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Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int fuzzerTests(U32 seed, U32 nbTests, unsigned startTest, U32 const maxDurationS, double compressibility, int bigTests)
{
static const U32 maxSrcLog = 23;
static const U32 maxSampleLog = 22;
size_t const srcBufferSize = (size_t)1<<maxSrcLog;
size_t const dstBufferSize = (size_t)1<<maxSampleLog;
size_t const cBufferSize = ZSTD_compressBound(dstBufferSize);
BYTE* cNoiseBuffer[5];
BYTE* const cBuffer = (BYTE*) malloc (cBufferSize);
BYTE* const dstBuffer = (BYTE*) malloc (dstBufferSize);
BYTE* const mirrorBuffer = (BYTE*) malloc (dstBufferSize);
ZSTD_CCtx* const refCtx = ZSTD_createCCtx();
ZSTD_CCtx* const ctx = ZSTD_createCCtx();
ZSTD_DCtx* const dctx = ZSTD_createDCtx();
U32 result = 0;
U32 testNb = 0;
U32 coreSeed = seed;
UTIL_time_t const startClock = UTIL_getTime();
U64 const maxClockSpan = maxDurationS * SEC_TO_MICRO;
int const cLevelLimiter = bigTests ? 3 : 2;
/* allocation */
cNoiseBuffer[0] = (BYTE*)malloc (srcBufferSize);
cNoiseBuffer[1] = (BYTE*)malloc (srcBufferSize);
cNoiseBuffer[2] = (BYTE*)malloc (srcBufferSize);
cNoiseBuffer[3] = (BYTE*)malloc (srcBufferSize);
cNoiseBuffer[4] = (BYTE*)malloc (srcBufferSize);
CHECK (!cNoiseBuffer[0] || !cNoiseBuffer[1] || !cNoiseBuffer[2] || !cNoiseBuffer[3] || !cNoiseBuffer[4]
|| !dstBuffer || !mirrorBuffer || !cBuffer || !refCtx || !ctx || !dctx,
"Not enough memory, fuzzer tests cancelled");
/* Create initial samples */
RDG_genBuffer(cNoiseBuffer[0], srcBufferSize, 0.00, 0., coreSeed); /* pure noise */
RDG_genBuffer(cNoiseBuffer[1], srcBufferSize, 0.05, 0., coreSeed); /* barely compressible */
RDG_genBuffer(cNoiseBuffer[2], srcBufferSize, compressibility, 0., coreSeed);
RDG_genBuffer(cNoiseBuffer[3], srcBufferSize, 0.95, 0., coreSeed); /* highly compressible */
RDG_genBuffer(cNoiseBuffer[4], srcBufferSize, 1.00, 0., coreSeed); /* sparse content */
/* catch up testNb */
for (testNb=1; testNb < startTest; testNb++) FUZ_rand(&coreSeed);
/* main test loop */
for ( ; (testNb <= nbTests) || (UTIL_clockSpanMicro(startClock) < maxClockSpan); testNb++ ) {
BYTE* srcBuffer; /* jumping pointer */
U32 lseed;
size_t sampleSize, maxTestSize, totalTestSize;
size_t cSize, totalCSize, totalGenSize;
U64 crcOrig;
BYTE* sampleBuffer;
const BYTE* dict;
size_t dictSize;
/* notification */
if (nbTests >= testNb) { DISPLAYUPDATE(2, "\r%6u/%6u ", testNb, nbTests); }
else { DISPLAYUPDATE(2, "\r%6u ", testNb); }
FUZ_rand(&coreSeed);
{ U32 const prime1 = 2654435761U; lseed = coreSeed ^ prime1; }
/* srcBuffer selection [0-4] */
{ U32 buffNb = FUZ_rand(&lseed) & 0x7F;
if (buffNb & 7) buffNb=2; /* most common : compressible (P) */
else {
buffNb >>= 3;
if (buffNb & 7) {
const U32 tnb[2] = { 1, 3 }; /* barely/highly compressible */
buffNb = tnb[buffNb >> 3];
} else {
const U32 tnb[2] = { 0, 4 }; /* not compressible / sparse */
buffNb = tnb[buffNb >> 3];
} }
srcBuffer = cNoiseBuffer[buffNb];
}
/* select src segment */
sampleSize = FUZ_randomLength(&lseed, maxSampleLog);
/* create sample buffer (to catch read error with valgrind & sanitizers) */
sampleBuffer = (BYTE*)malloc(sampleSize);
CHECK(sampleBuffer==NULL, "not enough memory for sample buffer");
{ size_t const sampleStart = FUZ_rand(&lseed) % (srcBufferSize - sampleSize);
memcpy(sampleBuffer, srcBuffer + sampleStart, sampleSize); }
crcOrig = XXH64(sampleBuffer, sampleSize, 0);
/* compression tests */
{ int const cLevelPositive =
( FUZ_rand(&lseed) %
(ZSTD_maxCLevel() - (FUZ_highbit32((U32)sampleSize) / cLevelLimiter)) )
+ 1;
int const cLevel = ((FUZ_rand(&lseed) & 15) == 3) ?
- (int)((FUZ_rand(&lseed) & 7) + 1) : /* test negative cLevel */
cLevelPositive;
DISPLAYLEVEL(5, "fuzzer t%u: Simple compression test (level %i) \n", testNb, cLevel);
cSize = ZSTD_compressCCtx(ctx, cBuffer, cBufferSize, sampleBuffer, sampleSize, cLevel);
CHECK(ZSTD_isError(cSize), "ZSTD_compressCCtx failed : %s", ZSTD_getErrorName(cSize));
/* compression failure test : too small dest buffer */
if (cSize > 3) {
const size_t missing = (FUZ_rand(&lseed) % (cSize-2)) + 1; /* no problem, as cSize > 4 (frameHeaderSizer) */
const size_t tooSmallSize = cSize - missing;
const U32 endMark = 0x4DC2B1A9;
memcpy(dstBuffer+tooSmallSize, &endMark, 4);
{ size_t const errorCode = ZSTD_compressCCtx(ctx, dstBuffer, tooSmallSize, sampleBuffer, sampleSize, cLevel);
CHECK(!ZSTD_isError(errorCode), "ZSTD_compressCCtx should have failed ! (buffer too small : %u < %u)", (U32)tooSmallSize, (U32)cSize); }
{ U32 endCheck; memcpy(&endCheck, dstBuffer+tooSmallSize, 4);
CHECK(endCheck != endMark, "ZSTD_compressCCtx : dst buffer overflow"); }
} }
/* frame header decompression test */
{ ZSTD_frameHeader zfh;
CHECK_Z( ZSTD_getFrameHeader(&zfh, cBuffer, cSize) );
CHECK(zfh.frameContentSize != sampleSize, "Frame content size incorrect");
}
/* Decompressed size test */
{ unsigned long long const rSize = ZSTD_findDecompressedSize(cBuffer, cSize);
CHECK(rSize != sampleSize, "decompressed size incorrect");
}
/* successful decompression test */
DISPLAYLEVEL(5, "fuzzer t%u: simple decompression test \n", testNb);
{ size_t const margin = (FUZ_rand(&lseed) & 1) ? 0 : (FUZ_rand(&lseed) & 31) + 1;
size_t const dSize = ZSTD_decompress(dstBuffer, sampleSize + margin, cBuffer, cSize);
CHECK(dSize != sampleSize, "ZSTD_decompress failed (%s) (srcSize : %u ; cSize : %u)", ZSTD_getErrorName(dSize), (U32)sampleSize, (U32)cSize);
{ U64 const crcDest = XXH64(dstBuffer, sampleSize, 0);
CHECK(crcOrig != crcDest, "decompression result corrupted (pos %u / %u)", (U32)findDiff(sampleBuffer, dstBuffer, sampleSize), (U32)sampleSize);
} }
free(sampleBuffer); /* no longer useful after this point */
/* truncated src decompression test */
DISPLAYLEVEL(5, "fuzzer t%u: decompression of truncated source \n", testNb);
{ size_t const missing = (FUZ_rand(&lseed) % (cSize-2)) + 1; /* no problem, as cSize > 4 (frameHeaderSizer) */
size_t const tooSmallSize = cSize - missing;
void* cBufferTooSmall = malloc(tooSmallSize); /* valgrind will catch read overflows */
CHECK(cBufferTooSmall == NULL, "not enough memory !");
memcpy(cBufferTooSmall, cBuffer, tooSmallSize);
{ size_t const errorCode = ZSTD_decompress(dstBuffer, dstBufferSize, cBufferTooSmall, tooSmallSize);
CHECK(!ZSTD_isError(errorCode), "ZSTD_decompress should have failed ! (truncated src buffer)"); }
free(cBufferTooSmall);
}
/* too small dst decompression test */
DISPLAYLEVEL(5, "fuzzer t%u: decompress into too small dst buffer \n", testNb);
if (sampleSize > 3) {
size_t const missing = (FUZ_rand(&lseed) % (sampleSize-2)) + 1; /* no problem, as cSize > 4 (frameHeaderSizer) */
size_t const tooSmallSize = sampleSize - missing;
static const BYTE token = 0xA9;
dstBuffer[tooSmallSize] = token;
{ size_t const errorCode = ZSTD_decompress(dstBuffer, tooSmallSize, cBuffer, cSize);
CHECK(!ZSTD_isError(errorCode), "ZSTD_decompress should have failed : %u > %u (dst buffer too small)", (U32)errorCode, (U32)tooSmallSize); }
CHECK(dstBuffer[tooSmallSize] != token, "ZSTD_decompress : dst buffer overflow");
}
/* noisy src decompression test */
if (cSize > 6) {
/* insert noise into src */
{ U32 const maxNbBits = FUZ_highbit32((U32)(cSize-4));
size_t pos = 4; /* preserve magic number (too easy to detect) */
for (;;) {
/* keep some original src */
{ U32 const nbBits = FUZ_rand(&lseed) % maxNbBits;
size_t const mask = (1<<nbBits) - 1;
size_t const skipLength = FUZ_rand(&lseed) & mask;
pos += skipLength;
}
if (pos >= cSize) break;
/* add noise */
{ U32 const nbBitsCodes = FUZ_rand(&lseed) % maxNbBits;
U32 const nbBits = nbBitsCodes ? nbBitsCodes-1 : 0;
size_t const mask = (1<<nbBits) - 1;
size_t const rNoiseLength = (FUZ_rand(&lseed) & mask) + 1;
size_t const noiseLength = MIN(rNoiseLength, cSize-pos);
size_t const noiseStart = FUZ_rand(&lseed) % (srcBufferSize - noiseLength);
memcpy(cBuffer + pos, srcBuffer + noiseStart, noiseLength);
pos += noiseLength;
} } }
/* decompress noisy source */
DISPLAYLEVEL(5, "fuzzer t%u: decompress noisy source \n", testNb);
{ U32 const endMark = 0xA9B1C3D6;
memcpy(dstBuffer+sampleSize, &endMark, 4);
{ size_t const decompressResult = ZSTD_decompress(dstBuffer, sampleSize, cBuffer, cSize);
/* result *may* be an unlikely success, but even then, it must strictly respect dst buffer boundaries */
CHECK((!ZSTD_isError(decompressResult)) && (decompressResult>sampleSize),
"ZSTD_decompress on noisy src : result is too large : %u > %u (dst buffer)", (U32)decompressResult, (U32)sampleSize);
}
{ U32 endCheck; memcpy(&endCheck, dstBuffer+sampleSize, 4);
CHECK(endMark!=endCheck, "ZSTD_decompress on noisy src : dst buffer overflow");
} } } /* noisy src decompression test */
/*===== Bufferless streaming compression test, scattered segments and dictionary =====*/
DISPLAYLEVEL(5, "fuzzer t%u: Bufferless streaming compression test \n", testNb);
{ U32 const testLog = FUZ_rand(&lseed) % maxSrcLog;
U32 const dictLog = FUZ_rand(&lseed) % maxSrcLog;
int const cLevel = (FUZ_rand(&lseed) %
(ZSTD_maxCLevel() -
(MAX(testLog, dictLog) / cLevelLimiter))) +
1;
maxTestSize = FUZ_rLogLength(&lseed, testLog);
if (maxTestSize >= dstBufferSize) maxTestSize = dstBufferSize-1;
dictSize = FUZ_rLogLength(&lseed, dictLog); /* needed also for decompression */
dict = srcBuffer + (FUZ_rand(&lseed) % (srcBufferSize - dictSize));
DISPLAYLEVEL(6, "fuzzer t%u: Compressing up to <=%u bytes at level %i with dictionary size %u \n",
testNb, (U32)maxTestSize, cLevel, (U32)dictSize);
if (FUZ_rand(&lseed) & 0xF) {
CHECK_Z ( ZSTD_compressBegin_usingDict(refCtx, dict, dictSize, cLevel) );
} else {
ZSTD_compressionParameters const cPar = ZSTD_getCParams(cLevel, ZSTD_CONTENTSIZE_UNKNOWN, dictSize);
ZSTD_frameParameters const fPar = { FUZ_rand(&lseed)&1 /* contentSizeFlag */,
!(FUZ_rand(&lseed)&3) /* contentChecksumFlag*/,
0 /*NodictID*/ }; /* note : since dictionary is fake, dictIDflag has no impact */
ZSTD_parameters const p = FUZ_makeParams(cPar, fPar);
CHECK_Z ( ZSTD_compressBegin_advanced(refCtx, dict, dictSize, p, 0) );
}
CHECK_Z( ZSTD_copyCCtx(ctx, refCtx, 0) );
}
{ U32 const nbChunks = (FUZ_rand(&lseed) & 127) + 2;
U32 n;
XXH64_state_t xxhState;
XXH64_reset(&xxhState, 0);
for (totalTestSize=0, cSize=0, n=0 ; n<nbChunks ; n++) {
size_t const segmentSize = FUZ_randomLength(&lseed, maxSampleLog);
size_t const segmentStart = FUZ_rand(&lseed) % (srcBufferSize - segmentSize);
if (cBufferSize-cSize < ZSTD_compressBound(segmentSize)) break; /* avoid invalid dstBufferTooSmall */
if (totalTestSize+segmentSize > maxTestSize) break;
{ size_t const compressResult = ZSTD_compressContinue(ctx, cBuffer+cSize, cBufferSize-cSize, srcBuffer+segmentStart, segmentSize);
CHECK (ZSTD_isError(compressResult), "multi-segments compression error : %s", ZSTD_getErrorName(compressResult));
cSize += compressResult;
}
XXH64_update(&xxhState, srcBuffer+segmentStart, segmentSize);
memcpy(mirrorBuffer + totalTestSize, srcBuffer+segmentStart, segmentSize);
totalTestSize += segmentSize;
}
{ size_t const flushResult = ZSTD_compressEnd(ctx, cBuffer+cSize, cBufferSize-cSize, NULL, 0);
CHECK (ZSTD_isError(flushResult), "multi-segments epilogue error : %s", ZSTD_getErrorName(flushResult));
cSize += flushResult;
}
crcOrig = XXH64_digest(&xxhState);
}
/* streaming decompression test */
DISPLAYLEVEL(5, "fuzzer t%u: Bufferless streaming decompression test \n", testNb);
/* ensure memory requirement is good enough (should always be true) */
{ ZSTD_frameHeader zfh;
CHECK( ZSTD_getFrameHeader(&zfh, cBuffer, ZSTD_frameHeaderSize_max),
"ZSTD_getFrameHeader(): error retrieving frame information");
{ size_t const roundBuffSize = ZSTD_decodingBufferSize_min(zfh.windowSize, zfh.frameContentSize);
CHECK_Z(roundBuffSize);
CHECK((roundBuffSize > totalTestSize) && (zfh.frameContentSize!=ZSTD_CONTENTSIZE_UNKNOWN),
"ZSTD_decodingBufferSize_min() requires more memory (%u) than necessary (%u)",
(U32)roundBuffSize, (U32)totalTestSize );
} }
if (dictSize<8) dictSize=0, dict=NULL; /* disable dictionary */
CHECK_Z( ZSTD_decompressBegin_usingDict(dctx, dict, dictSize) );
totalCSize = 0;
totalGenSize = 0;
while (totalCSize < cSize) {
size_t const inSize = ZSTD_nextSrcSizeToDecompress(dctx);
size_t const genSize = ZSTD_decompressContinue(dctx, dstBuffer+totalGenSize, dstBufferSize-totalGenSize, cBuffer+totalCSize, inSize);
CHECK (ZSTD_isError(genSize), "ZSTD_decompressContinue error : %s", ZSTD_getErrorName(genSize));
totalGenSize += genSize;
totalCSize += inSize;
}
CHECK (ZSTD_nextSrcSizeToDecompress(dctx) != 0, "frame not fully decoded");
CHECK (totalGenSize != totalTestSize, "streaming decompressed data : wrong size")
CHECK (totalCSize != cSize, "compressed data should be fully read")
{ U64 const crcDest = XXH64(dstBuffer, totalTestSize, 0);
CHECK(crcOrig != crcDest, "streaming decompressed data corrupted (pos %u / %u)",
(U32)findDiff(mirrorBuffer, dstBuffer, totalTestSize), (U32)totalTestSize);
}
} /* for ( ; (testNb <= nbTests) */
DISPLAY("\r%u fuzzer tests completed \n", testNb-1);
_cleanup:
ZSTD_freeCCtx(refCtx);
ZSTD_freeCCtx(ctx);
ZSTD_freeDCtx(dctx);
free(cNoiseBuffer[0]);
free(cNoiseBuffer[1]);
free(cNoiseBuffer[2]);
free(cNoiseBuffer[3]);
free(cNoiseBuffer[4]);
free(cBuffer);
free(dstBuffer);
free(mirrorBuffer);
return result;
_output_error:
result = 1;
goto _cleanup;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: A race condition in the one-pass compression functions of Zstandard prior to version 1.3.8 could allow an attacker to write bytes out of bounds if an output buffer smaller than the recommended size was used.
Commit Message: fixed T36302429 | Medium | 169,675 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ExtractPostscript(Image *image,const ImageInfo *image_info,
MagickOffsetType PS_Offset,ssize_t PS_Size,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
postscript_file[MaxTextExtent];
const MagicInfo
*magic_info;
FILE
*ps_file;
ImageInfo
*clone_info;
Image
*image2;
unsigned char
magick[2*MaxTextExtent];
if ((clone_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info)) == NULL)
return(image);
clone_info->blob=(void *) NULL;
clone_info->length=0;
/* Obtain temporary file */
(void) AcquireUniqueFilename(postscript_file);
ps_file=fopen_utf8(postscript_file,"wb");
if (ps_file == (FILE *) NULL)
goto FINISH;
/* Copy postscript to temporary file */
(void) SeekBlob(image,PS_Offset,SEEK_SET);
(void) ReadBlob(image, 2*MaxTextExtent, magick);
(void) SeekBlob(image,PS_Offset,SEEK_SET);
while(PS_Size-- > 0)
{
(void) fputc(ReadBlobByte(image),ps_file);
}
(void) fclose(ps_file);
/* Detect file format - Check magic.mgk configuration file. */
magic_info=GetMagicInfo(magick,2*MaxTextExtent,exception);
if(magic_info == (const MagicInfo *) NULL) goto FINISH_UNL;
/* printf("Detected:%s \n",magic_info->name); */
if(exception->severity != UndefinedException) goto FINISH_UNL;
if(magic_info->name == (char *) NULL) goto FINISH_UNL;
(void) strncpy(clone_info->magick,magic_info->name,MaxTextExtent);
/* Read nested image */
/*FormatString(clone_info->filename,"%s:%s",magic_info->name,postscript_file);*/
FormatLocaleString(clone_info->filename,MaxTextExtent,"%s",postscript_file);
image2=ReadImage(clone_info,exception);
if (!image2)
goto FINISH_UNL;
/*
Replace current image with new image while copying base image
attributes.
*/
(void) CopyMagickString(image2->filename,image->filename,MaxTextExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(image2->magick_filename,image->magick_filename,MaxTextExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(image2->magick,image->magick,MaxTextExtent);
image2->depth=image->depth;
DestroyBlob(image2);
image2->blob=ReferenceBlob(image->blob);
if ((image->rows == 0) || (image->columns == 0))
DeleteImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,image2);
FINISH_UNL:
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(postscript_file);
FINISH:
DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
return(image);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Off-by-one error in coders/wpg.c in ImageMagick allows remote attackers to have unspecified impact via vectors related to a string copy.
Commit Message: ... | High | 168,524 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void addDataToStreamTask(void* context)
{
OwnPtr<BlobRegistryContext> blobRegistryContext = adoptPtr(static_cast<BlobRegistryContext*>(context));
blobRegistry().addDataToStream(blobRegistryContext->url, blobRegistryContext->streamData);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 23.0.1271.91 on Mac OS X does not properly mitigate improper rendering behavior in the Intel GPU driver, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 170,681 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: yydestruct (const char *yymsg, int yytype, YYSTYPE *yyvaluep, void *yyscanner, RE_LEX_ENVIRONMENT *lex_env)
{
YYUSE (yyvaluep);
YYUSE (yyscanner);
YYUSE (lex_env);
if (!yymsg)
yymsg = "Deleting";
YY_SYMBOL_PRINT (yymsg, yytype, yyvaluep, yylocationp);
YY_IGNORE_MAYBE_UNINITIALIZED_BEGIN
switch (yytype)
{
case 6: /* _CLASS_ */
#line 96 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1257 */
{ yr_free(((*yyvaluep).class_vector)); }
#line 1045 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1257 */
break;
case 26: /* alternative */
#line 97 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1257 */
{ yr_re_node_destroy(((*yyvaluep).re_node)); }
#line 1051 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1257 */
break;
case 27: /* concatenation */
#line 98 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1257 */
{ yr_re_node_destroy(((*yyvaluep).re_node)); }
#line 1057 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1257 */
break;
case 28: /* repeat */
#line 99 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1257 */
{ yr_re_node_destroy(((*yyvaluep).re_node)); }
#line 1063 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1257 */
break;
case 29: /* single */
#line 100 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1257 */
{ yr_re_node_destroy(((*yyvaluep).re_node)); }
#line 1069 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1257 */
break;
default:
break;
}
YY_IGNORE_MAYBE_UNINITIALIZED_END
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-674
Summary: libyara/re.c in the regexp module in YARA 3.5.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (stack consumption) via a crafted rule that is mishandled in the _yr_re_emit function.
Commit Message: Fix issue #674. Move regexp limits to limits.h. | Medium | 168,103 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void handle_rx(struct vhost_net *net)
{
struct vhost_net_virtqueue *nvq = &net->vqs[VHOST_NET_VQ_RX];
struct vhost_virtqueue *vq = &nvq->vq;
unsigned uninitialized_var(in), log;
struct vhost_log *vq_log;
struct msghdr msg = {
.msg_name = NULL,
.msg_namelen = 0,
.msg_control = NULL, /* FIXME: get and handle RX aux data. */
.msg_controllen = 0,
.msg_iov = vq->iov,
.msg_flags = MSG_DONTWAIT,
};
struct virtio_net_hdr_mrg_rxbuf hdr = {
.hdr.flags = 0,
.hdr.gso_type = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE
};
size_t total_len = 0;
int err, mergeable;
s16 headcount;
size_t vhost_hlen, sock_hlen;
size_t vhost_len, sock_len;
struct socket *sock;
mutex_lock(&vq->mutex);
sock = vq->private_data;
if (!sock)
goto out;
vhost_disable_notify(&net->dev, vq);
vhost_hlen = nvq->vhost_hlen;
sock_hlen = nvq->sock_hlen;
vq_log = unlikely(vhost_has_feature(&net->dev, VHOST_F_LOG_ALL)) ?
vq->log : NULL;
mergeable = vhost_has_feature(&net->dev, VIRTIO_NET_F_MRG_RXBUF);
while ((sock_len = peek_head_len(sock->sk))) {
sock_len += sock_hlen;
vhost_len = sock_len + vhost_hlen;
headcount = get_rx_bufs(vq, vq->heads, vhost_len,
&in, vq_log, &log,
likely(mergeable) ? UIO_MAXIOV : 1);
/* On error, stop handling until the next kick. */
if (unlikely(headcount < 0))
break;
/* OK, now we need to know about added descriptors. */
if (!headcount) {
if (unlikely(vhost_enable_notify(&net->dev, vq))) {
/* They have slipped one in as we were
* doing that: check again. */
vhost_disable_notify(&net->dev, vq);
continue;
}
/* Nothing new? Wait for eventfd to tell us
* they refilled. */
break;
}
/* We don't need to be notified again. */
if (unlikely((vhost_hlen)))
/* Skip header. TODO: support TSO. */
move_iovec_hdr(vq->iov, nvq->hdr, vhost_hlen, in);
else
/* Copy the header for use in VIRTIO_NET_F_MRG_RXBUF:
* needed because recvmsg can modify msg_iov. */
copy_iovec_hdr(vq->iov, nvq->hdr, sock_hlen, in);
msg.msg_iovlen = in;
err = sock->ops->recvmsg(NULL, sock, &msg,
sock_len, MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_TRUNC);
/* Userspace might have consumed the packet meanwhile:
* it's not supposed to do this usually, but might be hard
* to prevent. Discard data we got (if any) and keep going. */
if (unlikely(err != sock_len)) {
pr_debug("Discarded rx packet: "
" len %d, expected %zd\n", err, sock_len);
vhost_discard_vq_desc(vq, headcount);
continue;
}
if (unlikely(vhost_hlen) &&
memcpy_toiovecend(nvq->hdr, (unsigned char *)&hdr, 0,
vhost_hlen)) {
vq_err(vq, "Unable to write vnet_hdr at addr %p\n",
vq->iov->iov_base);
break;
}
/* TODO: Should check and handle checksum. */
if (likely(mergeable) &&
memcpy_toiovecend(nvq->hdr, (unsigned char *)&headcount,
offsetof(typeof(hdr), num_buffers),
sizeof hdr.num_buffers)) {
vq_err(vq, "Failed num_buffers write");
vhost_discard_vq_desc(vq, headcount);
break;
}
vhost_add_used_and_signal_n(&net->dev, vq, vq->heads,
headcount);
if (unlikely(vq_log))
vhost_log_write(vq, vq_log, log, vhost_len);
total_len += vhost_len;
if (unlikely(total_len >= VHOST_NET_WEIGHT)) {
vhost_poll_queue(&vq->poll);
break;
}
}
out:
mutex_unlock(&vq->mutex);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: drivers/vhost/net.c in the Linux kernel before 3.13.10, when mergeable buffers are disabled, does not properly validate packet lengths, which allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (memory corruption and host OS crash) or possibly gain privileges on the host OS via crafted packets, related to the handle_rx and get_rx_bufs functions.
Commit Message: vhost: fix total length when packets are too short
When mergeable buffers are disabled, and the
incoming packet is too large for the rx buffer,
get_rx_bufs returns success.
This was intentional in order for make recvmsg
truncate the packet and then handle_rx would
detect err != sock_len and drop it.
Unfortunately we pass the original sock_len to
recvmsg - which means we use parts of iov not fully
validated.
Fix this up by detecting this overrun and doing packet drop
immediately.
CVE-2014-0077
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,461 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void FrameSelection::SelectAll(SetSelectionBy set_selection_by) {
if (isHTMLSelectElement(GetDocument().FocusedElement())) {
HTMLSelectElement* select_element =
toHTMLSelectElement(GetDocument().FocusedElement());
if (select_element->CanSelectAll()) {
select_element->SelectAll();
return;
}
}
Node* root = nullptr;
Node* select_start_target = nullptr;
if (set_selection_by == SetSelectionBy::kUser && IsHidden()) {
root = GetDocument().documentElement();
select_start_target = GetDocument().body();
} else if (ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTree().IsContentEditable()) {
root = HighestEditableRoot(ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTree().Start());
if (Node* shadow_root = NonBoundaryShadowTreeRootNode(
ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTree().Start()))
select_start_target = shadow_root->OwnerShadowHost();
else
select_start_target = root;
} else {
root = NonBoundaryShadowTreeRootNode(
ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTree().Start());
if (root) {
select_start_target = root->OwnerShadowHost();
} else {
root = GetDocument().documentElement();
select_start_target = GetDocument().body();
}
}
if (!root || EditingIgnoresContent(*root))
return;
if (select_start_target) {
const Document& expected_document = GetDocument();
if (select_start_target->DispatchEvent(Event::CreateCancelableBubble(
EventTypeNames::selectstart)) != DispatchEventResult::kNotCanceled)
return;
if (!IsAvailable()) {
return;
}
if (!root->isConnected() || expected_document != root->GetDocument())
return;
}
SetSelection(SelectionInDOMTree::Builder()
.SelectAllChildren(*root)
.SetIsHandleVisible(IsHandleVisible())
.Build());
SelectFrameElementInParentIfFullySelected();
NotifyTextControlOfSelectionChange(SetSelectionBy::kUser);
if (IsHandleVisible()) {
ContextMenuAllowedScope scope;
frame_->GetEventHandler().ShowNonLocatedContextMenu(nullptr,
kMenuSourceTouch);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The convolution implementation in Skia, as used in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73, does not properly constrain row lengths, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted graphics data.
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660} | High | 171,759 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: exsltCryptoPopString (xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int nargs,
xmlChar ** str) {
int str_len = 0;
if ((nargs < 1) || (nargs > 2)) {
xmlXPathSetArityError (ctxt);
return 0;
}
*str = xmlXPathPopString (ctxt);
str_len = xmlUTF8Strlen (*str);
if (str_len == 0) {
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
xmlFree (*str);
return 0;
}
return str_len;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: numbers.c in libxslt before 1.1.29, as used in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63, mishandles namespace nodes, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds heap memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338} | Medium | 173,286 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int b_unpack (lua_State *L) {
Header h;
const char *fmt = luaL_checkstring(L, 1);
size_t ld;
const char *data = luaL_checklstring(L, 2, &ld);
size_t pos = luaL_optinteger(L, 3, 1) - 1;
defaultoptions(&h);
lua_settop(L, 2);
while (*fmt) {
int opt = *fmt++;
size_t size = optsize(L, opt, &fmt);
pos += gettoalign(pos, &h, opt, size);
luaL_argcheck(L, pos+size <= ld, 2, "data string too short");
luaL_checkstack(L, 1, "too many results");
switch (opt) {
case 'b': case 'B': case 'h': case 'H':
case 'l': case 'L': case 'T': case 'i': case 'I': { /* integer types */
int issigned = islower(opt);
lua_Number res = getinteger(data+pos, h.endian, issigned, size);
lua_pushnumber(L, res);
break;
}
case 'x': {
break;
}
case 'f': {
float f;
memcpy(&f, data+pos, size);
correctbytes((char *)&f, sizeof(f), h.endian);
lua_pushnumber(L, f);
break;
}
case 'd': {
double d;
memcpy(&d, data+pos, size);
correctbytes((char *)&d, sizeof(d), h.endian);
lua_pushnumber(L, d);
break;
}
case 'c': {
if (size == 0) {
if (!lua_isnumber(L, -1))
luaL_error(L, "format `c0' needs a previous size");
size = lua_tonumber(L, -1);
lua_pop(L, 1);
luaL_argcheck(L, pos+size <= ld, 2, "data string too short");
}
lua_pushlstring(L, data+pos, size);
break;
}
case 's': {
const char *e = (const char *)memchr(data+pos, '\0', ld - pos);
if (e == NULL)
luaL_error(L, "unfinished string in data");
size = (e - (data+pos)) + 1;
lua_pushlstring(L, data+pos, size - 1);
break;
}
default: controloptions(L, opt, &fmt, &h);
}
pos += size;
}
lua_pushinteger(L, pos + 1);
return lua_gettop(L) - 2;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: An Integer Overflow issue was discovered in the struct library in the Lua subsystem in Redis before 3.2.12, 4.x before 4.0.10, and 5.x before 5.0 RC2, leading to a failure of bounds checking.
Commit Message: Security: update Lua struct package for security.
During an auditing Apple found that the "struct" Lua package
we ship with Redis (http://www.inf.puc-rio.br/~roberto/struct/) contains
a security problem. A bound-checking statement fails because of integer
overflow. The bug exists since we initially integrated this package with
Lua, when scripting was introduced, so every version of Redis with
EVAL/EVALSHA capabilities exposed is affected.
Instead of just fixing the bug, the library was updated to the latest
version shipped by the author. | High | 170,163 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool ChromeWebUIControllerFactory::HasWebUIScheme(const GURL& url) const {
return url.SchemeIs(chrome::kChromeDevToolsScheme) ||
url.SchemeIs(chrome::kChromeInternalScheme) ||
url.SchemeIs(chrome::kChromeUIScheme);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.46 does not use a dedicated process for the loading of links found on an internal page, which might allow attackers to bypass intended sandbox restrictions via a crafted page.
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,008 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: gfx::Vector2d LayerTreeHost::DistributeScrollOffsetToViewports(
const gfx::Vector2d offset,
Layer* layer) {
DCHECK(layer);
if (layer != outer_viewport_scroll_layer_.get())
return offset;
gfx::Vector2d inner_viewport_offset =
inner_viewport_scroll_layer_->scroll_offset();
gfx::Vector2d outer_viewport_offset =
outer_viewport_scroll_layer_->scroll_offset();
if (offset == inner_viewport_offset + outer_viewport_offset) {
return outer_viewport_offset;
}
gfx::Vector2d max_outer_viewport_scroll_offset =
outer_viewport_scroll_layer_->MaxScrollOffset();
gfx::Vector2d max_inner_viewport_scroll_offset =
inner_viewport_scroll_layer_->MaxScrollOffset();
outer_viewport_offset = offset - inner_viewport_offset;
outer_viewport_offset.SetToMin(max_outer_viewport_scroll_offset);
outer_viewport_offset.SetToMax(gfx::Vector2d());
inner_viewport_offset = offset - outer_viewport_offset;
inner_viewport_offset.SetToMin(max_inner_viewport_scroll_offset);
inner_viewport_offset.SetToMax(gfx::Vector2d());
inner_viewport_scroll_layer_->SetScrollOffset(inner_viewport_offset);
return outer_viewport_offset;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the XSLT ProcessingInstruction implementation in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 29.0.1547.57, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to an applyXSLTransform call involving (1) an HTML document or (2) an xsl:processing-instruction element that is still in the process of loading.
Commit Message: Removed pinch viewport scroll offset distribution
The associated change in Blink makes the pinch viewport a proper
ScrollableArea meaning the normal path for synchronizing layer scroll
offsets is used.
