instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 3
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static double calcerr(PNG_CONST png_modifier *pm, int in_depth, int out_depth)
{
/* Error in the linear composition arithmetic - only relevant when
* composition actually happens (0 < alpha < 1).
*/
if ((pm->calculations_use_input_precision ? in_depth : out_depth) == 16)
return pm->maxcalc16;
else if (pm->assume_16_bit_calculations)
return pm->maxcalcG;
else
return pm->maxcalc8;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 173,604 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int process_line(URLContext *h, char *line, int line_count,
int *new_location)
{
HTTPContext *s = h->priv_data;
const char *auto_method = h->flags & AVIO_FLAG_READ ? "POST" : "GET";
char *tag, *p, *end, *method, *resource, *version;
int ret;
/* end of header */
if (line[0] == '\0') {
s->end_header = 1;
return 0;
}
p = line;
if (line_count == 0) {
if (s->is_connected_server) {
method = p;
while (*p && !av_isspace(*p))
p++;
*(p++) = '\0';
av_log(h, AV_LOG_TRACE, "Received method: %s\n", method);
if (s->method) {
if (av_strcasecmp(s->method, method)) {
av_log(h, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Received and expected HTTP method do not match. (%s expected, %s received)\n",
s->method, method);
return ff_http_averror(400, AVERROR(EIO));
}
} else {
av_log(h, AV_LOG_TRACE, "Autodetected %s HTTP method\n", auto_method);
if (av_strcasecmp(auto_method, method)) {
av_log(h, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Received and autodetected HTTP method did not match "
"(%s autodetected %s received)\n", auto_method, method);
return ff_http_averror(400, AVERROR(EIO));
}
if (!(s->method = av_strdup(method)))
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
while (av_isspace(*p))
p++;
resource = p;
while (!av_isspace(*p))
p++;
*(p++) = '\0';
av_log(h, AV_LOG_TRACE, "Requested resource: %s\n", resource);
if (!(s->resource = av_strdup(resource)))
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
while (av_isspace(*p))
p++;
version = p;
while (*p && !av_isspace(*p))
p++;
*p = '\0';
if (av_strncasecmp(version, "HTTP/", 5)) {
av_log(h, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Malformed HTTP version string.\n");
return ff_http_averror(400, AVERROR(EIO));
}
av_log(h, AV_LOG_TRACE, "HTTP version string: %s\n", version);
} else {
while (!av_isspace(*p) && *p != '\0')
p++;
while (av_isspace(*p))
p++;
s->http_code = strtol(p, &end, 10);
av_log(h, AV_LOG_TRACE, "http_code=%d\n", s->http_code);
if ((ret = check_http_code(h, s->http_code, end)) < 0)
return ret;
}
} else {
while (*p != '\0' && *p != ':')
p++;
if (*p != ':')
return 1;
*p = '\0';
tag = line;
p++;
while (av_isspace(*p))
p++;
if (!av_strcasecmp(tag, "Location")) {
if ((ret = parse_location(s, p)) < 0)
return ret;
*new_location = 1;
} else if (!av_strcasecmp(tag, "Content-Length") && s->filesize == -1) {
s->filesize = strtoll(p, NULL, 10);
} else if (!av_strcasecmp(tag, "Content-Range")) {
parse_content_range(h, p);
} else if (!av_strcasecmp(tag, "Accept-Ranges") &&
!strncmp(p, "bytes", 5) &&
s->seekable == -1) {
h->is_streamed = 0;
} else if (!av_strcasecmp(tag, "Transfer-Encoding") &&
!av_strncasecmp(p, "chunked", 7)) {
s->filesize = -1;
s->chunksize = 0;
} else if (!av_strcasecmp(tag, "WWW-Authenticate")) {
ff_http_auth_handle_header(&s->auth_state, tag, p);
} else if (!av_strcasecmp(tag, "Authentication-Info")) {
ff_http_auth_handle_header(&s->auth_state, tag, p);
} else if (!av_strcasecmp(tag, "Proxy-Authenticate")) {
ff_http_auth_handle_header(&s->proxy_auth_state, tag, p);
} else if (!av_strcasecmp(tag, "Connection")) {
if (!strcmp(p, "close"))
s->willclose = 1;
} else if (!av_strcasecmp(tag, "Server")) {
if (!av_strcasecmp(p, "AkamaiGHost")) {
s->is_akamai = 1;
} else if (!av_strncasecmp(p, "MediaGateway", 12)) {
s->is_mediagateway = 1;
}
} else if (!av_strcasecmp(tag, "Content-Type")) {
av_free(s->mime_type);
s->mime_type = av_strdup(p);
} else if (!av_strcasecmp(tag, "Set-Cookie")) {
if (parse_cookie(s, p, &s->cookie_dict))
av_log(h, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Unable to parse '%s'\n", p);
} else if (!av_strcasecmp(tag, "Icy-MetaInt")) {
s->icy_metaint = strtoll(p, NULL, 10);
} else if (!av_strncasecmp(tag, "Icy-", 4)) {
if ((ret = parse_icy(s, tag, p)) < 0)
return ret;
} else if (!av_strcasecmp(tag, "Content-Encoding")) {
if ((ret = parse_content_encoding(h, p)) < 0)
return ret;
}
}
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in libavformat/http.c in FFmpeg before 2.8.10, 3.0.x before 3.0.5, 3.1.x before 3.1.6, and 3.2.x before 3.2.2 allows remote web servers to execute arbitrary code via a negative chunk size in an HTTP response.
Commit Message: http: make length/offset-related variables unsigned.
Fixes #5992, reported and found by Paul Cher <[email protected]>. | High | 168,504 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int follow_dotdot_rcu(struct nameidata *nd)
{
struct inode *inode = nd->inode;
if (!nd->root.mnt)
set_root_rcu(nd);
while (1) {
if (path_equal(&nd->path, &nd->root))
break;
if (nd->path.dentry != nd->path.mnt->mnt_root) {
struct dentry *old = nd->path.dentry;
struct dentry *parent = old->d_parent;
unsigned seq;
inode = parent->d_inode;
seq = read_seqcount_begin(&parent->d_seq);
if (unlikely(read_seqcount_retry(&old->d_seq, nd->seq)))
return -ECHILD;
nd->path.dentry = parent;
nd->seq = seq;
break;
} else {
struct mount *mnt = real_mount(nd->path.mnt);
struct mount *mparent = mnt->mnt_parent;
struct dentry *mountpoint = mnt->mnt_mountpoint;
struct inode *inode2 = mountpoint->d_inode;
unsigned seq = read_seqcount_begin(&mountpoint->d_seq);
if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&mount_lock, nd->m_seq)))
return -ECHILD;
if (&mparent->mnt == nd->path.mnt)
break;
/* we know that mountpoint was pinned */
nd->path.dentry = mountpoint;
nd->path.mnt = &mparent->mnt;
inode = inode2;
nd->seq = seq;
}
}
while (unlikely(d_mountpoint(nd->path.dentry))) {
struct mount *mounted;
mounted = __lookup_mnt(nd->path.mnt, nd->path.dentry);
if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&mount_lock, nd->m_seq)))
return -ECHILD;
if (!mounted)
break;
nd->path.mnt = &mounted->mnt;
nd->path.dentry = mounted->mnt.mnt_root;
inode = nd->path.dentry->d_inode;
nd->seq = read_seqcount_begin(&nd->path.dentry->d_seq);
}
nd->inode = inode;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: The prepend_path function in fs/dcache.c in the Linux kernel before 4.2.4 does not properly handle rename actions inside a bind mount, which allows local users to bypass an intended container protection mechanism by renaming a directory, related to a *double-chroot attack.*
Commit Message: vfs: Test for and handle paths that are unreachable from their mnt_root
In rare cases a directory can be renamed out from under a bind mount.
In those cases without special handling it becomes possible to walk up
the directory tree to the root dentry of the filesystem and down
from the root dentry to every other file or directory on the filesystem.
Like division by zero .. from an unconnected path can not be given
a useful semantic as there is no predicting at which path component
the code will realize it is unconnected. We certainly can not match
the current behavior as the current behavior is a security hole.
Therefore when encounting .. when following an unconnected path
return -ENOENT.
- Add a function path_connected to verify path->dentry is reachable
from path->mnt.mnt_root. AKA to validate that rename did not do
something nasty to the bind mount.
To avoid races path_connected must be called after following a path
component to it's next path component.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,636 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: xmlParsePEReference(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt)
{
const xmlChar *name;
xmlEntityPtr entity = NULL;
xmlParserInputPtr input;
if (RAW != '%')
return;
NEXT;
name = xmlParseName(ctxt);
if (name == NULL) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_PEREF_NO_NAME, "PEReference: no name\n");
return;
}
if (xmlParserDebugEntities)
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PEReference: %s\n", name);
if (RAW != ';') {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_PEREF_SEMICOL_MISSING, NULL);
return;
}
NEXT;
/*
* Increate the number of entity references parsed
*/
ctxt->nbentities++;
/*
* Request the entity from SAX
*/
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) &&
(ctxt->sax->getParameterEntity != NULL))
entity = ctxt->sax->getParameterEntity(ctxt->userData, name);
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
return;
if (entity == NULL) {
/*
* [ WFC: Entity Declared ]
* In a document without any DTD, a document with only an
* internal DTD subset which contains no parameter entity
* references, or a document with "standalone='yes'", ...
* ... The declaration of a parameter entity must precede
* any reference to it...
*/
if ((ctxt->standalone == 1) ||
((ctxt->hasExternalSubset == 0) &&
(ctxt->hasPErefs == 0))) {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_UNDECLARED_ENTITY,
"PEReference: %%%s; not found\n",
name);
} else {
/*
* [ VC: Entity Declared ]
* In a document with an external subset or external
* parameter entities with "standalone='no'", ...
* ... The declaration of a parameter entity must
* precede any reference to it...
*/
if ((ctxt->validate) && (ctxt->vctxt.error != NULL)) {
xmlValidityError(ctxt, XML_WAR_UNDECLARED_ENTITY,
"PEReference: %%%s; not found\n",
name, NULL);
} else
xmlWarningMsg(ctxt, XML_WAR_UNDECLARED_ENTITY,
"PEReference: %%%s; not found\n",
name, NULL);
ctxt->valid = 0;
}
xmlParserEntityCheck(ctxt, 0, NULL, 0);
} else {
/*
* Internal checking in case the entity quest barfed
*/
if ((entity->etype != XML_INTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITY) &&
(entity->etype != XML_EXTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITY)) {
xmlWarningMsg(ctxt, XML_WAR_UNDECLARED_ENTITY,
"Internal: %%%s; is not a parameter entity\n",
name, NULL);
} else {
xmlChar start[4];
xmlCharEncoding enc;
if ((entity->etype == XML_EXTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITY) &&
((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_NOENT) == 0) &&
((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_DTDVALID) == 0) &&
((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_DTDLOAD) == 0) &&
((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_DTDATTR) == 0) &&
(ctxt->replaceEntities == 0) &&
(ctxt->validate == 0))
return;
input = xmlNewEntityInputStream(ctxt, entity);
if (xmlPushInput(ctxt, input) < 0)
return;
if (entity->etype == XML_EXTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITY) {
/*
* Get the 4 first bytes and decode the charset
* if enc != XML_CHAR_ENCODING_NONE
* plug some encoding conversion routines.
* Note that, since we may have some non-UTF8
* encoding (like UTF16, bug 135229), the 'length'
* is not known, but we can calculate based upon
* the amount of data in the buffer.
*/
GROW
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
return;
if ((ctxt->input->end - ctxt->input->cur)>=4) {
start[0] = RAW;
start[1] = NXT(1);
start[2] = NXT(2);
start[3] = NXT(3);
enc = xmlDetectCharEncoding(start, 4);
if (enc != XML_CHAR_ENCODING_NONE) {
xmlSwitchEncoding(ctxt, enc);
}
}
if ((CMP5(CUR_PTR, '<', '?', 'x', 'm', 'l')) &&
(IS_BLANK_CH(NXT(5)))) {
xmlParseTextDecl(ctxt);
}
}
}
}
ctxt->hasPErefs = 1;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-835
Summary: parser.c in libxml2 before 2.9.5 does not prevent infinite recursion in parameter entities.
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579. | Medium | 167,665 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: xsltNumberFormatGetMultipleLevel(xsltTransformContextPtr context,
xmlNodePtr node,
xsltCompMatchPtr countPat,
xsltCompMatchPtr fromPat,
double *array,
int max,
xmlDocPtr doc,
xmlNodePtr elem)
{
int amount = 0;
int cnt;
xmlNodePtr ancestor;
xmlNodePtr preceding;
xmlXPathParserContextPtr parser;
context->xpathCtxt->node = node;
parser = xmlXPathNewParserContext(NULL, context->xpathCtxt);
if (parser) {
/* ancestor-or-self::*[count] */
for (ancestor = node;
(ancestor != NULL) && (ancestor->type != XML_DOCUMENT_NODE);
ancestor = xmlXPathNextAncestor(parser, ancestor)) {
if ((fromPat != NULL) &&
xsltTestCompMatchList(context, ancestor, fromPat))
break; /* for */
if ((countPat == NULL && node->type == ancestor->type &&
xmlStrEqual(node->name, ancestor->name)) ||
xsltTestCompMatchList(context, ancestor, countPat)) {
/* count(preceding-sibling::*) */
cnt = 0;
for (preceding = ancestor;
preceding != NULL;
preceding =
xmlXPathNextPrecedingSibling(parser, preceding)) {
if (countPat == NULL) {
if ((preceding->type == ancestor->type) &&
xmlStrEqual(preceding->name, ancestor->name)){
if ((preceding->ns == ancestor->ns) ||
((preceding->ns != NULL) &&
(ancestor->ns != NULL) &&
(xmlStrEqual(preceding->ns->href,
ancestor->ns->href) )))
cnt++;
}
} else {
if (xsltTestCompMatchList(context, preceding,
countPat))
cnt++;
}
}
array[amount++] = (double)cnt;
if (amount >= max)
break; /* for */
}
}
xmlXPathFreeParserContext(parser);
}
return amount;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: numbers.c in libxslt before 1.1.29, as used in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63, mishandles namespace nodes, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds heap memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338} | Medium | 173,309 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: stf_status ikev2parent_inI2outR2(struct msg_digest *md)
{
struct state *st = md->st;
/* struct connection *c = st->st_connection; */
/*
* the initiator sent us an encrypted payload. We need to calculate
* our g^xy, and skeyseed values, and then decrypt the payload.
*/
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log(
"ikev2 parent inI2outR2: calculating g^{xy} in order to decrypt I2"));
/* verify that there is in fact an encrypted payload */
if (!md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_v2E]) {
libreswan_log("R2 state should receive an encrypted payload");
reset_globals();
return STF_FATAL;
}
/* now. we need to go calculate the g^xy */
{
struct dh_continuation *dh = alloc_thing(
struct dh_continuation,
"ikev2_inI2outR2 KE");
stf_status e;
dh->md = md;
set_suspended(st, dh->md);
pcrc_init(&dh->dh_pcrc);
dh->dh_pcrc.pcrc_func = ikev2_parent_inI2outR2_continue;
e = start_dh_v2(&dh->dh_pcrc, st, st->st_import, RESPONDER,
st->st_oakley.groupnum);
if (e != STF_SUSPEND && e != STF_INLINE) {
loglog(RC_CRYPTOFAILED, "system too busy");
delete_state(st);
}
reset_globals();
return e;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The ikev2parent_inI1outR1 function in pluto/ikev2_parent.c in libreswan before 3.7 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (restart) via an IKEv2 I1 notification without a KE payload.
Commit Message: SECURITY: Properly handle IKEv2 I1 notification packet without KE payload | Medium | 166,475 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: zlib_end(struct zlib *zlib)
{
/* Output the summary line now; this ensures a summary line always gets
* output regardless of the manner of exit.
*/
if (!zlib->global->quiet)
{
if (zlib->ok_bits < 16) /* stream was read ok */
{
const char *reason;
if (zlib->cksum)
reason = "CHK"; /* checksum error */
else if (zlib->ok_bits > zlib->file_bits)
reason = "TFB"; /* fixing a too-far-back error */
else if (zlib->ok_bits == zlib->file_bits)
reason = "OK ";
else
reason = "OPT"; /* optimizing window bits */
/* SUMMARY FORMAT (for a successful zlib inflate):
*
* IDAT reason flevel file-bits ok-bits compressed uncompressed file
*/
type_name(zlib->chunk->chunk_type, stdout);
printf(" %s %s %d %d ", reason, zlib_flevel(zlib), zlib->file_bits,
zlib->ok_bits);
uarb_print(zlib->compressed_bytes, zlib->compressed_digits, stdout);
putc(' ', stdout);
uarb_print(zlib->uncompressed_bytes, zlib->uncompressed_digits,
stdout);
putc(' ', stdout);
fputs(zlib->file->file_name, stdout);
putc('\n', stdout);
}
else
{
/* This is a zlib read error; the chunk will be skipped. For an IDAT
* stream this will also cause a fatal read error (via stop()).
*
* SUMMARY FORMAT:
*
* IDAT SKP flevel file-bits z-rc compressed message file
*
* z-rc is the zlib failure code; message is the error message with
* spaces replaced by '-'. The compressed byte count indicates where
* in the zlib stream the error occured.
*/
type_name(zlib->chunk->chunk_type, stdout);
printf(" SKP %s %d %s ", zlib_flevel(zlib), zlib->file_bits,
zlib_rc(zlib));
uarb_print(zlib->compressed_bytes, zlib->compressed_digits, stdout);
putc(' ', stdout);
emit_string(zlib->z.msg ? zlib->z.msg : "[no_message]", stdout);
putc(' ', stdout);
fputs(zlib->file->file_name, stdout);
putc('\n', stdout);
}
}
if (zlib->state >= 0)
{
zlib->rc = inflateEnd(&zlib->z);
if (zlib->rc != Z_OK)
zlib_message(zlib, 1/*unexpected*/);
}
CLEAR(*zlib);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 173,741 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void CrosLibrary::TestApi::SetLoginLibrary(
LoginLibrary* library, bool own) {
library_->login_lib_.SetImpl(library, own);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The Program::getActiveUniformMaxLength function in libGLESv2/Program.cpp in libGLESv2.dll in the WebGLES library in Almost Native Graphics Layer Engine (ANGLE), as used in Mozilla Firefox 4.x before 4.0.1 on Windows and in the GPU process in Google Chrome before 10.0.648.205 on Windows, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via unspecified vectors, related to an *off-by-three* error.
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,640 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ~CreateFileResult()
{
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The URL loader in Google Chrome before 26.0.1410.43 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Oilpan: Ship Oilpan for SyncCallbackHelper, CreateFileResult and CallbackWrapper in filesystem/
These are leftovers when we shipped Oilpan for filesystem/ once.
BUG=340522
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/501263003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180909 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,416 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::RequestPasskey(
const dbus::ObjectPath& device_path,
const PasskeyCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(agent_.get());
DCHECK(device_path == object_path_);
VLOG(1) << object_path_.value() << ": RequestPasskey";
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Bluetooth.PairingMethod",
UMA_PAIRING_METHOD_REQUEST_PASSKEY,
UMA_PAIRING_METHOD_COUNT);
DCHECK(pairing_delegate_);
DCHECK(passkey_callback_.is_null());
passkey_callback_ = callback;
pairing_delegate_->RequestPasskey(this);
pairing_delegate_used_ = true;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 does not properly prevent pop-under windows, which allows remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,236 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: __xfs_get_blocks(
struct inode *inode,
sector_t iblock,
struct buffer_head *bh_result,
int create,
bool direct,
bool dax_fault)
{
struct xfs_inode *ip = XFS_I(inode);
struct xfs_mount *mp = ip->i_mount;
xfs_fileoff_t offset_fsb, end_fsb;
int error = 0;
int lockmode = 0;
struct xfs_bmbt_irec imap;
int nimaps = 1;
xfs_off_t offset;
ssize_t size;
int new = 0;
bool is_cow = false;
bool need_alloc = false;
BUG_ON(create && !direct);
if (XFS_FORCED_SHUTDOWN(mp))
return -EIO;
offset = (xfs_off_t)iblock << inode->i_blkbits;
ASSERT(bh_result->b_size >= (1 << inode->i_blkbits));
size = bh_result->b_size;
if (!create && offset >= i_size_read(inode))
return 0;
/*
* Direct I/O is usually done on preallocated files, so try getting
* a block mapping without an exclusive lock first.
*/
lockmode = xfs_ilock_data_map_shared(ip);
ASSERT(offset <= mp->m_super->s_maxbytes);
if (offset + size > mp->m_super->s_maxbytes)
size = mp->m_super->s_maxbytes - offset;
end_fsb = XFS_B_TO_FSB(mp, (xfs_ufsize_t)offset + size);
offset_fsb = XFS_B_TO_FSBT(mp, offset);
if (create && direct && xfs_is_reflink_inode(ip))
is_cow = xfs_reflink_find_cow_mapping(ip, offset, &imap,
&need_alloc);
if (!is_cow) {
error = xfs_bmapi_read(ip, offset_fsb, end_fsb - offset_fsb,
&imap, &nimaps, XFS_BMAPI_ENTIRE);
/*
* Truncate an overwrite extent if there's a pending CoW
* reservation before the end of this extent. This
* forces us to come back to get_blocks to take care of
* the CoW.
*/
if (create && direct && nimaps &&
imap.br_startblock != HOLESTARTBLOCK &&
imap.br_startblock != DELAYSTARTBLOCK &&
!ISUNWRITTEN(&imap))
xfs_reflink_trim_irec_to_next_cow(ip, offset_fsb,
&imap);
}
ASSERT(!need_alloc);
if (error)
goto out_unlock;
/* for DAX, we convert unwritten extents directly */
if (create &&
(!nimaps ||
(imap.br_startblock == HOLESTARTBLOCK ||
imap.br_startblock == DELAYSTARTBLOCK) ||
(IS_DAX(inode) && ISUNWRITTEN(&imap)))) {
/*
* xfs_iomap_write_direct() expects the shared lock. It
* is unlocked on return.
*/
if (lockmode == XFS_ILOCK_EXCL)
xfs_ilock_demote(ip, lockmode);
error = xfs_iomap_write_direct(ip, offset, size,
&imap, nimaps);
if (error)
return error;
new = 1;
trace_xfs_get_blocks_alloc(ip, offset, size,
ISUNWRITTEN(&imap) ? XFS_IO_UNWRITTEN
: XFS_IO_DELALLOC, &imap);
} else if (nimaps) {
trace_xfs_get_blocks_found(ip, offset, size,
ISUNWRITTEN(&imap) ? XFS_IO_UNWRITTEN
: XFS_IO_OVERWRITE, &imap);
xfs_iunlock(ip, lockmode);
} else {
trace_xfs_get_blocks_notfound(ip, offset, size);
goto out_unlock;
}
if (IS_DAX(inode) && create) {
ASSERT(!ISUNWRITTEN(&imap));
/* zeroing is not needed at a higher layer */
new = 0;
}
/* trim mapping down to size requested */
xfs_map_trim_size(inode, iblock, bh_result, &imap, offset, size);
/*
* For unwritten extents do not report a disk address in the buffered
* read case (treat as if we're reading into a hole).
*/
if (imap.br_startblock != HOLESTARTBLOCK &&
imap.br_startblock != DELAYSTARTBLOCK &&
(create || !ISUNWRITTEN(&imap))) {
if (create && direct && !is_cow) {
error = xfs_bounce_unaligned_dio_write(ip, offset_fsb,
&imap);
if (error)
return error;
}
xfs_map_buffer(inode, bh_result, &imap, offset);
if (ISUNWRITTEN(&imap))
set_buffer_unwritten(bh_result);
/* direct IO needs special help */
if (create) {
if (dax_fault)
ASSERT(!ISUNWRITTEN(&imap));
else
xfs_map_direct(inode, bh_result, &imap, offset,
is_cow);
}
}
/*
* If this is a realtime file, data may be on a different device.
* to that pointed to from the buffer_head b_bdev currently.
*/
bh_result->b_bdev = xfs_find_bdev_for_inode(inode);
/*
* If we previously allocated a block out beyond eof and we are now
* coming back to use it then we will need to flag it as new even if it
* has a disk address.
*
* With sub-block writes into unwritten extents we also need to mark
* the buffer as new so that the unwritten parts of the buffer gets
* correctly zeroed.
*/
if (create &&
((!buffer_mapped(bh_result) && !buffer_uptodate(bh_result)) ||
(offset >= i_size_read(inode)) ||
(new || ISUNWRITTEN(&imap))))
set_buffer_new(bh_result);
BUG_ON(direct && imap.br_startblock == DELAYSTARTBLOCK);
return 0;
out_unlock:
xfs_iunlock(ip, lockmode);
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: In the Linux kernel before 4.9.3, fs/xfs/xfs_aops.c allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) because there is a race condition between direct and memory-mapped I/O (associated with a hole) that is handled with BUG_ON instead of an I/O failure.
Commit Message: xfs: don't BUG() on mixed direct and mapped I/O
We've had reports of generic/095 causing XFS to BUG() in
__xfs_get_blocks() due to the existence of delalloc blocks on a
direct I/O read. generic/095 issues a mix of various types of I/O,
including direct and memory mapped I/O to a single file. This is
clearly not supported behavior and is known to lead to such
problems. E.g., the lack of exclusion between the direct I/O and
write fault paths means that a write fault can allocate delalloc
blocks in a region of a file that was previously a hole after the
direct read has attempted to flush/inval the file range, but before
it actually reads the block mapping. In turn, the direct read
discovers a delalloc extent and cannot proceed.
While the appropriate solution here is to not mix direct and memory
mapped I/O to the same regions of the same file, the current
BUG_ON() behavior is probably overkill as it can crash the entire
system. Instead, localize the failure to the I/O in question by
returning an error for a direct I/O that cannot be handled safely
due to delalloc blocks. Be careful to allow the case of a direct
write to post-eof delalloc blocks. This can occur due to speculative
preallocation and is safe as post-eof blocks are not accompanied by
dirty pages in pagecache (conversely, preallocation within eof must
have been zeroed, and thus dirtied, before the inode size could have
been increased beyond said blocks).
Finally, provide an additional warning if a direct I/O write occurs
while the file is memory mapped. This may not catch all problematic
scenarios, but provides a hint that some known-to-be-problematic I/O
methods are in use.
Signed-off-by: Brian Foster <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,864 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: WORD32 ih264d_parse_islice_data_cavlc(dec_struct_t * ps_dec,
dec_slice_params_t * ps_slice,
UWORD16 u2_first_mb_in_slice)
{
UWORD8 uc_more_data_flag;
UWORD8 u1_num_mbs, u1_mb_idx;
dec_mb_info_t *ps_cur_mb_info;
deblk_mb_t *ps_cur_deblk_mb;
dec_bit_stream_t * const ps_bitstrm = ps_dec->ps_bitstrm;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_ofst = &ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_buf = ps_bitstrm->pu4_buffer;
UWORD16 i2_pic_wdin_mbs = ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs;
WORD16 i2_cur_mb_addr;
UWORD8 u1_mbaff;
UWORD8 u1_num_mbs_next, u1_end_of_row, u1_tfr_n_mb;
WORD32 ret = OK;
ps_dec->u1_qp = ps_slice->u1_slice_qp;
ih264d_update_qp(ps_dec, 0);
u1_mbaff = ps_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag;
/* initializations */
u1_mb_idx = ps_dec->u1_mb_idx;
u1_num_mbs = u1_mb_idx;
uc_more_data_flag = 1;
i2_cur_mb_addr = u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mbaff;
do
{
UWORD8 u1_mb_type;
ps_dec->pv_prev_mb_parse_tu_coeff_data = ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data;
if(i2_cur_mb_addr > ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u2_max_mb_addr)
{
ret = ERROR_MB_ADDRESS_T;
break;
}
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info + u1_num_mbs;
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = u1_num_mbs;
ps_dec->u4_num_pmbair = (u1_num_mbs >> u1_mbaff);
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_end_of_slice = 0;
/***************************************************************/
/* Get the required information for decoding of MB */
/* mb_x, mb_y , neighbour availablity, */
/***************************************************************/
ps_dec->pf_get_mb_info(ps_dec, i2_cur_mb_addr, ps_cur_mb_info, 0);
/***************************************************************/
/* Set the deblocking parameters for this MB */
/***************************************************************/
ps_cur_deblk_mb = ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn + u1_num_mbs;
if(ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm == 0)
ih264d_set_deblocking_parameters(ps_cur_deblk_mb, ps_slice,
ps_dec->u1_mb_ngbr_availablity,
ps_dec->u1_cur_mb_fld_dec_flag);
ps_cur_deblk_mb->u1_mb_type = ps_cur_deblk_mb->u1_mb_type | D_INTRA_MB;
/**************************************************************/
/* Macroblock Layer Begins, Decode the u1_mb_type */
/**************************************************************/
{
UWORD32 u4_bitstream_offset = *pu4_bitstrm_ofst;
UWORD32 u4_word, u4_ldz, u4_temp;
/***************************************************************/
/* Find leading zeros in next 32 bits */
/***************************************************************/
NEXTBITS_32(u4_word, u4_bitstream_offset, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
u4_ldz = CLZ(u4_word);
/* Flush the ps_bitstrm */
u4_bitstream_offset += (u4_ldz + 1);
/* Read the suffix from the ps_bitstrm */
u4_word = 0;
if(u4_ldz)
GETBITS(u4_word, u4_bitstream_offset, pu4_bitstrm_buf,
u4_ldz);
*pu4_bitstrm_ofst = u4_bitstream_offset;
u4_temp = ((1 << u4_ldz) + u4_word - 1);
if(u4_temp > 25)
return ERROR_MB_TYPE;
u1_mb_type = u4_temp;
}
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_type = u1_mb_type;
COPYTHECONTEXT("u1_mb_type", u1_mb_type);
/**************************************************************/
/* Parse Macroblock data */
/**************************************************************/
if(25 == u1_mb_type)
{
/* I_PCM_MB */
ps_cur_mb_info->ps_curmb->u1_mb_type = I_PCM_MB;
ret = ih264d_parse_ipcm_mb(ps_dec, ps_cur_mb_info, u1_num_mbs);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
ps_cur_deblk_mb->u1_mb_qp = 0;
}
else
{
ret = ih264d_parse_imb_cavlc(ps_dec, ps_cur_mb_info, u1_num_mbs, u1_mb_type);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
ps_cur_deblk_mb->u1_mb_qp = ps_dec->u1_qp;
}
if(u1_mbaff)
{
ih264d_update_mbaff_left_nnz(ps_dec, ps_cur_mb_info);
}
/**************************************************************/
/* Get next Macroblock address */
/**************************************************************/
i2_cur_mb_addr++;
uc_more_data_flag = MORE_RBSP_DATA(ps_bitstrm);
/* Store the colocated information */
{
mv_pred_t *ps_mv_nmb_start = ps_dec->ps_mv_cur + (u1_num_mbs << 4);
mv_pred_t s_mvPred =
{
{ 0, 0, 0, 0 },
{ -1, -1 }, 0, 0};
ih264d_rep_mv_colz(ps_dec, &s_mvPred, ps_mv_nmb_start, 0,
(UWORD8)(ps_dec->u1_cur_mb_fld_dec_flag << 1), 4,
4);
}
/*if num _cores is set to 3,compute bs will be done in another thread*/
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores < 3)
{
if(ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm == 0)
ps_dec->pf_compute_bs(ps_dec, ps_cur_mb_info,
(UWORD16)(u1_num_mbs >> u1_mbaff));
}
u1_num_mbs++;
/****************************************************************/
/* Check for End Of Row */
/****************************************************************/
u1_num_mbs_next = i2_pic_wdin_mbs - ps_dec->u2_mbx - 1;
u1_end_of_row = (!u1_num_mbs_next) && (!(u1_mbaff && (u1_num_mbs & 0x01)));
u1_tfr_n_mb = (u1_num_mbs == ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp) || u1_end_of_row
|| (!uc_more_data_flag);
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_end_of_slice = (!uc_more_data_flag);
/*H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("Pic: %d Mb_X=%d Mb_Y=%d",
ps_slice->i4_poc >> ps_slice->u1_field_pic_flag,
ps_dec->u2_mbx,ps_dec->u2_mby + (1 - ps_cur_mb_info->u1_topmb));
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("u1_tfr_n_mb || (!uc_more_data_flag): %d", u1_tfr_n_mb || (!uc_more_data_flag));*/
if(u1_tfr_n_mb || (!uc_more_data_flag))
{
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ih264d_parse_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs,
u1_num_mbs_next, u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
ps_dec->ps_nmb_info += u1_num_mbs;
}
else
{
ih264d_decode_recon_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs,
u1_num_mbs_next, u1_tfr_n_mb,
u1_end_of_row);
}
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded += u1_num_mbs;
if(u1_tfr_n_mb)
u1_num_mbs = 0;
u1_mb_idx = u1_num_mbs;
ps_dec->u1_mb_idx = u1_num_mbs;
}
}
while(uc_more_data_flag);
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u4_mbs_in_slice = i2_cur_mb_addr
- (u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mbaff);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: A remote denial of service vulnerability in libavc in Mediaserver could enable an attacker to use a specially crafted file to cause a device hang or reboot. This issue is rated as High severity due to the possibility of remote denial of service. Product: Android. Versions: 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1. Android ID: A-33933140.
Commit Message: Fix in returning end of bitstream error for MBAFF
In case of MBAFF streams, slices should terminate on
even MB boundary. If bytes are exhausted with odd number
of MBs decoded for MBAff, then treat that as error.
Bug: 33933140
Change-Id: Ifc26b66ff8ebdb3aec5c0d6c512e4cac3f54c5b7
| High | 174,045 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void WebURLLoaderImpl::Context::OnReceivedResponse(
const ResourceResponseInfo& info) {
if (!client_)
return;
WebURLResponse response;
response.initialize();
PopulateURLResponse(request_.url(), info, &response);
bool show_raw_listing = (GURL(request_.url()).query() == "raw");
if (info.mime_type == "text/vnd.chromium.ftp-dir") {
if (show_raw_listing) {
response.setMIMEType("text/plain");
} else {
response.setMIMEType("text/html");
}
}
client_->didReceiveResponse(loader_, response);
if (!client_)
return;
DCHECK(!ftp_listing_delegate_.get());
DCHECK(!multipart_delegate_.get());
if (info.headers && info.mime_type == "multipart/x-mixed-replace") {
std::string content_type;
info.headers->EnumerateHeader(NULL, "content-type", &content_type);
std::string mime_type;
std::string charset;
bool had_charset = false;
std::string boundary;
net::HttpUtil::ParseContentType(content_type, &mime_type, &charset,
&had_charset, &boundary);
TrimString(boundary, " \"", &boundary);
if (!boundary.empty()) {
multipart_delegate_.reset(
new MultipartResponseDelegate(client_, loader_, response, boundary));
}
} else if (info.mime_type == "text/vnd.chromium.ftp-dir" &&
!show_raw_listing) {
ftp_listing_delegate_.reset(
new FtpDirectoryListingResponseDelegate(client_, loader_, response));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving a 404 HTTP status code during the loading of resources.
Commit Message: Protect WebURLLoaderImpl::Context while receiving responses.
A client's didReceiveResponse can cancel a request; by protecting the
Context we avoid a use after free in this case.
Interestingly, we really had very good warning about this problem, see
https://codereview.chromium.org/11900002/ back in January.
R=darin
BUG=241139
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15738007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@202821 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,266 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(locale_get_display_language)
{
get_icu_disp_value_src_php( LOC_LANG_TAG , INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU );
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The get_icu_value_internal function in ext/intl/locale/locale_methods.c in PHP before 5.5.36, 5.6.x before 5.6.22, and 7.x before 7.0.7 does not ensure the presence of a '0' character, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted locale_get_primary_language call.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read | High | 167,186 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int Equalizer_setParameter (EffectContext *pContext, void *pParam, void *pValue){
int status = 0;
int32_t preset;
int32_t band;
int32_t level;
int32_t *pParamTemp = (int32_t *)pParam;
int32_t param = *pParamTemp++;
switch (param) {
case EQ_PARAM_CUR_PRESET:
preset = (int32_t)(*(uint16_t *)pValue);
if ((preset >= EqualizerGetNumPresets())||(preset < 0)) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
EqualizerSetPreset(pContext, preset);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_BAND_LEVEL:
band = *pParamTemp;
level = (int32_t)(*(int16_t *)pValue);
if (band >= FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
EqualizerSetBandLevel(pContext, band, level);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_PROPERTIES: {
int16_t *p = (int16_t *)pValue;
if ((int)p[0] >= EqualizerGetNumPresets()) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (p[0] >= 0) {
EqualizerSetPreset(pContext, (int)p[0]);
} else {
if ((int)p[1] != FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
for (int i = 0; i < FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS; i++) {
EqualizerSetBandLevel(pContext, i, (int)p[2 + i]);
}
}
} break;
default:
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Equalizer_setParameter() invalid param %d", param);
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
return status;
} /* end Equalizer_setParameter */
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in lvm/wrapper/Bundle/EffectBundle.cpp in libeffects in the Qualcomm audio post processor could enable a local malicious application to access data outside of its permission levels. This issue is rated as Moderate because it could be used to access sensitive data without permission. Product: Android. Versions: 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1. Android ID: A-32588016.
Commit Message: Fix security vulnerability: Effect command might allow negative indexes
Bug: 32448258
Bug: 32095626
Test: Use POC bug or cts security test
Change-Id: I69f24eac5866f8d9090fc4c0ebe58c2c297b63df
(cherry picked from commit 01183402d757f0c28bfd5e3b127b3809dfd67459)
| Medium | 174,060 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool GpuProcessHost::LaunchGpuProcess(const std::string& channel_id) {
if (!(gpu_enabled_ &&
GpuDataManagerImpl::GetInstance()->ShouldUseSoftwareRendering()) &&
!hardware_gpu_enabled_) {
SendOutstandingReplies();
return false;
}
const CommandLine& browser_command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
CommandLine::StringType gpu_launcher =
browser_command_line.GetSwitchValueNative(switches::kGpuLauncher);
#if defined(OS_LINUX)
int child_flags = gpu_launcher.empty() ? ChildProcessHost::CHILD_ALLOW_SELF :
ChildProcessHost::CHILD_NORMAL;
#else
int child_flags = ChildProcessHost::CHILD_NORMAL;
#endif
FilePath exe_path = ChildProcessHost::GetChildPath(child_flags);
if (exe_path.empty())
return false;
CommandLine* cmd_line = new CommandLine(exe_path);
cmd_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kProcessType, switches::kGpuProcess);
cmd_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kProcessChannelID, channel_id);
if (kind_ == GPU_PROCESS_KIND_UNSANDBOXED)
cmd_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableGpuSandbox);
static const char* const kSwitchNames[] = {
switches::kDisableBreakpad,
switches::kDisableGLMultisampling,
switches::kDisableGpuSandbox,
switches::kReduceGpuSandbox,
switches::kDisableSeccompFilterSandbox,
switches::kDisableGpuSwitching,
switches::kDisableGpuVsync,
switches::kDisableGpuWatchdog,
switches::kDisableImageTransportSurface,
switches::kDisableLogging,
switches::kEnableGPUServiceLogging,
switches::kEnableLogging,
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
switches::kEnableSandboxLogging,
#endif
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
switches::kEnableVaapi,
#endif
switches::kGpuNoContextLost,
switches::kGpuStartupDialog,
switches::kLoggingLevel,
switches::kNoSandbox,
switches::kTestGLLib,
switches::kTraceStartup,
switches::kV,
switches::kVModule,
};
cmd_line->CopySwitchesFrom(browser_command_line, kSwitchNames,
arraysize(kSwitchNames));
cmd_line->CopySwitchesFrom(
browser_command_line, switches::kGpuSwitches, switches::kNumGpuSwitches);
content::GetContentClient()->browser()->AppendExtraCommandLineSwitches(
cmd_line, process_->GetData().id);
GpuDataManagerImpl::GetInstance()->AppendGpuCommandLine(cmd_line);
if (cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kUseGL))
software_rendering_ =
(cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kUseGL) == "swiftshader");
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("GPU.GPUProcessSoftwareRendering", software_rendering_);
if (!gpu_launcher.empty())
cmd_line->PrependWrapper(gpu_launcher);
process_->Launch(
#if defined(OS_WIN)
FilePath(),
#elif defined(OS_POSIX)
false, // Never use the zygote (GPU plugin can't be sandboxed).
base::EnvironmentVector(),
#endif
cmd_line);
process_launched_ = true;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("GPU.GPUProcessLifetimeEvents",
LAUNCHED, GPU_PROCESS_LIFETIME_EVENT_MAX);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Skia, as used in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.92, does not properly render text, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Revert 137988 - VAVDA is the hardware video decode accelerator for Chrome on Linux and ChromeOS for Intel CPUs (Sandy Bridge and newer).
