instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 90
9.34k
| output
stringlengths 16
15.4k
| __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
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|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::CreateDelegatedFrameHostClient() {
if (IsMus())
return;
cc::FrameSinkId frame_sink_id =
host_->AllocateFrameSinkId(is_guest_view_hack_);
if (!delegated_frame_host_client_) {
delegated_frame_host_client_ =
base::MakeUnique<DelegatedFrameHostClientAura>(this);
}
delegated_frame_host_ = base::MakeUnique<DelegatedFrameHost>(
frame_sink_id, delegated_frame_host_client_.get());
if (renderer_compositor_frame_sink_) {
delegated_frame_host_->DidCreateNewRendererCompositorFrameSink(
renderer_compositor_frame_sink_);
}
UpdateNeedsBeginFramesInternal();
if (host_->delegate() && host_->delegate()->GetInputEventRouter()) {
host_->delegate()->GetInputEventRouter()->AddFrameSinkIdOwner(
GetFrameSinkId(), this);
}
}
Commit Message: Allocate a FrameSinkId for RenderWidgetHostViewAura in mus+ash
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame expects its parent to have a valid
FrameSinkId. Make sure RenderWidgetHostViewAura has a FrameSinkId even
if DelegatedFrameHost is not used (in mus+ash).
BUG=706553
[email protected]
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2847253003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468179}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::CreateDelegatedFrameHostClient() {
if (IsMus())
return;
if (!delegated_frame_host_client_) {
delegated_frame_host_client_ =
base::MakeUnique<DelegatedFrameHostClientAura>(this);
}
delegated_frame_host_ = base::MakeUnique<DelegatedFrameHost>(
frame_sink_id_, delegated_frame_host_client_.get());
if (renderer_compositor_frame_sink_) {
delegated_frame_host_->DidCreateNewRendererCompositorFrameSink(
renderer_compositor_frame_sink_);
}
UpdateNeedsBeginFramesInternal();
if (host_->delegate() && host_->delegate()->GetInputEventRouter()) {
host_->delegate()->GetInputEventRouter()->AddFrameSinkIdOwner(
GetFrameSinkId(), this);
}
}
| 172,233 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long tty_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct tty_struct *tty = file_tty(file);
struct tty_struct *real_tty;
void __user *p = (void __user *)arg;
int retval;
struct tty_ldisc *ld;
if (tty_paranoia_check(tty, file_inode(file), "tty_ioctl"))
return -EINVAL;
real_tty = tty_pair_get_tty(tty);
/*
* Factor out some common prep work
*/
switch (cmd) {
case TIOCSETD:
case TIOCSBRK:
case TIOCCBRK:
case TCSBRK:
case TCSBRKP:
retval = tty_check_change(tty);
if (retval)
return retval;
if (cmd != TIOCCBRK) {
tty_wait_until_sent(tty, 0);
if (signal_pending(current))
return -EINTR;
}
break;
}
/*
* Now do the stuff.
*/
switch (cmd) {
case TIOCSTI:
return tiocsti(tty, p);
case TIOCGWINSZ:
return tiocgwinsz(real_tty, p);
case TIOCSWINSZ:
return tiocswinsz(real_tty, p);
case TIOCCONS:
return real_tty != tty ? -EINVAL : tioccons(file);
case FIONBIO:
return fionbio(file, p);
case TIOCEXCL:
set_bit(TTY_EXCLUSIVE, &tty->flags);
return 0;
case TIOCNXCL:
clear_bit(TTY_EXCLUSIVE, &tty->flags);
return 0;
case TIOCGEXCL:
{
int excl = test_bit(TTY_EXCLUSIVE, &tty->flags);
return put_user(excl, (int __user *)p);
}
case TIOCNOTTY:
if (current->signal->tty != tty)
return -ENOTTY;
no_tty();
return 0;
case TIOCSCTTY:
return tiocsctty(real_tty, file, arg);
case TIOCGPGRP:
return tiocgpgrp(tty, real_tty, p);
case TIOCSPGRP:
return tiocspgrp(tty, real_tty, p);
case TIOCGSID:
return tiocgsid(tty, real_tty, p);
case TIOCGETD:
return put_user(tty->ldisc->ops->num, (int __user *)p);
case TIOCSETD:
return tiocsetd(tty, p);
case TIOCVHANGUP:
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
tty_vhangup(tty);
return 0;
case TIOCGDEV:
{
unsigned int ret = new_encode_dev(tty_devnum(real_tty));
return put_user(ret, (unsigned int __user *)p);
}
/*
* Break handling
*/
case TIOCSBRK: /* Turn break on, unconditionally */
if (tty->ops->break_ctl)
return tty->ops->break_ctl(tty, -1);
return 0;
case TIOCCBRK: /* Turn break off, unconditionally */
if (tty->ops->break_ctl)
return tty->ops->break_ctl(tty, 0);
return 0;
case TCSBRK: /* SVID version: non-zero arg --> no break */
/* non-zero arg means wait for all output data
* to be sent (performed above) but don't send break.
* This is used by the tcdrain() termios function.
*/
if (!arg)
return send_break(tty, 250);
return 0;
case TCSBRKP: /* support for POSIX tcsendbreak() */
return send_break(tty, arg ? arg*100 : 250);
case TIOCMGET:
return tty_tiocmget(tty, p);
case TIOCMSET:
case TIOCMBIC:
case TIOCMBIS:
return tty_tiocmset(tty, cmd, p);
case TIOCGICOUNT:
retval = tty_tiocgicount(tty, p);
/* For the moment allow fall through to the old method */
if (retval != -EINVAL)
return retval;
break;
case TCFLSH:
switch (arg) {
case TCIFLUSH:
case TCIOFLUSH:
/* flush tty buffer and allow ldisc to process ioctl */
tty_buffer_flush(tty, NULL);
break;
}
break;
case TIOCSSERIAL:
tty_warn_deprecated_flags(p);
break;
}
if (tty->ops->ioctl) {
retval = tty->ops->ioctl(tty, cmd, arg);
if (retval != -ENOIOCTLCMD)
return retval;
}
ld = tty_ldisc_ref_wait(tty);
retval = -EINVAL;
if (ld->ops->ioctl) {
retval = ld->ops->ioctl(tty, file, cmd, arg);
if (retval == -ENOIOCTLCMD)
retval = -ENOTTY;
}
tty_ldisc_deref(ld);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: tty: Fix unsafe ldisc reference via ioctl(TIOCGETD)
ioctl(TIOCGETD) retrieves the line discipline id directly from the
ldisc because the line discipline id (c_line) in termios is untrustworthy;
userspace may have set termios via ioctl(TCSETS*) without actually
changing the line discipline via ioctl(TIOCSETD).
However, directly accessing the current ldisc via tty->ldisc is
unsafe; the ldisc ptr dereferenced may be stale if the line discipline
is changing via ioctl(TIOCSETD) or hangup.
Wait for the line discipline reference (just like read() or write())
to retrieve the "current" line discipline id.
