlock(pdu->tag, pdu->id, fid,
glock.type, glock.start, glock.length);
fidp = get_fid(pdu, fid);
if (fidp == NULL) {
err = -ENOENT;
goto out_nofid;
}
err = v9fs_co_fstat(pdu, fidp, &stbuf);
if (err < 0) {
goto out;
}
glock.type = P9_LOCK_TYPE_UNLCK;
err = pdu_marshal(pdu, offset, "bqqds", glock.type,
glock.start, glock.length, glock.proc_id,
&glock.client_id);
if (err < 0) {
goto out;
}
err += offset;
trace_v9fs_getlock_return(pdu->tag, pdu->id, glock.type, glock.start,
glock.length, glock.proc_id);
out:
put_fid(pdu, fidp);
out_nofid:
pdu_complete(pdu, err);
v9fs_string_free(&glock.client_id);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-400
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: int attribute_align_arg avcodec_open2(AVCodecContext *avctx, const AVCodec *codec, AVDictionary **options)
{
int ret = 0;
int codec_init_ok = 0;
AVDictionary *tmp = NULL;
const AVPixFmtDescriptor *pixdesc;
if (avcodec_is_open(avctx))
return 0;
if ((!codec && !avctx->codec)) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "No codec provided to avcodec_open2()\n");
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
}
if ((codec && avctx->codec && codec != avctx->codec)) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "This AVCodecContext was allocated for %s, "
"but %s passed to avcodec_open2()\n", avctx->codec->name, codec->name);
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
}
if (!codec)
codec = avctx->codec;
if (avctx->extradata_size < 0 || avctx->extradata_size >= FF_MAX_EXTRADATA_SIZE)
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
if (options)
av_dict_copy(&tmp, *options, 0);
ff_lock_avcodec(avctx, codec);
avctx->internal = av_mallocz(sizeof(*avctx->internal));
if (!avctx->internal) {
ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM);
goto end;
}
avctx->internal->pool = av_mallocz(sizeof(*avctx->internal->pool));
if (!avctx->internal->pool) {
ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM);
goto free_and_end;
}
avctx->internal->to_free = av_frame_alloc();
if (!avctx->internal->to_free) {
ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM);
goto free_and_end;
}
avctx->internal->compat_decode_frame = av_frame_alloc();
if (!avctx->internal->compat_decode_frame) {
ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM);
goto free_and_end;
}
avctx->internal->buffer_frame = av_frame_alloc();
if (!avctx->internal->buffer_frame) {
ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM);
goto free_and_end;
}
avctx->internal->buffer_pkt = av_packet_alloc();
if (!avctx->internal->buffer_pkt) {
ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM);
goto free_and_end;
}
avctx->internal->ds.in_pkt = av_packet_alloc();
if (!avctx->internal->ds.in_pkt) {
ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM);
goto free_and_end;
}
avctx->internal->last_pkt_props = av_packet_alloc();
if (!avctx->internal->last_pkt_props) {
ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM);
goto free_and_end;
}
avctx->internal->skip_samples_multiplier = 1;
if (codec->priv_data_size > 0) {
if (!avctx->priv_data) {
avctx->priv_data = av_mallocz(codec->priv_data_size);
if (!avctx->priv_data) {
ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM);
goto end;
}
if (codec->priv_class) {
*(const AVClass **)avctx->priv_data = codec->priv_class;
av_opt_set_defaults(avctx->priv_data);
}
}
if (codec->priv_class && (ret = av_opt_set_dict(avctx->priv_data, &tmp)) < 0)
goto free_and_end;
} else {
avctx->priv_data = NULL;
}
if ((ret = av_opt_set_dict(avctx, &tmp)) < 0)
goto free_and_end;
if (avctx->codec_whitelist && av_match_list(codec->name, avctx->codec_whitelist, ',') <= 0) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Codec (%s) not on whitelist \'%s\'\n", codec->name, avctx->codec_whitelist);
ret = AVERROR(EINVAL);
goto free_and_end;
}
if (!(avctx->coded_width && avctx->coded_height && avctx->width && avctx->height &&
(avctx->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_H264 || avctx->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_VP6F || avctx->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_DXV))) {
if (avctx->coded_width && avctx->coded_height)
ret = ff_set_dimensions(avctx, avctx->coded_width, avctx->coded_height);
else if (avctx->width && avctx->height)
ret = ff_set_dimensions(avctx, avctx->width, avctx->height);
if (ret < 0)
goto free_and_end;
}
if ((avctx->coded_width || avctx->coded_height || avctx->width || avctx->height)
&& ( av_image_check_size2(avctx->coded_width, avctx->coded_height, avctx->max_pixels, AV_PIX_FMT_NONE, 0, avctx) < 0
|| av_image_check_size2(avctx->width, avctx->height, avctx->max_pixels, AV_PIX_FMT_NONE, 0, avctx) < 0)) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Ignoring invalid width/height values\n");
ff_set_dimensions(avctx, 0, 0);
}
if (avctx->width > 0 && avctx->height > 0) {
if (av_image_check_sar(avctx->width, avctx->height,
avctx->sample_aspect_ratio) < 0) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "ignoring invalid SAR: %u/%u\n",
avctx->sample_aspect_ratio.num,
avctx->sample_aspect_ratio.den);
avctx->sample_aspect_ratio = (AVRational){ 0, 1 };
}
}
/* if the decoder init function was already called previously,
* free the already allocated subtitle_header before overwriting it */
if (av_codec_is_decoder(codec))
av_freep(&avctx->subtitle_header);
if (avctx->channels > FF_SANE_NB_CHANNELS) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Too many channels: %d\n", avctx->channels);
ret = AVERROR(EINVAL);
goto free_and_end;
}
avctx->codec = codec;
if ((avctx->codec_type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_UNKNOWN || avctx->codec_type == codec->type) &&
avctx->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_NONE) {
avctx->codec_type = codec->type;
avctx->codec_id = codec->id;
}
if (avctx->codec_id != codec->id || (avctx->codec_type != codec->type
&& avctx->codec_type != AVMEDIA_TYPE_ATTACHMENT)) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Codec type or id mismatches\n");
ret = AVERROR(EINVAL);
goto free_and_end;
}
avctx->frame_number = 0;
avctx->codec_descriptor = avcodec_descriptor_get(avctx->codec_id);
if ((avctx->codec->capabilities & AV_CODEC_CAP_EXPERIMENTAL) &&
avctx->strict_std_compliance > FF_COMPLIANCE_EXPERIMENTAL) {
const char *codec_string = av_codec_is_encoder(codec) ? "encoder" : "decoder";
AVCodec *codec2;
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"The %s '%s' is experimental but experimental codecs are not enabled, "
"add '-strict %d' if you want to use it.\n",
codec_string, codec->name, FF_COMPLIANCE_EXPERIMENTAL);
codec2 = av_codec_is_encoder(codec) ? avcodec_find_encoder(codec->id) : avcodec_find_decoder(codec->id);
if (!(codec2->capabilities & AV_CODEC_CAP_EXPERIMENTAL))
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Alternatively use the non experimental %s '%s'.\n",
codec_string, codec2->name);
ret = AVERROR_EXPERIMENTAL;
goto free_and_end;
}
if (avctx->codec_type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_AUDIO &&
(!avctx->time_base.num || !avctx->time_base.den)) {
avctx->time_base.num = 1;
avctx->time_base.den = avctx->sample_rate;
}
if (!HAVE_THREADS)
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: not compiled with thread support, using thread emulation\n");
if (CONFIG_FRAME_THREAD_ENCODER && av_codec_is_encoder(avctx->codec)) {
ff_unlock_avcodec(codec); //we will instantiate a few encoders thus kick the counter to prevent false detection of a problem
ret = ff_frame_thread_encoder_init(avctx, options ? *options : NULL);
ff_lock_avcodec(avctx, codec);
if (ret < 0)
goto free_and_end;
}
if (av_codec_is_decoder(avctx->codec)) {
ret = ff_decode_bsfs_init(avctx);
if (ret < 0)
goto free_and_end;
}
if (HAVE_THREADS
&& !(avctx->internal->frame_thread_encoder && (avctx->active_thread_type&FF_THREAD_FRAME))) {
ret = ff_thread_init(avctx);
if (ret < 0) {
goto free_and_end;
}
}
if (!HAVE_THREADS && !(codec->capabilities & AV_CODEC_CAP_AUTO_THREADS))
avctx->thread_count = 1;
if (avctx->codec->max_lowres < avctx->lowres || avctx->lowres < 0) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "The maximum value for lowres supported by the decoder is %d\n",
avctx->codec->max_lowres);
avctx->lowres = avctx->codec->max_lowres;
}
if (av_codec_is_encoder(avctx->codec)) {
int i;
#if FF_API_CODED_FRAME
FF_DISABLE_DEPRECATION_WARNINGS
avctx->coded_frame = av_frame_alloc();
if (!avctx->coded_frame) {
ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM);
goto free_and_end;
}
FF_ENABLE_DEPRECATION_WARNINGS
#endif
if (avctx->time_base.num <= 0 || avctx->time_base.den <= 0) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "The encoder timebase is not set.\n");
ret = AVERROR(EINVAL);
goto free_and_end;
}
if (avctx->codec->sample_fmts) {
for (i = 0; avctx->codec->sample_fmts[i] != AV_SAMPLE_FMT_NONE; i++) {
if (avctx->sample_fmt == avctx->codec->sample_fmts[i])
break;
if (avctx->channels == 1 &&
av_get_planar_sample_fmt(avctx->sample_fmt) ==
av_get_planar_sample_fmt(avctx->codec->sample_fmts[i])) {
avctx->sample_fmt = avctx->codec->sample_fmts[i];
break;
}
}
if (avctx->codec->sample_fmts[i] == AV_SAMPLE_FMT_NONE) {
char buf[128];
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", avctx->sample_fmt);
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Specified sample format %s is invalid or not supported\n",
(char *)av_x_if_null(av_get_sample_fmt_name(avctx->sample_fmt), buf));
ret = AVERROR(EINVAL);
goto free_and_end;
}
}
if (avctx->codec->pix_fmts) {
for (i = 0; avctx->codec->pix_fmts[i] != AV_PIX_FMT_NONE; i++)
if (avctx->pix_fmt == avctx->codec->pix_fmts[i])
break;
if (avctx->codec->pix_fmts[i] == AV_PIX_FMT_NONE
&& !((avctx->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_MJPEG || avctx->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_LJPEG)
&& avctx->strict_std_compliance <= FF_COMPLIANCE_UNOFFICIAL)) {
char buf[128];
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", avctx->pix_fmt);
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Specified pixel format %s is invalid or not supported\n",
(char *)av_x_if_null(av_get_pix_fmt_name(avctx->pix_fmt), buf));
ret = AVERROR(EINVAL);
goto free_and_end;
}
if (avctx->codec->pix_fmts[i] == AV_PIX_FMT_YUVJ420P ||
avctx->codec->pix_fmts[i] == AV_PIX_FMT_YUVJ411P ||
avctx->codec->pix_fmts[i] == AV_PIX_FMT_YUVJ422P ||
avctx->codec->pix_fmts[i] == AV_PIX_FMT_YUVJ440P ||
avctx->codec->pix_fmts[i] == AV_PIX_FMT_YUVJ444P)
avctx->color_range = AVCOL_RANGE_JPEG;
}
if (avctx->codec->supported_samplerates) {
for (i = 0; avctx->codec->supported_samplerates[i] != 0; i++)
if (avctx->sample_rate == avctx->codec->supported_samplerates[i])
break;
if (avctx->codec->supported_samplerates[i] == 0) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Specified sample rate %d is not supported\n",
avctx->sample_rate);
ret = AVERROR(EINVAL);
goto free_and_end;
}
}
if (avctx->sample_rate < 0) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Specified sample rate %d is not supported\n",
avctx->sample_rate);
ret = AVERROR(EINVAL);
goto free_and_end;
}
if (avctx->codec->channel_layouts) {
if (!avctx->channel_layout) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Channel layout not specified\n");
} else {
for (i = 0; avctx->codec->channel_layouts[i] != 0; i++)
if (avctx->channel_layout == avctx->codec->channel_layouts[i])
break;
if (avctx->codec->channel_layouts[i] == 0) {
char buf[512];
av_get_channel_layout_string(buf, sizeof(buf), -1, avctx->channel_layout);
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Specified channel layout '%s' is not supported\n", buf);
ret = AVERROR(EINVAL);
goto free_and_end;
}
}
}
if (avctx->channel_layout && avctx->channels) {
int channels = av_get_channel_layout_nb_channels(avctx->channel_layout);
if (channels != avctx->channels) {
char buf[512];
av_get_channel_layout_string(buf, sizeof(buf), -1, avctx->channel_layout);
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Channel layout '%s' with %d channels does not match number of specified channels %d\n",
buf, channels, avctx->channels);
ret = AVERROR(EINVAL);
goto free_and_end;
}
} else if (avctx->channel_layout) {
avctx->channels = av_get_channel_layout_nb_channels(avctx->channel_layout);
}
if (avctx->channels < 0) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Specified number of channels %d is not supported\n",
avctx->channels);
ret = AVERROR(EINVAL);
goto free_and_end;
}
if(avctx->codec_type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_VIDEO) {
pixdesc = av_pix_fmt_desc_get(avctx->pix_fmt);
if ( avctx->bits_per_raw_sample < 0
|| (avctx->bits_per_raw_sample > 8 && pixdesc->comp[0].depth <= 8)) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Specified bit depth %d not possible with the specified pixel formats depth %d\n",
avctx->bits_per_raw_sample, pixdesc->comp[0].depth);
avctx->bits_per_raw_sample = pixdesc->comp[0].depth;
}
if (avctx->width <= 0 || avctx->height <= 0) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "dimensions not set\n");
ret = AVERROR(EINVAL);
goto free_and_end;
}
}
if ( (avctx->codec_type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_VIDEO || avctx->codec_type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_AUDIO)
&& avctx->bit_rate>0 && avctx->bit_rate<1000) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Bitrate %"PRId64" is extremely low, maybe you mean %"PRId64"k\n", avctx->bit_rate, avctx->bit_rate);
}
if (!avctx->rc_initial_buffer_occupancy)
avctx->rc_initial_buffer_occupancy = avctx->rc_buffer_size * 3LL / 4;
if (avctx->ticks_per_frame && avctx->time_base.num &&
avctx->ticks_per_frame > INT_MAX / avctx->time_base.num) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"ticks_per_frame %d too large for the timebase %d/%d.",
avctx->ticks_per_frame,
avctx->time_base.num,
avctx->time_base.den);
goto free_and_end;
}
if (avctx->hw_frames_ctx) {
AVHWFramesContext *frames_ctx = (AVHWFramesContext*)avctx->hw_frames_ctx->data;
if (frames_ctx->format != avctx->pix_fmt) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Mismatching AVCodecContext.pix_fmt and AVHWFramesContext.format\n");
ret = AVERROR(EINVAL);
goto free_and_end;
}
if (avctx->sw_pix_fmt != AV_PIX_FMT_NONE &&
avctx->sw_pix_fmt != frames_ctx->sw_format) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Mismatching AVCodecContext.sw_pix_fmt (%s) "
"and AVHWFramesContext.sw_format (%s)\n",
av_get_pix_fmt_name(avctx->sw_pix_fmt),
av_get_pix_fmt_name(frames_ctx->sw_format));
ret = AVERROR(EINVAL);
goto free_and_end;
}
avctx->sw_pix_fmt = frames_ctx->sw_format;
}
}
avctx->pts_correction_num_faulty_pts =
avctx->pts_correction_num_faulty_dts = 0;
avctx->pts_correction_last_pts =
avctx->pts_correction_last_dts = INT64_MIN;
if ( !CONFIG_GRAY && avctx->flags & AV_CODEC_FLAG_GRAY
&& avctx->codec_descriptor->type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_VIDEO)
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"gray decoding requested but not enabled at configuration time\n");
if ( avctx->codec->init && (!(avctx->active_thread_type&FF_THREAD_FRAME)
|| avctx->internal->frame_thread_encoder)) {
ret = avctx->codec->init(avctx);
if (ret < 0) {
goto free_and_end;
}
codec_init_ok = 1;
}
ret=0;
if (av_codec_is_decoder(avctx->codec)) {
if (!avctx->bit_rate)
avctx->bit_rate = get_bit_rate(avctx);
/* validate channel layout from the decoder */
if (avctx->channel_layout) {
int channels = av_get_channel_layout_nb_channels(avctx->channel_layout);
if (!avctx->channels)
avctx->channels = channels;
else if (channels != avctx->channels) {
char buf[512];
av_get_channel_layout_string(buf, sizeof(buf), -1, avctx->channel_layout);
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"Channel layout '%s' with %d channels does not match specified number of channels %d: "
"ignoring specified channel layout\n",
buf, channels, avctx->channels);
avctx->channel_layout = 0;
}
}
if (avctx->channels && avctx->channels < 0 ||
avctx->channels > FF_SANE_NB_CHANNELS) {
ret = AVERROR(EINVAL);
goto free_and_end;
}
if (avctx->bits_per_coded_sample < 0) {
ret = AVERROR(EINVAL);
goto free_and_end;
}
if (avctx->sub_charenc) {
if (avctx->codec_type != AVMEDIA_TYPE_SUBTITLE) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Character encoding is only "
"supported with subtitles codecs\n");
ret = AVERROR(EINVAL);
goto free_and_end;
} else if (avctx->codec_descriptor->props & AV_CODEC_PROP_BITMAP_SUB) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Codec '%s' is bitmap-based, "
"subtitles character encoding will be ignored\n",
avctx->codec_descriptor->name);
avctx->sub_charenc_mode = FF_SUB_CHARENC_MODE_DO_NOTHING;
} else {
/* input character encoding is set for a text based subtitle
* codec at this point */
if (avctx->sub_charenc_mode == FF_SUB_CHARENC_MODE_AUTOMATIC)
avctx->sub_charenc_mode = FF_SUB_CHARENC_MODE_PRE_DECODER;
if (avctx->sub_charenc_mode == FF_SUB_CHARENC_MODE_PRE_DECODER) {
#if CONFIG_ICONV
iconv_t cd = iconv_open("UTF-8", avctx->sub_charenc);
if (cd == (iconv_t)-1) {
ret = AVERROR(errno);
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Unable to open iconv context "
"with input character encoding \"%s\"\n", avctx->sub_charenc);
goto free_and_end;
}
iconv_close(cd);
#else
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Character encoding subtitles "
"conversion needs a libavcodec built with iconv support "
"for this codec\n");
ret = AVERROR(ENOSYS);
goto free_and_end;
#endif
}
}
}
#if FF_API_AVCTX_TIMEBASE
if (avctx->framerate.num > 0 && avctx->framerate.den > 0)
avctx->time_base = av_inv_q(av_mul_q(avctx->framerate, (AVRational){avctx->ticks_per_frame, 1}));
#endif
}
if (codec->priv_data_size > 0 && avctx->priv_data && codec->priv_class) {
av_assert0(*(const AVClass **)avctx->priv_data == codec->priv_class);
}
end:
ff_unlock_avcodec(codec);
if (options) {
av_dict_free(options);
*options = tmp;
}
return ret;
free_and_end:
if (avctx->codec &&
(codec_init_ok ||
(avctx->codec->caps_internal & FF_CODEC_CAP_INIT_CLEANUP)))
avctx->codec->close(avctx);
if (codec->priv_class && codec->priv_data_size)
av_opt_free(avctx->priv_data);
av_opt_free(avctx);
#if FF_API_CODED_FRAME
FF_DISABLE_DEPRECATION_WARNINGS
av_frame_free(&avctx->coded_frame);
FF_ENABLE_DEPRECATION_WARNINGS
#endif
av_dict_free(&tmp);
av_freep(&avctx->priv_data);
if (avctx->internal) {
av_frame_free(&avctx->internal->to_free);
av_frame_free(&avctx->internal->compat_decode_frame);
av_frame_free(&avctx->internal->buffer_frame);
av_packet_free(&avctx->internal->buffer_pkt);
av_packet_free(&avctx->internal->last_pkt_props);
av_packet_free(&avctx->internal->ds.in_pkt);
ff_decode_bsfs_uninit(avctx);
av_freep(&avctx->internal->pool);
}
av_freep(&avctx->internal);
avctx->codec = NULL;
goto end;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/utils: Check close before calling it
Fixes: NULL pointer dereference
Fixes: 15733/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_AV_CODEC_ID_IDF_fuzzer-5658616977162240
Reviewed-by: Paul B Mahol <[email protected]>
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/projects/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: status_t AudioFlinger::EffectModule::command(uint32_t cmdCode,
uint32_t cmdSize,
void *pCmdData,
uint32_t *replySize,
void *pReplyData)
{
Mutex::Autolock _l(mLock);
ALOGVV("command(), cmdCode: %d, mEffectInterface: %p", cmdCode, mEffectInterface);
if (mState == DESTROYED || mEffectInterface == NULL) {
return NO_INIT;
}
if (mStatus != NO_ERROR) {
return mStatus;
}
if (cmdCode == EFFECT_CMD_GET_PARAM &&
(*replySize < sizeof(effect_param_t) ||
((effect_param_t *)pCmdData)->psize > *replySize - sizeof(effect_param_t))) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "29251553");
return -EINVAL;
}
status_t status = (*mEffectInterface)->command(mEffectInterface,
cmdCode,
cmdSize,
pCmdData,
replySize,
pReplyData);
if (cmdCode != EFFECT_CMD_GET_PARAM && status == NO_ERROR) {
uint32_t size = (replySize == NULL) ? 0 : *replySize;
for (size_t i = 1; i < mHandles.size(); i++) {
EffectHandle *h = mHandles[i];
if (h != NULL && !h->destroyed_l()) {
h->commandExecuted(cmdCode, cmdSize, pCmdData, size, pReplyData);
}
}
}
return status;
}
Commit Message: Add EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM parameter checking
Bug: 30204301
Change-Id: Ib9c3ee1c2f23c96f8f7092dd9e146bc453d7a290
(cherry picked from commit e4a1d91501d47931dbae19c47815952378787ab6)
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static bool fuse_page_is_writeback(struct inode *inode, pgoff_t index)
{
struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn(inode);
struct fuse_inode *fi = get_fuse_inode(inode);
struct fuse_req *req;
bool found = false;
spin_lock(&fc->lock);
list_for_each_entry(req, &fi->writepages, writepages_entry) {
pgoff_t curr_index;
BUG_ON(req->inode != inode);
curr_index = req->misc.write.in.offset >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
if (curr_index == index) {
found = true;
break;
}
}
spin_unlock(&fc->lock);
return found;
}
Commit Message: fuse: verify ioctl retries
Verify that the total length of the iovec returned in FUSE_IOCTL_RETRY
doesn't overflow iov_length().
