instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 3
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void FocusIn(const char* input_context_path) {
if (!input_context_path) {
LOG(ERROR) << "NULL context passed";
} else {
DLOG(INFO) << "FocusIn: " << input_context_path;
}
input_context_path_ = Or(input_context_path, "");
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,532 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> voidMethodWithArgsCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.voidMethodWithArgs");
if (args.Length() < 3)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(args.Holder());
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(int, intArg, toInt32(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
STRING_TO_V8PARAMETER_EXCEPTION_BLOCK(V8Parameter<>, strArg, MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 1, DefaultIsUndefined));
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(TestObj*, objArg, V8TestObj::HasInstance(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 2, DefaultIsUndefined)) ? V8TestObj::toNative(v8::Handle<v8::Object>::Cast(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 2, DefaultIsUndefined))) : 0);
imp->voidMethodWithArgs(intArg, strArg, objArg);
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,106 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: SocketStreamDispatcherHost::SocketStreamDispatcherHost(
int render_process_id,
ResourceMessageFilter::URLRequestContextSelector* selector,
content::ResourceContext* resource_context)
: ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(ssl_delegate_weak_factory_(this)),
render_process_id_(render_process_id),
url_request_context_selector_(selector),
resource_context_(resource_context) {
DCHECK(selector);
net::WebSocketJob::EnsureInit();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The WebSockets implementation in Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.52 does not properly handle use of SSL, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Inherits SupportsWeakPtr<T> instead of having WeakPtrFactory<T>
This change refines r137676.
BUG=122654
TEST=browser_test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332233
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139771 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,993 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: choose_volume(struct archive_read *a, struct iso9660 *iso9660)
{
struct file_info *file;
int64_t skipsize;
struct vd *vd;
const void *block;
char seenJoliet;
vd = &(iso9660->primary);
if (!iso9660->opt_support_joliet)
iso9660->seenJoliet = 0;
if (iso9660->seenJoliet &&
vd->location > iso9660->joliet.location)
/* This condition is unlikely; by way of caution. */
vd = &(iso9660->joliet);
skipsize = LOGICAL_BLOCK_SIZE * vd->location;
skipsize = __archive_read_consume(a, skipsize);
if (skipsize < 0)
return ((int)skipsize);
iso9660->current_position = skipsize;
block = __archive_read_ahead(a, vd->size, NULL);
if (block == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Failed to read full block when scanning "
"ISO9660 directory list");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
/*
* While reading Root Directory, flag seenJoliet must be zero to
* avoid converting special name 0x00(Current Directory) and
* next byte to UCS2.
*/
seenJoliet = iso9660->seenJoliet;/* Save flag. */
iso9660->seenJoliet = 0;
file = parse_file_info(a, NULL, block);
if (file == NULL)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
iso9660->seenJoliet = seenJoliet;
/*
* If the iso image has both RockRidge and Joliet, we preferentially
* use RockRidge Extensions rather than Joliet ones.
*/
if (vd == &(iso9660->primary) && iso9660->seenRockridge
&& iso9660->seenJoliet)
iso9660->seenJoliet = 0;
if (vd == &(iso9660->primary) && !iso9660->seenRockridge
&& iso9660->seenJoliet) {
/* Switch reading data from primary to joliet. */
vd = &(iso9660->joliet);
skipsize = LOGICAL_BLOCK_SIZE * vd->location;
skipsize -= iso9660->current_position;
skipsize = __archive_read_consume(a, skipsize);
if (skipsize < 0)
return ((int)skipsize);
iso9660->current_position += skipsize;
block = __archive_read_ahead(a, vd->size, NULL);
if (block == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Failed to read full block when scanning "
"ISO9660 directory list");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
iso9660->seenJoliet = 0;
file = parse_file_info(a, NULL, block);
if (file == NULL)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
iso9660->seenJoliet = seenJoliet;
}
/* Store the root directory in the pending list. */
if (add_entry(a, iso9660, file) != ARCHIVE_OK)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
if (iso9660->seenRockridge) {
a->archive.archive_format = ARCHIVE_FORMAT_ISO9660_ROCKRIDGE;
a->archive.archive_format_name =
"ISO9660 with Rockridge extensions";
}
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the ISO parser in libarchive before 3.2.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted ISO file.
Commit Message: Issue 717: Fix integer overflow when computing location of volume descriptor
The multiplication here defaulted to 'int' but calculations
of file positions should always use int64_t. A simple cast
suffices to fix this since the base location is always 32 bits
for ISO, so multiplying by the sector size will never overflow
a 64-bit integer. | Medium | 167,021 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void upnp_event_prepare(struct upnp_event_notify * obj)
{
static const char notifymsg[] =
"NOTIFY %s HTTP/1.1\r\n"
"Host: %s%s\r\n"
#if (UPNP_VERSION_MAJOR == 1) && (UPNP_VERSION_MINOR == 0)
"Content-Type: text/xml\r\n" /* UDA v1.0 */
#else
"Content-Type: text/xml; charset=\"utf-8\"\r\n" /* UDA v1.1 or later */
#endif
"Content-Length: %d\r\n"
"NT: upnp:event\r\n"
"NTS: upnp:propchange\r\n"
"SID: %s\r\n"
"SEQ: %u\r\n"
"Connection: close\r\n"
"Cache-Control: no-cache\r\n"
"\r\n"
"%.*s\r\n";
char * xml;
int l;
if(obj->sub == NULL) {
obj->state = EError;
return;
}
switch(obj->sub->service) {
case EWanCFG:
xml = getVarsWANCfg(&l);
break;
case EWanIPC:
xml = getVarsWANIPCn(&l);
break;
#ifdef ENABLE_L3F_SERVICE
case EL3F:
xml = getVarsL3F(&l);
break;
#endif
#ifdef ENABLE_6FC_SERVICE
case E6FC:
xml = getVars6FC(&l);
break;
#endif
#ifdef ENABLE_DP_SERVICE
case EDP:
xml = getVarsDP(&l);
break;
#endif
default:
xml = NULL;
l = 0;
}
obj->buffersize = 1024;
obj->buffer = malloc(obj->buffersize);
if(!obj->buffer) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: malloc returned NULL", "upnp_event_prepare");
if(xml) {
free(xml);
}
obj->state = EError;
return;
}
obj->tosend = snprintf(obj->buffer, obj->buffersize, notifymsg,
obj->path, obj->addrstr, obj->portstr, l+2,
obj->sub->uuid, obj->sub->seq,
l, xml);
if(xml) {
free(xml);
xml = NULL;
}
obj->state = ESending;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The upnp_event_prepare function in upnpevents.c in MiniUPnP MiniUPnPd through 2.1 allows a remote attacker to leak information from the heap due to improper validation of an snprintf return value.
Commit Message: upnp_event_prepare(): check the return value of snprintf() | Medium | 169,668 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: GDataEntry::GDataEntry(GDataDirectory* parent,
GDataDirectoryService* directory_service)
: directory_service_(directory_service),
deleted_(false) {
SetParent(parent);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.56 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the handling of fonts in CANVAS elements.
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,491 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: virtual void FramePktHook(const vpx_codec_cx_pkt_t *pkt) {
if (pkt->data.frame.flags & VPX_FRAME_IS_KEY) {
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| High | 174,512 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: TestFlashMessageLoop::~TestFlashMessageLoop() {
PP_DCHECK(!message_loop_);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The PPB_Flash_MessageLoop_Impl::InternalRun function in content/renderer/pepper/ppb_flash_message_loop_impl.cc in the Pepper plugin in Google Chrome before 49.0.2623.75 mishandles nested message loops, which allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Fix PPB_Flash_MessageLoop.
This CL suspends script callbacks and resource loads while running nested message loop using PPB_Flash_MessageLoop.
BUG=569496
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1559113002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374529} | Medium | 172,129 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ServiceWorkerDevToolsAgentHost::AttachSession(DevToolsSession* session) {
if (state_ == WORKER_READY) {
if (sessions().size() == 1) {
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&SetDevToolsAttachedOnIO,
context_weak_, version_id_, true));
}
session->SetRenderer(worker_process_id_, nullptr);
session->AttachToAgent(agent_ptr_);
}
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::InspectorHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::NetworkHandler(GetId())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::SchemaHandler()));
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Allowing the chrome.debugger API to attach to Web UI pages in DevTools in Google Chrome prior to 67.0.3396.62 allowed an attacker who convinced a user to install a malicious extension to execute arbitrary code via a crafted Chrome Extension.
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow chrome.debugger to attach to web ui pages
If the page navigates to web ui, we force detach the debugger extension.
[email protected]
Bug: 798222
Change-Id: Idb46c2f59e839388397a8dfa6ce2e2a897698df3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/935961
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540916} | High | 173,251 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void sycc420_to_rgb(opj_image_t *img)
{
int *d0, *d1, *d2, *r, *g, *b, *nr, *ng, *nb;
const int *y, *cb, *cr, *ny;
unsigned int maxw, maxh, max;
int offset, upb;
unsigned int i, j;
upb = (int)img->comps[0].prec;
offset = 1<<(upb - 1); upb = (1<<upb)-1;
maxw = (unsigned int)img->comps[0].w; maxh = (unsigned int)img->comps[0].h;
max = maxw * maxh;
y = img->comps[0].data;
cb = img->comps[1].data;
cr = img->comps[2].data;
d0 = r = (int*)malloc(sizeof(int) * (size_t)max);
d1 = g = (int*)malloc(sizeof(int) * (size_t)max);
d2 = b = (int*)malloc(sizeof(int) * (size_t)max);
if(r == NULL || g == NULL || b == NULL) goto fails;
for(i=0U; i < (maxh & ~(unsigned int)1U); i += 2U)
{
ny = y + maxw;
nr = r + maxw; ng = g + maxw; nb = b + maxw;
for(j=0; j < (maxw & ~(unsigned int)1U); j += 2U)
{
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
++y; ++r; ++g; ++b;
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
++y; ++r; ++g; ++b;
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *ny, *cb, *cr, nr, ng, nb);
++ny; ++nr; ++ng; ++nb;
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *ny, *cb, *cr, nr, ng, nb);
++ny; ++nr; ++ng; ++nb; ++cb; ++cr;
}
if(j < maxw)
{
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
++y; ++r; ++g; ++b;
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *ny, *cb, *cr, nr, ng, nb);
++ny; ++nr; ++ng; ++nb; ++cb; ++cr;
}
y += maxw; r += maxw; g += maxw; b += maxw;
}
if(i < maxh)
{
for(j=0U; j < (maxw & ~(unsigned int)1U); j += 2U)
{
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
++y; ++r; ++g; ++b;
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
++y; ++r; ++g; ++b; ++cb; ++cr;
}
if(j < maxw)
{
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
}
}
free(img->comps[0].data); img->comps[0].data = d0;
free(img->comps[1].data); img->comps[1].data = d1;
free(img->comps[2].data); img->comps[2].data = d2;
#if defined(USE_JPWL) || defined(USE_MJ2)
img->comps[1].w = maxw; img->comps[1].h = maxh;
img->comps[2].w = maxw; img->comps[2].h = maxh;
#else
img->comps[1].w = (OPJ_UINT32)maxw; img->comps[1].h = (OPJ_UINT32)maxh;
img->comps[2].w = (OPJ_UINT32)maxw; img->comps[2].h = (OPJ_UINT32)maxh;
#endif
img->comps[1].dx = img->comps[0].dx;
img->comps[2].dx = img->comps[0].dx;
img->comps[1].dy = img->comps[0].dy;
img->comps[2].dy = img->comps[0].dy;
return;
fails:
if(r) free(r);
if(g) free(g);
if(b) free(b);
}/* sycc420_to_rgb() */
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The sycc422_t_rgb function in common/color.c in OpenJPEG before 2.1.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a crafted jpeg2000 file.
Commit Message: Fix Out-Of-Bounds Read in sycc42x_to_rgb function (#745)
42x Images with an odd x0/y0 lead to subsampled component starting at the
2nd column/line.
That is offset = comp->dx * comp->x0 - image->x0 = 1
Fix #726 | Medium | 168,839 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ClipboardMessageFilter::OnWriteObjectsAsync(
const ui::Clipboard::ObjectMap& objects) {
scoped_ptr<ui::Clipboard::ObjectMap> sanitized_objects(
new ui::Clipboard::ObjectMap(objects));
sanitized_objects->erase(ui::Clipboard::CBF_SMBITMAP);
#if defined(OS_WIN)
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI,
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(
&WriteObjectsOnUIThread, base::Owned(sanitized_objects.release())));
#else
GetClipboard()->WriteObjects(
ui::CLIPBOARD_TYPE_COPY_PASTE, *sanitized_objects.get());
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The ScopedClipboardWriter::WritePickledData function in ui/base/clipboard/scoped_clipboard_writer.cc in Google Chrome before 33.0.1750.152 on OS X and Linux and before 33.0.1750.154 on Windows does not verify a certain format value, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the clipboard.
Commit Message: Refactor ui::Clipboard::ObjectMap sanitization in ClipboardMsgFilter.
BUG=352395
[email protected]
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/200523004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@257164 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,691 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int ne2000_buffer_full(NE2000State *s)
{
int avail, index, boundary;
index = s->curpag << 8;
boundary = s->boundary << 8;
if (index < boundary)
return 1;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The ne2000_receive function in the NE2000 NIC emulation support (hw/net/ne2000.c) in QEMU before 2.5.1 allows local guest OS administrators to cause a denial of service (infinite loop and QEMU process crash) via crafted values for the PSTART and PSTOP registers, involving ring buffer control.
Commit Message: | Low | 165,184 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void Browser::TabDetachedAt(TabContents* contents, int index) {
TabDetachedAtImpl(contents, index, DETACH_TYPE_DETACH);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The hyphenation functionality in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 does not properly validate file names, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,507 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void show_object(struct object *object, struct strbuf *path,
const char *last, void *data)
{
struct bitmap *base = data;
int bitmap_pos;
bitmap_pos = bitmap_position(object->oid.hash);
if (bitmap_pos < 0) {
char *name = path_name(path, last);
bitmap_pos = ext_index_add_object(object, name);
free(name);
}
bitmap_set(base, bitmap_pos);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Integer overflow in Git before 2.7.4 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a (1) long filename or (2) many nested trees, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]> | High | 167,422 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int fscrypt_get_crypt_info(struct inode *inode)
{
struct fscrypt_info *crypt_info;
struct fscrypt_context ctx;
struct crypto_skcipher *ctfm;
const char *cipher_str;
int keysize;
u8 *raw_key = NULL;
int res;
res = fscrypt_initialize(inode->i_sb->s_cop->flags);
if (res)
return res;
if (!inode->i_sb->s_cop->get_context)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
retry:
crypt_info = ACCESS_ONCE(inode->i_crypt_info);
if (crypt_info) {
if (!crypt_info->ci_keyring_key ||
key_validate(crypt_info->ci_keyring_key) == 0)
return 0;
fscrypt_put_encryption_info(inode, crypt_info);
goto retry;
}
res = inode->i_sb->s_cop->get_context(inode, &ctx, sizeof(ctx));
if (res < 0) {
if (!fscrypt_dummy_context_enabled(inode) ||
inode->i_sb->s_cop->is_encrypted(inode))
return res;
/* Fake up a context for an unencrypted directory */
memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
ctx.format = FS_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT_FORMAT_V1;
ctx.contents_encryption_mode = FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_XTS;
ctx.filenames_encryption_mode = FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_CTS;
memset(ctx.master_key_descriptor, 0x42, FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
} else if (res != sizeof(ctx)) {
return -EINVAL;
}
if (ctx.format != FS_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT_FORMAT_V1)
return -EINVAL;
if (ctx.flags & ~FS_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID)
return -EINVAL;
crypt_info = kmem_cache_alloc(fscrypt_info_cachep, GFP_NOFS);
if (!crypt_info)
return -ENOMEM;
crypt_info->ci_flags = ctx.flags;
crypt_info->ci_data_mode = ctx.contents_encryption_mode;
crypt_info->ci_filename_mode = ctx.filenames_encryption_mode;
crypt_info->ci_ctfm = NULL;
crypt_info->ci_keyring_key = NULL;
memcpy(crypt_info->ci_master_key, ctx.master_key_descriptor,
sizeof(crypt_info->ci_master_key));
res = determine_cipher_type(crypt_info, inode, &cipher_str, &keysize);
if (res)
goto out;
/*
* This cannot be a stack buffer because it is passed to the scatterlist
* crypto API as part of key derivation.
*/
res = -ENOMEM;
raw_key = kmalloc(FS_MAX_KEY_SIZE, GFP_NOFS);
if (!raw_key)
goto out;
res = validate_user_key(crypt_info, &ctx, raw_key, FS_KEY_DESC_PREFIX);
if (res && inode->i_sb->s_cop->key_prefix) {
int res2 = validate_user_key(crypt_info, &ctx, raw_key,
inode->i_sb->s_cop->key_prefix);
if (res2) {
if (res2 == -ENOKEY)
res = -ENOKEY;
goto out;
}
} else if (res) {
goto out;
}
ctfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher(cipher_str, 0, 0);
if (!ctfm || IS_ERR(ctfm)) {
res = ctfm ? PTR_ERR(ctfm) : -ENOMEM;
printk(KERN_DEBUG
"%s: error %d (inode %u) allocating crypto tfm\n",
__func__, res, (unsigned) inode->i_ino);
goto out;
}
crypt_info->ci_ctfm = ctfm;
crypto_skcipher_clear_flags(ctfm, ~0);
crypto_skcipher_set_flags(ctfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY);
res = crypto_skcipher_setkey(ctfm, raw_key, keysize);
if (res)
goto out;
kzfree(raw_key);
raw_key = NULL;
if (cmpxchg(&inode->i_crypt_info, NULL, crypt_info) != NULL) {
put_crypt_info(crypt_info);
goto retry;
}
return 0;
out:
if (res == -ENOKEY)
res = 0;
put_crypt_info(crypt_info);
kzfree(raw_key);
return res;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in fs/crypto/ in the Linux kernel before 4.10.7 allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) or possibly gain privileges by revoking keyring keys being used for ext4, f2fs, or ubifs encryption, causing cryptographic transform objects to be freed prematurely.
Commit Message: fscrypt: remove broken support for detecting keyring key revocation
Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that
had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become
"locked" again. This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most
severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for
an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other
threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently.
This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse.
This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects
the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired. Instead,
an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until
it is evicted from memory. Note that this is no worse than the case for
block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains
possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and
dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by
simply unmounting the filesystem. In fact, one of those actions was
already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely.
This change is not expected to break any applications.
In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key
revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations ---
waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations,
and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS
caches. But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed.
This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs
encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured
with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y,
CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or
CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y). Note that older kernels did not use the
shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications
of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them.
Fixes: b7236e21d55f ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode")
Cc: [email protected] # v4.2+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <[email protected]> | High | 168,281 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: CSSStyleSheet* CSSStyleSheet::CreateInline(Node& owner_node,
const KURL& base_url,
const TextPosition& start_position,
const WTF::TextEncoding& encoding) {
CSSParserContext* parser_context = CSSParserContext::Create(
owner_node.GetDocument(), owner_node.GetDocument().BaseURL(),
owner_node.GetDocument().GetReferrerPolicy(), encoding);
StyleSheetContents* sheet =
StyleSheetContents::Create(base_url.GetString(), parser_context);
return new CSSStyleSheet(sheet, owner_node, true, start_position);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Insufficient origin checks for CSS content in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 68.0.3440.75 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Disallow access to opaque CSS responses.
Bug: 848786
Change-Id: Ie53fbf644afdd76d7c65649a05c939c63d89b4ec
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1088335
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Matt Falkenhagen <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#565537} | Medium | 173,154 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: enum ImapAuthRes imap_auth_gss(struct ImapData *idata, const char *method)
{
gss_buffer_desc request_buf, send_token;
gss_buffer_t sec_token;
gss_name_t target_name;
gss_ctx_id_t context;
gss_OID mech_name;
char server_conf_flags;
gss_qop_t quality;
int cflags;
OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat;
char buf1[GSS_BUFSIZE], buf2[GSS_BUFSIZE];
unsigned long buf_size;
int rc;
if (!mutt_bit_isset(idata->capabilities, AGSSAPI))
return IMAP_AUTH_UNAVAIL;
if (mutt_account_getuser(&idata->conn->account) < 0)
return IMAP_AUTH_FAILURE;
/* get an IMAP service ticket for the server */
snprintf(buf1, sizeof(buf1), "imap@%s", idata->conn->account.host);
request_buf.value = buf1;
request_buf.length = strlen(buf1);
maj_stat = gss_import_name(&min_stat, &request_buf, gss_nt_service_name, &target_name);
if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
{
mutt_debug(2, "Couldn't get service name for [%s]\n", buf1);
return IMAP_AUTH_UNAVAIL;
}
else if (DebugLevel >= 2)
{
gss_display_name(&min_stat, target_name, &request_buf, &mech_name);
mutt_debug(2, "Using service name [%s]\n", (char *) request_buf.value);
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &request_buf);
}
/* Acquire initial credentials - without a TGT GSSAPI is UNAVAIL */
sec_token = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
context = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
/* build token */
maj_stat = gss_init_sec_context(&min_stat, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &context, target_name,
GSS_C_NO_OID, GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG,
0, GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS, sec_token, NULL,
&send_token, (unsigned int *) &cflags, NULL);
if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE && maj_stat != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
{
print_gss_error(maj_stat, min_stat);
mutt_debug(1, "Error acquiring credentials - no TGT?\n");
gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name);
return IMAP_AUTH_UNAVAIL;
}
/* now begin login */
mutt_message(_("Authenticating (GSSAPI)..."));
imap_cmd_start(idata, "AUTHENTICATE GSSAPI");
/* expect a null continuation response ("+") */
do
rc = imap_cmd_step(idata);
while (rc == IMAP_CMD_CONTINUE);
if (rc != IMAP_CMD_RESPOND)
{
mutt_debug(2, "Invalid response from server: %s\n", buf1);
gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name);
goto bail;
}
/* now start the security context initialisation loop... */
mutt_debug(2, "Sending credentials\n");
mutt_b64_encode(buf1, send_token.value, send_token.length, sizeof(buf1) - 2);
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
mutt_str_strcat(buf1, sizeof(buf1), "\r\n");
mutt_socket_send(idata->conn, buf1);
while (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
{
/* Read server data */
do
rc = imap_cmd_step(idata);
while (rc == IMAP_CMD_CONTINUE);
if (rc != IMAP_CMD_RESPOND)
{
mutt_debug(1, "#1 Error receiving server response.\n");
gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name);
goto bail;
}
request_buf.length = mutt_b64_decode(buf2, idata->buf + 2);
request_buf.value = buf2;
sec_token = &request_buf;
/* Write client data */
maj_stat = gss_init_sec_context(
&min_stat, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &context, target_name, GSS_C_NO_OID,
GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG, 0, GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS,
sec_token, NULL, &send_token, (unsigned int *) &cflags, NULL);
if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE && maj_stat != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
{
print_gss_error(maj_stat, min_stat);
mutt_debug(1, "Error exchanging credentials\n");
gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name);
goto err_abort_cmd;
}
mutt_b64_encode(buf1, send_token.value, send_token.length, sizeof(buf1) - 2);
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
mutt_str_strcat(buf1, sizeof(buf1), "\r\n");
mutt_socket_send(idata->conn, buf1);
}
gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name);
/* get security flags and buffer size */
do
rc = imap_cmd_step(idata);
while (rc == IMAP_CMD_CONTINUE);
if (rc != IMAP_CMD_RESPOND)
{
mutt_debug(1, "#2 Error receiving server response.\n");
goto bail;
}
request_buf.length = mutt_b64_decode(buf2, idata->buf + 2);
request_buf.value = buf2;
maj_stat = gss_unwrap(&min_stat, context, &request_buf, &send_token, &cflags, &quality);
if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
{
print_gss_error(maj_stat, min_stat);
mutt_debug(2, "Couldn't unwrap security level data\n");
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
goto err_abort_cmd;
}
mutt_debug(2, "Credential exchange complete\n");
/* first octet is security levels supported. We want NONE */
server_conf_flags = ((char *) send_token.value)[0];
if (!(((char *) send_token.value)[0] & GSS_AUTH_P_NONE))
{
mutt_debug(2, "Server requires integrity or privacy\n");
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
goto err_abort_cmd;
}
/* we don't care about buffer size if we don't wrap content. But here it is */
((char *) send_token.value)[0] = '\0';
buf_size = ntohl(*((long *) send_token.value));
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
mutt_debug(2, "Unwrapped security level flags: %c%c%c\n",
(server_conf_flags & GSS_AUTH_P_NONE) ? 'N' : '-',
(server_conf_flags & GSS_AUTH_P_INTEGRITY) ? 'I' : '-',
(server_conf_flags & GSS_AUTH_P_PRIVACY) ? 'P' : '-');
mutt_debug(2, "Maximum GSS token size is %ld\n", buf_size);
/* agree to terms (hack!) */
buf_size = htonl(buf_size); /* not relevant without integrity/privacy */
memcpy(buf1, &buf_size, 4);
buf1[0] = GSS_AUTH_P_NONE;
/* server decides if principal can log in as user */
strncpy(buf1 + 4, idata->conn->account.user, sizeof(buf1) - 4);
request_buf.value = buf1;
request_buf.length = 4 + strlen(idata->conn->account.user);
maj_stat = gss_wrap(&min_stat, context, 0, GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, &request_buf,
&cflags, &send_token);
if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
{
mutt_debug(2, "Error creating login request\n");
goto err_abort_cmd;
}
mutt_b64_encode(buf1, send_token.value, send_token.length, sizeof(buf1) - 2);
mutt_debug(2, "Requesting authorisation as %s\n", idata->conn->account.user);
mutt_str_strcat(buf1, sizeof(buf1), "\r\n");
mutt_socket_send(idata->conn, buf1);
/* Joy of victory or agony of defeat? */
do
rc = imap_cmd_step(idata);
while (rc == IMAP_CMD_CONTINUE);
if (rc == IMAP_CMD_RESPOND)
{
mutt_debug(1, "Unexpected server continuation request.\n");
goto err_abort_cmd;
}
if (imap_code(idata->buf))
{
/* flush the security context */
mutt_debug(2, "Releasing GSS credentials\n");
maj_stat = gss_delete_sec_context(&min_stat, &context, &send_token);
if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
mutt_debug(1, "Error releasing credentials\n");
/* send_token may contain a notification to the server to flush
* credentials. RFC1731 doesn't specify what to do, and since this
* support is only for authentication, we'll assume the server knows
* enough to flush its own credentials */
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
return IMAP_AUTH_SUCCESS;
}
else
goto bail;
err_abort_cmd:
mutt_socket_send(idata->conn, "*\r\n");
do
rc = imap_cmd_step(idata);
while (rc == IMAP_CMD_CONTINUE);
bail:
mutt_error(_("GSSAPI authentication failed."));
return IMAP_AUTH_FAILURE;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: An issue was discovered in Mutt before 1.10.1 and NeoMutt before 2018-07-16. They have a buffer overflow via base64 data.
Commit Message: Check outbuf length in mutt_to_base64()
The obuf can be overflowed in auth_cram.c, and possibly auth_gss.c.
Thanks to Jeriko One for the bug report. | High | 169,127 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl::SupportsSwapBuffersWithBounds() {
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 52.0.2743.82 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: gpu/android : Add support for partial swap with surface control.
Add support for PostSubBuffer to GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl. This should
allow the display compositor to draw the minimum sub-rect necessary from
the damage tracking in BufferQueue on the client-side, and also to pass
this damage rect to the framework.
[email protected]
Bug: 926020
Change-Id: I73d3320cab68250d4c6865bf21c5531682d8bf61
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1457467
Commit-Queue: Khushal <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Auto-Submit: Khushal <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629852} | Medium | 172,112 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: UNCURL_EXPORT int32_t uncurl_ws_accept(struct uncurl_conn *ucc, char **origins, int32_t n_origins)
{
int32_t e;
e = uncurl_read_header(ucc);
if (e != UNCURL_OK) return e;
uncurl_set_header_str(ucc, "Upgrade", "websocket");
uncurl_set_header_str(ucc, "Connection", "Upgrade");
char *origin = NULL;
e = uncurl_get_header_str(ucc, "Origin", &origin);
if (e != UNCURL_OK) return e;
bool origin_ok = false;
for (int32_t x = 0; x < n_origins; x++)
if (strstr(origin, origins[x])) {origin_ok = true; break;}
if (!origin_ok) return UNCURL_WS_ERR_ORIGIN;
char *sec_key = NULL;
e = uncurl_get_header_str(ucc, "Sec-WebSocket-Key", &sec_key);
if (e != UNCURL_OK) return e;
char *accept_key = ws_create_accept_key(sec_key);
uncurl_set_header_str(ucc, "Sec-WebSocket-Accept", accept_key);
free(accept_key);
e = uncurl_write_header(ucc, "101", "Switching Protocols", UNCURL_RESPONSE);
if (e != UNCURL_OK) return e;
ucc->ws_mask = 0;
return UNCURL_OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-352
Summary: In the uncurl_ws_accept function in uncurl.c in uncurl before 0.07, as used in Parsec before 140-3, insufficient Origin header validation (accepting an arbitrary substring match) for WebSocket API requests allows remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions. In Parsec, this means full control over the victim's computer.
Commit Message: origin matching must come at str end | High | 169,336 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int faultin_page(struct task_struct *tsk, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long address, unsigned int *flags, int *nonblocking)
{
unsigned int fault_flags = 0;
int ret;
/* mlock all present pages, but do not fault in new pages */
if ((*flags & (FOLL_POPULATE | FOLL_MLOCK)) == FOLL_MLOCK)
return -ENOENT;
/* For mm_populate(), just skip the stack guard page. */
if ((*flags & FOLL_POPULATE) &&
(stack_guard_page_start(vma, address) ||
stack_guard_page_end(vma, address + PAGE_SIZE)))
return -ENOENT;
if (*flags & FOLL_WRITE)
fault_flags |= FAULT_FLAG_WRITE;
if (*flags & FOLL_REMOTE)
fault_flags |= FAULT_FLAG_REMOTE;
if (nonblocking)
fault_flags |= FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY;
if (*flags & FOLL_NOWAIT)
fault_flags |= FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY | FAULT_FLAG_RETRY_NOWAIT;
if (*flags & FOLL_TRIED) {
VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(fault_flags & FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY);
fault_flags |= FAULT_FLAG_TRIED;
}
ret = handle_mm_fault(vma, address, fault_flags);
if (ret & VM_FAULT_ERROR) {
if (ret & VM_FAULT_OOM)
return -ENOMEM;
if (ret & (VM_FAULT_HWPOISON | VM_FAULT_HWPOISON_LARGE))
return *flags & FOLL_HWPOISON ? -EHWPOISON : -EFAULT;
if (ret & (VM_FAULT_SIGBUS | VM_FAULT_SIGSEGV))
return -EFAULT;
BUG();
}
if (tsk) {
if (ret & VM_FAULT_MAJOR)
tsk->maj_flt++;
else
tsk->min_flt++;
}
if (ret & VM_FAULT_RETRY) {
if (nonblocking)
*nonblocking = 0;
return -EBUSY;
}
/*
* The VM_FAULT_WRITE bit tells us that do_wp_page has broken COW when
* necessary, even if maybe_mkwrite decided not to set pte_write. We
* can thus safely do subsequent page lookups as if they were reads.
* But only do so when looping for pte_write is futile: in some cases
* userspace may also be wanting to write to the gotten user page,
* which a read fault here might prevent (a readonly page might get
* reCOWed by userspace write).
*/
if ((ret & VM_FAULT_WRITE) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))
*flags &= ~FOLL_WRITE;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in mm/gup.c in the Linux kernel 2.x through 4.x before 4.8.3 allows local users to gain privileges by leveraging incorrect handling of a copy-on-write (COW) feature to write to a read-only memory mapping, as exploited in the wild in October 2016, aka *Dirty COW.*
Commit Message: mm: remove gup_flags FOLL_WRITE games from __get_user_pages()
This is an ancient bug that was actually attempted to be fixed once
(badly) by me eleven years ago in commit 4ceb5db9757a ("Fix
get_user_pages() race for write access") but that was then undone due to
problems on s390 by commit f33ea7f404e5 ("fix get_user_pages bug").
In the meantime, the s390 situation has long been fixed, and we can now
fix it by checking the pte_dirty() bit properly (and do it better). The
s390 dirty bit was implemented in abf09bed3cce ("s390/mm: implement
software dirty bits") which made it into v3.9. Earlier kernels will
have to look at the page state itself.
Also, the VM has become more scalable, and what used a purely
theoretical race back then has become easier to trigger.
To fix it, we introduce a new internal FOLL_COW flag to mark the "yes,
we already did a COW" rather than play racy games with FOLL_WRITE that
is very fundamental, and then use the pte dirty flag to validate that
the FOLL_COW flag is still valid.
Reported-and-tested-by: Phil "not Paul" Oester <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Cc: Nick Piggin <[email protected]>
Cc: Greg Thelen <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | High | 167,163 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ShellMainDelegate::ShellMainDelegate() {
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The ContainerNode::parserRemoveChild function in WebKit/Source/core/dom/ContainerNode.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 49.0.2623.75, mishandles widget updates, which makes it easier for remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Fix content_shell with network service enabled not loading pages.
This regressed in my earlier cl r528763.
This is a reland of r547221.
Bug: 833612
Change-Id: I4c2649414d42773f2530e1abe5912a04fcd0ed9b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1064702
Reviewed-by: Jay Civelli <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560011} | Medium | 172,121 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: png_set_PLTE(png_structp png_ptr, png_infop info_ptr,
png_colorp palette, int num_palette)
{
png_debug1(1, "in %s storage function", "PLTE");
if (png_ptr == NULL || info_ptr == NULL)
return;
if (num_palette < 0 || num_palette > PNG_MAX_PALETTE_LENGTH)
{
if (info_ptr->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
png_error(png_ptr, "Invalid palette length");
else
{
png_warning(png_ptr, "Invalid palette length");
return;
}
}
/* It may not actually be necessary to set png_ptr->palette here;
* we do it for backward compatibility with the way the png_handle_tRNS
* function used to do the allocation.
*/
#ifdef PNG_FREE_ME_SUPPORTED
png_free_data(png_ptr, info_ptr, PNG_FREE_PLTE, 0);
#endif
/* Changed in libpng-1.2.1 to allocate PNG_MAX_PALETTE_LENGTH instead
* of num_palette entries, in case of an invalid PNG file that has
* too-large sample values.
*/
png_ptr->palette = (png_colorp)png_calloc(png_ptr,
PNG_MAX_PALETTE_LENGTH * png_sizeof(png_color));
png_memcpy(png_ptr->palette, palette, num_palette * png_sizeof(png_color));
info_ptr->palette = png_ptr->palette;
info_ptr->num_palette = png_ptr->num_palette = (png_uint_16)num_palette;
#ifdef PNG_FREE_ME_SUPPORTED
info_ptr->free_me |= PNG_FREE_PLTE;
#else
png_ptr->flags |= PNG_FLAG_FREE_PLTE;
#endif
info_ptr->valid |= PNG_INFO_PLTE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple buffer overflows in the (1) png_set_PLTE and (2) png_get_PLTE functions in libpng before 1.0.64, 1.1.x and 1.2.x before 1.2.54, 1.3.x and 1.4.x before 1.4.17, 1.5.x before 1.5.24, and 1.6.x before 1.6.19 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a small bit-depth value in an IHDR (aka image header) chunk in a PNG image.
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
[email protected]
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298} | High | 172,183 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int main(int argc, char** argv)
{
/* Kernel starts us with all fd's closed.
* But it's dangerous:
* fprintf(stderr) can dump messages into random fds, etc.
* Ensure that if any of fd 0,1,2 is closed, we open it to /dev/null.
*/
int fd = xopen("/dev/null", O_RDWR);
while (fd < 2)
fd = xdup(fd);
if (fd > 2)
close(fd);
int err = 1;
logmode = LOGMODE_JOURNAL;
/* Parse abrt.conf */
load_abrt_conf();
/* ... and plugins/CCpp.conf */
bool setting_MakeCompatCore;
bool setting_SaveBinaryImage;
bool setting_SaveFullCore;
bool setting_CreateCoreBacktrace;
bool setting_SaveContainerizedPackageData;
bool setting_StandaloneHook;
{
map_string_t *settings = new_map_string();
load_abrt_plugin_conf_file("CCpp.conf", settings);
const char *value;
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "MakeCompatCore");
setting_MakeCompatCore = value && string_to_bool(value);
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "SaveBinaryImage");
setting_SaveBinaryImage = value && string_to_bool(value);
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "SaveFullCore");
setting_SaveFullCore = value ? string_to_bool(value) : true;
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "CreateCoreBacktrace");
setting_CreateCoreBacktrace = value ? string_to_bool(value) : true;
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "SaveContainerizedPackageData");
setting_SaveContainerizedPackageData = value && string_to_bool(value);
/* Do not call abrt-action-save-package-data with process's root, if ExploreChroots is disabled. */
if (!g_settings_explorechroots)
{
if (setting_SaveContainerizedPackageData)
log_warning("Ignoring SaveContainerizedPackageData because ExploreChroots is disabled");
setting_SaveContainerizedPackageData = false;
}
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "StandaloneHook");
setting_StandaloneHook = value && string_to_bool(value);
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "VerboseLog");
if (value)
g_verbose = xatoi_positive(value);
free_map_string(settings);
}
if (argc == 2 && strcmp(argv[1], "--config-test"))
return test_configuration(setting_SaveFullCore, setting_CreateCoreBacktrace);
if (argc < 8)
{
/* percent specifier: %s %c %p %u %g %t %e %P %i*/
/* argv: [0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]*/
error_msg_and_die("Usage: %s SIGNO CORE_SIZE_LIMIT PID UID GID TIME BINARY_NAME GLOBAL_PID [TID]", argv[0]);
}
/* Not needed on 2.6.30.