This CL enables VAVDA acceleration for ChromeOS, both for HTML5 video and Flash.
The feature is currently hidden behind a command line flag and can be enabled by adding the --enable-vaapi parameter to command line.
BUG=117062
TEST=Manual runs of test streams.
Change-Id: I386e16739e2ef2230f52a0a434971b33d8654699
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9814001
This is causing crbug.com/129103
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10411066
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@138208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,701 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int packet_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int copied, err;
struct sockaddr_ll *sll;
int vnet_hdr_len = 0;
err = -EINVAL;
if (flags & ~(MSG_PEEK|MSG_DONTWAIT|MSG_TRUNC|MSG_CMSG_COMPAT|MSG_ERRQUEUE))
goto out;
#if 0
/* What error should we return now? EUNATTACH? */
if (pkt_sk(sk)->ifindex < 0)
return -ENODEV;
#endif
if (flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE) {
err = sock_recv_errqueue(sk, msg, len,
SOL_PACKET, PACKET_TX_TIMESTAMP);
goto out;
}
/*
* Call the generic datagram receiver. This handles all sorts
* of horrible races and re-entrancy so we can forget about it
* in the protocol layers.
*
* Now it will return ENETDOWN, if device have just gone down,
* but then it will block.
*/
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err);
/*
* An error occurred so return it. Because skb_recv_datagram()
* handles the blocking we don't see and worry about blocking
* retries.
*/
if (skb == NULL)
goto out;
if (pkt_sk(sk)->has_vnet_hdr) {
struct virtio_net_hdr vnet_hdr = { 0 };
err = -EINVAL;
vnet_hdr_len = sizeof(vnet_hdr);
if (len < vnet_hdr_len)
goto out_free;
len -= vnet_hdr_len;
if (skb_is_gso(skb)) {
struct skb_shared_info *sinfo = skb_shinfo(skb);
/* This is a hint as to how much should be linear. */
vnet_hdr.hdr_len = skb_headlen(skb);
vnet_hdr.gso_size = sinfo->gso_size;
if (sinfo->gso_type & SKB_GSO_TCPV4)
vnet_hdr.gso_type = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4;
else if (sinfo->gso_type & SKB_GSO_TCPV6)
vnet_hdr.gso_type = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV6;
else if (sinfo->gso_type & SKB_GSO_UDP)
vnet_hdr.gso_type = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP;
else if (sinfo->gso_type & SKB_GSO_FCOE)
goto out_free;
else
BUG();
if (sinfo->gso_type & SKB_GSO_TCP_ECN)
vnet_hdr.gso_type |= VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_ECN;
} else
vnet_hdr.gso_type = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE;
if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL) {
vnet_hdr.flags = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM;
vnet_hdr.csum_start = skb_checksum_start_offset(skb);
vnet_hdr.csum_offset = skb->csum_offset;
} else if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY) {
vnet_hdr.flags = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_DATA_VALID;
} /* else everything is zero */
err = memcpy_toiovec(msg->msg_iov, (void *)&vnet_hdr,
vnet_hdr_len);
if (err < 0)
goto out_free;
}
/*
* If the address length field is there to be filled in, we fill
* it in now.
*/
sll = &PACKET_SKB_CB(skb)->sa.ll;
if (sock->type == SOCK_PACKET)
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_pkt);
else
msg->msg_namelen = sll->sll_halen + offsetof(struct sockaddr_ll, sll_addr);
/*
* You lose any data beyond the buffer you gave. If it worries a
* user program they can ask the device for its MTU anyway.
*/
copied = skb->len;
if (copied > len) {
copied = len;
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
}
err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (err)
goto out_free;
sock_recv_ts_and_drops(msg, sk, skb);
if (msg->msg_name)
memcpy(msg->msg_name, &PACKET_SKB_CB(skb)->sa,
msg->msg_namelen);
if (pkt_sk(sk)->auxdata) {
struct tpacket_auxdata aux;
aux.tp_status = TP_STATUS_USER;
if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL)
aux.tp_status |= TP_STATUS_CSUMNOTREADY;
aux.tp_len = PACKET_SKB_CB(skb)->origlen;
aux.tp_snaplen = skb->len;
aux.tp_mac = 0;
aux.tp_net = skb_network_offset(skb);
if (vlan_tx_tag_present(skb)) {
aux.tp_vlan_tci = vlan_tx_tag_get(skb);
aux.tp_status |= TP_STATUS_VLAN_VALID;
} else {
aux.tp_vlan_tci = 0;
}
aux.tp_padding = 0;
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_PACKET, PACKET_AUXDATA, sizeof(aux), &aux);
}
/*
* Free or return the buffer as appropriate. Again this
* hides all the races and re-entrancy issues from us.
*/
err = vnet_hdr_len + ((flags&MSG_TRUNC) ? skb->len : copied);
out_free:
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
out:
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The x25_recvmsg function in net/x25/af_x25.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.4 updates a certain length value without ensuring that an associated data structure has been initialized, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a (1) recvfrom, (2) recvmmsg, or (3) recvmsg system call.
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,511 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::emptyBuffer(
OMX::buffer_id buffer,
OMX_U32 rangeOffset, OMX_U32 rangeLength,
OMX_U32 flags, OMX_TICKS timestamp, int fenceFd) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header = findBufferHeader(buffer);
BufferMeta *buffer_meta =
static_cast<BufferMeta *>(header->pAppPrivate);
sp<ABuffer> backup = buffer_meta->getBuffer(header, true /* backup */, false /* limit */);
sp<ABuffer> codec = buffer_meta->getBuffer(header, false /* backup */, false /* limit */);
if (mMetadataType[kPortIndexInput] == kMetadataBufferTypeGrallocSource
&& backup->capacity() >= sizeof(VideoNativeMetadata)
&& codec->capacity() >= sizeof(VideoGrallocMetadata)
&& ((VideoNativeMetadata *)backup->base())->eType
== kMetadataBufferTypeANWBuffer) {
VideoNativeMetadata &backupMeta = *(VideoNativeMetadata *)backup->base();
VideoGrallocMetadata &codecMeta = *(VideoGrallocMetadata *)codec->base();
CLOG_BUFFER(emptyBuffer, "converting ANWB %p to handle %p",
backupMeta.pBuffer, backupMeta.pBuffer->handle);
codecMeta.pHandle = backupMeta.pBuffer != NULL ? backupMeta.pBuffer->handle : NULL;
codecMeta.eType = kMetadataBufferTypeGrallocSource;
header->nFilledLen = rangeLength ? sizeof(codecMeta) : 0;
header->nOffset = 0;
} else {
if (rangeOffset > header->nAllocLen
|| rangeLength > header->nAllocLen - rangeOffset) {
CLOG_ERROR(emptyBuffer, OMX_ErrorBadParameter, FULL_BUFFER(NULL, header, fenceFd));
if (fenceFd >= 0) {
::close(fenceFd);
}
return BAD_VALUE;
}
header->nFilledLen = rangeLength;
header->nOffset = rangeOffset;
buffer_meta->CopyToOMX(header);
}
return emptyBuffer_l(header, flags, timestamp, (intptr_t)buffer, fenceFd);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: omx/OMXNodeInstance.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 does not validate the buffer port, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 28816827.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE omx: check buffer port before using
Bug: 28816827
Change-Id: I3d5bad4a1ef96dec544b05bb31cc6f7109aae0a5
| Medium | 173,526 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: gsicc_open_search(const char* pname, int namelen, gs_memory_t *mem_gc,
const char* dirname, int dirlen, stream**strp)
{
char *buffer;
stream* str;
/* Check if we need to prepend the file name */
if ( dirname != NULL) {
/* If this fails, we will still try the file by itself and with
%rom% since someone may have left a space some of the spaces
as our defaults, even if they defined the directory to use.
This will occur only after searching the defined directory.
A warning is noted. */
buffer = (char *) gs_alloc_bytes(mem_gc, namelen + dirlen + 1,
"gsicc_open_search");
if (buffer == NULL)
return_error(gs_error_VMerror);
strcpy(buffer, dirname);
strcat(buffer, pname);
/* Just to make sure we were null terminated */
buffer[namelen + dirlen] = '\0';
str = sfopen(buffer, "r", mem_gc);
gs_free_object(mem_gc, buffer, "gsicc_open_search");
if (str != NULL) {
*strp = str;
return 0;
}
}
/* First just try it like it is */
str = sfopen(pname, "r", mem_gc);
if (str != NULL) {
*strp = str;
return 0;
}
/* If that fails, try %rom% */ /* FIXME: Not sure this is needed or correct */
strlen(DEFAULT_DIR_ICC),"gsicc_open_search");
if (buffer == NULL)
return_error(gs_error_VMerror);
strcpy(buffer, DEFAULT_DIR_ICC);
strcat(buffer, pname);
/* Just to make sure we were null terminated */
buffer[namelen + strlen(DEFAULT_DIR_ICC)] = '\0';
str = sfopen(buffer, "r", mem_gc);
gs_free_object(mem_gc, buffer, "gsicc_open_search");
if (str == NULL) {
gs_warn1("Could not find %s ",pname);
}
*strp = str;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The PS Interpreter in Ghostscript 9.18 and 9.20 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via crafted userparams.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,265 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void DownloadItemImpl::OnDownloadCompleting(DownloadFileManager* file_manager) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
VLOG(20) << __FUNCTION__ << "()"
<< " needs rename = " << NeedsRename()
<< " " << DebugString(true);
DCHECK(!GetTargetName().empty());
DCHECK_NE(DANGEROUS, GetSafetyState());
DCHECK(file_manager);
bool should_overwrite =
(GetTargetDisposition() != DownloadItem::TARGET_DISPOSITION_UNIQUIFY);
DownloadFileManager::RenameCompletionCallback callback =
base::Bind(&DownloadItemImpl::OnDownloadRenamedToFinalName,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
base::Unretained(file_manager));
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::FILE, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&DownloadFileManager::RenameCompletingDownloadFile,
file_manager, GetGlobalId(), GetTargetFilePath(),
should_overwrite, callback));
} else {
Completed();
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::FILE, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&DownloadFileManager::CompleteDownload,
file_manager, download_id_));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger out-of-bounds write operations.
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,882 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool RenderViewHostManager::ShouldSwapProcessesForNavigation(
const NavigationEntry* curr_entry,
const NavigationEntryImpl* new_entry) const {
DCHECK(new_entry);
const GURL& current_url = (curr_entry) ? curr_entry->GetURL() :
render_view_host_->GetSiteInstance()->GetSiteURL();
BrowserContext* browser_context =
delegate_->GetControllerForRenderManager().GetBrowserContext();
if (WebUIControllerFactoryRegistry::GetInstance()->UseWebUIForURL(
browser_context, current_url)) {
if (!WebUIControllerFactoryRegistry::GetInstance()->IsURLAcceptableForWebUI(
browser_context, new_entry->GetURL(), false)) {
return true;
}
} else {
if (WebUIControllerFactoryRegistry::GetInstance()->UseWebUIForURL(
browser_context, new_entry->GetURL())) {
return true;
}
}
if (GetContentClient()->browser()->ShouldSwapProcessesForNavigation(
curr_entry ? curr_entry->GetURL() : GURL(), new_entry->GetURL())) {
return true;
}
if (!curr_entry)
return false;
if (curr_entry->IsViewSourceMode() != new_entry->IsViewSourceMode())
return true;
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Isolated Sites feature in Google Chrome before 26.0.1410.43 does not properly enforce the use of separate processes, which makes it easier for remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,437 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void CoordinatorImpl::PerformNextQueuedGlobalMemoryDump() {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
QueuedRequest* request = GetCurrentRequest();
if (request == nullptr)
return;
std::vector<QueuedRequestDispatcher::ClientInfo> clients;
for (const auto& kv : clients_) {
auto client_identity = kv.second->identity;
const base::ProcessId pid = GetProcessIdForClientIdentity(client_identity);
if (pid == base::kNullProcessId) {
VLOG(1) << "Couldn't find a PID for client \"" << client_identity.name()
<< "." << client_identity.instance() << "\"";
continue;
}
clients.emplace_back(kv.second->client.get(), pid, kv.second->process_type);
}
auto chrome_callback = base::Bind(
&CoordinatorImpl::OnChromeMemoryDumpResponse, base::Unretained(this));
auto os_callback = base::Bind(&CoordinatorImpl::OnOSMemoryDumpResponse,
base::Unretained(this), request->dump_guid);
QueuedRequestDispatcher::SetUpAndDispatch(request, clients, chrome_callback,
os_callback);
base::SequencedTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostDelayedTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&CoordinatorImpl::OnQueuedRequestTimedOut,
base::Unretained(this), request->dump_guid),
client_process_timeout_);
if (request->args.add_to_trace && heap_profiler_) {
request->heap_dump_in_progress = true;
bool strip_path_from_mapped_files =
base::trace_event::TraceLog::GetInstance()
->GetCurrentTraceConfig()
.IsArgumentFilterEnabled();
heap_profiler_->DumpProcessesForTracing(
strip_path_from_mapped_files,
base::BindRepeating(&CoordinatorImpl::OnDumpProcessesForTracing,
base::Unretained(this), request->dump_guid));
base::SequencedTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostDelayedTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&CoordinatorImpl::OnHeapDumpTimeOut,
base::Unretained(this), request->dump_guid),
kHeapDumpTimeout);
}
FinalizeGlobalMemoryDumpIfAllManagersReplied();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A use after free in ResourceCoordinator in Google Chrome prior to 69.0.3497.81 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Fix heap-use-after-free by using weak factory instead of Unretained
Bug: 856578
Change-Id: Ifb2a1b7e6c22e1af36e12eedba72427f51d925b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1114617
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Hector Dearman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#571528} | Medium | 173,214 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ikev1_cert_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext, u_int item_len,
const u_char *ep _U_, uint32_t phase _U_,
uint32_t doi0 _U_,
uint32_t proto0 _U_, int depth _U_)
{
const struct ikev1_pl_cert *p;
struct ikev1_pl_cert cert;
static const char *certstr[] = {
"none", "pkcs7", "pgp", "dns",
"x509sign", "x509ke", "kerberos", "crl",
"arl", "spki", "x509attr",
};
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s:", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_CERT)));
p = (const struct ikev1_pl_cert *)ext;
ND_TCHECK(*p);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&cert, ext, sizeof(cert));
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d", item_len - 4));
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", STR_OR_ID((cert.encode), certstr)));
if (2 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < item_len) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(ext + 1), item_len - 4))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + item_len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_CERT)));
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The IKEv2 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-isakmp.c, several functions.
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13690/IKEv2: Fix some bounds checks.
Use a pointer of the correct type in ND_TCHECK(), or use ND_TCHECK2()
and provide the correct length.
While we're at it, remove the blank line between some checks and the
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY()s they protect.
Also, note the places where we print the entire payload.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | High | 167,789 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: write_header( FT_Error error_code )
{
FT_Face face;
const char* basename;
const char* format;
error = FTC_Manager_LookupFace( handle->cache_manager,
handle->scaler.face_id, &face );
if ( error )
Fatal( "can't access font file" );
if ( !status.header )
{
basename = ft_basename( handle->current_font->filepathname );
switch ( error_code )
{
case FT_Err_Ok:
sprintf( status.header_buffer, "%s %s (file `%s')",
face->family_name, face->style_name, basename );
break;
case FT_Err_Invalid_Pixel_Size:
sprintf( status.header_buffer, "Invalid pixel size (file `%s')",
basename );
break;
case FT_Err_Invalid_PPem:
sprintf( status.header_buffer, "Invalid ppem value (file `%s')",
basename );
break;
default:
sprintf( status.header_buffer, "File `%s': error 0x%04x",
basename, (FT_UShort)error_code );
break;
}
status.header = (const char *)status.header_buffer;
}
grWriteCellString( display->bitmap, 0, 0, status.header,
display->fore_color );
format = "at %g points, first glyph index = %d";
snprintf( status.header_buffer, 256, format, status.ptsize/64., status.Num );
if ( FT_HAS_GLYPH_NAMES( face ) )
{
char* p;
int format_len, gindex, size;
size = strlen( status.header_buffer );
p = status.header_buffer + size;
size = 256 - size;
format = ", name = ";
format_len = strlen( format );
if ( size >= format_len + 2 )
{
gindex = status.Num;
strcpy( p, format );
if ( FT_Get_Glyph_Name( face, gindex, p + format_len, size - format_len ) )
*p = '\0';
}
}
status.header = (const char *)status.header_buffer;
grWriteCellString( display->bitmap, 0, HEADER_HEIGHT,
status.header_buffer, display->fore_color );
grRefreshSurface( display->surface );
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple buffer overflows in demo programs in FreeType before 2.4.0 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted font file.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,998 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int kvm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
{
return kvm_x86_ops->set_msr(vcpu, msr);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The WRMSR processing functionality in the KVM subsystem in the Linux kernel through 3.17.2 does not properly handle the writing of a non-canonical address to a model-specific register, which allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (host OS crash) by leveraging guest OS privileges, related to the wrmsr_interception function in arch/x86/kvm/svm.c and the handle_wrmsr function in arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c.
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,350 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void AudioOutputDevice::OnStateChanged(AudioOutputIPCDelegate::State state) {
DCHECK(message_loop()->BelongsToCurrentThread());
if (!stream_id_)
return;
if (state == AudioOutputIPCDelegate::kError) {
DLOG(WARNING) << "AudioOutputDevice::OnStateChanged(kError)";
base::AutoLock auto_lock_(audio_thread_lock_);
if (audio_thread_.get() && !audio_thread_->IsStopped())
callback_->OnRenderError();
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.92 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via vectors related to audio devices.
Commit Message: Revert r157378 as it caused WebRTC to dereference null pointers when restarting a call.
I've kept my unit test changes intact but disabled until I get a proper fix.
BUG=147499,150805
TBR=henrika
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/10946040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@157626 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,704 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void GaiaOAuthClient::Core::OnAuthTokenFetchComplete(
const net::URLRequestStatus& status,
int response_code,
const std::string& response) {
request_.reset();
if (!status.is_success()) {
delegate_->OnNetworkError(response_code);
return;
}
if (response_code == net::HTTP_BAD_REQUEST) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Gaia response: response code=net::HTTP_BAD_REQUEST.";
delegate_->OnOAuthError();
return;
}
if (response_code == net::HTTP_OK) {
scoped_ptr<Value> message_value(base::JSONReader::Read(response));
if (message_value.get() &&
message_value->IsType(Value::TYPE_DICTIONARY)) {
scoped_ptr<DictionaryValue> response_dict(
static_cast<DictionaryValue*>(message_value.release()));
response_dict->GetString(kAccessTokenValue, &access_token_);
response_dict->GetInteger(kExpiresInValue, &expires_in_seconds_);
}
VLOG(1) << "Gaia response: acess_token='" << access_token_
<< "', expires in " << expires_in_seconds_ << " second(s)";
} else {
LOG(ERROR) << "Gaia response: response code=" << response_code;
}
if (access_token_.empty()) {
delegate_->OnNetworkError(response_code);
} else {
FetchUserInfoAndInvokeCallback();
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove UrlFetcher from remoting and use the one in net instead.
BUG=133790
TEST=Stop and restart the Me2Me host. It should still work.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10637008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143798 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,807 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void AddExpectationsForSimulatedAttrib0(
GLsizei num_vertices, GLuint buffer_id) {
EXPECT_CALL(*gl_, BindBuffer(GL_ARRAY_BUFFER, kServiceAttrib0BufferId))
.Times(1)
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*gl_, BufferData(GL_ARRAY_BUFFER,
num_vertices * sizeof(GLfloat) * 4,
_, GL_DYNAMIC_DRAW))
.Times(1)
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*gl_, BufferSubData(
GL_ARRAY_BUFFER, 0, num_vertices * sizeof(GLfloat) * 4, _))
.Times(1)
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*gl_, VertexAttribPointer(0, 4, GL_FLOAT, GL_FALSE, 0, NULL))
.Times(1)
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*gl_, BindBuffer(GL_ARRAY_BUFFER, 0))
.Times(1)
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*gl_, VertexAttribPointer(0, 4, GL_FLOAT, GL_FALSE, 0, NULL))
.Times(1)
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*gl_, BindBuffer(GL_ARRAY_BUFFER, buffer_id))
.Times(1)
.RetiresOnSaturation();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163 does not properly handle triangle arrays, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
[email protected]
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,334 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int jpc_dec_decodepkts(jpc_dec_t *dec, jas_stream_t *pkthdrstream, jas_stream_t *in)
{
jpc_dec_tile_t *tile;
jpc_pi_t *pi;
int ret;
tile = dec->curtile;
pi = tile->pi;
for (;;) {
if (!tile->pkthdrstream || jas_stream_peekc(tile->pkthdrstream) == EOF) {
switch (jpc_dec_lookahead(in)) {
case JPC_MS_EOC:
case JPC_MS_SOT:
return 0;
break;
case JPC_MS_SOP:
case JPC_MS_EPH:
case 0:
break;
default:
return -1;
break;
}
}
if ((ret = jpc_pi_next(pi))) {
return ret;
}
if (dec->maxpkts >= 0 && dec->numpkts >= dec->maxpkts) {
jas_eprintf("warning: stopping decode prematurely as requested\n");
return 0;
}
if (jas_getdbglevel() >= 1) {
jas_eprintf("packet offset=%08ld prg=%d cmptno=%02d "
"rlvlno=%02d prcno=%03d lyrno=%02d\n", (long)
jas_stream_getrwcount(in), jpc_pi_prg(pi), jpc_pi_cmptno(pi),
jpc_pi_rlvlno(pi), jpc_pi_prcno(pi), jpc_pi_lyrno(pi));
}
if (jpc_dec_decodepkt(dec, pkthdrstream, in, jpc_pi_cmptno(pi), jpc_pi_rlvlno(pi),
jpc_pi_prcno(pi), jpc_pi_lyrno(pi))) {
return -1;
}
++dec->numpkts;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: An out-of-bounds heap read vulnerability was found in the jpc_pi_nextpcrl() function of jasper before 2.0.6 when processing crafted input.
Commit Message: Fixed numerous integer overflow problems in the code for packet iterators
in the JPC decoder. | Medium | 169,443 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int wanxl_ioctl(struct net_device *dev, struct ifreq *ifr, int cmd)
{
const size_t size = sizeof(sync_serial_settings);
sync_serial_settings line;
port_t *port = dev_to_port(dev);
if (cmd != SIOCWANDEV)
return hdlc_ioctl(dev, ifr, cmd);
switch (ifr->ifr_settings.type) {
case IF_GET_IFACE:
ifr->ifr_settings.type = IF_IFACE_SYNC_SERIAL;
if (ifr->ifr_settings.size < size) {
ifr->ifr_settings.size = size; /* data size wanted */
return -ENOBUFS;
}
line.clock_type = get_status(port)->clocking;
line.clock_rate = 0;
line.loopback = 0;
if (copy_to_user(ifr->ifr_settings.ifs_ifsu.sync, &line, size))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
case IF_IFACE_SYNC_SERIAL:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (dev->flags & IFF_UP)
return -EBUSY;
if (copy_from_user(&line, ifr->ifr_settings.ifs_ifsu.sync,
size))
return -EFAULT;
if (line.clock_type != CLOCK_EXT &&
line.clock_type != CLOCK_TXFROMRX)
return -EINVAL; /* No such clock setting */
if (line.loopback != 0)
return -EINVAL;
get_status(port)->clocking = line.clock_type;
return 0;
default:
return hdlc_ioctl(dev, ifr, cmd);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The wanxl_ioctl function in drivers/net/wan/wanxl.c in the Linux kernel before 3.11.7 does not properly initialize a certain data structure, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via an ioctl call.
Commit Message: wanxl: fix info leak in ioctl
The wanxl_ioctl() code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of
struct sync_serial_settings after the ->loopback member. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Salva Peiró <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Low | 166,438 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void _ewk_frame_smart_del(Evas_Object* ewkFrame)
{
EWK_FRAME_SD_GET(ewkFrame, smartData);
if (smartData) {
if (smartData->frame) {
WebCore::FrameLoaderClientEfl* flc = _ewk_frame_loader_efl_get(smartData->frame);
flc->setWebFrame(0);
smartData->frame->loader()->detachFromParent();
smartData->frame->loader()->cancelAndClear();
smartData->frame = 0;
}
eina_stringshare_del(smartData->title);
eina_stringshare_del(smartData->uri);
eina_stringshare_del(smartData->name);
}
_parent_sc.del(ewkFrame);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.52, does not properly perform garbage collection, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted JavaScript code.
Commit Message: [EFL] fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html is crashing
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85879
Patch by Mikhail Pozdnyakov <[email protected]> on 2012-05-17
Reviewed by Noam Rosenthal.
Source/WebKit/efl:
_ewk_frame_smart_del() is considering now that the frame can be present in cache.
loader()->detachFromParent() is only applied for the main frame.
loader()->cancelAndClear() is not used anymore.
* ewk/ewk_frame.cpp:
(_ewk_frame_smart_del):
LayoutTests:
* platform/efl/test_expectations.txt: Removed fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117409 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 170,978 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: TIFFFlushData1(TIFF* tif)
{
if (tif->tif_rawcc > 0 && tif->tif_flags & TIFF_BUF4WRITE ) {
if (!isFillOrder(tif, tif->tif_dir.td_fillorder) &&
(tif->tif_flags & TIFF_NOBITREV) == 0)
TIFFReverseBits((uint8*)tif->tif_rawdata,
tif->tif_rawcc);
if (!TIFFAppendToStrip(tif,
isTiled(tif) ? tif->tif_curtile : tif->tif_curstrip,
tif->tif_rawdata, tif->tif_rawcc))
return (0);
tif->tif_rawcc = 0;
tif->tif_rawcp = tif->tif_rawdata;
}
return (1);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: tools/tiffcrop.c in libtiff 4.0.6 has out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities in buffers. Reported as MSVR 35093, MSVR 35096, and MSVR 35097.
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix various out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap or stack allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35093,
MSVR 35096 and MSVR 35097. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal
Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* tools/tiff2pdf.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities in
heap allocate buffer in t2p_process_jpeg_strip(). Reported as MSVR
35098. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC
Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35094. Discovered by
Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities &
Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_write.c: fix issue in error code path of TIFFFlushData1()
that didn't reset the tif_rawcc and tif_rawcp members. I'm not
completely sure if that could happen in practice outside of the odd
behaviour of t2p_seekproc() of tiff2pdf). The report points that a
better fix could be to check the return value of TIFFFlushData1() in
places where it isn't done currently, but it seems this patch is enough.
Reported as MSVR 35095. Discovered by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan &
Suha Can from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team. | High | 166,871 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: BOOL SQLWriteFileDSN( LPCSTR pszFileName,
LPCSTR pszAppName,
LPCSTR pszKeyName,
LPCSTR pszString )
{
HINI hIni;
char szFileName[ODBC_FILENAME_MAX+1];
if ( pszFileName[0] == '/' )
{
strncpy( szFileName, sizeof(szFileName) - 5, pszFileName );
}
else
{
char szPath[ODBC_FILENAME_MAX+1];
*szPath = '\0';
_odbcinst_FileINI( szPath );
snprintf( szFileName, sizeof(szFileName) - 5, "%s/%s", szPath, pszFileName );
}
if ( strlen( szFileName ) < 4 || strcmp( szFileName + strlen( szFileName ) - 4, ".dsn" ))
{
strcat( szFileName, ".dsn" );
}
#ifdef __OS2__
if ( iniOpen( &hIni, szFileName, "#;", '[', ']', '=', TRUE, 0L ) != INI_SUCCESS )
#else
if ( iniOpen( &hIni, szFileName, "#;", '[', ']', '=', TRUE ) != INI_SUCCESS )
#endif
{
inst_logPushMsg( __FILE__, __FILE__, __LINE__, LOG_CRITICAL, ODBC_ERROR_INVALID_PATH, "" );
return FALSE;
}
/* delete section */
if ( pszString == NULL && pszKeyName == NULL )
{
if ( iniObjectSeek( hIni, (char *)pszAppName ) == INI_SUCCESS )
{
iniObjectDelete( hIni );
}
}
/* delete entry */
else if ( pszString == NULL )
{
if ( iniPropertySeek( hIni, (char *)pszAppName, (char *)pszKeyName, "" ) == INI_SUCCESS )
{
iniPropertyDelete( hIni );
}
}
else
{
/* add section */
if ( iniObjectSeek( hIni, (char *)pszAppName ) != INI_SUCCESS )
{
iniObjectInsert( hIni, (char *)pszAppName );
}
/* update entry */
if ( iniPropertySeek( hIni, (char *)pszAppName, (char *)pszKeyName, "" ) == INI_SUCCESS )
{
iniObjectSeek( hIni, (char *)pszAppName );
iniPropertyUpdate( hIni, (char *)pszKeyName, (char *)pszString );
}
/* add entry */
else
{
iniObjectSeek( hIni, (char *)pszAppName );
iniPropertyInsert( hIni, (char *)pszKeyName, (char *)pszString );
}
}
if ( iniCommit( hIni ) != INI_SUCCESS )
{
iniClose( hIni );
inst_logPushMsg( __FILE__, __FILE__, __LINE__, LOG_CRITICAL, ODBC_ERROR_REQUEST_FAILED, "" );
return FALSE;
}
iniClose( hIni );
return TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The SQLWriteFileDSN function in odbcinst/SQLWriteFileDSN.c in unixODBC 2.3.5 has strncpy arguments in the wrong order, which allows attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact.
Commit Message: New Pre Source | High | 169,317 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: image_transform_png_set_scale_16_set(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
transform_display *that, png_structp pp, png_infop pi)
{
png_set_scale_16(pp);
this->next->set(this->next, that, pp, pi);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 173,647 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: do_encrypt (const RIJNDAEL_context *ctx,
unsigned char *bx, const unsigned char *ax)
{
#ifdef USE_AMD64_ASM
return _gcry_aes_amd64_encrypt_block(ctx->keyschenc, bx, ax, ctx->rounds,
encT);
#elif defined(USE_ARM_ASM)
return _gcry_aes_arm_encrypt_block(ctx->keyschenc, bx, ax, ctx->rounds, encT);
#else
return do_encrypt_fn (ctx, bx, ax);
#endif /* !USE_ARM_ASM && !USE_AMD64_ASM*/
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: In Libgcrypt 1.8.4, the C implementation of AES is vulnerable to a flush-and-reload side-channel attack because physical addresses are available to other processes. (The C implementation is used on platforms where an assembly-language implementation is unavailable.)
Commit Message: AES: move look-up tables to .data section and unshare between processes
* cipher/rijndael-internal.h (ATTR_ALIGNED_64): New.
* cipher/rijndael-tables.h (encT): Move to 'enc_tables' structure.
(enc_tables): New structure for encryption table with counters before
and after.
(encT): New macro.
(dec_tables): Add counters before and after encryption table; Move
from .rodata to .data section.
(do_encrypt): Change 'encT' to 'enc_tables.T'.
(do_decrypt): Change '&dec_tables' to 'dec_tables.T'.
* cipher/cipher-gcm.c (prefetch_table): Make inline; Handle input
with length not multiple of 256.
(prefetch_enc, prefetch_dec): Modify pre- and post-table counters
to unshare look-up table pages between processes.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 4541
Signed-off-by: Jussi Kivilinna <[email protected]> | Medium | 170,212 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> itemCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestEventTarget.item");
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
TestEventTarget* imp = V8TestEventTarget::toNative(args.Holder());
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
{
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(int, index, toUInt32(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
if (UNLIKELY(index < 0)) {
ec = INDEX_SIZE_ERR;
goto fail;
}
return toV8(imp->item(index), args.GetIsolate());
}
fail:
V8Proxy::setDOMException(ec, args.GetIsolate());
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,071 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void * CAPSTONE_API cs_winkernel_malloc(size_t size)
{
NT_ASSERT(size);
#pragma prefast(suppress : 30030) // Allocating executable POOL_TYPE memory
CS_WINKERNEL_MEMBLOCK *block = (CS_WINKERNEL_MEMBLOCK *)ExAllocatePoolWithTag(
NonPagedPool, size + sizeof(CS_WINKERNEL_MEMBLOCK), CS_WINKERNEL_POOL_TAG);
if (!block) {
return NULL;
}
block->size = size;
return block->data;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the cs_winkernel_malloc function in winkernel_mm.c in Capstone 3.0.4 and earlier allows attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow in a kernel driver) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large value.
Commit Message: provide a validity check to prevent against Integer overflow conditions (#870)
* provide a validity check to prevent against Integer overflow conditions
* fix some style issues. | High | 168,311 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int ax25_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t size, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int copied;
int err = 0;
lock_sock(sk);
/*
* This works for seqpacket too. The receiver has ordered the
* queue for us! We do one quick check first though
*/
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_SEQPACKET && sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED) {
err = -ENOTCONN;
goto out;
}
/* Now we can treat all alike */
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags & ~MSG_DONTWAIT,
flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err);
if (skb == NULL)
goto out;
if (!ax25_sk(sk)->pidincl)
skb_pull(skb, 1); /* Remove PID */
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
copied = skb->len;
if (copied > size) {
copied = size;
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
}
skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (msg->msg_namelen != 0) {
struct sockaddr_ax25 *sax = (struct sockaddr_ax25 *)msg->msg_name;
ax25_digi digi;
ax25_address src;
const unsigned char *mac = skb_mac_header(skb);
ax25_addr_parse(mac + 1, skb->data - mac - 1, &src, NULL,
&digi, NULL, NULL);
sax->sax25_family = AF_AX25;
/* We set this correctly, even though we may not let the
application know the digi calls further down (because it
did NOT ask to know them). This could get political... **/
sax->sax25_ndigis = digi.ndigi;
sax->sax25_call = src;
if (sax->sax25_ndigis != 0) {
int ct;
struct full_sockaddr_ax25 *fsa = (struct full_sockaddr_ax25 *)sax;
for (ct = 0; ct < digi.ndigi; ct++)
fsa->fsa_digipeater[ct] = digi.calls[ct];
}
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(struct full_sockaddr_ax25);
}
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
err = copied;
out:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The ax25_recvmsg function in net/ax25/af_ax25.c in the Linux kernel before 3.9-rc7 does not initialize a certain data structure, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a crafted recvmsg or recvfrom system call.
Commit Message: ax25: fix info leak via msg_name in ax25_recvmsg()
When msg_namelen is non-zero the sockaddr info gets filled out, as
requested, but the code fails to initialize the padding bytes of struct
sockaddr_ax25 inserted by the compiler for alignment. Additionally the
msg_namelen value is updated to sizeof(struct full_sockaddr_ax25) but is
not always filled up to this size.
Both issues lead to the fact that the code will leak uninitialized
kernel stack bytes in net/socket.c.
Fix both issues by initializing the memory with memset(0).
Cc: Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,044 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ppp_hdlc(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *p, int length)
{
u_char *b, *s, *t, c;
int i, proto;
const void *se;
if (length <= 0)
return;
b = (uint8_t *)malloc(length);
if (b == NULL)
return;
/*
* Unescape all the data into a temporary, private, buffer.
* Do this so that we dont overwrite the original packet
* contents.
*/
for (s = (u_char *)p, t = b, i = length; i > 0; i--) {
c = *s++;
if (c == 0x7d) {
if (i > 1) {
i--;
c = *s++ ^ 0x20;
} else
continue;
}
*t++ = c;
}
se = ndo->ndo_snapend;
ndo->ndo_snapend = t;
length = t - b;
/* now lets guess about the payload codepoint format */
if (length < 1)
goto trunc;
proto = *b; /* start with a one-octet codepoint guess */
switch (proto) {
case PPP_IP:
ip_print(ndo, b + 1, length - 1);
goto cleanup;
case PPP_IPV6:
ip6_print(ndo, b + 1, length - 1);
goto cleanup;
default: /* no luck - try next guess */
break;
}
if (length < 2)
goto trunc;
proto = EXTRACT_16BITS(b); /* next guess - load two octets */
switch (proto) {
case (PPP_ADDRESS << 8 | PPP_CONTROL): /* looks like a PPP frame */
if (length < 4)
goto trunc;
proto = EXTRACT_16BITS(b+2); /* load the PPP proto-id */
handle_ppp(ndo, proto, b + 4, length - 4);
break;
default: /* last guess - proto must be a PPP proto-id */
handle_ppp(ndo, proto, b + 2, length - 2);
break;
}
cleanup:
ndo->ndo_snapend = se;
free(b);
return;
trunc:
ndo->ndo_snapend = se;
free(b);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|ppp]"));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ppp_hdlc function in print-ppp.c in tcpdump 4.6.2 and earlier allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) cia a crafted PPP packet.
Commit Message: Do bounds checking when unescaping PPP.
Clean up a const issue while we're at it. | Medium | 166,240 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void DisconnectWindowLinux::Hide() {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to display box rendering.
Commit Message: Initial implementation of DisconnectWindow on Linux.