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>
CC: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
CC: <[email protected]> [2.6.31+]
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: int kvm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
{
return kvm_x86_ops->set_msr(vcpu, msr);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void Verify_StoreExistingGroupExistingCache(base::Time expected_update_time) {
EXPECT_TRUE(delegate()->stored_group_success_);
EXPECT_EQ(cache_.get(), group_->newest_complete_cache());
AppCacheDatabase::CacheRecord cache_record;
EXPECT_TRUE(database()->FindCache(1, &cache_record));
EXPECT_EQ(1, cache_record.cache_id);
EXPECT_EQ(1, cache_record.group_id);
EXPECT_FALSE(cache_record.online_wildcard);
EXPECT_TRUE(expected_update_time == cache_record.update_time);
EXPECT_EQ(100 + kDefaultEntrySize, cache_record.cache_size);
std::vector<AppCacheDatabase::EntryRecord> entry_records;
EXPECT_TRUE(database()->FindEntriesForCache(1, &entry_records));
EXPECT_EQ(2U, entry_records.size());
if (entry_records[0].url == kDefaultEntryUrl)
entry_records.erase(entry_records.begin());
EXPECT_EQ(1, entry_records[0].cache_id);
EXPECT_EQ(kEntryUrl, entry_records[0].url);
EXPECT_EQ(AppCacheEntry::MASTER, entry_records[0].flags);
EXPECT_EQ(1, entry_records[0].response_id);
EXPECT_EQ(100, entry_records[0].response_size);
EXPECT_EQ(100 + kDefaultEntrySize, storage()->usage_map_[kOrigin]);
EXPECT_EQ(1, mock_quota_manager_proxy_->notify_storage_modified_count_);
EXPECT_EQ(kOrigin, mock_quota_manager_proxy_->last_origin_);
EXPECT_EQ(100, mock_quota_manager_proxy_->last_delta_);
TestFinished();
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: register_vrrp_scheduler_addresses(void)
{
register_thread_address("vrrp_arp_thread", vrrp_arp_thread);
register_thread_address("vrrp_dispatcher_init", vrrp_dispatcher_init);
register_thread_address("vrrp_gratuitous_arp_thread", vrrp_gratuitous_arp_thread);
register_thread_address("vrrp_lower_prio_gratuitous_arp_thread", vrrp_lower_prio_gratuitous_arp_thread);
register_thread_address("vrrp_script_child_thread", vrrp_script_child_thread);
register_thread_address("vrrp_script_thread", vrrp_script_thread);
register_thread_address("vrrp_read_dispatcher_thread", vrrp_read_dispatcher_thread);
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
register_thread_address("vrrp_bfd_thread", vrrp_bfd_thread);
#endif
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-59
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: SPL_METHOD(RecursiveDirectoryIterator, getSubPathname)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
char *sub_name;
int len;
char slash = SPL_HAS_FLAG(intern->flags, SPL_FILE_DIR_UNIXPATHS) ? '/' : DEFAULT_SLASH;
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (intern->u.dir.sub_path) {
len = spprintf(&sub_name, 0, "%s%c%s", intern->u.dir.sub_path, slash, intern->u.dir.entry.d_name);
RETURN_STRINGL(sub_name, len, 0);
} else {
RETURN_STRING(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name, 1);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void BlockPainter::PaintScrollHitTestDisplayItem(const PaintInfo& paint_info) {
DCHECK(RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SlimmingPaintV2Enabled());
if (paint_info.GetGlobalPaintFlags() & kGlobalPaintFlattenCompositingLayers)
return;
const auto* fragment = paint_info.FragmentToPaint(layout_block_);
const auto* properties = fragment ? fragment->PaintProperties() : nullptr;
if (properties && properties->Scroll()) {
DCHECK(properties->ScrollTranslation());
ScopedPaintChunkProperties scroll_hit_test_properties(
paint_info.context.GetPaintController(),
fragment->LocalBorderBoxProperties(), layout_block_,
DisplayItem::kScrollHitTest);
ScrollHitTestDisplayItem::Record(paint_info.context, layout_block_,
DisplayItem::kScrollHitTest,
properties->ScrollTranslation());
}
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <[email protected]>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> [email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleBeginQueryEXT(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const gles2::BeginQueryEXT& c) {
GLenum target = static_cast<GLenum>(c.target);
GLuint client_id = static_cast<GLuint>(c.id);
int32 sync_shm_id = static_cast<int32>(c.sync_data_shm_id);
uint32 sync_shm_offset = static_cast<uint32>(c.sync_data_shm_offset);
switch (target) {
case GL_COMMANDS_ISSUED_CHROMIUM:
break;
default:
if (!feature_info_->feature_flags().occlusion_query_boolean) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glBeginQueryEXT", "not enabled");
return error::kNoError;
}
break;
}
if (current_query_) {
SetGLError(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glBeginQueryEXT", "query already in progress");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (client_id == 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glBeginQueryEXT", "id is 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
QueryManager::Query* query = query_manager_->GetQuery(client_id);
if (!query) {
query = query_manager_->CreateQuery(
target, client_id, sync_shm_id, sync_shm_offset);
}
if (query->target() != target) {
SetGLError(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glBeginQueryEXT", "target does not match");
return error::kNoError;
} else if (query->shm_id() != sync_shm_id ||
query->shm_offset() != sync_shm_offset) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Shared memory used by query not the same as before";
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
if (!query_manager_->BeginQuery(query)) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
current_query_ = query;
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static inline struct sock *__udp4_lib_lookup_skb(struct sk_buff *skb,
__be16 sport, __be16 dport,
struct udp_table *udptable)
{
const struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(skb);
return __udp4_lib_lookup(dev_net(skb_dst(skb)->dev), iph->saddr, sport,
iph->daddr, dport, inet_iif(skb),
udptable);
}
Commit Message: udp: fix behavior of wrong checksums
We have two problems in UDP stack related to bogus checksums :
1) We return -EAGAIN to application even if receive queue is not empty.
This breaks applications using edge trigger epoll()
2) Under UDP flood, we can loop forever without yielding to other
processes, potentially hanging the host, especially on non SMP.
This patch is an attempt to make things better.
We might in the future add extra support for rt applications
wanting to better control time spent doing a recv() in a hostile
environment. For example we could validate checksums before queuing
packets in socket receive queue.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: xmlParseStartTag(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
const xmlChar *name;
const xmlChar *attname;
xmlChar *attvalue;
const xmlChar **atts = ctxt->atts;
int nbatts = 0;
int maxatts = ctxt->maxatts;
int i;
if (RAW != '<') return(NULL);
NEXT1;
name = xmlParseName(ctxt);
if (name == NULL) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_REQUIRED,
"xmlParseStartTag: invalid element name\n");
return(NULL);
}
/*
* Now parse the attributes, it ends up with the ending
*
* (S Attribute)* S?
*/
SKIP_BLANKS;
GROW;
while ((RAW != '>') &&
((RAW != '/') || (NXT(1) != '>')) &&
(IS_BYTE_CHAR(RAW))) {
const xmlChar *q = CUR_PTR;
unsigned int cons = ctxt->input->consumed;
attname = xmlParseAttribute(ctxt, &attvalue);
if ((attname != NULL) && (attvalue != NULL)) {
/*
* [ WFC: Unique Att Spec ]
* No attribute name may appear more than once in the same
* start-tag or empty-element tag.
*/
for (i = 0; i < nbatts;i += 2) {
if (xmlStrEqual(atts[i], attname)) {
xmlErrAttributeDup(ctxt, NULL, attname);
xmlFree(attvalue);
goto failed;
}
}
/*
* Add the pair to atts
*/
if (atts == NULL) {
maxatts = 22; /* allow for 10 attrs by default */
atts = (const xmlChar **)
xmlMalloc(maxatts * sizeof(xmlChar *));
if (atts == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
if (attvalue != NULL)
xmlFree(attvalue);
goto failed;
}
ctxt->atts = atts;
ctxt->maxatts = maxatts;
} else if (nbatts + 4 > maxatts) {
const xmlChar **n;
maxatts *= 2;
n = (const xmlChar **) xmlRealloc((void *) atts,
maxatts * sizeof(const xmlChar *));
if (n == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
if (attvalue != NULL)
xmlFree(attvalue);
goto failed;
}
atts = n;
ctxt->atts = atts;
ctxt->maxatts = maxatts;
}
atts[nbatts++] = attname;
atts[nbatts++] = attvalue;
atts[nbatts] = NULL;
atts[nbatts + 1] = NULL;
} else {
if (attvalue != NULL)
xmlFree(attvalue);
}
failed:
GROW
if ((RAW == '>') || (((RAW == '/') && (NXT(1) == '>'))))
break;
if (!IS_BLANK_CH(RAW)) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_SPACE_REQUIRED,
"attributes construct error\n");
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
if ((cons == ctxt->input->consumed) && (q == CUR_PTR) &&
(attname == NULL) && (attvalue == NULL)) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"xmlParseStartTag: problem parsing attributes\n");
break;
}
SHRINK;
GROW;
}
/*
* SAX: Start of Element !
*/
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (ctxt->sax->startElement != NULL) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX)) {
if (nbatts > 0)
ctxt->sax->startElement(ctxt->userData, name, atts);
else
ctxt->sax->startElement(ctxt->userData, name, NULL);
}
if (atts != NULL) {
/* Free only the content strings */
for (i = 1;i < nbatts;i+=2)
if (atts[i] != NULL)
xmlFree((xmlChar *) atts[i]);
}
return(name);
}
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int btrfs_ioctl_getflags(struct file *file, void __user *arg)
{
struct btrfs_inode *ip = BTRFS_I(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode);
unsigned int flags = btrfs_flags_to_ioctl(ip->flags);
if (copy_to_user(arg, &flags, sizeof(flags)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-310
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: alloc_trace_space(const gs_ref_memory_t *imem)
{
return imem->space + (imem->stable_memory == (const gs_memory_t *)imem);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: SProcXFixesSelectCursorInput(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xXFixesSelectCursorInputReq);
swaps(&stuff->length);
swapl(&stuff->window);
return (*ProcXFixesVector[stuff->xfixesReqType]) (client);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static inline unsigned int ReadProfileLong(const EndianType endian,
unsigned char *buffer)
{
unsigned int
value;
if (endian == LSBEndian)
{
value=(unsigned int) ((buffer[3] << 24) | (buffer[2] << 16) |
(buffer[1] << 8 ) | (buffer[0]));
return((unsigned int) (value & 0xffffffff));
}
value=(unsigned int) ((buffer[0] << 24) | (buffer[1] << 16) |
(buffer[2] << 8) | buffer[3]);
return((unsigned int) (value & 0xffffffff));
}
Commit Message: Fixed SEGV reported in https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/130
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::OnLostResources() {
image_transport_clients_.clear();
current_surface_ = 0;
protection_state_id_ = 0;
current_surface_is_protected_ = true;
current_surface_in_use_by_compositor_ = true;
surface_route_id_ = 0;
UpdateExternalTexture();
locks_pending_commit_.clear();
DCHECK(!shared_surface_handle_.is_null());
ImageTransportFactory* factory = ImageTransportFactory::GetInstance();
factory->DestroySharedSurfaceHandle(shared_surface_handle_);
shared_surface_handle_ = factory->CreateSharedSurfaceHandle();
host_->CompositingSurfaceUpdated();
host_->ScheduleComposite();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static void TIFFGetProperties(TIFF *tiff,Image *image,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
message[MagickPathExtent],
*text;
uint32
count,
length,
type;
unsigned long
*tietz;
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_ARTIST,&text) == 1)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:artist",text,exception);
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_COPYRIGHT,&text) == 1)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:copyright",text,exception);
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_DATETIME,&text) == 1)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:timestamp",text,exception);
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_DOCUMENTNAME,&text) == 1)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:document",text,exception);
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_HOSTCOMPUTER,&text) == 1)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:hostcomputer",text,exception);
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_IMAGEDESCRIPTION,&text) == 1)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"comment",text,exception);
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_MAKE,&text) == 1)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:make",text,exception);
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_MODEL,&text) == 1)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:model",text,exception);
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_OPIIMAGEID,&count,&text) == 1)
{
if (count >= MagickPathExtent)
count=MagickPathExtent-1;
(void) CopyMagickString(message,text,count+1);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:image-id",message,exception);
}
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_PAGENAME,&text) == 1)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"label",text,exception);
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SOFTWARE,&text) == 1)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:software",text,exception);
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,33423,&count,&text) == 1)
{
if (count >= MagickPathExtent)
count=MagickPathExtent-1;
(void) CopyMagickString(message,text,count+1);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:kodak-33423",message,exception);
}
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,36867,&count,&text) == 1)
{
if (count >= MagickPathExtent)
count=MagickPathExtent-1;
(void) CopyMagickString(message,text,count+1);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:kodak-36867",message,exception);
}
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SUBFILETYPE,&type) == 1)
switch (type)
{
case 0x01:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:subfiletype","REDUCEDIMAGE",
exception);
break;
}
case 0x02:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:subfiletype","PAGE",exception);
break;
}
case 0x04:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:subfiletype","MASK",exception);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,37706,&length,&tietz) == 1)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(message,MagickPathExtent,"%lu",tietz[0]);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:tietz_offset",message,exception);
}
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/298
CWE ID: CWE-476
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static struct page *__read_cache_page(struct address_space *mapping,
pgoff_t index,
int (*filler)(void *,struct page*),
void *data)
{
struct page *page;
int err;
repeat:
page = find_get_page(mapping, index);
if (!page) {
page = page_cache_alloc_cold(mapping);
if (!page)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
err = add_to_page_cache_lru(page, mapping, index, GFP_KERNEL);
if (unlikely(err)) {
page_cache_release(page);
if (err == -EEXIST)
goto repeat;
/* Presumably ENOMEM for radix tree node */
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
err = filler(data, page);
if (err < 0) {
page_cache_release(page);
page = ERR_PTR(err);
}
}
return page;
}
Commit Message: fix writev regression: pan hanging unkillable and un-straceable
Frederik Himpe reported an unkillable and un-straceable pan process.
Zero length iovecs can go into an infinite loop in writev, because the
iovec iterator does not always advance over them.
The sequence required to trigger this is not trivial. I think it
requires that a zero-length iovec be followed by a non-zero-length iovec
which causes a pagefault in the atomic usercopy. This causes the writev
code to drop back into single-segment copy mode, which then tries to
copy the 0 bytes of the zero-length iovec; a zero length copy looks like
a failure though, so it loops.
Put a test into iov_iter_advance to catch zero-length iovecs. We could
just put the test in the fallback path, but I feel it is more robust to
skip over zero-length iovecs throughout the code (iovec iterator may be
used in filesystems too, so it should be robust).
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static struct svc_xprt *svc_rdma_create(struct svc_serv *serv,
struct net *net,
struct sockaddr *sa, int salen,
int flags)
{
struct rdma_cm_id *listen_id;
struct svcxprt_rdma *cma_xprt;
int ret;
dprintk("svcrdma: Creating RDMA socket\n");
if ((sa->sa_family != AF_INET) && (sa->sa_family != AF_INET6)) {
dprintk("svcrdma: Address family %d is not supported.\n", sa->sa_family);
return ERR_PTR(-EAFNOSUPPORT);
}
cma_xprt = rdma_create_xprt(serv, 1);
if (!cma_xprt)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
listen_id = rdma_create_id(&init_net, rdma_listen_handler, cma_xprt,
RDMA_PS_TCP, IB_QPT_RC);
if (IS_ERR(listen_id)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(listen_id);
dprintk("svcrdma: rdma_create_id failed = %d\n", ret);
goto err0;
}
/* Allow both IPv4 and IPv6 sockets to bind a single port
* at the same time.
*/
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
ret = rdma_set_afonly(listen_id, 1);
if (ret) {
dprintk("svcrdma: rdma_set_afonly failed = %d\n", ret);
goto err1;
}
#endif
ret = rdma_bind_addr(listen_id, sa);
if (ret) {
dprintk("svcrdma: rdma_bind_addr failed = %d\n", ret);
goto err1;
}
cma_xprt->sc_cm_id = listen_id;
ret = rdma_listen(listen_id, RPCRDMA_LISTEN_BACKLOG);
if (ret) {
dprintk("svcrdma: rdma_listen failed = %d\n", ret);
goto err1;
}
/*
* We need to use the address from the cm_id in case the
* caller specified 0 for the port number.
*/
sa = (struct sockaddr *)&cma_xprt->sc_cm_id->route.addr.src_addr;
svc_xprt_set_local(&cma_xprt->sc_xprt, sa, salen);
return &cma_xprt->sc_xprt;
err1:
rdma_destroy_id(listen_id);
err0:
kfree(cma_xprt);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: const char* SegmentInfo::GetWritingAppAsUTF8() const
{
return m_pWritingAppAsUTF8;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: Vector<CSPHeaderAndType> ContentSecurityPolicy::Headers() const {
Vector<CSPHeaderAndType> headers;
headers.ReserveInitialCapacity(policies_.size());
for (const auto& policy : policies_) {
headers.UncheckedAppend(
CSPHeaderAndType(policy->Header(), policy->HeaderType()));
}
return headers;
}
Commit Message: Inherit the navigation initiator when navigating instead of the parent/opener
Spec PR: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-csp/pull/358
Bug: 905301, 894228, 836148
Change-Id: I43ada2266d42d1cd56dbe3c6dd89d115e878a83a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1314633
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#610850}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint(Platform::TouchPoint& point, unsigned modifiers)
{
m_webPage->m_inputHandler->setInputModeEnabled();
bool shiftActive = modifiers & KEYMOD_SHIFT;
bool altActive = modifiers & KEYMOD_ALT;
bool ctrlActive = modifiers & KEYMOD_CTRL;
switch (point.m_state) {
case Platform::TouchPoint::TouchPressed:
{
m_webPage->m_inputHandler->clearDidSpellCheckState();
if (!m_lastFatFingersResult.isValid())
doFatFingers(point);
Element* elementUnderFatFinger = m_lastFatFingersResult.nodeAsElementIfApplicable();
if (m_lastFatFingersResult.isTextInput()) {
elementUnderFatFinger = m_lastFatFingersResult.nodeAsElementIfApplicable(FatFingersResult::ShadowContentNotAllowed, true /* shouldUseRootEditableElement */);
m_shouldRequestSpellCheckOptions = m_webPage->m_inputHandler->shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint(point.m_pos, elementUnderFatFinger, m_spellCheckOptionRequest);
}
handleFatFingerPressed(shiftActive, altActive, ctrlActive);
break;
}
case Platform::TouchPoint::TouchReleased:
{
if (!m_shouldRequestSpellCheckOptions)
m_webPage->m_inputHandler->processPendingKeyboardVisibilityChange();
if (m_webPage->m_inputHandler->isInputMode())
m_webPage->m_inputHandler->notifyClientOfKeyboardVisibilityChange(true);
m_webPage->m_tapHighlight->hide();
IntPoint adjustedPoint = m_webPage->mapFromContentsToViewport(m_lastFatFingersResult.adjustedPosition());
PlatformMouseEvent mouseEvent(adjustedPoint, m_lastScreenPoint, PlatformEvent::MouseReleased, 1, LeftButton, shiftActive, ctrlActive, altActive, TouchScreen);
m_webPage->handleMouseEvent(mouseEvent);
if (m_shouldRequestSpellCheckOptions) {
IntPoint pixelPositionRelativeToViewport = m_webPage->mapToTransformed(adjustedPoint);
IntSize screenOffset(m_lastScreenPoint - pixelPositionRelativeToViewport);
m_webPage->m_inputHandler->requestSpellingCheckingOptions(m_spellCheckOptionRequest, screenOffset);
m_shouldRequestSpellCheckOptions = false;
}
m_lastFatFingersResult.reset(); // Reset the fat finger result as its no longer valid when a user's finger is not on the screen.
break;
}
case Platform::TouchPoint::TouchMoved:
{
m_webPage->m_inputHandler->clearDidSpellCheckState();
PlatformMouseEvent mouseEvent(point.m_pos, m_lastScreenPoint, PlatformEvent::MouseMoved, 1, LeftButton, shiftActive, ctrlActive, altActive, TouchScreen);
m_lastScreenPoint = point.m_screenPos;
m_webPage->handleMouseEvent(mouseEvent);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: int SeekHead::GetCount() const
{
return m_entry_count;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void rtsp_cmd_options(HTTPContext *c, const char *url)
{
/* rtsp_reply_header(c, RTSP_STATUS_OK); */
avio_printf(c->pb, "RTSP/1.0 %d %s\r\n", RTSP_STATUS_OK, "OK");
avio_printf(c->pb, "CSeq: %d\r\n", c->seq);
avio_printf(c->pb, "Public: %s\r\n",
"OPTIONS, DESCRIBE, SETUP, TEARDOWN, PLAY, PAUSE");
avio_printf(c->pb, "\r\n");
}
Commit Message: ffserver: Check chunk size
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: poc_ffserver.py
Found-by: Paul Cher <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void BrowserPluginGuest::SetCompositingBufferData(int gpu_process_id,
uint32 client_id,
uint32 context_id,
uint32 texture_id_0,
uint32 texture_id_1,
uint32 sync_point) {
if (texture_id_0 == 0) {
DCHECK(texture_id_1 == 0);
return;
}
DCHECK(texture_id_1 != 0);
DCHECK(texture_id_0 != texture_id_1);
surface_handle_ = gfx::GLSurfaceHandle(gfx::kNullPluginWindow, true);
surface_handle_.parent_gpu_process_id = gpu_process_id;
surface_handle_.parent_client_id = client_id;
surface_handle_.parent_context_id = context_id;
surface_handle_.parent_texture_id[0] = texture_id_0;
surface_handle_.parent_texture_id[1] = texture_id_1;
surface_handle_.sync_point = sync_point;
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static void *load_bytes(RBinFile *arch, const ut8 *buf, ut64 sz, ut64 loaddr, Sdb *sdb) {
if (!buf || !sz || sz == UT64_MAX) {
return NULL;
}
RBuffer *tbuf = r_buf_new ();
r_buf_set_bytes (tbuf, buf, sz);
struct r_bin_bflt_obj *res = r_bin_bflt_new_buf (tbuf);
r_buf_free (tbuf);
return res ? res : NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix #6829 oob write because of using wrong struct
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void HTMLInputElement::stepDown(int n, ExceptionState& exception_state) {
input_type_->StepUp(-1.0 * n, exception_state);
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: l2tp_msgtype_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat)
{
const uint16_t *ptr = (const uint16_t *)dat;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(l2tp_msgtype2str, "MSGTYPE-#%u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr))));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13006/L2TP: Check whether an AVP's content exceeds the AVP length.
It's not good enough to check whether all the data specified by the AVP
length was captured - you also have to check whether that length is
large enough for all the required data in the AVP.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Yannick Formaggio.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T impeg2d_dec_seq_hdr(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
stream_t *ps_stream;
ps_stream = &ps_dec->s_bit_stream;
UWORD16 u2_height;
UWORD16 u2_width;
if (impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN) != SEQUENCE_HEADER_CODE)
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
return IMPEG2D_FRM_HDR_START_CODE_NOT_FOUND;
}
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
u2_width = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,12);
u2_height = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,12);
if ((u2_width != ps_dec->u2_horizontal_size)
|| (u2_height != ps_dec->u2_vertical_size))
{
if (0 == ps_dec->u2_header_done)
{
/* This is the first time we are reading the resolution */
ps_dec->u2_horizontal_size = u2_width;
ps_dec->u2_vertical_size = u2_height;
if (0 == ps_dec->u4_frm_buf_stride)
{
ps_dec->u4_frm_buf_stride = (UWORD32) (u2_width);
}
}
else
{
if((u2_width > ps_dec->u2_create_max_width)
|| (u2_height > ps_dec->u2_create_max_height))
{
IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T e_error = IMPEG2D_UNSUPPORTED_DIMENSIONS;
ps_dec->u2_reinit_max_height = u2_height;
ps_dec->u2_reinit_max_width = u2_width;
return e_error;
}
else
{
/* The resolution has changed */
return (IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_RES_CHANGED;
}
}
}
if((ps_dec->u2_horizontal_size > ps_dec->u2_create_max_width)
|| (ps_dec->u2_vertical_size > ps_dec->u2_create_max_height))
{
IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T e_error = IMPEG2D_UNSUPPORTED_DIMENSIONS;
return SET_IVD_FATAL_ERROR(e_error);
}
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Flush the following as they are not being used */
/* aspect_ratio_info (4 bits) */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
ps_dec->u2_aspect_ratio_info = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,4);
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Frame rate code(4 bits) */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
ps_dec->u2_frame_rate_code = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,4);
if (ps_dec->u2_frame_rate_code > MPEG2_MAX_FRAME_RATE_CODE)
{
return IMPEG2D_FRM_HDR_DECODE_ERR;
}
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Flush the following as they are not being used */
/* bit_rate_value (18 bits) */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,18);
GET_MARKER_BIT(ps_dec,ps_stream);
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Flush the following as they are not being used */
/* vbv_buffer_size_value(10 bits), constrained_parameter_flag (1 bit) */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,11);
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Quantization matrix for the intra blocks */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
if(impeg2d_bit_stream_get_bit(ps_stream) == 1)
{
UWORD16 i;
for(i = 0; i < NUM_PELS_IN_BLOCK; i++)
{
ps_dec->au1_intra_quant_matrix[gau1_impeg2_inv_scan_zig_zag[i]] = (UWORD8)impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,8);
}
}
else
{
memcpy(ps_dec->au1_intra_quant_matrix,gau1_impeg2_intra_quant_matrix_default,
NUM_PELS_IN_BLOCK);
}
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Quantization matrix for the inter blocks */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
if(impeg2d_bit_stream_get_bit(ps_stream) == 1)
{
UWORD16 i;
for(i = 0; i < NUM_PELS_IN_BLOCK; i++)
{
ps_dec->au1_inter_quant_matrix[gau1_impeg2_inv_scan_zig_zag[i]] = (UWORD8)impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,8);
}
}
else
{
memcpy(ps_dec->au1_inter_quant_matrix,gau1_impeg2_inter_quant_matrix_default,
NUM_PELS_IN_BLOCK);
}
impeg2d_next_start_code(ps_dec);
return (IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE;
}
Commit Message: Fix in handling header decode errors
If header decode was unsuccessful, do not try decoding a frame
Also, initialize pic_wd, pic_ht for reinitialization when
decoder is created with smaller dimensions
Bug: 28886651
Bug: 35219737
Change-Id: I8c06d9052910e47fce2e6fe25ad318d4c83d2c50
(cherry picked from commit 2b9fa9ace2dbedfbac026fc9b6ab6cdac7f68c27)
(cherry picked from commit c2395cd7cc0c286a66de674032dd2ed26500aef4)
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: GF_Err rtp_hnti_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
u32 length;
GF_RTPBox *ptr = (GF_RTPBox *)s;
if (ptr == NULL) return GF_BAD_PARAM;
ISOM_DECREASE_SIZE(ptr, 4)
ptr->subType = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
length = (u32) (ptr->size);
ptr->sdpText = (char*)gf_malloc(sizeof(char) * (length+1));
if (!ptr->sdpText) return GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
gf_bs_read_data(bs, ptr->sdpText, length);
ptr->sdpText[length] = 0;
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static PHP_FUNCTION(xmlwriter_output_memory)
{
php_xmlwriter_flush(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, 1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int ocfs2_dio_get_block(struct inode *inode, sector_t iblock,
struct buffer_head *bh_result, int create)
{
struct ocfs2_super *osb = OCFS2_SB(inode->i_sb);
struct ocfs2_inode_info *oi = OCFS2_I(inode);
struct ocfs2_write_ctxt *wc;
struct ocfs2_write_cluster_desc *desc = NULL;
struct ocfs2_dio_write_ctxt *dwc = NULL;
struct buffer_head *di_bh = NULL;
u64 p_blkno;
loff_t pos = iblock << inode->i_sb->s_blocksize_bits;
unsigned len, total_len = bh_result->b_size;
int ret = 0, first_get_block = 0;
len = osb->s_clustersize - (pos & (osb->s_clustersize - 1));
len = min(total_len, len);
mlog(0, "get block of %lu at %llu:%u req %u\n",
inode->i_ino, pos, len, total_len);
/*
* Because we need to change file size in ocfs2_dio_end_io_write(), or
* we may need to add it to orphan dir. So can not fall to fast path
* while file size will be changed.