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | long tty_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct tty_struct *tty = file_tty(file);
struct tty_struct *real_tty;
void __user *p = (void __user *)arg;
int retval;
struct tty_ldisc *ld;
if (tty_paranoia_check(tty, file_inode(file), "tty_ioctl"))
return -EINVAL;
real_tty = tty_pair_get_tty(tty);
/*
* Factor out some common prep work
*/
switch (cmd) {
case TIOCSETD:
case TIOCSBRK:
case TIOCCBRK:
case TCSBRK:
case TCSBRKP:
retval = tty_check_change(tty);
if (retval)
return retval;
if (cmd != TIOCCBRK) {
tty_wait_until_sent(tty, 0);
if (signal_pending(current))
return -EINTR;
}
break;
}
/*
* Now do the stuff.
*/
switch (cmd) {
case TIOCSTI:
return tiocsti(tty, p);
case TIOCGWINSZ:
return tiocgwinsz(real_tty, p);
case TIOCSWINSZ:
return tiocswinsz(real_tty, p);
case TIOCCONS:
return real_tty != tty ? -EINVAL : tioccons(file);
case FIONBIO:
return fionbio(file, p);
case TIOCEXCL:
set_bit(TTY_EXCLUSIVE, &tty->flags);
return 0;
case TIOCNXCL:
clear_bit(TTY_EXCLUSIVE, &tty->flags);
return 0;
case TIOCGEXCL:
{
int excl = test_bit(TTY_EXCLUSIVE, &tty->flags);
return put_user(excl, (int __user *)p);
}
case TIOCNOTTY:
if (current->signal->tty != tty)
return -ENOTTY;
no_tty();
return 0;
case TIOCSCTTY:
return tiocsctty(real_tty, file, arg);
case TIOCGPGRP:
return tiocgpgrp(tty, real_tty, p);
case TIOCSPGRP:
return tiocspgrp(tty, real_tty, p);
case TIOCGSID:
return tiocgsid(tty, real_tty, p);
case TIOCGETD:
return tiocgetd(tty, p);
case TIOCSETD:
return tiocsetd(tty, p);
case TIOCVHANGUP:
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
tty_vhangup(tty);
return 0;
case TIOCGDEV:
{
unsigned int ret = new_encode_dev(tty_devnum(real_tty));
return put_user(ret, (unsigned int __user *)p);
}
/*
* Break handling
*/
case TIOCSBRK: /* Turn break on, unconditionally */
if (tty->ops->break_ctl)
return tty->ops->break_ctl(tty, -1);
return 0;
case TIOCCBRK: /* Turn break off, unconditionally */
if (tty->ops->break_ctl)
return tty->ops->break_ctl(tty, 0);
return 0;
case TCSBRK: /* SVID version: non-zero arg --> no break */
/* non-zero arg means wait for all output data
* to be sent (performed above) but don't send break.
* This is used by the tcdrain() termios function.
*/
if (!arg)
return send_break(tty, 250);
return 0;
case TCSBRKP: /* support for POSIX tcsendbreak() */
return send_break(tty, arg ? arg*100 : 250);
case TIOCMGET:
return tty_tiocmget(tty, p);
case TIOCMSET:
case TIOCMBIC:
case TIOCMBIS:
return tty_tiocmset(tty, cmd, p);
case TIOCGICOUNT:
retval = tty_tiocgicount(tty, p);
/* For the moment allow fall through to the old method */
if (retval != -EINVAL)
return retval;
break;
case TCFLSH:
switch (arg) {
case TCIFLUSH:
case TCIOFLUSH:
/* flush tty buffer and allow ldisc to process ioctl */
tty_buffer_flush(tty, NULL);
break;
}
break;
case TIOCSSERIAL:
tty_warn_deprecated_flags(p);
break;
}
if (tty->ops->ioctl) {
retval = tty->ops->ioctl(tty, cmd, arg);
if (retval != -ENOIOCTLCMD)
return retval;
}
ld = tty_ldisc_ref_wait(tty);
retval = -EINVAL;
if (ld->ops->ioctl) {
retval = ld->ops->ioctl(tty, file, cmd, arg);
if (retval == -ENOIOCTLCMD)
retval = -ENOTTY;
}
tty_ldisc_deref(ld);
return retval;
}
| 167,453 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: php_mysqlnd_rowp_read_text_protocol_aux(MYSQLND_MEMORY_POOL_CHUNK * row_buffer, zval ** fields,
unsigned int field_count, const MYSQLND_FIELD * fields_metadata,
zend_bool as_int_or_float, zend_bool copy_data, MYSQLND_STATS * stats TSRMLS_DC)
{
unsigned int i;
zend_bool last_field_was_string = FALSE;
zval **current_field, **end_field, **start_field;
zend_uchar * p = row_buffer->ptr;
size_t data_size = row_buffer->app;
zend_uchar * bit_area = (zend_uchar*) row_buffer->ptr + data_size + 1; /* we allocate from here */
DBG_ENTER("php_mysqlnd_rowp_read_text_protocol_aux");
if (!fields) {
DBG_RETURN(FAIL);
}
end_field = (start_field = fields) + field_count;
for (i = 0, current_field = start_field; current_field < end_field; current_field++, i++) {
DBG_INF("Directly creating zval");
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(*current_field);
if (!*current_field) {
DBG_RETURN(FAIL);
}
}
for (i = 0, current_field = start_field; current_field < end_field; current_field++, i++) {
/* Don't reverse the order. It is significant!*/
zend_uchar *this_field_len_pos = p;
/* php_mysqlnd_net_field_length() call should be after *this_field_len_pos = p; */
unsigned long len = php_mysqlnd_net_field_length(&p);
if (copy_data == FALSE && current_field > start_field && last_field_was_string) {
/*
Normal queries:
We have to put \0 now to the end of the previous field, if it was
a string. IS_NULL doesn't matter. Because we have already read our
length, then we can overwrite it in the row buffer.
This statement terminates the previous field, not the current one.
NULL_LENGTH is encoded in one byte, so we can stick a \0 there.
Any string's length is encoded in at least one byte, so we can stick
a \0 there.