* At least 2.6.18 has a bug where
* argv[1] = "SIGNO CORE_SIZE_LIMIT PID ..."
* argv[2] = "CORE_SIZE_LIMIT PID ..."
* and so on. Fixing it:
*/
if (strchr(argv[1], ' '))
{
int i;
for (i = 1; argv[i]; i++)
{
strchrnul(argv[i], ' ')[0] = '\0';
}
}
errno = 0;
const char* signal_str = argv[1];
int signal_no = xatoi_positive(signal_str);
off_t ulimit_c = strtoull(argv[2], NULL, 10);
if (ulimit_c < 0) /* unlimited? */
{
/* set to max possible >0 value */
ulimit_c = ~((off_t)1 << (sizeof(off_t)*8-1));
}
const char *pid_str = argv[3];
pid_t local_pid = xatoi_positive(argv[3]);
uid_t uid = xatoi_positive(argv[4]);
if (errno || local_pid <= 0)
{
perror_msg_and_die("PID '%s' or limit '%s' is bogus", argv[3], argv[2]);
}
{
char *s = xmalloc_fopen_fgetline_fclose(VAR_RUN"/abrt/saved_core_pattern");
/* If we have a saved pattern and it's not a "|PROG ARGS" thing... */
if (s && s[0] != '|')
core_basename = s;
else
free(s);
}
const char *global_pid_str = argv[8];
pid_t pid = xatoi_positive(argv[8]);
pid_t tid = -1;
const char *tid_str = argv[9];
if (tid_str)
{
tid = xatoi_positive(tid_str);
}
char path[PATH_MAX];
char *executable = get_executable(pid);
if (executable && strstr(executable, "/abrt-hook-ccpp"))
{
error_msg_and_die("PID %lu is '%s', not dumping it to avoid recursion",
(long)pid, executable);
}
user_pwd = get_cwd(pid); /* may be NULL on error */
log_notice("user_pwd:'%s'", user_pwd);
sprintf(path, "/proc/%lu/status", (long)pid);
char *proc_pid_status = xmalloc_xopen_read_close(path, /*maxsz:*/ NULL);
uid_t fsuid = uid;
uid_t tmp_fsuid = get_fsuid(proc_pid_status);
if (tmp_fsuid < 0)
perror_msg_and_die("Can't parse 'Uid: line' in /proc/%lu/status", (long)pid);
const int fsgid = get_fsgid(proc_pid_status);
if (fsgid < 0)
error_msg_and_die("Can't parse 'Gid: line' in /proc/%lu/status", (long)pid);
int suid_policy = dump_suid_policy();
if (tmp_fsuid != uid)
{
/* use root for suided apps unless it's explicitly set to UNSAFE */
fsuid = 0;
if (suid_policy == DUMP_SUID_UNSAFE)
fsuid = tmp_fsuid;
else
{
g_user_core_flags = O_EXCL;
g_need_nonrelative = 1;
}
}
/* Open a fd to compat coredump, if requested and is possible */
int user_core_fd = -1;
if (setting_MakeCompatCore && ulimit_c != 0)
/* note: checks "user_pwd == NULL" inside; updates core_basename */
user_core_fd = open_user_core(uid, fsuid, fsgid, pid, &argv[1]);
if (executable == NULL)
{
/* readlink on /proc/$PID/exe failed, don't create abrt dump dir */
error_msg("Can't read /proc/%lu/exe link", (long)pid);
return create_user_core(user_core_fd, pid, ulimit_c);
}
const char *signame = NULL;
if (!signal_is_fatal(signal_no, &signame))
return create_user_core(user_core_fd, pid, ulimit_c); // not a signal we care about
const int abrtd_running = daemon_is_ok();
if (!setting_StandaloneHook && !abrtd_running)
{
/* not an error, exit with exit code 0 */
log("abrtd is not running. If it crashed, "
"/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern contains a stale value, "
"consider resetting it to 'core'"
);
return create_user_core(user_core_fd, pid, ulimit_c);
}
if (setting_StandaloneHook)
ensure_writable_dir(g_settings_dump_location, DEFAULT_DUMP_LOCATION_MODE, "abrt");
if (g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize > 0)
{
/* If free space is less than 1/4 of MaxCrashReportsSize... */
if (low_free_space(g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize, g_settings_dump_location))
return create_user_core(user_core_fd, pid, ulimit_c);
}
/* Check /var/tmp/abrt/last-ccpp marker, do not dump repeated crashes
* if they happen too often. Else, write new marker value.
*/
snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/last-ccpp", g_settings_dump_location);
if (check_recent_crash_file(path, executable))
{
/* It is a repeating crash */
return create_user_core(user_core_fd, pid, ulimit_c);
}
const char *last_slash = strrchr(executable, '/');
if (last_slash && strncmp(++last_slash, "abrt", 4) == 0)
{
if (g_settings_debug_level == 0)
{
log_warning("Ignoring crash of %s (SIG%s).",
executable, signame ? signame : signal_str);
goto cleanup_and_exit;
}
/* If abrtd/abrt-foo crashes, we don't want to create a _directory_,
* since that can make new copy of abrtd to process it,
* and maybe crash again...
* Unlike dirs, mere files are ignored by abrtd.
*/
if (snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/%s-coredump", g_settings_dump_location, last_slash) >= sizeof(path))
error_msg_and_die("Error saving '%s': truncated long file path", path);
int abrt_core_fd = xopen3(path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600);
off_t core_size = copyfd_eof(STDIN_FILENO, abrt_core_fd, COPYFD_SPARSE);
if (core_size < 0 || fsync(abrt_core_fd) != 0)
{
unlink(path);
/* copyfd_eof logs the error including errno string,
* but it does not log file name */
error_msg_and_die("Error saving '%s'", path);
}
log_notice("Saved core dump of pid %lu (%s) to %s (%llu bytes)", (long)pid, executable, path, (long long)core_size);
err = 0;
goto cleanup_and_exit;
}
unsigned path_len = snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/ccpp-%s-%lu.new",
g_settings_dump_location, iso_date_string(NULL), (long)pid);
if (path_len >= (sizeof(path) - sizeof("/"FILENAME_COREDUMP)))
{
return create_user_core(user_core_fd, pid, ulimit_c);
}
/* If you don't want to have fs owner as root then:
*
* - use fsuid instead of uid for fs owner, so we don't expose any
* sensitive information of suided app in /var/(tmp|spool)/abrt
*
* - use dd_create_skeleton() and dd_reset_ownership(), when you finish
* creating the new dump directory, to prevent the real owner to write to
* the directory until the hook is done (avoid race conditions and defend
* hard and symbolic link attacs)
*/
dd = dd_create(path, /*fs owner*/0, DEFAULT_DUMP_DIR_MODE);
if (dd)
{
char source_filename[sizeof("/proc/%lu/somewhat_long_name") + sizeof(long)*3];
int source_base_ofs = sprintf(source_filename, "/proc/%lu/root", (long)pid);
source_base_ofs -= strlen("root");
/* What's wrong on using /proc/[pid]/root every time ?*/
/* It creates os_info_in_root_dir for all crashes. */
char *rootdir = process_has_own_root(pid) ? get_rootdir(pid) : NULL;
/* Reading data from an arbitrary root directory is not secure. */
if (g_settings_explorechroots)
{
/* Yes, test 'rootdir' but use 'source_filename' because 'rootdir' can
* be '/' for a process with own namespace. 'source_filename' is /proc/[pid]/root. */
dd_create_basic_files(dd, fsuid, (rootdir != NULL) ? source_filename : NULL);
}
else
{
dd_create_basic_files(dd, fsuid, NULL);
}
char *dest_filename = concat_path_file(dd->dd_dirname, "also_somewhat_longish_name");
char *dest_base = strrchr(dest_filename, '/') + 1;
strcpy(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "maps");
dd_copy_file(dd, FILENAME_MAPS, source_filename);
strcpy(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "limits");
dd_copy_file(dd, FILENAME_LIMITS, source_filename);
strcpy(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "cgroup");
dd_copy_file(dd, FILENAME_CGROUP, source_filename);
strcpy(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "mountinfo");
dd_copy_file(dd, FILENAME_MOUNTINFO, source_filename);
strcpy(dest_base, FILENAME_OPEN_FDS);
strcpy(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "fd");
dump_fd_info_ext(dest_filename, source_filename, dd->dd_uid, dd->dd_gid);
strcpy(dest_base, FILENAME_NAMESPACES);
dump_namespace_diff_ext(dest_filename, 1, pid, dd->dd_uid, dd->dd_gid);
free(dest_filename);
char *tmp = NULL;
get_env_variable(pid, "container", &tmp);
if (tmp != NULL)
{
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_CONTAINER, tmp);
free(tmp);
tmp = NULL;
}
get_env_variable(pid, "container_uuid", &tmp);
if (tmp != NULL)
{
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_CONTAINER_UUID, tmp);
free(tmp);
}
/* There's no need to compare mount namespaces and search for '/' in
* mountifo. Comparison of inodes of '/proc/[pid]/root' and '/' works
* fine. If those inodes do not equal each other, we have to verify
* that '/proc/[pid]/root' is not a symlink to a chroot.
*/
const int containerized = (rootdir != NULL && strcmp(rootdir, "/") == 0);
if (containerized)
{
log_debug("Process %d is considered to be containerized", pid);
pid_t container_pid;
if (get_pid_of_container(pid, &container_pid) == 0)
{
char *container_cmdline = get_cmdline(container_pid);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_CONTAINER_CMDLINE, container_cmdline);
free(container_cmdline);
}
}
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ANALYZER, "abrt-ccpp");
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_TYPE, "CCpp");
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_EXECUTABLE, executable);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_PID, pid_str);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_GLOBAL_PID, global_pid_str);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_PROC_PID_STATUS, proc_pid_status);
if (user_pwd)
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_PWD, user_pwd);
if (tid_str)
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_TID, tid_str);
if (rootdir)
{
if (strcmp(rootdir, "/") != 0)
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ROOTDIR, rootdir);
}
free(rootdir);
char *reason = xasprintf("%s killed by SIG%s",
last_slash, signame ? signame : signal_str);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_REASON, reason);
free(reason);
char *cmdline = get_cmdline(pid);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_CMDLINE, cmdline ? : "");
free(cmdline);
char *environ = get_environ(pid);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ENVIRON, environ ? : "");
free(environ);
char *fips_enabled = xmalloc_fopen_fgetline_fclose("/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled");
if (fips_enabled)
{
if (strcmp(fips_enabled, "0") != 0)
dd_save_text(dd, "fips_enabled", fips_enabled);
free(fips_enabled);
}
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ABRT_VERSION, VERSION);
/* In case of errors, treat the process as if it has locked memory */
long unsigned lck_bytes = ULONG_MAX;
const char *vmlck = strstr(proc_pid_status, "VmLck:");
if (vmlck == NULL)
error_msg("/proc/%s/status does not contain 'VmLck:' line", pid_str);
else if (1 != sscanf(vmlck + 6, "%lu kB\n", &lck_bytes))
error_msg("Failed to parse 'VmLck:' line in /proc/%s/status", pid_str);
if (lck_bytes)
{
log_notice("Process %s of user %lu has locked memory",
pid_str, (long unsigned)uid);
dd_mark_as_notreportable(dd, "The process had locked memory "
"which usually indicates efforts to protect sensitive "
"data (passwords) from being written to disk.\n"
"In order to avoid sensitive information leakages, "
"ABRT will not allow you to report this problem to "
"bug tracking tools");
}
if (setting_SaveBinaryImage)
{
if (save_crashing_binary(pid, dd))
{
error_msg("Error saving '%s'", path);
goto cleanup_and_exit;
}
}
off_t core_size = 0;
if (setting_SaveFullCore)
{
strcpy(path + path_len, "/"FILENAME_COREDUMP);
int abrt_core_fd = create_or_die(path, user_core_fd);
/* We write both coredumps at once.
* We can't write user coredump first, since it might be truncated
* and thus can't be copied and used as abrt coredump;
* and if we write abrt coredump first and then copy it as user one,
* then we have a race when process exits but coredump does not exist yet:
* $ echo -e '#include<signal.h>\nmain(){raise(SIGSEGV);}' | gcc -o test -x c -
* $ rm -f core*; ulimit -c unlimited; ./test; ls -l core*
* 21631 Segmentation fault (core dumped) ./test
* ls: cannot access core*: No such file or directory <=== BAD
*/
core_size = copyfd_sparse(STDIN_FILENO, abrt_core_fd, user_core_fd, ulimit_c);
close_user_core(user_core_fd, core_size);
if (fsync(abrt_core_fd) != 0 || close(abrt_core_fd) != 0 || core_size < 0)
{
unlink(path);
/* copyfd_sparse logs the error including errno string,
* but it does not log file name */
error_msg("Error writing '%s'", path);
goto cleanup_and_exit;
}
}
else
{
/* User core is created even if WriteFullCore is off. */
create_user_core(user_core_fd, pid, ulimit_c);
}
/* User core is either written or closed */
user_core_fd = -1;
/*
* ! No other errors should cause removal of the user core !
*/
/* Because of #1211835 and #1126850 */
#if 0
/* Save JVM crash log if it exists. (JVM's coredump per se
* is nearly useless for JVM developers)
*/
{
char *java_log = xasprintf("/tmp/jvm-%lu/hs_error.log", (long)pid);
int src_fd = open(java_log, O_RDONLY);
free(java_log);
/* If we couldn't open the error log in /tmp directory we can try to
* read the log from the current directory. It may produce AVC, it
* may produce some error log but all these are expected.
*/
if (src_fd < 0)
{
java_log = xasprintf("%s/hs_err_pid%lu.log", user_pwd, (long)pid);
src_fd = open(java_log, O_RDONLY);
free(java_log);
}
if (src_fd >= 0)
{
strcpy(path + path_len, "/hs_err.log");
int dst_fd = create_or_die(path, user_core_fd);
off_t sz = copyfd_eof(src_fd, dst_fd, COPYFD_SPARSE);
if (close(dst_fd) != 0 || sz < 0)
{
error_msg("Error saving '%s'", path);
goto cleanup_and_exit;
}
close(src_fd);
}
}
#endif
/* Perform crash-time unwind of the guilty thread. */
if (tid > 0 && setting_CreateCoreBacktrace)
create_core_backtrace(tid, executable, signal_no, dd);
/* We close dumpdir before we start catering for crash storm case.
* Otherwise, delete_dump_dir's from other concurrent
* CCpp's won't be able to delete our dump (their delete_dump_dir
* will wait for us), and we won't be able to delete their dumps.
* Classic deadlock.
*/
dd_close(dd);
dd = NULL;
path[path_len] = '\0'; /* path now contains only directory name */
if (abrtd_running && setting_SaveContainerizedPackageData && containerized)
{ /* Do we really need to run rpm from core_pattern hook? */
sprintf(source_filename, "/proc/%lu/root", (long)pid);
const char *cmd_args[6];
cmd_args[0] = BIN_DIR"/abrt-action-save-package-data";
cmd_args[1] = "-d";
cmd_args[2] = path;
cmd_args[3] = "-r";
cmd_args[4] = source_filename;
cmd_args[5] = NULL;
pid_t pid = fork_execv_on_steroids(0, (char **)cmd_args, NULL, NULL, path, 0);
int stat;
safe_waitpid(pid, &stat, 0);
}
char *newpath = xstrndup(path, path_len - (sizeof(".new")-1));
if (rename(path, newpath) == 0)
strcpy(path, newpath);
free(newpath);
if (core_size > 0)
log_notice("Saved core dump of pid %lu (%s) to %s (%llu bytes)",
(long)pid, executable, path, (long long)core_size);
if (abrtd_running)
notify_new_path(path);
/* rhbz#539551: "abrt going crazy when crashing process is respawned" */
if (g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize > 0)
{
/* x1.25 and round up to 64m: go a bit up, so that usual in-daemon trimming
* kicks in first, and we don't "fight" with it:
*/
unsigned maxsize = g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize + g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize / 4;
maxsize |= 63;
trim_problem_dirs(g_settings_dump_location, maxsize * (double)(1024*1024), path);
}
err = 0;
}
else
{
/* We didn't create abrt dump, but may need to create compat coredump */
return create_user_core(user_core_fd, pid, ulimit_c);
}
cleanup_and_exit:
if (dd)
dd_delete(dd);
if (user_core_fd >= 0)
unlinkat(dirfd(proc_cwd), core_basename, /*only files*/0);
if (proc_cwd != NULL)
closedir(proc_cwd);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-59
Summary: The abrt-hook-ccpp help program in Automatic Bug Reporting Tool (ABRT) before 2.7.1 allows local users with certain permissions to gain privileges via a symlink attack on a file with a predictable name, as demonstrated by /var/tmp/abrt/abrt-hax-coredump or /var/spool/abrt/abrt-hax-coredump.
Commit Message: ccpp: save abrt core files only to new files
Prior this commit abrt-hook-ccpp saved a core file generated by a
process running a program whose name starts with "abrt" in
DUMP_LOCATION/$(basename program)-coredump. If the file was a symlink,
the hook followed and wrote core file to the symlink's target.
Addresses CVE-2015-5287
Signed-off-by: Jakub Filak <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,604 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: intuit_diff_type (bool need_header, mode_t *p_file_type)
{
file_offset this_line = 0;
file_offset first_command_line = -1;
char first_ed_command_letter = 0;
lin fcl_line = 0; /* Pacify 'gcc -W'. */
bool this_is_a_command = false;
bool stars_this_line = false;
bool extended_headers = false;
enum nametype i;
struct stat st[3];
int stat_errno[3];
int version_controlled[3];
enum diff retval;
mode_t file_type;
size_t indent = 0;
for (i = OLD; i <= INDEX; i++)
if (p_name[i]) {
free (p_name[i]);
p_name[i] = 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE (invalid_names); i++)
invalid_names[i] = NULL;
for (i = OLD; i <= NEW; i++)
if (p_timestr[i])
{
free(p_timestr[i]);
p_timestr[i] = 0;
}
for (i = OLD; i <= NEW; i++)
if (p_sha1[i])
{
free (p_sha1[i]);
p_sha1[i] = 0;
}
p_git_diff = false;
for (i = OLD; i <= NEW; i++)
{
p_mode[i] = 0;
p_copy[i] = false;
p_rename[i] = false;
}
/* Ed and normal format patches don't have filename headers. */
if (diff_type == ED_DIFF || diff_type == NORMAL_DIFF)
need_header = false;
version_controlled[OLD] = -1;
version_controlled[NEW] = -1;
version_controlled[INDEX] = -1;
p_rfc934_nesting = 0;
p_timestamp[OLD].tv_sec = p_timestamp[NEW].tv_sec = -1;
p_says_nonexistent[OLD] = p_says_nonexistent[NEW] = 0;
Fseek (pfp, p_base, SEEK_SET);
p_input_line = p_bline - 1;
for (;;) {
char *s;
char *t;
file_offset previous_line = this_line;
bool last_line_was_command = this_is_a_command;
bool stars_last_line = stars_this_line;
size_t indent_last_line = indent;
char ed_command_letter;
bool strip_trailing_cr;
size_t chars_read;
indent = 0;
this_line = file_tell (pfp);
chars_read = pget_line (0, 0, false, false);
if (chars_read == (size_t) -1)
xalloc_die ();
if (! chars_read) {
if (first_ed_command_letter) {
/* nothing but deletes!? */
p_start = first_command_line;
p_sline = fcl_line;
retval = ED_DIFF;
goto scan_exit;
}
else {
p_start = this_line;
p_sline = p_input_line;
if (extended_headers)
{
/* Patch contains no hunks; any diff type will do. */
retval = UNI_DIFF;
goto scan_exit;
}
return NO_DIFF;
}
}
strip_trailing_cr = 2 <= chars_read && buf[chars_read - 2] == '\r';
for (s = buf; *s == ' ' || *s == '\t' || *s == 'X'; s++) {
if (*s == '\t')
indent = (indent + 8) & ~7;
else
indent++;
}
if (ISDIGIT (*s))
{
for (t = s + 1; ISDIGIT (*t) || *t == ','; t++)
/* do nothing */ ;
if (*t == 'd' || *t == 'c' || *t == 'a')
{
for (t++; ISDIGIT (*t) || *t == ','; t++)
/* do nothing */ ;
for (; *t == ' ' || *t == '\t'; t++)
/* do nothing */ ;
if (*t == '\r')
t++;
this_is_a_command = (*t == '\n');
}
}
if (! need_header
&& first_command_line < 0
&& ((ed_command_letter = get_ed_command_letter (s))
|| this_is_a_command)) {
first_command_line = this_line;
first_ed_command_letter = ed_command_letter;
fcl_line = p_input_line;
p_indent = indent; /* assume this for now */
p_strip_trailing_cr = strip_trailing_cr;
}
if (!stars_last_line && strnEQ(s, "*** ", 4))
{
fetchname (s+4, strippath, &p_name[OLD], &p_timestr[OLD],
&p_timestamp[OLD]);
need_header = false;
}
else if (strnEQ(s, "+++ ", 4))
{
/* Swap with NEW below. */
fetchname (s+4, strippath, &p_name[OLD], &p_timestr[OLD],
&p_timestamp[OLD]);
need_header = false;
p_strip_trailing_cr = strip_trailing_cr;
}
else if (strnEQ(s, "Index:", 6))
{
fetchname (s+6, strippath, &p_name[INDEX], (char **) 0, NULL);
need_header = false;
p_strip_trailing_cr = strip_trailing_cr;
}
else if (strnEQ(s, "Prereq:", 7))
{
for (t = s + 7; ISSPACE ((unsigned char) *t); t++)
/* do nothing */ ;
revision = t;
for (t = revision; *t; t++)
if (ISSPACE ((unsigned char) *t))
{
char const *u;
for (u = t + 1; ISSPACE ((unsigned char) *u); u++)
/* do nothing */ ;
if (*u)
{
char numbuf[LINENUM_LENGTH_BOUND + 1];
say ("Prereq: with multiple words at line %s of patch\n",
format_linenum (numbuf, this_line));
}
break;
}
if (t == revision)
revision = 0;
else {
char oldc = *t;
*t = '\0';
revision = xstrdup (revision);
*t = oldc;
}
}
else if (strnEQ (s, "diff --git ", 11))
{
char const *u;
if (extended_headers)
{
p_start = this_line;
p_sline = p_input_line;
/* Patch contains no hunks; any diff type will do. */
retval = UNI_DIFF;
goto scan_exit;
}
for (i = OLD; i <= NEW; i++)
{
free (p_name[i]);
p_name[i] = 0;
}
if (! ((p_name[OLD] = parse_name (s + 11, strippath, &u))
&& ISSPACE ((unsigned char) *u)
&& (p_name[NEW] = parse_name (u, strippath, &u))
&& (u = skip_spaces (u), ! *u)))
for (i = OLD; i <= NEW; i++)
{
free (p_name[i]);
p_name[i] = 0;
}
p_git_diff = true;
need_header = false;
}
else if (p_git_diff && strnEQ (s, "index ", 6))
{
char const *u, *v;
if ((u = skip_hex_digits (s + 6))
&& u[0] == '.' && u[1] == '.'
&& (v = skip_hex_digits (u + 2))
&& (! *v || ISSPACE ((unsigned char) *v)))
{
get_sha1(&p_sha1[OLD], s + 6, u);
get_sha1(&p_sha1[NEW], u + 2, v);
p_says_nonexistent[OLD] = sha1_says_nonexistent (p_sha1[OLD]);
p_says_nonexistent[NEW] = sha1_says_nonexistent (p_sha1[NEW]);
if (*(v = skip_spaces (v)))
p_mode[OLD] = p_mode[NEW] = fetchmode (v);
extended_headers = true;
}
}
else if (p_git_diff && strnEQ (s, "old mode ", 9))
{
p_mode[OLD] = fetchmode (s + 9);
extended_headers = true;
}
else if (p_git_diff && strnEQ (s, "new mode ", 9))
{
p_mode[NEW] = fetchmode (s + 9);
extended_headers = true;
}
else if (p_git_diff && strnEQ (s, "deleted file mode ", 18))
{
p_mode[OLD] = fetchmode (s + 18);
p_says_nonexistent[NEW] = 2;
extended_headers = true;
}
else if (p_git_diff && strnEQ (s, "new file mode ", 14))
{
p_mode[NEW] = fetchmode (s + 14);
p_says_nonexistent[OLD] = 2;
extended_headers = true;
}
else if (p_git_diff && strnEQ (s, "rename from ", 12))
{
/* Git leaves out the prefix in the file name in this header,
so we can only ignore the file name. */
p_rename[OLD] = true;
extended_headers = true;
}
else if (p_git_diff && strnEQ (s, "rename to ", 10))
{
/* Git leaves out the prefix in the file name in this header,
so we can only ignore the file name. */
p_rename[NEW] = true;
extended_headers = true;
}
else if (p_git_diff && strnEQ (s, "copy from ", 10))
{
/* Git leaves out the prefix in the file name in this header,
so we can only ignore the file name. */
p_copy[OLD] = true;
extended_headers = true;
}
else if (p_git_diff && strnEQ (s, "copy to ", 8))
{
/* Git leaves out the prefix in the file name in this header,
so we can only ignore the file name. */
p_copy[NEW] = true;
extended_headers = true;
}
else if (p_git_diff && strnEQ (s, "GIT binary patch", 16))
{
p_start = this_line;
p_sline = p_input_line;
retval = GIT_BINARY_DIFF;
goto scan_exit;
}
else
{
for (t = s; t[0] == '-' && t[1] == ' '; t += 2)
/* do nothing */ ;
if (strnEQ(t, "--- ", 4))
{
struct timespec timestamp;
timestamp.tv_sec = -1;
fetchname (t+4, strippath, &p_name[NEW], &p_timestr[NEW],
×tamp);
need_header = false;
if (timestamp.tv_sec != -1)
{
p_timestamp[NEW] = timestamp;
p_rfc934_nesting = (t - s) >> 1;
}
p_strip_trailing_cr = strip_trailing_cr;
}
}
if (need_header)
continue;
if ((diff_type == NO_DIFF || diff_type == ED_DIFF) &&
first_command_line >= 0 &&
strEQ(s, ".\n") ) {
p_start = first_command_line;
p_sline = fcl_line;
retval = ED_DIFF;
goto scan_exit;
}
if ((diff_type == NO_DIFF || diff_type == UNI_DIFF)
&& strnEQ(s, "@@ -", 4)) {
/* 'p_name', 'p_timestr', and 'p_timestamp' are backwards;
swap them. */
struct timespec ti = p_timestamp[OLD];
p_timestamp[OLD] = p_timestamp[NEW];
p_timestamp[NEW] = ti;
t = p_name[OLD];
p_name[OLD] = p_name[NEW];
p_name[NEW] = t;
t = p_timestr[OLD];
p_timestr[OLD] = p_timestr[NEW];
p_timestr[NEW] = t;
s += 4;
if (s[0] == '0' && !ISDIGIT (s[1]))
p_says_nonexistent[OLD] = 1 + ! p_timestamp[OLD].tv_sec;
while (*s != ' ' && *s != '\n')
s++;
while (*s == ' ')
s++;
if (s[0] == '+' && s[1] == '0' && !ISDIGIT (s[2]))
p_says_nonexistent[NEW] = 1 + ! p_timestamp[NEW].tv_sec;
p_indent = indent;
p_start = this_line;
p_sline = p_input_line;
retval = UNI_DIFF;
if (! ((p_name[OLD] || ! p_timestamp[OLD].tv_sec)
&& (p_name[NEW] || ! p_timestamp[NEW].tv_sec))
&& ! p_name[INDEX] && need_header)
{
char numbuf[LINENUM_LENGTH_BOUND + 1];
say ("missing header for unified diff at line %s of patch\n",
format_linenum (numbuf, p_sline));
}
goto scan_exit;
}
stars_this_line = strnEQ(s, "********", 8);
if ((diff_type == NO_DIFF
|| diff_type == CONTEXT_DIFF
|| diff_type == NEW_CONTEXT_DIFF)
&& stars_last_line && indent_last_line == indent
&& strnEQ (s, "*** ", 4)) {
s += 4;
if (s[0] == '0' && !ISDIGIT (s[1]))
p_says_nonexistent[OLD] = 1 + ! p_timestamp[OLD].tv_sec;
/* if this is a new context diff the character just before */
/* the newline is a '*'. */
while (*s != '\n')
s++;
p_indent = indent;
p_strip_trailing_cr = strip_trailing_cr;
p_start = previous_line;
p_sline = p_input_line - 1;
retval = (*(s-1) == '*' ? NEW_CONTEXT_DIFF : CONTEXT_DIFF);
{
/* Scan the first hunk to see whether the file contents
appear to have been deleted. */
file_offset saved_p_base = p_base;
lin saved_p_bline = p_bline;
Fseek (pfp, previous_line, SEEK_SET);
p_input_line -= 2;
if (another_hunk (retval, false)
&& ! p_repl_lines && p_newfirst == 1)
p_says_nonexistent[NEW] = 1 + ! p_timestamp[NEW].tv_sec;
next_intuit_at (saved_p_base, saved_p_bline);
}
if (! ((p_name[OLD] || ! p_timestamp[OLD].tv_sec)
&& (p_name[NEW] || ! p_timestamp[NEW].tv_sec))
&& ! p_name[INDEX] && need_header)
{
char numbuf[LINENUM_LENGTH_BOUND + 1];
say ("missing header for context diff at line %s of patch\n",
format_linenum (numbuf, p_sline));
}
goto scan_exit;
}
if ((diff_type == NO_DIFF || diff_type == NORMAL_DIFF) &&
last_line_was_command &&
(strnEQ(s, "< ", 2) || strnEQ(s, "> ", 2)) ) {
p_start = previous_line;
p_sline = p_input_line - 1;
p_indent = indent;
retval = NORMAL_DIFF;
goto scan_exit;
}
}
scan_exit:
/* The old, new, or old and new file types may be defined. When both
file types are defined, make sure they are the same, or else assume
we do not know the file type. */
file_type = p_mode[OLD] & S_IFMT;
if (file_type)
{
mode_t new_file_type = p_mode[NEW] & S_IFMT;
if (new_file_type && file_type != new_file_type)
file_type = 0;
}
else
{
file_type = p_mode[NEW] & S_IFMT;
if (! file_type)
file_type = S_IFREG;
}
*p_file_type = file_type;
/* To intuit 'inname', the name of the file to patch,
use the algorithm specified by POSIX 1003.1-2001 XCU lines 25680-26599
(with some modifications if posixly_correct is zero):
- Take the old and new names from the context header if present,
and take the index name from the 'Index:' line if present and
if either the old and new names are both absent
or posixly_correct is nonzero.
Consider the file names to be in the order (old, new, index).
- If some named files exist, use the first one if posixly_correct
is nonzero, the best one otherwise.
- If patch_get is nonzero, and no named files exist,
but an RCS or SCCS master file exists,
use the first named file with an RCS or SCCS master.
- If no named files exist, no RCS or SCCS master was found,
some names are given, posixly_correct is zero,
and the patch appears to create a file, then use the best name
requiring the creation of the fewest directories.
- Otherwise, report failure by setting 'inname' to 0;
this causes our invoker to ask the user for a file name. */
i = NONE;
if (!inname)
{
enum nametype i0 = NONE;
if (! posixly_correct && (p_name[OLD] || p_name[NEW]) && p_name[INDEX])
{
free (p_name[INDEX]);
p_name[INDEX] = 0;
}
for (i = OLD; i <= INDEX; i++)
if (p_name[i])
{
if (i0 != NONE && strcmp (p_name[i0], p_name[i]) == 0)
{
/* It's the same name as before; reuse stat results. */
stat_errno[i] = stat_errno[i0];
if (! stat_errno[i])
st[i] = st[i0];
}
else
{
stat_errno[i] = stat_file (p_name[i], &st[i]);
if (! stat_errno[i])
{
if (lookup_file_id (&st[i]) == DELETE_LATER)
stat_errno[i] = ENOENT;
else if (posixly_correct && name_is_valid (p_name[i]))
break;
}
}
i0 = i;
}
if (! posixly_correct)
{
/* The best of all existing files. */
i = best_name (p_name, stat_errno);
if (i == NONE && patch_get)
{
enum nametype nope = NONE;
for (i = OLD; i <= INDEX; i++)
if (p_name[i])
{
char const *cs;
char *getbuf;
char *diffbuf;
bool readonly = (outfile
&& strcmp (outfile, p_name[i]) != 0);
if (nope == NONE || strcmp (p_name[nope], p_name[i]) != 0)
{
cs = (version_controller
(p_name[i], readonly, (struct stat *) 0,
&getbuf, &diffbuf));
version_controlled[i] = !! cs;
if (cs)
{
if (version_get (p_name[i], cs, false, readonly,
getbuf, &st[i]))
stat_errno[i] = 0;
else
version_controlled[i] = 0;
free (getbuf);
free (diffbuf);
if (! stat_errno[i])
break;
}
}
nope = i;
}
}
if (i0 != NONE
&& (i == NONE || (st[i].st_mode & S_IFMT) == file_type)
&& maybe_reverse (p_name[i == NONE ? i0 : i], i == NONE,
i == NONE || st[i].st_size == 0)
&& i == NONE)
i = i0;
if (i == NONE && p_says_nonexistent[reverse])
{
int newdirs[3];
int newdirs_min = INT_MAX;
int distance_from_minimum[3];
for (i = OLD; i <= INDEX; i++)
if (p_name[i])
{
newdirs[i] = (prefix_components (p_name[i], false)
- prefix_components (p_name[i], true));
if (newdirs[i] < newdirs_min)
newdirs_min = newdirs[i];
}
for (i = OLD; i <= INDEX; i++)
if (p_name[i])
distance_from_minimum[i] = newdirs[i] - newdirs_min;
/* The best of the filenames which create the fewest directories. */
i = best_name (p_name, distance_from_minimum);
}
}
}
if ((pch_rename () || pch_copy ())
&& ! inname
&& ! ((i == OLD || i == NEW) &&
p_name[! reverse] &&
name_is_valid (p_name[! reverse])))
{
say ("Cannot %s file without two valid file names\n", pch_rename () ? "rename" : "copy");
}
if (i == NONE)
{
if (inname)
{
inerrno = stat_file (inname, &instat);
if (inerrno || (instat.st_mode & S_IFMT) == file_type)
maybe_reverse (inname, inerrno, inerrno || instat.st_size == 0);
}
else
inerrno = -1;
}
else
{
inname = xstrdup (p_name[i]);
inerrno = stat_errno[i];
invc = version_controlled[i];
instat = st[i];
}
return retval;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: An issue was discovered in GNU patch through 2.7.6. There is a segmentation fault, associated with a NULL pointer dereference, leading to a denial of service in the intuit_diff_type function in pch.c, aka a "mangled rename" issue.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,020 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: xmlPushInput(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlParserInputPtr input) {
int ret;
if (input == NULL) return(-1);
if (xmlParserDebugEntities) {
if ((ctxt->input != NULL) && (ctxt->input->filename))
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"%s(%d): ", ctxt->input->filename,
ctxt->input->line);
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"Pushing input %d : %.30s\n", ctxt->inputNr+1, input->cur);
}
ret = inputPush(ctxt, input);
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
return(-1);
GROW;
return(ret);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-835
Summary: parser.c in libxml2 before 2.9.5 does not prevent infinite recursion in parameter entities.
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579. | Medium | 167,666 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int genl_register_family(struct genl_family *family)
{
int err, i;
int start = GENL_START_ALLOC, end = GENL_MAX_ID;
err = genl_validate_ops(family);
if (err)
return err;
genl_lock_all();
if (genl_family_find_byname(family->name)) {
err = -EEXIST;
goto errout_locked;
}
/*
* Sadly, a few cases need to be special-cased
* due to them having previously abused the API
* and having used their family ID also as their
* multicast group ID, so we use reserved IDs
* for both to be sure we can do that mapping.
*/
if (family == &genl_ctrl) {
/* and this needs to be special for initial family lookups */
start = end = GENL_ID_CTRL;
} else if (strcmp(family->name, "pmcraid") == 0) {
start = end = GENL_ID_PMCRAID;
} else if (strcmp(family->name, "VFS_DQUOT") == 0) {
start = end = GENL_ID_VFS_DQUOT;
}
if (family->maxattr && !family->parallel_ops) {
family->attrbuf = kmalloc_array(family->maxattr + 1,
sizeof(struct nlattr *),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (family->attrbuf == NULL) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto errout_locked;
}
} else
family->attrbuf = NULL;
family->id = idr_alloc(&genl_fam_idr, family,
start, end + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (family->id < 0) {
err = family->id;
goto errout_locked;
}
err = genl_validate_assign_mc_groups(family);
if (err)
goto errout_remove;
genl_unlock_all();
/* send all events */
genl_ctrl_event(CTRL_CMD_NEWFAMILY, family, NULL, 0);
for (i = 0; i < family->n_mcgrps; i++)
genl_ctrl_event(CTRL_CMD_NEWMCAST_GRP, family,
&family->mcgrps[i], family->mcgrp_offset + i);
return 0;
errout_remove:
idr_remove(&genl_fam_idr, family->id);
kfree(family->attrbuf);
errout_locked:
genl_unlock_all();
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel before 5.0.6. There is a memory leak issue when idr_alloc() fails in genl_register_family() in net/netlink/genetlink.c.