*/
if (pos + total_len <= i_size_read(inode)) {
down_read(&oi->ip_alloc_sem);
/* This is the fast path for re-write. */
ret = ocfs2_get_block(inode, iblock, bh_result, create);
up_read(&oi->ip_alloc_sem);
if (buffer_mapped(bh_result) &&
!buffer_new(bh_result) &&
ret == 0)
goto out;
/* Clear state set by ocfs2_get_block. */
bh_result->b_state = 0;
}
dwc = ocfs2_dio_alloc_write_ctx(bh_result, &first_get_block);
if (unlikely(dwc == NULL)) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
mlog_errno(ret);
goto out;
}
if (ocfs2_clusters_for_bytes(inode->i_sb, pos + total_len) >
ocfs2_clusters_for_bytes(inode->i_sb, i_size_read(inode)) &&
!dwc->dw_orphaned) {
/*
* when we are going to alloc extents beyond file size, add the
* inode to orphan dir, so we can recall those spaces when
* system crashed during write.
*/
ret = ocfs2_add_inode_to_orphan(osb, inode);
if (ret < 0) {
mlog_errno(ret);
goto out;
}
dwc->dw_orphaned = 1;
}
ret = ocfs2_inode_lock(inode, &di_bh, 1);
if (ret) {
mlog_errno(ret);
goto out;
}
down_write(&oi->ip_alloc_sem);
if (first_get_block) {
if (ocfs2_sparse_alloc(OCFS2_SB(inode->i_sb)))
ret = ocfs2_zero_tail(inode, di_bh, pos);
else
ret = ocfs2_expand_nonsparse_inode(inode, di_bh, pos,
total_len, NULL);
if (ret < 0) {
mlog_errno(ret);
goto unlock;
}
}
ret = ocfs2_write_begin_nolock(inode->i_mapping, pos, len,
OCFS2_WRITE_DIRECT, NULL,
(void **)&wc, di_bh, NULL);
if (ret) {
mlog_errno(ret);
goto unlock;
}
desc = &wc->w_desc[0];
p_blkno = ocfs2_clusters_to_blocks(inode->i_sb, desc->c_phys);
BUG_ON(p_blkno == 0);
p_blkno += iblock & (u64)(ocfs2_clusters_to_blocks(inode->i_sb, 1) - 1);
map_bh(bh_result, inode->i_sb, p_blkno);
bh_result->b_size = len;
if (desc->c_needs_zero)
set_buffer_new(bh_result);
/* May sleep in end_io. It should not happen in a irq context. So defer
* it to dio work queue. */
set_buffer_defer_completion(bh_result);
if (!list_empty(&wc->w_unwritten_list)) {
struct ocfs2_unwritten_extent *ue = NULL;
ue = list_first_entry(&wc->w_unwritten_list,
struct ocfs2_unwritten_extent,
ue_node);
BUG_ON(ue->ue_cpos != desc->c_cpos);
/* The physical address may be 0, fill it. */
ue->ue_phys = desc->c_phys;
list_splice_tail_init(&wc->w_unwritten_list, &dwc->dw_zero_list);
dwc->dw_zero_count++;
}
ret = ocfs2_write_end_nolock(inode->i_mapping, pos, len, len, wc);
BUG_ON(ret != len);
ret = 0;
unlock:
up_write(&oi->ip_alloc_sem);
ocfs2_inode_unlock(inode, 1);
brelse(di_bh);
out:
if (ret < 0)
ret = -EIO;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ocfs2: ip_alloc_sem should be taken in ocfs2_get_block()
ip_alloc_sem should be taken in ocfs2_get_block() when reading file in
DIRECT mode to prevent concurrent access to extent tree with
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write(), which may cause BUGON in the following
situation:
read file 'A' end_io of writing file 'A'
vfs_read
__vfs_read
ocfs2_file_read_iter
generic_file_read_iter
ocfs2_direct_IO
__blockdev_direct_IO
do_blockdev_direct_IO
do_direct_IO
get_more_blocks
ocfs2_get_block
ocfs2_extent_map_get_blocks
ocfs2_get_clusters
ocfs2_get_clusters_nocache()
ocfs2_search_extent_list
return the index of record which
contains the v_cluster, that is
v_cluster > rec[i]->e_cpos.
ocfs2_dio_end_io
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write
down_write(&oi->ip_alloc_sem);
ocfs2_mark_extent_written
ocfs2_change_extent_flag
ocfs2_split_extent
...
--> modify the rec[i]->e_cpos, resulting
in v_cluster < rec[i]->e_cpos.
BUG_ON(v_cluster < le32_to_cpu(rec->e_cpos))
[[email protected]: v3]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: c15471f79506 ("ocfs2: fix sparse file & data ordering issue in direct io")
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Gang He <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Changwei Ge <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <[email protected]>
Cc: Joel Becker <[email protected]>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int fuse_copy_ioctl_iovec(struct fuse_conn *fc, struct iovec *dst,
void *src, size_t transferred, unsigned count,
bool is_compat)
{
unsigned i;
struct fuse_ioctl_iovec *fiov = src;
if (fc->minor < 16) {
return fuse_copy_ioctl_iovec_old(dst, src, transferred,
count, is_compat);
}
if (count * sizeof(struct fuse_ioctl_iovec) != transferred)
return -EIO;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
/* Did the server supply an inappropriate value? */
if (fiov[i].base != (unsigned long) fiov[i].base ||
fiov[i].len != (unsigned long) fiov[i].len)
return -EIO;
dst[i].iov_base = (void __user *) (unsigned long) fiov[i].base;
dst[i].iov_len = (size_t) fiov[i].len;
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
if (is_compat &&
(ptr_to_compat(dst[i].iov_base) != fiov[i].base ||
(compat_size_t) dst[i].iov_len != fiov[i].len))
return -EIO;
#endif
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fuse: break infinite loop in fuse_fill_write_pages()
I got a report about unkillable task eating CPU. Further
investigation shows, that the problem is in the fuse_fill_write_pages()
function. If iov's first segment has zero length, we get an infinite
loop, because we never reach iov_iter_advance() call.
Fix this by calling iov_iter_advance() before repeating an attempt to
copy data from userspace.
A similar problem is described in 124d3b7041f ("fix writev regression:
pan hanging unkillable and un-straceable"). If zero-length segmend
is followed by segment with invalid address,
iov_iter_fault_in_readable() checks only first segment (zero-length),
iov_iter_copy_from_user_atomic() skips it, fails at second and
returns zero -> goto again without skipping zero-length segment.
Patch calls iov_iter_advance() before goto again: we'll skip zero-length
segment at second iteraction and iov_iter_fault_in_readable() will detect
invalid address.
Special thanks to Konstantin Khlebnikov, who helped a lot with the commit
description.
Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Maxim Patlasov <[email protected]>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>
Fixes: ea9b9907b82a ("fuse: implement perform_write")
Cc: <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::RequestConfirmation(
const dbus::ObjectPath& device_path,
uint32 passkey,
const ConfirmationCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(agent_.get());
DCHECK(device_path == object_path_);
VLOG(1) << object_path_.value() << ": RequestConfirmation: " << passkey;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Bluetooth.PairingMethod",
UMA_PAIRING_METHOD_CONFIRM_PASSKEY,
UMA_PAIRING_METHOD_COUNT);
DCHECK(pairing_delegate_);
DCHECK(confirmation_callback_.is_null());
confirmation_callback_ = callback;
pairing_delegate_->ConfirmPasskey(this, passkey);
pairing_delegate_used_ = true;
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: int venc_dev::venc_output_log_buffers(const char *buffer_addr, int buffer_len)
{
if (!m_debug.outfile) {
int size = 0;
if(m_sVenc_cfg.codectype == V4L2_PIX_FMT_MPEG4) {
size = snprintf(m_debug.outfile_name, PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX, "%s/output_enc_%lu_%lu_%p.m4v",
m_debug.log_loc, m_sVenc_cfg.input_width, m_sVenc_cfg.input_height, this);
} else if(m_sVenc_cfg.codectype == V4L2_PIX_FMT_H264) {
size = snprintf(m_debug.outfile_name, PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX, "%s/output_enc_%lu_%lu_%p.264",
m_debug.log_loc, m_sVenc_cfg.input_width, m_sVenc_cfg.input_height, this);
} else if(m_sVenc_cfg.codectype == V4L2_PIX_FMT_HEVC) {
size = snprintf(m_debug.outfile_name, PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX, "%s/output_enc_%ld_%ld_%p.265",
m_debug.log_loc, m_sVenc_cfg.input_width, m_sVenc_cfg.input_height, this);
} else if(m_sVenc_cfg.codectype == V4L2_PIX_FMT_H263) {
size = snprintf(m_debug.outfile_name, PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX, "%s/output_enc_%lu_%lu_%p.263",
m_debug.log_loc, m_sVenc_cfg.input_width, m_sVenc_cfg.input_height, this);
} else if(m_sVenc_cfg.codectype == V4L2_PIX_FMT_VP8) {
size = snprintf(m_debug.outfile_name, PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX, "%s/output_enc_%lu_%lu_%p.ivf",
m_debug.log_loc, m_sVenc_cfg.input_width, m_sVenc_cfg.input_height, this);
}
if ((size > PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX) && (size < 0)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to open output file: %s for logging size:%d",
m_debug.outfile_name, size);
}
m_debug.outfile = fopen(m_debug.outfile_name, "ab");
if (!m_debug.outfile) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to open output file: %s for logging errno:%d",
m_debug.outfile_name, errno);
m_debug.outfile_name[0] = '\0';
return -1;
}
}
if (m_debug.outfile && buffer_len) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("%s buffer_len:%d", __func__, buffer_len);
fwrite(buffer_addr, buffer_len, 1, m_debug.outfile);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: const AtomicString& TextTrackCue::InterfaceName() const {
return EventTargetNames::TextTrackCue;
}
Commit Message: Support negative timestamps of TextTrackCue
Ensure proper behaviour for negative timestamps of TextTrackCue.
1. Cues with negative startTime should become active from 0s.
2. Cues with negative startTime and endTime should never be active.
Bug: 314032
Change-Id: Ib53710e58be0be770c933ea8c3c4709a0e5dec0d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/863270
Commit-Queue: srirama chandra sekhar <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529012}
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void NetworkHandler::ClearBrowserCache(
std::unique_ptr<ClearBrowserCacheCallback> callback) {
if (!process_) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::InternalError());
return;
}
content::BrowsingDataRemover* remover =
content::BrowserContext::GetBrowsingDataRemover(
process_->GetBrowserContext());
remover->RemoveAndReply(
base::Time(), base::Time::Max(),
content::BrowsingDataRemover::DATA_TYPE_CACHE,
content::BrowsingDataRemover::ORIGIN_TYPE_UNPROTECTED_WEB,
new DevtoolsClearCacheObserver(remover, std::move(callback)));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: IHEVCD_ERROR_T ihevcd_mv_buf_mgr_add_bufs(codec_t *ps_codec)
{
IHEVCD_ERROR_T ret = (IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_SUCCESS;
WORD32 i;
WORD32 max_dpb_size;
WORD32 mv_bank_size_allocated;
WORD32 pic_mv_bank_size;
sps_t *ps_sps;
UWORD8 *pu1_buf;
mv_buf_t *ps_mv_buf;
/* Initialize MV Bank buffer manager */
ps_sps = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_sps;
/* Compute the number of MV Bank buffers needed */
max_dpb_size = ps_sps->ai1_sps_max_dec_pic_buffering[ps_sps->i1_sps_max_sub_layers - 1];
/* Allocate one extra MV Bank to handle current frame
* In case of asynchronous parsing and processing, number of buffers should increase here
* based on when parsing and processing threads are synchronized
*/
max_dpb_size++;
pu1_buf = (UWORD8 *)ps_codec->pv_mv_bank_buf_base;
ps_mv_buf = (mv_buf_t *)pu1_buf;
pu1_buf += max_dpb_size * sizeof(mv_buf_t);
ps_codec->ps_mv_buf = ps_mv_buf;
mv_bank_size_allocated = ps_codec->i4_total_mv_bank_size - max_dpb_size * sizeof(mv_buf_t);
/* Compute MV bank size per picture */
pic_mv_bank_size = ihevcd_get_pic_mv_bank_size(ALIGN64(ps_sps->i2_pic_width_in_luma_samples) *
ALIGN64(ps_sps->i2_pic_height_in_luma_samples));
for(i = 0; i < max_dpb_size; i++)
{
WORD32 buf_ret;
WORD32 num_pu;
WORD32 num_ctb;
WORD32 pic_size;
pic_size = ALIGN64(ps_sps->i2_pic_width_in_luma_samples) *
ALIGN64(ps_sps->i2_pic_height_in_luma_samples);
num_pu = pic_size / (MIN_PU_SIZE * MIN_PU_SIZE);
num_ctb = pic_size / (MIN_CTB_SIZE * MIN_CTB_SIZE);
mv_bank_size_allocated -= pic_mv_bank_size;
if(mv_bank_size_allocated < 0)
{
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_error_code = IHEVCD_INSUFFICIENT_MEM_MVBANK;
return IHEVCD_INSUFFICIENT_MEM_MVBANK;
}
ps_mv_buf->pu4_pic_pu_idx = (UWORD32 *)pu1_buf;
pu1_buf += (num_ctb + 1) * sizeof(WORD32);
ps_mv_buf->pu1_pic_pu_map = pu1_buf;
pu1_buf += num_pu;
ps_mv_buf->pu1_pic_slice_map = (UWORD16 *)pu1_buf;
pu1_buf += ALIGN4(num_ctb * sizeof(UWORD16));
ps_mv_buf->ps_pic_pu = (pu_t *)pu1_buf;
pu1_buf += num_pu * sizeof(pu_t);
buf_ret = ihevc_buf_mgr_add((buf_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_mv_buf_mgr, ps_mv_buf, i);
if(0 != buf_ret)
{
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_error_code = IHEVCD_BUF_MGR_ERROR;
return IHEVCD_BUF_MGR_ERROR;
}
ps_mv_buf++;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Check only allocated mv bufs for releasing from reference
When checking mv bufs for releasing from reference, unallocated
mv bufs were also checked. This issue was fixed by restricting
the loop count to allocated number of mv bufs.
Bug: 34896906
Bug: 34819017
Change-Id: If832f590b301f414d4cd5206414efc61a70c17cb
(cherry picked from commit 23bfe3e06d53ea749073a5d7ceda84239742b2c2)
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: filter_lookup(struct archive *_a, int n)
{
struct archive_write *a = (struct archive_write *)_a;
struct archive_write_filter *f = a->filter_first;
if (n == -1)
return a->filter_last;
if (n < 0)
return NULL;
while (n > 0 && f != NULL) {
f = f->next_filter;
--n;
}
return f;
}
Commit Message: Limit write requests to at most INT_MAX.
This prevents a certain common programming error (passing -1 to write)
from leading to other problems deeper in the library.
CWE ID: CWE-189
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: make_boot_catalog(struct archive_write *a)
{
struct iso9660 *iso9660 = a->format_data;
unsigned char *block;
unsigned char *p;
uint16_t sum, *wp;
block = wb_buffptr(a);
memset(block, 0, LOGICAL_BLOCK_SIZE);
p = block;
/*
* Validation Entry
*/
/* Header ID */
p[0] = 1;
/* Platform ID */
p[1] = iso9660->el_torito.platform_id;
/* Reserved */
p[2] = p[3] = 0;
/* ID */
if (archive_strlen(&(iso9660->el_torito.id)) > 0)
strncpy((char *)p+4, iso9660->el_torito.id.s, 23);
p[27] = 0;
/* Checksum */
p[28] = p[29] = 0;
/* Key */
p[30] = 0x55;
p[31] = 0xAA;
sum = 0;
wp = (uint16_t *)block;
while (wp < (uint16_t *)&block[32])
sum += archive_le16dec(wp++);
set_num_721(&block[28], (~sum) + 1);
/*
* Initial/Default Entry
*/
p = &block[32];
/* Boot Indicator */
p[0] = 0x88;
/* Boot media type */
p[1] = iso9660->el_torito.media_type;
/* Load Segment */
if (iso9660->el_torito.media_type == BOOT_MEDIA_NO_EMULATION)
set_num_721(&p[2], iso9660->el_torito.boot_load_seg);
else
set_num_721(&p[2], 0);
/* System Type */
p[4] = iso9660->el_torito.system_type;
/* Unused */
p[5] = 0;
/* Sector Count */
if (iso9660->el_torito.media_type == BOOT_MEDIA_NO_EMULATION)
set_num_721(&p[6], iso9660->el_torito.boot_load_size);
else
set_num_721(&p[6], 1);
/* Load RBA */
set_num_731(&p[8],
iso9660->el_torito.boot->file->content.location);
/* Unused */
memset(&p[12], 0, 20);
return (wb_consume(a, LOGICAL_BLOCK_SIZE));
}
Commit Message: Issue 711: Be more careful about verifying filename lengths when writing ISO9660 archives
* Don't cast size_t to int, since this can lead to overflow
on machines where sizeof(int) < sizeof(size_t)
* Check a + b > limit by writing it as
a > limit || b > limit || a + b > limit
to avoid problems when a + b wraps around.
CWE ID: CWE-190
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: get_cdtext_generic (void *p_user_data)
{
generic_img_private_t *p_env = p_user_data;
uint8_t *p_cdtext_data = NULL;
size_t len;
if (!p_env) return NULL;
if (p_env->b_cdtext_error) return NULL;
if (NULL == p_env->cdtext) {
p_cdtext_data = read_cdtext_generic (p_env);
if (NULL != p_cdtext_data) {
len = CDIO_MMC_GET_LEN16(p_cdtext_data)-2;
p_env->cdtext = cdtext_init();
if(len <= 0 || 0 != cdtext_data_init (p_env->cdtext, &p_cdtext_data[4], len)) {
p_env->b_cdtext_error = true;
cdtext_destroy (p_env->cdtext);
free(p_env->cdtext);
p_env->cdtext = NULL;
}
}
free(p_cdtext_data);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-415
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: xsltNewKeyDef(const xmlChar *name, const xmlChar *nameURI) {
xsltKeyDefPtr cur;
cur = (xsltKeyDefPtr) xmlMalloc(sizeof(xsltKeyDef));
if (cur == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
"xsltNewKeyDef : malloc failed\n");
return(NULL);
}
memset(cur, 0, sizeof(xsltKeyDef));
if (name != NULL)
cur->name = xmlStrdup(name);
if (nameURI != NULL)
cur->nameURI = xmlStrdup(nameURI);
cur->nsList = NULL;
return(cur);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void big_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
{
size_t datalen = (size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len];
seq_puts(m, key->description);
if (key_is_instantiated(key))
seq_printf(m, ": %zu [%s]",
datalen,
datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD ? "file" : "buff");
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: [email protected] # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void StoreNewGroup() {
PushNextTask(base::BindOnce(&AppCacheStorageImplTest::Verify_StoreNewGroup,
base::Unretained(this)));
group_ =
new AppCacheGroup(storage(), kManifestUrl, storage()->NewGroupId());
cache_ = new AppCache(storage(), storage()->NewCacheId());
cache_->AddEntry(kEntryUrl, AppCacheEntry(AppCacheEntry::EXPLICIT, 1,
kDefaultEntrySize));
mock_quota_manager_proxy_->mock_manager_->async_ = true;
storage()->StoreGroupAndNewestCache(group_.get(), cache_.get(), delegate());
EXPECT_FALSE(delegate()->stored_group_success_);
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableReducedReferrerGranularity(bool enable) {
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SetReducedReferrerGranularityEnabled(enable);
}
Commit Message: Remove RequireCSSExtensionForFile runtime enabled flag.
The feature has long since been stable (since M64) and doesn't seem
to be a need for this flag.
BUG=788936
Change-Id: I666390b869289c328acb4a2daa5bf4154e1702c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324143
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607329}
CWE ID: CWE-254
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void ebt_unregister_table(struct net *net, struct ebt_table *table,
const struct nf_hook_ops *ops)
{
if (ops)
nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, ops, hweight32(table->valid_hooks));
__ebt_unregister_table(net, table);
}
Commit Message: netfilter: ebtables: CONFIG_COMPAT: don't trust userland offsets
We need to make sure the offsets are not out of range of the
total size.
Also check that they are in ascending order.
The WARN_ON triggered by syzkaller (it sets panic_on_warn) is
changed to also bail out, no point in continuing parsing.
Briefly tested with simple ruleset of
-A INPUT --limit 1/s' --log
plus jump to custom chains using 32bit ebtables binary.
Reported-by: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-787
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: TEE_Result tee_mmu_check_access_rights(const struct user_ta_ctx *utc,
uint32_t flags, uaddr_t uaddr,
size_t len)
{
uaddr_t a;
size_t addr_incr = MIN(CORE_MMU_USER_CODE_SIZE,
CORE_MMU_USER_PARAM_SIZE);
if (ADD_OVERFLOW(uaddr, len, &a))
return TEE_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED;
if ((flags & TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_NONSECURE) &&
(flags & TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_SECURE))
return TEE_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED;
/*
* Rely on TA private memory test to check if address range is private
* to TA or not.
*/
if (!(flags & TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_ANY_OWNER) &&
!tee_mmu_is_vbuf_inside_ta_private(utc, (void *)uaddr, len))
return TEE_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED;
for (a = uaddr; a < (uaddr + len); a += addr_incr) {
uint32_t attr;
TEE_Result res;
res = tee_mmu_user_va2pa_attr(utc, (void *)a, NULL, &attr);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
if ((flags & TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_NONSECURE) &&
(attr & TEE_MATTR_SECURE))
return TEE_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED;
if ((flags & TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_SECURE) &&
!(attr & TEE_MATTR_SECURE))
return TEE_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED;
if ((flags & TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_WRITE) && !(attr & TEE_MATTR_UW))
return TEE_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED;
if ((flags & TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_READ) && !(attr & TEE_MATTR_UR))
return TEE_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED;
}
return TEE_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: core: tee_mmu_check_access_rights() check all pages
Prior to this patch tee_mmu_check_access_rights() checks an address in
each page of a supplied range. If both the start and length of that
range is unaligned the last page in the range is sometimes not checked.
