instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 90
9.34k
| output
stringlengths 16
15.4k
| __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: explicit ConsoleCallbackFilter(
base::Callback<void(const base::string16&)> callback)
: callback_(callback) {}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | explicit ConsoleCallbackFilter(
| 172,489 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imageaffinematrixget)
{
double affine[6];
long type;
zval *options;
zval **tmp;
int res = GD_FALSE, i;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l|z", &type, &options) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
switch((gdAffineStandardMatrix)type) {
case GD_AFFINE_TRANSLATE:
case GD_AFFINE_SCALE: {
double x, y;
if (Z_TYPE_P(options) != IS_ARRAY) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Array expected as options");
}
if (zend_hash_find(HASH_OF(options), "x", sizeof("x"), (void **)&tmp) != FAILURE) {
convert_to_double_ex(tmp);
x = Z_DVAL_PP(tmp);
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Missing x position");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (zend_hash_find(HASH_OF(options), "y", sizeof("y"), (void **)&tmp) != FAILURE) {
convert_to_double_ex(tmp);
y = Z_DVAL_PP(tmp);
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Missing y position");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (type == GD_AFFINE_TRANSLATE) {
res = gdAffineTranslate(affine, x, y);
} else {
res = gdAffineScale(affine, x, y);
}
break;
}
case GD_AFFINE_ROTATE:
case GD_AFFINE_SHEAR_HORIZONTAL:
case GD_AFFINE_SHEAR_VERTICAL: {
double angle;
convert_to_double_ex(&options);
angle = Z_DVAL_P(options);
if (type == GD_AFFINE_SHEAR_HORIZONTAL) {
res = gdAffineShearHorizontal(affine, angle);
} else if (type == GD_AFFINE_SHEAR_VERTICAL) {
res = gdAffineShearVertical(affine, angle);
} else {
res = gdAffineRotate(affine, angle);
}
break;
}
default:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid type for element %li", type);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (res == GD_FALSE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
} else {
array_init(return_value);
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
add_index_double(return_value, i, affine[i]);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed bug #66356 (Heap Overflow Vulnerability in imagecrop())
And also fixed the bug: arguments are altered after some calls
CWE ID: CWE-189 | PHP_FUNCTION(imageaffinematrixget)
{
double affine[6];
long type;
zval *options;
zval **tmp;
int res = GD_FALSE, i;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l|z", &type, &options) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
switch((gdAffineStandardMatrix)type) {
case GD_AFFINE_TRANSLATE:
case GD_AFFINE_SCALE: {
double x, y;
if (Z_TYPE_P(options) != IS_ARRAY) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Array expected as options");
}
if (zend_hash_find(HASH_OF(options), "x", sizeof("x"), (void **)&tmp) != FAILURE) {
if (Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) != IS_DOUBLE) {
zval dval;
dval = **tmp;
zval_copy_ctor(&dval);
convert_to_double(&dval);
x = Z_DVAL(dval);
} else {
x = Z_DVAL_PP(tmp);
}
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Missing x position");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (zend_hash_find(HASH_OF(options), "y", sizeof("y"), (void **)&tmp) != FAILURE) {
if (Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) != IS_DOUBLE) {
zval dval;
dval = **tmp;
zval_copy_ctor(&dval);
convert_to_double(&dval);
y = Z_DVAL(dval);
} else {
y = Z_DVAL_PP(tmp);
}
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Missing y position");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (type == GD_AFFINE_TRANSLATE) {
res = gdAffineTranslate(affine, x, y);
} else {
res = gdAffineScale(affine, x, y);
}
break;
}
case GD_AFFINE_ROTATE:
case GD_AFFINE_SHEAR_HORIZONTAL:
case GD_AFFINE_SHEAR_VERTICAL: {
double angle;
convert_to_double_ex(&options);
angle = Z_DVAL_P(options);
if (type == GD_AFFINE_SHEAR_HORIZONTAL) {
res = gdAffineShearHorizontal(affine, angle);
} else if (type == GD_AFFINE_SHEAR_VERTICAL) {
res = gdAffineShearVertical(affine, angle);
} else {
res = gdAffineRotate(affine, angle);
}
break;
}
default:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid type for element %li", type);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (res == GD_FALSE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
} else {
array_init(return_value);
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
add_index_double(return_value, i, affine[i]);
}
}
}
| 166,429 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static inline void __file_sb_list_add(struct file *file, struct super_block *sb)
{
struct list_head *list;
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
int cpu;
cpu = smp_processor_id();
file->f_sb_list_cpu = cpu;
list = per_cpu_ptr(sb->s_files, cpu);
#else
list = &sb->s_files;
#endif
list_add(&file->f_u.fu_list, list);
}
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | static inline void __file_sb_list_add(struct file *file, struct super_block *sb)
| 166,795 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static inline LineContribType * _gdContributionsAlloc(unsigned int line_length, unsigned int windows_size)
{
unsigned int u = 0;
LineContribType *res;
int overflow_error = 0;
res = (LineContribType *) gdMalloc(sizeof(LineContribType));
if (!res) {
return NULL;
}
res->WindowSize = windows_size;
res->LineLength = line_length;
if (overflow2(line_length, sizeof(ContributionType))) {
gdFree(res);
return NULL;
}
res->ContribRow = (ContributionType *) gdMalloc(line_length * sizeof(ContributionType));
if (res->ContribRow == NULL) {
gdFree(res);
return NULL;
}
for (u = 0 ; u < line_length ; u++) {
if (overflow2(windows_size, sizeof(double))) {
overflow_error = 1;
} else {
res->ContribRow[u].Weights = (double *) gdMalloc(windows_size * sizeof(double));
}
if (overflow_error == 1 || res->ContribRow[u].Weights == NULL) {
unsigned int i;
u--;
for (i=0;i<=u;i++) {
gdFree(res->ContribRow[i].Weights);
}
gdFree(res->ContribRow);
gdFree(res);
return NULL;
}
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: Fix potential unsigned underflow
No need to decrease `u`, so we don't do it. While we're at it, we also factor
out the overflow check of the loop, what improves performance and readability.
This issue has been reported by Stefan Esser to [email protected].
CWE ID: CWE-191 | static inline LineContribType * _gdContributionsAlloc(unsigned int line_length, unsigned int windows_size)
{
unsigned int u = 0;
LineContribType *res;
size_t weights_size;
if (overflow2(windows_size, sizeof(double))) {
return NULL;
} else {
weights_size = windows_size * sizeof(double);
}
res = (LineContribType *) gdMalloc(sizeof(LineContribType));
if (!res) {
return NULL;
}
res->WindowSize = windows_size;
res->LineLength = line_length;
if (overflow2(line_length, sizeof(ContributionType))) {
gdFree(res);
return NULL;
}
res->ContribRow = (ContributionType *) gdMalloc(line_length * sizeof(ContributionType));
if (res->ContribRow == NULL) {
gdFree(res);
return NULL;
}
for (u = 0 ; u < line_length ; u++) {
res->ContribRow[u].Weights = (double *) gdMalloc(weights_size);
if (res->ContribRow[u].Weights == NULL) {
unsigned int i;
for (i=0;i<u;i++) {
gdFree(res->ContribRow[i].Weights);
}
gdFree(res->ContribRow);
gdFree(res);
return NULL;
}
}
return res;
}
| 168,511 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RunCoeffCheck() {
ACMRandom rnd(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
const int count_test_block = 5000;
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, input_block, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, output_ref_block, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, output_block, kNumCoeffs);
for (int i = 0; i < count_test_block; ++i) {
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j)
input_block[j] = rnd.Rand8() - rnd.Rand8();
fwd_txfm_ref(input_block, output_ref_block, pitch_, tx_type_);
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(RunFwdTxfm(input_block, output_block, pitch_));
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j)
EXPECT_EQ(output_block[j], output_ref_block[j]);
}
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void RunCoeffCheck() {
ACMRandom rnd(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
const int count_test_block = 5000;
DECLARE_ALIGNED(16, int16_t, input_block[kNumCoeffs]);
DECLARE_ALIGNED(16, tran_low_t, output_ref_block[kNumCoeffs]);
DECLARE_ALIGNED(16, tran_low_t, output_block[kNumCoeffs]);
for (int i = 0; i < count_test_block; ++i) {
// Initialize a test block with input range [-mask_, mask_].
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j)
input_block[j] = (rnd.Rand16() & mask_) - (rnd.Rand16() & mask_);
fwd_txfm_ref(input_block, output_ref_block, pitch_, tx_type_);
ASM_REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(RunFwdTxfm(input_block, output_block, pitch_));
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j)
EXPECT_EQ(output_block[j], output_ref_block[j]);
}
}
| 174,548 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: my_object_increment_retval (MyObject *obj, gint32 x)
{
return x + 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | my_object_increment_retval (MyObject *obj, gint32 x)
| 165,106 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: WebstoreBindings::WebstoreBindings(ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context) {
RouteFunction("Install",
base::Bind(&WebstoreBindings::Install, base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | WebstoreBindings::WebstoreBindings(ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context) {
RouteFunction("Install", "webstore",
base::Bind(&WebstoreBindings::Install, base::Unretained(this)));
}
| 172,245 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadMONOImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
x;
size_t
bit,
byte;
ssize_t
y;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
ThrowReaderException(OptionError,"MustSpecifyImageSize");
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,image->offset) == MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
/*
Initialize image colormap.
*/
image->depth=1;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,2) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
/*
Convert bi-level image to pixel packets.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
bit=0;
byte=0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (bit == 0)
byte=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (image_info->endian == LSBEndian)
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,((byte & 0x01) != 0) ? 0x00 : 0x01)
else
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,((byte & 0x01) != 0) ? 0x01 : 0x00)
bit++;
if (bit == 8)
bit=0;
byte>>=1;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
(void) SyncImage(image);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static Image *ReadMONOImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
x;
size_t
bit,
byte;
ssize_t
y;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
ThrowReaderException(OptionError,"MustSpecifyImageSize");
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,image->offset) == MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
/*
Initialize image colormap.
*/
image->depth=1;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,2) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
/*
Convert bi-level image to pixel packets.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
bit=0;
byte=0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (bit == 0)
byte=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (image_info->endian == LSBEndian)
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,((byte & 0x01) != 0) ? 0x00 : 0x01)
else
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,((byte & 0x01) != 0) ? 0x01 : 0x00)
bit++;
if (bit == 8)
bit=0;
byte>>=1;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
(void) SyncImage(image);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
| 168,582 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: modify_policy_2_svc(mpol_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
prime_arg = arg->rec.policy;
if (CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp) || !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context,
rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_MODIFY, NULL, NULL)) {
log_unauth("kadm5_modify_policy", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_MODIFY;
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_modify_policy((void *)handle, &arg->rec,
arg->mask);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_modify_policy",
((prime_arg == NULL) ? "(null)" : prime_arg), errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]
In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler. Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails. Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails. Discovered by Simo Sorce.
CVE-2015-8631:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one. Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-119 | modify_policy_2_svc(mpol_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc service_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
prime_arg = arg->rec.policy;
if (CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp) || !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context,
rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_MODIFY, NULL, NULL)) {
log_unauth("kadm5_modify_policy", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_MODIFY;
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_modify_policy((void *)handle, &arg->rec,
arg->mask);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_modify_policy",
((prime_arg == NULL) ? "(null)" : prime_arg), errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
exit_func:
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
| 167,520 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PGTYPESdate_from_asc(char *str, char **endptr)
{
date dDate;
fsec_t fsec;
struct tm tt,
*tm = &tt;
int dtype;
int nf;
char *field[MAXDATEFIELDS];
int ftype[MAXDATEFIELDS];
char lowstr[MAXDATELEN + 1];
char *realptr;
char **ptr = (endptr != NULL) ? endptr : &realptr;
bool EuroDates = FALSE;
errno = 0;
if (strlen(str) >= sizeof(lowstr))
{
errno = PGTYPES_DATE_BAD_DATE;
return INT_MIN;
}
if (ParseDateTime(str, lowstr, field, ftype, &nf, ptr) != 0 ||
DecodeDateTime(field, ftype, nf, &dtype, tm, &fsec, EuroDates) != 0)
{
errno = PGTYPES_DATE_BAD_DATE;
return INT_MIN;
}
switch (dtype)
{
case DTK_DATE:
break;
case DTK_EPOCH:
if (GetEpochTime(tm) < 0)
{
errno = PGTYPES_DATE_BAD_DATE;
return INT_MIN;
}
break;
default:
errno = PGTYPES_DATE_BAD_DATE;
return INT_MIN;
}
dDate = (date2j(tm->tm_year, tm->tm_mon, tm->tm_mday) - date2j(2000, 1, 1));
return dDate;
}
Commit Message: Fix handling of wide datetime input/output.
Many server functions use the MAXDATELEN constant to size a buffer for
parsing or displaying a datetime value. It was much too small for the
longest possible interval output and slightly too small for certain
valid timestamp input, particularly input with a long timezone name.
The long input was rejected needlessly; the long output caused
interval_out() to overrun its buffer. ECPG's pgtypes library has a copy
of the vulnerable functions, which bore the same vulnerabilities along
with some of its own. In contrast to the server, certain long inputs
caused stack overflow rather than failing cleanly. Back-patch to 8.4
(all supported versions).
Reported by Daniel Schüssler, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0063
CWE ID: CWE-119 | PGTYPESdate_from_asc(char *str, char **endptr)
{
date dDate;
fsec_t fsec;
struct tm tt,
*tm = &tt;
int dtype;
int nf;
char *field[MAXDATEFIELDS];
int ftype[MAXDATEFIELDS];
char lowstr[MAXDATELEN + MAXDATEFIELDS];
char *realptr;
char **ptr = (endptr != NULL) ? endptr : &realptr;
bool EuroDates = FALSE;
errno = 0;
if (strlen(str) > MAXDATELEN)
{
errno = PGTYPES_DATE_BAD_DATE;
return INT_MIN;
}
if (ParseDateTime(str, lowstr, field, ftype, &nf, ptr) != 0 ||
DecodeDateTime(field, ftype, nf, &dtype, tm, &fsec, EuroDates) != 0)
{
errno = PGTYPES_DATE_BAD_DATE;
return INT_MIN;
}
switch (dtype)
{
case DTK_DATE:
break;
case DTK_EPOCH:
if (GetEpochTime(tm) < 0)
{
errno = PGTYPES_DATE_BAD_DATE;
return INT_MIN;
}
break;
default:
errno = PGTYPES_DATE_BAD_DATE;
return INT_MIN;
}
dDate = (date2j(tm->tm_year, tm->tm_mon, tm->tm_mday) - date2j(2000, 1, 1));
return dDate;
}
| 166,463 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int re_yylex_init_extra(YY_EXTRA_TYPE yy_user_defined,yyscan_t* ptr_yy_globals )
{
struct yyguts_t dummy_yyguts;
re_yyset_extra (yy_user_defined, &dummy_yyguts);
if (ptr_yy_globals == NULL){
errno = EINVAL;
return 1;
}
*ptr_yy_globals = (yyscan_t) re_yyalloc ( sizeof( struct yyguts_t ), &dummy_yyguts );
if (*ptr_yy_globals == NULL){
errno = ENOMEM;
return 1;
}
/* By setting to 0xAA, we expose bugs in
yy_init_globals. Leave at 0x00 for releases. */
memset(*ptr_yy_globals,0x00,sizeof(struct yyguts_t));
re_yyset_extra (yy_user_defined, *ptr_yy_globals);
return yy_init_globals ( *ptr_yy_globals );
}
Commit Message: re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust (#586)
* Add test for issue #503
* re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust
This commit fixes parsing incomplete escape sequences at the end of a
regular expression and parsing things like \xxy (invalid hex digits)
which before were silently turned into (char)255.
Close #503
* Update re_lexer.c
CWE ID: CWE-476 | int re_yylex_init_extra(YY_EXTRA_TYPE yy_user_defined,yyscan_t* ptr_yy_globals )
{
struct yyguts_t dummy_yyguts;
re_yyset_extra (yy_user_defined, &dummy_yyguts);
if (ptr_yy_globals == NULL){
errno = EINVAL;
return 1;
}
*ptr_yy_globals = (yyscan_t) re_yyalloc ( sizeof( struct yyguts_t ), &dummy_yyguts );
if (*ptr_yy_globals == NULL){
errno = ENOMEM;
return 1;
}
/* By setting to 0xAA, we expose bugs in
yy_init_globals. Leave at 0x00 for releases. */
memset(*ptr_yy_globals,0x00,sizeof(struct yyguts_t));
re_yyset_extra (yy_user_defined, *ptr_yy_globals);
return yy_init_globals ( *ptr_yy_globals );
}
| 168,485 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int kvm_iommu_map_pages(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
{
gfn_t gfn, end_gfn;
pfn_t pfn;
int r = 0;
struct iommu_domain *domain = kvm->arch.iommu_domain;
int flags;
/* check if iommu exists and in use */
if (!domain)
return 0;
gfn = slot->base_gfn;
end_gfn = gfn + slot->npages;
flags = IOMMU_READ;
if (!(slot->flags & KVM_MEM_READONLY))
flags |= IOMMU_WRITE;
if (!kvm->arch.iommu_noncoherent)
flags |= IOMMU_CACHE;
while (gfn < end_gfn) {
unsigned long page_size;
/* Check if already mapped */
if (iommu_iova_to_phys(domain, gfn_to_gpa(gfn))) {
gfn += 1;
continue;
}
/* Get the page size we could use to map */
page_size = kvm_host_page_size(kvm, gfn);
/* Make sure the page_size does not exceed the memslot */
while ((gfn + (page_size >> PAGE_SHIFT)) > end_gfn)
page_size >>= 1;
/* Make sure gfn is aligned to the page size we want to map */
while ((gfn << PAGE_SHIFT) & (page_size - 1))
page_size >>= 1;
/* Make sure hva is aligned to the page size we want to map */
while (__gfn_to_hva_memslot(slot, gfn) & (page_size - 1))
page_size >>= 1;
/*
* Pin all pages we are about to map in memory. This is
* important because we unmap and unpin in 4kb steps later.
*/
pfn = kvm_pin_pages(slot, gfn, page_size);
if (is_error_noslot_pfn(pfn)) {
gfn += 1;
continue;
}
/* Map into IO address space */
r = iommu_map(domain, gfn_to_gpa(gfn), pfn_to_hpa(pfn),
page_size, flags);
if (r) {
printk(KERN_ERR "kvm_iommu_map_address:"
"iommu failed to map pfn=%llx\n", pfn);
goto unmap_pages;
}
gfn += page_size >> PAGE_SHIFT;
}
return 0;
unmap_pages:
kvm_iommu_put_pages(kvm, slot->base_gfn, gfn);
return r;
}
Commit Message: kvm: iommu: fix the third parameter of kvm_iommu_put_pages (CVE-2014-3601)
The third parameter of kvm_iommu_put_pages is wrong,
It should be 'gfn - slot->base_gfn'.
By making gfn very large, malicious guest or userspace can cause kvm to
go to this error path, and subsequently to pass a huge value as size.
Alternatively if gfn is small, then pages would be pinned but never
unpinned, causing host memory leak and local DOS.
Passing a reasonable but large value could be the most dangerous case,
because it would unpin a page that should have stayed pinned, and thus
allow the device to DMA into arbitrary memory. However, this cannot
happen because of the condition that can trigger the error:
- out of memory (where you can't allocate even a single page)
should not be possible for the attacker to trigger
- when exceeding the iommu's address space, guest pages after gfn
will also exceed the iommu's address space, and inside
kvm_iommu_put_pages() the iommu_iova_to_phys() will fail. The
page thus would not be unpinned at all.
Reported-by: Jack Morgenstein <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | int kvm_iommu_map_pages(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
{
gfn_t gfn, end_gfn;
pfn_t pfn;
int r = 0;
struct iommu_domain *domain = kvm->arch.iommu_domain;
int flags;
/* check if iommu exists and in use */
if (!domain)
return 0;
gfn = slot->base_gfn;
end_gfn = gfn + slot->npages;
flags = IOMMU_READ;
if (!(slot->flags & KVM_MEM_READONLY))
flags |= IOMMU_WRITE;
if (!kvm->arch.iommu_noncoherent)
flags |= IOMMU_CACHE;
while (gfn < end_gfn) {
unsigned long page_size;
/* Check if already mapped */
if (iommu_iova_to_phys(domain, gfn_to_gpa(gfn))) {
gfn += 1;
continue;
}
/* Get the page size we could use to map */
page_size = kvm_host_page_size(kvm, gfn);
/* Make sure the page_size does not exceed the memslot */
while ((gfn + (page_size >> PAGE_SHIFT)) > end_gfn)
page_size >>= 1;
/* Make sure gfn is aligned to the page size we want to map */
while ((gfn << PAGE_SHIFT) & (page_size - 1))
page_size >>= 1;
/* Make sure hva is aligned to the page size we want to map */
while (__gfn_to_hva_memslot(slot, gfn) & (page_size - 1))
page_size >>= 1;
/*
* Pin all pages we are about to map in memory. This is
* important because we unmap and unpin in 4kb steps later.
*/
pfn = kvm_pin_pages(slot, gfn, page_size);
if (is_error_noslot_pfn(pfn)) {
gfn += 1;
continue;
}
/* Map into IO address space */
r = iommu_map(domain, gfn_to_gpa(gfn), pfn_to_hpa(pfn),
page_size, flags);
if (r) {
printk(KERN_ERR "kvm_iommu_map_address:"
"iommu failed to map pfn=%llx\n", pfn);
kvm_unpin_pages(kvm, pfn, page_size);
goto unmap_pages;
}
gfn += page_size >> PAGE_SHIFT;
}
return 0;
unmap_pages:
kvm_iommu_put_pages(kvm, slot->base_gfn, gfn - slot->base_gfn);
return r;
}
| 166,351 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: LIBOPENMPT_MODPLUG_API unsigned int ModPlug_SampleName(ModPlugFile* file, unsigned int qual, char* buff)
{
const char* str;
unsigned int retval;
size_t tmpretval;
if(!file) return 0;
str = openmpt_module_get_sample_name(file->mod,qual-1);
if(!str){
if(buff){
*buff = '\0';
}
return 0;
}
tmpretval = strlen(str);
if(tmpretval>=INT_MAX){
tmpretval = INT_MAX-1;
}
retval = (int)tmpretval;
if(buff){
memcpy(buff,str,retval+1);
buff[retval] = '\0';
}
openmpt_free_string(str);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: [Fix] libmodplug: C API: Limit the length of strings copied to the output buffer of ModPlug_InstrumentName() and ModPlug_SampleName() to 32 bytes (including terminating null) as is done by original libmodplug. This avoids potential buffer overflows in software relying on this limit instead of querying the required buffer size beforehand. libopenmpt can return strings longer than 32 bytes here beacuse the internal limit of 32 bytes applies to strings encoded in arbitrary character encodings but the API returns them converted to UTF-8, which can be longer. (reported by Antonio Morales Maldonado of Semmle Security Research Team)
git-svn-id: https://source.openmpt.org/svn/openmpt/trunk/OpenMPT@12127 56274372-70c3-4bfc-bfc3-4c3a0b034d27
CWE ID: CWE-120 | LIBOPENMPT_MODPLUG_API unsigned int ModPlug_SampleName(ModPlugFile* file, unsigned int qual, char* buff)
{
const char* str;
char buf[32];
if(!file) return 0;
str = openmpt_module_get_sample_name(file->mod,qual-1);
memset(buf,0,32);
if(str){
strncpy(buf,str,31);
openmpt_free_string(str);
}
if(buff){
strncpy(buff,buf,32);
}
return (unsigned int)strlen(buf);
}
| 169,501 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: Core(const OAuthProviderInfo& info,
net::URLRequestContextGetter* request_context_getter)
: provider_info_(info),
request_context_getter_(request_context_getter),
delegate_(NULL) {
}
Commit Message: Remove UrlFetcher from remoting and use the one in net instead.
BUG=133790
TEST=Stop and restart the Me2Me host. It should still work.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10637008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143798 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | Core(const OAuthProviderInfo& info,
net::URLRequestContextGetter* request_context_getter)
: provider_info_(info),
request_context_getter_(request_context_getter),
delegate_(NULL),
url_fetcher_type_(URL_FETCHER_NONE) {
}
| 170,805 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int ovl_copy_up_locked(struct dentry *workdir, struct dentry *upperdir,
struct dentry *dentry, struct path *lowerpath,
struct kstat *stat, struct iattr *attr,
const char *link)
{
struct inode *wdir = workdir->d_inode;
struct inode *udir = upperdir->d_inode;
struct dentry *newdentry = NULL;
struct dentry *upper = NULL;
umode_t mode = stat->mode;
int err;
newdentry = ovl_lookup_temp(workdir, dentry);
err = PTR_ERR(newdentry);
if (IS_ERR(newdentry))
goto out;
upper = lookup_one_len(dentry->d_name.name, upperdir,
dentry->d_name.len);
err = PTR_ERR(upper);
if (IS_ERR(upper))
goto out1;
/* Can't properly set mode on creation because of the umask */
stat->mode &= S_IFMT;
err = ovl_create_real(wdir, newdentry, stat, link, NULL, true);
stat->mode = mode;
if (err)
goto out2;
if (S_ISREG(stat->mode)) {
struct path upperpath;
ovl_path_upper(dentry, &upperpath);
BUG_ON(upperpath.dentry != NULL);
upperpath.dentry = newdentry;
err = ovl_copy_up_data(lowerpath, &upperpath, stat->size);
if (err)
goto out_cleanup;
}
err = ovl_copy_xattr(lowerpath->dentry, newdentry);
if (err)
goto out_cleanup;
mutex_lock(&newdentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
err = ovl_set_attr(newdentry, stat);
if (!err && attr)
err = notify_change(newdentry, attr, NULL);
mutex_unlock(&newdentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
if (err)
goto out_cleanup;
err = ovl_do_rename(wdir, newdentry, udir, upper, 0);
if (err)
goto out_cleanup;
ovl_dentry_update(dentry, newdentry);
newdentry = NULL;
/*
* Non-directores become opaque when copied up.
*/
if (!S_ISDIR(stat->mode))
ovl_dentry_set_opaque(dentry, true);
out2:
dput(upper);
out1:
dput(newdentry);
out:
return err;
out_cleanup:
ovl_cleanup(wdir, newdentry);
goto out;
}
Commit Message: ovl: fix dentry reference leak
In ovl_copy_up_locked(), newdentry is leaked if the function exits through
out_cleanup as this just to out after calling ovl_cleanup() - which doesn't
actually release the ref on newdentry.
The out_cleanup segment should instead exit through out2 as certainly
newdentry leaks - and possibly upper does also, though this isn't caught
given the catch of newdentry.
Without this fix, something like the following is seen:
BUG: Dentry ffff880023e9eb20{i=f861,n=#ffff880023e82d90} still in use (1) [unmount of tmpfs tmpfs]
BUG: Dentry ffff880023ece640{i=0,n=bigfile} still in use (1) [unmount of tmpfs tmpfs]
when unmounting the upper layer after an error occurred in copyup.
An error can be induced by creating a big file in a lower layer with
something like:
dd if=/dev/zero of=/lower/a/bigfile bs=65536 count=1 seek=$((0xf000))
to create a large file (4.1G). Overlay an upper layer that is too small
(on tmpfs might do) and then induce a copy up by opening it writably.
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> # v3.18+
CWE ID: CWE-399 | static int ovl_copy_up_locked(struct dentry *workdir, struct dentry *upperdir,
struct dentry *dentry, struct path *lowerpath,
struct kstat *stat, struct iattr *attr,
const char *link)
{
struct inode *wdir = workdir->d_inode;
struct inode *udir = upperdir->d_inode;
struct dentry *newdentry = NULL;
struct dentry *upper = NULL;
umode_t mode = stat->mode;
int err;
newdentry = ovl_lookup_temp(workdir, dentry);
err = PTR_ERR(newdentry);
if (IS_ERR(newdentry))
goto out;
upper = lookup_one_len(dentry->d_name.name, upperdir,
dentry->d_name.len);
err = PTR_ERR(upper);
if (IS_ERR(upper))
goto out1;
/* Can't properly set mode on creation because of the umask */
stat->mode &= S_IFMT;
err = ovl_create_real(wdir, newdentry, stat, link, NULL, true);
stat->mode = mode;
if (err)
goto out2;
if (S_ISREG(stat->mode)) {
struct path upperpath;
ovl_path_upper(dentry, &upperpath);
BUG_ON(upperpath.dentry != NULL);
upperpath.dentry = newdentry;
err = ovl_copy_up_data(lowerpath, &upperpath, stat->size);
if (err)
goto out_cleanup;
}
err = ovl_copy_xattr(lowerpath->dentry, newdentry);
if (err)
goto out_cleanup;
mutex_lock(&newdentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
err = ovl_set_attr(newdentry, stat);
if (!err && attr)
err = notify_change(newdentry, attr, NULL);
mutex_unlock(&newdentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
if (err)
goto out_cleanup;
err = ovl_do_rename(wdir, newdentry, udir, upper, 0);
if (err)
goto out_cleanup;
ovl_dentry_update(dentry, newdentry);
newdentry = NULL;
/*
* Non-directores become opaque when copied up.
*/
if (!S_ISDIR(stat->mode))
ovl_dentry_set_opaque(dentry, true);
out2:
dput(upper);
out1:
dput(newdentry);
out:
return err;
out_cleanup:
ovl_cleanup(wdir, newdentry);
goto out2;
}
| 167,469 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: jbig2_image_compose_unopt(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, Jbig2Image *dst, Jbig2Image *src, int x, int y, Jbig2ComposeOp op)
{
int i, j;
int sw = src->width;
int sh = src->height;
int sx = 0;
int sy = 0;
/* clip to the dst image boundaries */
if (x < 0) {
sx += -x;
sw -= -x;
x = 0;
}
if (y < 0) {
sy += -y;
sh -= -y;
y = 0;
}
if (x + sw >= dst->width)
sw = dst->width - x;
if (y + sh >= dst->height)
sh = dst->height - y;
switch (op) {
case JBIG2_COMPOSE_OR:
for (j = 0; j < sh; j++) {
for (i = 0; i < sw; i++) {
jbig2_image_set_pixel(dst, i + x, j + y, jbig2_image_get_pixel(src, i + sx, j + sy) | jbig2_image_get_pixel(dst, i + x, j + y));
}
}
break;
case JBIG2_COMPOSE_AND:
for (j = 0; j < sh; j++) {
for (i = 0; i < sw; i++) {
jbig2_image_set_pixel(dst, i + x, j + y, jbig2_image_get_pixel(src, i + sx, j + sy) & jbig2_image_get_pixel(dst, i + x, j + y));
}
}
break;
case JBIG2_COMPOSE_XOR:
for (j = 0; j < sh; j++) {
for (i = 0; i < sw; i++) {
jbig2_image_set_pixel(dst, i + x, j + y, jbig2_image_get_pixel(src, i + sx, j + sy) ^ jbig2_image_get_pixel(dst, i + x, j + y));
}
}
break;
case JBIG2_COMPOSE_XNOR:
for (j = 0; j < sh; j++) {
for (i = 0; i < sw; i++) {
jbig2_image_set_pixel(dst, i + x, j + y, (jbig2_image_get_pixel(src, i + sx, j + sy) == jbig2_image_get_pixel(dst, i + x, j + y)));
}
}
break;
case JBIG2_COMPOSE_REPLACE:
for (j = 0; j < sh; j++) {
for (i = 0; i < sw; i++) {
jbig2_image_set_pixel(dst, i + x, j + y, jbig2_image_get_pixel(src, i + sx, j + sy));
}
}
break;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | jbig2_image_compose_unopt(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, Jbig2Image *dst, Jbig2Image *src, int x, int y, Jbig2ComposeOp op)
{
uint32_t i, j;
uint32_t sw = src->width;
uint32_t sh = src->height;
uint32_t sx = 0;
uint32_t sy = 0;
/* clip to the dst image boundaries */
if (x < 0) {
sx += -x;
sw -= -x;
x = 0;
}
if (y < 0) {
sy += -y;
sh -= -y;
y = 0;
}
if (x + sw >= dst->width)
sw = dst->width - x;
if (y + sh >= dst->height)
sh = dst->height - y;
switch (op) {
case JBIG2_COMPOSE_OR:
for (j = 0; j < sh; j++) {
for (i = 0; i < sw; i++) {
jbig2_image_set_pixel(dst, i + x, j + y, jbig2_image_get_pixel(src, i + sx, j + sy) | jbig2_image_get_pixel(dst, i + x, j + y));
}
}
break;
case JBIG2_COMPOSE_AND:
for (j = 0; j < sh; j++) {
for (i = 0; i < sw; i++) {
jbig2_image_set_pixel(dst, i + x, j + y, jbig2_image_get_pixel(src, i + sx, j + sy) & jbig2_image_get_pixel(dst, i + x, j + y));
}
}
break;
case JBIG2_COMPOSE_XOR:
for (j = 0; j < sh; j++) {
for (i = 0; i < sw; i++) {
jbig2_image_set_pixel(dst, i + x, j + y, jbig2_image_get_pixel(src, i + sx, j + sy) ^ jbig2_image_get_pixel(dst, i + x, j + y));
}
}
break;
case JBIG2_COMPOSE_XNOR:
for (j = 0; j < sh; j++) {
for (i = 0; i < sw; i++) {
jbig2_image_set_pixel(dst, i + x, j + y, (jbig2_image_get_pixel(src, i + sx, j + sy) == jbig2_image_get_pixel(dst, i + x, j + y)));
}
}
break;
case JBIG2_COMPOSE_REPLACE:
for (j = 0; j < sh; j++) {
for (i = 0; i < sw; i++) {
jbig2_image_set_pixel(dst, i + x, j + y, jbig2_image_get_pixel(src, i + sx, j + sy));
}
}
break;
}
return 0;
}
| 165,490 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: status_t CameraDeviceClient::dump(int fd, const Vector<String16>& args) {
String8 result;
result.appendFormat("CameraDeviceClient[%d] (%p) PID: %d, dump:\n",
mCameraId,
getRemoteCallback()->asBinder().get(),
mClientPid);
result.append(" State: ");
mFrameProcessor->dump(fd, args);
return dumpDevice(fd, args);
}
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
CWE ID: CWE-264 | status_t CameraDeviceClient::dump(int fd, const Vector<String16>& args) {
return BasicClient::dump(fd, args);
}
status_t CameraDeviceClient::dumpClient(int fd, const Vector<String16>& args) {
String8 result;
result.appendFormat("CameraDeviceClient[%d] (%p) PID: %d, dump:\n",
mCameraId,
getRemoteCallback()->asBinder().get(),
mClientPid);
result.append(" State: ");
mFrameProcessor->dump(fd, args);
return dumpDevice(fd, args);
}
| 173,939 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void GLOutputSurfaceBufferQueueAndroid::HandlePartialSwap(
const gfx::Rect& sub_buffer_rect,
uint32_t flags,
gpu::ContextSupport::SwapCompletedCallback swap_callback,
gpu::ContextSupport::PresentationCallback presentation_callback) {
DCHECK(sub_buffer_rect.IsEmpty());
context_provider_->ContextSupport()->CommitOverlayPlanes(
flags, std::move(swap_callback), std::move(presentation_callback));
}
Commit Message: gpu/android : Add support for partial swap with surface control.
Add support for PostSubBuffer to GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl. This should
allow the display compositor to draw the minimum sub-rect necessary from
the damage tracking in BufferQueue on the client-side, and also to pass
this damage rect to the framework.