BUG=None
TEST=Manual
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7089016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88889 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,473 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void SoftAVC::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
if (mSignalledError || mOutputPortSettingsChange != NONE) {
return;
}
if (mEOSStatus == OUTPUT_FRAMES_FLUSHED) {
return;
}
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(kInputPortIndex);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(kOutputPortIndex);
if (mHeadersDecoded) {
drainAllOutputBuffers(false /* eos */);
}
H264SwDecRet ret = H264SWDEC_PIC_RDY;
bool portWillReset = false;
while ((mEOSStatus != INPUT_DATA_AVAILABLE || !inQueue.empty())
&& outQueue.size() == kNumOutputBuffers) {
if (mEOSStatus == INPUT_EOS_SEEN) {
drainAllOutputBuffers(true /* eos */);
return;
}
BufferInfo *inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
++mPicId;
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header = new OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE;
memset(header, 0, sizeof(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE));
header->nTimeStamp = inHeader->nTimeStamp;
header->nFlags = inHeader->nFlags;
if (header->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
mEOSStatus = INPUT_EOS_SEEN;
}
mPicToHeaderMap.add(mPicId, header);
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
H264SwDecInput inPicture;
H264SwDecOutput outPicture;
memset(&inPicture, 0, sizeof(inPicture));
inPicture.dataLen = inHeader->nFilledLen;
inPicture.pStream = inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset;
inPicture.picId = mPicId;
inPicture.intraConcealmentMethod = 1;
H264SwDecPicture decodedPicture;
while (inPicture.dataLen > 0) {
ret = H264SwDecDecode(mHandle, &inPicture, &outPicture);
if (ret == H264SWDEC_HDRS_RDY_BUFF_NOT_EMPTY ||
ret == H264SWDEC_PIC_RDY_BUFF_NOT_EMPTY) {
inPicture.dataLen -= (u32)(outPicture.pStrmCurrPos - inPicture.pStream);
inPicture.pStream = outPicture.pStrmCurrPos;
if (ret == H264SWDEC_HDRS_RDY_BUFF_NOT_EMPTY) {
mHeadersDecoded = true;
H264SwDecInfo decoderInfo;
CHECK(H264SwDecGetInfo(mHandle, &decoderInfo) == H264SWDEC_OK);
SoftVideoDecoderOMXComponent::CropSettingsMode cropSettingsMode =
handleCropParams(decoderInfo);
handlePortSettingsChange(
&portWillReset, decoderInfo.picWidth, decoderInfo.picHeight,
cropSettingsMode);
}
} else {
if (portWillReset) {
if (H264SwDecNextPicture(mHandle, &decodedPicture, 0)
== H264SWDEC_PIC_RDY) {
saveFirstOutputBuffer(
decodedPicture.picId,
(uint8_t *)decodedPicture.pOutputPicture);
}
}
inPicture.dataLen = 0;
if (ret < 0) {
ALOGE("Decoder failed: %d", ret);
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined,
ERROR_MALFORMED, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
}
}
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
if (portWillReset) {
return;
}
if (mFirstPicture && !outQueue.empty()) {
drainOneOutputBuffer(mFirstPictureId, mFirstPicture);
delete[] mFirstPicture;
mFirstPicture = NULL;
mFirstPictureId = -1;
}
drainAllOutputBuffers(false /* eos */);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27833616.
Commit Message: codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (h263|h264)dec
Bug: 27833616
Change-Id: I0fd599b3da431425d89236ffdd9df423c11947c0
| High | 174,178 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: asmlinkage void __sched schedule(void)
{
struct task_struct *prev, *next;
unsigned long *switch_count;
struct rq *rq;
int cpu;
need_resched:
preempt_disable();
cpu = smp_processor_id();
rq = cpu_rq(cpu);
rcu_note_context_switch(cpu);
prev = rq->curr;
release_kernel_lock(prev);
need_resched_nonpreemptible:
schedule_debug(prev);
if (sched_feat(HRTICK))
hrtick_clear(rq);
raw_spin_lock_irq(&rq->lock);
clear_tsk_need_resched(prev);
switch_count = &prev->nivcsw;
if (prev->state && !(preempt_count() & PREEMPT_ACTIVE)) {
if (unlikely(signal_pending_state(prev->state, prev))) {
prev->state = TASK_RUNNING;
} else {
/*
* If a worker is going to sleep, notify and
* ask workqueue whether it wants to wake up a
* task to maintain concurrency. If so, wake
* up the task.
*/
if (prev->flags & PF_WQ_WORKER) {
struct task_struct *to_wakeup;
to_wakeup = wq_worker_sleeping(prev, cpu);
if (to_wakeup)
try_to_wake_up_local(to_wakeup);
}
deactivate_task(rq, prev, DEQUEUE_SLEEP);
}
switch_count = &prev->nvcsw;
}
pre_schedule(rq, prev);
if (unlikely(!rq->nr_running))
idle_balance(cpu, rq);
put_prev_task(rq, prev);
next = pick_next_task(rq);
if (likely(prev != next)) {
sched_info_switch(prev, next);
perf_event_task_sched_out(prev, next);
rq->nr_switches++;
rq->curr = next;
++*switch_count;
context_switch(rq, prev, next); /* unlocks the rq */
/*
* The context switch have flipped the stack from under us
* and restored the local variables which were saved when
* this task called schedule() in the past. prev == current
* is still correct, but it can be moved to another cpu/rq.
*/
cpu = smp_processor_id();
rq = cpu_rq(cpu);
} else
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&rq->lock);
post_schedule(rq);
if (unlikely(reacquire_kernel_lock(prev)))
goto need_resched_nonpreemptible;
preempt_enable_no_resched();
if (need_resched())
goto need_resched;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID:
Summary: The Linux kernel before 2.6.37 does not properly implement a certain clock-update optimization, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via an application that executes code in a loop.
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
LKML-Reference: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,677 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_vdec::get_parameter(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_IN OMX_INDEXTYPE paramIndex,
OMX_INOUT OMX_PTR paramData)
{
(void) hComp;
OMX_ERRORTYPE eRet = OMX_ErrorNone;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter:");
if (m_state == OMX_StateInvalid) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Get Param in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorInvalidState;
}
if (paramData == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Get Param in Invalid paramData");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
switch ((unsigned long)paramIndex) {
case OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition: {
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *portDefn =
(OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter: OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition");
eRet = update_portdef(portDefn);
if (eRet == OMX_ErrorNone)
m_port_def = *portDefn;
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoInit: {
OMX_PORT_PARAM_TYPE *portParamType =
(OMX_PORT_PARAM_TYPE *) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoInit");
portParamType->nVersion.nVersion = OMX_SPEC_VERSION;
portParamType->nSize = sizeof(portParamType);
portParamType->nPorts = 2;
portParamType->nStartPortNumber = 0;
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat: {
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *portFmt =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat");
portFmt->nVersion.nVersion = OMX_SPEC_VERSION;
portFmt->nSize = sizeof(portFmt);
if (0 == portFmt->nPortIndex) {
if (0 == portFmt->nIndex) {
portFmt->eColorFormat = OMX_COLOR_FormatUnused;
portFmt->eCompressionFormat = eCompressionFormat;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("get_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat:"\
" NoMore compression formats");
eRet = OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
} else if (1 == portFmt->nPortIndex) {
portFmt->eCompressionFormat = OMX_VIDEO_CodingUnused;
bool useNonSurfaceMode = false;
#if defined(_ANDROID_) && !defined(FLEXYUV_SUPPORTED)
useNonSurfaceMode = (m_enable_android_native_buffers == OMX_FALSE);
#endif
portFmt->eColorFormat = useNonSurfaceMode ?
getPreferredColorFormatNonSurfaceMode(portFmt->nIndex) :
getPreferredColorFormatDefaultMode(portFmt->nIndex);
if (portFmt->eColorFormat == OMX_COLOR_FormatMax ) {
eRet = OMX_ErrorNoMore;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat:"\
" NoMore Color formats");
}
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("returning color-format: 0x%x", portFmt->eColorFormat);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("get_parameter: Bad port index %d",
(int)portFmt->nPortIndex);
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
break;
}
/*Component should support this port definition*/
case OMX_IndexParamAudioInit: {
OMX_PORT_PARAM_TYPE *audioPortParamType =
(OMX_PORT_PARAM_TYPE *) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter: OMX_IndexParamAudioInit");
audioPortParamType->nVersion.nVersion = OMX_SPEC_VERSION;
audioPortParamType->nSize = sizeof(audioPortParamType);
audioPortParamType->nPorts = 0;
audioPortParamType->nStartPortNumber = 0;
break;
}
/*Component should support this port definition*/
case OMX_IndexParamImageInit: {
OMX_PORT_PARAM_TYPE *imagePortParamType =
(OMX_PORT_PARAM_TYPE *) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter: OMX_IndexParamImageInit");
imagePortParamType->nVersion.nVersion = OMX_SPEC_VERSION;
imagePortParamType->nSize = sizeof(imagePortParamType);
imagePortParamType->nPorts = 0;
imagePortParamType->nStartPortNumber = 0;
break;
}
/*Component should support this port definition*/
case OMX_IndexParamOtherInit: {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("get_parameter: OMX_IndexParamOtherInit %08x",
paramIndex);
eRet =OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole: {
OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *comp_role;
comp_role = (OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *) paramData;
comp_role->nVersion.nVersion = OMX_SPEC_VERSION;
comp_role->nSize = sizeof(*comp_role);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Getparameter: OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole %d",
paramIndex);
strlcpy((char*)comp_role->cRole,(const char*)m_cRole,
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
break;
}
/* Added for parameter test */
case OMX_IndexParamPriorityMgmt: {
OMX_PRIORITYMGMTTYPE *priorityMgmType =
(OMX_PRIORITYMGMTTYPE *) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter: OMX_IndexParamPriorityMgmt");
priorityMgmType->nVersion.nVersion = OMX_SPEC_VERSION;
priorityMgmType->nSize = sizeof(priorityMgmType);
break;
}
/* Added for parameter test */
case OMX_IndexParamCompBufferSupplier: {
OMX_PARAM_BUFFERSUPPLIERTYPE *bufferSupplierType =
(OMX_PARAM_BUFFERSUPPLIERTYPE*) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter: OMX_IndexParamCompBufferSupplier");
bufferSupplierType->nSize = sizeof(bufferSupplierType);
bufferSupplierType->nVersion.nVersion = OMX_SPEC_VERSION;
if (0 == bufferSupplierType->nPortIndex)
bufferSupplierType->nPortIndex = OMX_BufferSupplyUnspecified;
else if (1 == bufferSupplierType->nPortIndex)
bufferSupplierType->nPortIndex = OMX_BufferSupplyUnspecified;
else
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoAvc: {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoAvc %08x",
paramIndex);
break;
}
case (OMX_INDEXTYPE)QOMX_IndexParamVideoMvc: {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter: QOMX_IndexParamVideoMvc %08x",
paramIndex);
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoH263: {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoH263 %08x",
paramIndex);
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoMpeg4: {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoMpeg4 %08x",
paramIndex);
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoMpeg2: {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoMpeg2 %08x",
paramIndex);
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelQuerySupported: {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelQuerySupported %08x", paramIndex);
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PROFILELEVELTYPE *profileLevelType =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PROFILELEVELTYPE *)paramData;
eRet = get_supported_profile_level_for_1080p(profileLevelType);
break;
}
#if defined (_ANDROID_HONEYCOMB_) || defined (_ANDROID_ICS_)
case OMX_GoogleAndroidIndexGetAndroidNativeBufferUsage: {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter: OMX_GoogleAndroidIndexGetAndroidNativeBufferUsage");
GetAndroidNativeBufferUsageParams* nativeBuffersUsage = (GetAndroidNativeBufferUsageParams *) paramData;
if (nativeBuffersUsage->nPortIndex == OMX_CORE_OUTPUT_PORT_INDEX) {
if (secure_mode && !secure_scaling_to_non_secure_opb) {
nativeBuffersUsage->nUsage = (GRALLOC_USAGE_PRIVATE_MM_HEAP | GRALLOC_USAGE_PROTECTED |
GRALLOC_USAGE_PRIVATE_UNCACHED);
} else {
nativeBuffersUsage->nUsage =
(GRALLOC_USAGE_PRIVATE_IOMMU_HEAP |
GRALLOC_USAGE_PRIVATE_UNCACHED);
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("get_parameter: OMX_GoogleAndroidIndexGetAndroidNativeBufferUsage failed!");
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
}
break;
#endif
#ifdef FLEXYUV_SUPPORTED
case OMX_QcomIndexFlexibleYUVDescription: {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter: describeColorFormat");
eRet = describeColorFormat(paramData);
break;
}
#endif
default: {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("get_parameter: unknown param %08x", paramIndex);
eRet =OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter returning WxH(%d x %d) SxSH(%d x %d)",
drv_ctx.video_resolution.frame_width,
drv_ctx.video_resolution.frame_height,
drv_ctx.video_resolution.stride,
drv_ctx.video_resolution.scan_lines);
return eRet;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The mm-video-v4l2 vidc component in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not validate certain OMX parameter data structures, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27532721.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vidc: validate omx param/config data
Check the sanity of config/param strcuture objects
passed to get/set _ config()/parameter() methods.
Bug: 27533317
Security Vulnerability in MediaServer
omx_vdec::get_config() Can lead to arbitrary write
Change-Id: I6c3243afe12055ab94f1a1ecf758c10e88231809
Conflicts:
mm-core/inc/OMX_QCOMExtns.h
mm-video-v4l2/vidc/vdec/src/omx_vdec_msm8974.cpp
mm-video-v4l2/vidc/venc/src/omx_video_base.cpp
mm-video-v4l2/vidc/venc/src/omx_video_encoder.cpp
| High | 173,789 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: image_size_of_type(int color_type, int bit_depth, unsigned int *colors)
{
if (*colors)
return 16;
else
{
int pixel_depth = pixel_depth_of_type(color_type, bit_depth);
if (pixel_depth < 8)
return 64;
else if (pixel_depth > 16)
return 1024;
else
return 256;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 173,581 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: pcap_ng_check_header(const uint8_t *magic, FILE *fp, u_int precision,
char *errbuf, int *err)
{
bpf_u_int32 magic_int;
size_t amt_read;
bpf_u_int32 total_length;
bpf_u_int32 byte_order_magic;
struct block_header *bhdrp;
struct section_header_block *shbp;
pcap_t *p;
int swapped = 0;
struct pcap_ng_sf *ps;
int status;
struct block_cursor cursor;
struct interface_description_block *idbp;
/*
* Assume no read errors.
*/
*err = 0;
/*
* Check whether the first 4 bytes of the file are the block
* type for a pcapng savefile.
*/
memcpy(&magic_int, magic, sizeof(magic_int));
if (magic_int != BT_SHB) {
/*
* XXX - check whether this looks like what the block
* type would be after being munged by mapping between
* UN*X and DOS/Windows text file format and, if it
* does, look for the byte-order magic number in
* the appropriate place and, if we find it, report
* this as possibly being a pcapng file transferred
* between UN*X and Windows in text file format?
*/
return (NULL); /* nope */
}
/*
* OK, they are. However, that's just \n\r\r\n, so it could,
* conceivably, be an ordinary text file.
*
* It could not, however, conceivably be any other type of
* capture file, so we can read the rest of the putative
* Section Header Block; put the block type in the common
* header, read the rest of the common header and the
* fixed-length portion of the SHB, and look for the byte-order
* magic value.
*/
amt_read = fread(&total_length, 1, sizeof(total_length), fp);
if (amt_read < sizeof(total_length)) {
if (ferror(fp)) {
pcap_fmt_errmsg_for_errno(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE,
errno, "error reading dump file");
*err = 1;
return (NULL); /* fail */
}
/*
* Possibly a weird short text file, so just say
* "not pcapng".
*/
return (NULL);
}
amt_read = fread(&byte_order_magic, 1, sizeof(byte_order_magic), fp);
if (amt_read < sizeof(byte_order_magic)) {
if (ferror(fp)) {
pcap_fmt_errmsg_for_errno(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE,
errno, "error reading dump file");
*err = 1;
return (NULL); /* fail */
}
/*
* Possibly a weird short text file, so just say
* "not pcapng".
*/
return (NULL);
}
if (byte_order_magic != BYTE_ORDER_MAGIC) {
byte_order_magic = SWAPLONG(byte_order_magic);
if (byte_order_magic != BYTE_ORDER_MAGIC) {
/*
* Not a pcapng file.
*/
return (NULL);
}
swapped = 1;
total_length = SWAPLONG(total_length);
}
/*
* Check the sanity of the total length.
*/
if (total_length < sizeof(*bhdrp) + sizeof(*shbp) + sizeof(struct block_trailer) ||
(total_length > BT_SHB_INSANE_MAX)) {
pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE,
"Section Header Block in pcapng dump file has invalid length %" PRIsize " < _%lu_ < %lu (BT_SHB_INSANE_MAX)",
sizeof(*bhdrp) + sizeof(*shbp) + sizeof(struct block_trailer),
total_length,
BT_SHB_INSANE_MAX);
*err = 1;
return (NULL);
}
/*
* OK, this is a good pcapng file.
* Allocate a pcap_t for it.
*/
p = pcap_open_offline_common(errbuf, sizeof (struct pcap_ng_sf));
if (p == NULL) {
/* Allocation failed. */
*err = 1;
return (NULL);
}
p->swapped = swapped;
ps = p->priv;
/*
* What precision does the user want?
*/
switch (precision) {
case PCAP_TSTAMP_PRECISION_MICRO:
ps->user_tsresol = 1000000;
break;
case PCAP_TSTAMP_PRECISION_NANO:
ps->user_tsresol = 1000000000;
break;
default:
pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE,
"unknown time stamp resolution %u", precision);
free(p);
*err = 1;
return (NULL);
}
p->opt.tstamp_precision = precision;
/*
* Allocate a buffer into which to read blocks. We default to
* the maximum of:
*
* the total length of the SHB for which we read the header;
*
* 2K, which should be more than large enough for an Enhanced
* Packet Block containing a full-size Ethernet frame, and
* leaving room for some options.
*
* If we find a bigger block, we reallocate the buffer, up to
* the maximum size. We start out with a maximum size of
* INITIAL_MAX_BLOCKSIZE; if we see any link-layer header types
* with a maximum snapshot that results in a larger maximum
* block length, we boost the maximum.
*/
p->bufsize = 2048;
if (p->bufsize < total_length)
p->bufsize = total_length;
p->buffer = malloc(p->bufsize);
if (p->buffer == NULL) {
pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, "out of memory");
free(p);
*err = 1;
return (NULL);
}
ps->max_blocksize = INITIAL_MAX_BLOCKSIZE;
/*
* Copy the stuff we've read to the buffer, and read the rest
* of the SHB.
*/
bhdrp = (struct block_header *)p->buffer;
shbp = (struct section_header_block *)((u_char *)p->buffer + sizeof(struct block_header));
bhdrp->block_type = magic_int;
bhdrp->total_length = total_length;
shbp->byte_order_magic = byte_order_magic;
if (read_bytes(fp,
(u_char *)p->buffer + (sizeof(magic_int) + sizeof(total_length) + sizeof(byte_order_magic)),
total_length - (sizeof(magic_int) + sizeof(total_length) + sizeof(byte_order_magic)),
1, errbuf) == -1)
goto fail;
if (p->swapped) {
/*
* Byte-swap the fields we've read.
*/
shbp->major_version = SWAPSHORT(shbp->major_version);
shbp->minor_version = SWAPSHORT(shbp->minor_version);
/*
* XXX - we don't care about the section length.
*/
}
/* currently only SHB version 1.0 is supported */
if (! (shbp->major_version == PCAP_NG_VERSION_MAJOR &&
shbp->minor_version == PCAP_NG_VERSION_MINOR)) {
pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE,
"unsupported pcapng savefile version %u.%u",
shbp->major_version, shbp->minor_version);
goto fail;
}
p->version_major = shbp->major_version;
p->version_minor = shbp->minor_version;
/*
* Save the time stamp resolution the user requested.
*/
p->opt.tstamp_precision = precision;
/*
* Now start looking for an Interface Description Block.
*/
for (;;) {
/*
* Read the next block.
*/
status = read_block(fp, p, &cursor, errbuf);
if (status == 0) {
/* EOF - no IDB in this file */
pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE,
"the capture file has no Interface Description Blocks");
goto fail;
}
if (status == -1)
goto fail; /* error */
switch (cursor.block_type) {
case BT_IDB:
/*
* Get a pointer to the fixed-length portion of the
* IDB.
*/
idbp = get_from_block_data(&cursor, sizeof(*idbp),
errbuf);
if (idbp == NULL)
goto fail; /* error */
/*
* Byte-swap it if necessary.
*/
if (p->swapped) {
idbp->linktype = SWAPSHORT(idbp->linktype);
idbp->snaplen = SWAPLONG(idbp->snaplen);
}
/*
* Try to add this interface.
*/
if (!add_interface(p, &cursor, errbuf))
goto fail;
goto done;
case BT_EPB:
case BT_SPB:
case BT_PB:
/*
* Saw a packet before we saw any IDBs. That's
* not valid, as we don't know what link-layer
* encapsulation the packet has.
*/
pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE,
"the capture file has a packet block before any Interface Description Blocks");
goto fail;
default:
/*
* Just ignore it.
*/
break;
}
}
done:
p->tzoff = 0; /* XXX - not used in pcap */
p->linktype = linktype_to_dlt(idbp->linktype);
p->snapshot = pcap_adjust_snapshot(p->linktype, idbp->snaplen);
p->linktype_ext = 0;
/*
* If the maximum block size for a packet with the maximum
* snapshot length for this DLT_ is bigger than the current
* maximum block size, increase the maximum.
*/
if (MAX_BLOCKSIZE_FOR_SNAPLEN(max_snaplen_for_dlt(p->linktype)) > ps->max_blocksize)
ps->max_blocksize = MAX_BLOCKSIZE_FOR_SNAPLEN(max_snaplen_for_dlt(p->linktype));
p->next_packet_op = pcap_ng_next_packet;
p->cleanup_op = pcap_ng_cleanup;
return (p);
fail:
free(ps->ifaces);
free(p->buffer);
free(p);
*err = 1;
return (NULL);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: sf-pcapng.c in libpcap before 1.9.1 does not properly validate the PHB header length before allocating memory.
Commit Message: Fix some format warnings. | Medium | 169,539 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: P2PQuicStreamTest()
: connection_(
new quic::test::MockQuicConnection(&connection_helper_,
&alarm_factory_,
quic::Perspective::IS_CLIENT)),
session_(connection_) {
session_.Initialize();
stream_ = new P2PQuicStreamImpl(kStreamId, &session_);
stream_->SetDelegate(&delegate_);
session_.ActivateStream(std::unique_ptr<P2PQuicStreamImpl>(stream_));
connection_helper_.AdvanceTime(quic::QuicTime::Delta::FromSeconds(1));
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: The TreeScope::adoptIfNeeded function in WebKit/Source/core/dom/TreeScope.cpp in the DOM implementation in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 50.0.2661.102, does not prevent script execution during node-adoption operations, which allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: P2PQuicStream write functionality.
This adds the P2PQuicStream::WriteData function and adds tests. It also
adds the concept of a write buffered amount, enforcing this at the
P2PQuicStreamImpl.
Bug: 874296
Change-Id: Id02c8aa8d5368a87bb24a2e50dab5ef94bcae131
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1315534
Commit-Queue: Seth Hampson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605766} | Medium | 172,264 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int command_read(struct pci_dev *dev, int offset, u16 *value, void *data)
{
int i;
int ret;
ret = xen_pcibk_read_config_word(dev, offset, value, data);
if (!pci_is_enabled(dev))
return ret;
for (i = 0; i < PCI_ROM_RESOURCE; i++) {
if (dev->resource[i].flags & IORESOURCE_IO)
*value |= PCI_COMMAND_IO;
if (dev->resource[i].flags & IORESOURCE_MEM)
*value |= PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY;
}
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Xen 3.3.x through 4.5.x and the Linux kernel through 3.19.1 do not properly restrict access to PCI command registers, which might allow local guest OS users to cause a denial of service (non-maskable interrupt and host crash) by disabling the (1) memory or (2) I/O decoding for a PCI Express device and then accessing the device, which triggers an Unsupported Request (UR) response.
Commit Message: xen-pciback: limit guest control of command register
Otherwise the guest can abuse that control to cause e.g. PCIe
Unsupported Request responses by disabling memory and/or I/O decoding
and subsequently causing (CPU side) accesses to the respective address
ranges, which (depending on system configuration) may be fatal to the
host.
Note that to alter any of the bits collected together as
PCI_COMMAND_GUEST permissive mode is now required to be enabled
globally or on the specific device.
This is CVE-2015-2150 / XSA-120.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,682 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: update_info_partition_on_linux_dmmp (Device *device)
{
const gchar *dm_name;
const gchar* const *targets_type;
const gchar* const *targets_params;
gchar *params;
gint linear_slave_major;
gint linear_slave_minor;
guint64 offset_sectors;
Device *linear_slave;
gchar *s;
params = NULL;
dm_name = g_udev_device_get_property (device->priv->d, "DM_NAME");
if (dm_name == NULL)
goto out;
targets_type = g_udev_device_get_property_as_strv (device->priv->d, "UDISKS_DM_TARGETS_TYPE");
if (targets_type == NULL || g_strcmp0 (targets_type[0], "linear") != 0)
goto out;
goto out;
params = decode_udev_encoded_string (targets_params[0]);
if (sscanf (params,
"%d:%d %" G_GUINT64_FORMAT,
&linear_slave_major,
&linear_slave_minor,
&offset_sectors) != 3)
goto out;
linear_slave = daemon_local_find_by_dev (device->priv->daemon,
makedev (linear_slave_major, linear_slave_minor));
if (linear_slave == NULL)
goto out;
if (!linear_slave->priv->device_is_linux_dmmp)
goto out;
/* The Partition* properties has been set as part of
* update_info_partition() by reading UDISKS_PARTITION_*
* properties.. so here we bascially just update the presentation
* device file name and and whether the device is a drive.
*/
s = g_strdup_printf ("/dev/mapper/%s", dm_name);
device_set_device_file_presentation (device, s);
g_free (s);
device_set_device_is_drive (device, FALSE);
out:
g_free (params);
return TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: probers/udisks-dm-export.c in udisks before 1.0.1 exports UDISKS_DM_TARGETS_PARAMS information to udev even for a crypt UDISKS_DM_TARGETS_TYPE, which allows local users to discover encryption keys by (1) running a certain udevadm command or (2) reading a certain file under /dev/.udev/db/.
Commit Message: | Low | 165,132 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ResetState() {
nav_handle1_.reset();
nav_handle2_.reset();
nav_handle3_.reset();
throttle1_.reset();
throttle2_.reset();
throttle3_.reset();
contents1_.reset();
contents2_.reset();
contents3_.reset();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple use-after-free vulnerabilities in the formfiller implementation in PDFium, as used in Google Chrome before 48.0.2564.82, allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted PDF document, related to improper tracking of the destruction of (1) IPWL_FocusHandler and (2) IPWL_Provider objects.
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871} | Medium | 172,231 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: lldp_private_8021_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *tptr, u_int tlv_len)
{
int subtype, hexdump = FALSE;
u_int sublen;
u_int tval;
uint8_t i;
if (tlv_len < 4) {
return hexdump;
}
subtype = *(tptr+3);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Subtype (%u)",
tok2str(lldp_8021_subtype_values, "unknown", subtype),
subtype));
switch (subtype) {
case LLDP_PRIVATE_8021_SUBTYPE_PORT_VLAN_ID:
if (tlv_len < 6) {
return hexdump;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t port vlan id (PVID): %u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr + 4)));
break;
case LLDP_PRIVATE_8021_SUBTYPE_PROTOCOL_VLAN_ID:
if (tlv_len < 7) {
return hexdump;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t port and protocol vlan id (PPVID): %u, flags [%s] (0x%02x)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+5),
bittok2str(lldp_8021_port_protocol_id_values, "none", *(tptr+4)),
*(tptr + 4)));
break;
case LLDP_PRIVATE_8021_SUBTYPE_VLAN_NAME:
if (tlv_len < 6) {
return hexdump;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t vlan id (VID): %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr + 4)));
if (tlv_len < 7) {
return hexdump;
}
sublen = *(tptr+6);
if (tlv_len < 7+sublen) {
return hexdump;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t vlan name: "));
safeputs(ndo, tptr + 7, sublen);
break;
case LLDP_PRIVATE_8021_SUBTYPE_PROTOCOL_IDENTITY:
if (tlv_len < 5) {
return hexdump;
}
sublen = *(tptr+4);
if (tlv_len < 5+sublen) {
return hexdump;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t protocol identity: "));
safeputs(ndo, tptr + 5, sublen);
break;
case LLDP_PRIVATE_8021_SUBTYPE_CONGESTION_NOTIFICATION:
if(tlv_len<LLDP_PRIVATE_8021_SUBTYPE_CONGESTION_NOTIFICATION_LENGTH){
return hexdump;
}
tval=*(tptr+4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Pre-Priority CNPV Indicator"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Priority : 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Value : "));
for(i=0;i<NO_OF_BITS;i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%-2d ", (tval >> i) & 0x01));
tval=*(tptr+5);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Pre-Priority Ready Indicator"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Priority : 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Value : "));
for(i=0;i<NO_OF_BITS;i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%-2d ", (tval >> i) & 0x01));
break;
case LLDP_PRIVATE_8021_SUBTYPE_ETS_CONFIGURATION:
if(tlv_len<LLDP_PRIVATE_8021_SUBTYPE_ETS_CONFIGURATION_LENGTH) {
return hexdump;
}
tval=*(tptr+4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Willing:%d, CBS:%d, RES:%d, Max TCs:%d",
tval >> 7, (tval >> 6) & 0x02, (tval >> 3) & 0x07, tval & 0x07));
/*Print Priority Assignment Table*/
print_ets_priority_assignment_table(ndo, tptr + 5);
/*Print TC Bandwidth Table*/
print_tc_bandwidth_table(ndo, tptr + 9);
/* Print TSA Assignment Table */
print_tsa_assignment_table(ndo, tptr + 17);
break;
case LLDP_PRIVATE_8021_SUBTYPE_ETS_RECOMMENDATION:
if(tlv_len<LLDP_PRIVATE_8021_SUBTYPE_ETS_RECOMMENDATION_LENGTH) {
return hexdump;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t RES: %d", *(tptr + 4)));
/*Print Priority Assignment Table */
print_ets_priority_assignment_table(ndo, tptr + 5);
/*Print TC Bandwidth Table */
print_tc_bandwidth_table(ndo, tptr + 9);
/* Print TSA Assignment Table */
print_tsa_assignment_table(ndo, tptr + 17);
break;
case LLDP_PRIVATE_8021_SUBTYPE_PFC_CONFIGURATION:
if(tlv_len<LLDP_PRIVATE_8021_SUBTYPE_PFC_CONFIGURATION_LENGTH) {
return hexdump;
}
tval=*(tptr+4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Willing: %d, MBC: %d, RES: %d, PFC cap:%d ",
tval >> 7, (tval >> 6) & 0x01, (tval >> 4) & 0x03, (tval & 0x0f)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t PFC Enable"));
tval=*(tptr+5);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Priority : 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Value : "));
for(i=0;i<NO_OF_BITS;i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%-2d ", (tval >> i) & 0x01));
break;
case LLDP_PRIVATE_8021_SUBTYPE_APPLICATION_PRIORITY:
if(tlv_len<LLDP_PRIVATE_8021_SUBTYPE_APPLICATION_PRIORITY_MIN_LENGTH) {
return hexdump;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t RES: %d", *(tptr + 4)));
if(tlv_len<=LLDP_PRIVATE_8021_SUBTYPE_APPLICATION_PRIORITY_MIN_LENGTH){
return hexdump;
}
/* Length of Application Priority Table */
sublen=tlv_len-5;
if(sublen%3!=0){
return hexdump;
}
i=0;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Application Priority Table"));
while(i<sublen) {
tval=*(tptr+i+5);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Priority: %d, RES: %d, Sel: %d",
tval >> 5, (tval >> 3) & 0x03, (tval & 0x07)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Protocol ID: %d", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr + i + 5)));
i=i+3;
}
break;
case LLDP_PRIVATE_8021_SUBTYPE_EVB:
if(tlv_len<LLDP_PRIVATE_8021_SUBTYPE_EVB_LENGTH){
return hexdump;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t EVB Bridge Status"));
tval=*(tptr+4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t RES: %d, BGID: %d, RRCAP: %d, RRCTR: %d",
tval >> 3, (tval >> 2) & 0x01, (tval >> 1) & 0x01, tval & 0x01));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t EVB Station Status"));
tval=*(tptr+5);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t RES: %d, SGID: %d, RRREQ: %d,RRSTAT: %d",
tval >> 4, (tval >> 3) & 0x01, (tval >> 2) & 0x01, tval & 0x03));
tval=*(tptr+6);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t R: %d, RTE: %d, ",tval >> 5, tval & 0x1f));
tval=*(tptr+7);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "EVB Mode: %s [%d]",
tok2str(lldp_evb_mode_values, "unknown", tval >> 6), tval >> 6));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t ROL: %d, RWD: %d, ", (tval >> 5) & 0x01, tval & 0x1f));
tval=*(tptr+8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "RES: %d, ROL: %d, RKA: %d", tval >> 6, (tval >> 5) & 0x01, tval & 0x1f));
break;
case LLDP_PRIVATE_8021_SUBTYPE_CDCP:
if(tlv_len<LLDP_PRIVATE_8021_SUBTYPE_CDCP_MIN_LENGTH){
return hexdump;
}
tval=*(tptr+4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Role: %d, RES: %d, Scomp: %d ",
tval >> 7, (tval >> 4) & 0x07, (tval >> 3) & 0x01));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ChnCap: %d", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr + 6) & 0x0fff));
sublen=tlv_len-8;
if(sublen%3!=0) {
return hexdump;
}
i=0;
while(i<sublen) {
tval=EXTRACT_24BITS(tptr+i+8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t SCID: %d, SVID: %d",
tval >> 12, tval & 0x000fff));
i=i+3;
}
break;
default:
hexdump = TRUE;
break;
}
return hexdump;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-835
Summary: The LLDP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 could enter an infinite loop due to a bug in print-lldp.c:lldp_private_8021_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12997/LLDP: Don't use an 8-bit loop counter.
If you have a
for (i = 0; i < N; i++)
loop, you'd better make sure that i is big enough to hold N - not N-1,
N.
The TLV length here is 9 bits long, not 8 bits long, so an 8-bit loop
counter will overflow and you can loop infinitely.
This fixes an infinite loop discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s).
Clean up the output a bit while we're at it. | Medium | 167,910 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::AdjustSurfaceProtection() {
bool surface_is_protected =
current_surface_ ||
!host_->is_hidden() ||
(current_surface_is_protected_ &&
(pending_thumbnail_tasks_ > 0 ||
current_surface_in_use_by_compositor_));
if (current_surface_is_protected_ == surface_is_protected)
return;
current_surface_is_protected_ = surface_is_protected;
++protection_state_id_;
if (!surface_route_id_ || !shared_surface_handle_.parent_gpu_process_id)
return;
RenderWidgetHostImpl::SendFrontSurfaceIsProtected(
surface_is_protected,
protection_state_id_,
surface_route_id_,
shared_surface_handle_.parent_gpu_process_id);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X does not properly implement signal handling for Native Client (aka NaCl) code, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,376 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long mkvparser::UnserializeString(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos,
long long size_, char*& str) {
delete[] str;
str = NULL;
if (size_ >= LONG_MAX) // we need (size+1) chars
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
const long size = static_cast<long>(size_);
str = new (std::nothrow) char[size + 1];
if (str == NULL)
return -1;
unsigned char* const buf = reinterpret_cast<unsigned char*>(str);
const long status = pReader->Read(pos, size, buf);
if (status) {
delete[] str;
str = NULL;
return status;
}
str[size] = '\0';
return 0; // success
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
| High | 173,867 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: NeXTDecode(TIFF* tif, uint8* buf, tmsize_t occ, uint16 s)
{
static const char module[] = "NeXTDecode";
unsigned char *bp, *op;
tmsize_t cc;
uint8* row;
tmsize_t scanline, n;
(void) s;
/*
* Each scanline is assumed to start off as all
* white (we assume a PhotometricInterpretation
* of ``min-is-black'').
*/
for (op = (unsigned char*) buf, cc = occ; cc-- > 0;)
*op++ = 0xff;
bp = (unsigned char *)tif->tif_rawcp;
cc = tif->tif_rawcc;
scanline = tif->tif_scanlinesize;
if (occ % scanline)
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module, "Fractional scanlines cannot be read");
return (0);
}
for (row = buf; cc > 0 && occ > 0; occ -= scanline, row += scanline) {
n = *bp++, cc--;
switch (n) {
case LITERALROW:
/*
* The entire scanline is given as literal values.
*/
if (cc < scanline)
goto bad;
_TIFFmemcpy(row, bp, scanline);
bp += scanline;
cc -= scanline;
break;
case LITERALSPAN: {
tmsize_t off;
/*
* The scanline has a literal span that begins at some
* offset.
*/
if( cc < 4 )
goto bad;
off = (bp[0] * 256) + bp[1];
n = (bp[2] * 256) + bp[3];
if (cc < 4+n || off+n > scanline)
goto bad;
_TIFFmemcpy(row+off, bp+4, n);
bp += 4+n;
cc -= 4+n;
break;
}
default: {
uint32 npixels = 0, grey;
uint32 imagewidth = tif->tif_dir.td_imagewidth;
if( isTiled(tif) )
imagewidth = tif->tif_dir.td_tilewidth;
/*
* The scanline is composed of a sequence of constant
* color ``runs''. We shift into ``run mode'' and
* interpret bytes as codes of the form
* <color><npixels> until we've filled the scanline.
*/
op = row;
for (;;) {
grey = (uint32)((n>>6) & 0x3);
n &= 0x3f;
/*
* Ensure the run does not exceed the scanline
* bounds, potentially resulting in a security
* issue.
*/
while (n-- > 0 && npixels < imagewidth)
SETPIXEL(op, grey);
if (npixels >= imagewidth)
break;
if (cc == 0)
goto bad;
n = *bp++, cc--;
}
break;
}
}
}
tif->tif_rawcp = (uint8*) bp;
tif->tif_rawcc = cc;
return (1);
bad:
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module, "Not enough data for scanline %ld",
(long) tif->tif_row);
return (0);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The NeXTDecode function in tif_next.c in LibTIFF allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds write) via a crafted TIFF image, as demonstrated by libtiff5.tif.