With this patch the first address of each page in the range is checked
to simplify the logic of checking each page and the range and also to
cover the last page under all circumstances.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0005: "tee_mmu_check_access_rights does not check
final page of TA buffer"
Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <[email protected]> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Joakim Bech <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Riscure <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: int DiskCacheBackendTest::GetRoundedSize(int exact_size) {
if (!simple_cache_mode_)
return exact_size;
return (exact_size + 255) & 0xFFFFFF00;
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, webPhar)
{
zval *mimeoverride = NULL, *rewrite = NULL;
char *alias = NULL, *error, *index_php = NULL, *f404 = NULL, *ru = NULL;
int alias_len = 0, ret, f404_len = 0, free_pathinfo = 0, ru_len = 0;
char *fname, *path_info, *mime_type = NULL, *entry, *pt;
const char *basename;
int fname_len, entry_len, code, index_php_len = 0, not_cgi;
phar_archive_data *phar = NULL;
phar_entry_info *info = NULL;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "|s!s!saz", &alias, &alias_len, &index_php, &index_php_len, &f404, &f404_len, &mimeoverride, &rewrite) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
phar_request_initialize(TSRMLS_C);
fname = (char*)zend_get_executed_filename(TSRMLS_C);
fname_len = strlen(fname);
if (phar_open_executed_filename(alias, alias_len, &error TSRMLS_CC) != SUCCESS) {
if (error) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "%s", error);
efree(error);
}
return;
}
/* retrieve requested file within phar */
if (!(SG(request_info).request_method && SG(request_info).request_uri && (!strcmp(SG(request_info).request_method, "GET") || !strcmp(SG(request_info).request_method, "POST")))) {
return;
}
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
fname = estrndup(fname, fname_len);
phar_unixify_path_separators(fname, fname_len);
#endif
basename = zend_memrchr(fname, '/', fname_len);
if (!basename) {
basename = fname;
} else {
++basename;
}
if ((strlen(sapi_module.name) == sizeof("cgi-fcgi")-1 && !strncmp(sapi_module.name, "cgi-fcgi", sizeof("cgi-fcgi")-1))
|| (strlen(sapi_module.name) == sizeof("fpm-fcgi")-1 && !strncmp(sapi_module.name, "fpm-fcgi", sizeof("fpm-fcgi")-1))
|| (strlen(sapi_module.name) == sizeof("cgi")-1 && !strncmp(sapi_module.name, "cgi", sizeof("cgi")-1))) {
if (PG(http_globals)[TRACK_VARS_SERVER]) {
HashTable *_server = Z_ARRVAL_P(PG(http_globals)[TRACK_VARS_SERVER]);
zval **z_script_name, **z_path_info;
if (SUCCESS != zend_hash_find(_server, "SCRIPT_NAME", sizeof("SCRIPT_NAME"), (void**)&z_script_name) ||
IS_STRING != Z_TYPE_PP(z_script_name) ||
!strstr(Z_STRVAL_PP(z_script_name), basename)) {
return;
}
if (SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(_server, "PATH_INFO", sizeof("PATH_INFO"), (void**)&z_path_info) &&
IS_STRING == Z_TYPE_PP(z_path_info)) {
entry_len = Z_STRLEN_PP(z_path_info);
entry = estrndup(Z_STRVAL_PP(z_path_info), entry_len);
path_info = emalloc(Z_STRLEN_PP(z_script_name) + entry_len + 1);
memcpy(path_info, Z_STRVAL_PP(z_script_name), Z_STRLEN_PP(z_script_name));
memcpy(path_info + Z_STRLEN_PP(z_script_name), entry, entry_len + 1);
free_pathinfo = 1;
} else {
entry_len = 0;
entry = estrndup("", 0);
path_info = Z_STRVAL_PP(z_script_name);
}
pt = estrndup(Z_STRVAL_PP(z_script_name), Z_STRLEN_PP(z_script_name));
} else {
char *testit;
testit = sapi_getenv("SCRIPT_NAME", sizeof("SCRIPT_NAME")-1 TSRMLS_CC);
if (!(pt = strstr(testit, basename))) {
efree(testit);
return;
}
path_info = sapi_getenv("PATH_INFO", sizeof("PATH_INFO")-1 TSRMLS_CC);
if (path_info) {
entry = path_info;
entry_len = strlen(entry);
spprintf(&path_info, 0, "%s%s", testit, path_info);
free_pathinfo = 1;
} else {
path_info = testit;
free_pathinfo = 1;
entry = estrndup("", 0);
entry_len = 0;
}
pt = estrndup(testit, (pt - testit) + (fname_len - (basename - fname)));
}
not_cgi = 0;
} else {
path_info = SG(request_info).request_uri;
if (!(pt = strstr(path_info, basename))) {
/* this can happen with rewrite rules - and we have no idea what to do then, so return */
return;
}
entry_len = strlen(path_info);
entry_len -= (pt - path_info) + (fname_len - (basename - fname));
entry = estrndup(pt + (fname_len - (basename - fname)), entry_len);
pt = estrndup(path_info, (pt - path_info) + (fname_len - (basename - fname)));
not_cgi = 1;
}
if (rewrite) {
zend_fcall_info fci;
zend_fcall_info_cache fcc;
zval *params, *retval_ptr, **zp[1];
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(params);
ZVAL_STRINGL(params, entry, entry_len, 1);
zp[0] = ¶ms;
#if PHP_VERSION_ID < 50300
if (FAILURE == zend_fcall_info_init(rewrite, &fci, &fcc TSRMLS_CC)) {
#else
if (FAILURE == zend_fcall_info_init(rewrite, 0, &fci, &fcc, NULL, NULL TSRMLS_CC)) {
#endif
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "phar error: invalid rewrite callback");
if (free_pathinfo) {
efree(path_info);
}
return;
}
fci.param_count = 1;
fci.params = zp;
#if PHP_VERSION_ID < 50300
++(params->refcount);
#else
Z_ADDREF_P(params);
#endif
fci.retval_ptr_ptr = &retval_ptr;
if (FAILURE == zend_call_function(&fci, &fcc TSRMLS_CC)) {
if (!EG(exception)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "phar error: failed to call rewrite callback");
}
if (free_pathinfo) {
efree(path_info);
}
return;
}
if (!fci.retval_ptr_ptr || !retval_ptr) {
if (free_pathinfo) {
efree(path_info);
}
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "phar error: rewrite callback must return a string or false");
return;
}
switch (Z_TYPE_P(retval_ptr)) {
#if PHP_VERSION_ID >= 60000
case IS_UNICODE:
zval_unicode_to_string(retval_ptr TSRMLS_CC);
/* break intentionally omitted */
#endif
case IS_STRING:
efree(entry);
if (fci.retval_ptr_ptr != &retval_ptr) {
entry = estrndup(Z_STRVAL_PP(fci.retval_ptr_ptr), Z_STRLEN_PP(fci.retval_ptr_ptr));
entry_len = Z_STRLEN_PP(fci.retval_ptr_ptr);
} else {
entry = Z_STRVAL_P(retval_ptr);
entry_len = Z_STRLEN_P(retval_ptr);
}
break;
case IS_BOOL:
phar_do_403(entry, entry_len TSRMLS_CC);
if (free_pathinfo) {
efree(path_info);
}
zend_bailout();
return;
default:
efree(retval_ptr);
if (free_pathinfo) {
efree(path_info);
}
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "phar error: rewrite callback must return a string or false");
return;
}
}
if (entry_len) {
phar_postprocess_ru_web(fname, fname_len, &entry, &entry_len, &ru, &ru_len TSRMLS_CC);
}
if (!entry_len || (entry_len == 1 && entry[0] == '/')) {
efree(entry);
/* direct request */
if (index_php_len) {
entry = index_php;
entry_len = index_php_len;
if (entry[0] != '/') {
spprintf(&entry, 0, "/%s", index_php);
++entry_len;
}
} else {
/* assume "index.php" is starting point */
entry = estrndup("/index.php", sizeof("/index.php"));
entry_len = sizeof("/index.php")-1;
}
if (FAILURE == phar_get_archive(&phar, fname, fname_len, NULL, 0, NULL TSRMLS_CC) ||
(info = phar_get_entry_info(phar, entry, entry_len, NULL, 0 TSRMLS_CC)) == NULL) {
phar_do_404(phar, fname, fname_len, f404, f404_len, entry, entry_len TSRMLS_CC);
if (free_pathinfo) {
efree(path_info);
}
zend_bailout();
} else {
char *tmp = NULL, sa = '\0';
sapi_header_line ctr = {0};
ctr.response_code = 301;
ctr.line_len = sizeof("HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently")-1;
ctr.line = "HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently";
sapi_header_op(SAPI_HEADER_REPLACE, &ctr TSRMLS_CC);
if (not_cgi) {
tmp = strstr(path_info, basename) + fname_len;
sa = *tmp;
*tmp = '\0';
}
ctr.response_code = 0;
if (path_info[strlen(path_info)-1] == '/') {
ctr.line_len = spprintf(&(ctr.line), 4096, "Location: %s%s", path_info, entry + 1);
} else {
ctr.line_len = spprintf(&(ctr.line), 4096, "Location: %s%s", path_info, entry);
}
if (not_cgi) {
*tmp = sa;
}
if (free_pathinfo) {
efree(path_info);
}
sapi_header_op(SAPI_HEADER_REPLACE, &ctr TSRMLS_CC);
sapi_send_headers(TSRMLS_C);
efree(ctr.line);
zend_bailout();
}
}
if (FAILURE == phar_get_archive(&phar, fname, fname_len, NULL, 0, NULL TSRMLS_CC) ||
(info = phar_get_entry_info(phar, entry, entry_len, NULL, 0 TSRMLS_CC)) == NULL) {
phar_do_404(phar, fname, fname_len, f404, f404_len, entry, entry_len TSRMLS_CC);
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
efree(fname);
#endif
zend_bailout();
}
if (mimeoverride && zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_P(mimeoverride))) {
const char *ext = zend_memrchr(entry, '.', entry_len);
zval **val;
if (ext) {
++ext;
if (SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(mimeoverride), ext, strlen(ext)+1, (void **) &val)) {
switch (Z_TYPE_PP(val)) {
case IS_LONG:
if (Z_LVAL_PP(val) == PHAR_MIME_PHP || Z_LVAL_PP(val) == PHAR_MIME_PHPS) {
mime_type = "";
code = Z_LVAL_PP(val);
} else {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Unknown mime type specifier used, only Phar::PHP, Phar::PHPS and a mime type string are allowed");
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
efree(fname);
#endif
RETURN_FALSE;
}
break;
case IS_STRING:
mime_type = Z_STRVAL_PP(val);
code = PHAR_MIME_OTHER;
break;
default:
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Unknown mime type specifier used (not a string or int), only Phar::PHP, Phar::PHPS and a mime type string are allowed");
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
efree(fname);
#endif
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
}
}
if (!mime_type) {
code = phar_file_type(&PHAR_G(mime_types), entry, &mime_type TSRMLS_CC);
}
ret = phar_file_action(phar, info, mime_type, code, entry, entry_len, fname, pt, ru, ru_len TSRMLS_CC);
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto void Phar::mungServer(array munglist)
* Defines a list of up to 4 $_SERVER variables that should be modified for execution
* to mask the presence of the phar archive. This should be used in conjunction with
* Phar::webPhar(), and has no effect otherwise
* SCRIPT_NAME, PHP_SELF, REQUEST_URI and SCRIPT_FILENAME
*/
PHP_METHOD(Phar, mungServer)
{
zval *mungvalues;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "a", &mungvalues) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (!zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_P(mungvalues))) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "No values passed to Phar::mungServer(), expecting an array of any of these strings: PHP_SELF, REQUEST_URI, SCRIPT_FILENAME, SCRIPT_NAME");
return;
}
if (zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_P(mungvalues)) > 4) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Too many values passed to Phar::mungServer(), expecting an array of any of these strings: PHP_SELF, REQUEST_URI, SCRIPT_FILENAME, SCRIPT_NAME");
return;
}
phar_request_initialize(TSRMLS_C);
for (zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset(Z_ARRVAL_P(mungvalues)); SUCCESS == zend_hash_has_more_elements(Z_ARRVAL_P(mungvalues)); zend_hash_move_forward(Z_ARRVAL_P(mungvalues))) {
zval **data = NULL;
if (SUCCESS != zend_hash_get_current_data(Z_ARRVAL_P(mungvalues), (void **) &data)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "unable to retrieve array value in Phar::mungServer()");
return;
}
if (Z_TYPE_PP(data) != IS_STRING) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Non-string value passed to Phar::mungServer(), expecting an array of any of these strings: PHP_SELF, REQUEST_URI, SCRIPT_FILENAME, SCRIPT_NAME");
return;
}
if (Z_STRLEN_PP(data) == sizeof("PHP_SELF")-1 && !strncmp(Z_STRVAL_PP(data), "PHP_SELF", sizeof("PHP_SELF")-1)) {
PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_SERVER_mung_list |= PHAR_MUNG_PHP_SELF;
}
if (Z_STRLEN_PP(data) == sizeof("REQUEST_URI")-1) {
if (!strncmp(Z_STRVAL_PP(data), "REQUEST_URI", sizeof("REQUEST_URI")-1)) {
PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_SERVER_mung_list |= PHAR_MUNG_REQUEST_URI;
}
if (!strncmp(Z_STRVAL_PP(data), "SCRIPT_NAME", sizeof("SCRIPT_NAME")-1)) {
PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_SERVER_mung_list |= PHAR_MUNG_SCRIPT_NAME;
}
}
if (Z_STRLEN_PP(data) == sizeof("SCRIPT_FILENAME")-1 && !strncmp(Z_STRVAL_PP(data), "SCRIPT_FILENAME", sizeof("SCRIPT_FILENAME")-1)) {
PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_SERVER_mung_list |= PHAR_MUNG_SCRIPT_FILENAME;
}
}
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto void Phar::interceptFileFuncs()
* instructs phar to intercept fopen, file_get_contents, opendir, and all of the stat-related functions
* and return stat on files within the phar for relative paths
*
* Once called, this cannot be reversed, and continue until the end of the request.
*
* This allows legacy scripts to be pharred unmodified
*/
PHP_METHOD(Phar, interceptFileFuncs)
{
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
phar_intercept_functions(TSRMLS_C);
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto array Phar::createDefaultStub([string indexfile[, string webindexfile]])
* Return a stub that can be used to run a phar-based archive without the phar extension
* indexfile is the CLI startup filename, which defaults to "index.php", webindexfile
* is the web startup filename, and also defaults to "index.php"
*/
PHP_METHOD(Phar, createDefaultStub)
{
char *index = NULL, *webindex = NULL, *stub, *error;
int index_len = 0, webindex_len = 0;
size_t stub_len;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "|ss", &index, &index_len, &webindex, &webindex_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
stub = phar_create_default_stub(index, webindex, &stub_len, &error TSRMLS_CC);
if (error) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "%s", error);
efree(error);
return;
}
RETURN_STRINGL(stub, stub_len, 0);
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto mixed Phar::mapPhar([string alias, [int dataoffset]])
* Reads the currently executed file (a phar) and registers its manifest */
PHP_METHOD(Phar, mapPhar)
{
char *alias = NULL, *error;
int alias_len = 0;
long dataoffset = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "|s!l", &alias, &alias_len, &dataoffset) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
phar_request_initialize(TSRMLS_C);
RETVAL_BOOL(phar_open_executed_filename(alias, alias_len, &error TSRMLS_CC) == SUCCESS);
if (error) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "%s", error);
efree(error);
}
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto mixed Phar::loadPhar(string filename [, string alias])
* Loads any phar archive with an alias */
PHP_METHOD(Phar, loadPhar)
{
char *fname, *alias = NULL, *error;
int fname_len, alias_len = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s|s!", &fname, &fname_len, &alias, &alias_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
phar_request_initialize(TSRMLS_C);
RETVAL_BOOL(phar_open_from_filename(fname, fname_len, alias, alias_len, REPORT_ERRORS, NULL, &error TSRMLS_CC) == SUCCESS);
if (error) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "%s", error);
efree(error);
}
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto string Phar::apiVersion()
* Returns the api version */
PHP_METHOD(Phar, apiVersion)
{
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_STRINGL(PHP_PHAR_API_VERSION, sizeof(PHP_PHAR_API_VERSION)-1, 1);
}
/* }}}*/
/* {{{ proto bool Phar::canCompress([int method])
* Returns whether phar extension supports compression using zlib/bzip2 */
PHP_METHOD(Phar, canCompress)
{
long method = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "|l", &method) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
phar_request_initialize(TSRMLS_C);
switch (method) {
case PHAR_ENT_COMPRESSED_GZ:
if (PHAR_G(has_zlib)) {
RETURN_TRUE;
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
case PHAR_ENT_COMPRESSED_BZ2:
if (PHAR_G(has_bz2)) {
RETURN_TRUE;
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
default:
if (PHAR_G(has_zlib) || PHAR_G(has_bz2)) {
RETURN_TRUE;
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto bool Phar::canWrite()
* Returns whether phar extension supports writing and creating phars */
PHP_METHOD(Phar, canWrite)
{
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_BOOL(!PHAR_G(readonly));
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto bool Phar::isValidPharFilename(string filename[, bool executable = true])
* Returns whether the given filename is a valid phar filename */
PHP_METHOD(Phar, isValidPharFilename)
{
char *fname;
const char *ext_str;
int fname_len, ext_len, is_executable;
zend_bool executable = 1;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s|b", &fname, &fname_len, &executable) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
is_executable = executable;
RETVAL_BOOL(phar_detect_phar_fname_ext(fname, fname_len, &ext_str, &ext_len, is_executable, 2, 1 TSRMLS_CC) == SUCCESS);
}
/* }}} */
#if HAVE_SPL
/**
* from spl_directory
*/
static void phar_spl_foreign_dtor(spl_filesystem_object *object TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
phar_archive_data *phar = (phar_archive_data *) object->oth;
if (!phar->is_persistent) {
phar_archive_delref(phar TSRMLS_CC);
}
object->oth = NULL;
}
/* }}} */
/**
* from spl_directory
*/
static void phar_spl_foreign_clone(spl_filesystem_object *src, spl_filesystem_object *dst TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
phar_archive_data *phar_data = (phar_archive_data *) dst->oth;
if (!phar_data->is_persistent) {
++(phar_data->refcount);
}
}
/* }}} */
static spl_other_handler phar_spl_foreign_handler = {
phar_spl_foreign_dtor,
phar_spl_foreign_clone
};
#endif /* HAVE_SPL */
/* {{{ proto void Phar::__construct(string fname [, int flags [, string alias]])
* Construct a Phar archive object
*
* proto void PharData::__construct(string fname [[, int flags [, string alias]], int file format = Phar::TAR])
* Construct a PharData archive object
*
* This function is used as the constructor for both the Phar and PharData
* classes, hence the two prototypes above.
*/
PHP_METHOD(Phar, __construct)
{
#if !HAVE_SPL
zend_throw_exception_ex(zend_exception_get_default(TSRMLS_C), 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Cannot instantiate Phar object without SPL extension");
#else
char *fname, *alias = NULL, *error, *arch = NULL, *entry = NULL, *save_fname;
int fname_len, alias_len = 0, arch_len, entry_len, is_data;
#if PHP_VERSION_ID < 50300
long flags = 0;
#else
long flags = SPL_FILE_DIR_SKIPDOTS|SPL_FILE_DIR_UNIXPATHS;
#endif
long format = 0;
phar_archive_object *phar_obj;
phar_archive_data *phar_data;
zval *zobj = getThis(), arg1, arg2;
phar_obj = (phar_archive_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
is_data = instanceof_function(Z_OBJCE_P(zobj), phar_ce_data TSRMLS_CC);
if (is_data) {
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s|ls!l", &fname, &fname_len, &flags, &alias, &alias_len, &format) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
} else {
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s|ls!", &fname, &fname_len, &flags, &alias, &alias_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
}
if (phar_obj->arc.archive) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Cannot call constructor twice");
return;
}
save_fname = fname;
if (SUCCESS == phar_split_fname(fname, fname_len, &arch, &arch_len, &entry, &entry_len, !is_data, 2 TSRMLS_CC)) {
/* use arch (the basename for the archive) for fname instead of fname */
/* this allows support for RecursiveDirectoryIterator of subdirectories */
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
phar_unixify_path_separators(arch, arch_len);
#endif
fname = arch;
fname_len = arch_len;
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
} else {
arch = estrndup(fname, fname_len);
arch_len = fname_len;
fname = arch;
phar_unixify_path_separators(arch, arch_len);
#endif
}
if (phar_open_or_create_filename(fname, fname_len, alias, alias_len, is_data, REPORT_ERRORS, &phar_data, &error TSRMLS_CC) == FAILURE) {
if (fname == arch && fname != save_fname) {
efree(arch);
fname = save_fname;
}
if (entry) {
efree(entry);
}
if (error) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC,
"%s", error);
efree(error);
} else {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC,
"Phar creation or opening failed");
}
return;
}
if (is_data && phar_data->is_tar && phar_data->is_brandnew && format == PHAR_FORMAT_ZIP) {
phar_data->is_zip = 1;
phar_data->is_tar = 0;
}
if (fname == arch) {
efree(arch);
fname = save_fname;
}
if ((is_data && !phar_data->is_data) || (!is_data && phar_data->is_data)) {
if (is_data) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC,
"PharData class can only be used for non-executable tar and zip archives");
} else {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC,
"Phar class can only be used for executable tar and zip archives");
}
efree(entry);
return;
}
is_data = phar_data->is_data;
if (!phar_data->is_persistent) {
++(phar_data->refcount);
}
phar_obj->arc.archive = phar_data;
phar_obj->spl.oth_handler = &phar_spl_foreign_handler;
if (entry) {
fname_len = spprintf(&fname, 0, "phar://%s%s", phar_data->fname, entry);
efree(entry);
} else {
fname_len = spprintf(&fname, 0, "phar://%s", phar_data->fname);
}
INIT_PZVAL(&arg1);
ZVAL_STRINGL(&arg1, fname, fname_len, 0);
INIT_PZVAL(&arg2);
ZVAL_LONG(&arg2, flags);
zend_call_method_with_2_params(&zobj, Z_OBJCE_P(zobj),
&spl_ce_RecursiveDirectoryIterator->constructor, "__construct", NULL, &arg1, &arg2);
if (!phar_data->is_persistent) {
phar_obj->arc.archive->is_data = is_data;
} else if (!EG(exception)) {
/* register this guy so we can modify if necessary */
zend_hash_add(&PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_persist_map, (const char *) phar_obj->arc.archive, sizeof(phar_obj->arc.archive), (void *) &phar_obj, sizeof(phar_archive_object **), NULL);
}
phar_obj->spl.info_class = phar_ce_entry;
efree(fname);
#endif /* HAVE_SPL */
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto array Phar::getSupportedSignatures()
* Return array of supported signature types
*/
PHP_METHOD(Phar, getSupportedSignatures)
{
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
array_init(return_value);
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, "MD5", 3, 1);
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, "SHA-1", 5, 1);
#ifdef PHAR_HASH_OK
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, "SHA-256", 7, 1);
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, "SHA-512", 7, 1);
#endif
#if PHAR_HAVE_OPENSSL
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, "OpenSSL", 7, 1);
#else
if (zend_hash_exists(&module_registry, "openssl", sizeof("openssl"))) {
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, "OpenSSL", 7, 1);
}
#endif
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto array Phar::getSupportedCompression()
* Return array of supported comparession algorithms
*/
PHP_METHOD(Phar, getSupportedCompression)
{
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
array_init(return_value);
phar_request_initialize(TSRMLS_C);
if (PHAR_G(has_zlib)) {
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, "GZ", 2, 1);
}
if (PHAR_G(has_bz2)) {
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, "BZIP2", 5, 1);
}
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto array Phar::unlinkArchive(string archive)
* Completely remove a phar archive from memory and disk
*/
PHP_METHOD(Phar, unlinkArchive)
{
char *fname, *error, *zname, *arch, *entry;
int fname_len, zname_len, arch_len, entry_len;
phar_archive_data *phar;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s", &fname, &fname_len) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (!fname_len) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Unknown phar archive \"\"");
return;
}
if (FAILURE == phar_open_from_filename(fname, fname_len, NULL, 0, REPORT_ERRORS, &phar, &error TSRMLS_CC)) {
if (error) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Unknown phar archive \"%s\": %s", fname, error);
efree(error);
} else {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Unknown phar archive \"%s\"", fname);
}
return;
}
zname = (char*)zend_get_executed_filename(TSRMLS_C);
zname_len = strlen(zname);
if (zname_len > 7 && !memcmp(zname, "phar://", 7) && SUCCESS == phar_split_fname(zname, zname_len, &arch, &arch_len, &entry, &entry_len, 2, 0 TSRMLS_CC)) {
if (arch_len == fname_len && !memcmp(arch, fname, arch_len)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "phar archive \"%s\" cannot be unlinked from within itself", fname);
efree(arch);
efree(entry);
return;
}
efree(arch);
efree(entry);
}
if (phar->is_persistent) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "phar archive \"%s\" is in phar.cache_list, cannot unlinkArchive()", fname);
return;
}
if (phar->refcount) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "phar archive \"%s\" has open file handles or objects. fclose() all file handles, and unset() all objects prior to calling unlinkArchive()", fname);
return;
}
fname = estrndup(phar->fname, phar->fname_len);
/* invalidate phar cache */
PHAR_G(last_phar) = NULL;
PHAR_G(last_phar_name) = PHAR_G(last_alias) = NULL;
phar_archive_delref(phar TSRMLS_CC);
unlink(fname);
efree(fname);
RETURN_TRUE;
}
/* }}} */
#if HAVE_SPL
#define PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT() \
phar_archive_object *phar_obj = (phar_archive_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC); \
if (!phar_obj->arc.archive) { \
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, \
"Cannot call method on an uninitialized Phar object"); \
return; \
}
/* {{{ proto void Phar::__destruct()
* if persistent, remove from the cache
*/
PHP_METHOD(Phar, __destruct)
{
phar_archive_object *phar_obj = (phar_archive_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (phar_obj->arc.archive && phar_obj->arc.archive->is_persistent) {
zend_hash_del(&PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_persist_map, (const char *) phar_obj->arc.archive, sizeof(phar_obj->arc.archive));
}
}
/* }}} */
struct _phar_t {
phar_archive_object *p;
zend_class_entry *c;
char *b;
uint l;
zval *ret;
int count;
php_stream *fp;
};
static int phar_build(zend_object_iterator *iter, void *puser TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
zval **value;
zend_uchar key_type;
zend_bool close_fp = 1;
ulong int_key;
struct _phar_t *p_obj = (struct _phar_t*) puser;
uint str_key_len, base_len = p_obj->l, fname_len;
phar_entry_data *data;
php_stream *fp;
size_t contents_len;
char *fname, *error = NULL, *base = p_obj->b, *opened, *save = NULL, *temp = NULL;
phar_zstr key;
char *str_key;
zend_class_entry *ce = p_obj->c;
phar_archive_object *phar_obj = p_obj->p;
char *str = "[stream]";
iter->funcs->get_current_data(iter, &value TSRMLS_CC);
if (EG(exception)) {
return ZEND_HASH_APPLY_STOP;
}
if (!value) {
/* failure in get_current_data */
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Iterator %v returned no value", ce->name);
return ZEND_HASH_APPLY_STOP;
}
switch (Z_TYPE_PP(value)) {
#if PHP_VERSION_ID >= 60000
case IS_UNICODE:
zval_unicode_to_string(*(value) TSRMLS_CC);
/* break intentionally omitted */
#endif
case IS_STRING:
break;
case IS_RESOURCE:
php_stream_from_zval_no_verify(fp, value);
if (!fp) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Iterator %v returned an invalid stream handle", ce->name);
return ZEND_HASH_APPLY_STOP;
}
if (iter->funcs->get_current_key) {
key_type = iter->funcs->get_current_key(iter, &key, &str_key_len, &int_key TSRMLS_CC);
if (EG(exception)) {
return ZEND_HASH_APPLY_STOP;
}
if (key_type == HASH_KEY_IS_LONG) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Iterator %v returned an invalid key (must return a string)", ce->name);
return ZEND_HASH_APPLY_STOP;
}
if (key_type > 9) { /* IS_UNICODE == 10 */
#if PHP_VERSION_ID < 60000
/* this can never happen, but fixes a compile warning */
spprintf(&str_key, 0, "%s", key);
#else
spprintf(&str_key, 0, "%v", key);
ezfree(key);
#endif
} else {
PHAR_STR(key, str_key);
}
save = str_key;