[email protected]
Bug: 926020
Change-Id: I73d3320cab68250d4c6865bf21c5531682d8bf61
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1457467
Commit-Queue: Khushal <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Auto-Submit: Khushal <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629852}
CWE ID: | void GLOutputSurfaceBufferQueueAndroid::HandlePartialSwap(
| 172,104 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int jpc_dec_tiledecode(jpc_dec_t *dec, jpc_dec_tile_t *tile)
{
int i;
int j;
jpc_dec_tcomp_t *tcomp;
jpc_dec_rlvl_t *rlvl;
jpc_dec_band_t *band;
int compno;
int rlvlno;
int bandno;
int adjust;
int v;
jpc_dec_ccp_t *ccp;
jpc_dec_cmpt_t *cmpt;
if (jpc_dec_decodecblks(dec, tile)) {
jas_eprintf("jpc_dec_decodecblks failed\n");
return -1;
}
/* Perform dequantization. */
for (compno = 0, tcomp = tile->tcomps; compno < dec->numcomps;
++compno, ++tcomp) {
ccp = &tile->cp->ccps[compno];
for (rlvlno = 0, rlvl = tcomp->rlvls; rlvlno < tcomp->numrlvls;
++rlvlno, ++rlvl) {
if (!rlvl->bands) {
continue;
}
for (bandno = 0, band = rlvl->bands;
bandno < rlvl->numbands; ++bandno, ++band) {
if (!band->data) {
continue;
}
jpc_undo_roi(band->data, band->roishift, ccp->roishift -
band->roishift, band->numbps);
if (tile->realmode) {
jas_matrix_asl(band->data, JPC_FIX_FRACBITS);
jpc_dequantize(band->data, band->absstepsize);
}
}
}
}
/* Apply an inverse wavelet transform if necessary. */
for (compno = 0, tcomp = tile->tcomps; compno < dec->numcomps;
++compno, ++tcomp) {
ccp = &tile->cp->ccps[compno];
jpc_tsfb_synthesize(tcomp->tsfb, tcomp->data);
}
/* Apply an inverse intercomponent transform if necessary. */
switch (tile->cp->mctid) {
case JPC_MCT_RCT:
if (dec->numcomps < 3) {
jas_eprintf("RCT requires at least three components\n");
return -1;
}
jpc_irct(tile->tcomps[0].data, tile->tcomps[1].data,
tile->tcomps[2].data);
break;
case JPC_MCT_ICT:
if (dec->numcomps < 3) {
jas_eprintf("ICT requires at least three components\n");
return -1;
}
jpc_iict(tile->tcomps[0].data, tile->tcomps[1].data,
tile->tcomps[2].data);
break;
}
/* Perform rounding and convert to integer values. */
if (tile->realmode) {
for (compno = 0, tcomp = tile->tcomps; compno < dec->numcomps;
++compno, ++tcomp) {
for (i = 0; i < jas_matrix_numrows(tcomp->data); ++i) {
for (j = 0; j < jas_matrix_numcols(tcomp->data); ++j) {
v = jas_matrix_get(tcomp->data, i, j);
v = jpc_fix_round(v);
jas_matrix_set(tcomp->data, i, j, jpc_fixtoint(v));
}
}
}
}
/* Perform level shift. */
for (compno = 0, tcomp = tile->tcomps, cmpt = dec->cmpts; compno <
dec->numcomps; ++compno, ++tcomp, ++cmpt) {
adjust = cmpt->sgnd ? 0 : (1 << (cmpt->prec - 1));
for (i = 0; i < jas_matrix_numrows(tcomp->data); ++i) {
for (j = 0; j < jas_matrix_numcols(tcomp->data); ++j) {
*jas_matrix_getref(tcomp->data, i, j) += adjust;
}
}
}
/* Perform clipping. */
for (compno = 0, tcomp = tile->tcomps, cmpt = dec->cmpts; compno <
dec->numcomps; ++compno, ++tcomp, ++cmpt) {
jpc_fix_t mn;
jpc_fix_t mx;
mn = cmpt->sgnd ? (-(1 << (cmpt->prec - 1))) : (0);
mx = cmpt->sgnd ? ((1 << (cmpt->prec - 1)) - 1) : ((1 <<
cmpt->prec) - 1);
jas_matrix_clip(tcomp->data, mn, mx);
}
/* XXX need to free tsfb struct */
/* Write the data for each component of the image. */
for (compno = 0, tcomp = tile->tcomps, cmpt = dec->cmpts; compno <
dec->numcomps; ++compno, ++tcomp, ++cmpt) {
if (jas_image_writecmpt(dec->image, compno, tcomp->xstart -
JPC_CEILDIV(dec->xstart, cmpt->hstep), tcomp->ystart -
JPC_CEILDIV(dec->ystart, cmpt->vstep), jas_matrix_numcols(
tcomp->data), jas_matrix_numrows(tcomp->data), tcomp->data)) {
jas_eprintf("write component failed\n");
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: The component domains must be the same for the ICT/RCT in the JPC codec.
This was previously enforced with an assertion.
Now, it is handled in a more graceful manner.
CWE ID: | static int jpc_dec_tiledecode(jpc_dec_t *dec, jpc_dec_tile_t *tile)
{
int i;
int j;
jpc_dec_tcomp_t *tcomp;
jpc_dec_rlvl_t *rlvl;
jpc_dec_band_t *band;
int compno;
int rlvlno;
int bandno;
int adjust;
int v;
jpc_dec_ccp_t *ccp;
jpc_dec_cmpt_t *cmpt;
if (jpc_dec_decodecblks(dec, tile)) {
jas_eprintf("jpc_dec_decodecblks failed\n");
return -1;
}
/* Perform dequantization. */
for (compno = 0, tcomp = tile->tcomps; compno < dec->numcomps;
++compno, ++tcomp) {
ccp = &tile->cp->ccps[compno];
for (rlvlno = 0, rlvl = tcomp->rlvls; rlvlno < tcomp->numrlvls;
++rlvlno, ++rlvl) {
if (!rlvl->bands) {
continue;
}
for (bandno = 0, band = rlvl->bands;
bandno < rlvl->numbands; ++bandno, ++band) {
if (!band->data) {
continue;
}
jpc_undo_roi(band->data, band->roishift, ccp->roishift -
band->roishift, band->numbps);
if (tile->realmode) {
jas_matrix_asl(band->data, JPC_FIX_FRACBITS);
jpc_dequantize(band->data, band->absstepsize);
}
}
}
}
/* Apply an inverse wavelet transform if necessary. */
for (compno = 0, tcomp = tile->tcomps; compno < dec->numcomps;
++compno, ++tcomp) {
ccp = &tile->cp->ccps[compno];
jpc_tsfb_synthesize(tcomp->tsfb, tcomp->data);
}
/* Apply an inverse intercomponent transform if necessary. */
switch (tile->cp->mctid) {
case JPC_MCT_RCT:
if (dec->numcomps < 3) {
jas_eprintf("RCT requires at least three components\n");
return -1;
}
if (!jas_image_cmpt_domains_same(dec->image)) {
jas_eprintf("RCT requires all components have the same domain\n");
return -1;
}
jpc_irct(tile->tcomps[0].data, tile->tcomps[1].data,
tile->tcomps[2].data);
break;
case JPC_MCT_ICT:
if (dec->numcomps < 3) {
jas_eprintf("ICT requires at least three components\n");
return -1;
}
if (!jas_image_cmpt_domains_same(dec->image)) {
jas_eprintf("RCT requires all components have the same domain\n");
return -1;
}
jpc_iict(tile->tcomps[0].data, tile->tcomps[1].data,
tile->tcomps[2].data);
break;
}
/* Perform rounding and convert to integer values. */
if (tile->realmode) {
for (compno = 0, tcomp = tile->tcomps; compno < dec->numcomps;
++compno, ++tcomp) {
for (i = 0; i < jas_matrix_numrows(tcomp->data); ++i) {
for (j = 0; j < jas_matrix_numcols(tcomp->data); ++j) {
v = jas_matrix_get(tcomp->data, i, j);
v = jpc_fix_round(v);
jas_matrix_set(tcomp->data, i, j, jpc_fixtoint(v));
}
}
}
}
/* Perform level shift. */
for (compno = 0, tcomp = tile->tcomps, cmpt = dec->cmpts; compno <
dec->numcomps; ++compno, ++tcomp, ++cmpt) {
adjust = cmpt->sgnd ? 0 : (1 << (cmpt->prec - 1));
for (i = 0; i < jas_matrix_numrows(tcomp->data); ++i) {
for (j = 0; j < jas_matrix_numcols(tcomp->data); ++j) {
*jas_matrix_getref(tcomp->data, i, j) += adjust;
}
}
}
/* Perform clipping. */
for (compno = 0, tcomp = tile->tcomps, cmpt = dec->cmpts; compno <
dec->numcomps; ++compno, ++tcomp, ++cmpt) {
jpc_fix_t mn;
jpc_fix_t mx;
mn = cmpt->sgnd ? (-(1 << (cmpt->prec - 1))) : (0);
mx = cmpt->sgnd ? ((1 << (cmpt->prec - 1)) - 1) : ((1 <<
cmpt->prec) - 1);
jas_matrix_clip(tcomp->data, mn, mx);
}
/* XXX need to free tsfb struct */
/* Write the data for each component of the image. */
for (compno = 0, tcomp = tile->tcomps, cmpt = dec->cmpts; compno <
dec->numcomps; ++compno, ++tcomp, ++cmpt) {
if (jas_image_writecmpt(dec->image, compno, tcomp->xstart -
JPC_CEILDIV(dec->xstart, cmpt->hstep), tcomp->ystart -
JPC_CEILDIV(dec->ystart, cmpt->vstep), jas_matrix_numcols(
tcomp->data), jas_matrix_numrows(tcomp->data), tcomp->data)) {
jas_eprintf("write component failed\n");
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
| 168,738 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int __glXDisp_CreateContext(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
{
xGLXCreateContextReq *req = (xGLXCreateContextReq *) pc;
__GLXconfig *config;
__GLXscreen *pGlxScreen;
int err;
if (!validGlxScreen(cl->client, req->screen, &pGlxScreen, &err))
return err;
if (!validGlxVisual(cl->client, pGlxScreen, req->visual, &config, &err))
config, pGlxScreen, req->isDirect);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | int __glXDisp_CreateContext(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
{
ClientPtr client = cl->client;
xGLXCreateContextReq *req = (xGLXCreateContextReq *) pc;
__GLXconfig *config;
__GLXscreen *pGlxScreen;
int err;
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xGLXCreateContextReq);
if (!validGlxScreen(cl->client, req->screen, &pGlxScreen, &err))
return err;
if (!validGlxVisual(cl->client, pGlxScreen, req->visual, &config, &err))
config, pGlxScreen, req->isDirect);
}
| 165,271 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int create_user_ns(struct cred *new)
{
struct user_namespace *ns, *parent_ns = new->user_ns;
kuid_t owner = new->euid;
kgid_t group = new->egid;
int ret;
/* The creator needs a mapping in the parent user namespace
* or else we won't be able to reasonably tell userspace who
* created a user_namespace.
*/
if (!kuid_has_mapping(parent_ns, owner) ||
!kgid_has_mapping(parent_ns, group))
return -EPERM;
ns = kmem_cache_zalloc(user_ns_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ns)
return -ENOMEM;
ret = proc_alloc_inum(&ns->proc_inum);
if (ret) {
kmem_cache_free(user_ns_cachep, ns);
return ret;
}
atomic_set(&ns->count, 1);
/* Leave the new->user_ns reference with the new user namespace. */
ns->parent = parent_ns;
ns->owner = owner;
ns->group = group;
set_cred_user_ns(new, ns);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: userns: Don't allow creation if the user is chrooted
Guarantee that the policy of which files may be access that is
established by setting the root directory will not be violated
by user namespaces by verifying that the root directory points
to the root of the mount namespace at the time of user namespace
creation.
Changing the root is a privileged operation, and as a matter of policy
it serves to limit unprivileged processes to files below the current
root directory.
For reasons of simplicity and comprehensibility the privilege to
change the root directory is gated solely on the CAP_SYS_CHROOT
capability in the user namespace. Therefore when creating a user
namespace we must ensure that the policy of which files may be access
can not be violated by changing the root directory.
Anyone who runs a processes in a chroot and would like to use user
namespace can setup the same view of filesystems with a mount
namespace instead. With this result that this is not a practical
limitation for using user namespaces.
Cc: [email protected]
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | int create_user_ns(struct cred *new)
{
struct user_namespace *ns, *parent_ns = new->user_ns;
kuid_t owner = new->euid;
kgid_t group = new->egid;
int ret;
/*
* Verify that we can not violate the policy of which files
* may be accessed that is specified by the root directory,
* by verifing that the root directory is at the root of the
* mount namespace which allows all files to be accessed.
*/
if (current_chrooted())
return -EPERM;
/* The creator needs a mapping in the parent user namespace
* or else we won't be able to reasonably tell userspace who
* created a user_namespace.
*/
if (!kuid_has_mapping(parent_ns, owner) ||
!kgid_has_mapping(parent_ns, group))
return -EPERM;
ns = kmem_cache_zalloc(user_ns_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ns)
return -ENOMEM;
ret = proc_alloc_inum(&ns->proc_inum);
if (ret) {
kmem_cache_free(user_ns_cachep, ns);
return ret;
}
atomic_set(&ns->count, 1);
/* Leave the new->user_ns reference with the new user namespace. */
ns->parent = parent_ns;
ns->owner = owner;
ns->group = group;
set_cred_user_ns(new, ns);
return 0;
}
| 166,097 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: dissect_spoolss_keybuffer(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, dcerpc_info *di, guint8 *drep)
{
guint32 size;
int end_offset;
if (di->conformant_run)
return offset;
/* Dissect size and data */
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep,
hf_keybuffer_size, &size);
end_offset = offset + (size*2);
if (end_offset < offset) {
/*
* Overflow - make the end offset one past the end of
* the packet data, so we throw an exception (as the
* size is almost certainly too big).
*/
end_offset = tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset) + 1;
}
while (offset < end_offset)
offset = dissect_spoolss_uint16uni(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, drep, NULL, hf_keybuffer);
return offset;
}
Commit Message: SPOOLSS: Try to avoid an infinite loop.
Use tvb_reported_length_remaining in dissect_spoolss_uint16uni. Make
sure our offset always increments in dissect_spoolss_keybuffer.
Change-Id: I7017c9685bb2fa27161d80a03b8fca4ef630e793
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/14687
Reviewed-by: Gerald Combs <[email protected]>
Petri-Dish: Gerald Combs <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | dissect_spoolss_keybuffer(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, dcerpc_info *di, guint8 *drep)
{
guint32 size;
int end_offset;
if (di->conformant_run)
return offset;
/* Dissect size and data */
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep,
hf_keybuffer_size, &size);
end_offset = offset + (size*2);
if (end_offset < offset) {
/*
* Overflow - make the end offset one past the end of
* the packet data, so we throw an exception (as the
* size is almost certainly too big).
*/
end_offset = tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset) + 1;
}
while (offset > 0 && offset < end_offset) {
offset = dissect_spoolss_uint16uni(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, drep, NULL, hf_keybuffer);
}
return offset;
}
| 167,159 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_server_method(int ver)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
if (ver == SSL2_VERSION)
return(SSLv2_server_method());
#endif
if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
return(SSLv3_server_method());
else if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
return(TLSv1_server_method());
else if (ver == TLS1_1_VERSION)
return(TLSv1_1_server_method());
else
return(NULL);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310 | static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_server_method(int ver)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
if (ver == SSL2_VERSION)
return(SSLv2_server_method());
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
return(SSLv3_server_method());
#endif
if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
return(TLSv1_server_method());
else if (ver == TLS1_1_VERSION)
return(TLSv1_1_server_method());
else
return(NULL);
}
| 165,158 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void StreamingProcessor::releaseRecordingFrame(const sp<IMemory>& mem) {
ATRACE_CALL();
status_t res;
Mutex::Autolock m(mMutex);
ssize_t offset;
size_t size;
sp<IMemoryHeap> heap = mem->getMemory(&offset, &size);
if (heap->getHeapID() != mRecordingHeap->mHeap->getHeapID()) {
ALOGW("%s: Camera %d: Mismatched heap ID, ignoring release "
"(got %x, expected %x)", __FUNCTION__, mId,
heap->getHeapID(), mRecordingHeap->mHeap->getHeapID());
return;
}
VideoNativeMetadata *payload = reinterpret_cast<VideoNativeMetadata*>(
(uint8_t*)heap->getBase() + offset);
if (payload->eType != kMetadataBufferTypeANWBuffer) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Recording frame type invalid (got %x, expected %x)",
__FUNCTION__, mId, payload->eType,
kMetadataBufferTypeANWBuffer);
return;
}
size_t itemIndex;
for (itemIndex = 0; itemIndex < mRecordingBuffers.size(); itemIndex++) {
const BufferItem item = mRecordingBuffers[itemIndex];
if (item.mBuf != BufferItemConsumer::INVALID_BUFFER_SLOT &&
item.mGraphicBuffer->getNativeBuffer() == payload->pBuffer) {
break;
}
}
if (itemIndex == mRecordingBuffers.size()) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Can't find returned ANW Buffer %p in list of "
"outstanding buffers", __FUNCTION__, mId,
payload->pBuffer);
return;
}
ALOGVV("%s: Camera %d: Freeing returned ANW buffer %p index %d", __FUNCTION__,
mId, payload->pBuffer, itemIndex);
res = mRecordingConsumer->releaseBuffer(mRecordingBuffers[itemIndex]);
if (res != OK) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Unable to free recording frame "
"(Returned ANW buffer: %p): %s (%d)", __FUNCTION__,
mId, payload->pBuffer, strerror(-res), res);
return;
}
mRecordingBuffers.replaceAt(itemIndex);
mRecordingHeapFree++;
ALOGV_IF(mRecordingHeapFree == mRecordingHeapCount,
"%s: Camera %d: All %d recording buffers returned",
__FUNCTION__, mId, mRecordingHeapCount);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Camera: Adjust pointers to ANW buffers to avoid infoleak
Subtract address of a random static object from pointers being routed
through app process.
Bug: 28466701
Change-Id: Idcbfe81e9507433769672f3dc6d67db5eeed4e04
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void StreamingProcessor::releaseRecordingFrame(const sp<IMemory>& mem) {
ATRACE_CALL();
status_t res;
Mutex::Autolock m(mMutex);
ssize_t offset;
size_t size;
sp<IMemoryHeap> heap = mem->getMemory(&offset, &size);
if (heap->getHeapID() != mRecordingHeap->mHeap->getHeapID()) {
ALOGW("%s: Camera %d: Mismatched heap ID, ignoring release "
"(got %x, expected %x)", __FUNCTION__, mId,
heap->getHeapID(), mRecordingHeap->mHeap->getHeapID());
return;
}
VideoNativeMetadata *payload = reinterpret_cast<VideoNativeMetadata*>(
(uint8_t*)heap->getBase() + offset);
if (payload->eType != kMetadataBufferTypeANWBuffer) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Recording frame type invalid (got %x, expected %x)",
__FUNCTION__, mId, payload->eType,
kMetadataBufferTypeANWBuffer);
return;
}
// b/28466701
payload->pBuffer = (ANativeWindowBuffer*)(((uint8_t*)payload->pBuffer) +
ICameraRecordingProxy::getCommonBaseAddress());
size_t itemIndex;
for (itemIndex = 0; itemIndex < mRecordingBuffers.size(); itemIndex++) {
const BufferItem item = mRecordingBuffers[itemIndex];
if (item.mBuf != BufferItemConsumer::INVALID_BUFFER_SLOT &&
item.mGraphicBuffer->getNativeBuffer() == payload->pBuffer) {
break;
}
}
if (itemIndex == mRecordingBuffers.size()) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Can't find returned ANW Buffer %p in list of "
"outstanding buffers", __FUNCTION__, mId,
payload->pBuffer);
return;
}
ALOGVV("%s: Camera %d: Freeing returned ANW buffer %p index %d", __FUNCTION__,
mId, payload->pBuffer, itemIndex);
res = mRecordingConsumer->releaseBuffer(mRecordingBuffers[itemIndex]);
if (res != OK) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Unable to free recording frame "
"(Returned ANW buffer: %p): %s (%d)", __FUNCTION__,
mId, payload->pBuffer, strerror(-res), res);
return;
}
mRecordingBuffers.replaceAt(itemIndex);
mRecordingHeapFree++;
ALOGV_IF(mRecordingHeapFree == mRecordingHeapCount,
"%s: Camera %d: All %d recording buffers returned",
__FUNCTION__, mId, mRecordingHeapCount);
}
| 173,512 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int jpc_pi_nextpcrl(register jpc_pi_t *pi)
{
int rlvlno;
jpc_pirlvl_t *pirlvl;
jpc_pchg_t *pchg;
int prchind;
int prcvind;
int *prclyrno;
int compno;
jpc_picomp_t *picomp;
int xstep;
int ystep;
uint_fast32_t trx0;
uint_fast32_t try0;
uint_fast32_t r;
uint_fast32_t rpx;
uint_fast32_t rpy;
pchg = pi->pchg;
if (!pi->prgvolfirst) {
goto skip;
} else {
pi->xstep = 0;
pi->ystep = 0;
for (compno = 0, picomp = pi->picomps; compno < pi->numcomps;
++compno, ++picomp) {
for (rlvlno = 0, pirlvl = picomp->pirlvls; rlvlno <
picomp->numrlvls; ++rlvlno, ++pirlvl) {
xstep = picomp->hsamp * (1 <<
(pirlvl->prcwidthexpn + picomp->numrlvls -
rlvlno - 1));
ystep = picomp->vsamp * (1 <<
(pirlvl->prcheightexpn + picomp->numrlvls -
rlvlno - 1));
pi->xstep = (!pi->xstep) ? xstep :
JAS_MIN(pi->xstep, xstep);
pi->ystep = (!pi->ystep) ? ystep :
JAS_MIN(pi->ystep, ystep);
}
}
pi->prgvolfirst = 0;
}
for (pi->y = pi->ystart; pi->y < pi->yend; pi->y += pi->ystep -
(pi->y % pi->ystep)) {
for (pi->x = pi->xstart; pi->x < pi->xend; pi->x += pi->xstep -
(pi->x % pi->xstep)) {
for (pi->compno = pchg->compnostart, pi->picomp =
&pi->picomps[pi->compno]; pi->compno < pi->numcomps
&& pi->compno < JAS_CAST(int, pchg->compnoend); ++pi->compno,
++pi->picomp) {
for (pi->rlvlno = pchg->rlvlnostart,
pi->pirlvl = &pi->picomp->pirlvls[pi->rlvlno];
pi->rlvlno < pi->picomp->numrlvls &&
pi->rlvlno < pchg->rlvlnoend; ++pi->rlvlno,
++pi->pirlvl) {
if (pi->pirlvl->numprcs == 0) {
continue;
}
r = pi->picomp->numrlvls - 1 - pi->rlvlno;
trx0 = JPC_CEILDIV(pi->xstart, pi->picomp->hsamp << r);
try0 = JPC_CEILDIV(pi->ystart, pi->picomp->vsamp << r);
rpx = r + pi->pirlvl->prcwidthexpn;
rpy = r + pi->pirlvl->prcheightexpn;
if (((pi->x == pi->xstart && ((trx0 << r) % (1 << rpx))) ||
!(pi->x % (pi->picomp->hsamp << rpx))) &&
((pi->y == pi->ystart && ((try0 << r) % (1 << rpy))) ||
!(pi->y % (pi->picomp->vsamp << rpy)))) {
prchind = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(JPC_CEILDIV(pi->x, pi->picomp->hsamp
<< r), pi->pirlvl->prcwidthexpn) - JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(trx0,
pi->pirlvl->prcwidthexpn);
prcvind = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(JPC_CEILDIV(pi->y, pi->picomp->vsamp
<< r), pi->pirlvl->prcheightexpn) - JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(try0,
pi->pirlvl->prcheightexpn);
pi->prcno = prcvind * pi->pirlvl->numhprcs + prchind;
assert(pi->prcno < pi->pirlvl->numprcs);
for (pi->lyrno = 0; pi->lyrno < pi->numlyrs &&
pi->lyrno < JAS_CAST(int, pchg->lyrnoend); ++pi->lyrno) {
prclyrno = &pi->pirlvl->prclyrnos[pi->prcno];
if (pi->lyrno >= *prclyrno) {
++(*prclyrno);
return 0;
}
skip:
;
}
}
}
}
}
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fixed numerous integer overflow problems in the code for packet iterators
in the JPC decoder.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static int jpc_pi_nextpcrl(register jpc_pi_t *pi)
{
int rlvlno;
jpc_pirlvl_t *pirlvl;
jpc_pchg_t *pchg;
int prchind;
int prcvind;
int *prclyrno;
int compno;
jpc_picomp_t *picomp;
int xstep;
int ystep;
uint_fast32_t trx0;
uint_fast32_t try0;
uint_fast32_t r;
uint_fast32_t rpx;
uint_fast32_t rpy;
pchg = pi->pchg;
if (!pi->prgvolfirst) {
goto skip;
} else {
pi->xstep = 0;
pi->ystep = 0;
for (compno = 0, picomp = pi->picomps; compno < pi->numcomps;
++compno, ++picomp) {
for (rlvlno = 0, pirlvl = picomp->pirlvls; rlvlno <
picomp->numrlvls; ++rlvlno, ++pirlvl) {
// Check for the potential for overflow problems.
if (pirlvl->prcwidthexpn + pi->picomp->numrlvls >
JAS_UINTFAST32_NUMBITS - 2 ||
pirlvl->prcheightexpn + pi->picomp->numrlvls >
JAS_UINTFAST32_NUMBITS - 2) {
return -1;
}
xstep = picomp->hsamp * (JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, 1) <<
(pirlvl->prcwidthexpn + picomp->numrlvls - rlvlno - 1));
ystep = picomp->vsamp * (JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, 1) <<
(pirlvl->prcheightexpn + picomp->numrlvls - rlvlno - 1));
pi->xstep = (!pi->xstep) ? xstep : JAS_MIN(pi->xstep, xstep);
pi->ystep = (!pi->ystep) ? ystep : JAS_MIN(pi->ystep, ystep);
}
}
pi->prgvolfirst = 0;
}
for (pi->y = pi->ystart; pi->y < pi->yend; pi->y += pi->ystep -
(pi->y % pi->ystep)) {
for (pi->x = pi->xstart; pi->x < pi->xend; pi->x += pi->xstep -
(pi->x % pi->xstep)) {
for (pi->compno = pchg->compnostart, pi->picomp =
&pi->picomps[pi->compno]; pi->compno < pi->numcomps
&& pi->compno < JAS_CAST(int, pchg->compnoend); ++pi->compno,
++pi->picomp) {
for (pi->rlvlno = pchg->rlvlnostart,
pi->pirlvl = &pi->picomp->pirlvls[pi->rlvlno];
pi->rlvlno < pi->picomp->numrlvls &&
pi->rlvlno < pchg->rlvlnoend; ++pi->rlvlno,
++pi->pirlvl) {
if (pi->pirlvl->numprcs == 0) {
continue;
}
r = pi->picomp->numrlvls - 1 - pi->rlvlno;
trx0 = JPC_CEILDIV(pi->xstart, pi->picomp->hsamp << r);
try0 = JPC_CEILDIV(pi->ystart, pi->picomp->vsamp << r);
rpx = r + pi->pirlvl->prcwidthexpn;
rpy = r + pi->pirlvl->prcheightexpn;
if (((pi->x == pi->xstart &&
((trx0 << r) % (JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, 1) << rpx))) ||
!(pi->x % (pi->picomp->hsamp << rpx))) &&
((pi->y == pi->ystart &&
((try0 << r) % (JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, 1) << rpy))) ||
!(pi->y % (pi->picomp->vsamp << rpy)))) {
prchind = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(JPC_CEILDIV(pi->x,
pi->picomp->hsamp << r), pi->pirlvl->prcwidthexpn) -
JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(trx0, pi->pirlvl->prcwidthexpn);
prcvind = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(JPC_CEILDIV(pi->y,
pi->picomp->vsamp << r), pi->pirlvl->prcheightexpn) -
JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(try0, pi->pirlvl->prcheightexpn);
pi->prcno = prcvind * pi->pirlvl->numhprcs + prchind;
assert(pi->prcno < pi->pirlvl->numprcs);
for (pi->lyrno = 0; pi->lyrno < pi->numlyrs &&
pi->lyrno < JAS_CAST(int, pchg->lyrnoend);
++pi->lyrno) {
prclyrno = &pi->pirlvl->prclyrnos[pi->prcno];
if (pi->lyrno >= *prclyrno) {
++(*prclyrno);
return 0;
}
skip:
;
}
}
}
}
}
}
return 1;
}
| 169,440 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: image_transform_png_set_expand_set(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
transform_display *that, png_structp pp, png_infop pi)
{
png_set_expand(pp);
this->next->set(this->next, that, pp, pi);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | image_transform_png_set_expand_set(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
image_transform_png_set_expand_set(const image_transform *this,
transform_display *that, png_structp pp, png_infop pi)
{
png_set_expand(pp);
if (that->this.has_tRNS)
that->this.is_transparent = 1;
this->next->set(this->next, that, pp, pi);
}
| 173,634 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int ff_mpeg4_decode_picture_header(Mpeg4DecContext *ctx, GetBitContext *gb)
{
MpegEncContext *s = &ctx->m;
unsigned startcode, v;
int ret;
int vol = 0;
/* search next start code */
align_get_bits(gb);
if (!s->studio_profile && s->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample != 8)
s->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample = 0;
if (s->codec_tag == AV_RL32("WV1F") && show_bits(gb, 24) == 0x575630) {
skip_bits(gb, 24);
if (get_bits(gb, 8) == 0xF0)
goto end;
}
startcode = 0xff;
for (;;) {
if (get_bits_count(gb) >= gb->size_in_bits) {
if (gb->size_in_bits == 8 &&
(ctx->divx_version >= 0 || ctx->xvid_build >= 0) || s->codec_tag == AV_RL32("QMP4")) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_VERBOSE, "frame skip %d\n", gb->size_in_bits);
return FRAME_SKIPPED; // divx bug
} else
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA; // end of stream
}
/* use the bits after the test */
v = get_bits(gb, 8);
startcode = ((startcode << 8) | v) & 0xffffffff;
if ((startcode & 0xFFFFFF00) != 0x100)
continue; // no startcode
if (s->avctx->debug & FF_DEBUG_STARTCODE) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "startcode: %3X ", startcode);
if (startcode <= 0x11F)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Video Object Start");
else if (startcode <= 0x12F)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Video Object Layer Start");
else if (startcode <= 0x13F)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Reserved");
else if (startcode <= 0x15F)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "FGS bp start");
else if (startcode <= 0x1AF)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Reserved");
else if (startcode == 0x1B0)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Visual Object Seq Start");
else if (startcode == 0x1B1)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Visual Object Seq End");
else if (startcode == 0x1B2)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "User Data");
else if (startcode == 0x1B3)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Group of VOP start");
else if (startcode == 0x1B4)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Video Session Error");
else if (startcode == 0x1B5)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Visual Object Start");
else if (startcode == 0x1B6)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Video Object Plane start");
else if (startcode == 0x1B7)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "slice start");
else if (startcode == 0x1B8)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "extension start");
else if (startcode == 0x1B9)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "fgs start");
else if (startcode == 0x1BA)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "FBA Object start");
else if (startcode == 0x1BB)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "FBA Object Plane start");
else if (startcode == 0x1BC)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Mesh Object start");
else if (startcode == 0x1BD)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Mesh Object Plane start");
else if (startcode == 0x1BE)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Still Texture Object start");
else if (startcode == 0x1BF)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Texture Spatial Layer start");
else if (startcode == 0x1C0)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Texture SNR Layer start");
else if (startcode == 0x1C1)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Texture Tile start");
else if (startcode == 0x1C2)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Texture Shape Layer start");
else if (startcode == 0x1C3)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "stuffing start");
else if (startcode <= 0x1C5)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "reserved");
else if (startcode <= 0x1FF)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "System start");
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, " at %d\n", get_bits_count(gb));
}
if (startcode >= 0x120 && startcode <= 0x12F) {
if (vol) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Ignoring multiple VOL headers\n");
continue;
}
vol++;
if ((ret = decode_vol_header(ctx, gb)) < 0)
return ret;
} else if (startcode == USER_DATA_STARTCODE) {
decode_user_data(ctx, gb);
} else if (startcode == GOP_STARTCODE) {
mpeg4_decode_gop_header(s, gb);
} else if (startcode == VOS_STARTCODE) {
int profile, level;
mpeg4_decode_profile_level(s, gb, &profile, &level);
if (profile == FF_PROFILE_MPEG4_SIMPLE_STUDIO &&
(level > 0 && level < 9)) {
s->studio_profile = 1;
next_start_code_studio(gb);
extension_and_user_data(s, gb, 0);
} else if (s->studio_profile) {
avpriv_request_sample(s->avctx, "Mixes studio and non studio profile\n");
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
s->avctx->profile = profile;
s->avctx->level = level;
} else if (startcode == VISUAL_OBJ_STARTCODE) {
if (s->studio_profile) {
if ((ret = decode_studiovisualobject(ctx, gb)) < 0)
return ret;
} else
mpeg4_decode_visual_object(s, gb);
} else if (startcode == VOP_STARTCODE) {
break;
}
align_get_bits(gb);
startcode = 0xff;
}
end:
if (s->avctx->flags & AV_CODEC_FLAG_LOW_DELAY)
s->low_delay = 1;
s->avctx->has_b_frames = !s->low_delay;
if (s->studio_profile) {
av_assert0(s->avctx->profile == FF_PROFILE_MPEG4_SIMPLE_STUDIO);
if (!s->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Missing VOL header\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
return decode_studio_vop_header(ctx, gb);
} else
return decode_vop_header(ctx, gb);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/mpeg4videodec: Remove use of FF_PROFILE_MPEG4_SIMPLE_STUDIO as indicator of studio profile
The profile field is changed by code inside and outside the decoder,
its not a reliable indicator of the internal codec state.
Maintaining it consistency with studio_profile is messy.
Its easier to just avoid it and use only studio_profile
Fixes: assertion failure
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_9.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru Razvan Caciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | int ff_mpeg4_decode_picture_header(Mpeg4DecContext *ctx, GetBitContext *gb)
{
MpegEncContext *s = &ctx->m;
unsigned startcode, v;
int ret;
int vol = 0;
/* search next start code */
align_get_bits(gb);
if (!s->studio_profile && s->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample != 8)
s->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample = 0;
if (s->codec_tag == AV_RL32("WV1F") && show_bits(gb, 24) == 0x575630) {
skip_bits(gb, 24);
if (get_bits(gb, 8) == 0xF0)
goto end;
}
startcode = 0xff;
for (;;) {
if (get_bits_count(gb) >= gb->size_in_bits) {
if (gb->size_in_bits == 8 &&
(ctx->divx_version >= 0 || ctx->xvid_build >= 0) || s->codec_tag == AV_RL32("QMP4")) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_VERBOSE, "frame skip %d\n", gb->size_in_bits);
return FRAME_SKIPPED; // divx bug
} else
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA; // end of stream
}
/* use the bits after the test */
v = get_bits(gb, 8);
startcode = ((startcode << 8) | v) & 0xffffffff;
if ((startcode & 0xFFFFFF00) != 0x100)
continue; // no startcode
if (s->avctx->debug & FF_DEBUG_STARTCODE) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "startcode: %3X ", startcode);
if (startcode <= 0x11F)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Video Object Start");
else if (startcode <= 0x12F)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Video Object Layer Start");
else if (startcode <= 0x13F)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Reserved");
else if (startcode <= 0x15F)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "FGS bp start");
else if (startcode <= 0x1AF)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Reserved");
else if (startcode == 0x1B0)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Visual Object Seq Start");
else if (startcode == 0x1B1)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Visual Object Seq End");
else if (startcode == 0x1B2)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "User Data");
else if (startcode == 0x1B3)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Group of VOP start");
else if (startcode == 0x1B4)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Video Session Error");
else if (startcode == 0x1B5)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Visual Object Start");
else if (startcode == 0x1B6)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Video Object Plane start");
else if (startcode == 0x1B7)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "slice start");
else if (startcode == 0x1B8)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "extension start");
else if (startcode == 0x1B9)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "fgs start");
else if (startcode == 0x1BA)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "FBA Object start");
else if (startcode == 0x1BB)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "FBA Object Plane start");
else if (startcode == 0x1BC)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Mesh Object start");
else if (startcode == 0x1BD)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Mesh Object Plane start");
else if (startcode == 0x1BE)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Still Texture Object start");
else if (startcode == 0x1BF)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Texture Spatial Layer start");
else if (startcode == 0x1C0)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Texture SNR Layer start");
else if (startcode == 0x1C1)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Texture Tile start");
else if (startcode == 0x1C2)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Texture Shape Layer start");
else if (startcode == 0x1C3)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "stuffing start");
else if (startcode <= 0x1C5)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "reserved");
else if (startcode <= 0x1FF)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "System start");
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, " at %d\n", get_bits_count(gb));
}
if (startcode >= 0x120 && startcode <= 0x12F) {
if (vol) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Ignoring multiple VOL headers\n");
continue;
}
vol++;
if ((ret = decode_vol_header(ctx, gb)) < 0)
return ret;
} else if (startcode == USER_DATA_STARTCODE) {
decode_user_data(ctx, gb);
} else if (startcode == GOP_STARTCODE) {
mpeg4_decode_gop_header(s, gb);
} else if (startcode == VOS_STARTCODE) {
int profile, level;
mpeg4_decode_profile_level(s, gb, &profile, &level);
if (profile == FF_PROFILE_MPEG4_SIMPLE_STUDIO &&
(level > 0 && level < 9)) {
s->studio_profile = 1;
next_start_code_studio(gb);
extension_and_user_data(s, gb, 0);
} else if (s->studio_profile) {
avpriv_request_sample(s->avctx, "Mixes studio and non studio profile\n");
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
s->avctx->profile = profile;
s->avctx->level = level;
} else if (startcode == VISUAL_OBJ_STARTCODE) {
if (s->studio_profile) {
if ((ret = decode_studiovisualobject(ctx, gb)) < 0)
return ret;
} else
mpeg4_decode_visual_object(s, gb);
} else if (startcode == VOP_STARTCODE) {
break;
}
align_get_bits(gb);
startcode = 0xff;
}
end:
if (s->avctx->flags & AV_CODEC_FLAG_LOW_DELAY)
s->low_delay = 1;
s->avctx->has_b_frames = !s->low_delay;
if (s->studio_profile) {
if (!s->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Missing VOL header\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
return decode_studio_vop_header(ctx, gb);
} else
return decode_vop_header(ctx, gb);
}
| 169,157 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: GURL DevToolsWindow::GetDevToolsURL(Profile* profile,
const GURL& base_url,
bool shared_worker_frontend,
bool v8_only_frontend,
const std::string& remote_frontend,
bool can_dock) {
if (base_url.SchemeIs("data"))
return base_url;
std::string frontend_url(
!remote_frontend.empty() ?
remote_frontend :
base_url.is_empty() ? chrome::kChromeUIDevToolsURL : base_url.spec());
std::string url_string(
frontend_url +
((frontend_url.find("?") == std::string::npos) ? "?" : "&"));
if (shared_worker_frontend)
url_string += "&isSharedWorker=true";
if (v8_only_frontend)
url_string += "&v8only=true";
if (remote_frontend.size()) {
url_string += "&remoteFrontend=true";
} else {
url_string += "&remoteBase=" + DevToolsUI::GetRemoteBaseURL().spec();
}
if (can_dock)
url_string += "&can_dock=true";
return GURL(url_string);
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Move sanitize url to devtools_ui.cc.