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_next.c: fix potential out-of-bound write in NeXTDecode()
triggered by http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/vulns/libtiff5.tif
(bugzilla #2508) | Medium | 167,499 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: zsetstrokecolor(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p)
{
int code;
code = zswapcolors(i_ctx_p);
if (code < 0)
/* Set up for the continuation procedure which will finish by restoring the fill colour space */
/* Make sure the exec stack has enough space */
check_estack(1);
/* Now, the actual continuation routine */
push_op_estack(setstrokecolor_cont);
code = zsetcolor(i_ctx_p);
if (code >= 0)
if (code >= 0)
return o_push_estack;
return code;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: An issue was discovered in Artifex Ghostscript before 9.24. Incorrect exec stack handling in the "CS" and "SC" PDF primitives could be used by remote attackers able to supply crafted PDFs to crash the interpreter or possibly have unspecified other impact.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,699 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void RenderThreadImpl::Init(
const scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner>& resource_task_queue) {
TRACE_EVENT0("startup", "RenderThreadImpl::Init");
base::trace_event::TraceLog::GetInstance()->SetThreadSortIndex(
base::PlatformThread::CurrentId(),
kTraceEventRendererMainThreadSortIndex);
#if BUILDFLAG(USE_EXTERNAL_POPUP_MENU)
blink::WebView::SetUseExternalPopupMenus(true);
#endif
lazy_tls.Pointer()->Set(this);
ChildProcess::current()->set_main_thread(this);
metrics::InitializeSingleSampleMetricsFactory(
base::BindRepeating(&CreateSingleSampleMetricsProvider,
message_loop()->task_runner(), GetConnector()));
gpu_ = ui::Gpu::Create(
GetConnector(),
IsRunningInMash() ? ui::mojom::kServiceName : mojom::kBrowserServiceName,
GetIOTaskRunner());
viz::mojom::SharedBitmapAllocationNotifierPtr
shared_bitmap_allocation_notifier_ptr;
GetConnector()->BindInterface(
mojom::kBrowserServiceName,
mojo::MakeRequest(&shared_bitmap_allocation_notifier_ptr));
shared_bitmap_manager_ = std::make_unique<viz::ClientSharedBitmapManager>(
viz::mojom::ThreadSafeSharedBitmapAllocationNotifierPtr::Create(
shared_bitmap_allocation_notifier_ptr.PassInterface(),
GetChannel()->ipc_task_runner_refptr()));
notification_dispatcher_ =
new NotificationDispatcher(thread_safe_sender());
AddFilter(notification_dispatcher_->GetFilter());
resource_dispatcher_.reset(new ResourceDispatcher(
this, message_loop()->task_runner()));
resource_message_filter_ =
new ChildResourceMessageFilter(resource_dispatcher_.get());
AddFilter(resource_message_filter_.get());
quota_message_filter_ =
new QuotaMessageFilter(thread_safe_sender());
quota_dispatcher_.reset(new QuotaDispatcher(thread_safe_sender(),
quota_message_filter_.get()));
AddFilter(quota_message_filter_->GetFilter());
auto registry = std::make_unique<service_manager::BinderRegistry>();
BlinkInterfaceRegistryImpl interface_registry(registry->GetWeakPtr());
InitializeWebKit(resource_task_queue, &interface_registry);
blink_initialized_time_ = base::TimeTicks::Now();
webkit_shared_timer_suspended_ = false;
widget_count_ = 0;
hidden_widget_count_ = 0;
idle_notification_delay_in_ms_ = kInitialIdleHandlerDelayMs;
idle_notifications_to_skip_ = 0;
appcache_dispatcher_.reset(
new AppCacheDispatcher(Get(), new AppCacheFrontendImpl()));
dom_storage_dispatcher_.reset(new DomStorageDispatcher());
main_thread_indexed_db_dispatcher_.reset(new IndexedDBDispatcher());
main_thread_cache_storage_dispatcher_.reset(
new CacheStorageDispatcher(thread_safe_sender()));
file_system_dispatcher_.reset(new FileSystemDispatcher());
resource_dispatch_throttler_.reset(new ResourceDispatchThrottler(
static_cast<RenderThread*>(this), renderer_scheduler_.get(),
base::TimeDelta::FromSecondsD(kThrottledResourceRequestFlushPeriodS),
kMaxResourceRequestsPerFlushWhenThrottled));
resource_dispatcher_->set_message_sender(resource_dispatch_throttler_.get());
blob_message_filter_ = new BlobMessageFilter(GetFileThreadTaskRunner());
AddFilter(blob_message_filter_.get());
vc_manager_.reset(new VideoCaptureImplManager());
browser_plugin_manager_.reset(new BrowserPluginManager());
AddObserver(browser_plugin_manager_.get());
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_WEBRTC)
peer_connection_tracker_.reset(new PeerConnectionTracker());
AddObserver(peer_connection_tracker_.get());
p2p_socket_dispatcher_ = new P2PSocketDispatcher(GetIOTaskRunner().get());
AddFilter(p2p_socket_dispatcher_.get());
peer_connection_factory_.reset(
new PeerConnectionDependencyFactory(p2p_socket_dispatcher_.get()));
aec_dump_message_filter_ = new AecDumpMessageFilter(
GetIOTaskRunner(), message_loop()->task_runner());
AddFilter(aec_dump_message_filter_.get());
#endif // BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_WEBRTC)
audio_input_message_filter_ = new AudioInputMessageFilter(GetIOTaskRunner());
AddFilter(audio_input_message_filter_.get());
scoped_refptr<AudioMessageFilter> audio_message_filter;
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
features::kUseMojoAudioOutputStreamFactory)) {
audio_message_filter =
base::MakeRefCounted<AudioMessageFilter>(GetIOTaskRunner());
AddFilter(audio_message_filter.get());
}
audio_ipc_factory_.emplace(std::move(audio_message_filter),
GetIOTaskRunner());
midi_message_filter_ = new MidiMessageFilter(GetIOTaskRunner());
AddFilter(midi_message_filter_.get());
AddFilter((new CacheStorageMessageFilter(thread_safe_sender()))->GetFilter());
AddFilter((new ServiceWorkerContextMessageFilter())->GetFilter());
#if defined(USE_AURA)
if (IsRunningInMash()) {
CreateRenderWidgetWindowTreeClientFactory(GetServiceManagerConnection());
}
#endif
registry->AddInterface(base::Bind(&SharedWorkerFactoryImpl::Create),
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get());
GetServiceManagerConnection()->AddConnectionFilter(
std::make_unique<SimpleConnectionFilter>(std::move(registry)));
{
auto registry_with_source_info =
std::make_unique<service_manager::BinderRegistryWithArgs<
const service_manager::BindSourceInfo&>>();
registry_with_source_info->AddInterface(
base::Bind(&CreateFrameFactory), base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get());
GetServiceManagerConnection()->AddConnectionFilter(
std::make_unique<SimpleConnectionFilterWithSourceInfo>(
std::move(registry_with_source_info)));
}
GetContentClient()->renderer()->RenderThreadStarted();
StartServiceManagerConnection();
GetAssociatedInterfaceRegistry()->AddInterface(
base::Bind(&RenderThreadImpl::OnRendererInterfaceRequest,
base::Unretained(this)));
InitSkiaEventTracer();
base::trace_event::MemoryDumpManager::GetInstance()->RegisterDumpProvider(
skia::SkiaMemoryDumpProvider::GetInstance(), "Skia", nullptr);
const base::CommandLine& command_line =
*base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
#if defined(ENABLE_IPC_FUZZER)
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kIpcDumpDirectory)) {
base::FilePath dump_directory =
command_line.GetSwitchValuePath(switches::kIpcDumpDirectory);
IPC::ChannelProxy::OutgoingMessageFilter* filter =
LoadExternalIPCDumper(dump_directory);
GetChannel()->set_outgoing_message_filter(filter);
}
#endif
cc::SetClientNameForMetrics("Renderer");
is_threaded_animation_enabled_ =
!command_line.HasSwitch(cc::switches::kDisableThreadedAnimation);
is_zero_copy_enabled_ = command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableZeroCopy);
is_partial_raster_enabled_ =
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisablePartialRaster);
is_gpu_memory_buffer_compositor_resources_enabled_ = command_line.HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableGpuMemoryBufferCompositorResources);
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
is_elastic_overscroll_enabled_ = true;
#else
is_elastic_overscroll_enabled_ = false;
#endif
std::string image_texture_target_string =
command_line.GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kContentImageTextureTarget);
buffer_to_texture_target_map_ =
viz::StringToBufferToTextureTargetMap(image_texture_target_string);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableLCDText)) {
is_lcd_text_enabled_ = false;
} else if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableLCDText)) {
is_lcd_text_enabled_ = true;
} else {
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
is_lcd_text_enabled_ = false;
#else
is_lcd_text_enabled_ = true;
#endif
}
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableGpuCompositing))
is_gpu_compositing_disabled_ = true;
is_gpu_rasterization_forced_ =
command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kForceGpuRasterization);
is_async_worker_context_enabled_ =
command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableGpuAsyncWorkerContext);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kGpuRasterizationMSAASampleCount)) {
std::string string_value = command_line.GetSwitchValueASCII(
switches::kGpuRasterizationMSAASampleCount);
bool parsed_msaa_sample_count =
base::StringToInt(string_value, &gpu_rasterization_msaa_sample_count_);
DCHECK(parsed_msaa_sample_count) << string_value;
DCHECK_GE(gpu_rasterization_msaa_sample_count_, 0);
} else {
gpu_rasterization_msaa_sample_count_ = -1;
}
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableDistanceFieldText)) {
is_distance_field_text_enabled_ = false;
} else if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableDistanceFieldText)) {
is_distance_field_text_enabled_ = true;
} else {
is_distance_field_text_enabled_ = false;
}
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableCompositorImageAnimations(
command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableCompositorImageAnimations));
media::InitializeMediaLibrary();
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableAcceleratedVideoDecode) &&
media::MediaCodecUtil::IsMediaCodecAvailable()) {
media::EnablePlatformDecoderSupport();
}
#endif
memory_pressure_listener_.reset(new base::MemoryPressureListener(
base::Bind(&RenderThreadImpl::OnMemoryPressure, base::Unretained(this)),
base::Bind(&RenderThreadImpl::OnSyncMemoryPressure,
base::Unretained(this))));
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kMemoryCoordinator)) {
base::MemoryPressureListener::SetNotificationsSuppressed(true);
mojom::MemoryCoordinatorHandlePtr parent_coordinator;
GetConnector()->BindInterface(mojom::kBrowserServiceName,
mojo::MakeRequest(&parent_coordinator));
memory_coordinator_ = CreateChildMemoryCoordinator(
std::move(parent_coordinator), this);
}
int num_raster_threads = 0;
std::string string_value =
command_line.GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kNumRasterThreads);
bool parsed_num_raster_threads =
base::StringToInt(string_value, &num_raster_threads);
DCHECK(parsed_num_raster_threads) << string_value;
DCHECK_GT(num_raster_threads, 0);
categorized_worker_pool_->Start(num_raster_threads);
discardable_memory::mojom::DiscardableSharedMemoryManagerPtr manager_ptr;
if (IsRunningInMash()) {
#if defined(USE_AURA)
GetServiceManagerConnection()->GetConnector()->BindInterface(
ui::mojom::kServiceName, &manager_ptr);
#else
NOTREACHED();
#endif
} else {
ChildThread::Get()->GetConnector()->BindInterface(
mojom::kBrowserServiceName, mojo::MakeRequest(&manager_ptr));
}
discardable_shared_memory_manager_ = std::make_unique<
discardable_memory::ClientDiscardableSharedMemoryManager>(
std::move(manager_ptr), GetIOTaskRunner());
base::DiscardableMemoryAllocator::SetInstance(
discardable_shared_memory_manager_.get());
GetConnector()->BindInterface(mojom::kBrowserServiceName,
mojo::MakeRequest(&storage_partition_service_));
#if defined(OS_LINUX)
ChildProcess::current()->SetIOThreadPriority(base::ThreadPriority::DISPLAY);
ChildThreadImpl::current()->SetThreadPriority(
categorized_worker_pool_->background_worker_thread_id(),
base::ThreadPriority::BACKGROUND);
#endif
process_foregrounded_count_ = 0;
needs_to_record_first_active_paint_ = false;
was_backgrounded_time_ = base::TimeTicks::Min();
base::MemoryCoordinatorClientRegistry::GetInstance()->Register(this);
if (!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kSingleProcess))
base::SequencedWorkerPool::EnableForProcess();
EVP_set_buggy_rsa_parser(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kBuggyRSAParser));
GetConnector()->BindInterface(mojom::kBrowserServiceName,
mojo::MakeRequest(&frame_sink_provider_));
if (!is_gpu_compositing_disabled_) {
GetConnector()->BindInterface(
mojom::kBrowserServiceName,
mojo::MakeRequest(&compositing_mode_reporter_));
viz::mojom::CompositingModeWatcherPtr watcher_ptr;
compositing_mode_watcher_binding_.Bind(mojo::MakeRequest(&watcher_ptr));
compositing_mode_reporter_->AddCompositingModeWatcher(
std::move(watcher_ptr));
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: Inappropriate implementation in BoringSSL SPAKE2 in Google Chrome prior to 63.0.3239.84 allowed a remote attacker to leak the low-order bits of SHA512(password) by inspecting protocol traffic.
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774} | Medium | 172,934 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int journal_unmap_buffer(journal_t *journal, struct buffer_head *bh)
{
transaction_t *transaction;
struct journal_head *jh;
int may_free = 1;
int ret;
BUFFER_TRACE(bh, "entry");
/*
* It is safe to proceed here without the j_list_lock because the
* buffers cannot be stolen by try_to_free_buffers as long as we are
* holding the page lock. --sct
*/
if (!buffer_jbd(bh))
goto zap_buffer_unlocked;
/* OK, we have data buffer in journaled mode */
write_lock(&journal->j_state_lock);
jbd_lock_bh_state(bh);
spin_lock(&journal->j_list_lock);
jh = jbd2_journal_grab_journal_head(bh);
if (!jh)
goto zap_buffer_no_jh;
/*
* We cannot remove the buffer from checkpoint lists until the
* transaction adding inode to orphan list (let's call it T)
* is committed. Otherwise if the transaction changing the
* buffer would be cleaned from the journal before T is
* committed, a crash will cause that the correct contents of
* the buffer will be lost. On the other hand we have to
* clear the buffer dirty bit at latest at the moment when the
* transaction marking the buffer as freed in the filesystem
* structures is committed because from that moment on the
* buffer can be reallocated and used by a different page.
* Since the block hasn't been freed yet but the inode has
* already been added to orphan list, it is safe for us to add
* the buffer to BJ_Forget list of the newest transaction.
*/
transaction = jh->b_transaction;
if (transaction == NULL) {
/* First case: not on any transaction. If it
* has no checkpoint link, then we can zap it:
* it's a writeback-mode buffer so we don't care
* if it hits disk safely. */
if (!jh->b_cp_transaction) {
JBUFFER_TRACE(jh, "not on any transaction: zap");
goto zap_buffer;
}
if (!buffer_dirty(bh)) {
/* bdflush has written it. We can drop it now */
goto zap_buffer;
}
/* OK, it must be in the journal but still not
* written fully to disk: it's metadata or
* journaled data... */
if (journal->j_running_transaction) {
/* ... and once the current transaction has
* committed, the buffer won't be needed any
* longer. */
JBUFFER_TRACE(jh, "checkpointed: add to BJ_Forget");
ret = __dispose_buffer(jh,
journal->j_running_transaction);
jbd2_journal_put_journal_head(jh);
spin_unlock(&journal->j_list_lock);
jbd_unlock_bh_state(bh);
write_unlock(&journal->j_state_lock);
return ret;
} else {
/* There is no currently-running transaction. So the
* orphan record which we wrote for this file must have
* passed into commit. We must attach this buffer to
* the committing transaction, if it exists. */
if (journal->j_committing_transaction) {
JBUFFER_TRACE(jh, "give to committing trans");
ret = __dispose_buffer(jh,
journal->j_committing_transaction);
jbd2_journal_put_journal_head(jh);
spin_unlock(&journal->j_list_lock);
jbd_unlock_bh_state(bh);
write_unlock(&journal->j_state_lock);
return ret;
} else {
/* The orphan record's transaction has
* committed. We can cleanse this buffer */
clear_buffer_jbddirty(bh);
goto zap_buffer;
}
}
} else if (transaction == journal->j_committing_transaction) {
JBUFFER_TRACE(jh, "on committing transaction");
/*
* The buffer is committing, we simply cannot touch
* it. So we just set j_next_transaction to the
* running transaction (if there is one) and mark
* buffer as freed so that commit code knows it should
* clear dirty bits when it is done with the buffer.
*/
set_buffer_freed(bh);
if (journal->j_running_transaction && buffer_jbddirty(bh))
jh->b_next_transaction = journal->j_running_transaction;
jbd2_journal_put_journal_head(jh);
spin_unlock(&journal->j_list_lock);
jbd_unlock_bh_state(bh);
write_unlock(&journal->j_state_lock);
return 0;
} else {
/* Good, the buffer belongs to the running transaction.
* We are writing our own transaction's data, not any
* previous one's, so it is safe to throw it away
* (remember that we expect the filesystem to have set
* i_size already for this truncate so recovery will not
* expose the disk blocks we are discarding here.) */
J_ASSERT_JH(jh, transaction == journal->j_running_transaction);
JBUFFER_TRACE(jh, "on running transaction");
may_free = __dispose_buffer(jh, transaction);
}
zap_buffer:
jbd2_journal_put_journal_head(jh);
zap_buffer_no_jh:
spin_unlock(&journal->j_list_lock);
jbd_unlock_bh_state(bh);
write_unlock(&journal->j_state_lock);
zap_buffer_unlocked:
clear_buffer_dirty(bh);
J_ASSERT_BH(bh, !buffer_jbddirty(bh));
clear_buffer_mapped(bh);
clear_buffer_req(bh);
clear_buffer_new(bh);
bh->b_bdev = NULL;
return may_free;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The journal_unmap_buffer function in fs/jbd2/transaction.c in the Linux kernel before 3.3.1 does not properly handle the _Delay and _Unwritten buffer head states, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) by leveraging the presence of an ext4 filesystem that was mounted with a journal.
Commit Message: jbd2: clear BH_Delay & BH_Unwritten in journal_unmap_buffer
journal_unmap_buffer()'s zap_buffer: code clears a lot of buffer head
state ala discard_buffer(), but does not touch _Delay or _Unwritten as
discard_buffer() does.
This can be problematic in some areas of the ext4 code which assume
that if they have found a buffer marked unwritten or delay, then it's
a live one. Perhaps those spots should check whether it is mapped
as well, but if jbd2 is going to tear down a buffer, let's really
tear it down completely.
Without this I get some fsx failures on sub-page-block filesystems
up until v3.2, at which point 4e96b2dbbf1d7e81f22047a50f862555a6cb87cb
and 189e868fa8fdca702eb9db9d8afc46b5cb9144c9 make the failures go
away, because buried within that large change is some more flag
clearing. I still think it's worth doing in jbd2, since
->invalidatepage leads here directly, and it's the right place
to clear away these flags.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] | Medium | 165,741 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PanelSettingsMenuModel::PanelSettingsMenuModel(Panel* panel)
: ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(ui::SimpleMenuModel(this)),
panel_(panel) {
const Extension* extension = panel_->GetExtension();
DCHECK(extension);
AddItem(COMMAND_NAME, UTF8ToUTF16(extension->name()));
AddSeparator();
AddItem(COMMAND_CONFIGURE, l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_OPTIONS));
AddItem(COMMAND_DISABLE, l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_DISABLE));
AddItem(COMMAND_UNINSTALL,
l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_UNINSTALL,
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_SHORT_PRODUCT_NAME)));
AddSeparator();
AddItem(COMMAND_MANAGE, l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_MANAGE_EXTENSIONS));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Skia, as used in Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.52, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: [i18n-fixlet] Make strings branding specific in extension code.
IDS_EXTENSIONS_UNINSTALL
IDS_EXTENSIONS_INCOGNITO_WARNING
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING
IDS_EXTENSION_ALERT_ITEM_EXTERNAL And fix a $1 $1 bug.
IDS_EXTENSION_INLINE_INSTALL_PROMPT_TITLE
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9107061
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@118018 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,983 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: kg_unseal_v1_iov(krb5_context context,
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx,
gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov,
int iov_count,
size_t token_wrapper_len,
int *conf_state,
gss_qop_t *qop_state,
int toktype)
{
OM_uint32 code;
gss_iov_buffer_t header;
gss_iov_buffer_t trailer;
unsigned char *ptr;
int sealalg;
int signalg;
krb5_checksum cksum;
krb5_checksum md5cksum;
size_t cksum_len = 0;
size_t conflen = 0;
int direction;
krb5_ui_4 seqnum;
OM_uint32 retval;
size_t sumlen;
krb5_keyusage sign_usage = KG_USAGE_SIGN;
md5cksum.length = cksum.length = 0;
md5cksum.contents = cksum.contents = NULL;
header = kg_locate_header_iov(iov, iov_count, toktype);
assert(header != NULL);
trailer = kg_locate_iov(iov, iov_count, GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_TRAILER);
if (trailer != NULL && trailer->buffer.length != 0) {
*minor_status = (OM_uint32)KRB5_BAD_MSIZE;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
if (header->buffer.length < token_wrapper_len + 14) {
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
ptr = (unsigned char *)header->buffer.value + token_wrapper_len;
signalg = ptr[0];
signalg |= ptr[1] << 8;
sealalg = ptr[2];
sealalg |= ptr[3] << 8;
if (ptr[4] != 0xFF || ptr[5] != 0xFF) {
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
if (toktype != KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG && sealalg != 0xFFFF) {
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
if (toktype == KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG &&
!(sealalg == 0xFFFF || sealalg == ctx->sealalg)) {
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
if ((ctx->sealalg == SEAL_ALG_NONE && signalg > 1) ||
(ctx->sealalg == SEAL_ALG_1 && signalg != SGN_ALG_3) ||
(ctx->sealalg == SEAL_ALG_DES3KD &&
signalg != SGN_ALG_HMAC_SHA1_DES3_KD)||
(ctx->sealalg == SEAL_ALG_MICROSOFT_RC4 &&
signalg != SGN_ALG_HMAC_MD5)) {
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
switch (signalg) {
case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5:
case SGN_ALG_MD2_5:
case SGN_ALG_HMAC_MD5:
cksum_len = 8;
if (toktype != KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG)
sign_usage = 15;
break;
case SGN_ALG_3:
cksum_len = 16;
break;
case SGN_ALG_HMAC_SHA1_DES3_KD:
cksum_len = 20;
break;
default:
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
/* get the token parameters */
code = kg_get_seq_num(context, ctx->seq, ptr + 14, ptr + 6, &direction,
&seqnum);
if (code != 0) {
*minor_status = code;
return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
}
/* decode the message, if SEAL */
if (toktype == KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG) {
if (sealalg != 0xFFFF) {
if (ctx->sealalg == SEAL_ALG_MICROSOFT_RC4) {
unsigned char bigend_seqnum[4];
krb5_keyblock *enc_key;
size_t i;
store_32_be(seqnum, bigend_seqnum);
code = krb5_k_key_keyblock(context, ctx->enc, &enc_key);
if (code != 0) {
retval = GSS_S_FAILURE;
goto cleanup;
}
assert(enc_key->length == 16);
for (i = 0; i < enc_key->length; i++)
((char *)enc_key->contents)[i] ^= 0xF0;
code = kg_arcfour_docrypt_iov(context, enc_key, 0,
&bigend_seqnum[0], 4,
iov, iov_count);
krb5_free_keyblock(context, enc_key);
} else {
code = kg_decrypt_iov(context, 0,
((ctx->gss_flags & GSS_C_DCE_STYLE) != 0),
0 /*EC*/, 0 /*RRC*/,
ctx->enc, KG_USAGE_SEAL, NULL,
iov, iov_count);
}
if (code != 0) {
retval = GSS_S_FAILURE;
goto cleanup;
}
}
conflen = kg_confounder_size(context, ctx->enc->keyblock.enctype);
}
if (header->buffer.length != token_wrapper_len + 14 + cksum_len + conflen) {
retval = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
goto cleanup;
}
/* compute the checksum of the message */
/* initialize the checksum */
switch (signalg) {
case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5:
case SGN_ALG_MD2_5:
case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC:
case SGN_ALG_3:
md5cksum.checksum_type = CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5;
break;
case SGN_ALG_HMAC_MD5:
md5cksum.checksum_type = CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_MD5_ARCFOUR;
break;
case SGN_ALG_HMAC_SHA1_DES3_KD:
md5cksum.checksum_type = CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_DES3;
break;
default:
abort();
}
code = krb5_c_checksum_length(context, md5cksum.checksum_type, &sumlen);
if (code != 0) {
retval = GSS_S_FAILURE;
goto cleanup;
}
md5cksum.length = sumlen;
/* compute the checksum of the message */
code = kg_make_checksum_iov_v1(context, md5cksum.checksum_type,
cksum_len, ctx->seq, ctx->enc,
sign_usage, iov, iov_count, toktype,
&md5cksum);
if (code != 0) {
retval = GSS_S_FAILURE;
goto cleanup;
}
switch (signalg) {
case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5:
case SGN_ALG_3:
code = kg_encrypt_inplace(context, ctx->seq, KG_USAGE_SEAL,
(g_OID_equal(ctx->mech_used,
gss_mech_krb5_old) ?
ctx->seq->keyblock.contents : NULL),
md5cksum.contents, 16);
if (code != 0) {
retval = GSS_S_FAILURE;
goto cleanup;
}
cksum.length = cksum_len;
cksum.contents = md5cksum.contents + 16 - cksum.length;
code = k5_bcmp(cksum.contents, ptr + 14, cksum.length);
break;
case SGN_ALG_HMAC_SHA1_DES3_KD:
case SGN_ALG_HMAC_MD5:
code = k5_bcmp(md5cksum.contents, ptr + 14, cksum_len);
break;
default:
code = 0;
retval = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
goto cleanup;
break;
}
if (code != 0) {
code = 0;
retval = GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* For GSS_C_DCE_STYLE, the caller manages the padding, because the
* pad length is in the RPC PDU. The value of the padding may be
* uninitialized. For normal GSS, the last bytes of the decrypted
* data contain the pad length. kg_fixup_padding_iov() will find
* this and fixup the last data IOV appropriately.
*/
if (toktype == KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG &&
(ctx->gss_flags & GSS_C_DCE_STYLE) == 0) {
retval = kg_fixup_padding_iov(&code, iov, iov_count);
if (retval != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
goto cleanup;
}
if (conf_state != NULL)
*conf_state = (sealalg != 0xFFFF);
if (qop_state != NULL)
*qop_state = GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT;
if ((ctx->initiate && direction != 0xff) ||
(!ctx->initiate && direction != 0)) {
*minor_status = (OM_uint32)G_BAD_DIRECTION;
retval = GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
}
code = 0;
retval = g_order_check(&ctx->seqstate, (gssint_uint64)seqnum);
cleanup:
krb5_free_checksum_contents(context, &md5cksum);
*minor_status = code;
return retval;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) 1.7.x through 1.12.x before 1.12.2 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (buffer over-read or NULL pointer dereference, and application crash) by injecting invalid tokens into a GSSAPI application session.
Commit Message: Handle invalid RFC 1964 tokens [CVE-2014-4341...]
Detect the following cases which would otherwise cause invalid memory
accesses and/or integer underflow:
* An RFC 1964 token being processed by an RFC 4121-only context
[CVE-2014-4342]
* A header with fewer than 22 bytes after the token ID or an
incomplete checksum [CVE-2014-4341 CVE-2014-4342]
* A ciphertext shorter than the confounder [CVE-2014-4341]
* A declared padding length longer than the plaintext [CVE-2014-4341]
If we detect a bad pad byte, continue on to compute the checksum to
avoid creating a padding oracle, but treat the checksum as invalid
even if it compares equal.
CVE-2014-4341:
In MIT krb5, an unauthenticated remote attacker with the ability to
inject packets into a legitimately established GSSAPI application
session can cause a program crash due to invalid memory references
when attempting to read beyond the end of a buffer.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
CVE-2014-4342:
In MIT krb5 releases krb5-1.7 and later, an unauthenticated remote
attacker with the ability to inject packets into a legitimately
established GSSAPI application session can cause a program crash due
to invalid memory references when reading beyond the end of a buffer
or by causing a null pointer dereference.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[[email protected]: CVE summaries, CVSS]
(cherry picked from commit fb99962cbd063ac04c9a9d2cc7c75eab73f3533d)
ticket: 7949
version_fixed: 1.12.2
status: resolved | Medium | 166,313 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void EC_GROUP_clear_free(EC_GROUP *group)
{
if (!group) return;
if (group->meth->group_clear_finish != 0)
group->meth->group_clear_finish(group);
else if (group->meth->group_finish != 0)
group->meth->group_finish(group);
EC_EX_DATA_clear_free_all_data(&group->extra_data);
if (group->generator != NULL)
EC_EX_DATA_clear_free_all_data(&group->extra_data);
if (group->generator != NULL)
EC_POINT_clear_free(group->generator);
BN_clear_free(&group->order);
OPENSSL_cleanse(group, sizeof *group);
OPENSSL_free(group);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-320
Summary: A timing attack flaw was found in OpenSSL 1.0.1u and before that could allow a malicious user with local access to recover ECDSA P-256 private keys.
Commit Message: | Low | 165,506 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int hci_sock_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
struct hci_ufilter uf;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
int len, opt, err = 0;
BT_DBG("sk %p, opt %d", sk, optname);
if (get_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
lock_sock(sk);
if (hci_pi(sk)->channel != HCI_CHANNEL_RAW) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto done;
}
switch (optname) {
case HCI_DATA_DIR:
if (hci_pi(sk)->cmsg_mask & HCI_CMSG_DIR)
opt = 1;
else
opt = 0;
if (put_user(opt, optval))
err = -EFAULT;
break;
case HCI_TIME_STAMP:
if (hci_pi(sk)->cmsg_mask & HCI_CMSG_TSTAMP)
opt = 1;
else
opt = 0;
if (put_user(opt, optval))
err = -EFAULT;
break;
case HCI_FILTER:
{
struct hci_filter *f = &hci_pi(sk)->filter;
uf.type_mask = f->type_mask;
uf.opcode = f->opcode;
uf.event_mask[0] = *((u32 *) f->event_mask + 0);
uf.event_mask[1] = *((u32 *) f->event_mask + 1);
}
len = min_t(unsigned int, len, sizeof(uf));
if (copy_to_user(optval, &uf, len))
err = -EFAULT;
break;
default:
err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
}
done:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The Bluetooth protocol stack in the Linux kernel before 3.6 does not properly initialize certain structures, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a crafted application that targets the (1) L2CAP or (2) HCI implementation.
Commit Message: Bluetooth: HCI - Fix info leak in getsockopt(HCI_FILTER)
The HCI code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of struct
hci_ufilter before copying it to userland -- that for leaking two
bytes kernel stack. Add an explicit memset(0) before filling the
structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <[email protected]>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Low | 166,182 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_asconf_ack(struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type, void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
struct sctp_chunk *asconf_ack = arg;
struct sctp_chunk *last_asconf = asoc->addip_last_asconf;
struct sctp_chunk *abort;
struct sctp_paramhdr *err_param = NULL;
sctp_addiphdr_t *addip_hdr;
__u32 sent_serial, rcvd_serial;
if (!sctp_vtag_verify(asconf_ack, asoc)) {
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPORT_BAD_TAG,
SCTP_NULL());
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
}
/* ADD-IP, Section 4.1.2:
* This chunk MUST be sent in an authenticated way by using
* the mechanism defined in [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-sctp-auth]. If this chunk
* is received unauthenticated it MUST be silently discarded as
* described in [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-sctp-auth].
*/
if (!net->sctp.addip_noauth && !asconf_ack->auth)
return sctp_sf_discard_chunk(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
/* Make sure that the ADDIP chunk has a valid length. */
if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(asconf_ack, sizeof(sctp_addip_chunk_t)))
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
commands);
addip_hdr = (sctp_addiphdr_t *)asconf_ack->skb->data;
rcvd_serial = ntohl(addip_hdr->serial);
/* Verify the ASCONF-ACK chunk before processing it. */
if (!sctp_verify_asconf(asoc,
(sctp_paramhdr_t *)addip_hdr->params,
(void *)asconf_ack->chunk_end,
&err_param))
return sctp_sf_violation_paramlen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
(void *)err_param, commands);
if (last_asconf) {
addip_hdr = (sctp_addiphdr_t *)last_asconf->subh.addip_hdr;
sent_serial = ntohl(addip_hdr->serial);
} else {
sent_serial = asoc->addip_serial - 1;
}
/* D0) If an endpoint receives an ASCONF-ACK that is greater than or
* equal to the next serial number to be used but no ASCONF chunk is
* outstanding the endpoint MUST ABORT the association. Note that a
* sequence number is greater than if it is no more than 2^^31-1
* larger than the current sequence number (using serial arithmetic).
*/
if (ADDIP_SERIAL_gte(rcvd_serial, sent_serial + 1) &&
!(asoc->addip_last_asconf)) {
abort = sctp_make_abort(asoc, asconf_ack,
sizeof(sctp_errhdr_t));
if (abort) {
sctp_init_cause(abort, SCTP_ERROR_ASCONF_ACK, 0);
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY,
SCTP_CHUNK(abort));
}
/* We are going to ABORT, so we might as well stop
* processing the rest of the chunks in the packet.
*/
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_TIMER_STOP,
SCTP_TO(SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_T4_RTO));
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_DISCARD_PACKET, SCTP_NULL());
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_SET_SK_ERR,
SCTP_ERROR(ECONNABORTED));
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_FAILED,
SCTP_PERR(SCTP_ERROR_ASCONF_ACK));
SCTP_INC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_ABORTEDS);
SCTP_DEC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_CURRESTAB);
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_ABORT;
}
if ((rcvd_serial == sent_serial) && asoc->addip_last_asconf) {
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_TIMER_STOP,
SCTP_TO(SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_T4_RTO));
if (!sctp_process_asconf_ack((struct sctp_association *)asoc,
asconf_ack)) {
/* Successfully processed ASCONF_ACK. We can
* release the next asconf if we have one.
*/
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_SEND_NEXT_ASCONF,
SCTP_NULL());
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
}
abort = sctp_make_abort(asoc, asconf_ack,
sizeof(sctp_errhdr_t));
if (abort) {
sctp_init_cause(abort, SCTP_ERROR_RSRC_LOW, 0);
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY,
SCTP_CHUNK(abort));
}
/* We are going to ABORT, so we might as well stop
* processing the rest of the chunks in the packet.
*/
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_DISCARD_PACKET, SCTP_NULL());
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_SET_SK_ERR,
SCTP_ERROR(ECONNABORTED));
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_FAILED,
SCTP_PERR(SCTP_ERROR_ASCONF_ACK));
SCTP_INC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_ABORTEDS);
SCTP_DEC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_CURRESTAB);
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_ABORT;
}
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DISCARD;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The SCTP implementation in the Linux kernel through 3.17.2 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (system crash) via a malformed ASCONF chunk, related to net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c and net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c.
Commit Message: net: sctp: fix skb_over_panic when receiving malformed ASCONF chunks
Commit 6f4c618ddb0 ("SCTP : Add paramters validity check for
ASCONF chunk") added basic verification of ASCONF chunks, however,
it is still possible to remotely crash a server by sending a
special crafted ASCONF chunk, even up to pre 2.6.12 kernels:
skb_over_panic: text:ffffffffa01ea1c3 len:31056 put:30768
head:ffff88011bd81800 data:ffff88011bd81800 tail:0x7950
end:0x440 dev:<NULL>
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:129!
[...]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffff8144fb1c>] skb_put+0x5c/0x70
[<ffffffffa01ea1c3>] sctp_addto_chunk+0x63/0xd0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01eadaf>] sctp_process_asconf+0x1af/0x540 [sctp]
[<ffffffff8152d025>] ? _read_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20
[<ffffffffa01e0038>] sctp_sf_do_asconf+0x168/0x240 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp]
[<ffffffff8147645d>] ? fib_rules_lookup+0xad/0xf0
[<ffffffffa01e6b22>] ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x32/0x40 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e8393>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd3/0x180 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter]
[<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff81496ded>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0
[<ffffffff81497078>] ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0
[<ffffffff8149653d>] ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440
[<ffffffff81496ac5>] ip_rcv+0x275/0x350
[<ffffffff8145c88b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750
[<ffffffff81460588>] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x60
This can be triggered e.g., through a simple scripted nmap
connection scan injecting the chunk after the handshake, for
example, ...
-------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
<----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
------------------ ASCONF; UNKNOWN ------------------>
... where ASCONF chunk of length 280 contains 2 parameters ...
1) Add IP address parameter (param length: 16)
2) Add/del IP address parameter (param length: 255)
... followed by an UNKNOWN chunk of e.g. 4 bytes. Here, the
Address Parameter in the ASCONF chunk is even missing, too.
This is just an example and similarly-crafted ASCONF chunks
could be used just as well.
The ASCONF chunk passes through sctp_verify_asconf() as all
parameters passed sanity checks, and after walking, we ended
up successfully at the chunk end boundary, and thus may invoke
sctp_process_asconf(). Parameter walking is done with
WORD_ROUND() to take padding into account.
In sctp_process_asconf()'s TLV processing, we may fail in
sctp_process_asconf_param() e.g., due to removal of the IP
address that is also the source address of the packet containing
the ASCONF chunk, and thus we need to add all TLVs after the
failure to our ASCONF response to remote via helper function
sctp_add_asconf_response(), which basically invokes a
sctp_addto_chunk() adding the error parameters to the given
skb.
When walking to the next parameter this time, we proceed
with ...
length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length);
asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length;
... instead of the WORD_ROUND()'ed length, thus resulting here
in an off-by-one that leads to reading the follow-up garbage
parameter length of 12336, and thus throwing an skb_over_panic
for the reply when trying to sctp_addto_chunk() next time,
which implicitly calls the skb_put() with that length.
Fix it by using sctp_walk_params() [ which is also used in
INIT parameter processing ] macro in the verification *and*
in ASCONF processing: it will make sure we don't spill over,
that we walk parameters WORD_ROUND()'ed. Moreover, we're being
more defensive and guard against unknown parameter types and
missized addresses.
Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.
Fixes: b896b82be4ae ("[SCTP] ADDIP: Support for processing incoming ASCONF_ACK chunks.")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | High | 166,336 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: doProlog(XML_Parser parser, const ENCODING *enc, const char *s, const char *end,
int tok, const char *next, const char **nextPtr, XML_Bool haveMore) {
#ifdef XML_DTD
static const XML_Char externalSubsetName[] = {ASCII_HASH, '\0'};
#endif /* XML_DTD */
static const XML_Char atypeCDATA[]
= {ASCII_C, ASCII_D, ASCII_A, ASCII_T, ASCII_A, '\0'};
static const XML_Char atypeID[] = {ASCII_I, ASCII_D, '\0'};
static const XML_Char atypeIDREF[]
= {ASCII_I, ASCII_D, ASCII_R, ASCII_E, ASCII_F, '\0'};
static const XML_Char atypeIDREFS[]
= {ASCII_I, ASCII_D, ASCII_R, ASCII_E, ASCII_F, ASCII_S, '\0'};
static const XML_Char atypeENTITY[]
= {ASCII_E, ASCII_N, ASCII_T, ASCII_I, ASCII_T, ASCII_Y, '\0'};
static const XML_Char atypeENTITIES[]
= {ASCII_E, ASCII_N, ASCII_T, ASCII_I, ASCII_T,
ASCII_I, ASCII_E, ASCII_S, '\0'};
static const XML_Char atypeNMTOKEN[]
= {ASCII_N, ASCII_M, ASCII_T, ASCII_O, ASCII_K, ASCII_E, ASCII_N, '\0'};
static const XML_Char atypeNMTOKENS[]
= {ASCII_N, ASCII_M, ASCII_T, ASCII_O, ASCII_K,
ASCII_E, ASCII_N, ASCII_S, '\0'};
static const XML_Char notationPrefix[]
= {ASCII_N, ASCII_O, ASCII_T, ASCII_A, ASCII_T,
ASCII_I, ASCII_O, ASCII_N, ASCII_LPAREN, '\0'};
static const XML_Char enumValueSep[] = {ASCII_PIPE, '\0'};
static const XML_Char enumValueStart[] = {ASCII_LPAREN, '\0'};
/* save one level of indirection */
DTD *const dtd = parser->m_dtd;
const char **eventPP;
const char **eventEndPP;
enum XML_Content_Quant quant;
if (enc == parser->m_encoding) {
eventPP = &parser->m_eventPtr;
eventEndPP = &parser->m_eventEndPtr;
} else {
eventPP = &(parser->m_openInternalEntities->internalEventPtr);
eventEndPP = &(parser->m_openInternalEntities->internalEventEndPtr);
}
for (;;) {
int role;
XML_Bool handleDefault = XML_TRUE;
*eventPP = s;
*eventEndPP = next;
if (tok <= 0) {
if (haveMore && tok != XML_TOK_INVALID) {
*nextPtr = s;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
}
switch (tok) {
case XML_TOK_INVALID:
*eventPP = next;
return XML_ERROR_INVALID_TOKEN;
case XML_TOK_PARTIAL:
return XML_ERROR_UNCLOSED_TOKEN;
case XML_TOK_PARTIAL_CHAR:
return XML_ERROR_PARTIAL_CHAR;
case -XML_TOK_PROLOG_S:
tok = -tok;
break;
case XML_TOK_NONE:
#ifdef XML_DTD
/* for internal PE NOT referenced between declarations */
if (enc != parser->m_encoding
&& ! parser->m_openInternalEntities->betweenDecl) {
*nextPtr = s;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
}
/* WFC: PE Between Declarations - must check that PE contains
complete markup, not only for external PEs, but also for
internal PEs if the reference occurs between declarations.