This is a 2 sided patch, the other CL:
https://codereview.chromium.org/199253002/
BUG=349941
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/210543002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260105 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,199 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: do_REMOTE_syscall()
{
int condor_sysnum;
int rval = -1, result = -1, fd = -1, mode = -1, uid = -1, gid = -1;
int length = -1;
condor_errno_t terrno;
char *path = NULL, *buffer = NULL;
void *buf = NULL;
syscall_sock->decode();
dprintf(D_SYSCALLS, "About to decode condor_sysnum\n");
rval = syscall_sock->code(condor_sysnum);
if (!rval) {
MyString err_msg;
err_msg = "Can no longer talk to condor_starter <";
err_msg += syscall_sock->peer_ip_str();
err_msg += ':';
err_msg += syscall_sock->peer_port();
err_msg += '>';
thisRemoteResource->closeClaimSock();
/* It is possible that we are failing to read the
syscall number because the starter went away
because we *asked* it to go away. Don't be shocked
and surprised if the startd/starter actually did
what we asked when we deactivated the claim */
if ( thisRemoteResource->wasClaimDeactivated() ) {
return 0;
}
if( Shadow->supportsReconnect() ) {
dprintf( D_ALWAYS, "%s\n", err_msg.Value() );
const char* txt = "Socket between submit and execute hosts "
"closed unexpectedly";
Shadow->logDisconnectedEvent( txt );
if (!Shadow->shouldAttemptReconnect(thisRemoteResource)) {
dprintf(D_ALWAYS, "This job cannot reconnect to starter, so job exiting\n");
Shadow->gracefulShutDown();
EXCEPT( "%s", err_msg.Value() );
}
Shadow->reconnect();
return 0;
} else {
EXCEPT( "%s", err_msg.Value() );
}
}
dprintf(D_SYSCALLS,
"Got request for syscall %s (%d)\n",
shadow_syscall_name(condor_sysnum), condor_sysnum);
switch( condor_sysnum ) {
case CONDOR_register_starter_info:
{
ClassAd ad;
result = ( ad.initFromStream(*syscall_sock) );
ASSERT( result );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
errno = 0;
rval = pseudo_register_starter_info( &ad );
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d\n", rval, terrno );
syscall_sock->encode();
result = ( syscall_sock->code(rval) );
ASSERT( result );
if( rval < 0 ) {
result = ( syscall_sock->code( terrno ) );
ASSERT( result );
}
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
return 0;
}
case CONDOR_register_job_info:
{
ClassAd ad;
result = ( ad.initFromStream(*syscall_sock) );
ASSERT( result );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
errno = 0;
rval = pseudo_register_job_info( &ad );
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d\n", rval, terrno );
syscall_sock->encode();
result = ( syscall_sock->code(rval) );
ASSERT( result );
if( rval < 0 ) {
result = ( syscall_sock->code( terrno ) );
ASSERT( result );
}
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
return 0;
}
case CONDOR_get_job_info:
{
ClassAd *ad = NULL;
bool delete_ad;
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
errno = 0;
rval = pseudo_get_job_info(ad, delete_ad);
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d\n", rval, terrno );
syscall_sock->encode();
result = ( syscall_sock->code(rval) );
ASSERT( result );
if( rval < 0 ) {
result = ( syscall_sock->code( terrno ) );
ASSERT( result );
} else {
result = ( ad->put(*syscall_sock) );
ASSERT( result );
}
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
if ( delete_ad ) {
delete ad;
}
return 0;
}
case CONDOR_get_user_info:
{
ClassAd *ad = NULL;
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
errno = 0;
rval = pseudo_get_user_info(ad);
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d\n", rval, terrno );
syscall_sock->encode();
result = ( syscall_sock->code(rval) );
ASSERT( result );
if( rval < 0 ) {
result = ( syscall_sock->code( terrno ) );
ASSERT( result );
} else {
result = ( ad->put(*syscall_sock) );
ASSERT( result );
}
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
return 0;
}
case CONDOR_job_exit:
{
int status=0;
int reason=0;
ClassAd ad;
result = ( syscall_sock->code(status) );
ASSERT( result );
result = ( syscall_sock->code(reason) );
ASSERT( result );
result = ( ad.initFromStream(*syscall_sock) );
ASSERT( result );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
errno = 0;
rval = pseudo_job_exit(status, reason, &ad);
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d\n", rval, terrno );
syscall_sock->encode();
result = ( syscall_sock->code(rval) );
ASSERT( result );
if( rval < 0 ) {
result = ( syscall_sock->code( terrno ) );
ASSERT( result );
}
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
return -1;
}
case CONDOR_job_termination:
{
ClassAd ad;
result = ( ad.initFromStream(*syscall_sock) );
ASSERT( result );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
errno = 0;
rval = pseudo_job_termination( &ad );
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d\n", rval, terrno );
syscall_sock->encode();
result = ( syscall_sock->code(rval) );
ASSERT( result );
if( rval < 0 ) {
result = ( syscall_sock->code( terrno ) );
ASSERT( result );
}
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
return 0;
}
case CONDOR_begin_execution:
{
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
errno = 0;
rval = pseudo_begin_execution();
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d\n", rval, terrno );
syscall_sock->encode();
result = ( syscall_sock->code(rval) );
ASSERT( result );
if( rval < 0 ) {
result = ( syscall_sock->code( terrno ) );
ASSERT( result );
}
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
return 0;
}
case CONDOR_open:
{
open_flags_t flags;
int lastarg;
result = ( syscall_sock->code(flags) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " flags = %d\n", flags );
result = ( syscall_sock->code(lastarg) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " lastarg = %d\n", lastarg );
path = NULL;
result = ( syscall_sock->code(path) );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " path = %s\n", path );
ASSERT( result );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
bool access_ok;
if ( flags & O_RDONLY ) {
access_ok = read_access(path);
} else {
access_ok = write_access(path);
}
errno = 0;
if ( access_ok ) {
rval = safe_open_wrapper_follow( path , flags , lastarg);
} else {
rval = -1;
errno = EACCES;
}
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d\n", rval, terrno );
syscall_sock->encode();
result = ( syscall_sock->code(rval) );
ASSERT( result );
if( rval < 0 ) {
result = ( syscall_sock->code( terrno ) );
ASSERT( result );
}
free( (char *)path );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
return 0;
}
case CONDOR_close:
{
result = ( syscall_sock->code(fd) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " fd = %d\n", fd );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
errno = 0;
rval = close( fd);
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d\n", rval, terrno );
syscall_sock->encode();
result = ( syscall_sock->code(rval) );
ASSERT( result );
if( rval < 0 ) {
result = ( syscall_sock->code( terrno ) );
ASSERT( result );
}
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
return 0;
}
case CONDOR_read:
{
size_t len;
result = ( syscall_sock->code(fd) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " fd = %d\n", fd );
result = ( syscall_sock->code(len) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " len = %ld\n", (long)len );
buf = (void *)malloc( (unsigned)len );
memset( buf, 0, (unsigned)len );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
errno = 0;
rval = read( fd , buf , len);
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d\n", rval, terrno );
syscall_sock->encode();
result = ( syscall_sock->code(rval) );
ASSERT( result );
if( rval < 0 ) {
result = ( syscall_sock->code( terrno ) );
ASSERT( result );
}
if( rval >= 0 ) {
result = ( syscall_sock->code_bytes_bool(buf, rval) );
ASSERT( result );
}
free( buf );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
return 0;
}
case CONDOR_write:
{
size_t len;
result = ( syscall_sock->code(fd) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " fd = %d\n", fd );
result = ( syscall_sock->code(len) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " len = %ld\n", (long)len );
buf = (void *)malloc( (unsigned)len );
memset( buf, 0, (unsigned)len );
result = ( syscall_sock->code_bytes_bool(buf, len) );
ASSERT( result );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
errno = 0;
rval = write( fd , buf , len);
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d\n", rval, terrno );
syscall_sock->encode();
result = ( syscall_sock->code(rval) );
ASSERT( result );
if( rval < 0 ) {
result = ( syscall_sock->code( terrno ) );
ASSERT( result );
}
free( buf );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
return 0;
}
case CONDOR_lseek:
case CONDOR_lseek64:
case CONDOR_llseek:
{
off_t offset;
int whence;
result = ( syscall_sock->code(fd) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " fd = %d\n", fd );
result = ( syscall_sock->code(offset) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " offset = %ld\n", (long)offset );
result = ( syscall_sock->code(whence) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " whence = %d\n", whence );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
errno = 0;
rval = lseek( fd , offset , whence);
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d\n", rval, terrno );
syscall_sock->encode();
result = ( syscall_sock->code(rval) );
ASSERT( result );
if( rval < 0 ) {
result = ( syscall_sock->code( terrno ) );
ASSERT( result );
}
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
return 0;
}
case CONDOR_unlink:
{
path = NULL;
result = ( syscall_sock->code(path) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " path = %s\n", path );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
if ( write_access(path) ) {
errno = 0;
rval = unlink( path);
} else {
rval = -1;
errno = EACCES;
}
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d\n", rval, terrno );
syscall_sock->encode();
result = ( syscall_sock->code(rval) );
ASSERT( result );
if( rval < 0 ) {
result = ( syscall_sock->code( terrno ) );
ASSERT( result );
}
free( (char *)path );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
return 0;
}
case CONDOR_rename:
{
char * from;
char * to;
to = NULL;
from = NULL;
result = ( syscall_sock->code(from) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " from = %s\n", from );
result = ( syscall_sock->code(to) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " to = %s\n", to );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
if ( write_access(from) && write_access(to) ) {
errno = 0;
rval = rename( from , to);
} else {
rval = -1;
errno = EACCES;
}
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d\n", rval, terrno );
syscall_sock->encode();
result = ( syscall_sock->code(rval) );
ASSERT( result );
if( rval < 0 ) {
result = ( syscall_sock->code( terrno ) );
ASSERT( result );
}
free( (char *)to );
free( (char *)from );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
return 0;
}
case CONDOR_register_mpi_master_info:
{
ClassAd ad;
result = ( ad.initFromStream(*syscall_sock) );
ASSERT( result );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
errno = 0;
rval = pseudo_register_mpi_master_info( &ad );
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d\n", rval, terrno );
syscall_sock->encode();
result = ( syscall_sock->code(rval) );
ASSERT( result );
if( rval < 0 ) {
result = ( syscall_sock->code( terrno ) );
ASSERT( result );
}
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
return 0;
}
case CONDOR_mkdir:
{
path = NULL;
result = ( syscall_sock->code(path) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " path = %s\n", path );
result = ( syscall_sock->code(mode) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " mode = %d\n", mode );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
if ( write_access(path) ) {
errno = 0;
rval = mkdir(path,mode);
} else {
rval = -1;
errno = EACCES;
}
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d\n", rval, terrno );
syscall_sock->encode();
result = ( syscall_sock->code(rval) );
ASSERT( result );
if( rval < 0 ) {
result = ( syscall_sock->code( terrno ) );
ASSERT( result );
}
free( (char *)path );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
return 0;
}
case CONDOR_rmdir:
{
path = NULL;
result = ( syscall_sock->code(path) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " path = %s\n", path );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
if ( write_access(path) ) {
errno = 0;
rval = rmdir( path);
} else {
rval = -1;
errno = EACCES;
}
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d\n", rval, terrno );
syscall_sock->encode();
result = ( syscall_sock->code(rval) );
ASSERT( result );
if( rval < 0 ) {
result = ( syscall_sock->code( terrno ) );
ASSERT( result );
}
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
return 0;
}
case CONDOR_fsync:
{
result = ( syscall_sock->code(fd) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " fs = %d\n", fd );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
errno = 0;
rval = fsync(fd);
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d\n", rval, terrno );
syscall_sock->encode();
result = ( syscall_sock->code(rval) );
ASSERT( result );
if( rval < 0 ) {
result = ( syscall_sock->code( terrno ) );
ASSERT( result );
}
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
return 0;
}
case CONDOR_get_file_info_new:
{
char * logical_name;
char * actual_url;
actual_url = NULL;
logical_name = NULL;
ASSERT( syscall_sock->code(logical_name) );
ASSERT( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );;
errno = (condor_errno_t)0;
rval = pseudo_get_file_info_new( logical_name , actual_url );
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d\n", rval, (int)terrno );
syscall_sock->encode();
ASSERT( syscall_sock->code(rval) );
if( rval < 0 ) {
ASSERT( syscall_sock->code(terrno) );
}
if( rval >= 0 ) {
ASSERT( syscall_sock->code(actual_url) );
}
free( (char *)actual_url );
free( (char *)logical_name );
ASSERT( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );;
return 0;
}
case CONDOR_ulog:
{
ClassAd ad;
result = ( ad.initFromStream(*syscall_sock) );
ASSERT( result );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
rval = pseudo_ulog(&ad);
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d\n", rval );
return 0;
}
case CONDOR_get_job_attr:
{
char * attrname = 0;
assert( syscall_sock->code(attrname) );
assert( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );;
errno = (condor_errno_t)0;
MyString expr;
if ( thisRemoteResource->allowRemoteReadAttributeAccess(attrname) ) {
rval = pseudo_get_job_attr( attrname , expr);
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
} else {
rval = -1;
terrno = (condor_errno_t)EACCES;
}
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d\n", rval, (int)terrno );
syscall_sock->encode();
assert( syscall_sock->code(rval) );
if( rval < 0 ) {
assert( syscall_sock->code(terrno) );
}
if( rval >= 0 ) {
assert( syscall_sock->put(expr.Value()) );
}
free( (char *)attrname );
assert( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );;
return 0;
}
case CONDOR_set_job_attr:
{
char * attrname = 0;
char * expr = 0;
assert( syscall_sock->code(expr) );
assert( syscall_sock->code(attrname) );
assert( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );;
errno = (condor_errno_t)0;
if ( thisRemoteResource->allowRemoteWriteAttributeAccess(attrname) ) {
rval = pseudo_set_job_attr( attrname , expr , true );
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
} else {
rval = -1;
terrno = (condor_errno_t)EACCES;
}
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d\n", rval, (int)terrno );
syscall_sock->encode();
assert( syscall_sock->code(rval) );
if( rval < 0 ) {
assert( syscall_sock->code(terrno) );
}
free( (char *)expr );
free( (char *)attrname );
assert( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );;
return 0;
}
case CONDOR_constrain:
{
char * expr = 0;
assert( syscall_sock->code(expr) );
assert( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );;
errno = (condor_errno_t)0;
if ( thisRemoteResource->allowRemoteWriteAttributeAccess(ATTR_REQUIREMENTS) ) {
rval = pseudo_constrain( expr);
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
} else {
rval = -1;
terrno = (condor_errno_t)EACCES;
}
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d\n", rval, (int)terrno );
syscall_sock->encode();
assert( syscall_sock->code(rval) );
if( rval < 0 ) {
assert( syscall_sock->code(terrno) );
}
free( (char *)expr );
assert( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );;
return 0;
}
case CONDOR_get_sec_session_info:
{
MyString starter_reconnect_session_info;
MyString starter_filetrans_session_info;
MyString reconnect_session_id;
MyString reconnect_session_info;
MyString reconnect_session_key;
MyString filetrans_session_id;
MyString filetrans_session_info;
MyString filetrans_session_key;
bool socket_default_crypto = syscall_sock->get_encryption();
if( !socket_default_crypto ) {
syscall_sock->set_crypto_mode(true);
}
assert( syscall_sock->code(starter_reconnect_session_info) );
assert( syscall_sock->code(starter_filetrans_session_info) );
assert( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
errno = (condor_errno_t)0;
rval = pseudo_get_sec_session_info(
starter_reconnect_session_info.Value(),
reconnect_session_id,
reconnect_session_info,
reconnect_session_key,
starter_filetrans_session_info.Value(),
filetrans_session_id,
filetrans_session_info,
filetrans_session_key );
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d\n", rval, (int)terrno );
syscall_sock->encode();
assert( syscall_sock->code(rval) );
if( rval < 0 ) {
assert( syscall_sock->code(terrno) );
}
else {
assert( syscall_sock->code(reconnect_session_id) );
assert( syscall_sock->code(reconnect_session_info) );
assert( syscall_sock->code(reconnect_session_key) );
assert( syscall_sock->code(filetrans_session_id) );
assert( syscall_sock->code(filetrans_session_info) );
assert( syscall_sock->code(filetrans_session_key) );
}
assert( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
if( !socket_default_crypto ) {
syscall_sock->set_crypto_mode( false ); // restore default
}
return 0;
}
#ifdef WIN32
#else
case CONDOR_pread:
{
size_t len, offset;
result = ( syscall_sock->code(fd) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " fd = %d\n", fd );
result = ( syscall_sock->code(len) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " len = %ld\n", (long)len );
result = ( syscall_sock->code(offset) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " offset = %ld\n", (long)offset );
buf = (void *)malloc( (unsigned)len );
memset( buf, 0, (unsigned)len );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
errno = 0;
rval = pread( fd , buf , len, offset );
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d\n", rval, terrno );
syscall_sock->encode();
result = ( syscall_sock->code(rval) );
ASSERT( result );
if( rval < 0 ) {
result = ( syscall_sock->code( terrno ) );
ASSERT( result );
}
else {
result = ( syscall_sock->code_bytes_bool(buf, rval) );
ASSERT( result );
}
free( buf );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
return 0;
}
case CONDOR_pwrite:
{
size_t len, offset;
result = ( syscall_sock->code(fd) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " fd = %d\n", fd );
result = ( syscall_sock->code(len) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " len = %ld\n", (long)len );
result = ( syscall_sock->code(offset) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " offset = %ld\n", (long)offset);
buf = malloc( (unsigned)len );
memset( buf, 0, (unsigned)len );
result = ( syscall_sock->code_bytes_bool(buf, len) );
ASSERT( result );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
errno = 0;
rval = pwrite( fd , buf , len, offset);
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d\n", rval, terrno );
syscall_sock->encode();
result = ( syscall_sock->code(rval) );
ASSERT( result );
if( rval < 0 ) {
result = ( syscall_sock->code( terrno ) );
ASSERT( result );
}
free( buf );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
return 0;
}
case CONDOR_sread:
{
size_t len, offset, stride_length, stride_skip;
result = ( syscall_sock->code(fd) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " fd = %d\n", fd );
result = ( syscall_sock->code(len) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " len = %ld\n", (long)len );
result = ( syscall_sock->code(offset) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " offset = %ld\n", (long)offset );
result = ( syscall_sock->code(stride_length) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " stride_length = %ld\n", (long)stride_length);
result = ( syscall_sock->code(stride_skip) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " stride_skip = %ld\n", (long)stride_skip);
buf = (void *)malloc( (unsigned)len );
memset( buf, 0, (unsigned)len );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
errno = EINVAL;
rval = -1;
unsigned int total = 0;
buffer = (char*)buf;
while(total < len && stride_length > 0) {
if(len - total < stride_length) {
stride_length = len - total;
}
rval = pread( fd, (void*)&buffer[total], stride_length, offset );
if(rval >= 0) {
total += rval;
offset += stride_skip;
}
else {
break;
}
}
syscall_sock->encode();
if( rval < 0 ) {
result = ( syscall_sock->code(rval) );
ASSERT( result );
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d\n", rval, terrno );
result = ( syscall_sock->code( terrno ) );
ASSERT( result );
}
else {
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d\n", total, terrno );
result = ( syscall_sock->code(total) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_ALWAYS, "buffer: %s\n", buffer);
result = ( syscall_sock->code_bytes_bool(buf, total) );
ASSERT( result );
}
free( buf );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
return 0;
}
case CONDOR_swrite:
{
size_t len, offset, stride_length, stride_skip;
result = ( syscall_sock->code(fd) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " fd = %d\n", fd );
result = ( syscall_sock->code(len) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " len = %ld\n", (long)len );
result = ( syscall_sock->code(offset) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " offset = %ld\n", (long)offset);
result = ( syscall_sock->code(stride_length) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " stride_length = %ld\n", (long)stride_length);
result = ( syscall_sock->code(stride_skip) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " stride_skip = %ld\n", (long)stride_skip);
buf = (void *)malloc( (unsigned)len );
memset( buf, 0, (unsigned)len );
result = ( syscall_sock->code_bytes_bool(buf, len) );
ASSERT( result );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
errno = EINVAL;
rval = -1;
unsigned int total = 0;
buffer = (char*)buf;
while(total < len && stride_length > 0) {
if(len - total < stride_length) {
stride_length = len - total;
}
rval = pwrite( fd, (void*)&buffer[total], stride_length, offset);
if(rval >= 0) {
total += rval;
offset += stride_skip;
}
else {
break;
}
}
syscall_sock->encode();
if( rval < 0 ) {
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d (%s)\n", rval, terrno, strerror(errno));
result = ( syscall_sock->code(rval) );
ASSERT( result );
result = ( syscall_sock->code( terrno ) );
ASSERT( result );
}
else {
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d (%s)\n", total, terrno, strerror(errno));
result = ( syscall_sock->code(total) );
ASSERT( result );
}
free( buf );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
return 0;
}
case CONDOR_rmall:
{
result = ( syscall_sock->code(path) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " path = %s\n", path );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
errno = 0;
if ( write_access(path) ) {
rval = rmdir(path);
if(rval == -1) {
Directory dir(path);
if(dir.Remove_Entire_Directory()) {
rval = rmdir(path);
}
}
} else {
rval = -1;
errno = EACCES;
}
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d\n", rval, terrno );
syscall_sock->encode();
result = ( syscall_sock->code(rval) );
ASSERT( result );
if( rval < 0 ) {
result = ( syscall_sock->code( terrno ) );
ASSERT( result );
}
free( (char *)path );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
return 0;
}
case CONDOR_getfile:
{
result = ( syscall_sock->code(path) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " path = %s\n", path );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
errno = 0;
fd = safe_open_wrapper_follow( path, O_RDONLY );
if(fd >= 0) {
struct stat info;
stat(path, &info);
length = info.st_size;
buf = (void *)malloc( (unsigned)length );
memset( buf, 0, (unsigned)length );
errno = 0;
rval = read( fd , buf , length);
} else {
rval = fd;
}
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d\n", rval, terrno );
syscall_sock->encode();
result = ( syscall_sock->code(rval) );
ASSERT( result );
if( rval < 0 ) {
result = ( syscall_sock->code( terrno ) );
ASSERT( result );
}
else {
result = ( syscall_sock->code_bytes_bool(buf, rval) );
ASSERT( result );
}
free( (char *)path );
free( buf );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
return 0;
}
case CONDOR_putfile:
{
result = ( syscall_sock->code(path) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf(D_SYSCALLS, " path: %s\n", path);
result = ( syscall_sock->code(mode) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf(D_SYSCALLS, " mode: %d\n", mode);
result = ( syscall_sock->code(length) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf(D_SYSCALLS, " length: %d\n", length);
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
errno = 0;
fd = safe_open_wrapper_follow(path, O_CREAT | O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC, mode);
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d\n", rval, terrno );
syscall_sock->encode();
result = ( syscall_sock->code(fd) );
ASSERT( result );
if( fd < 0 ) {
result = ( syscall_sock->code( terrno ) );
ASSERT( result );
}
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
int num = -1;
if(fd >= 0) {
syscall_sock->decode();
buffer = (char*)malloc( (unsigned)length );
memset( buffer, 0, (unsigned)length );
result = ( syscall_sock->code_bytes_bool(buffer, length) );
ASSERT( result );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
num = write(fd, buffer, length);
}
else {
dprintf(D_SYSCALLS, "Unable to put file %s\n", path);
}
close(fd);
syscall_sock->encode();
result = ( syscall_sock->code(num) );
ASSERT( result );
if( num < 0 ) {
result = ( syscall_sock->code( terrno ) );
ASSERT( result );
}
free((char*)path);
free((char*)buffer);
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
return 0;
}
case CONDOR_getlongdir:
{
result = ( syscall_sock->code(path) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " path = %s\n", path );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
errno = 0;
rval = -1;
MyString msg, check;
const char *next;
Directory directory(path);
struct stat stat_buf;
char line[1024];
while((next = directory.Next())) {
dprintf(D_ALWAYS, "next: %s\n", next);
msg.sprintf_cat("%s\n", next);
check.sprintf("%s%c%s", path, DIR_DELIM_CHAR, next);
rval = stat(check.Value(), &stat_buf);
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
if(rval == -1) {
break;
}
if(stat_string(line, &stat_buf) < 0) {
rval = -1;
break;
}
msg.sprintf_cat("%s", line);
}
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
if(msg.Length() > 0) {
msg.sprintf_cat("\n"); // Needed to signify end of data
rval = msg.Length();
}
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d\n", rval, terrno );
syscall_sock->encode();
result = ( syscall_sock->code(rval) );
ASSERT( result );
if( rval < 0 ) {
result = ( syscall_sock->code( terrno ) );
ASSERT( result );
}
else {
result = ( syscall_sock->put(msg.Value()) );
ASSERT( result );
}
free((char*)path);
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
return 0;
}
case CONDOR_getdir:
{
result = ( syscall_sock->code(path) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " path = %s\n", path );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
errno = 0;
rval = -1;
MyString msg;
const char *next;
Directory directory(path);
while((next = directory.Next())) {
msg.sprintf_cat(next);
msg.sprintf_cat("\n");
}
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
if(msg.Length() > 0) {
msg.sprintf_cat("\n"); // Needed to signify end of data
rval = msg.Length();
}
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d\n", rval, terrno );
syscall_sock->encode();
result = ( syscall_sock->code(rval) );
ASSERT( result );
if( rval < 0 ) {
result = ( syscall_sock->code( terrno ) );
ASSERT( result );
}
else {
result = ( syscall_sock->put(msg.Value()) );
ASSERT( result );
}
free((char*)path);
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
return 0;
}
case CONDOR_whoami:
{
result = ( syscall_sock->code(length) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " length = %d\n", length );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
errno = 0;
buffer = (char*)malloc( (unsigned)length );
int size = 6;
if(length < size) {
rval = -1;
terrno = (condor_errno_t) ENOSPC;
}
else {
rval = sprintf(buffer, "CONDOR");
terrno = (condor_errno_t) errno;
}
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d\n", rval, terrno );
syscall_sock->encode();
result = ( syscall_sock->code(rval) );
ASSERT( result );
if( rval != size) {
result = ( syscall_sock->code( terrno ) );
ASSERT( result );
}
else {
result = ( syscall_sock->code_bytes_bool(buffer, rval));
ASSERT( result );
}
free((char*)buffer);
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
return 0;
}
case CONDOR_whoareyou:
{
char *host = NULL;
result = ( syscall_sock->code(host) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " host = %s\n", host );
result = ( syscall_sock->code(length) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " length = %d\n", length );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
errno = 0;
buffer = (char*)malloc( (unsigned)length );
int size = 7;
if(length < size) {
rval = -1;
terrno = (condor_errno_t) ENOSPC;
}
else {
rval = sprintf(buffer, "UNKNOWN");
terrno = (condor_errno_t) errno;
}
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d\n", rval, terrno );
syscall_sock->encode();
result = ( syscall_sock->code(rval) );
ASSERT( result );
if( rval != size) {
result = ( syscall_sock->code( terrno ) );
ASSERT( result );
}
else {
result = ( syscall_sock->code_bytes_bool(buffer, rval));
ASSERT( result );
}
free((char*)buffer);
free((char*)host);
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
return 0;
}
case CONDOR_fstatfs:
{
result = ( syscall_sock->code(fd) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " fd = %d\n", fd );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
errno = 0;
#if defined(Solaris)
struct statvfs statfs_buf;
rval = fstatvfs(fd, &statfs_buf);
#else
struct statfs statfs_buf;
rval = fstatfs(fd, &statfs_buf);
#endif
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
char line[1024];
if(rval == 0) {
if(statfs_string(line, &statfs_buf) < 0) {
rval = -1;
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
}
}
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d\n", rval, terrno );
syscall_sock->encode();
result = ( syscall_sock->code(rval) );
ASSERT( result );
if( rval < 0 ) {
result = ( syscall_sock->code( terrno ) );
ASSERT( result );
}
else {
result = ( syscall_sock->code_bytes_bool(line, 1024) );
ASSERT( result );
}
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
return 0;
}
case CONDOR_fchown:
{
result = ( syscall_sock->code(fd) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " fd = %d\n", fd );
result = ( syscall_sock->code(uid) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " uid = %d\n", uid );
result = ( syscall_sock->code(gid) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " gid = %d\n", gid );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
errno = 0;
rval = fchown(fd, uid, gid);
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d\n", rval, terrno );
syscall_sock->encode();
result = ( syscall_sock->code(rval) );
ASSERT( result );
if( rval < 0 ) {
result = ( syscall_sock->code( terrno ) );
ASSERT( result );
}
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
return 0;
}
case CONDOR_fchmod:
{
result = ( syscall_sock->code(fd) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " fd = %d\n", fd );
result = ( syscall_sock->code(mode) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " mode = %d\n", mode );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
errno = 0;
rval = fchmod(fd, (mode_t)mode);
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d\n", rval, terrno );
syscall_sock->encode();
result = ( syscall_sock->code(rval) );
ASSERT( result );
if(rval < 0) {
result = ( syscall_sock->code( terrno ) );
ASSERT( result );
}
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
return 0;
}
case CONDOR_ftruncate:
{
result = ( syscall_sock->code(fd) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " fd = %d\n", fd );
result = ( syscall_sock->code(length) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " length = %d\n", length );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
errno = 0;
rval = ftruncate(fd, length);
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d\n", rval, terrno );
syscall_sock->encode();
result = ( syscall_sock->code(rval) );
ASSERT( result );
if(rval < 0) {
result = ( syscall_sock->code( terrno ) );
ASSERT( result );
}
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
return 0;
}
case CONDOR_link:
{
char *newpath = NULL;
result = ( syscall_sock->code(path) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " path = %s\n", path );
result = ( syscall_sock->code(newpath) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " newpath = %s\n", newpath );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
errno = 0;
rval = link(path, newpath);
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d\n", rval, terrno );
syscall_sock->encode();
result = ( syscall_sock->code(rval) );
ASSERT( result );
if(rval < 0) {
result = ( syscall_sock->code( terrno ) );
ASSERT( result );
}
free((char*)path);
free((char*)newpath);
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
return 0;
}
case CONDOR_symlink:
{
char *newpath = NULL;
result = ( syscall_sock->code(path) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " path = %s\n", path );
result = ( syscall_sock->code(newpath) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " newpath = %s\n", newpath );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
errno = 0;
rval = symlink(path, newpath);
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d\n", rval, terrno );
syscall_sock->encode();
result = ( syscall_sock->code(rval) );
ASSERT( result );
if(rval < 0) {
result = ( syscall_sock->code( terrno ) );
ASSERT( result );
}
free((char*)path);
free((char*)newpath);
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
return 0;
}
case CONDOR_readlink:
{
result = ( syscall_sock->code(path) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " path = %s\n", path );
result = ( syscall_sock->code(length) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " length = %d\n", length );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
char *lbuffer = (char*)malloc(length);
errno = 0;
rval = readlink(path, lbuffer, length);
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d\n", rval, terrno );
syscall_sock->encode();
result = ( syscall_sock->code(rval) );
ASSERT( result );
if( rval < 0 ) {
result = ( syscall_sock->code( terrno ) );
ASSERT( result );
}
else {
result = ( syscall_sock->code_bytes_bool(lbuffer, rval));
ASSERT( result );
}
free(lbuffer);
free(path);
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
return 0;
}
case CONDOR_lstat:
{
result = ( syscall_sock->code(path) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " path = %s\n", path );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
errno = 0;
struct stat stat_buf;
rval = lstat(path, &stat_buf);
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
char line[1024];
if(rval == 0) {
if(stat_string(line, &stat_buf) < 0) {
rval = -1;
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
}
}
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d\n", rval, terrno );
syscall_sock->encode();
result = ( syscall_sock->code(rval) );
ASSERT( result );
if( rval < 0 ) {
result = ( syscall_sock->code( terrno ) );
ASSERT( result );
}
else {
result = ( syscall_sock->code_bytes_bool(line, 1024) );
ASSERT( result );
}
free( (char*)path );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
return 0;
}
case CONDOR_statfs:
{
result = ( syscall_sock->code(path) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " path = %s\n", path );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
errno = 0;
#if defined(Solaris)
struct statvfs statfs_buf;
rval = statvfs(path, &statfs_buf);
#else
struct statfs statfs_buf;
rval = statfs(path, &statfs_buf);
#endif
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
char line[1024];
if(rval == 0) {
if(statfs_string(line, &statfs_buf) < 0) {
rval = -1;
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
}
}
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d\n", rval, terrno );
syscall_sock->encode();
result = ( syscall_sock->code(rval) );
ASSERT( result );
if( rval < 0 ) {
result = ( syscall_sock->code( terrno ) );
ASSERT( result );
}
else {
result = ( syscall_sock->code_bytes_bool(line, 1024) );
ASSERT( result );
}
free( (char*)path );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
return 0;
}
case CONDOR_chown:
{
result = ( syscall_sock->code(path) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " path = %s\n", path );
result = ( syscall_sock->code(uid) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " uid = %d\n", uid );
result = ( syscall_sock->code(gid) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " gid = %d\n", gid );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
errno = 0;
rval = chown(path, uid, gid);
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d\n", rval, terrno );
syscall_sock->encode();
result = ( syscall_sock->code(rval) );
ASSERT( result );
if( rval < 0 ) {
result = ( syscall_sock->code( terrno ) );
ASSERT( result );
}
free( (char*)path );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
return 0;
}
case CONDOR_lchown:
{
result = ( syscall_sock->code(path) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " path = %s\n", path );
result = ( syscall_sock->code(uid) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " uid = %d\n", uid );
result = ( syscall_sock->code(gid) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " gid = %d\n", gid );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
errno = 0;
rval = lchown(path, uid, gid);
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d\n", rval, terrno );
syscall_sock->encode();
result = ( syscall_sock->code(rval) );
ASSERT( result );
if( rval < 0 ) {
result = ( syscall_sock->code( terrno ) );
ASSERT( result );
}
free( (char*)path );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
return 0;
}
case CONDOR_truncate:
{
result = ( syscall_sock->code(path) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " path = %s\n", path );
result = ( syscall_sock->code(length) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " length = %d\n", length );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
errno = 0;
if ( write_access(path) ) {
errno = 0;
rval = truncate(path, length);
} else {
rval = -1;
errno = EACCES;
}
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d\n", rval, terrno );
syscall_sock->encode();
result = ( syscall_sock->code(rval) );
ASSERT( result );
if(rval < 0) {
result = ( syscall_sock->code( terrno ) );
ASSERT( result );
}
free( (char*)path );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
return 0;
}
#endif // ! WIN32
case CONDOR_fstat:
{
result = ( syscall_sock->code(fd) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " fd = %d\n", fd );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
errno = 0;
struct stat stat_buf;
rval = fstat(fd, &stat_buf);
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
char line[1024];
if(rval == 0) {
if(stat_string(line, &stat_buf) < 0) {
rval = -1;
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
}
}
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d\n", rval, terrno );
syscall_sock->encode();
result = ( syscall_sock->code(rval) );
ASSERT( result );
if( rval < 0 ) {
result = ( syscall_sock->code( terrno ) );
ASSERT( result );
}
else {
result = ( syscall_sock->code_bytes_bool(line, 1024) );
ASSERT( result );
}
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
return 0;
}
case CONDOR_stat:
{
result = ( syscall_sock->code(path) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " path = %s\n", path );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
errno = 0;
struct stat stat_buf;
rval = stat(path, &stat_buf);
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
char line[1024];
if(rval == 0) {
if(stat_string(line, &stat_buf) < 0) {
rval = -1;
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
}
}
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d\n", rval, terrno );
syscall_sock->encode();
result = ( syscall_sock->code(rval) );
ASSERT( result );
if( rval < 0 ) {
result = ( syscall_sock->code( terrno ) );
ASSERT( result );
}
else {
result = ( syscall_sock->code_bytes_bool(line, 1024) );
ASSERT( result );
}
free( (char*)path );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
return 0;
}
case CONDOR_access:
{
int flags = -1;
result = ( syscall_sock->code(path) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " path = %s\n", path );
result = ( syscall_sock->code(flags) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " flags = %d\n", flags );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
errno = 0;
rval = access(path, flags);
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d\n", rval, terrno );
syscall_sock->encode();
result = ( syscall_sock->code(rval) );
ASSERT( result );
if(rval < 0 ) {
result = ( syscall_sock->code( terrno ) );
ASSERT( result );
}
free( (char*)path );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
return 0;
}
case CONDOR_chmod:
{
result = ( syscall_sock->code(path) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " path = %s\n", path );
result = ( syscall_sock->code(mode) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " mode = %d\n", mode );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
errno = 0;
rval = chmod(path, mode);
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d\n", rval, terrno );
syscall_sock->encode();
result = ( syscall_sock->code(rval) );
ASSERT( result );
if(rval < 0) {
result = ( syscall_sock->code( terrno ) );
ASSERT( result );
}
free( (char*)path );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
return 0;
}
case CONDOR_utime:
{
time_t actime = -1, modtime = -1;
result = ( syscall_sock->code(path) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " path = %s\n", path );
result = ( syscall_sock->code(actime) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " actime = %ld\n", actime );
result = ( syscall_sock->code(modtime) );
ASSERT( result );
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, " modtime = %ld\n", modtime );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
struct utimbuf ut;
ut.actime = actime;
ut.modtime = modtime;
errno = 0;
rval = utime(path, &ut);
terrno = (condor_errno_t)errno;
dprintf( D_SYSCALLS, "\trval = %d, errno = %d\n", rval, terrno );
syscall_sock->encode();
result = ( syscall_sock->code(rval) );
ASSERT( result );
if(rval < 0) {
result = ( syscall_sock->code( terrno ) );
ASSERT( result );
}
free( (char*)path );
result = ( syscall_sock->end_of_message() );
ASSERT( result );
return 0;
}
default:
{
dprintf(D_ALWAYS, "ERROR: unknown syscall %d received\n", condor_sysnum );
return 0;
}
} /* End of switch on system call number */
return -1;
} /* End of do_REMOTE_syscall() procedure */
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-134
Summary: Multiple format string vulnerabilities in Condor 7.2.0 through 7.6.4, and possibly certain 7.7.x versions, as used in Red Hat MRG Grid and possibly other products, allow local users to cause a denial of service (condor_schedd daemon and failure to launch jobs) and possibly execute arbitrary code via format string specifiers in (1) the reason for a hold for a job that uses an XML user log, (2) the filename of a file to be transferred, and possibly other unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,376 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: report_error (const char *format, ...)