Commit Message: genetlink: Fix a memory leak on error path
In genl_register_family(), when idr_alloc() fails,
we forget to free the memory we possibly allocate for
family->attrbuf.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]>
Fixes: 2ae0f17df1cd ("genetlink: use idr to track families")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kirill Tkhai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,524 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int list_locations(struct kmem_cache *s, char *buf,
enum track_item alloc)
{
int len = 0;
unsigned long i;
struct loc_track t = { 0, 0, NULL };
int node;
if (!alloc_loc_track(&t, PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(struct location),
GFP_TEMPORARY))
return sprintf(buf, "Out of memory\n");
/* Push back cpu slabs */
flush_all(s);
for_each_node_state(node, N_NORMAL_MEMORY) {
struct kmem_cache_node *n = get_node(s, node);
unsigned long flags;
struct page *page;
if (!atomic_long_read(&n->nr_slabs))
continue;
spin_lock_irqsave(&n->list_lock, flags);
list_for_each_entry(page, &n->partial, lru)
process_slab(&t, s, page, alloc);
list_for_each_entry(page, &n->full, lru)
process_slab(&t, s, page, alloc);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&n->list_lock, flags);
}
for (i = 0; i < t.count; i++) {
struct location *l = &t.loc[i];
if (len > PAGE_SIZE - 100)
break;
len += sprintf(buf + len, "%7ld ", l->count);
if (l->addr)
len += sprint_symbol(buf + len, (unsigned long)l->addr);
else
len += sprintf(buf + len, "<not-available>");
if (l->sum_time != l->min_time) {
unsigned long remainder;
len += sprintf(buf + len, " age=%ld/%ld/%ld",
l->min_time,
div_long_long_rem(l->sum_time, l->count, &remainder),
l->max_time);
} else
len += sprintf(buf + len, " age=%ld",
l->min_time);
if (l->min_pid != l->max_pid)
len += sprintf(buf + len, " pid=%ld-%ld",
l->min_pid, l->max_pid);
else
len += sprintf(buf + len, " pid=%ld",
l->min_pid);
if (num_online_cpus() > 1 && !cpus_empty(l->cpus) &&
len < PAGE_SIZE - 60) {
len += sprintf(buf + len, " cpus=");
len += cpulist_scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len - 50,
l->cpus);
}
if (num_online_nodes() > 1 && !nodes_empty(l->nodes) &&
len < PAGE_SIZE - 60) {
len += sprintf(buf + len, " nodes=");
len += nodelist_scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len - 50,
l->nodes);
}
len += sprintf(buf + len, "\n");
}
free_loc_track(&t);
if (!t.count)
len += sprintf(buf, "No data\n");
return len;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The div_long_long_rem implementation in include/asm-x86/div64.h in the Linux kernel before 2.6.26 on the x86 platform allows local users to cause a denial of service (Divide Error Fault and panic) via a clock_gettime system call.
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <[email protected]>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: john stultz <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,758 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void InspectorNetworkAgent::DidBlockRequest(
ExecutionContext* execution_context,
const ResourceRequest& request,
DocumentLoader* loader,
const FetchInitiatorInfo& initiator_info,
ResourceRequestBlockedReason reason) {
unsigned long identifier = CreateUniqueIdentifier();
WillSendRequestInternal(execution_context, identifier, loader, request,
ResourceResponse(), initiator_info);
String request_id = IdentifiersFactory::RequestId(identifier);
String protocol_reason = BuildBlockedReason(reason);
GetFrontend()->loadingFailed(
request_id, MonotonicallyIncreasingTime(),
InspectorPageAgent::ResourceTypeJson(
resources_data_->GetResourceType(request_id)),
String(), false, protocol_reason);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: WebRTC in Google Chrome prior to 56.0.2924.76 for Linux, Windows and Mac, and 56.0.2924.87 for Android, failed to perform proper bounds checking, which allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936} | Medium | 172,465 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static bool check_underflow(const struct arpt_entry *e)
{
const struct xt_entry_target *t;
unsigned int verdict;
if (!unconditional(&e->arp))
return false;
t = arpt_get_target_c(e);
if (strcmp(t->u.user.name, XT_STANDARD_TARGET) != 0)
return false;
verdict = ((struct xt_standard_target *)t)->verdict;
verdict = -verdict - 1;
return verdict == NF_DROP || verdict == NF_ACCEPT;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow +Priv Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The netfilter subsystem in the Linux kernel through 4.5.2 does not validate certain offset fields, which allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (heap memory corruption) via an IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE setsockopt call.
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: fix unconditional helper
Ben Hawkes says:
In the mark_source_chains function (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c) it
is possible for a user-supplied ipt_entry structure to have a large
next_offset field. This field is not bounds checked prior to writing a
counter value at the supplied offset.
Problem is that mark_source_chains should not have been called --
the rule doesn't have a next entry, so its supposed to return
an absolute verdict of either ACCEPT or DROP.
However, the function conditional() doesn't work as the name implies.
It only checks that the rule is using wildcard address matching.
However, an unconditional rule must also not be using any matches
(no -m args).
The underflow validator only checked the addresses, therefore
passing the 'unconditional absolute verdict' test, while
mark_source_chains also tested for presence of matches, and thus
proceeeded to the next (not-existent) rule.
Unify this so that all the callers have same idea of 'unconditional rule'.
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> | High | 167,364 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void pdf_load_pages_kids(FILE *fp, pdf_t *pdf)
{
int i, id, dummy;
char *buf, *c;
long start, sz;
start = ftell(fp);
/* Load all kids for all xref tables (versions) */
for (i=0; i<pdf->n_xrefs; i++)
{
if (pdf->xrefs[i].version && (pdf->xrefs[i].end != 0))
{
fseek(fp, pdf->xrefs[i].start, SEEK_SET);
while (SAFE_F(fp, (fgetc(fp) != 't')))
; /* Iterate to trailer */
/* Get root catalog */
sz = pdf->xrefs[i].end - ftell(fp);
buf = malloc(sz + 1);
SAFE_E(fread(buf, 1, sz, fp), sz, "Failed to load /Root.\n");
buf[sz] = '\0';
if (!(c = strstr(buf, "/Root")))
{
free(buf);
continue;
}
/* Jump to catalog (root) */
id = atoi(c + strlen("/Root") + 1);
free(buf);
buf = get_object(fp, id, &pdf->xrefs[i], NULL, &dummy);
if (!buf || !(c = strstr(buf, "/Pages")))
{
free(buf);
continue;
}
/* Start at the first Pages obj and get kids */
id = atoi(c + strlen("/Pages") + 1);
load_kids(fp, id, &pdf->xrefs[i]);
free(buf);
}
}
fseek(fp, start, SEEK_SET);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: An issue was discovered in PDFResurrect before 0.18. pdf_load_pages_kids in pdf.c doesn't validate a certain size value, which leads to a malloc failure and out-of-bounds write.
Commit Message: Zero and sanity check all dynamic allocs.
This addresses the memory issues in Issue #6 expressed in
calloc_some.pdf and malloc_some.pdf | Medium | 169,571 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: HostCache::HostCache(size_t max_entries)
: max_entries_(max_entries), network_changes_(0) {}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 43.0.2357.65 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Add PersistenceDelegate to HostCache
PersistenceDelegate is a new interface for persisting the contents of
the HostCache. This commit includes the interface itself, the logic in
HostCache for interacting with it, and a mock implementation of the
interface for testing. It does not include support for immediate data
removal since that won't be needed for the currently planned use case.
BUG=605149
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2943143002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#481015} | High | 172,007 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: kdc_process_for_user(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm,
krb5_pa_data *pa_data,
krb5_keyblock *tgs_session,
krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user **s4u_x509_user,
const char **status)
{
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_pa_for_user *for_user;
krb5_data req_data;
req_data.length = pa_data->length;
req_data.data = (char *)pa_data->contents;
code = decode_krb5_pa_for_user(&req_data, &for_user);
if (code)
return code;
code = verify_for_user_checksum(kdc_context, tgs_session, for_user);
if (code) {
*status = "INVALID_S4U2SELF_CHECKSUM";
krb5_free_pa_for_user(kdc_context, for_user);
return code;
}
*s4u_x509_user = calloc(1, sizeof(krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user));
if (*s4u_x509_user == NULL) {
krb5_free_pa_for_user(kdc_context, for_user);
return ENOMEM;
}
(*s4u_x509_user)->user_id.user = for_user->user;
for_user->user = NULL;
krb5_free_pa_for_user(kdc_context, for_user);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-617
Summary: In MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) 1.7 and later, an authenticated attacker can cause a KDC assertion failure by sending invalid S4U2Self or S4U2Proxy requests.
Commit Message: Prevent KDC unset status assertion failures
Assign status values if S4U2Self padata fails to decode, if an
S4U2Proxy request uses invalid KDC options, or if an S4U2Proxy request
uses an evidence ticket which does not match the canonicalized request
server principal name. Reported by Samuel Cabrero.
If a status value is not assigned during KDC processing, default to
"UNKNOWN_REASON" rather than failing an assertion. This change will
prevent future denial of service bugs due to similar mistakes, and
will allow us to omit assigning status values for unlikely errors such
as small memory allocation failures.
CVE-2017-11368:
In MIT krb5 1.7 and later, an authenticated attacker can cause an
assertion failure in krb5kdc by sending an invalid S4U2Self or
S4U2Proxy request.
CVSSv3 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H/E:H/RL:O/RC:C
ticket: 8599 (new)
target_version: 1.15-next
target_version: 1.14-next
tags: pullup | Medium | 168,041 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void jas_seq2d_bindsub(jas_matrix_t *s, jas_matrix_t *s1, int xstart,
int ystart, int xend, int yend)
{
jas_matrix_bindsub(s, s1, ystart - s1->ystart_, xstart - s1->xstart_,
yend - s1->ystart_ - 1, xend - s1->xstart_ - 1);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in jas_image.c in JasPer before 1.900.25 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now. | Medium | 168,707 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: get_page_image(LoadContext *lc, ddjvu_page_t *page, int x, int y, int w, int h, const ImageInfo *image_info ) {
ddjvu_format_t
*format;
ddjvu_page_type_t
type;
Image
*image;
int
ret,
stride;
unsigned char
*q;
ddjvu_rect_t rect;
rect.x = x;
rect.y = y;
rect.w = (unsigned int) w; /* /10 */
rect.h = (unsigned int) h; /* /10 */
image = lc->image;
type = ddjvu_page_get_type(lc->page);
/* stride of this temporary buffer: */
stride = (type == DDJVU_PAGETYPE_BITONAL)?
(image->columns + 7)/8 : image->columns *3;
q = (unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->rows,stride);
if (q == (unsigned char *) NULL)
return;
format = ddjvu_format_create(
(type == DDJVU_PAGETYPE_BITONAL)?DDJVU_FORMAT_LSBTOMSB : DDJVU_FORMAT_RGB24,
/* DDJVU_FORMAT_RGB24
* DDJVU_FORMAT_RGBMASK32*/
/* DDJVU_FORMAT_RGBMASK32 */
0, NULL);
#if 0
/* fixme: ThrowReaderException is a macro, which uses `exception' variable */
if (format == NULL)
{
abort();
/* ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed"); */
}
#endif
ddjvu_format_set_row_order(format, 1);
ddjvu_format_set_y_direction(format, 1);
ret = ddjvu_page_render(page,
DDJVU_RENDER_COLOR, /* ddjvu_render_mode_t */
&rect,
&rect, /* mmc: ?? */
format,
stride, /* ?? */
(char*)q);
(void) ret;
ddjvu_format_release(format);
if (type == DDJVU_PAGETYPE_BITONAL) {
/* */
#if DEBUG
printf("%s: expanding BITONAL page/image\n", __FUNCTION__);
#endif
register IndexPacket *indexes;
size_t bit, byte;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
PixelPacket * o = QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (o == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
bit=0;
byte=0;
/* fixme: the non-aligned, last =<7 bits ! that's ok!!!*/
for (x= 0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (bit == 0) byte= (size_t) q[(y * stride) + (x / 8)];
if (indexes != (IndexPacket *) NULL)
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,(IndexPacket) (((byte & 0x01) != 0) ? 0x00 : 0x01));
bit++;
if (bit == 8)
bit=0;
byte>>=1;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,&image->exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (!image->ping)
SyncImage(image);
} else {
#if DEBUG
printf("%s: expanding PHOTO page/image\n", __FUNCTION__);
#endif
/* now transfer line-wise: */
ssize_t i;
#if 0
/* old: */
char* r;
#else
register PixelPacket *r;
unsigned char *s;
#endif
s=q;
for (i = 0;i< (ssize_t) image->rows; i++)
{
#if DEBUG
if (i % 1000 == 0) printf("%d\n",i);
#endif
r = QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,i,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (r == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(r,ScaleCharToQuantum(*s++));
SetPixelGreen(r,ScaleCharToQuantum(*s++));
SetPixelBlue(r,ScaleCharToQuantum(*s++));
r++;
}
(void) SyncAuthenticPixels(image,&image->exception);
}
}
q=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(q);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: | Medium | 168,559 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void __skb_complete_tx_timestamp(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct sock *sk,
int tstype)
{
struct sock_exterr_skb *serr;
int err;
serr = SKB_EXT_ERR(skb);
memset(serr, 0, sizeof(*serr));
serr->ee.ee_errno = ENOMSG;
serr->ee.ee_origin = SO_EE_ORIGIN_TIMESTAMPING;
serr->ee.ee_info = tstype;
if (sk->sk_tsflags & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_ID) {
serr->ee.ee_data = skb_shinfo(skb)->tskey;
if (sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_TCP &&
sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM)
serr->ee.ee_data -= sk->sk_tskey;
}
err = sock_queue_err_skb(sk, skb);
if (err)
kfree_skb(skb);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Info
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The TCP stack in the Linux kernel through 4.10.6 mishandles the SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS feature, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from the kernel's internal socket data structures or cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via crafted system calls, related to net/core/skbuff.c and net/socket.c.
Commit Message: tcp: mark skbs with SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS
SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS can be enabled and disabled
while packets are collected on the error queue.
So, checking SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS in sk->sk_tsflags
is not enough to safely assume that the skb contains
OPT_STATS data.
Add a bit in sock_exterr_skb to indicate whether the
skb contains opt_stats data.
Fixes: 1c885808e456 ("tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING")
Reported-by: JongHwan Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 170,071 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void PlatformSensorProviderAndroid::CreateAbsoluteOrientationQuaternionSensor(
JNIEnv* env,
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping mapping,
const CreateSensorCallback& callback) {
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jobject> sensor = Java_PlatformSensorProvider_createSensor(
env, j_object_,
static_cast<jint>(mojom::SensorType::ABSOLUTE_ORIENTATION_QUATERNION));
if (sensor.obj()) {
auto concrete_sensor = base::MakeRefCounted<PlatformSensorAndroid>(
mojom::SensorType::ABSOLUTE_ORIENTATION_QUATERNION, std::move(mapping),
this, sensor);
callback.Run(concrete_sensor);
} else {
auto sensor_fusion_algorithm =
std::make_unique<OrientationQuaternionFusionAlgorithmUsingEulerAngles>(
true /* absolute */);
PlatformSensorFusion::Create(std::move(mapping), this,
std::move(sensor_fusion_algorithm), callback);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: Lack of special casing of Android ashmem in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to bypass inter-process read only guarantees via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607} | Medium | 172,835 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static ssize_t o2nm_node_num_store(struct config_item *item, const char *page,
size_t count)
{
struct o2nm_node *node = to_o2nm_node(item);
struct o2nm_cluster *cluster = to_o2nm_cluster_from_node(node);
unsigned long tmp;
char *p = (char *)page;
int ret = 0;
tmp = simple_strtoul(p, &p, 0);
if (!p || (*p && (*p != '\n')))
return -EINVAL;
if (tmp >= O2NM_MAX_NODES)
return -ERANGE;
/* once we're in the cl_nodes tree networking can look us up by
* node number and try to use our address and port attributes
* to connect to this node.. make sure that they've been set
* before writing the node attribute? */
if (!test_bit(O2NM_NODE_ATTR_ADDRESS, &node->nd_set_attributes) ||
!test_bit(O2NM_NODE_ATTR_PORT, &node->nd_set_attributes))
return -EINVAL; /* XXX */
write_lock(&cluster->cl_nodes_lock);
if (cluster->cl_nodes[tmp])
ret = -EEXIST;
else if (test_and_set_bit(O2NM_NODE_ATTR_NUM,
&node->nd_set_attributes))
ret = -EBUSY;
else {
cluster->cl_nodes[tmp] = node;
node->nd_num = tmp;
set_bit(tmp, cluster->cl_nodes_bitmap);
}
write_unlock(&cluster->cl_nodes_lock);
if (ret)
return ret;
return count;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: In fs/ocfs2/cluster/nodemanager.c in the Linux kernel before 4.15, local users can cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and BUG) because a required mutex is not used.
Commit Message: ocfs2: subsystem.su_mutex is required while accessing the item->ci_parent
The subsystem.su_mutex is required while accessing the item->ci_parent,
otherwise, NULL pointer dereference to the item->ci_parent will be
triggered in the following situation:
add node delete node
sys_write
vfs_write
configfs_write_file
o2nm_node_store
o2nm_node_local_write
do_rmdir
vfs_rmdir
configfs_rmdir
mutex_lock(&subsys->su_mutex);
unlink_obj
item->ci_group = NULL;
item->ci_parent = NULL;
to_o2nm_cluster_from_node
node->nd_item.ci_parent->ci_parent
BUG since of NULL pointer dereference to nd_item.ci_parent
Moreover, the o2nm_cluster also should be protected by the
subsystem.su_mutex.
[[email protected]: v2]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <[email protected]>
Cc: Joel Becker <[email protected]>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Low | 169,407 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int rtmp_packet_read_one_chunk(URLContext *h, RTMPPacket *p,
int chunk_size, RTMPPacket **prev_pkt_ptr,
int *nb_prev_pkt, uint8_t hdr)
{
uint8_t buf[16];
int channel_id, timestamp, size;
uint32_t ts_field; // non-extended timestamp or delta field
uint32_t extra = 0;
enum RTMPPacketType type;
int written = 0;
int ret, toread;
RTMPPacket *prev_pkt;
written++;
channel_id = hdr & 0x3F;
if (channel_id < 2) { //special case for channel number >= 64
buf[1] = 0;
if (ffurl_read_complete(h, buf, channel_id + 1) != channel_id + 1)
return AVERROR(EIO);
written += channel_id + 1;
channel_id = AV_RL16(buf) + 64;
}
if ((ret = ff_rtmp_check_alloc_array(prev_pkt_ptr, nb_prev_pkt,
channel_id)) < 0)
return ret;
prev_pkt = *prev_pkt_ptr;
size = prev_pkt[channel_id].size;
type = prev_pkt[channel_id].type;
extra = prev_pkt[channel_id].extra;
hdr >>= 6; // header size indicator
if (hdr == RTMP_PS_ONEBYTE) {
ts_field = prev_pkt[channel_id].ts_field;
} else {
if (ffurl_read_complete(h, buf, 3) != 3)
return AVERROR(EIO);
written += 3;
ts_field = AV_RB24(buf);
if (hdr != RTMP_PS_FOURBYTES) {
if (ffurl_read_complete(h, buf, 3) != 3)
return AVERROR(EIO);
written += 3;
size = AV_RB24(buf);
if (ffurl_read_complete(h, buf, 1) != 1)
return AVERROR(EIO);
written++;
type = buf[0];
if (hdr == RTMP_PS_TWELVEBYTES) {
if (ffurl_read_complete(h, buf, 4) != 4)
return AVERROR(EIO);
written += 4;
extra = AV_RL32(buf);
}
}
}
if (ts_field == 0xFFFFFF) {
if (ffurl_read_complete(h, buf, 4) != 4)
return AVERROR(EIO);
timestamp = AV_RB32(buf);
} else {
timestamp = ts_field;
}
if (hdr != RTMP_PS_TWELVEBYTES)
timestamp += prev_pkt[channel_id].timestamp;
if (!prev_pkt[channel_id].read) {
if ((ret = ff_rtmp_packet_create(p, channel_id, type, timestamp,
size)) < 0)
return ret;
p->read = written;
p->offset = 0;
prev_pkt[channel_id].ts_field = ts_field;
prev_pkt[channel_id].timestamp = timestamp;
} else {
RTMPPacket *prev = &prev_pkt[channel_id];
p->data = prev->data;
p->size = prev->size;
p->channel_id = prev->channel_id;
p->type = prev->type;
p->ts_field = prev->ts_field;
p->extra = prev->extra;
p->offset = prev->offset;
p->read = prev->read + written;
p->timestamp = prev->timestamp;
prev->data = NULL;
}
p->extra = extra;
prev_pkt[channel_id].channel_id = channel_id;
prev_pkt[channel_id].type = type;
prev_pkt[channel_id].size = size;
prev_pkt[channel_id].extra = extra;
size = size - p->offset;
toread = FFMIN(size, chunk_size);
if (ffurl_read_complete(h, p->data + p->offset, toread) != toread) {
ff_rtmp_packet_destroy(p);
return AVERROR(EIO);
}
size -= toread;
p->read += toread;
p->offset += toread;
if (size > 0) {
RTMPPacket *prev = &prev_pkt[channel_id];
prev->data = p->data;
prev->read = p->read;
prev->offset = p->offset;
p->data = NULL;
return AVERROR(EAGAIN);
}
prev_pkt[channel_id].read = 0; // read complete; reset if needed
return p->read;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in libavformat/rtmppkt.c in FFmpeg before 2.8.10, 3.0.x before 3.0.5, 3.1.x before 3.1.6, and 3.2.x before 3.2.2 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by leveraging failure to check for RTMP packet size mismatches.
Commit Message: avformat/rtmppkt: Check for packet size mismatches
Fixes out of array access
Found-by: Paul Cher <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Paul Cher <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | High | 168,495 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int kvm_set_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
{
bool pr = false;
u32 msr = msr_info->index;
u64 data = msr_info->data;
switch (msr) {
case MSR_AMD64_NB_CFG:
case MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV:
case MSR_IA32_UCODE_WRITE:
case MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA:
case MSR_AMD64_PATCH_LOADER:
case MSR_AMD64_BU_CFG2:
break;
case MSR_EFER:
return set_efer(vcpu, data);
case MSR_K7_HWCR:
data &= ~(u64)0x40; /* ignore flush filter disable */
data &= ~(u64)0x100; /* ignore ignne emulation enable */
data &= ~(u64)0x8; /* ignore TLB cache disable */
if (data != 0) {
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "unimplemented HWCR wrmsr: 0x%llx\n",
data);
return 1;
}
break;
case MSR_FAM10H_MMIO_CONF_BASE:
if (data != 0) {
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "unimplemented MMIO_CONF_BASE wrmsr: "
"0x%llx\n", data);
return 1;
}
break;
case MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR:
if (!data) {
/* We support the non-activated case already */
break;
} else if (data & ~(DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR | DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF)) {
/* Values other than LBR and BTF are vendor-specific,
thus reserved and should throw a #GP */
return 1;
}
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "%s: MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR 0x%llx, nop\n",
__func__, data);
break;
case 0x200 ... 0x2ff:
return set_msr_mtrr(vcpu, msr, data);
case MSR_IA32_APICBASE:
kvm_set_apic_base(vcpu, data);
break;
case APIC_BASE_MSR ... APIC_BASE_MSR + 0x3ff:
return kvm_x2apic_msr_write(vcpu, msr, data);
case MSR_IA32_TSCDEADLINE:
kvm_set_lapic_tscdeadline_msr(vcpu, data);
break;
case MSR_IA32_TSC_ADJUST:
if (guest_cpuid_has_tsc_adjust(vcpu)) {
if (!msr_info->host_initiated) {
u64 adj = data - vcpu->arch.ia32_tsc_adjust_msr;
kvm_x86_ops->adjust_tsc_offset(vcpu, adj, true);
}
vcpu->arch.ia32_tsc_adjust_msr = data;
}
break;
case MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE:
vcpu->arch.ia32_misc_enable_msr = data;
break;
case MSR_KVM_WALL_CLOCK_NEW:
case MSR_KVM_WALL_CLOCK:
vcpu->kvm->arch.wall_clock = data;
kvm_write_wall_clock(vcpu->kvm, data);
break;
case MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME_NEW:
case MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME: {
kvmclock_reset(vcpu);
vcpu->arch.time = data;
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_CLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu);
/* we verify if the enable bit is set... */
if (!(data & 1))
break;
/* ...but clean it before doing the actual write */
vcpu->arch.time_offset = data & ~(PAGE_MASK | 1);
vcpu->arch.time_page =
gfn_to_page(vcpu->kvm, data >> PAGE_SHIFT);
if (is_error_page(vcpu->arch.time_page))
vcpu->arch.time_page = NULL;
break;
}
case MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_EN:
if (kvm_pv_enable_async_pf(vcpu, data))
return 1;
break;
case MSR_KVM_STEAL_TIME:
if (unlikely(!sched_info_on()))
return 1;
if (data & KVM_STEAL_RESERVED_MASK)
return 1;
if (kvm_gfn_to_hva_cache_init(vcpu->kvm, &vcpu->arch.st.stime,
data & KVM_STEAL_VALID_BITS))
return 1;
vcpu->arch.st.msr_val = data;
if (!(data & KVM_MSR_ENABLED))
break;
vcpu->arch.st.last_steal = current->sched_info.run_delay;
preempt_disable();
accumulate_steal_time(vcpu);
preempt_enable();
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_STEAL_UPDATE, vcpu);
break;
case MSR_KVM_PV_EOI_EN:
if (kvm_lapic_enable_pv_eoi(vcpu, data))
return 1;
break;
case MSR_IA32_MCG_CTL:
case MSR_IA32_MCG_STATUS:
case MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL ... MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL + 4 * KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS - 1:
return set_msr_mce(vcpu, msr, data);
/* Performance counters are not protected by a CPUID bit,
* so we should check all of them in the generic path for the sake of
* cross vendor migration.
* Writing a zero into the event select MSRs disables them,
* which we perfectly emulate ;-). Any other value should be at least
* reported, some guests depend on them.
*/
case MSR_K7_EVNTSEL0:
case MSR_K7_EVNTSEL1:
case MSR_K7_EVNTSEL2:
case MSR_K7_EVNTSEL3:
if (data != 0)
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "unimplemented perfctr wrmsr: "
"0x%x data 0x%llx\n", msr, data);
break;
/* at least RHEL 4 unconditionally writes to the perfctr registers,
* so we ignore writes to make it happy.
*/
case MSR_K7_PERFCTR0:
case MSR_K7_PERFCTR1:
case MSR_K7_PERFCTR2:
case MSR_K7_PERFCTR3:
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "unimplemented perfctr wrmsr: "
"0x%x data 0x%llx\n", msr, data);
break;
case MSR_P6_PERFCTR0:
case MSR_P6_PERFCTR1:
pr = true;
case MSR_P6_EVNTSEL0:
case MSR_P6_EVNTSEL1:
if (kvm_pmu_msr(vcpu, msr))
return kvm_pmu_set_msr(vcpu, msr, data);
if (pr || data != 0)
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "disabled perfctr wrmsr: "
"0x%x data 0x%llx\n", msr, data);
break;
case MSR_K7_CLK_CTL:
/*
* Ignore all writes to this no longer documented MSR.
* Writes are only relevant for old K7 processors,
* all pre-dating SVM, but a recommended workaround from
* AMD for these chips. It is possible to specify the
* affected processor models on the command line, hence
* the need to ignore the workaround.
*/
break;
case HV_X64_MSR_GUEST_OS_ID ... HV_X64_MSR_SINT15:
if (kvm_hv_msr_partition_wide(msr)) {
int r;
mutex_lock(&vcpu->kvm->lock);
r = set_msr_hyperv_pw(vcpu, msr, data);
mutex_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->lock);
return r;
} else
return set_msr_hyperv(vcpu, msr, data);
break;
case MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL3:
/* Drop writes to this legacy MSR -- see rdmsr
* counterpart for further detail.
*/
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "ignored wrmsr: 0x%x data %llx\n", msr, data);
break;
case MSR_AMD64_OSVW_ID_LENGTH:
if (!guest_cpuid_has_osvw(vcpu))
return 1;
vcpu->arch.osvw.length = data;
break;
case MSR_AMD64_OSVW_STATUS:
if (!guest_cpuid_has_osvw(vcpu))
return 1;
vcpu->arch.osvw.status = data;
break;
default:
if (msr && (msr == vcpu->kvm->arch.xen_hvm_config.msr))
return xen_hvm_config(vcpu, data);
if (kvm_pmu_msr(vcpu, msr))
return kvm_pmu_set_msr(vcpu, msr, data);
if (!ignore_msrs) {
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "unhandled wrmsr: 0x%x data %llx\n",
msr, data);
return 1;
} else {
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "ignored wrmsr: 0x%x data %llx\n",
msr, data);
break;
}
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The kvm_set_msr_common function in arch/x86/kvm/x86.c in the Linux kernel through 3.8.4 does not ensure a required time_page alignment during an MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME operation, which allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (buffer overflow and host OS memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted application.
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix for buffer overflow in handling of MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME (CVE-2013-1796)
If the guest sets the GPA of the time_page so that the request to update the
time straddles a page then KVM will write onto an incorrect page. The
write is done byusing kmap atomic to get a pointer to the page for the time
structure and then performing a memcpy to that page starting at an offset
that the guest controls. Well behaved guests always provide a 32-byte aligned
address, however a malicious guest could use this to corrupt host kernel
memory.
Tested: Tested against kvmclock unit test.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,120 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void build_l4proto_icmp(const struct nf_conntrack *ct, struct nethdr *n)
{
ct_build_u8(ct, ATTR_ICMP_TYPE, n, NTA_ICMP_TYPE);
ct_build_u8(ct, ATTR_ICMP_CODE, n, NTA_ICMP_CODE);
ct_build_u16(ct, ATTR_ICMP_ID, n, NTA_ICMP_ID);
ct_build_group(ct, ATTR_GRP_ORIG_PORT, n, NTA_PORT,
sizeof(struct nfct_attr_grp_port));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-17
Summary: conntrackd in conntrack-tools 1.4.2 and earlier does not ensure that the optional kernel modules are loaded before using them, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via a (1) DCCP, (2) SCTP, or (3) ICMPv6 packet.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,630 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void FragmentPaintPropertyTreeBuilder::UpdateEffect() {
DCHECK(properties_);
const ComputedStyle& style = object_.StyleRef();
if (NeedsPaintPropertyUpdate()) {
const auto* output_clip =
object_.IsSVGChild() ? context_.current.clip : nullptr;
if (NeedsEffect(object_)) {
base::Optional<IntRect> mask_clip = CSSMaskPainter::MaskBoundingBox(
object_, context_.current.paint_offset);
bool has_clip_path =
style.ClipPath() && fragment_data_.ClipPathBoundingBox();
bool has_spv1_composited_clip_path =
has_clip_path && object_.HasLayer() &&
ToLayoutBoxModelObject(object_).Layer()->GetCompositedLayerMapping();
bool has_mask_based_clip_path =
has_clip_path && !fragment_data_.ClipPathPath();
base::Optional<IntRect> clip_path_clip;
if (has_spv1_composited_clip_path || has_mask_based_clip_path) {
clip_path_clip = fragment_data_.ClipPathBoundingBox();
}
if ((mask_clip || clip_path_clip) &&
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SlimmingPaintV175Enabled()) {
IntRect combined_clip = mask_clip ? *mask_clip : *clip_path_clip;
if (mask_clip && clip_path_clip)
combined_clip.Intersect(*clip_path_clip);
OnUpdateClip(properties_->UpdateMaskClip(
context_.current.clip,
ClipPaintPropertyNode::State{context_.current.transform,
FloatRoundedRect(combined_clip)}));
output_clip = properties_->MaskClip();
} else {
OnClearClip(properties_->ClearMaskClip());
}
EffectPaintPropertyNode::State state;
state.local_transform_space = context_.current.transform;
state.output_clip = output_clip;
state.opacity = style.Opacity();
if (object_.IsBlendingAllowed()) {
state.blend_mode = WebCoreCompositeToSkiaComposite(
kCompositeSourceOver, style.GetBlendMode());
}
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SlimmingPaintV2Enabled() ||
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::BlinkGenPropertyTreesEnabled()) {
if (CompositingReasonFinder::RequiresCompositingForOpacityAnimation(
style)) {
state.direct_compositing_reasons =
CompositingReason::kActiveOpacityAnimation;
}
state.compositor_element_id = CompositorElementIdFromUniqueObjectId(
object_.UniqueId(), CompositorElementIdNamespace::kPrimary);
}
OnUpdate(
properties_->UpdateEffect(context_.current_effect, std::move(state)));
if (mask_clip || has_spv1_composited_clip_path) {
EffectPaintPropertyNode::State mask_state;
mask_state.local_transform_space = context_.current.transform;
mask_state.output_clip = output_clip;
mask_state.color_filter = CSSMaskPainter::MaskColorFilter(object_);
mask_state.blend_mode = SkBlendMode::kDstIn;
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SlimmingPaintV2Enabled() ||
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::BlinkGenPropertyTreesEnabled()) {
mask_state.compositor_element_id =
CompositorElementIdFromUniqueObjectId(
object_.UniqueId(),
CompositorElementIdNamespace::kEffectMask);
}
OnUpdate(properties_->UpdateMask(properties_->Effect(),
std::move(mask_state)));
} else {
OnClear(properties_->ClearMask());
}
if (has_mask_based_clip_path) {
const EffectPaintPropertyNode* parent = has_spv1_composited_clip_path
? properties_->Mask()
: properties_->Effect();
EffectPaintPropertyNode::State clip_path_state;
clip_path_state.local_transform_space = context_.current.transform;
clip_path_state.output_clip = output_clip;
clip_path_state.blend_mode = SkBlendMode::kDstIn;
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SlimmingPaintV2Enabled() ||
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::BlinkGenPropertyTreesEnabled()) {
clip_path_state.compositor_element_id =
CompositorElementIdFromUniqueObjectId(
object_.UniqueId(),
CompositorElementIdNamespace::kEffectClipPath);
}
OnUpdate(
properties_->UpdateClipPath(parent, std::move(clip_path_state)));
} else {
OnClear(properties_->ClearClipPath());
}
} else {
OnClear(properties_->ClearEffect());
OnClear(properties_->ClearMask());
OnClear(properties_->ClearClipPath());
OnClearClip(properties_->ClearMaskClip());
}
}
if (properties_->Effect()) {
context_.current_effect = properties_->Effect();
if (properties_->MaskClip()) {
context_.current.clip = context_.absolute_position.clip =
context_.fixed_position.clip = properties_->MaskClip();
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <[email protected]>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> [email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930} | High | 171,795 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int check_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
int off, int size)
{
bool strict = env->strict_alignment;
const char *pointer_desc = "";
switch (reg->type) {
case PTR_TO_PACKET:
case PTR_TO_PACKET_META:
/* Special case, because of NET_IP_ALIGN. Given metadata sits
* right in front, treat it the very same way.
*/
return check_pkt_ptr_alignment(env, reg, off, size, strict);
case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
pointer_desc = "value ";
break;
case PTR_TO_CTX:
pointer_desc = "context ";
break;
case PTR_TO_STACK:
pointer_desc = "stack ";
break;
default:
break;
}
return check_generic_ptr_alignment(env, reg, pointer_desc, off, size,
strict);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: kernel/bpf/verifier.c in the Linux kernel through 4.14.8 allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging the lack of stack-pointer alignment enforcement.
Commit Message: bpf: force strict alignment checks for stack pointers
Force strict alignment checks for stack pointers because the tracking of
stack spills relies on it; unaligned stack accesses can lead to corruption
of spilled registers, which is exploitable.
Fixes: f1174f77b50c ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> | High | 167,641 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: process_chpw_request(krb5_context context, void *server_handle, char *realm,
krb5_keytab keytab, const krb5_fulladdr *local_faddr,
const krb5_fulladdr *remote_faddr, krb5_data *req,
krb5_data *rep)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
char *ptr;
unsigned int plen, vno;
krb5_data ap_req, ap_rep = empty_data();
krb5_data cipher = empty_data(), clear = empty_data();
krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL;
krb5_principal changepw = NULL;
krb5_principal client, target = NULL;
krb5_ticket *ticket = NULL;
krb5_replay_data replay;
krb5_error krberror;
int numresult;
char strresult[1024];
char *clientstr = NULL, *targetstr = NULL;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
size_t clen;
char *cdots;
struct sockaddr_storage ss;
socklen_t salen;
char addrbuf[100];
krb5_address *addr = remote_faddr->address;
*rep = empty_data();
if (req->length < 4) {
/* either this, or the server is printing bad messages,
or the caller passed in garbage */
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_MALFORMED;
strlcpy(strresult, "Request was truncated", sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
ptr = req->data;
/* verify length */
plen = (*ptr++ & 0xff);
plen = (plen<<8) | (*ptr++ & 0xff);
if (plen != req->length) {
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_MALFORMED;
strlcpy(strresult, "Request length was inconsistent",
sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
/* verify version number */
vno = (*ptr++ & 0xff) ;
vno = (vno<<8) | (*ptr++ & 0xff);
if (vno != 1 && vno != RFC3244_VERSION) {
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BAD_PVNO;
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_BAD_VERSION;
snprintf(strresult, sizeof(strresult),
"Request contained unknown protocol version number %d", vno);
goto chpwfail;
}
/* read, check ap-req length */
ap_req.length = (*ptr++ & 0xff);
ap_req.length = (ap_req.length<<8) | (*ptr++ & 0xff);
if (ptr + ap_req.length >= req->data + req->length) {
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_MALFORMED;
strlcpy(strresult, "Request was truncated in AP-REQ",
sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
/* verify ap_req */
ap_req.data = ptr;
ptr += ap_req.length;
ret = krb5_auth_con_init(context, &auth_context);
if (ret) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR;
strlcpy(strresult, "Failed initializing auth context",
sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
ret = krb5_auth_con_setflags(context, auth_context,
KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_SEQUENCE);
if (ret) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR;
strlcpy(strresult, "Failed initializing auth context",
sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
ret = krb5_build_principal(context, &changepw, strlen(realm), realm,
"kadmin", "changepw", NULL);
if (ret) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR;
strlcpy(strresult, "Failed building kadmin/changepw principal",
sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
ret = krb5_rd_req(context, &auth_context, &ap_req, changepw, keytab,
NULL, &ticket);
if (ret) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_AUTHERROR;
strlcpy(strresult, "Failed reading application request",
sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
/* construct the ap-rep */
ret = krb5_mk_rep(context, auth_context, &ap_rep);
if (ret) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_AUTHERROR;
strlcpy(strresult, "Failed replying to application request",
sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
/* decrypt the ChangePasswdData */
cipher.length = (req->data + req->length) - ptr;
cipher.data = ptr;
/*
* Don't set a remote address in auth_context before calling krb5_rd_priv,
* so that we can work against clients behind a NAT. Reflection attacks
* aren't a concern since we use sequence numbers and since our requests
* don't look anything like our responses. Also don't set a local address,
* since we don't know what interface the request was received on.
