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stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 386
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stringclasses 3
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Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool Extension::InitFromValue(const DictionaryValue& source, int flags,
std::string* error) {
URLPattern::ParseOption parse_strictness =
(flags & STRICT_ERROR_CHECKS ? URLPattern::PARSE_STRICT
: URLPattern::PARSE_LENIENT);
if (source.HasKey(keys::kPublicKey)) {
std::string public_key_bytes;
if (!source.GetString(keys::kPublicKey,
&public_key_) ||
!ParsePEMKeyBytes(public_key_,
&public_key_bytes) ||
!GenerateId(public_key_bytes, &id_)) {
*error = errors::kInvalidKey;
return false;
}
} else if (flags & REQUIRE_KEY) {
*error = errors::kInvalidKey;
return false;
} else {
id_ = Extension::GenerateIdForPath(path());
if (id_.empty()) {
NOTREACHED() << "Could not create ID from path.";
return false;
}
}
manifest_value_.reset(source.DeepCopy());
extension_url_ = Extension::GetBaseURLFromExtensionId(id());
std::string version_str;
if (!source.GetString(keys::kVersion, &version_str)) {
*error = errors::kInvalidVersion;
return false;
}
version_.reset(Version::GetVersionFromString(version_str));
if (!version_.get() ||
version_->components().size() > 4) {
*error = errors::kInvalidVersion;
return false;
}
string16 localized_name;
if (!source.GetString(keys::kName, &localized_name)) {
*error = errors::kInvalidName;
return false;
}
base::i18n::AdjustStringForLocaleDirection(&localized_name);
name_ = UTF16ToUTF8(localized_name);
if (source.HasKey(keys::kDescription)) {
if (!source.GetString(keys::kDescription,
&description_)) {
*error = errors::kInvalidDescription;
return false;
}
}
if (source.HasKey(keys::kHomepageURL)) {
std::string tmp;
if (!source.GetString(keys::kHomepageURL, &tmp)) {
*error = ExtensionErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
errors::kInvalidHomepageURL, "");
return false;
}
homepage_url_ = GURL(tmp);
if (!homepage_url_.is_valid()) {
*error = ExtensionErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
errors::kInvalidHomepageURL, tmp);
return false;
}
}
if (source.HasKey(keys::kUpdateURL)) {
std::string tmp;
if (!source.GetString(keys::kUpdateURL, &tmp)) {
*error = ExtensionErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
errors::kInvalidUpdateURL, "");
return false;
}
update_url_ = GURL(tmp);
if (!update_url_.is_valid() ||
update_url_.has_ref()) {
*error = ExtensionErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
errors::kInvalidUpdateURL, tmp);
return false;
}
}
if (source.HasKey(keys::kMinimumChromeVersion)) {
std::string minimum_version_string;
if (!source.GetString(keys::kMinimumChromeVersion,
&minimum_version_string)) {
*error = errors::kInvalidMinimumChromeVersion;
return false;
}
scoped_ptr<Version> minimum_version(
Version::GetVersionFromString(minimum_version_string));
if (!minimum_version.get()) {
*error = errors::kInvalidMinimumChromeVersion;
return false;
}
chrome::VersionInfo current_version_info;
if (!current_version_info.is_valid()) {
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
scoped_ptr<Version> current_version(
Version::GetVersionFromString(current_version_info.Version()));
if (!current_version.get()) {
DCHECK(false);
return false;
}
if (current_version->CompareTo(*minimum_version) < 0) {
*error = ExtensionErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
errors::kChromeVersionTooLow,
l10n_util::GetStringUTF8(IDS_PRODUCT_NAME),
minimum_version_string);
return false;
}
}
source.GetBoolean(keys::kConvertedFromUserScript,
&converted_from_user_script_);
if (source.HasKey(keys::kIcons)) {
DictionaryValue* icons_value = NULL;
if (!source.GetDictionary(keys::kIcons, &icons_value)) {
*error = errors::kInvalidIcons;
return false;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(kIconSizes); ++i) {
std::string key = base::IntToString(kIconSizes[i]);
if (icons_value->HasKey(key)) {
std::string icon_path;
if (!icons_value->GetString(key, &icon_path)) {
*error = ExtensionErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
errors::kInvalidIconPath, key);
return false;
}
if (!icon_path.empty() && icon_path[0] == '/')
icon_path = icon_path.substr(1);
if (icon_path.empty()) {
*error = ExtensionErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
errors::kInvalidIconPath, key);
return false;
}
icons_.Add(kIconSizes[i], icon_path);
}
}
}
is_theme_ = false;
if (source.HasKey(keys::kTheme)) {
if (ContainsNonThemeKeys(source)) {
*error = errors::kThemesCannotContainExtensions;
return false;
}
DictionaryValue* theme_value = NULL;
if (!source.GetDictionary(keys::kTheme, &theme_value)) {
*error = errors::kInvalidTheme;
return false;
}
is_theme_ = true;
DictionaryValue* images_value = NULL;
if (theme_value->GetDictionary(keys::kThemeImages, &images_value)) {
for (DictionaryValue::key_iterator iter = images_value->begin_keys();
iter != images_value->end_keys(); ++iter) {
std::string val;
if (!images_value->GetString(*iter, &val)) {
*error = errors::kInvalidThemeImages;
return false;
}
}
theme_images_.reset(images_value->DeepCopy());
}
DictionaryValue* colors_value = NULL;
if (theme_value->GetDictionary(keys::kThemeColors, &colors_value)) {
for (DictionaryValue::key_iterator iter = colors_value->begin_keys();
iter != colors_value->end_keys(); ++iter) {
ListValue* color_list = NULL;
double alpha = 0.0;
int color = 0;
if (!colors_value->GetListWithoutPathExpansion(*iter, &color_list) ||
((color_list->GetSize() != 3) &&
((color_list->GetSize() != 4) ||
!color_list->GetDouble(3, &alpha))) ||
!color_list->GetInteger(0, &color) ||
!color_list->GetInteger(1, &color) ||
!color_list->GetInteger(2, &color)) {
*error = errors::kInvalidThemeColors;
return false;
}
}
theme_colors_.reset(colors_value->DeepCopy());
}
DictionaryValue* tints_value = NULL;
if (theme_value->GetDictionary(keys::kThemeTints, &tints_value)) {
for (DictionaryValue::key_iterator iter = tints_value->begin_keys();
iter != tints_value->end_keys(); ++iter) {
ListValue* tint_list = NULL;
double v = 0.0;
if (!tints_value->GetListWithoutPathExpansion(*iter, &tint_list) ||
tint_list->GetSize() != 3 ||
!tint_list->GetDouble(0, &v) ||
!tint_list->GetDouble(1, &v) ||
!tint_list->GetDouble(2, &v)) {
*error = errors::kInvalidThemeTints;
return false;
}
}
theme_tints_.reset(tints_value->DeepCopy());
}
DictionaryValue* display_properties_value = NULL;
if (theme_value->GetDictionary(keys::kThemeDisplayProperties,
&display_properties_value)) {
theme_display_properties_.reset(
display_properties_value->DeepCopy());
}
return true;
}
if (source.HasKey(keys::kPlugins)) {
ListValue* list_value = NULL;
if (!source.GetList(keys::kPlugins, &list_value)) {
*error = errors::kInvalidPlugins;
return false;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < list_value->GetSize(); ++i) {
DictionaryValue* plugin_value = NULL;
std::string path_str;
bool is_public = false;
if (!list_value->GetDictionary(i, &plugin_value)) {
*error = errors::kInvalidPlugins;
return false;
}
if (!plugin_value->GetString(keys::kPluginsPath, &path_str)) {
*error = ExtensionErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
errors::kInvalidPluginsPath, base::IntToString(i));
return false;
}
if (plugin_value->HasKey(keys::kPluginsPublic)) {
if (!plugin_value->GetBoolean(keys::kPluginsPublic, &is_public)) {
*error = ExtensionErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
errors::kInvalidPluginsPublic, base::IntToString(i));
return false;
}
}
#if !defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
plugins_.push_back(PluginInfo());
plugins_.back().path = path().AppendASCII(path_str);
plugins_.back().is_public = is_public;
#endif
}
}
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableExperimentalExtensionApis) &&
source.HasKey(keys::kNaClModules)) {
ListValue* list_value = NULL;
if (!source.GetList(keys::kNaClModules, &list_value)) {
*error = errors::kInvalidNaClModules;
return false;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < list_value->GetSize(); ++i) {
DictionaryValue* module_value = NULL;
std::string path_str;
std::string mime_type;
if (!list_value->GetDictionary(i, &module_value)) {
*error = errors::kInvalidNaClModules;
return false;
}
if (!module_value->GetString(keys::kNaClModulesPath, &path_str)) {
*error = ExtensionErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
errors::kInvalidNaClModulesPath, base::IntToString(i));
return false;
}
if (!module_value->GetString(keys::kNaClModulesMIMEType, &mime_type)) {
*error = ExtensionErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
errors::kInvalidNaClModulesMIMEType, base::IntToString(i));
return false;
}
nacl_modules_.push_back(NaClModuleInfo());
nacl_modules_.back().url = GetResourceURL(path_str);
nacl_modules_.back().mime_type = mime_type;
}
}
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableExperimentalExtensionApis) &&
source.HasKey(keys::kToolstrips)) {
ListValue* list_value = NULL;
if (!source.GetList(keys::kToolstrips, &list_value)) {
*error = errors::kInvalidToolstrips;
return false;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < list_value->GetSize(); ++i) {
GURL toolstrip;
DictionaryValue* toolstrip_value = NULL;
std::string toolstrip_path;
if (list_value->GetString(i, &toolstrip_path)) {
toolstrip = GetResourceURL(toolstrip_path);
} else if (list_value->GetDictionary(i, &toolstrip_value)) {
if (!toolstrip_value->GetString(keys::kToolstripPath,
&toolstrip_path)) {
*error = ExtensionErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
errors::kInvalidToolstrip, base::IntToString(i));
return false;
}
toolstrip = GetResourceURL(toolstrip_path);
} else {
*error = ExtensionErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
errors::kInvalidToolstrip, base::IntToString(i));
return false;
}
toolstrips_.push_back(toolstrip);
}
}
if (source.HasKey(keys::kContentScripts)) {
ListValue* list_value;
if (!source.GetList(keys::kContentScripts, &list_value)) {
*error = errors::kInvalidContentScriptsList;
return false;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < list_value->GetSize(); ++i) {
DictionaryValue* content_script = NULL;
if (!list_value->GetDictionary(i, &content_script)) {
*error = ExtensionErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
errors::kInvalidContentScript, base::IntToString(i));
return false;
}
UserScript script;
if (!LoadUserScriptHelper(content_script, i, flags, error, &script))
return false; // Failed to parse script context definition.
script.set_extension_id(id());
if (converted_from_user_script_) {
script.set_emulate_greasemonkey(true);
script.set_match_all_frames(true); // Greasemonkey matches all frames.
}
content_scripts_.push_back(script);
}
}
DictionaryValue* page_action_value = NULL;
if (source.HasKey(keys::kPageActions)) {
ListValue* list_value = NULL;
if (!source.GetList(keys::kPageActions, &list_value)) {
*error = errors::kInvalidPageActionsList;
return false;
}
size_t list_value_length = list_value->GetSize();
if (list_value_length == 0u) {
} else if (list_value_length == 1u) {
if (!list_value->GetDictionary(0, &page_action_value)) {
*error = errors::kInvalidPageAction;
return false;
}
} else { // list_value_length > 1u.
*error = errors::kInvalidPageActionsListSize;
return false;
}
} else if (source.HasKey(keys::kPageAction)) {
if (!source.GetDictionary(keys::kPageAction, &page_action_value)) {
*error = errors::kInvalidPageAction;
return false;
}
}
if (page_action_value) {
page_action_.reset(
LoadExtensionActionHelper(page_action_value, error));
if (!page_action_.get())
return false; // Failed to parse page action definition.
}
if (source.HasKey(keys::kBrowserAction)) {
DictionaryValue* browser_action_value = NULL;
if (!source.GetDictionary(keys::kBrowserAction, &browser_action_value)) {
*error = errors::kInvalidBrowserAction;
return false;
}
browser_action_.reset(
LoadExtensionActionHelper(browser_action_value, error));
if (!browser_action_.get())
return false; // Failed to parse browser action definition.
}
if (source.HasKey(keys::kFileBrowserHandlers)) {
ListValue* file_browser_handlers_value = NULL;
if (!source.GetList(keys::kFileBrowserHandlers,
&file_browser_handlers_value)) {
*error = errors::kInvalidFileBrowserHandler;
return false;
}
file_browser_handlers_.reset(
LoadFileBrowserHandlers(file_browser_handlers_value, error));
if (!file_browser_handlers_.get())
return false; // Failed to parse file browser actions definition.
}
if (!LoadIsApp(manifest_value_.get(), error) ||
!LoadExtent(manifest_value_.get(), keys::kWebURLs,
&extent_,
errors::kInvalidWebURLs, errors::kInvalidWebURL,
parse_strictness, error) ||
!EnsureNotHybridApp(manifest_value_.get(), error) ||
!LoadLaunchURL(manifest_value_.get(), error) ||
!LoadLaunchContainer(manifest_value_.get(), error) ||
!LoadAppIsolation(manifest_value_.get(), error)) {
return false;
}
if (source.HasKey(keys::kOptionsPage)) {
std::string options_str;
if (!source.GetString(keys::kOptionsPage, &options_str)) {
*error = errors::kInvalidOptionsPage;
return false;
}
if (is_hosted_app()) {
GURL options_url(options_str);
if (!options_url.is_valid() ||
!(options_url.SchemeIs("http") || options_url.SchemeIs("https"))) {
*error = errors::kInvalidOptionsPageInHostedApp;
return false;
}
options_url_ = options_url;
} else {
GURL absolute(options_str);
if (absolute.is_valid()) {
*error = errors::kInvalidOptionsPageExpectUrlInPackage;
return false;
}
options_url_ = GetResourceURL(options_str);
if (!options_url_.is_valid()) {
*error = errors::kInvalidOptionsPage;
return false;
}
}
}
if (source.HasKey(keys::kPermissions)) {
ListValue* permissions = NULL;
if (!source.GetList(keys::kPermissions, &permissions)) {
*error = ExtensionErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
errors::kInvalidPermissions, "");
return false;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < permissions->GetSize(); ++i) {
std::string permission_str;
if (!permissions->GetString(i, &permission_str)) {
*error = ExtensionErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
errors::kInvalidPermission, base::IntToString(i));
return false;
}
if (!IsComponentOnlyPermission(permission_str)
#ifndef NDEBUG
&& !CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kExposePrivateExtensionApi)
#endif
) {
continue;
}
if (permission_str == kOldUnlimitedStoragePermission)
permission_str = kUnlimitedStoragePermission;
if (web_extent().is_empty() || location() == Extension::COMPONENT) {
if (IsAPIPermission(permission_str)) {
if (permission_str == Extension::kExperimentalPermission &&
!CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableExperimentalExtensionApis) &&
location() != Extension::COMPONENT) {
*error = errors::kExperimentalFlagRequired;
return false;
}
api_permissions_.insert(permission_str);
continue;
}
} else {
if (IsHostedAppPermission(permission_str)) {
api_permissions_.insert(permission_str);
continue;
}
}
URLPattern pattern = URLPattern(CanExecuteScriptEverywhere() ?
URLPattern::SCHEME_ALL : kValidHostPermissionSchemes);
URLPattern::ParseResult parse_result = pattern.Parse(permission_str,
parse_strictness);
if (parse_result == URLPattern::PARSE_SUCCESS) {
if (!CanSpecifyHostPermission(pattern)) {
*error = ExtensionErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
errors::kInvalidPermissionScheme, base::IntToString(i));
return false;
}
pattern.SetPath("/*");
if (pattern.MatchesScheme(chrome::kFileScheme) &&
!CanExecuteScriptEverywhere()) {
wants_file_access_ = true;
if (!(flags & ALLOW_FILE_ACCESS))
pattern.set_valid_schemes(
pattern.valid_schemes() & ~URLPattern::SCHEME_FILE);
}
host_permissions_.push_back(pattern);
}
}
}
if (source.HasKey(keys::kBackground)) {
std::string background_str;
if (!source.GetString(keys::kBackground, &background_str)) {
*error = errors::kInvalidBackground;
return false;
}
if (is_hosted_app()) {
if (api_permissions_.find(kBackgroundPermission) ==
api_permissions_.end()) {
*error = errors::kBackgroundPermissionNeeded;
return false;
}
GURL bg_page(background_str);
if (!bg_page.is_valid()) {
*error = errors::kInvalidBackgroundInHostedApp;
return false;
}
if (!(bg_page.SchemeIs("https") ||
(CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kAllowHTTPBackgroundPage) &&
bg_page.SchemeIs("http")))) {
*error = errors::kInvalidBackgroundInHostedApp;
return false;
}
background_url_ = bg_page;
} else {
background_url_ = GetResourceURL(background_str);
}
}
if (source.HasKey(keys::kDefaultLocale)) {
if (!source.GetString(keys::kDefaultLocale, &default_locale_) ||
!l10n_util::IsValidLocaleSyntax(default_locale_)) {
*error = errors::kInvalidDefaultLocale;
return false;
}
}
if (source.HasKey(keys::kChromeURLOverrides)) {
DictionaryValue* overrides = NULL;
if (!source.GetDictionary(keys::kChromeURLOverrides, &overrides)) {
*error = errors::kInvalidChromeURLOverrides;
return false;
}
for (DictionaryValue::key_iterator iter = overrides->begin_keys();
iter != overrides->end_keys(); ++iter) {
std::string page = *iter;
std::string val;
if ((page != chrome::kChromeUINewTabHost &&
#if defined(TOUCH_UI)
page != chrome::kChromeUIKeyboardHost &&
#endif
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
page != chrome::kChromeUIActivationMessageHost &&
#endif
page != chrome::kChromeUIBookmarksHost &&
page != chrome::kChromeUIHistoryHost) ||
!overrides->GetStringWithoutPathExpansion(*iter, &val)) {
*error = errors::kInvalidChromeURLOverrides;
return false;
}
chrome_url_overrides_[page] = GetResourceURL(val);
}
if (overrides->size() > 1) {
*error = errors::kMultipleOverrides;
return false;
}
}
if (source.HasKey(keys::kOmnibox)) {
if (!source.GetString(keys::kOmniboxKeyword, &omnibox_keyword_) ||
omnibox_keyword_.empty()) {
*error = errors::kInvalidOmniboxKeyword;
return false;
}
}
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableExperimentalExtensionApis) &&
source.HasKey(keys::kContentSecurityPolicy)) {
std::string content_security_policy;
if (!source.GetString(keys::kContentSecurityPolicy,
&content_security_policy)) {
*error = errors::kInvalidContentSecurityPolicy;
return false;
}
const char kBadCSPCharacters[] = {'\r', '\n', '\0'};
if (content_security_policy.find_first_of(kBadCSPCharacters, 0,
arraysize(kBadCSPCharacters)) !=
std::string::npos) {
*error = errors::kInvalidContentSecurityPolicy;
return false;
}
content_security_policy_ = content_security_policy;
}
if (source.HasKey(keys::kDevToolsPage)) {
std::string devtools_str;
if (!source.GetString(keys::kDevToolsPage, &devtools_str)) {
*error = errors::kInvalidDevToolsPage;
return false;
}
if (!HasApiPermission(Extension::kExperimentalPermission)) {
*error = errors::kDevToolsExperimental;
return false;
}
devtools_url_ = GetResourceURL(devtools_str);
}
if (source.HasKey(keys::kSidebar)) {
DictionaryValue* sidebar_value = NULL;
if (!source.GetDictionary(keys::kSidebar, &sidebar_value)) {
*error = errors::kInvalidSidebar;
return false;
}
if (!HasApiPermission(Extension::kExperimentalPermission)) {
*error = errors::kSidebarExperimental;
return false;
}
sidebar_defaults_.reset(LoadExtensionSidebarDefaults(sidebar_value, error));
if (!sidebar_defaults_.get())
return false; // Failed to parse sidebar definition.
}
if (source.HasKey(keys::kTts)) {
DictionaryValue* tts_dict = NULL;
if (!source.GetDictionary(keys::kTts, &tts_dict)) {
*error = errors::kInvalidTts;
return false;
}
if (tts_dict->HasKey(keys::kTtsVoices)) {
ListValue* tts_voices = NULL;
if (!tts_dict->GetList(keys::kTtsVoices, &tts_voices)) {
*error = errors::kInvalidTtsVoices;
return false;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < tts_voices->GetSize(); i++) {
DictionaryValue* one_tts_voice = NULL;
if (!tts_voices->GetDictionary(i, &one_tts_voice)) {
*error = errors::kInvalidTtsVoices;
return false;
}
TtsVoice voice_data;
if (one_tts_voice->HasKey(keys::kTtsVoicesVoiceName)) {
if (!one_tts_voice->GetString(
keys::kTtsVoicesVoiceName, &voice_data.voice_name)) {
*error = errors::kInvalidTtsVoicesVoiceName;
return false;
}
}
if (one_tts_voice->HasKey(keys::kTtsVoicesLocale)) {
if (!one_tts_voice->GetString(
keys::kTtsVoicesLocale, &voice_data.locale) ||
!l10n_util::IsValidLocaleSyntax(voice_data.locale)) {
*error = errors::kInvalidTtsVoicesLocale;
return false;
}
}
if (one_tts_voice->HasKey(keys::kTtsVoicesGender)) {
if (!one_tts_voice->GetString(
keys::kTtsVoicesGender, &voice_data.gender) ||
(voice_data.gender != keys::kTtsGenderMale &&
voice_data.gender != keys::kTtsGenderFemale)) {
*error = errors::kInvalidTtsVoicesGender;
return false;
}
}
tts_voices_.push_back(voice_data);
}
}
}
incognito_split_mode_ = is_app();
if (source.HasKey(keys::kIncognito)) {
std::string value;
if (!source.GetString(keys::kIncognito, &value)) {
*error = errors::kInvalidIncognitoBehavior;
return false;
}
if (value == values::kIncognitoSpanning) {
incognito_split_mode_ = false;
} else if (value == values::kIncognitoSplit) {
incognito_split_mode_ = true;
} else {
*error = errors::kInvalidIncognitoBehavior;
return false;
}
}
if (HasMultipleUISurfaces()) {
*error = errors::kOneUISurfaceOnly;
return false;
}
InitEffectiveHostPermissions();
DCHECK(source.Equals(manifest_value_.get()));
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The extensions implementation in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly validate the URL for the home page, which allows remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: Prevent extensions from defining homepages with schemes other than valid web extents.
BUG=84402
TEST=ExtensionManifestTest.ParseHomepageURLs
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7089014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87722 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 15,491 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void _xml_characterDataHandler(void *userData, const XML_Char *s, int len)
{
xml_parser *parser = (xml_parser *)userData;
if (parser) {
zval *retval, *args[2];
if (parser->characterDataHandler) {
args[0] = _xml_resource_zval(parser->index);
args[1] = _xml_xmlchar_zval(s, len, parser->target_encoding);
if ((retval = xml_call_handler(parser, parser->characterDataHandler, parser->characterDataPtr, 2, args))) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&retval);
}
}
if (parser->data) {
int i;
int doprint = 0;
char *decoded_value;
int decoded_len;
decoded_value = xml_utf8_decode(s,len,&decoded_len,parser->target_encoding);
for (i = 0; i < decoded_len; i++) {
switch (decoded_value[i]) {
case ' ':
case '\t':
case '\n':
continue;
default:
doprint = 1;
break;
}
if (doprint) {
break;
}
}
if (doprint || (! parser->skipwhite)) {
if (parser->lastwasopen) {
zval **myval;
/* check if the current tag already has a value - if yes append to that! */
if (zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_PP(parser->ctag),"value",sizeof("value"),(void **) &myval) == SUCCESS) {
int newlen = Z_STRLEN_PP(myval) + decoded_len;
Z_STRVAL_PP(myval) = erealloc(Z_STRVAL_PP(myval),newlen+1);
strncpy(Z_STRVAL_PP(myval) + Z_STRLEN_PP(myval), decoded_value, decoded_len + 1);
Z_STRLEN_PP(myval) += decoded_len;
efree(decoded_value);
} else {
add_assoc_string(*(parser->ctag),"value",decoded_value,0);
}
} else {
zval *tag;
zval **curtag, **mytype, **myval;
HashPosition hpos=NULL;
zend_hash_internal_pointer_end_ex(Z_ARRVAL_P(parser->data), &hpos);
if (hpos && (zend_hash_get_current_data_ex(Z_ARRVAL_P(parser->data), (void **) &curtag, &hpos) == SUCCESS)) {
if (zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_PP(curtag),"type",sizeof("type"),(void **) &mytype) == SUCCESS) {
if (!strcmp(Z_STRVAL_PP(mytype), "cdata")) {
if (zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_PP(curtag),"value",sizeof("value"),(void **) &myval) == SUCCESS) {
int newlen = Z_STRLEN_PP(myval) + decoded_len;
Z_STRVAL_PP(myval) = erealloc(Z_STRVAL_PP(myval),newlen+1);
strncpy(Z_STRVAL_PP(myval) + Z_STRLEN_PP(myval), decoded_value, decoded_len + 1);
Z_STRLEN_PP(myval) += decoded_len;
efree(decoded_value);
return;
}
}
}
}
if (parser->level <= XML_MAXLEVEL) {
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(tag);
array_init(tag);
_xml_add_to_info(parser,parser->ltags[parser->level-1] + parser->toffset);
add_assoc_string(tag,"tag",parser->ltags[parser->level-1] + parser->toffset,1);
add_assoc_string(tag,"value",decoded_value,0);
add_assoc_string(tag,"type","cdata",1);
add_assoc_long(tag,"level",parser->level);
zend_hash_next_index_insert(Z_ARRVAL_P(parser->data),&tag,sizeof(zval*),NULL);
} else if (parser->level == (XML_MAXLEVEL + 1)) {
TSRMLS_FETCH();
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Maximum depth exceeded - Results truncated");
}
}
} else {
efree(decoded_value);
}
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The xml_parse_into_struct function in ext/xml/xml.c in PHP before 5.5.35, 5.6.x before 5.6.21, and 7.x before 7.0.6 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (buffer under-read and segmentation fault) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted XML data in the second argument, leading to a parser level of zero.
Commit Message: | High | 6,040 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: sysapi_translate_arch( const char *machine, const char *)
{
char tmp[64];
char *tmparch;
#if defined(AIX)
/* AIX machines have a ton of different models encoded into the uname
structure, so go to some other function to decode and group the
architecture together */
struct utsname buf;
if( uname(&buf) < 0 ) {
return NULL;
}
return( get_aix_arch( &buf ) );
#elif defined(HPUX)
return( get_hpux_arch( ) );
#else
if( !strcmp(machine, "alpha") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "ALPHA" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "i86pc") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "INTEL" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "i686") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "INTEL" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "i586") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "INTEL" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "i486") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "INTEL" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "i386") ) { //LDAP entry
#if defined(Darwin)
/* Mac OS X often claims to be i386 in uname, even if the
* hardware is x86_64 and the OS can run 64-bit binaries.
* We'll base our architecture name on the default build
* target for gcc. In 10.5 and earlier, that's i386.
* On 10.6, it's x86_64.
* The value we're querying is the kernel version.
* 10.6 kernels have a version that starts with "10."
* Older versions have a lower first number.
*/
int ret;
char val[32];
size_t len = sizeof(val);
/* assume x86 */
sprintf( tmp, "INTEL" );
ret = sysctlbyname("kern.osrelease", &val, &len, NULL, 0);
if (ret == 0 && strncmp(val, "10.", 3) == 0) {
/* but we could be proven wrong */
sprintf( tmp, "X86_64" );
}
#else
sprintf( tmp, "INTEL" );
#endif
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "ia64") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "IA64" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "x86_64") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "X86_64" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "amd64") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "X86_64" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "sun4u") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "SUN4u" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "sun4m") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "SUN4x" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "sun4c") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "SUN4x" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "sparc") ) { //LDAP entry
sprintf( tmp, "SUN4x" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "Power Macintosh") ) { //LDAP entry
sprintf( tmp, "PPC" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "ppc") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "PPC" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "ppc32") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "PPC" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "ppc64") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "PPC64" );
}
else {
sprintf( tmp, machine );
}
tmparch = strdup( tmp );
if( !tmparch ) {
EXCEPT( "Out of memory!" );
}
return( tmparch );
#endif /* if HPUX else */
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-134
Summary: Multiple format string vulnerabilities in Condor 7.2.0 through 7.6.4, and possibly certain 7.7.x versions, as used in Red Hat MRG Grid and possibly other products, allow local users to cause a denial of service (condor_schedd daemon and failure to launch jobs) and possibly execute arbitrary code via format string specifiers in (1) the reason for a hold for a job that uses an XML user log, (2) the filename of a file to be transferred, and possibly other unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: | Medium | 8,718 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: xmlParseEntityValue(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlChar **orig) {
xmlChar *buf = NULL;
int len = 0;
int size = XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE;
int c, l;
xmlChar stop;
xmlChar *ret = NULL;
const xmlChar *cur = NULL;
xmlParserInputPtr input;
if (RAW == '"') stop = '"';
else if (RAW == '\'') stop = '\'';
else {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_NOT_STARTED, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
buf = (xmlChar *) xmlMallocAtomic(size * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (buf == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
/*
* The content of the entity definition is copied in a buffer.
*/
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_ENTITY_VALUE;
input = ctxt->input;
GROW;
NEXT;
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
/*
* NOTE: 4.4.5 Included in Literal
* When a parameter entity reference appears in a literal entity
* value, ... a single or double quote character in the replacement
* text is always treated as a normal data character and will not
* terminate the literal.
* In practice it means we stop the loop only when back at parsing
* the initial entity and the quote is found
*/
while ((IS_CHAR(c)) && ((c != stop) || /* checked */
(ctxt->input != input))) {
if (len + 5 >= size) {
xmlChar *tmp;
size *= 2;
tmp = (xmlChar *) xmlRealloc(buf, size * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (tmp == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
xmlFree(buf);
return(NULL);
}
buf = tmp;
}
COPY_BUF(l,buf,len,c);
NEXTL(l);
/*
* Pop-up of finished entities.
*/
while ((RAW == 0) && (ctxt->inputNr > 1)) /* non input consuming */
xmlPopInput(ctxt);
GROW;
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
if (c == 0) {
GROW;
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
}
}
buf[len] = 0;
/*
* Raise problem w.r.t. '&' and '%' being used in non-entities
* reference constructs. Note Charref will be handled in
* xmlStringDecodeEntities()
*/
cur = buf;
while (*cur != 0) { /* non input consuming */
if ((*cur == '%') || ((*cur == '&') && (cur[1] != '#'))) {
xmlChar *name;
xmlChar tmp = *cur;
cur++;
name = xmlParseStringName(ctxt, &cur);
if ((name == NULL) || (*cur != ';')) {
xmlFatalErrMsgInt(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_CHAR_ERROR,
"EntityValue: '%c' forbidden except for entities references\n",
tmp);
}
if ((tmp == '%') && (ctxt->inSubset == 1) &&
(ctxt->inputNr == 1)) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_PE_INTERNAL, NULL);
}
if (name != NULL)
xmlFree(name);
if (*cur == 0)
break;
}
cur++;
}
/*
* Then PEReference entities are substituted.
*/
if (c != stop) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_NOT_FINISHED, NULL);
xmlFree(buf);
} else {
NEXT;
/*
* NOTE: 4.4.7 Bypassed
* When a general entity reference appears in the EntityValue in
* an entity declaration, it is bypassed and left as is.
* so XML_SUBSTITUTE_REF is not set here.
*/
ret = xmlStringDecodeEntities(ctxt, buf, XML_SUBSTITUTE_PEREF,
0, 0, 0);
if (orig != NULL)
*orig = buf;
else
xmlFree(buf);
}
return(ret);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: parser.c in libxml2 before 2.9.0, as used in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 and other products, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a document that ends abruptly, related to the lack of certain checks for the XML_PARSER_EOF state.