*/
if (parser->m_isParamEntity || enc != parser->m_encoding) {
if (XmlTokenRole(&parser->m_prologState, XML_TOK_NONE, end, end, enc)
== XML_ROLE_ERROR)
return XML_ERROR_INCOMPLETE_PE;
*nextPtr = s;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
}
#endif /* XML_DTD */
return XML_ERROR_NO_ELEMENTS;
default:
tok = -tok;
next = end;
break;
}
}
role = XmlTokenRole(&parser->m_prologState, tok, s, next, enc);
switch (role) {
case XML_ROLE_XML_DECL: {
enum XML_Error result = processXmlDecl(parser, 0, s, next);
if (result != XML_ERROR_NONE)
return result;
enc = parser->m_encoding;
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
} break;
case XML_ROLE_DOCTYPE_NAME:
if (parser->m_startDoctypeDeclHandler) {
parser->m_doctypeName
= poolStoreString(&parser->m_tempPool, enc, s, next);
if (! parser->m_doctypeName)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
poolFinish(&parser->m_tempPool);
parser->m_doctypePubid = NULL;
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
parser->m_doctypeSysid = NULL; /* always initialize to NULL */
break;
case XML_ROLE_DOCTYPE_INTERNAL_SUBSET:
if (parser->m_startDoctypeDeclHandler) {
parser->m_startDoctypeDeclHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_doctypeName, parser->m_doctypeSysid,
parser->m_doctypePubid, 1);
parser->m_doctypeName = NULL;
poolClear(&parser->m_tempPool);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
#ifdef XML_DTD
case XML_ROLE_TEXT_DECL: {
enum XML_Error result = processXmlDecl(parser, 1, s, next);
if (result != XML_ERROR_NONE)
return result;
enc = parser->m_encoding;
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
} break;
#endif /* XML_DTD */
case XML_ROLE_DOCTYPE_PUBLIC_ID:
#ifdef XML_DTD
parser->m_useForeignDTD = XML_FALSE;
parser->m_declEntity = (ENTITY *)lookup(
parser, &dtd->paramEntities, externalSubsetName, sizeof(ENTITY));
if (! parser->m_declEntity)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
#endif /* XML_DTD */
dtd->hasParamEntityRefs = XML_TRUE;
if (parser->m_startDoctypeDeclHandler) {
XML_Char *pubId;
if (! XmlIsPublicId(enc, s, next, eventPP))
return XML_ERROR_PUBLICID;
pubId = poolStoreString(&parser->m_tempPool, enc,
s + enc->minBytesPerChar,
next - enc->minBytesPerChar);
if (! pubId)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
normalizePublicId(pubId);
poolFinish(&parser->m_tempPool);
parser->m_doctypePubid = pubId;
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
goto alreadyChecked;
}
/* fall through */
case XML_ROLE_ENTITY_PUBLIC_ID:
if (! XmlIsPublicId(enc, s, next, eventPP))
return XML_ERROR_PUBLICID;
alreadyChecked:
if (dtd->keepProcessing && parser->m_declEntity) {
XML_Char *tem
= poolStoreString(&dtd->pool, enc, s + enc->minBytesPerChar,
next - enc->minBytesPerChar);
if (! tem)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
normalizePublicId(tem);
parser->m_declEntity->publicId = tem;
poolFinish(&dtd->pool);
/* Don't suppress the default handler if we fell through from
* the XML_ROLE_DOCTYPE_PUBLIC_ID case.
*/
if (parser->m_entityDeclHandler && role == XML_ROLE_ENTITY_PUBLIC_ID)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_DOCTYPE_CLOSE:
if (parser->m_doctypeName) {
parser->m_startDoctypeDeclHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_doctypeName, parser->m_doctypeSysid,
parser->m_doctypePubid, 0);
poolClear(&parser->m_tempPool);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
/* parser->m_doctypeSysid will be non-NULL in the case of a previous
XML_ROLE_DOCTYPE_SYSTEM_ID, even if parser->m_startDoctypeDeclHandler
was not set, indicating an external subset
*/
#ifdef XML_DTD
if (parser->m_doctypeSysid || parser->m_useForeignDTD) {
XML_Bool hadParamEntityRefs = dtd->hasParamEntityRefs;
dtd->hasParamEntityRefs = XML_TRUE;
if (parser->m_paramEntityParsing
&& parser->m_externalEntityRefHandler) {
ENTITY *entity = (ENTITY *)lookup(parser, &dtd->paramEntities,
externalSubsetName, sizeof(ENTITY));
if (! entity) {
/* The external subset name "#" will have already been
* inserted into the hash table at the start of the
* external entity parsing, so no allocation will happen
* and lookup() cannot fail.
*/
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY; /* LCOV_EXCL_LINE */
}
if (parser->m_useForeignDTD)
entity->base = parser->m_curBase;
dtd->paramEntityRead = XML_FALSE;
if (! parser->m_externalEntityRefHandler(
parser->m_externalEntityRefHandlerArg, 0, entity->base,
entity->systemId, entity->publicId))
return XML_ERROR_EXTERNAL_ENTITY_HANDLING;
if (dtd->paramEntityRead) {
if (! dtd->standalone && parser->m_notStandaloneHandler
&& ! parser->m_notStandaloneHandler(parser->m_handlerArg))
return XML_ERROR_NOT_STANDALONE;
}
/* if we didn't read the foreign DTD then this means that there
is no external subset and we must reset dtd->hasParamEntityRefs
*/
else if (! parser->m_doctypeSysid)
dtd->hasParamEntityRefs = hadParamEntityRefs;
/* end of DTD - no need to update dtd->keepProcessing */
}
parser->m_useForeignDTD = XML_FALSE;
}
#endif /* XML_DTD */
if (parser->m_endDoctypeDeclHandler) {
parser->m_endDoctypeDeclHandler(parser->m_handlerArg);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_INSTANCE_START:
#ifdef XML_DTD
/* if there is no DOCTYPE declaration then now is the
last chance to read the foreign DTD
*/
if (parser->m_useForeignDTD) {
XML_Bool hadParamEntityRefs = dtd->hasParamEntityRefs;
dtd->hasParamEntityRefs = XML_TRUE;
if (parser->m_paramEntityParsing
&& parser->m_externalEntityRefHandler) {
ENTITY *entity = (ENTITY *)lookup(parser, &dtd->paramEntities,
externalSubsetName, sizeof(ENTITY));
if (! entity)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
entity->base = parser->m_curBase;
dtd->paramEntityRead = XML_FALSE;
if (! parser->m_externalEntityRefHandler(
parser->m_externalEntityRefHandlerArg, 0, entity->base,
entity->systemId, entity->publicId))
return XML_ERROR_EXTERNAL_ENTITY_HANDLING;
if (dtd->paramEntityRead) {
if (! dtd->standalone && parser->m_notStandaloneHandler
&& ! parser->m_notStandaloneHandler(parser->m_handlerArg))
return XML_ERROR_NOT_STANDALONE;
}
/* if we didn't read the foreign DTD then this means that there
is no external subset and we must reset dtd->hasParamEntityRefs
*/
else
dtd->hasParamEntityRefs = hadParamEntityRefs;
/* end of DTD - no need to update dtd->keepProcessing */
}
}
#endif /* XML_DTD */
parser->m_processor = contentProcessor;
return contentProcessor(parser, s, end, nextPtr);
case XML_ROLE_ATTLIST_ELEMENT_NAME:
parser->m_declElementType = getElementType(parser, enc, s, next);
if (! parser->m_declElementType)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
goto checkAttListDeclHandler;
case XML_ROLE_ATTRIBUTE_NAME:
parser->m_declAttributeId = getAttributeId(parser, enc, s, next);
if (! parser->m_declAttributeId)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
parser->m_declAttributeIsCdata = XML_FALSE;
parser->m_declAttributeType = NULL;
parser->m_declAttributeIsId = XML_FALSE;
goto checkAttListDeclHandler;
case XML_ROLE_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_CDATA:
parser->m_declAttributeIsCdata = XML_TRUE;
parser->m_declAttributeType = atypeCDATA;
goto checkAttListDeclHandler;
case XML_ROLE_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_ID:
parser->m_declAttributeIsId = XML_TRUE;
parser->m_declAttributeType = atypeID;
goto checkAttListDeclHandler;
case XML_ROLE_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_IDREF:
parser->m_declAttributeType = atypeIDREF;
goto checkAttListDeclHandler;
case XML_ROLE_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_IDREFS:
parser->m_declAttributeType = atypeIDREFS;
goto checkAttListDeclHandler;
case XML_ROLE_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_ENTITY:
parser->m_declAttributeType = atypeENTITY;
goto checkAttListDeclHandler;
case XML_ROLE_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_ENTITIES:
parser->m_declAttributeType = atypeENTITIES;
goto checkAttListDeclHandler;
case XML_ROLE_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_NMTOKEN:
parser->m_declAttributeType = atypeNMTOKEN;
goto checkAttListDeclHandler;
case XML_ROLE_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_NMTOKENS:
parser->m_declAttributeType = atypeNMTOKENS;
checkAttListDeclHandler:
if (dtd->keepProcessing && parser->m_attlistDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
break;
case XML_ROLE_ATTRIBUTE_ENUM_VALUE:
case XML_ROLE_ATTRIBUTE_NOTATION_VALUE:
if (dtd->keepProcessing && parser->m_attlistDeclHandler) {
const XML_Char *prefix;
if (parser->m_declAttributeType) {
prefix = enumValueSep;
} else {
prefix = (role == XML_ROLE_ATTRIBUTE_NOTATION_VALUE ? notationPrefix
: enumValueStart);
}
if (! poolAppendString(&parser->m_tempPool, prefix))
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
if (! poolAppend(&parser->m_tempPool, enc, s, next))
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
parser->m_declAttributeType = parser->m_tempPool.start;
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_IMPLIED_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE:
case XML_ROLE_REQUIRED_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE:
if (dtd->keepProcessing) {
if (! defineAttribute(parser->m_declElementType,
parser->m_declAttributeId,
parser->m_declAttributeIsCdata,
parser->m_declAttributeIsId, 0, parser))
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
if (parser->m_attlistDeclHandler && parser->m_declAttributeType) {
if (*parser->m_declAttributeType == XML_T(ASCII_LPAREN)
|| (*parser->m_declAttributeType == XML_T(ASCII_N)
&& parser->m_declAttributeType[1] == XML_T(ASCII_O))) {
/* Enumerated or Notation type */
if (! poolAppendChar(&parser->m_tempPool, XML_T(ASCII_RPAREN))
|| ! poolAppendChar(&parser->m_tempPool, XML_T('\0')))
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
parser->m_declAttributeType = parser->m_tempPool.start;
poolFinish(&parser->m_tempPool);
}
*eventEndPP = s;
parser->m_attlistDeclHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_declElementType->name,
parser->m_declAttributeId->name, parser->m_declAttributeType, 0,
role == XML_ROLE_REQUIRED_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE);
poolClear(&parser->m_tempPool);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_DEFAULT_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE:
case XML_ROLE_FIXED_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE:
if (dtd->keepProcessing) {
const XML_Char *attVal;
enum XML_Error result = storeAttributeValue(
parser, enc, parser->m_declAttributeIsCdata,
s + enc->minBytesPerChar, next - enc->minBytesPerChar, &dtd->pool);
if (result)
return result;
attVal = poolStart(&dtd->pool);
poolFinish(&dtd->pool);
/* ID attributes aren't allowed to have a default */
if (! defineAttribute(
parser->m_declElementType, parser->m_declAttributeId,
parser->m_declAttributeIsCdata, XML_FALSE, attVal, parser))
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
if (parser->m_attlistDeclHandler && parser->m_declAttributeType) {
if (*parser->m_declAttributeType == XML_T(ASCII_LPAREN)
|| (*parser->m_declAttributeType == XML_T(ASCII_N)
&& parser->m_declAttributeType[1] == XML_T(ASCII_O))) {
/* Enumerated or Notation type */
if (! poolAppendChar(&parser->m_tempPool, XML_T(ASCII_RPAREN))
|| ! poolAppendChar(&parser->m_tempPool, XML_T('\0')))
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
parser->m_declAttributeType = parser->m_tempPool.start;
poolFinish(&parser->m_tempPool);
}
*eventEndPP = s;
parser->m_attlistDeclHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_declElementType->name,
parser->m_declAttributeId->name, parser->m_declAttributeType,
attVal, role == XML_ROLE_FIXED_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE);
poolClear(&parser->m_tempPool);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_ENTITY_VALUE:
if (dtd->keepProcessing) {
enum XML_Error result = storeEntityValue(
parser, enc, s + enc->minBytesPerChar, next - enc->minBytesPerChar);
if (parser->m_declEntity) {
parser->m_declEntity->textPtr = poolStart(&dtd->entityValuePool);
parser->m_declEntity->textLen
= (int)(poolLength(&dtd->entityValuePool));
poolFinish(&dtd->entityValuePool);
if (parser->m_entityDeclHandler) {
*eventEndPP = s;
parser->m_entityDeclHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_declEntity->name,
parser->m_declEntity->is_param, parser->m_declEntity->textPtr,
parser->m_declEntity->textLen, parser->m_curBase, 0, 0, 0);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
} else
poolDiscard(&dtd->entityValuePool);
if (result != XML_ERROR_NONE)
return result;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_DOCTYPE_SYSTEM_ID:
#ifdef XML_DTD
parser->m_useForeignDTD = XML_FALSE;
#endif /* XML_DTD */
dtd->hasParamEntityRefs = XML_TRUE;
if (parser->m_startDoctypeDeclHandler) {
parser->m_doctypeSysid = poolStoreString(&parser->m_tempPool, enc,
s + enc->minBytesPerChar,
next - enc->minBytesPerChar);
if (parser->m_doctypeSysid == NULL)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
poolFinish(&parser->m_tempPool);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
#ifdef XML_DTD
else
/* use externalSubsetName to make parser->m_doctypeSysid non-NULL
for the case where no parser->m_startDoctypeDeclHandler is set */
parser->m_doctypeSysid = externalSubsetName;
#endif /* XML_DTD */
if (! dtd->standalone
#ifdef XML_DTD
&& ! parser->m_paramEntityParsing
#endif /* XML_DTD */
&& parser->m_notStandaloneHandler
&& ! parser->m_notStandaloneHandler(parser->m_handlerArg))
return XML_ERROR_NOT_STANDALONE;
#ifndef XML_DTD
break;
#else /* XML_DTD */
if (! parser->m_declEntity) {
parser->m_declEntity = (ENTITY *)lookup(
parser, &dtd->paramEntities, externalSubsetName, sizeof(ENTITY));
if (! parser->m_declEntity)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
parser->m_declEntity->publicId = NULL;
}
#endif /* XML_DTD */
/* fall through */
case XML_ROLE_ENTITY_SYSTEM_ID:
if (dtd->keepProcessing && parser->m_declEntity) {
parser->m_declEntity->systemId
= poolStoreString(&dtd->pool, enc, s + enc->minBytesPerChar,
next - enc->minBytesPerChar);
if (! parser->m_declEntity->systemId)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
parser->m_declEntity->base = parser->m_curBase;
poolFinish(&dtd->pool);
/* Don't suppress the default handler if we fell through from
* the XML_ROLE_DOCTYPE_SYSTEM_ID case.
*/
if (parser->m_entityDeclHandler && role == XML_ROLE_ENTITY_SYSTEM_ID)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_ENTITY_COMPLETE:
if (dtd->keepProcessing && parser->m_declEntity
&& parser->m_entityDeclHandler) {
*eventEndPP = s;
parser->m_entityDeclHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_declEntity->name,
parser->m_declEntity->is_param, 0, 0, parser->m_declEntity->base,
parser->m_declEntity->systemId, parser->m_declEntity->publicId, 0);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_ENTITY_NOTATION_NAME:
if (dtd->keepProcessing && parser->m_declEntity) {
parser->m_declEntity->notation
= poolStoreString(&dtd->pool, enc, s, next);
if (! parser->m_declEntity->notation)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
poolFinish(&dtd->pool);
if (parser->m_unparsedEntityDeclHandler) {
*eventEndPP = s;
parser->m_unparsedEntityDeclHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_declEntity->name,
parser->m_declEntity->base, parser->m_declEntity->systemId,
parser->m_declEntity->publicId, parser->m_declEntity->notation);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
} else if (parser->m_entityDeclHandler) {
*eventEndPP = s;
parser->m_entityDeclHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_declEntity->name, 0, 0, 0,
parser->m_declEntity->base, parser->m_declEntity->systemId,
parser->m_declEntity->publicId, parser->m_declEntity->notation);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_GENERAL_ENTITY_NAME: {
if (XmlPredefinedEntityName(enc, s, next)) {
parser->m_declEntity = NULL;
break;
}
if (dtd->keepProcessing) {
const XML_Char *name = poolStoreString(&dtd->pool, enc, s, next);
if (! name)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
parser->m_declEntity = (ENTITY *)lookup(parser, &dtd->generalEntities,
name, sizeof(ENTITY));
if (! parser->m_declEntity)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
if (parser->m_declEntity->name != name) {
poolDiscard(&dtd->pool);
parser->m_declEntity = NULL;
} else {
poolFinish(&dtd->pool);
parser->m_declEntity->publicId = NULL;
parser->m_declEntity->is_param = XML_FALSE;
/* if we have a parent parser or are reading an internal parameter
entity, then the entity declaration is not considered "internal"
*/
parser->m_declEntity->is_internal
= ! (parser->m_parentParser || parser->m_openInternalEntities);
if (parser->m_entityDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
} else {
poolDiscard(&dtd->pool);
parser->m_declEntity = NULL;
}
} break;
case XML_ROLE_PARAM_ENTITY_NAME:
#ifdef XML_DTD
if (dtd->keepProcessing) {
const XML_Char *name = poolStoreString(&dtd->pool, enc, s, next);
if (! name)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
parser->m_declEntity = (ENTITY *)lookup(parser, &dtd->paramEntities,
name, sizeof(ENTITY));
if (! parser->m_declEntity)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
if (parser->m_declEntity->name != name) {
poolDiscard(&dtd->pool);
parser->m_declEntity = NULL;
} else {
poolFinish(&dtd->pool);
parser->m_declEntity->publicId = NULL;
parser->m_declEntity->is_param = XML_TRUE;
/* if we have a parent parser or are reading an internal parameter
entity, then the entity declaration is not considered "internal"
*/
parser->m_declEntity->is_internal
= ! (parser->m_parentParser || parser->m_openInternalEntities);
if (parser->m_entityDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
} else {
poolDiscard(&dtd->pool);
parser->m_declEntity = NULL;
}
#else /* not XML_DTD */
parser->m_declEntity = NULL;
#endif /* XML_DTD */
break;
case XML_ROLE_NOTATION_NAME:
parser->m_declNotationPublicId = NULL;
parser->m_declNotationName = NULL;
if (parser->m_notationDeclHandler) {
parser->m_declNotationName
= poolStoreString(&parser->m_tempPool, enc, s, next);
if (! parser->m_declNotationName)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
poolFinish(&parser->m_tempPool);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_NOTATION_PUBLIC_ID:
if (! XmlIsPublicId(enc, s, next, eventPP))
return XML_ERROR_PUBLICID;
if (parser
->m_declNotationName) { /* means m_notationDeclHandler != NULL */
XML_Char *tem = poolStoreString(&parser->m_tempPool, enc,
s + enc->minBytesPerChar,
next - enc->minBytesPerChar);
if (! tem)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
normalizePublicId(tem);
parser->m_declNotationPublicId = tem;
poolFinish(&parser->m_tempPool);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_NOTATION_SYSTEM_ID:
if (parser->m_declNotationName && parser->m_notationDeclHandler) {
const XML_Char *systemId = poolStoreString(&parser->m_tempPool, enc,
s + enc->minBytesPerChar,
next - enc->minBytesPerChar);
if (! systemId)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
*eventEndPP = s;
parser->m_notationDeclHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_declNotationName, parser->m_curBase,
systemId, parser->m_declNotationPublicId);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
poolClear(&parser->m_tempPool);
break;
case XML_ROLE_NOTATION_NO_SYSTEM_ID:
if (parser->m_declNotationPublicId && parser->m_notationDeclHandler) {
*eventEndPP = s;
parser->m_notationDeclHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_declNotationName, parser->m_curBase,
0, parser->m_declNotationPublicId);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
poolClear(&parser->m_tempPool);
break;
case XML_ROLE_ERROR:
switch (tok) {
case XML_TOK_PARAM_ENTITY_REF:
/* PE references in internal subset are
not allowed within declarations. */
return XML_ERROR_PARAM_ENTITY_REF;
case XML_TOK_XML_DECL:
return XML_ERROR_MISPLACED_XML_PI;
default:
return XML_ERROR_SYNTAX;
}
#ifdef XML_DTD
case XML_ROLE_IGNORE_SECT: {
enum XML_Error result;
if (parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, next);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
result = doIgnoreSection(parser, enc, &next, end, nextPtr, haveMore);
if (result != XML_ERROR_NONE)
return result;
else if (! next) {
parser->m_processor = ignoreSectionProcessor;
return result;
}
} break;
#endif /* XML_DTD */
case XML_ROLE_GROUP_OPEN:
if (parser->m_prologState.level >= parser->m_groupSize) {
if (parser->m_groupSize) {
{
char *const new_connector = (char *)REALLOC(
parser, parser->m_groupConnector, parser->m_groupSize *= 2);
if (new_connector == NULL) {
parser->m_groupSize /= 2;
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
}
parser->m_groupConnector = new_connector;
}
if (dtd->scaffIndex) {
int *const new_scaff_index = (int *)REALLOC(
parser, dtd->scaffIndex, parser->m_groupSize * sizeof(int));
if (new_scaff_index == NULL)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
dtd->scaffIndex = new_scaff_index;
}
} else {
parser->m_groupConnector
= (char *)MALLOC(parser, parser->m_groupSize = 32);
if (! parser->m_groupConnector) {
parser->m_groupSize = 0;
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
}
}
}
parser->m_groupConnector[parser->m_prologState.level] = 0;
if (dtd->in_eldecl) {
int myindex = nextScaffoldPart(parser);
if (myindex < 0)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
assert(dtd->scaffIndex != NULL);
dtd->scaffIndex[dtd->scaffLevel] = myindex;
dtd->scaffLevel++;
dtd->scaffold[myindex].type = XML_CTYPE_SEQ;
if (parser->m_elementDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_GROUP_SEQUENCE:
if (parser->m_groupConnector[parser->m_prologState.level] == ASCII_PIPE)
return XML_ERROR_SYNTAX;
parser->m_groupConnector[parser->m_prologState.level] = ASCII_COMMA;
if (dtd->in_eldecl && parser->m_elementDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
break;
case XML_ROLE_GROUP_CHOICE:
if (parser->m_groupConnector[parser->m_prologState.level] == ASCII_COMMA)
return XML_ERROR_SYNTAX;
if (dtd->in_eldecl
&& ! parser->m_groupConnector[parser->m_prologState.level]
&& (dtd->scaffold[dtd->scaffIndex[dtd->scaffLevel - 1]].type
!= XML_CTYPE_MIXED)) {
dtd->scaffold[dtd->scaffIndex[dtd->scaffLevel - 1]].type
= XML_CTYPE_CHOICE;
if (parser->m_elementDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
parser->m_groupConnector[parser->m_prologState.level] = ASCII_PIPE;
break;
case XML_ROLE_PARAM_ENTITY_REF:
#ifdef XML_DTD
case XML_ROLE_INNER_PARAM_ENTITY_REF:
dtd->hasParamEntityRefs = XML_TRUE;
if (! parser->m_paramEntityParsing)
dtd->keepProcessing = dtd->standalone;
else {
const XML_Char *name;
ENTITY *entity;
name = poolStoreString(&dtd->pool, enc, s + enc->minBytesPerChar,
next - enc->minBytesPerChar);
if (! name)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
entity = (ENTITY *)lookup(parser, &dtd->paramEntities, name, 0);
poolDiscard(&dtd->pool);
/* first, determine if a check for an existing declaration is needed;
if yes, check that the entity exists, and that it is internal,
otherwise call the skipped entity handler
*/
if (parser->m_prologState.documentEntity
&& (dtd->standalone ? ! parser->m_openInternalEntities
: ! dtd->hasParamEntityRefs)) {
if (! entity)
return XML_ERROR_UNDEFINED_ENTITY;
else if (! entity->is_internal) {
/* It's hard to exhaustively search the code to be sure,
* but there doesn't seem to be a way of executing the
* following line. There are two cases:
*
* If 'standalone' is false, the DTD must have no
* parameter entities or we wouldn't have passed the outer
* 'if' statement. That measn the only entity in the hash
* table is the external subset name "#" which cannot be
* given as a parameter entity name in XML syntax, so the
* lookup must have returned NULL and we don't even reach
* the test for an internal entity.
*
* If 'standalone' is true, it does not seem to be
* possible to create entities taking this code path that
* are not internal entities, so fail the test above.
*
* Because this analysis is very uncertain, the code is
* being left in place and merely removed from the
* coverage test statistics.
*/
return XML_ERROR_ENTITY_DECLARED_IN_PE; /* LCOV_EXCL_LINE */
}
} else if (! entity) {
dtd->keepProcessing = dtd->standalone;
/* cannot report skipped entities in declarations */
if ((role == XML_ROLE_PARAM_ENTITY_REF)
&& parser->m_skippedEntityHandler) {
parser->m_skippedEntityHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, name, 1);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
}
if (entity->open)
return XML_ERROR_RECURSIVE_ENTITY_REF;
if (entity->textPtr) {
enum XML_Error result;
XML_Bool betweenDecl
= (role == XML_ROLE_PARAM_ENTITY_REF ? XML_TRUE : XML_FALSE);
result = processInternalEntity(parser, entity, betweenDecl);
if (result != XML_ERROR_NONE)
return result;
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
break;
}
if (parser->m_externalEntityRefHandler) {
dtd->paramEntityRead = XML_FALSE;
entity->open = XML_TRUE;
if (! parser->m_externalEntityRefHandler(
parser->m_externalEntityRefHandlerArg, 0, entity->base,
entity->systemId, entity->publicId)) {
entity->open = XML_FALSE;
return XML_ERROR_EXTERNAL_ENTITY_HANDLING;
}
entity->open = XML_FALSE;
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
if (! dtd->paramEntityRead) {
dtd->keepProcessing = dtd->standalone;
break;
}
} else {
dtd->keepProcessing = dtd->standalone;
break;
}
}
#endif /* XML_DTD */
if (! dtd->standalone && parser->m_notStandaloneHandler
&& ! parser->m_notStandaloneHandler(parser->m_handlerArg))
return XML_ERROR_NOT_STANDALONE;
break;
/* Element declaration stuff */
case XML_ROLE_ELEMENT_NAME:
if (parser->m_elementDeclHandler) {
parser->m_declElementType = getElementType(parser, enc, s, next);
if (! parser->m_declElementType)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
dtd->scaffLevel = 0;
dtd->scaffCount = 0;
dtd->in_eldecl = XML_TRUE;
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_CONTENT_ANY:
case XML_ROLE_CONTENT_EMPTY:
if (dtd->in_eldecl) {
if (parser->m_elementDeclHandler) {
XML_Content *content
= (XML_Content *)MALLOC(parser, sizeof(XML_Content));
if (! content)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
content->quant = XML_CQUANT_NONE;
content->name = NULL;
content->numchildren = 0;
content->children = NULL;
content->type = ((role == XML_ROLE_CONTENT_ANY) ? XML_CTYPE_ANY
: XML_CTYPE_EMPTY);
*eventEndPP = s;
parser->m_elementDeclHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_declElementType->name, content);
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
dtd->in_eldecl = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_CONTENT_PCDATA:
if (dtd->in_eldecl) {
dtd->scaffold[dtd->scaffIndex[dtd->scaffLevel - 1]].type
= XML_CTYPE_MIXED;
if (parser->m_elementDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_CONTENT_ELEMENT:
quant = XML_CQUANT_NONE;
goto elementContent;
case XML_ROLE_CONTENT_ELEMENT_OPT:
quant = XML_CQUANT_OPT;
goto elementContent;
case XML_ROLE_CONTENT_ELEMENT_REP:
quant = XML_CQUANT_REP;
goto elementContent;
case XML_ROLE_CONTENT_ELEMENT_PLUS:
quant = XML_CQUANT_PLUS;
elementContent:
if (dtd->in_eldecl) {
ELEMENT_TYPE *el;
const XML_Char *name;
int nameLen;
const char *nxt
= (quant == XML_CQUANT_NONE ? next : next - enc->minBytesPerChar);
int myindex = nextScaffoldPart(parser);
if (myindex < 0)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
dtd->scaffold[myindex].type = XML_CTYPE_NAME;
dtd->scaffold[myindex].quant = quant;
el = getElementType(parser, enc, s, nxt);
if (! el)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
name = el->name;
dtd->scaffold[myindex].name = name;
nameLen = 0;
for (; name[nameLen++];)
;
dtd->contentStringLen += nameLen;
if (parser->m_elementDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_GROUP_CLOSE:
quant = XML_CQUANT_NONE;
goto closeGroup;
case XML_ROLE_GROUP_CLOSE_OPT:
quant = XML_CQUANT_OPT;
goto closeGroup;
case XML_ROLE_GROUP_CLOSE_REP:
quant = XML_CQUANT_REP;
goto closeGroup;
case XML_ROLE_GROUP_CLOSE_PLUS:
quant = XML_CQUANT_PLUS;
closeGroup:
if (dtd->in_eldecl) {
if (parser->m_elementDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
dtd->scaffLevel--;
dtd->scaffold[dtd->scaffIndex[dtd->scaffLevel]].quant = quant;
if (dtd->scaffLevel == 0) {
if (! handleDefault) {
XML_Content *model = build_model(parser);
if (! model)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
*eventEndPP = s;
parser->m_elementDeclHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_declElementType->name, model);
}
dtd->in_eldecl = XML_FALSE;
dtd->contentStringLen = 0;
}
}
break;
/* End element declaration stuff */
case XML_ROLE_PI:
if (! reportProcessingInstruction(parser, enc, s, next))
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
break;
case XML_ROLE_COMMENT:
if (! reportComment(parser, enc, s, next))
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
break;
case XML_ROLE_NONE:
switch (tok) {
case XML_TOK_BOM:
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
break;
}
break;
case XML_ROLE_DOCTYPE_NONE:
if (parser->m_startDoctypeDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
break;
case XML_ROLE_ENTITY_NONE:
if (dtd->keepProcessing && parser->m_entityDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
break;
case XML_ROLE_NOTATION_NONE:
if (parser->m_notationDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
break;
case XML_ROLE_ATTLIST_NONE:
if (dtd->keepProcessing && parser->m_attlistDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
break;
case XML_ROLE_ELEMENT_NONE:
if (parser->m_elementDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
break;
} /* end of big switch */
if (handleDefault && parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, next);
switch (parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing) {
case XML_SUSPENDED:
*nextPtr = next;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
case XML_FINISHED:
return XML_ERROR_ABORTED;
default:
s = next;
tok = XmlPrologTok(enc, s, end, &next);
}
}
/* not reached */
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-611
Summary: In libexpat before 2.2.8, crafted XML input could fool the parser into changing from DTD parsing to document parsing too early; a consecutive call to XML_GetCurrentLineNumber (or XML_GetCurrentColumnNumber) then resulted in a heap-based buffer over-read.
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype | Medium | 169,529 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: status_t BnOMX::onTransact(
uint32_t code, const Parcel &data, Parcel *reply, uint32_t flags) {
switch (code) {
case LIVES_LOCALLY:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
pid_t pid = (pid_t)data.readInt32();
reply->writeInt32(livesLocally(node, pid));
return OK;
}
case LIST_NODES:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
List<ComponentInfo> list;
listNodes(&list);
reply->writeInt32(list.size());
for (List<ComponentInfo>::iterator it = list.begin();
it != list.end(); ++it) {
ComponentInfo &cur = *it;
reply->writeString8(cur.mName);
reply->writeInt32(cur.mRoles.size());
for (List<String8>::iterator role_it = cur.mRoles.begin();
role_it != cur.mRoles.end(); ++role_it) {
reply->writeString8(*role_it);
}
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case ALLOCATE_NODE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
const char *name = data.readCString();
sp<IOMXObserver> observer =
interface_cast<IOMXObserver>(data.readStrongBinder());
node_id node;
status_t err = allocateNode(name, observer, &node);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32((int32_t)node);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case FREE_NODE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
reply->writeInt32(freeNode(node));
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SEND_COMMAND:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_COMMANDTYPE cmd =
static_cast<OMX_COMMANDTYPE>(data.readInt32());
OMX_S32 param = data.readInt32();
reply->writeInt32(sendCommand(node, cmd, param));
return NO_ERROR;
}
case GET_PARAMETER:
case SET_PARAMETER:
case GET_CONFIG:
case SET_CONFIG:
case SET_INTERNAL_OPTION:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_INDEXTYPE index = static_cast<OMX_INDEXTYPE>(data.readInt32());
size_t size = data.readInt64();
status_t err = NOT_ENOUGH_DATA;
void *params = NULL;
size_t pageSize = 0;
size_t allocSize = 0;
if ((index == (OMX_INDEXTYPE) OMX_IndexParamConsumerUsageBits && size < 4) ||
(code != SET_INTERNAL_OPTION && size < 8)) {
ALOGE("b/27207275 (%zu)", size);
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "27207275");
} else {
err = NO_MEMORY;
pageSize = (size_t) sysconf(_SC_PAGE_SIZE);
if (size > SIZE_MAX - (pageSize * 2)) {
ALOGE("requested param size too big");
} else {
allocSize = (size + pageSize * 2) & ~(pageSize - 1);
params = mmap(NULL, allocSize, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1 /* fd */, 0 /* offset */);
}
if (params != MAP_FAILED) {
err = data.read(params, size);
if (err != OK) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "26914474");
} else {
err = NOT_ENOUGH_DATA;
OMX_U32 declaredSize = *(OMX_U32*)params;
if (code != SET_INTERNAL_OPTION &&
index != (OMX_INDEXTYPE) OMX_IndexParamConsumerUsageBits &&
declaredSize > size) {
ALOGE("b/27207275 (%u/%zu)", declaredSize, size);
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "27207275");
} else {
mprotect((char*)params + allocSize - pageSize, pageSize, PROT_NONE);
switch (code) {
case GET_PARAMETER:
err = getParameter(node, index, params, size);
break;
case SET_PARAMETER:
err = setParameter(node, index, params, size);
break;
case GET_CONFIG:
err = getConfig(node, index, params, size);
break;
case SET_CONFIG:
err = setConfig(node, index, params, size);
break;
case SET_INTERNAL_OPTION:
{
InternalOptionType type =
(InternalOptionType)data.readInt32();
err = setInternalOption(node, index, type, params, size);
break;
}
default:
TRESPASS();
}
}
}
} else {
ALOGE("couldn't map: %s", strerror(errno));
}
}
reply->writeInt32(err);
if ((code == GET_PARAMETER || code == GET_CONFIG) && err == OK) {
reply->write(params, size);
}
if (params) {
munmap(params, allocSize);
}
params = NULL;
return NO_ERROR;
}
case GET_STATE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_STATETYPE state = OMX_StateInvalid;
status_t err = getState(node, &state);
reply->writeInt32(state);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case ENABLE_GRAPHIC_BUFFERS:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
OMX_BOOL enable = (OMX_BOOL)data.readInt32();
status_t err = enableGraphicBuffers(node, port_index, enable);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case GET_GRAPHIC_BUFFER_USAGE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 usage = 0;
status_t err = getGraphicBufferUsage(node, port_index, &usage);
reply->writeInt32(err);
reply->writeInt32(usage);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case USE_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
sp<IMemory> params =
interface_cast<IMemory>(data.readStrongBinder());
OMX_U32 allottedSize = data.readInt32();
buffer_id buffer;
status_t err = useBuffer(node, port_index, params, &buffer, allottedSize);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32((int32_t)buffer);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case USE_GRAPHIC_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
sp<GraphicBuffer> graphicBuffer = new GraphicBuffer();
data.read(*graphicBuffer);
buffer_id buffer;
status_t err = useGraphicBuffer(
node, port_index, graphicBuffer, &buffer);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32((int32_t)buffer);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case UPDATE_GRAPHIC_BUFFER_IN_META:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
sp<GraphicBuffer> graphicBuffer = new GraphicBuffer();
data.read(*graphicBuffer);
buffer_id buffer = (buffer_id)data.readInt32();
status_t err = updateGraphicBufferInMeta(
node, port_index, graphicBuffer, buffer);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case CREATE_INPUT_SURFACE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
sp<IGraphicBufferProducer> bufferProducer;
MetadataBufferType type = kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid;
status_t err = createInputSurface(node, port_index, &bufferProducer, &type);
if ((err != OK) && (type == kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid)) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "26324358");
}
reply->writeInt32(type);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeStrongBinder(IInterface::asBinder(bufferProducer));
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case CREATE_PERSISTENT_INPUT_SURFACE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
sp<IGraphicBufferProducer> bufferProducer;
sp<IGraphicBufferConsumer> bufferConsumer;
status_t err = createPersistentInputSurface(
&bufferProducer, &bufferConsumer);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeStrongBinder(IInterface::asBinder(bufferProducer));
reply->writeStrongBinder(IInterface::asBinder(bufferConsumer));
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SET_INPUT_SURFACE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
sp<IGraphicBufferConsumer> bufferConsumer =
interface_cast<IGraphicBufferConsumer>(data.readStrongBinder());
MetadataBufferType type = kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid;
status_t err = setInputSurface(node, port_index, bufferConsumer, &type);
if ((err != OK) && (type == kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid)) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "26324358");
}
reply->writeInt32(type);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SIGNAL_END_OF_INPUT_STREAM:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
status_t err = signalEndOfInputStream(node);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case STORE_META_DATA_IN_BUFFERS:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
OMX_BOOL enable = (OMX_BOOL)data.readInt32();
MetadataBufferType type = kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid;
status_t err = storeMetaDataInBuffers(node, port_index, enable, &type);
reply->writeInt32(type);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case PREPARE_FOR_ADAPTIVE_PLAYBACK:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
OMX_BOOL enable = (OMX_BOOL)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 max_width = data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 max_height = data.readInt32();
status_t err = prepareForAdaptivePlayback(
node, port_index, enable, max_width, max_height);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case CONFIGURE_VIDEO_TUNNEL_MODE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
OMX_BOOL tunneled = (OMX_BOOL)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 audio_hw_sync = data.readInt32();
native_handle_t *sideband_handle = NULL;
status_t err = configureVideoTunnelMode(
node, port_index, tunneled, audio_hw_sync, &sideband_handle);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if(err == OK){
reply->writeNativeHandle(sideband_handle);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case ALLOC_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
if (!isSecure(node) || port_index != 0 /* kPortIndexInput */) {
ALOGE("b/24310423");
reply->writeInt32(INVALID_OPERATION);
return NO_ERROR;
}
size_t size = data.readInt64();
buffer_id buffer;
void *buffer_data;
status_t err = allocateBuffer(
node, port_index, size, &buffer, &buffer_data);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32((int32_t)buffer);
reply->writeInt64((uintptr_t)buffer_data);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case ALLOC_BUFFER_WITH_BACKUP:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
sp<IMemory> params =
interface_cast<IMemory>(data.readStrongBinder());
OMX_U32 allottedSize = data.readInt32();
buffer_id buffer;
status_t err = allocateBufferWithBackup(
node, port_index, params, &buffer, allottedSize);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32((int32_t)buffer);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case FREE_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
buffer_id buffer = (buffer_id)data.readInt32();
reply->writeInt32(freeBuffer(node, port_index, buffer));
return NO_ERROR;
}
case FILL_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
buffer_id buffer = (buffer_id)data.readInt32();
bool haveFence = data.readInt32();
int fenceFd = haveFence ? ::dup(data.readFileDescriptor()) : -1;
reply->writeInt32(fillBuffer(node, buffer, fenceFd));
return NO_ERROR;
}
case EMPTY_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
buffer_id buffer = (buffer_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 range_offset = data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 range_length = data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 flags = data.readInt32();
OMX_TICKS timestamp = data.readInt64();
bool haveFence = data.readInt32();
int fenceFd = haveFence ? ::dup(data.readFileDescriptor()) : -1;
reply->writeInt32(emptyBuffer(
node, buffer, range_offset, range_length, flags, timestamp, fenceFd));
return NO_ERROR;
}
case GET_EXTENSION_INDEX:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
const char *parameter_name = data.readCString();
OMX_INDEXTYPE index;
status_t err = getExtensionIndex(node, parameter_name, &index);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32(index);
}
return OK;
}
default:
return BBinder::onTransact(code, data, reply, flags);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not validate OMX buffer sizes, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27207275.