*/
*this_field_len_pos = '\0';
}
/* NULL or NOT NULL, this is the question! */
if (len == MYSQLND_NULL_LENGTH) {
ZVAL_NULL(*current_field);
last_field_was_string = FALSE;
} else {
#if defined(MYSQLND_STRING_TO_INT_CONVERSION)
struct st_mysqlnd_perm_bind perm_bind =
mysqlnd_ps_fetch_functions[fields_metadata[i].type];
#endif
if (MYSQLND_G(collect_statistics)) {
enum_mysqlnd_collected_stats statistic;
switch (fields_metadata[i].type) {
case MYSQL_TYPE_DECIMAL: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_DECIMAL; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_TINY: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_INT8; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_SHORT: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_INT16; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_LONG: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_INT32; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_FLOAT: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_FLOAT; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_DOUBLE: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_DOUBLE; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_NULL: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_NULL; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_TIMESTAMP: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_TIMESTAMP; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_LONGLONG: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_INT64; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_INT24: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_INT24; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_DATE: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_DATE; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_TIME: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_TIME; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_DATETIME: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_DATETIME; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_YEAR: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_YEAR; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_NEWDATE: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_DATE; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_VARCHAR: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_STRING; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_BIT: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_BIT; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_NEWDECIMAL: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_DECIMAL; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_ENUM: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_ENUM; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_SET: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_SET; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_JSON: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_JSON; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_TINY_BLOB: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_BLOB; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_MEDIUM_BLOB:statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_BLOB; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_LONG_BLOB: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_BLOB; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_BLOB: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_BLOB; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_VAR_STRING: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_STRING; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_STRING: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_STRING; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_GEOMETRY: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_GEOMETRY; break;
default: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_OTHER; break;
}
MYSQLND_INC_CONN_STATISTIC_W_VALUE2(stats, statistic, 1, STAT_BYTES_RECEIVED_PURE_DATA_TEXT, len);
}
#ifdef MYSQLND_STRING_TO_INT_CONVERSION
if (as_int_or_float && perm_bind.php_type == IS_LONG) {
zend_uchar save = *(p + len);
/* We have to make it ASCIIZ temporarily */
*(p + len) = '\0';
if (perm_bind.pack_len < SIZEOF_LONG) {
/* direct conversion */
int64_t v =
#ifndef PHP_WIN32
atoll((char *) p);
#else
_atoi64((char *) p);
#endif
ZVAL_LONG(*current_field, (long) v); /* the cast is safe */
} else {
uint64_t v =
#ifndef PHP_WIN32
(uint64_t) atoll((char *) p);
#else
(uint64_t) _atoi64((char *) p);
#endif
zend_bool uns = fields_metadata[i].flags & UNSIGNED_FLAG? TRUE:FALSE;
/* We have to make it ASCIIZ temporarily */
#if SIZEOF_LONG==8
if (uns == TRUE && v > 9223372036854775807L)
#elif SIZEOF_LONG==4
if ((uns == TRUE && v > L64(2147483647)) ||
(uns == FALSE && (( L64(2147483647) < (int64_t) v) ||
(L64(-2147483648) > (int64_t) v))))
#else
#error Need fix for this architecture
#endif /* SIZEOF */
{
ZVAL_STRINGL(*current_field, (char *)p, len, 0);
} else {
ZVAL_LONG(*current_field, (long) v); /* the cast is safe */
}
}
*(p + len) = save;
} else if (as_int_or_float && perm_bind.php_type == IS_DOUBLE) {
zend_uchar save = *(p + len);
/* We have to make it ASCIIZ temporarily */
*(p + len) = '\0';
ZVAL_DOUBLE(*current_field, atof((char *) p));
*(p + len) = save;
} else
#endif /* MYSQLND_STRING_TO_INT_CONVERSION */
if (fields_metadata[i].type == MYSQL_TYPE_BIT) {
/*
BIT fields are specially handled. As they come as bit mask, we have
to convert it to human-readable representation. As the bits take
less space in the protocol than the numbers they represent, we don't
have enough space in the packet buffer to overwrite inside.
Thus, a bit more space is pre-allocated at the end of the buffer,
see php_mysqlnd_rowp_read(). And we add the strings at the end.
Definitely not nice, _hackish_ :(, but works.
*/
zend_uchar *start = bit_area;
ps_fetch_from_1_to_8_bytes(*current_field, &(fields_metadata[i]), 0, &p, len TSRMLS_CC);
/*
We have advanced in ps_fetch_from_1_to_8_bytes. We should go back because
later in this function there will be an advancement.
*/
p -= len;
if (Z_TYPE_PP(current_field) == IS_LONG) {
bit_area += 1 + sprintf((char *)start, "%ld", Z_LVAL_PP(current_field));
ZVAL_STRINGL(*current_field, (char *) start, bit_area - start - 1, copy_data);
} else if (Z_TYPE_PP(current_field) == IS_STRING){
memcpy(bit_area, Z_STRVAL_PP(current_field), Z_STRLEN_PP(current_field));
bit_area += Z_STRLEN_PP(current_field);
*bit_area++ = '\0';
zval_dtor(*current_field);
ZVAL_STRINGL(*current_field, (char *) start, bit_area - start - 1, copy_data);
}
} else {
ZVAL_STRINGL(*current_field, (char *)p, len, copy_data);
}
p += len;
last_field_was_string = TRUE;
}
}
if (copy_data == FALSE && last_field_was_string) {
/* Normal queries: The buffer has one more byte at the end, because we need it */
row_buffer->ptr[data_size] = '\0';
}
DBG_RETURN(PASS);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72293 - Heap overflow in mysqlnd related to BIT fields
CWE ID: CWE-119 | php_mysqlnd_rowp_read_text_protocol_aux(MYSQLND_MEMORY_POOL_CHUNK * row_buffer, zval ** fields,
unsigned int field_count, const MYSQLND_FIELD * fields_metadata,
zend_bool as_int_or_float, zend_bool copy_data, MYSQLND_STATS * stats TSRMLS_DC)
{
unsigned int i;
zend_bool last_field_was_string = FALSE;
zval **current_field, **end_field, **start_field;
zend_uchar * p = row_buffer->ptr;
size_t data_size = row_buffer->app;
zend_uchar * bit_area = (zend_uchar*) row_buffer->ptr + data_size + 1; /* we allocate from here */
const zend_uchar * const packet_end = (zend_uchar*) row_buffer->ptr + data_size;
DBG_ENTER("php_mysqlnd_rowp_read_text_protocol_aux");
if (!fields) {
DBG_RETURN(FAIL);
}
end_field = (start_field = fields) + field_count;
for (i = 0, current_field = start_field; current_field < end_field; current_field++, i++) {
DBG_INF("Directly creating zval");
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(*current_field);
if (!*current_field) {
DBG_RETURN(FAIL);
}
}
for (i = 0, current_field = start_field; current_field < end_field; current_field++, i++) {
/* Don't reverse the order. It is significant!*/
zend_uchar *this_field_len_pos = p;
/* php_mysqlnd_net_field_length() call should be after *this_field_len_pos = p; */
const unsigned long len = php_mysqlnd_net_field_length(&p);
if (len != MYSQLND_NULL_LENGTH && ((p + len) > packet_end)) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Malformed server packet. Field length pointing "MYSQLND_SZ_T_SPEC
" bytes after end of packet", (p + len) - packet_end - 1);
DBG_RETURN(FAIL);
}
if (copy_data == FALSE && current_field > start_field && last_field_was_string) {
/*
Normal queries:
We have to put \0 now to the end of the previous field, if it was
a string. IS_NULL doesn't matter. Because we have already read our
length, then we can overwrite it in the row buffer.
This statement terminates the previous field, not the current one.
NULL_LENGTH is encoded in one byte, so we can stick a \0 there.
Any string's length is encoded in at least one byte, so we can stick
a \0 there.