*/
ret = krb5_rd_priv(context, auth_context, &cipher, &clear, &replay);
if (ret) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR;
strlcpy(strresult, "Failed decrypting request", sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
client = ticket->enc_part2->client;
/* decode ChangePasswdData for setpw requests */
if (vno == RFC3244_VERSION) {
krb5_data *clear_data;
ret = decode_krb5_setpw_req(&clear, &clear_data, &target);
if (ret != 0) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_MALFORMED;
strlcpy(strresult, "Failed decoding ChangePasswdData",
sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
zapfree(clear.data, clear.length);
clear = *clear_data;
free(clear_data);
if (target != NULL) {
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, target, &targetstr);
if (ret != 0) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR;
strlcpy(strresult, "Failed unparsing target name for log",
sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
}
}
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, client, &clientstr);
if (ret) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR;
strlcpy(strresult, "Failed unparsing client name for log",
sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
/* for cpw, verify that this is an AS_REQ ticket */
if (vno == 1 &&
(ticket->enc_part2->flags & TKT_FLG_INITIAL) == 0) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_INITIAL_FLAG_NEEDED;
strlcpy(strresult, "Ticket must be derived from a password",
sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
/* change the password */
ptr = k5memdup0(clear.data, clear.length, &ret);
ret = schpw_util_wrapper(server_handle, client, target,
(ticket->enc_part2->flags & TKT_FLG_INITIAL) != 0,
ptr, NULL, strresult, sizeof(strresult));
if (ret)
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
/* zap the password */
zapfree(clear.data, clear.length);
zapfree(ptr, clear.length);
clear = empty_data();
clen = strlen(clientstr);
trunc_name(&clen, &cdots);
switch (addr->addrtype) {
case ADDRTYPE_INET: {
struct sockaddr_in *sin = ss2sin(&ss);
sin->sin_family = AF_INET;
memcpy(&sin->sin_addr, addr->contents, addr->length);
sin->sin_port = htons(remote_faddr->port);
salen = sizeof(*sin);
break;
}
case ADDRTYPE_INET6: {
struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6 = ss2sin6(&ss);
sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6;
memcpy(&sin6->sin6_addr, addr->contents, addr->length);
sin6->sin6_port = htons(remote_faddr->port);
salen = sizeof(*sin6);
break;
}
default: {
struct sockaddr *sa = ss2sa(&ss);
sa->sa_family = AF_UNSPEC;
salen = sizeof(*sa);
break;
}
}
if (getnameinfo(ss2sa(&ss), salen,
addrbuf, sizeof(addrbuf), NULL, 0,
NI_NUMERICHOST | NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0)
strlcpy(addrbuf, "<unprintable>", sizeof(addrbuf));
if (vno == RFC3244_VERSION) {
size_t tlen;
char *tdots;
const char *targetp;
if (target == NULL) {
tlen = clen;
tdots = cdots;
targetp = targetstr;
} else {
tlen = strlen(targetstr);
trunc_name(&tlen, &tdots);
targetp = clientstr;
}
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_NOTICE, _("setpw request from %s by %.*s%s for "
"%.*s%s: %s"), addrbuf, (int) clen,
clientstr, cdots, (int) tlen, targetp, tdots,
errmsg ? errmsg : "success");
} else {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_NOTICE, _("chpw request from %s for %.*s%s: %s"),
addrbuf, (int) clen, clientstr, cdots,
errmsg ? errmsg : "success");
}
switch (ret) {
case KADM5_AUTH_CHANGEPW:
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_ACCESSDENIED;
break;
case KADM5_PASS_Q_TOOSHORT:
case KADM5_PASS_REUSE:
case KADM5_PASS_Q_CLASS:
case KADM5_PASS_Q_DICT:
case KADM5_PASS_Q_GENERIC:
case KADM5_PASS_TOOSOON:
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_SOFTERROR;
break;
case 0:
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_SUCCESS;
strlcpy(strresult, "", sizeof(strresult));
break;
default:
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR;
break;
}
chpwfail:
clear.length = 2 + strlen(strresult);
clear.data = (char *) malloc(clear.length);
ptr = clear.data;
*ptr++ = (numresult>>8) & 0xff;
*ptr++ = numresult & 0xff;
memcpy(ptr, strresult, strlen(strresult));
cipher = empty_data();
if (ap_rep.length) {
ret = krb5_auth_con_setaddrs(context, auth_context,
local_faddr->address, NULL);
if (ret) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR;
strlcpy(strresult,
"Failed storing client and server internet addresses",
sizeof(strresult));
} else {
ret = krb5_mk_priv(context, auth_context, &clear, &cipher,
&replay);
if (ret) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR;
strlcpy(strresult, "Failed encrypting reply",
sizeof(strresult));
}
}
}
/* if no KRB-PRIV was constructed, then we need a KRB-ERROR.
if this fails, just bail. there's nothing else we can do. */
if (cipher.length == 0) {
/* clear out ap_rep now, so that it won't be inserted in the
reply */
if (ap_rep.length) {
free(ap_rep.data);
ap_rep = empty_data();
}
krberror.ctime = 0;
krberror.cusec = 0;
krberror.susec = 0;
ret = krb5_timeofday(context, &krberror.stime);
if (ret)
goto bailout;
/* this is really icky. but it's what all the other callers
to mk_error do. */
krberror.error = ret;
krberror.error -= ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
if (krberror.error < 0 || krberror.error > 128)
krberror.error = KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
krberror.client = NULL;
ret = krb5_build_principal(context, &krberror.server,
strlen(realm), realm,
"kadmin", "changepw", NULL);
if (ret)
goto bailout;
krberror.text.length = 0;
krberror.e_data = clear;
ret = krb5_mk_error(context, &krberror, &cipher);
krb5_free_principal(context, krberror.server);
if (ret)
goto bailout;
}
/* construct the reply */
ret = alloc_data(rep, 6 + ap_rep.length + cipher.length);
if (ret)
goto bailout;
ptr = rep->data;
/* length */
*ptr++ = (rep->length>>8) & 0xff;
*ptr++ = rep->length & 0xff;
/* version == 0x0001 big-endian */
*ptr++ = 0;
*ptr++ = 1;
/* ap_rep length, big-endian */
*ptr++ = (ap_rep.length>>8) & 0xff;
*ptr++ = ap_rep.length & 0xff;
/* ap-rep data */
if (ap_rep.length) {
memcpy(ptr, ap_rep.data, ap_rep.length);
ptr += ap_rep.length;
}
/* krb-priv or krb-error */
memcpy(ptr, cipher.data, cipher.length);
bailout:
krb5_auth_con_free(context, auth_context);
krb5_free_principal(context, changepw);
krb5_free_ticket(context, ticket);
free(ap_rep.data);
free(clear.data);
free(cipher.data);
krb5_free_principal(context, target);
krb5_free_unparsed_name(context, targetstr);
krb5_free_unparsed_name(context, clientstr);
krb5_free_error_message(context, errmsg);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: schpw.c in the kpasswd service in kadmind in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.11.3 does not properly validate UDP packets before sending responses, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU and bandwidth consumption) via a forged packet that triggers a communication loop, as demonstrated by krb_pingpong.nasl, a related issue to CVE-1999-0103.
Commit Message: Fix kpasswd UDP ping-pong [CVE-2002-2443]
The kpasswd service provided by kadmind was vulnerable to a UDP
"ping-pong" attack [CVE-2002-2443]. Don't respond to packets unless
they pass some basic validation, and don't respond to our own error
packets.
Some authors use CVE-1999-0103 to refer to the kpasswd UDP ping-pong
attack or UDP ping-pong attacks in general, but there is discussion
leading toward narrowing the definition of CVE-1999-0103 to the echo,
chargen, or other similar built-in inetd services.
Thanks to Vincent Danen for alerting us to this issue.
CVSSv2: AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P/E:P/RL:O/RC:C
ticket: 7637 (new)
target_version: 1.11.3
tags: pullup | Medium | 166,235 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: pimv2_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *bp, register u_int len, const u_char *bp2)
{
register const u_char *ep;
register const struct pim *pim = (const struct pim *)bp;
int advance;
enum checksum_status cksum_status;
ep = (const u_char *)ndo->ndo_snapend;
if (bp >= ep)
return;
if (ep > bp + len)
ep = bp + len;
ND_TCHECK(pim->pim_rsv);
pimv2_addr_len = pim->pim_rsv;
if (pimv2_addr_len != 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", RFC2117-encoding"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", cksum 0x%04x ", EXTRACT_16BITS(&pim->pim_cksum)));
if (EXTRACT_16BITS(&pim->pim_cksum) == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(unverified)"));
} else {
if (PIM_TYPE(pim->pim_typever) == PIMV2_TYPE_REGISTER) {
/*
* The checksum only covers the packet header,
* not the encapsulated packet.
*/
cksum_status = pimv2_check_checksum(ndo, bp, bp2, 8);
if (cksum_status == INCORRECT) {
/*
* To quote RFC 4601, "For interoperability
* reasons, a message carrying a checksum
* calculated over the entire PIM Register
* message should also be accepted."
*/
cksum_status = pimv2_check_checksum(ndo, bp, bp2, len);
}
} else {
/*
* The checksum covers the entire packet.
*/
cksum_status = pimv2_check_checksum(ndo, bp, bp2, len);
}
switch (cksum_status) {
case CORRECT:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(correct)"));
break;
case INCORRECT:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(incorrect)"));
break;
case UNVERIFIED:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(unverified)"));
break;
}
}
switch (PIM_TYPE(pim->pim_typever)) {
case PIMV2_TYPE_HELLO:
{
uint16_t otype, olen;
bp += 4;
while (bp < ep) {
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 4);
otype = EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[0]);
olen = EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[2]);
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 4 + olen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Option (%u), length %u, Value: ",
tok2str(pimv2_hello_option_values, "Unknown", otype),
otype,
olen));
bp += 4;
switch (otype) {
case PIMV2_HELLO_OPTION_HOLDTIME:
if (olen != 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ERROR: Option Length != 2 Bytes (%u)", olen));
} else {
unsigned_relts_print(ndo, EXTRACT_16BITS(bp));
}
break;
case PIMV2_HELLO_OPTION_LANPRUNEDELAY:
if (olen != 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ERROR: Option Length != 4 Bytes (%u)", olen));
} else {
char t_bit;
uint16_t lan_delay, override_interval;
lan_delay = EXTRACT_16BITS(bp);
override_interval = EXTRACT_16BITS(bp+2);
t_bit = (lan_delay & 0x8000)? 1 : 0;
lan_delay &= ~0x8000;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t T-bit=%d, LAN delay %dms, Override interval %dms",
t_bit, lan_delay, override_interval));
}
break;
case PIMV2_HELLO_OPTION_DR_PRIORITY_OLD:
case PIMV2_HELLO_OPTION_DR_PRIORITY:
switch (olen) {
case 0:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Bi-Directional Capability (Old)"));
break;
case 4:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u", EXTRACT_32BITS(bp)));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ERROR: Option Length != 4 Bytes (%u)", olen));
break;
}
break;
case PIMV2_HELLO_OPTION_GENID:
if (olen != 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ERROR: Option Length != 4 Bytes (%u)", olen));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "0x%08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(bp)));
}
break;
case PIMV2_HELLO_OPTION_REFRESH_CAP:
if (olen != 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ERROR: Option Length != 4 Bytes (%u)", olen));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "v%d", *bp));
if (*(bp+1) != 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", interval "));
unsigned_relts_print(ndo, *(bp+1));
}
if (EXTRACT_16BITS(bp+2) != 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?0x%04x?", EXTRACT_16BITS(bp+2)));
}
}
break;
case PIMV2_HELLO_OPTION_BIDIR_CAP:
break;
case PIMV2_HELLO_OPTION_ADDRESS_LIST_OLD:
case PIMV2_HELLO_OPTION_ADDRESS_LIST:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
const u_char *ptr = bp;
while (ptr < (bp+olen)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t "));
advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, ptr, pimv2_unicast, 0);
if (advance < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
ptr += advance;
}
}
break;
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, bp, "\n\t ", olen);
break;
}
/* do we want to see an additionally hexdump ? */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag> 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, bp, "\n\t ", olen);
bp += olen;
}
break;
}
case PIMV2_TYPE_REGISTER:
{
const struct ip *ip;
ND_TCHECK2(*(bp + 4), PIMV2_REGISTER_FLAG_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Flags [ %s ]\n\t",
tok2str(pimv2_register_flag_values,
"none",
EXTRACT_32BITS(bp+4))));
bp += 8; len -= 8;
/* encapsulated multicast packet */
ip = (const struct ip *)bp;
switch (IP_V(ip)) {
case 0: /* Null header */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "IP-Null-header %s > %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ip->ip_src),
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ip->ip_dst)));
break;
case 4: /* IPv4 */
ip_print(ndo, bp, len);
break;
case 6: /* IPv6 */
ip6_print(ndo, bp, len);
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "IP ver %d", IP_V(ip)));
break;
}
break;
}
case PIMV2_TYPE_REGISTER_STOP:
bp += 4; len -= 4;
if (bp >= ep)
break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " group="));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_group, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance; len -= advance;
if (bp >= ep)
break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " source="));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_unicast, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance; len -= advance;
break;
case PIMV2_TYPE_JOIN_PRUNE:
case PIMV2_TYPE_GRAFT:
case PIMV2_TYPE_GRAFT_ACK:
/*
* 0 1 2 3
* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* |PIM Ver| Type | Addr length | Checksum |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Unicast-Upstream Neighbor Address |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Reserved | Num groups | Holdtime |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Encoded-Multicast Group Address-1 |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Number of Joined Sources | Number of Pruned Sources |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Encoded-Joined Source Address-1 |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | . |
* | . |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Encoded-Joined Source Address-n |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Encoded-Pruned Source Address-1 |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | . |
* | . |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Encoded-Pruned Source Address-n |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | . |
* | . |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Encoded-Multicast Group Address-n |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*/
{
uint8_t ngroup;
uint16_t holdtime;
uint16_t njoin;
uint16_t nprune;
int i, j;
bp += 4; len -= 4;
if (PIM_TYPE(pim->pim_typever) != 7) { /*not for Graft-ACK*/
if (bp >= ep)
break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", upstream-neighbor: "));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_unicast, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance; len -= advance;
}
if (bp + 4 > ep)
break;
ngroup = bp[1];
holdtime = EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[2]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %u group(s)", ngroup));
if (PIM_TYPE(pim->pim_typever) != 7) { /*not for Graft-ACK*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", holdtime: "));
if (holdtime == 0xffff)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "infinite"));
else
unsigned_relts_print(ndo, holdtime);
}
bp += 4; len -= 4;
for (i = 0; i < ngroup; i++) {
if (bp >= ep)
goto jp_done;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t group #%u: ", i+1));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_group, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
goto jp_done;
}
bp += advance; len -= advance;
if (bp + 4 > ep) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
goto jp_done;
}
njoin = EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[0]);
nprune = EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[2]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", joined sources: %u, pruned sources: %u", njoin, nprune));
bp += 4; len -= 4;
for (j = 0; j < njoin; j++) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t joined source #%u: ", j+1));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_source, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
goto jp_done;
}
bp += advance; len -= advance;
}
for (j = 0; j < nprune; j++) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t pruned source #%u: ", j+1));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_source, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
goto jp_done;
}
bp += advance; len -= advance;
}
}
jp_done:
break;
}
case PIMV2_TYPE_BOOTSTRAP:
{
int i, j, frpcnt;
bp += 4;
/* Fragment Tag, Hash Mask len, and BSR-priority */
if (bp + sizeof(uint16_t) >= ep) break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " tag=%x", EXTRACT_16BITS(bp)));
bp += sizeof(uint16_t);
if (bp >= ep) break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " hashmlen=%d", bp[0]));
if (bp + 1 >= ep) break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BSRprio=%d", bp[1]));
bp += 2;
/* Encoded-Unicast-BSR-Address */
if (bp >= ep) break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BSR="));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_unicast, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance;
for (i = 0; bp < ep; i++) {
/* Encoded-Group Address */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (group%d: ", i));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_group, 0))
< 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
goto bs_done;
}
bp += advance;
/* RP-Count, Frag RP-Cnt, and rsvd */
if (bp >= ep) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
goto bs_done;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " RPcnt=%d", bp[0]));
if (bp + 1 >= ep) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
goto bs_done;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " FRPcnt=%d", frpcnt = bp[1]));
bp += 4;
for (j = 0; j < frpcnt && bp < ep; j++) {
/* each RP info */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " RP%d=", j));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp,
pimv2_unicast,
0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
goto bs_done;
}
bp += advance;
if (bp + 1 >= ep) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
goto bs_done;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ",holdtime="));
unsigned_relts_print(ndo, EXTRACT_16BITS(bp));
if (bp + 2 >= ep) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
goto bs_done;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ",prio=%d", bp[2]));
bp += 4;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
}
bs_done:
break;
}
case PIMV2_TYPE_ASSERT:
bp += 4; len -= 4;
if (bp >= ep)
break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " group="));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_group, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance; len -= advance;
if (bp >= ep)
break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " src="));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_unicast, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance; len -= advance;
if (bp + 8 > ep)
break;
if (bp[0] & 0x80)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " RPT"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " pref=%u", EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[0]) & 0x7fffffff));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " metric=%u", EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[4])));
break;
case PIMV2_TYPE_CANDIDATE_RP:
{
int i, pfxcnt;
bp += 4;
/* Prefix-Cnt, Priority, and Holdtime */
if (bp >= ep) break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " prefix-cnt=%d", bp[0]));
pfxcnt = bp[0];
if (bp + 1 >= ep) break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " prio=%d", bp[1]));
if (bp + 3 >= ep) break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " holdtime="));
unsigned_relts_print(ndo, EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[2]));
bp += 4;
/* Encoded-Unicast-RP-Address */
if (bp >= ep) break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " RP="));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_unicast, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance;
/* Encoded-Group Addresses */
for (i = 0; i < pfxcnt && bp < ep; i++) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " Group%d=", i));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_group, 0))
< 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance;
}
break;
}
case PIMV2_TYPE_PRUNE_REFRESH:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " src="));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_unicast, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " grp="));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_group, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " forwarder="));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_unicast, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance;
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " TUNR "));
unsigned_relts_print(ndo, EXTRACT_16BITS(bp));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [type %d]", PIM_TYPE(pim->pim_typever)));
break;
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|pim]"));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The PIM parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-pim.c, several functions.
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13030/PIM: Redo bounds checks and add length checks.
Use ND_TCHECK macros to do bounds checking, and add length checks before
the bounds checks.
Add a bounds check that the review process found was missing.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
Update one test output file to reflect the changes. | High | 167,858 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int msr_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
unsigned int cpu;
struct cpuinfo_x86 *c;
cpu = iminor(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode);
if (cpu >= nr_cpu_ids || !cpu_online(cpu))
return -ENXIO; /* No such CPU */
c = &cpu_data(cpu);
if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_MSR))
return -EIO; /* MSR not supported */
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The msr_open function in arch/x86/kernel/msr.c in the Linux kernel before 3.7.6 allows local users to bypass intended capability restrictions by executing a crafted application as root, as demonstrated by msr32.c.
Commit Message: x86/msr: Add capabilities check
At the moment the MSR driver only relies upon file system
checks. This means that anything as root with any capability set
can write to MSRs. Historically that wasn't very interesting but
on modern processors the MSRs are such that writing to them
provides several ways to execute arbitary code in kernel space.
Sample code and documentation on doing this is circulating and
MSR attacks are used on Windows 64bit rootkits already.
In the Linux case you still need to be able to open the device
file so the impact is fairly limited and reduces the security of
some capability and security model based systems down towards
that of a generic "root owns the box" setup.
Therefore they should require CAP_SYS_RAWIO to prevent an
elevation of capabilities. The impact of this is fairly minimal
on most setups because they don't have heavy use of
capabilities. Those using SELinux, SMACK or AppArmor rules might
want to consider if their rulesets on the MSR driver could be
tighter.
Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Horses <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,166 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: Metadata* EntrySync::getMetadata(ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
RefPtr<MetadataSyncCallbackHelper> helper = MetadataSyncCallbackHelper::create();
m_fileSystem->getMetadata(this, helper->successCallback(), helper->errorCallback(), DOMFileSystemBase::Synchronous);
return helper->getResult(exceptionState);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The URL loader in Google Chrome before 26.0.1410.43 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Oilpan: Ship Oilpan for SyncCallbackHelper, CreateFileResult and CallbackWrapper in filesystem/
These are leftovers when we shipped Oilpan for filesystem/ once.
BUG=340522
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/501263003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180909 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,421 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_enc_get_supported_key_sizes)
{
int i, count = 0;
int *key_sizes;
MCRYPT_GET_TD_ARG
array_init(return_value);
key_sizes = mcrypt_enc_get_supported_key_sizes(pm->td, &count);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
add_index_long(return_value, i, key_sizes[i]);
}
mcrypt_free(key_sizes);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in mcrypt.c in the mcrypt extension in PHP before 5.5.37, 5.6.x before 5.6.23, and 7.x before 7.0.8 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted length value, related to the (1) mcrypt_generic and (2) mdecrypt_generic functions.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows | High | 167,093 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: swabHorAcc16(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
uint16* wp = (uint16*) cp0;
tmsize_t wc = cc / 2;
TIFFSwabArrayOfShort(wp, wc);
horAcc16(tif, cp0, cc);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: tif_predict.h and tif_predict.c in libtiff 4.0.6 have assertions that can lead to assertion failures in debug mode, or buffer overflows in release mode, when dealing with unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105, aka *Predictor heap-buffer-overflow.*
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predict.h, libtiff/tif_predict.c:
Replace assertions by runtime checks to avoid assertions in debug mode,
or buffer overflows in release mode. Can happen when dealing with
unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105
by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations
team. | High | 166,888 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void addModuleArgument(sqlite3 *db, Table *pTable, char *zArg){
int nBytes = sizeof(char *)*(2+pTable->nModuleArg);
char **azModuleArg;
azModuleArg = sqlite3DbRealloc(db, pTable->azModuleArg, nBytes);
if( azModuleArg==0 ){
sqlite3DbFree(db, zArg);
}else{
int i = pTable->nModuleArg++;
azModuleArg[i] = zArg;
azModuleArg[i+1] = 0;
pTable->azModuleArg = azModuleArg;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in SQLite via WebSQL in Google Chrome prior to 74.0.3729.131 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: sqlite: backport bugfixes for dbfuzz2
Bug: 952406
Change-Id: Icbec429742048d6674828726c96d8e265c41b595
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1568152
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Darwin Huang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#651030} | Medium | 173,014 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Sdb *store_versioninfo_gnu_verdef(ELFOBJ *bin, Elf_(Shdr) *shdr, int sz) {
const char *section_name = "";
const char *link_section_name = "";
char *end = NULL;
Elf_(Shdr) *link_shdr = NULL;
ut8 dfs[sizeof (Elf_(Verdef))] = {0};
Sdb *sdb;
int cnt, i;
if (shdr->sh_link > bin->ehdr.e_shnum) {
return false;
}
link_shdr = &bin->shdr[shdr->sh_link];
if (shdr->sh_size < 1) {
return false;
}
Elf_(Verdef) *defs = calloc (shdr->sh_size, sizeof (char));
if (!defs) {
return false;
}
if (bin->shstrtab && shdr->sh_name < bin->shstrtab_size) {
section_name = &bin->shstrtab[shdr->sh_name];
}
if (link_shdr && bin->shstrtab && link_shdr->sh_name < bin->shstrtab_size) {
link_section_name = &bin->shstrtab[link_shdr->sh_name];
}
if (!defs) {
bprintf ("Warning: Cannot allocate memory (Check Elf_(Verdef))\n");
return NULL;
}
sdb = sdb_new0 ();
end = (char *)defs + shdr->sh_size;
sdb_set (sdb, "section_name", section_name, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "entries", shdr->sh_info, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "addr", shdr->sh_addr, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "offset", shdr->sh_offset, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "link", shdr->sh_link, 0);
sdb_set (sdb, "link_section_name", link_section_name, 0);
for (cnt = 0, i = 0; cnt < shdr->sh_info && ((char *)defs + i < end); ++cnt) {
Sdb *sdb_verdef = sdb_new0 ();
char *vstart = ((char*)defs) + i;
char key[32] = {0};
Elf_(Verdef) *verdef = (Elf_(Verdef)*)vstart;
Elf_(Verdaux) aux = {0};
int j = 0;
int isum = 0;
r_buf_read_at (bin->b, shdr->sh_offset + i, dfs, sizeof (Elf_(Verdef)));
verdef->vd_version = READ16 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_flags = READ16 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_ndx = READ16 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_cnt = READ16 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_hash = READ32 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_aux = READ32 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_next = READ32 (dfs, j)
vstart += verdef->vd_aux;
if (vstart > end || vstart + sizeof (Elf_(Verdaux)) > end) {
sdb_free (sdb_verdef);
goto out_error;
}
j = 0;
aux.vda_name = READ32 (vstart, j)
aux.vda_next = READ32 (vstart, j)
isum = i + verdef->vd_aux;
if (aux.vda_name > bin->dynstr_size) {
sdb_free (sdb_verdef);
goto out_error;
}
sdb_num_set (sdb_verdef, "idx", i, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb_verdef, "vd_version", verdef->vd_version, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb_verdef, "vd_ndx", verdef->vd_ndx, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb_verdef, "vd_cnt", verdef->vd_cnt, 0);
sdb_set (sdb_verdef, "vda_name", &bin->dynstr[aux.vda_name], 0);
sdb_set (sdb_verdef, "flags", get_ver_flags (verdef->vd_flags), 0);
for (j = 1; j < verdef->vd_cnt; ++j) {
int k;
Sdb *sdb_parent = sdb_new0 ();
isum += aux.vda_next;
vstart += aux.vda_next;
if (vstart > end || vstart + sizeof(Elf_(Verdaux)) > end) {
sdb_free (sdb_verdef);
sdb_free (sdb_parent);
goto out_error;
}
k = 0;
aux.vda_name = READ32 (vstart, k)
aux.vda_next = READ32 (vstart, k)
if (aux.vda_name > bin->dynstr_size) {
sdb_free (sdb_verdef);
sdb_free (sdb_parent);
goto out_error;
}
sdb_num_set (sdb_parent, "idx", isum, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb_parent, "parent", j, 0);
sdb_set (sdb_parent, "vda_name", &bin->dynstr[aux.vda_name], 0);
snprintf (key, sizeof (key), "parent%d", j - 1);
sdb_ns_set (sdb_verdef, key, sdb_parent);
}
snprintf (key, sizeof (key), "verdef%d", cnt);
sdb_ns_set (sdb, key, sdb_verdef);
if (!verdef->vd_next) {
sdb_free (sdb_verdef);
goto out_error;
}
i += verdef->vd_next;
}
free (defs);
return sdb;
out_error:
free (defs);
sdb_free (sdb);
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The store_versioninfo_gnu_verdef function in libr/bin/format/elf/elf.c in radare2 2.0.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (r_read_le16 invalid write and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted ELF file.
Commit Message: Fix #8685 - Crash in ELF version parsing | Medium | 167,720 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: main(int argc, char **argv)
{
png_uint_32 opts = FAST_WRITE;
format_list formats;
const char *touch = NULL;
int log_pass = 0;
int redundant = 0;
int stride_extra = 0;
int retval = 0;
int c;
init_sRGB_to_d();
#if 0
init_error_via_linear();
#endif
format_init(&formats);
for (c=1; c<argc; ++c)
{
const char *arg = argv[c];
if (strcmp(arg, "--log") == 0)
log_pass = 1;
else if (strcmp(arg, "--fresh") == 0)
{
memset(gpc_error, 0, sizeof gpc_error);
memset(gpc_error_via_linear, 0, sizeof gpc_error_via_linear);
}
else if (strcmp(arg, "--file") == 0)
# ifdef PNG_STDIO_SUPPORTED
opts |= READ_FILE;
# else
return 77; /* skipped: no support */
# endif
else if (strcmp(arg, "--memory") == 0)
opts &= ~READ_FILE;
else if (strcmp(arg, "--stdio") == 0)
# ifdef PNG_STDIO_SUPPORTED
opts |= USE_STDIO;
# else
return 77; /* skipped: no support */
# endif
else if (strcmp(arg, "--name") == 0)
opts &= ~USE_STDIO;
else if (strcmp(arg, "--verbose") == 0)
opts |= VERBOSE;
else if (strcmp(arg, "--quiet") == 0)
opts &= ~VERBOSE;
else if (strcmp(arg, "--preserve") == 0)
opts |= KEEP_TMPFILES;
else if (strcmp(arg, "--nopreserve") == 0)
opts &= ~KEEP_TMPFILES;
else if (strcmp(arg, "--keep-going") == 0)
opts |= KEEP_GOING;
else if (strcmp(arg, "--fast") == 0)
opts |= FAST_WRITE;
else if (strcmp(arg, "--slow") == 0)
opts &= ~FAST_WRITE;
else if (strcmp(arg, "--accumulate") == 0)
opts |= ACCUMULATE;
else if (strcmp(arg, "--redundant") == 0)
redundant = 1;
else if (strcmp(arg, "--stop") == 0)
opts &= ~KEEP_GOING;
else if (strcmp(arg, "--strict") == 0)
opts |= STRICT;
else if (strcmp(arg, "--sRGB-16bit") == 0)
opts |= sRGB_16BIT;
else if (strcmp(arg, "--linear-16bit") == 0)
opts &= ~sRGB_16BIT;
else if (strcmp(arg, "--tmpfile") == 0)
{
if (c+1 < argc)
{
if (strlen(argv[++c]) >= sizeof tmpf)
{
fflush(stdout);
fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s is too long for a temp file prefix\n",
argv[0], argv[c]);
exit(99);
}
/* Safe: checked above */
strcpy(tmpf, argv[c]);
}
else
{
fflush(stdout);
fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s requires a temporary file prefix\n",
argv[0], arg);
exit(99);
}
}
else if (strcmp(arg, "--touch") == 0)
{
if (c+1 < argc)
touch = argv[++c];
else
{
fflush(stdout);
fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s requires a file name argument\n",
argv[0], arg);
exit(99);
}
}
else if (arg[0] == '+')
{
png_uint_32 format = formatof(arg+1);
if (format > FORMAT_COUNT)
exit(99);
format_set(&formats, format);
}
else if (arg[0] == '-' && arg[1] != 0 && (arg[1] != '0' || arg[2] != 0))
{
fflush(stdout);
fprintf(stderr, "%s: unknown option: %s\n", argv[0], arg);
exit(99);
}
else
{
if (format_is_initial(&formats))
format_default(&formats, redundant);
if (arg[0] == '-')
{
const int term = (arg[1] == '0' ? 0 : '\n');
unsigned int ich = 0;
/* Loop reading files, use a static buffer to simplify this and just
* stop if the name gets to long.
*/
static char buffer[4096];
do
{
int ch = getchar();
/* Don't allow '\0' in file names, and terminate with '\n' or,
* for -0, just '\0' (use -print0 to find to make this work!)
*/
if (ch == EOF || ch == term || ch == 0)
{
buffer[ich] = 0;
if (ich > 0 && !test_one_file(buffer, &formats, opts,
stride_extra, log_pass))
retval = 1;
if (ch == EOF)
break;
ich = 0;
--ich; /* so that the increment below sets it to 0 again */
}
else
buffer[ich] = (char)ch;
} while (++ich < sizeof buffer);
if (ich)
{
buffer[32] = 0;
buffer[4095] = 0;
fprintf(stderr, "%s...%s: file name too long\n", buffer,
buffer+(4096-32));
exit(99);
}
}
else if (!test_one_file(arg, &formats, opts, stride_extra, log_pass))
retval = 1;
}
}
if (opts & ACCUMULATE)
{
unsigned int in;
printf("static png_uint_16 gpc_error[16/*in*/][16/*out*/][4/*a*/] =\n");
printf("{\n");
for (in=0; in<16; ++in)
{
unsigned int out;
printf(" { /* input: %s */\n ", format_names[in]);
for (out=0; out<16; ++out)
{
unsigned int alpha;
printf(" {");
for (alpha=0; alpha<4; ++alpha)
{
printf(" %d", gpc_error[in][out][alpha]);
if (alpha < 3) putchar(',');
}
printf(" }");
if (out < 15)
{
putchar(',');
if (out % 4 == 3) printf("\n ");
}
}
printf("\n }");
if (in < 15)
putchar(',');
else
putchar('\n');
}
printf("};\n");
printf("static png_uint_16 gpc_error_via_linear[16][4/*out*/][4] =\n");
printf("{\n");
for (in=0; in<16; ++in)
{
unsigned int out;
printf(" { /* input: %s */\n ", format_names[in]);
for (out=0; out<4; ++out)
{
unsigned int alpha;
printf(" {");
for (alpha=0; alpha<4; ++alpha)
{
printf(" %d", gpc_error_via_linear[in][out][alpha]);
if (alpha < 3) putchar(',');
}
printf(" }");
if (out < 3)
putchar(',');
}
printf("\n }");
if (in < 15)
putchar(',');
else
putchar('\n');
}
printf("};\n");
printf("static png_uint_16 gpc_error_to_colormap[8/*i*/][8/*o*/][4] =\n");
printf("{\n");
for (in=0; in<8; ++in)
{
unsigned int out;
printf(" { /* input: %s */\n ", format_names[in]);
for (out=0; out<8; ++out)
{
unsigned int alpha;
printf(" {");
for (alpha=0; alpha<4; ++alpha)
{
printf(" %d", gpc_error_to_colormap[in][out][alpha]);
if (alpha < 3) putchar(',');
}
printf(" }");
if (out < 7)
{
putchar(',');
if (out % 4 == 3) printf("\n ");
}
}
printf("\n }");
if (in < 7)
putchar(',');
else
putchar('\n');
}
printf("};\n");
}
if (retval == 0 && touch != NULL)
{
FILE *fsuccess = fopen(touch, "wt");
if (fsuccess != NULL)
{
int error = 0;
fprintf(fsuccess, "PNG simple API tests succeeded\n");
fflush(fsuccess);
error = ferror(fsuccess);
if (fclose(fsuccess) || error)
{
fflush(stdout);
fprintf(stderr, "%s: write failed\n", touch);
exit(99);
}
}
else
{
fflush(stdout);
fprintf(stderr, "%s: open failed\n", touch);
exit(99);
}
}
return retval;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 173,595 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ColorChooserDialog::DidCloseDialog(bool chose_color,
SkColor color,
RunState run_state) {
if (!listener_)
return;
EndRun(run_state);
CopyCustomColors(custom_colors_, g_custom_colors);
if (chose_color)
listener_->OnColorChosen(color);
listener_->OnColorChooserDialogClosed();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the color-chooser dialog in Google Chrome before 30.0.1599.66 on Windows allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to color_chooser_dialog.cc and color_chooser_win.cc in browser/ui/views/.
Commit Message: ColorChooserWin::End should act like the dialog has closed
This is only a problem on Windows.
When the page closes itself while the color chooser dialog is open,
ColorChooserDialog::DidCloseDialog was called after the listener has been destroyed.
ColorChooserWin::End() will not actually close the color chooser dialog (because we can't) but act like it did so we can do the necessary cleanup.