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 1,008 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: MagickExport unsigned char *DetachBlob(BlobInfo *blob_info)
{
unsigned char
*data;
assert(blob_info != (BlobInfo *) NULL);
if (blob_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"...");
if (blob_info->mapped != MagickFalse)
{
(void) UnmapBlob(blob_info->data,blob_info->length);
RelinquishMagickResource(MapResource,blob_info->length);
}
blob_info->mapped=MagickFalse;
blob_info->length=0;
blob_info->offset=0;
blob_info->eof=MagickFalse;
blob_info->error=0;
blob_info->exempt=MagickFalse;
blob_info->type=UndefinedStream;
blob_info->file_info.file=(FILE *) NULL;
data=blob_info->data;
blob_info->data=(unsigned char *) NULL;
blob_info->stream=(StreamHandler) NULL;
return(data);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: In ImageMagick 7.x before 7.0.8-42 and 6.x before 6.9.10-42, there is a use after free vulnerability in the UnmapBlob function that allows an attacker to cause a denial of service by sending a crafted file.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick6/issues/43 | Medium | 4,071 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void RunInvTxfm(const int16_t *out, uint8_t *dst, int stride) {
inv_txfm_(out, dst, stride);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| High | 26,408 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void get_checksum2(char *buf, int32 len, char *sum)
{
md_context m;
switch (xfersum_type) {
case CSUM_MD5: {
uchar seedbuf[4];
md5_begin(&m);
if (proper_seed_order) {
if (checksum_seed) {
SIVALu(seedbuf, 0, checksum_seed);
md5_update(&m, seedbuf, 4);
}
md5_update(&m, (uchar *)buf, len);
} else {
md5_update(&m, (uchar *)buf, len);
if (checksum_seed) {
SIVALu(seedbuf, 0, checksum_seed);
md5_update(&m, seedbuf, 4);
}
}
md5_result(&m, (uchar *)sum);
break;
}
case CSUM_MD4:
case CSUM_MD4_OLD:
case CSUM_MD4_BUSTED: {
int32 i;
static char *buf1;
static int32 len1;
mdfour_begin(&m);
if (len > len1) {
if (buf1)
free(buf1);
buf1 = new_array(char, len+4);
len1 = len;
if (!buf1)
out_of_memory("get_checksum2");
}
memcpy(buf1, buf, len);
if (checksum_seed) {
SIVAL(buf1,len,checksum_seed);
len += 4;
}
for (i = 0; i + CSUM_CHUNK <= len; i += CSUM_CHUNK)
mdfour_update(&m, (uchar *)(buf1+i), CSUM_CHUNK);
/*
* Prior to version 27 an incorrect MD4 checksum was computed
* by failing to call mdfour_tail() for block sizes that
* are multiples of 64. This is fixed by calling mdfour_update()
* are multiples of 64. This is fixed by calling mdfour_update()
* even when there are no more bytes.
*/
if (len - i > 0 || xfersum_type != CSUM_MD4_BUSTED)
mdfour_update(&m, (uchar *)(buf1+i), len-i);
mdfour_result(&m, (uchar *)sum);
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-354
Summary: rsync 3.1.3-development before 2017-10-24 mishandles archaic checksums, which makes it easier for remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions. NOTE: the rsync development branch has significant use beyond the rsync developers, e.g., the code has been copied for use in various GitHub projects.
Commit Message: | High | 22,730 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void check_pointer_type_change(Notifier *notifier, void *data)
{
VncState *vs = container_of(notifier, VncState, mouse_mode_notifier);
int absolute = qemu_input_is_absolute();
if (vnc_has_feature(vs, VNC_FEATURE_POINTER_TYPE_CHANGE) && vs->absolute != absolute) {
vnc_write_u8(vs, 0);
vnc_write_u16(vs, 1);
vnc_framebuffer_update(vs, absolute, 0,
surface_width(vs->vd->ds),
surface_height(vs->vd->ds),
VNC_ENCODING_POINTER_TYPE_CHANGE);
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
vnc_flush(vs);
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
vnc_flush(vs);
}
vs->absolute = absolute;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: An out-of-bounds memory access issue was found in Quick Emulator (QEMU) before 1.7.2 in the VNC display driver. This flaw could occur while refreshing the VNC display surface area in the 'vnc_refresh_server_surface'. A user inside a guest could use this flaw to crash the QEMU process.
Commit Message: | Medium | 26,955 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: status_t BnOMX::onTransact(
uint32_t code, const Parcel &data, Parcel *reply, uint32_t flags) {
switch (code) {
case LIVES_LOCALLY:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
pid_t pid = (pid_t)data.readInt32();
reply->writeInt32(livesLocally(node, pid));
return OK;
}
case LIST_NODES:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
List<ComponentInfo> list;
listNodes(&list);
reply->writeInt32(list.size());
for (List<ComponentInfo>::iterator it = list.begin();
it != list.end(); ++it) {
ComponentInfo &cur = *it;
reply->writeString8(cur.mName);
reply->writeInt32(cur.mRoles.size());
for (List<String8>::iterator role_it = cur.mRoles.begin();
role_it != cur.mRoles.end(); ++role_it) {
reply->writeString8(*role_it);
}
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case ALLOCATE_NODE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
const char *name = data.readCString();
sp<IOMXObserver> observer =
interface_cast<IOMXObserver>(data.readStrongBinder());
node_id node;
status_t err = allocateNode(name, observer, &node);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32((int32_t)node);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case FREE_NODE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
reply->writeInt32(freeNode(node));
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SEND_COMMAND:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_COMMANDTYPE cmd =
static_cast<OMX_COMMANDTYPE>(data.readInt32());
OMX_S32 param = data.readInt32();
reply->writeInt32(sendCommand(node, cmd, param));
return NO_ERROR;
}
case GET_PARAMETER:
case SET_PARAMETER:
case GET_CONFIG:
case SET_CONFIG:
case SET_INTERNAL_OPTION:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_INDEXTYPE index = static_cast<OMX_INDEXTYPE>(data.readInt32());
size_t size = data.readInt64();
status_t err = NO_MEMORY;
void *params = calloc(size, 1);
if (params) {
err = data.read(params, size);
if (err != OK) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "26914474");
} else {
switch (code) {
case GET_PARAMETER:
err = getParameter(node, index, params, size);
break;
case SET_PARAMETER:
err = setParameter(node, index, params, size);
break;
case GET_CONFIG:
err = getConfig(node, index, params, size);
break;
case SET_CONFIG:
err = setConfig(node, index, params, size);
break;
case SET_INTERNAL_OPTION:
{
InternalOptionType type =
(InternalOptionType)data.readInt32();
err = setInternalOption(node, index, type, params, size);
break;
}
default:
TRESPASS();
}
}
}
reply->writeInt32(err);
if ((code == GET_PARAMETER || code == GET_CONFIG) && err == OK) {
reply->write(params, size);
}
free(params);
params = NULL;
return NO_ERROR;
}
case GET_STATE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_STATETYPE state = OMX_StateInvalid;
status_t err = getState(node, &state);
reply->writeInt32(state);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case ENABLE_GRAPHIC_BUFFERS:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
OMX_BOOL enable = (OMX_BOOL)data.readInt32();
status_t err = enableGraphicBuffers(node, port_index, enable);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case GET_GRAPHIC_BUFFER_USAGE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 usage = 0;
status_t err = getGraphicBufferUsage(node, port_index, &usage);
reply->writeInt32(err);
reply->writeInt32(usage);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case USE_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
sp<IMemory> params =
interface_cast<IMemory>(data.readStrongBinder());
OMX_U32 allottedSize = data.readInt32();
buffer_id buffer;
status_t err = useBuffer(node, port_index, params, &buffer, allottedSize);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32((int32_t)buffer);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case USE_GRAPHIC_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
sp<GraphicBuffer> graphicBuffer = new GraphicBuffer();
data.read(*graphicBuffer);
buffer_id buffer;
status_t err = useGraphicBuffer(
node, port_index, graphicBuffer, &buffer);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32((int32_t)buffer);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case UPDATE_GRAPHIC_BUFFER_IN_META:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
sp<GraphicBuffer> graphicBuffer = new GraphicBuffer();
data.read(*graphicBuffer);
buffer_id buffer = (buffer_id)data.readInt32();
status_t err = updateGraphicBufferInMeta(
node, port_index, graphicBuffer, buffer);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case CREATE_INPUT_SURFACE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
sp<IGraphicBufferProducer> bufferProducer;
MetadataBufferType type = kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid;
status_t err = createInputSurface(node, port_index, &bufferProducer, &type);
if ((err != OK) && (type == kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid)) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "26324358");
}
reply->writeInt32(type);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeStrongBinder(IInterface::asBinder(bufferProducer));
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case CREATE_PERSISTENT_INPUT_SURFACE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
sp<IGraphicBufferProducer> bufferProducer;
sp<IGraphicBufferConsumer> bufferConsumer;
status_t err = createPersistentInputSurface(
&bufferProducer, &bufferConsumer);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeStrongBinder(IInterface::asBinder(bufferProducer));
reply->writeStrongBinder(IInterface::asBinder(bufferConsumer));
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SET_INPUT_SURFACE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
sp<IGraphicBufferConsumer> bufferConsumer =
interface_cast<IGraphicBufferConsumer>(data.readStrongBinder());
MetadataBufferType type = kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid;
status_t err = setInputSurface(node, port_index, bufferConsumer, &type);
if ((err != OK) && (type == kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid)) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "26324358");
}
reply->writeInt32(type);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SIGNAL_END_OF_INPUT_STREAM:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
status_t err = signalEndOfInputStream(node);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case STORE_META_DATA_IN_BUFFERS:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
OMX_BOOL enable = (OMX_BOOL)data.readInt32();
MetadataBufferType type = kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid;
status_t err = storeMetaDataInBuffers(node, port_index, enable, &type);
reply->writeInt32(type);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case PREPARE_FOR_ADAPTIVE_PLAYBACK:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
OMX_BOOL enable = (OMX_BOOL)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 max_width = data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 max_height = data.readInt32();
status_t err = prepareForAdaptivePlayback(
node, port_index, enable, max_width, max_height);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case CONFIGURE_VIDEO_TUNNEL_MODE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
OMX_BOOL tunneled = (OMX_BOOL)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 audio_hw_sync = data.readInt32();
native_handle_t *sideband_handle = NULL;
status_t err = configureVideoTunnelMode(
node, port_index, tunneled, audio_hw_sync, &sideband_handle);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if(err == OK){
reply->writeNativeHandle(sideband_handle);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case ALLOC_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
if (!isSecure(node) || port_index != 0 /* kPortIndexInput */) {
ALOGE("b/24310423");
reply->writeInt32(INVALID_OPERATION);
return NO_ERROR;
}
size_t size = data.readInt64();
buffer_id buffer;
void *buffer_data;
status_t err = allocateBuffer(
node, port_index, size, &buffer, &buffer_data);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32((int32_t)buffer);
reply->writeInt64((uintptr_t)buffer_data);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case ALLOC_BUFFER_WITH_BACKUP:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
sp<IMemory> params =
interface_cast<IMemory>(data.readStrongBinder());
OMX_U32 allottedSize = data.readInt32();
buffer_id buffer;
status_t err = allocateBufferWithBackup(
node, port_index, params, &buffer, allottedSize);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32((int32_t)buffer);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case FREE_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
buffer_id buffer = (buffer_id)data.readInt32();
reply->writeInt32(freeBuffer(node, port_index, buffer));
return NO_ERROR;
}
case FILL_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
buffer_id buffer = (buffer_id)data.readInt32();
bool haveFence = data.readInt32();
int fenceFd = haveFence ? ::dup(data.readFileDescriptor()) : -1;
reply->writeInt32(fillBuffer(node, buffer, fenceFd));
return NO_ERROR;
}
case EMPTY_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
buffer_id buffer = (buffer_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 range_offset = data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 range_length = data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 flags = data.readInt32();
OMX_TICKS timestamp = data.readInt64();
bool haveFence = data.readInt32();
int fenceFd = haveFence ? ::dup(data.readFileDescriptor()) : -1;
reply->writeInt32(emptyBuffer(
node, buffer, range_offset, range_length, flags, timestamp, fenceFd));
return NO_ERROR;
}
case GET_EXTENSION_INDEX:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
const char *parameter_name = data.readCString();
OMX_INDEXTYPE index;
status_t err = getExtensionIndex(node, parameter_name, &index);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32(index);
}
return OK;
}
default:
return BBinder::onTransact(code, data, reply, flags);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not validate OMX buffer sizes, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27207275.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
| High | 25,585 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: next_format(png_bytep colour_type, png_bytep bit_depth,
unsigned int* palette_number, int no_low_depth_gray)
{
if (*bit_depth == 0)
{
*colour_type = 0;
if (no_low_depth_gray)
*bit_depth = 8;
else
*bit_depth = 1;
*palette_number = 0;
return 1;
}
if (*colour_type == 3)
{
/* Add multiple palettes for colour type 3. */
if (++*palette_number < PALETTE_COUNT(*bit_depth))
return 1;
*palette_number = 0;
}
*bit_depth = (png_byte)(*bit_depth << 1);
/* Palette images are restricted to 8 bit depth */
if (*bit_depth <= 8
# ifdef DO_16BIT
|| (*colour_type != 3 && *bit_depth <= 16)
# endif
)
return 1;
/* Move to the next color type, or return 0 at the end. */
switch (*colour_type)
{
case 0:
*colour_type = 2;
*bit_depth = 8;
return 1;
case 2:
*colour_type = 3;
*bit_depth = 1;
return 1;
case 3:
*colour_type = 4;
*bit_depth = 8;
return 1;
case 4:
*colour_type = 6;
*bit_depth = 8;
return 1;
default:
return 0;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 4,268 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> strictFunctionCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.strictFunction");
if (args.Length() < 3)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(args.Holder());
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
{
STRING_TO_V8PARAMETER_EXCEPTION_BLOCK(V8Parameter<>, str, MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined));
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(float, a, static_cast<float>(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 1, DefaultIsUndefined)->NumberValue()));
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(int, b, V8int::HasInstance(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 2, DefaultIsUndefined)) ? V8int::toNative(v8::Handle<v8::Object>::Cast(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 2, DefaultIsUndefined))) : 0);
RefPtr<bool> result = imp->strictFunction(str, a, b, ec);
if (UNLIKELY(ec))
goto fail;
return toV8(result.release(), args.GetIsolate());
}
fail:
V8Proxy::setDOMException(ec, args.GetIsolate());
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 13,354 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int b_unpack (lua_State *L) {
Header h;
const char *fmt = luaL_checkstring(L, 1);
size_t ld;
const char *data = luaL_checklstring(L, 2, &ld);
size_t pos = luaL_optinteger(L, 3, 1) - 1;
int n = 0; /* number of results */
defaultoptions(&h);
while (*fmt) {
int opt = *fmt++;
size_t size = optsize(L, opt, &fmt);
pos += gettoalign(pos, &h, opt, size);
luaL_argcheck(L, pos+size <= ld, 2, "data string too short");
/* stack space for item + next position */
luaL_checkstack(L, 2, "too many results");
switch (opt) {
case 'b': case 'B': case 'h': case 'H':
case 'l': case 'L': case 'T': case 'i': case 'I': { /* integer types */
int issigned = islower(opt);
lua_Number res = getinteger(data+pos, h.endian, issigned, size);
lua_pushnumber(L, res); n++;
break;
}
case 'x': {
break;
}
case 'f': {
float f;
memcpy(&f, data+pos, size);
correctbytes((char *)&f, sizeof(f), h.endian);
lua_pushnumber(L, f); n++;
break;
}
case 'd': {
double d;
memcpy(&d, data+pos, size);
correctbytes((char *)&d, sizeof(d), h.endian);
lua_pushnumber(L, d); n++;
break;
}
case 'c': {
if (size == 0) {
if (n == 0 || !lua_isnumber(L, -1))
luaL_error(L, "format 'c0' needs a previous size");
size = lua_tonumber(L, -1);
lua_pop(L, 1); n--;
luaL_argcheck(L, size <= ld && pos <= ld - size,
2, "data string too short");
}
lua_pushlstring(L, data+pos, size); n++;
break;
}
case 's': {
const char *e = (const char *)memchr(data+pos, '\0', ld - pos);
if (e == NULL)
luaL_error(L, "unfinished string in data");
size = (e - (data+pos)) + 1;
lua_pushlstring(L, data+pos, size - 1); n++;
break;
}
default: controloptions(L, opt, &fmt, &h);
}
pos += size;
}
lua_pushinteger(L, pos + 1); /* next position */
return n + 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: An Integer Overflow issue was discovered in the struct library in the Lua subsystem in Redis before 3.2.12, 4.x before 4.0.10, and 5.x before 5.0 RC2, leading to a failure of bounds checking.
Commit Message: Security: fix Lua struct package offset handling.
After the first fix to the struct package I found another similar
problem, which is fixed by this patch. It could be reproduced easily by
running the following script:
return struct.unpack('f', "xxxxxxxxxxxxx",-3)
The above will access bytes before the 'data' pointer. | High | 9,304 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int URI_FUNC(ComposeQueryEngine)(URI_CHAR * dest,
const URI_TYPE(QueryList) * queryList,
int maxChars, int * charsWritten, int * charsRequired,
UriBool spaceToPlus, UriBool normalizeBreaks) {
UriBool firstItem = URI_TRUE;
int ampersandLen = 0; /* increased to 1 from second item on */
URI_CHAR * write = dest;
/* Subtract terminator */
if (dest == NULL) {
*charsRequired = 0;
} else {
maxChars--;
}
while (queryList != NULL) {
const URI_CHAR * const key = queryList->key;
const URI_CHAR * const value = queryList->value;
const int worstCase = (normalizeBreaks == URI_TRUE ? 6 : 3);
const int keyLen = (key == NULL) ? 0 : (int)URI_STRLEN(key);
const int keyRequiredChars = worstCase * keyLen;
const int valueLen = (value == NULL) ? 0 : (int)URI_STRLEN(value);
const int valueRequiredChars = worstCase * valueLen;
if (dest == NULL) {
if (firstItem == URI_TRUE) {
ampersandLen = 1;
firstItem = URI_FALSE;
}
(*charsRequired) += ampersandLen + keyRequiredChars + ((value == NULL)
? 0
: 1 + valueRequiredChars);
} else {
URI_CHAR * afterKey;
if ((write - dest) + ampersandLen + keyRequiredChars > maxChars) {
return URI_ERROR_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE;
}
/* Copy key */
if (firstItem == URI_TRUE) {
firstItem = URI_FALSE;
} else {
write[0] = _UT('&');
write++;
}
afterKey = URI_FUNC(EscapeEx)(key, key + keyLen,
write, spaceToPlus, normalizeBreaks);
write += (afterKey - write);
if (value != NULL) {
URI_CHAR * afterValue;
if ((write - dest) + 1 + valueRequiredChars > maxChars) {
return URI_ERROR_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE;
}
/* Copy value */
write[0] = _UT('=');
write++;
afterValue = URI_FUNC(EscapeEx)(value, value + valueLen,
write, spaceToPlus, normalizeBreaks);
write += (afterValue - write);
}
}
queryList = queryList->next;
}
if (dest != NULL) {
write[0] = _UT('\0');
if (charsWritten != NULL) {
*charsWritten = (int)(write - dest) + 1; /* .. for terminator */
}
}
return URI_SUCCESS;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: An issue was discovered in uriparser before 0.9.0. UriQuery.c allows an out-of-bounds write via a uriComposeQuery* or uriComposeQueryEx* function because the '&' character is mishandled in certain contexts.
Commit Message: UriQuery.c: Fix out-of-bounds-write in ComposeQuery and ...Ex
Reported by Google Autofuzz team | High | 9,490 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int ras_putdatastd(jas_stream_t *out, ras_hdr_t *hdr, jas_image_t *image, int numcmpts, int *cmpts)
{
int rowsize;
int pad;
unsigned int z;
int nz;
int c;
int x;
int y;
int v;
jas_matrix_t *data[3];
int i;
for (i = 0; i < numcmpts; ++i) {
data[i] = jas_matrix_create(jas_image_height(image), jas_image_width(image));
assert(data[i]);
}
rowsize = RAS_ROWSIZE(hdr);
pad = rowsize - (hdr->width * hdr->depth + 7) / 8;
hdr->length = hdr->height * rowsize;
for (y = 0; y < hdr->height; y++) {
for (i = 0; i < numcmpts; ++i) {
if (jas_image_readcmpt(image, cmpts[i], 0, y,
jas_image_width(image), 1, data[i])) {
return -1;
}
}
z = 0;
nz = 0;
for (x = 0; x < hdr->width; x++) {
z <<= hdr->depth;
if (RAS_ISRGB(hdr)) {
v = RAS_RED((jas_matrix_getv(data[0], x))) |
RAS_GREEN((jas_matrix_getv(data[1], x))) |
RAS_BLUE((jas_matrix_getv(data[2], x)));
} else {
v = (jas_matrix_getv(data[0], x));
}
z |= v & RAS_ONES(hdr->depth);
nz += hdr->depth;
while (nz >= 8) {
c = (z >> (nz - 8)) & 0xff;
if (jas_stream_putc(out, c) == EOF) {
return -1;
}
nz -= 8;
z &= RAS_ONES(nz);
}
}
if (nz > 0) {
c = (z >> (8 - nz)) & RAS_ONES(nz);
if (jas_stream_putc(out, c) == EOF) {
return -1;
}
}
if (pad % 2) {
if (jas_stream_putc(out, 0) == EOF) {
return -1;
}
}
}
for (i = 0; i < numcmpts; ++i) {
jas_matrix_destroy(data[i]);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The ras_getcmap function in ras_dec.c in JasPer before 1.900.14 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (assertion failure) via a crafted image file.
Commit Message: Fixed a few bugs in the RAS encoder and decoder where errors were tested
with assertions instead of being gracefully handled. | Medium | 3,597 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: BrowserGpuChannelHostFactory::EstablishRequest::EstablishRequest()
: event(false, false),
gpu_process_handle(base::kNullProcessHandle) {
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 20.0.1132.43 on Windows does not properly isolate sandboxed processes, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (process interference) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 3,825 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void AudioRendererHost::OnCreateStream(
int stream_id, const media::AudioParameters& params, int input_channels) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
DCHECK(LookupById(stream_id) == NULL);
media::AudioParameters audio_params(params);
uint32 buffer_size = media::AudioBus::CalculateMemorySize(audio_params);
DCHECK_GT(buffer_size, 0U);
DCHECK_LE(buffer_size,
static_cast<uint32>(media::limits::kMaxPacketSizeInBytes));
DCHECK_GE(input_channels, 0);
DCHECK_LT(input_channels, media::limits::kMaxChannels);
int output_memory_size = AudioBus::CalculateMemorySize(audio_params);
DCHECK_GT(output_memory_size, 0);
int frames = audio_params.frames_per_buffer();
int input_memory_size =
AudioBus::CalculateMemorySize(input_channels, frames);
DCHECK_GE(input_memory_size, 0);
scoped_ptr<AudioEntry> entry(new AudioEntry());
uint32 io_buffer_size = output_memory_size + input_memory_size;
uint32 shared_memory_size =
media::TotalSharedMemorySizeInBytes(io_buffer_size);
if (!entry->shared_memory.CreateAndMapAnonymous(shared_memory_size)) {
SendErrorMessage(stream_id);
return;
}
scoped_ptr<AudioSyncReader> reader(
new AudioSyncReader(&entry->shared_memory, params, input_channels));
if (!reader->Init()) {
SendErrorMessage(stream_id);
return;
}
entry->reader.reset(reader.release());
entry->controller = media::AudioOutputController::Create(
audio_manager_, this, audio_params, entry->reader.get());
if (!entry->controller) {
SendErrorMessage(stream_id);
return;
}
entry->stream_id = stream_id;
audio_entries_.insert(std::make_pair(stream_id, entry.release()));
if (media_observer_)
media_observer_->OnSetAudioStreamStatus(this, stream_id, "created");
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in the audio IPC layer in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Improve validation when creating audio streams.
BUG=166795
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11647012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173981 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 135 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::IsEmulatedQueryTarget(GLenum target) const {
switch (target) {
case GL_COMMANDS_COMPLETED_CHROMIUM:
case GL_READBACK_SHADOW_COPIES_UPDATED_CHROMIUM:
case GL_COMMANDS_ISSUED_CHROMIUM:
case GL_LATENCY_QUERY_CHROMIUM:
case GL_ASYNC_PIXEL_PACK_COMPLETED_CHROMIUM:
case GL_GET_ERROR_QUERY_CHROMIUM:
return true;
default:
return false;
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A heap use after free in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 55.0.2883.75 for Mac, Windows and Linux, and 55.0.2883.84 for Android allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568} | Medium | 29,395 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
const struct cred *old = current_cred();
struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
bool effective, has_cap = false;
int ret;
effective = false;
ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_cap);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (!issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
/*
* If the legacy file capability is set, then don't set privs
* for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user. Do set it
* for a root user just to cause least surprise to an admin.
*/
if (has_cap && new->uid != 0 && new->euid == 0) {
warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(bprm->filename);
goto skip;
}
/*
* To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root
* executables under compatibility mode, we override the
* capability sets for the file.
*
* If only the real uid is 0, we do not set the effective bit.
*/
if (new->euid == 0 || new->uid == 0) {
/* pP' = (cap_bset & ~0) | (pI & ~0) */
new->cap_permitted = cap_combine(old->cap_bset,
old->cap_inheritable);
}
if (new->euid == 0)
effective = true;
}
skip:
/* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised
* credentials unless they have the appropriate permit
*/
if ((new->euid != old->uid ||
new->egid != old->gid ||
!cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) &&
bprm->unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP) {
/* downgrade; they get no more than they had, and maybe less */
if (!capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
new->euid = new->uid;
new->egid = new->gid;
}
new->cap_permitted = cap_intersect(new->cap_permitted,
old->cap_permitted);
}
new->suid = new->fsuid = new->euid;
new->sgid = new->fsgid = new->egid;
if (effective)
new->cap_effective = new->cap_permitted;
else
cap_clear(new->cap_effective);
bprm->cap_effective = effective;
/*
* Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set
*
* We do not bother to audit if 3 things are true:
* 1) cap_effective has all caps
* 2) we are root
* 3) root is supposed to have all caps (SECURE_NOROOT)
* Since this is just a normal root execing a process.
*
* Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think
* that is interesting information to audit.
*/
if (!cap_isclear(new->cap_effective)) {
if (!cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, new->cap_effective) ||
new->euid != 0 || new->uid != 0 ||
issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
}
new->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The cap_bprm_set_creds function in security/commoncap.c in the Linux kernel before 3.3.3 does not properly handle the use of file system capabilities (aka fcaps) for implementing a privileged executable file, which allows local users to bypass intended personality restrictions via a crafted application, as demonstrated by an attack that uses a parent process to disable ASLR.
Commit Message: fcaps: clear the same personality flags as suid when fcaps are used
If a process increases permissions using fcaps all of the dangerous
personality flags which are cleared for suid apps should also be cleared.
Thus programs given priviledge with fcaps will continue to have address space
randomization enabled even if the parent tried to disable it to make it
easier to attack.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]> | High | 12,220 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: WebNavigationPolicy RenderViewImpl::decidePolicyForNavigation(
WebFrame* frame, const WebURLRequest& request, WebNavigationType type,
const WebNode&, WebNavigationPolicy default_policy, bool is_redirect) {
if (is_swapped_out_) {
if (request.url() != GURL("about:swappedout"))
return WebKit::WebNavigationPolicyIgnore;
return default_policy;
}
const GURL& url = request.url();
bool is_content_initiated =
DocumentState::FromDataSource(frame->provisionalDataSource())->
navigation_state()->is_content_initiated();
const CommandLine& command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableStrictSiteIsolation) &&
!frame->parent() && (is_content_initiated || is_redirect)) {
WebString origin_str = frame->document().securityOrigin().toString();
GURL frame_url(origin_str.utf8().data());
if (frame_url.GetOrigin() != url.GetOrigin()) {
Referrer referrer(
GURL(request.httpHeaderField(WebString::fromUTF8("Referer"))),
GetReferrerPolicyFromRequest(request));
OpenURL(frame, url, referrer, default_policy);
return WebKit::WebNavigationPolicyIgnore;
}
}
if (is_content_initiated) {
bool browser_handles_top_level_requests =
renderer_preferences_.browser_handles_top_level_requests &&
IsNonLocalTopLevelNavigation(url, frame, type);
if (browser_handles_top_level_requests ||
renderer_preferences_.browser_handles_all_requests) {
Referrer referrer(
GURL(request.httpHeaderField(WebString::fromUTF8("Referer"))),
GetReferrerPolicyFromRequest(request));
page_id_ = -1;
last_page_id_sent_to_browser_ = -1;
OpenURL(frame, url, referrer, default_policy);
return WebKit::WebNavigationPolicyIgnore; // Suppress the load here.
}
}
if (!frame->parent() && is_content_initiated &&
!url.SchemeIs(chrome::kAboutScheme)) {
bool send_referrer = false;
int cumulative_bindings =
RenderProcess::current()->GetEnabledBindings();
bool should_fork =
content::GetContentClient()->HasWebUIScheme(url) ||
(cumulative_bindings & content::BINDINGS_POLICY_WEB_UI) ||
url.SchemeIs(chrome::kViewSourceScheme) ||
frame->isViewSourceModeEnabled();
if (!should_fork) {
if (request.httpMethod() == "GET") {
bool is_initial_navigation = page_id_ == -1;
should_fork = content::GetContentClient()->renderer()->ShouldFork(
frame, url, is_initial_navigation, &send_referrer);
}
}
if (should_fork) {
Referrer referrer(
GURL(request.httpHeaderField(WebString::fromUTF8("Referer"))),
GetReferrerPolicyFromRequest(request));
OpenURL(
frame, url, send_referrer ? referrer : Referrer(), default_policy);
return WebKit::WebNavigationPolicyIgnore; // Suppress the load here.
}
}
GURL old_url(frame->dataSource()->request().url());
bool is_fork =
old_url == GURL(chrome::kAboutBlankURL) &&
historyBackListCount() < 1 &&
historyForwardListCount() < 1 &&
frame->opener() == NULL &&
frame->parent() == NULL &&
is_content_initiated &&
default_policy == WebKit::WebNavigationPolicyCurrentTab &&
type == WebKit::WebNavigationTypeOther;
if (is_fork) {
OpenURL(frame, url, Referrer(), default_policy);
return WebKit::WebNavigationPolicyIgnore;
}
return default_policy;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.46 does not properly perform window navigation, which has unspecified impact and remote attack vectors.
Commit Message: Use a new scheme for swapping out RenderViews.
BUG=118664
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9720004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@127986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 27,295 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void MediaInterfaceProxy::OnConnectionError() {
DVLOG(1) << __FUNCTION__;
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
interface_factory_ptr_.reset();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: SkPictureShader.cpp in Skia, as used in Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging access to a renderer process and providing crafted serialized data.
Commit Message: media: Support hosting mojo CDM in a standalone service
Currently when mojo CDM is enabled it is hosted in the MediaService
running in the process specified by "mojo_media_host". However, on
some platforms we need to run mojo CDM and other mojo media services in
different processes. For example, on desktop platforms, we want to run
mojo video decoder in the GPU process, but run the mojo CDM in the
utility process.
This CL adds a new build flag "enable_standalone_cdm_service". When
enabled, the mojo CDM service will be hosted in a standalone "cdm"
service running in the utility process. All other mojo media services
will sill be hosted in the "media" servie running in the process
specified by "mojo_media_host".
BUG=664364
TEST=Encrypted media browser tests using mojo CDM is still working.