*/
*this_field_len_pos = '\0';
}
/* NULL or NOT NULL, this is the question! */
if (len == MYSQLND_NULL_LENGTH) {
ZVAL_NULL(*current_field);
last_field_was_string = FALSE;
} else {
#if defined(MYSQLND_STRING_TO_INT_CONVERSION)
struct st_mysqlnd_perm_bind perm_bind =
mysqlnd_ps_fetch_functions[fields_metadata[i].type];
#endif
if (MYSQLND_G(collect_statistics)) {
enum_mysqlnd_collected_stats statistic;
switch (fields_metadata[i].type) {
case MYSQL_TYPE_DECIMAL: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_DECIMAL; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_TINY: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_INT8; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_SHORT: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_INT16; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_LONG: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_INT32; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_FLOAT: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_FLOAT; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_DOUBLE: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_DOUBLE; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_NULL: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_NULL; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_TIMESTAMP: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_TIMESTAMP; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_LONGLONG: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_INT64; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_INT24: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_INT24; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_DATE: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_DATE; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_TIME: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_TIME; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_DATETIME: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_DATETIME; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_YEAR: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_YEAR; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_NEWDATE: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_DATE; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_VARCHAR: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_STRING; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_BIT: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_BIT; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_NEWDECIMAL: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_DECIMAL; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_ENUM: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_ENUM; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_SET: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_SET; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_JSON: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_JSON; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_TINY_BLOB: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_BLOB; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_MEDIUM_BLOB:statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_BLOB; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_LONG_BLOB: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_BLOB; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_BLOB: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_BLOB; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_VAR_STRING: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_STRING; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_STRING: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_STRING; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_GEOMETRY: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_GEOMETRY; break;
default: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_OTHER; break;
}
MYSQLND_INC_CONN_STATISTIC_W_VALUE2(stats, statistic, 1, STAT_BYTES_RECEIVED_PURE_DATA_TEXT, len);
}
#ifdef MYSQLND_STRING_TO_INT_CONVERSION
if (as_int_or_float && perm_bind.php_type == IS_LONG) {
zend_uchar save = *(p + len);
/* We have to make it ASCIIZ temporarily */
*(p + len) = '\0';
if (perm_bind.pack_len < SIZEOF_LONG) {
/* direct conversion */
int64_t v =
#ifndef PHP_WIN32
atoll((char *) p);
#else
_atoi64((char *) p);
#endif
ZVAL_LONG(*current_field, (long) v); /* the cast is safe */
} else {
uint64_t v =
#ifndef PHP_WIN32
(uint64_t) atoll((char *) p);
#else
(uint64_t) _atoi64((char *) p);
#endif
zend_bool uns = fields_metadata[i].flags & UNSIGNED_FLAG? TRUE:FALSE;
/* We have to make it ASCIIZ temporarily */
#if SIZEOF_LONG==8
if (uns == TRUE && v > 9223372036854775807L)
#elif SIZEOF_LONG==4
if ((uns == TRUE && v > L64(2147483647)) ||
(uns == FALSE && (( L64(2147483647) < (int64_t) v) ||
(L64(-2147483648) > (int64_t) v))))
#else
#error Need fix for this architecture
#endif /* SIZEOF */
{
ZVAL_STRINGL(*current_field, (char *)p, len, 0);
} else {
ZVAL_LONG(*current_field, (long) v); /* the cast is safe */
}
}
*(p + len) = save;
} else if (as_int_or_float && perm_bind.php_type == IS_DOUBLE) {
zend_uchar save = *(p + len);
/* We have to make it ASCIIZ temporarily */
*(p + len) = '\0';
ZVAL_DOUBLE(*current_field, atof((char *) p));
*(p + len) = save;
} else
#endif /* MYSQLND_STRING_TO_INT_CONVERSION */
if (fields_metadata[i].type == MYSQL_TYPE_BIT) {
/*
BIT fields are specially handled. As they come as bit mask, we have
to convert it to human-readable representation. As the bits take
less space in the protocol than the numbers they represent, we don't
have enough space in the packet buffer to overwrite inside.
Thus, a bit more space is pre-allocated at the end of the buffer,
see php_mysqlnd_rowp_read(). And we add the strings at the end.
Definitely not nice, _hackish_ :(, but works.
*/
zend_uchar *start = bit_area;
ps_fetch_from_1_to_8_bytes(*current_field, &(fields_metadata[i]), 0, &p, len TSRMLS_CC);
/*
We have advanced in ps_fetch_from_1_to_8_bytes. We should go back because
later in this function there will be an advancement.
*/
p -= len;
if (Z_TYPE_PP(current_field) == IS_LONG) {
bit_area += 1 + sprintf((char *)start, "%ld", Z_LVAL_PP(current_field));
ZVAL_STRINGL(*current_field, (char *) start, bit_area - start - 1, copy_data);
} else if (Z_TYPE_PP(current_field) == IS_STRING){
memcpy(bit_area, Z_STRVAL_PP(current_field), Z_STRLEN_PP(current_field));
bit_area += Z_STRLEN_PP(current_field);
*bit_area++ = '\0';
zval_dtor(*current_field);
ZVAL_STRINGL(*current_field, (char *) start, bit_area - start - 1, copy_data);
}
} else {
ZVAL_STRINGL(*current_field, (char *)p, len, copy_data);
}
p += len;
last_field_was_string = TRUE;
}
}
if (copy_data == FALSE && last_field_was_string) {
/* Normal queries: The buffer has one more byte at the end, because we need it */
row_buffer->ptr[data_size] = '\0';
}
DBG_RETURN(PASS);
}
| 166,937 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int get_core_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct kvm_one_reg *reg)
{
/*
* Because the kvm_regs structure is a mix of 32, 64 and
* 128bit fields, we index it as if it was a 32bit
* array. Hence below, nr_regs is the number of entries, and
* off the index in the "array".
*/
__u32 __user *uaddr = (__u32 __user *)(unsigned long)reg->addr;
struct kvm_regs *regs = vcpu_gp_regs(vcpu);
int nr_regs = sizeof(*regs) / sizeof(__u32);
u32 off;
/* Our ID is an index into the kvm_regs struct. */
off = core_reg_offset_from_id(reg->id);
if (off >= nr_regs ||
(off + (KVM_REG_SIZE(reg->id) / sizeof(__u32))) >= nr_regs)
return -ENOENT;
if (copy_to_user(uaddr, ((u32 *)regs) + off, KVM_REG_SIZE(reg->id)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: arm64: KVM: Tighten guest core register access from userspace
We currently allow userspace to access the core register file
in about any possible way, including straddling multiple
registers and doing unaligned accesses.
This is not the expected use of the ABI, and nobody is actually
using it that way. Let's tighten it by explicitly checking
the size and alignment for each field of the register file.
Cc: <[email protected]>
Fixes: 2f4a07c5f9fe ("arm64: KVM: guest one-reg interface")
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dave Martin <[email protected]>
[maz: rewrote Dave's initial patch to be more easily backported]
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static int get_core_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct kvm_one_reg *reg)
{
/*
* Because the kvm_regs structure is a mix of 32, 64 and
* 128bit fields, we index it as if it was a 32bit
* array. Hence below, nr_regs is the number of entries, and
* off the index in the "array".