Commit Message: Fix OMX_IndexParamConsumerUsageBits size check
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I9a7c9fb22a0e84a490ff09c151bd2f88141fdbc0
| High | 174,227 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: krb5_init_creds_step(krb5_context context,
krb5_init_creds_context ctx,
krb5_data *in,
krb5_data *out,
krb5_krbhst_info *hostinfo,
unsigned int *flags)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
size_t len = 0;
size_t size;
AS_REQ req2;
krb5_data_zero(out);
if (ctx->as_req.req_body.cname == NULL) {
ret = init_as_req(context, ctx->flags, &ctx->cred,
ctx->addrs, ctx->etypes, &ctx->as_req);
if (ret) {
free_init_creds_ctx(context, ctx);
return ret;
}
}
#define MAX_PA_COUNTER 10
if (ctx->pa_counter > MAX_PA_COUNTER) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, KRB5_GET_IN_TKT_LOOP,
N_("Looping %d times while getting "
"initial credentials", ""),
ctx->pa_counter);
return KRB5_GET_IN_TKT_LOOP;
}
ctx->pa_counter++;
_krb5_debug(context, 5, "krb5_get_init_creds: loop %d", ctx->pa_counter);
/* Lets process the input packet */
if (in && in->length) {
krb5_kdc_rep rep;
memset(&rep, 0, sizeof(rep));
_krb5_debug(context, 5, "krb5_get_init_creds: processing input");
ret = decode_AS_REP(in->data, in->length, &rep.kdc_rep, &size);
if (ret == 0) {
unsigned eflags = EXTRACT_TICKET_AS_REQ | EXTRACT_TICKET_TIMESYNC;
krb5_data data;
/*
* Unwrap AS-REP
*/
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(Ticket, data.data, data.length,
&rep.kdc_rep.ticket, &size, ret);
if (ret)
goto out;
heim_assert(data.length == size, "ASN.1 internal error");
ret = fast_unwrap_as_rep(context, ctx->nonce, &data,
&ctx->fast_state, &rep.kdc_rep);
krb5_data_free(&data);
if (ret)
goto out;
/*
* Now check and extract the ticket
*/
if (ctx->flags.canonicalize) {
eflags |= EXTRACT_TICKET_ALLOW_SERVER_MISMATCH;
eflags |= EXTRACT_TICKET_MATCH_REALM;
}
if (ctx->ic_flags & KRB5_INIT_CREDS_NO_C_CANON_CHECK)
eflags |= EXTRACT_TICKET_ALLOW_CNAME_MISMATCH;
ret = process_pa_data_to_key(context, ctx, &ctx->cred,
&ctx->as_req, &rep.kdc_rep,
hostinfo, &ctx->fast_state.reply_key);
if (ret) {
free_AS_REP(&rep.kdc_rep);
goto out;
}
_krb5_debug(context, 5, "krb5_get_init_creds: extracting ticket");
ret = _krb5_extract_ticket(context,
&rep,
&ctx->cred,
ctx->fast_state.reply_key,
NULL,
KRB5_KU_AS_REP_ENC_PART,
NULL,
ctx->nonce,
eflags,
&ctx->req_buffer,
NULL,
NULL);
if (ret == 0)
ret = copy_EncKDCRepPart(&rep.enc_part, &ctx->enc_part);
krb5_free_keyblock(context, ctx->fast_state.reply_key);
ctx->fast_state.reply_key = NULL;
*flags = 0;
free_AS_REP(&rep.kdc_rep);
free_EncASRepPart(&rep.enc_part);
return ret;
} else {
/* let's try to parse it as a KRB-ERROR */
_krb5_debug(context, 5, "krb5_get_init_creds: got an error");
free_KRB_ERROR(&ctx->error);
ret = krb5_rd_error(context, in, &ctx->error);
if(ret && in->length && ((char*)in->data)[0] == 4)
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_V4_REPLY;
if (ret) {
_krb5_debug(context, 5, "krb5_get_init_creds: failed to read error");
goto out;
}
/*
* Unwrap KRB-ERROR
*/
ret = fast_unwrap_error(context, &ctx->fast_state, &ctx->error);
if (ret)
goto out;
/*
*
*/
ret = krb5_error_from_rd_error(context, &ctx->error, &ctx->cred);
_krb5_debug(context, 5, "krb5_get_init_creds: KRB-ERROR %d", ret);
/*
* If no preauth was set and KDC requires it, give it one
* more try.
*/
if (ret == KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED) {
free_METHOD_DATA(&ctx->md);
memset(&ctx->md, 0, sizeof(ctx->md));
if (ctx->error.e_data) {
ret = decode_METHOD_DATA(ctx->error.e_data->data,
ctx->error.e_data->length,
&ctx->md,
NULL);
if (ret)
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
N_("Failed to decode METHOD-DATA", ""));
} else {
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
N_("Preauth required but no preauth "
"options send by KDC", ""));
}
} else if (ret == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW && context->kdc_sec_offset == 0) {
/*
* Try adapt to timeskrew when we are using pre-auth, and
* if there was a time skew, try again.
*/
krb5_set_real_time(context, ctx->error.stime, -1);
if (context->kdc_sec_offset)
ret = 0;
_krb5_debug(context, 10, "init_creds: err skew updateing kdc offset to %d",
context->kdc_sec_offset);
ctx->used_pa_types = 0;
} else if (ret == KRB5_KDC_ERR_WRONG_REALM && ctx->flags.canonicalize) {
/* client referal to a new realm */
if (ctx->error.crealm == NULL) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
N_("Got a client referral, not but no realm", ""));
goto out;
}
_krb5_debug(context, 5,
"krb5_get_init_creds: got referal to realm %s",
*ctx->error.crealm);
ret = krb5_principal_set_realm(context,
ctx->cred.client,
*ctx->error.crealm);
if (ret)
goto out;
if (krb5_principal_is_krbtgt(context, ctx->cred.server)) {
ret = krb5_init_creds_set_service(context, ctx, NULL);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
free_AS_REQ(&ctx->as_req);
memset(&ctx->as_req, 0, sizeof(ctx->as_req));
ctx->used_pa_types = 0;
} else if (ret == KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXP && ctx->runflags.change_password == 0 && ctx->prompter) {
char buf2[1024];
ctx->runflags.change_password = 1;
ctx->prompter(context, ctx->prompter_data, NULL, N_("Password has expired", ""), 0, NULL);
/* try to avoid recursion */
if (ctx->in_tkt_service != NULL && strcmp(ctx->in_tkt_service, "kadmin/changepw") == 0)
goto out;
/* don't try to change password where then where none */
if (ctx->prompter == NULL)
goto out;
ret = change_password(context,
ctx->cred.client,
ctx->password,
buf2,
sizeof(buf2),
ctx->prompter,
ctx->prompter_data,
NULL);
if (ret)
goto out;
krb5_init_creds_set_password(context, ctx, buf2);
ctx->used_pa_types = 0;
ret = 0;
} else if (ret == KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED) {
if (ctx->fast_state.flags & KRB5_FAST_DISABLED)
goto out;
if (ctx->fast_state.flags & (KRB5_FAST_REQUIRED | KRB5_FAST_EXPECTED))
goto out;
_krb5_debug(context, 10, "preauth failed with FAST, "
"and told by KD or user, trying w/o FAST");
ctx->fast_state.flags |= KRB5_FAST_DISABLED;
ctx->used_pa_types = 0;
ret = 0;
}
if (ret)
goto out;
}
}
if (ctx->as_req.req_body.cname == NULL) {
ret = init_as_req(context, ctx->flags, &ctx->cred,
ctx->addrs, ctx->etypes, &ctx->as_req);
if (ret) {
free_init_creds_ctx(context, ctx);
return ret;
}
}
if (ctx->as_req.padata) {
free_METHOD_DATA(ctx->as_req.padata);
free(ctx->as_req.padata);
ctx->as_req.padata = NULL;
}
/* Set a new nonce. */
ctx->as_req.req_body.nonce = ctx->nonce;
/* fill_in_md_data */
ret = process_pa_data_to_md(context, &ctx->cred, &ctx->as_req, ctx,
&ctx->md, &ctx->as_req.padata,
ctx->prompter, ctx->prompter_data);
if (ret)
goto out;
/*
* Wrap with FAST
*/
copy_AS_REQ(&ctx->as_req, &req2);
ret = fast_wrap_req(context, &ctx->fast_state, &req2);
if (ret) {
free_AS_REQ(&req2);
goto out;
}
krb5_data_free(&ctx->req_buffer);
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(AS_REQ,
ctx->req_buffer.data, ctx->req_buffer.length,
&req2, &len, ret);
free_AS_REQ(&req2);
if (ret)
goto out;
if(len != ctx->req_buffer.length)
krb5_abortx(context, "internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
out->data = ctx->req_buffer.data;
out->length = ctx->req_buffer.length;
*flags = KRB5_INIT_CREDS_STEP_FLAG_CONTINUE;
return 0;
out:
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-320
Summary: In the client side of Heimdal before 7.6.0, failure to verify anonymous PKINIT PA-PKINIT-KX key exchange permits a man-in-the-middle attack. This issue is in krb5_init_creds_step in lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c.
Commit Message: CVE-2019-12098: krb5: always confirm PA-PKINIT-KX for anon PKINIT
RFC8062 Section 7 requires verification of the PA-PKINIT-KX key excahnge
when anonymous PKINIT is used. Failure to do so can permit an active
attacker to become a man-in-the-middle.
Introduced by a1ef548600c5bb51cf52a9a9ea12676506ede19f. First tagged
release Heimdal 1.4.0.
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N (4.8)
Change-Id: I6cc1c0c24985936468af08693839ac6c3edda133
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Altman <[email protected]>
Approved-by: Jeffrey Altman <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 38c797e1ae9b9c8f99ae4aa2e73957679031fd2b) | Medium | 169,670 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter::MimeHandlerViewGuestCreatedCallback(
int element_instance_id,
int embedder_render_process_id,
int embedder_render_frame_id,
int32_t plugin_frame_routing_id,
const gfx::Size& element_size,
mime_handler::BeforeUnloadControlPtrInfo before_unload_control,
bool is_full_page_plugin,
WebContents* web_contents) {
auto* guest_view = MimeHandlerViewGuest::FromWebContents(web_contents);
if (!guest_view)
return;
guest_view->SetBeforeUnloadController(std::move(before_unload_control));
int guest_instance_id = guest_view->guest_instance_id();
auto* rfh = RenderFrameHost::FromID(embedder_render_process_id,
embedder_render_frame_id);
if (!rfh)
return;
guest_view->SetEmbedderFrame(embedder_render_process_id,
embedder_render_frame_id);
base::DictionaryValue attach_params;
attach_params.SetInteger(guest_view::kElementWidth, element_size.width());
attach_params.SetInteger(guest_view::kElementHeight, element_size.height());
auto* manager = GuestViewManager::FromBrowserContext(browser_context_);
if (!manager) {
guest_view::bad_message::ReceivedBadMessage(
this,
guest_view::bad_message::GVMF_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE_BEFORE_GVM_CREATION);
guest_view->Destroy(true);
return;
}
manager->AttachGuest(embedder_render_process_id, element_instance_id,
guest_instance_id, attach_params);
if (!content::MimeHandlerViewMode::UsesCrossProcessFrame()) {
rfh->Send(new ExtensionsGuestViewMsg_CreateMimeHandlerViewGuestACK(
element_instance_id));
return;
}
auto* plugin_rfh = RenderFrameHost::FromID(embedder_render_process_id,
plugin_frame_routing_id);
if (!plugin_rfh) {
plugin_rfh = RenderFrameHost::FromPlaceholderId(embedder_render_process_id,
plugin_frame_routing_id);
}
if (!plugin_rfh) {
guest_view->GetEmbedderFrame()->Send(
new ExtensionsGuestViewMsg_RetryCreatingMimeHandlerViewGuest(
element_instance_id));
guest_view->Destroy(true);
return;
}
if (guest_view->web_contents()->CanAttachToOuterContentsFrame(plugin_rfh)) {
guest_view->AttachToOuterWebContentsFrame(plugin_rfh, element_instance_id,
is_full_page_plugin);
} else {
frame_navigation_helpers_[element_instance_id] =
std::make_unique<FrameNavigationHelper>(
plugin_rfh, guest_view->guest_instance_id(), element_instance_id,
is_full_page_plugin, this);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Data race in extensions guest view in Google Chrome prior to 73.0.3683.75 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [GuestView] - Introduce MimeHandlerViewAttachHelper
This CL is for the most part a mechanical change which extracts almost
all the frame-based MimeHandlerView code out of
ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter. This change both removes the current
clutter form EGVMF as well as fixesa race introduced when the
frame-based logic was added to EGVMF. The reason for the race was that
EGVMF is destroyed on IO thread but all the access to it (for
frame-based MHV) are from UI.
[email protected],[email protected]
Bug: 659750, 896679, 911161, 918861
Change-Id: I6474b870e4d56daa68be03637bb633665d9f9dda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1401451
Commit-Queue: Ehsan Karamad <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: James MacLean <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ehsan Karamad <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621155} | Medium | 173,045 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void nsc_encode_subsampling(NSC_CONTEXT* context)
{
UINT16 x;
UINT16 y;
BYTE* co_dst;
BYTE* cg_dst;
INT8* co_src0;
INT8* co_src1;
INT8* cg_src0;
INT8* cg_src1;
UINT32 tempWidth;
UINT32 tempHeight;
tempWidth = ROUND_UP_TO(context->width, 8);
tempHeight = ROUND_UP_TO(context->height, 2);
for (y = 0; y < tempHeight >> 1; y++)
{
co_dst = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[1] + y * (tempWidth >> 1);
cg_dst = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[2] + y * (tempWidth >> 1);
co_src0 = (INT8*) context->priv->PlaneBuffers[1] + (y << 1) * tempWidth;
co_src1 = co_src0 + tempWidth;
cg_src0 = (INT8*) context->priv->PlaneBuffers[2] + (y << 1) * tempWidth;
cg_src1 = cg_src0 + tempWidth;
for (x = 0; x < tempWidth >> 1; x++)
{
*co_dst++ = (BYTE)(((INT16) * co_src0 + (INT16) * (co_src0 + 1) +
(INT16) * co_src1 + (INT16) * (co_src1 + 1)) >> 2);
*cg_dst++ = (BYTE)(((INT16) * cg_src0 + (INT16) * (cg_src0 + 1) +
(INT16) * cg_src1 + (INT16) * (cg_src1 + 1)) >> 2);
co_src0 += 2;
co_src1 += 2;
cg_src0 += 2;
cg_src1 += 2;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: FreeRDP prior to version 2.0.0-rc4 contains an Out-Of-Bounds Write of up to 4 bytes in function nsc_rle_decode() that results in a memory corruption and possibly even a remote code execution.
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8788
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies. | High | 169,289 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: const ClipPaintPropertyNode* c0() {
return ClipPaintPropertyNode::Root();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <[email protected]>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> [email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930} | High | 171,821 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static bool r_bin_mdmp_init_directory(struct r_bin_mdmp_obj *obj) {
int i;
ut8 *directory_base;
struct minidump_directory *entry;
directory_base = obj->b->buf + obj->hdr->stream_directory_rva;
sdb_num_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_directory.offset",
obj->hdr->stream_directory_rva, 0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_directory.format", "[4]E? "
"(mdmp_stream_type)StreamType "
"(mdmp_location_descriptor)Location", 0);
/* Parse each entry in the directory */
for (i = 0; i < (int)obj->hdr->number_of_streams; i++) {
entry = (struct minidump_directory *)(directory_base + (i * sizeof (struct minidump_directory)));
r_bin_mdmp_init_directory_entry (obj, entry);
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The r_bin_mdmp_init_directory_entry function in mdmp.c in radare2 2.7.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer over-read and application crash) via a crafted Mini Crash Dump file.
Commit Message: Fix #10464 - oobread crash in mdmp | Medium | 169,148 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void V8ContextNativeHandler::RunWithNativesEnabledModuleSystem(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
CHECK_EQ(args.Length(), 1);
CHECK(args[0]->IsFunction());
v8::Local<v8::Value> call_with_args[] = {
context()->module_system()->NewInstance()};
ModuleSystem::NativesEnabledScope natives_enabled(context()->module_system());
context()->CallFunction(v8::Local<v8::Function>::Cast(args[0]), 1,
call_with_args);
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS
CWE ID: CWE-79
Summary: Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the V8ContextNativeHandler::GetModuleSystem function in extensions/renderer/v8_context_native_handler.cc in Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML by leveraging the lack of a certain V8 context restriction, aka a Blink *Universal XSS (UXSS).*
Commit Message: Add a test that getModuleSystem() doesn't work cross origin
BUG=504011
[email protected]
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1241443004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338663} | Medium | 171,948 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: WORD32 ih264d_mark_err_slice_skip(dec_struct_t * ps_dec,
WORD32 num_mb_skip,
UWORD8 u1_is_idr_slice,
UWORD16 u2_frame_num,
pocstruct_t *ps_cur_poc,
WORD32 prev_slice_err)
{
WORD32 i2_cur_mb_addr;
UWORD32 u1_num_mbs, u1_num_mbsNby2;
UWORD32 u1_mb_idx = ps_dec->u1_mb_idx;
UWORD32 i2_mb_skip_run;
UWORD32 u1_num_mbs_next, u1_end_of_row;
const UWORD32 i2_pic_wdin_mbs = ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs;
UWORD32 u1_slice_end;
UWORD32 u1_tfr_n_mb;
UWORD32 u1_decode_nmb;
dec_bit_stream_t * const ps_bitstrm = ps_dec->ps_bitstrm;
dec_slice_params_t * ps_slice = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_buf = ps_bitstrm->pu4_buffer;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_ofst = &ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst;
deblk_mb_t *ps_cur_deblk_mb;
dec_mb_info_t *ps_cur_mb_info;
parse_pmbarams_t *ps_parse_mb_data;
UWORD32 u1_inter_mb_type;
UWORD32 u1_deblk_mb_type;
UWORD16 u2_total_mbs_coded;
UWORD32 u1_mbaff = ps_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag;
parse_part_params_t *ps_part_info;
WORD32 ret;
UNUSED(u1_is_idr_slice);
if(ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u1_err_flag & REJECT_CUR_PIC)
{
ih264d_err_pic_dispbuf_mgr(ps_dec);
return 0;
}
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag && (num_mb_skip & 1))
{
num_mb_skip++;
}
ps_dec->ps_dpb_cmds->u1_long_term_reference_flag = 0;
if(prev_slice_err == 1)
{
/* first slice - missing/header corruption */
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num = u2_frame_num;
{
WORD32 i, j, poc = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_first_mb_in_slice = 0;
ps_dec->pf_mvpred = ih264d_mvpred_nonmbaff;
ps_dec->p_form_mb_part_info = ih264d_form_mb_part_info_bp;
ps_dec->p_motion_compensate = ih264d_motion_compensate_bp;
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_pic != NULL)
poc = ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_poc + 2;
j = -1;
for(i = 0; i < MAX_NUM_PIC_PARAMS; i++)
{
if(ps_dec->ps_pps[i].u1_is_valid == TRUE)
{
if(ps_dec->ps_pps[i].ps_sps->u1_is_valid == TRUE)
{
j = i;
break;
}
}
}
if(j == -1)
{
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
}
/* call ih264d_start_of_pic only if it was not called earlier*/
if(ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got == 0)
{
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type = P_SLICE;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc = 1;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_unit_type = 1;
ret = ih264d_start_of_pic(ps_dec, poc, ps_cur_poc,
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num,
&ps_dec->ps_pps[j]);
if(ret != OK)
{
return ret;
}
}
ps_dec->ps_ref_pic_buf_lx[0][0]->u1_pic_buf_id = 0;
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 0;
{
ih264d_get_next_display_field(ps_dec,
ps_dec->ps_out_buffer,
&(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
/* If error code is non-zero then there is no buffer available for display,
hence avoid format conversion */
if(0 != ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code)
{
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row = ps_dec->s_disp_frame_info.u4_y_ht;
}
else
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 1;
}
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse == 1)
{
if(ps_dec->u4_dec_thread_created == 0)
{
ithread_create(ps_dec->pv_dec_thread_handle, NULL,
(void *)ih264d_decode_picture_thread,
(void *)ps_dec);
ps_dec->u4_dec_thread_created = 1;
}
if((ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3) &&
((ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm == 0) || ps_dec->i1_recon_in_thread3_flag)
&& (ps_dec->u4_bs_deblk_thread_created == 0))
{
ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk = 0;
ithread_create(ps_dec->pv_bs_deblk_thread_handle, NULL,
(void *)ih264d_recon_deblk_thread,
(void *)ps_dec);
ps_dec->u4_bs_deblk_thread_created = 1;
}
}
}
ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic = 0;
}
else
{
dec_slice_struct_t *ps_parse_cur_slice;
ps_parse_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_dec_slice_buf + ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num;
if(ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done
&& ps_parse_cur_slice == ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice)
{
if((u1_mbaff) && (ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb & 1))
{
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb - 1;
ps_dec->u2_cur_mb_addr--;
}
u1_num_mbs = ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb;
if(u1_num_mbs)
{
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info + u1_num_mbs - 1;
}
else
{
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info;
}
else
{
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info
+ ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_prev_nmb - 1;
}
}
ps_dec->u2_mby = ps_cur_mb_info->u2_mby;
ps_dec->u2_mbx = ps_cur_mb_info->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->u1_mb_ngbr_availablity =
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_ngbr_availablity;
if(u1_num_mbs)
{
ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data = ps_dec->pv_prev_mb_parse_tu_coeff_data;
ps_dec->u2_cur_mb_addr--;
ps_dec->i4_submb_ofst -= SUB_BLK_SIZE;
if (ps_dec->u1_pr_sl_type == P_SLICE
|| ps_dec->u1_pr_sl_type == B_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->pf_mvpred_ref_tfr_nby2mb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs);
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
}
u1_num_mbs_next = i2_pic_wdin_mbs - ps_dec->u2_mbx - 1;
u1_end_of_row = (!u1_num_mbs_next)
&& (!(u1_mbaff && (u1_num_mbs & 0x01)));
u1_slice_end = 1;
u1_tfr_n_mb = 1;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_end_of_slice = u1_slice_end;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ih264d_parse_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs,
u1_num_mbs_next, u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
ps_dec->ps_nmb_info += u1_num_mbs;
}
else
{
ih264d_decode_recon_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs,
u1_num_mbs_next, u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
}
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded += u1_num_mbs;
ps_dec->u1_mb_idx = 0;
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = 0;
}
if(ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded
>= ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
{
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 1;
return 0;
}
/* Inserting new slice only if the current slice has atleast 1 MB*/
if(ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u4_first_mb_in_slice <
(UWORD32)(ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded >> ps_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag))
{
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mbx = ps_dec->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mby = ps_dec->u2_mby;
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num++;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice++;
}
}
else
{
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_dec_slice_buf
+ ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num;
}
}
/******************************************************/
/* Initializations to new slice */
/******************************************************/
{
WORD32 num_entries;
WORD32 size;
UWORD8 *pu1_buf;
num_entries = MIN(MAX_FRAMES, ps_dec->u4_num_ref_frames_at_init);
num_entries = 2 * ((2 * num_entries) + 1);
size = num_entries * sizeof(void *);
size += PAD_MAP_IDX_POC * sizeof(void *);
pu1_buf = (UWORD8 *)ps_dec->pv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_buf;
pu1_buf += size * ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc = (volatile void **)pu1_buf;
}
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_first_mb_in_slice = ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded >> u1_mbaff;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->i1_slice_alpha_c0_offset = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->i1_slice_beta_offset = 0;
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag)
ps_dec->u2_prv_frame_num = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u4_first_mb_in_slice = ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded >> u1_mbaff;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u2_log2Y_crwd = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_log2Y_crwd;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->pv_tu_coeff_data_start = ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data;
}
else
{
ps_dec->pv_proc_tu_coeff_data = ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data;
}
/******************************************************/
/* Initializations specific to P slice */
/******************************************************/
u1_inter_mb_type = P_MB;
u1_deblk_mb_type = D_INTER_MB;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type = P_SLICE;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->slice_type = P_SLICE;
ps_dec->pf_mvpred_ref_tfr_nby2mb = ih264d_mv_pred_ref_tfr_nby2_pmb;
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
ps_dec->u2_mbx =
(MOD(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_first_mb_in_slice - 1, ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs));
ps_dec->u2_mby =
(DIV(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_first_mb_in_slice - 1, ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs));
ps_dec->u2_mby <<= u1_mbaff;
/******************************************************/
/* Parsing / decoding the slice */
/******************************************************/
ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done = 2;
ps_dec->u1_qp = ps_slice->u1_slice_qp;
ih264d_update_qp(ps_dec, 0);
u1_mb_idx = ps_dec->u1_mb_idx;
ps_parse_mb_data = ps_dec->ps_parse_mb_data;
u1_num_mbs = u1_mb_idx;
u1_slice_end = 0;
u1_tfr_n_mb = 0;
u1_decode_nmb = 0;
u1_num_mbsNby2 = 0;
i2_cur_mb_addr = ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded;
i2_mb_skip_run = num_mb_skip;
while(!u1_slice_end)
{
UWORD8 u1_mb_type;
if(i2_cur_mb_addr > ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u2_max_mb_addr)
break;
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info + u1_num_mbs;
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = u1_num_mbs;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_Mux = 0;
ps_dec->u4_num_pmbair = (u1_num_mbs >> u1_mbaff);
ps_cur_deblk_mb = ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn + u1_num_mbs;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_end_of_slice = 0;
/* Storing Default partition info */
ps_parse_mb_data->u1_num_part = 1;
ps_parse_mb_data->u1_isI_mb = 0;
/**************************************************************/
/* Get the required information for decoding of MB */
/**************************************************************/
/* mb_x, mb_y, neighbor availablity, */
if (u1_mbaff)
ih264d_get_mb_info_cavlc_mbaff(ps_dec, i2_cur_mb_addr, ps_cur_mb_info, i2_mb_skip_run);
else
ih264d_get_mb_info_cavlc_nonmbaff(ps_dec, i2_cur_mb_addr, ps_cur_mb_info, i2_mb_skip_run);
/* Set the deblocking parameters for this MB */
if(ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm == 0)
{
ih264d_set_deblocking_parameters(ps_cur_deblk_mb, ps_slice,
ps_dec->u1_mb_ngbr_availablity,
ps_dec->u1_cur_mb_fld_dec_flag);
}
/* Set appropriate flags in ps_cur_mb_info and ps_dec */
ps_dec->i1_prev_mb_qp_delta = 0;
ps_dec->u1_sub_mb_num = 0;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_type = MB_SKIP;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_mc_mode = PRED_16x16;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_cbp = 0;
/* Storing Skip partition info */
ps_part_info = ps_dec->ps_part;
ps_part_info->u1_is_direct = PART_DIRECT_16x16;
ps_part_info->u1_sub_mb_num = 0;
ps_dec->ps_part++;
/* Update Nnzs */
ih264d_update_nnz_for_skipmb(ps_dec, ps_cur_mb_info, CAVLC);
ps_cur_mb_info->ps_curmb->u1_mb_type = u1_inter_mb_type;
ps_cur_deblk_mb->u1_mb_type |= u1_deblk_mb_type;
i2_mb_skip_run--;
ps_cur_deblk_mb->u1_mb_qp = ps_dec->u1_qp;
if (u1_mbaff)
{
ih264d_update_mbaff_left_nnz(ps_dec, ps_cur_mb_info);
}
/**************************************************************/
/* Get next Macroblock address */
/**************************************************************/
i2_cur_mb_addr++;
u1_num_mbs++;
u1_num_mbsNby2++;
ps_parse_mb_data++;
/****************************************************************/
/* Check for End Of Row and other flags that determine when to */
/* do DMA setup for N/2-Mb, Decode for N-Mb, and Transfer for */
/* N-Mb */
/****************************************************************/
u1_num_mbs_next = i2_pic_wdin_mbs - ps_dec->u2_mbx - 1;
u1_end_of_row = (!u1_num_mbs_next) && (!(u1_mbaff && (u1_num_mbs & 0x01)));
u1_slice_end = !i2_mb_skip_run;
u1_tfr_n_mb = (u1_num_mbs == ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp) || u1_end_of_row
|| u1_slice_end;
u1_decode_nmb = u1_tfr_n_mb || u1_slice_end;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_end_of_slice = u1_slice_end;
if(u1_decode_nmb)
{
ps_dec->pf_mvpred_ref_tfr_nby2mb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs);
u1_num_mbsNby2 = 0;
ps_parse_mb_data = ps_dec->ps_parse_mb_data;
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ih264d_parse_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs,
u1_num_mbs_next, u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
ps_dec->ps_nmb_info += u1_num_mbs;
}
else
{
ih264d_decode_recon_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs, u1_num_mbs_next,
u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
}
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded += u1_num_mbs;
if(u1_tfr_n_mb)
u1_num_mbs = 0;
u1_mb_idx = u1_num_mbs;
ps_dec->u1_mb_idx = u1_num_mbs;
}
}
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u4_mbs_in_slice = i2_cur_mb_addr
- ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u4_first_mb_in_slice;
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("Mbs in slice: %d\n", ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u4_mbs_in_slice);
/* incremented here only if first slice is inserted */
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic != 0)
{
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice++;
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num++;
}
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mbx = ps_dec->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mby = ps_dec->u2_mby;
if(ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded
>= ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
{
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 1;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in libavc in Mediaserver could enable a local malicious application to access data outside of its permission levels. This issue is rated as Moderate because it could be used to access data without permission. Product: Android. Versions: 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1. Android ID: A-33551775.
Commit Message: Decoder: Fixed initialization of first_slice_in_pic
To handle some errors, first_slice_in_pic was being set to 2.
This is now cleaned up and first_slice_in_pic is set to 1 only once per pic.
This will ensure picture level initializations are done only once even in case
of error clips
Bug: 33717589
Bug: 33551775
Bug: 33716442
Bug: 33677995
Change-Id: If341436b3cbaa724017eedddd88c2e6fac36d8ba
| Medium | 174,039 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int snd_hrtimer_start(struct snd_timer *t)
{
struct snd_hrtimer *stime = t->private_data;
atomic_set(&stime->running, 0);
hrtimer_cancel(&stime->hrt);
hrtimer_start(&stime->hrt, ns_to_ktime(t->sticks * resolution),
HRTIMER_MODE_REL);
atomic_set(&stime->running, 1);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: sound/core/hrtimer.c in the Linux kernel before 4.4.1 does not prevent recursive callback access, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (deadlock) via a crafted ioctl call.
Commit Message: ALSA: hrtimer: Fix stall by hrtimer_cancel()
hrtimer_cancel() waits for the completion from the callback, thus it
must not be called inside the callback itself. This was already a
problem in the past with ALSA hrtimer driver, and the early commit
[fcfdebe70759: ALSA: hrtimer - Fix lock-up] tried to address it.
However, the previous fix is still insufficient: it may still cause a
lockup when the ALSA timer instance reprograms itself in its callback.
Then it invokes the start function even in snd_timer_interrupt() that
is called in hrtimer callback itself, results in a CPU stall. This is
no hypothetical problem but actually triggered by syzkaller fuzzer.
This patch tries to fix the issue again. Now we call
hrtimer_try_to_cancel() at both start and stop functions so that it
won't fall into a deadlock, yet giving some chance to cancel the queue
if the functions have been called outside the callback. The proper
hrtimer_cancel() is called in anyway at closing, so this should be
enough.
Reported-and-tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]> | Low | 167,398 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: _zip_cdir_new(int nentry, struct zip_error *error)
{
struct zip_cdir *cd;
if ((cd=(struct zip_cdir *)malloc(sizeof(*cd))) == NULL) {
_zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_MEMORY, 0);
return NULL;
}
if ((cd->entry=(struct zip_dirent *)malloc(sizeof(*(cd->entry))*nentry))
== NULL) {
_zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_MEMORY, 0);
free(cd);
return NULL;
}
/* entries must be initialized by caller */
cd->nentry = nentry;
cd->size = cd->offset = 0;
cd->comment = NULL;
cd->comment_len = 0;
return cd;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in the _zip_cdir_new function in zip_dirent.c in libzip 0.11.2 and earlier, as used in the ZIP extension in PHP before 5.4.39, 5.5.x before 5.5.23, and 5.6.x before 5.6.7 and other products, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a ZIP archive that contains many entries, leading to a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: | High | 164,752 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: white_point(PNG_CONST color_encoding *encoding)
{
CIE_color white;
white.X = encoding->red.X + encoding->green.X + encoding->blue.X;
white.Y = encoding->red.Y + encoding->green.Y + encoding->blue.Y;
white.Z = encoding->red.Z + encoding->green.Z + encoding->blue.Z;
return white;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 173,718 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, getCsvControl)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
char delimiter[2], enclosure[2];
array_init(return_value);
delimiter[0] = intern->u.file.delimiter;
delimiter[1] = '\0';
enclosure[0] = intern->u.file.enclosure;
enclosure[1] = '\0';
add_next_index_string(return_value, delimiter, 1);
add_next_index_string(return_value, enclosure, 1);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the SplFileObject::fread function in spl_directory.c in the SPL extension in PHP before 5.5.37 and 5.6.x before 5.6.23 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large integer argument, a related issue to CVE-2016-5096.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int | High | 167,064 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: cJSON *cJSON_CreateStringArray( const char **strings, int count )
{
int i;
cJSON *n = 0, *p = 0, *a = cJSON_CreateArray();
for ( i = 0; a && i < count; ++i ) {
n = cJSON_CreateString( strings[i] );
if ( ! i )
a->child = n;
else
suffix_object( p, n );
p = n;
}
return a;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The parse_string function in cjson.c in the cJSON library mishandles UTF8/16 strings, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or execute arbitrary code via a non-hex character in a JSON string, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <[email protected]> | High | 167,279 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ParamTraits<GURL>::Write(Message* m, const GURL& p) {
DCHECK(p.possibly_invalid_spec().length() <= content::kMaxURLChars);
m->WriteString(p.possibly_invalid_spec());
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy via a malformed URL.
Commit Message: Beware of print-read inconsistency when serializing GURLs.
BUG=165622
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11576038
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173583 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,503 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: horDiff16(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
TIFFPredictorState* sp = PredictorState(tif);
tmsize_t stride = sp->stride;
uint16 *wp = (uint16*) cp0;
tmsize_t wc = cc/2;
assert((cc%(2*stride))==0);
if (wc > stride) {
wc -= stride;
wp += wc - 1;
do {
REPEAT4(stride, wp[stride] = (uint16)(((unsigned int)wp[stride] - (unsigned int)wp[0]) & 0xffff); wp--)
wc -= stride;
} while (wc > 0);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: tif_predict.h and tif_predict.c in libtiff 4.0.6 have assertions that can lead to assertion failures in debug mode, or buffer overflows in release mode, when dealing with unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105, aka *Predictor heap-buffer-overflow.*
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predict.h, libtiff/tif_predict.c:
Replace assertions by runtime checks to avoid assertions in debug mode,
or buffer overflows in release mode. Can happen when dealing with
unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105
by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations
team. | High | 166,885 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ProcessRequest() {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
timer.Stop(); // Erase reference to self.
WallpaperManager* manager = WallpaperManager::Get();
if (manager->pending_inactive_ == this)
manager->pending_inactive_ = NULL;
started_load_at_ = base::Time::Now();
if (default_) {
manager->DoSetDefaultWallpaper(account_id_, std::move(on_finish_));
} else if (!user_wallpaper_.isNull()) {
SetWallpaper(user_wallpaper_, info_);
} else if (!wallpaper_path_.empty()) {
manager->task_runner_->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&WallpaperManager::GetCustomWallpaperInternal,
account_id_, info_, wallpaper_path_,
true /* update wallpaper */,
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get(),
base::Passed(std::move(on_finish_)),
manager->weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
} else if (!info_.location.empty()) {
manager->LoadWallpaper(account_id_, info_, true, std::move(on_finish_));
} else {
NOTREACHED();
started_load_at_ = base::Time();
}
on_finish_.reset();
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The XSSAuditor::canonicalize function in core/html/parser/XSSAuditor.cpp in the XSS auditor in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89, does not properly choose a truncation point, which makes it easier for remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via an unspecified linear-time attack.
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
[email protected], [email protected]
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <[email protected]>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982} | Medium | 171,969 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: std::string GetDMToken() {
std::string dm_token = *GetTestingDMToken();
#if !defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
if (dm_token.empty() &&
policy::ChromeBrowserCloudManagementController::IsEnabled()) {
dm_token = policy::BrowserDMTokenStorage::Get()->RetrieveDMToken();
}
#endif
return dm_token;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient Policy Enforcement in Omnibox in Google Chrome prior to 59.0.3071.104 for Mac allowed a remote attacker to perform domain spoofing via a crafted domain name.
Commit Message: Migrate download_protection code to new DM token class.
Migrates RetrieveDMToken calls to use the new BrowserDMToken class.
Bug: 1020296
Change-Id: Icef580e243430d73b6c1c42b273a8540277481d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1904234
Commit-Queue: Dominique Fauteux-Chapleau <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tien Mai <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Rubery <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#714196} | Medium | 172,353 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: OMX::buffer_id OMXNodeInstance::findBufferID(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *bufferHeader) {
return (OMX::buffer_id)bufferHeader;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the OMXNodeInstance::emptyBuffer function in omx/OMXNodeInstance.cpp in libstagefright in Android before 5.1.1 LMY48I allows attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted application, aka internal bug 20634516.
Commit Message: IOMX: Enable buffer ptr to buffer id translation for arm32
Bug: 20634516
Change-Id: Iac9eac3cb251eccd9bbad5df7421a07edc21da0c
(cherry picked from commit 2d6b6601743c3c6960c6511a2cb774ef902759f4)
| High | 173,358 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteBMPImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
BMPInfo
bmp_info;
const char
*option;
const StringInfo
*profile;
MagickBooleanType
have_color_info,
status;
MagickOffsetType
scene;
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
register const Quantum
*p;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register unsigned char
*q;
size_t
bytes_per_line,
type;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
*bmp_data,
*pixels;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
type=4;
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"BMP2") == 0)
type=2;
else
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"BMP3") == 0)
type=3;
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"bmp:format");
if (option != (char *) NULL)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Format=%s",option);
if (LocaleCompare(option,"bmp2") == 0)
type=2;
if (LocaleCompare(option,"bmp3") == 0)
type=3;
if (LocaleCompare(option,"bmp4") == 0)
type=4;
}
scene=0;
do
{
/*
Initialize BMP raster file header.