Compatibility script is not reliable enough.
BUG=653134
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2403633002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#425814}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | GURL DevToolsWindow::GetDevToolsURL(Profile* profile,
const GURL& base_url,
bool shared_worker_frontend,
bool v8_only_frontend,
const std::string& remote_frontend,
bool can_dock) {
if (base_url.SchemeIs("data"))
return base_url;
std::string frontend_url(
!remote_frontend.empty() ?
remote_frontend :
base_url.is_empty() ? chrome::kChromeUIDevToolsURL : base_url.spec());
std::string url_string(
frontend_url +
((frontend_url.find("?") == std::string::npos) ? "?" : "&"));
if (shared_worker_frontend)
url_string += "&isSharedWorker=true";
if (v8_only_frontend)
url_string += "&v8only=true";
if (remote_frontend.size()) {
url_string += "&remoteFrontend=true";
} else {
url_string += "&remoteBase=" + DevToolsUI::GetRemoteBaseURL().spec();
}
if (can_dock)
url_string += "&can_dock=true";
return DevToolsUI::SanitizeFrontendURL(GURL(url_string));
}
| 172,509 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: AccessType GetExtensionAccess(const Extension* extension,
const GURL& url,
int tab_id) {
bool allowed_script = IsAllowedScript(extension, url, tab_id);
bool allowed_capture = extension->permissions_data()->CanCaptureVisiblePage(
url, tab_id, nullptr);
if (allowed_script && allowed_capture)
return ALLOWED_SCRIPT_AND_CAPTURE;
if (allowed_script)
return ALLOWED_SCRIPT_ONLY;
if (allowed_capture)
return ALLOWED_CAPTURE_ONLY;
return DISALLOWED;
}
Commit Message: Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | AccessType GetExtensionAccess(const Extension* extension,
const GURL& url,
int tab_id) {
bool allowed_script = IsAllowedScript(extension, url, tab_id);
bool allowed_capture = extension->permissions_data()->CanCaptureVisiblePage(
url, tab_id, nullptr,
extensions::CaptureRequirement::kActiveTabOrAllUrls);
if (allowed_script && allowed_capture)
return ALLOWED_SCRIPT_AND_CAPTURE;
if (allowed_script)
return ALLOWED_SCRIPT_ONLY;
if (allowed_capture)
return ALLOWED_CAPTURE_ONLY;
return DISALLOWED;
}
| 173,008 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: char **XGetFontPath(
register Display *dpy,
int *npaths) /* RETURN */
{
xGetFontPathReply rep;
unsigned long nbytes = 0;
char **flist = NULL;
char *ch = NULL;
char *chend;
int count = 0;
register unsigned i;
register int length;
_X_UNUSED register xReq *req;
LockDisplay(dpy);
GetEmptyReq (GetFontPath, req);
(void) _XReply (dpy, (xReply *) &rep, 0, xFalse);
if (rep.nPaths) {
flist = Xmalloc(rep.nPaths * sizeof (char *));
if (rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) {
nbytes = (unsigned long) rep.length << 2;
ch = Xmalloc (nbytes + 1);
/* +1 to leave room for last null-terminator */
}
if ((! flist) || (! ch)) {
Xfree(flist);
Xfree(ch);
_XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (char **) NULL;
}
_XReadPad (dpy, ch, nbytes);
/*
* unpack into null terminated strings.
*/
chend = ch + (nbytes + 1);
length = *ch;
for (i = 0; i < rep.nPaths; i++) {
if (ch + length < chend) {
flist[i] = ch+1; /* skip over length */
ch += length + 1; /* find next length ... */
length = *ch;
*ch = '\0'; /* and replace with null-termination */
count++;
} else
flist[i] = NULL;
}
}
*npaths = count;
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (flist);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-682 | char **XGetFontPath(
register Display *dpy,
int *npaths) /* RETURN */
{
xGetFontPathReply rep;
unsigned long nbytes = 0;
char **flist = NULL;
char *ch = NULL;
char *chend;
int count = 0;
register unsigned i;
register int length;
_X_UNUSED register xReq *req;
LockDisplay(dpy);
GetEmptyReq (GetFontPath, req);
(void) _XReply (dpy, (xReply *) &rep, 0, xFalse);
if (rep.nPaths) {
flist = Xmalloc(rep.nPaths * sizeof (char *));
if (rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) {
nbytes = (unsigned long) rep.length << 2;
ch = Xmalloc (nbytes + 1);
/* +1 to leave room for last null-terminator */
}
if ((! flist) || (! ch)) {
Xfree(flist);
Xfree(ch);
_XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (char **) NULL;
}
_XReadPad (dpy, ch, nbytes);
/*
* unpack into null terminated strings.
*/
chend = ch + nbytes;
length = *ch;
for (i = 0; i < rep.nPaths; i++) {
if (ch + length < chend) {
flist[i] = ch+1; /* skip over length */
ch += length + 1; /* find next length ... */
length = *ch;
*ch = '\0'; /* and replace with null-termination */
count++;
} else
flist[i] = NULL;
}
}
*npaths = count;
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (flist);
}
| 164,748 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int kvm_ioctl_create_device(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_create_device *cd)
{
struct kvm_device_ops *ops = NULL;
struct kvm_device *dev;
bool test = cd->flags & KVM_CREATE_DEVICE_TEST;
int ret;
if (cd->type >= ARRAY_SIZE(kvm_device_ops_table))
return -ENODEV;
ops = kvm_device_ops_table[cd->type];
if (ops == NULL)
return -ENODEV;
if (test)
return 0;
dev = kzalloc(sizeof(*dev), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dev)
return -ENOMEM;
dev->ops = ops;
dev->kvm = kvm;
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
ret = ops->create(dev, cd->type);
if (ret < 0) {
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
kfree(dev);
return ret;
}
list_add(&dev->vm_node, &kvm->devices);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
if (ops->init)
ops->init(dev);
ret = anon_inode_getfd(ops->name, &kvm_device_fops, dev, O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC);
if (ret < 0) {
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
list_del(&dev->vm_node);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
ops->destroy(dev);
return ret;
}
kvm_get_kvm(kvm);
cd->fd = ret;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: kvm: fix kvm_ioctl_create_device() reference counting (CVE-2019-6974)
kvm_ioctl_create_device() does the following:
1. creates a device that holds a reference to the VM object (with a borrowed
reference, the VM's refcount has not been bumped yet)
2. initializes the device
3. transfers the reference to the device to the caller's file descriptor table
4. calls kvm_get_kvm() to turn the borrowed reference to the VM into a real
reference
The ownership transfer in step 3 must not happen before the reference to the VM
becomes a proper, non-borrowed reference, which only happens in step 4.
After step 3, an attacker can close the file descriptor and drop the borrowed
reference, which can cause the refcount of the kvm object to drop to zero.
This means that we need to grab a reference for the device before
anon_inode_getfd(), otherwise the VM can disappear from under us.
Fixes: 852b6d57dc7f ("kvm: add device control API")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | static int kvm_ioctl_create_device(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_create_device *cd)
{
struct kvm_device_ops *ops = NULL;
struct kvm_device *dev;
bool test = cd->flags & KVM_CREATE_DEVICE_TEST;
int ret;
if (cd->type >= ARRAY_SIZE(kvm_device_ops_table))
return -ENODEV;
ops = kvm_device_ops_table[cd->type];
if (ops == NULL)
return -ENODEV;
if (test)
return 0;
dev = kzalloc(sizeof(*dev), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dev)
return -ENOMEM;
dev->ops = ops;
dev->kvm = kvm;
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
ret = ops->create(dev, cd->type);
if (ret < 0) {
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
kfree(dev);
return ret;
}
list_add(&dev->vm_node, &kvm->devices);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
if (ops->init)
ops->init(dev);
kvm_get_kvm(kvm);
ret = anon_inode_getfd(ops->name, &kvm_device_fops, dev, O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC);
if (ret < 0) {
kvm_put_kvm(kvm);
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
list_del(&dev->vm_node);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
ops->destroy(dev);
return ret;
}
cd->fd = ret;
return 0;
}
| 169,741 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int __vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
int r;
struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
vcpu->srcu_idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
r = vapic_enter(vcpu);
if (r) {
srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, vcpu->srcu_idx);
return r;
}
r = 1;
while (r > 0) {
if (vcpu->arch.mp_state == KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE &&
!vcpu->arch.apf.halted)
r = vcpu_enter_guest(vcpu);
else {
srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, vcpu->srcu_idx);
kvm_vcpu_block(vcpu);
vcpu->srcu_idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_UNHALT, vcpu)) {
kvm_apic_accept_events(vcpu);
switch(vcpu->arch.mp_state) {
case KVM_MP_STATE_HALTED:
vcpu->arch.pv.pv_unhalted = false;
vcpu->arch.mp_state =
KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE;
case KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE:
vcpu->arch.apf.halted = false;
break;
case KVM_MP_STATE_INIT_RECEIVED:
break;
default:
r = -EINTR;
break;
}
}
}
if (r <= 0)
break;
clear_bit(KVM_REQ_PENDING_TIMER, &vcpu->requests);
if (kvm_cpu_has_pending_timer(vcpu))
kvm_inject_pending_timer_irqs(vcpu);
if (dm_request_for_irq_injection(vcpu)) {
r = -EINTR;
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTR;
++vcpu->stat.request_irq_exits;
}
kvm_check_async_pf_completion(vcpu);
if (signal_pending(current)) {
r = -EINTR;
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTR;
++vcpu->stat.signal_exits;
}
if (need_resched()) {
srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, vcpu->srcu_idx);
kvm_resched(vcpu);
vcpu->srcu_idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
}
}
srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, vcpu->srcu_idx);
vapic_exit(vcpu);
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert vapic synchronization to _cached functions (CVE-2013-6368)
In kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic and kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic there is the
potential to corrupt kernel memory if userspace provides an address that
is at the end of a page. This patches concerts those functions to use
kvm_write_guest_cached and kvm_read_guest_cached. It also checks the
vapic_address specified by userspace during ioctl processing and returns
an error to userspace if the address is not a valid GPA.
This is generally not guest triggerable, because the required write is
done by firmware that runs before the guest. Also, it only affects AMD
processors and oldish Intel that do not have the FlexPriority feature
(unless you disable FlexPriority, of course; then newer processors are
also affected).
Fixes: b93463aa59d6 ('KVM: Accelerated apic support')
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static int __vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
int r;
struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
vcpu->srcu_idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
r = 1;
while (r > 0) {
if (vcpu->arch.mp_state == KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE &&
!vcpu->arch.apf.halted)
r = vcpu_enter_guest(vcpu);
else {
srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, vcpu->srcu_idx);
kvm_vcpu_block(vcpu);
vcpu->srcu_idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_UNHALT, vcpu)) {
kvm_apic_accept_events(vcpu);
switch(vcpu->arch.mp_state) {
case KVM_MP_STATE_HALTED:
vcpu->arch.pv.pv_unhalted = false;
vcpu->arch.mp_state =
KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE;
case KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE:
vcpu->arch.apf.halted = false;
break;
case KVM_MP_STATE_INIT_RECEIVED:
break;
default:
r = -EINTR;
break;
}
}
}
if (r <= 0)
break;
clear_bit(KVM_REQ_PENDING_TIMER, &vcpu->requests);
if (kvm_cpu_has_pending_timer(vcpu))
kvm_inject_pending_timer_irqs(vcpu);
if (dm_request_for_irq_injection(vcpu)) {
r = -EINTR;
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTR;
++vcpu->stat.request_irq_exits;
}
kvm_check_async_pf_completion(vcpu);
if (signal_pending(current)) {
r = -EINTR;
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTR;
++vcpu->stat.signal_exits;
}
if (need_resched()) {
srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, vcpu->srcu_idx);
kvm_resched(vcpu);
vcpu->srcu_idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
}
}
srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, vcpu->srcu_idx);
return r;
}
| 165,947 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool xmp_init()
{
RESET_ERROR;
try {
bool result = SXMPFiles::Initialize(kXMPFiles_IgnoreLocalText);
SXMPMeta::SetDefaultErrorCallback(&_xmp_error_callback, nullptr, 1);
return result;
SXMPMeta::SetDefaultErrorCallback(&_xmp_error_callback, nullptr, 1);
return result;
}
catch (const XMP_Error &e) {
set_error(e);
}
return false;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | bool xmp_init()
{
RESET_ERROR;
try {
// XMP SDK 5.1.2 needs this because it has been stripped off local
// text conversion the one that was done in Exempi with libiconv.
bool result = SXMPFiles::Initialize(kXMPFiles_IgnoreLocalText);
SXMPMeta::SetDefaultErrorCallback(&_xmp_error_callback, nullptr, 1);
return result;
SXMPMeta::SetDefaultErrorCallback(&_xmp_error_callback, nullptr, 1);
return result;
}
catch (const XMP_Error &e) {
set_error(e);
}
return false;
}
| 165,368 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: struct bpf_map *bpf_map_get_with_uref(u32 ufd)
{
struct fd f = fdget(ufd);
struct bpf_map *map;
map = __bpf_map_get(f);
if (IS_ERR(map))
return map;
bpf_map_inc(map, true);
fdput(f);
return map;
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix refcnt overflow
On a system with >32Gbyte of phyiscal memory and infinite RLIMIT_MEMLOCK,
the malicious application may overflow 32-bit bpf program refcnt.
It's also possible to overflow map refcnt on 1Tb system.
Impose 32k hard limit which means that the same bpf program or
map cannot be shared by more than 32k processes.
Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | struct bpf_map *bpf_map_get_with_uref(u32 ufd)
{
struct fd f = fdget(ufd);
struct bpf_map *map;
map = __bpf_map_get(f);
if (IS_ERR(map))
return map;
map = bpf_map_inc(map, true);
fdput(f);
return map;
}
| 167,252 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: GpuProcessHost::GpuProcessHost(int host_id, GpuProcessKind kind)
: host_id_(host_id),
gpu_process_(base::kNullProcessHandle),
in_process_(false),
software_rendering_(false),
kind_(kind),
process_launched_(false) {
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kSingleProcess) ||
CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kInProcessGPU))
in_process_ = true;
DCHECK(!in_process_ || g_gpu_process_hosts[kind] == NULL);
g_gpu_process_hosts[kind] = this;
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI,
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(base::IgnoreResult(&GpuProcessHostUIShim::Create), host_id));
process_.reset(
new BrowserChildProcessHostImpl(content::PROCESS_TYPE_GPU, this));
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | GpuProcessHost::GpuProcessHost(int host_id, GpuProcessKind kind)
: host_id_(host_id),
in_process_(false),
software_rendering_(false),
kind_(kind),
process_launched_(false) {
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kSingleProcess) ||
CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kInProcessGPU))
in_process_ = true;
DCHECK(!in_process_ || g_gpu_process_hosts[kind] == NULL);
g_gpu_process_hosts[kind] = this;
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI,
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(base::IgnoreResult(&GpuProcessHostUIShim::Create), host_id));
process_.reset(
new BrowserChildProcessHostImpl(content::PROCESS_TYPE_GPU, this));
}
| 170,921 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int DecodeTeredo(ThreadVars *tv, DecodeThreadVars *dtv, Packet *p, uint8_t *pkt, uint16_t len, PacketQueue *pq)
{
if (!g_teredo_enabled)
return TM_ECODE_FAILED;
uint8_t *start = pkt;
/* Is this packet to short to contain an IPv6 packet ? */
if (len < IPV6_HEADER_LEN)
return TM_ECODE_FAILED;
/* Teredo encapsulate IPv6 in UDP and can add some custom message
* part before the IPv6 packet. In our case, we just want to get
* over an ORIGIN indication. So we just make one offset if needed. */
if (start[0] == 0x0) {
switch (start[1]) {
/* origin indication: compatible with tunnel */
case 0x0:
/* offset is coherent with len and presence of an IPv6 header */
if (len >= TEREDO_ORIG_INDICATION_LENGTH + IPV6_HEADER_LEN)
start += TEREDO_ORIG_INDICATION_LENGTH;
else
return TM_ECODE_FAILED;
break;
/* authentication: negotiation not real tunnel */
case 0x1:
return TM_ECODE_FAILED;
/* this case is not possible in Teredo: not that protocol */
default:
return TM_ECODE_FAILED;
}
}
/* There is no specific field that we can check to prove that the packet
* is a Teredo packet. We've zapped here all the possible Teredo header
* and we should have an IPv6 packet at the start pointer.
* We then can only do two checks before sending the encapsulated packets
* to decoding:
* - The packet has a protocol version which is IPv6.
* - The IPv6 length of the packet matches what remains in buffer.
*/
if (IP_GET_RAW_VER(start) == 6) {
IPV6Hdr *thdr = (IPV6Hdr *)start;
if (len == IPV6_HEADER_LEN +
IPV6_GET_RAW_PLEN(thdr) + (start - pkt)) {
if (pq != NULL) {
int blen = len - (start - pkt);
/* spawn off tunnel packet */
Packet *tp = PacketTunnelPktSetup(tv, dtv, p, start, blen,
DECODE_TUNNEL_IPV6, pq);
if (tp != NULL) {
PKT_SET_SRC(tp, PKT_SRC_DECODER_TEREDO);
/* add the tp to the packet queue. */
PacketEnqueue(pq,tp);
StatsIncr(tv, dtv->counter_teredo);
return TM_ECODE_OK;
}
}
}
return TM_ECODE_FAILED;
}
return TM_ECODE_FAILED;
}
Commit Message: teredo: be stricter on what to consider valid teredo
Invalid Teredo can lead to valid DNS traffic (or other UDP traffic)
being misdetected as Teredo. This leads to false negatives in the
UDP payload inspection.
Make the teredo code only consider a packet teredo if the encapsulated
data was decoded without any 'invalid' events being set.
Bug #2736.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | int DecodeTeredo(ThreadVars *tv, DecodeThreadVars *dtv, Packet *p, uint8_t *pkt, uint16_t len, PacketQueue *pq)
{
if (!g_teredo_enabled)
return TM_ECODE_FAILED;
uint8_t *start = pkt;
/* Is this packet to short to contain an IPv6 packet ? */
if (len < IPV6_HEADER_LEN)
return TM_ECODE_FAILED;
/* Teredo encapsulate IPv6 in UDP and can add some custom message
* part before the IPv6 packet. In our case, we just want to get
* over an ORIGIN indication. So we just make one offset if needed. */
if (start[0] == 0x0) {
switch (start[1]) {
/* origin indication: compatible with tunnel */
case 0x0:
/* offset is coherent with len and presence of an IPv6 header */
if (len >= TEREDO_ORIG_INDICATION_LENGTH + IPV6_HEADER_LEN)
start += TEREDO_ORIG_INDICATION_LENGTH;
else
return TM_ECODE_FAILED;
break;
/* authentication: negotiation not real tunnel */
case 0x1:
return TM_ECODE_FAILED;
/* this case is not possible in Teredo: not that protocol */
default:
return TM_ECODE_FAILED;
}
}
/* There is no specific field that we can check to prove that the packet
* is a Teredo packet. We've zapped here all the possible Teredo header
* and we should have an IPv6 packet at the start pointer.
* We then can only do a few checks before sending the encapsulated packets
* to decoding:
* - The packet has a protocol version which is IPv6.
* - The IPv6 length of the packet matches what remains in buffer.
* - HLIM is 0. This would technically be valid, but still weird.
* - NH 0 (HOP) and not enough data.
*
* If all these conditions are met, the tunnel decoder will be called.
* If the packet gets an invalid event set, it will still be rejected.
*/
if (IP_GET_RAW_VER(start) == 6) {
IPV6Hdr *thdr = (IPV6Hdr *)start;
/* ignore hoplimit 0 packets, most likely an artifact of bad detection */
if (IPV6_GET_RAW_HLIM(thdr) == 0)
return TM_ECODE_FAILED;
/* if nh is 0 (HOP) with little data we have a bogus packet */
if (IPV6_GET_RAW_NH(thdr) == 0 && IPV6_GET_RAW_PLEN(thdr) < 8)
return TM_ECODE_FAILED;
if (len == IPV6_HEADER_LEN +
IPV6_GET_RAW_PLEN(thdr) + (start - pkt)) {
if (pq != NULL) {
int blen = len - (start - pkt);
/* spawn off tunnel packet */
Packet *tp = PacketTunnelPktSetup(tv, dtv, p, start, blen,
DECODE_TUNNEL_IPV6_TEREDO, pq);
if (tp != NULL) {
PKT_SET_SRC(tp, PKT_SRC_DECODER_TEREDO);
/* add the tp to the packet queue. */
PacketEnqueue(pq,tp);
StatsIncr(tv, dtv->counter_teredo);
return TM_ECODE_OK;
}
}
}
return TM_ECODE_FAILED;
}
return TM_ECODE_FAILED;
}
| 169,477 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftRaw::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 0 && pcmParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
pcmParams->eNumData = OMX_NumericalDataSigned;
pcmParams->eEndian = OMX_EndianBig;
pcmParams->bInterleaved = OMX_TRUE;
pcmParams->nBitPerSample = 16;
pcmParams->ePCMMode = OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeLinear;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[0] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelLF;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[1] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelRF;
pcmParams->nChannels = mChannelCount;
pcmParams->nSamplingRate = mSampleRate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftRaw::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(pcmParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 0 && pcmParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
pcmParams->eNumData = OMX_NumericalDataSigned;
pcmParams->eEndian = OMX_EndianBig;
pcmParams->bInterleaved = OMX_TRUE;
pcmParams->nBitPerSample = 16;
pcmParams->ePCMMode = OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeLinear;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[0] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelLF;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[1] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelRF;
pcmParams->nChannels = mChannelCount;
pcmParams->nSamplingRate = mSampleRate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
| 174,218 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool ReceiverWasAdded(const RtpTransceiverState& transceiver_state) {
uintptr_t receiver_id = RTCRtpReceiver::getId(
transceiver_state.receiver_state()->webrtc_receiver().get());
for (const auto& receiver : handler_->rtp_receivers_) {
if (receiver->Id() == receiver_id)
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Check weak pointers in RTCPeerConnectionHandler::WebRtcSetDescriptionObserverImpl
Bug: 912074
Change-Id: I8ba86751f5d5bf12db51520f985ef0d3dae63ed8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1411916
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#622945}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | bool ReceiverWasAdded(const RtpTransceiverState& transceiver_state) {
DCHECK(handler_);
uintptr_t receiver_id = RTCRtpReceiver::getId(
transceiver_state.receiver_state()->webrtc_receiver().get());
for (const auto& receiver : handler_->rtp_receivers_) {
if (receiver->Id() == receiver_id)
return false;
}
return true;
}
| 173,076 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: INLINE UWORD8 impeg2d_bit_stream_get_bit(stream_t *ps_stream)
{
UWORD32 u4_bit,u4_offset,u4_temp;
UWORD32 u4_curr_bit;
u4_offset = ps_stream->u4_offset;
u4_curr_bit = u4_offset & 0x1F;
u4_bit = ps_stream->u4_buf;
/* Move the current bit read from the current word to the
least significant bit positions of 'c'.*/
u4_bit >>= BITS_IN_INT - u4_curr_bit - 1;
u4_offset++;
/* If the last bit of the last word of the buffer has been read update
the currrent buf with next, and read next buf from bit stream buffer */
if (u4_curr_bit == 31)
{
ps_stream->u4_buf = ps_stream->u4_buf_nxt;
u4_temp = *(ps_stream->pu4_buf_aligned)++;
CONV_LE_TO_BE(ps_stream->u4_buf_nxt,u4_temp)
}
ps_stream->u4_offset = u4_offset;
return (u4_bit & 0x1);
}
Commit Message: Fixed bit stream access to make sure that it is not read beyond the allocated size.
Bug: 25765591
Change-Id: I98c23a3c3f84f6710f29bffe5ed73adcf51d47f6
CWE ID: CWE-254 | INLINE UWORD8 impeg2d_bit_stream_get_bit(stream_t *ps_stream)
{
UWORD32 u4_bit,u4_offset,u4_temp;
UWORD32 u4_curr_bit;
u4_offset = ps_stream->u4_offset;
u4_curr_bit = u4_offset & 0x1F;
u4_bit = ps_stream->u4_buf;
/* Move the current bit read from the current word to the
least significant bit positions of 'c'.*/
u4_bit >>= BITS_IN_INT - u4_curr_bit - 1;
u4_offset++;
/* If the last bit of the last word of the buffer has been read update
the currrent buf with next, and read next buf from bit stream buffer */
if (u4_curr_bit == 31)
{
ps_stream->u4_buf = ps_stream->u4_buf_nxt;
if (ps_stream->u4_offset < ps_stream->u4_max_offset)
{
u4_temp = *(ps_stream->pu4_buf_aligned)++;
CONV_LE_TO_BE(ps_stream->u4_buf_nxt,u4_temp)
}
}
ps_stream->u4_offset = u4_offset;
return (u4_bit & 0x1);
}
| 173,942 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: config_monitor(
config_tree *ptree
)
{
int_node *pfilegen_token;
const char *filegen_string;
const char *filegen_file;
FILEGEN *filegen;
filegen_node *my_node;
attr_val *my_opts;
int filegen_type;
int filegen_flag;
/* Set the statistics directory */
if (ptree->stats_dir)
stats_config(STATS_STATSDIR, ptree->stats_dir);
/* NOTE:
* Calling filegen_get is brain dead. Doing a string
* comparison to find the relavant filegen structure is
* expensive.
*
* Through the parser, we already know which filegen is
* being specified. Hence, we should either store a
* pointer to the specified structure in the syntax tree
* or an index into a filegen array.
*
* Need to change the filegen code to reflect the above.
*/
/* Turn on the specified statistics */
pfilegen_token = HEAD_PFIFO(ptree->stats_list);
for (; pfilegen_token != NULL; pfilegen_token = pfilegen_token->link) {
filegen_string = keyword(pfilegen_token->i);
filegen = filegen_get(filegen_string);
DPRINTF(4, ("enabling filegen for %s statistics '%s%s'\n",
filegen_string, filegen->prefix,
filegen->basename));
filegen->flag |= FGEN_FLAG_ENABLED;
}
/* Configure the statistics with the options */
my_node = HEAD_PFIFO(ptree->filegen_opts);
for (; my_node != NULL; my_node = my_node->link) {
filegen_file = keyword(my_node->filegen_token);
filegen = filegen_get(filegen_file);
/* Initialize the filegen variables to their pre-configuration states */
filegen_flag = filegen->flag;
filegen_type = filegen->type;
/* "filegen ... enabled" is the default (when filegen is used) */
filegen_flag |= FGEN_FLAG_ENABLED;
my_opts = HEAD_PFIFO(my_node->options);
for (; my_opts != NULL; my_opts = my_opts->link) {
switch (my_opts->attr) {
case T_File:
filegen_file = my_opts->value.s;
break;
case T_Type:
switch (my_opts->value.i) {
default:
NTP_INSIST(0);
break;
case T_None:
filegen_type = FILEGEN_NONE;
break;
case T_Pid:
filegen_type = FILEGEN_PID;
break;
case T_Day:
filegen_type = FILEGEN_DAY;
break;
case T_Week:
filegen_type = FILEGEN_WEEK;
break;
case T_Month:
filegen_type = FILEGEN_MONTH;
break;
case T_Year:
filegen_type = FILEGEN_YEAR;
break;
case T_Age:
filegen_type = FILEGEN_AGE;
break;
}
break;
case T_Flag:
switch (my_opts->value.i) {
case T_Link:
filegen_flag |= FGEN_FLAG_LINK;
break;
case T_Nolink:
filegen_flag &= ~FGEN_FLAG_LINK;
break;
case T_Enable:
filegen_flag |= FGEN_FLAG_ENABLED;
break;
case T_Disable:
filegen_flag &= ~FGEN_FLAG_ENABLED;
break;
default:
msyslog(LOG_ERR,
"Unknown filegen flag token %d",
my_opts->value.i);
exit(1);
}
break;
default:
msyslog(LOG_ERR,
"Unknown filegen option token %d",
my_opts->attr);
exit(1);
}
}
filegen_config(filegen, filegen_file, filegen_type,
filegen_flag);
}
}
Commit Message: [Bug 1773] openssl not detected during ./configure.
[Bug 1774] Segfaults if cryptostats enabled and built without OpenSSL.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | config_monitor(
config_tree *ptree
)
{
int_node *pfilegen_token;
const char *filegen_string;
const char *filegen_file;
FILEGEN *filegen;
filegen_node *my_node;
attr_val *my_opts;
int filegen_type;
int filegen_flag;
/* Set the statistics directory */
if (ptree->stats_dir)
stats_config(STATS_STATSDIR, ptree->stats_dir);
/* NOTE:
* Calling filegen_get is brain dead. Doing a string
* comparison to find the relavant filegen structure is
* expensive.
*
* Through the parser, we already know which filegen is
* being specified. Hence, we should either store a
* pointer to the specified structure in the syntax tree
* or an index into a filegen array.
*
* Need to change the filegen code to reflect the above.
*/
/* Turn on the specified statistics */
pfilegen_token = HEAD_PFIFO(ptree->stats_list);
for (; pfilegen_token != NULL; pfilegen_token = pfilegen_token->link) {
filegen_string = keyword(pfilegen_token->i);
filegen = filegen_get(filegen_string);
if (NULL == filegen) {
msyslog(LOG_ERR,
"stats %s unrecognized",
filegen_string);
continue;
}
DPRINTF(4, ("enabling filegen for %s statistics '%s%s'\n",
filegen_string, filegen->prefix,
filegen->basename));
filegen->flag |= FGEN_FLAG_ENABLED;
}
/* Configure the statistics with the options */
my_node = HEAD_PFIFO(ptree->filegen_opts);
for (; my_node != NULL; my_node = my_node->link) {
filegen_file = keyword(my_node->filegen_token);
filegen = filegen_get(filegen_file);
if (NULL == filegen) {
msyslog(LOG_ERR,
"filegen category '%s' unrecognized",
filegen_file);
continue;
}
/* Initialize the filegen variables to their pre-configuration states */
filegen_flag = filegen->flag;
filegen_type = filegen->type;
/* "filegen ... enabled" is the default (when filegen is used) */
filegen_flag |= FGEN_FLAG_ENABLED;
my_opts = HEAD_PFIFO(my_node->options);
for (; my_opts != NULL; my_opts = my_opts->link) {
switch (my_opts->attr) {
case T_File:
filegen_file = my_opts->value.s;
break;
case T_Type:
switch (my_opts->value.i) {
default:
NTP_INSIST(0);
break;
case T_None:
filegen_type = FILEGEN_NONE;
break;
case T_Pid:
filegen_type = FILEGEN_PID;
break;
case T_Day:
filegen_type = FILEGEN_DAY;
break;
case T_Week:
filegen_type = FILEGEN_WEEK;
break;
case T_Month:
filegen_type = FILEGEN_MONTH;
break;
case T_Year:
filegen_type = FILEGEN_YEAR;
break;
case T_Age:
filegen_type = FILEGEN_AGE;
break;
}
break;
case T_Flag:
switch (my_opts->value.i) {
case T_Link:
filegen_flag |= FGEN_FLAG_LINK;
break;
case T_Nolink:
filegen_flag &= ~FGEN_FLAG_LINK;
break;
case T_Enable:
filegen_flag |= FGEN_FLAG_ENABLED;
break;
case T_Disable:
filegen_flag &= ~FGEN_FLAG_ENABLED;
break;
default:
msyslog(LOG_ERR,
"Unknown filegen flag token %d",
my_opts->value.i);
exit(1);
}
break;
default:
msyslog(LOG_ERR,
"Unknown filegen option token %d",
my_opts->attr);
exit(1);
}
}
filegen_config(filegen, filegen_file, filegen_type,
filegen_flag);
}
}
| 168,875 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long mkvparser::UnserializeInt(
IMkvReader* pReader,
long long pos,
long size,
long long& result)
{
assert(pReader);
assert(pos >= 0);
assert(size > 0);
assert(size <= 8);
{
signed char b;
const long status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, (unsigned char*)&b);
if (status < 0)
return status;
result = b;
++pos;
}
for (long i = 1; i < size; ++i)
{
unsigned char b;
const long status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &b);
if (status < 0)
return status;
result <<= 8;
result |= b;
++pos;
}
return 0; //success
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long mkvparser::UnserializeInt(
if (size_ >= LONG_MAX) // we need (size+1) chars
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
const long size = static_cast<long>(size_);
str = new (std::nothrow) char[size + 1];
if (str == NULL)
return -1;
unsigned char* const buf = reinterpret_cast<unsigned char*>(str);
const long status = pReader->Read(pos, size, buf);
| 174,448 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int em_sysenter(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
const struct x86_emulate_ops *ops = ctxt->ops;
struct desc_struct cs, ss;
u64 msr_data;
u16 cs_sel, ss_sel;
u64 efer = 0;
ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_EFER, &efer);
/* inject #GP if in real mode */
if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_REAL)
return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
/*
* Not recognized on AMD in compat mode (but is recognized in legacy
* mode).
*/
if ((ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32) && (efer & EFER_LMA)
&& !vendor_intel(ctxt))
return emulate_ud(ctxt);
/* sysenter/sysexit have not been tested in 64bit mode. */
if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64)
return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
setup_syscalls_segments(ctxt, &cs, &ss);
ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, &msr_data);
switch (ctxt->mode) {
case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32:
if ((msr_data & 0xfffc) == 0x0)
return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
break;
case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64:
if (msr_data == 0x0)
return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
break;
default:
break;
}
ctxt->eflags &= ~(EFLG_VM | EFLG_IF);
cs_sel = (u16)msr_data;
cs_sel &= ~SELECTOR_RPL_MASK;
ss_sel = cs_sel + 8;
ss_sel &= ~SELECTOR_RPL_MASK;
if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64 || (efer & EFER_LMA)) {
cs.d = 0;
cs.l = 1;
}
ops->set_segment(ctxt, cs_sel, &cs, 0, VCPU_SREG_CS);
ops->set_segment(ctxt, ss_sel, &ss, 0, VCPU_SREG_SS);
ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, &msr_data);
ctxt->_eip = msr_data;
ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, &msr_data);
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSP) = msr_data;
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: SYSENTER emulation is broken
SYSENTER emulation is broken in several ways:
1. It misses the case of 16-bit code segments completely (CVE-2015-0239).
2. MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS is checked in 64-bit mode incorrectly (bits 0 and 1 can
still be set without causing #GP).
3. MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP and MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP are not masked in
legacy-mode.
4. There is some unneeded code.
Fix it.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | static int em_sysenter(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
const struct x86_emulate_ops *ops = ctxt->ops;
struct desc_struct cs, ss;
u64 msr_data;
u16 cs_sel, ss_sel;
u64 efer = 0;
ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_EFER, &efer);
/* inject #GP if in real mode */
if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_REAL)
return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
/*
* Not recognized on AMD in compat mode (but is recognized in legacy
* mode).
*/
if ((ctxt->mode != X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64) && (efer & EFER_LMA)
&& !vendor_intel(ctxt))
return emulate_ud(ctxt);
/* sysenter/sysexit have not been tested in 64bit mode. */
if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64)
return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
setup_syscalls_segments(ctxt, &cs, &ss);
ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, &msr_data);
if ((msr_data & 0xfffc) == 0x0)
return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
ctxt->eflags &= ~(EFLG_VM | EFLG_IF);
cs_sel = (u16)msr_data & ~SELECTOR_RPL_MASK;
ss_sel = cs_sel + 8;
if (efer & EFER_LMA) {
cs.d = 0;
cs.l = 1;
}
ops->set_segment(ctxt, cs_sel, &cs, 0, VCPU_SREG_CS);
ops->set_segment(ctxt, ss_sel, &ss, 0, VCPU_SREG_SS);
ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, &msr_data);
ctxt->_eip = (efer & EFER_LMA) ? msr_data : (u32)msr_data;
ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, &msr_data);
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSP) = (efer & EFER_LMA) ? msr_data :
(u32)msr_data;
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
| 166,742 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void AppCacheHost::SelectCache(const GURL& document_url,
const int64 cache_document_was_loaded_from,
const GURL& manifest_url) {
DCHECK(pending_start_update_callback_.is_null() &&
pending_swap_cache_callback_.is_null() &&
pending_get_status_callback_.is_null() &&
!is_selection_pending() && !was_select_cache_called_);
was_select_cache_called_ = true;
if (!is_cache_selection_enabled_) {
FinishCacheSelection(NULL, NULL);
return;
}
origin_in_use_ = document_url.GetOrigin();
if (service()->quota_manager_proxy() && !origin_in_use_.is_empty())
service()->quota_manager_proxy()->NotifyOriginInUse(origin_in_use_);
if (main_resource_blocked_)
frontend_->OnContentBlocked(host_id_,
blocked_manifest_url_);
if (cache_document_was_loaded_from != kAppCacheNoCacheId) {
LoadSelectedCache(cache_document_was_loaded_from);
return;
}
if (!manifest_url.is_empty() &&
(manifest_url.GetOrigin() == document_url.GetOrigin())) {
DCHECK(!first_party_url_.is_empty());
AppCachePolicy* policy = service()->appcache_policy();
if (policy &&
!policy->CanCreateAppCache(manifest_url, first_party_url_)) {
FinishCacheSelection(NULL, NULL);
std::vector<int> host_ids(1, host_id_);
frontend_->OnEventRaised(host_ids, APPCACHE_CHECKING_EVENT);
frontend_->OnErrorEventRaised(
host_ids,
AppCacheErrorDetails(
"Cache creation was blocked by the content policy",
APPCACHE_POLICY_ERROR,
GURL(),
0,
false /*is_cross_origin*/));
frontend_->OnContentBlocked(host_id_, manifest_url);
return;
}
set_preferred_manifest_url(manifest_url);
new_master_entry_url_ = document_url;
LoadOrCreateGroup(manifest_url);
return;
}
FinishCacheSelection(NULL, NULL);
}
Commit Message: Fix possible map::end() dereference in AppCacheUpdateJob triggered by a compromised renderer.