#else
report_error (format, va_alist)
const char *format;
va_dcl
#endif
{
va_list args;
error_prolog (1);
SH_VA_START (args, format);
vfprintf (stderr, format, args);
fprintf (stderr, "\n");
va_end (args);
if (exit_immediately_on_error)
exit_shell (1);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: A heap-based buffer overflow exists in GNU Bash before 4.3 when wide characters, not supported by the current locale set in the LC_CTYPE environment variable, are printed through the echo built-in function. A local attacker, who can provide data to print through the "echo -e" built-in function, may use this flaw to crash a script or execute code with the privileges of the bash process. This occurs because ansicstr() in lib/sh/strtrans.c mishandles u32cconv().
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,430 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int crypto_report_cipher(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
struct crypto_report_cipher rcipher;
strlcpy(rcipher.type, "cipher", sizeof(rcipher.type));
rcipher.blocksize = alg->cra_blocksize;
rcipher.min_keysize = alg->cra_cipher.cia_min_keysize;
rcipher.max_keysize = alg->cra_cipher.cia_max_keysize;
if (nla_put(skb, CRYPTOCFGA_REPORT_CIPHER,
sizeof(struct crypto_report_cipher), &rcipher))
goto nla_put_failure;
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel before 4.19.3. crypto_report_one() and related functions in crypto/crypto_user.c (the crypto user configuration API) do not fully initialize structures that are copied to userspace, potentially leaking sensitive memory to user programs. NOTE: this is a CVE-2013-2547 regression but with easier exploitability because the attacker does not need a capability (however, the system must have the CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER kconfig option).
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix leaking uninitialized memory to userspace
All bytes of the NETLINK_CRYPTO report structures must be initialized,
since they are copied to userspace. The change from strncpy() to
strlcpy() broke this. As a minimal fix, change it back.
Fixes: 4473710df1f8 ("crypto: user - Prepare for CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME expansion")
Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.12+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> | Low | 168,965 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool PDFiumEngine::HandleEvent(const pp::InputEvent& event) {
DCHECK(!defer_page_unload_);
defer_page_unload_ = true;
bool rv = false;
switch (event.GetType()) {
case PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_MOUSEDOWN:
rv = OnMouseDown(pp::MouseInputEvent(event));
break;
case PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_MOUSEUP:
rv = OnMouseUp(pp::MouseInputEvent(event));
break;
case PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_MOUSEMOVE:
rv = OnMouseMove(pp::MouseInputEvent(event));
break;
case PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_KEYDOWN:
rv = OnKeyDown(pp::KeyboardInputEvent(event));
break;
case PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_KEYUP:
rv = OnKeyUp(pp::KeyboardInputEvent(event));
break;
case PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_CHAR:
rv = OnChar(pp::KeyboardInputEvent(event));
break;
case PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_TOUCHSTART: {
KillTouchTimer(next_touch_timer_id_);
pp::TouchInputEvent touch_event(event);
if (touch_event.GetTouchCount(PP_TOUCHLIST_TYPE_TARGETTOUCHES) == 1)
ScheduleTouchTimer(touch_event);
break;
}
case PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_TOUCHEND:
KillTouchTimer(next_touch_timer_id_);
break;
case PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_TOUCHMOVE:
KillTouchTimer(next_touch_timer_id_);
default:
break;
}
DCHECK(defer_page_unload_);
defer_page_unload_ = false;
for (int page_index : deferred_page_unloads_)
pages_[page_index]->Unload();
deferred_page_unloads_.clear();
return rv;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Use after free in PDFium in Google Chrome prior to 64.0.3282.119 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted PDF file.
Commit Message: [pdf] Use a temporary list when unloading pages
When traversing the |deferred_page_unloads_| list and handling the
unloads it's possible for new pages to get added to the list which will
invalidate the iterator.
This CL swaps the list with an empty list and does the iteration on the
list copy. New items that are unloaded while handling the defers will be
unloaded at a later point.
Bug: 780450
Change-Id: Ic7ced1c82227109784fb536ce19a4dd51b9119ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758916
Commit-Queue: dsinclair <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#515056} | Medium | 172,665 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int tcos_select_file(sc_card_t *card,
const sc_path_t *in_path,
sc_file_t **file_out)
{
sc_context_t *ctx;
sc_apdu_t apdu;
sc_file_t *file=NULL;
u8 buf[SC_MAX_APDU_BUFFER_SIZE], pathbuf[SC_MAX_PATH_SIZE], *path = pathbuf;
unsigned int i;
int r, pathlen;
assert(card != NULL && in_path != NULL);
ctx=card->ctx;
memcpy(path, in_path->value, in_path->len);
pathlen = in_path->len;
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_4_SHORT, 0xA4, 0, 0x04);
switch (in_path->type) {
case SC_PATH_TYPE_FILE_ID:
if (pathlen != 2) return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
/* fall through */
case SC_PATH_TYPE_FROM_CURRENT:
apdu.p1 = 9;
break;
case SC_PATH_TYPE_DF_NAME:
apdu.p1 = 4;
break;
case SC_PATH_TYPE_PATH:
apdu.p1 = 8;
if (pathlen >= 2 && memcmp(path, "\x3F\x00", 2) == 0) path += 2, pathlen -= 2;
if (pathlen == 0) apdu.p1 = 0;
break;
case SC_PATH_TYPE_PARENT:
apdu.p1 = 3;
pathlen = 0;
break;
default:
SC_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS);
}
if( pathlen == 0 ) apdu.cse = SC_APDU_CASE_2_SHORT;
apdu.lc = pathlen;
apdu.data = path;
apdu.datalen = pathlen;
if (file_out != NULL) {
apdu.resp = buf;
apdu.resplen = sizeof(buf);
apdu.le = 256;
} else {
apdu.resplen = 0;
apdu.le = 0;
apdu.p2 = 0x0C;
apdu.cse = (pathlen == 0) ? SC_APDU_CASE_1 : SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT;
}
r = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
SC_TEST_RET(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r, "APDU transmit failed");
r = sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
if (r || file_out == NULL) SC_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, r);
if (apdu.resplen < 1 || apdu.resp[0] != 0x62){
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, "received invalid template %02X\n", apdu.resp[0]);
SC_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, SC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_DATA_RECEIVED);
}
file = sc_file_new();
if (file == NULL) SC_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
*file_out = file;
file->path = *in_path;
for(i=2; i+1<apdu.resplen && i+1+apdu.resp[i+1]<apdu.resplen; i+=2+apdu.resp[i+1]){
int j, len=apdu.resp[i+1];
unsigned char type=apdu.resp[i], *d=apdu.resp+i+2;
switch (type) {
case 0x80:
case 0x81:
file->size=0;
for(j=0; j<len; ++j) file->size = (file->size<<8) | d[j];
break;
case 0x82:
file->shareable = (d[0] & 0x40) ? 1 : 0;
file->ef_structure = d[0] & 7;
switch ((d[0]>>3) & 7) {
case 0: file->type = SC_FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF; break;
case 7: file->type = SC_FILE_TYPE_DF; break;
default:
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, "invalid file type %02X in file descriptor\n", d[0]);
SC_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, SC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_DATA_RECEIVED);
}
break;
case 0x83:
file->id = (d[0]<<8) | d[1];
break;
case 0x84:
memcpy(file->name, d, len);
file->namelen = len;
break;
case 0x86:
sc_file_set_sec_attr(file, d, len);
break;
default:
if (len>0) sc_file_set_prop_attr(file, d, len);
}
}
file->magic = SC_FILE_MAGIC;
parse_sec_attr(card, file, file->sec_attr, file->sec_attr_len);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: A double free when handling responses from an HSM Card in sc_pkcs15emu_sc_hsm_init in libopensc/pkcs15-sc-hsm.c in OpenSC before 0.19.0-rc1 could be used by attackers able to supply crafted smartcards to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact.
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems. | Medium | 169,075 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: QualifyIpPacket(IPHeader *pIpHeader, ULONG len)
{
tTcpIpPacketParsingResult res;
res.value = 0;
if (len < 4)
{
res.ipStatus = ppresNotIP;
return res;
}
UCHAR ver_len = pIpHeader->v4.ip_verlen;
UCHAR ip_version = (ver_len & 0xF0) >> 4;
USHORT ipHeaderSize = 0;
USHORT fullLength = 0;
res.value = 0;
if (ip_version == 4)
{
if (len < sizeof(IPv4Header))
{
res.ipStatus = ppresNotIP;
return res;
}
ipHeaderSize = (ver_len & 0xF) << 2;
fullLength = swap_short(pIpHeader->v4.ip_length);
DPrintf(3, ("ip_version %d, ipHeaderSize %d, protocol %d, iplen %d, L2 payload length %d\n",
ip_version, ipHeaderSize, pIpHeader->v4.ip_protocol, fullLength, len));
res.ipStatus = (ipHeaderSize >= sizeof(IPv4Header)) ? ppresIPV4 : ppresNotIP;
if (res.ipStatus == ppresNotIP)
{
return res;
}
if (ipHeaderSize >= fullLength || len < fullLength)
{
DPrintf(2, ("[%s] - truncated packet - ip_version %d, ipHeaderSize %d, protocol %d, iplen %d, L2 payload length %d\n", __FUNCTION__,
ip_version, ipHeaderSize, pIpHeader->v4.ip_protocol, fullLength, len));
res.ipCheckSum = ppresIPTooShort;
return res;
}
}
else if (ip_version == 6)
{
if (len < sizeof(IPv6Header))
{
res.ipStatus = ppresNotIP;
return res;
}
UCHAR nextHeader = pIpHeader->v6.ip6_next_header;
BOOLEAN bParsingDone = FALSE;
ipHeaderSize = sizeof(pIpHeader->v6);
res.ipStatus = ppresIPV6;
res.ipCheckSum = ppresCSOK;
fullLength = swap_short(pIpHeader->v6.ip6_payload_len);
fullLength += ipHeaderSize;
if (len < fullLength)
{
res.ipStatus = ppresNotIP;
return res;
}
while (nextHeader != 59)
{
IPv6ExtHeader *pExt;
switch (nextHeader)
{
case PROTOCOL_TCP:
bParsingDone = TRUE;
res.xxpStatus = ppresXxpKnown;
res.TcpUdp = ppresIsTCP;
res.xxpFull = len >= fullLength ? 1 : 0;
res = ProcessTCPHeader(res, pIpHeader, len, ipHeaderSize);
break;
case PROTOCOL_UDP:
bParsingDone = TRUE;
res.xxpStatus = ppresXxpKnown;
res.TcpUdp = ppresIsUDP;
res.xxpFull = len >= fullLength ? 1 : 0;
res = ProcessUDPHeader(res, pIpHeader, len, ipHeaderSize);
break;
case 0:
case 60:
case 43:
case 44:
case 51:
case 50:
case 135:
if (len >= ((ULONG)ipHeaderSize + 8))
{
pExt = (IPv6ExtHeader *)((PUCHAR)pIpHeader + ipHeaderSize);
nextHeader = pExt->ip6ext_next_header;
ipHeaderSize += 8;
ipHeaderSize += pExt->ip6ext_hdr_len * 8;
}
else
{
DPrintf(0, ("[%s] ERROR: Break in the middle of ext. headers(len %d, hdr > %d)\n", __FUNCTION__, len, ipHeaderSize));
res.ipStatus = ppresNotIP;
bParsingDone = TRUE;
}
break;
default:
res.xxpStatus = ppresXxpOther;
bParsingDone = TRUE;
break;
}
if (bParsingDone)
break;
}
if (ipHeaderSize <= MAX_SUPPORTED_IPV6_HEADERS)
{
DPrintf(3, ("ip_version %d, ipHeaderSize %d, protocol %d, iplen %d\n",
ip_version, ipHeaderSize, nextHeader, fullLength));
res.ipHeaderSize = ipHeaderSize;
}
else
{
DPrintf(0, ("[%s] ERROR: IP chain is too large (%d)\n", __FUNCTION__, ipHeaderSize));
res.ipStatus = ppresNotIP;
}
}
if (res.ipStatus == ppresIPV4)
{
res.ipHeaderSize = ipHeaderSize;
res.IsFragment = (pIpHeader->v4.ip_offset & ~0xC0) != 0;
switch (pIpHeader->v4.ip_protocol)
{
case PROTOCOL_TCP:
{
res = ProcessTCPHeader(res, pIpHeader, len, ipHeaderSize);
}
break;
case PROTOCOL_UDP:
{
res = ProcessUDPHeader(res, pIpHeader, len, ipHeaderSize);
}
break;
default:
res.xxpStatus = ppresXxpOther;
break;
}
}
return res;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The NetKVM Windows Virtio driver allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (guest crash) via a crafted length value in an IP packet, as demonstrated by a value that does not account for the size of the IP options.
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: Checking the length only on read
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <[email protected]> | Medium | 170,145 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int vnc_hextile_send_framebuffer_update(VncState *vs, int x,
int y, int w, int h)
{
int i, j;
int has_fg, has_bg;
uint8_t *last_fg, *last_bg;
VncDisplay *vd = vs->vd;
last_fg = (uint8_t *) g_malloc(vd->server->pf.bytes_per_pixel);
last_bg = (uint8_t *) g_malloc(vd->server->pf.bytes_per_pixel);
has_fg = has_bg = 0;
for (j = y; j < (y + h); j += 16) {
for (i = x; i < (x + w); i += 16) {
for (i = x; i < (x + w); i += 16) {
vs->hextile.send_tile(vs, i, j,
MIN(16, x + w - i), MIN(16, y + h - j),
last_bg, last_fg, &has_bg, &has_fg);
}
}
g_free(last_fg);
g_free(last_bg);
return 1;
}
void vnc_hextile_set_pixel_conversion(VncState *vs, int generic)
{
if (!generic) {
switch (vs->ds->surface->pf.bits_per_pixel) {
case 8:
vs->hextile.send_tile = send_hextile_tile_8;
break;
case 16:
vs->hextile.send_tile = send_hextile_tile_16;
break;
case 32:
vs->hextile.send_tile = send_hextile_tile_32;
break;
}
} else {
switch (vs->ds->surface->pf.bits_per_pixel) {
case 8:
vs->hextile.send_tile = send_hextile_tile_generic_8;
break;
case 16:
vs->hextile.send_tile = send_hextile_tile_generic_16;
break;
case 32:
vs->hextile.send_tile = send_hextile_tile_generic_32;
break;
}
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: An out-of-bounds memory access issue was found in Quick Emulator (QEMU) before 1.7.2 in the VNC display driver. This flaw could occur while refreshing the VNC display surface area in the 'vnc_refresh_server_surface'. A user inside a guest could use this flaw to crash the QEMU process.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,459 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *buf;
unsigned char *p, *d;
int i;
unsigned long l;
int al = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
int j;
SSL_COMP *comp;
#endif
buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
if ((sess == NULL) ||
(sess->ssl_version != s->version) ||
!sess->session_id_length || (sess->not_resumable)) {
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
goto err;
}
if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
/* Determine which DTLS version to use */
int options = s->options;
/* If DTLS 1.2 disabled correct the version number */
if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2) {
if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
goto err;
}
/*
* Disabling all versions is silly: return an error.
*/
if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
goto err;
}
/*
* Update method so we don't use any DTLS 1.2 features.
*/
s->method = DTLSv1_client_method();
s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
} else {
/*
* We only support one version: update method
*/
if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)
s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method();
s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
}
s->client_version = s->version;
}
/* else use the pre-loaded session */
p = s->s3->client_random;
/*
* for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
* required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
*/
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
size_t idx;
i = 1;
for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
if (p[idx]) {
i = 0;
break;
}
}
} else
i = 1;
if (i)
ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
/* Do the message type and length last */
d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
/*-
* version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
* an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
* field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
* used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
* choke if we initially report a higher version then
* renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
* didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
* but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
* 1.0.
*
* Possible scenario with previous logic:
* 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
* 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
* 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
* 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
* 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
* 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
* know that is maximum server supports.
* 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
* containing version 1.0.
*
* For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
* maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
* on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
* being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
* TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
* client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
* the negotiated version.
*/
*(p++) = s->client_version >> 8;
*(p++) = s->client_version & 0xff;
/* Random stuff */
memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
/* Session ID */
if (s->new_session)
i = 0;
else
i = s->session->session_id_length;
*(p++) = i;
if (i != 0) {
if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, i);
p += i;
}
/* cookie stuff for DTLS */
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
*(p++) = s->d1->cookie_len;
memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
p += s->d1->cookie_len;
}
/* Ciphers supported */
i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &(p[2]), 0);
if (i == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
goto err;
}
#ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
/*
* Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
* chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
* use TLS v1.2
*/
if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
&& i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH)
i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
#endif
s2n(i, p);
p += i;
/* COMPRESSION */
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
*(p++) = 1;
#else
if (!ssl_allow_compression(s) || !s->ctx->comp_methods)
j = 0;
else
j = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
*(p++) = 1 + j;
for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
*(p++) = comp->id;
}
#endif
*(p++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/* TLS extensions */
if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
if ((p =
ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
&al)) == NULL) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
#endif
l = p - d;
ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l);
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
}
/* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
return ssl_do_write(s);
err:
return (-1);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: The ssl3_client_hello function in s3_clnt.c in OpenSSL 1.0.2 before 1.0.2a does not ensure that the PRNG is seeded before proceeding with a handshake, which makes it easier for remote attackers to defeat cryptographic protection mechanisms by sniffing the network and then conducting a brute-force attack.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,812 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteTXTImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
buffer[MagickPathExtent],
colorspace[MagickPathExtent],
tuple[MagickPathExtent];
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
scene;
PixelInfo
pixel;
register const Quantum
*p;
register ssize_t
x;
ssize_t
y;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
scene=0;
do
{
ComplianceType
compliance;
const char
*value;
(void) CopyMagickString(colorspace,CommandOptionToMnemonic(
MagickColorspaceOptions,(ssize_t) image->colorspace),MagickPathExtent);
LocaleLower(colorspace);
image->depth=GetImageQuantumDepth(image,MagickTrue);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(colorspace,"a",MagickPathExtent);
compliance=NoCompliance;
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"txt:compliance");
if (value != (char *) NULL)
compliance=(ComplianceType) ParseCommandOption(MagickComplianceOptions,
MagickFalse,value);
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"SPARSE-COLOR") != 0)
{
size_t
depth;
depth=compliance == SVGCompliance ? image->depth :
MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH;
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"# ImageMagick pixel enumeration: %.20g,%.20g,%.20g,%s\n",(double)
image->columns,(double) image->rows,(double) ((MagickOffsetType)
GetQuantumRange(depth)),colorspace);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
GetPixelInfo(image,&pixel);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
GetPixelInfoPixel(image,p,&pixel);
if (pixel.colorspace == LabColorspace)
{
pixel.green-=(QuantumRange+1)/2.0;
pixel.blue-=(QuantumRange+1)/2.0;
}
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"SPARSE-COLOR") == 0)
{
/*
Sparse-color format.
*/
if (GetPixelAlpha(image,p) == (Quantum) OpaqueAlpha)
{
GetColorTuple(&pixel,MagickFalse,tuple);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"%.20g,%.20g,",(double) x,(double) y);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,tuple);
(void) WriteBlobString(image," ");
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
continue;
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g,%.20g: ",
(double) x,(double) y);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) CopyMagickString(tuple,"(",MagickPathExtent);
if (pixel.colorspace == GRAYColorspace)
ConcatenateColorComponent(&pixel,GrayPixelChannel,compliance,
tuple);
else
{
ConcatenateColorComponent(&pixel,RedPixelChannel,compliance,tuple);
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(tuple,",",MagickPathExtent);
ConcatenateColorComponent(&pixel,GreenPixelChannel,compliance,
tuple);
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(tuple,",",MagickPathExtent);
ConcatenateColorComponent(&pixel,BluePixelChannel,compliance,tuple);
}
if (pixel.colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
{
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(tuple,",",MagickPathExtent);
ConcatenateColorComponent(&pixel,BlackPixelChannel,compliance,
tuple);
}
if (pixel.alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(tuple,",",MagickPathExtent);
ConcatenateColorComponent(&pixel,AlphaPixelChannel,compliance,
tuple);
}
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(tuple,")",MagickPathExtent);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,tuple);
(void) WriteBlobString(image," ");
GetColorTuple(&pixel,MagickTrue,tuple);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%s",tuple);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image," ");
(void) QueryColorname(image,&pixel,SVGCompliance,tuple,exception);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,tuple);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"\n");
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
break;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,scene++,
GetImageListLength(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
} while (image_info->adjoin != MagickFalse);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: coders/tiff.c in ImageMagick before 7.0.3.7 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and crash) via a crafted image.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/298 | Medium | 168,680 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: base::string16 TranslateInfoBarDelegate::GetLanguageDisplayableName(
const std::string& language_code) {
return l10n_util::GetDisplayNameForLocale(
language_code, g_browser_process->GetApplicationLocale(), true);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Multiple race conditions in the Web Audio implementation in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 30.0.1599.66, allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to threading in core/html/HTMLMediaElement.cpp, core/platform/audio/AudioDSPKernelProcessor.cpp, core/platform/audio/HRTFElevation.cpp, and modules/webaudio/ConvolverNode.cpp.
Commit Message: Remove dependency of TranslateInfobarDelegate on profile
This CL uses TranslateTabHelper instead of Profile and also cleans up
some unused code and irrelevant dependencies.
BUG=371845
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/286973003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@270758 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,173 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void svc_rdma_send_error(struct svcxprt_rdma *xprt, struct rpcrdma_msg *rmsgp,
int status)
{
struct ib_send_wr err_wr;
struct page *p;
struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt *ctxt;
enum rpcrdma_errcode err;
__be32 *va;
int length;
int ret;
ret = svc_rdma_repost_recv(xprt, GFP_KERNEL);
if (ret)
return;
p = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p)
return;
va = page_address(p);
/* XDR encode an error reply */
err = ERR_CHUNK;
if (status == -EPROTONOSUPPORT)
err = ERR_VERS;
length = svc_rdma_xdr_encode_error(xprt, rmsgp, err, va);
ctxt = svc_rdma_get_context(xprt);
ctxt->direction = DMA_TO_DEVICE;
ctxt->count = 1;
ctxt->pages[0] = p;
/* Prepare SGE for local address */
ctxt->sge[0].lkey = xprt->sc_pd->local_dma_lkey;
ctxt->sge[0].length = length;
ctxt->sge[0].addr = ib_dma_map_page(xprt->sc_cm_id->device,
p, 0, length, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
if (ib_dma_mapping_error(xprt->sc_cm_id->device, ctxt->sge[0].addr)) {
dprintk("svcrdma: Error mapping buffer for protocol error\n");
svc_rdma_put_context(ctxt, 1);
return;
}
svc_rdma_count_mappings(xprt, ctxt);
/* Prepare SEND WR */
memset(&err_wr, 0, sizeof(err_wr));
ctxt->cqe.done = svc_rdma_wc_send;
err_wr.wr_cqe = &ctxt->cqe;
err_wr.sg_list = ctxt->sge;
err_wr.num_sge = 1;
err_wr.opcode = IB_WR_SEND;
err_wr.send_flags = IB_SEND_SIGNALED;
/* Post It */
ret = svc_rdma_send(xprt, &err_wr);
if (ret) {
dprintk("svcrdma: Error %d posting send for protocol error\n",
ret);
svc_rdma_unmap_dma(ctxt);
svc_rdma_put_context(ctxt, 1);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-404
Summary: The NFSv4 implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.11.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (resource consumption) by leveraging improper channel callback shutdown when unmounting an NFSv4 filesystem, aka a *module reference and kernel daemon* leak.
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
... | Medium | 168,174 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int main(void)
{
int fd, len, sock_opt;
int error;
struct cn_msg *message;
struct pollfd pfd;
struct nlmsghdr *incoming_msg;
struct cn_msg *incoming_cn_msg;
struct hv_kvp_msg *hv_msg;
char *p;
char *key_value;
char *key_name;
int op;
int pool;
char *if_name;
struct hv_kvp_ipaddr_value *kvp_ip_val;
daemon(1, 0);
openlog("KVP", 0, LOG_USER);
syslog(LOG_INFO, "KVP starting; pid is:%d", getpid());
/*
* Retrieve OS release information.
*/
kvp_get_os_info();
if (kvp_file_init()) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "Failed to initialize the pools");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
fd = socket(AF_NETLINK, SOCK_DGRAM, NETLINK_CONNECTOR);
if (fd < 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "netlink socket creation failed; error:%d", fd);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
addr.nl_family = AF_NETLINK;
addr.nl_pad = 0;
addr.nl_pid = 0;
addr.nl_groups = CN_KVP_IDX;
error = bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr));
if (error < 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "bind failed; error:%d", error);
close(fd);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
sock_opt = addr.nl_groups;
setsockopt(fd, 270, 1, &sock_opt, sizeof(sock_opt));
/*
* Register ourselves with the kernel.
*/
message = (struct cn_msg *)kvp_send_buffer;
message->id.idx = CN_KVP_IDX;
message->id.val = CN_KVP_VAL;
hv_msg = (struct hv_kvp_msg *)message->data;
hv_msg->kvp_hdr.operation = KVP_OP_REGISTER1;
message->ack = 0;
message->len = sizeof(struct hv_kvp_msg);
len = netlink_send(fd, message);
if (len < 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "netlink_send failed; error:%d", len);
close(fd);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
pfd.fd = fd;
while (1) {
struct sockaddr *addr_p = (struct sockaddr *) &addr;
socklen_t addr_l = sizeof(addr);
pfd.events = POLLIN;
pfd.revents = 0;
poll(&pfd, 1, -1);
len = recvfrom(fd, kvp_recv_buffer, sizeof(kvp_recv_buffer), 0,
addr_p, &addr_l);
if (len < 0 || addr.nl_pid) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "recvfrom failed; pid:%u error:%d %s",
addr.nl_pid, errno, strerror(errno));
close(fd);
return -1;
}
incoming_msg = (struct nlmsghdr *)kvp_recv_buffer;
incoming_cn_msg = (struct cn_msg *)NLMSG_DATA(incoming_msg);
hv_msg = (struct hv_kvp_msg *)incoming_cn_msg->data;
/*
* We will use the KVP header information to pass back
* the error from this daemon. So, first copy the state
* and set the error code to success.
*/
op = hv_msg->kvp_hdr.operation;
pool = hv_msg->kvp_hdr.pool;
hv_msg->error = HV_S_OK;
if ((in_hand_shake) && (op == KVP_OP_REGISTER1)) {
/*
* Driver is registering with us; stash away the version
* information.
*/
in_hand_shake = 0;
p = (char *)hv_msg->body.kvp_register.version;
lic_version = malloc(strlen(p) + 1);
if (lic_version) {
strcpy(lic_version, p);
syslog(LOG_INFO, "KVP LIC Version: %s",
lic_version);
} else {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "malloc failed");
}
continue;
}
switch (op) {
case KVP_OP_GET_IP_INFO:
kvp_ip_val = &hv_msg->body.kvp_ip_val;
if_name =
kvp_mac_to_if_name((char *)kvp_ip_val->adapter_id);
if (if_name == NULL) {
/*
* We could not map the mac address to an
* interface name; return error.
*/
hv_msg->error = HV_E_FAIL;
break;
}
error = kvp_get_ip_info(
0, if_name, KVP_OP_GET_IP_INFO,
kvp_ip_val,
(MAX_IP_ADDR_SIZE * 2));
if (error)
hv_msg->error = error;
free(if_name);
break;
case KVP_OP_SET_IP_INFO:
kvp_ip_val = &hv_msg->body.kvp_ip_val;
if_name = kvp_get_if_name(
(char *)kvp_ip_val->adapter_id);
if (if_name == NULL) {
/*
* We could not map the guid to an
* interface name; return error.
*/
hv_msg->error = HV_GUID_NOTFOUND;
break;
}
error = kvp_set_ip_info(if_name, kvp_ip_val);
if (error)
hv_msg->error = error;
free(if_name);
break;
case KVP_OP_SET:
if (kvp_key_add_or_modify(pool,
hv_msg->body.kvp_set.data.key,
hv_msg->body.kvp_set.data.key_size,
hv_msg->body.kvp_set.data.value,
hv_msg->body.kvp_set.data.value_size))
hv_msg->error = HV_S_CONT;
break;
case KVP_OP_GET:
if (kvp_get_value(pool,
hv_msg->body.kvp_set.data.key,
hv_msg->body.kvp_set.data.key_size,
hv_msg->body.kvp_set.data.value,
hv_msg->body.kvp_set.data.value_size))
hv_msg->error = HV_S_CONT;
break;
case KVP_OP_DELETE:
if (kvp_key_delete(pool,
hv_msg->body.kvp_delete.key,
hv_msg->body.kvp_delete.key_size))
hv_msg->error = HV_S_CONT;
break;
default:
break;
}
if (op != KVP_OP_ENUMERATE)
goto kvp_done;
/*
* If the pool is KVP_POOL_AUTO, dynamically generate
* both the key and the value; if not read from the
* appropriate pool.
*/
if (pool != KVP_POOL_AUTO) {
if (kvp_pool_enumerate(pool,
hv_msg->body.kvp_enum_data.index,
hv_msg->body.kvp_enum_data.data.key,
HV_KVP_EXCHANGE_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
hv_msg->body.kvp_enum_data.data.value,
HV_KVP_EXCHANGE_MAX_VALUE_SIZE))
hv_msg->error = HV_S_CONT;
goto kvp_done;
}
hv_msg = (struct hv_kvp_msg *)incoming_cn_msg->data;
key_name = (char *)hv_msg->body.kvp_enum_data.data.key;
key_value = (char *)hv_msg->body.kvp_enum_data.data.value;
switch (hv_msg->body.kvp_enum_data.index) {
case FullyQualifiedDomainName:
kvp_get_domain_name(key_value,
HV_KVP_EXCHANGE_MAX_VALUE_SIZE);
strcpy(key_name, "FullyQualifiedDomainName");
break;
case IntegrationServicesVersion:
strcpy(key_name, "IntegrationServicesVersion");
strcpy(key_value, lic_version);
break;
case NetworkAddressIPv4:
kvp_get_ip_info(AF_INET, NULL, KVP_OP_ENUMERATE,
key_value, HV_KVP_EXCHANGE_MAX_VALUE_SIZE);
strcpy(key_name, "NetworkAddressIPv4");
break;
case NetworkAddressIPv6:
kvp_get_ip_info(AF_INET6, NULL, KVP_OP_ENUMERATE,
key_value, HV_KVP_EXCHANGE_MAX_VALUE_SIZE);
strcpy(key_name, "NetworkAddressIPv6");
break;
case OSBuildNumber:
strcpy(key_value, os_build);
strcpy(key_name, "OSBuildNumber");
break;
case OSName:
strcpy(key_value, os_name);
strcpy(key_name, "OSName");
break;
case OSMajorVersion:
strcpy(key_value, os_major);
strcpy(key_name, "OSMajorVersion");
break;
case OSMinorVersion:
strcpy(key_value, os_minor);
strcpy(key_name, "OSMinorVersion");
break;
case OSVersion:
strcpy(key_value, os_version);
strcpy(key_name, "OSVersion");
break;
case ProcessorArchitecture:
strcpy(key_value, processor_arch);
strcpy(key_name, "ProcessorArchitecture");
break;
default:
hv_msg->error = HV_S_CONT;
break;
}
/*
* Send the value back to the kernel. The response is
* already in the receive buffer. Update the cn_msg header to
* reflect the key value that has been added to the message
*/
kvp_done:
incoming_cn_msg->id.idx = CN_KVP_IDX;
incoming_cn_msg->id.val = CN_KVP_VAL;
incoming_cn_msg->ack = 0;
incoming_cn_msg->len = sizeof(struct hv_kvp_msg);
len = netlink_send(fd, incoming_cn_msg);
if (len < 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "net_link send failed; error:%d", len);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The main function in tools/hv/hv_kvp_daemon.c in hypervkvpd, as distributed in the Linux kernel before 3.8-rc1, allows local users to cause a denial of service (daemon exit) via a crafted application that sends a Netlink message. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incorrect fix for CVE-2012-2669.
Commit Message: tools: hv: Netlink source address validation allows DoS
The source code without this patch caused hypervkvpd to exit when it processed
a spoofed Netlink packet which has been sent from an untrusted local user.
Now Netlink messages with a non-zero nl_pid source address are ignored
and a warning is printed into the syslog.
Signed-off-by: Tomas Hozza <[email protected]>
Acked-by: K. Y. Srinivasan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,528 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadJP2Image(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
const char
*option;
Image
*image;
int
jp2_status;
MagickBooleanType
status;
opj_codec_t
*jp2_codec;
opj_codestream_index_t
*codestream_index = (opj_codestream_index_t *) NULL;
opj_dparameters_t
parameters;
opj_image_t
*jp2_image;
opj_stream_t
*jp2_stream;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
sans[4];
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Initialize JP2 codec.