BUG=279263
[email protected], [email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/23785003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@220639 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,187 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void encode_frame(vpx_codec_ctx_t *codec,
vpx_image_t *img,
int frame_index,
int flags,
VpxVideoWriter *writer) {
vpx_codec_iter_t iter = NULL;
const vpx_codec_cx_pkt_t *pkt = NULL;
const vpx_codec_err_t res = vpx_codec_encode(codec, img, frame_index, 1,
flags, VPX_DL_GOOD_QUALITY);
if (res != VPX_CODEC_OK)
die_codec(codec, "Failed to encode frame");
while ((pkt = vpx_codec_get_cx_data(codec, &iter)) != NULL) {
if (pkt->kind == VPX_CODEC_CX_FRAME_PKT) {
const int keyframe = (pkt->data.frame.flags & VPX_FRAME_IS_KEY) != 0;
if (!vpx_video_writer_write_frame(writer,
pkt->data.frame.buf,
pkt->data.frame.sz,
pkt->data.frame.pts)) {
die_codec(codec, "Failed to write compressed frame");
}
printf(keyframe ? "K" : ".");
fflush(stdout);
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| High | 174,488 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> methodCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestMediaQueryListListener.method");
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
TestMediaQueryListListener* imp = V8TestMediaQueryListListener::toNative(args.Holder());
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(RefPtr<MediaQueryListListener>, listener, MediaQueryListListener::create(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
imp->method(listener);
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,074 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static bool vmxnet_tx_pkt_parse_headers(struct VmxnetTxPkt *pkt)
{
struct iovec *l2_hdr, *l3_hdr;
size_t bytes_read;
size_t full_ip6hdr_len;
uint16_t l3_proto;
assert(pkt);
l2_hdr = &pkt->vec[VMXNET_TX_PKT_L2HDR_FRAG];
l3_hdr = &pkt->vec[VMXNET_TX_PKT_L3HDR_FRAG];
bytes_read = iov_to_buf(pkt->raw, pkt->raw_frags, 0, l2_hdr->iov_base,
ETH_MAX_L2_HDR_LEN);
if (bytes_read < sizeof(struct eth_header)) {
l2_hdr->iov_len = 0;
return false;
}
l2_hdr->iov_len = sizeof(struct eth_header);
switch (be16_to_cpu(PKT_GET_ETH_HDR(l2_hdr->iov_base)->h_proto)) {
case ETH_P_VLAN:
l2_hdr->iov_len += sizeof(struct vlan_header);
break;
case ETH_P_DVLAN:
l2_hdr->iov_len += 2 * sizeof(struct vlan_header);
break;
}
if (bytes_read < l2_hdr->iov_len) {
l2_hdr->iov_len = 0;
return false;
}
l3_proto = eth_get_l3_proto(l2_hdr->iov_base, l2_hdr->iov_len);
switch (l3_proto) {
case ETH_P_IP:
l3_hdr->iov_base = g_malloc(ETH_MAX_IP4_HDR_LEN);
bytes_read = iov_to_buf(pkt->raw, pkt->raw_frags, l2_hdr->iov_len,
l3_hdr->iov_base, sizeof(struct ip_header));
if (bytes_read < sizeof(struct ip_header)) {
l3_hdr->iov_len = 0;
return false;
}
l3_hdr->iov_len = IP_HDR_GET_LEN(l3_hdr->iov_base);
pkt->l4proto = ((struct ip_header *) l3_hdr->iov_base)->ip_p;
/* copy optional IPv4 header data */
l3_hdr->iov_len = 0;
return false;
}
break;
case ETH_P_IPV6:
if (!eth_parse_ipv6_hdr(pkt->raw, pkt->raw_frags, l2_hdr->iov_len,
&pkt->l4proto, &full_ip6hdr_len)) {
l3_hdr->iov_len = 0;
return false;
}
l3_hdr->iov_base = g_malloc(full_ip6hdr_len);
bytes_read = iov_to_buf(pkt->raw, pkt->raw_frags, l2_hdr->iov_len,
l3_hdr->iov_base, full_ip6hdr_len);
if (bytes_read < full_ip6hdr_len) {
l3_hdr->iov_len = 0;
return false;
} else {
l3_hdr->iov_len = full_ip6hdr_len;
}
break;
default:
l3_hdr->iov_len = 0;
break;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The vmxnet_tx_pkt_parse_headers function in hw/net/vmxnet_tx_pkt.c in QEMU (aka Quick Emulator) allows local guest OS administrators to cause a denial of service (buffer over-read) by leveraging failure to check IP header length.
Commit Message: | Low | 164,950 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void copyStereo24(
short *dst,
const int *const *src,
unsigned nSamples,
unsigned /* nChannels */) {
for (unsigned i = 0; i < nSamples; ++i) {
*dst++ = src[0][i] >> 8;
*dst++ = src[1][i] >> 8;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: A remote code execution vulnerability in FLACExtractor.cpp in libstagefright in Mediaserver could enable an attacker using a specially crafted file to cause memory corruption during media file and data processing. This issue is rated as Critical due to the possibility of remote code execution within the context of the Mediaserver process. Product: Android. Versions: 4.4.4, 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2. Android ID: A-34970788.
Commit Message: FLACExtractor: copy protect mWriteBuffer
Bug: 30895578
Change-Id: I4cba36bbe3502678210e5925181683df9726b431
| High | 174,022 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: unsigned char *base64decode(const char *buf, size_t *size)
{
if (!buf || !size) return NULL;
size_t len = (*size > 0) ? *size : strlen(buf);
if (len <= 0) return NULL;
unsigned char *outbuf = (unsigned char*)malloc((len/4)*3+3);
const char *ptr = buf;
int p = 0;
size_t l = 0;
do {
ptr += strspn(ptr, "\r\n\t ");
if (*ptr == '\0' || ptr >= buf+len) {
break;
}
l = strcspn(ptr, "\r\n\t ");
if (l > 3 && ptr+l <= buf+len) {
p+=base64decode_block(outbuf+p, ptr, l);
ptr += l;
} else {
break;
}
} while (1);
outbuf[p] = 0;
*size = p;
return outbuf;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Info
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The base64decode function in base64.c in libimobiledevice libplist through 1.12 allows attackers to obtain sensitive information from process memory or cause a denial of service (buffer over-read) via split encoded Apple Property List data.
Commit Message: base64: Rework base64decode to handle split encoded data correctly | Medium | 168,416 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void PrintMsg_Print_Params::Reset() {
page_size = gfx::Size();
content_size = gfx::Size();
printable_area = gfx::Rect();
margin_top = 0;
margin_left = 0;
dpi = 0;
scale_factor = 1.0f;
rasterize_pdf = false;
document_cookie = 0;
selection_only = false;
supports_alpha_blend = false;
preview_ui_id = -1;
preview_request_id = 0;
is_first_request = false;
print_scaling_option = blink::kWebPrintScalingOptionSourceSize;
print_to_pdf = false;
display_header_footer = false;
title = base::string16();
url = base::string16();
should_print_backgrounds = false;
printed_doc_type = printing::SkiaDocumentType::PDF;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Failure to apply Mark-of-the-Web in Downloads in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker to bypass OS level controls via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: allow styling the page number element when printing over the protocol.
Bug: none
Change-Id: I13e6afbd86a7c6bcdedbf0645183194b9de7cfb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/809759
Commit-Queue: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jianzhou Feng <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523966} | Medium | 172,898 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: GDataFile* AddFile(GDataDirectory* parent,
GDataDirectoryService* directory_service,
int sequence_id) {
GDataFile* file = new GDataFile(NULL, directory_service);
const std::string title = "file" + base::IntToString(sequence_id);
const std::string resource_id = std::string("file_resource_id:") +
title;
file->set_title(title);
file->set_resource_id(resource_id);
file->set_file_md5(std::string("file_md5:") + title);
GDataFileError error = GDATA_FILE_ERROR_FAILED;
FilePath moved_file_path;
directory_service->MoveEntryToDirectory(
parent->GetFilePath(),
file,
base::Bind(&test_util::CopyResultsFromFileMoveCallback,
&error,
&moved_file_path));
test_util::RunBlockingPoolTask();
EXPECT_EQ(GDATA_FILE_OK, error);
EXPECT_EQ(parent->GetFilePath().AppendASCII(title), moved_file_path);
return file;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.56 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the handling of fonts in CANVAS elements.
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,495 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage::Transfer() {
CheckThread();
EnsureMailbox(kVerifiedSyncToken, GL_NEAREST);
detach_thread_at_next_check_ = true;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Incorrect, thread-unsafe use of SkImage in Canvas in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Fix *StaticBitmapImage ThreadChecker and unaccelerated SkImage destroy
- AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage was misusing ThreadChecker by having its
own detach logic. Using proper DetachThread is simpler, cleaner and
correct.
- UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage didn't destroy the SkImage in the
proper thread, leading to GrContext/SkSp problems.
Bug: 890576
Change-Id: Ic71e7f7322b0b851774628247aa5256664bc0723
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1307775
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Charette <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Roman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604427} | Medium | 172,598 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static vpx_codec_err_t decoder_peek_si_internal(const uint8_t *data,
unsigned int data_sz,
vpx_codec_stream_info_t *si,
int *is_intra_only,
vpx_decrypt_cb decrypt_cb,
void *decrypt_state) {
int intra_only_flag = 0;
uint8_t clear_buffer[9];
if (data + data_sz <= data)
return VPX_CODEC_INVALID_PARAM;
si->is_kf = 0;
si->w = si->h = 0;
if (decrypt_cb) {
data_sz = VPXMIN(sizeof(clear_buffer), data_sz);
decrypt_cb(decrypt_state, data, clear_buffer, data_sz);
data = clear_buffer;
}
{
int show_frame;
int error_resilient;
struct vpx_read_bit_buffer rb = { data, data + data_sz, 0, NULL, NULL };
const int frame_marker = vpx_rb_read_literal(&rb, 2);
const BITSTREAM_PROFILE profile = vp9_read_profile(&rb);
if (frame_marker != VP9_FRAME_MARKER)
return VPX_CODEC_UNSUP_BITSTREAM;
if (profile >= MAX_PROFILES)
return VPX_CODEC_UNSUP_BITSTREAM;
if ((profile >= 2 && data_sz <= 1) || data_sz < 1)
return VPX_CODEC_UNSUP_BITSTREAM;
if (vpx_rb_read_bit(&rb)) { // show an existing frame
vpx_rb_read_literal(&rb, 3); // Frame buffer to show.
return VPX_CODEC_OK;
}
if (data_sz <= 8)
return VPX_CODEC_UNSUP_BITSTREAM;
si->is_kf = !vpx_rb_read_bit(&rb);
show_frame = vpx_rb_read_bit(&rb);
error_resilient = vpx_rb_read_bit(&rb);
if (si->is_kf) {
if (!vp9_read_sync_code(&rb))
return VPX_CODEC_UNSUP_BITSTREAM;
if (!parse_bitdepth_colorspace_sampling(profile, &rb))
return VPX_CODEC_UNSUP_BITSTREAM;
vp9_read_frame_size(&rb, (int *)&si->w, (int *)&si->h);
} else {
intra_only_flag = show_frame ? 0 : vpx_rb_read_bit(&rb);
rb.bit_offset += error_resilient ? 0 : 2; // reset_frame_context
if (intra_only_flag) {
if (!vp9_read_sync_code(&rb))
return VPX_CODEC_UNSUP_BITSTREAM;
if (profile > PROFILE_0) {
if (!parse_bitdepth_colorspace_sampling(profile, &rb))
return VPX_CODEC_UNSUP_BITSTREAM;
}
rb.bit_offset += REF_FRAMES; // refresh_frame_flags
vp9_read_frame_size(&rb, (int *)&si->w, (int *)&si->h);
}
}
}
if (is_intra_only != NULL)
*is_intra_only = intra_only_flag;
return VPX_CODEC_OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The decoder_peek_si_internal function in vp9/vp9_dx_iface.c in libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-09-01, and 7.0 before 2016-09-01 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (buffer over-read, and device hang or reboot) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 30013856.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE | libvpx: cherry-pick aa1c813 from upstream
Description from upstream:
vp9: Fix potential SEGV in decoder_peek_si_internal
decoder_peek_si_internal could potentially read more bytes than
what actually exists in the input buffer. We check for the buffer
size to be at least 8, but we try to read up to 10 bytes in the
worst case. A well crafted file could thus cause a segfault.
Likely change that introduced this bug was:
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/#/c/70439 (git hash:
7c43fb6)
Bug: 30013856
Change-Id: If556414cb5b82472d5673e045bc185cc57bb9af3
(cherry picked from commit bd57d587c2eb743c61b049add18f9fd72bf78c33)
| High | 173,409 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int update_open_stateid(struct nfs4_state *state, nfs4_stateid *open_stateid, nfs4_stateid *delegation, int open_flags)
{
struct nfs_inode *nfsi = NFS_I(state->inode);
struct nfs_delegation *deleg_cur;
int ret = 0;
open_flags &= (FMODE_READ|FMODE_WRITE);
rcu_read_lock();
deleg_cur = rcu_dereference(nfsi->delegation);
if (deleg_cur == NULL)
goto no_delegation;
spin_lock(&deleg_cur->lock);
if (nfsi->delegation != deleg_cur ||
(deleg_cur->type & open_flags) != open_flags)
goto no_delegation_unlock;
if (delegation == NULL)
delegation = &deleg_cur->stateid;
else if (memcmp(deleg_cur->stateid.data, delegation->data, NFS4_STATEID_SIZE) != 0)
goto no_delegation_unlock;
nfs_mark_delegation_referenced(deleg_cur);
__update_open_stateid(state, open_stateid, &deleg_cur->stateid, open_flags);
ret = 1;
no_delegation_unlock:
spin_unlock(&deleg_cur->lock);
no_delegation:
rcu_read_unlock();
if (!ret && open_stateid != NULL) {
__update_open_stateid(state, open_stateid, NULL, open_flags);
ret = 1;
}
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The encode_share_access function in fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.29 allows local users to cause a denial of service (BUG and system crash) by using the mknod system call with a pathname on an NFSv4 filesystem.
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,708 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: olsr_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *pptr, u_int length, int is_ipv6)
{
union {
const struct olsr_common *common;
const struct olsr_msg4 *msg4;
const struct olsr_msg6 *msg6;
const struct olsr_hello *hello;
const struct olsr_hello_link *hello_link;
const struct olsr_tc *tc;
const struct olsr_hna4 *hna;
} ptr;
u_int msg_type, msg_len, msg_tlen, hello_len;
uint16_t name_entry_type, name_entry_len;
u_int name_entry_padding;
uint8_t link_type, neighbor_type;
const u_char *tptr, *msg_data;
tptr = pptr;
if (length < sizeof(struct olsr_common)) {
goto trunc;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(struct olsr_common));
ptr.common = (const struct olsr_common *)tptr;
length = min(length, EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr.common->packet_len));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "OLSRv%i, seq 0x%04x, length %u",
(is_ipv6 == 0) ? 4 : 6,
EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr.common->packet_seq),
length));
tptr += sizeof(struct olsr_common);
/*
* In non-verbose mode, just print version.
*/
if (ndo->ndo_vflag < 1) {
return;
}
while (tptr < (pptr+length)) {
union
{
const struct olsr_msg4 *v4;
const struct olsr_msg6 *v6;
} msgptr;
int msg_len_valid = 0;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(struct olsr_msg4));
if (is_ipv6)
{
msgptr.v6 = (const struct olsr_msg6 *) tptr;
msg_type = msgptr.v6->msg_type;
msg_len = EXTRACT_16BITS(msgptr.v6->msg_len);
if ((msg_len >= sizeof (struct olsr_msg6))
&& (msg_len <= length))
msg_len_valid = 1;
/* infinite loop check */
if (msg_type == 0 || msg_len == 0) {
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t%s Message (%#04x), originator %s, ttl %u, hop %u"
"\n\t vtime %.3fs, msg-seq 0x%04x, length %u%s",
tok2str(olsr_msg_values, "Unknown", msg_type),
msg_type, ip6addr_string(ndo, msgptr.v6->originator),
msgptr.v6->ttl,
msgptr.v6->hopcount,
ME_TO_DOUBLE(msgptr.v6->vtime),
EXTRACT_16BITS(msgptr.v6->msg_seq),
msg_len, (msg_len_valid == 0) ? " (invalid)" : ""));
if (!msg_len_valid) {
return;
}
msg_tlen = msg_len - sizeof(struct olsr_msg6);
msg_data = tptr + sizeof(struct olsr_msg6);
}
else /* (!is_ipv6) */
{
msgptr.v4 = (const struct olsr_msg4 *) tptr;
msg_type = msgptr.v4->msg_type;
msg_len = EXTRACT_16BITS(msgptr.v4->msg_len);
if ((msg_len >= sizeof (struct olsr_msg4))
&& (msg_len <= length))
msg_len_valid = 1;
/* infinite loop check */
if (msg_type == 0 || msg_len == 0) {
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t%s Message (%#04x), originator %s, ttl %u, hop %u"
"\n\t vtime %.3fs, msg-seq 0x%04x, length %u%s",
tok2str(olsr_msg_values, "Unknown", msg_type),
msg_type, ipaddr_string(ndo, msgptr.v4->originator),
msgptr.v4->ttl,
msgptr.v4->hopcount,
ME_TO_DOUBLE(msgptr.v4->vtime),
EXTRACT_16BITS(msgptr.v4->msg_seq),
msg_len, (msg_len_valid == 0) ? " (invalid)" : ""));
if (!msg_len_valid) {
return;
}
msg_tlen = msg_len - sizeof(struct olsr_msg4);
msg_data = tptr + sizeof(struct olsr_msg4);
}
switch (msg_type) {
case OLSR_HELLO_MSG:
case OLSR_HELLO_LQ_MSG:
if (msg_tlen < sizeof(struct olsr_hello))
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK2(*msg_data, sizeof(struct olsr_hello));
ptr.hello = (const struct olsr_hello *)msg_data;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t hello-time %.3fs, MPR willingness %u",
ME_TO_DOUBLE(ptr.hello->htime), ptr.hello->will));
msg_data += sizeof(struct olsr_hello);
msg_tlen -= sizeof(struct olsr_hello);
while (msg_tlen >= sizeof(struct olsr_hello_link)) {
int hello_len_valid = 0;
/*
* link-type.
*/
ND_TCHECK2(*msg_data, sizeof(struct olsr_hello_link));
ptr.hello_link = (const struct olsr_hello_link *)msg_data;
hello_len = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr.hello_link->len);
link_type = OLSR_EXTRACT_LINK_TYPE(ptr.hello_link->link_code);
neighbor_type = OLSR_EXTRACT_NEIGHBOR_TYPE(ptr.hello_link->link_code);
if ((hello_len <= msg_tlen)
&& (hello_len >= sizeof(struct olsr_hello_link)))
hello_len_valid = 1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t link-type %s, neighbor-type %s, len %u%s",
tok2str(olsr_link_type_values, "Unknown", link_type),
tok2str(olsr_neighbor_type_values, "Unknown", neighbor_type),
hello_len,
(hello_len_valid == 0) ? " (invalid)" : ""));
if (hello_len_valid == 0)
break;
msg_data += sizeof(struct olsr_hello_link);
msg_tlen -= sizeof(struct olsr_hello_link);
hello_len -= sizeof(struct olsr_hello_link);
ND_TCHECK2(*msg_data, hello_len);
if (msg_type == OLSR_HELLO_MSG) {
if (olsr_print_neighbor(ndo, msg_data, hello_len) == -1)
goto trunc;
} else {
if (is_ipv6) {
if (olsr_print_lq_neighbor6(ndo, msg_data, hello_len) == -1)
goto trunc;
} else {
if (olsr_print_lq_neighbor4(ndo, msg_data, hello_len) == -1)
goto trunc;
}
}
msg_data += hello_len;
msg_tlen -= hello_len;
}
break;
case OLSR_TC_MSG:
case OLSR_TC_LQ_MSG:
if (msg_tlen < sizeof(struct olsr_tc))
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK2(*msg_data, sizeof(struct olsr_tc));
ptr.tc = (const struct olsr_tc *)msg_data;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t advertised neighbor seq 0x%04x",
EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr.tc->ans_seq)));
msg_data += sizeof(struct olsr_tc);
msg_tlen -= sizeof(struct olsr_tc);
if (msg_type == OLSR_TC_MSG) {
if (olsr_print_neighbor(ndo, msg_data, msg_tlen) == -1)
goto trunc;
} else {
if (is_ipv6) {
if (olsr_print_lq_neighbor6(ndo, msg_data, msg_tlen) == -1)
goto trunc;
} else {
if (olsr_print_lq_neighbor4(ndo, msg_data, msg_tlen) == -1)
goto trunc;
}
}
break;
case OLSR_MID_MSG:
{
size_t addr_size = sizeof(struct in_addr);
if (is_ipv6)
addr_size = sizeof(struct in6_addr);
while (msg_tlen >= addr_size) {
ND_TCHECK2(*msg_data, addr_size);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t interface address %s",
is_ipv6 ? ip6addr_string(ndo, msg_data) :
ipaddr_string(ndo, msg_data)));
msg_data += addr_size;
msg_tlen -= addr_size;
}
break;
}
case OLSR_HNA_MSG:
if (is_ipv6)
{
int i = 0;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Advertised networks (total %u)",
(unsigned int) (msg_tlen / sizeof(struct olsr_hna6))));
while (msg_tlen >= sizeof(struct olsr_hna6)) {
const struct olsr_hna6 *hna6;
ND_TCHECK2(*msg_data, sizeof(struct olsr_hna6));
hna6 = (const struct olsr_hna6 *)msg_data;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t #%i: %s/%u",
i, ip6addr_string(ndo, hna6->network),
mask62plen (hna6->mask)));
msg_data += sizeof(struct olsr_hna6);
msg_tlen -= sizeof(struct olsr_hna6);
}
}
else
{
int col = 0;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Advertised networks (total %u)",
(unsigned int) (msg_tlen / sizeof(struct olsr_hna4))));
while (msg_tlen >= sizeof(struct olsr_hna4)) {
ND_TCHECK2(*msg_data, sizeof(struct olsr_hna4));
ptr.hna = (const struct olsr_hna4 *)msg_data;
/* print 4 prefixes per line */
if (!ptr.hna->network[0] && !ptr.hna->network[1] &&
!ptr.hna->network[2] && !ptr.hna->network[3] &&
!ptr.hna->mask[GW_HNA_PAD] &&
ptr.hna->mask[GW_HNA_FLAGS]) {
/* smart gateway */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%sSmart-Gateway:%s%s%s%s%s %u/%u",
col == 0 ? "\n\t " : ", ", /* indent */
/* sgw */
/* LINKSPEED */
(ptr.hna->mask[GW_HNA_FLAGS] &
GW_HNA_FLAG_LINKSPEED) ? " LINKSPEED" : "",
/* IPV4 */
(ptr.hna->mask[GW_HNA_FLAGS] &
GW_HNA_FLAG_IPV4) ? " IPV4" : "",
/* IPV4-NAT */
(ptr.hna->mask[GW_HNA_FLAGS] &
GW_HNA_FLAG_IPV4_NAT) ? " IPV4-NAT" : "",
/* IPV6 */
(ptr.hna->mask[GW_HNA_FLAGS] &
GW_HNA_FLAG_IPV6) ? " IPV6" : "",
/* IPv6PREFIX */
(ptr.hna->mask[GW_HNA_FLAGS] &
GW_HNA_FLAG_IPV6PREFIX) ? " IPv6-PREFIX" : "",
/* uplink */
(ptr.hna->mask[GW_HNA_FLAGS] &
GW_HNA_FLAG_LINKSPEED) ?
deserialize_gw_speed(ptr.hna->mask[GW_HNA_UPLINK]) : 0,
/* downlink */
(ptr.hna->mask[GW_HNA_FLAGS] &
GW_HNA_FLAG_LINKSPEED) ?
deserialize_gw_speed(ptr.hna->mask[GW_HNA_DOWNLINK]) : 0
));
} else {
/* normal route */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s%s/%u",
col == 0 ? "\n\t " : ", ",
ipaddr_string(ndo, ptr.hna->network),
mask2plen(EXTRACT_32BITS(ptr.hna->mask))));
}
msg_data += sizeof(struct olsr_hna4);
msg_tlen -= sizeof(struct olsr_hna4);
col = (col + 1) % 4;
}
}
break;
case OLSR_NAMESERVICE_MSG:
{
u_int name_entries = EXTRACT_16BITS(msg_data+2);
u_int addr_size = 4;
int name_entries_valid = 0;
u_int i;
if (is_ipv6)
addr_size = 16;
if ((name_entries > 0)
&& ((name_entries * (4 + addr_size)) <= msg_tlen))
name_entries_valid = 1;
if (msg_tlen < 4)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK2(*msg_data, 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Version %u, Entries %u%s",
EXTRACT_16BITS(msg_data),
name_entries, (name_entries_valid == 0) ? " (invalid)" : ""));
if (name_entries_valid == 0)
break;
msg_data += 4;
msg_tlen -= 4;
for (i = 0; i < name_entries; i++) {
int name_entry_len_valid = 0;
if (msg_tlen < 4)
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*msg_data, 4);
name_entry_type = EXTRACT_16BITS(msg_data);
name_entry_len = EXTRACT_16BITS(msg_data+2);
msg_data += 4;
msg_tlen -= 4;
if ((name_entry_len > 0) && ((addr_size + name_entry_len) <= msg_tlen))
name_entry_len_valid = 1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t #%u: type %#06x, length %u%s",
(unsigned int) i, name_entry_type,
name_entry_len, (name_entry_len_valid == 0) ? " (invalid)" : ""));
if (name_entry_len_valid == 0)
break;
/* 32-bit alignment */
name_entry_padding = 0;
if (name_entry_len%4 != 0)
name_entry_padding = 4-(name_entry_len%4);
if (msg_tlen < addr_size + name_entry_len + name_entry_padding)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK2(*msg_data, addr_size + name_entry_len + name_entry_padding);
if (is_ipv6)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", address %s, name \"",
ip6addr_string(ndo, msg_data)));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", address %s, name \"",
ipaddr_string(ndo, msg_data)));
(void)fn_printn(ndo, msg_data + addr_size, name_entry_len, NULL);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\""));
msg_data += addr_size + name_entry_len + name_entry_padding;
msg_tlen -= addr_size + name_entry_len + name_entry_padding;
} /* for (i = 0; i < name_entries; i++) */
break;
} /* case OLSR_NAMESERVICE_MSG */
/*
* FIXME those are the defined messages that lack a decoder
* you are welcome to contribute code ;-)
*/
case OLSR_POWERINFO_MSG:
default:
print_unknown_data(ndo, msg_data, "\n\t ", msg_tlen);
break;
} /* switch (msg_type) */
tptr += msg_len;
} /* while (tptr < (pptr+length)) */
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|olsr]"));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The OLSR parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-olsr.c:olsr_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13688/OLSR: Do bounds checks before we fetch data.
While we're at it, clean up some other bounds checks, so we check that
we have a complete IPv4 message header if it's IPv4 and a complete IPv6
message header if it's IPv6.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s). | High | 167,805 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: print_trans(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *words, const u_char *data1, const u_char *buf, const u_char *maxbuf)
{
u_int bcc;
const char *f1, *f2, *f3, *f4;
const u_char *data, *param;
const u_char *w = words + 1;
int datalen, paramlen;
if (request) {
ND_TCHECK2(w[12 * 2], 2);
paramlen = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(w + 9 * 2);
param = buf + EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(w + 10 * 2);
datalen = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(w + 11 * 2);
data = buf + EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(w + 12 * 2);
f1 = "TotParamCnt=[d] \nTotDataCnt=[d] \nMaxParmCnt=[d] \nMaxDataCnt=[d]\nMaxSCnt=[d] \nTransFlags=[w] \nRes1=[w] \nRes2=[w] \nRes3=[w]\nParamCnt=[d] \nParamOff=[d] \nDataCnt=[d] \nDataOff=[d] \nSUCnt=[d]\n";
f2 = "|Name=[S]\n";
f3 = "|Param ";
f4 = "|Data ";
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(w[7 * 2], 2);
paramlen = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(w + 3 * 2);
param = buf + EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(w + 4 * 2);
datalen = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(w + 6 * 2);
data = buf + EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(w + 7 * 2);
f1 = "TotParamCnt=[d] \nTotDataCnt=[d] \nRes1=[d]\nParamCnt=[d] \nParamOff=[d] \nRes2=[d] \nDataCnt=[d] \nDataOff=[d] \nRes3=[d]\nLsetup=[d]\n";
f2 = "|Unknown ";
f3 = "|Param ";
f4 = "|Data ";
}
smb_fdata(ndo, words + 1, f1, min(words + 1 + 2 * words[0], maxbuf),
unicodestr);
ND_TCHECK2(*data1, 2);
bcc = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(data1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "smb_bcc=%u\n", bcc));
if (bcc > 0) {
smb_fdata(ndo, data1 + 2, f2, maxbuf - (paramlen + datalen), unicodestr);
if (strcmp((const char *)(data1 + 2), "\\MAILSLOT\\BROWSE") == 0) {
print_browse(ndo, param, paramlen, data, datalen);
return;
}
if (strcmp((const char *)(data1 + 2), "\\PIPE\\LANMAN") == 0) {
print_ipc(ndo, param, paramlen, data, datalen);
return;
}
if (paramlen)
smb_fdata(ndo, param, f3, min(param + paramlen, maxbuf), unicodestr);
if (datalen)
smb_fdata(ndo, data, f4, min(data + datalen, maxbuf), unicodestr);
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The SMB parser in tcpdump before 4.9.3 has buffer over-reads in print-smb.c:print_trans() for MAILSLOTBROWSE and PIPELANMAN.
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) SMB: Add two missing bounds checks | High | 169,815 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int modbus_reply(modbus_t *ctx, const uint8_t *req,
int req_length, modbus_mapping_t *mb_mapping)
{
int offset;
int slave;
int function;
uint16_t address;
uint8_t rsp[MAX_MESSAGE_LENGTH];
int rsp_length = 0;
sft_t sft;
if (ctx == NULL) {
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
}
offset = ctx->backend->header_length;
slave = req[offset - 1];
function = req[offset];
address = (req[offset + 1] << 8) + req[offset + 2];
sft.slave = slave;
sft.function = function;
sft.t_id = ctx->backend->prepare_response_tid(req, &req_length);
/* Data are flushed on illegal number of values errors. */
switch (function) {
case MODBUS_FC_READ_COILS:
case MODBUS_FC_READ_DISCRETE_INPUTS: {
unsigned int is_input = (function == MODBUS_FC_READ_DISCRETE_INPUTS);
int start_bits = is_input ? mb_mapping->start_input_bits : mb_mapping->start_bits;
int nb_bits = is_input ? mb_mapping->nb_input_bits : mb_mapping->nb_bits;
uint8_t *tab_bits = is_input ? mb_mapping->tab_input_bits : mb_mapping->tab_bits;
const char * const name = is_input ? "read_input_bits" : "read_bits";
int nb = (req[offset + 3] << 8) + req[offset + 4];
/* The mapping can be shifted to reduce memory consumption and it
doesn't always start at address zero. */
int mapping_address = address - start_bits;
if (nb < 1 || MODBUS_MAX_READ_BITS < nb) {
rsp_length = response_exception(
ctx, &sft, MODBUS_EXCEPTION_ILLEGAL_DATA_VALUE, rsp, TRUE,
"Illegal nb of values %d in %s (max %d)\n",
nb, name, MODBUS_MAX_READ_BITS);
} else if (mapping_address < 0 || (mapping_address + nb) > nb_bits) {
rsp_length = response_exception(
ctx, &sft,
MODBUS_EXCEPTION_ILLEGAL_DATA_ADDRESS, rsp, FALSE,
"Illegal data address 0x%0X in %s\n",
mapping_address < 0 ? address : address + nb, name);
} else {
rsp_length = ctx->backend->build_response_basis(&sft, rsp);
rsp[rsp_length++] = (nb / 8) + ((nb % 8) ? 1 : 0);
rsp_length = response_io_status(tab_bits, mapping_address, nb,
rsp, rsp_length);
}
}
break;
case MODBUS_FC_READ_HOLDING_REGISTERS:
case MODBUS_FC_READ_INPUT_REGISTERS: {
unsigned int is_input = (function == MODBUS_FC_READ_INPUT_REGISTERS);
int start_registers = is_input ? mb_mapping->start_input_registers : mb_mapping->start_registers;
int nb_registers = is_input ? mb_mapping->nb_input_registers : mb_mapping->nb_registers;
uint16_t *tab_registers = is_input ? mb_mapping->tab_input_registers : mb_mapping->tab_registers;
const char * const name = is_input ? "read_input_registers" : "read_registers";
int nb = (req[offset + 3] << 8) + req[offset + 4];
/* The mapping can be shifted to reduce memory consumption and it
doesn't always start at address zero. */
int mapping_address = address - start_registers;
if (nb < 1 || MODBUS_MAX_READ_REGISTERS < nb) {
rsp_length = response_exception(
ctx, &sft, MODBUS_EXCEPTION_ILLEGAL_DATA_VALUE, rsp, TRUE,
"Illegal nb of values %d in %s (max %d)\n",
nb, name, MODBUS_MAX_READ_REGISTERS);
} else if (mapping_address < 0 || (mapping_address + nb) > nb_registers) {
rsp_length = response_exception(
ctx, &sft, MODBUS_EXCEPTION_ILLEGAL_DATA_ADDRESS, rsp, FALSE,
"Illegal data address 0x%0X in %s\n",
mapping_address < 0 ? address : address + nb, name);
} else {
int i;
rsp_length = ctx->backend->build_response_basis(&sft, rsp);
rsp[rsp_length++] = nb << 1;
for (i = mapping_address; i < mapping_address + nb; i++) {
rsp[rsp_length++] = tab_registers[i] >> 8;
rsp[rsp_length++] = tab_registers[i] & 0xFF;
}
}
}
break;
case MODBUS_FC_WRITE_SINGLE_COIL: {
int mapping_address = address - mb_mapping->start_bits;
if (mapping_address < 0 || mapping_address >= mb_mapping->nb_bits) {
rsp_length = response_exception(
ctx, &sft, MODBUS_EXCEPTION_ILLEGAL_DATA_ADDRESS, rsp, FALSE,
"Illegal data address 0x%0X in write_bit\n",
address);
} else {
int data = (req[offset + 3] << 8) + req[offset + 4];
if (data == 0xFF00 || data == 0x0) {
mb_mapping->tab_bits[mapping_address] = data ? ON : OFF;
memcpy(rsp, req, req_length);
rsp_length = req_length;
} else {
rsp_length = response_exception(
ctx, &sft,
MODBUS_EXCEPTION_ILLEGAL_DATA_VALUE, rsp, FALSE,
"Illegal data value 0x%0X in write_bit request at address %0X\n",
data, address);
}
}
}
break;
case MODBUS_FC_WRITE_SINGLE_REGISTER: {
int mapping_address = address - mb_mapping->start_registers;
if (mapping_address < 0 || mapping_address >= mb_mapping->nb_registers) {
rsp_length = response_exception(
ctx, &sft,
MODBUS_EXCEPTION_ILLEGAL_DATA_ADDRESS, rsp, FALSE,
"Illegal data address 0x%0X in write_register\n",
address);
} else {
int data = (req[offset + 3] << 8) + req[offset + 4];
mb_mapping->tab_registers[mapping_address] = data;
memcpy(rsp, req, req_length);
rsp_length = req_length;
}
}
break;
case MODBUS_FC_WRITE_MULTIPLE_COILS: {
int nb = (req[offset + 3] << 8) + req[offset + 4];
int mapping_address = address - mb_mapping->start_bits;
if (nb < 1 || MODBUS_MAX_WRITE_BITS < nb) {
/* May be the indication has been truncated on reading because of
* invalid address (eg. nb is 0 but the request contains values to
* write) so it's necessary to flush. */
rsp_length = response_exception(
ctx, &sft, MODBUS_EXCEPTION_ILLEGAL_DATA_VALUE, rsp, TRUE,
"Illegal number of values %d in write_bits (max %d)\n",
nb, MODBUS_MAX_WRITE_BITS);
} else if (mapping_address < 0 ||
(mapping_address + nb) > mb_mapping->nb_bits) {
rsp_length = response_exception(
ctx, &sft,
MODBUS_EXCEPTION_ILLEGAL_DATA_ADDRESS, rsp, FALSE,
"Illegal data address 0x%0X in write_bits\n",
mapping_address < 0 ? address : address + nb);
} else {
/* 6 = byte count */
modbus_set_bits_from_bytes(mb_mapping->tab_bits, mapping_address, nb,
&req[offset + 6]);
rsp_length = ctx->backend->build_response_basis(&sft, rsp);
/* 4 to copy the bit address (2) and the quantity of bits */
memcpy(rsp + rsp_length, req + rsp_length, 4);
rsp_length += 4;
}
}
break;
case MODBUS_FC_WRITE_MULTIPLE_REGISTERS: {
int nb = (req[offset + 3] << 8) + req[offset + 4];
int mapping_address = address - mb_mapping->start_registers;
if (nb < 1 || MODBUS_MAX_WRITE_REGISTERS < nb) {
rsp_length = response_exception(
ctx, &sft, MODBUS_EXCEPTION_ILLEGAL_DATA_VALUE, rsp, TRUE,
"Illegal number of values %d in write_registers (max %d)\n",
nb, MODBUS_MAX_WRITE_REGISTERS);
} else if (mapping_address < 0 ||
(mapping_address + nb) > mb_mapping->nb_registers) {
rsp_length = response_exception(
ctx, &sft, MODBUS_EXCEPTION_ILLEGAL_DATA_ADDRESS, rsp, FALSE,
"Illegal data address 0x%0X in write_registers\n",
mapping_address < 0 ? address : address + nb);
} else {
int i, j;
for (i = mapping_address, j = 6; i < mapping_address + nb; i++, j += 2) {
/* 6 and 7 = first value */
mb_mapping->tab_registers[i] =
(req[offset + j] << 8) + req[offset + j + 1];
}
rsp_length = ctx->backend->build_response_basis(&sft, rsp);
/* 4 to copy the address (2) and the no. of registers */
memcpy(rsp + rsp_length, req + rsp_length, 4);
rsp_length += 4;
}
}
break;
case MODBUS_FC_REPORT_SLAVE_ID: {
int str_len;
int byte_count_pos;
rsp_length = ctx->backend->build_response_basis(&sft, rsp);
/* Skip byte count for now */
byte_count_pos = rsp_length++;
rsp[rsp_length++] = _REPORT_SLAVE_ID;
/* Run indicator status to ON */
rsp[rsp_length++] = 0xFF;
/* LMB + length of LIBMODBUS_VERSION_STRING */
str_len = 3 + strlen(LIBMODBUS_VERSION_STRING);
memcpy(rsp + rsp_length, "LMB" LIBMODBUS_VERSION_STRING, str_len);
rsp_length += str_len;
rsp[byte_count_pos] = rsp_length - byte_count_pos - 1;
}
break;
case MODBUS_FC_READ_EXCEPTION_STATUS:
if (ctx->debug) {
fprintf(stderr, "FIXME Not implemented\n");
}
errno = ENOPROTOOPT;
return -1;
break;
case MODBUS_FC_MASK_WRITE_REGISTER: {
int mapping_address = address - mb_mapping->start_registers;
if (mapping_address < 0 || mapping_address >= mb_mapping->nb_registers) {
rsp_length = response_exception(
ctx, &sft, MODBUS_EXCEPTION_ILLEGAL_DATA_ADDRESS, rsp, FALSE,
"Illegal data address 0x%0X in write_register\n",
address);
} else {
uint16_t data = mb_mapping->tab_registers[mapping_address];
uint16_t and = (req[offset + 3] << 8) + req[offset + 4];
uint16_t or = (req[offset + 5] << 8) + req[offset + 6];
data = (data & and) | (or & (~and));
mb_mapping->tab_registers[mapping_address] = data;
memcpy(rsp, req, req_length);
rsp_length = req_length;
}
}
break;
case MODBUS_FC_WRITE_AND_READ_REGISTERS: {
int nb = (req[offset + 3] << 8) + req[offset + 4];
uint16_t address_write = (req[offset + 5] << 8) + req[offset + 6];
int nb_write = (req[offset + 7] << 8) + req[offset + 8];
int nb_write_bytes = req[offset + 9];
int mapping_address = address - mb_mapping->start_registers;
int mapping_address_write = address_write - mb_mapping->start_registers;
if (nb_write < 1 || MODBUS_MAX_WR_WRITE_REGISTERS < nb_write ||
nb < 1 || MODBUS_MAX_WR_READ_REGISTERS < nb ||
nb_write_bytes != nb_write * 2) {
rsp_length = response_exception(
ctx, &sft, MODBUS_EXCEPTION_ILLEGAL_DATA_VALUE, rsp, TRUE,
"Illegal nb of values (W%d, R%d) in write_and_read_registers (max W%d, R%d)\n",
nb_write, nb, MODBUS_MAX_WR_WRITE_REGISTERS, MODBUS_MAX_WR_READ_REGISTERS);
} else if (mapping_address < 0 ||
(mapping_address + nb) > mb_mapping->nb_registers ||
mapping_address < 0 ||
(mapping_address_write + nb_write) > mb_mapping->nb_registers) {
rsp_length = response_exception(
ctx, &sft, MODBUS_EXCEPTION_ILLEGAL_DATA_ADDRESS, rsp, FALSE,
"Illegal data read address 0x%0X or write address 0x%0X write_and_read_registers\n",
mapping_address < 0 ? address : address + nb,
mapping_address_write < 0 ? address_write : address_write + nb_write);
} else {
int i, j;
rsp_length = ctx->backend->build_response_basis(&sft, rsp);
rsp[rsp_length++] = nb << 1;
/* Write first.