BUG=551044
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1418783005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#358815}
CWE ID: | void AppCacheHost::SelectCache(const GURL& document_url,
bool AppCacheHost::SelectCache(const GURL& document_url,
const int64 cache_document_was_loaded_from,
const GURL& manifest_url) {
if (was_select_cache_called_)
return false;
DCHECK(pending_start_update_callback_.is_null() &&
pending_swap_cache_callback_.is_null() &&
pending_get_status_callback_.is_null() &&
!is_selection_pending());
was_select_cache_called_ = true;
if (!is_cache_selection_enabled_) {
FinishCacheSelection(NULL, NULL);
return true;
}
origin_in_use_ = document_url.GetOrigin();
if (service()->quota_manager_proxy() && !origin_in_use_.is_empty())
service()->quota_manager_proxy()->NotifyOriginInUse(origin_in_use_);
if (main_resource_blocked_)
frontend_->OnContentBlocked(host_id_,
blocked_manifest_url_);
if (cache_document_was_loaded_from != kAppCacheNoCacheId) {
LoadSelectedCache(cache_document_was_loaded_from);
return true;
}
if (!manifest_url.is_empty() &&
(manifest_url.GetOrigin() == document_url.GetOrigin())) {
DCHECK(!first_party_url_.is_empty());
AppCachePolicy* policy = service()->appcache_policy();
if (policy &&
!policy->CanCreateAppCache(manifest_url, first_party_url_)) {
FinishCacheSelection(NULL, NULL);
std::vector<int> host_ids(1, host_id_);
frontend_->OnEventRaised(host_ids, APPCACHE_CHECKING_EVENT);
frontend_->OnErrorEventRaised(
host_ids,
AppCacheErrorDetails(
"Cache creation was blocked by the content policy",
APPCACHE_POLICY_ERROR,
GURL(),
0,
false /*is_cross_origin*/));
frontend_->OnContentBlocked(host_id_, manifest_url);
return true;
}
set_preferred_manifest_url(manifest_url);
new_master_entry_url_ = document_url;
LoadOrCreateGroup(manifest_url);
return true;
}
FinishCacheSelection(NULL, NULL);
return true;
}
| 171,740 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: hstore_from_arrays(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
int32 buflen;
HStore *out;
Pairs *pairs;
Datum *key_datums;
bool *key_nulls;
int key_count;
Datum *value_datums;
bool *value_nulls;
int value_count;
ArrayType *key_array;
ArrayType *value_array;
int i;
if (PG_ARGISNULL(0))
PG_RETURN_NULL();
key_array = PG_GETARG_ARRAYTYPE_P(0);
Assert(ARR_ELEMTYPE(key_array) == TEXTOID);
/*
* must check >1 rather than != 1 because empty arrays have 0 dimensions,
* not 1
*/
if (ARR_NDIM(key_array) > 1)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_ARRAY_SUBSCRIPT_ERROR),
errmsg("wrong number of array subscripts")));
deconstruct_array(key_array,
TEXTOID, -1, false, 'i',
&key_datums, &key_nulls, &key_count);
/* value_array might be NULL */
if (PG_ARGISNULL(1))
{
value_array = NULL;
value_count = key_count;
value_datums = NULL;
value_nulls = NULL;
}
else
{
value_array = PG_GETARG_ARRAYTYPE_P(1);
Assert(ARR_ELEMTYPE(value_array) == TEXTOID);
if (ARR_NDIM(value_array) > 1)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_ARRAY_SUBSCRIPT_ERROR),
errmsg("wrong number of array subscripts")));
if ((ARR_NDIM(key_array) > 0 || ARR_NDIM(value_array) > 0) &&
(ARR_NDIM(key_array) != ARR_NDIM(value_array) ||
ARR_DIMS(key_array)[0] != ARR_DIMS(value_array)[0] ||
ARR_LBOUND(key_array)[0] != ARR_LBOUND(value_array)[0]))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_ARRAY_SUBSCRIPT_ERROR),
errmsg("arrays must have same bounds")));
deconstruct_array(value_array,
TEXTOID, -1, false, 'i',
&value_datums, &value_nulls, &value_count);
Assert(key_count == value_count);
}
pairs = palloc(key_count * sizeof(Pairs));
for (i = 0; i < key_count; ++i)
{
if (key_nulls[i])
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_NULL_VALUE_NOT_ALLOWED),
errmsg("null value not allowed for hstore key")));
if (!value_nulls || value_nulls[i])
{
pairs[i].key = VARDATA_ANY(key_datums[i]);
pairs[i].val = NULL;
pairs[i].keylen = hstoreCheckKeyLen(VARSIZE_ANY_EXHDR(key_datums[i]));
pairs[i].vallen = 4;
pairs[i].isnull = true;
pairs[i].needfree = false;
}
else
{
pairs[i].key = VARDATA_ANY(key_datums[i]);
pairs[i].val = VARDATA_ANY(value_datums[i]);
pairs[i].keylen = hstoreCheckKeyLen(VARSIZE_ANY_EXHDR(key_datums[i]));
pairs[i].vallen = hstoreCheckValLen(VARSIZE_ANY_EXHDR(value_datums[i]));
pairs[i].isnull = false;
pairs[i].needfree = false;
}
}
key_count = hstoreUniquePairs(pairs, key_count, &buflen);
out = hstorePairs(pairs, key_count, buflen);
PG_RETURN_POINTER(out);
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | hstore_from_arrays(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
int32 buflen;
HStore *out;
Pairs *pairs;
Datum *key_datums;
bool *key_nulls;
int key_count;
Datum *value_datums;
bool *value_nulls;
int value_count;
ArrayType *key_array;
ArrayType *value_array;
int i;
if (PG_ARGISNULL(0))
PG_RETURN_NULL();
key_array = PG_GETARG_ARRAYTYPE_P(0);
Assert(ARR_ELEMTYPE(key_array) == TEXTOID);
/*
* must check >1 rather than != 1 because empty arrays have 0 dimensions,
* not 1
*/
if (ARR_NDIM(key_array) > 1)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_ARRAY_SUBSCRIPT_ERROR),
errmsg("wrong number of array subscripts")));
deconstruct_array(key_array,
TEXTOID, -1, false, 'i',
&key_datums, &key_nulls, &key_count);
/* see discussion in hstoreArrayToPairs() */
if (key_count > MaxAllocSize / sizeof(Pairs))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_PROGRAM_LIMIT_EXCEEDED),
errmsg("number of pairs (%d) exceeds the maximum allowed (%d)",
key_count, (int) (MaxAllocSize / sizeof(Pairs)))));
/* value_array might be NULL */
if (PG_ARGISNULL(1))
{
value_array = NULL;
value_count = key_count;
value_datums = NULL;
value_nulls = NULL;
}
else
{
value_array = PG_GETARG_ARRAYTYPE_P(1);
Assert(ARR_ELEMTYPE(value_array) == TEXTOID);
if (ARR_NDIM(value_array) > 1)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_ARRAY_SUBSCRIPT_ERROR),
errmsg("wrong number of array subscripts")));
if ((ARR_NDIM(key_array) > 0 || ARR_NDIM(value_array) > 0) &&
(ARR_NDIM(key_array) != ARR_NDIM(value_array) ||
ARR_DIMS(key_array)[0] != ARR_DIMS(value_array)[0] ||
ARR_LBOUND(key_array)[0] != ARR_LBOUND(value_array)[0]))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_ARRAY_SUBSCRIPT_ERROR),
errmsg("arrays must have same bounds")));
deconstruct_array(value_array,
TEXTOID, -1, false, 'i',
&value_datums, &value_nulls, &value_count);
Assert(key_count == value_count);
}
pairs = palloc(key_count * sizeof(Pairs));
for (i = 0; i < key_count; ++i)
{
if (key_nulls[i])
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_NULL_VALUE_NOT_ALLOWED),
errmsg("null value not allowed for hstore key")));
if (!value_nulls || value_nulls[i])
{
pairs[i].key = VARDATA_ANY(key_datums[i]);
pairs[i].val = NULL;
pairs[i].keylen = hstoreCheckKeyLen(VARSIZE_ANY_EXHDR(key_datums[i]));
pairs[i].vallen = 4;
pairs[i].isnull = true;
pairs[i].needfree = false;
}
else
{
pairs[i].key = VARDATA_ANY(key_datums[i]);
pairs[i].val = VARDATA_ANY(value_datums[i]);
pairs[i].keylen = hstoreCheckKeyLen(VARSIZE_ANY_EXHDR(key_datums[i]));
pairs[i].vallen = hstoreCheckValLen(VARSIZE_ANY_EXHDR(value_datums[i]));
pairs[i].isnull = false;
pairs[i].needfree = false;
}
}
key_count = hstoreUniquePairs(pairs, key_count, &buflen);
out = hstorePairs(pairs, key_count, buflen);
PG_RETURN_POINTER(out);
}
| 166,397 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: copy_thread(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long stack_start,
unsigned long stk_sz, struct task_struct *p)
{
struct thread_info *thread = task_thread_info(p);
struct pt_regs *childregs = task_pt_regs(p);
memset(&thread->cpu_context, 0, sizeof(struct cpu_context_save));
if (likely(!(p->flags & PF_KTHREAD))) {
*childregs = *current_pt_regs();
childregs->ARM_r0 = 0;
if (stack_start)
childregs->ARM_sp = stack_start;
} else {
memset(childregs, 0, sizeof(struct pt_regs));
thread->cpu_context.r4 = stk_sz;
thread->cpu_context.r5 = stack_start;
childregs->ARM_cpsr = SVC_MODE;
}
thread->cpu_context.pc = (unsigned long)ret_from_fork;
thread->cpu_context.sp = (unsigned long)childregs;
clear_ptrace_hw_breakpoint(p);
if (clone_flags & CLONE_SETTLS)
thread->tp_value = childregs->ARM_r3;
thread_notify(THREAD_NOTIFY_COPY, thread);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ARM: 7735/2: Preserve the user r/w register TPIDRURW on context switch and fork
Since commit 6a1c53124aa1 the user writeable TLS register was zeroed to
prevent it from being used as a covert channel between two tasks.
There are more and more applications coming to Windows RT,
Wine could support them, but mostly they expect to have
the thread environment block (TEB) in TPIDRURW.
This patch preserves that register per thread instead of clearing it.
Unlike the TPIDRURO, which is already switched, the TPIDRURW
can be updated from userspace so needs careful treatment in the case that we
modify TPIDRURW and call fork(). To avoid this we must always read
TPIDRURW in copy_thread.
Signed-off-by: André Hentschel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Austin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | copy_thread(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long stack_start,
unsigned long stk_sz, struct task_struct *p)
{
struct thread_info *thread = task_thread_info(p);
struct pt_regs *childregs = task_pt_regs(p);
memset(&thread->cpu_context, 0, sizeof(struct cpu_context_save));
if (likely(!(p->flags & PF_KTHREAD))) {
*childregs = *current_pt_regs();
childregs->ARM_r0 = 0;
if (stack_start)
childregs->ARM_sp = stack_start;
} else {
memset(childregs, 0, sizeof(struct pt_regs));
thread->cpu_context.r4 = stk_sz;
thread->cpu_context.r5 = stack_start;
childregs->ARM_cpsr = SVC_MODE;
}
thread->cpu_context.pc = (unsigned long)ret_from_fork;
thread->cpu_context.sp = (unsigned long)childregs;
clear_ptrace_hw_breakpoint(p);
if (clone_flags & CLONE_SETTLS)
thread->tp_value[0] = childregs->ARM_r3;
thread->tp_value[1] = get_tpuser();
thread_notify(THREAD_NOTIFY_COPY, thread);
return 0;
}
| 167,579 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void HTMLFormControlElement::updateVisibleValidationMessage() {
Page* page = document().page();
if (!page)
return;
String message;
if (layoutObject() && willValidate())
message = validationMessage().stripWhiteSpace();
m_hasValidationMessage = true;
ValidationMessageClient* client = &page->validationMessageClient();
TextDirection messageDir = LTR;
TextDirection subMessageDir = LTR;
String subMessage = validationSubMessage().stripWhiteSpace();
if (message.isEmpty())
client->hideValidationMessage(*this);
else
findCustomValidationMessageTextDirection(message, messageDir, subMessage,
subMessageDir);
client->showValidationMessage(*this, message, messageDir, subMessage,
subMessageDir);
}
Commit Message: Form validation: Do not show validation bubble if the page is invisible.
BUG=673163
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2572813003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#438476}
CWE ID: CWE-1021 | void HTMLFormControlElement::updateVisibleValidationMessage() {
Page* page = document().page();
if (!page || !page->isPageVisible())
return;
String message;
if (layoutObject() && willValidate())
message = validationMessage().stripWhiteSpace();
m_hasValidationMessage = true;
ValidationMessageClient* client = &page->validationMessageClient();
TextDirection messageDir = LTR;
TextDirection subMessageDir = LTR;
String subMessage = validationSubMessage().stripWhiteSpace();
if (message.isEmpty())
client->hideValidationMessage(*this);
else
findCustomValidationMessageTextDirection(message, messageDir, subMessage,
subMessageDir);
client->showValidationMessage(*this, message, messageDir, subMessage,
subMessageDir);
}
| 172,492 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int snd_ctl_elem_write(struct snd_card *card, struct snd_ctl_file *file,
struct snd_ctl_elem_value *control)
{
struct snd_kcontrol *kctl;
struct snd_kcontrol_volatile *vd;
unsigned int index_offset;
int result;
down_read(&card->controls_rwsem);
kctl = snd_ctl_find_id(card, &control->id);
if (kctl == NULL) {
result = -ENOENT;
} else {
index_offset = snd_ctl_get_ioff(kctl, &control->id);
vd = &kctl->vd[index_offset];
if (!(vd->access & SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_WRITE) ||
kctl->put == NULL ||
(file && vd->owner && vd->owner != file)) {
result = -EPERM;
} else {
snd_ctl_build_ioff(&control->id, kctl, index_offset);
result = kctl->put(kctl, control);
}
if (result > 0) {
up_read(&card->controls_rwsem);
snd_ctl_notify(card, SNDRV_CTL_EVENT_MASK_VALUE,
&control->id);
return 0;
}
}
up_read(&card->controls_rwsem);
return result;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: control: Don't access controls outside of protected regions
A control that is visible on the card->controls list can be freed at any time.
This means we must not access any of its memory while not holding the
controls_rw_lock. Otherwise we risk a use after free access.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | static int snd_ctl_elem_write(struct snd_card *card, struct snd_ctl_file *file,
struct snd_ctl_elem_value *control)
{
struct snd_kcontrol *kctl;
struct snd_kcontrol_volatile *vd;
unsigned int index_offset;
int result;
down_read(&card->controls_rwsem);
kctl = snd_ctl_find_id(card, &control->id);
if (kctl == NULL) {
result = -ENOENT;
} else {
index_offset = snd_ctl_get_ioff(kctl, &control->id);
vd = &kctl->vd[index_offset];
if (!(vd->access & SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_WRITE) ||
kctl->put == NULL ||
(file && vd->owner && vd->owner != file)) {
result = -EPERM;
} else {
snd_ctl_build_ioff(&control->id, kctl, index_offset);
result = kctl->put(kctl, control);
}
if (result > 0) {
struct snd_ctl_elem_id id = control->id;
up_read(&card->controls_rwsem);
snd_ctl_notify(card, SNDRV_CTL_EVENT_MASK_VALUE, &id);
return 0;
}
}
up_read(&card->controls_rwsem);
return result;
}
| 166,293 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadCLIPBOARDImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
ssize_t
y;
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
{
HBITMAP
bitmapH;
HPALETTE
hPal;
OpenClipboard(NULL);
bitmapH=(HBITMAP) GetClipboardData(CF_BITMAP);
hPal=(HPALETTE) GetClipboardData(CF_PALETTE);
CloseClipboard();
if ( bitmapH == NULL )
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"NoBitmapOnClipboard");
{
BITMAPINFO
DIBinfo;
BITMAP
bitmap;
HBITMAP
hBitmap,
hOldBitmap;
HDC
hDC,
hMemDC;
RGBQUAD
*pBits,
*ppBits;
/* create an offscreen DC for the source */
hMemDC=CreateCompatibleDC(NULL);
hOldBitmap=(HBITMAP) SelectObject(hMemDC,bitmapH);
GetObject(bitmapH,sizeof(BITMAP),(LPSTR) &bitmap);
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
{
image->rows=bitmap.bmHeight;
image->columns=bitmap.bmWidth;
}
/*
Initialize the bitmap header info.
*/
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&DIBinfo,0,sizeof(BITMAPINFO));
DIBinfo.bmiHeader.biSize=sizeof(BITMAPINFOHEADER);
DIBinfo.bmiHeader.biWidth=(LONG) image->columns;
DIBinfo.bmiHeader.biHeight=(-1)*(LONG) image->rows;
DIBinfo.bmiHeader.biPlanes=1;
DIBinfo.bmiHeader.biBitCount=32;
DIBinfo.bmiHeader.biCompression=BI_RGB;
hDC=GetDC(NULL);
if (hDC == 0)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnableToCreateADC");
hBitmap=CreateDIBSection(hDC,&DIBinfo,DIB_RGB_COLORS,(void **) &ppBits,
NULL,0);
ReleaseDC(NULL,hDC);
if (hBitmap == 0)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnableToCreateBitmap");
/* create an offscreen DC */
hDC=CreateCompatibleDC(NULL);
if (hDC == 0)
{
DeleteObject(hBitmap);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnableToCreateADC");
}
hOldBitmap=(HBITMAP) SelectObject(hDC,hBitmap);
if (hOldBitmap == 0)
{
DeleteDC(hDC);
DeleteObject(hBitmap);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnableToCreateBitmap");
}
if (hPal != NULL)
{
/* Kenichi Masuko says this needed */
SelectPalette(hDC, hPal, FALSE);
RealizePalette(hDC);
}
/* bitblt from the memory to the DIB-based one */
BitBlt(hDC,0,0,(int) image->columns,(int) image->rows,hMemDC,0,0,SRCCOPY);
/* finally copy the pixels! */
pBits=ppBits;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(pBits->rgbRed));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(pBits->rgbGreen));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(pBits->rgbBlue));
SetPixelOpacity(q,OpaqueOpacity);
pBits++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
DeleteDC(hDC);
DeleteObject(hBitmap);
}
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static Image *ReadCLIPBOARDImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
ssize_t
y;
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
{
HBITMAP
bitmapH;
HPALETTE
hPal;
OpenClipboard(NULL);
bitmapH=(HBITMAP) GetClipboardData(CF_BITMAP);
hPal=(HPALETTE) GetClipboardData(CF_PALETTE);
CloseClipboard();
if (bitmapH == NULL)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"NoBitmapOnClipboard");
{
BITMAPINFO
DIBinfo;
BITMAP
bitmap;
HBITMAP
hBitmap,
hOldBitmap;
HDC
hDC,
hMemDC;
RGBQUAD
*pBits,
*ppBits;
/* create an offscreen DC for the source */
hMemDC=CreateCompatibleDC(NULL);
hOldBitmap=(HBITMAP) SelectObject(hMemDC,bitmapH);
GetObject(bitmapH,sizeof(BITMAP),(LPSTR) &bitmap);
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
{
image->columns=bitmap.bmWidth;
image->rows=bitmap.bmHeight;
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
/*
Initialize the bitmap header info.
*/
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&DIBinfo,0,sizeof(BITMAPINFO));
DIBinfo.bmiHeader.biSize=sizeof(BITMAPINFOHEADER);
DIBinfo.bmiHeader.biWidth=(LONG) image->columns;
DIBinfo.bmiHeader.biHeight=(-1)*(LONG) image->rows;
DIBinfo.bmiHeader.biPlanes=1;
DIBinfo.bmiHeader.biBitCount=32;
DIBinfo.bmiHeader.biCompression=BI_RGB;
hDC=GetDC(NULL);
if (hDC == 0)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnableToCreateADC");
hBitmap=CreateDIBSection(hDC,&DIBinfo,DIB_RGB_COLORS,(void **) &ppBits,
NULL,0);
ReleaseDC(NULL,hDC);
if (hBitmap == 0)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnableToCreateBitmap");
/* create an offscreen DC */
hDC=CreateCompatibleDC(NULL);
if (hDC == 0)
{
DeleteObject(hBitmap);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnableToCreateADC");
}
hOldBitmap=(HBITMAP) SelectObject(hDC,hBitmap);
if (hOldBitmap == 0)
{
DeleteDC(hDC);
DeleteObject(hBitmap);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnableToCreateBitmap");
}
if (hPal != NULL)
{
/* Kenichi Masuko says this needed */
SelectPalette(hDC, hPal, FALSE);
RealizePalette(hDC);
}
/* bitblt from the memory to the DIB-based one */
BitBlt(hDC,0,0,(int) image->columns,(int) image->rows,hMemDC,0,0,SRCCOPY);
/* finally copy the pixels! */
pBits=ppBits;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(pBits->rgbRed));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(pBits->rgbGreen));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(pBits->rgbBlue));
SetPixelOpacity(q,OpaqueOpacity);
pBits++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
DeleteDC(hDC);
DeleteObject(hBitmap);
}
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
| 168,552 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: findoprnd(ITEM *ptr, int32 *pos)
{
#ifdef BS_DEBUG
elog(DEBUG3, (ptr[*pos].type == OPR) ?
"%d %c" : "%d %d", *pos, ptr[*pos].val);
#endif
if (ptr[*pos].type == VAL)
{
ptr[*pos].left = 0;
(*pos)--;
}
else if (ptr[*pos].val == (int32) '!')
{
ptr[*pos].left = -1;
(*pos)--;
findoprnd(ptr, pos);
}
else
{
ITEM *curitem = &ptr[*pos];
int32 tmp = *pos;
(*pos)--;
findoprnd(ptr, pos);
curitem->left = *pos - tmp;
findoprnd(ptr, pos);
}
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | findoprnd(ITEM *ptr, int32 *pos)
{
/* since this function recurses, it could be driven to stack overflow. */
check_stack_depth();
#ifdef BS_DEBUG
elog(DEBUG3, (ptr[*pos].type == OPR) ?
"%d %c" : "%d %d", *pos, ptr[*pos].val);
#endif
if (ptr[*pos].type == VAL)
{
ptr[*pos].left = 0;
(*pos)--;
}
else if (ptr[*pos].val == (int32) '!')
{
ptr[*pos].left = -1;
(*pos)--;
findoprnd(ptr, pos);
}
else
{
ITEM *curitem = &ptr[*pos];
int32 tmp = *pos;
(*pos)--;
findoprnd(ptr, pos);
curitem->left = *pos - tmp;
findoprnd(ptr, pos);
}
}
| 166,403 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: netscreen_seek_read(wtap *wth, gint64 seek_off,
struct wtap_pkthdr *phdr, Buffer *buf,
int *err, gchar **err_info)
{
int pkt_len;
char line[NETSCREEN_LINE_LENGTH];
char cap_int[NETSCREEN_MAX_INT_NAME_LENGTH];
gboolean cap_dir;
char cap_dst[13];
if (file_seek(wth->random_fh, seek_off, SEEK_SET, err) == -1) {
return FALSE;
}
if (file_gets(line, NETSCREEN_LINE_LENGTH, wth->random_fh) == NULL) {
*err = file_error(wth->random_fh, err_info);
if (*err == 0) {
*err = WTAP_ERR_SHORT_READ;
}
return FALSE;
}
pkt_len = parse_netscreen_rec_hdr(phdr, line, cap_int, &cap_dir,
cap_dst, err, err_info);
if (pkt_len == -1)
return FALSE;
if (!parse_netscreen_hex_dump(wth->random_fh, pkt_len, cap_int,
cap_dst, phdr, buf, err, err_info))
return FALSE;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fix packet length handling.
Treat the packet length as unsigned - it shouldn't be negative in the
file. If it is, that'll probably cause the sscanf to fail, so we'll
report the file as bad.
Check it against WTAP_MAX_PACKET_SIZE to make sure we don't try to
allocate a huge amount of memory, just as we do in other file readers.
Use the now-validated packet size as the length in
ws_buffer_assure_space(), so we are certain to have enough space, and
don't allocate too much space.
Merge the header and packet data parsing routines while we're at it.
Bug: 12396
Change-Id: I7f981f9cdcbea7ecdeb88bfff2f12d875de2244f
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15176
Reviewed-by: Guy Harris <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | netscreen_seek_read(wtap *wth, gint64 seek_off,
struct wtap_pkthdr *phdr, Buffer *buf,
int *err, gchar **err_info)
{
char line[NETSCREEN_LINE_LENGTH];
if (file_seek(wth->random_fh, seek_off, SEEK_SET, err) == -1) {
return FALSE;
}
if (file_gets(line, NETSCREEN_LINE_LENGTH, wth->random_fh) == NULL) {
*err = file_error(wth->random_fh, err_info);
if (*err == 0) {
*err = WTAP_ERR_SHORT_READ;
}
return FALSE;
}
return parse_netscreen_packet(wth->random_fh, phdr, buf, line,
err, err_info);
}
| 167,147 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_info_header(FILE* IN, OPJ_BITMAPINFOHEADER* header)
{
memset(header, 0, sizeof(*header));
/* INFO HEADER */
/* ------------- */
header->biSize = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biSize |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biSize |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biSize |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
switch (header->biSize) {
case 12U: /* BITMAPCOREHEADER */
case 40U: /* BITMAPINFOHEADER */
case 52U: /* BITMAPV2INFOHEADER */
case 56U: /* BITMAPV3INFOHEADER */
case 108U: /* BITMAPV4HEADER */
case 124U: /* BITMAPV5HEADER */
break;
default:
fprintf(stderr, "Error, unknown BMP header size %d\n", header->biSize);
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
header->biWidth = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biWidth |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biWidth |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biWidth |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
header->biHeight = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biHeight |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biHeight |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biHeight |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
header->biPlanes = (OPJ_UINT16)getc(IN);
header->biPlanes |= (OPJ_UINT16)((OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8);
header->biBitCount = (OPJ_UINT16)getc(IN);
header->biBitCount |= (OPJ_UINT16)((OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8);
if (header->biSize >= 40U) {
header->biCompression = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biCompression |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biCompression |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biCompression |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
header->biSizeImage = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biSizeImage |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biSizeImage |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biSizeImage |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
header->biXpelsPerMeter = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biXpelsPerMeter |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biXpelsPerMeter |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biXpelsPerMeter |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
header->biYpelsPerMeter = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biYpelsPerMeter |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biYpelsPerMeter |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biYpelsPerMeter |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
header->biClrUsed = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biClrUsed |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biClrUsed |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biClrUsed |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
header->biClrImportant = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biClrImportant |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biClrImportant |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biClrImportant |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
}
if (header->biSize >= 56U) {
header->biRedMask = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biRedMask |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biRedMask |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biRedMask |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
header->biGreenMask = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biGreenMask |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biGreenMask |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biGreenMask |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
header->biBlueMask = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biBlueMask |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biBlueMask |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biBlueMask |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
header->biAlphaMask = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biAlphaMask |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biAlphaMask |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biAlphaMask |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
}
if (header->biSize >= 108U) {
header->biColorSpaceType = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biColorSpaceType |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biColorSpaceType |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biColorSpaceType |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
if (fread(&(header->biColorSpaceEP), 1U, sizeof(header->biColorSpaceEP),
IN) != sizeof(header->biColorSpaceEP)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error, can't read BMP header\n");
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
header->biRedGamma = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biRedGamma |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biRedGamma |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biRedGamma |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
header->biGreenGamma = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biGreenGamma |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biGreenGamma |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biGreenGamma |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
header->biBlueGamma = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biBlueGamma |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biBlueGamma |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biBlueGamma |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
}
if (header->biSize >= 124U) {
header->biIntent = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biIntent |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biIntent |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biIntent |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
header->biIccProfileData = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biIccProfileData |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biIccProfileData |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biIccProfileData |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
header->biIccProfileSize = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biIccProfileSize |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biIccProfileSize |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biIccProfileSize |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
header->biReserved = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biReserved |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biReserved |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biReserved |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
}
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: bmp_read_info_header(): reject bmp files with biBitCount == 0 (#983)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_info_header(FILE* IN, OPJ_BITMAPINFOHEADER* header)
{
memset(header, 0, sizeof(*header));
/* INFO HEADER */
/* ------------- */
header->biSize = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biSize |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biSize |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biSize |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
switch (header->biSize) {
case 12U: /* BITMAPCOREHEADER */
case 40U: /* BITMAPINFOHEADER */
case 52U: /* BITMAPV2INFOHEADER */
case 56U: /* BITMAPV3INFOHEADER */
case 108U: /* BITMAPV4HEADER */
case 124U: /* BITMAPV5HEADER */
break;
default:
fprintf(stderr, "Error, unknown BMP header size %d\n", header->biSize);
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
header->biWidth = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biWidth |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biWidth |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biWidth |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
header->biHeight = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biHeight |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biHeight |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biHeight |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
header->biPlanes = (OPJ_UINT16)getc(IN);
header->biPlanes |= (OPJ_UINT16)((OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8);
header->biBitCount = (OPJ_UINT16)getc(IN);
header->biBitCount |= (OPJ_UINT16)((OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8);
if (header->biBitCount == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error, invalid biBitCount %d\n", 0);
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
if (header->biSize >= 40U) {
header->biCompression = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biCompression |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biCompression |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biCompression |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
header->biSizeImage = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biSizeImage |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biSizeImage |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biSizeImage |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
header->biXpelsPerMeter = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biXpelsPerMeter |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biXpelsPerMeter |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biXpelsPerMeter |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
header->biYpelsPerMeter = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biYpelsPerMeter |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biYpelsPerMeter |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biYpelsPerMeter |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
header->biClrUsed = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biClrUsed |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biClrUsed |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biClrUsed |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
header->biClrImportant = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biClrImportant |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biClrImportant |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biClrImportant |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
}
if (header->biSize >= 56U) {
header->biRedMask = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biRedMask |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biRedMask |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biRedMask |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
header->biGreenMask = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biGreenMask |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biGreenMask |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biGreenMask |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
header->biBlueMask = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biBlueMask |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biBlueMask |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biBlueMask |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
header->biAlphaMask = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biAlphaMask |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biAlphaMask |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biAlphaMask |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
}
if (header->biSize >= 108U) {
header->biColorSpaceType = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biColorSpaceType |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biColorSpaceType |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biColorSpaceType |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
if (fread(&(header->biColorSpaceEP), 1U, sizeof(header->biColorSpaceEP),
IN) != sizeof(header->biColorSpaceEP)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error, can't read BMP header\n");
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
header->biRedGamma = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biRedGamma |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biRedGamma |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biRedGamma |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
header->biGreenGamma = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biGreenGamma |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biGreenGamma |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biGreenGamma |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
header->biBlueGamma = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biBlueGamma |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biBlueGamma |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biBlueGamma |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
}
if (header->biSize >= 124U) {
header->biIntent = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biIntent |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biIntent |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biIntent |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
header->biIccProfileData = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biIccProfileData |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biIccProfileData |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biIccProfileData |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
header->biIccProfileSize = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biIccProfileSize |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biIccProfileSize |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biIccProfileSize |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
header->biReserved = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biReserved |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biReserved |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biReserved |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
}
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
| 167,932 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void nfs_set_open_stateid(struct nfs4_state *state, nfs4_stateid *stateid, int open_flags)
{
write_seqlock(&state->seqlock);
nfs_set_open_stateid_locked(state, stateid, open_flags);
write_sequnlock(&state->seqlock);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | static void nfs_set_open_stateid(struct nfs4_state *state, nfs4_stateid *stateid, int open_flags)
static void nfs_set_open_stateid(struct nfs4_state *state, nfs4_stateid *stateid, fmode_t fmode)
{
write_seqlock(&state->seqlock);
nfs_set_open_stateid_locked(state, stateid, fmode);
write_sequnlock(&state->seqlock);
}
| 165,705 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void reply_sesssetup_and_X_spnego(struct smb_request *req)
{
const uint8 *p;
DATA_BLOB blob1;
size_t bufrem;
char *tmp;
const char *native_os;
const char *native_lanman;
const char *primary_domain;
const char *p2;
uint16 data_blob_len = SVAL(req->vwv+7, 0);
enum remote_arch_types ra_type = get_remote_arch();
int vuid = req->vuid;
user_struct *vuser = NULL;
NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_OK;
uint16 smbpid = req->smbpid;
struct smbd_server_connection *sconn = smbd_server_conn;
DEBUG(3,("Doing spnego session setup\n"));
if (global_client_caps == 0) {
global_client_caps = IVAL(req->vwv+10, 0);
if (!(global_client_caps & CAP_STATUS32)) {
remove_from_common_flags2(FLAGS2_32_BIT_ERROR_CODES);
}
}
p = req->buf;
if (data_blob_len == 0) {
/* an invalid request */
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE));
return;
}
bufrem = smbreq_bufrem(req, p);
/* pull the spnego blob */
blob1 = data_blob(p, MIN(bufrem, data_blob_len));
#if 0
file_save("negotiate.dat", blob1.data, blob1.length);
#endif
p2 = (char *)req->buf + data_blob_len;
p2 += srvstr_pull_req_talloc(talloc_tos(), req, &tmp, p2,
STR_TERMINATE);
native_os = tmp ? tmp : "";
p2 += srvstr_pull_req_talloc(talloc_tos(), req, &tmp, p2,
STR_TERMINATE);
native_lanman = tmp ? tmp : "";
p2 += srvstr_pull_req_talloc(talloc_tos(), req, &tmp, p2,
STR_TERMINATE);
primary_domain = tmp ? tmp : "";
DEBUG(3,("NativeOS=[%s] NativeLanMan=[%s] PrimaryDomain=[%s]\n",
native_os, native_lanman, primary_domain));
if ( ra_type == RA_WIN2K ) {
/* Vista sets neither the OS or lanman strings */
if ( !strlen(native_os) && !strlen(native_lanman) )
set_remote_arch(RA_VISTA);
/* Windows 2003 doesn't set the native lanman string,
but does set primary domain which is a bug I think */
if ( !strlen(native_lanman) ) {
ra_lanman_string( primary_domain );
} else {
ra_lanman_string( native_lanman );
}
}
/* Did we get a valid vuid ? */
if (!is_partial_auth_vuid(sconn, vuid)) {
/* No, then try and see if this is an intermediate sessionsetup
* for a large SPNEGO packet. */
struct pending_auth_data *pad;
pad = get_pending_auth_data(sconn, smbpid);
if (pad) {
DEBUG(10,("reply_sesssetup_and_X_spnego: found "
"pending vuid %u\n",
(unsigned int)pad->vuid ));
vuid = pad->vuid;
}
}
/* Do we have a valid vuid now ? */
if (!is_partial_auth_vuid(sconn, vuid)) {
/* No, start a new authentication setup. */
vuid = register_initial_vuid(sconn);
if (vuid == UID_FIELD_INVALID) {
data_blob_free(&blob1);
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(
NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER));
return;
}
}
vuser = get_partial_auth_user_struct(sconn, vuid);
/* This MUST be valid. */
if (!vuser) {
smb_panic("reply_sesssetup_and_X_spnego: invalid vuid.");
}
/* Large (greater than 4k) SPNEGO blobs are split into multiple
* sessionsetup requests as the Windows limit on the security blob
* field is 4k. Bug #4400. JRA.