*/
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace,exception);
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&bmp_info,0,sizeof(bmp_info));
bmp_info.file_size=14+12;
if (type > 2)
bmp_info.file_size+=28;
bmp_info.offset_bits=bmp_info.file_size;
bmp_info.compression=BI_RGB;
if ((image->storage_class == PseudoClass) && (image->colors > 256))
(void) SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass,exception);
if (image->storage_class != DirectClass)
{
/*
Colormapped BMP raster.
*/
bmp_info.bits_per_pixel=8;
if (image->colors <= 2)
bmp_info.bits_per_pixel=1;
else
if (image->colors <= 16)
bmp_info.bits_per_pixel=4;
else
if (image->colors <= 256)
bmp_info.bits_per_pixel=8;
if (image_info->compression == RLECompression)
bmp_info.bits_per_pixel=8;
bmp_info.number_colors=1U << bmp_info.bits_per_pixel;
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
(void) SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass,exception);
else
if ((size_t) bmp_info.number_colors < image->colors)
(void) SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass,exception);
else
{
bmp_info.file_size+=3*(1UL << bmp_info.bits_per_pixel);
bmp_info.offset_bits+=3*(1UL << bmp_info.bits_per_pixel);
if (type > 2)
{
bmp_info.file_size+=(1UL << bmp_info.bits_per_pixel);
bmp_info.offset_bits+=(1UL << bmp_info.bits_per_pixel);
}
}
}
if (image->storage_class == DirectClass)
{
/*
Full color BMP raster.
*/
bmp_info.number_colors=0;
bmp_info.bits_per_pixel=(unsigned short)
((type > 3) && (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait) ? 32 : 24);
bmp_info.compression=(unsigned int) ((type > 3) &&
(image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait) ? BI_BITFIELDS : BI_RGB);
if ((type == 3) && (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait))
{
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"bmp3:alpha");
if (IsStringTrue(option))
bmp_info.bits_per_pixel=32;
}
}
bytes_per_line=4*((image->columns*bmp_info.bits_per_pixel+31)/32);
bmp_info.ba_offset=0;
profile=GetImageProfile(image,"icc");
have_color_info=(image->rendering_intent != UndefinedIntent) ||
(profile != (StringInfo *) NULL) || (image->gamma != 0.0) ? MagickTrue :
MagickFalse;
if (type == 2)
bmp_info.size=12;
else
if ((type == 3) || ((image->alpha_trait == UndefinedPixelTrait) &&
(have_color_info == MagickFalse)))
{
type=3;
bmp_info.size=40;
}
else
{
int
extra_size;
bmp_info.size=108;
extra_size=68;
if ((image->rendering_intent != UndefinedIntent) ||
(profile != (StringInfo *) NULL))
{
bmp_info.size=124;
extra_size+=16;
}
bmp_info.file_size+=extra_size;
bmp_info.offset_bits+=extra_size;
}
bmp_info.width=(ssize_t) image->columns;
bmp_info.height=(ssize_t) image->rows;
bmp_info.planes=1;
bmp_info.image_size=(unsigned int) (bytes_per_line*image->rows);
bmp_info.file_size+=bmp_info.image_size;
bmp_info.x_pixels=75*39;
bmp_info.y_pixels=75*39;
switch (image->units)
{
case UndefinedResolution:
case PixelsPerInchResolution:
{
bmp_info.x_pixels=(unsigned int) (100.0*image->resolution.x/2.54);
bmp_info.y_pixels=(unsigned int) (100.0*image->resolution.y/2.54);
break;
}
case PixelsPerCentimeterResolution:
{
bmp_info.x_pixels=(unsigned int) (100.0*image->resolution.x);
bmp_info.y_pixels=(unsigned int) (100.0*image->resolution.y);
break;
}
}
bmp_info.colors_important=bmp_info.number_colors;
/*
Convert MIFF to BMP raster pixels.
*/
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory((size_t) bmp_info.image_size,
sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
(void) ResetMagickMemory(pixels,0,(size_t) bmp_info.image_size);
switch (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel)
{
case 1:
{
size_t
bit,
byte;
/*
Convert PseudoClass image to a BMP monochrome image.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
ssize_t
offset;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
q=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
bit=0;
byte=0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
byte<<=1;
byte|=GetPixelIndex(image,p) != 0 ? 0x01 : 0x00;
bit++;
if (bit == 8)
{
*q++=(unsigned char) byte;
bit=0;
byte=0;
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (bit != 0)
{
*q++=(unsigned char) (byte << (8-bit));
x++;
}
offset=(ssize_t) (image->columns+7)/8;
for (x=offset; x < (ssize_t) bytes_per_line; x++)
*q++=0x00;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case 4:
{
size_t
byte,
nibble;
ssize_t
offset;
/*
Convert PseudoClass image to a BMP monochrome image.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
q=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
nibble=0;
byte=0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
byte<<=4;
byte|=((size_t) GetPixelIndex(image,p) & 0x0f);
nibble++;
if (nibble == 2)
{
*q++=(unsigned char) byte;
nibble=0;
byte=0;
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (nibble != 0)
{
*q++=(unsigned char) (byte << 4);
x++;
}
offset=(ssize_t) (image->columns+1)/2;
for (x=offset; x < (ssize_t) bytes_per_line; x++)
*q++=0x00;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case 8:
{
/*
Convert PseudoClass packet to BMP pixel.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
q=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
*q++=(unsigned char) GetPixelIndex(image,p);
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
for ( ; x < (ssize_t) bytes_per_line; x++)
*q++=0x00;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case 24:
{
/*
Convert DirectClass packet to BMP BGR888.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
q=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelBlue(image,p));
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelGreen(image,p));
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelRed(image,p));
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
for (x=3L*(ssize_t) image->columns; x < (ssize_t) bytes_per_line; x++)
*q++=0x00;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case 32:
{
/*
Convert DirectClass packet to ARGB8888 pixel.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
q=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelBlue(image,p));
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelGreen(image,p));
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelRed(image,p));
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelAlpha(image,p));
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
}
if ((type > 2) && (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel == 8))
if (image_info->compression != NoCompression)
{
MemoryInfo
*rle_info;
/*
Convert run-length encoded raster pixels.
*/
rle_info=AcquireVirtualMemory((size_t) (2*(bytes_per_line+2)+2),
(image->rows+2)*sizeof(*pixels));
if (rle_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
{
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
bmp_data=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(rle_info);
bmp_info.file_size-=bmp_info.image_size;
bmp_info.image_size=(unsigned int) EncodeImage(image,bytes_per_line,
pixels,bmp_data);
bmp_info.file_size+=bmp_info.image_size;
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
pixel_info=rle_info;
pixels=bmp_data;
bmp_info.compression=BI_RLE8;
}
/*
Write BMP for Windows, all versions, 14-byte header.
*/
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Writing BMP version %.20g datastream",(double) type);
if (image->storage_class == DirectClass)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Storage class=DirectClass");
else
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Storage class=PseudoClass");
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Image depth=%.20g",(double) image->depth);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Matte=True");
else
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Matte=MagickFalse");
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" BMP bits_per_pixel=%.20g",(double) bmp_info.bits_per_pixel);
switch ((int) bmp_info.compression)
{
case BI_RGB:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression=BI_RGB");
break;
}
case BI_RLE8:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression=BI_RLE8");
break;
}
case BI_BITFIELDS:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression=BI_BITFIELDS");
break;
}
default:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression=UNKNOWN (%lu)",bmp_info.compression);
break;
}
}
if (bmp_info.number_colors == 0)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Number_colors=unspecified");
else
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Number_colors=%lu",bmp_info.number_colors);
}
(void) WriteBlob(image,2,(unsigned char *) "BM");
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,bmp_info.file_size);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,bmp_info.ba_offset); /* always 0 */
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,bmp_info.offset_bits);
if (type == 2)
{
/*
Write 12-byte version 2 bitmap header.
*/
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,bmp_info.size);
(void) WriteBlobLSBSignedShort(image,(signed short) bmp_info.width);
(void) WriteBlobLSBSignedShort(image,(signed short) bmp_info.height);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,bmp_info.planes);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,bmp_info.bits_per_pixel);
}
else
{
/*
Write 40-byte version 3+ bitmap header.
*/
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,bmp_info.size);
(void) WriteBlobLSBSignedLong(image,(signed int) bmp_info.width);
(void) WriteBlobLSBSignedLong(image,(signed int) bmp_info.height);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,bmp_info.planes);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,bmp_info.bits_per_pixel);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,bmp_info.compression);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,bmp_info.image_size);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,bmp_info.x_pixels);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,bmp_info.y_pixels);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,bmp_info.number_colors);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,bmp_info.colors_important);
}
if ((type > 3) && ((image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait) ||
(have_color_info != MagickFalse)))
{
/*
Write the rest of the 108-byte BMP Version 4 header.
*/
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,0x00ff0000U); /* Red mask */
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,0x0000ff00U); /* Green mask */
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,0x000000ffU); /* Blue mask */
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,0xff000000U); /* Alpha mask */
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,0x73524742U); /* sRGB */
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int)
(image->chromaticity.red_primary.x*0x40000000));
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int)
(image->chromaticity.red_primary.y*0x40000000));
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int)
((1.000f-(image->chromaticity.red_primary.x+
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y))*0x40000000));
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int)
(image->chromaticity.green_primary.x*0x40000000));
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int)
(image->chromaticity.green_primary.y*0x40000000));
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int)
((1.000f-(image->chromaticity.green_primary.x+
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y))*0x40000000));
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int)
(image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x*0x40000000));
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int)
(image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y*0x40000000));
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int)
((1.000f-(image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x+
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y))*0x40000000));
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int)
(bmp_info.gamma_scale.x*0x10000));
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int)
(bmp_info.gamma_scale.y*0x10000));
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int)
(bmp_info.gamma_scale.z*0x10000));
if ((image->rendering_intent != UndefinedIntent) ||
(profile != (StringInfo *) NULL))
{
ssize_t
intent;
switch ((int) image->rendering_intent)
{
case SaturationIntent:
{
intent=LCS_GM_BUSINESS;
break;
}
case RelativeIntent:
{
intent=LCS_GM_GRAPHICS;
break;
}
case PerceptualIntent:
{
intent=LCS_GM_IMAGES;
break;
}
case AbsoluteIntent:
{
intent=LCS_GM_ABS_COLORIMETRIC;
break;
}
default:
{
intent=0;
break;
}
}
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int) intent);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,0x00); /* dummy profile data */
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,0x00); /* dummy profile length */
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,0x00); /* reserved */
}
}
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
unsigned char
*bmp_colormap;
/*
Dump colormap to file.
*/
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Colormap: %.20g entries",(double) image->colors);
bmp_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) (1UL <<
bmp_info.bits_per_pixel),4*sizeof(*bmp_colormap));
if (bmp_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
q=bmp_colormap;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) MagickMin((ssize_t) image->colors,(ssize_t) bmp_info.number_colors); i++)
{
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[i].blue));
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[i].green));
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[i].red));
if (type > 2)
*q++=(unsigned char) 0x0;
}
for ( ; i < (ssize_t) (1UL << bmp_info.bits_per_pixel); i++)
{
*q++=(unsigned char) 0x00;
*q++=(unsigned char) 0x00;
*q++=(unsigned char) 0x00;
if (type > 2)
*q++=(unsigned char) 0x00;
}
if (type <= 2)
(void) WriteBlob(image,(size_t) (3*(1L << bmp_info.bits_per_pixel)),
bmp_colormap);
else
(void) WriteBlob(image,(size_t) (4*(1L << bmp_info.bits_per_pixel)),
bmp_colormap);
bmp_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(bmp_colormap);
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Pixels: %lu bytes",bmp_info.image_size);
(void) WriteBlob(image,(size_t) bmp_info.image_size,pixels);
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
break;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,scene++,
GetImageListLength(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
} while (image_info->adjoin != MagickFalse);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the BMP coder in ImageMagick before 7.0.2-10 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via crafted height and width values, which triggers an out-of-bounds write.
Commit Message: Prevent buffer overflow in BMP coder (bug report from pwchen of tencent). | Medium | 168,824 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static boolean ReadIPTCProfile(j_decompress_ptr jpeg_info)
{
char
magick[MagickPathExtent];
ErrorManager
*error_manager;
ExceptionInfo
*exception;
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register ssize_t
i;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
length;
StringInfo
*iptc_profile,
*profile;
/*
Determine length of binary data stored here.
*/
length=(size_t) ((size_t) GetCharacter(jpeg_info) << 8);
length+=(size_t) GetCharacter(jpeg_info);
length-=2;
if (length <= 14)
{
while (length-- > 0)
if (GetCharacter(jpeg_info) == EOF)
break;
return(TRUE);
}
/*
Validate that this was written as a Photoshop resource format slug.
*/
for (i=0; i < 10; i++)
magick[i]=(char) GetCharacter(jpeg_info);
magick[10]='\0';
length-=10;
if (length <= 10)
return(TRUE);
if (LocaleCompare(magick,"Photoshop ") != 0)
{
/*
Not a IPTC profile, return.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
if (GetCharacter(jpeg_info) == EOF)
break;
return(TRUE);
}
/*
Remove the version number.
*/
for (i=0; i < 4; i++)
if (GetCharacter(jpeg_info) == EOF)
break;
if (length <= 11)
return(TRUE);
length-=4;
error_manager=(ErrorManager *) jpeg_info->client_data;
exception=error_manager->exception;
image=error_manager->image;
profile=BlobToStringInfo((const void *) NULL,length);
if (profile == (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed","`%s'",image->filename);
return(FALSE);
}
error_manager->profile=profile;
p=GetStringInfoDatum(profile);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
{
int
c;
c=GetCharacter(jpeg_info);
if (c == EOF)
break;
*p++=(unsigned char) c;
}
error_manager->profile=NULL;
if (i != (ssize_t) length)
{
profile=DestroyStringInfo(profile);
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile","`%s'",
image->filename);
return(FALSE);
}
/* The IPTC profile is actually an 8bim */
iptc_profile=(StringInfo *) GetImageProfile(image,"8bim");
if (iptc_profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
ConcatenateStringInfo(iptc_profile,profile);
profile=DestroyStringInfo(profile);
}
else
{
status=SetImageProfile(image,"8bim",profile,exception);
profile=DestroyStringInfo(profile);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed","`%s'",image->filename);
return(FALSE);
}
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Profile: iptc, %.20g bytes",(double) length);
return(TRUE);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: ImageMagick before 7.0.8-55 has a use-after-free in DestroyStringInfo in MagickCore/string.c because the error manager is mishandled in coders/jpeg.c.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1641 | Low | 169,488 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> postMessageCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestActiveDOMObject.postMessage");
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
TestActiveDOMObject* imp = V8TestActiveDOMObject::toNative(args.Holder());
STRING_TO_V8PARAMETER_EXCEPTION_BLOCK(V8Parameter<>, message, MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined));
imp->postMessage(message);
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,067 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool FrameFetchContext::UpdateTimingInfoForIFrameNavigation(
ResourceTimingInfo* info) {
if (IsDetached())
return false;
if (!GetFrame()->Owner())
return false;
if (!GetFrame()->should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent())
return false;
if (MasterDocumentLoader()->LoadType() == WebFrameLoadType::kBackForward)
return false;
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Incorrect handling of timer information during navigation in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 70.0.3538.67 allowed a remote attacker to obtain cross origin URLs via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Do not forward resource timing to parent frame after back-forward navigation
LocalFrame has |should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent_| flag not to
send timing info to parent except for the first navigation. This flag is
cleared when the first timing is sent to parent, however this does not happen
if iframe's first navigation was by back-forward navigation. For such
iframes, we shouldn't send timings to parent at all.
Bug: 876822
Change-Id: I128b51a82ef278c439548afc8283ae63abdef5c5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1186215
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585736} | Medium | 172,657 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: double ConvolverNode::latencyTime() const
{
return m_reverb ? m_reverb->latencyFrames() / static_cast<double>(sampleRate()) : 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Multiple race conditions in the Web Audio implementation in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 30.0.1599.66, allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to threading in core/html/HTMLMediaElement.cpp, core/platform/audio/AudioDSPKernelProcessor.cpp, core/platform/audio/HRTFElevation.cpp, and modules/webaudio/ConvolverNode.cpp.
Commit Message: Fix threading races on ConvolverNode::m_reverb in ConvolverNode::latencyFrames()
According to the crash report (https://cluster-fuzz.appspot.com/testcase?key=6515787040817152),
ConvolverNode::m_reverb races between ConvolverNode::latencyFrames() and ConvolverNode::setBuffer().
This CL adds a proper lock for ConvolverNode::m_reverb.
BUG=223962
No tests because the crash depends on threading races and thus not reproducible.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23514037
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157245 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,172 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int masq_inet_event(struct notifier_block *this,
unsigned long event,
void *ptr)
{
struct net_device *dev = ((struct in_ifaddr *)ptr)->ifa_dev->dev;
struct netdev_notifier_info info;
netdev_notifier_info_init(&info, dev);
return masq_device_event(this, event, &info);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The IPv4 implementation in the Linux kernel before 4.5.2 mishandles destruction of device objects, which allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (host OS networking outage) by arranging for a large number of IP addresses.
Commit Message: ipv4: Don't do expensive useless work during inetdev destroy.
When an inetdev is destroyed, every address assigned to the interface
is removed. And in this scenerio we do two pointless things which can
be very expensive if the number of assigned interfaces is large:
1) Address promotion. We are deleting all addresses, so there is no
point in doing this.
2) A full nf conntrack table purge for every address. We only need to
do this once, as is already caught by the existing
masq_dev_notifier so masq_inet_event() can skip this.
Reported-by: Solar Designer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <[email protected]> | Low | 167,356 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: explicit HeaderTestDispatcherHostDelegate(const GURL& watch_url)
: watch_url_(watch_url) {}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 50.0.2661.94 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Fix ChromeResourceDispatcherHostDelegateMirrorBrowserTest.MirrorRequestHeader with network service.
The functionality worked, as part of converting DICE, however the test code didn't work since it
depended on accessing the net objects directly. Switch the tests to use the EmbeddedTestServer, to
better match production, which removes the dependency on net/.
Also:
-make GetFilePathWithReplacements replace strings in the mock headers if they're present
-add a global to google_util to ignore ports; that way other tests can be converted without having
to modify each callsite to google_util
Bug: 881976
Change-Id: Ic52023495c1c98c1248025c11cdf37f433fef058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1328142
Commit-Queue: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ramin Halavati <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Maks Orlovich <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607652} | High | 172,576 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int vfs_open(const struct path *path, struct file *file,
const struct cred *cred)
{
struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry;
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
file->f_path = *path;
if (dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_OP_SELECT_INODE) {
inode = dentry->d_op->d_select_inode(dentry, file->f_flags);
if (IS_ERR(inode))
return PTR_ERR(inode);
}
return do_dentry_open(file, inode, NULL, cred);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: The filesystem layer in the Linux kernel before 4.5.5 proceeds with post-rename operations after an OverlayFS file is renamed to a self-hardlink, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) via a rename system call, related to fs/namei.c and fs/open.c.
Commit Message: vfs: add vfs_select_inode() helper
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.2+ | Medium | 169,943 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void BufferQueueConsumer::dump(String8& result, const char* prefix) const {
const IPCThreadState* ipc = IPCThreadState::self();
const pid_t pid = ipc->getCallingPid();
const uid_t uid = ipc->getCallingUid();
if ((uid != AID_SHELL)
&& !PermissionCache::checkPermission(String16(
"android.permission.DUMP"), pid, uid)) {
result.appendFormat("Permission Denial: can't dump BufferQueueConsumer "
"from pid=%d, uid=%d\n", pid, uid);
} else {
mCore->dump(result, prefix);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass +Info
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: libs/gui/BufferQueueConsumer.cpp in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-04-01 does not check for the android.permission.DUMP permission, which allows attackers to obtain sensitive information, and consequently bypass an unspecified protection mechanism, via a dump request, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27046057.
Commit Message: Add SN logging
Bug 27046057
Change-Id: Iede7c92e59e60795df1ec7768ebafd6b090f1c27
| High | 173,894 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void fib_del_ifaddr(struct in_ifaddr *ifa, struct in_ifaddr *iprim)
{
struct in_device *in_dev = ifa->ifa_dev;
struct net_device *dev = in_dev->dev;
struct in_ifaddr *ifa1;
struct in_ifaddr *prim = ifa, *prim1 = NULL;
__be32 brd = ifa->ifa_address | ~ifa->ifa_mask;
__be32 any = ifa->ifa_address & ifa->ifa_mask;
#define LOCAL_OK 1
#define BRD_OK 2
#define BRD0_OK 4
#define BRD1_OK 8
unsigned int ok = 0;
int subnet = 0; /* Primary network */
int gone = 1; /* Address is missing */
int same_prefsrc = 0; /* Another primary with same IP */
if (ifa->ifa_flags & IFA_F_SECONDARY) {
prim = inet_ifa_byprefix(in_dev, any, ifa->ifa_mask);
if (!prim) {
pr_warn("%s: bug: prim == NULL\n", __func__);
return;
}
if (iprim && iprim != prim) {
pr_warn("%s: bug: iprim != prim\n", __func__);
return;
}
} else if (!ipv4_is_zeronet(any) &&
(any != ifa->ifa_local || ifa->ifa_prefixlen < 32)) {
if (!(ifa->ifa_flags & IFA_F_NOPREFIXROUTE))
fib_magic(RTM_DELROUTE,
dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK ? RTN_LOCAL : RTN_UNICAST,
any, ifa->ifa_prefixlen, prim);
subnet = 1;
}
/* Deletion is more complicated than add.
* We should take care of not to delete too much :-)
*
* Scan address list to be sure that addresses are really gone.
*/
for (ifa1 = in_dev->ifa_list; ifa1; ifa1 = ifa1->ifa_next) {
if (ifa1 == ifa) {
/* promotion, keep the IP */
gone = 0;
continue;
}
/* Ignore IFAs from our subnet */
if (iprim && ifa1->ifa_mask == iprim->ifa_mask &&
inet_ifa_match(ifa1->ifa_address, iprim))
continue;
/* Ignore ifa1 if it uses different primary IP (prefsrc) */
if (ifa1->ifa_flags & IFA_F_SECONDARY) {
/* Another address from our subnet? */
if (ifa1->ifa_mask == prim->ifa_mask &&
inet_ifa_match(ifa1->ifa_address, prim))
prim1 = prim;
else {
/* We reached the secondaries, so
* same_prefsrc should be determined.
*/
if (!same_prefsrc)
continue;
/* Search new prim1 if ifa1 is not
* using the current prim1
*/
if (!prim1 ||
ifa1->ifa_mask != prim1->ifa_mask ||
!inet_ifa_match(ifa1->ifa_address, prim1))
prim1 = inet_ifa_byprefix(in_dev,
ifa1->ifa_address,
ifa1->ifa_mask);
if (!prim1)
continue;
if (prim1->ifa_local != prim->ifa_local)
continue;
}
} else {
if (prim->ifa_local != ifa1->ifa_local)
continue;
prim1 = ifa1;
if (prim != prim1)
same_prefsrc = 1;
}
if (ifa->ifa_local == ifa1->ifa_local)
ok |= LOCAL_OK;
if (ifa->ifa_broadcast == ifa1->ifa_broadcast)
ok |= BRD_OK;
if (brd == ifa1->ifa_broadcast)
ok |= BRD1_OK;
if (any == ifa1->ifa_broadcast)
ok |= BRD0_OK;
/* primary has network specific broadcasts */
if (prim1 == ifa1 && ifa1->ifa_prefixlen < 31) {
__be32 brd1 = ifa1->ifa_address | ~ifa1->ifa_mask;
__be32 any1 = ifa1->ifa_address & ifa1->ifa_mask;
if (!ipv4_is_zeronet(any1)) {
if (ifa->ifa_broadcast == brd1 ||
ifa->ifa_broadcast == any1)
ok |= BRD_OK;
if (brd == brd1 || brd == any1)
ok |= BRD1_OK;
if (any == brd1 || any == any1)
ok |= BRD0_OK;
}
}
}
if (!(ok & BRD_OK))
fib_magic(RTM_DELROUTE, RTN_BROADCAST, ifa->ifa_broadcast, 32, prim);
if (subnet && ifa->ifa_prefixlen < 31) {
if (!(ok & BRD1_OK))
fib_magic(RTM_DELROUTE, RTN_BROADCAST, brd, 32, prim);
if (!(ok & BRD0_OK))
fib_magic(RTM_DELROUTE, RTN_BROADCAST, any, 32, prim);
}
if (!(ok & LOCAL_OK)) {
unsigned int addr_type;
fib_magic(RTM_DELROUTE, RTN_LOCAL, ifa->ifa_local, 32, prim);
/* Check, that this local address finally disappeared. */
addr_type = inet_addr_type_dev_table(dev_net(dev), dev,
ifa->ifa_local);
if (gone && addr_type != RTN_LOCAL) {
/* And the last, but not the least thing.
* We must flush stray FIB entries.
*
* First of all, we scan fib_info list searching
* for stray nexthop entries, then ignite fib_flush.
*/
if (fib_sync_down_addr(dev_net(dev), ifa->ifa_local))
fib_flush(dev_net(dev));
}
}
#undef LOCAL_OK
#undef BRD_OK
#undef BRD0_OK
#undef BRD1_OK
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The IPv4 implementation in the Linux kernel before 4.5.2 mishandles destruction of device objects, which allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (host OS networking outage) by arranging for a large number of IP addresses.
Commit Message: ipv4: Don't do expensive useless work during inetdev destroy.
When an inetdev is destroyed, every address assigned to the interface
is removed. And in this scenerio we do two pointless things which can
be very expensive if the number of assigned interfaces is large:
1) Address promotion. We are deleting all addresses, so there is no
point in doing this.
2) A full nf conntrack table purge for every address. We only need to
do this once, as is already caught by the existing
masq_dev_notifier so masq_inet_event() can skip this.
Reported-by: Solar Designer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <[email protected]> | Low | 167,355 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadJP2Image(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
const char
*option;
Image
*image;
int
jp2_status;
MagickBooleanType
status;
opj_codec_t
*jp2_codec;
opj_codestream_index_t
*codestream_index = (opj_codestream_index_t *) NULL;
opj_dparameters_t
parameters;
opj_image_t
*jp2_image;
opj_stream_t
*jp2_stream;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
sans[4];
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Initialize JP2 codec.
*/
if (ReadBlob(image,4,sans) != 4)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
(void) SeekBlob(image,SEEK_SET,0);
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"JPT") == 0)
jp2_codec=opj_create_decompress(OPJ_CODEC_JPT);
else
if (IsJ2K(sans,4) != MagickFalse)
jp2_codec=opj_create_decompress(OPJ_CODEC_J2K);
else
jp2_codec=opj_create_decompress(OPJ_CODEC_JP2);
opj_set_warning_handler(jp2_codec,JP2WarningHandler,exception);
opj_set_error_handler(jp2_codec,JP2ErrorHandler,exception);
opj_set_default_decoder_parameters(¶meters);
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"jp2:reduce-factor");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
parameters.cp_reduce=StringToInteger(option);
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"jp2:layer-number");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
parameters.cp_layer=StringToInteger(option);
if (opj_setup_decoder(jp2_codec,¶meters) == 0)
{
opj_destroy_codec(jp2_codec);
ThrowReaderException(DelegateError,"UnableToManageJP2Stream");
}
jp2_stream=opj_stream_create(OPJ_J2K_STREAM_CHUNK_SIZE,OPJ_TRUE);
opj_stream_set_read_function(jp2_stream,JP2ReadHandler);
opj_stream_set_write_function(jp2_stream,JP2WriteHandler);
opj_stream_set_seek_function(jp2_stream,JP2SeekHandler);
opj_stream_set_skip_function(jp2_stream,JP2SkipHandler);
opj_stream_set_user_data(jp2_stream,image,NULL);
opj_stream_set_user_data_length(jp2_stream,GetBlobSize(image));
if (opj_read_header(jp2_stream,jp2_codec,&jp2_image) == 0)
{
opj_stream_destroy(jp2_stream);
opj_destroy_codec(jp2_codec);
ThrowReaderException(DelegateError,"UnableToDecodeImageFile");
}
jp2_status=1;
if ((image->columns != 0) && (image->rows != 0))
{
/*
Extract an area from the image.
*/
jp2_status=opj_set_decode_area(jp2_codec,jp2_image,image->extract_info.x,
image->extract_info.y,image->extract_info.x+(ssize_t) image->columns,
image->extract_info.y+(ssize_t) image->rows);
if (jp2_status == 0)
{
opj_stream_destroy(jp2_stream);
opj_destroy_codec(jp2_codec);
opj_image_destroy(jp2_image);
ThrowReaderException(DelegateError,"UnableToDecodeImageFile");
}
}
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
jp2_status=opj_get_decoded_tile(jp2_codec,jp2_stream,jp2_image,
(unsigned int) image_info->scene);
else
if (image->ping == MagickFalse)
{
jp2_status=opj_decode(jp2_codec,jp2_stream,jp2_image);
if (jp2_status != 0)
jp2_status=opj_end_decompress(jp2_codec,jp2_stream);
}
if (jp2_status == 0)
{
opj_stream_destroy(jp2_stream);
opj_destroy_codec(jp2_codec);
opj_image_destroy(jp2_image);
ThrowReaderException(DelegateError,"UnableToDecodeImageFile");
}
opj_stream_destroy(jp2_stream);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) jp2_image->numcomps; i++)
{
if ((jp2_image->comps[i].dx == 0) || (jp2_image->comps[i].dy == 0))
{
opj_destroy_codec(jp2_codec);
opj_image_destroy(jp2_image);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"IrregularChannelGeometryNotSupported")
}
}
/*
Convert JP2 image.
*/
image->columns=(size_t) jp2_image->comps[0].w;
image->rows=(size_t) jp2_image->comps[0].h;
image->depth=jp2_image->comps[0].prec;
image->compression=JPEG2000Compression;
if (jp2_image->numcomps <= 2)
{
SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace);
if (jp2_image->numcomps > 1)
image->matte=MagickTrue;
}
if (jp2_image->numcomps > 3)
image->matte=MagickTrue;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) jp2_image->numcomps; i++)
if ((jp2_image->comps[i].dx > 1) || (jp2_image->comps[i].dy > 1))
SetImageColorspace(image,YUVColorspace);
if (jp2_image->icc_profile_buf != (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
StringInfo
*profile;
profile=BlobToStringInfo(jp2_image->icc_profile_buf,
jp2_image->icc_profile_len);
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
SetImageProfile(image,"icc",profile);
}
if (image->ping != MagickFalse)
{
opj_destroy_codec(jp2_codec);
opj_image_destroy(jp2_image);
opj_destroy_cstr_index(&codestream_index);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register PixelPacket
*restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
register ssize_t
i;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) jp2_image->numcomps; i++)
{
double
pixel,
scale;
scale=QuantumRange/(double) ((1UL << jp2_image->comps[i].prec)-1);
pixel=scale*(jp2_image->comps[i].data[y/jp2_image->comps[i].dy*
image->columns/jp2_image->comps[i].dx+x/jp2_image->comps[i].dx]+
(jp2_image->comps[i].sgnd ? 1UL << (jp2_image->comps[i].prec-1) : 0));
switch (i)
{
case 0:
{
q->red=ClampToQuantum(pixel);
q->green=q->red;
q->blue=q->red;
q->opacity=OpaqueOpacity;
break;
}
case 1:
{
if (jp2_image->numcomps == 2)
{
q->opacity=ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange-pixel);
break;
}
q->green=ClampToQuantum(pixel);
break;
}
case 2:
{
q->blue=ClampToQuantum(pixel);
break;
}
case 3:
{
q->opacity=ClampToQuantum(pixel);
break;
}
}
}
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
/*
Free resources.
*/
opj_destroy_codec(jp2_codec);
opj_image_destroy(jp2_image);
opj_destroy_cstr_index(&codestream_index);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: | Medium | 168,575 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void sas_deform_port(struct asd_sas_phy *phy, int gone)
{
struct sas_ha_struct *sas_ha = phy->ha;
struct asd_sas_port *port = phy->port;
struct sas_internal *si =
to_sas_internal(sas_ha->core.shost->transportt);
struct domain_device *dev;
unsigned long flags;
if (!port)
return; /* done by a phy event */
dev = port->port_dev;
if (dev)
dev->pathways--;
if (port->num_phys == 1) {
sas_unregister_domain_devices(port, gone);
sas_port_delete(port->port);
port->port = NULL;
} else {
sas_port_delete_phy(port->port, phy->phy);
sas_device_set_phy(dev, port->port);
}
if (si->dft->lldd_port_deformed)
si->dft->lldd_port_deformed(phy);
spin_lock_irqsave(&sas_ha->phy_port_lock, flags);
spin_lock(&port->phy_list_lock);
list_del_init(&phy->port_phy_el);
sas_phy_set_target(phy, NULL);
phy->port = NULL;
port->num_phys--;
port->phy_mask &= ~(1U << phy->id);
if (port->num_phys == 0) {
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&port->phy_list);
memset(port->sas_addr, 0, SAS_ADDR_SIZE);
memset(port->attached_sas_addr, 0, SAS_ADDR_SIZE);
port->class = 0;
port->iproto = 0;
port->tproto = 0;
port->oob_mode = 0;
port->phy_mask = 0;
}
spin_unlock(&port->phy_list_lock);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sas_ha->phy_port_lock, flags);
return;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The Serial Attached SCSI (SAS) implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.15.9 mishandles a mutex within libsas, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (deadlock) by triggering certain error-handling code.
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: direct call probe and destruct
In commit 87c8331fcf72 ("[SCSI] libsas: prevent domain rediscovery
competing with ata error handling") introduced disco mutex to prevent
rediscovery competing with ata error handling and put the whole
revalidation in the mutex. But the rphy add/remove needs to wait for the
error handling which also grabs the disco mutex. This may leads to dead
lock.So the probe and destruct event were introduce to do the rphy
add/remove asynchronously and out of the lock.
The asynchronously processed workers makes the whole discovery process
not atomic, the other events may interrupt the process. For example,
if a loss of signal event inserted before the probe event, the
sas_deform_port() is called and the port will be deleted.
And sas_port_delete() may run before the destruct event, but the
port-x:x is the top parent of end device or expander. This leads to
a kernel WARNING such as:
[ 82.042979] sysfs group 'power' not found for kobject 'phy-1:0:22'
[ 82.042983] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 82.042986] WARNING: CPU: 54 PID: 1714 at fs/sysfs/group.c:237
sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043059] Call trace:
[ 82.043082] [<ffff0000082e7624>] sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043085] [<ffff00000864e320>] dpm_sysfs_remove+0x60/0x70
[ 82.043086] [<ffff00000863ee10>] device_del+0x138/0x308
[ 82.043089] [<ffff00000869a2d0>] sas_phy_delete+0x38/0x60
[ 82.043091] [<ffff00000869a86c>] do_sas_phy_delete+0x6c/0x80
[ 82.043093] [<ffff00000863dc20>] device_for_each_child+0x58/0xa0
[ 82.043095] [<ffff000008696f80>] sas_remove_children+0x40/0x50
[ 82.043100] [<ffff00000869d1bc>] sas_destruct_devices+0x64/0xa0
[ 82.043102] [<ffff0000080e93bc>] process_one_work+0x1fc/0x4b0
[ 82.043104] [<ffff0000080e96c0>] worker_thread+0x50/0x490
[ 82.043105] [<ffff0000080f0364>] kthread+0xfc/0x128
[ 82.043107] [<ffff0000080836c0>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x50
Make probe and destruct a direct call in the disco and revalidate function,
but put them outside the lock. The whole discovery or revalidate won't
be interrupted by other events. And the DISCE_PROBE and DISCE_DESTRUCT
event are deleted as a result of the direct call.
Introduce a new list to destruct the sas_port and put the port delete after
the destruct. This makes sure the right order of destroying the sysfs
kobject and fix the warning above.
In sas_ex_revalidate_domain() have a loop to find all broadcasted
device, and sometimes we have a chance to find the same expander twice.
Because the sas_port will be deleted at the end of the whole revalidate
process, sas_port with the same name cannot be added before this.
Otherwise the sysfs will complain of creating duplicate filename. Since
the LLDD will send broadcast for every device change, we can only
process one expander's revalidation.
[mkp: kbuild test robot warning]
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <[email protected]>
CC: John Garry <[email protected]>
CC: Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]>
CC: Ewan Milne <[email protected]>
CC: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
CC: Tomas Henzl <[email protected]>
CC: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]> | Low | 169,393 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: UserCloudPolicyManagerChromeOS::UserCloudPolicyManagerChromeOS(
scoped_ptr<CloudPolicyStore> store,
scoped_ptr<CloudExternalDataManager> external_data_manager,
const base::FilePath& component_policy_cache_path,
bool wait_for_policy_fetch,
base::TimeDelta initial_policy_fetch_timeout,
const scoped_refptr<base::SequencedTaskRunner>& task_runner,
const scoped_refptr<base::SequencedTaskRunner>& file_task_runner,
const scoped_refptr<base::SequencedTaskRunner>& io_task_runner)
: CloudPolicyManager(
PolicyNamespaceKey(dm_protocol::kChromeUserPolicyType, std::string()),
store.get(),
task_runner,
file_task_runner,
io_task_runner),
store_(store.Pass()),
external_data_manager_(external_data_manager.Pass()),
component_policy_cache_path_(component_policy_cache_path),
wait_for_policy_fetch_(wait_for_policy_fetch),
policy_fetch_timeout_(false, false) {
time_init_started_ = base::Time::Now();
if (wait_for_policy_fetch_) {
policy_fetch_timeout_.Start(
FROM_HERE,
initial_policy_fetch_timeout,
base::Bind(&UserCloudPolicyManagerChromeOS::OnBlockingFetchTimeout,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The SVG implementation in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 31.0.1650.48, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) by leveraging the use of tree order, rather than transitive dependency order, for layout.
Commit Message: Make the policy fetch for first time login blocking
The CL makes policy fetching for first time login blocking for all users, except the ones that are known to be non-enterprise users.
BUG=334584
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/330843002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@282925 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,149 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ConnectPanelServiceSignals() {
if (!ibus_) {
return;
}
IBusPanelService* ibus_panel_service = IBUS_PANEL_SERVICE(
g_object_get_data(G_OBJECT(ibus_), kPanelObjectKey));
if (!ibus_panel_service) {
LOG(ERROR) << "IBusPanelService is NOT available.";
return;
}
g_signal_connect(ibus_panel_service,
"focus-in",
G_CALLBACK(FocusInCallback),
this);
g_signal_connect(ibus_panel_service,
"register-properties",
G_CALLBACK(RegisterPropertiesCallback),
this);
g_signal_connect(ibus_panel_service,
"update-property",
G_CALLBACK(UpdatePropertyCallback),
this);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,530 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static struct rmap_item *scan_get_next_rmap_item(struct page **page)
{
struct mm_struct *mm;
struct mm_slot *slot;
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
struct rmap_item *rmap_item;
if (list_empty(&ksm_mm_head.mm_list))
return NULL;
slot = ksm_scan.mm_slot;
if (slot == &ksm_mm_head) {
/*
* A number of pages can hang around indefinitely on per-cpu
* pagevecs, raised page count preventing write_protect_page
* from merging them. Though it doesn't really matter much,
* it is puzzling to see some stuck in pages_volatile until
* other activity jostles them out, and they also prevented
* LTP's KSM test from succeeding deterministically; so drain
* them here (here rather than on entry to ksm_do_scan(),
* so we don't IPI too often when pages_to_scan is set low).