10 and 11 are the offset of the first values to write */
for (i = mapping_address_write, j = 10;
i < mapping_address_write + nb_write; i++, j += 2) {
mb_mapping->tab_registers[i] =
(req[offset + j] << 8) + req[offset + j + 1];
}
/* and read the data for the response */
for (i = mapping_address; i < mapping_address + nb; i++) {
rsp[rsp_length++] = mb_mapping->tab_registers[i] >> 8;
rsp[rsp_length++] = mb_mapping->tab_registers[i] & 0xFF;
}
}
}
break;
default:
rsp_length = response_exception(
ctx, &sft, MODBUS_EXCEPTION_ILLEGAL_FUNCTION, rsp, TRUE,
"Unknown Modbus function code: 0x%0X\n", function);
break;
}
/* Suppress any responses when the request was a broadcast */
return (ctx->backend->backend_type == _MODBUS_BACKEND_TYPE_RTU &&
slave == MODBUS_BROADCAST_ADDRESS) ? 0 : send_msg(ctx, rsp, rsp_length);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: An issue was discovered in libmodbus before 3.0.7 and 3.1.x before 3.1.5. There is an out-of-bounds read for the MODBUS_FC_WRITE_MULTIPLE_REGISTERS case, aka VD-1301.
Commit Message: Fix VD-1301 and VD-1302 vulnerabilities
This patch was contributed by Maor Vermucht and Or Peles from
VDOO Connected Trust. | High | 169,581 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl::FlipVertically(
uint8* framebuffer,
unsigned int width,
unsigned int height) {
uint8* scanline = scanline_.get();
if (!scanline)
return;
unsigned int row_bytes = width * 4;
unsigned int count = height / 2;
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < count; i++) {
uint8* row_a = framebuffer + i * row_bytes;
uint8* row_b = framebuffer + (height - i - 1) * row_bytes;
memcpy(scanline, row_b, row_bytes);
memcpy(row_b, row_a, row_bytes);
memcpy(row_a, scanline, row_bytes);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The WebGL implementation in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not properly handle CANVAS elements, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Fix mismanagement in handling of temporary scanline for vertical flip.
BUG=116637
TEST=manual test from bug report with ASAN
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9617038
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@125301 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,063 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int string_check(char *buf, const char *buf2)
{
if(strcmp(buf, buf2)) {
/* they shouldn't differ */
printf("sprintf failed:\nwe '%s'\nsystem: '%s'\n",
buf, buf2);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: curl before version 7.52.0 is vulnerable to a buffer overflow when doing a large floating point output in libcurl's implementation of the printf() functions. If there are any application that accepts a format string from the outside without necessary input filtering, it could allow remote attacks.
Commit Message: printf: fix floating point buffer overflow issues
... and add a bunch of floating point printf tests | Medium | 169,437 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PHP_MINIT_FUNCTION(gd)
{
le_gd = zend_register_list_destructors_ex(php_free_gd_image, NULL, "gd", module_number);
le_gd_font = zend_register_list_destructors_ex(php_free_gd_font, NULL, "gd font", module_number);
#if HAVE_GD_BUNDLED && HAVE_LIBFREETYPE
gdFontCacheMutexSetup();
#endif
#if HAVE_LIBT1
T1_SetBitmapPad(8);
T1_InitLib(NO_LOGFILE | IGNORE_CONFIGFILE | IGNORE_FONTDATABASE);
T1_SetLogLevel(T1LOG_DEBUG);
le_ps_font = zend_register_list_destructors_ex(php_free_ps_font, NULL, "gd PS font", module_number);
le_ps_enc = zend_register_list_destructors_ex(php_free_ps_enc, NULL, "gd PS encoding", module_number);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_GD_BUNDLED
gdSetErrorMethod(php_gd_error_method);
#endif
REGISTER_INI_ENTRIES();
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_GIF", 1, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_JPG", 2, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_JPEG", 2, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_PNG", 4, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_WBMP", 8, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_XPM", 16, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_WEBP", 32, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
/* special colours for gd */
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_COLOR_TILED", gdTiled, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_COLOR_STYLED", gdStyled, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_COLOR_BRUSHED", gdBrushed, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_COLOR_STYLEDBRUSHED", gdStyledBrushed, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_COLOR_TRANSPARENT", gdTransparent, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
/* for imagefilledarc */
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_ARC_ROUNDED", gdArc, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_ARC_PIE", gdPie, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_ARC_CHORD", gdChord, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_ARC_NOFILL", gdNoFill, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_ARC_EDGED", gdEdged, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
/* GD2 image format types */
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_GD2_RAW", GD2_FMT_RAW, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_GD2_COMPRESSED", GD2_FMT_COMPRESSED, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_FLIP_HORIZONTAL", GD_FLIP_HORINZONTAL, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_FLIP_VERTICAL", GD_FLIP_VERTICAL, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_FLIP_BOTH", GD_FLIP_BOTH, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_EFFECT_REPLACE", gdEffectReplace, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_EFFECT_ALPHABLEND", gdEffectAlphaBlend, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_EFFECT_NORMAL", gdEffectNormal, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_EFFECT_OVERLAY", gdEffectOverlay, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_CROP_DEFAULT", GD_CROP_DEFAULT, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_CROP_TRANSPARENT", GD_CROP_TRANSPARENT, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_CROP_BLACK", GD_CROP_BLACK, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_CROP_WHITE", GD_CROP_WHITE, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_CROP_SIDES", GD_CROP_SIDES, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_CROP_THRESHOLD", GD_CROP_THRESHOLD, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_BELL", GD_BELL, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_BESSEL", GD_BESSEL, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_BILINEAR_FIXED", GD_BILINEAR_FIXED, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_BICUBIC", GD_BICUBIC, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_BICUBIC_FIXED", GD_BICUBIC_FIXED, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_BLACKMAN", GD_BLACKMAN, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_BOX", GD_BOX, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_BSPLINE", GD_BSPLINE, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_CATMULLROM", GD_CATMULLROM, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_GAUSSIAN", GD_GAUSSIAN, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_GENERALIZED_CUBIC", GD_GENERALIZED_CUBIC, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_HERMITE", GD_HERMITE, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_HAMMING", GD_HAMMING, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_HANNING", GD_HANNING, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_MITCHELL", GD_MITCHELL, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_POWER", GD_POWER, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_QUADRATIC", GD_QUADRATIC, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_SINC", GD_SINC, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_NEAREST_NEIGHBOUR", GD_NEAREST_NEIGHBOUR, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_WEIGHTED4", GD_WEIGHTED4, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_TRIANGLE", GD_TRIANGLE, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_AFFINE_TRANSLATE", GD_AFFINE_TRANSLATE, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_AFFINE_SCALE", GD_AFFINE_SCALE, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_AFFINE_ROTATE", GD_AFFINE_ROTATE, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_AFFINE_SHEAR_HORIZONTAL", GD_AFFINE_SHEAR_HORIZONTAL, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_AFFINE_SHEAR_VERTICAL", GD_AFFINE_SHEAR_VERTICAL, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
#if defined(HAVE_GD_BUNDLED)
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("GD_BUNDLED", 1, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
#else
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("GD_BUNDLED", 0, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
#endif
/* Section Filters */
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_FILTER_NEGATE", IMAGE_FILTER_NEGATE, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_FILTER_GRAYSCALE", IMAGE_FILTER_GRAYSCALE, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_FILTER_BRIGHTNESS", IMAGE_FILTER_BRIGHTNESS, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_FILTER_CONTRAST", IMAGE_FILTER_CONTRAST, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_FILTER_COLORIZE", IMAGE_FILTER_COLORIZE, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_FILTER_EDGEDETECT", IMAGE_FILTER_EDGEDETECT, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_FILTER_GAUSSIAN_BLUR", IMAGE_FILTER_GAUSSIAN_BLUR, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_FILTER_SELECTIVE_BLUR", IMAGE_FILTER_SELECTIVE_BLUR, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_FILTER_EMBOSS", IMAGE_FILTER_EMBOSS, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_FILTER_MEAN_REMOVAL", IMAGE_FILTER_MEAN_REMOVAL, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_FILTER_SMOOTH", IMAGE_FILTER_SMOOTH, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("IMG_FILTER_PIXELATE", IMAGE_FILTER_PIXELATE, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
/* End Section Filters */
#ifdef GD_VERSION_STRING
REGISTER_STRING_CONSTANT("GD_VERSION", GD_VERSION_STRING, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
#endif
#if defined(GD_MAJOR_VERSION) && defined(GD_MINOR_VERSION) && defined(GD_RELEASE_VERSION) && defined(GD_EXTRA_VERSION)
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("GD_MAJOR_VERSION", GD_MAJOR_VERSION, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("GD_MINOR_VERSION", GD_MINOR_VERSION, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("GD_RELEASE_VERSION", GD_RELEASE_VERSION, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_STRING_CONSTANT("GD_EXTRA_VERSION", GD_EXTRA_VERSION, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_GD_PNG
/*
* cannot include #include "png.h"
* /usr/include/pngconf.h:310:2: error: #error png.h already includes setjmp.h with some additional fixup.
* as error, use the values for now...
*/
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("PNG_NO_FILTER", 0x00, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("PNG_FILTER_NONE", 0x08, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("PNG_FILTER_SUB", 0x10, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("PNG_FILTER_UP", 0x20, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("PNG_FILTER_AVG", 0x40, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("PNG_FILTER_PAETH", 0x80, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("PNG_ALL_FILTERS", 0x08 | 0x10 | 0x20 | 0x40 | 0x80, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
#endif
return SUCCESS;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: The imagetruecolortopalette function in ext/gd/gd.c in PHP before 5.6.25 and 7.x before 7.0.10 does not properly validate the number of colors, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (select_colors allocation error and out-of-bounds write) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large value in the third argument.
Commit Message: Fix bug#72697 - select_colors write out-of-bounds | High | 166,955 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: uint32_t GetPayloadTime(size_t handle, uint32_t index, float *in, float *out)
{
mp4object *mp4 = (mp4object *)handle;
if (mp4 == NULL) return 0;
if (mp4->metaoffsets == 0 || mp4->basemetadataduration == 0 || mp4->meta_clockdemon == 0 || in == NULL || out == NULL) return 1;
*in = (float)((double)index * (double)mp4->basemetadataduration / (double)mp4->meta_clockdemon);
*out = (float)((double)(index + 1) * (double)mp4->basemetadataduration / (double)mp4->meta_clockdemon);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: GoPro GPMF-parser 1.2.2 has an out-of-bounds write in OpenMP4Source in demo/GPMF_mp4reader.c.
Commit Message: fixed many security issues with the too crude mp4 reader | Medium | 169,549 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void PrintPreviewUI::GetPrintPreviewDataForIndex(
int index,
scoped_refptr<base::RefCountedBytes>* data) {
print_preview_data_service()->GetDataEntry(preview_ui_addr_str_, index, data);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The IPC implementation in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows attackers to obtain potentially sensitive information about memory addresses via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,834 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> strictFunctionCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.strictFunction");
if (args.Length() < 3)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(args.Holder());
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
{
STRING_TO_V8PARAMETER_EXCEPTION_BLOCK(V8Parameter<>, str, MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined));
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(float, a, static_cast<float>(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 1, DefaultIsUndefined)->NumberValue()));
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(int, b, V8int::HasInstance(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 2, DefaultIsUndefined)) ? V8int::toNative(v8::Handle<v8::Object>::Cast(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 2, DefaultIsUndefined))) : 0);
RefPtr<bool> result = imp->strictFunction(str, a, b, ec);
if (UNLIKELY(ec))
goto fail;
return toV8(result.release(), args.GetIsolate());
}
fail:
V8Proxy::setDOMException(ec, args.GetIsolate());
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,105 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int ape_decode_frame(AVCodecContext *avctx, void *data,
int *got_frame_ptr, AVPacket *avpkt)
{
AVFrame *frame = data;
const uint8_t *buf = avpkt->data;
APEContext *s = avctx->priv_data;
uint8_t *sample8;
int16_t *sample16;
int32_t *sample24;
int i, ch, ret;
int blockstodecode;
/* this should never be negative, but bad things will happen if it is, so
check it just to make sure. */
av_assert0(s->samples >= 0);
if(!s->samples){
uint32_t nblocks, offset;
int buf_size;
if (!avpkt->size) {
*got_frame_ptr = 0;
return 0;
}
if (avpkt->size < 8) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Packet is too small\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
buf_size = avpkt->size & ~3;
if (buf_size != avpkt->size) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "packet size is not a multiple of 4. "
"extra bytes at the end will be skipped.\n");
}
if (s->fileversion < 3950) // previous versions overread two bytes
buf_size += 2;
av_fast_padded_malloc(&s->data, &s->data_size, buf_size);
if (!s->data)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
s->bdsp.bswap_buf((uint32_t *) s->data, (const uint32_t *) buf,
buf_size >> 2);
memset(s->data + (buf_size & ~3), 0, buf_size & 3);
s->ptr = s->data;
s->data_end = s->data + buf_size;
nblocks = bytestream_get_be32(&s->ptr);
offset = bytestream_get_be32(&s->ptr);
if (s->fileversion >= 3900) {
if (offset > 3) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Incorrect offset passed\n");
s->data = NULL;
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (s->data_end - s->ptr < offset) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Packet is too small\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
s->ptr += offset;
} else {
if ((ret = init_get_bits8(&s->gb, s->ptr, s->data_end - s->ptr)) < 0)
return ret;
if (s->fileversion > 3800)
skip_bits_long(&s->gb, offset * 8);
else
skip_bits_long(&s->gb, offset);
}
if (!nblocks || nblocks > INT_MAX) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Invalid sample count: %"PRIu32".\n",
nblocks);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
/* Initialize the frame decoder */
if (init_frame_decoder(s) < 0) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Error reading frame header\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
s->samples = nblocks;
}
if (!s->data) {
*got_frame_ptr = 0;
return avpkt->size;
}
blockstodecode = FFMIN(s->blocks_per_loop, s->samples);
if (s->fileversion < 3930)
blockstodecode = s->samples;
/* reallocate decoded sample buffer if needed */
av_fast_malloc(&s->decoded_buffer, &s->decoded_size,
2 * FFALIGN(blockstodecode, 8) * sizeof(*s->decoded_buffer));
if (!s->decoded_buffer)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
memset(s->decoded_buffer, 0, s->decoded_size);
s->decoded[0] = s->decoded_buffer;
s->decoded[1] = s->decoded_buffer + FFALIGN(blockstodecode, 8);
/* get output buffer */
frame->nb_samples = blockstodecode;
if ((ret = ff_get_buffer(avctx, frame, 0)) < 0)
return ret;
s->error=0;
if ((s->channels == 1) || (s->frameflags & APE_FRAMECODE_PSEUDO_STEREO))
ape_unpack_mono(s, blockstodecode);
else
ape_unpack_stereo(s, blockstodecode);
emms_c();
if (s->error) {
s->samples=0;
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Error decoding frame\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
switch (s->bps) {
case 8:
for (ch = 0; ch < s->channels; ch++) {
sample8 = (uint8_t *)frame->data[ch];
for (i = 0; i < blockstodecode; i++)
*sample8++ = (s->decoded[ch][i] + 0x80) & 0xff;
}
break;
case 16:
for (ch = 0; ch < s->channels; ch++) {
sample16 = (int16_t *)frame->data[ch];
for (i = 0; i < blockstodecode; i++)
*sample16++ = s->decoded[ch][i];
}
break;
case 24:
for (ch = 0; ch < s->channels; ch++) {
sample24 = (int32_t *)frame->data[ch];
for (i = 0; i < blockstodecode; i++)
*sample24++ = s->decoded[ch][i] << 8;
}
break;
}
s->samples -= blockstodecode;
*got_frame_ptr = 1;
return !s->samples ? avpkt->size : 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Integer overflow in the ape_decode_frame function in libavcodec/apedec.c in FFmpeg through 3.3.2 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-array access and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted APE file.
Commit Message: avcodec/apedec: Fix integer overflow
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: PoC.ape and others
Found-by: Bingchang, Liu@VARAS of IIE
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | Medium | 168,038 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void Splash::scaleMaskYdXu(SplashImageMaskSource src, void *srcData,
int srcWidth, int srcHeight,
int scaledWidth, int scaledHeight,
SplashBitmap *dest) {
Guchar *lineBuf;
Guint *pixBuf;
Guint pix;
Guchar *destPtr;
int yp, yq, xp, xq, yt, y, yStep, xt, x, xStep, d;
int i, j;
yp = srcHeight / scaledHeight;
lineBuf = (Guchar *)gmalloc(srcWidth);
pixBuf = (Guint *)gmallocn(srcWidth, sizeof(int));
yt = 0;
destPtr = dest->data;
for (y = 0; y < scaledHeight; ++y) {
yt = 0;
destPtr = dest->data;
for (y = 0; y < scaledHeight; ++y) {
}
memset(pixBuf, 0, srcWidth * sizeof(int));
for (i = 0; i < yStep; ++i) {
(*src)(srcData, lineBuf);
for (j = 0; j < srcWidth; ++j) {
pixBuf[j] += lineBuf[j];
}
}
xt = 0;
d = (255 << 23) / yStep;
for (x = 0; x < srcWidth; ++x) {
if ((xt += xq) >= srcWidth) {
xt -= srcWidth;
xStep = xp + 1;
} else {
xStep = xp;
}
pix = pixBuf[x];
pix = (pix * d) >> 23;
for (i = 0; i < xStep; ++i) {
*destPtr++ = (Guchar)pix;
}
}
}
gfree(pixBuf);
gfree(lineBuf);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: poppler before 0.22.1 allows context-dependent attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) and possibly execute arbitrary code via vectors that trigger an "invalid memory access" in (1) splash/Splash.cc, (2) poppler/Function.cc, and (3) poppler/Stream.cc.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,737 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: status_t NuPlayer::GenericSource::setBuffers(
bool audio, Vector<MediaBuffer *> &buffers) {
if (mIsWidevine && !audio && mVideoTrack.mSource != NULL) {
return mVideoTrack.mSource->setBuffers(buffers);
}
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: media/libmediaplayerservice/nuplayer/GenericSource.cpp in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01 does not validate certain track data, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 28799341.
Commit Message: Resolve a merge issue between lmp and lmp-mr1+
Change-Id: I336cb003fb7f50fd7d95c30ca47e45530a7ad503
(cherry picked from commit 33f6da1092834f1e4be199cfa3b6310d66b521c0)
(cherry picked from commit bb3a0338b58fafb01ac5b34efc450b80747e71e4)
| High | 174,166 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> convert3Callback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.convert3");
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(args.Holder());
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(c*, , V8c::HasInstance(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)) ? V8c::toNative(v8::Handle<v8::Object>::Cast(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined))) : 0);
imp->convert3();
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,079 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: archive_acl_from_text_l(struct archive_acl *acl, const char *text,
int want_type, struct archive_string_conv *sc)
{
struct {
const char *start;
const char *end;
} field[6], name;
const char *s, *st;
int numfields, fields, n, r, sol, ret;
int type, types, tag, permset, id;
size_t len;
char sep;
switch (want_type) {
case ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_POSIX1E:
want_type = ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_ACCESS;
__LA_FALLTHROUGH;
case ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
case ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
numfields = 5;
break;
case ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_NFS4:
numfields = 6;
break;
default:
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
ret = ARCHIVE_OK;
types = 0;
while (text != NULL && *text != '\0') {
/*
* Parse the fields out of the next entry,
* advance 'text' to start of next entry.
*/
fields = 0;
do {
const char *start, *end;
next_field(&text, &start, &end, &sep);
if (fields < numfields) {
field[fields].start = start;
field[fields].end = end;
}
++fields;
} while (sep == ':');
/* Set remaining fields to blank. */
for (n = fields; n < numfields; ++n)
field[n].start = field[n].end = NULL;
if (field[0].start != NULL && *(field[0].start) == '#') {
/* Comment, skip entry */
continue;
}
n = 0;
sol = 0;
id = -1;
permset = 0;
name.start = name.end = NULL;
if (want_type != ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_NFS4) {
/* POSIX.1e ACLs */
/*
* Default keyword "default:user::rwx"
* if found, we have one more field
*
* We also support old Solaris extension:
* "defaultuser::rwx" is the default ACL corresponding
* to "user::rwx", etc. valid only for first field
*/
s = field[0].start;
len = field[0].end - field[0].start;
if (*s == 'd' && (len == 1 || (len >= 7
&& memcmp((s + 1), "efault", 6) == 0))) {
type = ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT;
if (len > 7)
field[0].start += 7;
else
n = 1;
} else
type = want_type;
/* Check for a numeric ID in field n+1 or n+3. */
isint(field[n + 1].start, field[n + 1].end, &id);
/* Field n+3 is optional. */
if (id == -1 && fields > (n + 3))
isint(field[n + 3].start, field[n + 3].end,
&id);
tag = 0;
s = field[n].start;
st = field[n].start + 1;
len = field[n].end - field[n].start;
switch (*s) {
case 'u':
if (len == 1 || (len == 4
&& memcmp(st, "ser", 3) == 0))
tag = ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_USER_OBJ;
break;
case 'g':
if (len == 1 || (len == 5
&& memcmp(st, "roup", 4) == 0))
tag = ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_GROUP_OBJ;
break;
case 'o':
if (len == 1 || (len == 5
&& memcmp(st, "ther", 4) == 0))
tag = ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_OTHER;
break;
case 'm':
if (len == 1 || (len == 4
&& memcmp(st, "ask", 3) == 0))
tag = ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_MASK;
break;
default:
break;
}
switch (tag) {
case ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_OTHER:
case ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_MASK:
if (fields == (n + 2)
&& field[n + 1].start < field[n + 1].end
&& ismode(field[n + 1].start,
field[n + 1].end, &permset)) {
/* This is Solaris-style "other:rwx" */
sol = 1;
} else if (fields == (n + 3) &&
field[n + 1].start < field[n + 1].end) {
/* Invalid mask or other field */
ret = ARCHIVE_WARN;
continue;
}
break;
case ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_USER_OBJ:
case ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
if (id != -1 ||
field[n + 1].start < field[n + 1].end) {
name = field[n + 1];
if (tag == ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_USER_OBJ)
tag = ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_USER;
else
tag = ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_GROUP;
}
break;
default:
/* Invalid tag, skip entry */
ret = ARCHIVE_WARN;
continue;
}
/*
* Without "default:" we expect mode in field 3
* Exception: Solaris other and mask fields
*/
if (permset == 0 && !ismode(field[n + 2 - sol].start,
field[n + 2 - sol].end, &permset)) {
/* Invalid mode, skip entry */
ret = ARCHIVE_WARN;
continue;
}
} else {
/* NFS4 ACLs */
s = field[0].start;
len = field[0].end - field[0].start;
tag = 0;
switch (len) {
case 4:
if (memcmp(s, "user", 4) == 0)
tag = ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_USER;
break;
case 5:
if (memcmp(s, "group", 5) == 0)
tag = ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_GROUP;
break;
case 6:
if (memcmp(s, "owner@", 6) == 0)
tag = ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_USER_OBJ;
else if (memcmp(s, "group@", 6) == 0)
tag = ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_GROUP_OBJ;
break;
case 9:
if (memcmp(s, "everyone@", 9) == 0)
tag = ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_EVERYONE;
break;
default:
break;
}
if (tag == 0) {
/* Invalid tag, skip entry */
ret = ARCHIVE_WARN;
continue;
} else if (tag == ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_USER ||
tag == ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_GROUP) {
n = 1;
name = field[1];
isint(name.start, name.end, &id);
} else
n = 0;
if (!is_nfs4_perms(field[1 + n].start,
field[1 + n].end, &permset)) {
/* Invalid NFSv4 perms, skip entry */
ret = ARCHIVE_WARN;
continue;
}
if (!is_nfs4_flags(field[2 + n].start,
field[2 + n].end, &permset)) {
/* Invalid NFSv4 flags, skip entry */
ret = ARCHIVE_WARN;
continue;
}
s = field[3 + n].start;
len = field[3 + n].end - field[3 + n].start;
type = 0;
if (len == 4) {
if (memcmp(s, "deny", 4) == 0)
type = ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_DENY;
} else if (len == 5) {
if (memcmp(s, "allow", 5) == 0)
type = ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_ALLOW;
else if (memcmp(s, "audit", 5) == 0)
type = ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_AUDIT;
else if (memcmp(s, "alarm", 5) == 0)
type = ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_ALARM;
}
if (type == 0) {
/* Invalid entry type, skip entry */
ret = ARCHIVE_WARN;
continue;
}
isint(field[4 + n].start, field[4 + n].end,
&id);
}
/* Add entry to the internal list. */
r = archive_acl_add_entry_len_l(acl, type, permset,
tag, id, name.start, name.end - name.start, sc);
if (r < ARCHIVE_WARN)
return (r);
if (r != ARCHIVE_OK)
ret = ARCHIVE_WARN;
types |= type;
}
/* Reset ACL */
archive_acl_reset(acl, types);
return (ret);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: libarchive version commit 379867ecb330b3a952fb7bfa7bffb7bbd5547205 onwards (release v3.3.0 onwards) contains a CWE-476: NULL Pointer Dereference vulnerability in ACL parser - libarchive/archive_acl.c, archive_acl_from_text_l() that can result in Crash/DoS. This attack appear to be exploitable via the victim must open a specially crafted archive file.
Commit Message: Skip 0-length ACL fields
Currently, it is possible to create an archive that crashes bsdtar
with a malformed ACL:
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
archive_acl_from_text_l (acl=<optimised out>, text=0x7e2e92 "", want_type=<optimised out>, sc=<optimised out>) at libarchive/archive_acl.c:1726
1726 switch (*s) {
(gdb) p n
$1 = 1
(gdb) p field[n]
$2 = {start = 0x0, end = 0x0}
Stop this by checking that the length is not zero before beginning
the switch statement.
I am pretty sure this is the bug mentioned in the qsym paper [1],
and I was able to replicate it with a qsym + AFL + afl-rb setup.
[1] https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/yun | Medium | 168,929 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static struct sock *unix_create1(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int kern)
{
struct sock *sk = NULL;
struct unix_sock *u;
atomic_long_inc(&unix_nr_socks);
if (atomic_long_read(&unix_nr_socks) > 2 * get_max_files())
goto out;
sk = sk_alloc(net, PF_UNIX, GFP_KERNEL, &unix_proto, kern);
if (!sk)
goto out;
sock_init_data(sock, sk);
lockdep_set_class(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock,
&af_unix_sk_receive_queue_lock_key);
sk->sk_write_space = unix_write_space;
sk->sk_max_ack_backlog = net->unx.sysctl_max_dgram_qlen;
sk->sk_destruct = unix_sock_destructor;
u = unix_sk(sk);
u->path.dentry = NULL;
u->path.mnt = NULL;
spin_lock_init(&u->lock);
atomic_long_set(&u->inflight, 0);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&u->link);
mutex_init(&u->readlock); /* single task reading lock */
init_waitqueue_head(&u->peer_wait);
unix_insert_socket(unix_sockets_unbound(sk), sk);
out:
if (sk == NULL)
atomic_long_dec(&unix_nr_socks);
else {
local_bh_disable();
sock_prot_inuse_add(sock_net(sk), sk->sk_prot, 1);
local_bh_enable();
}
return sk;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Bypass
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in net/unix/af_unix.c in the Linux kernel before 4.3.3 allows local users to bypass intended AF_UNIX socket permissions or cause a denial of service (panic) via crafted epoll_ctl calls.
Commit Message: unix: avoid use-after-free in ep_remove_wait_queue
Rainer Weikusat <[email protected]> writes:
An AF_UNIX datagram socket being the client in an n:1 association with
some server socket is only allowed to send messages to the server if the
receive queue of this socket contains at most sk_max_ack_backlog
datagrams. This implies that prospective writers might be forced to go
to sleep despite none of the message presently enqueued on the server
receive queue were sent by them. In order to ensure that these will be
woken up once space becomes again available, the present unix_dgram_poll
routine does a second sock_poll_wait call with the peer_wait wait queue
of the server socket as queue argument (unix_dgram_recvmsg does a wake
up on this queue after a datagram was received). This is inherently
problematic because the server socket is only guaranteed to remain alive
for as long as the client still holds a reference to it. In case the
connection is dissolved via connect or by the dead peer detection logic
in unix_dgram_sendmsg, the server socket may be freed despite "the
polling mechanism" (in particular, epoll) still has a pointer to the
corresponding peer_wait queue. There's no way to forcibly deregister a
wait queue with epoll.
Based on an idea by Jason Baron, the patch below changes the code such
that a wait_queue_t belonging to the client socket is enqueued on the
peer_wait queue of the server whenever the peer receive queue full
condition is detected by either a sendmsg or a poll. A wake up on the
peer queue is then relayed to the ordinary wait queue of the client
socket via wake function. The connection to the peer wait queue is again
dissolved if either a wake up is about to be relayed or the client
socket reconnects or a dead peer is detected or the client socket is
itself closed. This enables removing the second sock_poll_wait from
unix_dgram_poll, thus avoiding the use-after-free, while still ensuring
that no blocked writer sleeps forever.
Signed-off-by: Rainer Weikusat <[email protected]>
Fixes: ec0d215f9420 ("af_unix: fix 'poll for write'/connected DGRAM sockets")
Reviewed-by: Jason Baron <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,833 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: USHORT CNB::QueryL4HeaderOffset(PVOID PacketData, ULONG IpHeaderOffset) const
{
USHORT Res;
auto ppr = ParaNdis_ReviewIPPacket(RtlOffsetToPointer(PacketData, IpHeaderOffset),
GetDataLength(), __FUNCTION__);
if (ppr.ipStatus != ppresNotIP)
{
Res = static_cast<USHORT>(IpHeaderOffset + ppr.ipHeaderSize);
}
else
{
DPrintf(0, ("[%s] ERROR: NOT an IP packet - expected troubles!\n", __FUNCTION__));
Res = 0;
}
return Res;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The NetKVM Windows Virtio driver allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (guest crash) via a crafted length value in an IP packet, as demonstrated by a value that does not account for the size of the IP options.
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: Checking the length only on read
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <[email protected]> | Medium | 170,141 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: uint32_t _WM_SetupMidiEvent(struct _mdi *mdi, uint8_t * event_data, uint8_t running_event) {
/*
Only add standard MIDI and Sysex events in here.
Non-standard events need to be handled by calling function
to avoid compatibility issues.
TODO:
Add value limit checks
*/
uint32_t ret_cnt = 0;
uint8_t command = 0;
uint8_t channel = 0;
uint8_t data_1 = 0;
uint8_t data_2 = 0;
char *text = NULL;
if (event_data[0] >= 0x80) {
command = *event_data & 0xf0;
channel = *event_data++ & 0x0f;
ret_cnt++;
} else {
command = running_event & 0xf0;
channel = running_event & 0x0f;
}
switch(command) {
case 0x80:
_SETUP_NOTEOFF:
data_1 = *event_data++;
data_2 = *event_data++;
_WM_midi_setup_noteoff(mdi, channel, data_1, data_2);
ret_cnt += 2;
break;
case 0x90:
if (event_data[1] == 0) goto _SETUP_NOTEOFF; /* A velocity of 0 in a note on is actually a note off */
data_1 = *event_data++;
data_2 = *event_data++;
midi_setup_noteon(mdi, channel, data_1, data_2);
ret_cnt += 2;
break;
case 0xa0:
data_1 = *event_data++;
data_2 = *event_data++;
midi_setup_aftertouch(mdi, channel, data_1, data_2);
ret_cnt += 2;
break;
case 0xb0:
data_1 = *event_data++;
data_2 = *event_data++;
midi_setup_control(mdi, channel, data_1, data_2);
ret_cnt += 2;
break;
case 0xc0:
data_1 = *event_data++;
midi_setup_patch(mdi, channel, data_1);
ret_cnt++;
break;
case 0xd0:
data_1 = *event_data++;
midi_setup_channel_pressure(mdi, channel, data_1);
ret_cnt++;
break;
case 0xe0:
data_1 = *event_data++;
data_2 = *event_data++;
midi_setup_pitch(mdi, channel, ((data_2 << 7) | (data_1 & 0x7f)));
ret_cnt += 2;
break;
case 0xf0:
if (channel == 0x0f) {
/*
MIDI Meta Events
*/
uint32_t tmp_length = 0;
if ((event_data[0] == 0x00) && (event_data[1] == 0x02)) {
/*
Sequence Number
We only setting this up here for WM_Event2Midi function
*/
midi_setup_sequenceno(mdi, ((event_data[2] << 8) + event_data[3]));
ret_cnt += 4;
} else if (event_data[0] == 0x01) {
/* Text Event */
/* Get Length */
event_data++;
ret_cnt++;
if (*event_data > 0x7f) {
do {
tmp_length = (tmp_length << 7) + (*event_data & 0x7f);
event_data++;
ret_cnt++;
} while (*event_data > 0x7f);
}
tmp_length = (tmp_length << 7) + (*event_data & 0x7f);
event_data++;
ret_cnt++;
text = malloc(tmp_length + 1);
memcpy(text, event_data, tmp_length);
text[tmp_length] = '\0';
midi_setup_text(mdi, text);
ret_cnt += tmp_length;
} else if (event_data[0] == 0x02) {
/* Copyright Event */
/* Get Length */
event_data++;
ret_cnt++;
if (*event_data > 0x7f) {
do {
tmp_length = (tmp_length << 7) + (*event_data & 0x7f);
event_data++;
ret_cnt++;
} while (*event_data > 0x7f);
}
tmp_length = (tmp_length << 7) + (*event_data & 0x7f);
event_data++;
ret_cnt++;
/* Copy copyright info in the getinfo struct */
if (mdi->extra_info.copyright) {
mdi->extra_info.copyright = realloc(mdi->extra_info.copyright,(strlen(mdi->extra_info.copyright) + 1 + tmp_length + 1));
memcpy(&mdi->extra_info.copyright[strlen(mdi->extra_info.copyright) + 1], event_data, tmp_length);
mdi->extra_info.copyright[strlen(mdi->extra_info.copyright) + 1 + tmp_length] = '\0';
mdi->extra_info.copyright[strlen(mdi->extra_info.copyright)] = '\n';
} else {
mdi->extra_info.copyright = malloc(tmp_length + 1);
memcpy(mdi->extra_info.copyright, event_data, tmp_length);
mdi->extra_info.copyright[tmp_length] = '\0';
}
/* NOTE: free'd when events are cleared during closure of mdi */
text = malloc(tmp_length + 1);
memcpy(text, event_data, tmp_length);
text[tmp_length] = '\0';
midi_setup_copyright(mdi, text);
ret_cnt += tmp_length;
} else if (event_data[0] == 0x03) {
/* Track Name Event */
/* Get Length */
event_data++;
ret_cnt++;
if (*event_data > 0x7f) {
do {
tmp_length = (tmp_length << 7) + (*event_data & 0x7f);
event_data++;
ret_cnt++;
} while (*event_data > 0x7f);
}
tmp_length = (tmp_length << 7) + (*event_data & 0x7f);
event_data++;
ret_cnt++;
text = malloc(tmp_length + 1);
memcpy(text, event_data, tmp_length);
text[tmp_length] = '\0';
midi_setup_trackname(mdi, text);
ret_cnt += tmp_length;
} else if (event_data[0] == 0x04) {
/* Instrument Name Event */
/* Get Length */
event_data++;
ret_cnt++;
if (*event_data > 0x7f) {
do {
tmp_length = (tmp_length << 7) + (*event_data & 0x7f);
event_data++;
ret_cnt++;
} while (*event_data > 0x7f);
}
tmp_length = (tmp_length << 7) + (*event_data & 0x7f);
event_data++;
ret_cnt++;
text = malloc(tmp_length + 1);
memcpy(text, event_data, tmp_length);
text[tmp_length] = '\0';
midi_setup_instrumentname(mdi, text);
ret_cnt += tmp_length;
} else if (event_data[0] == 0x05) {
/* Lyric Event */
/* Get Length */
event_data++;
ret_cnt++;
if (*event_data > 0x7f) {
do {
tmp_length = (tmp_length << 7) + (*event_data & 0x7f);
event_data++;
ret_cnt++;
} while (*event_data > 0x7f);
}
tmp_length = (tmp_length << 7) + (*event_data & 0x7f);
event_data++;
ret_cnt++;
text = malloc(tmp_length + 1);
memcpy(text, event_data, tmp_length);
text[tmp_length] = '\0';
midi_setup_lyric(mdi, text);
ret_cnt += tmp_length;
} else if (event_data[0] == 0x06) {
/* Marker Event */
/* Get Length */
event_data++;
ret_cnt++;
if (*event_data > 0x7f) {
do {
tmp_length = (tmp_length << 7) + (*event_data & 0x7f);
event_data++;
ret_cnt++;
} while (*event_data > 0x7f);
}
tmp_length = (tmp_length << 7) + (*event_data & 0x7f);
event_data++;
ret_cnt++;
text = malloc(tmp_length + 1);
memcpy(text, event_data, tmp_length);
text[tmp_length] = '\0';
midi_setup_marker(mdi, text);
ret_cnt += tmp_length;
} else if (event_data[0] == 0x07) {
/* Cue Point Event */
/* Get Length */
event_data++;
ret_cnt++;
if (*event_data > 0x7f) {
do {
tmp_length = (tmp_length << 7) + (*event_data & 0x7f);
event_data++;
ret_cnt++;
} while (*event_data > 0x7f);
}
tmp_length = (tmp_length << 7) + (*event_data & 0x7f);
event_data++;
ret_cnt++;
text = malloc(tmp_length + 1);
memcpy(text, event_data, tmp_length);
text[tmp_length] = '\0';
midi_setup_cuepoint(mdi, text);
ret_cnt += tmp_length;
} else if ((event_data[0] == 0x20) && (event_data[1] == 0x01)) {
/*
Channel Prefix
We only setting this up here for WM_Event2Midi function
*/
midi_setup_channelprefix(mdi, event_data[2]);
ret_cnt += 3;
} else if ((event_data[0] == 0x21) && (event_data[1] == 0x01)) {
/*
Port Prefix
We only setting this up here for WM_Event2Midi function
*/
midi_setup_portprefix(mdi, event_data[2]);
ret_cnt += 3;
} else if ((event_data[0] == 0x2F) && (event_data[1] == 0x00)) {
/*
End of Track
Deal with this inside calling function
We only setting this up here for _WM_Event2Midi function
*/
_WM_midi_setup_endoftrack(mdi);
ret_cnt += 2;
} else if ((event_data[0] == 0x51) && (event_data[1] == 0x03)) {
/*
Tempo
Deal with this inside calling function.