Change-Id: I95be6e05adc9ebcff966b26958ef1d7becdfb487
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/567172
Commit-Queue: Xiaohan Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dan Sanders <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486947} | High | 2,727 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void decode_residue(vorb *f, float *residue_buffers[], int ch, int n, int rn, uint8 *do_not_decode)
{
int i,j,pass;
Residue *r = f->residue_config + rn;
int rtype = f->residue_types[rn];
int c = r->classbook;
int classwords = f->codebooks[c].dimensions;
int n_read = r->end - r->begin;
int part_read = n_read / r->part_size;
int temp_alloc_point = temp_alloc_save(f);
#ifndef STB_VORBIS_DIVIDES_IN_RESIDUE
uint8 ***part_classdata = (uint8 ***) temp_block_array(f,f->channels, part_read * sizeof(**part_classdata));
#else
int **classifications = (int **) temp_block_array(f,f->channels, part_read * sizeof(**classifications));
#endif
CHECK(f);
for (i=0; i < ch; ++i)
if (!do_not_decode[i])
memset(residue_buffers[i], 0, sizeof(float) * n);
if (rtype == 2 && ch != 1) {
for (j=0; j < ch; ++j)
if (!do_not_decode[j])
break;
if (j == ch)
goto done;
for (pass=0; pass < 8; ++pass) {
int pcount = 0, class_set = 0;
if (ch == 2) {
while (pcount < part_read) {
int z = r->begin + pcount*r->part_size;
int c_inter = (z & 1), p_inter = z>>1;
if (pass == 0) {
Codebook *c = f->codebooks+r->classbook;
int q;
DECODE(q,f,c);
if (q == EOP) goto done;
#ifndef STB_VORBIS_DIVIDES_IN_RESIDUE
part_classdata[0][class_set] = r->classdata[q];
#else
for (i=classwords-1; i >= 0; --i) {
classifications[0][i+pcount] = q % r->classifications;
q /= r->classifications;
}
#endif
}
for (i=0; i < classwords && pcount < part_read; ++i, ++pcount) {
int z = r->begin + pcount*r->part_size;
#ifndef STB_VORBIS_DIVIDES_IN_RESIDUE
int c = part_classdata[0][class_set][i];
#else
int c = classifications[0][pcount];
#endif
int b = r->residue_books[c][pass];
if (b >= 0) {
Codebook *book = f->codebooks + b;
#ifdef STB_VORBIS_DIVIDES_IN_CODEBOOK
if (!codebook_decode_deinterleave_repeat(f, book, residue_buffers, ch, &c_inter, &p_inter, n, r->part_size))
goto done;
#else
if (!codebook_decode_deinterleave_repeat(f, book, residue_buffers, ch, &c_inter, &p_inter, n, r->part_size))
goto done;
#endif
} else {
z += r->part_size;
c_inter = z & 1;
p_inter = z >> 1;
}
}
#ifndef STB_VORBIS_DIVIDES_IN_RESIDUE
++class_set;
#endif
}
} else if (ch == 1) {
while (pcount < part_read) {
int z = r->begin + pcount*r->part_size;
int c_inter = 0, p_inter = z;
if (pass == 0) {
Codebook *c = f->codebooks+r->classbook;
int q;
DECODE(q,f,c);
if (q == EOP) goto done;
#ifndef STB_VORBIS_DIVIDES_IN_RESIDUE
part_classdata[0][class_set] = r->classdata[q];
#else
for (i=classwords-1; i >= 0; --i) {
classifications[0][i+pcount] = q % r->classifications;
q /= r->classifications;
}
#endif
}
for (i=0; i < classwords && pcount < part_read; ++i, ++pcount) {
int z = r->begin + pcount*r->part_size;
#ifndef STB_VORBIS_DIVIDES_IN_RESIDUE
int c = part_classdata[0][class_set][i];
#else
int c = classifications[0][pcount];
#endif
int b = r->residue_books[c][pass];
if (b >= 0) {
Codebook *book = f->codebooks + b;
if (!codebook_decode_deinterleave_repeat(f, book, residue_buffers, ch, &c_inter, &p_inter, n, r->part_size))
goto done;
} else {
z += r->part_size;
c_inter = 0;
p_inter = z;
}
}
#ifndef STB_VORBIS_DIVIDES_IN_RESIDUE
++class_set;
#endif
}
} else {
while (pcount < part_read) {
int z = r->begin + pcount*r->part_size;
int c_inter = z % ch, p_inter = z/ch;
if (pass == 0) {
Codebook *c = f->codebooks+r->classbook;
int q;
DECODE(q,f,c);
if (q == EOP) goto done;
#ifndef STB_VORBIS_DIVIDES_IN_RESIDUE
part_classdata[0][class_set] = r->classdata[q];
#else
for (i=classwords-1; i >= 0; --i) {
classifications[0][i+pcount] = q % r->classifications;
q /= r->classifications;
}
#endif
}
for (i=0; i < classwords && pcount < part_read; ++i, ++pcount) {
int z = r->begin + pcount*r->part_size;
#ifndef STB_VORBIS_DIVIDES_IN_RESIDUE
int c = part_classdata[0][class_set][i];
#else
int c = classifications[0][pcount];
#endif
int b = r->residue_books[c][pass];
if (b >= 0) {
Codebook *book = f->codebooks + b;
if (!codebook_decode_deinterleave_repeat(f, book, residue_buffers, ch, &c_inter, &p_inter, n, r->part_size))
goto done;
} else {
z += r->part_size;
c_inter = z % ch;
p_inter = z / ch;
}
}
#ifndef STB_VORBIS_DIVIDES_IN_RESIDUE
++class_set;
#endif
}
}
}
goto done;
}
CHECK(f);
for (pass=0; pass < 8; ++pass) {
int pcount = 0, class_set=0;
while (pcount < part_read) {
if (pass == 0) {
for (j=0; j < ch; ++j) {
if (!do_not_decode[j]) {
Codebook *c = f->codebooks+r->classbook;
int temp;
DECODE(temp,f,c);
if (temp == EOP) goto done;
#ifndef STB_VORBIS_DIVIDES_IN_RESIDUE
part_classdata[j][class_set] = r->classdata[temp];
#else
for (i=classwords-1; i >= 0; --i) {
classifications[j][i+pcount] = temp % r->classifications;
temp /= r->classifications;
}
#endif
}
}
}
for (i=0; i < classwords && pcount < part_read; ++i, ++pcount) {
for (j=0; j < ch; ++j) {
if (!do_not_decode[j]) {
#ifndef STB_VORBIS_DIVIDES_IN_RESIDUE
int c = part_classdata[j][class_set][i];
#else
int c = classifications[j][pcount];
#endif
int b = r->residue_books[c][pass];
if (b >= 0) {
float *target = residue_buffers[j];
int offset = r->begin + pcount * r->part_size;
int n = r->part_size;
Codebook *book = f->codebooks + b;
if (!residue_decode(f, book, target, offset, n, rtype))
goto done;
}
}
}
}
#ifndef STB_VORBIS_DIVIDES_IN_RESIDUE
++class_set;
#endif
}
}
done:
CHECK(f);
#ifndef STB_VORBIS_DIVIDES_IN_RESIDUE
temp_free(f,part_classdata);
#else
temp_free(f,classifications);
#endif
temp_alloc_restore(f,temp_alloc_point);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Sean Barrett stb_vorbis version 1.12 and earlier contains a Buffer Overflow vulnerability in All vorbis decoding paths. that can result in memory corruption, denial of service, comprised execution of host program. This attack appear to be exploitable via Victim must open a specially crafted Ogg Vorbis file. This vulnerability appears to have been fixed in 1.13.
Commit Message: fix unchecked length in stb_vorbis that could crash on corrupt/invalid files | Medium | 29,384 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
BIGNUM **rp)
{
BN_CTX *ctx;
BIGNUM k, kq, *K, *kinv = NULL, *r = NULL;
BIGNUM l, m;
int ret = 0;
int q_bits;
if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) {
DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
return 0;
}
BN_init(&k);
BN_init(&kq);
BN_init(&l);
BN_init(&m);
if (ctx_in == NULL) {
if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
} else
ctx = ctx_in;
if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
/* Preallocate space */
q_bits = BN_num_bits(dsa->q);
if (!BN_set_bit(&k, q_bits)
|| !BN_set_bit(&l, q_bits)
|| !BN_set_bit(&m, q_bits))
goto err;
/* Get random k */
do
if (!BN_rand_range(&k, dsa->q))
goto err;
while (BN_is_zero(&k));
if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
BN_set_flags(&k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
}
if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) {
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p,
CRYPTO_LOCK_DSA, dsa->p, ctx))
goto err;
}
/* Compute r = (g^k mod p) mod q */
if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
/*
* We do not want timing information to leak the length of k, so we
* compute G^k using an equivalent scalar of fixed bit-length.
*
* We unconditionally perform both of these additions to prevent a
* small timing information leakage. We then choose the sum that is
* one bit longer than the modulus.
*
* TODO: revisit the BN_copy aiming for a memory access agnostic
* conditional copy.
*/
if (!BN_add(&l, &k, dsa->q)
|| !BN_add(&m, &l, dsa->q)
|| !BN_copy(&kq, BN_num_bits(&l) > q_bits ? &l : &m))
goto err;
BN_set_flags(&kq, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
K = &kq;
} else {
K = &k;
}
DSA_BN_MOD_EXP(goto err, dsa, r, dsa->g, K, dsa->p, ctx,
dsa->method_mont_p);
if (!BN_mod(r, r, dsa->q, ctx))
goto err;
/* Compute part of 's = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q' */
if ((kinv = BN_mod_inverse(NULL, &k, dsa->q, ctx)) == NULL)
goto err;
if (*kinvp != NULL)
BN_clear_free(*kinvp);
*kinvp = kinv;
kinv = NULL;
if (*rp != NULL)
BN_clear_free(*rp);
*rp = r;
ret = 1;
err:
if (!ret) {
DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
if (r != NULL)
BN_clear_free(r);
}
if (ctx_in == NULL)
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
BN_clear_free(&k);
BN_clear_free(&kq);
BN_clear_free(&l);
BN_clear_free(&m);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-320
Summary: The OpenSSL DSA signature algorithm has been shown to be vulnerable to a timing side channel attack. An attacker could use variations in the signing algorithm to recover the private key. Fixed in OpenSSL 1.1.1a (Affected 1.1.1). Fixed in OpenSSL 1.1.0j (Affected 1.1.0-1.1.0i). Fixed in OpenSSL 1.0.2q (Affected 1.0.2-1.0.2p).
Commit Message: | Medium | 15,406 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid, const struct cred *cred,
key_perm_t perm, unsigned long flags,
struct key_restriction *restrict_link)
{
struct key_user *user = NULL;
struct key *key;
size_t desclen, quotalen;
int ret;
key = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
if (!desc || !*desc)
goto error;
if (type->vet_description) {
ret = type->vet_description(desc);
if (ret < 0) {
key = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto error;
}
}
desclen = strlen(desc);
quotalen = desclen + 1 + type->def_datalen;
/* get hold of the key tracking for this user */
user = key_user_lookup(uid);
if (!user)
goto no_memory_1;
/* check that the user's quota permits allocation of another key and
* its description */
if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA)) {
unsigned maxkeys = uid_eq(uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ?
key_quota_root_maxkeys : key_quota_maxkeys;
unsigned maxbytes = uid_eq(uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ?
key_quota_root_maxbytes : key_quota_maxbytes;
spin_lock(&user->lock);
if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN)) {
if (user->qnkeys + 1 >= maxkeys ||
user->qnbytes + quotalen >= maxbytes ||
user->qnbytes + quotalen < user->qnbytes)
goto no_quota;
}
user->qnkeys++;
user->qnbytes += quotalen;
spin_unlock(&user->lock);
}
/* allocate and initialise the key and its description */
key = kmem_cache_zalloc(key_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!key)
goto no_memory_2;
key->index_key.desc_len = desclen;
key->index_key.description = kmemdup(desc, desclen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!key->index_key.description)
goto no_memory_3;
refcount_set(&key->usage, 1);
init_rwsem(&key->sem);
lockdep_set_class(&key->sem, &type->lock_class);
key->index_key.type = type;
key->user = user;
key->quotalen = quotalen;
key->datalen = type->def_datalen;
key->uid = uid;
key->gid = gid;
key->perm = perm;
key->restrict_link = restrict_link;
if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA))
key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA;
if (flags & KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN)
key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN;
#ifdef KEY_DEBUGGING
key->magic = KEY_DEBUG_MAGIC;
#endif
/* let the security module know about the key */
ret = security_key_alloc(key, cred, flags);
if (ret < 0)
goto security_error;
/* publish the key by giving it a serial number */
atomic_inc(&user->nkeys);
key_alloc_serial(key);
error:
return key;
security_error:
kfree(key->description);
kmem_cache_free(key_jar, key);
if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA)) {
spin_lock(&user->lock);
user->qnkeys--;
user->qnbytes -= quotalen;
spin_unlock(&user->lock);
}
key_user_put(user);
key = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto error;
no_memory_3:
kmem_cache_free(key_jar, key);
no_memory_2:
if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA)) {
spin_lock(&user->lock);
user->qnkeys--;
user->qnbytes -= quotalen;
spin_unlock(&user->lock);
}
key_user_put(user);
no_memory_1:
key = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
goto error;
no_quota:
spin_unlock(&user->lock);
key_user_put(user);
key = ERR_PTR(-EDQUOT);
goto error;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: In the Linux kernel before 4.13.5, a local user could create keyrings for other users via keyctl commands, setting unwanted defaults or causing a denial of service.
Commit Message: KEYS: prevent creating a different user's keyrings
It was possible for an unprivileged user to create the user and user
session keyrings for another user. For example:
sudo -u '#3000' sh -c 'keyctl add keyring _uid.4000 "" @u
keyctl add keyring _uid_ses.4000 "" @u
sleep 15' &
sleep 1
sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @u
sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @us
This is problematic because these "fake" keyrings won't have the right
permissions. In particular, the user who created them first will own
them and will have full access to them via the possessor permissions,
which can be used to compromise the security of a user's keys:
-4: alswrv-----v------------ 3000 0 keyring: _uid.4000
-5: alswrv-----v------------ 3000 0 keyring: _uid_ses.4000
Fix it by marking user and user session keyrings with a flag
KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING. Then, when searching for a user or user session
keyring by name, skip all keyrings that don't have the flag set.
Fixes: 69664cf16af4 ("keys: don't generate user and user session keyrings unless they're accessed")
Cc: <[email protected]> [v2.6.26+]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]> | Low | 29,718 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: ZEND_API void zend_object_store_ctor_failed(zval *zobject TSRMLS_DC)
{
zend_object_handle handle = Z_OBJ_HANDLE_P(zobject);
zend_object_store_bucket *obj_bucket = &EG(objects_store).object_buckets[handle];
obj_bucket->bucket.obj.handlers = Z_OBJ_HT_P(zobject);;
obj_bucket->destructor_called = 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: ext/standard/var_unserializer.re in PHP before 5.6.26 mishandles object-deserialization failures, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact via an unserialize call that references a partially constructed object.
Commit Message: Fix bug #73052 - Memory Corruption in During Deserialized-object Destruction | High | 15,539 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static Image *ReadHRZImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register unsigned char
*p;
ssize_t
count,
y;
size_t
length;
unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Convert HRZ raster image to pixel packets.
*/
image->columns=256;
image->rows=240;
image->depth=8;
pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->columns,3*
sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
length=(size_t) (3*image->columns);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
if ((size_t) count != length)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
p=pixels;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(4**p++));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(4**p++));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(4**p++));
SetPixelOpacity(q,OpaqueOpacity);
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,y,image->rows) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: | Medium | 25,951 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void destroy_server_connect(SERVER_CONNECT_REC *conn)
{
IRC_SERVER_CONNECT_REC *ircconn;
ircconn = IRC_SERVER_CONNECT(conn);
if (ircconn == NULL)
return;
g_free_not_null(ircconn->usermode);
g_free_not_null(ircconn->alternate_nick);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Irssi before 1.0.8, 1.1.x before 1.1.3, and 1.2.x before 1.2.1, when SASL is enabled, has a use after free when sending SASL login to the server.
Commit Message: Merge pull request #1058 from ailin-nemui/sasl-reconnect
copy sasl username and password values | Medium | 19,999 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void Editor::Transpose() {
if (!CanEdit())
//// TODO(yosin): We should move |Transpose()| into |ExecuteTranspose()| in
//// "EditorCommand.cpp"
return;
GetFrame().GetDocument()->UpdateStyleAndLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
const EphemeralRange& range = ComputeRangeForTranspose(GetFrame());
if (range.IsNull())
return;
const String& text = PlainText(range);
if (text.length() != 2)
return;
const String& transposed = text.Right(1) + text.Left(1);
if (DispatchBeforeInputInsertText(
EventTargetNodeForDocument(GetFrame().GetDocument()), transposed,
InputEvent::InputType::kInsertTranspose,
new StaticRangeVector(1, StaticRange::Create(range))) !=
DispatchEventResult::kNotCanceled)
return;
if (frame_->GetDocument()->GetFrame() != frame_)
return;
GetFrame().GetDocument()->UpdateStyleAndLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
const EphemeralRange& new_range = ComputeRangeForTranspose(GetFrame());
if (new_range.IsNull())
return;
const String& new_text = PlainText(new_range);
if (new_text.length() != 2)
return;
const String& new_transposed = new_text.Right(1) + new_text.Left(1);
const SelectionInDOMTree& new_selection =
SelectionInDOMTree::Builder().SetBaseAndExtent(new_range).Build();
if (CreateVisibleSelection(new_selection) !=
GetFrame().Selection().ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTree())
GetFrame().Selection().SetSelection(new_selection);
ReplaceSelectionWithText(new_transposed, false, false,
InputEvent::InputType::kInsertTranspose);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 43.0.2357.65 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518} | High | 7,912 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static bool ldap_push_filter(struct asn1_data *data, struct ldb_parse_tree *tree)
{
int i;
switch (tree->operation) {
case LDB_OP_AND:
case LDB_OP_OR:
asn1_push_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT(tree->operation==LDB_OP_AND?0:1));
for (i=0; i<tree->u.list.num_elements; i++) {
if (!ldap_push_filter(data, tree->u.list.elements[i])) {
return false;
}
}
asn1_pop_tag(data);
break;
case LDB_OP_NOT:
asn1_push_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT(2));
if (!ldap_push_filter(data, tree->u.isnot.child)) {
return false;
}
asn1_pop_tag(data);
break;
case LDB_OP_EQUALITY:
/* equality test */
asn1_push_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT(3));
asn1_write_OctetString(data, tree->u.equality.attr,
strlen(tree->u.equality.attr));
asn1_write_OctetString(data, tree->u.equality.value.data,
tree->u.equality.value.length);
asn1_pop_tag(data);
break;
case LDB_OP_SUBSTRING:
/*
SubstringFilter ::= SEQUENCE {
type AttributeDescription,
-- at least one must be present
substrings SEQUENCE OF CHOICE {
initial [0] LDAPString,
any [1] LDAPString,
final [2] LDAPString } }
*/
asn1_push_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT(4));
asn1_write_OctetString(data, tree->u.substring.attr, strlen(tree->u.substring.attr));
asn1_push_tag(data, ASN1_SEQUENCE(0));
if (tree->u.substring.chunks && tree->u.substring.chunks[0]) {
i = 0;
if (!tree->u.substring.start_with_wildcard) {
asn1_push_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT_SIMPLE(0));
asn1_write_DATA_BLOB_LDAPString(data, tree->u.substring.chunks[i]);
asn1_pop_tag(data);
i++;
}
while (tree->u.substring.chunks[i]) {
int ctx;
if (( ! tree->u.substring.chunks[i + 1]) &&
(tree->u.substring.end_with_wildcard == 0)) {
ctx = 2;
} else {
ctx = 1;
}
asn1_push_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT_SIMPLE(ctx));
asn1_write_DATA_BLOB_LDAPString(data, tree->u.substring.chunks[i]);
asn1_pop_tag(data);
i++;
}
}
asn1_pop_tag(data);
asn1_pop_tag(data);
break;
case LDB_OP_GREATER:
/* greaterOrEqual test */
asn1_push_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT(5));
asn1_write_OctetString(data, tree->u.comparison.attr,
strlen(tree->u.comparison.attr));
asn1_write_OctetString(data, tree->u.comparison.value.data,
tree->u.comparison.value.length);
asn1_pop_tag(data);
break;
case LDB_OP_LESS:
/* lessOrEqual test */
asn1_push_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT(6));
asn1_write_OctetString(data, tree->u.comparison.attr,
strlen(tree->u.comparison.attr));
asn1_write_OctetString(data, tree->u.comparison.value.data,
tree->u.comparison.value.length);
asn1_pop_tag(data);
break;
case LDB_OP_PRESENT:
/* present test */
asn1_push_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT_SIMPLE(7));
asn1_write_LDAPString(data, tree->u.present.attr);
asn1_pop_tag(data);
return !data->has_error;
case LDB_OP_APPROX:
/* approx test */
asn1_push_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT(8));
asn1_write_OctetString(data, tree->u.comparison.attr,
strlen(tree->u.comparison.attr));
asn1_write_OctetString(data, tree->u.comparison.value.data,
tree->u.comparison.value.length);
asn1_pop_tag(data);
break;
case LDB_OP_EXTENDED:
/*
MatchingRuleAssertion ::= SEQUENCE {
matchingRule [1] MatchingRuleID OPTIONAL,
type [2] AttributeDescription OPTIONAL,
matchValue [3] AssertionValue,
dnAttributes [4] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE
}
*/
asn1_push_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT(9));
if (tree->u.extended.rule_id) {
asn1_push_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT_SIMPLE(1));
asn1_write_LDAPString(data, tree->u.extended.rule_id);
asn1_pop_tag(data);
}
if (tree->u.extended.attr) {
asn1_push_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT_SIMPLE(2));
asn1_write_LDAPString(data, tree->u.extended.attr);
asn1_pop_tag(data);
}
asn1_push_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT_SIMPLE(3));
asn1_write_DATA_BLOB_LDAPString(data, &tree->u.extended.value);
asn1_pop_tag(data);
asn1_push_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT_SIMPLE(4));
asn1_write_uint8(data, tree->u.extended.dnAttributes);
asn1_pop_tag(data);
asn1_pop_tag(data);
break;
default:
return false;
}
return !data->has_error;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The LDAP server in the AD domain controller in Samba 4.x before 4.1.22 does not check return values to ensure successful ASN.1 memory allocation, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption and daemon crash) via crafted packets.
Commit Message: | Medium | 2,134 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void put_crypt_info(struct fscrypt_info *ci)
{
if (!ci)
return;
key_put(ci->ci_keyring_key);
crypto_free_skcipher(ci->ci_ctfm);
kmem_cache_free(fscrypt_info_cachep, ci);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in fs/crypto/ in the Linux kernel before 4.10.7 allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) or possibly gain privileges by revoking keyring keys being used for ext4, f2fs, or ubifs encryption, causing cryptographic transform objects to be freed prematurely.
Commit Message: fscrypt: remove broken support for detecting keyring key revocation
Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that
had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become
"locked" again. This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most
severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for
an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other
threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently.
This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse.
This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects
the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired. Instead,
an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until
it is evicted from memory. Note that this is no worse than the case for
block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains
possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and
dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by
simply unmounting the filesystem. In fact, one of those actions was
already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely.
This change is not expected to break any applications.
In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key
revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations ---
waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations,
and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS
caches. But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed.
This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs
encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured
with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y,
CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or
CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y). Note that older kernels did not use the
shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications
of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them.
Fixes: b7236e21d55f ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode")
Cc: [email protected] # v4.2+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <[email protected]> | High | 25,336 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: write_one_file(Image *output, Image *image, int convert_to_8bit)
{
if (image->opts & FAST_WRITE)
image->image.flags |= PNG_IMAGE_FLAG_FAST;
if (image->opts & USE_STDIO)
{
FILE *f = tmpfile();
if (f != NULL)
{
if (png_image_write_to_stdio(&image->image, f, convert_to_8bit,
image->buffer+16, (png_int_32)image->stride, image->colormap))
{
if (fflush(f) == 0)
{
rewind(f);
initimage(output, image->opts, "tmpfile", image->stride_extra);
output->input_file = f;
if (!checkopaque(image))
return 0;
}
else
return logclose(image, f, "tmpfile", ": flush: ");
}
else
{
fclose(f);
return logerror(image, "tmpfile", ": write failed", "");
}
}
else
return logerror(image, "tmpfile", ": open: ", strerror(errno));
}
else
{
static int counter = 0;
char name[32];
sprintf(name, "%s%d.png", tmpf, ++counter);
if (png_image_write_to_file(&image->image, name, convert_to_8bit,
image->buffer+16, (png_int_32)image->stride, image->colormap))
{
initimage(output, image->opts, output->tmpfile_name,
image->stride_extra);
/* Afterwards, or freeimage will delete it! */
strcpy(output->tmpfile_name, name);
if (!checkopaque(image))
return 0;
}
else
return logerror(image, name, ": write failed", "");
}
/* 'output' has an initialized temporary image, read this back in and compare
* this against the original: there should be no change since the original
* format was written unmodified unless 'convert_to_8bit' was specified.
* However, if the original image was color-mapped, a simple read will zap
* the linear, color and maybe alpha flags, this will cause spurious failures
* under some circumstances.
*/
if (read_file(output, image->image.format | FORMAT_NO_CHANGE, NULL))
{
png_uint_32 original_format = image->image.format;
if (convert_to_8bit)
original_format &= ~PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_LINEAR;
if ((output->image.format & BASE_FORMATS) !=
(original_format & BASE_FORMATS))
return logerror(image, image->file_name, ": format changed on read: ",
output->file_name);
return compare_two_images(image, output, 0/*via linear*/, NULL);
}
else
return logerror(output, output->tmpfile_name,
": read of new file failed", "");
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 21,590 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool BrowserCommandController::ExecuteCommandWithDisposition(
int id, WindowOpenDisposition disposition) {
if (!SupportsCommand(id) || !IsCommandEnabled(id))
return false;
if (browser_->tab_strip_model()->active_index() == TabStripModel::kNoTab)
return true;
DCHECK(command_updater_.IsCommandEnabled(id)) << "Invalid/disabled command "
<< id;
switch (id) {
case IDC_BACK:
GoBack(browser_, disposition);
break;
case IDC_FORWARD:
GoForward(browser_, disposition);
break;
case IDC_RELOAD:
Reload(browser_, disposition);
break;
case IDC_RELOAD_CLEARING_CACHE:
ClearCache(browser_);
FALLTHROUGH;
case IDC_RELOAD_BYPASSING_CACHE:
ReloadBypassingCache(browser_, disposition);
break;
case IDC_HOME:
Home(browser_, disposition);
break;
case IDC_OPEN_CURRENT_URL:
OpenCurrentURL(browser_);
break;
case IDC_STOP:
Stop(browser_);
break;
case IDC_NEW_WINDOW:
NewWindow(browser_);
break;
case IDC_NEW_INCOGNITO_WINDOW:
NewIncognitoWindow(profile());
break;
case IDC_CLOSE_WINDOW:
base::RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("CloseWindowByKey"));
CloseWindow(browser_);
break;
case IDC_NEW_TAB: {
NewTab(browser_);
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_DESKTOP_IN_PRODUCT_HELP)
auto* new_tab_tracker =
feature_engagement::NewTabTrackerFactory::GetInstance()
->GetForProfile(profile());
new_tab_tracker->OnNewTabOpened();
new_tab_tracker->CloseBubble();
#endif
break;
}
case IDC_CLOSE_TAB:
base::RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("CloseTabByKey"));
CloseTab(browser_);
break;
case IDC_SELECT_NEXT_TAB:
base::RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("Accel_SelectNextTab"));
SelectNextTab(browser_);
break;
case IDC_SELECT_PREVIOUS_TAB:
base::RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("Accel_SelectPreviousTab"));
SelectPreviousTab(browser_);
break;
case IDC_MOVE_TAB_NEXT:
MoveTabNext(browser_);
break;
case IDC_MOVE_TAB_PREVIOUS:
MoveTabPrevious(browser_);
break;
case IDC_SELECT_TAB_0:
case IDC_SELECT_TAB_1:
case IDC_SELECT_TAB_2:
case IDC_SELECT_TAB_3:
case IDC_SELECT_TAB_4:
case IDC_SELECT_TAB_5:
case IDC_SELECT_TAB_6:
case IDC_SELECT_TAB_7:
base::RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("Accel_SelectNumberedTab"));
SelectNumberedTab(browser_, id - IDC_SELECT_TAB_0);
break;
case IDC_SELECT_LAST_TAB:
base::RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("Accel_SelectNumberedTab"));
SelectLastTab(browser_);
break;
case IDC_DUPLICATE_TAB:
DuplicateTab(browser_);
break;
case IDC_RESTORE_TAB:
RestoreTab(browser_);
break;
case IDC_SHOW_AS_TAB:
ConvertPopupToTabbedBrowser(browser_);
break;
case IDC_FULLSCREEN:
chrome::ToggleFullscreenMode(browser_);
break;
case IDC_OPEN_IN_PWA_WINDOW:
base::RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("OpenActiveTabInPwaWindow"));
ReparentSecureActiveTabIntoPwaWindow(browser_);
break;
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
case IDC_VISIT_DESKTOP_OF_LRU_USER_2:
case IDC_VISIT_DESKTOP_OF_LRU_USER_3:
ExecuteVisitDesktopCommand(id, window()->GetNativeWindow());
break;
#endif
#if defined(OS_LINUX) && !defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
case IDC_MINIMIZE_WINDOW:
browser_->window()->Minimize();
break;
case IDC_MAXIMIZE_WINDOW:
browser_->window()->Maximize();
break;
case IDC_RESTORE_WINDOW:
browser_->window()->Restore();
break;
case IDC_USE_SYSTEM_TITLE_BAR: {
PrefService* prefs = profile()->GetPrefs();
prefs->SetBoolean(prefs::kUseCustomChromeFrame,
!prefs->GetBoolean(prefs::kUseCustomChromeFrame));
break;
}
#endif
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
case IDC_TOGGLE_FULLSCREEN_TOOLBAR:
chrome::ToggleFullscreenToolbar(browser_);
break;
case IDC_TOGGLE_JAVASCRIPT_APPLE_EVENTS: {
PrefService* prefs = profile()->GetPrefs();
prefs->SetBoolean(prefs::kAllowJavascriptAppleEvents,
!prefs->GetBoolean(prefs::kAllowJavascriptAppleEvents));
break;
}
#endif
case IDC_EXIT:
Exit();
break;
case IDC_SAVE_PAGE:
SavePage(browser_);
break;
case IDC_BOOKMARK_PAGE:
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_DESKTOP_IN_PRODUCT_HELP)
feature_engagement::BookmarkTrackerFactory::GetInstance()
->GetForProfile(profile())
->OnBookmarkAdded();
#endif
BookmarkCurrentPageAllowingExtensionOverrides(browser_);
break;
case IDC_BOOKMARK_ALL_TABS:
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_DESKTOP_IN_PRODUCT_HELP)
feature_engagement::BookmarkTrackerFactory::GetInstance()
->GetForProfile(profile())
->OnBookmarkAdded();
#endif
BookmarkAllTabs(browser_);
break;
case IDC_VIEW_SOURCE:
browser_->tab_strip_model()
->GetActiveWebContents()
->GetMainFrame()
->ViewSource();
break;
case IDC_EMAIL_PAGE_LOCATION:
EmailPageLocation(browser_);
break;
case IDC_PRINT:
Print(browser_);
break;
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PRINTING)
case IDC_BASIC_PRINT:
base::RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("Accel_Advanced_Print"));
BasicPrint(browser_);
break;
#endif // ENABLE_PRINTING
case IDC_SAVE_CREDIT_CARD_FOR_PAGE:
SaveCreditCard(browser_);
break;
case IDC_MIGRATE_LOCAL_CREDIT_CARD_FOR_PAGE:
MigrateLocalCards(browser_);
break;
case IDC_TRANSLATE_PAGE:
Translate(browser_);
break;
case IDC_MANAGE_PASSWORDS_FOR_PAGE:
ManagePasswordsForPage(browser_);
break;
case IDC_CUT:
case IDC_COPY:
case IDC_PASTE:
CutCopyPaste(browser_, id);
break;
case IDC_FIND:
Find(browser_);
break;
case IDC_FIND_NEXT:
FindNext(browser_);
break;
case IDC_FIND_PREVIOUS:
FindPrevious(browser_);
break;
case IDC_ZOOM_PLUS:
Zoom(browser_, content::PAGE_ZOOM_IN);
break;
case IDC_ZOOM_NORMAL:
Zoom(browser_, content::PAGE_ZOOM_RESET);
break;
case IDC_ZOOM_MINUS:
Zoom(browser_, content::PAGE_ZOOM_OUT);
break;
case IDC_FOCUS_TOOLBAR:
base::RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("Accel_Focus_Toolbar"));
FocusToolbar(browser_);
break;
case IDC_FOCUS_LOCATION:
base::RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("Accel_Focus_Location"));
FocusLocationBar(browser_);
break;
case IDC_FOCUS_SEARCH:
base::RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("Accel_Focus_Search"));
FocusSearch(browser_);
break;
case IDC_FOCUS_MENU_BAR:
FocusAppMenu(browser_);
break;
case IDC_FOCUS_BOOKMARKS:
base::RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("Accel_Focus_Bookmarks"));
FocusBookmarksToolbar(browser_);
break;
case IDC_FOCUS_INACTIVE_POPUP_FOR_ACCESSIBILITY:
FocusInactivePopupForAccessibility(browser_);
break;
case IDC_FOCUS_NEXT_PANE:
FocusNextPane(browser_);
break;
case IDC_FOCUS_PREVIOUS_PANE:
FocusPreviousPane(browser_);
break;
case IDC_OPEN_FILE:
browser_->OpenFile();
break;
case IDC_CREATE_SHORTCUT:
CreateBookmarkAppFromCurrentWebContents(browser_,
true /* force_shortcut_app */);
break;
case IDC_INSTALL_PWA:
CreateBookmarkAppFromCurrentWebContents(browser_,
false /* force_shortcut_app */);
break;
case IDC_DEV_TOOLS:
ToggleDevToolsWindow(browser_, DevToolsToggleAction::Show());
break;
case IDC_DEV_TOOLS_CONSOLE:
ToggleDevToolsWindow(browser_, DevToolsToggleAction::ShowConsolePanel());
break;
case IDC_DEV_TOOLS_DEVICES:
InspectUI::InspectDevices(browser_);
break;
case IDC_DEV_TOOLS_INSPECT:
ToggleDevToolsWindow(browser_, DevToolsToggleAction::Inspect());
break;
case IDC_DEV_TOOLS_TOGGLE:
ToggleDevToolsWindow(browser_, DevToolsToggleAction::Toggle());
break;
case IDC_TASK_MANAGER:
OpenTaskManager(browser_);
break;
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
case IDC_TAKE_SCREENSHOT:
TakeScreenshot();
break;
#endif
#if defined(GOOGLE_CHROME_BUILD)
case IDC_FEEDBACK:
OpenFeedbackDialog(browser_, kFeedbackSourceBrowserCommand);
break;
#endif
case IDC_SHOW_BOOKMARK_BAR:
ToggleBookmarkBar(browser_);
break;
case IDC_PROFILING_ENABLED:
Profiling::Toggle();
break;
case IDC_SHOW_BOOKMARK_MANAGER:
ShowBookmarkManager(browser_);
break;
case IDC_SHOW_APP_MENU:
base::RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("Accel_Show_App_Menu"));
ShowAppMenu(browser_);
break;
case IDC_SHOW_AVATAR_MENU:
ShowAvatarMenu(browser_);
break;
case IDC_SHOW_HISTORY:
ShowHistory(browser_);
break;
case IDC_SHOW_DOWNLOADS:
ShowDownloads(browser_);
break;
case IDC_MANAGE_EXTENSIONS:
ShowExtensions(browser_, std::string());
break;
case IDC_OPTIONS:
ShowSettings(browser_);
break;
case IDC_EDIT_SEARCH_ENGINES:
ShowSearchEngineSettings(browser_);
break;
case IDC_VIEW_PASSWORDS:
ShowPasswordManager(browser_);
break;
case IDC_CLEAR_BROWSING_DATA:
ShowClearBrowsingDataDialog(browser_);
break;
case IDC_IMPORT_SETTINGS:
ShowImportDialog(browser_);
break;
case IDC_TOGGLE_REQUEST_TABLET_SITE:
ToggleRequestTabletSite(browser_);
break;
case IDC_ABOUT:
ShowAboutChrome(browser_);
break;
case IDC_UPGRADE_DIALOG:
OpenUpdateChromeDialog(browser_);
break;
case IDC_HELP_PAGE_VIA_KEYBOARD:
ShowHelp(browser_, HELP_SOURCE_KEYBOARD);
break;
case IDC_HELP_PAGE_VIA_MENU:
ShowHelp(browser_, HELP_SOURCE_MENU);
break;
case IDC_SHOW_BETA_FORUM:
ShowBetaForum(browser_);
break;
case IDC_SHOW_SIGNIN:
ShowBrowserSigninOrSettings(
browser_, signin_metrics::AccessPoint::ACCESS_POINT_MENU);
break;
case IDC_DISTILL_PAGE:
DistillCurrentPage(browser_);
break;
case IDC_ROUTE_MEDIA:
RouteMedia(browser_);
break;
case IDC_WINDOW_MUTE_SITE:
MuteSite(browser_);
break;
case IDC_WINDOW_PIN_TAB:
PinTab(browser_);
break;
case IDC_COPY_URL:
CopyURL(browser_);
break;
case IDC_OPEN_IN_CHROME:
OpenInChrome(browser_);
break;
case IDC_SITE_SETTINGS:
ShowSiteSettings(
browser_,
browser_->tab_strip_model()->GetActiveWebContents()->GetVisibleURL());
break;
case IDC_HOSTED_APP_MENU_APP_INFO:
ShowPageInfoDialog(browser_->tab_strip_model()->GetActiveWebContents(),
bubble_anchor_util::kAppMenuButton);
break;
default:
LOG(WARNING) << "Received Unimplemented Command: " << id;
break;
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient restrictions on what can be done with Apple Events in Google Chrome on macOS prior to 72.0.3626.81 allowed a local attacker to execute JavaScript via Apple Events.