*/
__u32 __user *uaddr = (__u32 __user *)(unsigned long)reg->addr;
struct kvm_regs *regs = vcpu_gp_regs(vcpu);
int nr_regs = sizeof(*regs) / sizeof(__u32);
u32 off;
/* Our ID is an index into the kvm_regs struct. */
off = core_reg_offset_from_id(reg->id);
if (off >= nr_regs ||
(off + (KVM_REG_SIZE(reg->id) / sizeof(__u32))) >= nr_regs)
return -ENOENT;
if (validate_core_offset(reg))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_to_user(uaddr, ((u32 *)regs) + off, KVM_REG_SIZE(reg->id)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
| 169,011 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool HarfBuzzShaper::shape(GlyphBuffer* glyphBuffer)
{
if (!createHarfBuzzRuns())
return false;
m_totalWidth = 0;
if (!shapeHarfBuzzRuns())
return false;
if (glyphBuffer && !fillGlyphBuffer(glyphBuffer))
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Always initialize |m_totalWidth| in HarfBuzzShaper::shape.
[email protected]
BUG=476647
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1108663003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@194541 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | bool HarfBuzzShaper::shape(GlyphBuffer* glyphBuffer)
{
if (!createHarfBuzzRuns())
return false;
if (!shapeHarfBuzzRuns())
return false;
if (glyphBuffer && !fillGlyphBuffer(glyphBuffer))
return false;
return true;
}
| 172,005 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: produce_output()
{
char *str;
FILE *mailer;
MyString subject,szTmp;
subject.sprintf("condor_preen results %s: %d old file%s found",
my_full_hostname(), BadFiles->number(),
(BadFiles->number() > 1)?"s":"");
if( MailFlag ) {
if( (mailer=email_open(PreenAdmin, subject.Value())) == NULL ) {
EXCEPT( "Can't do email_open(\"%s\", \"%s\")\n",PreenAdmin,subject.Value());
}
} else {
mailer = stdout;
}
szTmp.sprintf("The condor_preen process has found the following stale condor files on <%s>:\n\n", get_local_hostname().Value());
dprintf(D_ALWAYS, szTmp.Value());
if( MailFlag ) {
fprintf( mailer, "\n" );
fprintf( mailer, szTmp.Value());
}
for( BadFiles->rewind(); (str = BadFiles->next()); ) {
szTmp.sprintf(" %s\n", str);
dprintf(D_ALWAYS, szTmp.Value() );
fprintf( mailer, szTmp.Value() );
}
if( MailFlag ) {
const char *explanation = "\n\nWhat is condor_preen?\n\n"
"The condor_preen tool examines the directories belonging to Condor, and\n"
"removes extraneous files and directories which may be left over from Condor\n"
"processes which terminated abnormally either due to internal errors or a\n"
"system crash. The directories checked are the LOG, EXECUTE, and SPOOL\n"
"directories as defined in the Condor configuration files. The condor_preen\n"
"tool is intended to be run as user root (or user condor) periodically as a\n"
"backup method to ensure reasonable file system cleanliness in the face of\n"
"errors. This is done automatically by default by the condor_master daemon.\n"
"It may also be explicitly invoked on an as needed basis.\n\n"
"See the Condor manual section on condor_preen for more details.\n";
fprintf( mailer, "%s\n", explanation );
email_close( mailer );
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | produce_output()
{
char *str;
FILE *mailer;
MyString subject,szTmp;
subject.sprintf("condor_preen results %s: %d old file%s found",
my_full_hostname(), BadFiles->number(),
(BadFiles->number() > 1)?"s":"");
if( MailFlag ) {
if( (mailer=email_open(PreenAdmin, subject.Value())) == NULL ) {
EXCEPT( "Can't do email_open(\"%s\", \"%s\")\n",PreenAdmin,subject.Value());
}
} else {
mailer = stdout;
}
szTmp.sprintf("The condor_preen process has found the following stale condor files on <%s>:\n\n", get_local_hostname().Value());
dprintf(D_ALWAYS, "%s", szTmp.Value());
if( MailFlag ) {
fprintf( mailer, "\n" );
fprintf( mailer, "%s", szTmp.Value());
}
for( BadFiles->rewind(); (str = BadFiles->next()); ) {
szTmp.sprintf(" %s\n", str);
dprintf(D_ALWAYS, "%s", szTmp.Value() );
fprintf( mailer, "%s", szTmp.Value() );
}
if( MailFlag ) {
const char *explanation = "\n\nWhat is condor_preen?\n\n"
"The condor_preen tool examines the directories belonging to Condor, and\n"
"removes extraneous files and directories which may be left over from Condor\n"
"processes which terminated abnormally either due to internal errors or a\n"
"system crash. The directories checked are the LOG, EXECUTE, and SPOOL\n"
"directories as defined in the Condor configuration files. The condor_preen\n"
"tool is intended to be run as user root (or user condor) periodically as a\n"
"backup method to ensure reasonable file system cleanliness in the face of\n"
"errors. This is done automatically by default by the condor_master daemon.\n"
"It may also be explicitly invoked on an as needed basis.\n\n"
"See the Condor manual section on condor_preen for more details.\n";
fprintf( mailer, "%s\n", explanation );
email_close( mailer );
}
}
| 165,381 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: BrowserContextDestroyer::BrowserContextDestroyer(
BrowserContext* context,
const std::set<content::RenderProcessHost*>& hosts)
: context_(context),
pending_hosts_(0) {
for (std::set<content::RenderProcessHost*>::iterator it = hosts.begin();
it != hosts.end(); ++it) {
(*it)->AddObserver(this);
++pending_hosts_;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | BrowserContextDestroyer::BrowserContextDestroyer(
std::unique_ptr<BrowserContext> context,
const std::set<content::RenderProcessHost*>& hosts,
uint32_t otr_contexts_pending_deletion)
: context_(std::move(context)),
otr_contexts_pending_deletion_(otr_contexts_pending_deletion),
finish_destroy_scheduled_(false) {
DCHECK(hosts.size() > 0 ||
(!context->IsOffTheRecord() &&
(otr_contexts_pending_deletion > 0 ||
context->HasOffTheRecordContext())));
g_contexts_pending_deletion.Get().push_back(this);
for (auto* host : hosts) {
ObserveHost(host);
}
}
| 165,418 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void gdImageRectangle (gdImagePtr im, int x1, int y1, int x2, int y2, int color)