We only setting this up here for _WM_Event2Midi function
*/
_WM_midi_setup_tempo(mdi, ((event_data[2] << 16) + (event_data[3] << 8) + event_data[4]));
ret_cnt += 5;
} else if ((event_data[0] == 0x54) && (event_data[1] == 0x05)) {
/*
SMPTE Offset
We only setting this up here for WM_Event2Midi function
*/
midi_setup_smpteoffset(mdi, ((event_data[3] << 24) + (event_data[4] << 16) + (event_data[5] << 8) + event_data[6]));
/*
Because this has 5 bytes of data we gonna "hack" it a little
*/
mdi->events[mdi->events_size - 1].event_data.channel = event_data[2];
ret_cnt += 7;
} else if ((event_data[0] == 0x58) && (event_data[1] == 0x04)) {
/*
Time Signature
We only setting this up here for WM_Event2Midi function
*/
midi_setup_timesignature(mdi, ((event_data[2] << 24) + (event_data[3] << 16) + (event_data[4] << 8) + event_data[5]));
ret_cnt += 6;
} else if ((event_data[0] == 0x59) && (event_data[1] == 0x02)) {
/*
Key Signature
We only setting this up here for WM_Event2Midi function
*/
midi_setup_keysignature(mdi, ((event_data[2] << 8) + event_data[3]));
ret_cnt += 4;
} else {
/*
Unsupported Meta Event
*/
event_data++;
ret_cnt++;
if (*event_data > 0x7f) {
do {
tmp_length = (tmp_length << 7) + (*event_data & 0x7f);
event_data++;
ret_cnt++;
} while (*event_data > 0x7f);
}
tmp_length = (tmp_length << 7) + (*event_data & 0x7f);
ret_cnt++;
ret_cnt += tmp_length;
}
} else if ((channel == 0) || (channel == 7)) {
/*
Sysex Events
*/
uint32_t sysex_len = 0;
uint8_t *sysex_store = NULL;
if (*event_data > 0x7f) {
do {
sysex_len = (sysex_len << 7) + (*event_data & 0x7F);
event_data++;
ret_cnt++;
} while (*event_data > 0x7f);
}
sysex_len = (sysex_len << 7) + (*event_data & 0x7F);
event_data++;
if (!sysex_len) break;
ret_cnt++;
sysex_store = malloc(sizeof(uint8_t) * sysex_len);
memcpy(sysex_store, event_data, sysex_len);
if (sysex_store[sysex_len - 1] == 0xF7) {
uint8_t rolandsysexid[] = { 0x41, 0x10, 0x42, 0x12 };
if (memcmp(rolandsysexid, sysex_store, 4) == 0) {
/* For Roland Sysex Messages */
/* checksum */
uint8_t sysex_cs = 0;
uint32_t sysex_ofs = 4;
do {
sysex_cs += sysex_store[sysex_ofs];
if (sysex_cs > 0x7F) {
sysex_cs -= 0x80;
}
sysex_ofs++;
} while (sysex_store[sysex_ofs + 1] != 0xf7);
sysex_cs = 128 - sysex_cs;
/* is roland sysex message valid */
if (sysex_cs == sysex_store[sysex_ofs]) {
/* process roland sysex event */
if (sysex_store[4] == 0x40) {
if (((sysex_store[5] & 0xf0) == 0x10) && (sysex_store[6] == 0x15)) {
/* Roland Drum Track Setting */
uint8_t sysex_ch = 0x0f & sysex_store[5];
if (sysex_ch == 0x00) {
sysex_ch = 0x09;
} else if (sysex_ch <= 0x09) {
sysex_ch -= 1;
}
midi_setup_sysex_roland_drum_track(mdi, sysex_ch, sysex_store[7]);
} else if ((sysex_store[5] == 0x00) && (sysex_store[6] == 0x7F) && (sysex_store[7] == 0x00)) {
/* Roland GS Reset */
midi_setup_sysex_roland_reset(mdi);
}
}
}
} else {
/* For non-Roland Sysex Messages */
uint8_t gm_reset[] = {0x7e, 0x7f, 0x09, 0x01, 0xf7};
uint8_t yamaha_reset[] = {0x43, 0x10, 0x4c, 0x00, 0x00, 0x7e, 0x00, 0xf7};
if (memcmp(gm_reset, sysex_store, 5) == 0) {
/* GM Reset */
midi_setup_sysex_gm_reset(mdi);
} else if (memcmp(yamaha_reset,sysex_store,8) == 0) {
/* Yamaha Reset */
midi_setup_sysex_yamaha_reset(mdi);
}
}
}
free(sysex_store);
sysex_store = NULL;
/*
event_data += sysex_len;
*/
ret_cnt += sysex_len;
} else {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_CORUPT, "(unrecognized meta type event)", 0);
return 0;
}
break;
default: /* Should NEVER get here */
ret_cnt = 0;
break;
}
if (ret_cnt == 0)
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_CORUPT, "(missing event)", 0);
return ret_cnt;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The _WM_SetupMidiEvent function in internal_midi.c:2122 in WildMIDI 0.4.2 can cause a denial of service (invalid memory read and application crash) via a crafted mid file.
Commit Message: Add a new size parameter to _WM_SetupMidiEvent() so that it knows
where to stop reading, and adjust its users properly. Fixes bug #175
(CVE-2017-11661, CVE-2017-11662, CVE-2017-11663, CVE-2017-11664.) | Medium | 168,007 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int snmp_helper(void *context, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag,
const void *data, size_t datalen)
{
struct snmp_ctx *ctx = (struct snmp_ctx *)context;
__be32 *pdata = (__be32 *)data;
if (*pdata == ctx->from) {
pr_debug("%s: %pI4 to %pI4\n", __func__,
(void *)&ctx->from, (void *)&ctx->to);
if (*ctx->check)
fast_csum(ctx, (unsigned char *)data - ctx->begin);
*pdata = ctx->to;
}
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-129
Summary: In the Linux kernel before 4.20.12, net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_snmp_basic_main.c in the SNMP NAT module has insufficient ASN.1 length checks (aka an array index error), making out-of-bounds read and write operations possible, leading to an OOPS or local privilege escalation. This affects snmp_version and snmp_helper.
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_nat_snmp_basic: add missing length checks in ASN.1 cbs
The generic ASN.1 decoder infrastructure doesn't guarantee that callbacks
will get as much data as they expect; callbacks have to check the `datalen`
parameter before looking at `data`. Make sure that snmp_version() and
snmp_helper() don't read/write beyond the end of the packet data.
(Also move the assignment to `pdata` down below the check to make it clear
that it isn't necessarily a pointer we can use before the `datalen` check.)
Fixes: cc2d58634e0f ("netfilter: nf_nat_snmp_basic: use asn1 decoder library")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,723 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: MagickExport Image *MeanShiftImage(const Image *image,const size_t width,
const size_t height,const double color_distance,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define MaxMeanShiftIterations 100
#define MeanShiftImageTag "MeanShift/Image"
CacheView
*image_view,
*mean_view,
*pixel_view;
Image
*mean_image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
progress;
ssize_t
y;
assert(image != (const Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
mean_image=CloneImage(image,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (mean_image == (Image *) NULL)
return((Image *) NULL);
if (SetImageStorageClass(mean_image,DirectClass,exception) == MagickFalse)
{
mean_image=DestroyImage(mean_image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
status=MagickTrue;
progress=0;
image_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(image,exception);
pixel_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(image,exception);
mean_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(mean_image,exception);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp parallel for schedule(static) shared(status,progress) \
magick_number_threads(mean_image,mean_image,mean_image->rows,1)
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) mean_image->rows; y++)
{
register const Quantum
*magick_restrict p;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
p=GetCacheViewVirtualPixels(image_view,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(mean_view,0,y,mean_image->columns,1,
exception);
if ((p == (const Quantum *) NULL) || (q == (Quantum *) NULL))
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) mean_image->columns; x++)
{
PixelInfo
mean_pixel,
previous_pixel;
PointInfo
mean_location,
previous_location;
register ssize_t
i;
GetPixelInfo(image,&mean_pixel);
GetPixelInfoPixel(image,p,&mean_pixel);
mean_location.x=(double) x;
mean_location.y=(double) y;
for (i=0; i < MaxMeanShiftIterations; i++)
{
double
distance,
gamma;
PixelInfo
sum_pixel;
PointInfo
sum_location;
ssize_t
count,
v;
sum_location.x=0.0;
sum_location.y=0.0;
GetPixelInfo(image,&sum_pixel);
previous_location=mean_location;
previous_pixel=mean_pixel;
count=0;
for (v=(-((ssize_t) height/2)); v <= (((ssize_t) height/2)); v++)
{
ssize_t
u;
for (u=(-((ssize_t) width/2)); u <= (((ssize_t) width/2)); u++)
{
if ((v*v+u*u) <= (ssize_t) ((width/2)*(height/2)))
{
PixelInfo
pixel;
status=GetOneCacheViewVirtualPixelInfo(pixel_view,(ssize_t)
MagickRound(mean_location.x+u),(ssize_t) MagickRound(
mean_location.y+v),&pixel,exception);
distance=(mean_pixel.red-pixel.red)*(mean_pixel.red-pixel.red)+
(mean_pixel.green-pixel.green)*(mean_pixel.green-pixel.green)+
(mean_pixel.blue-pixel.blue)*(mean_pixel.blue-pixel.blue);
if (distance <= (color_distance*color_distance))
{
sum_location.x+=mean_location.x+u;
sum_location.y+=mean_location.y+v;
sum_pixel.red+=pixel.red;
sum_pixel.green+=pixel.green;
sum_pixel.blue+=pixel.blue;
sum_pixel.alpha+=pixel.alpha;
count++;
}
}
}
}
gamma=1.0/count;
mean_location.x=gamma*sum_location.x;
mean_location.y=gamma*sum_location.y;
mean_pixel.red=gamma*sum_pixel.red;
mean_pixel.green=gamma*sum_pixel.green;
mean_pixel.blue=gamma*sum_pixel.blue;
mean_pixel.alpha=gamma*sum_pixel.alpha;
distance=(mean_location.x-previous_location.x)*
(mean_location.x-previous_location.x)+
(mean_location.y-previous_location.y)*
(mean_location.y-previous_location.y)+
255.0*QuantumScale*(mean_pixel.red-previous_pixel.red)*
255.0*QuantumScale*(mean_pixel.red-previous_pixel.red)+
255.0*QuantumScale*(mean_pixel.green-previous_pixel.green)*
255.0*QuantumScale*(mean_pixel.green-previous_pixel.green)+
255.0*QuantumScale*(mean_pixel.blue-previous_pixel.blue)*
255.0*QuantumScale*(mean_pixel.blue-previous_pixel.blue);
if (distance <= 3.0)
break;
}
SetPixelRed(mean_image,ClampToQuantum(mean_pixel.red),q);
SetPixelGreen(mean_image,ClampToQuantum(mean_pixel.green),q);
SetPixelBlue(mean_image,ClampToQuantum(mean_pixel.blue),q);
SetPixelAlpha(mean_image,ClampToQuantum(mean_pixel.alpha),q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
q+=GetPixelChannels(mean_image);
}
if (SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(mean_view,exception) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
if (image->progress_monitor != (MagickProgressMonitor) NULL)
{
MagickBooleanType
proceed;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp atomic
#endif
progress++;
proceed=SetImageProgress(image,MeanShiftImageTag,progress,image->rows);
if (proceed == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
}
mean_view=DestroyCacheView(mean_view);
pixel_view=DestroyCacheView(pixel_view);
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
return(mean_image);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-369
Summary: In ImageMagick 7.x before 7.0.8-41 and 6.x before 6.9.10-41, there is a divide-by-zero vulnerability in the MeanShiftImage function. It allows an attacker to cause a denial of service by sending a crafted file.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1552 | Medium | 170,189 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: gnutls_session_get_data (gnutls_session_t session,
void *session_data, size_t * session_data_size)
{
gnutls_datum_t psession;
int ret;
if (session->internals.resumable == RESUME_FALSE)
return GNUTLS_E_INVALID_SESSION;
psession.data = session_data;
ret = _gnutls_session_pack (session, &psession);
if (ret < 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return ret;
}
*session_data_size = psession.size;
if (psession.size > *session_data_size)
{
ret = GNUTLS_E_SHORT_MEMORY_BUFFER;
goto error;
}
if (session_data != NULL)
memcpy (session_data, psession.data, psession.size);
ret = 0;
error:
_gnutls_free_datum (&psession);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the gnutls_session_get_data function in lib/gnutls_session.c in GnuTLS 2.12.x before 2.12.14 and 3.x before 3.0.7, when used on a client that performs nonstandard session resumption, allows remote TLS servers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a large SessionTicket.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,569 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: AppControllerImpl::AppControllerImpl(Profile* profile)
//// static
: profile_(profile),
app_service_proxy_(apps::AppServiceProxy::Get(profile)),
url_prefix_(base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->GetSwitchValueASCII(
chromeos::switches::kKioskNextHomeUrlPrefix)) {
app_service_proxy_->AppRegistryCache().AddObserver(this);
if (profile) {
content::URLDataSource::Add(profile,
std::make_unique<apps::AppIconSource>(profile));
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A heap use after free in PDFium in Google Chrome prior to 54.0.2840.59 for Windows, Mac, and Linux; 54.0.2840.85 for Android allows a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via crafted PDF files.
Commit Message: Refactor the AppController implementation into a KeyedService.
This is necessary to guarantee that the AppController will not outlive
the AppServiceProxy, which could happen before during Profile destruction.
Bug: 945427
Change-Id: I9e2089799e38d5a70a4a9aa66df5319113e7809e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1542336
Reviewed-by: Michael Giuffrida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Lucas Tenório <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#645122} | Medium | 172,079 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool OMXNodeInstance::handleMessage(omx_message &msg) {
const sp<GraphicBufferSource>& bufferSource(getGraphicBufferSource());
if (msg.type == omx_message::FILL_BUFFER_DONE) {
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *buffer =
findBufferHeader(msg.u.extended_buffer_data.buffer);
{
Mutex::Autolock _l(mDebugLock);
mOutputBuffersWithCodec.remove(buffer);
CLOG_BUMPED_BUFFER(
FBD, WITH_STATS(FULL_BUFFER(
msg.u.extended_buffer_data.buffer, buffer, msg.fenceFd)));
unbumpDebugLevel_l(kPortIndexOutput);
}
BufferMeta *buffer_meta =
static_cast<BufferMeta *>(buffer->pAppPrivate);
if (buffer->nOffset + buffer->nFilledLen < buffer->nOffset
|| buffer->nOffset + buffer->nFilledLen > buffer->nAllocLen) {
CLOG_ERROR(onFillBufferDone, OMX_ErrorBadParameter,
FULL_BUFFER(NULL, buffer, msg.fenceFd));
}
buffer_meta->CopyFromOMX(buffer);
if (bufferSource != NULL) {
bufferSource->codecBufferFilled(buffer);
msg.u.extended_buffer_data.timestamp = buffer->nTimeStamp;
}
} else if (msg.type == omx_message::EMPTY_BUFFER_DONE) {
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *buffer =
findBufferHeader(msg.u.buffer_data.buffer);
{
Mutex::Autolock _l(mDebugLock);
mInputBuffersWithCodec.remove(buffer);
CLOG_BUMPED_BUFFER(
EBD, WITH_STATS(EMPTY_BUFFER(msg.u.buffer_data.buffer, buffer, msg.fenceFd)));
}
if (bufferSource != NULL) {
bufferSource->codecBufferEmptied(buffer, msg.fenceFd);
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: omx/OMXNodeInstance.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 does not validate the buffer port, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 28816827.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE omx: check buffer port before using
Bug: 28816827
Change-Id: I3d5bad4a1ef96dec544b05bb31cc6f7109aae0a5
| Medium | 173,530 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int usb_get_bos_descriptor(struct usb_device *dev)
{
struct device *ddev = &dev->dev;
struct usb_bos_descriptor *bos;
struct usb_dev_cap_header *cap;
unsigned char *buffer;
int length, total_len, num, i;
int ret;
bos = kzalloc(sizeof(struct usb_bos_descriptor), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!bos)
return -ENOMEM;
/* Get BOS descriptor */
ret = usb_get_descriptor(dev, USB_DT_BOS, 0, bos, USB_DT_BOS_SIZE);
if (ret < USB_DT_BOS_SIZE) {
dev_err(ddev, "unable to get BOS descriptor\n");
if (ret >= 0)
ret = -ENOMSG;
kfree(bos);
return ret;
}
length = bos->bLength;
total_len = le16_to_cpu(bos->wTotalLength);
num = bos->bNumDeviceCaps;
kfree(bos);
if (total_len < length)
return -EINVAL;
dev->bos = kzalloc(sizeof(struct usb_host_bos), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dev->bos)
return -ENOMEM;
/* Now let's get the whole BOS descriptor set */
buffer = kzalloc(total_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buffer) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto err;
}
dev->bos->desc = (struct usb_bos_descriptor *)buffer;
ret = usb_get_descriptor(dev, USB_DT_BOS, 0, buffer, total_len);
if (ret < total_len) {
dev_err(ddev, "unable to get BOS descriptor set\n");
if (ret >= 0)
ret = -ENOMSG;
goto err;
}
total_len -= length;
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
buffer += length;
cap = (struct usb_dev_cap_header *)buffer;
length = cap->bLength;
if (total_len < length)
break;
total_len -= length;
if (cap->bDescriptorType != USB_DT_DEVICE_CAPABILITY) {
dev_warn(ddev, "descriptor type invalid, skip\n");
continue;
}
switch (cap->bDevCapabilityType) {
case USB_CAP_TYPE_WIRELESS_USB:
/* Wireless USB cap descriptor is handled by wusb */
break;
case USB_CAP_TYPE_EXT:
dev->bos->ext_cap =
(struct usb_ext_cap_descriptor *)buffer;
break;
case USB_SS_CAP_TYPE:
dev->bos->ss_cap =
(struct usb_ss_cap_descriptor *)buffer;
break;
case USB_SSP_CAP_TYPE:
dev->bos->ssp_cap =
(struct usb_ssp_cap_descriptor *)buffer;
break;
case CONTAINER_ID_TYPE:
dev->bos->ss_id =
(struct usb_ss_container_id_descriptor *)buffer;
break;
case USB_PTM_CAP_TYPE:
dev->bos->ptm_cap =
(struct usb_ptm_cap_descriptor *)buffer;
default:
break;
}
}
return 0;
err:
usb_release_bos_descriptor(dev);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The usb_get_bos_descriptor function in drivers/usb/core/config.c in the Linux kernel before 4.13.10 allows local users to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted USB device.
Commit Message: USB: core: fix out-of-bounds access bug in usb_get_bos_descriptor()
Andrey used the syzkaller fuzzer to find an out-of-bounds memory
access in usb_get_bos_descriptor(). The code wasn't checking that the
next usb_dev_cap_header structure could fit into the remaining buffer
space.
This patch fixes the error and also reduces the bNumDeviceCaps field
in the header to match the actual number of capabilities found, in
cases where there are fewer than expected.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
CC: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> | High | 167,675 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int wvlan_uil_put_info(struct uilreq *urq, struct wl_private *lp)
{
int result = 0;
ltv_t *pLtv;
bool_t ltvAllocated = FALSE;
ENCSTRCT sEncryption;
#ifdef USE_WDS
hcf_16 hcfPort = HCF_PORT_0;
#endif /* USE_WDS */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
DBG_FUNC("wvlan_uil_put_info");
DBG_ENTER(DbgInfo);
if (urq->hcfCtx == &(lp->hcfCtx)) {
if (capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
if ((urq->data != NULL) && (urq->len != 0)) {
/* Make sure that we have at least a command and length to send. */
if (urq->len < (sizeof(hcf_16) * 2)) {
urq->len = sizeof(lp->ltvRecord);
urq->result = UIL_ERR_LEN;
DBG_ERROR(DbgInfo, "No Length/Type in LTV!!!\n");
DBG_ERROR(DbgInfo, "UIL_ERR_LEN\n");
DBG_LEAVE(DbgInfo);
return result;
}
/* Verify the user buffer */
result = verify_area(VERIFY_READ, urq->data, urq->len);
if (result != 0) {
urq->result = UIL_FAILURE;
DBG_ERROR(DbgInfo, "verify_area(), VERIFY_READ FAILED\n");
DBG_LEAVE(DbgInfo);
return result;
}
/* Get only the command and length information. */
copy_from_user(&(lp->ltvRecord), urq->data, sizeof(hcf_16) * 2);
/* Make sure the incoming LTV record length is within the bounds of the
IOCTL length */
if (((lp->ltvRecord.len + 1) * sizeof(hcf_16)) > urq->len) {
urq->len = sizeof(lp->ltvRecord);
urq->result = UIL_ERR_LEN;
DBG_ERROR(DbgInfo, "UIL_ERR_LEN\n");
DBG_LEAVE(DbgInfo);
return result;
}
/* If the requested length is greater than the size of our local
LTV record, try to allocate it from the kernel stack.
Otherwise, we just use our local LTV record. */
if (urq->len > sizeof(lp->ltvRecord)) {
pLtv = kmalloc(urq->len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (pLtv != NULL) {
ltvAllocated = TRUE;
} else {
DBG_ERROR(DbgInfo, "Alloc FAILED\n");
urq->len = sizeof(lp->ltvRecord);
urq->result = UIL_ERR_LEN;
result = -ENOMEM;
DBG_LEAVE(DbgInfo);
return result;
}
} else {
pLtv = &(lp->ltvRecord);
}
/* Copy the data from the user's buffer into the local LTV
record data area. */
copy_from_user(pLtv, urq->data, urq->len);
/* We need to snoop the commands to see if there is anything we
need to store for the purposes of a reset or start/stop
sequence. Perform endian translation as needed */
switch (pLtv->typ) {
case CFG_CNF_PORT_TYPE:
lp->PortType = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_CNF_OWN_MAC_ADDR:
/* TODO: determine if we are going to store anything based on this */
break;
case CFG_CNF_OWN_CHANNEL:
lp->Channel = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
/* CFG_CNF_OWN_SSID currently same as CNF_DESIRED_SSID. Do we
need separate storage for this? */
/* case CFG_CNF_OWN_SSID: */
case CFG_CNF_OWN_ATIM_WINDOW:
lp->atimWindow = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_CNF_SYSTEM_SCALE:
lp->DistanceBetweenAPs = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
case CFG_CNF_MAX_DATA_LEN:
/* TODO: determine if we are going to store anything based
on this */
break;
case CFG_CNF_PM_ENABLED:
lp->PMEnabled = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_CNF_MCAST_RX:
lp->MulticastReceive = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_CNF_MAX_SLEEP_DURATION:
lp->MaxSleepDuration = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_CNF_HOLDOVER_DURATION:
lp->holdoverDuration = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_CNF_OWN_NAME:
memset(lp->StationName, 0, sizeof(lp->StationName));
memcpy((void *)lp->StationName, (void *)&pLtv->u.u8[2], (size_t)pLtv->u.u16[0]);
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_CNF_LOAD_BALANCING:
lp->loadBalancing = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_CNF_MEDIUM_DISTRIBUTION:
lp->mediumDistribution = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
#ifdef WARP
case CFG_CNF_TX_POW_LVL:
lp->txPowLevel = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
/* case CFG_CNF_SHORT_RETRY_LIMIT: */ /* Short Retry Limit */
/* case 0xFC33: */ /* Long Retry Limit */
case CFG_SUPPORTED_RATE_SET_CNTL: /* Supported Rate Set Control */
lp->srsc[0] = pLtv->u.u16[0];
lp->srsc[1] = pLtv->u.u16[1];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
pLtv->u.u16[1] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[1]);
break;
case CFG_BASIC_RATE_SET_CNTL: /* Basic Rate Set Control */
lp->brsc[0] = pLtv->u.u16[0];
lp->brsc[1] = pLtv->u.u16[1];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
pLtv->u.u16[1] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[1]);
break;
case CFG_CNF_CONNECTION_CNTL:
lp->connectionControl = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
/* case CFG_PROBE_DATA_RATE: */
#endif /* HERMES25 */
#if 1 /* ;? (HCF_TYPE) & HCF_TYPE_AP */
/* ;?should we restore this to allow smaller memory footprint */
case CFG_CNF_OWN_DTIM_PERIOD:
lp->DTIMPeriod = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
#ifdef WARP
case CFG_CNF_OWN_BEACON_INTERVAL: /* Own Beacon Interval */
lp->ownBeaconInterval = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
#endif /* WARP */
case CFG_COEXISTENSE_BEHAVIOUR: /* Coexistence behavior */
lp->coexistence = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
#ifdef USE_WDS
case CFG_CNF_WDS_ADDR1:
memcpy(&lp->wds_port[0].wdsAddress, &pLtv->u.u8[0], ETH_ALEN);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_1;
break;
case CFG_CNF_WDS_ADDR2:
memcpy(&lp->wds_port[1].wdsAddress, &pLtv->u.u8[0], ETH_ALEN);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_2;
break;
case CFG_CNF_WDS_ADDR3:
memcpy(&lp->wds_port[2].wdsAddress, &pLtv->u.u8[0], ETH_ALEN);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_3;
break;
case CFG_CNF_WDS_ADDR4:
memcpy(&lp->wds_port[3].wdsAddress, &pLtv->u.u8[0], ETH_ALEN);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_4;
break;
case CFG_CNF_WDS_ADDR5:
memcpy(&lp->wds_port[4].wdsAddress, &pLtv->u.u8[0], ETH_ALEN);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_5;
break;
case CFG_CNF_WDS_ADDR6:
memcpy(&lp->wds_port[5].wdsAddress, &pLtv->u.u8[0], ETH_ALEN);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_6;
break;
#endif /* USE_WDS */
case CFG_CNF_MCAST_PM_BUF:
lp->multicastPMBuffering = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_CNF_REJECT_ANY:
lp->RejectAny = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
#endif
case CFG_CNF_ENCRYPTION:
lp->EnableEncryption = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_CNF_AUTHENTICATION:
lp->authentication = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
#if 1 /* ;? (HCF_TYPE) & HCF_TYPE_AP */
/* ;?should we restore this to allow smaller memory footprint */
/* case CFG_CNF_EXCL_UNENCRYPTED:
lp->ExcludeUnencrypted = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break; */
case CFG_CNF_MCAST_RATE:
/* TODO: determine if we are going to store anything based on this */
break;
case CFG_CNF_INTRA_BSS_RELAY:
lp->intraBSSRelay = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
#endif
case CFG_CNF_MICRO_WAVE:
/* TODO: determine if we are going to store anything based on this */
break;
/*case CFG_CNF_LOAD_BALANCING:*/
/* TODO: determine if we are going to store anything based on this */
/* break; */
/* case CFG_CNF_MEDIUM_DISTRIBUTION: */
/* TODO: determine if we are going to store anything based on this */
/* break; */
/* case CFG_CNF_RX_ALL_GROUP_ADDRESS: */
/* TODO: determine if we are going to store anything based on this */
/* break; */
/* case CFG_CNF_COUNTRY_INFO: */
/* TODO: determine if we are going to store anything based on this */
/* break; */
case CFG_CNF_OWN_SSID:
/* case CNF_DESIRED_SSID: */
case CFG_DESIRED_SSID:
memset(lp->NetworkName, 0, sizeof(lp->NetworkName));
memcpy((void *)lp->NetworkName, (void *)&pLtv->u.u8[2], (size_t)pLtv->u.u16[0]);
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
/* take care of the special network name "ANY" case */
if ((strlen(&pLtv->u.u8[2]) == 0) ||
(strcmp(&pLtv->u.u8[2], "ANY") == 0) ||
(strcmp(&pLtv->u.u8[2], "any") == 0)) {
/* set the SSID_STRCT llen field (u16[0]) to zero, and the
effectually null the string u8[2] */
pLtv->u.u16[0] = 0;
pLtv->u.u8[2] = 0;
}
break;
case CFG_GROUP_ADDR:
/* TODO: determine if we are going to store anything based on this */
break;
case CFG_CREATE_IBSS:
lp->CreateIBSS = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_RTS_THRH:
lp->RTSThreshold = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_TX_RATE_CNTL:
lp->TxRateControl[0] = pLtv->u.u16[0];
lp->TxRateControl[1] = pLtv->u.u16[1];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
pLtv->u.u16[1] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[1]);
break;
case CFG_PROMISCUOUS_MODE:
/* TODO: determine if we are going to store anything based on this */
break;
/* case CFG_WAKE_ON_LAN: */
/* TODO: determine if we are going to store anything based on this */
/* break; */
#if 1 /* ;? #if (HCF_TYPE) & HCF_TYPE_AP */
/* ;?should we restore this to allow smaller memory footprint */
case CFG_RTS_THRH0:
lp->RTSThreshold = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_TX_RATE_CNTL0:
/*;?no idea what this should be, get going so comment it out lp->TxRateControl = pLtv->u.u16[0];*/
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
#ifdef USE_WDS
case CFG_RTS_THRH1:
lp->wds_port[0].rtsThreshold = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_1;
break;
case CFG_RTS_THRH2:
lp->wds_port[1].rtsThreshold = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_2;
break;
case CFG_RTS_THRH3:
lp->wds_port[2].rtsThreshold = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_3;
break;
case CFG_RTS_THRH4:
lp->wds_port[3].rtsThreshold = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_4;
break;
case CFG_RTS_THRH5:
lp->wds_port[4].rtsThreshold = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_5;
break;
case CFG_RTS_THRH6:
lp->wds_port[5].rtsThreshold = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_6;
break;
case CFG_TX_RATE_CNTL1:
lp->wds_port[0].txRateCntl = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_1;
break;
case CFG_TX_RATE_CNTL2:
lp->wds_port[1].txRateCntl = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_2;
break;
case CFG_TX_RATE_CNTL3:
lp->wds_port[2].txRateCntl = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_3;
break;
case CFG_TX_RATE_CNTL4:
lp->wds_port[3].txRateCntl = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_4;
break;
case CFG_TX_RATE_CNTL5:
lp->wds_port[4].txRateCntl = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_5;
break;
case CFG_TX_RATE_CNTL6:
lp->wds_port[5].txRateCntl = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_6;
break;
#endif /* USE_WDS */
#endif /* (HCF_TYPE) & HCF_TYPE_AP */
case CFG_DEFAULT_KEYS:
{
CFG_DEFAULT_KEYS_STRCT *pKeys = (CFG_DEFAULT_KEYS_STRCT *)pLtv;
pKeys->key[0].len = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pKeys->key[0].len);
pKeys->key[1].len = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pKeys->key[1].len);
pKeys->key[2].len = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pKeys->key[2].len);
pKeys->key[3].len = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pKeys->key[3].len);
memcpy((void *)&(lp->DefaultKeys), (void *)pKeys,
sizeof(CFG_DEFAULT_KEYS_STRCT));
}
break;
case CFG_TX_KEY_ID:
lp->TransmitKeyID = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_SCAN_SSID:
/* TODO: determine if we are going to store anything based on this */
break;
case CFG_TICK_TIME:
/* TODO: determine if we are going to store anything based on this */
break;
/* these RIDS are Info RIDs, and should they be allowed for puts??? */
case CFG_MAX_LOAD_TIME:
case CFG_DL_BUF:
/* case CFG_HSI_SUP_RANGE: */
case CFG_NIC_SERIAL_NUMBER:
case CFG_NIC_IDENTITY:
case CFG_NIC_MFI_SUP_RANGE:
case CFG_NIC_CFI_SUP_RANGE:
case CFG_NIC_TEMP_TYPE:
case CFG_NIC_PROFILE:
case CFG_FW_IDENTITY:
case CFG_FW_SUP_RANGE:
case CFG_MFI_ACT_RANGES_STA:
case CFG_CFI_ACT_RANGES_STA:
case CFG_PORT_STAT:
case CFG_CUR_SSID:
case CFG_CUR_BSSID:
case CFG_COMMS_QUALITY:
case CFG_CUR_TX_RATE:
case CFG_CUR_BEACON_INTERVAL:
case CFG_CUR_SCALE_THRH:
case CFG_PROTOCOL_RSP_TIME:
case CFG_CUR_SHORT_RETRY_LIMIT:
case CFG_CUR_LONG_RETRY_LIMIT:
case CFG_MAX_TX_LIFETIME:
case CFG_MAX_RX_LIFETIME:
case CFG_CF_POLLABLE:
case CFG_AUTHENTICATION_ALGORITHMS:
case CFG_PRIVACY_OPT_IMPLEMENTED:
/* case CFG_CURRENT_REMOTE_RATES: */
/* case CFG_CURRENT_USED_RATES: */
/* case CFG_CURRENT_SYSTEM_SCALE: */
/* case CFG_CURRENT_TX_RATE1: */
/* case CFG_CURRENT_TX_RATE2: */
/* case CFG_CURRENT_TX_RATE3: */
/* case CFG_CURRENT_TX_RATE4: */
/* case CFG_CURRENT_TX_RATE5: */
/* case CFG_CURRENT_TX_RATE6: */
case CFG_NIC_MAC_ADDR:
case CFG_PCF_INFO:
/* case CFG_CURRENT_COUNTRY_INFO: */
case CFG_PHY_TYPE:
case CFG_CUR_CHANNEL:
/* case CFG_CURRENT_POWER_STATE: */
/* case CFG_CCAMODE: */
case CFG_SUPPORTED_DATA_RATES:
break;
case CFG_AP_MODE:
/*;? lp->DownloadFirmware = (pLtv->u.u16[0]) + 1; */
DBG_ERROR(DbgInfo, "set CFG_AP_MODE no longer supported\n");
break;
case CFG_ENCRYPT_STRING:
/* TODO: ENDIAN TRANSLATION HERE??? */
memset(lp->szEncryption, 0, sizeof(lp->szEncryption));
memcpy((void *)lp->szEncryption, (void *)&pLtv->u.u8[0],
(pLtv->len * sizeof(hcf_16)));
wl_wep_decode(CRYPT_CODE, &sEncryption,
lp->szEncryption);
/* the Linux driver likes to use 1-4 for the key IDs, and then
convert to 0-3 when sending to the card. The Windows code
base used 0-3 in the API DLL, which was ported to Linux. For
the sake of the user experience, we decided to keep 0-3 as the
numbers used in the DLL; and will perform the +1 conversion here.