Commit Message: mac: Do not let synthetic events toggle "Allow JavaScript From AppleEvents"
Bug: 891697
Change-Id: I49eb77963515637df739c9d2ce83530d4e21cf15
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1308771
Reviewed-by: Elly Fong-Jones <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604268} | Medium | 24,851 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void __exit pf_exit(void)
{
struct pf_unit *pf;
int unit;
unregister_blkdev(major, name);
for (pf = units, unit = 0; unit < PF_UNITS; pf++, unit++) {
if (pf->present)
del_gendisk(pf->disk);
blk_cleanup_queue(pf->disk->queue);
blk_mq_free_tag_set(&pf->tag_set);
put_disk(pf->disk);
if (pf->present)
pi_release(pf->pi);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel before 5.0.9. There is a NULL pointer dereference for a pf data structure if alloc_disk fails in drivers/block/paride/pf.c.
Commit Message: paride/pf: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference
Syzkaller report this:
pf: pf version 1.04, major 47, cluster 64, nice 0
pf: No ATAPI disk detected
kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 9887 Comm: syz-executor.0 Tainted: G C 5.1.0-rc3+ #8
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:pf_init+0x7af/0x1000 [pf]
Code: 46 77 d2 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 80 3c 28 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 03 25 a6 d2 4c 8b 23 49 8d bc 24 80 05 00 00 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <80> 3c 28 00 74 05 e8 e6 24 a6 d2 49 8b bc 24 80 05 00 00 e8 79 34
RSP: 0018:ffff8881abcbf998 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 00000000000000b0 RBX: ffffffffc1e4a8a8 RCX: ffffffffaec50788
RDX: 0000000000039b10 RSI: ffffc9000153c000 RDI: 0000000000000580
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffffed103ee44e59 R09: ffffed103ee44e59
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed103ee44e58 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffffffc1e4b028 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000020
FS: 00007f1b78a91700(0000) GS:ffff8881f7200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f6d72b207f8 CR3: 00000001d5790004 CR4: 00000000007606f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
? 0xffffffffc1e50000
do_one_initcall+0xbc/0x47d init/main.c:901
do_init_module+0x1b5/0x547 kernel/module.c:3456
load_module+0x6405/0x8c10 kernel/module.c:3804
__do_sys_finit_module+0x162/0x190 kernel/module.c:3898
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f1b78a90c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000180 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f1b78a90c70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f1b78a916bc
R13: 00000000004bcefa R14: 00000000006f6fb0 R15: 0000000000000004
Modules linked in: pf(+) paride gpio_tps65218 tps65218 i2c_cht_wc ati_remote dc395x act_meta_skbtcindex act_ife ife ecdh_generic rc_xbox_dvd sky81452_regulator v4l2_fwnode leds_blinkm snd_usb_hiface comedi(C) aes_ti slhc cfi_cmdset_0020 mtd cfi_util sx8654 mdio_gpio of_mdio fixed_phy mdio_bitbang libphy alcor_pci matrix_keymap hid_uclogic usbhid scsi_transport_fc videobuf2_v4l2 videobuf2_dma_sg snd_soc_pcm179x_spi snd_soc_pcm179x_codec i2c_demux_pinctrl mdev snd_indigodj isl6405 mii enc28j60 cmac adt7316_i2c(C) adt7316(C) fmc_trivial fmc nf_reject_ipv4 authenc rc_dtt200u rtc_ds1672 dvb_usb_dibusb_mc dvb_usb_dibusb_mc_common dib3000mc dibx000_common dvb_usb_dibusb_common dvb_usb dvb_core videobuf2_common videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops regulator_haptic adf7242 mac802154 ieee802154 s5h1409 da9034_ts snd_intel8x0m wmi cx24120 usbcore sdhci_cadence sdhci_pltfm sdhci mmc_core joydev i2c_algo_bit scsi_transport_iscsi iscsi_boot_sysfs ves1820 lockd grace nfs_acl auth_rpcgss sunrp
c
ip_vs snd_soc_adau7002 snd_cs4281 snd_rawmidi gameport snd_opl3_lib snd_seq_device snd_hwdep snd_ac97_codec ad7418 hid_primax hid snd_soc_cs4265 snd_soc_core snd_pcm_dmaengine snd_pcm snd_timer ac97_bus snd_compress snd soundcore ti_adc108s102 eeprom_93cx6 i2c_algo_pca mlxreg_hotplug st_pressure st_sensors industrialio_triggered_buffer kfifo_buf industrialio v4l2_common videodev media snd_soc_adau_utils rc_pinnacle_grey rc_core pps_gpio leds_lm3692x nandcore ledtrig_pattern iptable_security iptable_raw iptable_mangle iptable_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 iptable_filter bpfilter ip6_vti ip_vti ip_gre ipip sit tunnel4 ip_tunnel hsr veth netdevsim vxcan batman_adv cfg80211 rfkill chnl_net caif nlmon dummy team bonding vcan bridge stp llc ip6_gre gre ip6_tunnel tunnel6 tun mousedev ppdev tpm kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel ide_pci_generic aes_x86_64 piix crypto_simd input_leds psmouse cryp
td
glue_helper ide_core intel_agp serio_raw intel_gtt agpgart ata_generic i2c_piix4 pata_acpi parport_pc parport rtc_cmos floppy sch_fq_codel ip_tables x_tables sha1_ssse3 sha1_generic ipv6 [last unloaded: paride]
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
---[ end trace 7a818cf5f210d79e ]---
If alloc_disk fails in pf_init_units, pf->disk will be
NULL, however in pf_detect and pf_exit, it's not check
this before free.It may result a NULL pointer dereference.
Also when register_blkdev failed, blk_cleanup_queue() and
blk_mq_free_tag_set() should be called to free resources.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]>
Fixes: 6ce59025f118 ("paride/pf: cleanup queues when detection fails")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> | Medium | 4,184 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void IDNSpoofChecker::SetAllowedUnicodeSet(UErrorCode* status) {
if (U_FAILURE(*status))
return;
const icu::UnicodeSet* recommended_set =
uspoof_getRecommendedUnicodeSet(status);
icu::UnicodeSet allowed_set;
allowed_set.addAll(*recommended_set);
const icu::UnicodeSet* inclusion_set = uspoof_getInclusionUnicodeSet(status);
allowed_set.addAll(*inclusion_set);
allowed_set.remove(0x338u);
allowed_set.remove(0x58au); // Armenian Hyphen
allowed_set.remove(0x2010u);
allowed_set.remove(0x2019u); // Right Single Quotation Mark
allowed_set.remove(0x2027u);
allowed_set.remove(0x30a0u); // Katakana-Hiragana Double Hyphen
allowed_set.remove(0x2bbu); // Modifier Letter Turned Comma
allowed_set.remove(0x2bcu); // Modifier Letter Apostrophe
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
allowed_set.remove(0x0620u);
allowed_set.remove(0x0F8Cu);
allowed_set.remove(0x0F8Du);
allowed_set.remove(0x0F8Eu);
allowed_set.remove(0x0F8Fu);
#endif
allowed_set.remove(0x01CDu, 0x01DCu); // Latin Ext B; Pinyin
allowed_set.remove(0x1C80u, 0x1C8Fu); // Cyrillic Extended-C
allowed_set.remove(0x1E00u, 0x1E9Bu); // Latin Extended Additional
allowed_set.remove(0x1F00u, 0x1FFFu); // Greek Extended
allowed_set.remove(0xA640u, 0xA69Fu); // Cyrillic Extended-B
allowed_set.remove(0xA720u, 0xA7FFu); // Latin Extended-D
uspoof_setAllowedUnicodeSet(checker_, &allowed_set, status);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Incorrect handling of confusable characters in URL Formatter in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed a remote attacker to spoof the contents of the Omnibox (URL bar) via a crafted domain name.
Commit Message: Block modifier-letter-voicing character from domain names
This character (ˬ) is easy to miss between other characters. It's one of the three characters from Spacing-Modifier-Letters block that ICU lists in its recommended set in uspoof.cpp. Two of these characters (modifier-letter-turned-comma and modifier-letter-apostrophe) are already blocked in crbug/678812.
Bug: 896717
Change-Id: I24b2b591de8cc7822cd55aa005b15676be91175e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1303037
Commit-Queue: Mustafa Emre Acer <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Li <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604128} | Medium | 22,809 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void copyStereo16(
short *dst,
const int *const *src,
unsigned nSamples,
unsigned /* nChannels */) {
for (unsigned i = 0; i < nSamples; ++i) {
*dst++ = src[0][i];
*dst++ = src[1][i];
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: A remote code execution vulnerability in FLACExtractor.cpp in libstagefright in Mediaserver could enable an attacker using a specially crafted file to cause memory corruption during media file and data processing. This issue is rated as Critical due to the possibility of remote code execution within the context of the Mediaserver process. Product: Android. Versions: 4.4.4, 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2. Android ID: A-34970788.
Commit Message: FLACExtractor: copy protect mWriteBuffer
Bug: 30895578
Change-Id: I4cba36bbe3502678210e5925181683df9726b431
| High | 8,631 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int br_mdb_fill_info(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb,
struct net_device *dev)
{
struct net_bridge *br = netdev_priv(dev);
struct net_bridge_mdb_htable *mdb;
struct nlattr *nest, *nest2;
int i, err = 0;
int idx = 0, s_idx = cb->args[1];
if (br->multicast_disabled)
return 0;
mdb = rcu_dereference(br->mdb);
if (!mdb)
return 0;
nest = nla_nest_start(skb, MDBA_MDB);
if (nest == NULL)
return -EMSGSIZE;
for (i = 0; i < mdb->max; i++) {
struct net_bridge_mdb_entry *mp;
struct net_bridge_port_group *p, **pp;
struct net_bridge_port *port;
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(mp, &mdb->mhash[i], hlist[mdb->ver]) {
if (idx < s_idx)
goto skip;
nest2 = nla_nest_start(skb, MDBA_MDB_ENTRY);
if (nest2 == NULL) {
err = -EMSGSIZE;
goto out;
}
for (pp = &mp->ports;
(p = rcu_dereference(*pp)) != NULL;
pp = &p->next) {
port = p->port;
if (port) {
struct br_mdb_entry e;
e.ifindex = port->dev->ifindex;
e.state = p->state;
if (p->addr.proto == htons(ETH_P_IP))
e.addr.u.ip4 = p->addr.u.ip4;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
if (p->addr.proto == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
e.addr.u.ip6 = p->addr.u.ip6;
#endif
e.addr.proto = p->addr.proto;
if (nla_put(skb, MDBA_MDB_ENTRY_INFO, sizeof(e), &e)) {
nla_nest_cancel(skb, nest2);
err = -EMSGSIZE;
goto out;
}
}
}
nla_nest_end(skb, nest2);
skip:
idx++;
}
}
out:
cb->args[1] = idx;
nla_nest_end(skb, nest);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: net/bridge/br_mdb.c in the Linux kernel before 3.8.4 does not initialize certain structures, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a crafted application.
Commit Message: bridge: fix mdb info leaks
The bridging code discloses heap and stack bytes via the RTM_GETMDB
netlink interface and via the notify messages send to group RTNLGRP_MDB
afer a successful add/del.
Fix both cases by initializing all unset members/padding bytes with
memset(0).
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Low | 15,467 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: png_set_IHDR(png_structp png_ptr, png_infop info_ptr,
png_uint_32 width, png_uint_32 height, int bit_depth,
int color_type, int interlace_type, int compression_type,
int filter_type)
{
png_debug1(1, "in %s storage function", "IHDR");
if (png_ptr == NULL || info_ptr == NULL)
return;
info_ptr->width = width;
info_ptr->height = height;
info_ptr->bit_depth = (png_byte)bit_depth;
info_ptr->color_type = (png_byte)color_type;
info_ptr->compression_type = (png_byte)compression_type;
info_ptr->filter_type = (png_byte)filter_type;
info_ptr->interlace_type = (png_byte)interlace_type;
png_check_IHDR (png_ptr, info_ptr->width, info_ptr->height,
info_ptr->bit_depth, info_ptr->color_type, info_ptr->interlace_type,
info_ptr->compression_type, info_ptr->filter_type);
if (info_ptr->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
info_ptr->channels = 1;
else if (info_ptr->color_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR)
info_ptr->channels = 3;
else
info_ptr->channels = 1;
if (info_ptr->color_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_ALPHA)
info_ptr->channels++;
info_ptr->pixel_depth = (png_byte)(info_ptr->channels * info_ptr->bit_depth);
/* Check for potential overflow */
if (width > (PNG_UINT_32_MAX
>> 3) /* 8-byte RGBA pixels */
- 64 /* bigrowbuf hack */
- 1 /* filter byte */
- 7*8 /* rounding of width to multiple of 8 pixels */
- 8) /* extra max_pixel_depth pad */
info_ptr->rowbytes = (png_size_t)0;
else
info_ptr->rowbytes = PNG_ROWBYTES(info_ptr->pixel_depth, width);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple buffer overflows in the (1) png_set_PLTE and (2) png_get_PLTE functions in libpng before 1.0.64, 1.1.x and 1.2.x before 1.2.54, 1.3.x and 1.4.x before 1.4.17, 1.5.x before 1.5.24, and 1.6.x before 1.6.19 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a small bit-depth value in an IHDR (aka image header) chunk in a PNG image.
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
[email protected]
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298} | High | 18,113 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void MediaInterfaceProxy::CreateCdm(
media::mojom::ContentDecryptionModuleRequest request) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
GetMediaInterfaceFactory()->CreateCdm(std::move(request));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: SkPictureShader.cpp in Skia, as used in Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging access to a renderer process and providing crafted serialized data.
Commit Message: media: Support hosting mojo CDM in a standalone service
Currently when mojo CDM is enabled it is hosted in the MediaService
running in the process specified by "mojo_media_host". However, on
some platforms we need to run mojo CDM and other mojo media services in
different processes. For example, on desktop platforms, we want to run
mojo video decoder in the GPU process, but run the mojo CDM in the
utility process.
This CL adds a new build flag "enable_standalone_cdm_service". When
enabled, the mojo CDM service will be hosted in a standalone "cdm"
service running in the utility process. All other mojo media services
will sill be hosted in the "media" servie running in the process
specified by "mojo_media_host".
BUG=664364
TEST=Encrypted media browser tests using mojo CDM is still working.
Change-Id: I95be6e05adc9ebcff966b26958ef1d7becdfb487
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/567172
Commit-Queue: Xiaohan Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dan Sanders <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486947} | High | 4,098 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int rt_fill_info(struct net *net, __be32 dst, __be32 src,
struct flowi4 *fl4, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 portid,
u32 seq, int event, int nowait, unsigned int flags)
{
struct rtable *rt = skb_rtable(skb);
struct rtmsg *r;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
unsigned long expires = 0;
u32 error;
u32 metrics[RTAX_MAX];
nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, portid, seq, event, sizeof(*r), flags);
if (nlh == NULL)
return -EMSGSIZE;
r = nlmsg_data(nlh);
r->rtm_family = AF_INET;
r->rtm_dst_len = 32;
r->rtm_src_len = 0;
r->rtm_tos = fl4->flowi4_tos;
r->rtm_table = RT_TABLE_MAIN;
if (nla_put_u32(skb, RTA_TABLE, RT_TABLE_MAIN))
goto nla_put_failure;
r->rtm_type = rt->rt_type;
r->rtm_scope = RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE;
r->rtm_protocol = RTPROT_UNSPEC;
r->rtm_flags = (rt->rt_flags & ~0xFFFF) | RTM_F_CLONED;
if (rt->rt_flags & RTCF_NOTIFY)
r->rtm_flags |= RTM_F_NOTIFY;
if (nla_put_be32(skb, RTA_DST, dst))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (src) {
r->rtm_src_len = 32;
if (nla_put_be32(skb, RTA_SRC, src))
goto nla_put_failure;
}
if (rt->dst.dev &&
nla_put_u32(skb, RTA_OIF, rt->dst.dev->ifindex))
goto nla_put_failure;
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_CLASSID
if (rt->dst.tclassid &&
nla_put_u32(skb, RTA_FLOW, rt->dst.tclassid))
goto nla_put_failure;
#endif
if (!rt_is_input_route(rt) &&
fl4->saddr != src) {
if (nla_put_be32(skb, RTA_PREFSRC, fl4->saddr))
goto nla_put_failure;
}
if (rt->rt_uses_gateway &&
nla_put_be32(skb, RTA_GATEWAY, rt->rt_gateway))
goto nla_put_failure;
expires = rt->dst.expires;
if (expires) {
unsigned long now = jiffies;
if (time_before(now, expires))
expires -= now;
else
expires = 0;
}
memcpy(metrics, dst_metrics_ptr(&rt->dst), sizeof(metrics));
if (rt->rt_pmtu && expires)
metrics[RTAX_MTU - 1] = rt->rt_pmtu;
if (rtnetlink_put_metrics(skb, metrics) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (fl4->flowi4_mark &&
nla_put_u32(skb, RTA_MARK, fl4->flowi4_mark))
goto nla_put_failure;
error = rt->dst.error;
if (rt_is_input_route(rt)) {
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_MROUTE
if (ipv4_is_multicast(dst) && !ipv4_is_local_multicast(dst) &&
IPV4_DEVCONF_ALL(net, MC_FORWARDING)) {
int err = ipmr_get_route(net, skb,
fl4->saddr, fl4->daddr,
r, nowait);
if (err <= 0) {
if (!nowait) {
if (err == 0)
return 0;
goto nla_put_failure;
} else {
if (err == -EMSGSIZE)
goto nla_put_failure;
error = err;
}
}
} else
#endif
if (nla_put_u32(skb, RTA_IIF, skb->dev->ifindex))
goto nla_put_failure;
}
if (rtnl_put_cacheinfo(skb, &rt->dst, 0, expires, error) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
return nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
nla_put_failure:
nlmsg_cancel(skb, nlh);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-17
Summary: The IPv4 implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.18.8 does not properly consider the length of the Read-Copy Update (RCU) grace period for redirecting lookups in the absence of caching, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption or system crash) via a flood of packets.
Commit Message: ipv4: try to cache dst_entries which would cause a redirect
Not caching dst_entries which cause redirects could be exploited by hosts
on the same subnet, causing a severe DoS attack. This effect aggravated
since commit f88649721268999 ("ipv4: fix dst race in sk_dst_get()").
Lookups causing redirects will be allocated with DST_NOCACHE set which
will force dst_release to free them via RCU. Unfortunately waiting for
RCU grace period just takes too long, we can end up with >1M dst_entries
waiting to be released and the system will run OOM. rcuos threads cannot
catch up under high softirq load.
Attaching the flag to emit a redirect later on to the specific skb allows
us to cache those dst_entries thus reducing the pressure on allocation
and deallocation.
This issue was discovered by Marcelo Leitner.
Cc: Julian Anastasov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Leitner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | High | 1,683 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: long kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl(struct file *filp,
unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
{
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = filp->private_data;
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
switch (ioctl) {
case KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT: {
struct kvm_vcpu_init init;
if (copy_from_user(&init, argp, sizeof(init)))
return -EFAULT;
return kvm_vcpu_set_target(vcpu, &init);
}
case KVM_SET_ONE_REG:
case KVM_GET_ONE_REG: {
struct kvm_one_reg reg;
if (copy_from_user(®, argp, sizeof(reg)))
return -EFAULT;
if (ioctl == KVM_SET_ONE_REG)
return kvm_arm_set_reg(vcpu, ®);
else
return kvm_arm_get_reg(vcpu, ®);
}
case KVM_GET_REG_LIST: {
struct kvm_reg_list __user *user_list = argp;
struct kvm_reg_list reg_list;
unsigned n;
if (copy_from_user(®_list, user_list, sizeof(reg_list)))
return -EFAULT;
n = reg_list.n;
reg_list.n = kvm_arm_num_regs(vcpu);
if (copy_to_user(user_list, ®_list, sizeof(reg_list)))
return -EFAULT;
if (n < reg_list.n)
return -E2BIG;
return kvm_arm_copy_reg_indices(vcpu, user_list->reg);
}
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: arch/arm/kvm/arm.c in the Linux kernel before 3.10 on the ARM platform, when KVM is used, allows host OS users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference, OOPS, and host OS crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact by omitting vCPU initialization before a KVM_GET_REG_LIST ioctl call.
Commit Message: ARM: KVM: prevent NULL pointer dereferences with KVM VCPU ioctl
Some ARM KVM VCPU ioctls require the vCPU to be properly initialized
with the KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT ioctl before being used with further
requests. KVM_RUN checks whether this initialization has been
done, but other ioctls do not.
Namely KVM_GET_REG_LIST will dereference an array with index -1
without initialization and thus leads to a kernel oops.
Fix this by adding checks before executing the ioctl handlers.
[ Removed superflous comment from static function - Christoffer ]
Changes from v1:
* moved check into a static function with a meaningful name
Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <[email protected]> | Medium | 24,550 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: char *enl_ipc_get(const char *msg_data)
{
static char *message = NULL;
static unsigned short len = 0;
char buff[13], *ret_msg = NULL;
register unsigned char i;
unsigned char blen;
if (msg_data == IPC_TIMEOUT) {
return(IPC_TIMEOUT);
}
for (i = 0; i < 12; i++) {
buff[i] = msg_data[i];
}
buff[12] = 0;
blen = strlen(buff);
if (message != NULL) {
len += blen;
message = (char *) erealloc(message, len + 1);
strcat(message, buff);
} else {
len = blen;
message = (char *) emalloc(len + 1);
strcpy(message, buff);
}
if (blen < 12) {
ret_msg = message;
message = NULL;
D(("Received complete reply: \"%s\"\n", ret_msg));
}
return(ret_msg);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: In wallpaper.c in feh before v2.18.3, if a malicious client pretends to be the E17 window manager, it is possible to trigger an out-of-boundary heap write while receiving an IPC message. An integer overflow leads to a buffer overflow and/or a double free.
Commit Message: Fix double-free/OOB-write while receiving IPC data
If a malicious client pretends to be the E17 window manager, it is
possible to trigger an out of boundary heap write while receiving an
IPC message.
The length of the already received message is stored in an unsigned
short, which overflows after receiving 64 KB of data. It's comparably
small amount of data and therefore achievable for an attacker.
When len overflows, realloc() will either be called with a small value
and therefore chars will be appended out of bounds, or len + 1 will be
exactly 0, in which case realloc() behaves like free(). This could be
abused for a later double-free attack as it's even possible to overwrite
the free information -- but this depends on the malloc implementation.
Signed-off-by: Tobias Stoeckmann <[email protected]> | High | 4,936 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void sctp_sock_migrate(struct sock *oldsk, struct sock *newsk,
struct sctp_association *assoc,
sctp_socket_type_t type)
{
struct sctp_sock *oldsp = sctp_sk(oldsk);
struct sctp_sock *newsp = sctp_sk(newsk);
struct sctp_bind_bucket *pp; /* hash list port iterator */
struct sctp_endpoint *newep = newsp->ep;
struct sk_buff *skb, *tmp;
struct sctp_ulpevent *event;
int flags = 0;
/* Migrate socket buffer sizes and all the socket level options to the
* new socket.
*/
newsk->sk_sndbuf = oldsk->sk_sndbuf;
newsk->sk_rcvbuf = oldsk->sk_rcvbuf;
/* Brute force copy old sctp opt. */
inet_sk_copy_descendant(newsk, oldsk);
/* Restore the ep value that was overwritten with the above structure
* copy.
*/
newsp->ep = newep;
newsp->hmac = NULL;
/* Hook this new socket in to the bind_hash list. */
pp = sctp_sk(oldsk)->bind_hash;
sk_add_bind_node(newsk, &pp->owner);
sctp_sk(newsk)->bind_hash = pp;
inet_sk(newsk)->num = inet_sk(oldsk)->num;
/* Copy the bind_addr list from the original endpoint to the new
* endpoint so that we can handle restarts properly
*/
if (PF_INET6 == assoc->base.sk->sk_family)
flags = SCTP_ADDR6_ALLOWED;
if (assoc->peer.ipv4_address)
flags |= SCTP_ADDR4_PEERSUPP;
if (assoc->peer.ipv6_address)
flags |= SCTP_ADDR6_PEERSUPP;
sctp_bind_addr_copy(&newsp->ep->base.bind_addr,
&oldsp->ep->base.bind_addr,
SCTP_SCOPE_GLOBAL, GFP_KERNEL, flags);
/* Move any messages in the old socket's receive queue that are for the
* peeled off association to the new socket's receive queue.
*/
sctp_skb_for_each(skb, &oldsk->sk_receive_queue, tmp) {
event = sctp_skb2event(skb);
if (event->asoc == assoc) {
sctp_sock_rfree(skb);
__skb_unlink(skb, &oldsk->sk_receive_queue);
__skb_queue_tail(&newsk->sk_receive_queue, skb);
sctp_skb_set_owner_r(skb, newsk);
}
}
/* Clean up any messages pending delivery due to partial
* delivery. Three cases:
* 1) No partial deliver; no work.
* 2) Peeling off partial delivery; keep pd_lobby in new pd_lobby.
* 3) Peeling off non-partial delivery; move pd_lobby to receive_queue.
*/
skb_queue_head_init(&newsp->pd_lobby);
sctp_sk(newsk)->pd_mode = assoc->ulpq.pd_mode;
if (sctp_sk(oldsk)->pd_mode) {
struct sk_buff_head *queue;
/* Decide which queue to move pd_lobby skbs to. */
if (assoc->ulpq.pd_mode) {
queue = &newsp->pd_lobby;
} else
queue = &newsk->sk_receive_queue;
/* Walk through the pd_lobby, looking for skbs that
* need moved to the new socket.
*/
sctp_skb_for_each(skb, &oldsp->pd_lobby, tmp) {
event = sctp_skb2event(skb);
if (event->asoc == assoc) {
sctp_sock_rfree(skb);
__skb_unlink(skb, &oldsp->pd_lobby);
__skb_queue_tail(queue, skb);
sctp_skb_set_owner_r(skb, newsk);
}
}
/* Clear up any skbs waiting for the partial
* delivery to finish.
*/
if (assoc->ulpq.pd_mode)
sctp_clear_pd(oldsk);
}
/* Set the type of socket to indicate that it is peeled off from the
* original UDP-style socket or created with the accept() call on a
* TCP-style socket..