*/
if (ReadBlob(image,4,sans) != 4)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
(void) SeekBlob(image,SEEK_SET,0);
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"JPT") == 0)
jp2_codec=opj_create_decompress(OPJ_CODEC_JPT);
else
if (IsJ2K(sans,4) != MagickFalse)
jp2_codec=opj_create_decompress(OPJ_CODEC_J2K);
else
jp2_codec=opj_create_decompress(OPJ_CODEC_JP2);
opj_set_warning_handler(jp2_codec,JP2WarningHandler,exception);
opj_set_error_handler(jp2_codec,JP2ErrorHandler,exception);
opj_set_default_decoder_parameters(¶meters);
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"jp2:reduce-factor");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
parameters.cp_reduce=StringToInteger(option);
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"jp2:quality-layers");
if (option == (const char *) NULL)
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"jp2:layer-number");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
parameters.cp_layer=StringToInteger(option);
if (opj_setup_decoder(jp2_codec,¶meters) == 0)
{
opj_destroy_codec(jp2_codec);
ThrowReaderException(DelegateError,"UnableToManageJP2Stream");
}
jp2_stream=opj_stream_create(OPJ_J2K_STREAM_CHUNK_SIZE,OPJ_TRUE);
opj_stream_set_read_function(jp2_stream,JP2ReadHandler);
opj_stream_set_write_function(jp2_stream,JP2WriteHandler);
opj_stream_set_seek_function(jp2_stream,JP2SeekHandler);
opj_stream_set_skip_function(jp2_stream,JP2SkipHandler);
opj_stream_set_user_data(jp2_stream,image,NULL);
opj_stream_set_user_data_length(jp2_stream,GetBlobSize(image));
if (opj_read_header(jp2_stream,jp2_codec,&jp2_image) == 0)
{
opj_stream_destroy(jp2_stream);
opj_destroy_codec(jp2_codec);
ThrowReaderException(DelegateError,"UnableToDecodeImageFile");
}
jp2_status=1;
if ((image->columns != 0) && (image->rows != 0))
{
/*
Extract an area from the image.
*/
jp2_status=opj_set_decode_area(jp2_codec,jp2_image,
(OPJ_INT32) image->extract_info.x,(OPJ_INT32) image->extract_info.y,
(OPJ_INT32) image->extract_info.x+(ssize_t) image->columns,
(OPJ_INT32) image->extract_info.y+(ssize_t) image->rows);
if (jp2_status == 0)
{
opj_stream_destroy(jp2_stream);
opj_destroy_codec(jp2_codec);
opj_image_destroy(jp2_image);
ThrowReaderException(DelegateError,"UnableToDecodeImageFile");
}
}
if ((image_info->number_scenes != 0) && (image_info->scene != 0))
jp2_status=opj_get_decoded_tile(jp2_codec,jp2_stream,jp2_image,
(unsigned int) image_info->scene-1);
else
if (image->ping == MagickFalse)
{
jp2_status=opj_decode(jp2_codec,jp2_stream,jp2_image);
if (jp2_status != 0)
jp2_status=opj_end_decompress(jp2_codec,jp2_stream);
}
if (jp2_status == 0)
{
opj_stream_destroy(jp2_stream);
opj_destroy_codec(jp2_codec);
opj_image_destroy(jp2_image);
ThrowReaderException(DelegateError,"UnableToDecodeImageFile");
}
opj_stream_destroy(jp2_stream);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) jp2_image->numcomps; i++)
{
if ((jp2_image->comps[0].dx == 0) || (jp2_image->comps[0].dy == 0) ||
(jp2_image->comps[0].dx != jp2_image->comps[i].dx) ||
(jp2_image->comps[0].dy != jp2_image->comps[i].dy) ||
(jp2_image->comps[0].prec != jp2_image->comps[i].prec) ||
(jp2_image->comps[0].sgnd != jp2_image->comps[i].sgnd) ||
(jp2_image->comps[i].data == NULL))
{
opj_destroy_codec(jp2_codec);
opj_image_destroy(jp2_image);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"IrregularChannelGeometryNotSupported")
}
}
/*
Convert JP2 image.
*/
image->columns=(size_t) jp2_image->comps[0].w;
image->rows=(size_t) jp2_image->comps[0].h;
image->depth=jp2_image->comps[0].prec;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
image->compression=JPEG2000Compression;
if (jp2_image->color_space == 2)
{
SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace);
if (jp2_image->numcomps > 1)
image->matte=MagickTrue;
}
else
if (jp2_image->color_space == 3)
SetImageColorspace(image,Rec601YCbCrColorspace);
if (jp2_image->numcomps > 3)
image->matte=MagickTrue;
if (jp2_image->icc_profile_buf != (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
StringInfo
*profile;
profile=BlobToStringInfo(jp2_image->icc_profile_buf,
jp2_image->icc_profile_len);
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
SetImageProfile(image,"icc",profile);
}
if (image->ping != MagickFalse)
{
opj_destroy_codec(jp2_codec);
opj_image_destroy(jp2_image);
opj_destroy_cstr_index(&codestream_index);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register PixelPacket
*magick_restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
register ssize_t
i;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) jp2_image->numcomps; i++)
{
double
pixel,
scale;
scale=QuantumRange/(double) ((1UL << jp2_image->comps[i].prec)-1);
pixel=scale*(jp2_image->comps[i].data[y/jp2_image->comps[i].dy*
image->columns/jp2_image->comps[i].dx+x/jp2_image->comps[i].dx]+
(jp2_image->comps[i].sgnd ? 1UL << (jp2_image->comps[i].prec-1) : 0));
switch (i)
{
case 0:
{
q->red=ClampToQuantum(pixel);
q->green=q->red;
q->blue=q->red;
q->opacity=OpaqueOpacity;
break;
}
case 1:
{
if (jp2_image->numcomps == 2)
{
q->opacity=ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange-pixel);
break;
}
q->green=ClampToQuantum(pixel);
break;
}
case 2:
{
q->blue=ClampToQuantum(pixel);
break;
}
case 3:
{
q->opacity=ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange-pixel);
break;
}
}
}
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
/*
Free resources.
*/
opj_destroy_codec(jp2_codec);
opj_image_destroy(jp2_image);
opj_destroy_cstr_index(&codestream_index);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: In ImageMagick before 6.9.8-8 and 7.x before 7.0.5-9, the ReadJP2Image function in coders/jp2.c does not properly validate the channel geometry, leading to a crash.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/501 | Medium | 167,809 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: parse_wcc_attr(netdissect_options *ndo,
const uint32_t *dp)
{
ND_PRINT((ndo, " sz %" PRIu64, EXTRACT_64BITS(&dp[0])));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " mtime %u.%06u ctime %u.%06u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[2]), EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[3]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[4]), EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[5])));
return (dp + 6);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The NFS parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-nfs.c:interp_reply().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12898/NFS: Fix bounds checking.
Fix the bounds checking for the NFSv3 WRITE procedure to check whether the
length of the opaque data being written is present in the captured data,
not just whether the byte count is present in the captured data.
furthest forward in the packet, not the item before it. (This also lets
us eliminate the check for the "stable" argument being present in the
captured data; rewrite the code to print that to make it a bit clearer.)
Check that the entire ar_stat field is present in the capture.
Note that parse_wcc_attr() is called after we've already checked whether
the wcc_data is present.
Check before fetching the "access" part of the NFSv3 ACCESS results.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Include a test for the "check before fetching the "access" part..." fix,
using the capture supplied by the reporter(s). | High | 167,940 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: smb_com_flush(smb_request_t *sr)
{
smb_ofile_t *file;
smb_llist_t *flist;
int rc;
if (smb_flush_required == 0) {
rc = smbsr_encode_empty_result(sr);
return ((rc == 0) ? SDRC_SUCCESS : SDRC_ERROR);
}
if (sr->smb_fid != 0xffff) {
smbsr_lookup_file(sr);
if (sr->fid_ofile == NULL) {
smbsr_error(sr, NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE,
ERRDOS, ERRbadfid);
return (SDRC_ERROR);
}
smb_flush_file(sr, sr->fid_ofile);
} else {
flist = &sr->tid_tree->t_ofile_list;
smb_llist_enter(flist, RW_READER);
file = smb_llist_head(flist);
while (file) {
mutex_enter(&file->f_mutex);
smb_flush_file(sr, file);
mutex_exit(&file->f_mutex);
file = smb_llist_next(flist, file);
}
smb_llist_exit(flist);
}
rc = smbsr_encode_empty_result(sr);
return ((rc == 0) ? SDRC_SUCCESS : SDRC_ERROR);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: illumos smbsrv NULL pointer dereference allows system crash.
Commit Message: 7483 SMB flush on pipe triggers NULL pointer dereference in module smbsrv
Reviewed by: Gordon Ross <[email protected]>
Reviewed by: Matt Barden <[email protected]>
Reviewed by: Evan Layton <[email protected]>
Reviewed by: Dan McDonald <[email protected]>
Approved by: Gordon Ross <[email protected]> | High | 168,826 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void sctp_generate_t3_rtx_event(unsigned long peer)
{
int error;
struct sctp_transport *transport = (struct sctp_transport *) peer;
struct sctp_association *asoc = transport->asoc;
struct net *net = sock_net(asoc->base.sk);
/* Check whether a task is in the sock. */
bh_lock_sock(asoc->base.sk);
if (sock_owned_by_user(asoc->base.sk)) {
pr_debug("%s: sock is busy\n", __func__);
/* Try again later. */
if (!mod_timer(&transport->T3_rtx_timer, jiffies + (HZ/20)))
sctp_transport_hold(transport);
goto out_unlock;
}
/* Is this transport really dead and just waiting around for
* the timer to let go of the reference?
*/
if (transport->dead)
goto out_unlock;
/* Run through the state machine. */
error = sctp_do_sm(net, SCTP_EVENT_T_TIMEOUT,
SCTP_ST_TIMEOUT(SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_T3_RTX),
asoc->state,
asoc->ep, asoc,
transport, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (error)
asoc->base.sk->sk_err = -error;
out_unlock:
bh_unlock_sock(asoc->base.sk);
sctp_transport_put(transport);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c in the Linux kernel before 4.3 does not properly manage the relationship between a lock and a socket, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (deadlock) via a crafted sctp_accept call.
Commit Message: sctp: Prevent soft lockup when sctp_accept() is called during a timeout event
A case can occur when sctp_accept() is called by the user during
a heartbeat timeout event after the 4-way handshake. Since
sctp_assoc_migrate() changes both assoc->base.sk and assoc->ep, the
bh_sock_lock in sctp_generate_heartbeat_event() will be taken with
the listening socket but released with the new association socket.
The result is a deadlock on any future attempts to take the listening
socket lock.
Note that this race can occur with other SCTP timeouts that take
the bh_lock_sock() in the event sctp_accept() is called.
BUG: soft lockup - CPU#9 stuck for 67s! [swapper:0]
...
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8152d48e>] [<ffffffff8152d48e>] _spin_lock+0x1e/0x30
RSP: 0018:ffff880028323b20 EFLAGS: 00000206
RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff880028323b20 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff880028323be0 RDI: ffff8804632c4b48
RBP: ffffffff8100bb93 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff880610662280 R11: 0000000000000100 R12: ffff880028323aa0
R13: ffff8804383c3880 R14: ffff880028323a90 R15: ffffffff81534225
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880028320000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 00000000006df528 CR3: 0000000001a85000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process swapper (pid: 0, threadinfo ffff880616b70000, task ffff880616b6cab0)
Stack:
ffff880028323c40 ffffffffa01c2582 ffff880614cfb020 0000000000000000
<d> 0100000000000000 00000014383a6c44 ffff8804383c3880 ffff880614e93c00
<d> ffff880614e93c00 0000000000000000 ffff8804632c4b00 ffff8804383c38b8
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffffa01c2582>] ? sctp_rcv+0x492/0xa10 [sctp]
[<ffffffff8148c559>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
[<ffffffff814974a0>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8148c716>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffff814974a0>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8149757d>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0
[<ffffffff81497808>] ? ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0
[<ffffffff81496ccd>] ? ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440
[<ffffffff81497255>] ? ip_rcv+0x275/0x350
[<ffffffff8145cfeb>] ? __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750
...
With lockdep debugging:
=====================================
[ BUG: bad unlock balance detected! ]
-------------------------------------
CslRx/12087 is trying to release lock (slock-AF_INET) at:
[<ffffffffa01bcae0>] sctp_generate_timeout_event+0x40/0xe0 [sctp]
but there are no more locks to release!
other info that might help us debug this:
2 locks held by CslRx/12087:
#0: (&asoc->timers[i]){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8108ce1f>] run_timer_softirq+0x16f/0x3e0
#1: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffffa01bcac3>] sctp_generate_timeout_event+0x23/0xe0 [sctp]
Ensure the socket taken is also the same one that is released by
saving a copy of the socket before entering the timeout event
critical section.
Signed-off-by: Karl Heiss <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,502 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void color_cmyk_to_rgb(opj_image_t *image)
{
float C, M, Y, K;
float sC, sM, sY, sK;
unsigned int w, h, max, i;
w = image->comps[0].w;
h = image->comps[0].h;
if(image->numcomps < 4) return;
max = w * h;
sC = 1.0F / (float)((1 << image->comps[0].prec) - 1);
sM = 1.0F / (float)((1 << image->comps[1].prec) - 1);
sY = 1.0F / (float)((1 << image->comps[2].prec) - 1);
sK = 1.0F / (float)((1 << image->comps[3].prec) - 1);
for(i = 0; i < max; ++i)
{
/* CMYK values from 0 to 1 */
C = (float)(image->comps[0].data[i]) * sC;
M = (float)(image->comps[1].data[i]) * sM;
Y = (float)(image->comps[2].data[i]) * sY;
K = (float)(image->comps[3].data[i]) * sK;
/* Invert all CMYK values */
C = 1.0F - C;
M = 1.0F - M;
Y = 1.0F - Y;
K = 1.0F - K;
/* CMYK -> RGB : RGB results from 0 to 255 */
image->comps[0].data[i] = (int)(255.0F * C * K); /* R */
image->comps[1].data[i] = (int)(255.0F * M * K); /* G */
image->comps[2].data[i] = (int)(255.0F * Y * K); /* B */
}
free(image->comps[3].data); image->comps[3].data = NULL;
image->comps[0].prec = 8;
image->comps[1].prec = 8;
image->comps[2].prec = 8;
image->numcomps -= 1;
image->color_space = OPJ_CLRSPC_SRGB;
for (i = 3; i < image->numcomps; ++i) {
memcpy(&(image->comps[i]), &(image->comps[i+1]), sizeof(image->comps[i]));
}
}/* color_cmyk_to_rgb() */
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in the color_cmyk_to_rgb in common/color.c in OpenJPEG before 2.1.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via a crafted .j2k file.
Commit Message: Fix Heap Buffer Overflow in function color_cmyk_to_rgb
Fix uclouvain/openjpeg#774 | Medium | 168,836 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadPDBImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
unsigned char
attributes,
tag[3];
Image
*image;
IndexPacket
index;
MagickBooleanType
status;
PDBImage
pdb_image;
PDBInfo
pdb_info;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
bits_per_pixel,
num_pad_bytes,
one,
packets;
ssize_t
count,
img_offset,
comment_offset = 0,
y;
unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Determine if this a PDB image file.
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,sizeof(pdb_info.name),(unsigned char *) pdb_info.name);
if (count != sizeof(pdb_info.name))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
pdb_info.attributes=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
pdb_info.version=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
pdb_info.create_time=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
pdb_info.modify_time=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
pdb_info.archive_time=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
pdb_info.modify_number=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
pdb_info.application_info=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
pdb_info.sort_info=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
(void) ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) pdb_info.type);
(void) ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) pdb_info.id);
pdb_info.seed=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
pdb_info.next_record=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
pdb_info.number_records=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if ((memcmp(pdb_info.type,"vIMG",4) != 0) ||
(memcmp(pdb_info.id,"View",4) != 0))
if (pdb_info.next_record != 0)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"MultipleRecordListNotSupported");
/*
Read record header.
*/
img_offset=(ssize_t) ((int) ReadBlobMSBLong(image));
attributes=(unsigned char) ((int) ReadBlobByte(image));
(void) attributes;
count=ReadBlob(image,3,(unsigned char *) tag);
if (count != 3 || memcmp(tag,"\x6f\x80\x00",3) != 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
if (pdb_info.number_records > 1)
{
comment_offset=(ssize_t) ((int) ReadBlobMSBLong(image));
attributes=(unsigned char) ((int) ReadBlobByte(image));
count=ReadBlob(image,3,(unsigned char *) tag);
if (count != 3 || memcmp(tag,"\x6f\x80\x01",3) != 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
}
num_pad_bytes = (size_t) (img_offset - TellBlob( image ));
while (num_pad_bytes-- != 0)
{
int
c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == EOF)
break;
}
/*
Read image header.
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,sizeof(pdb_image.name),(unsigned char *) pdb_image.name);
if (count != sizeof(pdb_image.name))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
pdb_image.version=ReadBlobByte(image);
pdb_image.type=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
pdb_image.reserved_1=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
pdb_image.note=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
pdb_image.x_last=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
pdb_image.y_last=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
pdb_image.reserved_2=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
pdb_image.x_anchor=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
pdb_image.y_anchor=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
pdb_image.width=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
pdb_image.height=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
/*
Initialize image structure.
*/
image->columns=(size_t) pdb_image.width;
image->rows=(size_t) pdb_image.height;
image->depth=8;
image->storage_class=PseudoClass;
bits_per_pixel=pdb_image.type == 0 ? 2UL : pdb_image.type == 2 ? 4UL : 1UL;
one=1;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,one << bits_per_pixel) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
packets=(bits_per_pixel*image->columns+7)/8;
pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(packets+256UL,image->rows*
sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
switch (pdb_image.version & 0x07)
{
case 0:
{
image->compression=NoCompression;
count=(ssize_t) ReadBlob(image, packets * image -> rows, pixels);
break;
}
case 1:
{
image->compression=RLECompression;
if (!DecodeImage(image, pixels, packets * image -> rows))
ThrowReaderException( CorruptImageError, "RLEDecoderError" );
break;
}
default:
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"UnrecognizedImageCompressionType" );
}
p=pixels;
switch (bits_per_pixel)
{
case 1:
{
int
bit;
/*
Read 1-bit PDB image.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-7); x+=8)
{
for (bit=0; bit < 8; bit++)
{
index=(IndexPacket) (*p & (0x80 >> bit) ? 0x00 : 0x01);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+bit,index);
}
p++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
(void) SyncImage(image);
break;
}
case 2:
{
/*
Read 2-bit PDB image.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns-3; x+=4)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,3UL-((*p >> 6) & 0x03));
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,3UL-((*p >> 4) & 0x03));
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+1,index);
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,3UL-((*p >> 2) & 0x03));
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+2,index);
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,3UL-((*p) & 0x03));
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+3,index);
p++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
(void) SyncImage(image);
break;
}
case 4:
{
/*
Read 4-bit PDB image.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns-1; x+=2)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,15UL-((*p >> 4) & 0x0f));
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,15UL-((*p) & 0x0f));
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+1,index);
p++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
(void) SyncImage(image);
break;
}
default:
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
if (pdb_info.number_records > 1)
{
char
*comment;
int
c;
register char
*p;
size_t
length;
num_pad_bytes = (size_t) (comment_offset - TellBlob( image ));
while (num_pad_bytes--) ReadBlobByte( image );
/*
Read comment.
*/
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
length=MaxTextExtent;
comment=AcquireString((char *) NULL);
for (p=comment; c != EOF; p++)
{
if ((size_t) (p-comment+MaxTextExtent) >= length)
{
*p='\0';
length<<=1;
length+=MaxTextExtent;
comment=(char *) ResizeQuantumMemory(comment,length+MaxTextExtent,
sizeof(*comment));
if (comment == (char *) NULL)
break;
p=comment+strlen(comment);
}
*p=c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
}
*p='\0';
if (comment == (char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"comment",comment);
comment=DestroyString(comment);
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: MagickCore/memory.c in ImageMagick allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds access) via a crafted PDB file.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/143 | Medium | 168,790 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: WORD32 ixheaacd_complex_anal_filt(ia_esbr_hbe_txposer_struct *ptr_hbe_txposer) {
WORD32 idx;
WORD32 anal_size = 2 * ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size;
WORD32 N = (10 * anal_size);
for (idx = 0; idx < (ptr_hbe_txposer->no_bins >> 1); idx++) {
WORD32 i, j, k, l;
FLOAT32 window_output[640];
FLOAT32 u[128], u_in[256], u_out[256];
FLOAT32 accu_r, accu_i;
const FLOAT32 *inp_signal;
FLOAT32 *anal_buf;
FLOAT32 *analy_cos_sin_tab = ptr_hbe_txposer->analy_cos_sin_tab;
const FLOAT32 *interp_window_coeff = ptr_hbe_txposer->analy_wind_coeff;
FLOAT32 *x = ptr_hbe_txposer->analy_buf;
memset(ptr_hbe_txposer->qmf_in_buf[idx + HBE_OPER_WIN_LEN - 1], 0,
TWICE_QMF_SYNTH_CHANNELS_NUM * sizeof(FLOAT32));
inp_signal = ptr_hbe_txposer->ptr_input_buf +
idx * 2 * ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size + 1;
anal_buf = &ptr_hbe_txposer->qmf_in_buf[idx + HBE_OPER_WIN_LEN - 1]
[4 * ptr_hbe_txposer->k_start];
for (i = N - 1; i >= anal_size; i--) {
x[i] = x[i - anal_size];
}
for (i = anal_size - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
x[i] = inp_signal[anal_size - 1 - i];
}
for (i = 0; i < N; i++) {
window_output[i] = x[i] * interp_window_coeff[i];
}
for (i = 0; i < 2 * anal_size; i++) {
accu_r = 0.0;
for (j = 0; j < 5; j++) {
accu_r = accu_r + window_output[i + j * 2 * anal_size];
}
u[i] = accu_r;
}
if (anal_size == 40) {
for (i = 1; i < anal_size; i++) {
FLOAT32 temp1 = u[i] + u[2 * anal_size - i];
FLOAT32 temp2 = u[i] - u[2 * anal_size - i];
u[i] = temp1;
u[2 * anal_size - i] = temp2;
}
for (k = 0; k < anal_size; k++) {
accu_r = u[anal_size];
if (k & 1)
accu_i = u[0];
else
accu_i = -u[0];
for (l = 1; l < anal_size; l++) {
accu_r = accu_r + u[0 + l] * analy_cos_sin_tab[2 * l + 0];
accu_i = accu_i + u[2 * anal_size - l] * analy_cos_sin_tab[2 * l + 1];
}
analy_cos_sin_tab += (2 * anal_size);
*anal_buf++ = (FLOAT32)accu_r;
*anal_buf++ = (FLOAT32)accu_i;
}
} else {
FLOAT32 *ptr_u = u_in;
FLOAT32 *ptr_v = u_out;
for (k = 0; k < anal_size * 2; k++) {
*ptr_u++ = ((*analy_cos_sin_tab++) * u[k]);
*ptr_u++ = ((*analy_cos_sin_tab++) * u[k]);
}
if (ixheaacd_cmplx_anal_fft != NULL)
(*ixheaacd_cmplx_anal_fft)(u_in, u_out, anal_size * 2);
else
return -1;
for (k = 0; k < anal_size / 2; k++) {
*(anal_buf + 1) = -*ptr_v++;
*anal_buf = *ptr_v++;
anal_buf += 2;
*(anal_buf + 1) = *ptr_v++;
*anal_buf = -*ptr_v++;
anal_buf += 2;
}
}
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: In ixheaacd_real_synth_fft_p3 of ixheaacd_esbr_fft.c there is a possible out of bounds write due to a missing bounds check. This could lead to remote code execution with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is needed for exploitation. Product: Android Versions: Android-9.0 Android ID: A-110769924
Commit Message: Fix for stack corruption in esbr
Bug: 110769924
Test: poc from bug before/after
Change-Id: I99c6e89902064849ea1310c271064bdeccf7f20e
(cherry picked from commit 7e90d745c22695236437297cd8167a9312427a4a)
(cherry picked from commit 5464927f0c1fc721fa03d1c5be77b0b43dfffc50)
| High | 174,090 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium::setRemoteDescription(PassRefPtr<RTCVoidRequest> request, PassRefPtr<RTCSessionDescriptionDescriptor> sessionDescription)
{
if (!m_webHandler)
return;
m_webHandler->setRemoteDescription(request, sessionDescription);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163, does not properly perform object sealing, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that leverage *type confusion.*
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 170,355 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int decode_nal_unit(HEVCContext *s, const H2645NAL *nal)
{
HEVCLocalContext *lc = s->HEVClc;
GetBitContext *gb = &lc->gb;
int ctb_addr_ts, ret;
*gb = nal->gb;
s->nal_unit_type = nal->type;
s->temporal_id = nal->temporal_id;
switch (s->nal_unit_type) {
case HEVC_NAL_VPS:
if (s->avctx->hwaccel && s->avctx->hwaccel->decode_params) {
ret = s->avctx->hwaccel->decode_params(s->avctx,
nal->type,
nal->raw_data,
nal->raw_size);
if (ret < 0)
goto fail;
}
ret = ff_hevc_decode_nal_vps(gb, s->avctx, &s->ps);
if (ret < 0)
goto fail;
break;
case HEVC_NAL_SPS:
if (s->avctx->hwaccel && s->avctx->hwaccel->decode_params) {
ret = s->avctx->hwaccel->decode_params(s->avctx,
nal->type,
nal->raw_data,
nal->raw_size);
if (ret < 0)
goto fail;
}
ret = ff_hevc_decode_nal_sps(gb, s->avctx, &s->ps,
s->apply_defdispwin);
if (ret < 0)
goto fail;
break;
case HEVC_NAL_PPS:
if (s->avctx->hwaccel && s->avctx->hwaccel->decode_params) {
ret = s->avctx->hwaccel->decode_params(s->avctx,
nal->type,
nal->raw_data,
nal->raw_size);
if (ret < 0)
goto fail;
}
ret = ff_hevc_decode_nal_pps(gb, s->avctx, &s->ps);
if (ret < 0)
goto fail;
break;
case HEVC_NAL_SEI_PREFIX:
case HEVC_NAL_SEI_SUFFIX:
if (s->avctx->hwaccel && s->avctx->hwaccel->decode_params) {
ret = s->avctx->hwaccel->decode_params(s->avctx,
nal->type,
nal->raw_data,
nal->raw_size);
if (ret < 0)
goto fail;
}
ret = ff_hevc_decode_nal_sei(gb, s->avctx, &s->sei, &s->ps, s->nal_unit_type);
if (ret < 0)
goto fail;
break;
case HEVC_NAL_TRAIL_R:
case HEVC_NAL_TRAIL_N:
case HEVC_NAL_TSA_N:
case HEVC_NAL_TSA_R:
case HEVC_NAL_STSA_N:
case HEVC_NAL_STSA_R:
case HEVC_NAL_BLA_W_LP:
case HEVC_NAL_BLA_W_RADL:
case HEVC_NAL_BLA_N_LP:
case HEVC_NAL_IDR_W_RADL:
case HEVC_NAL_IDR_N_LP:
case HEVC_NAL_CRA_NUT:
case HEVC_NAL_RADL_N:
case HEVC_NAL_RADL_R:
case HEVC_NAL_RASL_N:
case HEVC_NAL_RASL_R:
ret = hls_slice_header(s);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (
(s->avctx->skip_frame >= AVDISCARD_BIDIR && s->sh.slice_type == HEVC_SLICE_B) ||
(s->avctx->skip_frame >= AVDISCARD_NONINTRA && s->sh.slice_type != HEVC_SLICE_I) ||
(s->avctx->skip_frame >= AVDISCARD_NONKEY && !IS_IRAP(s))) {
break;
}
if (s->sh.first_slice_in_pic_flag) {
if (s->ref) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Two slices reporting being the first in the same frame.\n");
goto fail;
}
if (s->max_ra == INT_MAX) {
if (s->nal_unit_type == HEVC_NAL_CRA_NUT || IS_BLA(s)) {
s->max_ra = s->poc;
} else {
if (IS_IDR(s))
s->max_ra = INT_MIN;
}
}
if ((s->nal_unit_type == HEVC_NAL_RASL_R || s->nal_unit_type == HEVC_NAL_RASL_N) &&
s->poc <= s->max_ra) {
s->is_decoded = 0;
break;
} else {
if (s->nal_unit_type == HEVC_NAL_RASL_R && s->poc > s->max_ra)
s->max_ra = INT_MIN;
}
s->overlap ++;
ret = hevc_frame_start(s);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
} else if (!s->ref) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "First slice in a frame missing.\n");
goto fail;
}
if (s->nal_unit_type != s->first_nal_type) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Non-matching NAL types of the VCL NALUs: %d %d\n",
s->first_nal_type, s->nal_unit_type);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (!s->sh.dependent_slice_segment_flag &&
s->sh.slice_type != HEVC_SLICE_I) {
ret = ff_hevc_slice_rpl(s);
if (ret < 0) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"Error constructing the reference lists for the current slice.\n");
goto fail;
}
}
if (s->sh.first_slice_in_pic_flag && s->avctx->hwaccel) {
ret = s->avctx->hwaccel->start_frame(s->avctx, NULL, 0);
if (ret < 0)
goto fail;
}
if (s->avctx->hwaccel) {
ret = s->avctx->hwaccel->decode_slice(s->avctx, nal->raw_data, nal->raw_size);
if (ret < 0)
goto fail;
} else {
if (s->threads_number > 1 && s->sh.num_entry_point_offsets > 0)
ctb_addr_ts = hls_slice_data_wpp(s, nal);
else
ctb_addr_ts = hls_slice_data(s);
if (ctb_addr_ts >= (s->ps.sps->ctb_width * s->ps.sps->ctb_height)) {
s->is_decoded = 1;
}
if (ctb_addr_ts < 0) {
ret = ctb_addr_ts;
goto fail;
}
}
break;
case HEVC_NAL_EOS_NUT:
case HEVC_NAL_EOB_NUT:
s->seq_decode = (s->seq_decode + 1) & 0xff;
s->max_ra = INT_MAX;
break;
case HEVC_NAL_AUD:
case HEVC_NAL_FD_NUT:
break;
default:
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_INFO,
"Skipping NAL unit %d\n", s->nal_unit_type);
}
return 0;
fail:
if (s->avctx->err_recognition & AV_EF_EXPLODE)
return ret;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: libavcodec/hevcdec.c in FFmpeg 4.1.2 mishandles detection of duplicate first slices, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and out-of-array access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted HEVC data.
Commit Message: avcodec/hevcdec: Avoid only partly skiping duplicate first slices
Fixes: NULL pointer dereference and out of array access
Fixes: 13871/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_AV_CODEC_ID_HEVC_fuzzer-5746167087890432
Fixes: 13845/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_AV_CODEC_ID_HEVC_fuzzer-5650370728034304
This also fixes the return code for explode mode
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/projects/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: James Almer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,706 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void perf_tp_event(u64 addr, u64 count, void *record, int entry_size,
struct pt_regs *regs, struct hlist_head *head, int rctx)
{
struct perf_sample_data data;
struct perf_event *event;
struct hlist_node *node;
struct perf_raw_record raw = {
.size = entry_size,
.data = record,
};
perf_sample_data_init(&data, addr);
data.raw = &raw;
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(event, node, head, hlist_entry) {
if (perf_tp_event_match(event, &data, regs))
perf_swevent_event(event, count, 1, &data, regs);
}
perf_swevent_put_recursion_context(rctx);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,840 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int sctp_do_peeloff(struct sock *sk, sctp_assoc_t id, struct socket **sockp)
{
struct sctp_association *asoc = sctp_id2assoc(sk, id);
struct sctp_sock *sp = sctp_sk(sk);
struct socket *sock;
int err = 0;
if (!asoc)
return -EINVAL;
/* An association cannot be branched off from an already peeled-off
* socket, nor is this supported for tcp style sockets.
*/
if (!sctp_style(sk, UDP))
return -EINVAL;
/* Create a new socket. */
err = sock_create(sk->sk_family, SOCK_SEQPACKET, IPPROTO_SCTP, &sock);
if (err < 0)
return err;
sctp_copy_sock(sock->sk, sk, asoc);
/* Make peeled-off sockets more like 1-1 accepted sockets.
* Set the daddr and initialize id to something more random
*/
sp->pf->to_sk_daddr(&asoc->peer.primary_addr, sk);
/* Populate the fields of the newsk from the oldsk and migrate the
* asoc to the newsk.
*/
sctp_sock_migrate(sk, sock->sk, asoc, SCTP_SOCKET_UDP_HIGH_BANDWIDTH);
*sockp = sock;
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: net/sctp/socket.c in the Linux kernel through 4.10.1 does not properly restrict association peel-off operations during certain wait states, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (invalid unlock and double free) via a multithreaded application. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incorrect fix for CVE-2017-5986.
Commit Message: sctp: deny peeloff operation on asocs with threads sleeping on it
commit 2dcab5984841 ("sctp: avoid BUG_ON on sctp_wait_for_sndbuf")
attempted to avoid a BUG_ON call when the association being used for a
sendmsg() is blocked waiting for more sndbuf and another thread did a
peeloff operation on such asoc, moving it to another socket.
As Ben Hutchings noticed, then in such case it would return without
locking back the socket and would cause two unlocks in a row.
Further analysis also revealed that it could allow a double free if the
application managed to peeloff the asoc that is created during the
sendmsg call, because then sctp_sendmsg() would try to free the asoc
that was created only for that call.
This patch takes another approach. It will deny the peeloff operation
if there is a thread sleeping on the asoc, so this situation doesn't
exist anymore. This avoids the issues described above and also honors
the syscalls that are already being handled (it can be multiple sendmsg
calls).
Joint work with Xin Long.
Fixes: 2dcab5984841 ("sctp: avoid BUG_ON on sctp_wait_for_sndbuf")
Cc: Alexander Popov <[email protected]>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 168,342 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter::MaybeCreateThrottle(
NavigationHandle* handle) {
DCHECK(content::MimeHandlerViewMode::UsesCrossProcessFrame());
if (!handle->GetParentFrame()) {
return nullptr;
}
int32_t parent_process_id = handle->GetParentFrame()->GetProcess()->GetID();
auto& map = *GetProcessIdToFilterMap();
if (!base::ContainsKey(map, parent_process_id) || !map[parent_process_id]) {
return nullptr;
}
for (auto& pair : map[parent_process_id]->frame_navigation_helpers_) {
if (!pair.second->ShouldCancelAndIgnore(handle))
continue;
return std::make_unique<CancelAndIgnoreNavigationForPluginFrameThrottle>(
handle);
}
return nullptr;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Data race in extensions guest view in Google Chrome prior to 73.0.3683.75 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [GuestView] - Introduce MimeHandlerViewAttachHelper
This CL is for the most part a mechanical change which extracts almost
all the frame-based MimeHandlerView code out of
ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter. This change both removes the current
clutter form EGVMF as well as fixesa race introduced when the
frame-based logic was added to EGVMF. The reason for the race was that
EGVMF is destroyed on IO thread but all the access to it (for
frame-based MHV) are from UI.