We could have converted the entire Linux driver, but this is
less obtrusive. This may be a "todo" to convert the whole driver */
lp->TransmitKeyID = sEncryption.wTxKeyID + 1;
lp->EnableEncryption = sEncryption.wEnabled;
memcpy(&lp->DefaultKeys, &sEncryption.EncStr,
sizeof(CFG_DEFAULT_KEYS_STRCT));
break;
/*case CFG_COUNTRY_STRING:
memset(lp->countryString, 0, sizeof(lp->countryString));
memcpy((void *)lp->countryString, (void *)&pLtv->u.u8[2], (size_t)pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
*/
case CFG_DRIVER_ENABLE:
lp->driverEnable = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_WOLAS_ENABLE:
lp->wolasEnable = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_SET_WPA_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_SUITE:
lp->AuthKeyMgmtSuite = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_DISASSOCIATE_ADDR:
pLtv->u.u16[ETH_ALEN / 2] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[ETH_ALEN / 2]);
break;
case CFG_ADD_TKIP_DEFAULT_KEY:
case CFG_REMOVE_TKIP_DEFAULT_KEY:
/* Endian convert the Tx Key Information */
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_ADD_TKIP_MAPPED_KEY:
break;
case CFG_REMOVE_TKIP_MAPPED_KEY:
break;
/* some RIDs just can't be put */
case CFG_MB_INFO:
case CFG_IFB:
default:
break;
}
/* This code will prevent Static Configuration Entities from
being sent to the card, as they require a call to
UIL_ACT_APPLY to take effect. Dynamic Entities will be sent
immediately */
switch (pLtv->typ) {
case CFG_CNF_PORT_TYPE:
case CFG_CNF_OWN_MAC_ADDR:
case CFG_CNF_OWN_CHANNEL:
case CFG_CNF_OWN_SSID:
case CFG_CNF_OWN_ATIM_WINDOW:
case CFG_CNF_SYSTEM_SCALE:
case CFG_CNF_MAX_DATA_LEN:
case CFG_CNF_PM_ENABLED:
case CFG_CNF_MCAST_RX:
case CFG_CNF_MAX_SLEEP_DURATION:
case CFG_CNF_HOLDOVER_DURATION:
case CFG_CNF_OWN_NAME:
case CFG_CNF_LOAD_BALANCING:
case CFG_CNF_MEDIUM_DISTRIBUTION:
#ifdef WARP
case CFG_CNF_TX_POW_LVL:
case CFG_CNF_CONNECTION_CNTL:
/*case CFG_PROBE_DATA_RATE: */
#endif /* HERMES25 */
#if 1 /*;? (HCF_TYPE) & HCF_TYPE_AP */
/*;?should we restore this to allow smaller memory footprint */
case CFG_CNF_OWN_DTIM_PERIOD:
#ifdef WARP
case CFG_CNF_OWN_BEACON_INTERVAL: /* Own Beacon Interval */
#endif /* WARP */
#ifdef USE_WDS
case CFG_CNF_WDS_ADDR1:
case CFG_CNF_WDS_ADDR2:
case CFG_CNF_WDS_ADDR3:
case CFG_CNF_WDS_ADDR4:
case CFG_CNF_WDS_ADDR5:
case CFG_CNF_WDS_ADDR6:
#endif
case CFG_CNF_MCAST_PM_BUF:
case CFG_CNF_REJECT_ANY:
#endif
case CFG_CNF_ENCRYPTION:
case CFG_CNF_AUTHENTICATION:
#if 1 /* ;? (HCF_TYPE) & HCF_TYPE_AP */
/* ;?should we restore this to allow smaller memory footprint */
case CFG_CNF_EXCL_UNENCRYPTED:
case CFG_CNF_MCAST_RATE:
case CFG_CNF_INTRA_BSS_RELAY:
#endif
case CFG_CNF_MICRO_WAVE:
/* case CFG_CNF_LOAD_BALANCING: */
/* case CFG_CNF_MEDIUM_DISTRIBUTION: */
/* case CFG_CNF_RX_ALL_GROUP_ADDRESS: */
/* case CFG_CNF_COUNTRY_INFO: */
/* case CFG_COUNTRY_STRING: */
case CFG_AP_MODE:
case CFG_ENCRYPT_STRING:
/* case CFG_DRIVER_ENABLE: */
case CFG_WOLAS_ENABLE:
case CFG_MB_INFO:
case CFG_IFB:
break;
/* Deal with this dynamic MSF RID, as it's required for WPA */
case CFG_DRIVER_ENABLE:
if (lp->driverEnable) {
hcf_cntl(&(lp->hcfCtx), HCF_CNTL_ENABLE | HCF_PORT_0);
hcf_cntl(&(lp->hcfCtx), HCF_CNTL_CONNECT);
} else {
hcf_cntl(&(lp->hcfCtx), HCF_CNTL_DISABLE | HCF_PORT_0);
hcf_cntl(&(lp->hcfCtx), HCF_CNTL_DISCONNECT);
}
break;
default:
wl_act_int_off(lp);
urq->result = hcf_put_info(&(lp->hcfCtx), (LTVP) pLtv);
wl_act_int_on(lp);
break;
}
if (ltvAllocated)
kfree(pLtv);
} else {
urq->result = UIL_FAILURE;
}
} else {
DBG_ERROR(DbgInfo, "EPERM\n");
urq->result = UIL_FAILURE;
result = -EPERM;
}
} else {
DBG_ERROR(DbgInfo, "UIL_ERR_WRONG_IFB\n");
urq->result = UIL_ERR_WRONG_IFB;
}
DBG_LEAVE(DbgInfo);
return result;
} /* wvlan_uil_put_info */
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple buffer overflows in drivers/staging/wlags49_h2/wl_priv.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12 allow local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability and providing a long station-name string, related to the (1) wvlan_uil_put_info and (2) wvlan_set_station_nickname functions.
Commit Message: staging: wlags49_h2: buffer overflow setting station name
We need to check the length parameter before doing the memcpy(). I've
actually changed it to strlcpy() as well so that it's NUL terminated.
You need CAP_NET_ADMIN to trigger these so it's not the end of the
world.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,964 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: _XcursorReadImage (XcursorFile *file,
XcursorFileHeader *fileHeader,
int toc)
{
XcursorChunkHeader chunkHeader;
XcursorImage head;
XcursorImage *image;
int n;
XcursorPixel *p;
if (!file || !fileHeader)
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorFileReadChunkHeader (file, fileHeader, toc, &chunkHeader))
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.width))
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.height))
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.xhot))
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.yhot))
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.delay))
return NULL;
/* sanity check data */
if (head.width >= 0x10000 || head.height > 0x10000)
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.delay))
return NULL;
/* sanity check data */
if (head.width >= 0x10000 || head.height > 0x10000)
return NULL;
if (head.width == 0 || head.height == 0)
return NULL;
return NULL;
if (chunkHeader.version < image->version)
image->version = chunkHeader.version;
image->size = chunkHeader.subtype;
image->xhot = head.xhot;
image->yhot = head.yhot;
image->delay = head.delay;
n = image->width * image->height;
p = image->pixels;
while (n--)
{
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, p))
{
XcursorImageDestroy (image);
return NULL;
}
p++;
}
return image;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: libXcursor before 1.1.15 has various integer overflows that could lead to heap buffer overflows when processing malicious cursors, e.g., with programs like GIMP. It is also possible that an attack vector exists against the related code in cursor/xcursor.c in Wayland through 1.14.0.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,627 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int BN_GF2m_mod_inv(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
BIGNUM *b, *c = NULL, *u = NULL, *v = NULL, *tmp;
int ret = 0;
bn_check_top(a);
bn_check_top(p);
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
if ((b = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
goto err;
if ((c = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
goto err;
if ((u = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
goto err;
if ((v = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
goto err;
if (!BN_GF2m_mod(u, a, p))
goto err;
if (BN_is_zero(u))
goto err;
if (!BN_copy(v, p))
goto err;
# if 0
if (!BN_one(b))
goto err;
while (1) {
while (!BN_is_odd(u)) {
if (BN_is_zero(u))
goto err;
if (!BN_rshift1(u, u))
goto err;
if (BN_is_odd(b)) {
if (!BN_GF2m_add(b, b, p))
goto err;
}
if (!BN_rshift1(b, b))
goto err;
}
if (BN_abs_is_word(u, 1))
break;
if (BN_num_bits(u) < BN_num_bits(v)) {
tmp = u;
u = v;
v = tmp;
tmp = b;
b = c;
c = tmp;
}
if (!BN_GF2m_add(u, u, v))
goto err;
if (!BN_GF2m_add(b, b, c))
goto err;
}
# else
{
int i, ubits = BN_num_bits(u), vbits = BN_num_bits(v), /* v is copy
* of p */
top = p->top;
BN_ULONG *udp, *bdp, *vdp, *cdp;
bn_wexpand(u, top);
udp = u->d;
for (i = u->top; i < top; i++)
udp[i] = 0;
u->top = top;
bn_wexpand(b, top);
bdp = b->d;
bdp[0] = 1;
for (i = 1; i < top; i++)
bdp[i] = 0;
b->top = top;
bn_wexpand(c, top);
cdp = c->d;
for (i = 0; i < top; i++)
cdp[i] = 0;
c->top = top;
vdp = v->d; /* It pays off to "cache" *->d pointers,
* because it allows optimizer to be more
* aggressive. But we don't have to "cache"
* p->d, because *p is declared 'const'... */
while (1) {
while (ubits && !(udp[0] & 1)) {
BN_ULONG u0, u1, b0, b1, mask;
u0 = udp[0];
b0 = bdp[0];
mask = (BN_ULONG)0 - (b0 & 1);
b0 ^= p->d[0] & mask;
for (i = 0; i < top - 1; i++) {
u1 = udp[i + 1];
udp[i] = ((u0 >> 1) | (u1 << (BN_BITS2 - 1))) & BN_MASK2;
u0 = u1;
b1 = bdp[i + 1] ^ (p->d[i + 1] & mask);
bdp[i] = ((b0 >> 1) | (b1 << (BN_BITS2 - 1))) & BN_MASK2;
b0 = b1;
}
udp[i] = u0 >> 1;
bdp[i] = b0 >> 1;
ubits--;
}
if (ubits <= BN_BITS2 && udp[0] == 1)
break;
if (ubits < vbits) {
i = ubits;
ubits = vbits;
vbits = i;
tmp = u;
u = v;
v = tmp;
tmp = b;
b = c;
c = tmp;
udp = vdp;
vdp = v->d;
bdp = cdp;
cdp = c->d;
}
for (i = 0; i < top; i++) {
udp[i] ^= vdp[i];
bdp[i] ^= cdp[i];
}
if (ubits == vbits) {
BN_ULONG ul;
int utop = (ubits - 1) / BN_BITS2;
while ((ul = udp[utop]) == 0 && utop)
utop--;
ubits = utop * BN_BITS2 + BN_num_bits_word(ul);
}
}
bn_correct_top(b);
}
# endif
if (!BN_copy(r, b))
goto err;
bn_check_top(r);
ret = 1;
err:
# ifdef BN_DEBUG /* BN_CTX_end would complain about the
* expanded form */
bn_correct_top(c);
bn_correct_top(u);
bn_correct_top(v);
# endif
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The BN_GF2m_mod_inv function in crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c in OpenSSL before 0.9.8s, 1.0.0 before 1.0.0e, 1.0.1 before 1.0.1n, and 1.0.2 before 1.0.2b does not properly handle ECParameters structures in which the curve is over a malformed binary polynomial field, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (infinite loop) via a session that uses an Elliptic Curve algorithm, as demonstrated by an attack against a server that supports client authentication.
Commit Message: bn/bn_gf2m.c: avoid infinite loop wich malformed ECParamters.
CVE-2015-1788
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,694 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void RenderViewTest::SetUp() {
if (!GetContentClient()->renderer())
GetContentClient()->set_renderer(&mock_content_renderer_client_);
if (!render_thread_.get())
render_thread_.reset(new MockRenderThread());
render_thread_->set_routing_id(kRouteId);
render_thread_->set_surface_id(kSurfaceId);
render_thread_->set_new_window_routing_id(kNewWindowRouteId);
command_line_.reset(new CommandLine(CommandLine::NO_PROGRAM));
params_.reset(new content::MainFunctionParams(*command_line_));
platform_.reset(new RendererMainPlatformDelegate(*params_));
platform_->PlatformInitialize();
webkit_glue::SetJavaScriptFlags(" --expose-gc");
WebKit::initialize(&webkit_platform_support_);
mock_process_.reset(new MockRenderProcess);
RenderViewImpl* view = RenderViewImpl::Create(
0,
kOpenerId,
content::RendererPreferences(),
WebPreferences(),
new SharedRenderViewCounter(0),
kRouteId,
kSurfaceId,
kInvalidSessionStorageNamespaceId,
string16(),
1,
WebKit::WebScreenInfo(),
false);
view->AddRef();
view_ = view;
mock_keyboard_.reset(new MockKeyboard());
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.46 does not properly perform window navigation, which has unspecified impact and remote attack vectors.
Commit Message: Use a new scheme for swapping out RenderViews.
BUG=118664
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9720004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@127986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,034 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ProxyChannelDelegate::ProxyChannelDelegate()
: shutdown_event_(true, false) {
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving SVG text references.
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,737 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: MagickExport void *AcquireQuantumMemory(const size_t count,const size_t quantum)
{
size_t
extent;
if (CheckMemoryOverflow(count,quantum) != MagickFalse)
return((void *) NULL);
extent=count*quantum;
return(AcquireMagickMemory(extent));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: magick/memory.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via vectors involving *too many exceptions,* which trigger a buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Suspend exception processing if there are too many exceptions | Medium | 168,543 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void gdImageCopyMerge (gdImagePtr dst, gdImagePtr src, int dstX, int dstY, int srcX, int srcY, int w, int h, int pct)
{
int c, dc;
int x, y;
int tox, toy;
int ncR, ncG, ncB;
toy = dstY;
for (y = srcY; y < (srcY + h); y++) {
tox = dstX;
for (x = srcX; x < (srcX + w); x++) {
int nc;
c = gdImageGetPixel(src, x, y);
/* Added 7/24/95: support transparent copies */
if (gdImageGetTransparent(src) == c) {
tox++;
continue;
}
/* If it's the same image, mapping is trivial */
if (dst == src) {
nc = c;
} else {
dc = gdImageGetPixel(dst, tox, toy);
ncR = (int)(gdImageRed (src, c) * (pct / 100.0) + gdImageRed (dst, dc) * ((100 - pct) / 100.0));
ncG = (int)(gdImageGreen (src, c) * (pct / 100.0) + gdImageGreen (dst, dc) * ((100 - pct) / 100.0));
ncB = (int)(gdImageBlue (src, c) * (pct / 100.0) + gdImageBlue (dst, dc) * ((100 - pct) / 100.0));
/* Find a reasonable color */
nc = gdImageColorResolve (dst, ncR, ncG, ncB);
}
gdImageSetPixel (dst, tox, toy, nc);
tox++;
}
toy++;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the gdImageCreate function in gd.c in the GD Graphics Library (aka libgd) before 2.0.34RC1, as used in PHP before 5.5.37, 5.6.x before 5.6.23, and 7.x before 7.0.8, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted image dimensions.
Commit Message: iFixed bug #72446 - Integer Overflow in gdImagePaletteToTrueColor() resulting in heap overflow | Medium | 167,125 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int decode_getacl(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct rpc_rqst *req,
size_t *acl_len)
{
__be32 *savep;
uint32_t attrlen,
bitmap[3] = {0};
struct kvec *iov = req->rq_rcv_buf.head;
int status;
*acl_len = 0;
if ((status = decode_op_hdr(xdr, OP_GETATTR)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((status = decode_attr_bitmap(xdr, bitmap)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((status = decode_attr_length(xdr, &attrlen, &savep)) != 0)
goto out;
if (unlikely(bitmap[0] & (FATTR4_WORD0_ACL - 1U)))
return -EIO;
if (likely(bitmap[0] & FATTR4_WORD0_ACL)) {
size_t hdrlen;
u32 recvd;
/* We ignore &savep and don't do consistency checks on
* the attr length. Let userspace figure it out.... */
hdrlen = (u8 *)xdr->p - (u8 *)iov->iov_base;
recvd = req->rq_rcv_buf.len - hdrlen;
if (attrlen > recvd) {
dprintk("NFS: server cheating in getattr"
" acl reply: attrlen %u > recvd %u\n",
attrlen, recvd);
return -EINVAL;
}
xdr_read_pages(xdr, attrlen);
*acl_len = attrlen;
} else
status = -EOPNOTSUPP;
out:
return status;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The NFSv4 implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.2.2 does not properly handle bitmap sizes in GETACL replies, which allows remote NFS servers to cause a denial of service (OOPS) by sending an excessive number of bitmap words.
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,719 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::SimulateAttrib0(
GLuint max_vertex_accessed, bool* simulated) {
DCHECK(simulated);
*simulated = false;
if (gfx::GetGLImplementation() == gfx::kGLImplementationEGLGLES2)
return true;
const VertexAttribManager::VertexAttribInfo* info =
vertex_attrib_manager_->GetVertexAttribInfo(0);
bool attrib_0_used = current_program_->GetAttribInfoByLocation(0) != NULL;
if (info->enabled() && attrib_0_used) {
return true;
}
typedef VertexAttribManager::VertexAttribInfo::Vec4 Vec4;
GLuint num_vertices = max_vertex_accessed + 1;
GLuint size_needed = 0;
if (num_vertices == 0 ||
!SafeMultiply(num_vertices, static_cast<GLuint>(sizeof(Vec4)),
&size_needed) ||
size_needed > 0x7FFFFFFFU) {
SetGLError(GL_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "glDrawXXX: Simulating attrib 0");
return false;
}
CopyRealGLErrorsToWrapper();
glBindBuffer(GL_ARRAY_BUFFER, attrib_0_buffer_id_);
if (static_cast<GLsizei>(size_needed) > attrib_0_size_) {
glBufferData(GL_ARRAY_BUFFER, size_needed, NULL, GL_DYNAMIC_DRAW);
GLenum error = glGetError();
if (error != GL_NO_ERROR) {
SetGLError(GL_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "glDrawXXX: Simulating attrib 0");
return false;
}
attrib_0_buffer_matches_value_ = false;
}
if (attrib_0_used &&
(!attrib_0_buffer_matches_value_ ||
(info->value().v[0] != attrib_0_value_.v[0] ||
info->value().v[1] != attrib_0_value_.v[1] ||
info->value().v[2] != attrib_0_value_.v[2] ||
info->value().v[3] != attrib_0_value_.v[3]))) {
std::vector<Vec4> temp(num_vertices, info->value());
glBufferSubData(GL_ARRAY_BUFFER, 0, size_needed, &temp[0].v[0]);
attrib_0_buffer_matches_value_ = true;
attrib_0_value_ = info->value();
attrib_0_size_ = size_needed;
}
glVertexAttribPointer(0, 4, GL_FLOAT, GL_FALSE, 0, NULL);
if (info->divisor())
glVertexAttribDivisorANGLE(0, 0);
*simulated = true;
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.46 on Linux does not properly mitigate an unspecified flaw in an NVIDIA driver, which has unknown impact and attack vectors. NOTE: see CVE-2012-3105 for the related MFSA 2012-34 issue in Mozilla products.
Commit Message: Always write data to new buffer in SimulateAttrib0
This is to work around linux nvidia driver bug.
TEST=asan
BUG=118970
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/10019003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@131538 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,058 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long SegmentInfo::Parse()
{
assert(m_pMuxingAppAsUTF8 == NULL);
assert(m_pWritingAppAsUTF8 == NULL);
assert(m_pTitleAsUTF8 == NULL);
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
long long pos = m_start;
const long long stop = m_start + m_size;
m_timecodeScale = 1000000;
m_duration = -1;
while (pos < stop)
{
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(
pReader,
pos,
stop,
id,
size);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
if (id == 0x0AD7B1) //Timecode Scale
{
m_timecodeScale = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (m_timecodeScale <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
else if (id == 0x0489) //Segment duration
{
const long status = UnserializeFloat(
pReader,
pos,
size,
m_duration);
if (status < 0)
return status;
if (m_duration < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
else if (id == 0x0D80) //MuxingApp
{
const long status = UnserializeString(
pReader,
pos,
size,
m_pMuxingAppAsUTF8);
if (status)
return status;
}
else if (id == 0x1741) //WritingApp
{
const long status = UnserializeString(
pReader,
pos,
size,
m_pWritingAppAsUTF8);
if (status)
return status;
}
else if (id == 0x3BA9) //Title
{
const long status = UnserializeString(
pReader,
pos,
size,
m_pTitleAsUTF8);
if (status)
return status;
}
pos += size;
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,404 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: std::unique_ptr<HistogramBase> PersistentHistogramAllocator::AllocateHistogram(
HistogramType histogram_type,
const std::string& name,
int minimum,
int maximum,
const BucketRanges* bucket_ranges,
int32_t flags,
Reference* ref_ptr) {
if (memory_allocator_->IsCorrupt()) {
RecordCreateHistogramResult(CREATE_HISTOGRAM_ALLOCATOR_CORRUPT);
return nullptr;
}
PersistentHistogramData* histogram_data =
memory_allocator_->New<PersistentHistogramData>(
offsetof(PersistentHistogramData, name) + name.length() + 1);
if (histogram_data) {
memcpy(histogram_data->name, name.c_str(), name.size() + 1);
histogram_data->histogram_type = histogram_type;
histogram_data->flags = flags | HistogramBase::kIsPersistent;
}
if (histogram_type != SPARSE_HISTOGRAM) {
size_t bucket_count = bucket_ranges->bucket_count();
size_t counts_bytes = CalculateRequiredCountsBytes(bucket_count);
if (counts_bytes == 0) {
NOTREACHED();
return nullptr;
}
DCHECK_EQ(this, GlobalHistogramAllocator::Get());
PersistentMemoryAllocator::Reference ranges_ref =
bucket_ranges->persistent_reference();
if (!ranges_ref) {
size_t ranges_count = bucket_count + 1;
size_t ranges_bytes = ranges_count * sizeof(HistogramBase::Sample);
ranges_ref =
memory_allocator_->Allocate(ranges_bytes, kTypeIdRangesArray);
if (ranges_ref) {
HistogramBase::Sample* ranges_data =
memory_allocator_->GetAsArray<HistogramBase::Sample>(
ranges_ref, kTypeIdRangesArray, ranges_count);
if (ranges_data) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < bucket_ranges->size(); ++i)
ranges_data[i] = bucket_ranges->range(i);
bucket_ranges->set_persistent_reference(ranges_ref);
} else {
NOTREACHED();
ranges_ref = PersistentMemoryAllocator::kReferenceNull;
}
}
} else {
DCHECK_EQ(kTypeIdRangesArray, memory_allocator_->GetType(ranges_ref));
}
if (ranges_ref && histogram_data) {
histogram_data->minimum = minimum;
histogram_data->maximum = maximum;
histogram_data->bucket_count = static_cast<uint32_t>(bucket_count);
histogram_data->ranges_ref = ranges_ref;
histogram_data->ranges_checksum = bucket_ranges->checksum();
} else {
histogram_data = nullptr; // Clear this for proper handling below.
}
}
if (histogram_data) {
std::unique_ptr<HistogramBase> histogram = CreateHistogram(histogram_data);
DCHECK(histogram);
DCHECK_NE(0U, histogram_data->samples_metadata.id);
DCHECK_NE(0U, histogram_data->logged_metadata.id);
PersistentMemoryAllocator::Reference histogram_ref =
memory_allocator_->GetAsReference(histogram_data);
if (ref_ptr != nullptr)
*ref_ptr = histogram_ref;
subtle::NoBarrier_Store(&last_created_, histogram_ref);
return histogram;
}
CreateHistogramResultType result;
if (memory_allocator_->IsCorrupt()) {
RecordCreateHistogramResult(CREATE_HISTOGRAM_ALLOCATOR_NEWLY_CORRUPT);
result = CREATE_HISTOGRAM_ALLOCATOR_CORRUPT;
} else if (memory_allocator_->IsFull()) {
result = CREATE_HISTOGRAM_ALLOCATOR_FULL;
} else {
result = CREATE_HISTOGRAM_ALLOCATOR_ERROR;
}
RecordCreateHistogramResult(result);
if (result != CREATE_HISTOGRAM_ALLOCATOR_FULL)
NOTREACHED() << memory_allocator_->Name() << ", error=" << result;
return nullptr;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Extensions subsystem in Google Chrome before 49.0.2623.75 does not properly maintain own properties, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions via crafted JavaScript code that triggers an incorrect cast, related to extensions/renderer/v8_helpers.h and gin/converter.h.
Commit Message: Remove UMA.CreatePersistentHistogram.Result
This histogram isn't showing anything meaningful and the problems it
could show are better observed by looking at the allocators directly.
Bug: 831013
Change-Id: Ibe968597758230192e53a7675e7390e968c9e5b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1008047
Commit-Queue: Brian White <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexei Svitkine <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#549986} | Medium | 172,131 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: asmlinkage void __kprobes do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long write,
unsigned long address)
{
struct vm_area_struct * vma = NULL;
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm;
const int field = sizeof(unsigned long) * 2;
siginfo_t info;
int fault;
#if 0
printk("Cpu%d[%s:%d:%0*lx:%ld:%0*lx]\n", raw_smp_processor_id(),
current->comm, current->pid, field, address, write,
field, regs->cp0_epc);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_KPROBES
/*
* This is to notify the fault handler of the kprobes. The
* exception code is redundant as it is also carried in REGS,
* but we pass it anyhow.
*/
if (notify_die(DIE_PAGE_FAULT, "page fault", regs, -1,
(regs->cp0_cause >> 2) & 0x1f, SIGSEGV) == NOTIFY_STOP)
return;
#endif
info.si_code = SEGV_MAPERR;
/*
* We fault-in kernel-space virtual memory on-demand. The
* 'reference' page table is init_mm.pgd.
*
* NOTE! We MUST NOT take any locks for this case. We may
* be in an interrupt or a critical region, and should
* only copy the information from the master page table,
* nothing more.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
# define VMALLOC_FAULT_TARGET no_context
#else
# define VMALLOC_FAULT_TARGET vmalloc_fault
#endif
if (unlikely(address >= VMALLOC_START && address <= VMALLOC_END))
goto VMALLOC_FAULT_TARGET;
#ifdef MODULE_START
if (unlikely(address >= MODULE_START && address < MODULE_END))
goto VMALLOC_FAULT_TARGET;
#endif
/*
* If we're in an interrupt or have no user
* context, we must not take the fault..
*/
if (in_atomic() || !mm)
goto bad_area_nosemaphore;
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
vma = find_vma(mm, address);
if (!vma)
goto bad_area;
if (vma->vm_start <= address)
goto good_area;
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN))
goto bad_area;
if (expand_stack(vma, address))
goto bad_area;
/*
* Ok, we have a good vm_area for this memory access, so
* we can handle it..
*/
good_area:
info.si_code = SEGV_ACCERR;
if (write) {
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))
goto bad_area;
} else {
if (kernel_uses_smartmips_rixi) {
if (address == regs->cp0_epc && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
#if 0
pr_notice("Cpu%d[%s:%d:%0*lx:%ld:%0*lx] XI violation\n",
raw_smp_processor_id(),
current->comm, current->pid,
field, address, write,
field, regs->cp0_epc);
#endif
goto bad_area;
}
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_READ)) {
#if 0
pr_notice("Cpu%d[%s:%d:%0*lx:%ld:%0*lx] RI violation\n",
raw_smp_processor_id(),
current->comm, current->pid,
field, address, write,
field, regs->cp0_epc);
#endif
goto bad_area;
}
} else {
if (!(vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC)))
goto bad_area;
}
}
/*
* If for any reason at all we couldn't handle the fault,
* make sure we exit gracefully rather than endlessly redo
* the fault.
*/
fault = handle_mm_fault(mm, vma, address, write ? FAULT_FLAG_WRITE : 0);
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, address);
if (unlikely(fault & VM_FAULT_ERROR)) {
if (fault & VM_FAULT_OOM)
goto out_of_memory;
else if (fault & VM_FAULT_SIGBUS)
goto do_sigbus;
BUG();
}
if (fault & VM_FAULT_MAJOR) {
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS_MAJ,
1, 0, regs, address);
tsk->maj_flt++;
} else {
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS_MIN,
1, 0, regs, address);
tsk->min_flt++;
}
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
return;
/*
* Something tried to access memory that isn't in our memory map..
* Fix it, but check if it's kernel or user first..
*/
bad_area:
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
bad_area_nosemaphore:
/* User mode accesses just cause a SIGSEGV */
if (user_mode(regs)) {
tsk->thread.cp0_badvaddr = address;
tsk->thread.error_code = write;
#if 0
printk("do_page_fault() #2: sending SIGSEGV to %s for "
"invalid %s\n%0*lx (epc == %0*lx, ra == %0*lx)\n",
tsk->comm,
write ? "write access to" : "read access from",
field, address,
field, (unsigned long) regs->cp0_epc,
field, (unsigned long) regs->regs[31]);
#endif
info.si_signo = SIGSEGV;
info.si_errno = 0;
/* info.si_code has been set above */
info.si_addr = (void __user *) address;
force_sig_info(SIGSEGV, &info, tsk);
return;
}
no_context:
/* Are we prepared to handle this kernel fault? */
if (fixup_exception(regs)) {
current->thread.cp0_baduaddr = address;
return;
}
/*
* Oops. The kernel tried to access some bad page. We'll have to
* terminate things with extreme prejudice.
*/
bust_spinlocks(1);
printk(KERN_ALERT "CPU %d Unable to handle kernel paging request at "
"virtual address %0*lx, epc == %0*lx, ra == %0*lx\n",
raw_smp_processor_id(), field, address, field, regs->cp0_epc,
field, regs->regs[31]);
die("Oops", regs);
out_of_memory:
/*
* We ran out of memory, call the OOM killer, and return the userspace
* (which will retry the fault, or kill us if we got oom-killed).
*/
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
pagefault_out_of_memory();
return;
do_sigbus:
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
/* Kernel mode? Handle exceptions or die */
if (!user_mode(regs))
goto no_context;
else
/*
* Send a sigbus, regardless of whether we were in kernel
* or user mode.
*/
#if 0
printk("do_page_fault() #3: sending SIGBUS to %s for "
"invalid %s\n%0*lx (epc == %0*lx, ra == %0*lx)\n",
tsk->comm,
write ? "write access to" : "read access from",
field, address,
field, (unsigned long) regs->cp0_epc,
field, (unsigned long) regs->regs[31]);
#endif
tsk->thread.cp0_badvaddr = address;
info.si_signo = SIGBUS;
info.si_errno = 0;
info.si_code = BUS_ADRERR;
info.si_addr = (void __user *) address;
force_sig_info(SIGBUS, &info, tsk);
return;
#ifndef CONFIG_64BIT
vmalloc_fault:
{
/*
* Synchronize this task's top level page-table
* with the 'reference' page table.
*
* Do _not_ use "tsk" here. We might be inside
* an interrupt in the middle of a task switch..
*/
int offset = __pgd_offset(address);
pgd_t *pgd, *pgd_k;
pud_t *pud, *pud_k;
pmd_t *pmd, *pmd_k;
pte_t *pte_k;
pgd = (pgd_t *) pgd_current[raw_smp_processor_id()] + offset;
pgd_k = init_mm.pgd + offset;
if (!pgd_present(*pgd_k))
goto no_context;
set_pgd(pgd, *pgd_k);
pud = pud_offset(pgd, address);
pud_k = pud_offset(pgd_k, address);
if (!pud_present(*pud_k))
goto no_context;
pmd = pmd_offset(pud, address);
pmd_k = pmd_offset(pud_k, address);
if (!pmd_present(*pmd_k))
goto no_context;
set_pmd(pmd, *pmd_k);
pte_k = pte_offset_kernel(pmd_k, address);
if (!pte_present(*pte_k))
goto no_context;
return;
}
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,787 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int _dbus_printf_string_upper_bound (const char *format,
va_list args)
{
/* MSVCRT's vsnprintf semantics are a bit different */
char buf[1024];
int bufsize;
int len;
bufsize = sizeof (buf);
len = _vsnprintf (buf, bufsize - 1, format, args);
while (len == -1) /* try again */
{
p = malloc (bufsize);
if (p == NULL)
return -1;
if (p == NULL)
return -1;
len = _vsnprintf (p, bufsize - 1, format, args);
free (p);
}
* Returns the UTF-16 form of a UTF-8 string. The result should be
* freed with dbus_free() when no longer needed.
*
* @param str the UTF-8 string
* @param error return location for error code
*/
wchar_t *
_dbus_win_utf8_to_utf16 (const char *str,
DBusError *error)
{
DBusString s;
int n;
wchar_t *retval;
_dbus_string_init_const (&s, str);
if (!_dbus_string_validate_utf8 (&s, 0, _dbus_string_get_length (&s)))
{
dbus_set_error_const (error, DBUS_ERROR_FAILED, "Invalid UTF-8");
return NULL;
}
n = MultiByteToWideChar (CP_UTF8, 0, str, -1, NULL, 0);
if (n == 0)
{
_dbus_win_set_error_from_win_error (error, GetLastError ());
return NULL;
}
retval = dbus_new (wchar_t, n);
if (!retval)
{
_DBUS_SET_OOM (error);
return NULL;
}
if (MultiByteToWideChar (CP_UTF8, 0, str, -1, retval, n) != n)
{
dbus_free (retval);
dbus_set_error_const (error, DBUS_ERROR_FAILED, "MultiByteToWideChar inconsistency");
return NULL;
}
return retval;
}
/**
* Returns the UTF-8 form of a UTF-16 string. The result should be
* freed with dbus_free() when no longer needed.
*
* @param str the UTF-16 string
* @param error return location for error code
*/
char *
_dbus_win_utf16_to_utf8 (const wchar_t *str,
DBusError *error)
{
int n;
char *retval;
n = WideCharToMultiByte (CP_UTF8, 0, str, -1, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
if (n == 0)
{
_dbus_win_set_error_from_win_error (error, GetLastError ());
return NULL;
}
retval = dbus_malloc (n);
if (!retval)
{
_DBUS_SET_OOM (error);
return NULL;
}
if (WideCharToMultiByte (CP_UTF8, 0, str, -1, retval, n, NULL, NULL) != n)
{
dbus_free (retval);
dbus_set_error_const (error, DBUS_ERROR_FAILED, "WideCharToMultiByte inconsistency");
return NULL;
}
return retval;
}
/************************************************************************
************************************************************************/
dbus_bool_t
_dbus_win_account_to_sid (const wchar_t *waccount,
void **ppsid,
DBusError *error)
{
dbus_bool_t retval = FALSE;
DWORD sid_length, wdomain_length;
SID_NAME_USE use;
wchar_t *wdomain;
*ppsid = NULL;
sid_length = 0;
wdomain_length = 0;
if (!LookupAccountNameW (NULL, waccount, NULL, &sid_length,
NULL, &wdomain_length, &use) &&
GetLastError () != ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER)
{
_dbus_win_set_error_from_win_error (error, GetLastError ());
return FALSE;
}
*ppsid = dbus_malloc (sid_length);
if (!*ppsid)
{
_DBUS_SET_OOM (error);
return FALSE;
}
wdomain = dbus_new (wchar_t, wdomain_length);
if (!wdomain)
{
_DBUS_SET_OOM (error);
goto out1;
}
if (!LookupAccountNameW (NULL, waccount, (PSID) *ppsid, &sid_length,
wdomain, &wdomain_length, &use))
{
_dbus_win_set_error_from_win_error (error, GetLastError ());
goto out2;
}
if (!IsValidSid ((PSID) *ppsid))
{
dbus_set_error_const (error, DBUS_ERROR_FAILED, "Invalid SID");
goto out2;
}
retval = TRUE;
out2:
dbus_free (wdomain);
out1:
if (!retval)
{
dbus_free (*ppsid);
*ppsid = NULL;
}
return retval;
}
/** @} end of sysdeps-win */
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The _dbus_printf_string_upper_bound function in dbus/dbus-sysdeps-unix.c in D-Bus (aka DBus) 1.4.x before 1.4.26, 1.6.x before 1.6.12, and 1.7.x before 1.7.4 allows local users to cause a denial of service (service crash) via a crafted message.
Commit Message: | Low | 164,723 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PassRefPtr<RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl> RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create(ScriptExecutionContext* context, PassRefPtr<RTCSessionDescriptionCallback> successCallback, PassRefPtr<RTCErrorCallback> errorCallback)
{
RefPtr<RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl> request = adoptRef(new RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl(context, successCallback, errorCallback));
request->suspendIfNeeded();
return request.release();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163, does not properly perform object sealing, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that leverage *type confusion.*
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 170,342 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::freeBuffer(
OMX_U32 portIndex, OMX::buffer_id buffer) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
CLOG_BUFFER(freeBuffer, "%s:%u %#x", portString(portIndex), portIndex, buffer);
removeActiveBuffer(portIndex, buffer);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header = findBufferHeader(buffer);
BufferMeta *buffer_meta = static_cast<BufferMeta *>(header->pAppPrivate);
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_FreeBuffer(mHandle, portIndex, header);
CLOG_IF_ERROR(freeBuffer, err, "%s:%u %#x", portString(portIndex), portIndex, buffer);
delete buffer_meta;
buffer_meta = NULL;
invalidateBufferID(buffer);
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: omx/OMXNodeInstance.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 does not validate the buffer port, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 28816827.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE omx: check buffer port before using
Bug: 28816827
Change-Id: I3d5bad4a1ef96dec544b05bb31cc6f7109aae0a5
| Medium | 173,529 |
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