if (str_key[str_key_len - 1] == '\0') {
str_key_len--;
}
} else {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Iterator %v returned an invalid key (must return a string)", ce->name);
return ZEND_HASH_APPLY_STOP;
}
close_fp = 0;
opened = (char *) estrndup(str, sizeof("[stream]") - 1);
goto after_open_fp;
case IS_OBJECT:
if (instanceof_function(Z_OBJCE_PP(value), spl_ce_SplFileInfo TSRMLS_CC)) {
char *test = NULL;
zval dummy;
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(*value TSRMLS_CC);
if (!base_len) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Iterator %v returns an SplFileInfo object, so base directory must be specified", ce->name);
return ZEND_HASH_APPLY_STOP;
}
switch (intern->type) {
case SPL_FS_DIR:
#if PHP_VERSION_ID >= 60000
test = spl_filesystem_object_get_path(intern, NULL, NULL TSRMLS_CC).s;
#elif PHP_VERSION_ID >= 50300
test = spl_filesystem_object_get_path(intern, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
#else
test = intern->path;
#endif
fname_len = spprintf(&fname, 0, "%s%c%s", test, DEFAULT_SLASH, intern->u.dir.entry.d_name);
php_stat(fname, fname_len, FS_IS_DIR, &dummy TSRMLS_CC);
if (Z_BVAL(dummy)) {
/* ignore directories */
efree(fname);
return ZEND_HASH_APPLY_KEEP;
}
test = expand_filepath(fname, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
efree(fname);
if (test) {
fname = test;
fname_len = strlen(fname);
} else {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Could not resolve file path");
return ZEND_HASH_APPLY_STOP;
}
save = fname;
goto phar_spl_fileinfo;
case SPL_FS_INFO:
case SPL_FS_FILE:
#if PHP_VERSION_ID >= 60000
if (intern->file_name_type == IS_UNICODE) {
zval zv;
INIT_ZVAL(zv);
Z_UNIVAL(zv) = intern->file_name;
Z_UNILEN(zv) = intern->file_name_len;
Z_TYPE(zv) = IS_UNICODE;
zval_copy_ctor(&zv);
zval_unicode_to_string(&zv TSRMLS_CC);
fname = expand_filepath(Z_STRVAL(zv), NULL TSRMLS_CC);
ezfree(Z_UNIVAL(zv));
} else {
fname = expand_filepath(intern->file_name.s, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
}
#else
fname = expand_filepath(intern->file_name, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
#endif
if (!fname) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Could not resolve file path");
return ZEND_HASH_APPLY_STOP;
}
fname_len = strlen(fname);
save = fname;
goto phar_spl_fileinfo;
}
}
/* fall-through */
default:
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Iterator %v returned an invalid value (must return a string)", ce->name);
return ZEND_HASH_APPLY_STOP;
}
fname = Z_STRVAL_PP(value);
fname_len = Z_STRLEN_PP(value);
phar_spl_fileinfo:
if (base_len) {
temp = expand_filepath(base, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
if (!temp) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Could not resolve file path");
if (save) {
efree(save);
}
return ZEND_HASH_APPLY_STOP;
}
base = temp;
base_len = strlen(base);
if (strstr(fname, base)) {
str_key_len = fname_len - base_len;
if (str_key_len <= 0) {
if (save) {
efree(save);
efree(temp);
}
return ZEND_HASH_APPLY_KEEP;
}
str_key = fname + base_len;
if (*str_key == '/' || *str_key == '\\') {
str_key++;
str_key_len--;
}
} else {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Iterator %v returned a path \"%s\" that is not in the base directory \"%s\"", ce->name, fname, base);
if (save) {
efree(save);
efree(temp);
}
return ZEND_HASH_APPLY_STOP;
}
} else {
if (iter->funcs->get_current_key) {
key_type = iter->funcs->get_current_key(iter, &key, &str_key_len, &int_key TSRMLS_CC);
if (EG(exception)) {
return ZEND_HASH_APPLY_STOP;
}
if (key_type == HASH_KEY_IS_LONG) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Iterator %v returned an invalid key (must return a string)", ce->name);
return ZEND_HASH_APPLY_STOP;
}
if (key_type > 9) { /* IS_UNICODE == 10 */
#if PHP_VERSION_ID < 60000
/* this can never happen, but fixes a compile warning */
spprintf(&str_key, 0, "%s", key);
#else
spprintf(&str_key, 0, "%v", key);
ezfree(key);
#endif
} else {
PHAR_STR(key, str_key);
}
save = str_key;
if (str_key[str_key_len - 1] == '\0') str_key_len--;
} else {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Iterator %v returned an invalid key (must return a string)", ce->name);
return ZEND_HASH_APPLY_STOP;
}
}
#if PHP_API_VERSION < 20100412
if (PG(safe_mode) && (!php_checkuid(fname, NULL, CHECKUID_ALLOW_ONLY_FILE))) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Iterator %v returned a path \"%s\" that safe mode prevents opening", ce->name, fname);
if (save) {
efree(save);
}
if (temp) {
efree(temp);
}
return ZEND_HASH_APPLY_STOP;
}
#endif
if (php_check_open_basedir(fname TSRMLS_CC)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Iterator %v returned a path \"%s\" that open_basedir prevents opening", ce->name, fname);
if (save) {
efree(save);
}
if (temp) {
efree(temp);
}
return ZEND_HASH_APPLY_STOP;
}
/* try to open source file, then create internal phar file and copy contents */
fp = php_stream_open_wrapper(fname, "rb", STREAM_MUST_SEEK|0, &opened);
if (!fp) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Iterator %v returned a file that could not be opened \"%s\"", ce->name, fname);
if (save) {
efree(save);
}
if (temp) {
efree(temp);
}
return ZEND_HASH_APPLY_STOP;
}
after_open_fp:
if (str_key_len >= sizeof(".phar")-1 && !memcmp(str_key, ".phar", sizeof(".phar")-1)) {
/* silently skip any files that would be added to the magic .phar directory */
if (save) {
efree(save);
}
if (temp) {
efree(temp);
}
if (opened) {
efree(opened);
}
if (close_fp) {
php_stream_close(fp);
}
return ZEND_HASH_APPLY_KEEP;
}
if (!(data = phar_get_or_create_entry_data(phar_obj->arc.archive->fname, phar_obj->arc.archive->fname_len, str_key, str_key_len, "w+b", 0, &error, 1 TSRMLS_CC))) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Entry %s cannot be created: %s", str_key, error);
efree(error);
if (save) {
efree(save);
}
if (opened) {
efree(opened);
}
if (temp) {
efree(temp);
}
if (close_fp) {
php_stream_close(fp);
}
return ZEND_HASH_APPLY_STOP;
} else {
if (error) {
efree(error);
}
/* convert to PHAR_UFP */
if (data->internal_file->fp_type == PHAR_MOD) {
php_stream_close(data->internal_file->fp);
}
data->internal_file->fp = NULL;
data->internal_file->fp_type = PHAR_UFP;
data->internal_file->offset_abs = data->internal_file->offset = php_stream_tell(p_obj->fp);
data->fp = NULL;
phar_stream_copy_to_stream(fp, p_obj->fp, PHP_STREAM_COPY_ALL, &contents_len);
data->internal_file->uncompressed_filesize = data->internal_file->compressed_filesize =
php_stream_tell(p_obj->fp) - data->internal_file->offset;
}
if (close_fp) {
php_stream_close(fp);
}
add_assoc_string(p_obj->ret, str_key, opened, 0);
if (save) {
efree(save);
}
if (temp) {
efree(temp);
}
data->internal_file->compressed_filesize = data->internal_file->uncompressed_filesize = contents_len;
phar_entry_delref(data TSRMLS_CC);
return ZEND_HASH_APPLY_KEEP;
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto array Phar::buildFromDirectory(string base_dir[, string regex])
* Construct a phar archive from an existing directory, recursively.
* Optional second parameter is a regular expression for filtering directory contents.
*
* Return value is an array mapping phar index to actual files added.
*/
PHP_METHOD(Phar, buildFromDirectory)
{
char *dir, *error, *regex = NULL;
int dir_len, regex_len = 0;
zend_bool apply_reg = 0;
zval arg, arg2, *iter, *iteriter, *regexiter = NULL;
struct _phar_t pass;
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (PHAR_G(readonly) && !phar_obj->arc.archive->is_data) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC,
"Cannot write to archive - write operations restricted by INI setting");
return;
}
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s|s", &dir, &dir_len, ®ex, ®ex_len) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(iter);
if (SUCCESS != object_init_ex(iter, spl_ce_RecursiveDirectoryIterator)) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&iter);
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Unable to instantiate directory iterator for %s", phar_obj->arc.archive->fname);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
INIT_PZVAL(&arg);
ZVAL_STRINGL(&arg, dir, dir_len, 0);
INIT_PZVAL(&arg2);
#if PHP_VERSION_ID < 50300
ZVAL_LONG(&arg2, 0);
#else
ZVAL_LONG(&arg2, SPL_FILE_DIR_SKIPDOTS|SPL_FILE_DIR_UNIXPATHS);
#endif
zend_call_method_with_2_params(&iter, spl_ce_RecursiveDirectoryIterator,
&spl_ce_RecursiveDirectoryIterator->constructor, "__construct", NULL, &arg, &arg2);
if (EG(exception)) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&iter);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(iteriter);
if (SUCCESS != object_init_ex(iteriter, spl_ce_RecursiveIteratorIterator)) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&iter);
zval_ptr_dtor(&iteriter);
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Unable to instantiate directory iterator for %s", phar_obj->arc.archive->fname);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
zend_call_method_with_1_params(&iteriter, spl_ce_RecursiveIteratorIterator,
&spl_ce_RecursiveIteratorIterator->constructor, "__construct", NULL, iter);
if (EG(exception)) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&iter);
zval_ptr_dtor(&iteriter);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
zval_ptr_dtor(&iter);
if (regex_len > 0) {
apply_reg = 1;
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(regexiter);
if (SUCCESS != object_init_ex(regexiter, spl_ce_RegexIterator)) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&iteriter);
zval_dtor(regexiter);
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Unable to instantiate regex iterator for %s", phar_obj->arc.archive->fname);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
INIT_PZVAL(&arg2);
ZVAL_STRINGL(&arg2, regex, regex_len, 0);
zend_call_method_with_2_params(®exiter, spl_ce_RegexIterator,
&spl_ce_RegexIterator->constructor, "__construct", NULL, iteriter, &arg2);
}
array_init(return_value);
pass.c = apply_reg ? Z_OBJCE_P(regexiter) : Z_OBJCE_P(iteriter);
pass.p = phar_obj;
pass.b = dir;
pass.l = dir_len;
pass.count = 0;
pass.ret = return_value;
pass.fp = php_stream_fopen_tmpfile();
if (pass.fp == NULL) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "phar \"%s\" unable to create temporary file", phar_obj->arc.archive->fname);
return;
}
if (phar_obj->arc.archive->is_persistent && FAILURE == phar_copy_on_write(&(phar_obj->arc.archive) TSRMLS_CC)) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&iteriter);
if (apply_reg) {
zval_ptr_dtor(®exiter);
}
php_stream_close(pass.fp);
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "phar \"%s\" is persistent, unable to copy on write", phar_obj->arc.archive->fname);
return;
}
if (SUCCESS == spl_iterator_apply((apply_reg ? regexiter : iteriter), (spl_iterator_apply_func_t) phar_build, (void *) &pass TSRMLS_CC)) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&iteriter);
if (apply_reg) {
zval_ptr_dtor(®exiter);
}
phar_obj->arc.archive->ufp = pass.fp;
phar_flush(phar_obj->arc.archive, 0, 0, 0, &error TSRMLS_CC);
if (error) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "%s", error);
efree(error);
}
} else {
zval_ptr_dtor(&iteriter);
if (apply_reg) {
zval_ptr_dtor(®exiter);
}
php_stream_close(pass.fp);
}
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto array Phar::buildFromIterator(Iterator iter[, string base_directory])
* Construct a phar archive from an iterator. The iterator must return a series of strings
* that are full paths to files that should be added to the phar. The iterator key should
* be the path that the file will have within the phar archive.
*
* If base directory is specified, then the key will be ignored, and instead the portion of
* the current value minus the base directory will be used
*
* Returned is an array mapping phar index to actual file added
*/
PHP_METHOD(Phar, buildFromIterator)
{
zval *obj;
char *error;
uint base_len = 0;
char *base = NULL;
struct _phar_t pass;
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (PHAR_G(readonly) && !phar_obj->arc.archive->is_data) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC,
"Cannot write out phar archive, phar is read-only");
return;
}
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "O|s", &obj, zend_ce_traversable, &base, &base_len) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (phar_obj->arc.archive->is_persistent && FAILURE == phar_copy_on_write(&(phar_obj->arc.archive) TSRMLS_CC)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "phar \"%s\" is persistent, unable to copy on write", phar_obj->arc.archive->fname);
return;
}
array_init(return_value);
pass.c = Z_OBJCE_P(obj);
pass.p = phar_obj;
pass.b = base;
pass.l = base_len;
pass.ret = return_value;
pass.count = 0;
pass.fp = php_stream_fopen_tmpfile();
if (pass.fp == NULL) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "phar \"%s\": unable to create temporary file", phar_obj->arc.archive->fname);
return;
}
if (SUCCESS == spl_iterator_apply(obj, (spl_iterator_apply_func_t) phar_build, (void *) &pass TSRMLS_CC)) {
phar_obj->arc.archive->ufp = pass.fp;
phar_flush(phar_obj->arc.archive, 0, 0, 0, &error TSRMLS_CC);
if (error) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "%s", error);
efree(error);
}
} else {
php_stream_close(pass.fp);
}
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto int Phar::count()
* Returns the number of entries in the Phar archive
*/
PHP_METHOD(Phar, count)
{
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_LONG(zend_hash_num_elements(&phar_obj->arc.archive->manifest));
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto bool Phar::isFileFormat(int format)
* Returns true if the phar archive is based on the tar/zip/phar file format depending
* on whether Phar::TAR, Phar::ZIP or Phar::PHAR was passed in
*/
PHP_METHOD(Phar, isFileFormat)
{
long type;
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l", &type) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
switch (type) {
case PHAR_FORMAT_TAR:
RETURN_BOOL(phar_obj->arc.archive->is_tar);
case PHAR_FORMAT_ZIP:
RETURN_BOOL(phar_obj->arc.archive->is_zip);
case PHAR_FORMAT_PHAR:
RETURN_BOOL(!phar_obj->arc.archive->is_tar && !phar_obj->arc.archive->is_zip);
default:
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Unknown file format specified");
}
}
/* }}} */
static int phar_copy_file_contents(phar_entry_info *entry, php_stream *fp TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
char *error;
off_t offset;
phar_entry_info *link;
if (FAILURE == phar_open_entry_fp(entry, &error, 1 TSRMLS_CC)) {
if (error) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC,
"Cannot convert phar archive \"%s\", unable to open entry \"%s\" contents: %s", entry->phar->fname, entry->filename, error);
efree(error);
} else {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC,
"Cannot convert phar archive \"%s\", unable to open entry \"%s\" contents", entry->phar->fname, entry->filename);
}
return FAILURE;
}
/* copy old contents in entirety */
phar_seek_efp(entry, 0, SEEK_SET, 0, 1 TSRMLS_CC);
offset = php_stream_tell(fp);
link = phar_get_link_source(entry TSRMLS_CC);
if (!link) {
link = entry;
}
if (SUCCESS != phar_stream_copy_to_stream(phar_get_efp(link, 0 TSRMLS_CC), fp, link->uncompressed_filesize, NULL)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC,
"Cannot convert phar archive \"%s\", unable to copy entry \"%s\" contents", entry->phar->fname, entry->filename);
return FAILURE;
}
if (entry->fp_type == PHAR_MOD) {
/* save for potential restore on error */
entry->cfp = entry->fp;
entry->fp = NULL;
}
/* set new location of file contents */
entry->fp_type = PHAR_FP;
entry->offset = offset;
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
static zval *phar_rename_archive(phar_archive_data *phar, char *ext, zend_bool compress TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
const char *oldname = NULL;
char *oldpath = NULL;
char *basename = NULL, *basepath = NULL;
char *newname = NULL, *newpath = NULL;
zval *ret, arg1;
zend_class_entry *ce;
char *error;
const char *pcr_error;
int ext_len = ext ? strlen(ext) : 0;
int oldname_len;
phar_archive_data **pphar = NULL;
php_stream_statbuf ssb;
if (!ext) {
if (phar->is_zip) {
if (phar->is_data) {
ext = "zip";
} else {
ext = "phar.zip";
}
} else if (phar->is_tar) {
switch (phar->flags) {
case PHAR_FILE_COMPRESSED_GZ:
if (phar->is_data) {
ext = "tar.gz";
} else {
ext = "phar.tar.gz";
}
break;
case PHAR_FILE_COMPRESSED_BZ2:
if (phar->is_data) {
ext = "tar.bz2";
} else {
ext = "phar.tar.bz2";
}
break;
default:
if (phar->is_data) {
ext = "tar";
} else {
ext = "phar.tar";
}
}
} else {
switch (phar->flags) {
case PHAR_FILE_COMPRESSED_GZ:
ext = "phar.gz";
break;
case PHAR_FILE_COMPRESSED_BZ2:
ext = "phar.bz2";
break;
default:
ext = "phar";
}
}
} else if (phar_path_check(&ext, &ext_len, &pcr_error) > pcr_is_ok) {
if (phar->is_data) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "data phar converted from \"%s\" has invalid extension %s", phar->fname, ext);
} else {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "phar converted from \"%s\" has invalid extension %s", phar->fname, ext);
}
return NULL;
}
if (ext[0] == '.') {
++ext;
}
oldpath = estrndup(phar->fname, phar->fname_len);
oldname = zend_memrchr(phar->fname, '/', phar->fname_len);
++oldname;
oldname_len = strlen(oldname);
basename = estrndup(oldname, oldname_len);
spprintf(&newname, 0, "%s.%s", strtok(basename, "."), ext);
efree(basename);
basepath = estrndup(oldpath, (strlen(oldpath) - oldname_len));
phar->fname_len = spprintf(&newpath, 0, "%s%s", basepath, newname);
phar->fname = newpath;
phar->ext = newpath + phar->fname_len - strlen(ext) - 1;
efree(basepath);
efree(newname);
if (PHAR_G(manifest_cached) && SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(&cached_phars, newpath, phar->fname_len, (void **) &pphar)) {
efree(oldpath);
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Unable to add newly converted phar \"%s\" to the list of phars, new phar name is in phar.cache_list", phar->fname);
return NULL;
}
if (SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_fname_map), newpath, phar->fname_len, (void **) &pphar)) {
if ((*pphar)->fname_len == phar->fname_len && !memcmp((*pphar)->fname, phar->fname, phar->fname_len)) {
if (!zend_hash_num_elements(&phar->manifest)) {
(*pphar)->is_tar = phar->is_tar;
(*pphar)->is_zip = phar->is_zip;
(*pphar)->is_data = phar->is_data;
(*pphar)->flags = phar->flags;
(*pphar)->fp = phar->fp;
phar->fp = NULL;
phar_destroy_phar_data(phar TSRMLS_CC);
phar = *pphar;
phar->refcount++;
newpath = oldpath;
goto its_ok;
}
}
efree(oldpath);
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Unable to add newly converted phar \"%s\" to the list of phars, a phar with that name already exists", phar->fname);
return NULL;
}
its_ok:
if (SUCCESS == php_stream_stat_path(newpath, &ssb)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "phar \"%s\" exists and must be unlinked prior to conversion", newpath);
efree(oldpath);
return NULL;
}
if (!phar->is_data) {
if (SUCCESS != phar_detect_phar_fname_ext(newpath, phar->fname_len, (const char **) &(phar->ext), &(phar->ext_len), 1, 1, 1 TSRMLS_CC)) {
efree(oldpath);
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "phar \"%s\" has invalid extension %s", phar->fname, ext);
return NULL;
}
if (phar->alias) {
if (phar->is_temporary_alias) {
phar->alias = NULL;
phar->alias_len = 0;
} else {
phar->alias = estrndup(newpath, strlen(newpath));
phar->alias_len = strlen(newpath);
phar->is_temporary_alias = 1;
zend_hash_update(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_alias_map), newpath, phar->fname_len, (void*)&phar, sizeof(phar_archive_data*), NULL);
}
}
} else {
if (SUCCESS != phar_detect_phar_fname_ext(newpath, phar->fname_len, (const char **) &(phar->ext), &(phar->ext_len), 0, 1, 1 TSRMLS_CC)) {
efree(oldpath);
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "data phar \"%s\" has invalid extension %s", phar->fname, ext);
return NULL;
}
phar->alias = NULL;
phar->alias_len = 0;
}
if ((!pphar || phar == *pphar) && SUCCESS != zend_hash_update(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_fname_map), newpath, phar->fname_len, (void*)&phar, sizeof(phar_archive_data*), NULL)) {
efree(oldpath);
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Unable to add newly converted phar \"%s\" to the list of phars", phar->fname);
return NULL;
}
phar_flush(phar, 0, 0, 1, &error TSRMLS_CC);
if (error) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "%s", error);
efree(error);
efree(oldpath);
return NULL;
}
efree(oldpath);
if (phar->is_data) {
ce = phar_ce_data;
} else {
ce = phar_ce_archive;
}
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(ret);
if (SUCCESS != object_init_ex(ret, ce)) {
zval_dtor(ret);
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Unable to instantiate phar object when converting archive \"%s\"", phar->fname);
return NULL;
}
INIT_PZVAL(&arg1);
ZVAL_STRINGL(&arg1, phar->fname, phar->fname_len, 0);
zend_call_method_with_1_params(&ret, ce, &ce->constructor, "__construct", NULL, &arg1);
return ret;
}
/* }}} */
static zval *phar_convert_to_other(phar_archive_data *source, int convert, char *ext, php_uint32 flags TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
phar_archive_data *phar;
phar_entry_info *entry, newentry;
zval *ret;
/* invalidate phar cache */
PHAR_G(last_phar) = NULL;
PHAR_G(last_phar_name) = PHAR_G(last_alias) = NULL;
phar = (phar_archive_data *) ecalloc(1, sizeof(phar_archive_data));
/* set whole-archive compression and type from parameter */
phar->flags = flags;
phar->is_data = source->is_data;
switch (convert) {
case PHAR_FORMAT_TAR:
phar->is_tar = 1;
break;
case PHAR_FORMAT_ZIP:
phar->is_zip = 1;
break;
default:
phar->is_data = 0;
break;
}
zend_hash_init(&(phar->manifest), sizeof(phar_entry_info),
zend_get_hash_value, destroy_phar_manifest_entry, 0);
zend_hash_init(&phar->mounted_dirs, sizeof(char *),
zend_get_hash_value, NULL, 0);
zend_hash_init(&phar->virtual_dirs, sizeof(char *),
zend_get_hash_value, NULL, 0);
phar->fp = php_stream_fopen_tmpfile();
if (phar->fp == NULL) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "unable to create temporary file");
return NULL;
}
phar->fname = source->fname;
phar->fname_len = source->fname_len;
phar->is_temporary_alias = source->is_temporary_alias;
phar->alias = source->alias;
if (source->metadata) {
zval *t;
t = source->metadata;
ALLOC_ZVAL(phar->metadata);
*phar->metadata = *t;
zval_copy_ctor(phar->metadata);
#if PHP_VERSION_ID < 50300
phar->metadata->refcount = 1;
#else
Z_SET_REFCOUNT_P(phar->metadata, 1);
#endif
phar->metadata_len = 0;
}
/* first copy each file's uncompressed contents to a temporary file and set per-file flags */
for (zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset(&source->manifest); SUCCESS == zend_hash_has_more_elements(&source->manifest); zend_hash_move_forward(&source->manifest)) {
if (FAILURE == zend_hash_get_current_data(&source->manifest, (void **) &entry)) {
zend_hash_destroy(&(phar->manifest));
php_stream_close(phar->fp);
efree(phar);
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC,
"Cannot convert phar archive \"%s\"", source->fname);
return NULL;
}
newentry = *entry;
if (newentry.link) {
newentry.link = estrdup(newentry.link);
goto no_copy;
}
if (newentry.tmp) {
newentry.tmp = estrdup(newentry.tmp);
goto no_copy;
}
newentry.metadata_str.c = 0;
if (FAILURE == phar_copy_file_contents(&newentry, phar->fp TSRMLS_CC)) {
zend_hash_destroy(&(phar->manifest));
php_stream_close(phar->fp);
efree(phar);
/* exception already thrown */
return NULL;
}
no_copy:
newentry.filename = estrndup(newentry.filename, newentry.filename_len);
if (newentry.metadata) {
zval *t;
t = newentry.metadata;
ALLOC_ZVAL(newentry.metadata);
*newentry.metadata = *t;
zval_copy_ctor(newentry.metadata);
#if PHP_VERSION_ID < 50300
newentry.metadata->refcount = 1;
#else
Z_SET_REFCOUNT_P(newentry.metadata, 1);
#endif
newentry.metadata_str.c = NULL;
newentry.metadata_str.len = 0;
}
newentry.is_zip = phar->is_zip;
newentry.is_tar = phar->is_tar;
if (newentry.is_tar) {
newentry.tar_type = (entry->is_dir ? TAR_DIR : TAR_FILE);
}
newentry.is_modified = 1;
newentry.phar = phar;
newentry.old_flags = newentry.flags & ~PHAR_ENT_COMPRESSION_MASK; /* remove compression from old_flags */
phar_set_inode(&newentry TSRMLS_CC);
zend_hash_add(&(phar->manifest), newentry.filename, newentry.filename_len, (void*)&newentry, sizeof(phar_entry_info), NULL);
phar_add_virtual_dirs(phar, newentry.filename, newentry.filename_len TSRMLS_CC);
}
if ((ret = phar_rename_archive(phar, ext, 0 TSRMLS_CC))) {
return ret;
} else {
zend_hash_destroy(&(phar->manifest));
zend_hash_destroy(&(phar->mounted_dirs));
zend_hash_destroy(&(phar->virtual_dirs));
php_stream_close(phar->fp);
efree(phar->fname);
efree(phar);
return NULL;
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void LogoService::GetLogo(LogoCallbacks callbacks) {
if (!template_url_service_) {
RunCallbacksWithDisabled(std::move(callbacks));
return;
}
const TemplateURL* template_url =
template_url_service_->GetDefaultSearchProvider();
if (!template_url) {
RunCallbacksWithDisabled(std::move(callbacks));
return;
}
const base::CommandLine* command_line =
base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
GURL logo_url;
if (command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kSearchProviderLogoURL)) {
logo_url = GURL(
command_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kSearchProviderLogoURL));
} else {
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
logo_url = template_url->logo_url();
#endif
}
GURL base_url;
GURL doodle_url;
const bool is_google = template_url->url_ref().HasGoogleBaseURLs(
template_url_service_->search_terms_data());
if (is_google) {
base_url =
GURL(template_url_service_->search_terms_data().GoogleBaseURLValue());
doodle_url = search_provider_logos::GetGoogleDoodleURL(base_url);
} else if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kThirdPartyDoodles)) {
if (command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kThirdPartyDoodleURL)) {
doodle_url = GURL(
command_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kThirdPartyDoodleURL));
} else {
std::string override_url = base::GetFieldTrialParamValueByFeature(
features::kThirdPartyDoodles,
features::kThirdPartyDoodlesOverrideUrlParam);
if (!override_url.empty()) {
doodle_url = GURL(override_url);
} else {
doodle_url = template_url->doodle_url();
}
}
base_url = doodle_url.GetOrigin();
}
if (!logo_url.is_valid() && !doodle_url.is_valid()) {
RunCallbacksWithDisabled(std::move(callbacks));
return;
}
const bool use_fixed_logo = !doodle_url.is_valid();
if (!logo_tracker_) {
std::unique_ptr<LogoCache> logo_cache = std::move(logo_cache_for_test_);
if (!logo_cache) {
logo_cache = std::make_unique<LogoCache>(cache_directory_);
}
std::unique_ptr<base::Clock> clock = std::move(clock_for_test_);
if (!clock) {
clock = std::make_unique<base::DefaultClock>();
}
logo_tracker_ = std::make_unique<LogoTracker>(
request_context_getter_,
std::make_unique<LogoDelegateImpl>(std::move(image_decoder_)),
std::move(logo_cache), std::move(clock));
}
if (use_fixed_logo) {
logo_tracker_->SetServerAPI(
logo_url, base::Bind(&search_provider_logos::ParseFixedLogoResponse),
base::Bind(&search_provider_logos::UseFixedLogoUrl));
} else if (is_google) {
logo_tracker_->SetServerAPI(
doodle_url,
search_provider_logos::GetGoogleParseLogoResponseCallback(base_url),
search_provider_logos::GetGoogleAppendQueryparamsCallback(
use_gray_background_));
} else {
logo_tracker_->SetServerAPI(
doodle_url,
base::Bind(&search_provider_logos::GoogleNewParseLogoResponse,
base_url),
base::Bind(&search_provider_logos::GoogleNewAppendQueryparamsToLogoURL,
use_gray_background_));
}
logo_tracker_->GetLogo(std::move(callbacks));
}
Commit Message: Local NTP: add smoke tests for doodles
Split LogoService into LogoService interface and LogoServiceImpl to make
it easier to provide fake data to the test.