[email protected],[email protected]
Bug: 659750, 896679, 911161, 918861
Change-Id: I6474b870e4d56daa68be03637bb633665d9f9dda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1401451
Commit-Queue: Ehsan Karamad <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: James MacLean <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ehsan Karamad <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621155} | Medium | 173,044 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void BlobURLRegistry::unregisterURL(const KURL& url)
{
ThreadableBlobRegistry::unregisterBlobURL(url);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 23.0.1271.91 on Mac OS X does not properly mitigate improper rendering behavior in the Intel GPU driver, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 170,678 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ftrace_regex_lseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int whence)
{
loff_t ret;
if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
ret = seq_lseek(file, offset, whence);
else
file->f_pos = ret = 1;
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The ftrace implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.8.8 allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability for write access to the (1) set_ftrace_pid or (2) set_graph_function file, and then making an lseek system call.
Commit Message: tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]> | High | 166,027 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::AttachSession(DevToolsSession* session) {
session->SetRenderer(frame_host_ ? frame_host_->GetProcess()->GetID()
: ChildProcessHost::kInvalidUniqueID,
frame_host_);
protocol::EmulationHandler* emulation_handler =
new protocol::EmulationHandler();
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::BrowserHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::DOMHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(emulation_handler));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::InputHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::InspectorHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::IOHandler(
GetIOContext())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::MemoryHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::NetworkHandler(GetId())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::SchemaHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::ServiceWorkerHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::StorageHandler()));
session->AddHandler(
base::WrapUnique(new protocol::TargetHandler(false /* browser_only */)));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::TracingHandler(
protocol::TracingHandler::Renderer,
frame_tree_node_ ? frame_tree_node_->frame_tree_node_id() : 0,
GetIOContext())));
session->AddHandler(
base::WrapUnique(new protocol::PageHandler(emulation_handler)));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::SecurityHandler()));
if (EnsureAgent())
session->AttachToAgent(agent_ptr_);
if (sessions().size() == 1) {
frame_trace_recorder_.reset(new DevToolsFrameTraceRecorder());
GrantPolicy();
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
GetWakeLock()->RequestWakeLock();
#endif
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Allowing the chrome.debugger API to attach to Web UI pages in DevTools in Google Chrome prior to 67.0.3396.62 allowed an attacker who convinced a user to install a malicious extension to execute arbitrary code via a crafted Chrome Extension.
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow chrome.debugger to attach to web ui pages
If the page navigates to web ui, we force detach the debugger extension.
[email protected]
Bug: 798222
Change-Id: Idb46c2f59e839388397a8dfa6ce2e2a897698df3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/935961
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540916} | High | 173,248 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: process_secondary_order(STREAM s)
{
/* The length isn't calculated correctly by the server.
* For very compact orders the length becomes negative
* so a signed integer must be used. */
uint16 length;
uint16 flags;
uint8 type;
uint8 *next_order;
in_uint16_le(s, length);
in_uint16_le(s, flags); /* used by bmpcache2 */
in_uint8(s, type);
next_order = s->p + (sint16) length + 7;
switch (type)
{
case RDP_ORDER_RAW_BMPCACHE:
process_raw_bmpcache(s);
break;
case RDP_ORDER_COLCACHE:
process_colcache(s);
break;
case RDP_ORDER_BMPCACHE:
process_bmpcache(s);
break;
case RDP_ORDER_FONTCACHE:
process_fontcache(s);
break;
case RDP_ORDER_RAW_BMPCACHE2:
process_bmpcache2(s, flags, False); /* uncompressed */
break;
case RDP_ORDER_BMPCACHE2:
process_bmpcache2(s, flags, True); /* compressed */
break;
case RDP_ORDER_BRUSHCACHE:
process_brushcache(s, flags);
break;
default:
logger(Graphics, Warning,
"process_secondary_order(), unhandled secondary order %d", type);
}
s->p = next_order;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: rdesktop versions up to and including v1.8.3 contain a Buffer Overflow over the global variables in the function seamless_process_line() that results in memory corruption and probably even a remote code execution.
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182 | High | 169,801 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int jas_iccgetuint(jas_stream_t *in, int n, ulonglong *val)
{
int i;
int c;
ulonglong v;
v = 0;
for (i = n; i > 0; --i) {
if ((c = jas_stream_getc(in)) == EOF)
return -1;
v = (v << 8) | c;
}
*val = v;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in jas_image.c in JasPer before 1.900.25 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now. | Medium | 168,684 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ContentUtilityClient* ShellMainDelegate::CreateContentUtilityClient() {
utility_client_.reset(new ShellContentUtilityClient);
return utility_client_.get();
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The ContainerNode::parserRemoveChild function in WebKit/Source/core/dom/ContainerNode.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 49.0.2623.75, mishandles widget updates, which makes it easier for remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Fix content_shell with network service enabled not loading pages.
This regressed in my earlier cl r528763.
This is a reland of r547221.
Bug: 833612
Change-Id: I4c2649414d42773f2530e1abe5912a04fcd0ed9b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1064702
Reviewed-by: Jay Civelli <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560011} | Medium | 172,120 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void TypingCommand::insertText(Document& document,
const String& text,
Options options,
TextCompositionType composition,
const bool isIncrementalInsertion) {
LocalFrame* frame = document.frame();
DCHECK(frame);
if (!text.isEmpty())
document.frame()->spellChecker().updateMarkersForWordsAffectedByEditing(
isSpaceOrNewline(text[0]));
insertText(document, text,
frame->selection().computeVisibleSelectionInDOMTreeDeprecated(),
options, composition, isIncrementalInsertion);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 41.0.2272.76, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging incorrect ordering of operations in the Web SQL Database thread relative to Blink's main thread, related to the shutdown function in web/WebKit.cpp.
Commit Message: Make TypingCommand::insertText() to take SelectionInDOMTree instead of VisibleSelection
This patch makes |TypingCommand::insertText()| to take |SelectionInDOMTree|
instead of |VisibleSelection| to reduce usage of |VisibleSelection| for
improving code health.
BUG=657237
TEST=n/a
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2733183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455368} | High | 172,031 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: const unsigned char* Track::GetCodecPrivate(size_t& size) const
{
size = m_info.codecPrivateSize;
return m_info.codecPrivate;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,295 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long Chapters::Edition::Parse(
IMkvReader* pReader,
long long pos,
long long size)
{
const long long stop = pos + size;
while (pos < stop)
{
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(
pReader,
pos,
stop,
id,
size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (size == 0) // weird
continue;
if (id == 0x36) // Atom ID
{
status = ParseAtom(pReader, pos, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
}
pos += size;
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,401 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static reactor_status_t run_reactor(reactor_t *reactor, int iterations) {
assert(reactor != NULL);
reactor->run_thread = pthread_self();
reactor->is_running = true;
struct epoll_event events[MAX_EVENTS];
for (int i = 0; iterations == 0 || i < iterations; ++i) {
pthread_mutex_lock(&reactor->list_lock);
list_clear(reactor->invalidation_list);
pthread_mutex_unlock(&reactor->list_lock);
int ret;
do {
ret = epoll_wait(reactor->epoll_fd, events, MAX_EVENTS, -1);
} while (ret == -1 && errno == EINTR);
if (ret == -1) {
LOG_ERROR("%s error in epoll_wait: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
reactor->is_running = false;
return REACTOR_STATUS_ERROR;
}
for (int j = 0; j < ret; ++j) {
if (events[j].data.ptr == NULL) {
eventfd_t value;
eventfd_read(reactor->event_fd, &value);
reactor->is_running = false;
return REACTOR_STATUS_STOP;
}
reactor_object_t *object = (reactor_object_t *)events[j].data.ptr;
pthread_mutex_lock(&reactor->list_lock);
if (list_contains(reactor->invalidation_list, object)) {
pthread_mutex_unlock(&reactor->list_lock);
continue;
}
pthread_mutex_lock(&object->lock);
pthread_mutex_unlock(&reactor->list_lock);
reactor->object_removed = false;
if (events[j].events & (EPOLLIN | EPOLLHUP | EPOLLRDHUP | EPOLLERR) && object->read_ready)
object->read_ready(object->context);
if (!reactor->object_removed && events[j].events & EPOLLOUT && object->write_ready)
object->write_ready(object->context);
pthread_mutex_unlock(&object->lock);
if (reactor->object_removed) {
pthread_mutex_destroy(&object->lock);
osi_free(object);
}
}
}
reactor->is_running = false;
return REACTOR_STATUS_DONE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
| Medium | 173,482 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ikev2_vid_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext,
u_int item_len _U_, const u_char *ep _U_,
uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
struct isakmp_gen e;
const u_char *vid;
int i, len;
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext, sizeof(e));
ikev2_pay_print(ndo, NPSTR(tpay), e.critical);
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d vid=", ntohs(e.len) - 4));
vid = (const u_char *)(ext+1);
len = ntohs(e.len) - 4;
ND_TCHECK2(*vid, len);
for(i=0; i<len; i++) {
if(ND_ISPRINT(vid[i])) ND_PRINT((ndo, "%c", vid[i]));
else ND_PRINT((ndo, "."));
}
if (2 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < len) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(ext + 1), ntohs(e.len) - 4))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + ntohs(e.len);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(tpay)));
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The IKEv2 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-isakmp.c, several functions.
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13690/IKEv2: Fix some bounds checks.
Use a pointer of the correct type in ND_TCHECK(), or use ND_TCHECK2()
and provide the correct length.
While we're at it, remove the blank line between some checks and the
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY()s they protect.
Also, note the places where we print the entire payload.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | High | 167,803 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
{
char *provider = NULL, *pin;
int r, i, version, count = 0, success = 0, confirm = 0;
u_int seconds;
time_t death = 0;
u_char type;
struct sshkey **keys = NULL, *k;
Identity *id;
Idtab *tab;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &provider, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &pin, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
while (sshbuf_len(e->request)) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(e->request, &type)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
switch (type) {
case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &seconds)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
death = monotime() + seconds;
break;
case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM:
confirm = 1;
break;
default:
error("process_add_smartcard_key: "
"Unknown constraint type %d", type);
goto send;
}
}
if (lifetime && !death)
death = monotime() + lifetime;
count = pkcs11_add_provider(provider, pin, &keys);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
k = keys[i];
version = k->type == KEY_RSA1 ? 1 : 2;
tab = idtab_lookup(version);
if (lookup_identity(k, version) == NULL) {
id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity));
id->key = k;
id->provider = xstrdup(provider);
id->comment = xstrdup(provider); /* XXX */
id->death = death;
id->confirm = confirm;
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tab->idlist, id, next);
tab->nentries++;
success = 1;
} else {
sshkey_free(k);
}
keys[i] = NULL;
}
send:
free(pin);
free(provider);
free(keys);
send_status(e, success);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-426
Summary: Untrusted search path vulnerability in ssh-agent.c in ssh-agent in OpenSSH before 7.4 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary local PKCS#11 modules by leveraging control over a forwarded agent-socket.
Commit Message: add a whitelist of paths from which ssh-agent will load (via
ssh-pkcs11-helper) a PKCS#11 module; ok markus@ | High | 168,664 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ChromeMetricsServiceClient::RegisterUKMProviders() {
ukm_service_->RegisterMetricsProvider(
std::make_unique<metrics::NetworkMetricsProvider>(
content::CreateNetworkConnectionTrackerAsyncGetter(),
std::make_unique<metrics::NetworkQualityEstimatorProviderImpl>()));
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
ukm_service_->RegisterMetricsProvider(
std::make_unique<ChromeOSMetricsProvider>());
#endif // !defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
ukm_service_->RegisterMetricsProvider(
std::make_unique<variations::FieldTrialsProvider>(nullptr,
kUKMFieldTrialSuffix));
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS
CWE ID: CWE-79
Summary: Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the Developer Tools (aka DevTools) subsystem in Google Chrome before 53.0.2785.89 on Windows and OS X and before 53.0.2785.92 on Linux allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via the settings parameter in a chrome-devtools-frontend.appspot.com URL's query string.
Commit Message: Add CPU metrics provider and Add CPU/GPU provider for UKM.
Bug: 907674
Change-Id: I61b88aeac8d2a7ff81d812fa5a267f48203ec7e2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1381376
Commit-Queue: Nik Bhagat <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#618037} | Medium | 172,071 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE1(unshare, unsigned long, unshare_flags)
{
struct fs_struct *fs, *new_fs = NULL;
struct files_struct *fd, *new_fd = NULL;
struct cred *new_cred = NULL;
struct nsproxy *new_nsproxy = NULL;
int do_sysvsem = 0;
int err;
/*
* If unsharing a user namespace must also unshare the thread.
*/
if (unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER)
unshare_flags |= CLONE_THREAD;
/*
* If unsharing a pid namespace must also unshare the thread.
*/
if (unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWPID)
unshare_flags |= CLONE_THREAD;
/*
* If unsharing a thread from a thread group, must also unshare vm.
*/
if (unshare_flags & CLONE_THREAD)
unshare_flags |= CLONE_VM;
/*
* If unsharing vm, must also unshare signal handlers.
*/
if (unshare_flags & CLONE_VM)
unshare_flags |= CLONE_SIGHAND;
/*
* If unsharing namespace, must also unshare filesystem information.
*/
if (unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWNS)
unshare_flags |= CLONE_FS;
err = check_unshare_flags(unshare_flags);
if (err)
goto bad_unshare_out;
/*
* CLONE_NEWIPC must also detach from the undolist: after switching
* to a new ipc namespace, the semaphore arrays from the old
* namespace are unreachable.
*/
if (unshare_flags & (CLONE_NEWIPC|CLONE_SYSVSEM))
do_sysvsem = 1;
err = unshare_fs(unshare_flags, &new_fs);
if (err)
goto bad_unshare_out;
err = unshare_fd(unshare_flags, &new_fd);
if (err)
goto bad_unshare_cleanup_fs;
err = unshare_userns(unshare_flags, &new_cred);
if (err)
goto bad_unshare_cleanup_fd;
err = unshare_nsproxy_namespaces(unshare_flags, &new_nsproxy,
new_cred, new_fs);
if (err)
goto bad_unshare_cleanup_cred;
if (new_fs || new_fd || do_sysvsem || new_cred || new_nsproxy) {
if (do_sysvsem) {
/*
* CLONE_SYSVSEM is equivalent to sys_exit().
*/
exit_sem(current);
}
if (new_nsproxy)
switch_task_namespaces(current, new_nsproxy);
task_lock(current);
if (new_fs) {
fs = current->fs;
spin_lock(&fs->lock);
current->fs = new_fs;
if (--fs->users)
new_fs = NULL;
else
new_fs = fs;
spin_unlock(&fs->lock);
}
if (new_fd) {
fd = current->files;
current->files = new_fd;
new_fd = fd;
}
task_unlock(current);
if (new_cred) {
/* Install the new user namespace */
commit_creds(new_cred);
new_cred = NULL;
}
}
bad_unshare_cleanup_cred:
if (new_cred)
put_cred(new_cred);
bad_unshare_cleanup_fd:
if (new_fd)
put_files_struct(new_fd);
bad_unshare_cleanup_fs:
if (new_fs)
free_fs_struct(new_fs);
bad_unshare_out:
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The clone system-call implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.8.3 does not properly handle a combination of the CLONE_NEWUSER and CLONE_FS flags, which allows local users to gain privileges by calling chroot and leveraging the sharing of the / directory between a parent process and a child process.
Commit Message: userns: Don't allow CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_FS
Don't allowing sharing the root directory with processes in a
different user namespace. There doesn't seem to be any point, and to
allow it would require the overhead of putting a user namespace
reference in fs_struct (for permission checks) and incrementing that
reference count on practically every call to fork.
So just perform the inexpensive test of forbidding sharing fs_struct
acrosss processes in different user namespaces. We already disallow
other forms of threading when unsharing a user namespace so this
should be no real burden in practice.
This updates setns, clone, and unshare to disallow multiple user
namespaces sharing an fs_struct.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | High | 166,106 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: magic_getparam(struct magic_set *ms, int param, void *val)
{
switch (param) {
case MAGIC_PARAM_INDIR_MAX:
*(size_t *)val = ms->indir_max;
return 0;
case MAGIC_PARAM_NAME_MAX:
*(size_t *)val = ms->name_max;
return 0;
case MAGIC_PARAM_ELF_PHNUM_MAX:
*(size_t *)val = ms->elf_phnum_max;
return 0;
case MAGIC_PARAM_ELF_SHNUM_MAX:
*(size_t *)val = ms->elf_shnum_max;
return 0;
default:
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The ELF parser in file 5.08 through 5.21 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a large number of notes.
Commit Message: - Add a limit to the number of ELF notes processed (Suggested by Alexander
Cherepanov)
- Restructure ELF note printing so that we don't print the same message
multiple times on repeated notes of the same kind. | Medium | 166,774 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void qrio_cpuwd_flag(bool flag)
{
u8 reason1;
void __iomem *qrio_base = (void *)CONFIG_SYS_QRIO_BASE;
reason1 = in_8(qrio_base + REASON1_OFF);
if (flag)
reason1 |= REASON1_CPUWD;
else
reason1 &= ~REASON1_CPUWD;
out_8(qrio_base + REASON1_OFF, reason1);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Das U-Boot versions 2016.09 through 2019.07-rc4 can memset() too much data while reading a crafted ext4 filesystem, which results in a stack buffer overflow and likely code execution.
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes | High | 169,624 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void UserSelectionScreen::FillUserDictionary(
user_manager::User* user,
bool is_owner,
bool is_signin_to_add,
proximity_auth::mojom::AuthType auth_type,
const std::vector<std::string>* public_session_recommended_locales,
base::DictionaryValue* user_dict) {
const bool is_public_session =
user->GetType() == user_manager::USER_TYPE_PUBLIC_ACCOUNT;
const bool is_legacy_supervised_user =
user->GetType() == user_manager::USER_TYPE_SUPERVISED;
const bool is_child_user = user->GetType() == user_manager::USER_TYPE_CHILD;
user_dict->SetString(kKeyUsername, user->GetAccountId().Serialize());
user_dict->SetString(kKeyEmailAddress, user->display_email());
user_dict->SetString(kKeyDisplayName, user->GetDisplayName());
user_dict->SetBoolean(kKeyPublicAccount, is_public_session);
user_dict->SetBoolean(kKeyLegacySupervisedUser, is_legacy_supervised_user);
user_dict->SetBoolean(kKeyChildUser, is_child_user);
user_dict->SetBoolean(kKeyDesktopUser, false);
user_dict->SetInteger(kKeyInitialAuthType, static_cast<int>(auth_type));
user_dict->SetBoolean(kKeySignedIn, user->is_logged_in());
user_dict->SetBoolean(kKeyIsOwner, is_owner);
user_dict->SetBoolean(kKeyIsActiveDirectory, user->IsActiveDirectoryUser());
user_dict->SetBoolean(kKeyAllowFingerprint, AllowFingerprintForUser(user));
FillMultiProfileUserPrefs(user, user_dict, is_signin_to_add);
if (is_public_session) {
AddPublicSessionDetailsToUserDictionaryEntry(
user_dict, public_session_recommended_locales);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in browser/extensions/api/webrtc_audio_private/webrtc_audio_private_api.cc in the WebRTC Audio Private API implementation in Google Chrome before 49.0.2623.75 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging incorrect reliance on the resource context pointer.
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224} | High | 172,200 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void DaemonProcessTest::LaunchNetworkProcess() {
terminal_id_ = 0;
daemon_process_->OnChannelConnected();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving PDF fields.
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,541 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static long madvise_willneed(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
struct vm_area_struct **prev,
unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
{
struct file *file = vma->vm_file;
#ifdef CONFIG_SWAP
if (!file) {
*prev = vma;
force_swapin_readahead(vma, start, end);
return 0;
}
if (shmem_mapping(file->f_mapping)) {
*prev = vma;
force_shm_swapin_readahead(vma, start, end,
file->f_mapping);
return 0;
}
#else
if (!file)
return -EBADF;
#endif
if (IS_DAX(file_inode(file))) {
/* no bad return value, but ignore advice */
return 0;
}
*prev = vma;
start = ((start - vma->vm_start) >> PAGE_SHIFT) + vma->vm_pgoff;
if (end > vma->vm_end)
end = vma->vm_end;
end = ((end - vma->vm_start) >> PAGE_SHIFT) + vma->vm_pgoff;
force_page_cache_readahead(file->f_mapping, file, start, end - start);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-835
Summary: The madvise_willneed function in mm/madvise.c in the Linux kernel before 4.14.4 allows local users to cause a denial of service (infinite loop) by triggering use of MADVISE_WILLNEED for a DAX mapping.
Commit Message: mm/madvise.c: fix madvise() infinite loop under special circumstances
MADVISE_WILLNEED has always been a noop for DAX (formerly XIP) mappings.
Unfortunately madvise_willneed() doesn't communicate this information
properly to the generic madvise syscall implementation. The calling
convention is quite subtle there. madvise_vma() is supposed to either
return an error or update &prev otherwise the main loop will never
advance to the next vma and it will keep looping for ever without a way
to get out of the kernel.
It seems this has been broken since introduction. Nobody has noticed
because nobody seems to be using MADVISE_WILLNEED on these DAX mappings.
[[email protected]: rewrite changelog]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: fe77ba6f4f97 ("[PATCH] xip: madvice/fadvice: execute in place")
Signed-off-by: chenjie <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: guoxuenan <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Minchan Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: zhangyi (F) <[email protected]>
Cc: Miao Xie <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Cc: Shaohua Li <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <[email protected]>
Cc: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: Carsten Otte <[email protected]>
Cc: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,409 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static zend_object_value spl_filesystem_object_clone(zval *zobject TSRMLS_DC)
{
zend_object_value new_obj_val;
zend_object *old_object;
zend_object *new_object;
zend_object_handle handle = Z_OBJ_HANDLE_P(zobject);
spl_filesystem_object *intern;
spl_filesystem_object *source;
int index, skip_dots;
old_object = zend_objects_get_address(zobject TSRMLS_CC);
source = (spl_filesystem_object*)old_object;
new_obj_val = spl_filesystem_object_new_ex(old_object->ce, &intern TSRMLS_CC);
new_object = &intern->std;
intern->flags = source->flags;
switch (source->type) {
case SPL_FS_INFO:
intern->_path_len = source->_path_len;
intern->_path = estrndup(source->_path, source->_path_len);
intern->file_name_len = source->file_name_len;
intern->file_name = estrndup(source->file_name, intern->file_name_len);
break;
case SPL_FS_DIR:
spl_filesystem_dir_open(intern, source->_path TSRMLS_CC);
/* read until we hit the position in which we were before */
skip_dots = SPL_HAS_FLAG(source->flags, SPL_FILE_DIR_SKIPDOTS);
for(index = 0; index < source->u.dir.index; ++index) {
do {
spl_filesystem_dir_read(intern TSRMLS_CC);
} while (skip_dots && spl_filesystem_is_dot(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name));
}
intern->u.dir.index = index;
break;
case SPL_FS_FILE:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_ERROR, "An object of class %s cannot be cloned", old_object->ce->name);
break;
}
intern->file_class = source->file_class;
intern->info_class = source->info_class;
intern->oth = source->oth;
intern->oth_handler = source->oth_handler;
zend_objects_clone_members(new_object, new_obj_val, old_object, handle TSRMLS_CC);
if (intern->oth_handler && intern->oth_handler->clone) {
intern->oth_handler->clone(source, intern TSRMLS_CC);
}
return new_obj_val;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the SplFileObject::fread function in spl_directory.c in the SPL extension in PHP before 5.5.37 and 5.6.x before 5.6.23 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large integer argument, a related issue to CVE-2016-5096.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int | High | 167,080 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: tChecksumCheckResult ParaNdis_CheckRxChecksum(
PARANDIS_ADAPTER *pContext,
ULONG virtioFlags,
tCompletePhysicalAddress *pPacketPages,
ULONG ulPacketLength,
ULONG ulDataOffset)
{
tOffloadSettingsFlags f = pContext->Offload.flags;
tChecksumCheckResult res;
tTcpIpPacketParsingResult ppr;
ULONG flagsToCalculate = 0;
res.value = 0;
if (f.fRxIPChecksum) flagsToCalculate |= pcrIpChecksum; // check only
if (!(virtioFlags & VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_DATA_VALID))
{
if (virtioFlags & VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM)
{
flagsToCalculate |= pcrFixXxpChecksum | pcrTcpChecksum | pcrUdpChecksum;
}
else
{
if (f.fRxTCPChecksum) flagsToCalculate |= pcrTcpV4Checksum;
if (f.fRxUDPChecksum) flagsToCalculate |= pcrUdpV4Checksum;
if (f.fRxTCPv6Checksum) flagsToCalculate |= pcrTcpV6Checksum;
if (f.fRxUDPv6Checksum) flagsToCalculate |= pcrUdpV6Checksum;
}
}
ppr = ParaNdis_CheckSumVerify(pPacketPages, ulPacketLength - ETH_HEADER_SIZE, ulDataOffset + ETH_HEADER_SIZE, flagsToCalculate, __FUNCTION__);
if (ppr.ipCheckSum == ppresIPTooShort || ppr.xxpStatus == ppresXxpIncomplete)
{
res.flags.IpOK = FALSE;
res.flags.IpFailed = TRUE;
return res;
}
if (virtioFlags & VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_DATA_VALID)
{
pContext->extraStatistics.framesRxCSHwOK++;
ppr.xxpCheckSum = ppresCSOK;
}
if (ppr.ipStatus == ppresIPV4 && !ppr.IsFragment)
{
if (f.fRxIPChecksum)
{
res.flags.IpOK = ppr.ipCheckSum == ppresCSOK;
res.flags.IpFailed = ppr.ipCheckSum == ppresCSBad;
}
if(ppr.xxpStatus == ppresXxpKnown)
{
if(ppr.TcpUdp == ppresIsTCP) /* TCP */
{
if (f.fRxTCPChecksum)
{
res.flags.TcpOK = ppr.xxpCheckSum == ppresCSOK || ppr.fixedXxpCS;
res.flags.TcpFailed = !res.flags.TcpOK;
}
}
else /* UDP */
{
if (f.fRxUDPChecksum)
{
res.flags.UdpOK = ppr.xxpCheckSum == ppresCSOK || ppr.fixedXxpCS;
res.flags.UdpFailed = !res.flags.UdpOK;
}
}
}
}
else if (ppr.ipStatus == ppresIPV6)
{
if(ppr.xxpStatus == ppresXxpKnown)
{
if(ppr.TcpUdp == ppresIsTCP) /* TCP */
{
if (f.fRxTCPv6Checksum)
{
res.flags.TcpOK = ppr.xxpCheckSum == ppresCSOK || ppr.fixedXxpCS;
res.flags.TcpFailed = !res.flags.TcpOK;
}
}
else /* UDP */
{
if (f.fRxUDPv6Checksum)
{
res.flags.UdpOK = ppr.xxpCheckSum == ppresCSOK || ppr.fixedXxpCS;
res.flags.UdpFailed = !res.flags.UdpOK;
}
}
}
}
return res;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The NetKVM Windows Virtio driver allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (guest crash) via a crafted length value in an IP packet, as demonstrated by a value that does not account for the size of the IP options.
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: Checking the length only on read
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <[email protected]> | Medium | 170,139 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int mov_read_dref(MOVContext *c, AVIOContext *pb, MOVAtom atom)
{
AVStream *st;
MOVStreamContext *sc;
int entries, i, j;
if (c->fc->nb_streams < 1)
return 0;
st = c->fc->streams[c->fc->nb_streams-1];
sc = st->priv_data;
avio_rb32(pb); // version + flags
entries = avio_rb32(pb);
if (entries >= UINT_MAX / sizeof(*sc->drefs))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
av_free(sc->drefs);
sc->drefs = av_mallocz(entries * sizeof(*sc->drefs));
if (!sc->drefs)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
sc->drefs_count = entries;
for (i = 0; i < sc->drefs_count; i++) {
MOVDref *dref = &sc->drefs[i];
uint32_t size = avio_rb32(pb);
int64_t next = avio_tell(pb) + size - 4;
if (size < 12)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
dref->type = avio_rl32(pb);
avio_rb32(pb); // version + flags
av_dlog(c->fc, "type %.4s size %d\n", (char*)&dref->type, size);
if (dref->type == MKTAG('a','l','i','s') && size > 150) {
/* macintosh alias record */
uint16_t volume_len, len;
int16_t type;
avio_skip(pb, 10);
volume_len = avio_r8(pb);
volume_len = FFMIN(volume_len, 27);
avio_read(pb, dref->volume, 27);
dref->volume[volume_len] = 0;
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "volume %s, len %d\n", dref->volume, volume_len);
avio_skip(pb, 12);
len = avio_r8(pb);
len = FFMIN(len, 63);
avio_read(pb, dref->filename, 63);
dref->filename[len] = 0;
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "filename %s, len %d\n", dref->filename, len);
avio_skip(pb, 16);
/* read next level up_from_alias/down_to_target */
dref->nlvl_from = avio_rb16(pb);
dref->nlvl_to = avio_rb16(pb);
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "nlvl from %d, nlvl to %d\n",
dref->nlvl_from, dref->nlvl_to);
avio_skip(pb, 16);
for (type = 0; type != -1 && avio_tell(pb) < next; ) {
if(url_feof(pb))
return AVERROR_EOF;
type = avio_rb16(pb);
len = avio_rb16(pb);
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "type %d, len %d\n", type, len);
if (len&1)
len += 1;
if (type == 2) { // absolute path
av_free(dref->path);
dref->path = av_mallocz(len+1);
if (!dref->path)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
avio_read(pb, dref->path, len);
if (len > volume_len && !strncmp(dref->path, dref->volume, volume_len)) {
len -= volume_len;
memmove(dref->path, dref->path+volume_len, len);
dref->path[len] = 0;
}
for (j = 0; j < len; j++)
if (dref->path[j] == ':')
dref->path[j] = '/';
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "path %s\n", dref->path);
} else if (type == 0) { // directory name
av_free(dref->dir);
dref->dir = av_malloc(len+1);
if (!dref->dir)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
avio_read(pb, dref->dir, len);
dref->dir[len] = 0;
for (j = 0; j < len; j++)
if (dref->dir[j] == ':')
dref->dir[j] = '/';
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "dir %s\n", dref->dir);
} else
avio_skip(pb, len);
}
}
avio_seek(pb, next, SEEK_SET);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The mov_read_dref function in libavformat/mov.c in Libav before 11.7 and FFmpeg before 0.11 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or execute arbitrary code via the entries value in a dref box in an MP4 file.
Commit Message: mov: reset dref_count on realloc to keep values consistent.
This fixes a potential crash.
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,385 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void PrintWebViewHelper::PrintNode(const WebKit::WebNode& node) {
if (node.isNull() || !node.document().frame()) {
return;
}
if (is_preview_enabled_) {
print_preview_context_.InitWithNode(node);
RequestPrintPreview(PRINT_PREVIEW_USER_INITIATED_CONTEXT_NODE);
} else {
WebKit::WebNode duplicate_node(node);
Print(duplicate_node.document().frame(), duplicate_node);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 23.0.1271.91 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to printing.
Commit Message: Guard against the same PrintWebViewHelper being re-entered.
BUG=159165
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11367076
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@165821 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,697 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool IsIDNComponentSafe(base::StringPiece16 label, bool is_tld_ascii) {
return g_idn_spoof_checker.Get().SafeToDisplayAsUnicode(label, is_tld_ascii);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Incorrect handling of confusable characters in URL Formatter in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a remote attacker to perform domain spoofing via IDN homographs via a crafted domain name.
Commit Message: Restrict Latin Small Letter Thorn (U+00FE) to Icelandic domains
This character (þ) can be confused with both b and p when used in a domain
name. IDN spoof checker doesn't have a good way of flagging a character as
confusable with multiple characters, so it can't catch spoofs containing
this character. As a practical fix, this CL restricts this character to
domains under Iceland's ccTLD (.is). With this change, a domain name containing
"þ" with a non-.is TLD will be displayed in punycode in the UI.
This change affects less than 10 real world domains with limited popularity.
Bug: 798892, 843352, 904327, 1017707
Change-Id: Ib07190dcde406bf62ce4413688a4fb4859a51030
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1879992
Commit-Queue: Mustafa Emre Acer <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christopher Thompson <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#709309} | Medium | 172,730 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void start_daemon()
{
struct usb_sock_t *usb_sock;
if (g_options.noprinter_mode == 0) {
usb_sock = usb_open();
if (usb_sock == NULL)
goto cleanup_usb;
} else
usb_sock = NULL;
uint16_t desired_port = g_options.desired_port;
struct tcp_sock_t *tcp_socket;
while ((tcp_socket = tcp_open(desired_port)) == NULL &&
g_options.only_desired_port == 0) {
desired_port ++;
if (desired_port == 1 || desired_port == 0)
desired_port = 49152;
}
if (tcp_socket == NULL)
goto cleanup_tcp;
uint16_t real_port = tcp_port_number_get(tcp_socket);
if (desired_port != 0 && g_options.only_desired_port == 1 &&
desired_port != real_port) {
ERR("Received port number did not match requested port number."
" The requested port number may be too high.");
goto cleanup_tcp;
}
printf("%u|", real_port);
fflush(stdout);
uint16_t pid;
if (!g_options.nofork_mode && (pid = fork()) > 0) {
printf("%u|", pid);
exit(0);
}
if (usb_can_callback(usb_sock))
usb_register_callback(usb_sock);
for (;;) {
struct service_thread_param *args = calloc(1, sizeof(*args));
if (args == NULL) {
ERR("Failed to alloc space for thread args");
goto cleanup_thread;
}
args->usb_sock = usb_sock;
args->tcp = tcp_conn_accept(tcp_socket);
if (args->tcp == NULL) {
ERR("Failed to open tcp connection");
goto cleanup_thread;
}
int status = pthread_create(&args->thread_handle, NULL,
&service_connection, args);
if (status) {
ERR("Failed to spawn thread, error %d", status);
goto cleanup_thread;
}
continue;
cleanup_thread:
if (args != NULL) {
if (args->tcp != NULL)
tcp_conn_close(args->tcp);
free(args);
}
break;
}
cleanup_tcp:
if (tcp_socket!= NULL)
tcp_close(tcp_socket);
cleanup_usb:
if (usb_sock != NULL)
usb_close(usb_sock);
return;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: IPPUSBXD before 1.22 listens on all interfaces, which allows remote attackers to obtain access to USB connected printers via a direct request.