*/
newsp->type = type;
/* Mark the new socket "in-use" by the user so that any packets
* that may arrive on the association after we've moved it are
* queued to the backlog. This prevents a potential race between
* backlog processing on the old socket and new-packet processing
* on the new socket.
*/
sctp_lock_sock(newsk);
sctp_assoc_migrate(assoc, newsk);
/* If the association on the newsk is already closed before accept()
* is called, set RCV_SHUTDOWN flag.
*/
if (sctp_state(assoc, CLOSED) && sctp_style(newsk, TCP))
newsk->sk_shutdown |= RCV_SHUTDOWN;
newsk->sk_state = SCTP_SS_ESTABLISHED;
sctp_release_sock(newsk);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: A certain Red Hat patch to the sctp_sock_migrate function in net/sctp/socket.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.21, as used in Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL) 5, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and OOPS) via a crafted SCTP packet.
Commit Message: [SCTP]: Fix assertion (!atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc)) failed message
In current implementation, LKSCTP does receive buffer accounting for
data in sctp_receive_queue and pd_lobby. However, LKSCTP don't do
accounting for data in frag_list when data is fragmented. In addition,
LKSCTP doesn't do accounting for data in reasm and lobby queue in
structure sctp_ulpq.
When there are date in these queue, assertion failed message is printed
in inet_sock_destruct because sk_rmem_alloc of oldsk does not become 0
when socket is destroyed.
Signed-off-by: Tsutomu Fujii <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | High | 20,056 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int decode_level3_header(LHAFileHeader **header, LHAInputStream *stream)
{
unsigned int header_len;
if (lha_decode_uint16(&RAW_DATA(header, 0)) != 4) {
return 0;
}
if (!extend_raw_data(header, stream,
LEVEL_3_HEADER_LEN - RAW_DATA_LEN(header))) {
return 0;
}
header_len = lha_decode_uint32(&RAW_DATA(header, 24));
if (header_len > LEVEL_3_MAX_HEADER_LEN) {
return 0;
}
if (!extend_raw_data(header, stream,
header_len - RAW_DATA_LEN(header))) {
return 0;
}
memcpy((*header)->compress_method, &RAW_DATA(header, 2), 5);
(*header)->compress_method[5] = '\0';
(*header)->compressed_length = lha_decode_uint32(&RAW_DATA(header, 7));
(*header)->length = lha_decode_uint32(&RAW_DATA(header, 11));
(*header)->timestamp = lha_decode_uint32(&RAW_DATA(header, 15));
(*header)->crc = lha_decode_uint16(&RAW_DATA(header, 21));
(*header)->os_type = RAW_DATA(header, 23);
if (!decode_extended_headers(header, 28)) {
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer underflow in the decode_level3_header function in lib/lha_file_header.c in Lhasa before 0.3.1 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted archive.
Commit Message: Fix integer underflow vulnerability in L3 decode.
Marcin 'Icewall' Noga of Cisco TALOS discovered that the level 3 header
decoding routines were vulnerable to an integer underflow, if the 32-bit
header length was less than the base level 3 header length. This could
lead to an exploitable heap corruption condition.
Thanks go to Marcin Noga and Regina Wilson of Cisco TALOS for reporting
this vulnerability. | Medium | 29,903 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int em_ret_far(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
int rc;
unsigned long cs;
int cpl = ctxt->ops->cpl(ctxt);
rc = emulate_pop(ctxt, &ctxt->_eip, ctxt->op_bytes);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
if (ctxt->op_bytes == 4)
ctxt->_eip = (u32)ctxt->_eip;
rc = emulate_pop(ctxt, &cs, ctxt->op_bytes);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
/* Outer-privilege level return is not implemented */
if (ctxt->mode >= X86EMUL_MODE_PROT16 && (cs & 3) > cpl)
return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
rc = load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, (u16)cs, VCPU_SREG_CS);
return rc;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c in the KVM subsystem in the Linux kernel through 3.17.2 does not properly perform RIP changes, which allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (guest OS crash) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Handle errors when RIP is set during far jumps
Far jmp/call/ret may fault while loading a new RIP. Currently KVM does not
handle this case, and may result in failed vm-entry once the assignment is
done. The tricky part of doing so is that loading the new CS affects the
VMCS/VMCB state, so if we fail during loading the new RIP, we are left in
unconsistent state. Therefore, this patch saves on 64-bit the old CS
descriptor and restores it if loading RIP failed.
This fixes CVE-2014-3647.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> | Low | 11,329 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: WORD32 ixheaacd_real_synth_filt(ia_esbr_hbe_txposer_struct *ptr_hbe_txposer,
WORD32 num_columns, FLOAT32 qmf_buf_real[][64],
FLOAT32 qmf_buf_imag[][64]) {
WORD32 i, j, k, l, idx;
FLOAT32 g[640];
FLOAT32 w[640];
FLOAT32 synth_out[128];
FLOAT32 accu_r;
WORD32 synth_size = ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size;
FLOAT32 *ptr_cos_tab_trans_qmf =
(FLOAT32 *)&ixheaacd_cos_table_trans_qmf[0][0] +
ptr_hbe_txposer->k_start * 32;
FLOAT32 *buffer = ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_buf;
for (idx = 0; idx < num_columns; idx++) {
FLOAT32 loc_qmf_buf[64];
FLOAT32 *synth_buf_r = loc_qmf_buf;
FLOAT32 *out_buf = ptr_hbe_txposer->ptr_input_buf +
(idx + 1) * ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size;
FLOAT32 *synth_cos_tab = ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_cos_tab;
const FLOAT32 *interp_window_coeff = ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_wind_coeff;
if (ptr_hbe_txposer->k_start < 0) return -1;
for (k = 0; k < synth_size; k++) {
WORD32 ki = ptr_hbe_txposer->k_start + k;
synth_buf_r[k] = (FLOAT32)(
ptr_cos_tab_trans_qmf[(k << 1) + 0] * qmf_buf_real[idx][ki] +
ptr_cos_tab_trans_qmf[(k << 1) + 1] * qmf_buf_imag[idx][ki]);
synth_buf_r[k + ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size] = 0;
}
for (l = (20 * synth_size - 1); l >= 2 * synth_size; l--) {
buffer[l] = buffer[l - 2 * synth_size];
}
if (synth_size == 20) {
FLOAT32 *psynth_cos_tab = synth_cos_tab;
for (l = 0; l < (synth_size + 1); l++) {
accu_r = 0.0;
for (k = 0; k < synth_size; k++) {
accu_r += synth_buf_r[k] * psynth_cos_tab[k];
}
buffer[0 + l] = accu_r;
buffer[synth_size - l] = accu_r;
psynth_cos_tab = psynth_cos_tab + synth_size;
}
for (l = (synth_size + 1); l < (2 * synth_size - synth_size / 2); l++) {
accu_r = 0.0;
for (k = 0; k < synth_size; k++) {
accu_r += synth_buf_r[k] * psynth_cos_tab[k];
}
buffer[0 + l] = accu_r;
buffer[3 * synth_size - l] = -accu_r;
psynth_cos_tab = psynth_cos_tab + synth_size;
}
accu_r = 0.0;
for (k = 0; k < synth_size; k++) {
accu_r += synth_buf_r[k] * psynth_cos_tab[k];
}
buffer[3 * synth_size >> 1] = accu_r;
} else {
FLOAT32 tmp;
FLOAT32 *ptr_u = synth_out;
WORD32 kmax = (synth_size >> 1);
FLOAT32 *syn_buf = &buffer[kmax];
kmax += synth_size;
if (ixheaacd_real_synth_fft != NULL)
(*ixheaacd_real_synth_fft)(synth_buf_r, synth_out, synth_size * 2);
else
return -1;
for (k = 0; k < kmax; k++) {
tmp = ((*ptr_u++) * (*synth_cos_tab++));
tmp -= ((*ptr_u++) * (*synth_cos_tab++));
*syn_buf++ = tmp;
}
syn_buf = &buffer[0];
kmax -= synth_size;
for (k = 0; k < kmax; k++) {
tmp = ((*ptr_u++) * (*synth_cos_tab++));
tmp -= ((*ptr_u++) * (*synth_cos_tab++));
*syn_buf++ = tmp;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
memcpy(&g[(2 * i + 0) * synth_size], &buffer[(4 * i + 0) * synth_size],
sizeof(FLOAT32) * synth_size);
memcpy(&g[(2 * i + 1) * synth_size], &buffer[(4 * i + 3) * synth_size],
sizeof(FLOAT32) * synth_size);
}
for (k = 0; k < 10 * synth_size; k++) {
w[k] = g[k] * interp_window_coeff[k];
}
for (i = 0; i < synth_size; i++) {
accu_r = 0.0;
for (j = 0; j < 10; j++) {
accu_r = accu_r + w[synth_size * j + i];
}
out_buf[i] = (FLOAT32)accu_r;
}
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: In ixheaacd_real_synth_fft_p3 of ixheaacd_esbr_fft.c there is a possible out of bounds write due to a missing bounds check. This could lead to remote code execution with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is needed for exploitation. Product: Android Versions: Android-9.0 Android ID: A-110769924
Commit Message: Fix for stack corruption in esbr
Bug: 110769924
Test: poc from bug before/after
Change-Id: I99c6e89902064849ea1310c271064bdeccf7f20e
(cherry picked from commit 7e90d745c22695236437297cd8167a9312427a4a)
(cherry picked from commit 5464927f0c1fc721fa03d1c5be77b0b43dfffc50)
| High | 6,693 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: IDNSpoofChecker::IDNSpoofChecker() {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
checker_ = uspoof_open(&status);
if (U_FAILURE(status)) {
checker_ = nullptr;
return;
}
uspoof_setRestrictionLevel(checker_, USPOOF_HIGHLY_RESTRICTIVE);
SetAllowedUnicodeSet(&status);
int32_t checks = uspoof_getChecks(checker_, &status) | USPOOF_AUX_INFO;
uspoof_setChecks(checker_, checks, &status);
deviation_characters_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u00df\\u03c2\\u200c\\u200d]"), status);
deviation_characters_.freeze();
non_ascii_latin_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:] - [a-zA-Z]]"), status);
non_ascii_latin_letters_.freeze();
kana_letters_exceptions_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u3078-\\u307a\\u30d8-\\u30da\\u30fb-\\u30fe]"),
status);
kana_letters_exceptions_.freeze();
combining_diacritics_exceptions_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u0300-\\u0339]"), status);
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[асԁеһіјӏорԛѕԝхуъЬҽпгѵѡ]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Cyrl:]]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_.freeze();
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status));
lgc_letters_n_ascii_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:][:Greek:][:Cyrillic:][0-9\\u002e_"
"\\u002d][\\u0300-\\u0339]]"),
status);
lgc_letters_n_ascii_.freeze();
UParseError parse_error;
diacritic_remover_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("DropAcc"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("::NFD; ::[:Nonspacing Mark:] Remove; ::NFC;"
" ł > l; ø > o; đ > d;"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
extra_confusable_mapper_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("ExtraConf"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[þϼҏ] > p; [ħнћңҥӈӊԋԧԩ] > h;"
"[ĸκкқҝҟҡӄԟ] > k; [ŋп] > n; [ŧтҭԏ] > t;"
"[ƅьҍв] > b; [ωшщฟ] > w; [мӎ] > m;"
"[єҽҿၔ] > e; ґ > r; [ғӻ] > f; [ҫင] > c;"
"ұ > y; [χҳӽӿ] > x;"
"ԃ > d; [ԍဌ] > g; [ടร] > s; ၂ > j;"
"[зӡ] > 3"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status))
<< "Spoofchecker initalization failed due to an error: "
<< u_errorName(status);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Incorrect handling of confusable characters in URL Formatter in Google Chrome prior to 68.0.3440.75 allowed a remote attacker to perform domain spoofing via IDN homographs via a crafted domain name.
Commit Message: Add a few more confusability mapping entries
U+0153(œ) => ce
U+00E6(æ), U+04D5 (ӕ) => ae
U+0499(ҙ) => 3
U+0525(ԥ) => n
Bug: 835554, 826019, 836885
Test: components_unittests --gtest_filter=*IDN*
Change-Id: Ic89211f70359d3d67cc25c1805b426b72cdb16ae
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1055894
Commit-Queue: Jungshik Shin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#558928} | Medium | 14,421 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int PDFiumEngine::GetVisiblePageIndex(FPDF_PAGE page) {
for (int page_index : visible_pages_) {
if (pages_[page_index]->GetPage() == page)
return page_index;
}
return -1;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An iterator-invalidation bug in PDFium in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside a sandbox via a crafted PDF file.
Commit Message: Copy visible_pages_ when iterating over it.
On this case, a call inside the loop may cause visible_pages_ to
change.
Bug: 822091
Change-Id: I41b0715faa6fe3e39203cd9142cf5ea38e59aefb
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/964592
Reviewed-by: dsinclair <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Henrique Nakashima <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#543494} | Medium | 21,994 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: InvalidState AXNodeObject::getInvalidState() const {
const AtomicString& attributeValue =
getAOMPropertyOrARIAAttribute(AOMStringProperty::kInvalid);
if (equalIgnoringCase(attributeValue, "false"))
return InvalidStateFalse;
if (equalIgnoringCase(attributeValue, "true"))
return InvalidStateTrue;
if (equalIgnoringCase(attributeValue, "spelling"))
return InvalidStateSpelling;
if (equalIgnoringCase(attributeValue, "grammar"))
return InvalidStateGrammar;
if (!attributeValue.isEmpty())
return InvalidStateOther;
if (getNode() && getNode()->isElementNode() &&
toElement(getNode())->isFormControlElement()) {
HTMLFormControlElement* element = toHTMLFormControlElement(getNode());
HeapVector<Member<HTMLFormControlElement>> invalidControls;
bool isInvalid =
!element->checkValidity(&invalidControls, CheckValidityDispatchNoEvent);
return isInvalid ? InvalidStateTrue : InvalidStateFalse;
}
return AXObject::getInvalidState();
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89 does not ensure that the auto-open list omits all dangerous file types, which makes it easier for remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by providing a crafted file and leveraging a user's previous *Always open files of this type* choice, related to download_commands.cc and download_prefs.cc.
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858} | Medium | 24,491 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: isis_print_is_reach_subtlv(netdissect_options *ndo,
const uint8_t *tptr, u_int subt, u_int subl,
const char *ident)
{
u_int te_class,priority_level,gmpls_switch_cap;
union { /* int to float conversion buffer for several subTLVs */
float f;
uint32_t i;
} bw;
/* first lets see if we know the subTLVs name*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s%s subTLV #%u, length: %u",
ident, tok2str(isis_ext_is_reach_subtlv_values, "unknown", subt),
subt, subl));
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, subl);
switch(subt) {
case ISIS_SUBTLV_EXT_IS_REACH_ADMIN_GROUP:
case ISIS_SUBTLV_EXT_IS_REACH_LINK_LOCAL_REMOTE_ID:
case ISIS_SUBTLV_EXT_IS_REACH_LINK_REMOTE_ID:
if (subl >= 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", 0x%08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
if (subl == 8) /* rfc4205 */
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", 0x%08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+4)));
}
break;
case ISIS_SUBTLV_EXT_IS_REACH_IPV4_INTF_ADDR:
case ISIS_SUBTLV_EXT_IS_REACH_IPV4_NEIGHBOR_ADDR:
if (subl >= sizeof(struct in_addr))
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
break;
case ISIS_SUBTLV_EXT_IS_REACH_MAX_LINK_BW :
case ISIS_SUBTLV_EXT_IS_REACH_RESERVABLE_BW:
if (subl >= 4) {
bw.i = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %.3f Mbps", bw.f * 8 / 1000000));
}
break;
case ISIS_SUBTLV_EXT_IS_REACH_UNRESERVED_BW :
if (subl >= 32) {
for (te_class = 0; te_class < 8; te_class++) {
bw.i = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s TE-Class %u: %.3f Mbps",
ident,
te_class,
bw.f * 8 / 1000000));
tptr+=4;
}
}
break;
case ISIS_SUBTLV_EXT_IS_REACH_BW_CONSTRAINTS: /* fall through */
case ISIS_SUBTLV_EXT_IS_REACH_BW_CONSTRAINTS_OLD:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%sBandwidth Constraints Model ID: %s (%u)",
ident,
tok2str(diffserv_te_bc_values, "unknown", *tptr),
*tptr));
tptr++;
/* decode BCs until the subTLV ends */
for (te_class = 0; te_class < (subl-1)/4; te_class++) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 4);
bw.i = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Bandwidth constraint CT%u: %.3f Mbps",
ident,
te_class,
bw.f * 8 / 1000000));
tptr+=4;
}
break;
case ISIS_SUBTLV_EXT_IS_REACH_TE_METRIC:
if (subl >= 3)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %u", EXTRACT_24BITS(tptr)));
break;
case ISIS_SUBTLV_EXT_IS_REACH_LINK_ATTRIBUTE:
if (subl == 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", [ %s ] (0x%04x)",
bittok2str(isis_subtlv_link_attribute_values,
"Unknown",
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)),
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)));
}
break;
case ISIS_SUBTLV_EXT_IS_REACH_LINK_PROTECTION_TYPE:
if (subl >= 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %s, Priority %u",
bittok2str(gmpls_link_prot_values, "none", *tptr),
*(tptr+1)));
}
break;
case ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_METRIC:
if (subl >= 6) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", LM: %u", EXTRACT_24BITS(tptr)));
tptr=tptr+3;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", P: %u", *(tptr)));
tptr++;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", P-ID: %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)));
}
break;
case ISIS_SUBTLV_EXT_IS_REACH_INTF_SW_CAP_DESCR:
if (subl >= 36) {
gmpls_switch_cap = *tptr;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Interface Switching Capability:%s",
ident,
tok2str(gmpls_switch_cap_values, "Unknown", gmpls_switch_cap)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", LSP Encoding: %s",
tok2str(gmpls_encoding_values, "Unknown", *(tptr + 1))));
tptr+=4;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Max LSP Bandwidth:", ident));
for (priority_level = 0; priority_level < 8; priority_level++) {
bw.i = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s priority level %d: %.3f Mbps",
ident,
priority_level,
bw.f * 8 / 1000000));
tptr+=4;
}
subl-=36;
switch (gmpls_switch_cap) {
case GMPLS_PSC1:
case GMPLS_PSC2:
case GMPLS_PSC3:
case GMPLS_PSC4:
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 6);
bw.i = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Min LSP Bandwidth: %.3f Mbps", ident, bw.f * 8 / 1000000));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Interface MTU: %u", ident, EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr + 4)));
break;
case GMPLS_TSC:
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 8);
bw.i = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Min LSP Bandwidth: %.3f Mbps", ident, bw.f * 8 / 1000000));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Indication %s", ident,
tok2str(gmpls_switch_cap_tsc_indication_values, "Unknown (%u)", *(tptr + 4))));
break;
default:
/* there is some optional stuff left to decode but this is as of yet
not specified so just lets hexdump what is left */
if(subl>0){
if (!print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t\t ", subl))
return(0);
}
}
}
break;
default:
if (!print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t\t ", subl))
return(0);
break;
}
return(1);
trunc:
return(0);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The ISO IS-IS parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-isoclns.c:isis_print_is_reach_subtlv().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13055/IS-IS: fix an Extended IS Reachability sub-TLV
In isis_print_is_reach_subtlv() one of the case blocks did not check that
the sub-TLV "V" is actually present and could over-read the input buffer.
Add a length check to fix that and remove a useless boundary check from
a loop because the boundary is tested for the full length of "V" before
the switch block.
Update one of the prior test cases as it turns out it depended on this
previously incorrect code path to make it to its own malformed structure
further down the buffer, the bugfix has changed its output.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | High | 27,348 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: __imlib_Ellipse_DrawToData(int xc, int yc, int a, int b, DATA32 color,
DATA32 * dst, int dstw, int clx, int cly, int clw,
int clh, ImlibOp op, char dst_alpha, char blend)
{
ImlibPointDrawFunction pfunc;
int xx, yy, x, y, prev_x, prev_y, ty, by, lx, rx;
DATA32 a2, b2, *tp, *bp;
DATA64 dx, dy;
if (A_VAL(&color) == 0xff)
blend = 0;
pfunc = __imlib_GetPointDrawFunction(op, dst_alpha, blend);
if (!pfunc)
return;
xc -= clx;
yc -= cly;
dst += (dstw * cly) + clx;
a2 = a * a;
b2 = b * b;
yy = b << 16;
prev_y = b;
dx = a2 * b;
dy = 0;
ty = yc - b - 1;
by = yc + b;
lx = xc - 1;
rx = xc;
tp = dst + (dstw * ty) + lx;
bp = dst + (dstw * by) + lx;
while (dy < dx)
{
int len;
y = yy >> 16;
y += ((yy - (y << 16)) >> 15);
if (prev_y != y)
{
prev_y = y;
dx -= a2;
ty++;
by--;
tp += dstw;
bp -= dstw;
}
len = rx - lx;
if (IN_RANGE(lx, ty, clw, clh))
pfunc(color, tp);
if (IN_RANGE(rx, ty, clw, clh))
pfunc(color, tp + len);
if (IN_RANGE(lx, by, clw, clh))
pfunc(color, bp);
if (IN_RANGE(rx, by, clw, clh))
pfunc(color, bp + len);
dy += b2;
yy -= ((dy << 16) / dx);
lx--;
if ((lx < 0) && (rx > clw))
return;
if ((ty > clh) || (by < 0))
return;
}
xx = yy;
prev_x = xx >> 16;
dx = dy;
ty++;
by--;
tp += dstw;
bp -= dstw;
while (ty < yc)
{
int len;
x = xx >> 16;
x += ((xx - (x << 16)) >> 15);
if (prev_x != x)
{
prev_x = x;
dy += b2;
lx--;
rx++;
tp--;
bp--;
}
len = rx - lx;
if (IN_RANGE(lx, ty, clw, clh))
pfunc(color, tp);
if (IN_RANGE(rx, ty, clw, clh))
pfunc(color, tp + len);
if (IN_RANGE(lx, by, clw, clh))
pfunc(color, bp);
if (IN_RANGE(rx, by, clw, clh))
pfunc(color, bp + len);
if (IN_RANGE(rx, by, clw, clh))
pfunc(color, bp + len);
dx -= a2;
xx += ((dx << 16) / dy);
ty++;
if ((ty > clh) || (by < 0))
return;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: imlib2 before 1.4.9 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (divide-by-zero error and application crash) by drawing a 2x1 ellipse.
Commit Message: | Medium | 10,762 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: ShelfLayoutManager::AutoHideState ShelfLayoutManager::CalculateAutoHideState(
VisibilityState visibility_state) const {
if (visibility_state != AUTO_HIDE || !launcher_widget())
return AUTO_HIDE_HIDDEN;
Shell* shell = Shell::GetInstance();
if (shell->GetAppListTargetVisibility())
return AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN;
if (shell->system_tray() && shell->system_tray()->should_show_launcher())
return AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN;
if (launcher_ && launcher_->IsShowingMenu())
return AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN;
if (launcher_widget()->IsActive() || status_->IsActive())
return AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN;
if (event_filter_.get() && event_filter_->in_mouse_drag())
return AUTO_HIDE_HIDDEN;
aura::RootWindow* root = launcher_widget()->GetNativeView()->GetRootWindow();
bool mouse_over_launcher =
launcher_widget()->GetWindowScreenBounds().Contains(
root->last_mouse_location());
return mouse_over_launcher ? AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN : AUTO_HIDE_HIDDEN;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger out-of-bounds write operations.
Commit Message: ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 5,509 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int rds_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
size_t size, int msg_flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct rds_sock *rs = rds_sk_to_rs(sk);
long timeo;
int ret = 0, nonblock = msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT;
struct sockaddr_in *sin;
struct rds_incoming *inc = NULL;
/* udp_recvmsg()->sock_recvtimeo() gets away without locking too.. */
timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, nonblock);
rdsdebug("size %zu flags 0x%x timeo %ld\n", size, msg_flags, timeo);
msg->msg_namelen = 0;
if (msg_flags & MSG_OOB)
goto out;
while (1) {
/* If there are pending notifications, do those - and nothing else */
if (!list_empty(&rs->rs_notify_queue)) {
ret = rds_notify_queue_get(rs, msg);
break;
}
if (rs->rs_cong_notify) {
ret = rds_notify_cong(rs, msg);
break;
}
if (!rds_next_incoming(rs, &inc)) {
if (nonblock) {
ret = -EAGAIN;
break;
}
timeo = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(*sk_sleep(sk),
(!list_empty(&rs->rs_notify_queue) ||
rs->rs_cong_notify ||
rds_next_incoming(rs, &inc)), timeo);
rdsdebug("recvmsg woke inc %p timeo %ld\n", inc,
timeo);
if (timeo > 0 || timeo == MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT)
continue;
ret = timeo;
if (ret == 0)
ret = -ETIMEDOUT;
break;
}
rdsdebug("copying inc %p from %pI4:%u to user\n", inc,
&inc->i_conn->c_faddr,
ntohs(inc->i_hdr.h_sport));
ret = inc->i_conn->c_trans->inc_copy_to_user(inc, msg->msg_iov,
size);
if (ret < 0)
break;
/*
* if the message we just copied isn't at the head of the
* recv queue then someone else raced us to return it, try
* to get the next message.
*/
if (!rds_still_queued(rs, inc, !(msg_flags & MSG_PEEK))) {
rds_inc_put(inc);
inc = NULL;
rds_stats_inc(s_recv_deliver_raced);
continue;
}
if (ret < be32_to_cpu(inc->i_hdr.h_len)) {
if (msg_flags & MSG_TRUNC)
ret = be32_to_cpu(inc->i_hdr.h_len);
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
}
if (rds_cmsg_recv(inc, msg)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
rds_stats_inc(s_recv_delivered);
sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)msg->msg_name;
if (sin) {
sin->sin_family = AF_INET;
sin->sin_port = inc->i_hdr.h_sport;
sin->sin_addr.s_addr = inc->i_saddr;
memset(sin->sin_zero, 0, sizeof(sin->sin_zero));
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(*sin);
}
break;
}
if (inc)
rds_inc_put(inc);
out:
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The x25_recvmsg function in net/x25/af_x25.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.4 updates a certain length value without ensuring that an associated data structure has been initialized, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a (1) recvfrom, (2) recvmmsg, or (3) recvmsg system call.
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 10,378 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: BuildTestPacket(uint16_t id, uint16_t off, int mf, const char content,
int content_len)
{
Packet *p = NULL;
int hlen = 20;
int ttl = 64;
uint8_t *pcontent;
IPV4Hdr ip4h;
p = SCCalloc(1, sizeof(*p) + default_packet_size);
if (unlikely(p == NULL))
return NULL;
PACKET_INITIALIZE(p);
gettimeofday(&p->ts, NULL);
ip4h.ip_verhl = 4 << 4;
ip4h.ip_verhl |= hlen >> 2;
ip4h.ip_len = htons(hlen + content_len);
ip4h.ip_id = htons(id);
ip4h.ip_off = htons(off);
if (mf)
ip4h.ip_off = htons(IP_MF | off);
else
ip4h.ip_off = htons(off);
ip4h.ip_ttl = ttl;
ip4h.ip_proto = IPPROTO_ICMP;
ip4h.s_ip_src.s_addr = 0x01010101; /* 1.1.1.1 */
ip4h.s_ip_dst.s_addr = 0x02020202; /* 2.2.2.2 */
/* copy content_len crap, we need full length */
PacketCopyData(p, (uint8_t *)&ip4h, sizeof(ip4h));
p->ip4h = (IPV4Hdr *)GET_PKT_DATA(p);
SET_IPV4_SRC_ADDR(p, &p->src);
SET_IPV4_DST_ADDR(p, &p->dst);
pcontent = SCCalloc(1, content_len);
if (unlikely(pcontent == NULL))
return NULL;
memset(pcontent, content, content_len);
PacketCopyDataOffset(p, hlen, pcontent, content_len);
SET_PKT_LEN(p, hlen + content_len);
SCFree(pcontent);
p->ip4h->ip_csum = IPV4CalculateChecksum((uint16_t *)GET_PKT_DATA(p), hlen);
/* Self test. */
if (IPV4_GET_VER(p) != 4)
goto error;
if (IPV4_GET_HLEN(p) != hlen)
goto error;
if (IPV4_GET_IPLEN(p) != hlen + content_len)
goto error;
if (IPV4_GET_IPID(p) != id)
goto error;
if (IPV4_GET_IPOFFSET(p) != off)
goto error;
if (IPV4_GET_MF(p) != mf)
goto error;
if (IPV4_GET_IPTTL(p) != ttl)
goto error;
if (IPV4_GET_IPPROTO(p) != IPPROTO_ICMP)
goto error;
return p;
error:
if (p != NULL)
SCFree(p);
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-358
Summary: Suricata before 3.2.1 has an IPv4 defragmentation evasion issue caused by lack of a check for the IP protocol during fragment matching.
Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host. | Medium | 18,330 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static sk_sp<SkImage> premulSkImageToUnPremul(SkImage* input) {
SkImageInfo info = SkImageInfo::Make(input->width(), input->height(),
kN32_SkColorType, kUnpremul_SkAlphaType);
RefPtr<Uint8Array> dstPixels = copySkImageData(input, info);
if (!dstPixels)
return nullptr;
return newSkImageFromRaster(
info, std::move(dstPixels),
static_cast<size_t>(input->width()) * info.bytesPerPixel());
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Bad casting in bitmap manipulation in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 55.0.2883.75 for Mac, Windows and Linux, and 55.0.2883.84 for Android allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Prevent bad casting in ImageBitmap when calling ArrayBuffer::createOrNull
Currently when ImageBitmap's constructor is invoked, we check whether
dstSize will overflow size_t or not. The problem comes when we call
ArrayBuffer::createOrNull some times in the code.
Both parameters of ArrayBuffer::createOrNull are unsigned. In ImageBitmap
when we call this method, the first parameter is usually width * height.
This could overflow unsigned even if it has been checked safe with size_t,
the reason is that unsigned is a 32-bit value on 64-bit systems, while
size_t is a 64-bit value.
This CL makes a change such that we check whether the dstSize will overflow
unsigned or not. In this case, we can guarantee that createOrNull will not have
any crash.
BUG=664139
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2500493002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#431936} | Medium | 693 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void pdf_summarize(
FILE *fp,
const pdf_t *pdf,
const char *name,
pdf_flag_t flags)
{
int i, j, page, n_versions, n_entries;
FILE *dst, *out;
char *dst_name, *c;
dst = NULL;
dst_name = NULL;
if (name)
{
dst_name = malloc(strlen(name) * 2 + 16);
sprintf(dst_name, "%s/%s", name, name);
if ((c = strrchr(dst_name, '.')) && (strncmp(c, ".pdf", 4) == 0))
*c = '\0';
strcat(dst_name, ".summary");
if (!(dst = fopen(dst_name, "w")))
{
ERR("Could not open file '%s' for writing\n", dst_name);
return;
}
}
/* Send output to file or stdout */
out = (dst) ? dst : stdout;
/* Count versions */
n_versions = pdf->n_xrefs;
if (n_versions && pdf->xrefs[0].is_linear)
--n_versions;
/* Ignore bad xref entry */
for (i=1; i<pdf->n_xrefs; ++i)
if (pdf->xrefs[i].end == 0)
--n_versions;
/* If we have no valid versions but linear, count that */
if (!pdf->n_xrefs || (!n_versions && pdf->xrefs[0].is_linear))
n_versions = 1;
/* Compare each object (if we dont have xref streams) */
n_entries = 0;
for (i=0; !(const int)pdf->has_xref_streams && i<pdf->n_xrefs; i++)
{
if (flags & PDF_FLAG_QUIET)
continue;
for (j=0; j<pdf->xrefs[i].n_entries; j++)
{
++n_entries;
fprintf(out,
"%s: --%c-- Version %d -- Object %d (%s)",
pdf->name,
pdf_get_object_status(pdf, i, j),
pdf->xrefs[i].version,
pdf->xrefs[i].entries[j].obj_id,
get_type(fp, pdf->xrefs[i].entries[j].obj_id,
&pdf->xrefs[i]));
/* TODO
page = get_page(pdf->xrefs[i].entries[j].obj_id, &pdf->xrefs[i]);
*/
if (0 /*page*/)
fprintf(out, " Page(%d)\n", page);
else
fprintf(out, "\n");
}
}
/* Trailing summary */
if (!(flags & PDF_FLAG_QUIET))
{
/* Let the user know that we cannot we print a per-object summary.