*/
status = check_spnego_blob_complete(sconn, smbpid, vuid, &blob1);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
if (!NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status,
NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED)) {
/* Real error - kill the intermediate vuid */
invalidate_vuid(sconn, vuid);
}
data_blob_free(&blob1);
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(status));
return;
}
if (blob1.data[0] == ASN1_APPLICATION(0)) {
/* its a negTokenTarg packet */
reply_spnego_negotiate(req, vuid, blob1,
&vuser->auth_ntlmssp_state);
data_blob_free(&blob1);
return;
}
if (blob1.data[0] == ASN1_CONTEXT(1)) {
/* its a auth packet */
reply_spnego_auth(req, vuid, blob1,
&vuser->auth_ntlmssp_state);
data_blob_free(&blob1);
return;
}
if (strncmp((char *)(blob1.data), "NTLMSSP", 7) == 0) {
DATA_BLOB chal;
if (!vuser->auth_ntlmssp_state) {
status = auth_ntlmssp_start(&vuser->auth_ntlmssp_state);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
/* Kill the intermediate vuid */
invalidate_vuid(sconn, vuid);
data_blob_free(&blob1);
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(status));
return;
}
}
status = auth_ntlmssp_update(vuser->auth_ntlmssp_state,
blob1, &chal);
data_blob_free(&blob1);
reply_spnego_ntlmssp(req, vuid,
&vuser->auth_ntlmssp_state,
&chal, status, OID_NTLMSSP, false);
data_blob_free(&chal);
return;
}
/* what sort of packet is this? */
DEBUG(1,("Unknown packet in reply_sesssetup_and_X_spnego\n"));
data_blob_free(&blob1);
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static void reply_sesssetup_and_X_spnego(struct smb_request *req)
{
const uint8 *p;
DATA_BLOB blob1;
size_t bufrem;
char *tmp;
const char *native_os;
const char *native_lanman;
const char *primary_domain;
const char *p2;
uint16 data_blob_len = SVAL(req->vwv+7, 0);
enum remote_arch_types ra_type = get_remote_arch();
int vuid = req->vuid;
user_struct *vuser = NULL;
NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_OK;
uint16 smbpid = req->smbpid;
struct smbd_server_connection *sconn = smbd_server_conn;
DEBUG(3,("Doing spnego session setup\n"));
if (global_client_caps == 0) {
global_client_caps = IVAL(req->vwv+10, 0);
if (!(global_client_caps & CAP_STATUS32)) {
remove_from_common_flags2(FLAGS2_32_BIT_ERROR_CODES);
}
}
p = req->buf;
if (data_blob_len == 0) {
/* an invalid request */
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE));
return;
}
bufrem = smbreq_bufrem(req, p);
/* pull the spnego blob */
blob1 = data_blob(p, MIN(bufrem, data_blob_len));
#if 0
file_save("negotiate.dat", blob1.data, blob1.length);
#endif
p2 = (char *)req->buf + blob1.length;
p2 += srvstr_pull_req_talloc(talloc_tos(), req, &tmp, p2,
STR_TERMINATE);
native_os = tmp ? tmp : "";
p2 += srvstr_pull_req_talloc(talloc_tos(), req, &tmp, p2,
STR_TERMINATE);
native_lanman = tmp ? tmp : "";
p2 += srvstr_pull_req_talloc(talloc_tos(), req, &tmp, p2,
STR_TERMINATE);
primary_domain = tmp ? tmp : "";
DEBUG(3,("NativeOS=[%s] NativeLanMan=[%s] PrimaryDomain=[%s]\n",
native_os, native_lanman, primary_domain));
if ( ra_type == RA_WIN2K ) {
/* Vista sets neither the OS or lanman strings */
if ( !strlen(native_os) && !strlen(native_lanman) )
set_remote_arch(RA_VISTA);
/* Windows 2003 doesn't set the native lanman string,
but does set primary domain which is a bug I think */
if ( !strlen(native_lanman) ) {
ra_lanman_string( primary_domain );
} else {
ra_lanman_string( native_lanman );
}
}
/* Did we get a valid vuid ? */
if (!is_partial_auth_vuid(sconn, vuid)) {
/* No, then try and see if this is an intermediate sessionsetup
* for a large SPNEGO packet. */
struct pending_auth_data *pad;
pad = get_pending_auth_data(sconn, smbpid);
if (pad) {
DEBUG(10,("reply_sesssetup_and_X_spnego: found "
"pending vuid %u\n",
(unsigned int)pad->vuid ));
vuid = pad->vuid;
}
}
/* Do we have a valid vuid now ? */
if (!is_partial_auth_vuid(sconn, vuid)) {
/* No, start a new authentication setup. */
vuid = register_initial_vuid(sconn);
if (vuid == UID_FIELD_INVALID) {
data_blob_free(&blob1);
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(
NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER));
return;
}
}
vuser = get_partial_auth_user_struct(sconn, vuid);
/* This MUST be valid. */
if (!vuser) {
smb_panic("reply_sesssetup_and_X_spnego: invalid vuid.");
}
/* Large (greater than 4k) SPNEGO blobs are split into multiple
* sessionsetup requests as the Windows limit on the security blob
* field is 4k. Bug #4400. JRA.
*/
status = check_spnego_blob_complete(sconn, smbpid, vuid, &blob1);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
if (!NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status,
NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED)) {
/* Real error - kill the intermediate vuid */
invalidate_vuid(sconn, vuid);
}
data_blob_free(&blob1);
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(status));
return;
}
if (blob1.data[0] == ASN1_APPLICATION(0)) {
/* its a negTokenTarg packet */
reply_spnego_negotiate(req, vuid, blob1,
&vuser->auth_ntlmssp_state);
data_blob_free(&blob1);
return;
}
if (blob1.data[0] == ASN1_CONTEXT(1)) {
/* its a auth packet */
reply_spnego_auth(req, vuid, blob1,
&vuser->auth_ntlmssp_state);
data_blob_free(&blob1);
return;
}
if (strncmp((char *)(blob1.data), "NTLMSSP", 7) == 0) {
DATA_BLOB chal;
if (!vuser->auth_ntlmssp_state) {
status = auth_ntlmssp_start(&vuser->auth_ntlmssp_state);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
/* Kill the intermediate vuid */
invalidate_vuid(sconn, vuid);
data_blob_free(&blob1);
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(status));
return;
}
}
status = auth_ntlmssp_update(vuser->auth_ntlmssp_state,
blob1, &chal);
data_blob_free(&blob1);
reply_spnego_ntlmssp(req, vuid,
&vuser->auth_ntlmssp_state,
&chal, status, OID_NTLMSSP, false);
data_blob_free(&chal);
return;
}
/* what sort of packet is this? */
DEBUG(1,("Unknown packet in reply_sesssetup_and_X_spnego\n"));
data_blob_free(&blob1);
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE));
}
| 165,054 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ShellWindowFrameView::OnPaint(gfx::Canvas* canvas) {
SkPaint paint;
paint.setAntiAlias(false);
paint.setStyle(SkPaint::kFill_Style);
paint.setColor(SK_ColorWHITE);
gfx::Path path;
const int radius = 1;
path.moveTo(0, radius);
path.lineTo(radius, 0);
path.lineTo(width() - radius - 1, 0);
path.lineTo(width(), radius + 1);
path.lineTo(width(), kCaptionHeight);
path.lineTo(0, kCaptionHeight);
path.close();
canvas->DrawPath(path, paint);
}
Commit Message: [views] Remove header bar on shell windows created with {frame: none}.
BUG=130182
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10597003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143439 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-79 | void ShellWindowFrameView::OnPaint(gfx::Canvas* canvas) {
if (is_frameless_)
return;
SkPaint paint;
paint.setAntiAlias(false);
paint.setStyle(SkPaint::kFill_Style);
paint.setColor(SK_ColorWHITE);
gfx::Path path;
const int radius = 1;
path.moveTo(0, radius);
path.lineTo(radius, 0);
path.lineTo(width() - radius - 1, 0);
path.lineTo(width(), radius + 1);
path.lineTo(width(), kCaptionHeight);
path.lineTo(0, kCaptionHeight);
path.close();
canvas->DrawPath(path, paint);
}
| 170,717 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void v9fs_attach(void *opaque)
{
V9fsPDU *pdu = opaque;
V9fsState *s = pdu->s;
int32_t fid, afid, n_uname;
V9fsString uname, aname;
V9fsFidState *fidp;
size_t offset = 7;
V9fsQID qid;
ssize_t err;
v9fs_string_init(&uname);
v9fs_string_init(&aname);
err = pdu_unmarshal(pdu, offset, "ddssd", &fid,
&afid, &uname, &aname, &n_uname);
if (err < 0) {
goto out_nofid;
}
trace_v9fs_attach(pdu->tag, pdu->id, fid, afid, uname.data, aname.data);
fidp = alloc_fid(s, fid);
if (fidp == NULL) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_nofid;
}
fidp->uid = n_uname;
err = v9fs_co_name_to_path(pdu, NULL, "/", &fidp->path);
if (err < 0) {
err = -EINVAL;
clunk_fid(s, fid);
goto out;
}
err = fid_to_qid(pdu, fidp, &qid);
if (err < 0) {
err = -EINVAL;
clunk_fid(s, fid);
goto out;
}
err = pdu_marshal(pdu, offset, "Q", &qid);
if (err < 0) {
clunk_fid(s, fid);
goto out;
}
err += offset;
trace_v9fs_attach_return(pdu->tag, pdu->id,
qid.type, qid.version, qid.path);
/*
* attach could get called multiple times for the same export.
*/
if (!s->migration_blocker) {
s->root_fid = fid;
error_setg(&s->migration_blocker,
"Migration is disabled when VirtFS export path '%s' is mounted in the guest using mount_tag '%s'",
s->ctx.fs_root ? s->ctx.fs_root : "NULL", s->tag);
migrate_add_blocker(s->migration_blocker);
}
out:
put_fid(pdu, fidp);
out_nofid:
pdu_complete(pdu, err);
v9fs_string_free(&uname);
v9fs_string_free(&aname);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-22 | static void v9fs_attach(void *opaque)
{
V9fsPDU *pdu = opaque;
V9fsState *s = pdu->s;
int32_t fid, afid, n_uname;
V9fsString uname, aname;
V9fsFidState *fidp;
size_t offset = 7;
V9fsQID qid;
ssize_t err;
v9fs_string_init(&uname);
v9fs_string_init(&aname);
err = pdu_unmarshal(pdu, offset, "ddssd", &fid,
&afid, &uname, &aname, &n_uname);
if (err < 0) {
goto out_nofid;
}
trace_v9fs_attach(pdu->tag, pdu->id, fid, afid, uname.data, aname.data);
fidp = alloc_fid(s, fid);
if (fidp == NULL) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_nofid;
}
fidp->uid = n_uname;
err = v9fs_co_name_to_path(pdu, NULL, "/", &fidp->path);
if (err < 0) {
err = -EINVAL;
clunk_fid(s, fid);
goto out;
}
err = fid_to_qid(pdu, fidp, &qid);
if (err < 0) {
err = -EINVAL;
clunk_fid(s, fid);
goto out;
}
err = pdu_marshal(pdu, offset, "Q", &qid);
if (err < 0) {
clunk_fid(s, fid);
goto out;
}
err += offset;
memcpy(&s->root_qid, &qid, sizeof(qid));
trace_v9fs_attach_return(pdu->tag, pdu->id,
qid.type, qid.version, qid.path);
/*
* attach could get called multiple times for the same export.
*/
if (!s->migration_blocker) {
s->root_fid = fid;
error_setg(&s->migration_blocker,
"Migration is disabled when VirtFS export path '%s' is mounted in the guest using mount_tag '%s'",
s->ctx.fs_root ? s->ctx.fs_root : "NULL", s->tag);
migrate_add_blocker(s->migration_blocker);
}
out:
put_fid(pdu, fidp);
out_nofid:
pdu_complete(pdu, err);
v9fs_string_free(&uname);
v9fs_string_free(&aname);
}
| 164,938 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ImageLoader::ImageLoader(Element* element)
: m_element(element),
m_derefElementTimer(this, &ImageLoader::timerFired),
m_hasPendingLoadEvent(false),
m_hasPendingErrorEvent(false),
m_imageComplete(true),
m_loadingImageDocument(false),
m_elementIsProtected(false),
m_suppressErrorEvents(false) {
RESOURCE_LOADING_DVLOG(1) << "new ImageLoader " << this;
}
Commit Message: Move ImageLoader timer to frame-specific TaskRunnerTimer.
Move ImageLoader timer m_derefElementTimer to frame-specific TaskRunnerTimer.
This associates it with the frame's Networking timer task queue.
BUG=624694
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2642103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#444927}
CWE ID: | ImageLoader::ImageLoader(Element* element)
: m_element(element),
m_derefElementTimer(TaskRunnerHelper::get(TaskType::Networking,
element->document().frame()),
this,
&ImageLoader::timerFired),
m_hasPendingLoadEvent(false),
m_hasPendingErrorEvent(false),
m_imageComplete(true),
m_loadingImageDocument(false),
m_elementIsProtected(false),
m_suppressErrorEvents(false) {
RESOURCE_LOADING_DVLOG(1) << "new ImageLoader " << this;
}
| 171,974 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static ssize_t aio_setup_vectored_rw(int type, struct kiocb *kiocb, bool compat)
{
ssize_t ret;
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
if (compat)
ret = compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(type,
(struct compat_iovec __user *)kiocb->ki_buf,
kiocb->ki_nbytes, 1, &kiocb->ki_inline_vec,
&kiocb->ki_iovec, 1);
else
#endif
ret = rw_copy_check_uvector(type,
(struct iovec __user *)kiocb->ki_buf,
kiocb->ki_nbytes, 1, &kiocb->ki_inline_vec,
&kiocb->ki_iovec, 1);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
kiocb->ki_nr_segs = kiocb->ki_nbytes;
kiocb->ki_cur_seg = 0;
/* ki_nbytes/left now reflect bytes instead of segs */
kiocb->ki_nbytes = ret;
kiocb->ki_left = ret;
ret = 0;
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: vfs: make AIO use the proper rw_verify_area() area helpers
We had for some reason overlooked the AIO interface, and it didn't use
the proper rw_verify_area() helper function that checks (for example)
mandatory locking on the file, and that the size of the access doesn't
cause us to overflow the provided offset limits etc.
Instead, AIO did just the security_file_permission() thing (that
rw_verify_area() also does) directly.
This fixes it to do all the proper helper functions, which not only
means that now mandatory file locking works with AIO too, we can
actually remove lines of code.
Reported-by: Manish Honap <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | static ssize_t aio_setup_vectored_rw(int type, struct kiocb *kiocb, bool compat)
{
ssize_t ret;
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
if (compat)
ret = compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(type,
(struct compat_iovec __user *)kiocb->ki_buf,
kiocb->ki_nbytes, 1, &kiocb->ki_inline_vec,
&kiocb->ki_iovec, 1);
else
#endif
ret = rw_copy_check_uvector(type,
(struct iovec __user *)kiocb->ki_buf,
kiocb->ki_nbytes, 1, &kiocb->ki_inline_vec,
&kiocb->ki_iovec, 1);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
ret = rw_verify_area(type, kiocb->ki_filp, &kiocb->ki_pos, ret);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
kiocb->ki_nr_segs = kiocb->ki_nbytes;
kiocb->ki_cur_seg = 0;
/* ki_nbytes/left now reflect bytes instead of segs */
kiocb->ki_nbytes = ret;
kiocb->ki_left = ret;
ret = 0;
out:
return ret;
}
| 167,613 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: validate_as_request(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm,
register krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_db_entry client,
krb5_db_entry server, krb5_timestamp kdc_time,
const char **status, krb5_pa_data ***e_data)
{
int errcode;
krb5_error_code ret;
/*
* If an option is set that is only allowed in TGS requests, complain.
*/
if (request->kdc_options & AS_INVALID_OPTIONS) {
*status = "INVALID AS OPTIONS";
return KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
}
/* The client must not be expired */
if (client.expiration && client.expiration < kdc_time) {
*status = "CLIENT EXPIRED";
if (vague_errors)
return(KRB_ERR_GENERIC);
else
return(KDC_ERR_NAME_EXP);
}
/* The client's password must not be expired, unless the server is
a KRB5_KDC_PWCHANGE_SERVICE. */
if (client.pw_expiration && client.pw_expiration < kdc_time &&
!isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_PWCHANGE_SERVICE)) {
*status = "CLIENT KEY EXPIRED";
if (vague_errors)
return(KRB_ERR_GENERIC);
else
return(KDC_ERR_KEY_EXP);
}
/* The server must not be expired */
if (server.expiration && server.expiration < kdc_time) {
*status = "SERVICE EXPIRED";
return(KDC_ERR_SERVICE_EXP);
}
/*
* If the client requires password changing, then only allow the
* pwchange service.
*/
if (isflagset(client.attributes, KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PWCHANGE) &&
!isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_PWCHANGE_SERVICE)) {
*status = "REQUIRED PWCHANGE";
return(KDC_ERR_KEY_EXP);
}
/* Client and server must allow postdating tickets */
if ((isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ALLOW_POSTDATE) ||
isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_POSTDATED)) &&
(isflagset(client.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_POSTDATED) ||
isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_POSTDATED))) {
*status = "POSTDATE NOT ALLOWED";
return(KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE);
}
/*
* A Windows KDC will return KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED instead of
* KDC_ERR_POLICY in the following case:
*
* - KDC_OPT_FORWARDABLE is set in KDCOptions but local
* policy has KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_FORWARDABLE set for the
* client, and;
* - KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PRE_AUTH is set for the client but
* preauthentication data is absent in the request.
*
* Hence, this check most be done after the check for preauth
* data, and is now performed by validate_forwardable() (the
* contents of which were previously below).
*/
/* Client and server must allow proxiable tickets */
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_PROXIABLE) &&
(isflagset(client.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_PROXIABLE) ||
isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_PROXIABLE))) {
*status = "PROXIABLE NOT ALLOWED";
return(KDC_ERR_POLICY);
}
/* Check to see if client is locked out */
if (isflagset(client.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX)) {
*status = "CLIENT LOCKED OUT";
return(KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED);
}
/* Check to see if server is locked out */
if (isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX)) {
*status = "SERVICE LOCKED OUT";
return(KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN);
}
/* Check to see if server is allowed to be a service */
if (isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_SVR)) {
*status = "SERVICE NOT ALLOWED";
return(KDC_ERR_MUST_USE_USER2USER);
}
if (check_anon(kdc_active_realm, request->client, request->server) != 0) {
*status = "ANONYMOUS NOT ALLOWED";
return(KDC_ERR_POLICY);
}
/* Perform KDB module policy checks. */
ret = krb5_db_check_policy_as(kdc_context, request, &client, &server,
kdc_time, status, e_data);
if (ret && ret != KRB5_PLUGIN_OP_NOTSUPP)
return errcode_to_protocol(ret);
/* Check against local policy. */
errcode = against_local_policy_as(request, client, server,
kdc_time, status, e_data);
if (errcode)
return errcode;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix S4U2Self KDC crash when anon is restricted
In validate_as_request(), when enforcing restrict_anonymous_to_tgt,
use client.princ instead of request->client; the latter is NULL when
validating S4U2Self requests.
CVE-2016-3120:
In MIT krb5 1.9 and later, an authenticated attacker can cause krb5kdc
to dereference a null pointer if the restrict_anonymous_to_tgt option
is set to true, by making an S4U2Self request.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:H/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8458 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
CWE ID: CWE-476 | validate_as_request(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm,
register krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_db_entry client,
krb5_db_entry server, krb5_timestamp kdc_time,
const char **status, krb5_pa_data ***e_data)
{
int errcode;
krb5_error_code ret;
/*
* If an option is set that is only allowed in TGS requests, complain.
*/
if (request->kdc_options & AS_INVALID_OPTIONS) {
*status = "INVALID AS OPTIONS";
return KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
}
/* The client must not be expired */
if (client.expiration && client.expiration < kdc_time) {
*status = "CLIENT EXPIRED";
if (vague_errors)
return(KRB_ERR_GENERIC);
else
return(KDC_ERR_NAME_EXP);
}
/* The client's password must not be expired, unless the server is
a KRB5_KDC_PWCHANGE_SERVICE. */
if (client.pw_expiration && client.pw_expiration < kdc_time &&
!isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_PWCHANGE_SERVICE)) {
*status = "CLIENT KEY EXPIRED";
if (vague_errors)
return(KRB_ERR_GENERIC);
else
return(KDC_ERR_KEY_EXP);
}
/* The server must not be expired */
if (server.expiration && server.expiration < kdc_time) {
*status = "SERVICE EXPIRED";
return(KDC_ERR_SERVICE_EXP);
}
/*
* If the client requires password changing, then only allow the
* pwchange service.
*/
if (isflagset(client.attributes, KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PWCHANGE) &&
!isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_PWCHANGE_SERVICE)) {
*status = "REQUIRED PWCHANGE";
return(KDC_ERR_KEY_EXP);
}
/* Client and server must allow postdating tickets */
if ((isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ALLOW_POSTDATE) ||
isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_POSTDATED)) &&
(isflagset(client.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_POSTDATED) ||
isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_POSTDATED))) {
*status = "POSTDATE NOT ALLOWED";
return(KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE);
}
/*
* A Windows KDC will return KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED instead of
* KDC_ERR_POLICY in the following case:
*
* - KDC_OPT_FORWARDABLE is set in KDCOptions but local
* policy has KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_FORWARDABLE set for the
* client, and;
* - KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PRE_AUTH is set for the client but
* preauthentication data is absent in the request.
*
* Hence, this check most be done after the check for preauth
* data, and is now performed by validate_forwardable() (the
* contents of which were previously below).
*/
/* Client and server must allow proxiable tickets */
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_PROXIABLE) &&
(isflagset(client.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_PROXIABLE) ||
isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_PROXIABLE))) {
*status = "PROXIABLE NOT ALLOWED";
return(KDC_ERR_POLICY);
}
/* Check to see if client is locked out */
if (isflagset(client.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX)) {
*status = "CLIENT LOCKED OUT";
return(KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED);
}
/* Check to see if server is locked out */
if (isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX)) {
*status = "SERVICE LOCKED OUT";
return(KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN);
}
/* Check to see if server is allowed to be a service */
if (isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_SVR)) {
*status = "SERVICE NOT ALLOWED";
return(KDC_ERR_MUST_USE_USER2USER);
}
if (check_anon(kdc_active_realm, client.princ, request->server) != 0) {
*status = "ANONYMOUS NOT ALLOWED";
return(KDC_ERR_POLICY);
}
/* Perform KDB module policy checks. */
ret = krb5_db_check_policy_as(kdc_context, request, &client, &server,
kdc_time, status, e_data);
if (ret && ret != KRB5_PLUGIN_OP_NOTSUPP)
return errcode_to_protocol(ret);
/* Check against local policy. */
errcode = against_local_policy_as(request, client, server,
kdc_time, status, e_data);
if (errcode)
return errcode;
return 0;
}
| 167,378 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: png_get_uint_31(png_structp png_ptr, png_bytep buf)
{
#ifdef PNG_READ_BIG_ENDIAN_SUPPORTED
png_uint_32 i = png_get_uint_32(buf);
#else
/* Avoid an extra function call by inlining the result. */
png_uint_32 i = ((png_uint_32)(*buf) << 24) +
((png_uint_32)(*(buf + 1)) << 16) +
((png_uint_32)(*(buf + 2)) << 8) +
(png_uint_32)(*(buf + 3));
#endif
if (i > PNG_UINT_31_MAX)
png_error(png_ptr, "PNG unsigned integer out of range.");
return (i);
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
[email protected]
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | png_get_uint_31(png_structp png_ptr, png_bytep buf)
{
#ifdef PNG_READ_BIG_ENDIAN_SUPPORTED
png_uint_32 i = png_get_uint_32(buf);
#else
/* Avoid an extra function call by inlining the result. */
png_uint_32 i = ((png_uint_32)((*(buf )) & 0xff) << 24) +
((png_uint_32)((*(buf + 1)) & 0xff) << 16) +
((png_uint_32)((*(buf + 2)) & 0xff) << 8) +
((png_uint_32)((*(buf + 3)) & 0xff) );
#endif
if (i > PNG_UINT_31_MAX)
png_error(png_ptr, "PNG unsigned integer out of range.");
return (i);
}
| 172,175 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: fbPictureInit (ScreenPtr pScreen, PictFormatPtr formats, int nformats)
{
srcRepeat = FALSE;
if (maskTransform)
maskRepeat = FALSE;
if (!miComputeCompositeRegion (®ion, pSrc, pMask, pDst, xSrc, ySrc,
xMask, yMask, xDst, yDst, width, height))
return;
n = REGION_NUM_RECTS (®ion);
pbox = REGION_RECTS (®ion);
while (n--)
{
h = pbox->y2 - pbox->y1;
y_src = pbox->y1 - yDst + ySrc;
y_msk = pbox->y1 - yDst + yMask;
y_dst = pbox->y1;
while (h)
{
h_this = h;
w = pbox->x2 - pbox->x1;
x_src = pbox->x1 - xDst + xSrc;
x_msk = pbox->x1 - xDst + xMask;
x_dst = pbox->x1;
if (maskRepeat)
{
y_msk = mod (y_msk - pMask->pDrawable->y, pMask->pDrawable->height);
if (h_this > pMask->pDrawable->height - y_msk)
h_this = pMask->pDrawable->height - y_msk;
y_msk += pMask->pDrawable->y;
}
if (srcRepeat)
{
y_src = mod (y_src - pSrc->pDrawable->y, pSrc->pDrawable->height);
if (h_this > pSrc->pDrawable->height - y_src)
h_this = pSrc->pDrawable->height - y_src;
y_src += pSrc->pDrawable->y;
}
while (w)
{
w_this = w;
if (maskRepeat)
{
x_msk = mod (x_msk - pMask->pDrawable->x, pMask->pDrawable->width);
if (w_this > pMask->pDrawable->width - x_msk)
w_this = pMask->pDrawable->width - x_msk;
x_msk += pMask->pDrawable->x;
}
if (srcRepeat)
{
x_src = mod (x_src - pSrc->pDrawable->x, pSrc->pDrawable->width);
if (w_this > pSrc->pDrawable->width - x_src)
w_this = pSrc->pDrawable->width - x_src;
x_src += pSrc->pDrawable->x;
}
(*func) (op, pSrc, pMask, pDst,
x_src, y_src, x_msk, y_msk, x_dst, y_dst,
w_this, h_this);
w -= w_this;
x_src += w_this;
x_msk += w_this;
x_dst += w_this;
}
h -= h_this;
y_src += h_this;
y_msk += h_this;
y_dst += h_this;
}
pbox++;
}
REGION_UNINIT (pDst->pDrawable->pScreen, ®ion);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | fbPictureInit (ScreenPtr pScreen, PictFormatPtr formats, int nformats)
{
srcRepeat = FALSE;
if (maskTransform)
maskRepeat = FALSE;
fbWalkCompositeRegion (op, pSrc, pMask, pDst, xSrc, ySrc,
xMask, yMask, xDst, yDst, width, height,
srcRepeat, maskRepeat, func);
}
| 165,130 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: header_put_be_int (SF_PRIVATE *psf, int x)
{ if (psf->headindex < SIGNED_SIZEOF (psf->header) - 4)
{ psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 24) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 16) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 8) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = x ;
} ;
} /* header_put_be_int */
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | header_put_be_int (SF_PRIVATE *psf, int x)
{ psf->header.ptr [psf->header.indx++] = (x >> 24) ;
psf->header.ptr [psf->header.indx++] = (x >> 16) ;
psf->header.ptr [psf->header.indx++] = (x >> 8) ;
psf->header.ptr [psf->header.indx++] = x ;
} /* header_put_be_int */
| 170,051 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void DatabaseMessageFilter::OnDatabaseOpened(const string16& origin_identifier,
const string16& database_name,
const string16& description,
int64 estimated_size) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::FILE));
int64 database_size = 0;
db_tracker_->DatabaseOpened(origin_identifier, database_name, description,
estimated_size, &database_size);
database_connections_.AddConnection(origin_identifier, database_name);
Send(new DatabaseMsg_UpdateSize(origin_identifier, database_name,
database_size));
}
Commit Message: WebDatabase: check path traversal in origin_identifier
BUG=172264
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12212091
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@183141 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-22 | void DatabaseMessageFilter::OnDatabaseOpened(const string16& origin_identifier,
const string16& database_name,
const string16& description,
int64 estimated_size) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::FILE));
if (!DatabaseUtil::IsValidOriginIdentifier(origin_identifier)) {
RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("BadMessageTerminate_DBMF"));
BadMessageReceived();
return;
}
int64 database_size = 0;
db_tracker_->DatabaseOpened(origin_identifier, database_name, description,
estimated_size, &database_size);
database_connections_.AddConnection(origin_identifier, database_name);
Send(new DatabaseMsg_UpdateSize(origin_identifier, database_name,
database_size));
}
| 171,477 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SaveCardBubbleControllerImpl::ShowBubbleForUpload(
const CreditCard& card,
std::unique_ptr<base::DictionaryValue> legal_message,
bool should_cvc_be_requested,
const base::Closure& save_card_callback) {
is_uploading_ = true;
is_reshow_ = false;
should_cvc_be_requested_ = should_cvc_be_requested;
AutofillMetrics::LogSaveCardPromptMetric(
AutofillMetrics::SAVE_CARD_PROMPT_SHOW_REQUESTED, is_uploading_,
is_reshow_,
pref_service_->GetInteger(
prefs::kAutofillAcceptSaveCreditCardPromptState));
if (!LegalMessageLine::Parse(*legal_message, &legal_message_lines_)) {
AutofillMetrics::LogSaveCardPromptMetric(
AutofillMetrics::SAVE_CARD_PROMPT_END_INVALID_LEGAL_MESSAGE,
is_uploading_, is_reshow_,
pref_service_->GetInteger(
prefs::kAutofillAcceptSaveCreditCardPromptState));
return;
}
card_ = card;
save_card_callback_ = save_card_callback;
ShowBubble();
}
Commit Message: [autofill] Avoid duplicate instances of the SaveCardBubble.
autofill::SaveCardBubbleControllerImpl::ShowBubble() expects
(via DCHECK) to only be called when the save card bubble is
not already visible. This constraint is violated if the user
clicks multiple times on a submit button.
If the underlying page goes away, the last SaveCardBubbleView
created by the controller will be automatically cleaned up,
but any others are left visible on the screen... holding a
refence to a possibly-deleted controller.
This CL early exits the ShowBubbleFor*** and ReshowBubble logic
if the bubble is already visible.
BUG=708819
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2862933002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#469768}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void SaveCardBubbleControllerImpl::ShowBubbleForUpload(
const CreditCard& card,
std::unique_ptr<base::DictionaryValue> legal_message,
bool should_cvc_be_requested,
const base::Closure& save_card_callback) {
// Don't show the bubble if it's already visible.
if (save_card_bubble_view_)
return;
is_uploading_ = true;
is_reshow_ = false;
should_cvc_be_requested_ = should_cvc_be_requested;
AutofillMetrics::LogSaveCardPromptMetric(
AutofillMetrics::SAVE_CARD_PROMPT_SHOW_REQUESTED, is_uploading_,
is_reshow_,
pref_service_->GetInteger(
prefs::kAutofillAcceptSaveCreditCardPromptState));
if (!LegalMessageLine::Parse(*legal_message, &legal_message_lines_)) {
AutofillMetrics::LogSaveCardPromptMetric(
AutofillMetrics::SAVE_CARD_PROMPT_END_INVALID_LEGAL_MESSAGE,
is_uploading_, is_reshow_,
pref_service_->GetInteger(
prefs::kAutofillAcceptSaveCreditCardPromptState));
return;
}
card_ = card;
save_card_callback_ = save_card_callback;
ShowBubble();
}
| 172,386 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static struct page *follow_pmd_mask(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long address, pud_t *pudp,
unsigned int flags,
struct follow_page_context *ctx)
{
pmd_t *pmd, pmdval;
spinlock_t *ptl;
struct page *page;
struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
pmd = pmd_offset(pudp, address);
/*
* The READ_ONCE() will stabilize the pmdval in a register or
* on the stack so that it will stop changing under the code.
*/
pmdval = READ_ONCE(*pmd);
if (pmd_none(pmdval))
return no_page_table(vma, flags);
if (pmd_huge(pmdval) && vma->vm_flags & VM_HUGETLB) {
page = follow_huge_pmd(mm, address, pmd, flags);
if (page)
return page;
return no_page_table(vma, flags);
}
if (is_hugepd(__hugepd(pmd_val(pmdval)))) {
page = follow_huge_pd(vma, address,
__hugepd(pmd_val(pmdval)), flags,
PMD_SHIFT);
if (page)
return page;
return no_page_table(vma, flags);
}
retry:
if (!pmd_present(pmdval)) {
if (likely(!(flags & FOLL_MIGRATION)))
return no_page_table(vma, flags);
VM_BUG_ON(thp_migration_supported() &&
!is_pmd_migration_entry(pmdval));
if (is_pmd_migration_entry(pmdval))
pmd_migration_entry_wait(mm, pmd);
pmdval = READ_ONCE(*pmd);
/*
* MADV_DONTNEED may convert the pmd to null because
* mmap_sem is held in read mode
*/
if (pmd_none(pmdval))
return no_page_table(vma, flags);
goto retry;
}
if (pmd_devmap(pmdval)) {
ptl = pmd_lock(mm, pmd);
page = follow_devmap_pmd(vma, address, pmd, flags, &ctx->pgmap);
spin_unlock(ptl);
if (page)
return page;
}
if (likely(!pmd_trans_huge(pmdval)))
return follow_page_pte(vma, address, pmd, flags, &ctx->pgmap);
if ((flags & FOLL_NUMA) && pmd_protnone(pmdval))
return no_page_table(vma, flags);
retry_locked:
ptl = pmd_lock(mm, pmd);
if (unlikely(pmd_none(*pmd))) {
spin_unlock(ptl);
return no_page_table(vma, flags);
}
if (unlikely(!pmd_present(*pmd))) {
spin_unlock(ptl);
if (likely(!(flags & FOLL_MIGRATION)))
return no_page_table(vma, flags);
pmd_migration_entry_wait(mm, pmd);
goto retry_locked;
}
if (unlikely(!pmd_trans_huge(*pmd))) {
spin_unlock(ptl);
return follow_page_pte(vma, address, pmd, flags, &ctx->pgmap);
}
if (flags & FOLL_SPLIT) {
int ret;
page = pmd_page(*pmd);
if (is_huge_zero_page(page)) {
spin_unlock(ptl);
ret = 0;
split_huge_pmd(vma, pmd, address);
if (pmd_trans_unstable(pmd))
ret = -EBUSY;
} else {
get_page(page);
spin_unlock(ptl);
lock_page(page);
ret = split_huge_page(page);
unlock_page(page);
put_page(page);
if (pmd_none(*pmd))
return no_page_table(vma, flags);
}
return ret ? ERR_PTR(ret) :
follow_page_pte(vma, address, pmd, flags, &ctx->pgmap);
}
page = follow_trans_huge_pmd(vma, address, pmd, flags);
spin_unlock(ptl);
ctx->page_mask = HPAGE_PMD_NR - 1;
return page;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416 | static struct page *follow_pmd_mask(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long address, pud_t *pudp,
unsigned int flags,
struct follow_page_context *ctx)
{
pmd_t *pmd, pmdval;
spinlock_t *ptl;
struct page *page;
struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
pmd = pmd_offset(pudp, address);
/*
* The READ_ONCE() will stabilize the pmdval in a register or
* on the stack so that it will stop changing under the code.
*/
pmdval = READ_ONCE(*pmd);
if (pmd_none(pmdval))
return no_page_table(vma, flags);
if (pmd_huge(pmdval) && vma->vm_flags & VM_HUGETLB) {
page = follow_huge_pmd(mm, address, pmd, flags);
if (page)
return page;
return no_page_table(vma, flags);
}
if (is_hugepd(__hugepd(pmd_val(pmdval)))) {
page = follow_huge_pd(vma, address,
__hugepd(pmd_val(pmdval)), flags,
PMD_SHIFT);
if (page)
return page;
return no_page_table(vma, flags);
}
retry:
if (!pmd_present(pmdval)) {
if (likely(!(flags & FOLL_MIGRATION)))
return no_page_table(vma, flags);
VM_BUG_ON(thp_migration_supported() &&
!is_pmd_migration_entry(pmdval));
if (is_pmd_migration_entry(pmdval))
pmd_migration_entry_wait(mm, pmd);
pmdval = READ_ONCE(*pmd);
/*
* MADV_DONTNEED may convert the pmd to null because
* mmap_sem is held in read mode
*/
if (pmd_none(pmdval))
return no_page_table(vma, flags);
goto retry;
}
if (pmd_devmap(pmdval)) {
ptl = pmd_lock(mm, pmd);
page = follow_devmap_pmd(vma, address, pmd, flags, &ctx->pgmap);
spin_unlock(ptl);
if (page)
return page;
}
if (likely(!pmd_trans_huge(pmdval)))
return follow_page_pte(vma, address, pmd, flags, &ctx->pgmap);
if ((flags & FOLL_NUMA) && pmd_protnone(pmdval))
return no_page_table(vma, flags);
retry_locked:
ptl = pmd_lock(mm, pmd);
if (unlikely(pmd_none(*pmd))) {
spin_unlock(ptl);
return no_page_table(vma, flags);
}
if (unlikely(!pmd_present(*pmd))) {
spin_unlock(ptl);
if (likely(!(flags & FOLL_MIGRATION)))
return no_page_table(vma, flags);
pmd_migration_entry_wait(mm, pmd);
goto retry_locked;
}
if (unlikely(!pmd_trans_huge(*pmd))) {
spin_unlock(ptl);
return follow_page_pte(vma, address, pmd, flags, &ctx->pgmap);
}
if (flags & FOLL_SPLIT) {
int ret;
page = pmd_page(*pmd);
if (is_huge_zero_page(page)) {
spin_unlock(ptl);
ret = 0;
split_huge_pmd(vma, pmd, address);
if (pmd_trans_unstable(pmd))
ret = -EBUSY;
} else {
if (unlikely(!try_get_page(page))) {
spin_unlock(ptl);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
spin_unlock(ptl);
lock_page(page);
ret = split_huge_page(page);
unlock_page(page);
put_page(page);
if (pmd_none(*pmd))
return no_page_table(vma, flags);
}
return ret ? ERR_PTR(ret) :
follow_page_pte(vma, address, pmd, flags, &ctx->pgmap);
}
page = follow_trans_huge_pmd(vma, address, pmd, flags);
spin_unlock(ptl);
ctx->page_mask = HPAGE_PMD_NR - 1;
return page;
}
| 170,223 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PromoResourceService::PromoResourceStateChange() {
web_resource_update_scheduled_ = false;
content::NotificationService* service =
content::NotificationService::current();
service->Notify(chrome::NOTIFICATION_PROMO_RESOURCE_STATE_CHANGED,
content::Source<WebResourceService>(this),
content::NotificationService::NoDetails());
}
Commit Message: Refresh promo notifications as they're fetched
The "guard" existed for notification scheduling was preventing
"turn-off a promo" and "update a promo" scenarios.