Commit Message: SECURITY FIX: Actually restrict the access to the printer to localhost
Before, any machine in any network connected by any of the interfaces (as
listed by "ifconfig") could access to an IPP-over-USB printer on the assigned
port, allowing users on remote machines to print and to access the web
configuration interface of a IPP-over-USB printer in contrary to conventional
USB printers which are only accessible locally. | High | 166,588 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: parse_charstrings( T1_Face face,
T1_Loader loader )
{
T1_Parser parser = &loader->parser;
PS_Table code_table = &loader->charstrings;
PS_Table name_table = &loader->glyph_names;
PS_Table swap_table = &loader->swap_table;
FT_Memory memory = parser->root.memory;
FT_Error error;
PSAux_Service psaux = (PSAux_Service)face->psaux;
FT_Byte* cur;
FT_Byte* limit = parser->root.limit;
FT_Int n, num_glyphs;
FT_UInt notdef_index = 0;
FT_Byte notdef_found = 0;
num_glyphs = (FT_Int)T1_ToInt( parser );
if ( num_glyphs < 0 )
{
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Fail;
}
/* some fonts like Optima-Oblique not only define the /CharStrings */
/* array but access it also */
if ( num_glyphs == 0 || parser->root.error )
return;
/* initialize tables, leaving space for addition of .notdef, */
/* if necessary, and a few other glyphs to handle buggy */
/* fonts which have more glyphs than specified. */
/* for some non-standard fonts like `Optima' which provides */
/* different outlines depending on the resolution it is */
/* possible to get here twice */
if ( !loader->num_glyphs )
{
error = psaux->ps_table_funcs->init(
code_table, num_glyphs + 1 + TABLE_EXTEND, memory );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
error = psaux->ps_table_funcs->init(
name_table, num_glyphs + 1 + TABLE_EXTEND, memory );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
/* Initialize table for swapping index notdef_index and */
/* index 0 names and codes (if necessary). */
error = psaux->ps_table_funcs->init( swap_table, 4, memory );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
}
n = 0;
for (;;)
{
FT_Long size;
FT_Byte* base;
/* the format is simple: */
/* `/glyphname' + binary data */
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
cur = parser->root.cursor;
if ( cur >= limit )
break;
/* we stop when we find a `def' or `end' keyword */
if ( cur + 3 < limit && IS_PS_DELIM( cur[3] ) )
{
if ( cur[0] == 'd' &&
cur[1] == 'e' &&
cur[2] == 'f' )
{
/* There are fonts which have this: */
/* */
/* /CharStrings 118 dict def */
/* Private begin */
/* CharStrings begin */
/* ... */
/* */
/* To catch this we ignore `def' if */
/* no charstring has actually been */
/* seen. */
if ( n )
break;
}
if ( cur[0] == 'e' &&
cur[1] == 'n' &&
cur[2] == 'd' )
break;
}
T1_Skip_PS_Token( parser );
if ( parser->root.error )
return;
if ( cur + 2 >= limit )
{
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Fail;
}
cur++; /* skip `/' */
len = parser->root.cursor - cur;
if ( !read_binary_data( parser, &size, &base, IS_INCREMENTAL ) )
return;
/* for some non-standard fonts like `Optima' which provides */
/* different outlines depending on the resolution it is */
/* possible to get here twice */
if ( loader->num_glyphs )
continue;
error = T1_Add_Table( name_table, n, cur, len + 1 );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
/* add a trailing zero to the name table */
name_table->elements[n][len] = '\0';
/* record index of /.notdef */
if ( *cur == '.' &&
ft_strcmp( ".notdef",
(const char*)(name_table->elements[n]) ) == 0 )
{
notdef_index = n;
notdef_found = 1;
}
if ( face->type1.private_dict.lenIV >= 0 &&
n < num_glyphs + TABLE_EXTEND )
{
FT_Byte* temp;
if ( size <= face->type1.private_dict.lenIV )
{
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Fail;
}
/* t1_decrypt() shouldn't write to base -- make temporary copy */
if ( FT_ALLOC( temp, size ) )
goto Fail;
FT_MEM_COPY( temp, base, size );
psaux->t1_decrypt( temp, size, 4330 );
size -= face->type1.private_dict.lenIV;
error = T1_Add_Table( code_table, n,
temp + face->type1.private_dict.lenIV, size );
FT_FREE( temp );
}
else
error = T1_Add_Table( code_table, n, base, size );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
n++;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: FreeType before 2.5.4 does not check for the end of the data during certain parsing actions, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted Type42 font, related to type42/t42parse.c and type1/t1load.c.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,857 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: std::string Backtrace::GetFunctionName(uintptr_t pc, uintptr_t* offset) {
std::string func_name = GetFunctionNameRaw(pc, offset);
if (!func_name.empty()) {
#if defined(__APPLE__)
if (func_name[0] != '_') {
return func_name;
}
#endif
char* name = __cxa_demangle(func_name.c_str(), 0, 0, 0);
if (name) {
func_name = name;
free(name);
}
}
return func_name;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: libbacktrace/Backtrace.cpp in debuggerd in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-05-01 allows attackers to gain privileges via an application containing a crafted symbol name, aka internal bug 27299236.
Commit Message: Don't demangle symbol names.
Bug: http://b/27299236
Change-Id: I26ef47f80d4d6048a316ba51e83365ff65d70439
| High | 173,887 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PageGroupLoadDeferrer::PageGroupLoadDeferrer(Page* page, bool deferSelf)
{
const HashSet<Page*>& pages = page->group().pages();
HashSet<Page*>::const_iterator end = pages.end();
for (HashSet<Page*>::const_iterator it = pages.begin(); it != end; ++it) {
Page* otherPage = *it;
if ((deferSelf || otherPage != page)) {
if (!otherPage->defersLoading()) {
m_deferredFrames.append(otherPage->mainFrame());
for (Frame* frame = otherPage->mainFrame(); frame; frame = frame->tree()->traverseNext())
frame->document()->suspendScheduledTasks(ActiveDOMObject::WillDeferLoading);
}
}
}
size_t count = m_deferredFrames.size();
for (size_t i = 0; i < count; ++i)
if (Page* page = m_deferredFrames[i]->page())
page->setDefersLoading(true);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 30.0.1599.66, allows remote attackers to spoof the address bar via vectors involving a response with a 204 (aka No Content) status code, in conjunction with a delay in notifying the user of an attempted spoof.
Commit Message: Don't wait to notify client of spoof attempt if a modal dialog is created.
BUG=281256
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23620020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157196 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,190 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: init_ctx_reselect(OM_uint32 *minor_status, spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc,
OM_uint32 acc_negState, gss_OID supportedMech,
gss_buffer_t *responseToken, gss_buffer_t *mechListMIC,
OM_uint32 *negState, send_token_flag *tokflag)
{
OM_uint32 tmpmin;
size_t i;
generic_gss_release_oid(&tmpmin, &sc->internal_mech);
gss_delete_sec_context(&tmpmin, &sc->ctx_handle,
GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
/* Find supportedMech in sc->mech_set. */
for (i = 0; i < sc->mech_set->count; i++) {
if (g_OID_equal(supportedMech, &sc->mech_set->elements[i]))
break;
}
if (i == sc->mech_set->count)
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
sc->internal_mech = &sc->mech_set->elements[i];
/*
* Windows 2003 and earlier don't correctly send a
* negState of request-mic when counter-proposing a
* mechanism. They probably don't handle mechListMICs
* properly either.
*/
if (acc_negState != REQUEST_MIC)
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
sc->mech_complete = 0;
sc->mic_reqd = 1;
*negState = REQUEST_MIC;
*tokflag = CONT_TOKEN_SEND;
return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: Double free vulnerability in the init_ctx_reselect function in the SPNEGO initiator in lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) 1.10.x through 1.12.x before 1.12.2 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly execute arbitrary code via network traffic that appears to come from an intended acceptor, but specifies a security mechanism different from the one proposed by the initiator.
Commit Message: Fix double-free in SPNEGO [CVE-2014-4343]
In commit cd7d6b08 ("Verify acceptor's mech in SPNEGO initiator") the
pointer sc->internal_mech became an alias into sc->mech_set->elements,
which should be considered constant for the duration of the SPNEGO
context. So don't free it.
CVE-2014-4343:
In MIT krb5 releases 1.10 and newer, an unauthenticated remote
attacker with the ability to spoof packets appearing to be from a
GSSAPI acceptor can cause a double-free condition in GSSAPI initiators
(clients) which are using the SPNEGO mechanism, by returning a
different underlying mechanism than was proposed by the initiator. At
this stage of the negotiation, the acceptor is unauthenticated, and
the acceptor's response could be spoofed by an attacker with the
ability to inject traffic to the initiator.
Historically, some double-free vulnerabilities can be translated into
remote code execution, though the necessary exploits must be tailored
to the individual application and are usually quite
complicated. Double-frees can also be exploited to cause an
application crash, for a denial of service. However, most GSSAPI
client applications are not vulnerable, as the SPNEGO mechanism is not
used by default (when GSS_C_NO_OID is passed as the mech_type argument
to gss_init_sec_context()). The most common use of SPNEGO is for
HTTP-Negotiate, used in web browsers and other web clients. Most such
clients are believed to not offer HTTP-Negotiate by default, instead
requiring a whitelist of sites for which it may be used to be
configured. If the whitelist is configured to only allow
HTTP-Negotiate over TLS connections ("https://"), a successful
attacker must also spoof the web server's SSL certificate, due to the
way the WWW-Authenticate header is sent in a 401 (Unauthorized)
response message. Unfortunately, many instructions for enabling
HTTP-Negotiate in common web browsers do not include a TLS
requirement.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:H/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[[email protected]: CVE summary and CVSSv2 vector]
ticket: 7969 (new)
target_version: 1.12.2
tags: pullup | High | 166,311 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: struct pipe_inode_info *alloc_pipe_info(void)
{
struct pipe_inode_info *pipe;
pipe = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pipe_inode_info), GFP_KERNEL);
if (pipe) {
pipe->bufs = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pipe_buffer) * PIPE_DEF_BUFFERS, GFP_KERNEL);
if (pipe->bufs) {
init_waitqueue_head(&pipe->wait);
pipe->r_counter = pipe->w_counter = 1;
pipe->buffers = PIPE_DEF_BUFFERS;
mutex_init(&pipe->mutex);
return pipe;
}
kfree(pipe);
}
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: fs/pipe.c in the Linux kernel before 4.5 does not limit the amount of unread data in pipes, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) by creating many pipes with non-default sizes.
Commit Message: pipe: limit the per-user amount of pages allocated in pipes
On no-so-small systems, it is possible for a single process to cause an
OOM condition by filling large pipes with data that are never read. A
typical process filling 4000 pipes with 1 MB of data will use 4 GB of
memory. On small systems it may be tricky to set the pipe max size to
prevent this from happening.
This patch makes it possible to enforce a per-user soft limit above
which new pipes will be limited to a single page, effectively limiting
them to 4 kB each, as well as a hard limit above which no new pipes may
be created for this user. This has the effect of protecting the system
against memory abuse without hurting other users, and still allowing
pipes to work correctly though with less data at once.
The limit are controlled by two new sysctls : pipe-user-pages-soft, and
pipe-user-pages-hard. Both may be disabled by setting them to zero. The
default soft limit allows the default number of FDs per process (1024)
to create pipes of the default size (64kB), thus reaching a limit of 64MB
before starting to create only smaller pipes. With 256 processes limited
to 1024 FDs each, this results in 1024*64kB + (256*1024 - 1024) * 4kB =
1084 MB of memory allocated for a user. The hard limit is disabled by
default to avoid breaking existing applications that make intensive use
of pipes (eg: for splicing).
Reported-by: [email protected]
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
Mitigates: CVE-2013-4312 (Linux 2.0+)
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,386 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void *_zend_shared_memdup(void *source, size_t size, zend_bool free_source)
{
void *old_p, *retval;
if ((old_p = zend_hash_index_find_ptr(&xlat_table, (zend_ulong)source)) != NULL) {
/* we already duplicated this pointer */
return old_p;
}
retval = ZCG(mem);
ZCG(mem) = (void*)(((char*)ZCG(mem)) + ZEND_ALIGNED_SIZE(size));
memcpy(retval, source, size);
if (free_source) {
efree(source);
}
zend_shared_alloc_register_xlat_entry(source, retval);
return retval;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the _zend_shared_memdup function in zend_shared_alloc.c in the OPcache extension in PHP through 5.6.7 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: | High | 164,770 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int prepend_path(const struct path *path,
const struct path *root,
char **buffer, int *buflen)
{
struct dentry *dentry;
struct vfsmount *vfsmnt;
struct mount *mnt;
int error = 0;
unsigned seq, m_seq = 0;
char *bptr;
int blen;
rcu_read_lock();
restart_mnt:
read_seqbegin_or_lock(&mount_lock, &m_seq);
seq = 0;
rcu_read_lock();
restart:
bptr = *buffer;
blen = *buflen;
error = 0;
dentry = path->dentry;
vfsmnt = path->mnt;
mnt = real_mount(vfsmnt);
read_seqbegin_or_lock(&rename_lock, &seq);
while (dentry != root->dentry || vfsmnt != root->mnt) {
struct dentry * parent;
if (dentry == vfsmnt->mnt_root || IS_ROOT(dentry)) {
struct mount *parent = ACCESS_ONCE(mnt->mnt_parent);
/* Global root? */
if (mnt != parent) {
dentry = ACCESS_ONCE(mnt->mnt_mountpoint);
mnt = parent;
vfsmnt = &mnt->mnt;
continue;
}
if (!error)
error = is_mounted(vfsmnt) ? 1 : 2;
break;
}
parent = dentry->d_parent;
prefetch(parent);
error = prepend_name(&bptr, &blen, &dentry->d_name);
if (error)
break;
dentry = parent;
}
if (!(seq & 1))
rcu_read_unlock();
if (need_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq)) {
seq = 1;
goto restart;
}
done_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq);
if (!(m_seq & 1))
rcu_read_unlock();
if (need_seqretry(&mount_lock, m_seq)) {
m_seq = 1;
goto restart_mnt;
}
done_seqretry(&mount_lock, m_seq);
if (error >= 0 && bptr == *buffer) {
if (--blen < 0)
error = -ENAMETOOLONG;
else
*--bptr = '/';
}
*buffer = bptr;
*buflen = blen;
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: The prepend_path function in fs/dcache.c in the Linux kernel before 4.2.4 does not properly handle rename actions inside a bind mount, which allows local users to bypass an intended container protection mechanism by renaming a directory, related to a *double-chroot attack.*
Commit Message: dcache: Handle escaped paths in prepend_path
A rename can result in a dentry that by walking up d_parent
will never reach it's mnt_root. For lack of a better term
I call this an escaped path.
prepend_path is called by four different functions __d_path,
d_absolute_path, d_path, and getcwd.
__d_path only wants to see paths are connected to the root it passes
in. So __d_path needs prepend_path to return an error.
d_absolute_path similarly wants to see paths that are connected to
some root. Escaped paths are not connected to any mnt_root so
d_absolute_path needs prepend_path to return an error greater
than 1. So escaped paths will be treated like paths on lazily
unmounted mounts.
getcwd needs to prepend "(unreachable)" so getcwd also needs
prepend_path to return an error.
d_path is the interesting hold out. d_path just wants to print
something, and does not care about the weird cases. Which raises
the question what should be printed?
Given that <escaped_path>/<anything> should result in -ENOENT I
believe it is desirable for escaped paths to be printed as empty
paths. As there are not really any meaninful path components when
considered from the perspective of a mount tree.
So tweak prepend_path to return an empty path with an new error
code of 3 when it encounters an escaped path.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,926 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int append_multiple_key_values(smart_str* loc_name, HashTable* hash_arr, char* key_name TSRMLS_DC)
{
zval** ele_value = NULL;
int i = 0;
int isFirstSubtag = 0;
int max_value = 0;
/* Variant/ Extlang/Private etc. */
if( zend_hash_find( hash_arr , key_name , strlen(key_name) + 1 ,(void **)&ele_value ) == SUCCESS ) {
if( Z_TYPE_PP(ele_value) == IS_STRING ){
add_prefix( loc_name , key_name);
smart_str_appendl(loc_name, SEPARATOR , sizeof(SEPARATOR)-1);
smart_str_appendl(loc_name, Z_STRVAL_PP(ele_value) , Z_STRLEN_PP(ele_value));
return SUCCESS;
} else if(Z_TYPE_PP(ele_value) == IS_ARRAY ) {
HashPosition pos;
HashTable *arr = HASH_OF(*ele_value);
zval **data = NULL;
zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset_ex(arr, &pos);
while(zend_hash_get_current_data_ex(arr, (void **)&data, &pos) != FAILURE) {
if(Z_TYPE_PP(data) != IS_STRING) {
return FAILURE;
}
if (isFirstSubtag++ == 0){
add_prefix(loc_name , key_name);
}
smart_str_appendl(loc_name, SEPARATOR , sizeof(SEPARATOR)-1);
smart_str_appendl(loc_name, Z_STRVAL_PP(data) , Z_STRLEN_PP(data));
zend_hash_move_forward_ex(arr, &pos);
}
return SUCCESS;
} else {
return FAILURE;
}
} else {
char cur_key_name[31];
/* Decide the max_value: the max. no. of elements allowed */
if( strcmp(key_name , LOC_VARIANT_TAG) ==0 ){
max_value = MAX_NO_VARIANT;
}
if( strcmp(key_name , LOC_EXTLANG_TAG) ==0 ){
max_value = MAX_NO_EXTLANG;
}
if( strcmp(key_name , LOC_PRIVATE_TAG) ==0 ){
max_value = MAX_NO_PRIVATE;
}
/* Multiple variant values as variant0, variant1 ,variant2 */
isFirstSubtag = 0;
for( i=0 ; i< max_value; i++ ){
snprintf( cur_key_name , 30, "%s%d", key_name , i);
if( zend_hash_find( hash_arr , cur_key_name , strlen(cur_key_name) + 1,(void **)&ele_value ) == SUCCESS ){
if( Z_TYPE_PP(ele_value)!= IS_STRING ){
/* variant is not a string */
return FAILURE;
}
/* Add the contents */
if (isFirstSubtag++ == 0){
add_prefix(loc_name , cur_key_name);
}
smart_str_appendl(loc_name, SEPARATOR , sizeof(SEPARATOR)-1);
smart_str_appendl(loc_name, Z_STRVAL_PP(ele_value) , Z_STRLEN_PP(ele_value));
}
} /* end of for */
} /* end of else */
return SUCCESS;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The get_icu_value_internal function in ext/intl/locale/locale_methods.c in PHP before 5.5.36, 5.6.x before 5.6.22, and 7.x before 7.0.7 does not ensure the presence of a '0' character, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted locale_get_primary_language call.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read | High | 167,199 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void call_console_drivers(unsigned start, unsigned end)
{
unsigned cur_index, start_print;
static int msg_level = -1;
BUG_ON(((int)(start - end)) > 0);
cur_index = start;
start_print = start;
while (cur_index != end) {
if (msg_level < 0 && ((end - cur_index) > 2)) {
/* strip log prefix */
cur_index += log_prefix(&LOG_BUF(cur_index), &msg_level, NULL);
start_print = cur_index;
}
while (cur_index != end) {
char c = LOG_BUF(cur_index);
cur_index++;
if (c == '\n') {
if (msg_level < 0) {
/*
* printk() has already given us loglevel tags in
* the buffer. This code is here in case the
* log buffer has wrapped right round and scribbled
* on those tags
*/
msg_level = default_message_loglevel;
}
_call_console_drivers(start_print, cur_index, msg_level);
msg_level = -1;
start_print = cur_index;
break;
}
}
}
_call_console_drivers(start_print, end, msg_level);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The log_prefix function in kernel/printk.c in the Linux kernel 3.x before 3.4.33 does not properly remove a prefix string from a syslog header, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (buffer overflow and system crash) by leveraging /dev/kmsg write access and triggering a call_console_drivers function call.
Commit Message: printk: fix buffer overflow when calling log_prefix function from call_console_drivers
This patch corrects a buffer overflow in kernels from 3.0 to 3.4 when calling
log_prefix() function from call_console_drivers().
This bug existed in previous releases but has been revealed with commit
162a7e7500f9664636e649ba59defe541b7c2c60 (2.6.39 => 3.0) that made changes
about how to allocate memory for early printk buffer (use of memblock_alloc).
It disappears with commit 7ff9554bb578ba02166071d2d487b7fc7d860d62 (3.4 => 3.5)
that does a refactoring of printk buffer management.
In log_prefix(), the access to "p[0]", "p[1]", "p[2]" or
"simple_strtoul(&p[1], &endp, 10)" may cause a buffer overflow as this
function is called from call_console_drivers by passing "&LOG_BUF(cur_index)"
where the index must be masked to do not exceed the buffer's boundary.
The trick is to prepare in call_console_drivers() a buffer with the necessary
data (PRI field of syslog message) to be safely evaluated in log_prefix().
This patch can be applied to stable kernel branches 3.0.y, 3.2.y and 3.4.y.
Without this patch, one can freeze a server running this loop from shell :
$ export DUMMY=`cat /dev/urandom | tr -dc '12345AZERTYUIOPQSDFGHJKLMWXCVBNazertyuiopqsdfghjklmwxcvbn' | head -c255`
$ while true do ; echo $DUMMY > /dev/kmsg ; done
The "server freeze" depends on where memblock_alloc does allocate printk buffer :
if the buffer overflow is inside another kernel allocation the problem may not
be revealed, else the server may hangs up.
Signed-off-by: Alexandre SIMON <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,126 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: virtual void SetUp() {
old_browser_client_ = content::GetContentClient()->browser();
content::GetContentClient()->set_browser(&browser_client_);
url_util::AddStandardScheme(kPrivilegedScheme);
url_util::AddStandardScheme(chrome::kChromeUIScheme);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.46 does not use a dedicated process for the loading of links found on an internal page, which might allow attackers to bypass intended sandbox restrictions via a crafted page.
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,010 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void dump_completed_IO(struct inode * inode)
{
#ifdef EXT4_DEBUG
struct list_head *cur, *before, *after;
ext4_io_end_t *io, *io0, *io1;
if (list_empty(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_completed_io_list)){
ext4_debug("inode %lu completed_io list is empty\n", inode->i_ino);
return;
}
ext4_debug("Dump inode %lu completed_io list \n", inode->i_ino);
list_for_each_entry(io, &EXT4_I(inode)->i_completed_io_list, list){
cur = &io->list;
before = cur->prev;
io0 = container_of(before, ext4_io_end_t, list);
after = cur->next;
io1 = container_of(after, ext4_io_end_t, list);
ext4_debug("io 0x%p from inode %lu,prev 0x%p,next 0x%p\n",
io, inode->i_ino, io0, io1);
}
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The ext4 implementation in the Linux kernel before 2.6.34 does not properly track the initialization of certain data structures, which allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and panic) via a crafted USB device, related to the ext4_fill_super function.
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,539 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int ext4_end_io_nolock(ext4_io_end_t *io)
{
struct inode *inode = io->inode;
loff_t offset = io->offset;
ssize_t size = io->size;
int ret = 0;
ext4_debug("ext4_end_io_nolock: io 0x%p from inode %lu,list->next 0x%p,"
"list->prev 0x%p\n",
io, inode->i_ino, io->list.next, io->list.prev);
if (list_empty(&io->list))
return ret;
if (io->flag != EXT4_IO_UNWRITTEN)
return ret;
if (offset + size <= i_size_read(inode))
ret = ext4_convert_unwritten_extents(inode, offset, size);
if (ret < 0) {
printk(KERN_EMERG "%s: failed to convert unwritten"
"extents to written extents, error is %d"
" io is still on inode %lu aio dio list\n",
__func__, ret, inode->i_ino);
return ret;
}
/* clear the DIO AIO unwritten flag */
io->flag = 0;
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The ext4 implementation in the Linux kernel before 2.6.34 does not properly track the initialization of certain data structures, which allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and panic) via a crafted USB device, related to the ext4_fill_super function.
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,541 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: xsltParseStylesheetAttributeSet(xsltStylesheetPtr style, xmlNodePtr cur) {
const xmlChar *ncname;
const xmlChar *prefix;
xmlChar *value;
xmlNodePtr child;
xsltAttrElemPtr attrItems;
if ((cur == NULL) || (style == NULL) || (cur->type != XML_ELEMENT_NODE))
return;
value = xmlGetNsProp(cur, (const xmlChar *)"name", NULL);
if (value == NULL) {
xsltGenericError(xsltGenericErrorContext,
"xsl:attribute-set : name is missing\n");
return;
}
ncname = xsltSplitQName(style->dict, value, &prefix);
xmlFree(value);
value = NULL;
if (style->attributeSets == NULL) {
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_ATTRIBUTES
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"creating attribute set table\n");
#endif
style->attributeSets = xmlHashCreate(10);
}
if (style->attributeSets == NULL)
return;
attrItems = xmlHashLookup2(style->attributeSets, ncname, prefix);
/*
* Parse the content. Only xsl:attribute elements are allowed.
*/
child = cur->children;
while (child != NULL) {
/*
* Report invalid nodes.
*/
if ((child->type != XML_ELEMENT_NODE) ||
(child->ns == NULL) ||
(! IS_XSLT_ELEM(child)))
{
if (child->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE)
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, child,
"xsl:attribute-set : unexpected child %s\n",
child->name);
else
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, child,
"xsl:attribute-set : child of unexpected type\n");
} else if (!IS_XSLT_NAME(child, "attribute")) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, child,
"xsl:attribute-set : unexpected child xsl:%s\n",
child->name);
} else {
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
xsltAttrElemPtr nextAttr, curAttr;
/*
* Process xsl:attribute
* ---------------------
*/
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_ATTRIBUTES
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"add attribute to list %s\n", ncname);
#endif
/*
* The following was taken over from
* xsltAddAttrElemList().
*/
if (attrItems == NULL) {
attrItems = xsltNewAttrElem(child);
} else {
curAttr = attrItems;
while (curAttr != NULL) {
nextAttr = curAttr->next;
if (curAttr->attr == child) {
/*
* URGENT TODO: Can somebody explain
* why attrItems is set to curAttr
* here? Is this somehow related to
* avoidance of recursions?
*/
attrItems = curAttr;
goto next_child;
}
if (curAttr->next == NULL)
curAttr->next = xsltNewAttrElem(child);
curAttr = nextAttr;
}
}
/*
* Parse the xsl:attribute and its content.
*/
xsltParseAnyXSLTElem(XSLT_CCTXT(style), child);
#else
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_ATTRIBUTES
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"add attribute to list %s\n", ncname);
#endif
/*
* OLD behaviour:
*/
attrItems = xsltAddAttrElemList(attrItems, child);
#endif
}
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
next_child:
#endif
child = child->next;
}
/*
* Process attribue "use-attribute-sets".
*/
/* TODO check recursion */
value = xmlGetNsProp(cur, (const xmlChar *)"use-attribute-sets",
NULL);
if (value != NULL) {
const xmlChar *curval, *endval;
curval = value;
while (*curval != 0) {
while (IS_BLANK(*curval)) curval++;
if (*curval == 0)
break;
endval = curval;
while ((*endval != 0) && (!IS_BLANK(*endval))) endval++;
curval = xmlDictLookup(style->dict, curval, endval - curval);
if (curval) {
const xmlChar *ncname2 = NULL;
const xmlChar *prefix2 = NULL;
xsltAttrElemPtr refAttrItems;
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_ATTRIBUTES
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsl:attribute-set : %s adds use %s\n", ncname, curval);
#endif
ncname2 = xsltSplitQName(style->dict, curval, &prefix2);
refAttrItems = xsltNewAttrElem(NULL);
if (refAttrItems != NULL) {
refAttrItems->set = ncname2;
refAttrItems->ns = prefix2;
attrItems = xsltMergeAttrElemList(style,
attrItems, refAttrItems);
xsltFreeAttrElem(refAttrItems);
}
}
curval = endval;
}
xmlFree(value);
value = NULL;
}
/*
* Update the value
*/
/*
* TODO: Why is this dummy entry needed.?
*/
if (attrItems == NULL)
attrItems = xsltNewAttrElem(NULL);
xmlHashUpdateEntry2(style->attributeSets, ncname, prefix, attrItems, NULL);
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_ATTRIBUTES
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"updated attribute list %s\n", ncname);
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: numbers.c in libxslt before 1.1.29, as used in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63, mishandles namespace nodes, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds heap memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338} | Medium | 173,298 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
{
unsigned char wire[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH];
unsigned long len, frag_off, frag_len;
int i,al;
struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
/* see if we have the required fragment already */
if ((frag_len = dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s,max,ok)) || *ok)
{
return frag_len;
}
/* read handshake message header */
i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,wire,
DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, 0);
if (i <= 0) /* nbio, or an error */
{
s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
*ok = 0;
return i;
}
/* Handshake fails if message header is incomplete */
if (i != DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
/* parse the message fragment header */
dtls1_get_message_header(wire, &msg_hdr);
/*
* if this is a future (or stale) message it gets buffered
* (or dropped)--no further processing at this time
* While listening, we accept seq 1 (ClientHello with cookie)
* although we're still expecting seq 0 (ClientHello)
*/
if (msg_hdr.seq != s->d1->handshake_read_seq && !(s->d1->listen && msg_hdr.seq == 1))
return dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(s, &msg_hdr, ok);
len = msg_hdr.msg_len;
frag_off = msg_hdr.frag_off;
frag_len = msg_hdr.frag_len;
if (frag_len && frag_len < len)
return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, &msg_hdr, ok);
if (!s->server && s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0 &&
wire[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
{
/* The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
* we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them
* if their format is correct. Does not count for
* 'Finished' MAC. */
if (wire[1] == 0 && wire[2] == 0 && wire[3] == 0)
{
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
wire, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
s->msg_callback_arg);
s->msg_callback_arg);
s->init_num = 0;
return dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn,
max, ok);
}
else /* Incorrectly formated Hello request */
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
}
if ((al=dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s,&msg_hdr,max)))
goto f_err;
/* XDTLS: ressurect this when restart is in place */
s->state=stn;
if ( frag_len > 0)
{
unsigned char *p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
&p[frag_off],frag_len,0);
/* XDTLS: fix this--message fragments cannot span multiple packets */
if (i <= 0)
{
s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
*ok = 0;
return i;
}
}
else
i = 0;
/* XDTLS: an incorrectly formatted fragment should cause the
* handshake to fail */
if (i != (int)frag_len)
{
al=SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
goto f_err;
}
*ok = 1;
/* Note that s->init_num is *not* used as current offset in
* s->init_buf->data, but as a counter summing up fragments'
* lengths: as soon as they sum up to handshake packet
* length, we assume we have got all the fragments. */
s->init_num = frag_len;
return frag_len;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
s->init_num = 0;
*ok=0;
return(-1);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The dtls1_get_message_fragment function in d1_both.c in OpenSSL before 0.9.8za, 1.0.0 before 1.0.0m, and 1.0.1 before 1.0.1h allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (recursion and client crash) via a DTLS hello message in an invalid DTLS handshake.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,282 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static long vfio_pci_ioctl(void *device_data,
unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct vfio_pci_device *vdev = device_data;
unsigned long minsz;
if (cmd == VFIO_DEVICE_GET_INFO) {
struct vfio_device_info info;
minsz = offsetofend(struct vfio_device_info, num_irqs);
if (copy_from_user(&info, (void __user *)arg, minsz))
return -EFAULT;
if (info.argsz < minsz)
return -EINVAL;
info.flags = VFIO_DEVICE_FLAGS_PCI;
if (vdev->reset_works)
info.flags |= VFIO_DEVICE_FLAGS_RESET;
info.num_regions = VFIO_PCI_NUM_REGIONS + vdev->num_regions;
info.num_irqs = VFIO_PCI_NUM_IRQS;
return copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, &info, minsz) ?
-EFAULT : 0;
} else if (cmd == VFIO_DEVICE_GET_REGION_INFO) {
struct pci_dev *pdev = vdev->pdev;
struct vfio_region_info info;
struct vfio_info_cap caps = { .buf = NULL, .size = 0 };
int i, ret;
minsz = offsetofend(struct vfio_region_info, offset);
if (copy_from_user(&info, (void __user *)arg, minsz))
return -EFAULT;
if (info.argsz < minsz)
return -EINVAL;
switch (info.index) {
case VFIO_PCI_CONFIG_REGION_INDEX:
info.offset = VFIO_PCI_INDEX_TO_OFFSET(info.index);
info.size = pdev->cfg_size;
info.flags = VFIO_REGION_INFO_FLAG_READ |
VFIO_REGION_INFO_FLAG_WRITE;
break;
case VFIO_PCI_BAR0_REGION_INDEX ... VFIO_PCI_BAR5_REGION_INDEX:
info.offset = VFIO_PCI_INDEX_TO_OFFSET(info.index);
info.size = pci_resource_len(pdev, info.index);
if (!info.size) {
info.flags = 0;
break;
}
info.flags = VFIO_REGION_INFO_FLAG_READ |
VFIO_REGION_INFO_FLAG_WRITE;
if (vdev->bar_mmap_supported[info.index]) {
info.flags |= VFIO_REGION_INFO_FLAG_MMAP;
if (info.index == vdev->msix_bar) {
ret = msix_sparse_mmap_cap(vdev, &caps);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
}
break;
case VFIO_PCI_ROM_REGION_INDEX:
{
void __iomem *io;
size_t size;
info.offset = VFIO_PCI_INDEX_TO_OFFSET(info.index);
info.flags = 0;
/* Report the BAR size, not the ROM size */
info.size = pci_resource_len(pdev, info.index);
if (!info.size) {
/* Shadow ROMs appear as PCI option ROMs */
if (pdev->resource[PCI_ROM_RESOURCE].flags &
IORESOURCE_ROM_SHADOW)
info.size = 0x20000;
else
break;
}
/* Is it really there? */
io = pci_map_rom(pdev, &size);
if (!io || !size) {
info.size = 0;
break;
}
pci_unmap_rom(pdev, io);
info.flags = VFIO_REGION_INFO_FLAG_READ;
break;
}
case VFIO_PCI_VGA_REGION_INDEX:
if (!vdev->has_vga)
return -EINVAL;
info.offset = VFIO_PCI_INDEX_TO_OFFSET(info.index);
info.size = 0xc0000;
info.flags = VFIO_REGION_INFO_FLAG_READ |
VFIO_REGION_INFO_FLAG_WRITE;
break;
default:
if (info.index >=
VFIO_PCI_NUM_REGIONS + vdev->num_regions)
return -EINVAL;
i = info.index - VFIO_PCI_NUM_REGIONS;
info.offset = VFIO_PCI_INDEX_TO_OFFSET(info.index);
info.size = vdev->region[i].size;
info.flags = vdev->region[i].flags;
ret = region_type_cap(vdev, &caps,
vdev->region[i].type,
vdev->region[i].subtype);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
if (caps.size) {
info.flags |= VFIO_REGION_INFO_FLAG_CAPS;
if (info.argsz < sizeof(info) + caps.size) {
info.argsz = sizeof(info) + caps.size;
info.cap_offset = 0;
} else {
vfio_info_cap_shift(&caps, sizeof(info));
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg +
sizeof(info), caps.buf,
caps.size)) {
kfree(caps.buf);
return -EFAULT;
}
info.cap_offset = sizeof(info);
}
kfree(caps.buf);
}
return copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, &info, minsz) ?
-EFAULT : 0;
} else if (cmd == VFIO_DEVICE_GET_IRQ_INFO) {
struct vfio_irq_info info;
minsz = offsetofend(struct vfio_irq_info, count);
if (copy_from_user(&info, (void __user *)arg, minsz))
return -EFAULT;
if (info.argsz < minsz || info.index >= VFIO_PCI_NUM_IRQS)
return -EINVAL;
switch (info.index) {
case VFIO_PCI_INTX_IRQ_INDEX ... VFIO_PCI_MSIX_IRQ_INDEX:
case VFIO_PCI_REQ_IRQ_INDEX:
break;
case VFIO_PCI_ERR_IRQ_INDEX:
if (pci_is_pcie(vdev->pdev))
break;
/* pass thru to return error */
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
info.flags = VFIO_IRQ_INFO_EVENTFD;
info.count = vfio_pci_get_irq_count(vdev, info.index);
if (info.index == VFIO_PCI_INTX_IRQ_INDEX)
info.flags |= (VFIO_IRQ_INFO_MASKABLE |
VFIO_IRQ_INFO_AUTOMASKED);
else
info.flags |= VFIO_IRQ_INFO_NORESIZE;
return copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, &info, minsz) ?