* If we have a 1.5 PDF using streams for xref, we have not objects
* to display, so let the user know whats up.
*/
if (pdf->has_xref_streams || !n_entries)
fprintf(out,
"%s: This PDF contains potential cross reference streams.\n"
"%s: An object summary is not available.\n",
pdf->name,
pdf->name);
fprintf(out,
"---------- %s ----------\n"
"Versions: %d\n",
pdf->name,
n_versions);
/* Count entries for summary */
if (!pdf->has_xref_streams)
for (i=0; i<pdf->n_xrefs; i++)
{
if (pdf->xrefs[i].is_linear)
continue;
n_entries = pdf->xrefs[i].n_entries;
/* If we are a linearized PDF, all versions are made from those
* objects too. So count em'
*/
if (pdf->xrefs[0].is_linear)
n_entries += pdf->xrefs[0].n_entries;
if (pdf->xrefs[i].version && n_entries)
fprintf(out,
"Version %d -- %d objects\n",
pdf->xrefs[i].version,
n_entries);
}
}
else /* Quiet output */
fprintf(out, "%s: %d\n", pdf->name, n_versions);
if (dst)
{
fclose(dst);
free(dst_name);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: An issue was discovered in PDFResurrect before 0.18. pdf_load_pages_kids in pdf.c doesn't validate a certain size value, which leads to a malloc failure and out-of-bounds write.
Commit Message: Zero and sanity check all dynamic allocs.
This addresses the memory issues in Issue #6 expressed in
calloc_some.pdf and malloc_some.pdf | Medium | 5,204 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: struct pipe_inode_info *alloc_pipe_info(void)
{
struct pipe_inode_info *pipe;
pipe = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pipe_inode_info), GFP_KERNEL);
if (pipe) {
pipe->bufs = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pipe_buffer) * PIPE_DEF_BUFFERS, GFP_KERNEL);
if (pipe->bufs) {
init_waitqueue_head(&pipe->wait);
pipe->r_counter = pipe->w_counter = 1;
pipe->buffers = PIPE_DEF_BUFFERS;
mutex_init(&pipe->mutex);
return pipe;
}
kfree(pipe);
}
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: fs/pipe.c in the Linux kernel before 4.5 does not limit the amount of unread data in pipes, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) by creating many pipes with non-default sizes.
Commit Message: pipe: limit the per-user amount of pages allocated in pipes
On no-so-small systems, it is possible for a single process to cause an
OOM condition by filling large pipes with data that are never read. A
typical process filling 4000 pipes with 1 MB of data will use 4 GB of
memory. On small systems it may be tricky to set the pipe max size to
prevent this from happening.
This patch makes it possible to enforce a per-user soft limit above
which new pipes will be limited to a single page, effectively limiting
them to 4 kB each, as well as a hard limit above which no new pipes may
be created for this user. This has the effect of protecting the system
against memory abuse without hurting other users, and still allowing
pipes to work correctly though with less data at once.
The limit are controlled by two new sysctls : pipe-user-pages-soft, and
pipe-user-pages-hard. Both may be disabled by setting them to zero. The
default soft limit allows the default number of FDs per process (1024)
to create pipes of the default size (64kB), thus reaching a limit of 64MB
before starting to create only smaller pipes. With 256 processes limited
to 1024 FDs each, this results in 1024*64kB + (256*1024 - 1024) * 4kB =
1084 MB of memory allocated for a user. The hard limit is disabled by
default to avoid breaking existing applications that make intensive use
of pipes (eg: for splicing).
Reported-by: [email protected]
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
Mitigates: CVE-2013-4312 (Linux 2.0+)
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]> | Medium | 2,084 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
{
int i, j, ok, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = -1, cookie_valid = 0;
unsigned int cookie_len;
long n;
unsigned long id;
unsigned char *p, *d;
SSL_CIPHER *c;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
unsigned char *q;
SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
#endif
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet)
goto retry_cert;
/*
* We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are
* TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down
* switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we
* will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1.
*/
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
}
s->first_packet = 1;
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
s->first_packet = 0;
d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
/*
* 2 bytes for client version, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE bytes for random, 1 byte
* for session id length
*/
if (n < 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
* differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
*/
s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8) | (int)p[1];
p += 2;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version &&
s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
: (s->client_version < s->version)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
/*
* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
* number
*/
s->version = s->client_version;
}
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
}
/*
* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just
* return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check
* cookie length...
*/
if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
if (cookie_length == 0)
return 1;
}
/* load the client random */
memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
/* get the session-id */
j = *(p++);
if (p + j > d + n) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
if ((j < 0) || (j > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
s->hit = 0;
/*
* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
* renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
* ignore resumption requests with flag
* SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
* than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this
* for security won't even compile against older library versions).
* 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
* request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
* unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
* SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored.
*/
if ((s->new_session
&& (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
goto err;
} else {
i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
/*
* Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
* version.
* RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
* with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
* the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
* In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
* will abort the handshake with an error.
*/
if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) { /* previous
* session */
s->hit = 1;
} else if (i == -1)
goto err;
else { /* i == 0 */
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
goto err;
}
}
p += j;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/* cookie stuff */
if (p + 1 > d + n) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
cookie_len = *(p++);
if (p + cookie_len > d + n) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
* HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
* does not cause an overflow.
*/
if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) {
/* too much data */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
/* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) {
memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
cookie_len) == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
/* else cookie verification succeeded */
}
/* default verification */
else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
cookie_valid = 1;
}
p += cookie_len;
if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
/* Select version to use */
if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) {
s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
} else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
s->version = s->client_version;
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
} else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) {
s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
} else {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
s->version = s->client_version;
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
}
s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
}
}
if (p + 2 > d + n) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
n2s(p, i);
if (i == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
goto f_err;
}
/* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) {
/* not enough data */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers)) == NULL) {
goto err;
}
p += i;
/* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
if (s->hit) {
j = 0;
id = s->session->cipher->id;
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
#endif
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
#endif
if (c->id == id) {
j = 1;
break;
}
}
/*
* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack:
* CVE-2010-4180.
*/
#if 0
if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
&& (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) {
/*
* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used
* cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead
* might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't
* chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the
* connection if the cipher is not enabled, though.
*/
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) {
s->session->cipher = c;
j = 1;
}
}
#endif
if (j == 0) {
/*
* we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
* to reuse it
*/
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
goto f_err;
}
}
/* compression */
i = *(p++);
if ((p + i) > (d + n)) {
/* not enough data */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
q = p;
#endif
for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
if (p[j] == 0)
break;
}
p += i;
if (j >= i) {
/* no compress */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/* TLS extensions */
if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d + n)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
}
/*
* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
* for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
* calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
* processing to use it in key derivation.
*/
{
unsigned char *pos;
pos = s->s3->server_random;
if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
goto f_err;
}
}
if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
&s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
&pref_cipher,
s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
s->hit = 1;
s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
ciphers = NULL;
/* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
pref_cipher =
pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
s->
session->ciphers,
SSL_get_ciphers
(s));
if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
goto f_err;
}
s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
if (s->cipher_list)
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
}
}
#endif
/*
* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
* options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
* algorithms from the client, starting at q.
*/
s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
/* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
/* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
/* Can't disable compression */
if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
goto f_err;
}
/* Look for resumed compression method */
for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
if (comp_id == comp->id) {
s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
break;
}
}
if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
goto f_err;
}
/* Look for resumed method in compression list */
for (m = 0; m < i; m++) {
if (q[m] == comp_id)
break;
}
if (m >= i) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
goto f_err;
}
} else if (s->hit)
comp = NULL;
else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
/* See if we have a match */
int m, nn, o, v, done = 0;
nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
v = comp->id;
for (o = 0; o < i; o++) {
if (v == q[o]) {
done = 1;
break;
}
}
if (done)
break;
}
if (done)
s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
else
comp = NULL;
}
#else
/*
* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
* using compression.
*/
if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
goto f_err;
}
#endif
/*
* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
*/
if (!s->hit) {
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
s->session->compress_meth = 0;
#else
s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
#endif
if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
if (ciphers == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
ciphers = NULL;
if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
/* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
retry_cert:
if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
if (rv == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
if (rv < 0) {
s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
return -1;
}
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
}
c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
if (c == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
goto f_err;
}
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
} else {
/* Session-id reuse */
#ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
SSL_CIPHER *nc = NULL;
SSL_CIPHER *ec = NULL;
if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) {
sk = s->session->ciphers;
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
nc = c;
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
ec = c;
}
if (nc != NULL)
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = nc;
else if (ec != NULL)
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = ec;
else
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
} else
#endif
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
}
if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
goto f_err;
}
/*-
* we now have the following setup.
* client_random
* cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
* ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
* compression - basically ignored right now
* ssl version is set - sslv3
* s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
* s->hit - session reuse flag
* s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
*/
/* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
}
ret = cookie_valid ? 2 : 1;
if (0) {
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
}
if (ciphers != NULL)
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: OpenSSL through 1.0.2h incorrectly uses pointer arithmetic for heap-buffer boundary checks, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (integer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging unexpected malloc behavior, related to s3_srvr.c, ssl_sess.c, and t1_lib.c.
Commit Message: | High | 27,910 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void DownloadManagerImpl::DownloadUrl(
std::unique_ptr<download::DownloadUrlParameters> params,
std::unique_ptr<storage::BlobDataHandle> blob_data_handle,
scoped_refptr<network::SharedURLLoaderFactory> blob_url_loader_factory) {
if (params->post_id() >= 0) {
DCHECK(params->prefer_cache());
DCHECK_EQ("POST", params->method());
}
download::RecordDownloadCountWithSource(
download::DownloadCountTypes::DOWNLOAD_TRIGGERED_COUNT,
params->download_source());
auto* rfh = RenderFrameHost::FromID(params->render_process_host_id(),
params->render_frame_host_routing_id());
BeginDownloadInternal(std::move(params), std::move(blob_data_handle),
std::move(blob_url_loader_factory), true,
rfh ? rfh->GetSiteInstance()->GetSiteURL() : GURL());
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Inappropriate implementation in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 74.0.3729.108 allowed a remote attacker to bypass same origin policy via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <[email protected]>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547} | Medium | 22,300 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void CopyToOMX(const OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header) {
if (!mIsBackup) {
return;
}
memcpy(header->pBuffer + header->nOffset,
(const OMX_U8 *)mMem->pointer() + header->nOffset,
header->nFilledLen);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in libstagefright in Mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-11-01, and 7.0 before 2016-11-01 could enable a local malicious application to access data outside of its permission levels. This issue is rated as Moderate because it could be used to access sensitive data without permission. Android ID: A-29422020.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: IOMX: work against metadata buffer spoofing
- Prohibit direct set/getParam/Settings for extensions meant for
OMXNodeInstance alone. This disallows enabling metadata mode
without the knowledge of OMXNodeInstance.
- Use a backup buffer for metadata mode buffers and do not directly
share with clients.
- Disallow setting up metadata mode/tunneling/input surface
after first sendCommand.
- Disallow store-meta for input cross process.
- Disallow emptyBuffer for surface input (via IOMX).
- Fix checking for input surface.
Bug: 29422020
Change-Id: I801c77b80e703903f62e42d76fd2e76a34e4bc8e
(cherry picked from commit 7c3c2fa3e233c656fc8c2fc2a6634b3ecf8a23e8)
| Medium | 27,791 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void NaClProcessHost::OnPpapiChannelCreated(
const IPC::ChannelHandle& channel_handle) {
DCHECK(enable_ipc_proxy_);
ReplyToRenderer(channel_handle);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving SVG text references.
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 17,138 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: PHP_NAMED_FUNCTION(zif_locale_set_default)
{
char* locale_name = NULL;
int len=0;
if(zend_parse_parameters( ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s",
&locale_name ,&len ) == FAILURE)
{
intl_error_set( NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR,
"locale_set_default: unable to parse input params", 0 TSRMLS_CC );
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if(len == 0) {
locale_name = (char *)uloc_getDefault() ;
len = strlen(locale_name);
}
zend_alter_ini_entry(LOCALE_INI_NAME, sizeof(LOCALE_INI_NAME), locale_name, len, PHP_INI_USER, PHP_INI_STAGE_RUNTIME);
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The get_icu_value_internal function in ext/intl/locale/locale_methods.c in PHP before 5.5.36, 5.6.x before 5.6.22, and 7.x before 7.0.7 does not ensure the presence of a '0' character, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted locale_get_primary_language call.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read | High | 15,873 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int read_entry(
git_index_entry **out,
size_t *out_size,
git_index *index,
const void *buffer,
size_t buffer_size,
const char *last)
{
size_t path_length, entry_size;
const char *path_ptr;
struct entry_short source;
git_index_entry entry = {{0}};
bool compressed = index->version >= INDEX_VERSION_NUMBER_COMP;
char *tmp_path = NULL;
if (INDEX_FOOTER_SIZE + minimal_entry_size > buffer_size)
return -1;
/* buffer is not guaranteed to be aligned */
memcpy(&source, buffer, sizeof(struct entry_short));
entry.ctime.seconds = (git_time_t)ntohl(source.ctime.seconds);
entry.ctime.nanoseconds = ntohl(source.ctime.nanoseconds);
entry.mtime.seconds = (git_time_t)ntohl(source.mtime.seconds);
entry.mtime.nanoseconds = ntohl(source.mtime.nanoseconds);
entry.dev = ntohl(source.dev);
entry.ino = ntohl(source.ino);
entry.mode = ntohl(source.mode);
entry.uid = ntohl(source.uid);
entry.gid = ntohl(source.gid);
entry.file_size = ntohl(source.file_size);
git_oid_cpy(&entry.id, &source.oid);
entry.flags = ntohs(source.flags);
if (entry.flags & GIT_IDXENTRY_EXTENDED) {
uint16_t flags_raw;
size_t flags_offset;
flags_offset = offsetof(struct entry_long, flags_extended);
memcpy(&flags_raw, (const char *) buffer + flags_offset,
sizeof(flags_raw));
flags_raw = ntohs(flags_raw);
memcpy(&entry.flags_extended, &flags_raw, sizeof(flags_raw));
path_ptr = (const char *) buffer + offsetof(struct entry_long, path);
} else
path_ptr = (const char *) buffer + offsetof(struct entry_short, path);
if (!compressed) {
path_length = entry.flags & GIT_IDXENTRY_NAMEMASK;
/* if this is a very long string, we must find its
* real length without overflowing */
if (path_length == 0xFFF) {
const char *path_end;
path_end = memchr(path_ptr, '\0', buffer_size);
if (path_end == NULL)
return -1;
path_length = path_end - path_ptr;
}
entry_size = index_entry_size(path_length, 0, entry.flags);
entry.path = (char *)path_ptr;
} else {
size_t varint_len;
size_t strip_len = git_decode_varint((const unsigned char *)path_ptr,
&varint_len);
size_t last_len = strlen(last);
size_t prefix_len = last_len - strip_len;
size_t suffix_len = strlen(path_ptr + varint_len);
size_t path_len;
if (varint_len == 0)
return index_error_invalid("incorrect prefix length");
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC_ADD(&path_len, prefix_len, suffix_len);
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC_ADD(&path_len, path_len, 1);
tmp_path = git__malloc(path_len);
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC(tmp_path);
memcpy(tmp_path, last, prefix_len);
memcpy(tmp_path + prefix_len, path_ptr + varint_len, suffix_len + 1);
entry_size = index_entry_size(suffix_len, varint_len, entry.flags);
entry.path = tmp_path;
}
if (entry_size == 0)
return -1;
if (INDEX_FOOTER_SIZE + entry_size > buffer_size)
return -1;
if (index_entry_dup(out, index, &entry) < 0) {
git__free(tmp_path);
return -1;
}
git__free(tmp_path);
*out_size = entry_size;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the index.c:read_entry() function while decompressing a compressed prefix length in libgit2 before v0.26.2 allows an attacker to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a crafted repository index file.
Commit Message: index: fix out-of-bounds read with invalid index entry prefix length
The index format in version 4 has prefix-compressed entries, where every
index entry can compress its path by using a path prefix of the previous
entry. Since implmenting support for this index format version in commit
5625d86b9 (index: support index v4, 2016-05-17), though, we do not
correctly verify that the prefix length that we want to reuse is
actually smaller or equal to the amount of characters than the length of
the previous index entry's path. This can lead to a an integer underflow
and subsequently to an out-of-bounds read.
Fix this by verifying that the prefix is actually smaller than the
previous entry's path length.
Reported-by: Krishna Ram Prakash R <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Vivek Parikh <[email protected]> | Medium | 12,734 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> optionsObjectCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.optionsObject");
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(args.Holder());
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(Dictionary, oo, MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined));
if (args.Length() > 0 && !oo.isUndefinedOrNull() && !oo.isObject()) {
return V8Proxy::throwTypeError("Not an object.");
}
if (args.Length() <= 1) {
imp->optionsObject(oo);
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(Dictionary, ooo, MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 1, DefaultIsUndefined));
if (args.Length() > 1 && !ooo.isUndefinedOrNull() && !ooo.isObject()) {
return V8Proxy::throwTypeError("Not an object.");
}
imp->optionsObject(oo, ooo);
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 29,230 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int sctp_process_param(struct sctp_association *asoc,
union sctp_params param,
const union sctp_addr *peer_addr,
gfp_t gfp)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(asoc->base.sk);
union sctp_addr addr;
int i;
__u16 sat;
int retval = 1;
sctp_scope_t scope;
time_t stale;
struct sctp_af *af;
union sctp_addr_param *addr_param;
struct sctp_transport *t;
struct sctp_endpoint *ep = asoc->ep;
/* We maintain all INIT parameters in network byte order all the
* time. This allows us to not worry about whether the parameters
* came from a fresh INIT, and INIT ACK, or were stored in a cookie.
*/
switch (param.p->type) {
case SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS:
if (PF_INET6 != asoc->base.sk->sk_family)
break;
goto do_addr_param;
case SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS:
/* v4 addresses are not allowed on v6-only socket */
if (ipv6_only_sock(asoc->base.sk))
break;
do_addr_param:
af = sctp_get_af_specific(param_type2af(param.p->type));
af->from_addr_param(&addr, param.addr, htons(asoc->peer.port), 0);
scope = sctp_scope(peer_addr);
if (sctp_in_scope(net, &addr, scope))
if (!sctp_assoc_add_peer(asoc, &addr, gfp, SCTP_UNCONFIRMED))
return 0;
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_COOKIE_PRESERVATIVE:
if (!net->sctp.cookie_preserve_enable)
break;
stale = ntohl(param.life->lifespan_increment);
/* Suggested Cookie Life span increment's unit is msec,
* (1/1000sec).
*/
asoc->cookie_life = ktime_add_ms(asoc->cookie_life, stale);
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_HOST_NAME_ADDRESS:
pr_debug("%s: unimplemented SCTP_HOST_NAME_ADDRESS\n", __func__);
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_SUPPORTED_ADDRESS_TYPES:
/* Turn off the default values first so we'll know which
* ones are really set by the peer.
*/
asoc->peer.ipv4_address = 0;
asoc->peer.ipv6_address = 0;
/* Assume that peer supports the address family
* by which it sends a packet.
*/
if (peer_addr->sa.sa_family == AF_INET6)
asoc->peer.ipv6_address = 1;
else if (peer_addr->sa.sa_family == AF_INET)
asoc->peer.ipv4_address = 1;
/* Cycle through address types; avoid divide by 0. */
sat = ntohs(param.p->length) - sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t);
if (sat)
sat /= sizeof(__u16);
for (i = 0; i < sat; ++i) {
switch (param.sat->types[i]) {
case SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS:
asoc->peer.ipv4_address = 1;
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS:
if (PF_INET6 == asoc->base.sk->sk_family)
asoc->peer.ipv6_address = 1;
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_HOST_NAME_ADDRESS:
asoc->peer.hostname_address = 1;
break;
default: /* Just ignore anything else. */
break;
}
}
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_STATE_COOKIE:
asoc->peer.cookie_len =
ntohs(param.p->length) - sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t);
asoc->peer.cookie = param.cookie->body;
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_HEARTBEAT_INFO:
/* Would be odd to receive, but it causes no problems. */
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_UNRECOGNIZED_PARAMETERS:
/* Rejected during verify stage. */
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_ECN_CAPABLE:
asoc->peer.ecn_capable = 1;
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_ADAPTATION_LAYER_IND:
asoc->peer.adaptation_ind = ntohl(param.aind->adaptation_ind);
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:
if (!net->sctp.addip_enable)
goto fall_through;
addr_param = param.v + sizeof(sctp_addip_param_t);
af = sctp_get_af_specific(param_type2af(param.p->type));
af->from_addr_param(&addr, addr_param,
htons(asoc->peer.port), 0);
/* if the address is invalid, we can't process it.
* XXX: see spec for what to do.
*/
if (!af->addr_valid(&addr, NULL, NULL))
break;
t = sctp_assoc_lookup_paddr(asoc, &addr);
if (!t)
break;
sctp_assoc_set_primary(asoc, t);
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_SUPPORTED_EXT:
sctp_process_ext_param(asoc, param);
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_FWD_TSN_SUPPORT:
if (net->sctp.prsctp_enable) {
asoc->peer.prsctp_capable = 1;
break;
}
/* Fall Through */
goto fall_through;
case SCTP_PARAM_RANDOM:
if (!ep->auth_enable)
goto fall_through;
/* Save peer's random parameter */
asoc->peer.peer_random = kmemdup(param.p,
ntohs(param.p->length), gfp);
if (!asoc->peer.peer_random) {
retval = 0;
break;
}
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_HMAC_ALGO:
if (!ep->auth_enable)
goto fall_through;
/* Save peer's HMAC list */
asoc->peer.peer_hmacs = kmemdup(param.p,
ntohs(param.p->length), gfp);
if (!asoc->peer.peer_hmacs) {
retval = 0;
break;
}
/* Set the default HMAC the peer requested*/
sctp_auth_asoc_set_default_hmac(asoc, param.hmac_algo);
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_CHUNKS:
if (!ep->auth_enable)
goto fall_through;
asoc->peer.peer_chunks = kmemdup(param.p,
ntohs(param.p->length), gfp);
if (!asoc->peer.peer_chunks)
retval = 0;
break;
fall_through:
default:
/* Any unrecognized parameters should have been caught
* and handled by sctp_verify_param() which should be
* called prior to this routine. Simply log the error
* here.
*/
pr_debug("%s: ignoring param:%d for association:%p.\n",
__func__, ntohs(param.p->type), asoc);
break;
}
return retval;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The sctp_process_param function in net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c in the SCTP implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.17.4, when ASCONF is used, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) via a malformed INIT chunk.
Commit Message: net: sctp: fix NULL pointer dereference in af->from_addr_param on malformed packet
An SCTP server doing ASCONF will panic on malformed INIT ping-of-death
in the form of:
------------ INIT[PARAM: SET_PRIMARY_IP] ------------>
While the INIT chunk parameter verification dissects through many things
in order to detect malformed input, it misses to actually check parameters
inside of parameters. E.g. RFC5061, section 4.2.4 proposes a 'set primary
IP address' parameter in ASCONF, which has as a subparameter an address
parameter.
So an attacker may send a parameter type other than SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS
or SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS, param_type2af() will subsequently return 0
and thus sctp_get_af_specific() returns NULL, too, which we then happily
dereference unconditionally through af->from_addr_param().
The trace for the log:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000078
IP: [<ffffffffa01e9c62>] sctp_process_init+0x492/0x990 [sctp]
PGD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[...]
Pid: 0, comm: swapper Not tainted 2.6.32-504.el6.x86_64 #1 Bochs Bochs
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa01e9c62>] [<ffffffffa01e9c62>] sctp_process_init+0x492/0x990 [sctp]
[...]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffffa01f2add>] ? sctp_bind_addr_copy+0x5d/0xe0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e1fcb>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x21b/0x340 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e5c09>] ? sctp_endpoint_lookup_assoc+0xc9/0xf0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e61f6>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x116/0x230 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter]
[<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[...]
A minimal way to address this is to check for NULL as we do on all
other such occasions where we know sctp_get_af_specific() could
possibly return with NULL.
Fixes: d6de3097592b ("[SCTP]: Add the handling of "Set Primary IP Address" parameter to INIT")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 27,335 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: MagickExport Image *MeanShiftImage(const Image *image,const size_t width,
const size_t height,const double color_distance,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define MaxMeanShiftIterations 100
#define MeanShiftImageTag "MeanShift/Image"
CacheView
*image_view,
*mean_view,
*pixel_view;
Image
*mean_image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
progress;
ssize_t
y;
assert(image != (const Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
mean_image=CloneImage(image,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (mean_image == (Image *) NULL)
return((Image *) NULL);
if (SetImageStorageClass(mean_image,DirectClass) == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&mean_image->exception);
mean_image=DestroyImage(mean_image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
status=MagickTrue;
progress=0;
image_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(image,exception);
pixel_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(image,exception);
mean_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(mean_image,exception);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp parallel for schedule(static) shared(status,progress) \
magick_number_threads(mean_image,mean_image,mean_image->rows,1)
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) mean_image->rows; y++)
{
register const IndexPacket
*magick_restrict indexes;
register const PixelPacket
*magick_restrict p;
register PixelPacket
*magick_restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
p=GetCacheViewVirtualPixels(image_view,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(mean_view,0,y,mean_image->columns,1,
exception);
if ((p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL) || (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL))
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
indexes=GetCacheViewVirtualIndexQueue(image_view);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) mean_image->columns; x++)
{
MagickPixelPacket
mean_pixel,
previous_pixel;
PointInfo
mean_location,
previous_location;
register ssize_t
i;
GetMagickPixelPacket(image,&mean_pixel);
SetMagickPixelPacket(image,p,indexes+x,&mean_pixel);
mean_location.x=(double) x;
mean_location.y=(double) y;
for (i=0; i < MaxMeanShiftIterations; i++)
{
double
distance,
gamma;
MagickPixelPacket
sum_pixel;
PointInfo
sum_location;
ssize_t
count,
v;
sum_location.x=0.0;
sum_location.y=0.0;
GetMagickPixelPacket(image,&sum_pixel);
previous_location=mean_location;
previous_pixel=mean_pixel;
count=0;
for (v=(-((ssize_t) height/2)); v <= (((ssize_t) height/2)); v++)
{
ssize_t
u;
for (u=(-((ssize_t) width/2)); u <= (((ssize_t) width/2)); u++)
{
if ((v*v+u*u) <= (ssize_t) ((width/2)*(height/2)))
{
PixelPacket
pixel;
status=GetOneCacheViewVirtualPixel(pixel_view,(ssize_t)
MagickRound(mean_location.x+u),(ssize_t) MagickRound(
mean_location.y+v),&pixel,exception);
distance=(mean_pixel.red-pixel.red)*(mean_pixel.red-pixel.red)+
(mean_pixel.green-pixel.green)*(mean_pixel.green-pixel.green)+
(mean_pixel.blue-pixel.blue)*(mean_pixel.blue-pixel.blue);
if (distance <= (color_distance*color_distance))
{
sum_location.x+=mean_location.x+u;
sum_location.y+=mean_location.y+v;
sum_pixel.red+=pixel.red;
sum_pixel.green+=pixel.green;
sum_pixel.blue+=pixel.blue;
sum_pixel.opacity+=pixel.opacity;
count++;
}
}
}
}
gamma=1.0/count;
mean_location.x=gamma*sum_location.x;
mean_location.y=gamma*sum_location.y;
mean_pixel.red=gamma*sum_pixel.red;
mean_pixel.green=gamma*sum_pixel.green;
mean_pixel.blue=gamma*sum_pixel.blue;
mean_pixel.opacity=gamma*sum_pixel.opacity;
distance=(mean_location.x-previous_location.x)*
(mean_location.x-previous_location.x)+
(mean_location.y-previous_location.y)*
(mean_location.y-previous_location.y)+
255.0*QuantumScale*(mean_pixel.red-previous_pixel.red)*
255.0*QuantumScale*(mean_pixel.red-previous_pixel.red)+
255.0*QuantumScale*(mean_pixel.green-previous_pixel.green)*
255.0*QuantumScale*(mean_pixel.green-previous_pixel.green)+
255.0*QuantumScale*(mean_pixel.blue-previous_pixel.blue)*
255.0*QuantumScale*(mean_pixel.blue-previous_pixel.blue);
if (distance <= 3.0)
break;
}
q->red=ClampToQuantum(mean_pixel.red);
q->green=ClampToQuantum(mean_pixel.green);
q->blue=ClampToQuantum(mean_pixel.blue);
q->opacity=ClampToQuantum(mean_pixel.opacity);
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(mean_view,exception) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
if (image->progress_monitor != (MagickProgressMonitor) NULL)
{
MagickBooleanType
proceed;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp atomic
#endif
progress++;
proceed=SetImageProgress(image,MeanShiftImageTag,progress,image->rows);
if (proceed == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
}
mean_view=DestroyCacheView(mean_view);
pixel_view=DestroyCacheView(pixel_view);
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
return(mean_image);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-369
Summary: In ImageMagick 7.x before 7.0.8-41 and 6.x before 6.9.10-41, there is a divide-by-zero vulnerability in the MeanShiftImage function. It allows an attacker to cause a denial of service by sending a crafted file.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1552 | Medium | 14,726 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::VaapiH264Accelerator::CreateH264Picture() {
scoped_refptr<VaapiDecodeSurface> va_surface = vaapi_dec_->CreateSurface();
if (!va_surface)
return nullptr;
return new VaapiH264Picture(std::move(va_surface));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: A race in the handling of SharedArrayBuffers in WebAssembly in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: vaapi vda: Delete owned objects on worker thread in Cleanup()
This CL adds a SEQUENCE_CHECKER to Vaapi*Accelerator classes, and
posts the destruction of those objects to the appropriate thread on
Cleanup().