Yet I do not believe it was adding any actual safety: if things
on a server backend go wrong, the clients will be affected one
way or the other, and it is better to have an option to shut
the malformed promo down "as quickly as possible" (~in 12-24 hours).
BUG=
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10696204
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void PromoResourceService::PromoResourceStateChange() {
content::NotificationService* service =
content::NotificationService::current();
service->Notify(chrome::NOTIFICATION_PROMO_RESOURCE_STATE_CHANGED,
content::Source<WebResourceService>(this),
content::NotificationService::NoDetails());
}
| 170,783 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static char *ps_files_path_create(char *buf, size_t buflen, ps_files *data, const char *key)
{
{
size_t len;
const char *p;
char c;
int ret = 1;
for (p = key; (c = *p); p++) {
/* valid characters are a..z,A..Z,0..9 */
if (!((c >= 'a' && c <= 'z')
|| (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z')
|| (c >= '0' && c <= '9')
|| c == ','
|| c == '-')) {
ret = 0;
break;
}
}
len = p - key;
/* Somewhat arbitrary length limit here, but should be way more than
anyone needs and avoids file-level warnings later on if we exceed MAX_PATH */
if (len == 0 || len > 128) {
ret = 0;
}
return ret;
}
static char *ps_files_path_create(char *buf, size_t buflen, ps_files *data, const char *key)
{
size_t key_len;
const char *p;
int i;
int n;
key_len = strlen(key);
if (key_len <= data->dirdepth ||
buflen < (strlen(data->basedir) + 2 * data->dirdepth + key_len + 5 + sizeof(FILE_PREFIX))) {
return NULL;
}
p = key;
memcpy(buf, data->basedir, data->basedir_len);
n = data->basedir_len;
buf[n++] = PHP_DIR_SEPARATOR;
for (i = 0; i < (int)data->dirdepth; i++) {
buf[n++] = *p++;
buf[n++] = PHP_DIR_SEPARATOR;
}
memcpy(buf + n, FILE_PREFIX, sizeof(FILE_PREFIX) - 1);
n += sizeof(FILE_PREFIX) - 1;
memcpy(buf + n, key, key_len);
n += key_len;
ps_files_close(data);
if (!ps_files_valid_key(key)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "The session id is too long or contains illegal characters, valid characters are a-z, A-Z, 0-9 and '-,'");
PS(invalid_session_id) = 1;
return;
}
if (!ps_files_path_create(buf, sizeof(buf), data, key)) {
return;
}
if (data->fd != -1) {
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
/* On Win32 locked files that are closed without being explicitly unlocked
will be unlocked only when "system resources become available". */
flock(data->fd, LOCK_UN);
#endif
close(data->fd);
data->fd = -1;
}
}
static void ps_files_open(ps_files *data, const char *key TSRMLS_DC)
{
char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
if (data->fd < 0 || !data->lastkey || strcmp(key, data->lastkey)) {
if (data->lastkey) {
efree(data->lastkey);
data->lastkey = NULL;
}
ps_files_close(data);
if (!ps_files_valid_key(key)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "The session id is too long or contains illegal characters, valid characters are a-z, A-Z, 0-9 and '-,'");
PS(invalid_session_id) = 1;
return;
}
if (!ps_files_path_create(buf, sizeof(buf), data, key)) {
return;
}
data->lastkey = estrdup(key);
data->fd = VCWD_OPEN_MODE(buf, O_CREAT | O_RDWR | O_BINARY, data->filemode);
if (data->fd != -1) {
#ifndef PHP_WIN32
/* check to make sure that the opened file is not a symlink, linking to data outside of allowable dirs */
if (PG(open_basedir)) {
struct stat sbuf;
if (fstat(data->fd, &sbuf)) {
close(data->fd);
return;
}
if (S_ISLNK(sbuf.st_mode) && php_check_open_basedir(buf TSRMLS_CC)) {
close(data->fd);
return;
}
}
#endif
flock(data->fd, LOCK_EX);
#ifdef F_SETFD
# ifndef FD_CLOEXEC
# define FD_CLOEXEC 1
# endif
if (fcntl(data->fd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "fcntl(%d, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) failed: %s (%d)", data->fd, strerror(errno), errno);
}
#endif
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "open(%s, O_RDWR) failed: %s (%d)", buf, strerror(errno), errno);
}
}
}
static int ps_files_cleanup_dir(const char *dirname, int maxlifetime TSRMLS_DC)
{
DIR *dir;
char dentry[sizeof(struct dirent) + MAXPATHLEN];
struct dirent *entry = (struct dirent *) &dentry;
struct stat sbuf;
char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
time_t now;
int nrdels = 0;
size_t dirname_len;
dir = opendir(dirname);
if (!dir) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_NOTICE, "ps_files_cleanup_dir: opendir(%s) failed: %s (%d)", dirname, strerror(errno), errno);
return (0);
}
time(&now);
return (nrdels);
}
#define PS_FILES_DATA ps_files *data = PS_GET_MOD_DATA()
PS_OPEN_FUNC(files)
(now - sbuf.st_mtime) > maxlifetime) {
VCWD_UNLINK(buf);
nrdels++;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static char *ps_files_path_create(char *buf, size_t buflen, ps_files *data, const char *key)
{
{
size_t len;
const char *p;
char c;
int ret = 1;
for (p = key; (c = *p); p++) {
/* valid characters are a..z,A..Z,0..9 */
if (!((c >= 'a' && c <= 'z')
|| (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z')
|| (c >= '0' && c <= '9')
|| c == ','
|| c == '-')) {
ret = 0;
break;
}
}
len = p - key;
/* Somewhat arbitrary length limit here, but should be way more than
anyone needs and avoids file-level warnings later on if we exceed MAX_PATH */
if (len == 0 || len > 128) {
ret = 0;
}
return ret;
}
static char *ps_files_path_create(char *buf, size_t buflen, ps_files *data, const char *key)
{
size_t key_len;
const char *p;
int i;
int n;
key_len = strlen(key);
if (key_len <= data->dirdepth ||
buflen < (strlen(data->basedir) + 2 * data->dirdepth + key_len + 5 + sizeof(FILE_PREFIX))) {
return NULL;
}
p = key;
memcpy(buf, data->basedir, data->basedir_len);
n = data->basedir_len;
buf[n++] = PHP_DIR_SEPARATOR;
for (i = 0; i < (int)data->dirdepth; i++) {
buf[n++] = *p++;
buf[n++] = PHP_DIR_SEPARATOR;
}
memcpy(buf + n, FILE_PREFIX, sizeof(FILE_PREFIX) - 1);
n += sizeof(FILE_PREFIX) - 1;
memcpy(buf + n, key, key_len);
n += key_len;
ps_files_close(data);
if (php_session_valid_key(key) == FAILURE) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "The session id is too long or contains illegal characters, valid characters are a-z, A-Z, 0-9 and '-,'");
return;
}
if (!ps_files_path_create(buf, sizeof(buf), data, key)) {
return;
}
if (data->fd != -1) {
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
/* On Win32 locked files that are closed without being explicitly unlocked
will be unlocked only when "system resources become available". */
flock(data->fd, LOCK_UN);
#endif
close(data->fd);
data->fd = -1;
}
}
static void ps_files_open(ps_files *data, const char *key TSRMLS_DC)
{
char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
if (data->fd < 0 || !data->lastkey || strcmp(key, data->lastkey)) {
if (data->lastkey) {
efree(data->lastkey);
data->lastkey = NULL;
}
ps_files_close(data);
if (!ps_files_valid_key(key)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "The session id is too long or contains illegal characters, valid characters are a-z, A-Z, 0-9 and '-,'");
PS(invalid_session_id) = 1;
return;
}
if (!ps_files_path_create(buf, sizeof(buf), data, key)) {
return;
}
data->lastkey = estrdup(key);
data->fd = VCWD_OPEN_MODE(buf, O_CREAT | O_RDWR | O_BINARY, data->filemode);
if (data->fd != -1) {
#ifndef PHP_WIN32
/* check to make sure that the opened file is not a symlink, linking to data outside of allowable dirs */
if (PG(open_basedir)) {
struct stat sbuf;
if (fstat(data->fd, &sbuf)) {
close(data->fd);
return;
}
if (S_ISLNK(sbuf.st_mode) && php_check_open_basedir(buf TSRMLS_CC)) {
close(data->fd);
return;
}
}
#endif
flock(data->fd, LOCK_EX);
#ifdef F_SETFD
# ifndef FD_CLOEXEC
# define FD_CLOEXEC 1
# endif
if (fcntl(data->fd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "fcntl(%d, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) failed: %s (%d)", data->fd, strerror(errno), errno);
}
#endif
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "open(%s, O_RDWR) failed: %s (%d)", buf, strerror(errno), errno);
}
}
}
static int ps_files_cleanup_dir(const char *dirname, int maxlifetime TSRMLS_DC)
{
DIR *dir;
char dentry[sizeof(struct dirent) + MAXPATHLEN];
struct dirent *entry = (struct dirent *) &dentry;
struct stat sbuf;
char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
time_t now;
int nrdels = 0;
size_t dirname_len;
dir = opendir(dirname);
if (!dir) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_NOTICE, "ps_files_cleanup_dir: opendir(%s) failed: %s (%d)", dirname, strerror(errno), errno);
return (0);
}
time(&now);
return (nrdels);
}
static int ps_files_key_exists(ps_files *data, const char *key TSRMLS_DC)
{
char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
struct stat sbuf;
if (!key || !ps_files_path_create(buf, sizeof(buf), data, key)) {
return FAILURE;
}
if (VCWD_STAT(buf, &sbuf)) {
return FAILURE;
}
return SUCCESS;
}
#define PS_FILES_DATA ps_files *data = PS_GET_MOD_DATA()
PS_OPEN_FUNC(files)
(now - sbuf.st_mtime) > maxlifetime) {
VCWD_UNLINK(buf);
nrdels++;
}
}
| 164,870 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RenderThreadImpl::Shutdown() {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(
RenderProcessObserver, observers_, OnRenderProcessShutdown());
ChildThread::Shutdown();
if (memory_observer_) {
message_loop()->RemoveTaskObserver(memory_observer_.get());
memory_observer_.reset();
}
if (webkit_platform_support_) {
webkit_platform_support_->web_database_observer_impl()->
WaitForAllDatabasesToClose();
}
if (devtools_agent_message_filter_.get()) {
RemoveFilter(devtools_agent_message_filter_.get());
devtools_agent_message_filter_ = NULL;
}
RemoveFilter(audio_input_message_filter_.get());
audio_input_message_filter_ = NULL;
RemoveFilter(audio_message_filter_.get());
audio_message_filter_ = NULL;
#if defined(ENABLE_WEBRTC)
RTCPeerConnectionHandler::DestructAllHandlers();
peer_connection_factory_.reset();
#endif
RemoveFilter(vc_manager_->video_capture_message_filter());
vc_manager_.reset();
RemoveFilter(db_message_filter_.get());
db_message_filter_ = NULL;
if (file_thread_)
file_thread_->Stop();
if (compositor_output_surface_filter_.get()) {
RemoveFilter(compositor_output_surface_filter_.get());
compositor_output_surface_filter_ = NULL;
}
media_thread_.reset();
compositor_thread_.reset();
input_handler_manager_.reset();
if (input_event_filter_.get()) {
RemoveFilter(input_event_filter_.get());
input_event_filter_ = NULL;
}
embedded_worker_dispatcher_.reset();
main_thread_indexed_db_dispatcher_.reset();
if (webkit_platform_support_)
blink::shutdown();
lazy_tls.Pointer()->Set(NULL);
#if defined(OS_WIN)
NPChannelBase::CleanupChannels();
#endif
}
Commit Message: Suspend shared timers while blockingly closing databases
BUG=388771
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/409863002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@284785 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | void RenderThreadImpl::Shutdown() {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(
RenderProcessObserver, observers_, OnRenderProcessShutdown());
ChildThread::Shutdown();
if (memory_observer_) {
message_loop()->RemoveTaskObserver(memory_observer_.get());
memory_observer_.reset();
}
if (webkit_platform_support_) {
// WaitForAllDatabasesToClose might run a nested message loop. To avoid
// processing timer events while we're already in the process of shutting
// down blink, put a ScopePageLoadDeferrer on the stack.
WebView::willEnterModalLoop();
webkit_platform_support_->web_database_observer_impl()->
WaitForAllDatabasesToClose();
WebView::didExitModalLoop();
}
if (devtools_agent_message_filter_.get()) {
RemoveFilter(devtools_agent_message_filter_.get());
devtools_agent_message_filter_ = NULL;
}
RemoveFilter(audio_input_message_filter_.get());
audio_input_message_filter_ = NULL;
RemoveFilter(audio_message_filter_.get());
audio_message_filter_ = NULL;
#if defined(ENABLE_WEBRTC)
RTCPeerConnectionHandler::DestructAllHandlers();
peer_connection_factory_.reset();
#endif
RemoveFilter(vc_manager_->video_capture_message_filter());
vc_manager_.reset();
RemoveFilter(db_message_filter_.get());
db_message_filter_ = NULL;
if (file_thread_)
file_thread_->Stop();
if (compositor_output_surface_filter_.get()) {
RemoveFilter(compositor_output_surface_filter_.get());
compositor_output_surface_filter_ = NULL;
}
media_thread_.reset();
compositor_thread_.reset();
input_handler_manager_.reset();
if (input_event_filter_.get()) {
RemoveFilter(input_event_filter_.get());
input_event_filter_ = NULL;
}
embedded_worker_dispatcher_.reset();
main_thread_indexed_db_dispatcher_.reset();
if (webkit_platform_support_)
blink::shutdown();
lazy_tls.Pointer()->Set(NULL);
#if defined(OS_WIN)
NPChannelBase::CleanupChannels();
#endif
}
| 171,176 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int __init acpi_custom_method_init(void)
{
if (!acpi_debugfs_dir)
return -ENOENT;
cm_dentry = debugfs_create_file("custom_method", S_IWUSR,
acpi_debugfs_dir, NULL, &cm_fops);
if (!cm_dentry)
return -ENODEV;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ACPI: Split out custom_method functionality into an own driver
With /sys/kernel/debug/acpi/custom_method root can write
to arbitrary memory and increase his priveleges, even if
these are restricted.
-> Make this an own debug .config option and warn about the
security issue in the config description.
-> Still keep acpi/debugfs.c which now only creates an empty
/sys/kernel/debug/acpi directory. There might be other
users of it later.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Renninger <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
Acked-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Len Brown <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static int __init acpi_custom_method_init(void)
| 165,901 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool NaClProcessHost::StartNaClExecution() {
NaClBrowser* nacl_browser = NaClBrowser::GetInstance();
nacl::NaClStartParams params;
params.validation_cache_enabled = nacl_browser->ValidationCacheIsEnabled();
params.validation_cache_key = nacl_browser->GetValidationCacheKey();
params.version = chrome::VersionInfo().CreateVersionString();
params.enable_exception_handling = enable_exception_handling_;
params.enable_debug_stub =
CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kEnableNaClDebug);
params.enable_ipc_proxy = enable_ipc_proxy_;
base::PlatformFile irt_file = nacl_browser->IrtFile();
CHECK_NE(irt_file, base::kInvalidPlatformFileValue);
const ChildProcessData& data = process_->GetData();
for (size_t i = 0; i < internal_->sockets_for_sel_ldr.size(); i++) {
if (!ShareHandleToSelLdr(data.handle,
internal_->sockets_for_sel_ldr[i], true,
¶ms.handles)) {
return false;
}
}
if (!ShareHandleToSelLdr(data.handle, irt_file, false, ¶ms.handles))
return false;
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
base::SharedMemory memory_buffer;
base::SharedMemoryCreateOptions options;
options.size = 1;
options.executable = true;
if (!memory_buffer.Create(options)) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to allocate memory buffer";
return false;
}
nacl::FileDescriptor memory_fd;
memory_fd.fd = dup(memory_buffer.handle().fd);
if (memory_fd.fd < 0) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to dup() a file descriptor";
return false;
}
memory_fd.auto_close = true;
params.handles.push_back(memory_fd);
#endif
process_->Send(new NaClProcessMsg_Start(params));
internal_->sockets_for_sel_ldr.clear();
return true;
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | bool NaClProcessHost::StartNaClExecution() {
NaClBrowser* nacl_browser = NaClBrowser::GetInstance();
nacl::NaClStartParams params;
params.validation_cache_enabled = nacl_browser->ValidationCacheIsEnabled();
params.validation_cache_key = nacl_browser->GetValidationCacheKey();
params.version = chrome::VersionInfo().CreateVersionString();
params.enable_exception_handling = enable_exception_handling_;
params.enable_debug_stub =
CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kEnableNaClDebug);
base::PlatformFile irt_file = nacl_browser->IrtFile();
CHECK_NE(irt_file, base::kInvalidPlatformFileValue);
const ChildProcessData& data = process_->GetData();
for (size_t i = 0; i < internal_->sockets_for_sel_ldr.size(); i++) {
if (!ShareHandleToSelLdr(data.handle,
internal_->sockets_for_sel_ldr[i], true,
¶ms.handles)) {
return false;
}
}
if (!ShareHandleToSelLdr(data.handle, irt_file, false, ¶ms.handles))
return false;
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
base::SharedMemory memory_buffer;
base::SharedMemoryCreateOptions options;
options.size = 1;
options.executable = true;
if (!memory_buffer.Create(options)) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to allocate memory buffer";
return false;
}
nacl::FileDescriptor memory_fd;
memory_fd.fd = dup(memory_buffer.handle().fd);
if (memory_fd.fd < 0) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to dup() a file descriptor";
return false;
}
memory_fd.auto_close = true;
params.handles.push_back(memory_fd);
#endif
process_->Send(new NaClProcessMsg_Start(params));
internal_->sockets_for_sel_ldr.clear();
return true;
}
| 170,729 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static opj_bool pi_next_cprl(opj_pi_iterator_t * pi)
{
opj_pi_comp_t *comp = NULL;
opj_pi_resolution_t *res = NULL;
long index = 0;
if (!pi->first) {
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
goto LABEL_SKIP;
} else {
pi->first = 0;
}
for (pi->compno = pi->poc.compno0; pi->compno < pi->poc.compno1; pi->compno++) {
int resno;
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
pi->dx = 0;
pi->dy = 0;
for (resno = 0; resno < comp->numresolutions; resno++) {
int dx, dy;
res = &comp->resolutions[resno];
dx = comp->dx * (1 << (res->pdx + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
dy = comp->dy * (1 << (res->pdy + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
pi->dx = !pi->dx ? dx : int_min(pi->dx, dx);
pi->dy = !pi->dy ? dy : int_min(pi->dy, dy);
}
if (!pi->tp_on) {
pi->poc.ty0 = pi->ty0;
pi->poc.tx0 = pi->tx0;
pi->poc.ty1 = pi->ty1;
pi->poc.tx1 = pi->tx1;
}
for (pi->y = pi->poc.ty0; pi->y < pi->poc.ty1;
pi->y += pi->dy - (pi->y % pi->dy)) {
for (pi->x = pi->poc.tx0; pi->x < pi->poc.tx1;
pi->x += pi->dx - (pi->x % pi->dx)) {
for (pi->resno = pi->poc.resno0;
pi->resno < int_min(pi->poc.resno1, comp->numresolutions); pi->resno++) {
int levelno;
int trx0, try0;
int trx1, try1;
int rpx, rpy;
int prci, prcj;
res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno];
levelno = comp->numresolutions - 1 - pi->resno;
trx0 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx0, comp->dx << levelno);
try0 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty0, comp->dy << levelno);
trx1 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx1, comp->dx << levelno);
try1 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty1, comp->dy << levelno);
rpx = res->pdx + levelno;
rpy = res->pdy + levelno;
if (!((pi->y % (comp->dy << rpy) == 0) || ((pi->y == pi->ty0) &&
((try0 << levelno) % (1 << rpy))))) {
continue;
}
if (!((pi->x % (comp->dx << rpx) == 0) || ((pi->x == pi->tx0) &&
((trx0 << levelno) % (1 << rpx))))) {
continue;
}
if ((res->pw == 0) || (res->ph == 0)) {
continue;
}
if ((trx0 == trx1) || (try0 == try1)) {
continue;
}
prci = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->x, comp->dx << levelno), res->pdx)
- int_floordivpow2(trx0, res->pdx);
prcj = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->y, comp->dy << levelno), res->pdy)
- int_floordivpow2(try0, res->pdy);
pi->precno = prci + prcj * res->pw;
for (pi->layno = pi->poc.layno0; pi->layno < pi->poc.layno1; pi->layno++) {
index = pi->layno * pi->step_l + pi->resno * pi->step_r + pi->compno *
pi->step_c + pi->precno * pi->step_p;
if (!pi->include[index]) {
pi->include[index] = 1;
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
LABEL_SKIP:
;
}
}
}
}
}
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
Commit Message: [MJ2] To avoid divisions by zero / undefined behaviour on shift
Signed-off-by: Young_X <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-369 | static opj_bool pi_next_cprl(opj_pi_iterator_t * pi)
{
opj_pi_comp_t *comp = NULL;
opj_pi_resolution_t *res = NULL;
long index = 0;
if (!pi->first) {
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
goto LABEL_SKIP;
} else {
pi->first = 0;
}
for (pi->compno = pi->poc.compno0; pi->compno < pi->poc.compno1; pi->compno++) {
int resno;
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
pi->dx = 0;
pi->dy = 0;
for (resno = 0; resno < comp->numresolutions; resno++) {
int dx, dy;
res = &comp->resolutions[resno];
dx = comp->dx * (1 << (res->pdx + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
dy = comp->dy * (1 << (res->pdy + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
pi->dx = !pi->dx ? dx : int_min(pi->dx, dx);
pi->dy = !pi->dy ? dy : int_min(pi->dy, dy);
}
if (!pi->tp_on) {
pi->poc.ty0 = pi->ty0;
pi->poc.tx0 = pi->tx0;
pi->poc.ty1 = pi->ty1;
pi->poc.tx1 = pi->tx1;
}
for (pi->y = pi->poc.ty0; pi->y < pi->poc.ty1;
pi->y += pi->dy - (pi->y % pi->dy)) {
for (pi->x = pi->poc.tx0; pi->x < pi->poc.tx1;
pi->x += pi->dx - (pi->x % pi->dx)) {
for (pi->resno = pi->poc.resno0;
pi->resno < int_min(pi->poc.resno1, comp->numresolutions); pi->resno++) {
int levelno;
int trx0, try0;
int trx1, try1;
int rpx, rpy;
int prci, prcj;
res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno];
levelno = comp->numresolutions - 1 - pi->resno;
trx0 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx0, comp->dx << levelno);
try0 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty0, comp->dy << levelno);
trx1 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx1, comp->dx << levelno);
try1 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty1, comp->dy << levelno);
rpx = res->pdx + levelno;
rpy = res->pdy + levelno;
/* To avoid divisions by zero / undefined behaviour on shift */
if (rpx >= 31 || ((comp->dx << rpx) >> rpx) != comp->dx ||
rpy >= 31 || ((comp->dy << rpy) >> rpy) != comp->dy) {
continue;
}
if (!((pi->y % (comp->dy << rpy) == 0) || ((pi->y == pi->ty0) &&
((try0 << levelno) % (1 << rpy))))) {
continue;
}
if (!((pi->x % (comp->dx << rpx) == 0) || ((pi->x == pi->tx0) &&
((trx0 << levelno) % (1 << rpx))))) {
continue;
}
if ((res->pw == 0) || (res->ph == 0)) {
continue;
}
if ((trx0 == trx1) || (try0 == try1)) {
continue;
}
prci = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->x, comp->dx << levelno), res->pdx)
- int_floordivpow2(trx0, res->pdx);
prcj = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->y, comp->dy << levelno), res->pdy)
- int_floordivpow2(try0, res->pdy);
pi->precno = prci + prcj * res->pw;
for (pi->layno = pi->poc.layno0; pi->layno < pi->poc.layno1; pi->layno++) {
index = pi->layno * pi->step_l + pi->resno * pi->step_r + pi->compno *
pi->step_c + pi->precno * pi->step_p;
if (!pi->include[index]) {
pi->include[index] = 1;
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
LABEL_SKIP:
;
}
}
}
}
}
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
| 169,772 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: AXObjectInclusion AXLayoutObject::defaultObjectInclusion(
IgnoredReasons* ignoredReasons) const {
if (!m_layoutObject) {
if (ignoredReasons)
ignoredReasons->push_back(IgnoredReason(AXNotRendered));
return IgnoreObject;
}
if (m_layoutObject->style()->visibility() != EVisibility::kVisible) {
if (equalIgnoringCase(getAttribute(aria_hiddenAttr), "false"))
return DefaultBehavior;
if (ignoredReasons)
ignoredReasons->push_back(IgnoredReason(AXNotVisible));
return IgnoreObject;
}
return AXObject::defaultObjectInclusion(ignoredReasons);
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | AXObjectInclusion AXLayoutObject::defaultObjectInclusion(
IgnoredReasons* ignoredReasons) const {
if (!m_layoutObject) {
if (ignoredReasons)
ignoredReasons->push_back(IgnoredReason(AXNotRendered));
return IgnoreObject;
}
if (m_layoutObject->style()->visibility() != EVisibility::kVisible) {
if (equalIgnoringASCIICase(getAttribute(aria_hiddenAttr), "false"))
return DefaultBehavior;
if (ignoredReasons)
ignoredReasons->push_back(IgnoredReason(AXNotVisible));
return IgnoreObject;
}
return AXObject::defaultObjectInclusion(ignoredReasons);
}
| 171,903 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: png_set_tIME(png_structp png_ptr, png_infop info_ptr, png_timep mod_time)
{
png_debug1(1, "in %s storage function", "tIME");
if (png_ptr == NULL || info_ptr == NULL ||
(png_ptr->mode & PNG_WROTE_tIME))
return;
png_memcpy(&(info_ptr->mod_time), mod_time, png_sizeof(png_time));
info_ptr->valid |= PNG_INFO_tIME;
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
[email protected]
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | png_set_tIME(png_structp png_ptr, png_infop info_ptr, png_timep mod_time)
{
png_debug1(1, "in %s storage function", "tIME");
if (png_ptr == NULL || info_ptr == NULL ||
(png_ptr->mode & PNG_WROTE_tIME))
return;
if (mod_time->month == 0 || mod_time->month > 12 ||
mod_time->day == 0 || mod_time->day > 31 ||
mod_time->hour > 23 || mod_time->minute > 59 ||
mod_time->second > 60)
{
png_warning(png_ptr, "Ignoring invalid time value");
return;
}
png_memcpy(&(info_ptr->mod_time), mod_time, png_sizeof(png_time));
info_ptr->valid |= PNG_INFO_tIME;
}
| 172,184 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: gfx::Size LockScreenMediaControlsView::CalculatePreferredSize() const {
return gfx::Size(kMediaControlsTotalWidthDp, kMediaControlsTotalHeightDp);
}
Commit Message: [Lock Screen Media Controls] Tweak UI based on new mocks
This CL rearranges the different components of the CrOS lock screen
media controls based on the newest mocks. This involves resizing most
of the child views and their spacings. The artwork was also resized
and re-positioned. Additionally, the close button was moved from the
main view to the header row child view.
Artist and title data about the current session will eventually be
placed to the right of the artwork, but right now this space is empty.
See the bug for before and after pictures.
Bug: 991647
Change-Id: I7b97f31982ccf2912bd2564d5241bfd849d21d92
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1746554
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Becca Hughes <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Mia Bergeron <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#686253}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | gfx::Size LockScreenMediaControlsView::CalculatePreferredSize() const {
return contents_view_->GetPreferredSize();
}
| 172,338 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ~SessionRestoreImpl() {
STLDeleteElements(&windows_);
CHECK(profiles_getting_restored);
CHECK(profiles_getting_restored->find(profile_) !=
profiles_getting_restored->end());
profiles_getting_restored->erase(profile_);
if (profiles_getting_restored->empty()) {
delete profiles_getting_restored;
profiles_getting_restored = NULL;
}
g_browser_process->ReleaseModule();
}
Commit Message: Lands http://codereview.chromium.org/9316065/ for Marja. I reviewed
this, so I'm using TBR to land it.
Don't crash if multiple SessionRestoreImpl:s refer to the same
Profile.
It shouldn't ever happen but it seems to happen anyway.
BUG=111238
TEST=NONE
[email protected]
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9343005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@120648 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | ~SessionRestoreImpl() {
STLDeleteElements(&windows_);
active_session_restorers->erase(this);
if (active_session_restorers->empty()) {
delete active_session_restorers;
active_session_restorers = NULL;
}
g_browser_process->ReleaseModule();
}
| 171,038 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: const char* Chapters::Display::GetString() const
{
return m_string;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | const char* Chapters::Display::GetString() const
| 174,359 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: WebString WebPageSerializer::generateMarkOfTheWebDeclaration(const WebURL& url)
{
return String::format("\n<!-- saved from url=(%04d)%s -->\n",
static_cast<int>(url.spec().length()),
url.spec().data());
}
Commit Message: Escape "--" in the page URL at page serialization
This patch makes page serializer to escape the page URL embed into a HTML
comment of result HTML[1] to avoid inserting text as HTML from URL by
introducing a static member function |PageSerialzier::markOfTheWebDeclaration()|
for sharing it between |PageSerialzier| and |WebPageSerialzier| classes.
[1] We use following format for serialized HTML:
saved from url=(${lengthOfURL})${URL}
BUG=503217
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=PageSerializerTest.markOfTheWebDeclaration
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=WebPageSerializerTest.fromUrlWithMinusMinu
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1371323003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351736}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | WebString WebPageSerializer::generateMarkOfTheWebDeclaration(const WebURL& url)
{
StringBuilder builder;
builder.append("\n<!-- ");
builder.append(PageSerializer::markOfTheWebDeclaration(url));
builder.append(" -->\n");
return builder.toString();
}
| 171,787 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: nfs41_callback_svc(void *vrqstp)
{
struct svc_rqst *rqstp = vrqstp;
struct svc_serv *serv = rqstp->rq_server;
struct rpc_rqst *req;
int error;
DEFINE_WAIT(wq);
set_freezable();
while (!kthread_should_stop()) {
if (try_to_freeze())
continue;
prepare_to_wait(&serv->sv_cb_waitq, &wq, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
spin_lock_bh(&serv->sv_cb_lock);
if (!list_empty(&serv->sv_cb_list)) {
req = list_first_entry(&serv->sv_cb_list,
struct rpc_rqst, rq_bc_list);
list_del(&req->rq_bc_list);
spin_unlock_bh(&serv->sv_cb_lock);
finish_wait(&serv->sv_cb_waitq, &wq);
dprintk("Invoking bc_svc_process()\n");
error = bc_svc_process(serv, req, rqstp);
dprintk("bc_svc_process() returned w/ error code= %d\n",
error);
} else {
spin_unlock_bh(&serv->sv_cb_lock);
schedule();
finish_wait(&serv->sv_cb_waitq, &wq);
}
flush_signals(current);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | nfs41_callback_svc(void *vrqstp)
{
struct svc_rqst *rqstp = vrqstp;
struct svc_serv *serv = rqstp->rq_server;
struct rpc_rqst *req;
int error;
DEFINE_WAIT(wq);
set_freezable();
while (!kthread_freezable_should_stop(NULL)) {
if (signal_pending(current))
flush_signals(current);
prepare_to_wait(&serv->sv_cb_waitq, &wq, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
spin_lock_bh(&serv->sv_cb_lock);
if (!list_empty(&serv->sv_cb_list)) {
req = list_first_entry(&serv->sv_cb_list,
struct rpc_rqst, rq_bc_list);
list_del(&req->rq_bc_list);
spin_unlock_bh(&serv->sv_cb_lock);
finish_wait(&serv->sv_cb_waitq, &wq);
dprintk("Invoking bc_svc_process()\n");
error = bc_svc_process(serv, req, rqstp);
dprintk("bc_svc_process() returned w/ error code= %d\n",
error);
} else {
spin_unlock_bh(&serv->sv_cb_lock);
if (!kthread_should_stop())
schedule();
finish_wait(&serv->sv_cb_waitq, &wq);
}
}
svc_exit_thread(rqstp);
module_put_and_exit(0);
return 0;
}
| 168,137 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl::FlipVertically(
uint8* framebuffer,
unsigned int width,
unsigned int height) {
uint8* scanline = scanline_.get();
if (!scanline)
return;
unsigned int row_bytes = width * 4;
unsigned int count = height / 2;
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < count; i++) {
uint8* row_a = framebuffer + i * row_bytes;
uint8* row_b = framebuffer + (height - i - 1) * row_bytes;
memcpy(scanline, row_b, row_bytes);
memcpy(row_b, row_a, row_bytes);
memcpy(row_a, scanline, row_bytes);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix mismanagement in handling of temporary scanline for vertical flip.
BUG=116637
TEST=manual test from bug report with ASAN
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9617038
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@125301 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl::FlipVertically(
uint8* framebuffer,
unsigned int width,
unsigned int height) {
if (width == 0)
return;
scanline_.resize(width * 4);
uint8* scanline = &scanline_[0];
unsigned int row_bytes = width * 4;
unsigned int count = height / 2;
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < count; i++) {
uint8* row_a = framebuffer + i * row_bytes;
uint8* row_b = framebuffer + (height - i - 1) * row_bytes;
memcpy(scanline, row_b, row_bytes);
memcpy(row_b, row_a, row_bytes);
memcpy(row_a, scanline, row_bytes);
}
}
| 171,063 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static TEE_Result set_rmem_param(const struct optee_msg_param_rmem *rmem,
struct param_mem *mem)
{
uint64_t shm_ref = READ_ONCE(rmem->shm_ref);
mem->mobj = mobj_reg_shm_get_by_cookie(shm_ref);
if (!mem->mobj)
return TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
mem->offs = READ_ONCE(rmem->offs);
mem->size = READ_ONCE(rmem->size);
return TEE_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: core: ensure that supplied range matches MOBJ
In set_rmem_param() if the MOBJ is found by the cookie it's verified to
represent non-secure shared memory. Prior to this patch the supplied
sub-range to be used of the MOBJ was not checked here and relied on
later checks further down the chain. Those checks seems to be enough
for user TAs, but not for pseudo TAs where the size isn't checked.
This patch adds a check for offset and size to see that they remain
inside the memory covered by the MOBJ.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0004: "Unchecked parameters are passed through from
REE".
Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <[email protected]> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Joakim Bech <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Riscure <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static TEE_Result set_rmem_param(const struct optee_msg_param_rmem *rmem,
struct param_mem *mem)
{
size_t req_size = 0;
uint64_t shm_ref = READ_ONCE(rmem->shm_ref);
mem->mobj = mobj_reg_shm_get_by_cookie(shm_ref);
if (!mem->mobj)
return TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
mem->offs = READ_ONCE(rmem->offs);
mem->size = READ_ONCE(rmem->size);
/*
* Check that the supplied offset and size is covered by the
* previously verified MOBJ.