{
int x1h = x1, x1v = x1, y1h = y1, y1v = y1, x2h = x2, x2v = x2, y2h = y2, y2v = y2;
int thick = im->thick;
int t;
if (x1 == x2 && y1 == y2 && thick == 1) {
gdImageSetPixel(im, x1, y1, color);
return;
}
if (y2 < y1) {
t=y1;
y1 = y2;
y2 = t;
t = x1;
x1 = x2;
x2 = t;
}
x1h = x1; x1v = x1; y1h = y1; y1v = y1; x2h = x2; x2v = x2; y2h = y2; y2v = y2;
if (thick > 1) {
int cx, cy, x1ul, y1ul, x2lr, y2lr;
int half = thick >> 1;
x1ul = x1 - half;
y1ul = y1 - half;
x2lr = x2 + half;
y2lr = y2 + half;
cy = y1ul + thick;
while (cy-- > y1ul) {
cx = x1ul - 1;
while (cx++ < x2lr) {
gdImageSetPixel(im, cx, cy, color);
}
}
cy = y2lr - thick;
while (cy++ < y2lr) {
cx = x1ul - 1;
while (cx++ < x2lr) {
gdImageSetPixel(im, cx, cy, color);
}
}
cy = y1ul + thick - 1;
while (cy++ < y2lr -thick) {
cx = x1ul - 1;
while (cx++ < x1ul + thick) {
gdImageSetPixel(im, cx, cy, color);
}
}
cy = y1ul + thick - 1;
while (cy++ < y2lr -thick) {
cx = x2lr - thick - 1;
while (cx++ < x2lr) {
gdImageSetPixel(im, cx, cy, color);
}
}
return;
} else {
y1v = y1h + 1;
y2v = y2h - 1;
gdImageLine(im, x1h, y1h, x2h, y1h, color);
gdImageLine(im, x1h, y2h, x2h, y2h, color);
gdImageLine(im, x1v, y1v, x1v, y2v, color);
gdImageLine(im, x2v, y1v, x2v, y2v, color);
}
}
Commit Message: iFixed bug #72446 - Integer Overflow in gdImagePaletteToTrueColor() resulting in heap overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190 | void gdImageRectangle (gdImagePtr im, int x1, int y1, int x2, int y2, int color)
{
int x1h = x1, x1v = x1, y1h = y1, y1v = y1, x2h = x2, x2v = x2, y2h = y2, y2v = y2;
int thick = im->thick;
int t;
if (x1 == x2 && y1 == y2 && thick == 1) {
gdImageSetPixel(im, x1, y1, color);
return;
}
if (y2 < y1) {
t=y1;
y1 = y2;
y2 = t;
t = x1;
x1 = x2;
x2 = t;
}
x1h = x1; x1v = x1; y1h = y1; y1v = y1; x2h = x2; x2v = x2; y2h = y2; y2v = y2;
if (thick > 1) {
int cx, cy, x1ul, y1ul, x2lr, y2lr;
int half = thick >> 1;
x1ul = x1 - half;
y1ul = y1 - half;
x2lr = x2 + half;
y2lr = y2 + half;
cy = y1ul + thick;
while (cy-- > y1ul) {
cx = x1ul - 1;
while (cx++ < x2lr) {
gdImageSetPixel(im, cx, cy, color);
}
}
cy = y2lr - thick;
while (cy++ < y2lr) {
cx = x1ul - 1;
while (cx++ < x2lr) {
gdImageSetPixel(im, cx, cy, color);
}
}
cy = y1ul + thick - 1;
while (cy++ < y2lr -thick) {
cx = x1ul - 1;
while (cx++ < x1ul + thick) {
gdImageSetPixel(im, cx, cy, color);
}
}
cy = y1ul + thick - 1;
while (cy++ < y2lr -thick) {
cx = x2lr - thick - 1;
while (cx++ < x2lr) {
gdImageSetPixel(im, cx, cy, color);
}
}
return;
} else {
y1v = y1h + 1;
y2v = y2h - 1;
gdImageLine(im, x1h, y1h, x2h, y1h, color);
gdImageLine(im, x1h, y2h, x2h, y2h, color);
gdImageLine(im, x1v, y1v, x1v, y2v, color);
gdImageLine(im, x2v, y1v, x2v, y2v, color);
}
}
| 167,130 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: my_object_get_value (MyObject *obj, guint *ret, GError **error)
{
*ret = obj->val;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | my_object_get_value (MyObject *obj, guint *ret, GError **error)
| 165,104 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::emptyBuffer(
OMX::buffer_id buffer,
OMX_U32 rangeOffset, OMX_U32 rangeLength,
OMX_U32 flags, OMX_TICKS timestamp, int fenceFd) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
if (getGraphicBufferSource() != NULL) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "29422020");
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header = findBufferHeader(buffer, kPortIndexInput);
if (header == NULL) {
ALOGE("b/25884056");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
BufferMeta *buffer_meta =
static_cast<BufferMeta *>(header->pAppPrivate);
sp<ABuffer> backup = buffer_meta->getBuffer(header, true /* backup */, false /* limit */);
sp<ABuffer> codec = buffer_meta->getBuffer(header, false /* backup */, false /* limit */);
if (mMetadataType[kPortIndexInput] == kMetadataBufferTypeGrallocSource
&& backup->capacity() >= sizeof(VideoNativeMetadata)
&& codec->capacity() >= sizeof(VideoGrallocMetadata)
&& ((VideoNativeMetadata *)backup->base())->eType
== kMetadataBufferTypeANWBuffer) {
VideoNativeMetadata &backupMeta = *(VideoNativeMetadata *)backup->base();
VideoGrallocMetadata &codecMeta = *(VideoGrallocMetadata *)codec->base();
CLOG_BUFFER(emptyBuffer, "converting ANWB %p to handle %p",
backupMeta.pBuffer, backupMeta.pBuffer->handle);
codecMeta.pHandle = backupMeta.pBuffer != NULL ? backupMeta.pBuffer->handle : NULL;
codecMeta.eType = kMetadataBufferTypeGrallocSource;
header->nFilledLen = rangeLength ? sizeof(codecMeta) : 0;
header->nOffset = 0;
} else {
if (rangeOffset > header->nAllocLen
|| rangeLength > header->nAllocLen - rangeOffset) {
CLOG_ERROR(emptyBuffer, OMX_ErrorBadParameter, FULL_BUFFER(NULL, header, fenceFd));
if (fenceFd >= 0) {
::close(fenceFd);
}
return BAD_VALUE;
}
header->nFilledLen = rangeLength;
header->nOffset = rangeOffset;
buffer_meta->CopyToOMX(header);
}
return emptyBuffer_l(header, flags, timestamp, (intptr_t)buffer, fenceFd);
}
Commit Message: IOMX: do not convert ANWB to gralloc source in emptyBuffer
Bug: 29422020
Bug: 31412859
Change-Id: If48e3e0b6f1af99a459fdc3f6f03744bbf0dc375
(cherry picked from commit 534bb6132a6a664f90b42b3ef81298b42efb3dc2)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | status_t OMXNodeInstance::emptyBuffer(
OMX::buffer_id buffer,
OMX_U32 rangeOffset, OMX_U32 rangeLength,
OMX_U32 flags, OMX_TICKS timestamp, int fenceFd) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
if (getGraphicBufferSource() != NULL) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "29422020");
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header = findBufferHeader(buffer, kPortIndexInput);
if (header == NULL) {
ALOGE("b/25884056");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
BufferMeta *buffer_meta =
static_cast<BufferMeta *>(header->pAppPrivate);
// set up proper filled length if component is configured for gralloc metadata mode
// ignore rangeOffset in this case (as client may be assuming ANW meta buffers).