*/
lru_add_drain_all();
root_unstable_tree = RB_ROOT;
spin_lock(&ksm_mmlist_lock);
slot = list_entry(slot->mm_list.next, struct mm_slot, mm_list);
ksm_scan.mm_slot = slot;
spin_unlock(&ksm_mmlist_lock);
next_mm:
ksm_scan.address = 0;
ksm_scan.rmap_list = &slot->rmap_list;
}
mm = slot->mm;
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
if (ksm_test_exit(mm))
vma = NULL;
else
vma = find_vma(mm, ksm_scan.address);
for (; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) {
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_MERGEABLE))
continue;
if (ksm_scan.address < vma->vm_start)
ksm_scan.address = vma->vm_start;
if (!vma->anon_vma)
ksm_scan.address = vma->vm_end;
while (ksm_scan.address < vma->vm_end) {
if (ksm_test_exit(mm))
break;
*page = follow_page(vma, ksm_scan.address, FOLL_GET);
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(*page)) {
ksm_scan.address += PAGE_SIZE;
cond_resched();
continue;
}
if (PageAnon(*page) ||
page_trans_compound_anon(*page)) {
flush_anon_page(vma, *page, ksm_scan.address);
flush_dcache_page(*page);
rmap_item = get_next_rmap_item(slot,
ksm_scan.rmap_list, ksm_scan.address);
if (rmap_item) {
ksm_scan.rmap_list =
&rmap_item->rmap_list;
ksm_scan.address += PAGE_SIZE;
} else
put_page(*page);
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
return rmap_item;
}
put_page(*page);
ksm_scan.address += PAGE_SIZE;
cond_resched();
}
}
if (ksm_test_exit(mm)) {
ksm_scan.address = 0;
ksm_scan.rmap_list = &slot->rmap_list;
}
/*
* Nuke all the rmap_items that are above this current rmap:
* because there were no VM_MERGEABLE vmas with such addresses.
*/
remove_trailing_rmap_items(slot, ksm_scan.rmap_list);
spin_lock(&ksm_mmlist_lock);
ksm_scan.mm_slot = list_entry(slot->mm_list.next,
struct mm_slot, mm_list);
if (ksm_scan.address == 0) {
/*
* We've completed a full scan of all vmas, holding mmap_sem
* throughout, and found no VM_MERGEABLE: so do the same as
* __ksm_exit does to remove this mm from all our lists now.
* This applies either when cleaning up after __ksm_exit
* (but beware: we can reach here even before __ksm_exit),
* or when all VM_MERGEABLE areas have been unmapped (and
* mmap_sem then protects against race with MADV_MERGEABLE).
*/
hlist_del(&slot->link);
list_del(&slot->mm_list);
spin_unlock(&ksm_mmlist_lock);
free_mm_slot(slot);
clear_bit(MMF_VM_MERGEABLE, &mm->flags);
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
mmdrop(mm);
} else {
spin_unlock(&ksm_mmlist_lock);
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
}
/* Repeat until we've completed scanning the whole list */
slot = ksm_scan.mm_slot;
if (slot != &ksm_mm_head)
goto next_mm;
ksm_scan.seqnr++;
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the scan_get_next_rmap_item function in mm/ksm.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39.3, when Kernel SamePage Merging (KSM) is enabled, allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted application.
Commit Message: ksm: fix NULL pointer dereference in scan_get_next_rmap_item()
Andrea Righi reported a case where an exiting task can race against
ksmd::scan_get_next_rmap_item (http://lkml.org/lkml/2011/6/1/742) easily
triggering a NULL pointer dereference in ksmd.
ksm_scan.mm_slot == &ksm_mm_head with only one registered mm
CPU 1 (__ksm_exit) CPU 2 (scan_get_next_rmap_item)
list_empty() is false
lock slot == &ksm_mm_head
list_del(slot->mm_list)
(list now empty)
unlock
lock
slot = list_entry(slot->mm_list.next)
(list is empty, so slot is still ksm_mm_head)
unlock
slot->mm == NULL ... Oops
Close this race by revalidating that the new slot is not simply the list
head again.
Andrea's test case:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#define BUFSIZE getpagesize()
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
void *ptr;
if (posix_memalign(&ptr, getpagesize(), BUFSIZE) < 0) {
perror("posix_memalign");
exit(1);
}
if (madvise(ptr, BUFSIZE, MADV_MERGEABLE) < 0) {
perror("madvise");
exit(1);
}
*(char *)NULL = 0;
return 0;
}
Reported-by: Andrea Righi <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Andrea Righi <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,871 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void SetRuntimeFeaturesDefaultsAndUpdateFromArgs(
const base::CommandLine& command_line) {
bool enableExperimentalWebPlatformFeatures = command_line.HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableExperimentalWebPlatformFeatures);
if (enableExperimentalWebPlatformFeatures)
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableExperimentalFeatures(true);
SetRuntimeFeatureDefaultsForPlatform();
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableOriginTrials(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kOriginTrials));
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kWebUsb))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableWebUsb(false);
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableBlinkHeapIncrementalMarking(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kBlinkHeapIncrementalMarking));
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableBlinkHeapUnifiedGarbageCollection(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
features::kBlinkHeapUnifiedGarbageCollection));
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kBloatedRendererDetection))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableBloatedRendererDetection(true);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableDatabases))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableDatabase(false);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableNotifications)) {
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableNotifications(false);
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnablePushMessaging(false);
}
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kNotificationContentImage))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableNotificationContentImage(false);
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableSharedArrayBuffer(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kSharedArrayBuffer) ||
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kWebAssemblyThreads));
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableSharedWorkers))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableSharedWorker(false);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableSpeechAPI))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableScriptedSpeech(false);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableFileSystem))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableFileSystem(false);
if (!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableAcceleratedJpegDecoding))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableDecodeToYUV(true);
#if defined(SUPPORT_WEBGL2_COMPUTE_CONTEXT)
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableWebGL2ComputeContext)) {
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableWebGL2ComputeContext(true);
}
#endif
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableWebGLDraftExtensions))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableWebGLDraftExtensions(true);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableAutomation) ||
command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kHeadless)) {
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableAutomationControlled(true);
}
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
const bool enable_canvas_2d_image_chromium =
command_line.HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableGpuMemoryBufferCompositorResources) &&
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisable2dCanvasImageChromium) &&
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableGpu) &&
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kCanvas2DImageChromium);
#else
constexpr bool enable_canvas_2d_image_chromium = false;
#endif
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableCanvas2dImageChromium(
enable_canvas_2d_image_chromium);
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
const bool enable_web_gl_image_chromium =
command_line.HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableGpuMemoryBufferCompositorResources) &&
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableWebGLImageChromium) &&
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableGpu) &&
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kWebGLImageChromium);
#else
const bool enable_web_gl_image_chromium =
command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableWebGLImageChromium);
#endif
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableWebGLImageChromium(enable_web_gl_image_chromium);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kForceOverlayFullscreenVideo))
WebRuntimeFeatures::ForceOverlayFullscreenVideo(true);
if (ui::IsOverlayScrollbarEnabled())
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableOverlayScrollbars(true);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnablePreciseMemoryInfo))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnablePreciseMemoryInfo(true);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnablePrintBrowser))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnablePrintBrowser(true);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableNetworkInformationDownlinkMax) ||
enableExperimentalWebPlatformFeatures) {
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableNetInfoDownlinkMax(true);
}
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kReducedReferrerGranularity))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableReducedReferrerGranularity(true);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisablePermissionsAPI))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnablePermissionsAPI(false);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableV8IdleTasks))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableV8IdleTasks(false);
else
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableV8IdleTasks(true);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableUnsafeWebGPU))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableWebGPU(true);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableWebVR))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableWebVR(true);
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kWebXr))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableWebXR(true);
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kWebXrGamepadSupport))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableWebXRGamepadSupport(true);
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kWebXrHitTest))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableWebXRHitTest(true);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisablePresentationAPI))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnablePresentationAPI(false);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableRemotePlaybackAPI))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableRemotePlaybackAPI(false);
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableSecMetadata(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kSecMetadata) ||
enableExperimentalWebPlatformFeatures);
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableUserActivationV2(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kUserActivationV2));
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kScrollAnchorSerialization))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableScrollAnchorSerialization(true);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableBlinkGenPropertyTrees))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableFeatureFromString("BlinkGenPropertyTrees", true);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableSlimmingPaintV2))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableFeatureFromString("SlimmingPaintV2", true);
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnablePassiveDocumentEventListeners(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kPassiveDocumentEventListeners));
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnablePassiveDocumentWheelEventListeners(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
features::kPassiveDocumentWheelEventListeners));
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableFeatureFromString(
"FontCacheScaling",
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kFontCacheScaling));
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableFeatureFromString(
"FontSrcLocalMatching",
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kFontSrcLocalMatching));
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableFeatureFromString(
"FramebustingNeedsSameOriginOrUserGesture",
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
features::kFramebustingNeedsSameOriginOrUserGesture));
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableBackgroundTimerThrottling))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableTimerThrottlingForBackgroundTabs(false);
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableExpensiveBackgroundTimerThrottling(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
features::kExpensiveBackgroundTimerThrottling));
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kHeapCompaction))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableHeapCompaction(true);
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableRenderingPipelineThrottling(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kRenderingPipelineThrottling));
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableTimerThrottlingForHiddenFrames(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kTimerThrottlingForHiddenFrames));
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
features::kSendBeaconThrowForBlobWithNonSimpleType))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableSendBeaconThrowForBlobWithNonSimpleType(true);
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableMediaSessionAPI))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableMediaSession(false);
#endif
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnablePaymentRequest(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kWebPayments));
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kServiceWorkerPaymentApps))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnablePaymentApp(true);
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableNetworkService(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(network::features::kNetworkService));
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kGamepadExtensions))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableGamepadExtensions(true);
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kGamepadVibration))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableGamepadVibration(true);
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kCompositeOpaqueFixedPosition))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableFeatureFromString("CompositeOpaqueFixedPosition",
true);
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kCompositeOpaqueScrollers))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableFeatureFromString("CompositeOpaqueScrollers",
false);
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kCompositorTouchAction))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableCompositorTouchAction(true);
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kCSSFragmentIdentifiers))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableCSSFragmentIdentifiers(true);
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kGenericSensor))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableGenericSensor(false);
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kGenericSensorExtraClasses))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableGenericSensorExtraClasses(true);
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(network::features::kOutOfBlinkCORS))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableOutOfBlinkCORS(true);
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableMediaCastOverlayButton(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(media::kMediaCastOverlayButton));
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kBlockCredentialedSubresources)) {
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableFeatureFromString("BlockCredentialedSubresources",
false);
}
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kRasterInducingScroll))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableRasterInducingScroll(true);
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableFeatureFromString(
"AllowContentInitiatedDataUrlNavigations",
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
features::kAllowContentInitiatedDataUrlNavigations));
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kWebNfc))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableWebNfc(true);
#endif
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableWebAuth(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kWebAuth));
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableWebAuthGetTransports(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kWebAuthGetTransports) ||
enableExperimentalWebPlatformFeatures);
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableClientPlaceholdersForServerLoFi(
base::GetFieldTrialParamValue("PreviewsClientLoFi",
"replace_server_placeholders") != "false");
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableResourceLoadScheduler(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kResourceLoadScheduler));
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kLayeredAPI))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableLayeredAPI(true);
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(blink::features::kLayoutNG))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableLayoutNG(true);
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableLazyInitializeMediaControls(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kLazyInitializeMediaControls));
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableMediaEngagementBypassAutoplayPolicies(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
media::kMediaEngagementBypassAutoplayPolicies));
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableOverflowIconsForMediaControls(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(media::kOverflowIconsForMediaControls));
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableAllowActivationDelegationAttr(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kAllowActivationDelegationAttr));
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableModernMediaControls(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(media::kUseModernMediaControls));
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableWorkStealingInScriptRunner(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kWorkStealingInScriptRunner));
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableScheduledScriptStreaming(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kScheduledScriptStreaming));
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableMergeBlockingNonBlockingPools(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(base::kMergeBlockingNonBlockingPools));
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kLazyFrameLoading))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableLazyFrameLoading(true);
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kLazyFrameVisibleLoadTimeMetrics))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableLazyFrameVisibleLoadTimeMetrics(true);
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kLazyImageLoading))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableLazyImageLoading(true);
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kLazyImageVisibleLoadTimeMetrics))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableLazyImageVisibleLoadTimeMetrics(true);
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableV8ContextSnapshot(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kV8ContextSnapshot));
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableRequireCSSExtensionForFile(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kRequireCSSExtensionForFile));
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnablePictureInPicture(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(media::kPictureInPicture));
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableCacheInlineScriptCode(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kCacheInlineScriptCode));
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableIsolatedCodeCache(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(net::features::kIsolatedCodeCache));
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kSignedHTTPExchange)) {
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableSignedHTTPExchange(true);
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnablePreloadImageSrcSetEnabled(true);
}
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableNestedWorkers(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(blink::features::kNestedWorkers));
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
features::kExperimentalProductivityFeatures)) {
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableExperimentalProductivityFeatures(true);
}
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kPageLifecycle))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnablePageLifecycle(true);
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kDisplayCutoutAPI) &&
base::android::BuildInfo::GetInstance()->sdk_int() >=
base::android::SDK_VERSION_P) {
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableDisplayCutoutAPI(true);
}
#endif
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableAccessibilityObjectModel))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableAccessibilityObjectModel(true);
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(blink::features::kWritableFilesAPI))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableFeatureFromString("WritableFiles", true);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(
switches::kDisableOriginTrialControlledBlinkFeatures)) {
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableOriginTrialControlledFeatures(false);
}
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableAutoplayIgnoresWebAudio(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(media::kAutoplayIgnoreWebAudio));
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableMediaControlsExpandGesture(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(media::kMediaControlsExpandGesture));
#endif
for (const std::string& feature :
FeaturesFromSwitch(command_line, switches::kEnableBlinkFeatures)) {
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableFeatureFromString(feature, true);
}
for (const std::string& feature :
FeaturesFromSwitch(command_line, switches::kDisableBlinkFeatures)) {
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableFeatureFromString(feature, false);
}
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnablePortals(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(blink::features::kPortals));
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kBackgroundFetch))
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableBackgroundFetch(false);
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableBackgroundFetchUploads(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kBackgroundFetchUploads));
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableNoHoverAfterLayoutChange(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kNoHoverAfterLayoutChange));
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableJankTracking(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(blink::features::kJankTracking) ||
enableExperimentalWebPlatformFeatures);
WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableNoHoverDuringScroll(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kNoHoverDuringScroll));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: Insufficient file type enforcement in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 69.0.3497.81 allowed a remote attacker to obtain local file data via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Remove RequireCSSExtensionForFile runtime enabled flag.
The feature has long since been stable (since M64) and doesn't seem
to be a need for this flag.
BUG=788936
Change-Id: I666390b869289c328acb4a2daa5bf4154e1702c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324143
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607329} | Low | 173,185 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: Response StorageHandler::TrackCacheStorageForOrigin(const std::string& origin) {
if (!process_)
return Response::InternalError();
GURL origin_url(origin);
if (!origin_url.is_valid())
return Response::InvalidParams(origin + " is not a valid URL");
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&CacheStorageObserver::TrackOriginOnIOThread,
base::Unretained(GetCacheStorageObserver()),
url::Origin::Create(origin_url)));
return Response::OK();
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An object lifetime issue in the developer tools network handler in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157} | Medium | 172,776 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int dsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
{
const unsigned char *p, *pm;
int pklen, pmlen;
int ptype;
void *pval;
ASN1_STRING *pstr;
X509_ALGOR *palg;
ASN1_INTEGER *privkey = NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
STACK_OF(ASN1_TYPE) *ndsa = NULL;
DSA *dsa = NULL;
if (!PKCS8_pkey_get0(NULL, &p, &pklen, &palg, p8))
return 0;
X509_ALGOR_get0(NULL, &ptype, &pval, palg);
if (*p == (V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)) {
ASN1_TYPE *t1, *t2;
if (!(ndsa = d2i_ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY(NULL, &p, pklen)))
goto decerr;
if (sk_ASN1_TYPE_num(ndsa) != 2)
goto decerr;
/*-
* Handle Two broken types:
* SEQUENCE {parameters, priv_key}
* SEQUENCE {pub_key, priv_key}
*/
t1 = sk_ASN1_TYPE_value(ndsa, 0);
t2 = sk_ASN1_TYPE_value(ndsa, 1);
if (t1->type == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
p8->broken = PKCS8_EMBEDDED_PARAM;
pval = t1->value.ptr;
} else if (ptype == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
p8->broken = PKCS8_NS_DB;
else
goto decerr;
if (t2->type != V_ASN1_INTEGER)
goto decerr;
privkey = t2->value.integer;
} else {
const unsigned char *q = p;
if (!(privkey = d2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, &p, pklen)))
goto decerr;
if (privkey->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) {
p8->broken = PKCS8_NEG_PRIVKEY;
ASN1_STRING_clear_free(privkey);
if (!(privkey = d2i_ASN1_UINTEGER(NULL, &q, pklen)))
goto decerr;
}
if (ptype != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
goto decerr;
}
pstr = pval;
pm = pstr->data;
pmlen = pstr->length;
if (!(dsa = d2i_DSAparams(NULL, &pm, pmlen)))
goto decerr;
/* We have parameters now set private key */
if (!(dsa->priv_key = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(privkey, NULL))) {
DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_DECODE, DSA_R_BN_ERROR);
goto dsaerr;
}
/* Calculate public key */
if (!(dsa->pub_key = BN_new())) {
DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_DECODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto dsaerr;
}
if (!(ctx = BN_CTX_new())) {
DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_DECODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto dsaerr;
}
if (!BN_mod_exp(dsa->pub_key, dsa->g, dsa->priv_key, dsa->p, ctx)) {
DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_DECODE, DSA_R_BN_ERROR);
goto dsaerr;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Mem. Corr.
CWE ID:
Summary: Double free vulnerability in the dsa_priv_decode function in crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c in OpenSSL 1.0.1 before 1.0.1s and 1.0.2 before 1.0.2g allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a malformed DSA private key.
Commit Message: | High | 165,253 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int udf_read_inode(struct inode *inode, bool hidden_inode)
{
struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
struct fileEntry *fe;
struct extendedFileEntry *efe;
uint16_t ident;
struct udf_inode_info *iinfo = UDF_I(inode);
struct udf_sb_info *sbi = UDF_SB(inode->i_sb);
struct kernel_lb_addr *iloc = &iinfo->i_location;
unsigned int link_count;
unsigned int indirections = 0;
int bs = inode->i_sb->s_blocksize;
int ret = -EIO;
reread:
if (iloc->logicalBlockNum >=
sbi->s_partmaps[iloc->partitionReferenceNum].s_partition_len) {
udf_debug("block=%d, partition=%d out of range\n",
iloc->logicalBlockNum, iloc->partitionReferenceNum);
return -EIO;
}
/*
* Set defaults, but the inode is still incomplete!
* Note: get_new_inode() sets the following on a new inode:
* i_sb = sb
* i_no = ino
* i_flags = sb->s_flags
* i_state = 0
* clean_inode(): zero fills and sets
* i_count = 1
* i_nlink = 1
* i_op = NULL;
*/
bh = udf_read_ptagged(inode->i_sb, iloc, 0, &ident);
if (!bh) {
udf_err(inode->i_sb, "(ino %ld) failed !bh\n", inode->i_ino);
return -EIO;
}
if (ident != TAG_IDENT_FE && ident != TAG_IDENT_EFE &&
ident != TAG_IDENT_USE) {
udf_err(inode->i_sb, "(ino %ld) failed ident=%d\n",
inode->i_ino, ident);
goto out;
}
fe = (struct fileEntry *)bh->b_data;
efe = (struct extendedFileEntry *)bh->b_data;
if (fe->icbTag.strategyType == cpu_to_le16(4096)) {
struct buffer_head *ibh;
ibh = udf_read_ptagged(inode->i_sb, iloc, 1, &ident);
if (ident == TAG_IDENT_IE && ibh) {
struct kernel_lb_addr loc;
struct indirectEntry *ie;
ie = (struct indirectEntry *)ibh->b_data;
loc = lelb_to_cpu(ie->indirectICB.extLocation);
if (ie->indirectICB.extLength) {
brelse(ibh);
memcpy(&iinfo->i_location, &loc,
sizeof(struct kernel_lb_addr));
if (++indirections > UDF_MAX_ICB_NESTING) {
udf_err(inode->i_sb,
"too many ICBs in ICB hierarchy"
" (max %d supported)\n",
UDF_MAX_ICB_NESTING);
goto out;
}
brelse(bh);
goto reread;
}
}
brelse(ibh);
} else if (fe->icbTag.strategyType != cpu_to_le16(4)) {
udf_err(inode->i_sb, "unsupported strategy type: %d\n",
le16_to_cpu(fe->icbTag.strategyType));
goto out;
}
if (fe->icbTag.strategyType == cpu_to_le16(4))
iinfo->i_strat4096 = 0;
else /* if (fe->icbTag.strategyType == cpu_to_le16(4096)) */
iinfo->i_strat4096 = 1;
iinfo->i_alloc_type = le16_to_cpu(fe->icbTag.flags) &
ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_MASK;
iinfo->i_unique = 0;
iinfo->i_lenEAttr = 0;
iinfo->i_lenExtents = 0;
iinfo->i_lenAlloc = 0;
iinfo->i_next_alloc_block = 0;
iinfo->i_next_alloc_goal = 0;
if (fe->descTag.tagIdent == cpu_to_le16(TAG_IDENT_EFE)) {
iinfo->i_efe = 1;
iinfo->i_use = 0;
ret = udf_alloc_i_data(inode, bs -
sizeof(struct extendedFileEntry));
if (ret)
goto out;
memcpy(iinfo->i_ext.i_data,
bh->b_data + sizeof(struct extendedFileEntry),
bs - sizeof(struct extendedFileEntry));
} else if (fe->descTag.tagIdent == cpu_to_le16(TAG_IDENT_FE)) {
iinfo->i_efe = 0;
iinfo->i_use = 0;
ret = udf_alloc_i_data(inode, bs - sizeof(struct fileEntry));
if (ret)
goto out;
memcpy(iinfo->i_ext.i_data,
bh->b_data + sizeof(struct fileEntry),
bs - sizeof(struct fileEntry));
} else if (fe->descTag.tagIdent == cpu_to_le16(TAG_IDENT_USE)) {
iinfo->i_efe = 0;
iinfo->i_use = 1;
iinfo->i_lenAlloc = le32_to_cpu(
((struct unallocSpaceEntry *)bh->b_data)->
lengthAllocDescs);
ret = udf_alloc_i_data(inode, bs -
sizeof(struct unallocSpaceEntry));
if (ret)
goto out;
memcpy(iinfo->i_ext.i_data,
bh->b_data + sizeof(struct unallocSpaceEntry),
bs - sizeof(struct unallocSpaceEntry));
return 0;
}
ret = -EIO;
read_lock(&sbi->s_cred_lock);
i_uid_write(inode, le32_to_cpu(fe->uid));
if (!uid_valid(inode->i_uid) ||
UDF_QUERY_FLAG(inode->i_sb, UDF_FLAG_UID_IGNORE) ||
UDF_QUERY_FLAG(inode->i_sb, UDF_FLAG_UID_SET))
inode->i_uid = UDF_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_uid;
i_gid_write(inode, le32_to_cpu(fe->gid));
if (!gid_valid(inode->i_gid) ||
UDF_QUERY_FLAG(inode->i_sb, UDF_FLAG_GID_IGNORE) ||
UDF_QUERY_FLAG(inode->i_sb, UDF_FLAG_GID_SET))
inode->i_gid = UDF_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_gid;
if (fe->icbTag.fileType != ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_DIRECTORY &&
sbi->s_fmode != UDF_INVALID_MODE)
inode->i_mode = sbi->s_fmode;
else if (fe->icbTag.fileType == ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_DIRECTORY &&
sbi->s_dmode != UDF_INVALID_MODE)
inode->i_mode = sbi->s_dmode;
else
inode->i_mode = udf_convert_permissions(fe);
inode->i_mode &= ~sbi->s_umask;
read_unlock(&sbi->s_cred_lock);
link_count = le16_to_cpu(fe->fileLinkCount);
if (!link_count) {
if (!hidden_inode) {
ret = -ESTALE;
goto out;
}
link_count = 1;
}
set_nlink(inode, link_count);
inode->i_size = le64_to_cpu(fe->informationLength);
iinfo->i_lenExtents = inode->i_size;
if (iinfo->i_efe == 0) {
inode->i_blocks = le64_to_cpu(fe->logicalBlocksRecorded) <<
(inode->i_sb->s_blocksize_bits - 9);
if (!udf_disk_stamp_to_time(&inode->i_atime, fe->accessTime))
inode->i_atime = sbi->s_record_time;
if (!udf_disk_stamp_to_time(&inode->i_mtime,
fe->modificationTime))
inode->i_mtime = sbi->s_record_time;
if (!udf_disk_stamp_to_time(&inode->i_ctime, fe->attrTime))
inode->i_ctime = sbi->s_record_time;
iinfo->i_unique = le64_to_cpu(fe->uniqueID);
iinfo->i_lenEAttr = le32_to_cpu(fe->lengthExtendedAttr);
iinfo->i_lenAlloc = le32_to_cpu(fe->lengthAllocDescs);
iinfo->i_checkpoint = le32_to_cpu(fe->checkpoint);
} else {
inode->i_blocks = le64_to_cpu(efe->logicalBlocksRecorded) <<
(inode->i_sb->s_blocksize_bits - 9);
if (!udf_disk_stamp_to_time(&inode->i_atime, efe->accessTime))
inode->i_atime = sbi->s_record_time;
if (!udf_disk_stamp_to_time(&inode->i_mtime,
efe->modificationTime))
inode->i_mtime = sbi->s_record_time;
if (!udf_disk_stamp_to_time(&iinfo->i_crtime, efe->createTime))
iinfo->i_crtime = sbi->s_record_time;
if (!udf_disk_stamp_to_time(&inode->i_ctime, efe->attrTime))
inode->i_ctime = sbi->s_record_time;
iinfo->i_unique = le64_to_cpu(efe->uniqueID);
iinfo->i_lenEAttr = le32_to_cpu(efe->lengthExtendedAttr);
iinfo->i_lenAlloc = le32_to_cpu(efe->lengthAllocDescs);
iinfo->i_checkpoint = le32_to_cpu(efe->checkpoint);
}
inode->i_generation = iinfo->i_unique;
/* Sanity checks for files in ICB so that we don't get confused later */
if (iinfo->i_alloc_type == ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_IN_ICB) {
/*
* For file in ICB data is stored in allocation descriptor
* so sizes should match
*/
if (iinfo->i_lenAlloc != inode->i_size)
goto out;
/* File in ICB has to fit in there... */
if (inode->i_size > bs - udf_file_entry_alloc_offset(inode))
goto out;
}
switch (fe->icbTag.fileType) {
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_DIRECTORY:
inode->i_op = &udf_dir_inode_operations;
inode->i_fop = &udf_dir_operations;
inode->i_mode |= S_IFDIR;
inc_nlink(inode);
break;
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_REALTIME:
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_REGULAR:
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_UNDEF:
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_VAT20:
if (iinfo->i_alloc_type == ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_IN_ICB)
inode->i_data.a_ops = &udf_adinicb_aops;
else
inode->i_data.a_ops = &udf_aops;
inode->i_op = &udf_file_inode_operations;
inode->i_fop = &udf_file_operations;
inode->i_mode |= S_IFREG;
break;
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_BLOCK:
inode->i_mode |= S_IFBLK;
break;
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_CHAR:
inode->i_mode |= S_IFCHR;
break;
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_FIFO:
init_special_inode(inode, inode->i_mode | S_IFIFO, 0);
break;
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_SOCKET:
init_special_inode(inode, inode->i_mode | S_IFSOCK, 0);
break;
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_SYMLINK:
inode->i_data.a_ops = &udf_symlink_aops;
inode->i_op = &udf_symlink_inode_operations;
inode->i_mode = S_IFLNK | S_IRWXUGO;
break;
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_MAIN:
udf_debug("METADATA FILE-----\n");
break;
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_MIRROR:
udf_debug("METADATA MIRROR FILE-----\n");
break;
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_BITMAP:
udf_debug("METADATA BITMAP FILE-----\n");
break;
default:
udf_err(inode->i_sb, "(ino %ld) failed unknown file type=%d\n",
inode->i_ino, fe->icbTag.fileType);
goto out;
}
if (S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode) || S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode)) {
struct deviceSpec *dsea =
(struct deviceSpec *)udf_get_extendedattr(inode, 12, 1);
if (dsea) {
init_special_inode(inode, inode->i_mode,
MKDEV(le32_to_cpu(dsea->majorDeviceIdent),
le32_to_cpu(dsea->minorDeviceIdent)));
/* Developer ID ??? */
} else
goto out;
}
ret = 0;
out:
brelse(bh);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The udf_read_inode function in fs/udf/inode.c in the Linux kernel before 3.19.1 does not validate certain length values, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (incorrect data representation or integer overflow, and OOPS) via a crafted UDF filesystem.
Commit Message: udf: Check length of extended attributes and allocation descriptors
Check length of extended attributes and allocation descriptors when
loading inodes from disk. Otherwise corrupted filesystems could confuse
the code and make the kernel oops.
Reported-by: Carl Henrik Lunde <[email protected]>
CC: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,614 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int Visualizer_command(effect_handle_t self, uint32_t cmdCode, uint32_t cmdSize,
void *pCmdData, uint32_t *replySize, void *pReplyData) {
VisualizerContext * pContext = (VisualizerContext *)self;
int retsize;
if (pContext == NULL || pContext->mState == VISUALIZER_STATE_UNINITIALIZED) {
return -EINVAL;
}
switch (cmdCode) {
case EFFECT_CMD_INIT:
if (pReplyData == NULL || *replySize != sizeof(int)) {
return -EINVAL;
}
*(int *) pReplyData = Visualizer_init(pContext);
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_SET_CONFIG:
if (pCmdData == NULL || cmdSize != sizeof(effect_config_t)
|| pReplyData == NULL || *replySize != sizeof(int)) {
return -EINVAL;
}
*(int *) pReplyData = Visualizer_setConfig(pContext,
(effect_config_t *) pCmdData);
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_GET_CONFIG:
if (pReplyData == NULL ||
*replySize != sizeof(effect_config_t)) {
return -EINVAL;
}
Visualizer_getConfig(pContext, (effect_config_t *)pReplyData);
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_RESET:
Visualizer_reset(pContext);
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_ENABLE:
if (pReplyData == NULL || *replySize != sizeof(int)) {
return -EINVAL;
}
if (pContext->mState != VISUALIZER_STATE_INITIALIZED) {
return -ENOSYS;
}
pContext->mState = VISUALIZER_STATE_ACTIVE;
ALOGV("EFFECT_CMD_ENABLE() OK");
*(int *)pReplyData = 0;
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_DISABLE:
if (pReplyData == NULL || *replySize != sizeof(int)) {
return -EINVAL;
}
if (pContext->mState != VISUALIZER_STATE_ACTIVE) {
return -ENOSYS;
}
pContext->mState = VISUALIZER_STATE_INITIALIZED;
ALOGV("EFFECT_CMD_DISABLE() OK");
*(int *)pReplyData = 0;
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_GET_PARAM: {
if (pCmdData == NULL ||
cmdSize != (int)(sizeof(effect_param_t) + sizeof(uint32_t)) ||
pReplyData == NULL ||
*replySize < (int)(sizeof(effect_param_t) + sizeof(uint32_t) + sizeof(uint32_t))) {
return -EINVAL;
}
memcpy(pReplyData, pCmdData, sizeof(effect_param_t) + sizeof(uint32_t));
effect_param_t *p = (effect_param_t *)pReplyData;
p->status = 0;
*replySize = sizeof(effect_param_t) + sizeof(uint32_t);
if (p->psize != sizeof(uint32_t)) {
p->status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
switch (*(uint32_t *)p->data) {
case VISUALIZER_PARAM_CAPTURE_SIZE:
ALOGV("get mCaptureSize = %" PRIu32, pContext->mCaptureSize);
*((uint32_t *)p->data + 1) = pContext->mCaptureSize;
p->vsize = sizeof(uint32_t);
*replySize += sizeof(uint32_t);
break;
case VISUALIZER_PARAM_SCALING_MODE:
ALOGV("get mScalingMode = %" PRIu32, pContext->mScalingMode);
*((uint32_t *)p->data + 1) = pContext->mScalingMode;
p->vsize = sizeof(uint32_t);
*replySize += sizeof(uint32_t);
break;
case VISUALIZER_PARAM_MEASUREMENT_MODE:
ALOGV("get mMeasurementMode = %" PRIu32, pContext->mMeasurementMode);
*((uint32_t *)p->data + 1) = pContext->mMeasurementMode;
p->vsize = sizeof(uint32_t);
*replySize += sizeof(uint32_t);
break;
default:
p->status = -EINVAL;
}
} break;
case EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM: {
if (pCmdData == NULL ||
cmdSize != (int)(sizeof(effect_param_t) + sizeof(uint32_t) + sizeof(uint32_t)) ||
pReplyData == NULL || *replySize != sizeof(int32_t)) {
return -EINVAL;
}
*(int32_t *)pReplyData = 0;
effect_param_t *p = (effect_param_t *)pCmdData;
if (p->psize != sizeof(uint32_t) || p->vsize != sizeof(uint32_t)) {
*(int32_t *)pReplyData = -EINVAL;
break;
}
switch (*(uint32_t *)p->data) {
case VISUALIZER_PARAM_CAPTURE_SIZE:
pContext->mCaptureSize = *((uint32_t *)p->data + 1);
ALOGV("set mCaptureSize = %" PRIu32, pContext->mCaptureSize);
break;
case VISUALIZER_PARAM_SCALING_MODE:
pContext->mScalingMode = *((uint32_t *)p->data + 1);
ALOGV("set mScalingMode = %" PRIu32, pContext->mScalingMode);
break;
case VISUALIZER_PARAM_LATENCY:
pContext->mLatency = *((uint32_t *)p->data + 1);
ALOGV("set mLatency = %" PRIu32, pContext->mLatency);
break;
case VISUALIZER_PARAM_MEASUREMENT_MODE:
pContext->mMeasurementMode = *((uint32_t *)p->data + 1);
ALOGV("set mMeasurementMode = %" PRIu32, pContext->mMeasurementMode);
break;
default:
*(int32_t *)pReplyData = -EINVAL;
}
} break;
case EFFECT_CMD_SET_DEVICE:
case EFFECT_CMD_SET_VOLUME:
case EFFECT_CMD_SET_AUDIO_MODE:
break;
case VISUALIZER_CMD_CAPTURE: {
uint32_t captureSize = pContext->mCaptureSize;
if (pReplyData == NULL || *replySize != captureSize) {
ALOGV("VISUALIZER_CMD_CAPTURE() error *replySize %" PRIu32 " captureSize %" PRIu32,
*replySize, captureSize);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (pContext->mState == VISUALIZER_STATE_ACTIVE) {
const uint32_t deltaMs = Visualizer_getDeltaTimeMsFromUpdatedTime(pContext);
if ((pContext->mLastCaptureIdx == pContext->mCaptureIdx) &&
(pContext->mBufferUpdateTime.tv_sec != 0) &&
(deltaMs > MAX_STALL_TIME_MS)) {
ALOGV("capture going to idle");
pContext->mBufferUpdateTime.tv_sec = 0;
memset(pReplyData, 0x80, captureSize);
} else {
int32_t latencyMs = pContext->mLatency;
latencyMs -= deltaMs;
if (latencyMs < 0) {
latencyMs = 0;
}
const uint32_t deltaSmpl =
pContext->mConfig.inputCfg.samplingRate * latencyMs / 1000;
int32_t capturePoint = pContext->mCaptureIdx - captureSize - deltaSmpl;
if (capturePoint < 0) {
uint32_t size = -capturePoint;
if (size > captureSize) {
size = captureSize;
}
memcpy(pReplyData,
pContext->mCaptureBuf + CAPTURE_BUF_SIZE + capturePoint,
size);
pReplyData = (char *)pReplyData + size;
captureSize -= size;
capturePoint = 0;
}
memcpy(pReplyData,
pContext->mCaptureBuf + capturePoint,
captureSize);
}
pContext->mLastCaptureIdx = pContext->mCaptureIdx;
} else {
memset(pReplyData, 0x80, captureSize);
}
} break;
case VISUALIZER_CMD_MEASURE: {
uint16_t peakU16 = 0;
float sumRmsSquared = 0.0f;
uint8_t nbValidMeasurements = 0;
const int32_t delayMs = Visualizer_getDeltaTimeMsFromUpdatedTime(pContext);
if (delayMs > DISCARD_MEASUREMENTS_TIME_MS) {
ALOGV("Discarding measurements, last measurement is %" PRId32 "ms old", delayMs);
for (uint32_t i=0 ; i<pContext->mMeasurementWindowSizeInBuffers ; i++) {
pContext->mPastMeasurements[i].mIsValid = false;
pContext->mPastMeasurements[i].mPeakU16 = 0;
pContext->mPastMeasurements[i].mRmsSquared = 0;
}
pContext->mMeasurementBufferIdx = 0;
} else {
for (uint32_t i=0 ; i < pContext->mMeasurementWindowSizeInBuffers ; i++) {
if (pContext->mPastMeasurements[i].mIsValid) {
if (pContext->mPastMeasurements[i].mPeakU16 > peakU16) {
peakU16 = pContext->mPastMeasurements[i].mPeakU16;
}
sumRmsSquared += pContext->mPastMeasurements[i].mRmsSquared;
nbValidMeasurements++;
}
}
}
float rms = nbValidMeasurements == 0 ? 0.0f : sqrtf(sumRmsSquared / nbValidMeasurements);
int32_t* pIntReplyData = (int32_t*)pReplyData;
if (rms < 0.000016f) {
pIntReplyData[MEASUREMENT_IDX_RMS] = -9600; //-96dB
} else {
pIntReplyData[MEASUREMENT_IDX_RMS] = (int32_t) (2000 * log10(rms / 32767.0f));
}
if (peakU16 == 0) {
pIntReplyData[MEASUREMENT_IDX_PEAK] = -9600; //-96dB
} else {
pIntReplyData[MEASUREMENT_IDX_PEAK] = (int32_t) (2000 * log10(peakU16 / 32767.0f));
}
ALOGV("VISUALIZER_CMD_MEASURE peak=%" PRIu16 " (%" PRId32 "mB), rms=%.1f (%" PRId32 "mB)",
peakU16, pIntReplyData[MEASUREMENT_IDX_PEAK],
rms, pIntReplyData[MEASUREMENT_IDX_RMS]);
}
break;
default:
ALOGW("Visualizer_command invalid command %" PRIu32, cmdCode);
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple heap-based buffer overflows in libeffects in the Audio Policy Service in mediaserver in Android before 5.1.1 LMY48I allow attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted application, aka internal bug 21953516.
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
| High | 173,355 |
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