*/
if (ADD_OVERFLOW(mem->offs, mem->size, &req_size) ||
mem->mobj->size < req_size)
return TEE_ERROR_SECURITY;
return TEE_SUCCESS;
}
| 169,474 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void OnSuggestionModelAdded(UiScene* scene,
UiBrowserInterface* browser,
Model* model,
SuggestionBinding* element_binding) {
auto icon = base::MakeUnique<VectorIcon>(100);
icon->SetDrawPhase(kPhaseForeground);
icon->SetType(kTypeOmniboxSuggestionIcon);
icon->set_hit_testable(false);
icon->SetSize(kSuggestionIconSizeDMM, kSuggestionIconSizeDMM);
BindColor(model, icon.get(), &ColorScheme::omnibox_icon,
&VectorIcon::SetColor);
VectorIcon* p_icon = icon.get();
auto icon_box = base::MakeUnique<UiElement>();
icon_box->SetDrawPhase(kPhaseNone);
icon_box->SetType(kTypeOmniboxSuggestionIconField);
icon_box->SetSize(kSuggestionIconFieldWidthDMM, kSuggestionHeightDMM);
icon_box->AddChild(std::move(icon));
auto content_text = base::MakeUnique<Text>(kSuggestionContentTextHeightDMM);
content_text->SetDrawPhase(kPhaseForeground);
content_text->SetType(kTypeOmniboxSuggestionContentText);
content_text->set_hit_testable(false);
content_text->SetTextLayoutMode(TextLayoutMode::kSingleLineFixedWidth);
content_text->SetSize(kSuggestionTextFieldWidthDMM, 0);
content_text->SetTextAlignment(UiTexture::kTextAlignmentLeft);
BindColor(model, content_text.get(), &ColorScheme::omnibox_suggestion_content,
&Text::SetColor);
Text* p_content_text = content_text.get();
auto description_text =
base::MakeUnique<Text>(kSuggestionDescriptionTextHeightDMM);
description_text->SetDrawPhase(kPhaseForeground);
description_text->SetType(kTypeOmniboxSuggestionDescriptionText);
description_text->set_hit_testable(false);
content_text->SetTextLayoutMode(TextLayoutMode::kSingleLineFixedWidth);
description_text->SetSize(kSuggestionTextFieldWidthDMM, 0);
description_text->SetTextAlignment(UiTexture::kTextAlignmentLeft);
BindColor(model, description_text.get(),
&ColorScheme::omnibox_suggestion_description, &Text::SetColor);
Text* p_description_text = description_text.get();
auto text_layout = base::MakeUnique<LinearLayout>(LinearLayout::kDown);
text_layout->SetType(kTypeOmniboxSuggestionTextLayout);
text_layout->set_hit_testable(false);
text_layout->set_margin(kSuggestionLineGapDMM);
text_layout->AddChild(std::move(content_text));
text_layout->AddChild(std::move(description_text));
auto right_margin = base::MakeUnique<UiElement>();
right_margin->SetDrawPhase(kPhaseNone);
right_margin->SetSize(kSuggestionRightMarginDMM, kSuggestionHeightDMM);
auto suggestion_layout = base::MakeUnique<LinearLayout>(LinearLayout::kRight);
suggestion_layout->SetType(kTypeOmniboxSuggestionLayout);
suggestion_layout->set_hit_testable(false);
suggestion_layout->AddChild(std::move(icon_box));
suggestion_layout->AddChild(std::move(text_layout));
suggestion_layout->AddChild(std::move(right_margin));
auto background = Create<Button>(
kNone, kPhaseForeground,
base::BindRepeating(
[](UiBrowserInterface* b, Model* m, SuggestionBinding* e) {
b->Navigate(e->model()->destination);
m->omnibox_input_active = false;
},
base::Unretained(browser), base::Unretained(model),
base::Unretained(element_binding)));
background->SetType(kTypeOmniboxSuggestionBackground);
background->set_hit_testable(true);
background->set_bubble_events(true);
background->set_bounds_contain_children(true);
background->set_hover_offset(0.0);
BindButtonColors(model, background.get(),
&ColorScheme::suggestion_button_colors,
&Button::SetButtonColors);
background->AddChild(std::move(suggestion_layout));
element_binding->bindings().push_back(
VR_BIND_FUNC(base::string16, SuggestionBinding, element_binding,
model()->content, Text, p_content_text, SetText));
element_binding->bindings().push_back(
base::MakeUnique<Binding<base::string16>>(
base::BindRepeating(
[](SuggestionBinding* m) { return m->model()->description; },
base::Unretained(element_binding)),
base::BindRepeating(
[](Text* v, const base::string16& text) {
v->SetVisibleImmediately(!text.empty());
v->set_requires_layout(!text.empty());
if (!text.empty()) {
v->SetText(text);
}
},
base::Unretained(p_description_text))));
element_binding->bindings().push_back(
VR_BIND(AutocompleteMatch::Type, SuggestionBinding, element_binding,
model()->type, VectorIcon, p_icon,
SetIcon(AutocompleteMatch::TypeToVectorIcon(value))));
element_binding->set_view(background.get());
scene->AddUiElement(kOmniboxSuggestions, std::move(background));
}
Commit Message: Fix wrapping behavior of description text in omnibox suggestion
This regression is introduced by
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/827033
The description text should not wrap.
Bug: NONE
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Iaac5e6176e1730853406602835d61fe1e80ec0d0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/839960
Reviewed-by: Christopher Grant <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Biao She <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525806}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void OnSuggestionModelAdded(UiScene* scene,
UiBrowserInterface* browser,
Model* model,
SuggestionBinding* element_binding) {
auto icon = base::MakeUnique<VectorIcon>(100);
icon->SetDrawPhase(kPhaseForeground);
icon->SetType(kTypeOmniboxSuggestionIcon);
icon->set_hit_testable(false);
icon->SetSize(kSuggestionIconSizeDMM, kSuggestionIconSizeDMM);
BindColor(model, icon.get(), &ColorScheme::omnibox_icon,
&VectorIcon::SetColor);
VectorIcon* p_icon = icon.get();
auto icon_box = base::MakeUnique<UiElement>();
icon_box->SetDrawPhase(kPhaseNone);
icon_box->SetType(kTypeOmniboxSuggestionIconField);
icon_box->SetSize(kSuggestionIconFieldWidthDMM, kSuggestionHeightDMM);
icon_box->AddChild(std::move(icon));
auto content_text = base::MakeUnique<Text>(kSuggestionContentTextHeightDMM);
content_text->SetDrawPhase(kPhaseForeground);
content_text->SetType(kTypeOmniboxSuggestionContentText);
content_text->set_hit_testable(false);
content_text->SetTextLayoutMode(TextLayoutMode::kSingleLineFixedWidth);
content_text->SetSize(kSuggestionTextFieldWidthDMM, 0);
content_text->SetTextAlignment(UiTexture::kTextAlignmentLeft);
BindColor(model, content_text.get(), &ColorScheme::omnibox_suggestion_content,
&Text::SetColor);
Text* p_content_text = content_text.get();
auto description_text =
base::MakeUnique<Text>(kSuggestionDescriptionTextHeightDMM);
description_text->SetDrawPhase(kPhaseForeground);
description_text->SetType(kTypeOmniboxSuggestionDescriptionText);
description_text->set_hit_testable(false);
description_text->SetTextLayoutMode(TextLayoutMode::kSingleLineFixedWidth);
description_text->SetSize(kSuggestionTextFieldWidthDMM, 0);
description_text->SetTextAlignment(UiTexture::kTextAlignmentLeft);
BindColor(model, description_text.get(),
&ColorScheme::omnibox_suggestion_description, &Text::SetColor);
Text* p_description_text = description_text.get();
auto text_layout = base::MakeUnique<LinearLayout>(LinearLayout::kDown);
text_layout->SetType(kTypeOmniboxSuggestionTextLayout);
text_layout->set_hit_testable(false);
text_layout->set_margin(kSuggestionLineGapDMM);
text_layout->AddChild(std::move(content_text));
text_layout->AddChild(std::move(description_text));
auto right_margin = base::MakeUnique<UiElement>();
right_margin->SetDrawPhase(kPhaseNone);
right_margin->SetSize(kSuggestionRightMarginDMM, kSuggestionHeightDMM);
auto suggestion_layout = base::MakeUnique<LinearLayout>(LinearLayout::kRight);
suggestion_layout->SetType(kTypeOmniboxSuggestionLayout);
suggestion_layout->set_hit_testable(false);
suggestion_layout->AddChild(std::move(icon_box));
suggestion_layout->AddChild(std::move(text_layout));
suggestion_layout->AddChild(std::move(right_margin));
auto background = Create<Button>(
kNone, kPhaseForeground,
base::BindRepeating(
[](UiBrowserInterface* b, Model* m, SuggestionBinding* e) {
b->Navigate(e->model()->destination);
m->omnibox_input_active = false;
},
base::Unretained(browser), base::Unretained(model),
base::Unretained(element_binding)));
background->SetType(kTypeOmniboxSuggestionBackground);
background->set_hit_testable(true);
background->set_bubble_events(true);
background->set_bounds_contain_children(true);
background->set_hover_offset(0.0);
BindButtonColors(model, background.get(),
&ColorScheme::suggestion_button_colors,
&Button::SetButtonColors);
background->AddChild(std::move(suggestion_layout));
element_binding->bindings().push_back(
VR_BIND_FUNC(base::string16, SuggestionBinding, element_binding,
model()->content, Text, p_content_text, SetText));
element_binding->bindings().push_back(
base::MakeUnique<Binding<base::string16>>(
base::BindRepeating(
[](SuggestionBinding* m) { return m->model()->description; },
base::Unretained(element_binding)),
base::BindRepeating(
[](Text* v, const base::string16& text) {
v->SetVisibleImmediately(!text.empty());
v->set_requires_layout(!text.empty());
if (!text.empty()) {
v->SetText(text);
}
},
base::Unretained(p_description_text))));
element_binding->bindings().push_back(
VR_BIND(AutocompleteMatch::Type, SuggestionBinding, element_binding,
model()->type, VectorIcon, p_icon,
SetIcon(AutocompleteMatch::TypeToVectorIcon(value))));
element_binding->set_view(background.get());
scene->AddUiElement(kOmniboxSuggestions, std::move(background));
}
| 173,221 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PaintLayerScrollableArea::UpdateCompositingLayersAfterScroll() {
PaintLayerCompositor* compositor = GetLayoutBox()->View()->Compositor();
if (!compositor->InCompositingMode())
return;
if (UsesCompositedScrolling()) {
DCHECK(Layer()->HasCompositedLayerMapping());
ScrollingCoordinator* scrolling_coordinator = GetScrollingCoordinator();
bool handled_scroll =
Layer()->IsRootLayer() && scrolling_coordinator &&
scrolling_coordinator->UpdateCompositedScrollOffset(this);
if (!handled_scroll) {
if (!RuntimeEnabledFeatures::BlinkGenPropertyTreesEnabled()) {
Layer()->GetCompositedLayerMapping()->SetNeedsGraphicsLayerUpdate(
kGraphicsLayerUpdateSubtree);
}
compositor->SetNeedsCompositingUpdate(
kCompositingUpdateAfterGeometryChange);
}
if (Layer()->IsRootLayer()) {
LocalFrame* frame = GetLayoutBox()->GetFrame();
if (frame && frame->View() &&
frame->View()->HasViewportConstrainedObjects()) {
Layer()->SetNeedsCompositingInputsUpdate();
}
}
} else {
Layer()->SetNeedsCompositingInputsUpdate();
}
}
Commit Message: Always call UpdateCompositedScrollOffset, not just for the root layer
Bug: 927560
Change-Id: I1d5522aae4f11dd3f5b8947bb089bac1bf19bdb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452701
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Mason Freed <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628942}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | void PaintLayerScrollableArea::UpdateCompositingLayersAfterScroll() {
PaintLayerCompositor* compositor = GetLayoutBox()->View()->Compositor();
if (!compositor->InCompositingMode())
return;
if (UsesCompositedScrolling()) {
DCHECK(Layer()->HasCompositedLayerMapping());
ScrollingCoordinator* scrolling_coordinator = GetScrollingCoordinator();
bool handled_scroll =
(Layer()->IsRootLayer() ||
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::BlinkGenPropertyTreesEnabled()) &&
scrolling_coordinator &&
scrolling_coordinator->UpdateCompositedScrollOffset(this);
if (!handled_scroll) {
if (!RuntimeEnabledFeatures::BlinkGenPropertyTreesEnabled()) {
Layer()->GetCompositedLayerMapping()->SetNeedsGraphicsLayerUpdate(
kGraphicsLayerUpdateSubtree);
}
compositor->SetNeedsCompositingUpdate(
kCompositingUpdateAfterGeometryChange);
}
if (Layer()->IsRootLayer()) {
LocalFrame* frame = GetLayoutBox()->GetFrame();
if (frame && frame->View() &&
frame->View()->HasViewportConstrainedObjects()) {
Layer()->SetNeedsCompositingInputsUpdate();
}
}
} else {
Layer()->SetNeedsCompositingInputsUpdate();
}
}
| 172,047 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: get_endpoints(struct usbtest_dev *dev, struct usb_interface *intf)
{
int tmp;
struct usb_host_interface *alt;
struct usb_host_endpoint *in, *out;
struct usb_host_endpoint *iso_in, *iso_out;
struct usb_host_endpoint *int_in, *int_out;
struct usb_device *udev;
for (tmp = 0; tmp < intf->num_altsetting; tmp++) {
unsigned ep;
in = out = NULL;
iso_in = iso_out = NULL;
int_in = int_out = NULL;
alt = intf->altsetting + tmp;
if (override_alt >= 0 &&
override_alt != alt->desc.bAlternateSetting)
continue;
/* take the first altsetting with in-bulk + out-bulk;
* ignore other endpoints and altsettings.
*/
for (ep = 0; ep < alt->desc.bNumEndpoints; ep++) {
struct usb_host_endpoint *e;
int edi;
e = alt->endpoint + ep;
edi = usb_endpoint_dir_in(&e->desc);
switch (usb_endpoint_type(&e->desc)) {
case USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_BULK:
endpoint_update(edi, &in, &out, e);
continue;
case USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_INT:
if (dev->info->intr)
endpoint_update(edi, &int_in, &int_out, e);
continue;
case USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_ISOC:
if (dev->info->iso)
endpoint_update(edi, &iso_in, &iso_out, e);
/* FALLTHROUGH */
default:
continue;
}
}
if ((in && out) || iso_in || iso_out || int_in || int_out)
goto found;
}
return -EINVAL;
found:
udev = testdev_to_usbdev(dev);
dev->info->alt = alt->desc.bAlternateSetting;
if (alt->desc.bAlternateSetting != 0) {
tmp = usb_set_interface(udev,
alt->desc.bInterfaceNumber,
alt->desc.bAlternateSetting);
if (tmp < 0)
return tmp;
}
if (in) {
dev->in_pipe = usb_rcvbulkpipe(udev,
in->desc.bEndpointAddress & USB_ENDPOINT_NUMBER_MASK);
dev->out_pipe = usb_sndbulkpipe(udev,
out->desc.bEndpointAddress & USB_ENDPOINT_NUMBER_MASK);
}
if (iso_in) {
dev->iso_in = &iso_in->desc;
dev->in_iso_pipe = usb_rcvisocpipe(udev,
iso_in->desc.bEndpointAddress
& USB_ENDPOINT_NUMBER_MASK);
}
if (iso_out) {
dev->iso_out = &iso_out->desc;
dev->out_iso_pipe = usb_sndisocpipe(udev,
iso_out->desc.bEndpointAddress
& USB_ENDPOINT_NUMBER_MASK);
}
if (int_in) {
dev->int_in = &int_in->desc;
dev->in_int_pipe = usb_rcvintpipe(udev,
int_in->desc.bEndpointAddress
& USB_ENDPOINT_NUMBER_MASK);
}
if (int_out) {
dev->int_out = &int_out->desc;
dev->out_int_pipe = usb_sndintpipe(udev,
int_out->desc.bEndpointAddress
& USB_ENDPOINT_NUMBER_MASK);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: usb: usbtest: fix NULL pointer dereference
If the usbtest driver encounters a device with an IN bulk endpoint but
no OUT bulk endpoint, it will try to dereference a NULL pointer
(out->desc.bEndpointAddress). The problem can be solved by adding a
missing test.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | get_endpoints(struct usbtest_dev *dev, struct usb_interface *intf)
{
int tmp;
struct usb_host_interface *alt;
struct usb_host_endpoint *in, *out;
struct usb_host_endpoint *iso_in, *iso_out;
struct usb_host_endpoint *int_in, *int_out;
struct usb_device *udev;
for (tmp = 0; tmp < intf->num_altsetting; tmp++) {
unsigned ep;
in = out = NULL;
iso_in = iso_out = NULL;
int_in = int_out = NULL;
alt = intf->altsetting + tmp;
if (override_alt >= 0 &&
override_alt != alt->desc.bAlternateSetting)
continue;
/* take the first altsetting with in-bulk + out-bulk;
* ignore other endpoints and altsettings.
*/
for (ep = 0; ep < alt->desc.bNumEndpoints; ep++) {
struct usb_host_endpoint *e;
int edi;
e = alt->endpoint + ep;
edi = usb_endpoint_dir_in(&e->desc);
switch (usb_endpoint_type(&e->desc)) {
case USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_BULK:
endpoint_update(edi, &in, &out, e);
continue;
case USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_INT:
if (dev->info->intr)
endpoint_update(edi, &int_in, &int_out, e);
continue;
case USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_ISOC:
if (dev->info->iso)
endpoint_update(edi, &iso_in, &iso_out, e);
/* FALLTHROUGH */
default:
continue;
}
}
if ((in && out) || iso_in || iso_out || int_in || int_out)
goto found;
}
return -EINVAL;
found:
udev = testdev_to_usbdev(dev);
dev->info->alt = alt->desc.bAlternateSetting;
if (alt->desc.bAlternateSetting != 0) {
tmp = usb_set_interface(udev,
alt->desc.bInterfaceNumber,
alt->desc.bAlternateSetting);
if (tmp < 0)
return tmp;
}
if (in)
dev->in_pipe = usb_rcvbulkpipe(udev,
in->desc.bEndpointAddress & USB_ENDPOINT_NUMBER_MASK);
if (out)
dev->out_pipe = usb_sndbulkpipe(udev,
out->desc.bEndpointAddress & USB_ENDPOINT_NUMBER_MASK);
if (iso_in) {
dev->iso_in = &iso_in->desc;
dev->in_iso_pipe = usb_rcvisocpipe(udev,
iso_in->desc.bEndpointAddress
& USB_ENDPOINT_NUMBER_MASK);
}
if (iso_out) {
dev->iso_out = &iso_out->desc;
dev->out_iso_pipe = usb_sndisocpipe(udev,
iso_out->desc.bEndpointAddress
& USB_ENDPOINT_NUMBER_MASK);
}
if (int_in) {
dev->int_in = &int_in->desc;
dev->in_int_pipe = usb_rcvintpipe(udev,
int_in->desc.bEndpointAddress
& USB_ENDPOINT_NUMBER_MASK);
}
if (int_out) {
dev->int_out = &int_out->desc;
dev->out_int_pipe = usb_sndintpipe(udev,
int_out->desc.bEndpointAddress
& USB_ENDPOINT_NUMBER_MASK);
}
return 0;
}
| 167,678 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int jffs2_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, int type)
{
int rc, xprefix;
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
xprefix = JFFS2_XPREFIX_ACL_ACCESS;
if (acl) {
umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
rc = posix_acl_equiv_mode(acl, &mode);
if (rc < 0)
return rc;
if (inode->i_mode != mode) {
struct iattr attr;
attr.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE | ATTR_CTIME;
attr.ia_mode = mode;
attr.ia_ctime = CURRENT_TIME_SEC;
rc = jffs2_do_setattr(inode, &attr);
if (rc < 0)
return rc;
}
if (rc == 0)
acl = NULL;
}
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
xprefix = JFFS2_XPREFIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
return acl ? -EACCES : 0;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
rc = __jffs2_set_acl(inode, xprefix, acl);
if (!rc)
set_cached_acl(inode, type, acl);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-285 | int jffs2_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, int type)
{
int rc, xprefix;
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
xprefix = JFFS2_XPREFIX_ACL_ACCESS;
if (acl) {
umode_t mode;
rc = posix_acl_update_mode(inode, &mode, &acl);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (inode->i_mode != mode) {
struct iattr attr;
attr.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE | ATTR_CTIME;
attr.ia_mode = mode;
attr.ia_ctime = CURRENT_TIME_SEC;
rc = jffs2_do_setattr(inode, &attr);
if (rc < 0)
return rc;
}
}
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
xprefix = JFFS2_XPREFIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
return acl ? -EACCES : 0;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
rc = __jffs2_set_acl(inode, xprefix, acl);
if (!rc)
set_cached_acl(inode, type, acl);
return rc;
}
| 166,974 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: my_object_error_get_type (void)
{
static GType etype = 0;
if (etype == 0)
{
static const GEnumValue values[] =
{
ENUM_ENTRY (MY_OBJECT_ERROR_FOO, "Foo"),
ENUM_ENTRY (MY_OBJECT_ERROR_BAR, "Bar"),
{ 0, 0, 0 }
};
etype = g_enum_register_static ("MyObjectError", values);
}
return etype;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | my_object_error_get_type (void)
| 165,097 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool NavigationControllerImpl::RendererDidNavigate(
RenderFrameHostImpl* rfh,
const FrameHostMsg_DidCommitProvisionalLoad_Params& params,
LoadCommittedDetails* details,
bool is_navigation_within_page,
NavigationHandleImpl* navigation_handle) {
is_initial_navigation_ = false;
bool overriding_user_agent_changed = false;
if (GetLastCommittedEntry()) {
details->previous_url = GetLastCommittedEntry()->GetURL();
details->previous_entry_index = GetLastCommittedEntryIndex();
if (pending_entry_ &&
pending_entry_->GetIsOverridingUserAgent() !=
GetLastCommittedEntry()->GetIsOverridingUserAgent())
overriding_user_agent_changed = true;
} else {
details->previous_url = GURL();
details->previous_entry_index = -1;
}
bool was_restored = false;
DCHECK(pending_entry_index_ == -1 || pending_entry_->site_instance() ||
pending_entry_->restore_type() != RestoreType::NONE);
if (pending_entry_ && pending_entry_->restore_type() != RestoreType::NONE) {
pending_entry_->set_restore_type(RestoreType::NONE);
was_restored = true;
}
details->did_replace_entry = params.should_replace_current_entry;
details->type = ClassifyNavigation(rfh, params);
details->is_same_document = is_navigation_within_page;
if (PendingEntryMatchesHandle(navigation_handle)) {
if (pending_entry_->reload_type() != ReloadType::NONE) {
last_committed_reload_type_ = pending_entry_->reload_type();
last_committed_reload_time_ =
time_smoother_.GetSmoothedTime(get_timestamp_callback_.Run());
} else if (!pending_entry_->is_renderer_initiated() ||
params.gesture == NavigationGestureUser) {
last_committed_reload_type_ = ReloadType::NONE;
last_committed_reload_time_ = base::Time();
}
}
switch (details->type) {
case NAVIGATION_TYPE_NEW_PAGE:
RendererDidNavigateToNewPage(rfh, params, details->is_same_document,
details->did_replace_entry,
navigation_handle);
break;
case NAVIGATION_TYPE_EXISTING_PAGE:
details->did_replace_entry = details->is_same_document;
RendererDidNavigateToExistingPage(rfh, params, details->is_same_document,
was_restored, navigation_handle);
break;
case NAVIGATION_TYPE_SAME_PAGE:
RendererDidNavigateToSamePage(rfh, params, navigation_handle);
break;
case NAVIGATION_TYPE_NEW_SUBFRAME:
RendererDidNavigateNewSubframe(rfh, params, details->is_same_document,
details->did_replace_entry);
break;
case NAVIGATION_TYPE_AUTO_SUBFRAME:
if (!RendererDidNavigateAutoSubframe(rfh, params)) {
NotifyEntryChanged(GetLastCommittedEntry());
return false;
}
break;
case NAVIGATION_TYPE_NAV_IGNORE:
if (pending_entry_) {
DiscardNonCommittedEntries();
delegate_->NotifyNavigationStateChanged(INVALIDATE_TYPE_URL);
}
return false;
default:
NOTREACHED();
}
base::Time timestamp =
time_smoother_.GetSmoothedTime(get_timestamp_callback_.Run());
DVLOG(1) << "Navigation finished at (smoothed) timestamp "
<< timestamp.ToInternalValue();
DiscardNonCommittedEntriesInternal();
DCHECK(params.page_state.IsValid()) << "Shouldn't see an empty PageState.";
NavigationEntryImpl* active_entry = GetLastCommittedEntry();
active_entry->SetTimestamp(timestamp);
active_entry->SetHttpStatusCode(params.http_status_code);
FrameNavigationEntry* frame_entry =
active_entry->GetFrameEntry(rfh->frame_tree_node());
if (frame_entry && frame_entry->site_instance() != rfh->GetSiteInstance())
frame_entry = nullptr;
if (frame_entry) {
DCHECK(params.page_state == frame_entry->page_state());
}
if (!rfh->GetParent() &&
IsBlockedNavigation(navigation_handle->GetNetErrorCode())) {
DCHECK(params.url_is_unreachable);
active_entry->SetURL(GURL(url::kAboutBlankURL));
active_entry->SetVirtualURL(params.url);
if (frame_entry) {
frame_entry->SetPageState(
PageState::CreateFromURL(active_entry->GetURL()));
}
}
size_t redirect_chain_size = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < params.redirects.size(); ++i) {
redirect_chain_size += params.redirects[i].spec().length();
}
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS("Navigation.RedirectChainSize", redirect_chain_size);
active_entry->ResetForCommit(frame_entry);
if (!rfh->GetParent())
CHECK_EQ(active_entry->site_instance(), rfh->GetSiteInstance());
active_entry->SetBindings(rfh->GetEnabledBindings());
details->entry = active_entry;
details->is_main_frame = !rfh->GetParent();
details->http_status_code = params.http_status_code;
NotifyNavigationEntryCommitted(details);
if (active_entry->GetURL().SchemeIs(url::kHttpsScheme) && !rfh->GetParent() &&
navigation_handle->GetNetErrorCode() == net::OK) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("Navigation.SecureSchemeHasSSLStatus",
!!active_entry->GetSSL().certificate);
}
if (overriding_user_agent_changed)
delegate_->UpdateOverridingUserAgent();
int nav_entry_id = active_entry->GetUniqueID();
for (FrameTreeNode* node : delegate_->GetFrameTree()->Nodes())
node->current_frame_host()->set_nav_entry_id(nav_entry_id);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Do not use NavigationEntry to block history navigations.
This is no longer necessary after r477371.
BUG=777419
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: I701e4d4853858281b43e3743b12274dbeadfbf18
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/733959
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511942}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | bool NavigationControllerImpl::RendererDidNavigate(
RenderFrameHostImpl* rfh,
const FrameHostMsg_DidCommitProvisionalLoad_Params& params,
LoadCommittedDetails* details,
bool is_navigation_within_page,
NavigationHandleImpl* navigation_handle) {
is_initial_navigation_ = false;
bool overriding_user_agent_changed = false;
if (GetLastCommittedEntry()) {
details->previous_url = GetLastCommittedEntry()->GetURL();
details->previous_entry_index = GetLastCommittedEntryIndex();
if (pending_entry_ &&
pending_entry_->GetIsOverridingUserAgent() !=
GetLastCommittedEntry()->GetIsOverridingUserAgent())
overriding_user_agent_changed = true;
} else {
details->previous_url = GURL();
details->previous_entry_index = -1;
}
bool was_restored = false;
DCHECK(pending_entry_index_ == -1 || pending_entry_->site_instance() ||
pending_entry_->restore_type() != RestoreType::NONE);
if (pending_entry_ && pending_entry_->restore_type() != RestoreType::NONE) {
pending_entry_->set_restore_type(RestoreType::NONE);
was_restored = true;
}
details->did_replace_entry = params.should_replace_current_entry;
details->type = ClassifyNavigation(rfh, params);
details->is_same_document = is_navigation_within_page;
if (PendingEntryMatchesHandle(navigation_handle)) {
if (pending_entry_->reload_type() != ReloadType::NONE) {
last_committed_reload_type_ = pending_entry_->reload_type();
last_committed_reload_time_ =
time_smoother_.GetSmoothedTime(get_timestamp_callback_.Run());
} else if (!pending_entry_->is_renderer_initiated() ||
params.gesture == NavigationGestureUser) {
last_committed_reload_type_ = ReloadType::NONE;
last_committed_reload_time_ = base::Time();
}
}
switch (details->type) {
case NAVIGATION_TYPE_NEW_PAGE:
RendererDidNavigateToNewPage(rfh, params, details->is_same_document,
details->did_replace_entry,
navigation_handle);
break;
case NAVIGATION_TYPE_EXISTING_PAGE:
details->did_replace_entry = details->is_same_document;
RendererDidNavigateToExistingPage(rfh, params, details->is_same_document,
was_restored, navigation_handle);
break;
case NAVIGATION_TYPE_SAME_PAGE:
RendererDidNavigateToSamePage(rfh, params, navigation_handle);
break;
case NAVIGATION_TYPE_NEW_SUBFRAME:
RendererDidNavigateNewSubframe(rfh, params, details->is_same_document,
details->did_replace_entry);
break;
case NAVIGATION_TYPE_AUTO_SUBFRAME:
if (!RendererDidNavigateAutoSubframe(rfh, params)) {
NotifyEntryChanged(GetLastCommittedEntry());
return false;
}
break;
case NAVIGATION_TYPE_NAV_IGNORE:
if (pending_entry_) {
DiscardNonCommittedEntries();
delegate_->NotifyNavigationStateChanged(INVALIDATE_TYPE_URL);
}
return false;
default:
NOTREACHED();
}
base::Time timestamp =
time_smoother_.GetSmoothedTime(get_timestamp_callback_.Run());
DVLOG(1) << "Navigation finished at (smoothed) timestamp "
<< timestamp.ToInternalValue();
DiscardNonCommittedEntriesInternal();
DCHECK(params.page_state.IsValid()) << "Shouldn't see an empty PageState.";
NavigationEntryImpl* active_entry = GetLastCommittedEntry();
active_entry->SetTimestamp(timestamp);
active_entry->SetHttpStatusCode(params.http_status_code);
FrameNavigationEntry* frame_entry =
active_entry->GetFrameEntry(rfh->frame_tree_node());
if (frame_entry && frame_entry->site_instance() != rfh->GetSiteInstance())
frame_entry = nullptr;
if (frame_entry) {
DCHECK(params.page_state == frame_entry->page_state());
}
size_t redirect_chain_size = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < params.redirects.size(); ++i) {
redirect_chain_size += params.redirects[i].spec().length();
}
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS("Navigation.RedirectChainSize", redirect_chain_size);
active_entry->ResetForCommit(frame_entry);
if (!rfh->GetParent())
CHECK_EQ(active_entry->site_instance(), rfh->GetSiteInstance());
active_entry->SetBindings(rfh->GetEnabledBindings());
details->entry = active_entry;
details->is_main_frame = !rfh->GetParent();
details->http_status_code = params.http_status_code;
NotifyNavigationEntryCommitted(details);
if (active_entry->GetURL().SchemeIs(url::kHttpsScheme) && !rfh->GetParent() &&
navigation_handle->GetNetErrorCode() == net::OK) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("Navigation.SecureSchemeHasSSLStatus",
!!active_entry->GetSSL().certificate);
}
if (overriding_user_agent_changed)
delegate_->UpdateOverridingUserAgent();
int nav_entry_id = active_entry->GetUniqueID();
for (FrameTreeNode* node : delegate_->GetFrameTree()->Nodes())
node->current_frame_host()->set_nav_entry_id(nav_entry_id);
return true;
}
| 172,932 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: pdf_dict_put(fz_context *ctx, pdf_obj *obj, pdf_obj *key, pdf_obj *val)
{
int i;
RESOLVE(obj);
if (!OBJ_IS_DICT(obj))
fz_throw(ctx, FZ_ERROR_GENERIC, "not a dict (%s)", pdf_objkindstr(obj));
if (!val)
val = PDF_OBJ_NULL;
if (DICT(obj)->len > 100 && !(obj->flags & PDF_FLAGS_SORTED))
pdf_sort_dict(ctx, obj);
if (key < PDF_OBJ_NAME__LIMIT)
i = pdf_dict_find(ctx, obj, key);
else
i = pdf_dict_finds(ctx, obj, pdf_to_name(ctx, key));
prepare_object_for_alteration(ctx, obj, val);
if (i >= 0 && i < DICT(obj)->len)
{
if (DICT(obj)->items[i].v != val)
{
pdf_obj *d = DICT(obj)->items[i].v;
DICT(obj)->items[i].v = pdf_keep_obj(ctx, val);
{
pdf_obj *d = DICT(obj)->items[i].v;
DICT(obj)->items[i].v = pdf_keep_obj(ctx, val);
pdf_drop_obj(ctx, d);
}
}
else
memmove(&DICT(obj)->items[i + 1],
&DICT(obj)->items[i],
(DICT(obj)->len - i) * sizeof(struct keyval));
DICT(obj)->items[i].k = pdf_keep_obj(ctx, key);
DICT(obj)->items[i].v = pdf_keep_obj(ctx, val);
DICT(obj)->len ++;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | pdf_dict_put(fz_context *ctx, pdf_obj *obj, pdf_obj *key, pdf_obj *val)
static void
pdf_dict_get_put(fz_context *ctx, pdf_obj *obj, pdf_obj *key, pdf_obj *val, pdf_obj **old_val)
{
int i;
if (old_val)
*old_val = NULL;
RESOLVE(obj);
if (!OBJ_IS_DICT(obj))
fz_throw(ctx, FZ_ERROR_GENERIC, "not a dict (%s)", pdf_objkindstr(obj));
if (!val)
val = PDF_OBJ_NULL;
if (DICT(obj)->len > 100 && !(obj->flags & PDF_FLAGS_SORTED))
pdf_sort_dict(ctx, obj);
if (key < PDF_OBJ_NAME__LIMIT)
i = pdf_dict_find(ctx, obj, key);
else
i = pdf_dict_finds(ctx, obj, pdf_to_name(ctx, key));
prepare_object_for_alteration(ctx, obj, val);
if (i >= 0 && i < DICT(obj)->len)
{
if (DICT(obj)->items[i].v != val)
{
pdf_obj *d = DICT(obj)->items[i].v;
DICT(obj)->items[i].v = pdf_keep_obj(ctx, val);
{
pdf_obj *d = DICT(obj)->items[i].v;
DICT(obj)->items[i].v = pdf_keep_obj(ctx, val);
if (old_val)
*old_val = d;
else
pdf_drop_obj(ctx, d);
}
}
else
memmove(&DICT(obj)->items[i + 1],
&DICT(obj)->items[i],
(DICT(obj)->len - i) * sizeof(struct keyval));
DICT(obj)->items[i].k = pdf_keep_obj(ctx, key);
DICT(obj)->items[i].v = pdf_keep_obj(ctx, val);
DICT(obj)->len ++;
}
}
| 165,260 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void Sp_split_regexp(js_State *J)
{
js_Regexp *re;
const char *text;
int limit, len, k;
const char *p, *a, *b, *c, *e;
Resub m;
text = checkstring(J, 0);
re = js_toregexp(J, 1);
limit = js_isdefined(J, 2) ? js_tointeger(J, 2) : 1 << 30;
js_newarray(J);
len = 0;
e = text + strlen(text);
/* splitting the empty string */
if (e == text) {
if (js_regexec(re->prog, text, &m, 0)) {
if (len == limit) return;
js_pushliteral(J, "");
js_setindex(J, -2, 0);
}
return;
}
p = a = text;
while (a < e) {
if (js_regexec(re->prog, a, &m, a > text ? REG_NOTBOL : 0))
break; /* no match */
b = m.sub[0].sp;
c = m.sub[0].ep;
/* empty string at end of last match */
if (b == p) {
++a;
continue;
}
if (len == limit) return;
js_pushlstring(J, p, b - p);
js_setindex(J, -2, len++);
for (k = 1; k < m.nsub; ++k) {
if (len == limit) return;
js_pushlstring(J, m.sub[k].sp, m.sub[k].ep - m.sub[k].sp);
js_setindex(J, -2, len++);
}
a = p = c;
}
if (len == limit) return;
js_pushstring(J, p);
js_setindex(J, -2, len);
}
Commit Message: Bug 700937: Limit recursion in regexp matcher.
Also handle negative return code as an error in the JS bindings.