if (mMetadataType[kPortIndexInput] == kMetadataBufferTypeGrallocSource) {
header->nFilledLen = rangeLength ? sizeof(VideoGrallocMetadata) : 0;
header->nOffset = 0;
} else {
if (rangeOffset > header->nAllocLen
|| rangeLength > header->nAllocLen - rangeOffset) {
CLOG_ERROR(emptyBuffer, OMX_ErrorBadParameter, FULL_BUFFER(NULL, header, fenceFd));
if (fenceFd >= 0) {
::close(fenceFd);
}
return BAD_VALUE;
}
header->nFilledLen = rangeLength;
header->nOffset = rangeOffset;
buffer_meta->CopyToOMX(header);
}
return emptyBuffer_l(header, flags, timestamp, (intptr_t)buffer, fenceFd);
}
| 174,145 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int handle_wrmsr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct msr_data msr;
u32 ecx = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX];
u64 data = (vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX] & -1u)
| ((u64)(vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX] & -1u) << 32);
msr.data = data;
msr.index = ecx;
msr.host_initiated = false;
if (vmx_set_msr(vcpu, &msr) != 0) {
trace_kvm_msr_write_ex(ecx, data);
kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
return 1;
}
trace_kvm_msr_write(ecx, data);
skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static int handle_wrmsr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct msr_data msr;
u32 ecx = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX];
u64 data = (vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX] & -1u)
| ((u64)(vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX] & -1u) << 32);
msr.data = data;
msr.index = ecx;
msr.host_initiated = false;
if (kvm_set_msr(vcpu, &msr) != 0) {
trace_kvm_msr_write_ex(ecx, data);
kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
return 1;
}
trace_kvm_msr_write(ecx, data);
skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
return 1;
}
| 166,349 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: GF_Err urn_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
u32 i, to_read;
char *tmpName;
GF_DataEntryURNBox *ptr = (GF_DataEntryURNBox *)s;
if (! ptr->size ) return GF_OK;
to_read = (u32) ptr->size;
tmpName = (char*)gf_malloc(sizeof(char) * to_read);
if (!tmpName) return GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
gf_bs_read_data(bs, tmpName, to_read);
i = 0;
while ( (tmpName[i] != 0) && (i < to_read) ) {
i++;
}
if (i == to_read) {
gf_free(tmpName);
return GF_ISOM_INVALID_FILE;
}
if (i == to_read - 1) {
ptr->nameURN = tmpName;
ptr->location = NULL;
return GF_OK;
}
ptr->nameURN = (char*)gf_malloc(sizeof(char) * (i+1));
if (!ptr->nameURN) {
gf_free(tmpName);
return GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
}
ptr->location = (char*)gf_malloc(sizeof(char) * (to_read - i - 1));
if (!ptr->location) {
gf_free(tmpName);
gf_free(ptr->nameURN);
ptr->nameURN = NULL;
return GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
}
memcpy(ptr->nameURN, tmpName, i + 1);
memcpy(ptr->location, tmpName + i + 1, (to_read - i - 1));
gf_free(tmpName);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | GF_Err urn_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
u32 i, to_read;
char *tmpName;
GF_DataEntryURNBox *ptr = (GF_DataEntryURNBox *)s;
if (! ptr->size ) return GF_OK;
to_read = (u32) ptr->size;
tmpName = (char*)gf_malloc(sizeof(char) * to_read);
if (!tmpName) return GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
gf_bs_read_data(bs, tmpName, to_read);
i = 0;
while ( (i < to_read) && (tmpName[i] != 0) ) {
i++;
}
if (i == to_read) {
gf_free(tmpName);
return GF_ISOM_INVALID_FILE;
}
if (i == to_read - 1) {
ptr->nameURN = tmpName;
ptr->location = NULL;
return GF_OK;
}
ptr->nameURN = (char*)gf_malloc(sizeof(char) * (i+1));
if (!ptr->nameURN) {
gf_free(tmpName);
return GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
}
ptr->location = (char*)gf_malloc(sizeof(char) * (to_read - i - 1));
if (!ptr->location) {
gf_free(tmpName);
gf_free(ptr->nameURN);
ptr->nameURN = NULL;
return GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
}
memcpy(ptr->nameURN, tmpName, i + 1);
memcpy(ptr->location, tmpName + i + 1, (to_read - i - 1));
gf_free(tmpName);
return GF_OK;
}
| 169,167 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PixarLogClose(TIFF* tif)
{
TIFFDirectory *td = &tif->tif_dir;
/* In a really sneaky (and really incorrect, and untruthful, and
* troublesome, and error-prone) maneuver that completely goes against
* the spirit of TIFF, and breaks TIFF, on close, we covertly
* modify both bitspersample and sampleformat in the directory to
* indicate 8-bit linear. This way, the decode "just works" even for
* readers that don't know about PixarLog, or how to set
* the PIXARLOGDATFMT pseudo-tag.
*/
td->td_bitspersample = 8;
td->td_sampleformat = SAMPLEFORMAT_UINT;
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c, libtiff/tif_luv.c: fix heap-based buffer
overflow on generation of PixarLog / LUV compressed files, with
ColorMap, TransferFunction attached and nasty plays with bitspersample.
The fix for LUV has not been tested, but suffers from the same kind
of issue of PixarLog.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2604
CWE ID: CWE-125 | PixarLogClose(TIFF* tif)
{
PixarLogState* sp = (PixarLogState*) tif->tif_data;
TIFFDirectory *td = &tif->tif_dir;
assert(sp != 0);
/* In a really sneaky (and really incorrect, and untruthful, and
* troublesome, and error-prone) maneuver that completely goes against
* the spirit of TIFF, and breaks TIFF, on close, we covertly
* modify both bitspersample and sampleformat in the directory to
* indicate 8-bit linear. This way, the decode "just works" even for
* readers that don't know about PixarLog, or how to set
* the PIXARLOGDATFMT pseudo-tag.
*/
if (sp->state&PLSTATE_INIT) {
/* We test the state to avoid an issue such as in
* http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2604
* What appends in that case is that the bitspersample is 1 and
* a TransferFunction is set. The size of the TransferFunction
* depends on 1<<bitspersample. So if we increase it, an access
* out of the buffer will happen at directory flushing.
* Another option would be to clear those targs.