Also makes {H264,VP8,VP9}Picture RefCountedThreadSafe, see miu@
comment in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/794091#message-a64bed985cfaf8a19499a517bb110a7ce581dc0f
TEST=play back VP9/VP8/H264 w/ simplechrome on soraka, Release build
unstripped, let video play for a few seconds then navigate back; no
crashes. Unittests as before:
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp9:320:240:250:250:35:150:12
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp8:320:240:250:250:35:150:11
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.h264:320:240:250:258:35:150:1
Bug: 789160
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I7d96aaf89c92bf46f00c8b8b36798e057a842ed2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/794091
Reviewed-by: Pawel Osciak <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Miguel Casas <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523372} | Medium | 16,799 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: status_t BnGraphicBufferProducer::onTransact(
uint32_t code, const Parcel& data, Parcel* reply, uint32_t flags)
{
switch(code) {
case REQUEST_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int bufferIdx = data.readInt32();
sp<GraphicBuffer> buffer;
int result = requestBuffer(bufferIdx, &buffer);
reply->writeInt32(buffer != 0);
if (buffer != 0) {
reply->write(*buffer);
}
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SET_BUFFER_COUNT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int bufferCount = data.readInt32();
int result = setBufferCount(bufferCount);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case DEQUEUE_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
bool async = static_cast<bool>(data.readInt32());
uint32_t width = data.readUint32();
uint32_t height = data.readUint32();
PixelFormat format = static_cast<PixelFormat>(data.readInt32());
uint32_t usage = data.readUint32();
int buf = 0;
sp<Fence> fence;
int result = dequeueBuffer(&buf, &fence, async, width, height,
format, usage);
reply->writeInt32(buf);
reply->writeInt32(fence != NULL);
if (fence != NULL) {
reply->write(*fence);
}
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case DETACH_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int slot = data.readInt32();
int result = detachBuffer(slot);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case DETACH_NEXT_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
sp<GraphicBuffer> buffer;
sp<Fence> fence;
int32_t result = detachNextBuffer(&buffer, &fence);
reply->writeInt32(result);
if (result == NO_ERROR) {
reply->writeInt32(buffer != NULL);
if (buffer != NULL) {
reply->write(*buffer);
}
reply->writeInt32(fence != NULL);
if (fence != NULL) {
reply->write(*fence);
}
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case ATTACH_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
sp<GraphicBuffer> buffer = new GraphicBuffer();
data.read(*buffer.get());
int slot = 0;
int result = attachBuffer(&slot, buffer);
reply->writeInt32(slot);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case QUEUE_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int buf = data.readInt32();
QueueBufferInput input(data);
QueueBufferOutput* const output =
reinterpret_cast<QueueBufferOutput *>(
reply->writeInplace(sizeof(QueueBufferOutput)));
memset(output, 0, sizeof(QueueBufferOutput));
status_t result = queueBuffer(buf, input, output);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case CANCEL_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int buf = data.readInt32();
sp<Fence> fence = new Fence();
data.read(*fence.get());
cancelBuffer(buf, fence);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case QUERY: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int value = 0;
int what = data.readInt32();
int res = query(what, &value);
reply->writeInt32(value);
reply->writeInt32(res);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case CONNECT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
sp<IProducerListener> listener;
if (data.readInt32() == 1) {
listener = IProducerListener::asInterface(data.readStrongBinder());
}
int api = data.readInt32();
bool producerControlledByApp = data.readInt32();
QueueBufferOutput* const output =
reinterpret_cast<QueueBufferOutput *>(
reply->writeInplace(sizeof(QueueBufferOutput)));
status_t res = connect(listener, api, producerControlledByApp, output);
reply->writeInt32(res);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case DISCONNECT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int api = data.readInt32();
status_t res = disconnect(api);
reply->writeInt32(res);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SET_SIDEBAND_STREAM: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
sp<NativeHandle> stream;
if (data.readInt32()) {
stream = NativeHandle::create(data.readNativeHandle(), true);
}
status_t result = setSidebandStream(stream);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case ALLOCATE_BUFFERS: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
bool async = static_cast<bool>(data.readInt32());
uint32_t width = data.readUint32();
uint32_t height = data.readUint32();
PixelFormat format = static_cast<PixelFormat>(data.readInt32());
uint32_t usage = data.readUint32();
allocateBuffers(async, width, height, format, usage);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case ALLOW_ALLOCATION: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
bool allow = static_cast<bool>(data.readInt32());
status_t result = allowAllocation(allow);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SET_GENERATION_NUMBER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
uint32_t generationNumber = data.readUint32();
status_t result = setGenerationNumber(generationNumber);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case GET_CONSUMER_NAME: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
reply->writeString8(getConsumerName());
return NO_ERROR;
}
}
return BBinder::onTransact(code, data, reply, flags);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-05-01 does not initialize certain data structures, which allows attackers to obtain sensitive information via a crafted application, related to IGraphicBufferConsumer.cpp and IGraphicBufferProducer.cpp, aka internal bug 27555981.
Commit Message: BQ: fix some uninitialized variables
Bug 27555981
Bug 27556038
Change-Id: I436b6fec589677d7e36c0e980f6e59808415dc0e
| Medium | 3,641 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: status_t NuPlayer::GenericSource::setBuffers(
bool audio, Vector<MediaBuffer *> &buffers) {
if (mIsSecure && !audio) {
return mVideoTrack.mSource->setBuffers(buffers);
}
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: media/libmediaplayerservice/nuplayer/GenericSource.cpp in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01 does not validate certain track data, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 28799341.
Commit Message: MPEG4Extractor: ensure kKeyTrackID exists before creating an MPEG4Source as track.
GenericSource: return error when no track exists.
SampleIterator: make sure mSamplesPerChunk is not zero before using it as divisor.
Bug: 21657957
Bug: 23705695
Bug: 22802344
Bug: 28799341
Change-Id: I7664992ade90b935d3f255dcd43ecc2898f30b04
(cherry picked from commit 0386c91b8a910a134e5898ffa924c1b6c7560b13)
| High | 2,825 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void SyncBackendHost::Initialize(
SyncFrontend* frontend,
const GURL& sync_service_url,
const syncable::ModelTypeSet& types,
net::URLRequestContextGetter* baseline_context_getter,
const SyncCredentials& credentials,
bool delete_sync_data_folder) {
if (!core_thread_.Start())
return;
frontend_ = frontend;
DCHECK(frontend);
registrar_.workers[GROUP_DB] = new DatabaseModelWorker();
registrar_.workers[GROUP_UI] = new UIModelWorker();
registrar_.workers[GROUP_PASSIVE] = new ModelSafeWorker();
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableSyncTypedUrls) || types.count(syncable::TYPED_URLS)) {
registrar_.workers[GROUP_HISTORY] =
new HistoryModelWorker(
profile_->GetHistoryService(Profile::IMPLICIT_ACCESS));
}
for (syncable::ModelTypeSet::const_iterator it = types.begin();
it != types.end(); ++it) {
registrar_.routing_info[(*it)] = GROUP_PASSIVE;
}
PasswordStore* password_store =
profile_->GetPasswordStore(Profile::IMPLICIT_ACCESS);
if (password_store) {
registrar_.workers[GROUP_PASSWORD] =
new PasswordModelWorker(password_store);
} else {
LOG_IF(WARNING, types.count(syncable::PASSWORDS) > 0) << "Password store "
<< "not initialized, cannot sync passwords";
registrar_.routing_info.erase(syncable::PASSWORDS);
}
registrar_.routing_info[syncable::NIGORI] = GROUP_PASSIVE;
core_->CreateSyncNotifier(baseline_context_getter);
InitCore(Core::DoInitializeOptions(
sync_service_url,
MakeHttpBridgeFactory(baseline_context_getter),
credentials,
delete_sync_data_folder,
RestoreEncryptionBootstrapToken(),
false));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 12.0.742.112 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving SVG use elements.
Commit Message: Enable HistoryModelWorker by default, now that bug 69561 is fixed.
BUG=69561
TEST=Run sync manually and run integration tests, sync should not crash.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7016007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85211 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 12,107 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: nf_ct_frag6_reasm(struct nf_ct_frag6_queue *fq, struct net_device *dev)
{
struct sk_buff *fp, *op, *head = fq->q.fragments;
int payload_len;
fq_kill(fq);
WARN_ON(head == NULL);
WARN_ON(NFCT_FRAG6_CB(head)->offset != 0);
/* Unfragmented part is taken from the first segment. */
payload_len = ((head->data - skb_network_header(head)) -
sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + fq->q.len -
sizeof(struct frag_hdr));
if (payload_len > IPV6_MAXPLEN) {
pr_debug("payload len is too large.\n");
goto out_oversize;
}
/* Head of list must not be cloned. */
if (skb_cloned(head) && pskb_expand_head(head, 0, 0, GFP_ATOMIC)) {
pr_debug("skb is cloned but can't expand head");
goto out_oom;
}
/* If the first fragment is fragmented itself, we split
* it to two chunks: the first with data and paged part
* and the second, holding only fragments. */
if (skb_has_frags(head)) {
struct sk_buff *clone;
int i, plen = 0;
if ((clone = alloc_skb(0, GFP_ATOMIC)) == NULL) {
pr_debug("Can't alloc skb\n");
goto out_oom;
}
clone->next = head->next;
head->next = clone;
skb_shinfo(clone)->frag_list = skb_shinfo(head)->frag_list;
skb_frag_list_init(head);
for (i=0; i<skb_shinfo(head)->nr_frags; i++)
plen += skb_shinfo(head)->frags[i].size;
clone->len = clone->data_len = head->data_len - plen;
head->data_len -= clone->len;
head->len -= clone->len;
clone->csum = 0;
clone->ip_summed = head->ip_summed;
NFCT_FRAG6_CB(clone)->orig = NULL;
atomic_add(clone->truesize, &nf_init_frags.mem);
}
/* We have to remove fragment header from datagram and to relocate
* header in order to calculate ICV correctly. */
skb_network_header(head)[fq->nhoffset] = skb_transport_header(head)[0];
memmove(head->head + sizeof(struct frag_hdr), head->head,
(head->data - head->head) - sizeof(struct frag_hdr));
head->mac_header += sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
head->network_header += sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
skb_shinfo(head)->frag_list = head->next;
skb_reset_transport_header(head);
skb_push(head, head->data - skb_network_header(head));
atomic_sub(head->truesize, &nf_init_frags.mem);
for (fp=head->next; fp; fp = fp->next) {
head->data_len += fp->len;
head->len += fp->len;
if (head->ip_summed != fp->ip_summed)
head->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
else if (head->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_COMPLETE)
head->csum = csum_add(head->csum, fp->csum);
head->truesize += fp->truesize;
atomic_sub(fp->truesize, &nf_init_frags.mem);
}
head->next = NULL;
head->dev = dev;
head->tstamp = fq->q.stamp;
ipv6_hdr(head)->payload_len = htons(payload_len);
/* Yes, and fold redundant checksum back. 8) */
if (head->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_COMPLETE)
head->csum = csum_partial(skb_network_header(head),
skb_network_header_len(head),
head->csum);
fq->q.fragments = NULL;
/* all original skbs are linked into the NFCT_FRAG6_CB(head).orig */
fp = skb_shinfo(head)->frag_list;
if (NFCT_FRAG6_CB(fp)->orig == NULL)
/* at above code, head skb is divided into two skbs. */
fp = fp->next;
op = NFCT_FRAG6_CB(head)->orig;
for (; fp; fp = fp->next) {
struct sk_buff *orig = NFCT_FRAG6_CB(fp)->orig;
op->next = orig;
op = orig;
NFCT_FRAG6_CB(fp)->orig = NULL;
}
return head;
out_oversize:
if (net_ratelimit())
printk(KERN_DEBUG "nf_ct_frag6_reasm: payload len = %d\n", payload_len);
goto out_fail;
out_oom:
if (net_ratelimit())
printk(KERN_DEBUG "nf_ct_frag6_reasm: no memory for reassembly\n");
out_fail:
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.34, when the nf_conntrack_ipv6 module is enabled, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) via certain types of fragmented IPv6 packets.
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_conntrack_reasm: properly handle packets fragmented into a single fragment
When an ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG message is received with a MTU below 1280,
all further packets include a fragment header.
Unlike regular defragmentation, conntrack also needs to "reassemble"
those fragments in order to obtain a packet without the fragment
header for connection tracking. Currently nf_conntrack_reasm checks
whether a fragment has either IP6_MF set or an offset != 0, which
makes it ignore those fragments.
Remove the invalid check and make reassembly handle fragment queues
containing only a single fragment.
Reported-and-tested-by: Ulrich Weber <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]> | High | 5,594 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: spnego_gss_get_mic_iov_length(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, gss_qop_t qop_req,
gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov, int iov_count)
{
return gss_get_mic_iov_length(minor_status, context_handle, qop_req, iov,
iov_count);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-18
Summary: lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.14 relies on an inappropriate context handle, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (incorrect pointer read and process crash) via a crafted SPNEGO packet that is mishandled during a gss_inquire_context call.
Commit Message: Fix SPNEGO context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2695]
The SPNEGO mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
mechanism context handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the SPNEGO context structure after context
establishment and refer to it in all GSS methods. Add initiate and
opened flags to the SPNEGO context structure for use in
gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment.
CVE-2015-2695:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established SPNEGO context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. This bug may go unnoticed, because
the most common SPNEGO authentication scenario establishes the context
after just one call to gss_accept_sec_context(). Java server
applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this
bug. A carefully crafted SPNEGO packet might allow the
gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined
results, but applications should not make access control decisions
based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[[email protected]: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup | High | 2,002 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: PaintArtifactCompositor::PendingLayer::PendingLayer(
const PaintChunk& first_paint_chunk,
size_t chunk_index,
bool chunk_requires_own_layer)
: bounds(first_paint_chunk.bounds),
rect_known_to_be_opaque(
first_paint_chunk.known_to_be_opaque ? bounds : FloatRect()),
property_tree_state(first_paint_chunk.properties.GetPropertyTreeState()),
requires_own_layer(chunk_requires_own_layer) {
paint_chunk_indices.push_back(chunk_index);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <[email protected]>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> [email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930} | High | 15,165 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool FakeCentral::IsPowered() const {
switch (state_) {
case mojom::CentralState::POWERED_OFF:
return false;
case mojom::CentralState::POWERED_ON:
return true;
case mojom::CentralState::ABSENT:
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap buffer overflow in filter processing in Skia in Google Chrome prior to 57.0.2987.98 for Mac, Windows, and Linux and 57.0.2987.108 for Android allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory read via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <[email protected]>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987} | Medium | 18,640 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: xmlXPathCompOpEvalPositionalPredicate(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt,
xmlXPathStepOpPtr op,
xmlNodeSetPtr set,
int contextSize,
int minPos,
int maxPos,
int hasNsNodes)
{
if (op->ch1 != -1) {
xmlXPathCompExprPtr comp = ctxt->comp;
if (comp->steps[op->ch1].op != XPATH_OP_PREDICATE) {
/*
* TODO: raise an internal error.
*/
}
contextSize = xmlXPathCompOpEvalPredicate(ctxt,
&comp->steps[op->ch1], set, contextSize, hasNsNodes);
CHECK_ERROR0;
if (contextSize <= 0)
return(0);
}
/*
* Check if the node set contains a sufficient number of nodes for
* the requested range.
*/
if (contextSize < minPos) {
xmlXPathNodeSetClear(set, hasNsNodes);
return(0);
}
if (op->ch2 == -1) {
/*
* TODO: Can this ever happen?
*/
return (contextSize);
} else {
xmlDocPtr oldContextDoc;
int i, pos = 0, newContextSize = 0, contextPos = 0, res;
xmlXPathStepOpPtr exprOp;
xmlXPathObjectPtr contextObj = NULL, exprRes = NULL;
xmlNodePtr oldContextNode, contextNode = NULL;
xmlXPathContextPtr xpctxt = ctxt->context;
#ifdef LIBXML_XPTR_ENABLED
/*
* URGENT TODO: Check the following:
* We don't expect location sets if evaluating prediates, right?
* Only filters should expect location sets, right?
*/
#endif /* LIBXML_XPTR_ENABLED */
/*
* Save old context.
*/
oldContextNode = xpctxt->node;
oldContextDoc = xpctxt->doc;
/*
* Get the expression of this predicate.
*/
exprOp = &ctxt->comp->steps[op->ch2];
for (i = 0; i < set->nodeNr; i++) {
if (set->nodeTab[i] == NULL)
continue;
contextNode = set->nodeTab[i];
xpctxt->node = contextNode;
xpctxt->contextSize = contextSize;
xpctxt->proximityPosition = ++contextPos;
/*
* Initialize the new set.
* Also set the xpath document in case things like
* key() evaluation are attempted on the predicate
*/
if ((contextNode->type != XML_NAMESPACE_DECL) &&
(contextNode->doc != NULL))
xpctxt->doc = contextNode->doc;
/*
* Evaluate the predicate expression with 1 context node
* at a time; this node is packaged into a node set; this
* node set is handed over to the evaluation mechanism.
*/
if (contextObj == NULL)
contextObj = xmlXPathCacheNewNodeSet(xpctxt, contextNode);
else
xmlXPathNodeSetAddUnique(contextObj->nodesetval,
contextNode);
valuePush(ctxt, contextObj);
res = xmlXPathCompOpEvalToBoolean(ctxt, exprOp, 1);
if ((ctxt->error != XPATH_EXPRESSION_OK) || (res == -1)) {
xmlXPathObjectPtr tmp;
/* pop the result if any */
tmp = valuePop(ctxt);
if (tmp != contextObj)
/*
* Free up the result
* then pop off contextObj, which will be freed later
*/
xmlXPathReleaseObject(xpctxt, tmp);
valuePop(ctxt);
goto evaluation_error;
}
if (res)
pos++;
if (res && (pos >= minPos) && (pos <= maxPos)) {
/*
* Fits in the requested range.
*/
newContextSize++;
if (minPos == maxPos) {
/*
* Only 1 node was requested.
*/
if (contextNode->type == XML_NAMESPACE_DECL) {
/*
* As always: take care of those nasty
* namespace nodes.
*/
set->nodeTab[i] = NULL;
}
xmlXPathNodeSetClear(set, hasNsNodes);
set->nodeNr = 1;
set->nodeTab[0] = contextNode;
goto evaluation_exit;
}
if (pos == maxPos) {
/*
* We are done.
*/
xmlXPathNodeSetClearFromPos(set, i +1, hasNsNodes);
goto evaluation_exit;
}
} else {
/*
* Remove the entry from the initial node set.
*/
set->nodeTab[i] = NULL;
if (contextNode->type == XML_NAMESPACE_DECL)
xmlXPathNodeSetFreeNs((xmlNsPtr) contextNode);
}
if (exprRes != NULL) {
xmlXPathReleaseObject(ctxt->context, exprRes);
exprRes = NULL;
}
if (ctxt->value == contextObj) {
/*
* Don't free the temporary XPath object holding the
* context node, in order to avoid massive recreation
* inside this loop.
*/
valuePop(ctxt);
xmlXPathNodeSetClear(contextObj->nodesetval, hasNsNodes);
} else {
/*
* The object was lost in the evaluation machinery.
* Can this happen? Maybe in case of internal-errors.
*/
contextObj = NULL;
}
}
goto evaluation_exit;
evaluation_error:
xmlXPathNodeSetClear(set, hasNsNodes);
newContextSize = 0;
evaluation_exit:
if (contextObj != NULL) {
if (ctxt->value == contextObj)
valuePop(ctxt);
xmlXPathReleaseObject(xpctxt, contextObj);
}
if (exprRes != NULL)
xmlXPathReleaseObject(ctxt->context, exprRes);
/*
* Reset/invalidate the context.
*/
xpctxt->node = oldContextNode;
xpctxt->doc = oldContextDoc;
xpctxt->contextSize = -1;
xpctxt->proximityPosition = -1;
return(newContextSize);
}
return(contextSize);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Double free vulnerability in libxml2, as used in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.215, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted XPath expression.
Commit Message: Fix libxml XPath bug.
BUG=89402
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7508039
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@95382 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 15,805 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static struct mnt_namespace *alloc_mnt_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns)
{
struct mnt_namespace *new_ns;
struct ucounts *ucounts;
int ret;
ucounts = inc_mnt_namespaces(user_ns);
if (!ucounts)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOSPC);
new_ns = kmalloc(sizeof(struct mnt_namespace), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new_ns) {
dec_mnt_namespaces(ucounts);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
ret = ns_alloc_inum(&new_ns->ns);
if (ret) {
kfree(new_ns);
dec_mnt_namespaces(ucounts);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
new_ns->ns.ops = &mntns_operations;
new_ns->seq = atomic64_add_return(1, &mnt_ns_seq);
atomic_set(&new_ns->count, 1);
new_ns->root = NULL;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new_ns->list);
init_waitqueue_head(&new_ns->poll);
new_ns->event = 0;
new_ns->user_ns = get_user_ns(user_ns);
new_ns->ucounts = ucounts;
return new_ns;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-400
Summary: fs/namespace.c in the Linux kernel before 4.9 does not restrict how many mounts may exist in a mount namespace, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption and deadlock) via MS_BIND mount system calls, as demonstrated by a loop that triggers exponential growth in the number of mounts.
Commit Message: mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts
CAI Qian <[email protected]> pointed out that the semantics
of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially
increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace.
mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2
mount --make-rshared /
for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done
Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem
as some people have managed to hit this by accident.
As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned.
Ian Kent <[email protected]> described the situation for autofs users
as follows:
> The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of
> the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance
> problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less
> than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that
> have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common
> case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've
> not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries.
>
> The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large
> number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat
> more active mounts.
So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount
namespace at 100,000. This is more than enough for any use case I
know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase
in mounts. Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and
malfunctioning programs.
For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing
to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl.
Tested-by: CAI Qian <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]> | Medium | 3,080 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int do_fpu_inst(unsigned short inst, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
struct sh_fpu_soft_struct *fpu = &(tsk->thread.xstate->softfpu);
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_EMULATION_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, 0);
if (!(task_thread_info(tsk)->status & TS_USEDFPU)) {
/* initialize once. */
fpu_init(fpu);
task_thread_info(tsk)->status |= TS_USEDFPU;
}
return fpu_emulate(inst, fpu, regs);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | Medium | 24,087 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int iscsi_decode_text_input(
u8 phase,
u8 sender,
char *textbuf,
u32 length,
struct iscsi_conn *conn)
{
struct iscsi_param_list *param_list = conn->param_list;
char *tmpbuf, *start = NULL, *end = NULL;
tmpbuf = kzalloc(length + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tmpbuf) {
pr_err("Unable to allocate memory for tmpbuf.\n");
return -1;
}
memcpy(tmpbuf, textbuf, length);
tmpbuf[length] = '\0';
start = tmpbuf;
end = (start + length);
while (start < end) {
char *key, *value;
struct iscsi_param *param;
if (iscsi_extract_key_value(start, &key, &value) < 0) {
kfree(tmpbuf);
return -1;
}
pr_debug("Got key: %s=%s\n", key, value);
if (phase & PHASE_SECURITY) {
if (iscsi_check_for_auth_key(key) > 0) {
char *tmpptr = key + strlen(key);
*tmpptr = '=';
kfree(tmpbuf);
return 1;
}
}
param = iscsi_check_key(key, phase, sender, param_list);
if (!param) {
if (iscsi_add_notunderstood_response(key,
value, param_list) < 0) {
kfree(tmpbuf);
return -1;
}
start += strlen(key) + strlen(value) + 2;
continue;
}
if (iscsi_check_value(param, value) < 0) {
kfree(tmpbuf);
return -1;
}
start += strlen(key) + strlen(value) + 2;
if (IS_PSTATE_PROPOSER(param)) {
if (iscsi_check_proposer_state(param, value) < 0) {
kfree(tmpbuf);
return -1;
}
SET_PSTATE_RESPONSE_GOT(param);
} else {
if (iscsi_check_acceptor_state(param, value, conn) < 0) {
kfree(tmpbuf);
return -1;
}
SET_PSTATE_ACCEPTOR(param);
}
}
kfree(tmpbuf);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in the iscsi_add_notunderstood_response function in drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_parameters.c in the iSCSI target subsystem in the Linux kernel through 3.9.4 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption and OOPS) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a long key that is not properly handled during construction of an error-response packet.
Commit Message: iscsi-target: fix heap buffer overflow on error
If a key was larger than 64 bytes, as checked by iscsi_check_key(), the
error response packet, generated by iscsi_add_notunderstood_response(),
would still attempt to copy the entire key into the packet, overflowing
the structure on the heap.
Remote preauthentication kernel memory corruption was possible if a
target was configured and listening on the network.
CVE-2013-2850
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <[email protected]> | High | 22,723 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: struct sctp_chunk *sctp_inq_pop(struct sctp_inq *queue)
{
struct sctp_chunk *chunk;
sctp_chunkhdr_t *ch = NULL;
/* The assumption is that we are safe to process the chunks
* at this time.
*/
if ((chunk = queue->in_progress)) {
/* There is a packet that we have been working on.
* Any post processing work to do before we move on?
*/
if (chunk->singleton ||
chunk->end_of_packet ||
chunk->pdiscard) {
sctp_chunk_free(chunk);
chunk = queue->in_progress = NULL;
} else {
/* Nothing to do. Next chunk in the packet, please. */
ch = (sctp_chunkhdr_t *) chunk->chunk_end;
/* Force chunk->skb->data to chunk->chunk_end. */
skb_pull(chunk->skb,
chunk->chunk_end - chunk->skb->data);
/* Verify that we have at least chunk headers
* worth of buffer left.
*/
if (skb_headlen(chunk->skb) < sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)) {
sctp_chunk_free(chunk);
chunk = queue->in_progress = NULL;
}
}
}
/* Do we need to take the next packet out of the queue to process? */
if (!chunk) {
struct list_head *entry;
/* Is the queue empty? */
if (list_empty(&queue->in_chunk_list))
return NULL;
entry = queue->in_chunk_list.next;
chunk = queue->in_progress =
list_entry(entry, struct sctp_chunk, list);
list_del_init(entry);
/* This is the first chunk in the packet. */
chunk->singleton = 1;
ch = (sctp_chunkhdr_t *) chunk->skb->data;
chunk->data_accepted = 0;
}
chunk->chunk_hdr = ch;
chunk->chunk_end = ((__u8 *)ch) + WORD_ROUND(ntohs(ch->length));
/* In the unlikely case of an IP reassembly, the skb could be
* non-linear. If so, update chunk_end so that it doesn't go past
* the skb->tail.
*/
if (unlikely(skb_is_nonlinear(chunk->skb))) {
if (chunk->chunk_end > skb_tail_pointer(chunk->skb))
chunk->chunk_end = skb_tail_pointer(chunk->skb);
}
skb_pull(chunk->skb, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t));
chunk->subh.v = NULL; /* Subheader is no longer valid. */
if (chunk->chunk_end < skb_tail_pointer(chunk->skb)) {
/* This is not a singleton */
chunk->singleton = 0;
} else if (chunk->chunk_end > skb_tail_pointer(chunk->skb)) {
/* RFC 2960, Section 6.10 Bundling
*
* Partial chunks MUST NOT be placed in an SCTP packet.
* If the receiver detects a partial chunk, it MUST drop
* the chunk.
*
* Since the end of the chunk is past the end of our buffer
* (which contains the whole packet, we can freely discard
* the whole packet.
*/
sctp_chunk_free(chunk);
chunk = queue->in_progress = NULL;
return NULL;
} else {
/* We are at the end of the packet, so mark the chunk
* in case we need to send a SACK.
*/
chunk->end_of_packet = 1;
}
pr_debug("+++sctp_inq_pop+++ chunk:%p[%s], length:%d, skb->len:%d\n",
chunk, sctp_cname(SCTP_ST_CHUNK(chunk->chunk_hdr->type)),
ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length), chunk->skb->len);
return chunk;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The SCTP implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.17.4 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) by triggering a large number of chunks in an association's output queue, as demonstrated by ASCONF probes, related to net/sctp/inqueue.c and net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c.
Commit Message: net: sctp: fix remote memory pressure from excessive queueing
This scenario is not limited to ASCONF, just taken as one
example triggering the issue. When receiving ASCONF probes
in the form of ...
-------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
<----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
---- ASCONF_a; [ASCONF_b; ...; ASCONF_n;] JUNK ------>
[...]
---- ASCONF_m; [ASCONF_o; ...; ASCONF_z;] JUNK ------>
... where ASCONF_a, ASCONF_b, ..., ASCONF_z are good-formed
ASCONFs and have increasing serial numbers, we process such
ASCONF chunk(s) marked with !end_of_packet and !singleton,
since we have not yet reached the SCTP packet end. SCTP does
only do verification on a chunk by chunk basis, as an SCTP
packet is nothing more than just a container of a stream of
chunks which it eats up one by one.
We could run into the case that we receive a packet with a
malformed tail, above marked as trailing JUNK. All previous
chunks are here goodformed, so the stack will eat up all
previous chunks up to this point. In case JUNK does not fit
into a chunk header and there are no more other chunks in
the input queue, or in case JUNK contains a garbage chunk
header, but the encoded chunk length would exceed the skb
tail, or we came here from an entirely different scenario
and the chunk has pdiscard=1 mark (without having had a flush
point), it will happen, that we will excessively queue up
the association's output queue (a correct final chunk may
then turn it into a response flood when flushing the
queue ;)): I ran a simple script with incremental ASCONF
serial numbers and could see the server side consuming
excessive amount of RAM [before/after: up to 2GB and more].
The issue at heart is that the chunk train basically ends
with !end_of_packet and !singleton markers and since commit
2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding
with 1 packet") therefore preventing an output queue flush
point in sctp_do_sm() -> sctp_cmd_interpreter() on the input
chunk (chunk = event_arg) even though local_cork is set,
but its precedence has changed since then. In the normal
case, the last chunk with end_of_packet=1 would trigger the
queue flush to accommodate possible outgoing bundling.
In the input queue, sctp_inq_pop() seems to do the right thing
in terms of discarding invalid chunks. So, above JUNK will
not enter the state machine and instead be released and exit
the sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() chunk processing loop. It's simply
the flush point being missing at loop exit. Adding a try-flush
approach on the output queue might not work as the underlying
infrastructure might be long gone at this point due to the
side-effect interpreter run.
One possibility, albeit a bit of a kludge, would be to defer
invalid chunk freeing into the state machine in order to
possibly trigger packet discards and thus indirectly a queue
flush on error. It would surely be better to discard chunks
as in the current, perhaps better controlled environment, but
going back and forth, it's simply architecturally not possible.
I tried various trailing JUNK attack cases and it seems to
look good now.
Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.
Fixes: 2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 11,625 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int ext4_orphan_del(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode)
{
struct list_head *prev;
struct ext4_inode_info *ei = EXT4_I(inode);
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi;
__u32 ino_next;
struct ext4_iloc iloc;
int err = 0;
if (!EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_journal)
return 0;
mutex_lock(&EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_orphan_lock);
if (list_empty(&ei->i_orphan))
goto out;
ino_next = NEXT_ORPHAN(inode);
prev = ei->i_orphan.prev;
sbi = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb);
jbd_debug(4, "remove inode %lu from orphan list\n", inode->i_ino);
list_del_init(&ei->i_orphan);
/* If we're on an error path, we may not have a valid
* transaction handle with which to update the orphan list on
* disk, but we still need to remove the inode from the linked
* list in memory. */
if (!handle)
goto out;
err = ext4_reserve_inode_write(handle, inode, &iloc);
if (err)
goto out_err;
if (prev == &sbi->s_orphan) {
jbd_debug(4, "superblock will point to %u\n", ino_next);
BUFFER_TRACE(sbi->s_sbh, "get_write_access");
err = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, sbi->s_sbh);
if (err)
goto out_brelse;
sbi->s_es->s_last_orphan = cpu_to_le32(ino_next);
err = ext4_handle_dirty_super(handle, inode->i_sb);
} else {
struct ext4_iloc iloc2;
struct inode *i_prev =
&list_entry(prev, struct ext4_inode_info, i_orphan)->vfs_inode;
jbd_debug(4, "orphan inode %lu will point to %u\n",
i_prev->i_ino, ino_next);
err = ext4_reserve_inode_write(handle, i_prev, &iloc2);
if (err)
goto out_brelse;
NEXT_ORPHAN(i_prev) = ino_next;
err = ext4_mark_iloc_dirty(handle, i_prev, &iloc2);
}
if (err)
goto out_brelse;
NEXT_ORPHAN(inode) = 0;
err = ext4_mark_iloc_dirty(handle, inode, &iloc);
out_err:
ext4_std_error(inode->i_sb, err);
out:
mutex_unlock(&EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_orphan_lock);
return err;
out_brelse:
brelse(iloc.bh);
goto out_err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The ext4_orphan_del function in fs/ext4/namei.c in the Linux kernel before 3.7.3 does not properly handle orphan-list entries for non-journal filesystems, which allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted filesystem on removable media, as demonstrated by the e2fsprogs tests/f_orphan_extents_inode/image.gz test.
Commit Message: ext4: avoid hang when mounting non-journal filesystems with orphan list
When trying to mount a file system which does not contain a journal,
but which does have a orphan list containing an inode which needs to
be truncated, the mount call with hang forever in
ext4_orphan_cleanup() because ext4_orphan_del() will return
immediately without removing the inode from the orphan list, leading
to an uninterruptible loop in kernel code which will busy out one of
the CPU's on the system.
This can be trivially reproduced by trying to mount the file system
found in tests/f_orphan_extents_inode/image.gz from the e2fsprogs
source tree. If a malicious user were to put this on a USB stick, and
mount it on a Linux desktop which has automatic mounts enabled, this
could be considered a potential denial of service attack. (Not a big
deal in practice, but professional paranoids worry about such things,
and have even been known to allocate CVE numbers for such problems.)