Bug: 768419
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:closure_compilation
Change-Id: I84639189d2db1b24a2e139936c99369352bab587
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/690198
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Marc Treib <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Chris Pickel <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#505374}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: const GURL& previous_url() { return previous_url_; }
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: my_object_many_uppercase (MyObject *obj, const char * const *in, char ***out, GError **error)
{
int len;
int i;
len = g_strv_length ((char**) in);
*out = g_new0 (char *, len + 1);
for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
{
(*out)[i] = g_ascii_strup (in[i], -1);
}
(*out)[i] = NULL;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void FragmentPaintPropertyTreeBuilder::UpdateOutOfFlowContext() {
if (!object_.IsBoxModelObject() && !properties_)
return;
if (object_.IsLayoutBlock())
context_.paint_offset_for_float = context_.current.paint_offset;
if (object_.CanContainAbsolutePositionObjects()) {
context_.absolute_position = context_.current;
}
if (object_.IsLayoutView()) {
const auto* initial_fixed_transform = context_.fixed_position.transform;
const auto* initial_fixed_scroll = context_.fixed_position.scroll;
context_.fixed_position = context_.current;
context_.fixed_position.fixed_position_children_fixed_to_root = true;
context_.fixed_position.transform = initial_fixed_transform;
context_.fixed_position.scroll = initial_fixed_scroll;
} else if (object_.CanContainFixedPositionObjects()) {
context_.fixed_position = context_.current;
context_.fixed_position.fixed_position_children_fixed_to_root = false;
} else if (properties_ && properties_->CssClip()) {
auto* css_clip = properties_->CssClip();
if (context_.fixed_position.clip == css_clip->Parent()) {
context_.fixed_position.clip = css_clip;
} else {
if (NeedsPaintPropertyUpdate()) {
OnUpdate(properties_->UpdateCssClipFixedPosition(
context_.fixed_position.clip,
ClipPaintPropertyNode::State{css_clip->LocalTransformSpace(),
css_clip->ClipRect()}));
}
if (properties_->CssClipFixedPosition())
context_.fixed_position.clip = properties_->CssClipFixedPosition();
return;
}
}
if (NeedsPaintPropertyUpdate() && properties_)
OnClear(properties_->ClearCssClipFixedPosition());
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <[email protected]>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> [email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void clean_module_classes(int module_number TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
zend_hash_apply_with_argument(EG(class_table), (apply_func_arg_t) clean_module_class, (void *) &module_number TSRMLS_CC);
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void ChromeExtensionsDispatcherDelegate::RegisterNativeHandlers(
extensions::Dispatcher* dispatcher,
extensions::ModuleSystem* module_system,
extensions::ScriptContext* context) {
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"app", std::unique_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new extensions::AppBindings(dispatcher, context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"sync_file_system",
std::unique_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new extensions::SyncFileSystemCustomBindings(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"file_browser_handler",
std::unique_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new extensions::FileBrowserHandlerCustomBindings(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"file_manager_private",
std::unique_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new extensions::FileManagerPrivateCustomBindings(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"notifications_private",
std::unique_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new extensions::NotificationsNativeHandler(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"mediaGalleries",
std::unique_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new extensions::MediaGalleriesCustomBindings(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"page_capture", std::unique_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new extensions::PageCaptureCustomBindings(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"platform_keys_natives",
std::unique_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new extensions::PlatformKeysNatives(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"tabs", std::unique_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new extensions::TabsCustomBindings(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"webstore", std::unique_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new extensions::WebstoreBindings(context)));
#if defined(ENABLE_WEBRTC)
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"cast_streaming_natives",
std::unique_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new extensions::CastStreamingNativeHandler(context)));
#endif
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"automationInternal",
std::unique_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new extensions::AutomationInternalCustomBindings(context)));
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: jp2_box_t *jp2_box_get(jas_stream_t *in)
{
jp2_box_t *box;
jp2_boxinfo_t *boxinfo;
jas_stream_t *tmpstream;
uint_fast32_t len;
uint_fast64_t extlen;
bool dataflag;
box = 0;
tmpstream = 0;
if (!(box = jas_malloc(sizeof(jp2_box_t)))) {
goto error;
}
box->ops = &jp2_boxinfo_unk.ops;
if (jp2_getuint32(in, &len) || jp2_getuint32(in, &box->type)) {
goto error;
}
boxinfo = jp2_boxinfolookup(box->type);
box->info = boxinfo;
box->ops = &boxinfo->ops;
box->len = len;
if (box->len == 1) {
if (jp2_getuint64(in, &extlen)) {
goto error;
}
if (extlen > 0xffffffffUL) {
jas_eprintf("warning: cannot handle large 64-bit box length\n");
extlen = 0xffffffffUL;
}
box->len = extlen;
box->datalen = extlen - JP2_BOX_HDRLEN(true);
} else {
box->datalen = box->len - JP2_BOX_HDRLEN(false);
}
if (box->len != 0 && box->len < 8) {
goto error;
}
dataflag = !(box->info->flags & (JP2_BOX_SUPER | JP2_BOX_NODATA));
if (dataflag) {
if (!(tmpstream = jas_stream_memopen(0, 0))) {
goto error;
}
if (jas_stream_copy(tmpstream, in, box->datalen)) {
jas_eprintf("cannot copy box data\n");
goto error;
}
jas_stream_rewind(tmpstream);
if (box->ops->getdata) {
if ((*box->ops->getdata)(box, tmpstream)) {
jas_eprintf("cannot parse box data\n");
goto error;
}
}
jas_stream_close(tmpstream);
}
if (jas_getdbglevel() >= 1) {
jp2_box_dump(box, stderr);
}
return box;
error:
if (box) {
jp2_box_destroy(box);
}
if (tmpstream) {
jas_stream_close(tmpstream);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed a bug that resulted in the destruction of JP2 box data that had never
been constructed in the first place.
CWE ID: CWE-476
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static uint32 vorbis_find_page(stb_vorbis *f, uint32 *end, uint32 *last)
{
for(;;) {
int n;
if (f->eof) return 0;
n = get8(f);
if (n == 0x4f) { // page header candidate
unsigned int retry_loc = stb_vorbis_get_file_offset(f);
int i;
if (retry_loc - 25 > f->stream_len)
return 0;
for (i=1; i < 4; ++i)
if (get8(f) != ogg_page_header[i])
break;
if (f->eof) return 0;
if (i == 4) {
uint8 header[27];
uint32 i, crc, goal, len;
for (i=0; i < 4; ++i)
header[i] = ogg_page_header[i];
for (; i < 27; ++i)
header[i] = get8(f);
if (f->eof) return 0;
if (header[4] != 0) goto invalid;
goal = header[22] + (header[23] << 8) + (header[24]<<16) + (header[25]<<24);
for (i=22; i < 26; ++i)
header[i] = 0;
crc = 0;
for (i=0; i < 27; ++i)
crc = crc32_update(crc, header[i]);
len = 0;
for (i=0; i < header[26]; ++i) {
int s = get8(f);
crc = crc32_update(crc, s);
len += s;
}
if (len && f->eof) return 0;
for (i=0; i < len; ++i)
crc = crc32_update(crc, get8(f));
if (crc == goal) {
if (end)
*end = stb_vorbis_get_file_offset(f);
if (last) {
if (header[5] & 0x04)
*last = 1;
else
*last = 0;
}
set_file_offset(f, retry_loc-1);
return 1;
}
}
invalid:
set_file_offset(f, retry_loc);
}
}
}
Commit Message: fix unchecked length in stb_vorbis that could crash on corrupt/invalid files
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void SoundPool::doLoad(sp<Sample>& sample)
{
ALOGV("doLoad: loading sample sampleID=%d", sample->sampleID());
sample->startLoad();
mDecodeThread->loadSample(sample->sampleID());
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE SoundPool: add lock for findSample access from SoundPoolThread
Sample decoding still occurs in SoundPoolThread
without holding the SoundPool lock.
Bug: 25781119
Change-Id: I11fde005aa9cf5438e0390a0d2dfe0ec1dd282e8
CWE ID: CWE-264
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: PassOwnPtr<GraphicsContext> UpdateAtlas::beginPaintingOnAvailableBuffer(ShareableSurface::Handle& handle, const WebCore::IntSize& size, IntPoint& offset)
{
buildLayoutIfNeeded();
IntRect rect = m_areaAllocator->allocate(size);
if (rect.isEmpty())
return PassOwnPtr<GraphicsContext>();
if (!m_surface->createHandle(handle))
return PassOwnPtr<WebCore::GraphicsContext>();
offset = rect.location();
OwnPtr<GraphicsContext> graphicsContext = m_surface->createGraphicsContext(rect);
if (flags() & ShareableBitmap::SupportsAlpha) {
graphicsContext->setCompositeOperation(CompositeCopy);
graphicsContext->fillRect(IntRect(IntPoint::zero(), size), Color::transparent, ColorSpaceDeviceRGB);
graphicsContext->setCompositeOperation(CompositeSourceOver);
}
return graphicsContext.release();
}
Commit Message: [WK2] LayerTreeCoordinator should release unused UpdatedAtlases
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95072
Reviewed by Jocelyn Turcotte.
Release graphic buffers that haven't been used for a while in order to save memory.
This way we can give back memory to the system when no user interaction happens
after a period of time, for example when we are in the background.
* Shared/ShareableBitmap.h:
* WebProcess/WebPage/CoordinatedGraphics/LayerTreeCoordinator.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::LayerTreeCoordinator):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::beginContentUpdate):
(WebKit):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::scheduleReleaseInactiveAtlases):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::releaseInactiveAtlasesTimerFired):
* WebProcess/WebPage/CoordinatedGraphics/LayerTreeCoordinator.h:
(LayerTreeCoordinator):
* WebProcess/WebPage/UpdateAtlas.cpp:
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::UpdateAtlas):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::didSwapBuffers):
Don't call buildLayoutIfNeeded here. It's enought to call it in beginPaintingOnAvailableBuffer
and this way we can track whether this atlas is used with m_areaAllocator.
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::beginPaintingOnAvailableBuffer):
* WebProcess/WebPage/UpdateAtlas.h:
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::addTimeInactive):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::isInactive):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::isInUse):
(UpdateAtlas):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@128473 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void UnloadController::TabAttachedImpl(content::WebContents* contents) {
registrar_.Add(
this,
content::NOTIFICATION_WEB_CONTENTS_DISCONNECTED,
content::Source<content::WebContents>(contents));
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void MediaRecorderHandler::Stop() {
DCHECK(main_render_thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
weak_factory_.InvalidateWeakPtrs();
recording_ = false;
timeslice_ = TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(0);
video_recorders_.clear();
audio_recorders_.clear();
webm_muxer_.reset();
}
Commit Message: Check context is attached before creating MediaRecorder
Bug: 896736
Change-Id: I3ccfd2188fb15704af14c8af050e0a5667855d34
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324231
Commit-Queue: Emircan Uysaler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Miguel Casas <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606242}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static bool generic_new(struct nf_conn *ct, const struct sk_buff *skb,
unsigned int dataoff, unsigned int *timeouts)
{
return true;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: conntrack: disable generic tracking for known protocols
Given following iptables ruleset:
-P FORWARD DROP
-A FORWARD -m sctp --dport 9 -j ACCEPT
-A FORWARD -p tcp --dport 80 -j ACCEPT
-A FORWARD -p tcp -m conntrack -m state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT
One would assume that this allows SCTP on port 9 and TCP on port 80.
Unfortunately, if the SCTP conntrack module is not loaded, this allows
*all* SCTP communication, to pass though, i.e. -p sctp -j ACCEPT,
which we think is a security issue.
This is because on the first SCTP packet on port 9, we create a dummy
"generic l4" conntrack entry without any port information (since
conntrack doesn't know how to extract this information).
All subsequent packets that are unknown will then be in established
state since they will fallback to proto_generic and will match the
'generic' entry.
Our originally proposed version [1] completely disabled generic protocol
tracking, but Jozsef suggests to not track protocols for which a more
suitable helper is available, hence we now mitigate the issue for in
tree known ct protocol helpers only, so that at least NAT and direction
information will still be preserved for others.
[1] http://www.spinics.net/lists/netfilter-devel/msg33430.html
Joint work with Daniel Borkmann.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-254
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: struct inode *new_inode(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct inode *inode;
spin_lock_prefetch(&inode_sb_list_lock);
inode = new_inode_pseudo(sb);
if (inode)
inode_sb_list_add(inode);
return inode;
}
Commit Message: fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static ssize_t __nfs4_get_acl_uncached(struct inode *inode, void *buf, size_t buflen)
{
struct page *pages[NFS4ACL_MAXPAGES] = {NULL, };
struct nfs_getaclargs args = {
.fh = NFS_FH(inode),
.acl_pages = pages,
.acl_len = buflen,
};
struct nfs_getaclres res = {
.acl_len = buflen,
};
void *resp_buf;
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_GETACL],
.rpc_argp = &args,
.rpc_resp = &res,
};
int ret = -ENOMEM, npages, i, acl_len = 0;
npages = (buflen + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
/* As long as we're doing a round trip to the server anyway,
* let's be prepared for a page of acl data. */
if (npages == 0)
npages = 1;
for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) {
pages[i] = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pages[i])
goto out_free;
}
if (npages > 1) {
/* for decoding across pages */
res.acl_scratch = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!res.acl_scratch)
goto out_free;
}
args.acl_len = npages * PAGE_SIZE;
args.acl_pgbase = 0;
/* Let decode_getfacl know not to fail if the ACL data is larger than
* the page we send as a guess */
if (buf == NULL)
res.acl_flags |= NFS4_ACL_LEN_REQUEST;
resp_buf = page_address(pages[0]);
dprintk("%s buf %p buflen %zu npages %d args.acl_len %zu\n",
__func__, buf, buflen, npages, args.acl_len);
ret = nfs4_call_sync(NFS_SERVER(inode)->client, NFS_SERVER(inode),
&msg, &args.seq_args, &res.seq_res, 0);
if (ret)
goto out_free;
acl_len = res.acl_len - res.acl_data_offset;
if (acl_len > args.acl_len)
nfs4_write_cached_acl(inode, NULL, acl_len);
else
nfs4_write_cached_acl(inode, resp_buf + res.acl_data_offset,
acl_len);
if (buf) {
ret = -ERANGE;
if (acl_len > buflen)
goto out_free;
_copy_from_pages(buf, pages, res.acl_data_offset,
res.acl_len);
}
ret = acl_len;
out_free:
for (i = 0; i < npages; i++)
if (pages[i])
__free_page(pages[i]);
if (res.acl_scratch)
__free_page(res.acl_scratch);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: png_check_chunk_length(png_const_structrp png_ptr, const png_uint_32 length)
{
png_alloc_size_t limit = PNG_UINT_31_MAX;
# ifdef PNG_SET_USER_LIMITS_SUPPORTED
if (png_ptr->user_chunk_malloc_max > 0 &&
png_ptr->user_chunk_malloc_max < limit)
limit = png_ptr->user_chunk_malloc_max;
# elif PNG_USER_CHUNK_MALLOC_MAX > 0
if (PNG_USER_CHUNK_MALLOC_MAX < limit)
limit = PNG_USER_CHUNK_MALLOC_MAX;
# endif
if (png_ptr->chunk_name == png_IDAT)
{
png_alloc_size_t idat_limit = PNG_UINT_31_MAX;
size_t row_factor =
(png_ptr->width * png_ptr->channels * (png_ptr->bit_depth > 8? 2: 1)
+ 1 + (png_ptr->interlaced? 6: 0));
if (png_ptr->height > PNG_UINT_32_MAX/row_factor)
idat_limit=PNG_UINT_31_MAX;
else
idat_limit = png_ptr->height * row_factor;
row_factor = row_factor > 32566? 32566 : row_factor;
idat_limit += 6 + 5*(idat_limit/row_factor+1); /* zlib+deflate overhead */
idat_limit=idat_limit < PNG_UINT_31_MAX? idat_limit : PNG_UINT_31_MAX;
limit = limit < idat_limit? idat_limit : limit;
}
if (length > limit)
{
png_debug2(0," length = %lu, limit = %lu",
(unsigned long)length,(unsigned long)limit);
png_chunk_error(png_ptr, "chunk data is too large");
}
}
Commit Message: [libpng16] Fix the calculation of row_factor in png_check_chunk_length
(Bug report by Thuan Pham, SourceForge issue #278)
CWE ID: CWE-190
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: aspath_cmp (const void *arg1, const void *arg2)
{
const struct assegment *seg1 = ((const struct aspath *)arg1)->segments;
const struct assegment *seg2 = ((const struct aspath *)arg2)->segments;
while (seg1 || seg2)
{
int i;
if ((!seg1 && seg2) || (seg1 && !seg2))
return 0;
if (seg1->type != seg2->type)
return 0;
if (seg1->length != seg2->length)
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < seg1->length; i++)
if (seg1->as[i] != seg2->as[i])
return 0;
seg1 = seg1->next;
seg2 = seg2->next;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: tt_cmap4_validate( FT_Byte* table,
FT_Validator valid )
{
FT_Byte* p;
FT_UInt length;
FT_Byte *ends, *starts, *offsets, *deltas, *glyph_ids;
FT_UInt num_segs;
FT_Error error = FT_Err_Ok;
if ( table + 2 + 2 > valid->limit )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
p = table + 2; /* skip format */
length = TT_NEXT_USHORT( p );
if ( length < 16 )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
/* in certain fonts, the `length' field is invalid and goes */
/* out of bound. We try to correct this here... */
if ( table + length > valid->limit )
/* in certain fonts, the `length' field is invalid and goes */
/* out of bound. We try to correct this here... */
if ( table + length > valid->limit )
{
length = (FT_UInt)( valid->limit - table );
}
p = table + 6;
num_segs = TT_NEXT_USHORT( p ); /* read segCountX2 */
if ( valid->level >= FT_VALIDATE_PARANOID )
{
/* check that we have an even value here */
if ( num_segs & 1 )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
}
num_segs /= 2;
if ( length < 16 + num_segs * 2 * 4 )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
/* check the search parameters - even though we never use them */
/* */
if ( valid->level >= FT_VALIDATE_PARANOID )
{
/* check the values of `searchRange', `entrySelector', `rangeShift' */
FT_UInt search_range = TT_NEXT_USHORT( p );
FT_UInt entry_selector = TT_NEXT_USHORT( p );
FT_UInt range_shift = TT_NEXT_USHORT( p );
if ( ( search_range | range_shift ) & 1 ) /* must be even values */
FT_INVALID_DATA;
search_range /= 2;
range_shift /= 2;
/* `search range' is the greatest power of 2 that is <= num_segs */
if ( search_range > num_segs ||
search_range * 2 < num_segs ||
search_range + range_shift != num_segs ||
search_range != ( 1U << entry_selector ) )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
}
ends = table + 14;
starts = table + 16 + num_segs * 2;
deltas = starts + num_segs * 2;
offsets = deltas + num_segs * 2;
glyph_ids = offsets + num_segs * 2;
/* check last segment; its end count value must be 0xFFFF */
if ( valid->level >= FT_VALIDATE_PARANOID )
{
p = ends + ( num_segs - 1 ) * 2;
if ( TT_PEEK_USHORT( p ) != 0xFFFFU )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
}
{
FT_UInt start, end, offset, n;
FT_UInt last_start = 0, last_end = 0;
FT_Int delta;
FT_Byte* p_start = starts;
FT_Byte* p_end = ends;
FT_Byte* p_delta = deltas;
FT_Byte* p_offset = offsets;
for ( n = 0; n < num_segs; n++ )
{
p = p_offset;
start = TT_NEXT_USHORT( p_start );
end = TT_NEXT_USHORT( p_end );
delta = TT_NEXT_SHORT( p_delta );
offset = TT_NEXT_USHORT( p_offset );
if ( start > end )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
/* this test should be performed at default validation level; */
/* unfortunately, some popular Asian fonts have overlapping */
/* ranges in their charmaps */
/* */
if ( start <= last_end && n > 0 )
{
if ( valid->level >= FT_VALIDATE_TIGHT )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
else
{
/* allow overlapping segments, provided their start points */
/* and end points, respectively, are in ascending order */
/* */
if ( last_start > start || last_end > end )
error |= TT_CMAP_FLAG_UNSORTED;
else
error |= TT_CMAP_FLAG_OVERLAPPING;
}
}
if ( offset && offset != 0xFFFFU )
{
p += offset; /* start of glyph ID array */
/* check that we point within the glyph IDs table only */
if ( valid->level >= FT_VALIDATE_TIGHT )
{
if ( p < glyph_ids ||
p + ( end - start + 1 ) * 2 > table + length )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
}
/* Some fonts handle the last segment incorrectly. In */
/* theory, 0xFFFF might point to an ordinary glyph -- */
/* a cmap 4 is versatile and could be used for any */
/* encoding, not only Unicode. However, reality shows */
/* that far too many fonts are sloppy and incorrectly */
/* set all fields but `start' and `end' for the last */
/* segment if it contains only a single character. */
/* */
/* We thus omit the test here, delaying it to the */
/* routines which actually access the cmap. */
else if ( n != num_segs - 1 ||
!( start == 0xFFFFU && end == 0xFFFFU ) )
{
if ( p < glyph_ids ||
p + ( end - start + 1 ) * 2 > valid->limit )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
}
/* check glyph indices within the segment range */
if ( valid->level >= FT_VALIDATE_TIGHT )
{
FT_UInt i, idx;
for ( i = start; i < end; i++ )
{
idx = FT_NEXT_USHORT( p );
if ( idx != 0 )
{
idx = (FT_UInt)( idx + delta ) & 0xFFFFU;
if ( idx >= TT_VALID_GLYPH_COUNT( valid ) )
FT_INVALID_GLYPH_ID;
}
}
}
}
else if ( offset == 0xFFFFU )
{
/* some fonts (erroneously?) use a range offset of 0xFFFF */
/* to mean missing glyph in cmap table */
/* */
if ( valid->level >= FT_VALIDATE_PARANOID ||
n != num_segs - 1 ||
!( start == 0xFFFFU && end == 0xFFFFU ) )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
}
last_start = start;
last_end = end;
}
}
return error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static Image *ReadWPGImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
typedef struct
{
size_t FileId;
MagickOffsetType DataOffset;
unsigned int ProductType;
unsigned int FileType;
unsigned char MajorVersion;
unsigned char MinorVersion;
unsigned int EncryptKey;
unsigned int Reserved;
} WPGHeader;
typedef struct
{
unsigned char RecType;
size_t RecordLength;
} WPGRecord;
typedef struct
{
unsigned char Class;
unsigned char RecType;
size_t Extension;
size_t RecordLength;
} WPG2Record;
typedef struct
{
unsigned HorizontalUnits;
unsigned VerticalUnits;
unsigned char PosSizePrecision;
} WPG2Start;
typedef struct
{
unsigned int Width;
unsigned int Height;
unsigned int Depth;
unsigned int HorzRes;
unsigned int VertRes;
} WPGBitmapType1;
typedef struct
{
unsigned int Width;
unsigned int Height;
unsigned char Depth;
unsigned char Compression;
} WPG2BitmapType1;
typedef struct
{
unsigned int RotAngle;
unsigned int LowLeftX;
unsigned int LowLeftY;
unsigned int UpRightX;
unsigned int UpRightY;
unsigned int Width;
unsigned int Height;
unsigned int Depth;
unsigned int HorzRes;
unsigned int VertRes;
} WPGBitmapType2;
typedef struct
{
unsigned int StartIndex;
unsigned int NumOfEntries;
} WPGColorMapRec;
/*
typedef struct {
size_t PS_unknown1;
unsigned int PS_unknown2;
unsigned int PS_unknown3;
} WPGPSl1Record;
*/
Image
*image;
unsigned int
status;
WPGHeader
Header;
WPGRecord
Rec;
WPG2Record
Rec2;
WPG2Start StartWPG;
WPGBitmapType1
BitmapHeader1;
WPG2BitmapType1
Bitmap2Header1;
WPGBitmapType2
BitmapHeader2;
WPGColorMapRec
WPG_Palette;
int
i,
bpp,
WPG2Flags;
ssize_t
ldblk;
size_t
one;
unsigned char
*BImgBuff;
tCTM CTM; /*current transform matrix*/
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
one=1;
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
image->depth=8;
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read WPG image.