CWE ID: CWE-400 | static void Sp_split_regexp(js_State *J)
{
js_Regexp *re;
const char *text;
int limit, len, k;
const char *p, *a, *b, *c, *e;
Resub m;
text = checkstring(J, 0);
re = js_toregexp(J, 1);
limit = js_isdefined(J, 2) ? js_tointeger(J, 2) : 1 << 30;
js_newarray(J);
len = 0;
e = text + strlen(text);
/* splitting the empty string */
if (e == text) {
if (js_doregexec(J, re->prog, text, &m, 0)) {
if (len == limit) return;
js_pushliteral(J, "");
js_setindex(J, -2, 0);
}
return;
}
p = a = text;
while (a < e) {
if (js_doregexec(J, re->prog, a, &m, a > text ? REG_NOTBOL : 0))
break; /* no match */
b = m.sub[0].sp;
c = m.sub[0].ep;
/* empty string at end of last match */
if (b == p) {
++a;
continue;
}
if (len == limit) return;
js_pushlstring(J, p, b - p);
js_setindex(J, -2, len++);
for (k = 1; k < m.nsub; ++k) {
if (len == limit) return;
js_pushlstring(J, m.sub[k].sp, m.sub[k].ep - m.sub[k].sp);
js_setindex(J, -2, len++);
}
a = p = c;
}
if (len == limit) return;
js_pushstring(J, p);
js_setindex(J, -2, len);
}
| 169,701 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ChromeContentRendererClient::RenderViewCreated(RenderView* render_view) {
ContentSettingsObserver* content_settings =
new ContentSettingsObserver(render_view);
new DevToolsAgent(render_view);
new ExtensionHelper(render_view, extension_dispatcher_.get());
new PageLoadHistograms(render_view, histogram_snapshots_.get());
new PrintWebViewHelper(render_view);
new SearchBox(render_view);
new SpellCheckProvider(render_view, spellcheck_.get());
#if defined(ENABLE_SAFE_BROWSING)
safe_browsing::MalwareDOMDetails::Create(render_view);
#endif
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
new TextInputClientObserver(render_view);
#endif // defined(OS_MACOSX)
PasswordAutofillManager* password_autofill_manager =
new PasswordAutofillManager(render_view);
AutofillAgent* autofill_agent = new AutofillAgent(render_view,
password_autofill_manager);
PageClickTracker* page_click_tracker = new PageClickTracker(render_view);
page_click_tracker->AddListener(password_autofill_manager);
page_click_tracker->AddListener(autofill_agent);
TranslateHelper* translate = new TranslateHelper(render_view, autofill_agent);
new ChromeRenderViewObserver(
render_view, content_settings, extension_dispatcher_.get(), translate);
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kDomAutomationController)) {
new AutomationRendererHelper(render_view);
}
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void ChromeContentRendererClient::RenderViewCreated(RenderView* render_view) {
ContentSettingsObserver* content_settings =
new ContentSettingsObserver(render_view);
new ExtensionHelper(render_view, extension_dispatcher_.get());
new PageLoadHistograms(render_view, histogram_snapshots_.get());
new PrintWebViewHelper(render_view);
new SearchBox(render_view);
new SpellCheckProvider(render_view, spellcheck_.get());
#if defined(ENABLE_SAFE_BROWSING)
safe_browsing::MalwareDOMDetails::Create(render_view);
#endif
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
new TextInputClientObserver(render_view);
#endif // defined(OS_MACOSX)
PasswordAutofillManager* password_autofill_manager =
new PasswordAutofillManager(render_view);
AutofillAgent* autofill_agent = new AutofillAgent(render_view,
password_autofill_manager);
PageClickTracker* page_click_tracker = new PageClickTracker(render_view);
page_click_tracker->AddListener(password_autofill_manager);
page_click_tracker->AddListener(autofill_agent);
TranslateHelper* translate = new TranslateHelper(render_view, autofill_agent);
new ChromeRenderViewObserver(
render_view, content_settings, extension_dispatcher_.get(), translate);
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kDomAutomationController)) {
new AutomationRendererHelper(render_view);
}
}
| 170,324 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: scoped_ptr<cc::CompositorFrame> TestSynchronousCompositor::DemandDrawHw(
gfx::Size surface_size,
const gfx::Transform& transform,
gfx::Rect viewport,
gfx::Rect clip,
gfx::Rect viewport_rect_for_tile_priority,
const gfx::Transform& transform_for_tile_priority) {
return hardware_frame_.Pass();
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | scoped_ptr<cc::CompositorFrame> TestSynchronousCompositor::DemandDrawHw(
const gfx::Size& surface_size,
const gfx::Transform& transform,
const gfx::Rect& viewport,
const gfx::Rect& clip,
const gfx::Rect& viewport_rect_for_tile_priority,
const gfx::Transform& transform_for_tile_priority) {
return hardware_frame_.Pass();
}
| 171,620 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xmlParseElementMixedContentDecl(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int inputchk) {
xmlElementContentPtr ret = NULL, cur = NULL, n;
const xmlChar *elem = NULL;
GROW;
if (CMP7(CUR_PTR, '#', 'P', 'C', 'D', 'A', 'T', 'A')) {
SKIP(7);
SKIP_BLANKS;
SHRINK;
if (RAW == ')') {
if ((ctxt->validate) && (ctxt->input->id != inputchk)) {
xmlValidityError(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_BOUNDARY,
"Element content declaration doesn't start and stop in the same entity\n",
NULL, NULL);
}
NEXT;
ret = xmlNewDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, NULL, XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_PCDATA);
if (ret == NULL)
return(NULL);
if (RAW == '*') {
ret->ocur = XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_MULT;
NEXT;
}
return(ret);
}
if ((RAW == '(') || (RAW == '|')) {
ret = cur = xmlNewDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, NULL, XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_PCDATA);
if (ret == NULL) return(NULL);
}
while (RAW == '|') {
NEXT;
if (elem == NULL) {
ret = xmlNewDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, NULL, XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_OR);
if (ret == NULL) return(NULL);
ret->c1 = cur;
if (cur != NULL)
cur->parent = ret;
cur = ret;
} else {
n = xmlNewDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, NULL, XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_OR);
if (n == NULL) return(NULL);
n->c1 = xmlNewDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, elem, XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_ELEMENT);
if (n->c1 != NULL)
n->c1->parent = n;
cur->c2 = n;
if (n != NULL)
n->parent = cur;
cur = n;
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
elem = xmlParseName(ctxt);
if (elem == NULL) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_REQUIRED,
"xmlParseElementMixedContentDecl : Name expected\n");
xmlFreeDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, cur);
return(NULL);
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
GROW;
}
if ((RAW == ')') && (NXT(1) == '*')) {
if (elem != NULL) {
cur->c2 = xmlNewDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, elem,
XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_ELEMENT);
if (cur->c2 != NULL)
cur->c2->parent = cur;
}
if (ret != NULL)
ret->ocur = XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_MULT;
if ((ctxt->validate) && (ctxt->input->id != inputchk)) {
xmlValidityError(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_BOUNDARY,
"Element content declaration doesn't start and stop in the same entity\n",
NULL, NULL);
}
SKIP(2);
} else {
xmlFreeDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, ret);
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_MIXED_NOT_STARTED, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
} else {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_PCDATA_REQUIRED, NULL);
}
return(ret);
}
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | xmlParseElementMixedContentDecl(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int inputchk) {
xmlElementContentPtr ret = NULL, cur = NULL, n;
const xmlChar *elem = NULL;
GROW;
if (CMP7(CUR_PTR, '#', 'P', 'C', 'D', 'A', 'T', 'A')) {
SKIP(7);
SKIP_BLANKS;
SHRINK;
if (RAW == ')') {
if ((ctxt->validate) && (ctxt->input->id != inputchk)) {
xmlValidityError(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_BOUNDARY,
"Element content declaration doesn't start and stop in the same entity\n",
NULL, NULL);
}
NEXT;
ret = xmlNewDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, NULL, XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_PCDATA);
if (ret == NULL)
return(NULL);
if (RAW == '*') {
ret->ocur = XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_MULT;
NEXT;
}
return(ret);
}
if ((RAW == '(') || (RAW == '|')) {
ret = cur = xmlNewDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, NULL, XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_PCDATA);
if (ret == NULL) return(NULL);
}
while ((RAW == '|') && (ctxt->instate != XML_PARSER_EOF)) {
NEXT;
if (elem == NULL) {
ret = xmlNewDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, NULL, XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_OR);
if (ret == NULL) return(NULL);
ret->c1 = cur;
if (cur != NULL)
cur->parent = ret;
cur = ret;
} else {
n = xmlNewDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, NULL, XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_OR);
if (n == NULL) return(NULL);
n->c1 = xmlNewDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, elem, XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_ELEMENT);
if (n->c1 != NULL)
n->c1->parent = n;
cur->c2 = n;
if (n != NULL)
n->parent = cur;
cur = n;
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
elem = xmlParseName(ctxt);
if (elem == NULL) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_REQUIRED,
"xmlParseElementMixedContentDecl : Name expected\n");
xmlFreeDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, cur);
return(NULL);
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
GROW;
}
if ((RAW == ')') && (NXT(1) == '*')) {
if (elem != NULL) {
cur->c2 = xmlNewDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, elem,
XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_ELEMENT);
if (cur->c2 != NULL)
cur->c2->parent = cur;
}
if (ret != NULL)
ret->ocur = XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_MULT;
if ((ctxt->validate) && (ctxt->input->id != inputchk)) {
xmlValidityError(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_BOUNDARY,
"Element content declaration doesn't start and stop in the same entity\n",
NULL, NULL);
}
SKIP(2);
} else {
xmlFreeDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, ret);
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_MIXED_NOT_STARTED, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
} else {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_PCDATA_REQUIRED, NULL);
}
return(ret);
}
| 171,286 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: X11SurfaceFactory::GetAllowedGLImplementations() {
std::vector<gl::GLImplementation> impls;
impls.push_back(gl::kGLImplementationEGLGLES2);
impls.push_back(gl::kGLImplementationDesktopGL);
impls.push_back(gl::kGLImplementationOSMesaGL);
return impls;
}
Commit Message: Add ThreadChecker for Ozone X11 GPU.
Ensure Ozone X11 tests the same thread constraints we have in Ozone GBM.
BUG=none
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2366643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421817}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | X11SurfaceFactory::GetAllowedGLImplementations() {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
std::vector<gl::GLImplementation> impls;
impls.push_back(gl::kGLImplementationEGLGLES2);
impls.push_back(gl::kGLImplementationDesktopGL);
impls.push_back(gl::kGLImplementationOSMesaGL);
return impls;
}
| 171,602 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void AppControllerImpl::SetClient(mojom::AppControllerClientPtr client) {
client_ = std::move(client);
}
Commit Message: Refactor the AppController implementation into a KeyedService.
This is necessary to guarantee that the AppController will not outlive
the AppServiceProxy, which could happen before during Profile destruction.
Bug: 945427
Change-Id: I9e2089799e38d5a70a4a9aa66df5319113e7809e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1542336
Reviewed-by: Michael Giuffrida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Lucas Tenório <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#645122}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void AppControllerImpl::SetClient(mojom::AppControllerClientPtr client) {
void AppControllerService::SetClient(mojom::AppControllerClientPtr client) {
client_ = std::move(client);
}
| 172,088 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: u_char *_our_safe_pcap_next(pcap_t *pcap, struct pcap_pkthdr *pkthdr,
const char *funcname, const int line, const char *file)
{
u_char *pktdata = (u_char *)pcap_next(pcap, pkthdr);
if (pktdata) {
if (pkthdr->len > MAXPACKET) {
fprintf(stderr, "safe_pcap_next ERROR: Invalid packet length in %s:%s() line %d: %u is greater than maximum %u\n",
file, funcname, line, pkthdr->len, MAXPACKET);
exit(-1);
}
if (pkthdr->len < pkthdr->caplen) {
fprintf(stderr, "safe_pcap_next ERROR: Invalid packet length in %s:%s() line %d: packet length %u is less than capture length %u\n",
file, funcname, line, pkthdr->len, pkthdr->caplen);
exit(-1);
}
}
return pktdata;
}
Commit Message: Bug #520 Fix heap overflow on zero or 0xFFFF packet length
Add check for packets that report zero packet length. Example
of fix:
src/tcpprep --auto=bridge --pcap=poc16-get_l2len-heapoverflow --cachefile=/dev/null
Warning: poc16-get_l2len-heapoverflow was captured using a snaplen of 17 bytes. This may mean you have truncated packets.
safe_pcap_next ERROR: Invalid packet length in tcpprep.c:process_raw_packets() line 334: packet length=0 capture length=0
CWE ID: CWE-125 | u_char *_our_safe_pcap_next(pcap_t *pcap, struct pcap_pkthdr *pkthdr,
const char *funcname, const int line, const char *file)
{
u_char *pktdata = (u_char *)pcap_next(pcap, pkthdr);
if (pktdata) {
if (pkthdr->len > MAXPACKET) {
fprintf(stderr, "safe_pcap_next ERROR: Invalid packet length in %s:%s() line %d: %u is greater than maximum %u\n",
file, funcname, line, pkthdr->len, MAXPACKET);
exit(-1);
}
if (!pkthdr->len || pkthdr->len < pkthdr->caplen) {
fprintf(stderr, "safe_pcap_next ERROR: Invalid packet length in %s:%s() line %d: packet length=%u capture length=%u\n",
file, funcname, line, pkthdr->len, pkthdr->caplen);
exit(-1);
}
}
return pktdata;
}
| 168,946 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: print_prefix(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *prefix, u_int max_length)
{
int plenbytes;
char buf[sizeof("xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx::/128")];
if (prefix[0] >= 96 && max_length >= IPV4_MAPPED_HEADING_LEN + 1 &&
is_ipv4_mapped_address(&prefix[1])) {
struct in_addr addr;
u_int plen;
plen = prefix[0]-96;
if (32 < plen)
return -1;
max_length -= 1;
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
plenbytes = (plen + 7) / 8;
if (max_length < (u_int)plenbytes + IPV4_MAPPED_HEADING_LEN)
return -3;
memcpy(&addr, &prefix[1 + IPV4_MAPPED_HEADING_LEN], plenbytes);
if (plen % 8) {
((u_char *)&addr)[plenbytes - 1] &=
((0xff00 >> (plen % 8)) & 0xff);
}
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/%d", ipaddr_string(ndo, &addr), plen);
plenbytes += 1 + IPV4_MAPPED_HEADING_LEN;
} else {
plenbytes = decode_prefix6(ndo, prefix, max_length, buf, sizeof(buf));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", buf));
return plenbytes;
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-16228/HNCP: make buffer access safer
print_prefix() has a buffer and does not initialize it. It may call
decode_prefix6(), which also does not initialize the buffer on invalid
input. When that happens, make sure to return from print_prefix() before
trying to print the [still uninitialized] buffer.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Wang Junjie of 360 ESG
Codesafe Team.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | print_prefix(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *prefix, u_int max_length)
{
int plenbytes;
char buf[sizeof("xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx::/128")];
if (prefix[0] >= 96 && max_length >= IPV4_MAPPED_HEADING_LEN + 1 &&
is_ipv4_mapped_address(&prefix[1])) {
struct in_addr addr;
u_int plen;
plen = prefix[0]-96;
if (32 < plen)
return -1;
max_length -= 1;
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
plenbytes = (plen + 7) / 8;
if (max_length < (u_int)plenbytes + IPV4_MAPPED_HEADING_LEN)
return -3;
memcpy(&addr, &prefix[1 + IPV4_MAPPED_HEADING_LEN], plenbytes);
if (plen % 8) {
((u_char *)&addr)[plenbytes - 1] &=
((0xff00 >> (plen % 8)) & 0xff);
}
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/%d", ipaddr_string(ndo, &addr), plen);
plenbytes += 1 + IPV4_MAPPED_HEADING_LEN;
} else {
plenbytes = decode_prefix6(ndo, prefix, max_length, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (plenbytes < 0)
return plenbytes;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", buf));
return plenbytes;
}
| 169,820 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xsltIf(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, xmlNodePtr contextNode,
xmlNodePtr inst, xsltStylePreCompPtr castedComp)
{
int res = 0;
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
xsltStyleItemIfPtr comp = (xsltStyleItemIfPtr) castedComp;
#else
xsltStylePreCompPtr comp = castedComp;
#endif
if ((ctxt == NULL) || (contextNode == NULL) || (inst == NULL))
return;
if ((comp == NULL) || (comp->test == NULL) || (comp->comp == NULL)) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, inst,
"Internal error in xsltIf(): "
"The XSLT 'if' instruction was not compiled.\n");
return;
}
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_IF,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltIf: test %s\n", comp->test));
#endif
#ifdef XSLT_FAST_IF
{
xmlXPathContextPtr xpctxt = ctxt->xpathCtxt;
xmlDocPtr oldXPContextDoc = xpctxt->doc;
xmlNsPtr *oldXPNamespaces = xpctxt->namespaces;
xmlNodePtr oldXPContextNode = xpctxt->node;
int oldXPProximityPosition = xpctxt->proximityPosition;
int oldXPContextSize = xpctxt->contextSize;
int oldXPNsNr = xpctxt->nsNr;
xmlDocPtr oldLocalFragmentTop = ctxt->localRVT;
xpctxt->node = contextNode;
if (comp != NULL) {
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
if (comp->inScopeNs != NULL) {
xpctxt->namespaces = comp->inScopeNs->list;
xpctxt->nsNr = comp->inScopeNs->xpathNumber;
} else {
xpctxt->namespaces = NULL;
xpctxt->nsNr = 0;
}
#else
xpctxt->namespaces = comp->nsList;
xpctxt->nsNr = comp->nsNr;
#endif
} else {
xpctxt->namespaces = NULL;
xpctxt->nsNr = 0;
}
/*
* This XPath function is optimized for boolean results.
*/
res = xmlXPathCompiledEvalToBoolean(comp->comp, xpctxt);
/*
* Cleanup fragments created during evaluation of the
* "select" expression.
*/
if (oldLocalFragmentTop != ctxt->localRVT)
xsltReleaseLocalRVTs(ctxt, oldLocalFragmentTop);
xpctxt->doc = oldXPContextDoc;
xpctxt->node = oldXPContextNode;
xpctxt->contextSize = oldXPContextSize;
xpctxt->proximityPosition = oldXPProximityPosition;
xpctxt->nsNr = oldXPNsNr;
xpctxt->namespaces = oldXPNamespaces;
}
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_IF,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltIf: test evaluate to %d\n", res));
#endif
if (res == -1) {
ctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
goto error;
}
if (res == 1) {
/*
* Instantiate the sequence constructor of xsl:if.
*/
xsltApplySequenceConstructor(ctxt,
contextNode, inst->children, NULL);
}
#else /* XSLT_FAST_IF */
{
xmlXPathObjectPtr xpobj = NULL;
/*
* OLD CODE:
*/
{
xmlXPathContextPtr xpctxt = ctxt->xpathCtxt;
xmlDocPtr oldXPContextDoc = xpctxt->doc;
xmlNsPtr *oldXPNamespaces = xpctxt->namespaces;
xmlNodePtr oldXPContextNode = xpctxt->node;
int oldXPProximityPosition = xpctxt->proximityPosition;
int oldXPContextSize = xpctxt->contextSize;
int oldXPNsNr = xpctxt->nsNr;
xpctxt->node = contextNode;
if (comp != NULL) {
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
if (comp->inScopeNs != NULL) {
xpctxt->namespaces = comp->inScopeNs->list;
xpctxt->nsNr = comp->inScopeNs->xpathNumber;
} else {
xpctxt->namespaces = NULL;
xpctxt->nsNr = 0;
}
#else
xpctxt->namespaces = comp->nsList;
xpctxt->nsNr = comp->nsNr;
#endif
} else {
xpctxt->namespaces = NULL;
xpctxt->nsNr = 0;
}
/*
* This XPath function is optimized for boolean results.
*/
xpobj = xmlXPathCompiledEval(comp->comp, xpctxt);
xpctxt->doc = oldXPContextDoc;
xpctxt->node = oldXPContextNode;
xpctxt->contextSize = oldXPContextSize;
xpctxt->proximityPosition = oldXPProximityPosition;
xpctxt->nsNr = oldXPNsNr;
xpctxt->namespaces = oldXPNamespaces;
}
if (xpobj != NULL) {
if (xpobj->type != XPATH_BOOLEAN)
xpobj = xmlXPathConvertBoolean(xpobj);
if (xpobj->type == XPATH_BOOLEAN) {
res = xpobj->boolval;
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_IF,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltIf: test evaluate to %d\n", res));
#endif
if (res) {
xsltApplySequenceConstructor(ctxt,
contextNode, inst->children, NULL);
}
} else {
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt, XSLT_TRACE_IF,
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltIf: test didn't evaluate to a boolean\n"));
#endif
ctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
}
xmlXPathFreeObject(xpobj);
} else {
ctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
}
}
#endif /* else of XSLT_FAST_IF */
error:
return;
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | xsltIf(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, xmlNodePtr contextNode,
xmlNodePtr inst, xsltStylePreCompPtr castedComp)
{
int res = 0;
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
xsltStyleItemIfPtr comp = (xsltStyleItemIfPtr) castedComp;
#else
xsltStylePreCompPtr comp = castedComp;
#endif
if ((ctxt == NULL) || (contextNode == NULL) || (inst == NULL))
return;
if ((comp == NULL) || (comp->test == NULL) || (comp->comp == NULL)) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, inst,
"Internal error in xsltIf(): "
"The XSLT 'if' instruction was not compiled.\n");
return;
}
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_IF,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltIf: test %s\n", comp->test));
#endif
#ifdef XSLT_FAST_IF
{
xmlDocPtr oldLocalFragmentTop = ctxt->localRVT;
res = xsltPreCompEvalToBoolean(ctxt, contextNode, comp);
/*
* Cleanup fragments created during evaluation of the
* "select" expression.
*/
if (oldLocalFragmentTop != ctxt->localRVT)
xsltReleaseLocalRVTs(ctxt, oldLocalFragmentTop);
}
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_IF,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltIf: test evaluate to %d\n", res));
#endif
if (res == -1) {
ctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
goto error;
}
if (res == 1) {
/*
* Instantiate the sequence constructor of xsl:if.
*/
xsltApplySequenceConstructor(ctxt,
contextNode, inst->children, NULL);
}
#else /* XSLT_FAST_IF */
{
/*
* OLD CODE:
*/
xmlXPathObjectPtr xpobj = xsltPreCompEval(ctxt, contextNode, comp);
if (xpobj != NULL) {
if (xpobj->type != XPATH_BOOLEAN)
xpobj = xmlXPathConvertBoolean(xpobj);
if (xpobj->type == XPATH_BOOLEAN) {
res = xpobj->boolval;
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_IF,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltIf: test evaluate to %d\n", res));
#endif
if (res) {
xsltApplySequenceConstructor(ctxt,
contextNode, inst->children, NULL);
}
} else {
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt, XSLT_TRACE_IF,
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltIf: test didn't evaluate to a boolean\n"));
#endif
ctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
}
xmlXPathFreeObject(xpobj);
} else {
ctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
}
}
#endif /* else of XSLT_FAST_IF */
error:
return;
}
| 173,328 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CreateFile(const FilePath& file_path) {
const std::string kFoo = "foo";
ASSERT_TRUE(file_util::WriteFile(file_path, kFoo.data(), kFoo.size()))
<< ": " << file_path.value();
}
Commit Message: Revert 144993 - gdata: Remove invalid files in the cache directories
Broke linux_chromeos_valgrind:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20OS%20%28valgrind%29%285%29/builds/8628/steps/memory%20test%3A%20unit/logs/stdio
In theory, we shouldn't have any invalid files left in the
cache directories, but things can go wrong and invalid files
may be left if the device shuts down unexpectedly, for instance.
Besides, it's good to be defensive.
BUG=134862
TEST=added unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693020
[email protected]
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145029 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void CreateFile(const FilePath& file_path) {
| 170,869 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static jas_image_cmpt_t *jas_image_cmpt_create(int_fast32_t tlx,
int_fast32_t tly, int_fast32_t hstep, int_fast32_t vstep,
int_fast32_t width, int_fast32_t height, uint_fast16_t depth, bool sgnd,
uint_fast32_t inmem)
{
jas_image_cmpt_t *cmpt;
size_t size;
cmpt = 0;
if (width < 0 || height < 0 || hstep <= 0 || vstep <= 0) {
goto error;
}
if (!jas_safe_intfast32_add(tlx, width, 0) ||
!jas_safe_intfast32_add(tly, height, 0)) {
goto error;
}
if (!(cmpt = jas_malloc(sizeof(jas_image_cmpt_t)))) {
goto error;
}
cmpt->type_ = JAS_IMAGE_CT_UNKNOWN;
cmpt->tlx_ = tlx;
cmpt->tly_ = tly;
cmpt->hstep_ = hstep;
cmpt->vstep_ = vstep;
cmpt->width_ = width;
cmpt->height_ = height;
cmpt->prec_ = depth;
cmpt->sgnd_ = sgnd;
cmpt->stream_ = 0;
cmpt->cps_ = (depth + 7) / 8;
if (!jas_safe_size_mul(cmpt->width_, cmpt->height_, &size) ||
!jas_safe_size_mul(size, cmpt->cps_, &size)) {
goto error;
}
cmpt->stream_ = (inmem) ? jas_stream_memopen2(0, size) :
jas_stream_tmpfile();
if (!cmpt->stream_) {
goto error;
}
/* Zero the component data. This isn't necessary, but it is
convenient for debugging purposes. */
/* Note: conversion of size - 1 to long can overflow */
if (size > 0) {
if (size - 1 > LONG_MAX) {
goto error;
}
if (jas_stream_seek(cmpt->stream_, size - 1, SEEK_SET) < 0 ||
jas_stream_putc(cmpt->stream_, 0) == EOF ||
jas_stream_seek(cmpt->stream_, 0, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
goto error;
}
}
return cmpt;
error:
if (cmpt) {
jas_image_cmpt_destroy(cmpt);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | static jas_image_cmpt_t *jas_image_cmpt_create(int_fast32_t tlx,
int_fast32_t tly, int_fast32_t hstep, int_fast32_t vstep,
int_fast32_t width, int_fast32_t height, uint_fast16_t depth, bool sgnd,
uint_fast32_t inmem)
{
jas_image_cmpt_t *cmpt;
size_t size;
JAS_DBGLOG(100, (
"jas_image_cmpt_create(%ld, %ld, %ld, %ld, %ld, %ld, %d, %d, %d)\n",
JAS_CAST(long, tlx),
JAS_CAST(long, tly),
JAS_CAST(long, hstep),
JAS_CAST(long, vstep),
JAS_CAST(long, width),
JAS_CAST(long, height),
JAS_CAST(int, depth),
sgnd,
inmem
));
cmpt = 0;
if (width < 0 || height < 0 || hstep <= 0 || vstep <= 0) {
goto error;
}
if (!jas_safe_intfast32_add(tlx, width, 0) ||
!jas_safe_intfast32_add(tly, height, 0)) {
goto error;
}
if (!jas_safe_intfast32_mul3(width, height, depth, 0)) {
goto error;
}
if (!(cmpt = jas_malloc(sizeof(jas_image_cmpt_t)))) {
goto error;
}
cmpt->type_ = JAS_IMAGE_CT_UNKNOWN;
cmpt->tlx_ = tlx;
cmpt->tly_ = tly;
cmpt->hstep_ = hstep;
cmpt->vstep_ = vstep;
cmpt->width_ = width;
cmpt->height_ = height;
cmpt->prec_ = depth;
cmpt->sgnd_ = sgnd;
cmpt->stream_ = 0;
cmpt->cps_ = (depth + 7) / 8;
if (!jas_safe_size_mul3(cmpt->width_, cmpt->height_, cmpt->cps_, &size)) {
goto error;
}
cmpt->stream_ = (inmem) ? jas_stream_memopen2(0, size) :
jas_stream_tmpfile();
if (!cmpt->stream_) {
goto error;
}
/* Zero the component data. This isn't necessary, but it is
convenient for debugging purposes. */
/* Note: conversion of size - 1 to long can overflow */
if (size > 0) {
if (size - 1 > LONG_MAX) {
goto error;
}
if (jas_stream_seek(cmpt->stream_, size - 1, SEEK_SET) < 0 ||
jas_stream_putc(cmpt->stream_, 0) == EOF ||
jas_stream_seek(cmpt->stream_, 0, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
goto error;
}
}
return cmpt;
error:
if (cmpt) {
jas_image_cmpt_destroy(cmpt);
}
return 0;
}
| 168,693 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void filter_block2d_8_c(const uint8_t *src_ptr,
const unsigned int src_stride,
const int16_t *HFilter,
const int16_t *VFilter,
uint8_t *dst_ptr,
unsigned int dst_stride,
unsigned int output_width,
unsigned int output_height) {
const int kInterp_Extend = 4;
const unsigned int intermediate_height =
(kInterp_Extend - 1) + output_height + kInterp_Extend;
/* Size of intermediate_buffer is max_intermediate_height * filter_max_width,
* where max_intermediate_height = (kInterp_Extend - 1) + filter_max_height
* + kInterp_Extend
* = 3 + 16 + 4
* = 23
* and filter_max_width = 16
*/
uint8_t intermediate_buffer[71 * 64];
const int intermediate_next_stride = 1 - intermediate_height * output_width;
{
uint8_t *output_ptr = intermediate_buffer;
const int src_next_row_stride = src_stride - output_width;
unsigned int i, j;
src_ptr -= (kInterp_Extend - 1) * src_stride + (kInterp_Extend - 1);
for (i = 0; i < intermediate_height; ++i) {
for (j = 0; j < output_width; ++j) {
const int temp = (src_ptr[0] * HFilter[0]) +
(src_ptr[1] * HFilter[1]) +
(src_ptr[2] * HFilter[2]) +
(src_ptr[3] * HFilter[3]) +
(src_ptr[4] * HFilter[4]) +
(src_ptr[5] * HFilter[5]) +
(src_ptr[6] * HFilter[6]) +
(src_ptr[7] * HFilter[7]) +
(VP9_FILTER_WEIGHT >> 1); // Rounding
*output_ptr = clip_pixel(temp >> VP9_FILTER_SHIFT);
++src_ptr;
output_ptr += intermediate_height;
}
src_ptr += src_next_row_stride;
output_ptr += intermediate_next_stride;
}
}
{
uint8_t *src_ptr = intermediate_buffer;
const int dst_next_row_stride = dst_stride - output_width;
unsigned int i, j;
for (i = 0; i < output_height; ++i) {
for (j = 0; j < output_width; ++j) {
const int temp = (src_ptr[0] * VFilter[0]) +
(src_ptr[1] * VFilter[1]) +
(src_ptr[2] * VFilter[2]) +
(src_ptr[3] * VFilter[3]) +
(src_ptr[4] * VFilter[4]) +
(src_ptr[5] * VFilter[5]) +
(src_ptr[6] * VFilter[6]) +
(src_ptr[7] * VFilter[7]) +
(VP9_FILTER_WEIGHT >> 1); // Rounding
*dst_ptr++ = clip_pixel(temp >> VP9_FILTER_SHIFT);
src_ptr += intermediate_height;
}
src_ptr += intermediate_next_stride;
dst_ptr += dst_next_row_stride;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void filter_block2d_8_c(const uint8_t *src_ptr,
const unsigned int src_stride,
const int16_t *HFilter,
const int16_t *VFilter,
uint8_t *dst_ptr,
unsigned int dst_stride,
unsigned int output_width,
unsigned int output_height) {
const int kInterp_Extend = 4;
const unsigned int intermediate_height =
(kInterp_Extend - 1) + output_height + kInterp_Extend;
unsigned int i, j;
// Size of intermediate_buffer is max_intermediate_height * filter_max_width,
// where max_intermediate_height = (kInterp_Extend - 1) + filter_max_height
// + kInterp_Extend
// = 3 + 16 + 4
// = 23
// and filter_max_width = 16
//
uint8_t intermediate_buffer[71 * kMaxDimension];
const int intermediate_next_stride = 1 - intermediate_height * output_width;
uint8_t *output_ptr = intermediate_buffer;
const int src_next_row_stride = src_stride - output_width;
src_ptr -= (kInterp_Extend - 1) * src_stride + (kInterp_Extend - 1);
for (i = 0; i < intermediate_height; ++i) {
for (j = 0; j < output_width; ++j) {
// Apply filter...
const int temp = (src_ptr[0] * HFilter[0]) +
(src_ptr[1] * HFilter[1]) +
(src_ptr[2] * HFilter[2]) +
(src_ptr[3] * HFilter[3]) +
(src_ptr[4] * HFilter[4]) +
(src_ptr[5] * HFilter[5]) +
(src_ptr[6] * HFilter[6]) +
(src_ptr[7] * HFilter[7]) +
(VP9_FILTER_WEIGHT >> 1); // Rounding
// Normalize back to 0-255...
*output_ptr = clip_pixel(temp >> VP9_FILTER_SHIFT);
++src_ptr;
output_ptr += intermediate_height;
}
src_ptr += src_next_row_stride;
output_ptr += intermediate_next_stride;
}
src_ptr = intermediate_buffer;
const int dst_next_row_stride = dst_stride - output_width;
for (i = 0; i < output_height; ++i) {
for (j = 0; j < output_width; ++j) {
// Apply filter...
const int temp = (src_ptr[0] * VFilter[0]) +
(src_ptr[1] * VFilter[1]) +
(src_ptr[2] * VFilter[2]) +
(src_ptr[3] * VFilter[3]) +
(src_ptr[4] * VFilter[4]) +
(src_ptr[5] * VFilter[5]) +
(src_ptr[6] * VFilter[6]) +
(src_ptr[7] * VFilter[7]) +
(VP9_FILTER_WEIGHT >> 1); // Rounding
// Normalize back to 0-255...
*dst_ptr++ = clip_pixel(temp >> VP9_FILTER_SHIFT);
src_ptr += intermediate_height;
}
src_ptr += intermediate_next_stride;
dst_ptr += dst_next_row_stride;
}
}
| 174,509 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: cib_timeout_handler(gpointer data)
{
struct timer_rec_s *timer = data;
timer_expired = TRUE;
crm_err("Call %d timed out after %ds", timer->call_id, timer->timeout);
/* Always return TRUE, never remove the handler
* We do that after the while-loop in cib_native_perform_op()
*/
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | cib_timeout_handler(gpointer data)
| 166,154 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: const BlockEntry* Cluster::GetEntry(const CuePoint& cp,
const CuePoint::TrackPosition& tp) const {
assert(m_pSegment);
#if 0
LoadBlockEntries();
if (m_entries == NULL)
return NULL;
const long long count = m_entries_count;
if (count <= 0)
return NULL;
const long long tc = cp.GetTimeCode();
if ((tp.m_block > 0) && (tp.m_block <= count))
{
const size_t block = static_cast<size_t>(tp.m_block);
const size_t index = block - 1;
const BlockEntry* const pEntry = m_entries[index];
assert(pEntry);
assert(!pEntry->EOS());
const Block* const pBlock = pEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
if ((pBlock->GetTrackNumber() == tp.m_track) &&
(pBlock->GetTimeCode(this) == tc))
{
return pEntry;
}
}
const BlockEntry* const* i = m_entries;
const BlockEntry* const* const j = i + count;
while (i != j)
{
#ifdef _DEBUG
const ptrdiff_t idx = i - m_entries;
idx;
#endif
const BlockEntry* const pEntry = *i++;
assert(pEntry);
assert(!pEntry->EOS());
const Block* const pBlock = pEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
if (pBlock->GetTrackNumber() != tp.m_track)
continue;
const long long tc_ = pBlock->GetTimeCode(this);
assert(tc_ >= 0);
if (tc_ < tc)
continue;
if (tc_ > tc)
return NULL;
const Tracks* const pTracks = m_pSegment->GetTracks();
assert(pTracks);
const long tn = static_cast<long>(tp.m_track);
const Track* const pTrack = pTracks->GetTrackByNumber(tn);
if (pTrack == NULL)
return NULL;
const long long type = pTrack->GetType();
if (type == 2) //audio
return pEntry;
if (type != 1) //not video
return NULL;
if (!pBlock->IsKey())
return NULL;
return pEntry;
}
return NULL;
#else
const long long tc = cp.GetTimeCode();
if (tp.m_block > 0) {
const long block = static_cast<long>(tp.m_block);
const long index = block - 1;
while (index >= m_entries_count) {
long long pos;
long len;
const long status = Parse(pos, len);
if (status < 0) // TODO: can this happen?
return NULL;
if (status > 0) // nothing remains to be parsed
return NULL;
}
const BlockEntry* const pEntry = m_entries[index];
assert(pEntry);
assert(!pEntry->EOS());
const Block* const pBlock = pEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
if ((pBlock->GetTrackNumber() == tp.m_track) &&
(pBlock->GetTimeCode(this) == tc)) {
return pEntry;
}
}
long index = 0;
for (;;) {
if (index >= m_entries_count) {
long long pos;
long len;
const long status = Parse(pos, len);
if (status < 0) // TODO: can this happen?
return NULL;
if (status > 0) // nothing remains to be parsed
return NULL;
assert(m_entries);
assert(index < m_entries_count);
}
const BlockEntry* const pEntry = m_entries[index];
assert(pEntry);
assert(!pEntry->EOS());
const Block* const pBlock = pEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
if (pBlock->GetTrackNumber() != tp.m_track) {
++index;
continue;
}
const long long tc_ = pBlock->GetTimeCode(this);
if (tc_ < tc) {
++index;
continue;
}
if (tc_ > tc)
return NULL;
const Tracks* const pTracks = m_pSegment->GetTracks();
assert(pTracks);
const long tn = static_cast<long>(tp.m_track);
const Track* const pTrack = pTracks->GetTrackByNumber(tn);
if (pTrack == NULL)
return NULL;
const long long type = pTrack->GetType();
if (type == 2) // audio
return pEntry;
if (type != 1) // not video
return NULL;
if (!pBlock->IsKey())
return NULL;
return pEntry;
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | const BlockEntry* Cluster::GetEntry(const CuePoint& cp,
const CuePoint::TrackPosition& tp) const {
assert(m_pSegment);
const long long tc = cp.GetTimeCode();
if (tp.m_block > 0) {
const long block = static_cast<long>(tp.m_block);
const long index = block - 1;
while (index >= m_entries_count) {
long long pos;
long len;
const long status = Parse(pos, len);
if (status < 0) // TODO: can this happen?
return NULL;
if (status > 0) // nothing remains to be parsed
return NULL;
}
const BlockEntry* const pEntry = m_entries[index];
assert(pEntry);
assert(!pEntry->EOS());
const Block* const pBlock = pEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
if ((pBlock->GetTrackNumber() == tp.m_track) &&
(pBlock->GetTimeCode(this) == tc)) {
return pEntry;
}
}
long index = 0;
for (;;) {
if (index >= m_entries_count) {
long long pos;
long len;
const long status = Parse(pos, len);
if (status < 0) // TODO: can this happen?
return NULL;
if (status > 0) // nothing remains to be parsed
return NULL;
assert(m_entries);
assert(index < m_entries_count);
}
const BlockEntry* const pEntry = m_entries[index];
assert(pEntry);
assert(!pEntry->EOS());
const Block* const pBlock = pEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
if (pBlock->GetTrackNumber() != tp.m_track) {
++index;
continue;
}
const long long tc_ = pBlock->GetTimeCode(this);
if (tc_ < tc) {
++index;
continue;
}
if (tc_ > tc)
return NULL;
const Tracks* const pTracks = m_pSegment->GetTracks();
assert(pTracks);
const long tn = static_cast<long>(tp.m_track);
const Track* const pTrack = pTracks->GetTrackByNumber(tn);
if (pTrack == NULL)
return NULL;
const long long type = pTrack->GetType();
if (type == 2) // audio
return pEntry;
if (type != 1) // not video
return NULL;
if (!pBlock->IsKey())
return NULL;
return pEntry;
}
}
| 173,817 |
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