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Zheng Liu <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] | Medium | 22,772 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(locale_get_display_name)
{
get_icu_disp_value_src_php( DISP_NAME , INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU );
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The get_icu_value_internal function in ext/intl/locale/locale_methods.c in PHP before 5.5.36, 5.6.x before 5.6.22, and 7.x before 7.0.7 does not ensure the presence of a '0' character, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted locale_get_primary_language call.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read | High | 7,725 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_vdec::empty_this_buffer(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_IN OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE* buffer)
{
OMX_ERRORTYPE ret1 = OMX_ErrorNone;
unsigned int nBufferIndex = drv_ctx.ip_buf.actualcount;
if (m_state == OMX_StateInvalid) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Empty this buffer in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorInvalidState;
}
if (buffer == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR:ETB Buffer is NULL");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (!m_inp_bEnabled) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR:ETB incorrect state operation, input port is disabled.");
return OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateOperation;
}
if (buffer->nInputPortIndex != OMX_CORE_INPUT_PORT_INDEX) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR:ETB invalid port in header %u", (unsigned int)buffer->nInputPortIndex);
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
#ifdef _ANDROID_
if (iDivXDrmDecrypt) {
OMX_ERRORTYPE drmErr = iDivXDrmDecrypt->Decrypt(buffer);
if (drmErr != OMX_ErrorNone) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("ERROR:iDivXDrmDecrypt->Decrypt %d", drmErr);
}
}
#endif //_ANDROID_
if (perf_flag) {
if (!latency) {
dec_time.stop();
latency = dec_time.processing_time_us();
dec_time.start();
}
}
if (arbitrary_bytes) {
nBufferIndex = buffer - m_inp_heap_ptr;
} else {
if (input_use_buffer == true) {
nBufferIndex = buffer - m_inp_heap_ptr;
m_inp_mem_ptr[nBufferIndex].nFilledLen = m_inp_heap_ptr[nBufferIndex].nFilledLen;
m_inp_mem_ptr[nBufferIndex].nTimeStamp = m_inp_heap_ptr[nBufferIndex].nTimeStamp;
m_inp_mem_ptr[nBufferIndex].nFlags = m_inp_heap_ptr[nBufferIndex].nFlags;
buffer = &m_inp_mem_ptr[nBufferIndex];
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Non-Arbitrary mode - buffer address is: malloc %p, pmem%p in Index %d, buffer %p of size %u",
&m_inp_heap_ptr[nBufferIndex], &m_inp_mem_ptr[nBufferIndex],nBufferIndex, buffer, (unsigned int)buffer->nFilledLen);
} else {
nBufferIndex = buffer - m_inp_mem_ptr;
}
}
if (nBufferIndex > drv_ctx.ip_buf.actualcount ) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR:ETB nBufferIndex is invalid");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (buffer->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_CODECCONFIG) {
codec_config_flag = true;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("%s: codec_config buffer", __FUNCTION__);
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("[ETB] BHdr(%p) pBuf(%p) nTS(%lld) nFL(%u)",
buffer, buffer->pBuffer, buffer->nTimeStamp, (unsigned int)buffer->nFilledLen);
if (arbitrary_bytes) {
post_event ((unsigned long)hComp,(unsigned long)buffer,
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_ETB_ARBITRARY);
} else {
post_event ((unsigned long)hComp,(unsigned long)buffer,OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_ETB);
}
time_stamp_dts.insert_timestamp(buffer);
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the mm-video-v4l2 vdec component in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01 allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27890802.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug: 27890802
Security Vulnerability - Heap Use-After-Free and Possible LPE in
MediaServer (libOmxVdec problem #6)
CRs-Fixed: 1008882
Change-Id: Iaac2e383cd53cf9cf8042c9ed93ddc76dba3907e
| High | 8,850 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: virtual void SetUp() {
svc_.encoding_mode = INTER_LAYER_PREDICTION_IP;
svc_.log_level = SVC_LOG_DEBUG;
svc_.log_print = 0;
codec_iface_ = vpx_codec_vp9_cx();
const vpx_codec_err_t res =
vpx_codec_enc_config_default(codec_iface_, &codec_enc_, 0);
EXPECT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res);
codec_enc_.g_w = kWidth;
codec_enc_.g_h = kHeight;
codec_enc_.g_timebase.num = 1;
codec_enc_.g_timebase.den = 60;
codec_enc_.kf_min_dist = 100;
codec_enc_.kf_max_dist = 100;
vpx_codec_dec_cfg_t dec_cfg = {0};
VP9CodecFactory codec_factory;
decoder_ = codec_factory.CreateDecoder(dec_cfg, 0);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| High | 28,375 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: NetworkLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetNetworkLibrary() {
return network_lib_.GetDefaultImpl(use_stub_impl_);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The Program::getActiveUniformMaxLength function in libGLESv2/Program.cpp in libGLESv2.dll in the WebGLES library in Almost Native Graphics Layer Engine (ANGLE), as used in Mozilla Firefox 4.x before 4.0.1 on Windows and in the GPU process in Google Chrome before 10.0.648.205 on Windows, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via unspecified vectors, related to an *off-by-three* error.
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 14,468 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void ShellWindow::Observe(int type,
const content::NotificationSource& source,
const content::NotificationDetails& details) {
switch (type) {
case chrome::NOTIFICATION_EXTENSION_UNLOADED: {
const extensions::Extension* unloaded_extension =
content::Details<extensions::UnloadedExtensionInfo>(
details)->extension;
if (extension_ == unloaded_extension)
Close();
break;
}
case content::NOTIFICATION_APP_TERMINATING:
Close();
break;
default:
NOTREACHED() << "Received unexpected notification";
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Make chrome.appWindow.create() provide access to the child window at a predictable time.
When you first create a window with chrome.appWindow.create(), it won't have
loaded any resources. So, at create time, you are guaranteed that:
child_window.location.href == 'about:blank'
child_window.document.documentElement.outerHTML ==
'<html><head></head><body></body></html>'
This is in line with the behaviour of window.open().
BUG=131735
TEST=browser_tests:PlatformAppBrowserTest.WindowsApi
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=144072
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10644006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@144356 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 6,507 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: TestPaintArtifact& TestPaintArtifact::Chunk(
DisplayItemClient& client,
scoped_refptr<const TransformPaintPropertyNode> transform,
scoped_refptr<const ClipPaintPropertyNode> clip,
scoped_refptr<const EffectPaintPropertyNode> effect) {
return Chunk(client,
PropertyTreeState(transform.get(), clip.get(), effect.get()));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <[email protected]>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> [email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930} | High | 19,039 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int crypto_shash_report(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
struct crypto_report_hash rhash;
struct shash_alg *salg = __crypto_shash_alg(alg);
snprintf(rhash.type, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "%s", "shash");
rhash.blocksize = alg->cra_blocksize;
rhash.digestsize = salg->digestsize;
if (nla_put(skb, CRYPTOCFGA_REPORT_HASH,
sizeof(struct crypto_report_hash), &rhash))
goto nla_put_failure;
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: The crypto_report_one function in crypto/crypto_user.c in the report API in the crypto user configuration API in the Linux kernel through 3.8.2 uses an incorrect length value during a copy operation, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability.
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> | Low | 22,367 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::CheckIfSuggestedPathExists(
int32 download_id,
const FilePath& unverified_path,
bool should_prompt,
bool is_forced_path,
content::DownloadDangerType danger_type,
const FilePath& default_path) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::FILE));
FilePath target_path(unverified_path);
file_util::CreateDirectory(default_path);
FilePath dir = target_path.DirName();
FilePath filename = target_path.BaseName();
if (!file_util::PathIsWritable(dir)) {
VLOG(1) << "Unable to write to directory \"" << dir.value() << "\"";
should_prompt = true;
PathService::Get(chrome::DIR_USER_DOCUMENTS, &dir);
target_path = dir.Append(filename);
}
bool should_uniquify =
(!is_forced_path &&
(danger_type == content::DOWNLOAD_DANGER_TYPE_NOT_DANGEROUS ||
should_prompt));
bool should_overwrite =
(should_uniquify || is_forced_path);
bool should_create_marker = (should_uniquify && !should_prompt);
if (should_uniquify) {
int uniquifier =
download_util::GetUniquePathNumberWithCrDownload(target_path);
if (uniquifier > 0) {
target_path = target_path.InsertBeforeExtensionASCII(
StringPrintf(" (%d)", uniquifier));
} else if (uniquifier == -1) {
VLOG(1) << "Unable to find a unique path for suggested path \""
<< target_path.value() << "\"";
should_prompt = true;
}
}
if (should_create_marker)
file_util::WriteFile(download_util::GetCrDownloadPath(target_path), "", 0);
DownloadItem::TargetDisposition disposition;
if (should_prompt)
disposition = DownloadItem::TARGET_DISPOSITION_PROMPT;
else if (should_overwrite)
disposition = DownloadItem::TARGET_DISPOSITION_OVERWRITE;
else
disposition = DownloadItem::TARGET_DISPOSITION_UNIQUIFY;
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::OnPathExistenceAvailable,
this, download_id, target_path, disposition, danger_type));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger out-of-bounds write operations.
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 5,058 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void ntlm_print_message_fields(NTLM_MESSAGE_FIELDS* fields, const char* name)
{
WLog_DBG(TAG, "%s (Len: %"PRIu16" MaxLen: %"PRIu16" BufferOffset: %"PRIu32")",
name, fields->Len, fields->MaxLen, fields->BufferOffset);
if (fields->Len > 0)
winpr_HexDump(TAG, WLOG_DEBUG, fields->Buffer, fields->Len);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: FreeRDP prior to version 2.0.0-rc4 contains several Out-Of-Bounds Reads in the NTLM Authentication module that results in a Denial of Service (segfault).
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8789
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies. | Medium | 8,104 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: parse_asntime_into_isotime (unsigned char const **buf, size_t *len,
ksba_isotime_t isotime)
{
struct tag_info ti;
gpg_error_t err;
err = _ksba_ber_parse_tl (buf, len, &ti);
if (err)
;
else if ( !(ti.class == CLASS_UNIVERSAL
&& (ti.tag == TYPE_UTC_TIME || ti.tag == TYPE_GENERALIZED_TIME)
&& !ti.is_constructed) )
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_OBJ);
else if (!(err = _ksba_asntime_to_iso (*buf, ti.length,
ti.tag == TYPE_UTC_TIME, isotime)))
parse_skip (buf, len, &ti);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Libksba before 1.3.4 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read and crash) via unspecified vectors, related to the "returned length of the object from _ksba_ber_parse_tl."
Commit Message: | Medium | 15,892 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void PasswordInputType::EnableSecureTextInput() {
LocalFrame* frame = GetElement().GetDocument().GetFrame();
if (!frame)
return;
frame->Selection().SetUseSecureKeyboardEntryWhenActive(true);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 46.0.2490.71 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517} | High | 22,284 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: kvm_irqfd(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_irqfd *args)
{
if (args->flags & ~(KVM_IRQFD_FLAG_DEASSIGN | KVM_IRQFD_FLAG_RESAMPLE))
return -EINVAL;
if (args->flags & KVM_IRQFD_FLAG_DEASSIGN)
return kvm_irqfd_deassign(kvm, args);
return kvm_irqfd_assign(kvm, args);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The KVM subsystem in the Linux kernel through 4.13.3 allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (assertion failure, and hypervisor hang or crash) via an out-of bounds guest_irq value, related to arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c and virt/kvm/eventfd.c.
Commit Message: KVM: Don't accept obviously wrong gsi values via KVM_IRQFD
We cannot add routes for gsi values >= KVM_MAX_IRQ_ROUTES -- see
kvm_set_irq_routing(). Hence, there is no sense in accepting them
via KVM_IRQFD. Prevent them from entering the system in the first
place.
Signed-off-by: Jan H. Schönherr <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> | Low | 29,856 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: SPL_METHOD(FilesystemIterator, current)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT(intern, SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT_AS_PATHNAME)) {
spl_filesystem_object_get_file_name(intern TSRMLS_CC);
RETURN_STRINGL(intern->file_name, intern->file_name_len, 1);
} else if (SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT(intern, SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT_AS_FILEINFO)) {
spl_filesystem_object_get_file_name(intern TSRMLS_CC);
spl_filesystem_object_create_type(0, intern, SPL_FS_INFO, NULL, return_value TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
RETURN_ZVAL(getThis(), 1, 0);
/*RETURN_STRING(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name, 1);*/
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the SplFileObject::fread function in spl_directory.c in the SPL extension in PHP before 5.5.37 and 5.6.x before 5.6.23 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large integer argument, a related issue to CVE-2016-5096.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int | High | 15,281 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: xsltStylePreCompute(xsltStylesheetPtr style, xmlNodePtr inst) {
/*
* URGENT TODO: Normally inst->psvi Should never be reserved here,
* BUT: since if we include the same stylesheet from
* multiple imports, then the stylesheet will be parsed
* again. We simply must not try to compute the stylesheet again.
* TODO: Get to the point where we don't need to query the
* namespace- and local-name of the node, but can evaluate this
* using cctxt->style->inode->category;
*/
if ((inst == NULL) || (inst->type != XML_ELEMENT_NODE) ||
(inst->psvi != NULL))
return;
if (IS_XSLT_ELEM(inst)) {
xsltStylePreCompPtr cur;
if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "apply-templates")) {
xsltCheckInstructionElement(style, inst);
xsltApplyTemplatesComp(style, inst);
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "with-param")) {
xsltCheckParentElement(style, inst, BAD_CAST "apply-templates",
BAD_CAST "call-template");
xsltWithParamComp(style, inst);
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "value-of")) {
xsltCheckInstructionElement(style, inst);
xsltValueOfComp(style, inst);
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "copy")) {
xsltCheckInstructionElement(style, inst);
xsltCopyComp(style, inst);
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "copy-of")) {
xsltCheckInstructionElement(style, inst);
xsltCopyOfComp(style, inst);
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "if")) {
xsltCheckInstructionElement(style, inst);
xsltIfComp(style, inst);
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "when")) {
xsltCheckParentElement(style, inst, BAD_CAST "choose", NULL);
xsltWhenComp(style, inst);
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "choose")) {
xsltCheckInstructionElement(style, inst);
xsltChooseComp(style, inst);
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "for-each")) {
xsltCheckInstructionElement(style, inst);
xsltForEachComp(style, inst);
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "apply-imports")) {
xsltCheckInstructionElement(style, inst);
xsltApplyImportsComp(style, inst);
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "attribute")) {
xmlNodePtr parent = inst->parent;
if ((parent == NULL) || (parent->ns == NULL) ||
((parent->ns != inst->ns) &&
(!xmlStrEqual(parent->ns->href, inst->ns->href))) ||
(!xmlStrEqual(parent->name, BAD_CAST "attribute-set"))) {
xsltCheckInstructionElement(style, inst);
}
xsltAttributeComp(style, inst);
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "element")) {
xsltCheckInstructionElement(style, inst);
xsltElementComp(style, inst);
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "text")) {
xsltCheckInstructionElement(style, inst);
xsltTextComp(style, inst);
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "sort")) {
xsltCheckParentElement(style, inst, BAD_CAST "apply-templates",
BAD_CAST "for-each");
xsltSortComp(style, inst);
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "comment")) {
xsltCheckInstructionElement(style, inst);
xsltCommentComp(style, inst);
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "number")) {
xsltCheckInstructionElement(style, inst);
xsltNumberComp(style, inst);
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "processing-instruction")) {
xsltCheckInstructionElement(style, inst);
xsltProcessingInstructionComp(style, inst);
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "call-template")) {
xsltCheckInstructionElement(style, inst);
xsltCallTemplateComp(style, inst);
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "param")) {
if (xsltCheckTopLevelElement(style, inst, 0) == 0)
xsltCheckInstructionElement(style, inst);
xsltParamComp(style, inst);
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "variable")) {
if (xsltCheckTopLevelElement(style, inst, 0) == 0)
xsltCheckInstructionElement(style, inst);
xsltVariableComp(style, inst);
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "otherwise")) {
xsltCheckParentElement(style, inst, BAD_CAST "choose", NULL);
xsltCheckInstructionElement(style, inst);
return;
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "template")) {
xsltCheckTopLevelElement(style, inst, 1);
return;
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "output")) {
xsltCheckTopLevelElement(style, inst, 1);
return;
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "preserve-space")) {
xsltCheckTopLevelElement(style, inst, 1);
return;
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "strip-space")) {
xsltCheckTopLevelElement(style, inst, 1);
return;
} else if ((IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "stylesheet")) ||
(IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "transform"))) {
xmlNodePtr parent = inst->parent;
if ((parent == NULL) || (parent->type != XML_DOCUMENT_NODE)) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, inst,
"element %s only allowed only as root element\n",
inst->name);
style->errors++;
}
return;
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "key")) {
xsltCheckTopLevelElement(style, inst, 1);
return;
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "message")) {
xsltCheckInstructionElement(style, inst);
return;
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "attribute-set")) {
xsltCheckTopLevelElement(style, inst, 1);
return;
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "namespace-alias")) {
xsltCheckTopLevelElement(style, inst, 1);
return;
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "include")) {
xsltCheckTopLevelElement(style, inst, 1);
return;
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "import")) {
xsltCheckTopLevelElement(style, inst, 1);
return;
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "decimal-format")) {
xsltCheckTopLevelElement(style, inst, 1);
return;
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "fallback")) {
xsltCheckInstructionElement(style, inst);
return;
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "document")) {
xsltCheckInstructionElement(style, inst);
inst->psvi = (void *) xsltDocumentComp(style, inst,
(xsltTransformFunction) xsltDocumentElem);
} else {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, inst,
"xsltStylePreCompute: unknown xsl:%s\n", inst->name);
if (style != NULL) style->warnings++;
}
cur = (xsltStylePreCompPtr) inst->psvi;
/*
* A ns-list is build for every XSLT item in the
* node-tree. This is needed for XPath expressions.
*/
if (cur != NULL) {
int i = 0;
cur->nsList = xmlGetNsList(inst->doc, inst);
if (cur->nsList != NULL) {
while (cur->nsList[i] != NULL)
i++;
}
cur->nsNr = i;
}
} else {
inst->psvi =
(void *) xsltPreComputeExtModuleElement(style, inst);
/*
* Unknown element, maybe registered at the context
* level. Mark it for later recognition.
*/
if (inst->psvi == NULL)
inst->psvi = (void *) xsltExtMarker;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: numbers.c in libxslt before 1.1.29, as used in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63, mishandles namespace nodes, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds heap memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338} | Medium | 16,139 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void BrowserRenderProcessHost::PropagateBrowserCommandLineToRenderer(
const CommandLine& browser_cmd,
CommandLine* renderer_cmd) const {
static const char* const kSwitchNames[] = {
switches::kChromeFrame,
switches::kDisable3DAPIs,
switches::kDisableAcceleratedCompositing,
switches::kDisableApplicationCache,
switches::kDisableAudio,
switches::kDisableBreakpad,
switches::kDisableDataTransferItems,
switches::kDisableDatabases,
switches::kDisableDesktopNotifications,
switches::kDisableDeviceOrientation,
switches::kDisableFileSystem,
switches::kDisableGeolocation,
switches::kDisableGLMultisampling,
switches::kDisableGLSLTranslator,
switches::kDisableGpuVsync,
switches::kDisableIndexedDatabase,
switches::kDisableJavaScriptI18NAPI,
switches::kDisableLocalStorage,
switches::kDisableLogging,
switches::kDisableSeccompSandbox,
switches::kDisableSessionStorage,
switches::kDisableSharedWorkers,
switches::kDisableSpeechInput,
switches::kDisableWebAudio,
switches::kDisableWebSockets,
switches::kEnableAdaptive,
switches::kEnableBenchmarking,
switches::kEnableDCHECK,
switches::kEnableGPUServiceLogging,
switches::kEnableGPUClientLogging,
switches::kEnableLogging,
switches::kEnableMediaStream,
switches::kEnablePepperTesting,
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
switches::kEnableSandboxLogging,
#endif
switches::kEnableSeccompSandbox,
switches::kEnableStatsTable,
switches::kEnableVideoFullscreen,
switches::kEnableVideoLogging,
switches::kFullMemoryCrashReport,
#if !defined (GOOGLE_CHROME_BUILD)
switches::kInProcessPlugins,
#endif // GOOGLE_CHROME_BUILD
switches::kInProcessWebGL,
switches::kJavaScriptFlags,
switches::kLoggingLevel,
switches::kLowLatencyAudio,
switches::kNoJsRandomness,
switches::kNoReferrers,
switches::kNoSandbox,
switches::kPlaybackMode,
switches::kPpapiOutOfProcess,
switches::kRecordMode,
switches::kRegisterPepperPlugins,
switches::kRendererAssertTest,
#if !defined(OFFICIAL_BUILD)
switches::kRendererCheckFalseTest,
#endif // !defined(OFFICIAL_BUILD)
switches::kRendererCrashTest,
switches::kRendererStartupDialog,
switches::kShowPaintRects,
switches::kSimpleDataSource,
switches::kTestSandbox,
switches::kUseGL,
switches::kUserAgent,
switches::kV,
switches::kVideoThreads,
switches::kVModule,
switches::kWebCoreLogChannels,
};
renderer_cmd->CopySwitchesFrom(browser_cmd, kSwitchNames,
arraysize(kSwitchNames));
if (profile()->IsOffTheRecord() &&
!browser_cmd.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableDatabases)) {
renderer_cmd->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableDatabases);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163 does not properly handle strings in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted document that triggers an incorrect read operation.
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 11,488 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: mkvparser::IMkvReader::~IMkvReader()
{
//// Disable MSVC warnings that suggest making code non-portable.
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 25,470 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAVCEncoder::internalSetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR params) {
int32_t indexFull = index;
switch (indexFull) {
case OMX_IndexParamVideoBitrate:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE *bitRate =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE *) params;
if (bitRate->nPortIndex != 1 ||
bitRate->eControlRate != OMX_Video_ControlRateVariable) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mBitrate = bitRate->nTargetBitrate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoAvc:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE *avcType =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE *)params;
if (avcType->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (avcType->eProfile != OMX_VIDEO_AVCProfileBaseline ||
avcType->nRefFrames != 1 ||
avcType->nBFrames != 0 ||
avcType->bUseHadamard != OMX_TRUE ||
(avcType->nAllowedPictureTypes & OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeB) != 0 ||
avcType->nRefIdx10ActiveMinus1 != 0 ||
avcType->nRefIdx11ActiveMinus1 != 0 ||
avcType->bWeightedPPrediction != OMX_FALSE ||
avcType->bEntropyCodingCABAC != OMX_FALSE ||
avcType->bconstIpred != OMX_FALSE ||
avcType->bDirect8x8Inference != OMX_FALSE ||
avcType->bDirectSpatialTemporal != OMX_FALSE ||
avcType->nCabacInitIdc != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (OK != ConvertOmxAvcLevelToAvcSpecLevel(avcType->eLevel, &mAVCEncLevel)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SoftVideoEncoderOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not validate OMX buffer sizes, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27207275.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
| High | 17,876 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static bool getCoverageFormat12(vector<uint32_t>& coverage, const uint8_t* data, size_t size) {
const size_t kNGroupsOffset = 12;
const size_t kFirstGroupOffset = 16;
const size_t kGroupSize = 12;
const size_t kStartCharCodeOffset = 0;
const size_t kEndCharCodeOffset = 4;
const size_t kMaxNGroups = 0xfffffff0 / kGroupSize; // protection against overflow
if (kFirstGroupOffset > size) {
return false;
}
uint32_t nGroups = readU32(data, kNGroupsOffset);
if (nGroups >= kMaxNGroups || kFirstGroupOffset + nGroups * kGroupSize > size) {
return false;
}
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < nGroups; i++) {
uint32_t groupOffset = kFirstGroupOffset + i * kGroupSize;
uint32_t start = readU32(data, groupOffset + kStartCharCodeOffset);
uint32_t end = readU32(data, groupOffset + kEndCharCodeOffset);
if (end < start) {
return false;
}
addRange(coverage, start, end + 1); // file is inclusive, vector is exclusive
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The Minikin library in Android 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-04-01 does not properly consider negative size values in font data, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption and reboot loop) via a crafted font, aka internal bug 26413177.
Commit Message: Add error logging on invalid cmap - DO NOT MERGE
This patch logs instances of fonts with invalid cmap tables.
Bug: 25645298
Bug: 26413177
Change-Id: I183985e9784a97a2b4307a22e036382b1fc90e5e
| Medium | 64 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: kdc_process_for_user(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm,
krb5_pa_data *pa_data,
krb5_keyblock *tgs_session,
krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user **s4u_x509_user,
const char **status)
{
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_pa_for_user *for_user;
krb5_data req_data;
req_data.length = pa_data->length;
req_data.data = (char *)pa_data->contents;
code = decode_krb5_pa_for_user(&req_data, &for_user);
if (code)
return code;
code = verify_for_user_checksum(kdc_context, tgs_session, for_user);
if (code) {
*status = "INVALID_S4U2SELF_CHECKSUM";
krb5_free_pa_for_user(kdc_context, for_user);
return code;
}
*s4u_x509_user = calloc(1, sizeof(krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user));
if (*s4u_x509_user == NULL) {
krb5_free_pa_for_user(kdc_context, for_user);
return ENOMEM;
}
(*s4u_x509_user)->user_id.user = for_user->user;
for_user->user = NULL;
krb5_free_pa_for_user(kdc_context, for_user);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-617
Summary: In MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) 1.7 and later, an authenticated attacker can cause a KDC assertion failure by sending invalid S4U2Self or S4U2Proxy requests.
Commit Message: Prevent KDC unset status assertion failures
Assign status values if S4U2Self padata fails to decode, if an
S4U2Proxy request uses invalid KDC options, or if an S4U2Proxy request
uses an evidence ticket which does not match the canonicalized request
server principal name. Reported by Samuel Cabrero.
If a status value is not assigned during KDC processing, default to
"UNKNOWN_REASON" rather than failing an assertion. This change will
prevent future denial of service bugs due to similar mistakes, and
will allow us to omit assigning status values for unlikely errors such
as small memory allocation failures.
CVE-2017-11368:
In MIT krb5 1.7 and later, an authenticated attacker can cause an
assertion failure in krb5kdc by sending an invalid S4U2Self or
S4U2Proxy request.
CVSSv3 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H/E:H/RL:O/RC:C
ticket: 8599 (new)
target_version: 1.15-next
target_version: 1.14-next
tags: pullup | Medium | 8,744 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void unix_notinflight(struct file *fp)
{
struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp);
if (s) {
struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(s);
spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock);
BUG_ON(list_empty(&u->link));
if (atomic_long_dec_and_test(&u->inflight))
list_del_init(&u->link);
unix_tot_inflight--;
spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The Linux kernel before 4.4.1 allows local users to bypass file-descriptor limits and cause a denial of service (memory consumption) by sending each descriptor over a UNIX socket before closing it, related to net/unix/af_unix.c and net/unix/garbage.c.
Commit Message: unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets
It is possible for a process to allocate and accumulate far more FDs than
the process' limit by sending them over a unix socket then closing them
to keep the process' fd count low.
This change addresses this problem by keeping track of the number of FDs
in flight per user and preventing non-privileged processes from having
more FDs in flight than their configured FD limit.
Reported-by: [email protected]
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
Mitigates: CVE-2013-4312 (Linux 2.0+)
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 24,734 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int ndp_sock_recv(struct ndp *ndp)
{
struct ndp_msg *msg;
enum ndp_msg_type msg_type;
size_t len;
int err;
msg = ndp_msg_alloc();
if (!msg)
return -ENOMEM;
len = ndp_msg_payload_maxlen(msg);
err = myrecvfrom6(ndp->sock, msg->buf, &len, 0,
&msg->addrto, &msg->ifindex);
if (err) {
err(ndp, "Failed to receive message");
goto free_msg;
}
dbg(ndp, "rcvd from: %s, ifindex: %u",
str_in6_addr(&msg->addrto), msg->ifindex);
if (len < sizeof(*msg->icmp6_hdr)) {
warn(ndp, "rcvd icmp6 packet too short (%luB)", len);
err = 0;
goto free_msg;
}
err = ndp_msg_type_by_raw_type(&msg_type, msg->icmp6_hdr->icmp6_type);
if (err) {
err = 0;
goto free_msg;
}
ndp_msg_init(msg, msg_type);
ndp_msg_payload_len_set(msg, len);
if (!ndp_msg_check_valid(msg)) {
warn(ndp, "rcvd invalid ND message");
err = 0;
goto free_msg;
}
dbg(ndp, "rcvd %s, len: %zuB",
ndp_msg_type_info(msg_type)->strabbr, len);
if (!ndp_msg_check_opts(msg)) {
err = 0;
goto free_msg;
}
err = ndp_call_handlers(ndp, msg);;
free_msg:
ndp_msg_destroy(msg);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: libndp before 1.6, as used in NetworkManager, does not properly validate the origin of Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP) messages, which allows remote attackers to conduct man-in-the-middle attacks or cause a denial of service (network connectivity disruption) by advertising a node as a router from a non-local network.
Commit Message: libndp: validate the IPv6 hop limit
None of the NDP messages should ever come from a non-local network; as
stated in RFC4861's 6.1.1 (RS), 6.1.2 (RA), 7.1.1 (NS), 7.1.2 (NA),
and 8.1. (redirect):
- The IP Hop Limit field has a value of 255, i.e., the packet
could not possibly have been forwarded by a router.
This fixes CVE-2016-3698.
Reported by: Julien BERNARD <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Lubomir Rintel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]> | Medium | 10,855 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: dophn_exec(struct magic_set *ms, int clazz, int swap, int fd, off_t off,
int num, size_t size, off_t fsize, int *flags, int sh_num)
{
Elf32_Phdr ph32;
Elf64_Phdr ph64;
const char *linking_style = "statically";
const char *interp = "";
unsigned char nbuf[BUFSIZ];
char ibuf[BUFSIZ];
ssize_t bufsize;
size_t offset, align, len;
if (size != xph_sizeof) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", corrupted program header size") == -1)
return -1;
return 0;
}
for ( ; num; num--) {
if (pread(fd, xph_addr, xph_sizeof, off) < (ssize_t)xph_sizeof) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
off += size;
bufsize = 0;
align = 4;
/* Things we can determine before we seek */
switch (xph_type) {
case PT_DYNAMIC:
linking_style = "dynamically";
break;
case PT_NOTE:
if (sh_num) /* Did this through section headers */
continue;
if (((align = xph_align) & 0x80000000UL) != 0 ||
align < 4) {
if (file_printf(ms,
", invalid note alignment 0x%lx",
(unsigned long)align) == -1)
return -1;
align = 4;
}
/*FALLTHROUGH*/
case PT_INTERP:
len = xph_filesz < sizeof(nbuf) ? xph_filesz
: sizeof(nbuf);
bufsize = pread(fd, nbuf, len, xph_offset);
if (bufsize == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
break;
default:
if (fsize != SIZE_UNKNOWN && xph_offset > fsize) {
/* Maybe warn here? */
continue;
}
break;
}
/* Things we can determine when we seek */
switch (xph_type) {
case PT_INTERP:
if (bufsize && nbuf[0]) {
nbuf[bufsize - 1] = '\0';
interp = (const char *)nbuf;
} else
interp = "*empty*";
break;
case PT_NOTE:
/*
* This is a PT_NOTE section; loop through all the notes
* in the section.
*/
offset = 0;
for (;;) {
if (offset >= (size_t)bufsize)
break;
offset = donote(ms, nbuf, offset,
(size_t)bufsize, clazz, swap, align,
flags);
if (offset == 0)
break;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
}
if (file_printf(ms, ", %s linked", linking_style)
== -1)
return -1;
if (interp[0])
if (file_printf(ms, ", interpreter %s",
file_printable(ibuf, sizeof(ibuf), interp)) == -1)
return -1;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The ELF parser in file 5.08 through 5.21 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a large number of notes.
Commit Message: - Add a limit to the number of ELF notes processed (Suggested by Alexander
Cherepanov)
- Restructure ELF note printing so that we don't print the same message
multiple times on repeated notes of the same kind. | Medium | 20,515 |
Subsets and Splits