*/
Header.FileId=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
Header.DataOffset=(MagickOffsetType) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
Header.ProductType=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Header.FileType=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Header.MajorVersion=ReadBlobByte(image);
Header.MinorVersion=ReadBlobByte(image);
Header.EncryptKey=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Header.Reserved=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if (Header.FileId!=0x435057FF || (Header.ProductType>>8)!=0x16)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (Header.EncryptKey!=0)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"EncryptedWPGImageFileNotSupported");
image->columns = 1;
image->rows = 1;
image->colors = 0;
bpp=0;
BitmapHeader2.RotAngle=0;
Rec2.RecordLength = 0;
switch(Header.FileType)
{
case 1: /* WPG level 1 */
while(!EOFBlob(image)) /* object parser loop */
{
(void) SeekBlob(image,Header.DataOffset,SEEK_SET);
if(EOFBlob(image))
break;
Rec.RecType=(i=ReadBlobByte(image));
if(i==EOF)
break;
Rd_WP_DWORD(image,&Rec.RecordLength);
if (Rec.RecordLength > GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if(EOFBlob(image))
break;
Header.DataOffset=TellBlob(image)+Rec.RecordLength;
switch(Rec.RecType)
{
case 0x0B: /* bitmap type 1 */
BitmapHeader1.Width=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader1.Height=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((BitmapHeader1.Width == 0) || (BitmapHeader1.Height == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
BitmapHeader1.Depth=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader1.HorzRes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader1.VertRes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if(BitmapHeader1.HorzRes && BitmapHeader1.VertRes)
{
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
image->x_resolution=BitmapHeader1.HorzRes/470.0;
image->y_resolution=BitmapHeader1.VertRes/470.0;
}
image->columns=BitmapHeader1.Width;
image->rows=BitmapHeader1.Height;
bpp=BitmapHeader1.Depth;
goto UnpackRaster;
case 0x0E: /*Color palette */
WPG_Palette.StartIndex=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries-WPG_Palette.StartIndex) >
(Rec2.RecordLength-2-2) / 3)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InvalidColormapIndex");
image->colors=WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries;
if (!AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors))
goto NoMemory;
for (i=WPG_Palette.StartIndex;
i < (int)WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
}
break;
case 0x11: /* Start PS l1 */
if(Rec.RecordLength > 8)
image=ExtractPostscript(image,image_info,
TellBlob(image)+8, /* skip PS header in the wpg */
(ssize_t) Rec.RecordLength-8,exception);
break;
case 0x14: /* bitmap type 2 */
BitmapHeader2.RotAngle=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.LowLeftY=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.UpRightX=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.UpRightY=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.Width=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.Height=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((BitmapHeader2.Width == 0) || (BitmapHeader2.Height == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
BitmapHeader2.Depth=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.HorzRes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.VertRes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
image->page.width=(unsigned int)
((BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX-BitmapHeader2.UpRightX)/470.0);
image->page.height=(unsigned int)
((BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX-BitmapHeader2.UpRightY)/470.0);
image->page.x=(int) (BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX/470.0);
image->page.y=(int) (BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX/470.0);
if(BitmapHeader2.HorzRes && BitmapHeader2.VertRes)
{
image->x_resolution=BitmapHeader2.HorzRes/470.0;
image->y_resolution=BitmapHeader2.VertRes/470.0;
}
image->columns=BitmapHeader2.Width;
image->rows=BitmapHeader2.Height;
bpp=BitmapHeader2.Depth;
UnpackRaster:
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
if ((image->colors == 0) && (bpp <= 16))
{
image->colors=one << bpp;
if (!AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors))
{
NoMemory:
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
/* printf("Load default colormap \n"); */
for (i=0; (i < (int) image->colors) && (i < 256); i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum(WPG1_Palette[i].Red);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum(WPG1_Palette[i].Green);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(WPG1_Palette[i].Blue);
}
}
else
{
if (bpp < 24)
if ( (image->colors < (one << bpp)) && (bpp != 24) )
image->colormap=(PixelPacket *) ResizeQuantumMemory(
image->colormap,(size_t) (one << bpp),
sizeof(*image->colormap));
}
if (bpp == 1)
{
if(image->colormap[0].red==0 &&
image->colormap[0].green==0 &&
image->colormap[0].blue==0 &&
image->colormap[1].red==0 &&
image->colormap[1].green==0 &&
image->colormap[1].blue==0)
{ /* fix crippled monochrome palette */
image->colormap[1].red =
image->colormap[1].green =
image->colormap[1].blue = QuantumRange;
}
}
if(UnpackWPGRaster(image,bpp) < 0)
/* The raster cannot be unpacked */
{
DecompressionFailed:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnableToDecompressImage");
}
if(Rec.RecType==0x14 && BitmapHeader2.RotAngle!=0 && !image_info->ping)
{
/* flop command */
if(BitmapHeader2.RotAngle & 0x8000)
{
Image
*flop_image;
flop_image = FlopImage(image, exception);
if (flop_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(flop_image,image);
ReplaceImageInList(&image,flop_image);
}
}
/* flip command */
if(BitmapHeader2.RotAngle & 0x2000)
{
Image
*flip_image;
flip_image = FlipImage(image, exception);
if (flip_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(flip_image,image);
ReplaceImageInList(&image,flip_image);
}
}
/* rotate command */
if(BitmapHeader2.RotAngle & 0x0FFF)
{
Image
*rotate_image;
rotate_image=RotateImage(image,(BitmapHeader2.RotAngle &
0x0FFF), exception);
if (rotate_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(rotate_image,image);
ReplaceImageInList(&image,rotate_image);
}
}
}
/* Allocate next image structure. */
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
image->depth=8;
if (image->next == (Image *) NULL)
goto Finish;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
image->columns=image->rows=1;
image->colors=0;
break;
case 0x1B: /* Postscript l2 */
if(Rec.RecordLength>0x3C)
image=ExtractPostscript(image,image_info,
TellBlob(image)+0x3C, /* skip PS l2 header in the wpg */
(ssize_t) Rec.RecordLength-0x3C,exception);
break;
}
}
break;
case 2: /* WPG level 2 */
(void) memset(CTM,0,sizeof(CTM));
StartWPG.PosSizePrecision = 0;
while(!EOFBlob(image)) /* object parser loop */
{
(void) SeekBlob(image,Header.DataOffset,SEEK_SET);
if(EOFBlob(image))
break;
Rec2.Class=(i=ReadBlobByte(image));
if(i==EOF)
break;
Rec2.RecType=(i=ReadBlobByte(image));
if(i==EOF)
break;
Rd_WP_DWORD(image,&Rec2.Extension);
Rd_WP_DWORD(image,&Rec2.RecordLength);
if(EOFBlob(image))
break;
Header.DataOffset=TellBlob(image)+Rec2.RecordLength;
switch(Rec2.RecType)
{
case 1:
StartWPG.HorizontalUnits=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
StartWPG.VerticalUnits=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
StartWPG.PosSizePrecision=ReadBlobByte(image);
break;
case 0x0C: /* Color palette */
WPG_Palette.StartIndex=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries-WPG_Palette.StartIndex) >
(Rec2.RecordLength-2-2) / 3)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InvalidColormapIndex");
image->colors=WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=WPG_Palette.StartIndex;
i < (int)WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum((char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum((char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
(void) ReadBlobByte(image); /*Opacity??*/
}
break;
case 0x0E:
Bitmap2Header1.Width=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Bitmap2Header1.Height=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((Bitmap2Header1.Width == 0) || (Bitmap2Header1.Height == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
Bitmap2Header1.Depth=ReadBlobByte(image);
Bitmap2Header1.Compression=ReadBlobByte(image);
if(Bitmap2Header1.Compression > 1)
continue; /*Unknown compression method */
switch(Bitmap2Header1.Depth)
{
case 1:
bpp=1;
break;
case 2:
bpp=2;
break;
case 3:
bpp=4;
break;
case 4:
bpp=8;
break;
case 8:
bpp=24;
break;
default:
continue; /*Ignore raster with unknown depth*/
}
image->columns=Bitmap2Header1.Width;
image->rows=Bitmap2Header1.Height;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
if ((image->colors == 0) && (bpp != 24))
{
size_t
one;
one=1;
image->colors=one << bpp;
if (!AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors))
goto NoMemory;
}
else
{
if(bpp < 24)
if( image->colors<(one << bpp) && bpp!=24 )
image->colormap=(PixelPacket *) ResizeQuantumMemory(
image->colormap,(size_t) (one << bpp),
sizeof(*image->colormap));
}
switch(Bitmap2Header1.Compression)
{
case 0: /*Uncompressed raster*/
{
ldblk=(ssize_t) ((bpp*image->columns+7)/8);
BImgBuff=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)
ldblk+1,sizeof(*BImgBuff));
if (BImgBuff == (unsigned char *) NULL)
goto NoMemory;
for(i=0; i< (ssize_t) image->rows; i++)
{
(void) ReadBlob(image,ldblk,BImgBuff);
InsertRow(BImgBuff,i,image,bpp);
}
if(BImgBuff)
BImgBuff=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(BImgBuff);
break;
}
case 1: /*RLE for WPG2 */
{
if( UnpackWPG2Raster(image,bpp) < 0)
goto DecompressionFailed;
break;
}
}
if(CTM[0][0]<0 && !image_info->ping)
{ /*?? RotAngle=360-RotAngle;*/
Image
*flop_image;
flop_image = FlopImage(image, exception);
if (flop_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(flop_image,image);
ReplaceImageInList(&image,flop_image);
}
/* Try to change CTM according to Flip - I am not sure, must be checked.
Tx(0,0)=-1; Tx(1,0)=0; Tx(2,0)=0;
Tx(0,1)= 0; Tx(1,1)=1; Tx(2,1)=0;
Tx(0,2)=(WPG._2Rect.X_ur+WPG._2Rect.X_ll);
Tx(1,2)=0; Tx(2,2)=1; */
}
if(CTM[1][1]<0 && !image_info->ping)
{ /*?? RotAngle=360-RotAngle;*/
Image
*flip_image;
flip_image = FlipImage(image, exception);
if (flip_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(flip_image,image);
ReplaceImageInList(&image,flip_image);
}
/* Try to change CTM according to Flip - I am not sure, must be checked.
float_matrix Tx(3,3);
Tx(0,0)= 1; Tx(1,0)= 0; Tx(2,0)=0;
Tx(0,1)= 0; Tx(1,1)=-1; Tx(2,1)=0;
Tx(0,2)= 0; Tx(1,2)=(WPG._2Rect.Y_ur+WPG._2Rect.Y_ll);
Tx(2,2)=1; */
}
/* Allocate next image structure. */
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
image->depth=8;
if (image->next == (Image *) NULL)
goto Finish;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
image->columns=image->rows=1;
image->colors=0;
break;
case 0x12: /* Postscript WPG2*/
i=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if(Rec2.RecordLength > (unsigned int) i)
image=ExtractPostscript(image,image_info,
TellBlob(image)+i, /*skip PS header in the wpg2*/
(ssize_t) (Rec2.RecordLength-i-2),exception);
break;
case 0x1B: /*bitmap rectangle*/
WPG2Flags = LoadWPG2Flags(image,StartWPG.PosSizePrecision,NULL,&CTM);
(void) WPG2Flags;
break;
}
}
break;
default:
{
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"DataEncodingSchemeIsNotSupported");
}
}
Finish:
(void) CloseBlob(image);
{
Image
*p;
ssize_t
scene=0;
/*
Rewind list, removing any empty images while rewinding.
*/
p=image;
image=NULL;
while (p != (Image *) NULL)
{
Image *tmp=p;
if ((p->rows == 0) || (p->columns == 0)) {
p=p->previous;
DeleteImageFromList(&tmp);
} else {
image=p;
p=p->previous;
}
}
/*
Fix scene numbers.
*/
for (p=image; p != (Image *) NULL; p=p->next)
p->scene=(size_t) scene++;
}
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"ImageFileDoesNotContainAnyImageData");
return(image);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/851
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static inline int getPixelOverflowColorTC(gdImagePtr im, const int x, const int y, const int color)
{
if (gdImageBoundsSafe(im, x, y)) {
const int c = im->tpixels[y][x];
if (c == im->transparent) {
return gdTrueColorAlpha(0, 0, 0, 127);
}
return c;
} else {
register int border = 0;
if (y < im->cy1) {
border = im->tpixels[0][im->cx1];
goto processborder;
}
if (y < im->cy1) {
border = im->tpixels[0][im->cx1];
goto processborder;
}
if (y > im->cy2) {
if (x >= im->cx1 && x <= im->cx1) {
border = im->tpixels[im->cy2][x];
goto processborder;
} else {
return gdTrueColorAlpha(0, 0, 0, 127);
}
}
/* y is bound safe at this point */
if (x < im->cx1) {
border = im->tpixels[y][im->cx1];
goto processborder;
}
if (x > im->cx2) {
border = im->tpixels[y][im->cx2];
}
processborder:
if (border == im->transparent) {
return gdTrueColorAlpha(0, 0, 0, 127);
} else{
return gdTrueColorAlpha(gdTrueColorGetRed(border), gdTrueColorGetGreen(border), gdTrueColorGetBlue(border), 127);
}
}
}
Commit Message: gdImageScaleTwoPass memory leak fix
Fixing memory leak in gdImageScaleTwoPass, as reported by @cmb69 and
confirmed by @vapier. This bug actually bit me in production and I'm
very thankful that it was reported with an easy fix.
Fixes #173.
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void FileSystemManagerImpl::Write(
const GURL& file_path,
const std::string& blob_uuid,
int64_t position,
blink::mojom::FileSystemCancellableOperationRequest op_request,
blink::mojom::FileSystemOperationListenerPtr listener) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
FileSystemURL url(context_->CrackURL(file_path));
base::Optional<base::File::Error> opt_error = ValidateFileSystemURL(url);
if (opt_error) {
listener->ErrorOccurred(opt_error.value());
return;
}
if (!security_policy_->CanWriteFileSystemFile(process_id_, url)) {
listener->ErrorOccurred(base::File::FILE_ERROR_SECURITY);
return;
}
std::unique_ptr<storage::BlobDataHandle> blob =
blob_storage_context_->context()->GetBlobDataFromUUID(blob_uuid);
OperationListenerID listener_id = AddOpListener(std::move(listener));
OperationID op_id = operation_runner()->Write(
url, std::move(blob), position,
base::BindRepeating(&FileSystemManagerImpl::DidWrite, GetWeakPtr(),
listener_id));
cancellable_operations_.AddBinding(
std::make_unique<FileSystemCancellableOperationImpl>(op_id, this),
std::move(op_request));
}
Commit Message: Disable FileSystemManager::CreateWriter if WritableFiles isn't enabled.
Bug: 922677
Change-Id: Ib16137cbabb2ec07f1ffc0484722f1d9cc533404
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1416570
Commit-Queue: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#623552}
CWE ID: CWE-189
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T impeg2d_dec_pic_ext_data(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
stream_t *ps_stream;
UWORD32 u4_start_code;
IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T e_error;
e_error = (IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE;
ps_stream = &ps_dec->s_bit_stream;
u4_start_code = impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
while ( (u4_start_code == EXTENSION_START_CODE ||
u4_start_code == USER_DATA_START_CODE) &&
(IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE == e_error)
{
if(u4_start_code == USER_DATA_START_CODE)
{
impeg2d_dec_user_data(ps_dec);
}
else
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
u4_start_code = impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,EXT_ID_LEN);
switch(u4_start_code)
{
case QUANT_MATRIX_EXT_ID:
impeg2d_dec_quant_matrix_ext(ps_dec);
break;
case COPYRIGHT_EXT_ID:
impeg2d_dec_copyright_ext(ps_dec);
break;
case PIC_DISPLAY_EXT_ID:
impeg2d_dec_pic_disp_ext(ps_dec);
break;
case CAMERA_PARAM_EXT_ID:
impeg2d_dec_cam_param_ext(ps_dec);
break;
case ITU_T_EXT_ID:
impeg2d_dec_itu_t_ext(ps_dec);
break;
case PIC_SPATIAL_SCALABLE_EXT_ID:
case PIC_TEMPORAL_SCALABLE_EXT_ID:
e_error = IMPEG2D_SCALABLITY_NOT_SUP;
break;
default:
/* In case its a reserved extension code */
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,EXT_ID_LEN);
impeg2d_next_start_code(ps_dec);
break;
}
}
u4_start_code = impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
}
return e_error;
}
Commit Message: Fixed bit stream access to make sure that it is not read beyond the allocated size.
Bug: 25765591
Change-Id: I98c23a3c3f84f6710f29bffe5ed73adcf51d47f6
CWE ID: CWE-254
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: vlog_message(const int facility, const char* format, va_list args)
{
#if !HAVE_VSYSLOG
char buf[MAX_LOG_MSG+1];
vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), format, args);
#endif
/* Don't write syslog if testing configuration */
if (__test_bit(CONFIG_TEST_BIT, &debug))
return;
if (log_file || (__test_bit(DONT_FORK_BIT, &debug) && log_console)) {
#if HAVE_VSYSLOG
va_list args1;
char buf[2 * MAX_LOG_MSG + 1];
va_copy(args1, args);
vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), format, args1);
va_end(args1);
#endif
/* timestamp setup */
time_t t = time(NULL);
struct tm tm;
localtime_r(&t, &tm);
char timestamp[64];
strftime(timestamp, sizeof(timestamp), "%c", &tm);
if (log_console && __test_bit(DONT_FORK_BIT, &debug))
fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s\n", timestamp, buf);
if (log_file) {
fprintf(log_file, "%s: %s\n", timestamp, buf);
if (always_flush_log_file)
fflush(log_file);
}
}
if (!__test_bit(NO_SYSLOG_BIT, &debug))
#if HAVE_VSYSLOG
vsyslog(facility, format, args);
#else
syslog(facility, "%s", buf);
#endif
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-59
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: int AudioRendererAlgorithm::FillBuffer(
uint8* dest, int requested_frames) {
DCHECK_NE(bytes_per_frame_, 0);
if (playback_rate_ == 0.0f)
return 0;
int total_frames_rendered = 0;
uint8* output_ptr = dest;
while (total_frames_rendered < requested_frames) {
if (index_into_window_ == window_size_)
ResetWindow();
bool rendered_frame = true;
if (playback_rate_ > 1.0)
rendered_frame = OutputFasterPlayback(output_ptr);
else if (playback_rate_ < 1.0)
rendered_frame = OutputSlowerPlayback(output_ptr);
else
rendered_frame = OutputNormalPlayback(output_ptr);
if (!rendered_frame) {
needs_more_data_ = true;
break;
}
output_ptr += bytes_per_frame_;
total_frames_rendered++;
}
return total_frames_rendered;
}
Commit Message: Protect AudioRendererAlgorithm from invalid step sizes.
BUG=165430
TEST=unittests and asan pass.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11573023
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173249 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
{
SSL_SESSION *sess;
unsigned char *sdec;
const unsigned char *p;
int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1;
unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
/* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
if (eticklen < 48)
return 2;
/* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
if (hctx == NULL)
hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
if (hctx == NULL)
return -2;
ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
ret = -2;
goto err;
}
if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
ctx, hctx, 0);
if (rv < 0)
goto err;
if (rv == 0) {
ret = 2;
goto err;
}
if (rv == 2)
renew_ticket = 1;
} else {
/* Check key name matches */
if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) != 0) {
ret = 2;
goto err;
}
if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
|| EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <=
0) {
goto err;
}
}
/*
* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
* checks on ticket.
if (mlen < 0) {
goto err;
}
eticklen -= mlen;
/* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
return 2;
}
/* Attempt to decrypt session data */
/* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
OPENSSL_free(sdec);
return -1;
}
if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
OPENSSL_free(sdec);
return 2;
}
slen += mlen;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
ctx = NULL;
p = sdec;
sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
OPENSSL_free(sdec);
if (sess) {
/*
* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
* that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
* structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
* standard.