-EFAULT : 0;
} else if (cmd == VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS) {
struct vfio_irq_set hdr;
u8 *data = NULL;
int ret = 0;
minsz = offsetofend(struct vfio_irq_set, count);
if (copy_from_user(&hdr, (void __user *)arg, minsz))
return -EFAULT;
if (hdr.argsz < minsz || hdr.index >= VFIO_PCI_NUM_IRQS ||
hdr.flags & ~(VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_TYPE_MASK |
VFIO_IRQ_SET_ACTION_TYPE_MASK))
return -EINVAL;
if (!(hdr.flags & VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_NONE)) {
size_t size;
int max = vfio_pci_get_irq_count(vdev, hdr.index);
if (hdr.flags & VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_BOOL)
size = sizeof(uint8_t);
else if (hdr.flags & VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_EVENTFD)
size = sizeof(int32_t);
else
return -EINVAL;
if (hdr.argsz - minsz < hdr.count * size ||
hdr.start >= max || hdr.start + hdr.count > max)
return -EINVAL;
data = memdup_user((void __user *)(arg + minsz),
hdr.count * size);
if (IS_ERR(data))
return PTR_ERR(data);
}
mutex_lock(&vdev->igate);
ret = vfio_pci_set_irqs_ioctl(vdev, hdr.flags, hdr.index,
hdr.start, hdr.count, data);
mutex_unlock(&vdev->igate);
kfree(data);
return ret;
} else if (cmd == VFIO_DEVICE_RESET) {
return vdev->reset_works ?
pci_try_reset_function(vdev->pdev) : -EINVAL;
} else if (cmd == VFIO_DEVICE_GET_PCI_HOT_RESET_INFO) {
struct vfio_pci_hot_reset_info hdr;
struct vfio_pci_fill_info fill = { 0 };
struct vfio_pci_dependent_device *devices = NULL;
bool slot = false;
int ret = 0;
minsz = offsetofend(struct vfio_pci_hot_reset_info, count);
if (copy_from_user(&hdr, (void __user *)arg, minsz))
return -EFAULT;
if (hdr.argsz < minsz)
return -EINVAL;
hdr.flags = 0;
/* Can we do a slot or bus reset or neither? */
if (!pci_probe_reset_slot(vdev->pdev->slot))
slot = true;
else if (pci_probe_reset_bus(vdev->pdev->bus))
return -ENODEV;
/* How many devices are affected? */
ret = vfio_pci_for_each_slot_or_bus(vdev->pdev,
vfio_pci_count_devs,
&fill.max, slot);
if (ret)
return ret;
WARN_ON(!fill.max); /* Should always be at least one */
/*
* If there's enough space, fill it now, otherwise return
* -ENOSPC and the number of devices affected.
*/
if (hdr.argsz < sizeof(hdr) + (fill.max * sizeof(*devices))) {
ret = -ENOSPC;
hdr.count = fill.max;
goto reset_info_exit;
}
devices = kcalloc(fill.max, sizeof(*devices), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!devices)
return -ENOMEM;
fill.devices = devices;
ret = vfio_pci_for_each_slot_or_bus(vdev->pdev,
vfio_pci_fill_devs,
&fill, slot);
/*
* If a device was removed between counting and filling,
* we may come up short of fill.max. If a device was
* added, we'll have a return of -EAGAIN above.
*/
if (!ret)
hdr.count = fill.cur;
reset_info_exit:
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, &hdr, minsz))
ret = -EFAULT;
if (!ret) {
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(arg + minsz), devices,
hdr.count * sizeof(*devices)))
ret = -EFAULT;
}
kfree(devices);
return ret;
} else if (cmd == VFIO_DEVICE_PCI_HOT_RESET) {
struct vfio_pci_hot_reset hdr;
int32_t *group_fds;
struct vfio_pci_group_entry *groups;
struct vfio_pci_group_info info;
bool slot = false;
int i, count = 0, ret = 0;
minsz = offsetofend(struct vfio_pci_hot_reset, count);
if (copy_from_user(&hdr, (void __user *)arg, minsz))
return -EFAULT;
if (hdr.argsz < minsz || hdr.flags)
return -EINVAL;
/* Can we do a slot or bus reset or neither? */
if (!pci_probe_reset_slot(vdev->pdev->slot))
slot = true;
else if (pci_probe_reset_bus(vdev->pdev->bus))
return -ENODEV;
/*
* We can't let userspace give us an arbitrarily large
* buffer to copy, so verify how many we think there
* could be. Note groups can have multiple devices so
* one group per device is the max.
*/
ret = vfio_pci_for_each_slot_or_bus(vdev->pdev,
vfio_pci_count_devs,
&count, slot);
if (ret)
return ret;
/* Somewhere between 1 and count is OK */
if (!hdr.count || hdr.count > count)
return -EINVAL;
group_fds = kcalloc(hdr.count, sizeof(*group_fds), GFP_KERNEL);
groups = kcalloc(hdr.count, sizeof(*groups), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!group_fds || !groups) {
kfree(group_fds);
kfree(groups);
return -ENOMEM;
}
if (copy_from_user(group_fds, (void __user *)(arg + minsz),
hdr.count * sizeof(*group_fds))) {
kfree(group_fds);
kfree(groups);
return -EFAULT;
}
/*
* For each group_fd, get the group through the vfio external
* user interface and store the group and iommu ID. This
* ensures the group is held across the reset.
*/
for (i = 0; i < hdr.count; i++) {
struct vfio_group *group;
struct fd f = fdget(group_fds[i]);
if (!f.file) {
ret = -EBADF;
break;
}
group = vfio_group_get_external_user(f.file);
fdput(f);
if (IS_ERR(group)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(group);
break;
}
groups[i].group = group;
groups[i].id = vfio_external_user_iommu_id(group);
}
kfree(group_fds);
/* release reference to groups on error */
if (ret)
goto hot_reset_release;
info.count = hdr.count;
info.groups = groups;
/*
* Test whether all the affected devices are contained
* by the set of groups provided by the user.
*/
ret = vfio_pci_for_each_slot_or_bus(vdev->pdev,
vfio_pci_validate_devs,
&info, slot);
if (!ret)
/* User has access, do the reset */
ret = slot ? pci_try_reset_slot(vdev->pdev->slot) :
pci_try_reset_bus(vdev->pdev->bus);
hot_reset_release:
for (i--; i >= 0; i--)
vfio_group_put_external_user(groups[i].group);
kfree(groups);
return ret;
}
return -ENOTTY;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_intrs.c in the Linux kernel through 4.8.11 misuses the kzalloc function, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (integer overflow) or have unspecified other impact by leveraging access to a vfio PCI device file.
Commit Message: vfio/pci: Fix integer overflows, bitmask check
The VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS ioctl did not sufficiently sanitize
user-supplied integers, potentially allowing memory corruption. This
patch adds appropriate integer overflow checks, checks the range bounds
for VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_NONE, and also verifies that only single element
in the VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_TYPE_MASK bitmask is set.
VFIO_IRQ_SET_ACTION_TYPE_MASK is already correctly checked later in
vfio_pci_set_irqs_ioctl().
Furthermore, a kzalloc is changed to a kcalloc because the use of a
kzalloc with an integer multiplication allowed an integer overflow
condition to be reached without this patch. kcalloc checks for overflow
and should prevent a similar occurrence.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Tsyrklevich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,900 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: sp<VBRISeeker> VBRISeeker::CreateFromSource(
const sp<DataSource> &source, off64_t post_id3_pos) {
off64_t pos = post_id3_pos;
uint8_t header[4];
ssize_t n = source->readAt(pos, header, sizeof(header));
if (n < (ssize_t)sizeof(header)) {
return NULL;
}
uint32_t tmp = U32_AT(&header[0]);
size_t frameSize;
int sampleRate;
if (!GetMPEGAudioFrameSize(tmp, &frameSize, &sampleRate)) {
return NULL;
}
pos += sizeof(header) + 32;
uint8_t vbriHeader[26];
n = source->readAt(pos, vbriHeader, sizeof(vbriHeader));
if (n < (ssize_t)sizeof(vbriHeader)) {
return NULL;
}
if (memcmp(vbriHeader, "VBRI", 4)) {
return NULL;
}
size_t numFrames = U32_AT(&vbriHeader[14]);
int64_t durationUs =
numFrames * 1000000ll * (sampleRate >= 32000 ? 1152 : 576) / sampleRate;
ALOGV("duration = %.2f secs", durationUs / 1E6);
size_t numEntries = U16_AT(&vbriHeader[18]);
size_t entrySize = U16_AT(&vbriHeader[22]);
size_t scale = U16_AT(&vbriHeader[20]);
ALOGV("%zu entries, scale=%zu, size_per_entry=%zu",
numEntries,
scale,
entrySize);
size_t totalEntrySize = numEntries * entrySize;
uint8_t *buffer = new uint8_t[totalEntrySize];
n = source->readAt(pos + sizeof(vbriHeader), buffer, totalEntrySize);
if (n < (ssize_t)totalEntrySize) {
delete[] buffer;
buffer = NULL;
return NULL;
}
sp<VBRISeeker> seeker = new VBRISeeker;
seeker->mBasePos = post_id3_pos + frameSize;
if (durationUs) {
seeker->mDurationUs = durationUs;
}
off64_t offset = post_id3_pos;
for (size_t i = 0; i < numEntries; ++i) {
uint32_t numBytes;
switch (entrySize) {
case 1: numBytes = buffer[i]; break;
case 2: numBytes = U16_AT(buffer + 2 * i); break;
case 3: numBytes = U24_AT(buffer + 3 * i); break;
default:
{
CHECK_EQ(entrySize, 4u);
numBytes = U32_AT(buffer + 4 * i); break;
}
}
numBytes *= scale;
seeker->mSegments.push(numBytes);
ALOGV("entry #%zu: %u offset %#016llx", i, numBytes, (long long)offset);
offset += numBytes;
}
delete[] buffer;
buffer = NULL;
ALOGI("Found VBRI header.");
return seeker;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: A denial of service vulnerability in VBRISeeker.cpp in libstagefright in Mediaserver could enable a remote attacker to use a specially crafted file to cause a device hang or reboot. This issue is rated as High due to the possibility of remote denial of service. Product: Android. Versions: 4.4.4, 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1. Android ID: A-32577290.
Commit Message: Make VBRISeeker more robust
Bug: 32577290
Change-Id: I9bcc9422ae7dd3ae4a38df330c9dcd7ac4941ec8
(cherry picked from commit 7fdd36418e945cf6a500018632dfb0ed8cb1a343)
| High | 174,069 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void buf_to_pages(const void *buf, size_t buflen,
struct page **pages, unsigned int *pgbase)
{
const void *p = buf;
*pgbase = offset_in_page(buf);
p -= *pgbase;
while (p < buf + buflen) {
*(pages++) = virt_to_page(p);
p += PAGE_CACHE_SIZE;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The NFSv4 implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.2.2 does not properly handle bitmap sizes in GETACL replies, which allows remote NFS servers to cause a denial of service (OOPS) by sending an excessive number of bitmap words.
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,717 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int dns_parse_callback(void *c, int rr, const void *data, int len, const void *packet)
{
char tmp[256];
struct dpc_ctx *ctx = c;
switch (rr) {
case RR_A:
if (len != 4) return -1;
ctx->addrs[ctx->cnt].scopeid = 0;
memcpy(ctx->addrs[ctx->cnt++].addr, data, 4);
break;
case RR_AAAA:
if (len != 16) return -1;
ctx->addrs[ctx->cnt].family = AF_INET6;
ctx->addrs[ctx->cnt].scopeid = 0;
memcpy(ctx->addrs[ctx->cnt++].addr, data, 16);
break;
case RR_CNAME:
if (__dn_expand(packet, (const unsigned char *)packet + 512,
data, tmp, sizeof tmp) > 0 && is_valid_hostname(tmp))
strcpy(ctx->canon, tmp);
break;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: musl libc before 1.1.17 has a buffer overflow via crafted DNS replies because dns_parse_callback in network/lookup_name.c does not restrict the number of addresses, and thus an attacker can provide an unexpected number by sending A records in a reply to an AAAA query.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,652 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: get_pols_2_svc(gpols_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static gpols_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_gpols_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
prime_arg = arg->exp;
if (prime_arg == NULL)
prime_arg = "*";
if (CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp) || !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context,
rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_LIST, NULL, NULL)) {
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_LIST;
log_unauth("kadm5_get_policies", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_get_policies((void *)handle,
arg->exp, &ret.pols,
&ret.count);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_get_policies", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple memory leaks in kadmin/server/server_stubs.c in kadmind in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.13.4 and 1.14.x before 1.14.1 allow remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via a request specifying a NULL principal name.
Commit Message: Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]
In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler. Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails. Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails. Discovered by Simo Sorce.
CVE-2015-8631:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one. Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup | Medium | 167,514 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: raptor_turtle_writer_get_option(raptor_turtle_writer *turtle_writer,
raptor_option option)
{
int result = -1;
switch(option) {
case RAPTOR_OPTION_WRITER_AUTO_INDENT:
result = TURTLE_WRITER_AUTO_INDENT(turtle_writer);
break;
case RAPTOR_OPTION_WRITER_INDENT_WIDTH:
result = turtle_writer->indent;
break;
/* writer options */
case RAPTOR_OPTION_WRITER_AUTO_EMPTY:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_WRITER_XML_VERSION:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_WRITER_XML_DECLARATION:
/* parser options */
case RAPTOR_OPTION_SCANNING:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_ALLOW_NON_NS_ATTRIBUTES:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_ALLOW_OTHER_PARSETYPES:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_ALLOW_BAGID:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_ALLOW_RDF_TYPE_RDF_LIST:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_NORMALIZE_LANGUAGE:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_NON_NFC_FATAL:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_WARN_OTHER_PARSETYPES:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_CHECK_RDF_ID:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_HTML_TAG_SOUP:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_MICROFORMATS:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_HTML_LINK:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_WWW_TIMEOUT:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_STRICT:
/* Shared */
case RAPTOR_OPTION_NO_NET:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_NO_FILE:
/* XML writer options */
case RAPTOR_OPTION_RELATIVE_URIS:
/* DOT serializer options */
case RAPTOR_OPTION_RESOURCE_BORDER:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_LITERAL_BORDER:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_BNODE_BORDER:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_RESOURCE_FILL:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_LITERAL_FILL:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_BNODE_FILL:
/* JSON serializer options */
case RAPTOR_OPTION_JSON_CALLBACK:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_JSON_EXTRA_DATA:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_RSS_TRIPLES:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_ATOM_ENTRY_URI:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_PREFIX_ELEMENTS:
/* Turtle serializer option */
case RAPTOR_OPTION_WRITE_BASE_URI:
/* WWW option */
case RAPTOR_OPTION_WWW_HTTP_CACHE_CONTROL:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_WWW_HTTP_USER_AGENT:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_WWW_CERT_FILENAME:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_WWW_CERT_TYPE:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_WWW_CERT_PASSPHRASE:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_WWW_SSL_VERIFY_PEER:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_WWW_SSL_VERIFY_HOST:
default:
break;
}
return result;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Redland Raptor (aka libraptor) before 2.0.7, as used by OpenOffice 3.3 and 3.4 Beta, LibreOffice before 3.4.6 and 3.5.x before 3.5.1, and other products, allows user-assisted remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a crafted XML external entity (XXE) declaration and reference in an RDF document.
Commit Message: CVE-2012-0037
Enforce entity loading policy in raptor_libxml_resolveEntity
and raptor_libxml_getEntity by checking for file URIs and network URIs.
Add RAPTOR_OPTION_LOAD_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES / loadExternalEntities for
turning on loading of XML external entity loading, disabled by default.
This affects all the parsers that use SAX2: rdfxml, rss-tag-soup (and
aliases) and rdfa. | Medium | 165,662 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: l2tp_msgtype_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat)
{
const uint16_t *ptr = (const uint16_t *)dat;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(l2tp_msgtype2str, "MSGTYPE-#%u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr))));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The L2TP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-l2tp.c, several functions.
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13006/L2TP: Check whether an AVP's content exceeds the AVP length.
It's not good enough to check whether all the data specified by the AVP
length was captured - you also have to check whether that length is
large enough for all the required data in the AVP.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Yannick Formaggio.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | High | 167,896 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: status_t GraphicBuffer::unflatten(
void const*& buffer, size_t& size, int const*& fds, size_t& count) {
if (size < 8*sizeof(int)) return NO_MEMORY;
int const* buf = static_cast<int const*>(buffer);
if (buf[0] != 'GBFR') return BAD_TYPE;
const size_t numFds = buf[8];
const size_t numInts = buf[9];
const size_t sizeNeeded = (10 + numInts) * sizeof(int);
if (size < sizeNeeded) return NO_MEMORY;
size_t fdCountNeeded = 0;
if (count < fdCountNeeded) return NO_MEMORY;
if (handle) {
free_handle();
}
if (numFds || numInts) {
width = buf[1];
height = buf[2];
stride = buf[3];
format = buf[4];
usage = buf[5];
native_handle* h = native_handle_create(numFds, numInts);
memcpy(h->data, fds, numFds*sizeof(int));
memcpy(h->data + numFds, &buf[10], numInts*sizeof(int));
handle = h;
} else {
width = height = stride = format = usage = 0;
handle = NULL;
}
mId = static_cast<uint64_t>(buf[6]) << 32;
mId |= static_cast<uint32_t>(buf[7]);
mOwner = ownHandle;
if (handle != 0) {
status_t err = mBufferMapper.registerBuffer(handle);
if (err != NO_ERROR) {
width = height = stride = format = usage = 0;
handle = NULL;
ALOGE("unflatten: registerBuffer failed: %s (%d)",
strerror(-err), err);
return err;
}
}
buffer = reinterpret_cast<void const*>(static_cast<int const*>(buffer) + sizeNeeded);
size -= sizeNeeded;
fds += numFds;
count -= numFds;
return NO_ERROR;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow +Priv Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in the GraphicBuffer::unflatten function in platform/frameworks/native/libs/ui/GraphicBuffer.cpp in Android through 5.0 allow attackers to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via vectors that trigger a large number of (1) file descriptors or (2) integer values.
Commit Message: Fix for corruption when numFds or numInts is too large.
Bug: 18076253
Change-Id: I4c5935440013fc755e1d123049290383f4659fb6
(cherry picked from commit dfd06b89a4b77fc75eb85a3c1c700da3621c0118)
| High | 173,374 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void Browser::TabDetachedAtImpl(TabContents* contents, int index,
DetachType type) {
if (type == DETACH_TYPE_DETACH) {
if (contents == chrome::GetActiveTabContents(this)) {
LocationBar* location_bar = window()->GetLocationBar();
if (location_bar)
location_bar->SaveStateToContents(contents->web_contents());
}
if (!tab_strip_model_->closing_all())
SyncHistoryWithTabs(0);
}
SetAsDelegate(contents->web_contents(), NULL);
RemoveScheduledUpdatesFor(contents->web_contents());
if (find_bar_controller_.get() && index == active_index()) {
find_bar_controller_->ChangeWebContents(NULL);
}
search_delegate_->OnTabDetached(contents->web_contents());
registrar_.Remove(this, content::NOTIFICATION_INTERSTITIAL_ATTACHED,
content::Source<WebContents>(contents->web_contents()));
registrar_.Remove(this, content::NOTIFICATION_INTERSTITIAL_DETACHED,
content::Source<WebContents>(contents->web_contents()));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The hyphenation functionality in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 does not properly validate file names, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,508 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int copy_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *dst_state,
const struct bpf_verifier_state *src)
{
struct bpf_func_state *dst;
int i, err;
/* if dst has more stack frames then src frame, free them */
for (i = src->curframe + 1; i <= dst_state->curframe; i++) {
free_func_state(dst_state->frame[i]);
dst_state->frame[i] = NULL;
}
dst_state->curframe = src->curframe;
for (i = 0; i <= src->curframe; i++) {
dst = dst_state->frame[i];
if (!dst) {
dst = kzalloc(sizeof(*dst), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dst)
return -ENOMEM;
dst_state->frame[i] = dst;
}
err = copy_func_state(dst, src->frame[i]);
if (err)
return err;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: kernel/bpf/verifier.c in the Linux kernel before 4.20.6 performs undesirable out-of-bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic in various cases, including cases of different branches with different state or limits to sanitize, leading to side-channel attacks.
Commit Message: bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic
Jann reported that the original commit back in b2157399cc98
("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") was not sufficient
to stop CPU from speculating out of bounds memory access:
While b2157399cc98 only focussed on masking array map access
for unprivileged users for tail calls and data access such
that the user provided index gets sanitized from BPF program
and syscall side, there is still a more generic form affected
from BPF programs that applies to most maps that hold user
data in relation to dynamic map access when dealing with
unknown scalars or "slow" known scalars as access offset, for
example:
- Load a map value pointer into R6
- Load an index into R7
- Do a slow computation (e.g. with a memory dependency) that
loads a limit into R8 (e.g. load the limit from a map for
high latency, then mask it to make the verifier happy)
- Exit if R7 >= R8 (mispredicted branch)
- Load R0 = R6[R7]
- Load R0 = R6[R0]
For unknown scalars there are two options in the BPF verifier
where we could derive knowledge from in order to guarantee
safe access to the memory: i) While </>/<=/>= variants won't
allow to derive any lower or upper bounds from the unknown
scalar where it would be safe to add it to the map value
pointer, it is possible through ==/!= test however. ii) another
option is to transform the unknown scalar into a known scalar,
for example, through ALU ops combination such as R &= <imm>
followed by R |= <imm> or any similar combination where the
original information from the unknown scalar would be destroyed
entirely leaving R with a constant. The initial slow load still
precedes the latter ALU ops on that register, so the CPU
executes speculatively from that point. Once we have the known
scalar, any compare operation would work then. A third option
only involving registers with known scalars could be crafted
as described in [0] where a CPU port (e.g. Slow Int unit)
would be filled with many dependent computations such that
the subsequent condition depending on its outcome has to wait
for evaluation on its execution port and thereby executing
speculatively if the speculated code can be scheduled on a
different execution port, or any other form of mistraining
as described in [1], for example. Given this is not limited
to only unknown scalars, not only map but also stack access
is affected since both is accessible for unprivileged users
and could potentially be used for out of bounds access under
speculation.
In order to prevent any of these cases, the verifier is now
sanitizing pointer arithmetic on the offset such that any
out of bounds speculation would be masked in a way where the
pointer arithmetic result in the destination register will
stay unchanged, meaning offset masked into zero similar as
in array_index_nospec() case. With regards to implementation,
there are three options that were considered: i) new insn
for sanitation, ii) push/pop insn and sanitation as inlined
BPF, iii) reuse of ax register and sanitation as inlined BPF.
Option i) has the downside that we end up using from reserved
bits in the opcode space, but also that we would require
each JIT to emit masking as native arch opcodes meaning
mitigation would have slow adoption till everyone implements
it eventually which is counter-productive. Option ii) and iii)
have both in common that a temporary register is needed in
order to implement the sanitation as inlined BPF since we
are not allowed to modify the source register. While a push /
pop insn in ii) would be useful to have in any case, it
requires once again that every JIT needs to implement it
first. While possible, amount of changes needed would also
be unsuitable for a -stable patch. Therefore, the path which
has fewer changes, less BPF instructions for the mitigation
and does not require anything to be changed in the JITs is
option iii) which this work is pursuing. The ax register is
already mapped to a register in all JITs (modulo arm32 where
it's mapped to stack as various other BPF registers there)
and used in constant blinding for JITs-only so far. It can
be reused for verifier rewrites under certain constraints.
The interpreter's tmp "register" has therefore been remapped
into extending the register set with hidden ax register and
reusing that for a number of instructions that needed the
prior temporary variable internally (e.g. div, mod). This
allows for zero increase in stack space usage in the interpreter,
and enables (restricted) generic use in rewrites otherwise as
long as such a patchlet does not make use of these instructions.
The sanitation mask is dynamic and relative to the offset the
map value or stack pointer currently holds.
There are various cases that need to be taken under consideration
for the masking, e.g. such operation could look as follows:
ptr += val or val += ptr or ptr -= val. Thus, the value to be
sanitized could reside either in source or in destination
register, and the limit is different depending on whether
the ALU op is addition or subtraction and depending on the
current known and bounded offset. The limit is derived as
follows: limit := max_value_size - (smin_value + off). For
subtraction: limit := umax_value + off. This holds because
we do not allow any pointer arithmetic that would
temporarily go out of bounds or would have an unknown
value with mixed signed bounds where it is unclear at
verification time whether the actual runtime value would
be either negative or positive. For example, we have a
derived map pointer value with constant offset and bounded
one, so limit based on smin_value works because the verifier
requires that statically analyzed arithmetic on the pointer
must be in bounds, and thus it checks if resulting
smin_value + off and umax_value + off is still within map
value bounds at time of arithmetic in addition to time of
access. Similarly, for the case of stack access we derive
the limit as follows: MAX_BPF_STACK + off for subtraction
and -off for the case of addition where off := ptr_reg->off +
ptr_reg->var_off.value. Subtraction is a special case for
the masking which can be in form of ptr += -val, ptr -= -val,
or ptr -= val. In the first two cases where we know that
the value is negative, we need to temporarily negate the
value in order to do the sanitation on a positive value
where we later swap the ALU op, and restore original source
register if the value was in source.
The sanitation of pointer arithmetic alone is still not fully
sufficient as is, since a scenario like the following could
happen ...
PTR += 0x1000 (e.g. K-based imm)
PTR -= BIG_NUMBER_WITH_SLOW_COMPARISON
PTR += 0x1000
PTR -= BIG_NUMBER_WITH_SLOW_COMPARISON
[...]
... which under speculation could end up as ...
PTR += 0x1000
PTR -= 0 [ truncated by mitigation ]
PTR += 0x1000
PTR -= 0 [ truncated by mitigation ]
[...]
... and therefore still access out of bounds. To prevent such
case, the verifier is also analyzing safety for potential out
of bounds access under speculative execution. Meaning, it is
also simulating pointer access under truncation. We therefore
"branch off" and push the current verification state after the
ALU operation with known 0 to the verification stack for later
analysis. Given the current path analysis succeeded it is
likely that the one under speculation can be pruned. In any
case, it is also subject to existing complexity limits and
therefore anything beyond this point will be rejected. In
terms of pruning, it needs to be ensured that the verification
state from speculative execution simulation must never prune
a non-speculative execution path, therefore, we mark verifier
state accordingly at the time of push_stack(). If verifier
detects out of bounds access under speculative execution from
one of the possible paths that includes a truncation, it will
reject such program.
Given we mask every reg-based pointer arithmetic for
unprivileged programs, we've been looking into how it could
affect real-world programs in terms of size increase. As the
majority of programs are targeted for privileged-only use
case, we've unconditionally enabled masking (with its alu
restrictions on top of it) for privileged programs for the
sake of testing in order to check i) whether they get rejected
in its current form, and ii) by how much the number of
instructions and size will increase. We've tested this by
using Katran, Cilium and test_l4lb from the kernel selftests.
For Katran we've evaluated balancer_kern.o, Cilium bpf_lxc.o
and an older test object bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o and l4lb
we've used test_l4lb.o as well as test_l4lb_noinline.o. We
found that none of the programs got rejected by the verifier
with this change, and that impact is rather minimal to none.
balancer_kern.o had 13,904 bytes (1,738 insns) xlated and
7,797 bytes JITed before and after the change. Most complex
program in bpf_lxc.o had 30,544 bytes (3,817 insns) xlated
and 18,538 bytes JITed before and after and none of the other
tail call programs in bpf_lxc.o had any changes either. For
the older bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o object we found a small
increase from 20,616 bytes (2,576 insns) and 12,536 bytes JITed
before to 20,664 bytes (2,582 insns) and 12,558 bytes JITed
after the change. Other programs from that object file had
similar small increase. Both test_l4lb.o had no change and
remained at 6,544 bytes (817 insns) xlated and 3,401 bytes
JITed and for test_l4lb_noinline.o constant at 5,080 bytes
(634 insns) xlated and 3,313 bytes JITed. This can be explained
in that LLVM typically optimizes stack based pointer arithmetic
by using K-based operations and that use of dynamic map access
is not overly frequent. However, in future we may decide to
optimize the algorithm further under known guarantees from
branch and value speculation. Latter seems also unclear in
terms of prediction heuristics that today's CPUs apply as well
as whether there could be collisions in e.g. the predictor's
Value History/Pattern Table for triggering out of bounds access,
thus masking is performed unconditionally at this point but could
be subject to relaxation later on. We were generally also
brainstorming various other approaches for mitigation, but the
blocker was always lack of available registers at runtime and/or
overhead for runtime tracking of limits belonging to a specific
pointer. Thus, we found this to be minimally intrusive under
given constraints.
With that in place, a simple example with sanitized access on
unprivileged load at post-verification time looks as follows:
# bpftool prog dump xlated id 282
[...]
28: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r7 +0)
29: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r7 +8)
30: (57) r1 &= 15
31: (79) r3 = *(u64 *)(r0 +4608)
32: (57) r3 &= 1
33: (47) r3 |= 1
34: (2d) if r2 > r3 goto pc+19
35: (b4) (u32) r11 = (u32) 20479 |
36: (1f) r11 -= r2 | Dynamic sanitation for pointer
37: (4f) r11 |= r2 | arithmetic with registers
38: (87) r11 = -r11 | containing bounded or known
39: (c7) r11 s>>= 63 | scalars in order to prevent
40: (5f) r11 &= r2 | out of bounds speculation.
41: (0f) r4 += r11 |
42: (71) r4 = *(u8 *)(r4 +0)
43: (6f) r4 <<= r1
[...]
For the case where the scalar sits in the destination register
as opposed to the source register, the following code is emitted
for the above example:
[...]
16: (b4) (u32) r11 = (u32) 20479
17: (1f) r11 -= r2
18: (4f) r11 |= r2
19: (87) r11 = -r11
20: (c7) r11 s>>= 63
21: (5f) r2 &= r11
22: (0f) r2 += r0
23: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r2 +0)
[...]
JIT blinding example with non-conflicting use of r10:
[...]
d5: je 0x0000000000000106 _
d7: mov 0x0(%rax),%edi |
da: mov $0xf153246,%r10d | Index load from map value and
e0: xor $0xf153259,%r10 | (const blinded) mask with 0x1f.
e7: and %r10,%rdi |_
ea: mov $0x2f,%r10d |
f0: sub %rdi,%r10 | Sanitized addition. Both use r10
f3: or %rdi,%r10 | but do not interfere with each
f6: neg %r10 | other. (Neither do these instructions
f9: sar $0x3f,%r10 | interfere with the use of ax as temp
fd: and %r10,%rdi | in interpreter.)
100: add %rax,%rdi |_
103: mov 0x0(%rdi),%eax
[...]
Tested that it fixes Jann's reproducer, and also checked that test_verifier
and test_progs suite with interpreter, JIT and JIT with hardening enabled
on x86-64 and arm64 runs successfully.
[0] Speculose: Analyzing the Security Implications of Speculative
Execution in CPUs, Giorgi Maisuradze and Christian Rossow,
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.04084.pdf
[1] A Systematic Evaluation of Transient Execution Attacks and
Defenses, Claudio Canella, Jo Van Bulck, Michael Schwarz,
Moritz Lipp, Benjamin von Berg, Philipp Ortner, Frank Piessens,
Dmitry Evtyushkin, Daniel Gruss,
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1811.05441.pdf
Fixes: b2157399cc98 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> | Medium | 170,241 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: _gcry_ecc_ecdsa_sign (gcry_mpi_t input, ECC_secret_key *skey,
gcry_mpi_t r, gcry_mpi_t s,
int flags, int hashalgo)
{
gpg_err_code_t rc = 0;
int extraloops = 0;
gcry_mpi_t k, dr, sum, k_1, x;
mpi_point_struct I;
gcry_mpi_t hash;
const void *abuf;
unsigned int abits, qbits;
mpi_ec_t ctx;
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_mpidump ("ecdsa sign hash ", input );
/* Convert the INPUT into an MPI if needed. */
rc = _gcry_dsa_normalize_hash (input, &hash, qbits);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (rc)
return rc;
k = NULL;
dr = mpi_alloc (0);
sum = mpi_alloc (0);
{
do
{
mpi_free (k);
k = NULL;
if ((flags & PUBKEY_FLAG_RFC6979) && hashalgo)
{
/* Use Pornin's method for deterministic DSA. If this
flag is set, it is expected that HASH is an opaque
MPI with the to be signed hash. That hash is also
used as h1 from 3.2.a. */
if (!mpi_is_opaque (input))
{
rc = GPG_ERR_CONFLICT;
goto leave;
}
abuf = mpi_get_opaque (input, &abits);
rc = _gcry_dsa_gen_rfc6979_k (&k, skey->E.n, skey->d,
abuf, (abits+7)/8,
hashalgo, extraloops);
if (rc)
goto leave;
extraloops++;
}
else
k = _gcry_dsa_gen_k (skey->E.n, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM);
_gcry_mpi_ec_mul_point (&I, k, &skey->E.G, ctx);
if (_gcry_mpi_ec_get_affine (x, NULL, &I, ctx))
{
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_debug ("ecc sign: Failed to get affine coordinates\n");
rc = GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE;
goto leave;
}
mpi_mod (r, x, skey->E.n); /* r = x mod n */
}
while (!mpi_cmp_ui (r, 0));
mpi_mulm (dr, skey->d, r, skey->E.n); /* dr = d*r mod n */
mpi_addm (sum, hash, dr, skey->E.n); /* sum = hash + (d*r) mod n */
mpi_invm (k_1, k, skey->E.n); /* k_1 = k^(-1) mod n */
mpi_mulm (s, k_1, sum, skey->E.n); /* s = k^(-1)*(hash+(d*r)) mod n */
}
while (!mpi_cmp_ui (s, 0));
if (DBG_CIPHER)
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Libgcrypt before 1.7.10 and 1.8.x before 1.8.3 allows a memory-cache side-channel attack on ECDSA signatures that can be mitigated through the use of blinding during the signing process in the _gcry_ecc_ecdsa_sign function in cipher/ecc-ecdsa.c, aka the Return Of the Hidden Number Problem or ROHNP. To discover an ECDSA key, the attacker needs access to either the local machine or a different virtual machine on the same physical host.
Commit Message: | Low | 165,348 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void BufferQueueConsumer::dump(String8& result, const char* prefix) const {
mCore->dump(result, prefix);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass +Info
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: libs/gui/BufferQueueConsumer.cpp in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-04-01 does not check for the android.permission.DUMP permission, which allows attackers to obtain sensitive information, and consequently bypass an unspecified protection mechanism, via a dump request, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27046057.