*/
if (sesslen)
memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
*psess = sess;
if (renew_ticket)
return 4;
else
return 3;
}
ERR_clear_error();
/*
* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
*/
return 2;
err:
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static long btrfs_ioctl_scrub_cancel(struct btrfs_root *root, void __user *arg)
{
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return btrfs_scrub_cancel(root->fs_info);
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-310
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void GfxImageColorMap::getRGBLine(Guchar *in, unsigned int *out, int length) {
int i, j;
Guchar *inp, *tmp_line;
switch (colorSpace->getMode()) {
case csIndexed:
case csSeparation:
tmp_line = (Guchar *) gmalloc (length * nComps2);
for (i = 0; i < length; i++) {
for (j = 0; j < nComps2; j++) {
tmp_line[i * nComps2 + j] = byte_lookup[in[i] * nComps2 + j];
}
}
colorSpace2->getRGBLine(tmp_line, out, length);
gfree (tmp_line);
break;
default:
inp = in;
for (j = 0; j < length; j++)
for (i = 0; i < nComps; i++) {
*inp = byte_lookup[*inp * nComps + i];
inp++;
}
colorSpace->getRGBLine(in, out, length);
break;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T impeg2d_dec_p_b_slice(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
WORD16 *pi2_vld_out;
UWORD32 i;
yuv_buf_t *ps_cur_frm_buf = &ps_dec->s_cur_frm_buf;
UWORD32 u4_frm_offset = 0;
const dec_mb_params_t *ps_dec_mb_params;
IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T e_error = (IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE;
pi2_vld_out = ps_dec->ai2_vld_buf;
memset(ps_dec->ai2_pred_mv,0,sizeof(ps_dec->ai2_pred_mv));
ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb = 0;
ps_dec->u2_first_mb = 1;
ps_dec->u2_picture_width = ps_dec->u2_frame_width;
if(ps_dec->u2_picture_structure != FRAME_PICTURE)
{
ps_dec->u2_picture_width <<= 1;
if(ps_dec->u2_picture_structure == BOTTOM_FIELD)
{
u4_frm_offset = ps_dec->u2_frame_width;
}
}
do
{
UWORD32 u4_x_offset, u4_y_offset;
UWORD32 u4_x_dst_offset = 0;
UWORD32 u4_y_dst_offset = 0;
UWORD8 *pu1_out_p;
UWORD8 *pu1_pred;
WORD32 u4_pred_strd;
IMPEG2D_TRACE_MB_START(ps_dec->u2_mb_x, ps_dec->u2_mb_y);
if(ps_dec->e_pic_type == B_PIC)
impeg2d_dec_pnb_mb_params(ps_dec);
else
impeg2d_dec_p_mb_params(ps_dec);
IMPEG2D_TRACE_MB_START(ps_dec->u2_mb_x, ps_dec->u2_mb_y);
u4_x_dst_offset = u4_frm_offset + (ps_dec->u2_mb_x << 4);
u4_y_dst_offset = (ps_dec->u2_mb_y << 4) * ps_dec->u2_picture_width;
pu1_out_p = ps_cur_frm_buf->pu1_y + u4_x_dst_offset + u4_y_dst_offset;
if(ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb == 0)
{
UWORD32 offset_x, offset_y, stride;
UWORD16 index = (ps_dec->u2_motion_type);
/*only for non intra mb's*/
if(ps_dec->e_mb_pred == BIDIRECT)
{
ps_dec_mb_params = &ps_dec->ps_func_bi_direct[index];
}
else
{
ps_dec_mb_params = &ps_dec->ps_func_forw_or_back[index];
}
stride = ps_dec->u2_picture_width;
offset_x = u4_frm_offset + (ps_dec->u2_mb_x << 4);
offset_y = (ps_dec->u2_mb_y << 4);
ps_dec->s_dest_buf.pu1_y = ps_cur_frm_buf->pu1_y + offset_y * stride + offset_x;
stride = stride >> 1;
ps_dec->s_dest_buf.pu1_u = ps_cur_frm_buf->pu1_u + (offset_y >> 1) * stride
+ (offset_x >> 1);
ps_dec->s_dest_buf.pu1_v = ps_cur_frm_buf->pu1_v + (offset_y >> 1) * stride
+ (offset_x >> 1);
PROFILE_DISABLE_MC_IF0
ps_dec_mb_params->pf_mc(ps_dec);
}
for(i = 0; i < NUM_LUMA_BLKS; ++i)
{
if((ps_dec->u2_cbp & (1 << (BLOCKS_IN_MB - 1 - i))) != 0)
{
e_error = ps_dec->pf_vld_inv_quant(ps_dec, pi2_vld_out, ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan_matrix,
ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb, Y_LUMA, 0);
if ((IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE != e_error)
{
return e_error;
}
u4_x_offset = gai2_impeg2_blk_x_off[i];
if(ps_dec->u2_field_dct == 0)
u4_y_offset = gai2_impeg2_blk_y_off_frm[i] ;
else
u4_y_offset = gai2_impeg2_blk_y_off_fld[i] ;
IMPEG2D_IDCT_INP_STATISTICS(pi2_vld_out, ps_dec->u4_non_zero_cols, ps_dec->u4_non_zero_rows);
PROFILE_DISABLE_IDCT_IF0
{
WORD32 idx;
if(1 == (ps_dec->u4_non_zero_cols | ps_dec->u4_non_zero_rows))
idx = 0;
else
idx = 1;
if(0 == ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb)
{
pu1_pred = pu1_out_p + u4_y_offset * ps_dec->u2_picture_width + u4_x_offset;
u4_pred_strd = ps_dec->u2_picture_width << ps_dec->u2_field_dct;
}
else
{
pu1_pred = (UWORD8 *)gau1_impeg2_zerobuf;
u4_pred_strd = 8;
}
ps_dec->pf_idct_recon[idx * 2 + ps_dec->i4_last_value_one](pi2_vld_out,
ps_dec->ai2_idct_stg1,
pu1_pred,
pu1_out_p + u4_y_offset * ps_dec->u2_picture_width + u4_x_offset,
8,
u4_pred_strd,
ps_dec->u2_picture_width << ps_dec->u2_field_dct,
~ps_dec->u4_non_zero_cols, ~ps_dec->u4_non_zero_rows);
}
}
}
/* For U and V blocks, divide the x and y offsets by 2. */
u4_x_dst_offset >>= 1;
u4_y_dst_offset >>= 2;
/* In case of chrominance blocks the DCT will be frame DCT */
/* i = 0, U component and i = 1 is V componet */
if((ps_dec->u2_cbp & 0x02) != 0)
{
pu1_out_p = ps_cur_frm_buf->pu1_u + u4_x_dst_offset + u4_y_dst_offset;
e_error = ps_dec->pf_vld_inv_quant(ps_dec, pi2_vld_out, ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan_matrix,
ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb, U_CHROMA, 0);
if ((IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE != e_error)
{
return e_error;
}
IMPEG2D_IDCT_INP_STATISTICS(pi2_vld_out, ps_dec->u4_non_zero_cols, ps_dec->u4_non_zero_rows);
PROFILE_DISABLE_IDCT_IF0
{
WORD32 idx;
if(1 == (ps_dec->u4_non_zero_cols | ps_dec->u4_non_zero_rows))
idx = 0;
else
idx = 1;
if(0 == ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb)
{
pu1_pred = pu1_out_p;
u4_pred_strd = ps_dec->u2_picture_width >> 1;
}
else
{
pu1_pred = (UWORD8 *)gau1_impeg2_zerobuf;
u4_pred_strd = 8;
}
ps_dec->pf_idct_recon[idx * 2 + ps_dec->i4_last_value_one](pi2_vld_out,
ps_dec->ai2_idct_stg1,
pu1_pred,
pu1_out_p,
8,
u4_pred_strd,
ps_dec->u2_picture_width >> 1,
~ps_dec->u4_non_zero_cols, ~ps_dec->u4_non_zero_rows);
}
}
if((ps_dec->u2_cbp & 0x01) != 0)
{
pu1_out_p = ps_cur_frm_buf->pu1_v + u4_x_dst_offset + u4_y_dst_offset;
e_error = ps_dec->pf_vld_inv_quant(ps_dec, pi2_vld_out, ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan_matrix,
ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb, V_CHROMA, 0);
if ((IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE != e_error)
{
return e_error;
}
IMPEG2D_IDCT_INP_STATISTICS(pi2_vld_out, ps_dec->u4_non_zero_cols, ps_dec->u4_non_zero_rows);
PROFILE_DISABLE_IDCT_IF0
{
WORD32 idx;
if(1 == (ps_dec->u4_non_zero_cols | ps_dec->u4_non_zero_rows))
idx = 0;
else
idx = 1;
if(0 == ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb)
{
pu1_pred = pu1_out_p;
u4_pred_strd = ps_dec->u2_picture_width >> 1;
}
else
{
pu1_pred = (UWORD8 *)gau1_impeg2_zerobuf;
u4_pred_strd = 8;
}
ps_dec->pf_idct_recon[idx * 2 + ps_dec->i4_last_value_one](pi2_vld_out,
ps_dec->ai2_idct_stg1,
pu1_pred,
pu1_out_p,
8,
u4_pred_strd,
ps_dec->u2_picture_width >> 1,
~ps_dec->u4_non_zero_cols, ~ps_dec->u4_non_zero_rows);
}
}
ps_dec->u2_num_mbs_left--;
ps_dec->u2_first_mb = 0;
ps_dec->u2_mb_x++;
if(ps_dec->s_bit_stream.u4_offset > ps_dec->s_bit_stream.u4_max_offset)
{
return IMPEG2D_BITSTREAM_BUFF_EXCEEDED_ERR;
}
else if (ps_dec->u2_mb_x == ps_dec->u2_num_horiz_mb)
{
ps_dec->u2_mb_x = 0;
ps_dec->u2_mb_y++;
}
}
while(ps_dec->u2_num_mbs_left != 0 && impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(&ps_dec->s_bit_stream,23) != 0x0);
return e_error;
}
Commit Message: Return error for wrong mb_type
If mb_type decoded returns an invalid type of MB, then return error
Bug: 26070014
Change-Id: I66abcad5de1352dd42d05b1a13bb4176153b133c
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void nfs4_setup_readdir(u64 cookie, __be32 *verifier, struct dentry *dentry,
struct nfs4_readdir_arg *readdir)
{
__be32 *start, *p;
BUG_ON(readdir->count < 80);
if (cookie > 2) {
readdir->cookie = cookie;
memcpy(&readdir->verifier, verifier, sizeof(readdir->verifier));
return;
}
readdir->cookie = 0;
memset(&readdir->verifier, 0, sizeof(readdir->verifier));
if (cookie == 2)
return;
/*
* NFSv4 servers do not return entries for '.' and '..'
* Therefore, we fake these entries here. We let '.'
* have cookie 0 and '..' have cookie 1. Note that
* when talking to the server, we always send cookie 0
* instead of 1 or 2.
*/
start = p = kmap_atomic(*readdir->pages, KM_USER0);
if (cookie == 0) {
*p++ = xdr_one; /* next */
*p++ = xdr_zero; /* cookie, first word */
*p++ = xdr_one; /* cookie, second word */
*p++ = xdr_one; /* entry len */
memcpy(p, ".\0\0\0", 4); /* entry */
p++;
*p++ = xdr_one; /* bitmap length */
*p++ = htonl(FATTR4_WORD0_FILEID); /* bitmap */
*p++ = htonl(8); /* attribute buffer length */
p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, NFS_FILEID(dentry->d_inode));
}
*p++ = xdr_one; /* next */
*p++ = xdr_zero; /* cookie, first word */
*p++ = xdr_two; /* cookie, second word */
*p++ = xdr_two; /* entry len */
memcpy(p, "..\0\0", 4); /* entry */
p++;
*p++ = xdr_one; /* bitmap length */
*p++ = htonl(FATTR4_WORD0_FILEID); /* bitmap */
*p++ = htonl(8); /* attribute buffer length */
p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, NFS_FILEID(dentry->d_parent->d_inode));
readdir->pgbase = (char *)p - (char *)start;
readdir->count -= readdir->pgbase;
kunmap_atomic(start, KM_USER0);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: char *dentry_path(struct dentry *dentry, char *buf, int buflen)
{
char *p = NULL;
char *retval;
if (d_unlinked(dentry)) {
p = buf + buflen;
if (prepend(&p, &buflen, "//deleted", 10) != 0)
goto Elong;
buflen++;
}
retval = __dentry_path(dentry, buf, buflen);
if (!IS_ERR(retval) && p)
*p = '/'; /* restore '/' overriden with '\0' */
return retval;
Elong:
return ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG);
}
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static void SkipDXTMipmaps(Image *image, DDSInfo *dds_info, int texel_size)
{
register ssize_t
i;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
size_t
h,
w;
/*
Only skip mipmaps for textures and cube maps
*/
if (dds_info->ddscaps1 & DDSCAPS_MIPMAP
&& (dds_info->ddscaps1 & DDSCAPS_TEXTURE
|| dds_info->ddscaps2 & DDSCAPS2_CUBEMAP))
{
w = DIV2(dds_info->width);
h = DIV2(dds_info->height);
/*
Mipmapcount includes the main image, so start from one
*/
for (i = 1; (i < (ssize_t) dds_info->mipmapcount) && w && h; i++)
{
offset = (MagickOffsetType) ((w + 3) / 4) * ((h + 3) / 4) * texel_size;
(void) SeekBlob(image, offset, SEEK_CUR);
w = DIV2(w);
h = DIV2(h);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Added extra EOF check and some minor refactoring.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: hook_connect (struct t_weechat_plugin *plugin, const char *proxy, const char *address,
int port, int sock, int ipv6, void *gnutls_sess, void *gnutls_cb,
int gnutls_dhkey_size, const char *local_hostname,
t_hook_callback_connect *callback, void *callback_data)
{
struct t_hook *new_hook;
struct t_hook_connect *new_hook_connect;
#ifndef HAVE_GNUTLS
/* make C compiler happy */
(void) gnutls_sess;
(void) gnutls_cb;
(void) gnutls_dhkey_size;
#endif
if ((sock < 0) || !address || (port <= 0) || !callback)
return NULL;
new_hook = malloc (sizeof (*new_hook));
if (!new_hook)
return NULL;
new_hook_connect = malloc (sizeof (*new_hook_connect));
if (!new_hook_connect)
{
free (new_hook);
return NULL;
}
hook_init_data (new_hook, plugin, HOOK_TYPE_CONNECT, HOOK_PRIORITY_DEFAULT,
callback_data);
new_hook->hook_data = new_hook_connect;
new_hook_connect->callback = callback;
new_hook_connect->proxy = (proxy) ? strdup (proxy) : NULL;
new_hook_connect->address = strdup (address);
new_hook_connect->port = port;
new_hook_connect->sock = sock;
new_hook_connect->ipv6 = ipv6;
#ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS
new_hook_connect->gnutls_sess = gnutls_sess;
new_hook_connect->gnutls_cb = gnutls_cb;
new_hook_connect->gnutls_dhkey_size = gnutls_dhkey_size;
#endif
new_hook_connect->local_hostname = (local_hostname) ?
strdup (local_hostname) : NULL;
new_hook_connect->child_read = -1;
new_hook_connect->child_write = -1;
new_hook_connect->child_pid = 0;
new_hook_connect->hook_fd = NULL;
new_hook_connect->handshake_hook_fd = NULL;
new_hook_connect->handshake_hook_timer = NULL;
new_hook_connect->handshake_fd_flags = 0;
new_hook_connect->handshake_ip_address = NULL;
hook_add_to_list (new_hook);
network_connect_with_fork (new_hook);
return new_hook;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static Image *ReadEXRImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
const ImfHeader
*hdr_info;
Image
*image;
ImageInfo
*read_info;
ImfInputFile
*file;
ImfRgba
*scanline;
int
max_x,
max_y,
min_x,
min_y;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
ssize_t
y;
/*
Open image.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
read_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
if (IsPathAccessible(read_info->filename) == MagickFalse)
{
(void) AcquireUniqueFilename(read_info->filename);
(void) ImageToFile(image,read_info->filename,exception);
}
file=ImfOpenInputFile(read_info->filename);
if (file == (ImfInputFile *) NULL)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,BlobError,"UnableToOpenBlob",
ImfErrorMessage());
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->filename,read_info->filename) != 0)
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(read_info->filename);
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
hdr_info=ImfInputHeader(file);
ImfHeaderDisplayWindow(hdr_info,&min_x,&min_y,&max_x,&max_y);
image->columns=max_x-min_x+1UL;
image->rows=max_y-min_y+1UL;
image->matte=MagickTrue;
SetImageColorspace(image,RGBColorspace);
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) ImfCloseInputFile(file);
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->filename,read_info->filename) != 0)
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(read_info->filename);
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
scanline=(ImfRgba *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->columns,sizeof(*scanline));
if (scanline == (ImfRgba *) NULL)
{
(void) ImfCloseInputFile(file);
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->filename,read_info->filename) != 0)
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(read_info->filename);
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
ResetMagickMemory(scanline,0,image->columns*sizeof(*scanline));
ImfInputSetFrameBuffer(file,scanline-min_x-image->columns*(min_y+y),1,
image->columns);
ImfInputReadPixels(file,min_y+y,min_y+y);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ClampToQuantum((MagickRealType) QuantumRange*
ImfHalfToFloat(scanline[x].r)));
SetPixelGreen(q,ClampToQuantum((MagickRealType) QuantumRange*
ImfHalfToFloat(scanline[x].g)));
SetPixelBlue(q,ClampToQuantum((MagickRealType) QuantumRange*
ImfHalfToFloat(scanline[x].b)));
SetPixelAlpha(q,ClampToQuantum((MagickRealType) QuantumRange*
ImfHalfToFloat(scanline[x].a)));
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
scanline=(ImfRgba *) RelinquishMagickMemory(scanline);
(void) ImfCloseInputFile(file);
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->filename,read_info->filename) != 0)
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(read_info->filename);
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static void *btif_hh_poll_event_thread(void *arg)
{
btif_hh_device_t *p_dev = arg;
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: Thread created fd = %d", __FUNCTION__, p_dev->fd);
struct pollfd pfds[1];
int ret;
pfds[0].fd = p_dev->fd;
pfds[0].events = POLLIN;
uhid_set_non_blocking(p_dev->fd);
while(p_dev->hh_keep_polling){
ret = poll(pfds, 1, 50);
if (ret < 0) {
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("%s: Cannot poll for fds: %s\n", __FUNCTION__, strerror(errno));
break;
}
if (pfds[0].revents & POLLIN) {
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("btif_hh_poll_event_thread: POLLIN");
ret = uhid_event(p_dev);
if (ret){
break;
}
}
}
p_dev->hh_poll_thread_id = -1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void ChromeWebContentsDelegateAndroid::Observe(
int type,
const content::NotificationSource& source,
const content::NotificationDetails& details) {
switch (type) {
case chrome::NOTIFICATION_FIND_RESULT_AVAILABLE:
OnFindResultAvailable(
content::Source<WebContents>(source).ptr(),
content::Details<FindNotificationDetails>(details).ptr());
break;
default:
NOTREACHED() << "Unexpected notification: " << type;
break;
}
}
Commit Message: Revert "Load web contents after tab is created."
This reverts commit 4c55f398def3214369aefa9f2f2e8f5940d3799d.
BUG=432562
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/894003005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#314469}
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int usbhid_parse(struct hid_device *hid)
{
struct usb_interface *intf = to_usb_interface(hid->dev.parent);
struct usb_host_interface *interface = intf->cur_altsetting;
struct usb_device *dev = interface_to_usbdev (intf);
struct hid_descriptor *hdesc;
u32 quirks = 0;
unsigned int rsize = 0;
char *rdesc;
int ret, n;
quirks = usbhid_lookup_quirk(le16_to_cpu(dev->descriptor.idVendor),
le16_to_cpu(dev->descriptor.idProduct));
if (quirks & HID_QUIRK_IGNORE)
return -ENODEV;
/* Many keyboards and mice don't like to be polled for reports,
* so we will always set the HID_QUIRK_NOGET flag for them. */
if (interface->desc.bInterfaceSubClass == USB_INTERFACE_SUBCLASS_BOOT) {
if (interface->desc.bInterfaceProtocol == USB_INTERFACE_PROTOCOL_KEYBOARD ||
interface->desc.bInterfaceProtocol == USB_INTERFACE_PROTOCOL_MOUSE)
quirks |= HID_QUIRK_NOGET;
}
if (usb_get_extra_descriptor(interface, HID_DT_HID, &hdesc) &&
(!interface->desc.bNumEndpoints ||
usb_get_extra_descriptor(&interface->endpoint[0], HID_DT_HID, &hdesc))) {
dbg_hid("class descriptor not present\n");
return -ENODEV;
}
hid->version = le16_to_cpu(hdesc->bcdHID);
hid->country = hdesc->bCountryCode;
for (n = 0; n < hdesc->bNumDescriptors; n++)
if (hdesc->desc[n].bDescriptorType == HID_DT_REPORT)
rsize = le16_to_cpu(hdesc->desc[n].wDescriptorLength);
if (!rsize || rsize > HID_MAX_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE) {
dbg_hid("weird size of report descriptor (%u)\n", rsize);
return -EINVAL;
}
rdesc = kmalloc(rsize, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!rdesc)
return -ENOMEM;
hid_set_idle(dev, interface->desc.bInterfaceNumber, 0, 0);
ret = hid_get_class_descriptor(dev, interface->desc.bInterfaceNumber,
HID_DT_REPORT, rdesc, rsize);
if (ret < 0) {
dbg_hid("reading report descriptor failed\n");
kfree(rdesc);
goto err;
}
ret = hid_parse_report(hid, rdesc, rsize);
kfree(rdesc);
if (ret) {
dbg_hid("parsing report descriptor failed\n");
goto err;
}
hid->quirks |= quirks;
return 0;
err:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: HID: usbhid: fix out-of-bounds bug
The hid descriptor identifies the length and type of subordinate
descriptors for a device. If the received hid descriptor is smaller than
the size of the struct hid_descriptor, it is possible to cause
out-of-bounds.
In addition, if bNumDescriptors of the hid descriptor have an incorrect
value, this can also cause out-of-bounds while approaching hdesc->desc[n].
So check the size of hid descriptor and bNumDescriptors.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in usbhid_parse+0x9b1/0xa20
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88006c5f8edf by task kworker/1:2/1261
CPU: 1 PID: 1261 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted
4.14.0-rc1-42251-gebb2c2437d80 #169
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
dump_stack+0x292/0x395 lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351
kasan_report+0x22f/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_load1_noabort+0x19/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:427
usbhid_parse+0x9b1/0xa20 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c:1004
hid_add_device+0x16b/0xb30 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:2944
usbhid_probe+0xc28/0x1100 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c:1369
usb_probe_interface+0x35d/0x8e0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:361
really_probe drivers/base/dd.c:413
driver_probe_device+0x610/0xa00 drivers/base/dd.c:557
__device_attach_driver+0x230/0x290 drivers/base/dd.c:653
bus_for_each_drv+0x161/0x210 drivers/base/bus.c:463
__device_attach+0x26e/0x3d0 drivers/base/dd.c:710
device_initial_probe+0x1f/0x30 drivers/base/dd.c:757
bus_probe_device+0x1eb/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:523
device_add+0xd0b/0x1660 drivers/base/core.c:1835
usb_set_configuration+0x104e/0x1870 drivers/usb/core/message.c:1932
generic_probe+0x73/0xe0 drivers/usb/core/generic.c:174
usb_probe_device+0xaf/0xe0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:266
really_probe drivers/base/dd.c:413
driver_probe_device+0x610/0xa00 drivers/base/dd.c:557
__device_attach_driver+0x230/0x290 drivers/base/dd.c:653
bus_for_each_drv+0x161/0x210 drivers/base/bus.c:463
__device_attach+0x26e/0x3d0 drivers/base/dd.c:710
device_initial_probe+0x1f/0x30 drivers/base/dd.c:757
bus_probe_device+0x1eb/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:523
device_add+0xd0b/0x1660 drivers/base/core.c:1835
usb_new_device+0x7b8/0x1020 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:2457
hub_port_connect drivers/usb/core/hub.c:4903
hub_port_connect_change drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5009
port_event drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5115
hub_event+0x194d/0x3740 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5195
process_one_work+0xc7f/0x1db0 kernel/workqueue.c:2119
worker_thread+0x221/0x1850 kernel/workqueue.c:2253
kthread+0x3a1/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:231
ret_from_fork+0x2a/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:431
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaejoong Kim <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Alan Stern <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-125
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void OnZipAnalysisFinished(const zip_analyzer::Results& results) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
DCHECK_EQ(ClientDownloadRequest::ZIPPED_EXECUTABLE, type_);
if (!service_)
return;
if (results.success) {
zipped_executable_ = results.has_executable;
archived_binary_.CopyFrom(results.archived_binary);
DVLOG(1) << "Zip analysis finished for " << item_->GetFullPath().value()
<< ", has_executable=" << results.has_executable
<< " has_archive=" << results.has_archive;
} else {
DVLOG(1) << "Zip analysis failed for " << item_->GetFullPath().value();
}
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("SBClientDownload.ZipFileHasExecutable",
zipped_executable_);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("SBClientDownload.ZipFileHasArchiveButNoExecutable",
results.has_archive && !zipped_executable_);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_TIMES("SBClientDownload.ExtractZipFeaturesTime",
base::TimeTicks::Now() - zip_analysis_start_time_);
for (const auto& file_extension : results.archived_archive_filetypes)
RecordArchivedArchiveFileExtensionType(file_extension);
if (!zipped_executable_ && !results.has_archive) {
PostFinishTask(UNKNOWN, REASON_ARCHIVE_WITHOUT_BINARIES);
return;
}
if (!zipped_executable_ && results.has_archive)
type_ = ClientDownloadRequest::ZIPPED_ARCHIVE;
OnFileFeatureExtractionDone();
}
Commit Message: Add the SandboxedDMGParser and wire it up to the DownloadProtectionService.
BUG=496898,464083
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1299223006 .
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344876}
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: std::string DownloadResourceHandler::DebugString() const {
const ResourceRequestInfoImpl* info = GetRequestInfo();
return base::StringPrintf("{"
" url_ = " "\"%s\""
" info = {"
" child_id = " "%d"
" request_id = " "%d"
" route_id = " "%d"
" }"
" }",
request() ?
request()->url().spec().c_str() :
"<NULL request>",
info->GetChildID(),
info->GetRequestID(),
info->GetRouteID());
}
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <[email protected]>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
CWE ID: CWE-284
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void LocalFrameClientImpl::SetVirtualTimePauser(
WebScopedVirtualTimePauser virtual_time_pauser) {
virtual_time_pauser_ = std::move(virtual_time_pauser);
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254
Output: | 0 |
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