Commit Message: BQ: Add permission check to BufferQueueConsumer::dump
Bug 27046057
Change-Id: Id7bd8cf95045b497943ea39dde49e877aa6f5c4e
| High | 174,232 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: xsltDocumentFunctionLoadDocument(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, xmlChar* URI)
{
xsltTransformContextPtr tctxt;
xmlURIPtr uri;
xmlChar *fragment;
xsltDocumentPtr idoc; /* document info */
xmlDocPtr doc;
xmlXPathContextPtr xptrctxt = NULL;
xmlXPathObjectPtr resObj = NULL;
tctxt = xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt);
if (tctxt == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
"document() : internal error tctxt == NULL\n");
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathNewNodeSet(NULL));
return;
}
uri = xmlParseURI((const char *) URI);
if (uri == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, NULL,
"document() : failed to parse URI\n");
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathNewNodeSet(NULL));
return;
}
/*
* check for and remove fragment identifier
*/
fragment = (xmlChar *)uri->fragment;
if (fragment != NULL) {
xmlChar *newURI;
uri->fragment = NULL;
newURI = xmlSaveUri(uri);
idoc = xsltLoadDocument(tctxt, newURI);
xmlFree(newURI);
} else
idoc = xsltLoadDocument(tctxt, URI);
xmlFreeURI(uri);
if (idoc == NULL) {
if ((URI == NULL) ||
(URI[0] == '#') ||
((tctxt->style->doc != NULL) &&
(xmlStrEqual(tctxt->style->doc->URL, URI))))
{
/*
* This selects the stylesheet's doc itself.
*/
doc = tctxt->style->doc;
} else {
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathNewNodeSet(NULL));
if (fragment != NULL)
xmlFree(fragment);
return;
}
} else
doc = idoc->doc;
if (fragment == NULL) {
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathNewNodeSet((xmlNodePtr) doc));
return;
}
/* use XPointer of HTML location for fragment ID */
#ifdef LIBXML_XPTR_ENABLED
xptrctxt = xmlXPtrNewContext(doc, NULL, NULL);
if (xptrctxt == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, NULL,
"document() : internal error xptrctxt == NULL\n");
goto out_fragment;
}
resObj = xmlXPtrEval(fragment, xptrctxt);
xmlXPathFreeContext(xptrctxt);
#endif
xmlFree(fragment);
if (resObj == NULL)
goto out_fragment;
switch (resObj->type) {
case XPATH_NODESET:
break;
case XPATH_UNDEFINED:
case XPATH_BOOLEAN:
case XPATH_NUMBER:
case XPATH_STRING:
case XPATH_POINT:
case XPATH_USERS:
case XPATH_XSLT_TREE:
case XPATH_RANGE:
case XPATH_LOCATIONSET:
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, NULL,
"document() : XPointer does not select a node set: #%s\n",
fragment);
goto out_object;
}
valuePush(ctxt, resObj);
return;
out_object:
xmlXPathFreeObject(resObj);
out_fragment:
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathNewNodeSet(NULL));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: numbers.c in libxslt before 1.1.29, as used in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63, mishandles namespace nodes, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds heap memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338} | Medium | 173,301 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: next_line(struct archive_read *a,
const char **b, ssize_t *avail, ssize_t *ravail, ssize_t *nl)
{
ssize_t len;
int quit;
quit = 0;
if (*avail == 0) {
*nl = 0;
len = 0;
} else
len = get_line_size(*b, *avail, nl);
/*
* Read bytes more while it does not reach the end of line.
*/
while (*nl == 0 && len == *avail && !quit) {
ssize_t diff = *ravail - *avail;
size_t nbytes_req = (*ravail+1023) & ~1023U;
ssize_t tested;
/* Increase reading bytes if it is not enough to at least
* new two lines. */
if (nbytes_req < (size_t)*ravail + 160)
nbytes_req <<= 1;
*b = __archive_read_ahead(a, nbytes_req, avail);
if (*b == NULL) {
if (*ravail >= *avail)
return (0);
/* Reading bytes reaches the end of file. */
*b = __archive_read_ahead(a, *avail, avail);
quit = 1;
}
*ravail = *avail;
*b += diff;
*avail -= diff;
tested = len;/* Skip some bytes we already determinated. */
len = get_line_size(*b, *avail, nl);
if (len >= 0)
len += tested;
}
return (len);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The mtree bidder in libarchive 3.2.1 does not keep track of line sizes when extending the read-ahead, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via a crafted file, which triggers an invalid read in the (1) detect_form or (2) bid_entry function in libarchive/archive_read_support_format_mtree.c.
Commit Message: Issue 747 (and others?): Avoid OOB read when parsing multiple long lines
The mtree bidder needs to look several lines ahead
in the input. It does this by extending the read-ahead
and parsing subsequent lines from the same growing buffer.
A bookkeeping error when extending the read-ahead would
sometimes lead it to significantly over-count the
size of the line being read. | Medium | 168,765 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::ClearUnclearedAttachments(
GLenum target, Framebuffer* framebuffer) {
if (target == GL_READ_FRAMEBUFFER_EXT) {
glBindFramebufferEXT(GL_READ_FRAMEBUFFER_EXT, 0);
glBindFramebufferEXT(GL_DRAW_FRAMEBUFFER_EXT, framebuffer->service_id());
}
GLbitfield clear_bits = 0;
if (framebuffer->HasUnclearedAttachment(GL_COLOR_ATTACHMENT0)) {
glClearColor(
0.0f, 0.0f, 0.0f,
(GLES2Util::GetChannelsForFormat(
framebuffer->GetColorAttachmentFormat()) & 0x0008) != 0 ? 0.0f :
1.0f);
state_.SetDeviceColorMask(GL_TRUE, GL_TRUE, GL_TRUE, GL_TRUE);
clear_bits |= GL_COLOR_BUFFER_BIT;
}
if (framebuffer->HasUnclearedAttachment(GL_STENCIL_ATTACHMENT) ||
framebuffer->HasUnclearedAttachment(GL_DEPTH_STENCIL_ATTACHMENT)) {
glClearStencil(0);
state_.SetDeviceStencilMaskSeparate(GL_FRONT, -1);
state_.SetDeviceStencilMaskSeparate(GL_BACK, -1);
clear_bits |= GL_STENCIL_BUFFER_BIT;
}
if (framebuffer->HasUnclearedAttachment(GL_DEPTH_ATTACHMENT) ||
framebuffer->HasUnclearedAttachment(GL_DEPTH_STENCIL_ATTACHMENT)) {
glClearDepth(1.0f);
state_.SetDeviceDepthMask(GL_TRUE);
clear_bits |= GL_DEPTH_BUFFER_BIT;
}
state_.SetDeviceCapabilityState(GL_SCISSOR_TEST, false);
glClear(clear_bits);
framebuffer_manager()->MarkAttachmentsAsCleared(
framebuffer, renderbuffer_manager(), texture_manager());
RestoreClearState();
if (target == GL_READ_FRAMEBUFFER_EXT) {
glBindFramebufferEXT(GL_READ_FRAMEBUFFER_EXT, framebuffer->service_id());
Framebuffer* draw_framebuffer =
GetFramebufferInfoForTarget(GL_DRAW_FRAMEBUFFER_EXT);
GLuint service_id = draw_framebuffer ? draw_framebuffer->service_id() :
GetBackbufferServiceId();
glBindFramebufferEXT(GL_DRAW_FRAMEBUFFER_EXT, service_id);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The WebGL implementation in Google Chrome before 37.0.2062.94 does not ensure that clear calls interact properly with the state of a draw buffer, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (read of uninitialized memory) via a crafted CANVAS element, related to gpu/command_buffer/service/framebuffer_manager.cc and gpu/command_buffer/service/gles2_cmd_decoder.cc.
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
[email protected],[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,658 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static struct sock *dccp_v6_request_recv_sock(const struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req,
struct dst_entry *dst,
struct request_sock *req_unhash,
bool *own_req)
{
struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req);
struct ipv6_pinfo *newnp;
const struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
struct inet_sock *newinet;
struct dccp6_sock *newdp6;
struct sock *newsk;
if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) {
/*
* v6 mapped
*/
newsk = dccp_v4_request_recv_sock(sk, skb, req, dst,
req_unhash, own_req);
if (newsk == NULL)
return NULL;
newdp6 = (struct dccp6_sock *)newsk;
newinet = inet_sk(newsk);
newinet->pinet6 = &newdp6->inet6;
newnp = inet6_sk(newsk);
memcpy(newnp, np, sizeof(struct ipv6_pinfo));
newnp->saddr = newsk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr;
inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_af_ops = &dccp_ipv6_mapped;
newsk->sk_backlog_rcv = dccp_v4_do_rcv;
newnp->pktoptions = NULL;
newnp->opt = NULL;
newnp->mcast_oif = inet6_iif(skb);
newnp->mcast_hops = ipv6_hdr(skb)->hop_limit;
/*
* No need to charge this sock to the relevant IPv6 refcnt debug socks count
* here, dccp_create_openreq_child now does this for us, see the comment in
* that function for the gory details. -acme
*/
/* It is tricky place. Until this moment IPv4 tcp
worked with IPv6 icsk.icsk_af_ops.
Sync it now.
*/
dccp_sync_mss(newsk, inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_pmtu_cookie);
return newsk;
}
if (sk_acceptq_is_full(sk))
goto out_overflow;
if (!dst) {
struct flowi6 fl6;
dst = inet6_csk_route_req(sk, &fl6, req, IPPROTO_DCCP);
if (!dst)
goto out;
}
newsk = dccp_create_openreq_child(sk, req, skb);
if (newsk == NULL)
goto out_nonewsk;
/*
* No need to charge this sock to the relevant IPv6 refcnt debug socks
* count here, dccp_create_openreq_child now does this for us, see the
* comment in that function for the gory details. -acme
*/
ip6_dst_store(newsk, dst, NULL, NULL);
newsk->sk_route_caps = dst->dev->features & ~(NETIF_F_IP_CSUM |
NETIF_F_TSO);
newdp6 = (struct dccp6_sock *)newsk;
newinet = inet_sk(newsk);
newinet->pinet6 = &newdp6->inet6;
newnp = inet6_sk(newsk);
memcpy(newnp, np, sizeof(struct ipv6_pinfo));
newsk->sk_v6_daddr = ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr;
newnp->saddr = ireq->ir_v6_loc_addr;
newsk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr = ireq->ir_v6_loc_addr;
newsk->sk_bound_dev_if = ireq->ir_iif;
/* Now IPv6 options...
First: no IPv4 options.
*/
newinet->inet_opt = NULL;
/* Clone RX bits */
newnp->rxopt.all = np->rxopt.all;
newnp->pktoptions = NULL;
newnp->opt = NULL;
newnp->mcast_oif = inet6_iif(skb);
newnp->mcast_hops = ipv6_hdr(skb)->hop_limit;
/*
* Clone native IPv6 options from listening socket (if any)
*
* Yes, keeping reference count would be much more clever, but we make
* one more one thing there: reattach optmem to newsk.
*/
opt = ireq->ipv6_opt;
if (!opt)
opt = rcu_dereference(np->opt);
if (opt) {
opt = ipv6_dup_options(newsk, opt);
RCU_INIT_POINTER(newnp->opt, opt);
}
inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = 0;
if (opt)
inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = opt->opt_nflen +
opt->opt_flen;
dccp_sync_mss(newsk, dst_mtu(dst));
newinet->inet_daddr = newinet->inet_saddr = LOOPBACK4_IPV6;
newinet->inet_rcv_saddr = LOOPBACK4_IPV6;
if (__inet_inherit_port(sk, newsk) < 0) {
inet_csk_prepare_forced_close(newsk);
dccp_done(newsk);
goto out;
}
*own_req = inet_ehash_nolisten(newsk, req_to_sk(req_unhash));
/* Clone pktoptions received with SYN, if we own the req */
if (*own_req && ireq->pktopts) {
newnp->pktoptions = skb_clone(ireq->pktopts, GFP_ATOMIC);
consume_skb(ireq->pktopts);
ireq->pktopts = NULL;
if (newnp->pktoptions)
skb_set_owner_r(newnp->pktoptions, newsk);
}
return newsk;
out_overflow:
__NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_LISTENOVERFLOWS);
out_nonewsk:
dst_release(dst);
out:
__NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_LISTENDROPS);
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock function in net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c in the Linux kernel through 4.11.1 mishandles inheritance, which allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted system calls, a related issue to CVE-2017-8890.
Commit Message: ipv6/dccp: do not inherit ipv6_mc_list from parent
Like commit 657831ffc38e ("dccp/tcp: do not inherit mc_list from parent")
we should clear ipv6_mc_list etc. for IPv6 sockets too.
Cc: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | High | 168,127 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: tt_cmap4_validate( FT_Byte* table,
FT_Validator valid )
{
FT_Byte* p;
FT_UInt length;
FT_Byte *ends, *starts, *offsets, *deltas, *glyph_ids;
FT_UInt num_segs;
FT_Error error = FT_Err_Ok;
if ( table + 2 + 2 > valid->limit )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
p = table + 2; /* skip format */
length = TT_NEXT_USHORT( p );
if ( length < 16 )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
/* in certain fonts, the `length' field is invalid and goes */
/* out of bound. We try to correct this here... */
if ( table + length > valid->limit )
/* in certain fonts, the `length' field is invalid and goes */
/* out of bound. We try to correct this here... */
if ( table + length > valid->limit )
{
length = (FT_UInt)( valid->limit - table );
}
p = table + 6;
num_segs = TT_NEXT_USHORT( p ); /* read segCountX2 */
if ( valid->level >= FT_VALIDATE_PARANOID )
{
/* check that we have an even value here */
if ( num_segs & 1 )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
}
num_segs /= 2;
if ( length < 16 + num_segs * 2 * 4 )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
/* check the search parameters - even though we never use them */
/* */
if ( valid->level >= FT_VALIDATE_PARANOID )
{
/* check the values of `searchRange', `entrySelector', `rangeShift' */
FT_UInt search_range = TT_NEXT_USHORT( p );
FT_UInt entry_selector = TT_NEXT_USHORT( p );
FT_UInt range_shift = TT_NEXT_USHORT( p );
if ( ( search_range | range_shift ) & 1 ) /* must be even values */
FT_INVALID_DATA;
search_range /= 2;
range_shift /= 2;
/* `search range' is the greatest power of 2 that is <= num_segs */
if ( search_range > num_segs ||
search_range * 2 < num_segs ||
search_range + range_shift != num_segs ||
search_range != ( 1U << entry_selector ) )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
}
ends = table + 14;
starts = table + 16 + num_segs * 2;
deltas = starts + num_segs * 2;
offsets = deltas + num_segs * 2;
glyph_ids = offsets + num_segs * 2;
/* check last segment; its end count value must be 0xFFFF */
if ( valid->level >= FT_VALIDATE_PARANOID )
{
p = ends + ( num_segs - 1 ) * 2;
if ( TT_PEEK_USHORT( p ) != 0xFFFFU )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
}
{
FT_UInt start, end, offset, n;
FT_UInt last_start = 0, last_end = 0;
FT_Int delta;
FT_Byte* p_start = starts;
FT_Byte* p_end = ends;
FT_Byte* p_delta = deltas;
FT_Byte* p_offset = offsets;
for ( n = 0; n < num_segs; n++ )
{
p = p_offset;
start = TT_NEXT_USHORT( p_start );
end = TT_NEXT_USHORT( p_end );
delta = TT_NEXT_SHORT( p_delta );
offset = TT_NEXT_USHORT( p_offset );
if ( start > end )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
/* this test should be performed at default validation level; */
/* unfortunately, some popular Asian fonts have overlapping */
/* ranges in their charmaps */
/* */
if ( start <= last_end && n > 0 )
{
if ( valid->level >= FT_VALIDATE_TIGHT )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
else
{
/* allow overlapping segments, provided their start points */
/* and end points, respectively, are in ascending order */
/* */
if ( last_start > start || last_end > end )
error |= TT_CMAP_FLAG_UNSORTED;
else
error |= TT_CMAP_FLAG_OVERLAPPING;
}
}
if ( offset && offset != 0xFFFFU )
{
p += offset; /* start of glyph ID array */
/* check that we point within the glyph IDs table only */
if ( valid->level >= FT_VALIDATE_TIGHT )
{
if ( p < glyph_ids ||
p + ( end - start + 1 ) * 2 > table + length )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
}
/* Some fonts handle the last segment incorrectly. In */
/* theory, 0xFFFF might point to an ordinary glyph -- */
/* a cmap 4 is versatile and could be used for any */
/* encoding, not only Unicode. However, reality shows */
/* that far too many fonts are sloppy and incorrectly */
/* set all fields but `start' and `end' for the last */
/* segment if it contains only a single character. */
/* */
/* We thus omit the test here, delaying it to the */
/* routines which actually access the cmap. */
else if ( n != num_segs - 1 ||
!( start == 0xFFFFU && end == 0xFFFFU ) )
{
if ( p < glyph_ids ||
p + ( end - start + 1 ) * 2 > valid->limit )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
}
/* check glyph indices within the segment range */
if ( valid->level >= FT_VALIDATE_TIGHT )
{
FT_UInt i, idx;
for ( i = start; i < end; i++ )
{
idx = FT_NEXT_USHORT( p );
if ( idx != 0 )
{
idx = (FT_UInt)( idx + delta ) & 0xFFFFU;
if ( idx >= TT_VALID_GLYPH_COUNT( valid ) )
FT_INVALID_GLYPH_ID;
}
}
}
}
else if ( offset == 0xFFFFU )
{
/* some fonts (erroneously?) use a range offset of 0xFFFF */
/* to mean missing glyph in cmap table */
/* */
if ( valid->level >= FT_VALIDATE_PARANOID ||
n != num_segs - 1 ||
!( start == 0xFFFFU && end == 0xFFFFU ) )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
}
last_start = start;
last_end = end;
}
}
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The tt_cmap4_validate function in sfnt/ttcmap.c in FreeType before 2.5.4 validates a certain length field before that field's value is completely calculated, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted cmap SFNT table.
Commit Message: | High | 164,859 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imageaffinematrixget)
{
double affine[6];
long type;
zval *options = NULL;
zval **tmp;
int res = GD_FALSE, i;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l|z", &type, &options) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
switch((gdAffineStandardMatrix)type) {
case GD_AFFINE_TRANSLATE:
case GD_AFFINE_SCALE: {
double x, y;
if (!options || Z_TYPE_P(options) != IS_ARRAY) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Array expected as options");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (zend_hash_find(HASH_OF(options), "x", sizeof("x"), (void **)&tmp) != FAILURE) {
if (Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) != IS_DOUBLE) {
zval dval;
dval = **tmp;
zval_copy_ctor(&dval);
convert_to_double(&dval);
x = Z_DVAL(dval);
} else {
x = Z_DVAL_PP(tmp);
}
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Missing x position");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (zend_hash_find(HASH_OF(options), "y", sizeof("y"), (void **)&tmp) != FAILURE) {
if (Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) != IS_DOUBLE) {
zval dval;
dval = **tmp;
zval_copy_ctor(&dval);
convert_to_double(&dval);
y = Z_DVAL(dval);
} else {
y = Z_DVAL_PP(tmp);
}
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Missing y position");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (type == GD_AFFINE_TRANSLATE) {
res = gdAffineTranslate(affine, x, y);
} else {
res = gdAffineScale(affine, x, y);
}
break;
}
case GD_AFFINE_ROTATE:
case GD_AFFINE_SHEAR_HORIZONTAL:
case GD_AFFINE_SHEAR_VERTICAL: {
double angle;
if (!options) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Number is expected as option");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if(Z_TYPE_P(options) != IS_DOUBLE) {
zval dval;
dval = *options;
zval_copy_ctor(&dval);
convert_to_double(&dval);
angle = Z_DVAL(dval);
} else {
angle = Z_DVAL_P(options);
}
if (type == GD_AFFINE_SHEAR_HORIZONTAL) {
res = gdAffineShearHorizontal(affine, angle);
} else if (type == GD_AFFINE_SHEAR_VERTICAL) {
res = gdAffineShearVertical(affine, angle);
} else {
res = gdAffineRotate(affine, angle);
}
break;
}
default:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid type for element %li", type);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (res == GD_FALSE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
} else {
array_init(return_value);
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
add_index_double(return_value, i, affine[i]);
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: The imagetruecolortopalette function in ext/gd/gd.c in PHP before 5.6.25 and 7.x before 7.0.10 does not properly validate the number of colors, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (select_colors allocation error and out-of-bounds write) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large value in the third argument.
Commit Message: Fix bug#72697 - select_colors write out-of-bounds | High | 166,954 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void UpdateProperty(IBusProperty* ibus_prop) {
DLOG(INFO) << "UpdateProperty";
DCHECK(ibus_prop);
ImePropertyList prop_list; // our representation.
if (!FlattenProperty(ibus_prop, &prop_list)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Malformed properties are detected";
return;
}
if (!prop_list.empty()) {
update_ime_property_(language_library_, prop_list);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,550 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int iw_process_rows_intermediate_to_final(struct iw_context *ctx, int intermed_channel,
const struct iw_csdescr *out_csdescr)
{
int i,j;
int z;
int k;
int retval=0;
iw_tmpsample tmpsamp;
iw_tmpsample alphasamp = 0.0;
iw_tmpsample *inpix_tofree = NULL; // Used if we need a separate temp buffer for input samples
iw_tmpsample *outpix_tofree = NULL; // Used if we need a separate temp buffer for output samples
int using_errdiffdither = 0;
int output_channel;
int is_alpha_channel;
int bkgd_has_transparency;
double tmpbkgdalpha=0.0;
int alt_bkgd = 0; // Nonzero if we should use bkgd2 for this sample
struct iw_resize_settings *rs = NULL;
int ditherfamily, dithersubtype;
struct iw_channelinfo_intermed *int_ci;
struct iw_channelinfo_out *out_ci;
iw_tmpsample *in_pix = NULL;
iw_tmpsample *out_pix = NULL;
int num_in_pix;
int num_out_pix;
num_in_pix = ctx->intermed_canvas_width;
num_out_pix = ctx->img2.width;
int_ci = &ctx->intermed_ci[intermed_channel];
output_channel = int_ci->corresponding_output_channel;
out_ci = &ctx->img2_ci[output_channel];
is_alpha_channel = (int_ci->channeltype==IW_CHANNELTYPE_ALPHA);
bkgd_has_transparency = iw_bkgd_has_transparency(ctx);
inpix_tofree = (iw_tmpsample*)iw_malloc(ctx, num_in_pix * sizeof(iw_tmpsample));
in_pix = inpix_tofree;
outpix_tofree = (iw_tmpsample*)iw_malloc(ctx, num_out_pix * sizeof(iw_tmpsample));
if(!outpix_tofree) goto done;
out_pix = outpix_tofree;
if(ctx->nearest_color_table && !is_alpha_channel &&
out_ci->ditherfamily==IW_DITHERFAMILY_NONE &&
out_ci->color_count==0)
{
out_ci->use_nearest_color_table = 1;
}
else {
out_ci->use_nearest_color_table = 0;
}
ditherfamily = out_ci->ditherfamily;
dithersubtype = out_ci->dithersubtype;
if(ditherfamily==IW_DITHERFAMILY_RANDOM) {
if(dithersubtype==IW_DITHERSUBTYPE_SAMEPATTERN && out_ci->channeltype!=IW_CHANNELTYPE_ALPHA)
{
iwpvt_prng_set_random_seed(ctx->prng,ctx->random_seed);
}
else {
iwpvt_prng_set_random_seed(ctx->prng,ctx->random_seed+out_ci->channeltype);
}
}
if(output_channel>=0 && out_ci->ditherfamily==IW_DITHERFAMILY_ERRDIFF) {
using_errdiffdither = 1;
for(i=0;i<ctx->img2.width;i++) {
for(k=0;k<IW_DITHER_MAXROWS;k++) {
ctx->dither_errors[k][i] = 0.0;
}
}
}
rs=&ctx->resize_settings[IW_DIMENSION_H];
if(!rs->rrctx) {
rs->rrctx = iwpvt_resize_rows_init(ctx,rs,int_ci->channeltype,
num_in_pix, num_out_pix);
if(!rs->rrctx) goto done;
}
for(j=0;j<ctx->intermed_canvas_height;j++) {
if(is_alpha_channel) {
for(i=0;i<num_in_pix;i++) {
inpix_tofree[i] = ctx->intermediate_alpha32[((size_t)j)*ctx->intermed_canvas_width+i];
}
}
else {
for(i=0;i<num_in_pix;i++) {
inpix_tofree[i] = ctx->intermediate32[((size_t)j)*ctx->intermed_canvas_width+i];
}
}
iwpvt_resize_row_main(rs->rrctx,in_pix,out_pix);
if(ctx->intclamp)
clamp_output_samples(ctx,out_pix,num_out_pix);
if(is_alpha_channel && outpix_tofree && ctx->final_alpha32) {
for(i=0;i<num_out_pix;i++) {
ctx->final_alpha32[((size_t)j)*ctx->img2.width+i] = (iw_float32)outpix_tofree[i];
}
}
if(output_channel == -1) {
goto here;
}
for(z=0;z<ctx->img2.width;z++) {
if(using_errdiffdither && (j%2))
i=ctx->img2.width-1-z;
else
i=z;
tmpsamp = out_pix[i];
if(ctx->bkgd_checkerboard) {
alt_bkgd = (((ctx->bkgd_check_origin[IW_DIMENSION_H]+i)/ctx->bkgd_check_size)%2) !=
(((ctx->bkgd_check_origin[IW_DIMENSION_V]+j)/ctx->bkgd_check_size)%2);
}
if(bkgd_has_transparency) {
tmpbkgdalpha = alt_bkgd ? ctx->bkgd2alpha : ctx->bkgd1alpha;
}
if(int_ci->need_unassoc_alpha_processing) {
alphasamp = ctx->final_alpha32[((size_t)j)*ctx->img2.width + i];
if(alphasamp!=0.0) {
tmpsamp /= alphasamp;
}
if(ctx->apply_bkgd && ctx->apply_bkgd_strategy==IW_BKGD_STRATEGY_LATE) {
double bkcolor;
bkcolor = alt_bkgd ? out_ci->bkgd2_color_lin : out_ci->bkgd1_color_lin;
if(bkgd_has_transparency) {
tmpsamp = tmpsamp*alphasamp + bkcolor*tmpbkgdalpha*(1.0-alphasamp);
}
else {
tmpsamp = tmpsamp*alphasamp + bkcolor*(1.0-alphasamp);
}
}
}
else if(is_alpha_channel && bkgd_has_transparency) {
tmpsamp = tmpsamp + tmpbkgdalpha*(1.0-tmpsamp);
}
if(ctx->img2.sampletype==IW_SAMPLETYPE_FLOATINGPOINT)
put_sample_convert_from_linear_flt(ctx,tmpsamp,i,j,output_channel,out_csdescr);
else
put_sample_convert_from_linear(ctx,tmpsamp,i,j,output_channel,out_csdescr);
}
if(using_errdiffdither) {
for(i=0;i<ctx->img2.width;i++) {
for(k=0;k<IW_DITHER_MAXROWS-1;k++) {
ctx->dither_errors[k][i] = ctx->dither_errors[k+1][i];
}
ctx->dither_errors[IW_DITHER_MAXROWS-1][i] = 0.0;
}
}
here:
;
}
retval=1;
done:
if(rs && rs->disable_rrctx_cache && rs->rrctx) {
iwpvt_resize_rows_done(rs->rrctx);
rs->rrctx = NULL;
}
if(inpix_tofree) iw_free(ctx,inpix_tofree);
if(outpix_tofree) iw_free(ctx,outpix_tofree);
return retval;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: imagew-main.c:960:12 in libimageworsener.a in ImageWorsener 1.3.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (buffer underflow) via a crafted image, related to imagew-bmp.c.
Commit Message: Fixed a bug that could cause invalid memory to be accessed
The bug could happen when transparency is removed from an image.
Also fixed a semi-related BMP error handling logic bug.
Fixes issue #21 | Medium | 168,118 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static ssize_t oz_cdev_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *fpos)
{
struct oz_pd *pd;
struct oz_elt_buf *eb;
struct oz_elt_info *ei;
struct oz_elt *elt;
struct oz_app_hdr *app_hdr;
struct oz_serial_ctx *ctx;
spin_lock_bh(&g_cdev.lock);
pd = g_cdev.active_pd;
if (pd)
oz_pd_get(pd);
spin_unlock_bh(&g_cdev.lock);
if (pd == NULL)
return -ENXIO;
if (!(pd->state & OZ_PD_S_CONNECTED))
return -EAGAIN;
eb = &pd->elt_buff;
ei = oz_elt_info_alloc(eb);
if (ei == NULL) {
count = 0;
goto out;
}
elt = (struct oz_elt *)ei->data;
app_hdr = (struct oz_app_hdr *)(elt+1);
elt->length = sizeof(struct oz_app_hdr) + count;
elt->type = OZ_ELT_APP_DATA;
ei->app_id = OZ_APPID_SERIAL;
ei->length = elt->length + sizeof(struct oz_elt);
app_hdr->app_id = OZ_APPID_SERIAL;
if (copy_from_user(app_hdr+1, buf, count))
goto out;
spin_lock_bh(&pd->app_lock[OZ_APPID_USB-1]);
ctx = (struct oz_serial_ctx *)pd->app_ctx[OZ_APPID_SERIAL-1];
if (ctx) {
app_hdr->elt_seq_num = ctx->tx_seq_num++;
if (ctx->tx_seq_num == 0)
ctx->tx_seq_num = 1;
spin_lock(&eb->lock);
if (oz_queue_elt_info(eb, 0, 0, ei) == 0)
ei = NULL;
spin_unlock(&eb->lock);
}
spin_unlock_bh(&pd->app_lock[OZ_APPID_USB-1]);
out:
if (ei) {
count = 0;
spin_lock_bh(&eb->lock);
oz_elt_info_free(eb, ei);
spin_unlock_bh(&eb->lock);
}
oz_pd_put(pd);
return count;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the oz_cdev_write function in drivers/staging/ozwpan/ozcdev.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12 allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted write operation.
Commit Message: staging: ozwpan: prevent overflow in oz_cdev_write()
We need to check "count" so we don't overflow the ei->data buffer.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,965 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ImageBitmapFactories::ImageBitmapLoader::LoadBlobAsync(
Blob* blob) {
loader_->Start(blob->GetBlobDataHandle());
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Incorrect object lifecycle management in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 72.0.3626.81 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Fix UAP in ImageBitmapLoader/FileReaderLoader
FileReaderLoader stores its client as a raw pointer, so in cases like
ImageBitmapLoader where the FileReaderLoaderClient really is garbage
collected we have to make sure to destroy the FileReaderLoader when
the ExecutionContext that owns it is destroyed.
Bug: 913970
Change-Id: I40b02115367cf7bf5bbbbb8e9b57874d2510f861
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1374511
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Roman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616342} | Medium | 173,068 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: virtual bool SetImeConfig(const std::string& section,
const std::string& config_name,
const ImeConfigValue& value) {
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,506 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: XOpenDevice(
register Display *dpy,
register XID id)
{
register long rlen; /* raw length */
xOpenDeviceReq *req;
xOpenDeviceReply rep;
XDevice *dev;
XExtDisplayInfo *info = XInput_find_display(dpy);
LockDisplay(dpy);
if (_XiCheckExtInit(dpy, XInput_Initial_Release, info) == -1)
return NULL;
GetReq(OpenDevice, req);
req->reqType = info->codes->major_opcode;
req->ReqType = X_OpenDevice;
req->deviceid = id;
if (!_XReply(dpy, (xReply *) & rep, 0, xFalse)) {
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (XDevice *) NULL;
return (XDevice *) NULL;
}
rlen = rep.length << 2;
dev = (XDevice *) Xmalloc(sizeof(XDevice) + rep.num_classes *
sizeof(XInputClassInfo));
if (dev) {
int dlen; /* data length */
_XEatData(dpy, (unsigned long)rlen - dlen);
} else
_XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (dev);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: X.org libXi before 1.7.7 allows remote X servers to cause a denial of service (infinite loop) via vectors involving length fields.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,921 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool ExtensionTtsSpeakCompletedFunction::RunImpl() {
int request_id;
std::string error_message;
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(args_->GetInteger(0, &request_id));
if (args_->GetSize() >= 2)
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(args_->GetString(1, &error_message));
ExtensionTtsController::GetInstance()->OnSpeechFinished(
request_id, error_message);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The PDF implementation in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.215 on Linux does not properly use the memset library function, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,385 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void InsertRow(unsigned char *p,ssize_t y,Image *image, int bpp)
{
ExceptionInfo
*exception;
int
bit;
ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
IndexPacket
index;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
exception=(&image->exception);
switch (bpp)
{
case 1: /* Convert bitmap scanline. */
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-7); x+=8)
{
for (bit=0; bit < 8; bit++)
{
index=((*p) & (0x80 >> bit) ? 0x01 : 0x00);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+bit,index);
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
q++;
}
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 8) != 0)
{
for (bit=0; bit < (ssize_t) (image->columns % 8); bit++)
{
index=((*p) & (0x80 >> bit) ? 0x01 : 0x00);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+bit,index);
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
q++;
}
p++;
}
if (!SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception))
break;
break;
}
case 2: /* Convert PseudoColor scanline. */
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-1); x+=4)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 6) & 0x3);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
q++;
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 4) & 0x3);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
q++;
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 2) & 0x3);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
q++;
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p) & 0x3);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+1,index);
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
p++;
q++;
}
if ((image->columns % 4) != 0)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 6) & 0x3);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
q++;
if ((image->columns % 4) >= 1)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 4) & 0x3);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
q++;
if ((image->columns % 4) >= 2)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 2) & 0x3);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
q++;
}
}
p++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
break;
}
case 4: /* Convert PseudoColor scanline. */
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-1); x+=2)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 4) & 0x0f);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
q++;
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p) & 0x0f);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+1,index);
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
p++;
q++;
}
if ((image->columns % 2) != 0)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 4) & 0x0f);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
break;
}
case 8: /* Convert PseudoColor scanline. */
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL) break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,*p);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
break;
case 24: /* Convert DirectColor scanline. */
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
q++;
}
if (!SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception))
break;
break;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: coders/wpg.c in ImageMagick allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds write) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: Fixed out-of-bounds write reported in: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/102 | Medium | 170,114 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int br_mdb_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
struct net_device *dev;
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
struct nlmsghdr *nlh = NULL;
int idx = 0, s_idx;
s_idx = cb->args[0];
rcu_read_lock();
/* In theory this could be wrapped to 0... */
cb->seq = net->dev_base_seq + br_mdb_rehash_seq;
for_each_netdev_rcu(net, dev) {
if (dev->priv_flags & IFF_EBRIDGE) {
struct br_port_msg *bpm;
if (idx < s_idx)
goto skip;
nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).portid,
cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq, RTM_GETMDB,
sizeof(*bpm), NLM_F_MULTI);
if (nlh == NULL)
break;
bpm = nlmsg_data(nlh);
bpm->ifindex = dev->ifindex;
if (br_mdb_fill_info(skb, cb, dev) < 0)
goto out;
if (br_rports_fill_info(skb, cb, dev) < 0)
goto out;
cb->args[1] = 0;
nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
skip:
idx++;
}
}
out:
if (nlh)
nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
rcu_read_unlock();
cb->args[0] = idx;
return skb->len;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: net/bridge/br_mdb.c in the Linux kernel before 3.8.4 does not initialize certain structures, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a crafted application.
Commit Message: bridge: fix mdb info leaks
The bridging code discloses heap and stack bytes via the RTM_GETMDB
netlink interface and via the notify messages send to group RTNLGRP_MDB
afer a successful add/del.
Fix both cases by initializing all unset members/padding bytes with
memset(0).
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Low | 166,052 |
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