*/
td->td_bitspersample = 8;
td->td_sampleformat = SAMPLEFORMAT_UINT;
}
}
| 168,466 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xsltValueOf(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, xmlNodePtr node,
xmlNodePtr inst, xsltStylePreCompPtr castedComp)
{
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
xsltStyleItemValueOfPtr comp = (xsltStyleItemValueOfPtr) castedComp;
#else
xsltStylePreCompPtr comp = castedComp;
#endif
xmlXPathObjectPtr res = NULL;
xmlChar *value = NULL;
xmlDocPtr oldXPContextDoc;
xmlNsPtr *oldXPNamespaces;
xmlNodePtr oldXPContextNode;
int oldXPProximityPosition, oldXPContextSize, oldXPNsNr;
xmlXPathContextPtr xpctxt;
if ((ctxt == NULL) || (node == NULL) || (inst == NULL))
return;
if ((comp == NULL) || (comp->select == NULL) || (comp->comp == NULL)) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, inst,
"Internal error in xsltValueOf(): "
"The XSLT 'value-of' instruction was not compiled.\n");
return;
}
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_VALUE_OF,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltValueOf: select %s\n", comp->select));
#endif
xpctxt = ctxt->xpathCtxt;
oldXPContextDoc = xpctxt->doc;
oldXPContextNode = xpctxt->node;
oldXPProximityPosition = xpctxt->proximityPosition;
oldXPContextSize = xpctxt->contextSize;
oldXPNsNr = xpctxt->nsNr;
oldXPNamespaces = xpctxt->namespaces;
xpctxt->node = node;
if (comp != NULL) {
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
if (comp->inScopeNs != NULL) {
xpctxt->namespaces = comp->inScopeNs->list;
xpctxt->nsNr = comp->inScopeNs->xpathNumber;
} else {
xpctxt->namespaces = NULL;
xpctxt->nsNr = 0;
}
#else
xpctxt->namespaces = comp->nsList;
xpctxt->nsNr = comp->nsNr;
#endif
} else {
xpctxt->namespaces = NULL;
xpctxt->nsNr = 0;
}
res = xmlXPathCompiledEval(comp->comp, xpctxt);
xpctxt->doc = oldXPContextDoc;
xpctxt->node = oldXPContextNode;
xpctxt->contextSize = oldXPContextSize;
xpctxt->proximityPosition = oldXPProximityPosition;
xpctxt->nsNr = oldXPNsNr;
xpctxt->namespaces = oldXPNamespaces;
/*
* Cast the XPath object to string.
*/
if (res != NULL) {
value = xmlXPathCastToString(res);
if (value == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, inst,
"Internal error in xsltValueOf(): "
"failed to cast an XPath object to string.\n");
ctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
goto error;
}
if (value[0] != 0) {
xsltCopyTextString(ctxt, ctxt->insert, value, comp->noescape);
}
} else {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, inst,
"XPath evaluation returned no result.\n");
ctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
goto error;
}
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
if (value) {
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_VALUE_OF,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltValueOf: result '%s'\n", value));
}
#endif
error:
if (value != NULL)
xmlFree(value);
if (res != NULL)
xmlXPathFreeObject(res);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | xsltValueOf(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, xmlNodePtr node,
xmlNodePtr inst, xsltStylePreCompPtr castedComp)
{
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
xsltStyleItemValueOfPtr comp = (xsltStyleItemValueOfPtr) castedComp;
#else
xsltStylePreCompPtr comp = castedComp;
#endif
xmlXPathObjectPtr res = NULL;
xmlChar *value = NULL;
if ((ctxt == NULL) || (node == NULL) || (inst == NULL))
return;
if ((comp == NULL) || (comp->select == NULL) || (comp->comp == NULL)) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, inst,
"Internal error in xsltValueOf(): "
"The XSLT 'value-of' instruction was not compiled.\n");
return;
}
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_VALUE_OF,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltValueOf: select %s\n", comp->select));
#endif
res = xsltPreCompEval(ctxt, node, comp);
/*
* Cast the XPath object to string.
*/
if (res != NULL) {
value = xmlXPathCastToString(res);
if (value == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, inst,
"Internal error in xsltValueOf(): "
"failed to cast an XPath object to string.\n");
ctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
goto error;
}
if (value[0] != 0) {
xsltCopyTextString(ctxt, ctxt->insert, value, comp->noescape);
}
} else {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, inst,
"XPath evaluation returned no result.\n");
ctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
goto error;
}
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
if (value) {
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_VALUE_OF,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltValueOf: result '%s'\n", value));
}
#endif
error:
if (value != NULL)
xmlFree(value);
if (res != NULL)
xmlXPathFreeObject(res);
}
| 173,331 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void set_own_dir(const char *argv0) {
size_t l = strlen(argv0);
while(l && argv0[l - 1] != '/')
l--;
if(l == 0)
memcpy(own_dir, ".", 2);
else {
memcpy(own_dir, argv0, l - 1);
own_dir[l] = 0;
}
}
Commit Message: fix for CVE-2015-3887
closes #60
CWE ID: CWE-426 | static void set_own_dir(const char *argv0) {
size_t l = strlen(argv0);
while(l && argv0[l - 1] != '/')
l--;
if(l == 0)
#ifdef SUPER_SECURE
memcpy(own_dir, "/dev/null/", 2);
#else
memcpy(own_dir, ".", 2);
#endif
else {
memcpy(own_dir, argv0, l - 1);
own_dir[l] = 0;
}
}
| 168,884 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key,
unsigned timeout,
unsigned error,
struct key *keyring,
struct key *authkey)
{
struct assoc_array_edit *edit;
struct timespec now;
int ret, awaken, link_ret = 0;
key_check(key);
key_check(keyring);
awaken = 0;
ret = -EBUSY;
if (keyring) {
if (keyring->restrict_link)
return -EPERM;
link_ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &key->index_key, &edit);
}
mutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex);
/* can't instantiate twice */
if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) {
/* mark the key as being negatively instantiated */
atomic_inc(&key->user->nikeys);
key->reject_error = -error;
smp_wmb();
set_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags);
set_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags);
now = current_kernel_time();
key->expiry = now.tv_sec + timeout;
key_schedule_gc(key->expiry + key_gc_delay);
if (test_and_clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags))
awaken = 1;
ret = 0;
/* and link it into the destination keyring */
if (keyring && link_ret == 0)
__key_link(key, &edit);
/* disable the authorisation key */
if (authkey)
key_revoke(authkey);
}
mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);
if (keyring && link_ret == 0)
__key_link_end(keyring, &key->index_key, edit);
/* wake up anyone waiting for a key to be constructed */
if (awaken)
wake_up_bit(&key->flags, KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT);
return ret == 0 ? link_ret : ret;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: [email protected] # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key,
unsigned timeout,
unsigned error,
struct key *keyring,
struct key *authkey)
{
struct assoc_array_edit *edit;
struct timespec now;
int ret, awaken, link_ret = 0;
key_check(key);
key_check(keyring);
awaken = 0;
ret = -EBUSY;
if (keyring) {
if (keyring->restrict_link)
return -EPERM;
link_ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &key->index_key, &edit);
}
mutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex);
/* can't instantiate twice */
if (key->state == KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED) {
/* mark the key as being negatively instantiated */
atomic_inc(&key->user->nikeys);
mark_key_instantiated(key, -error);
now = current_kernel_time();
key->expiry = now.tv_sec + timeout;
key_schedule_gc(key->expiry + key_gc_delay);
if (test_and_clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags))
awaken = 1;
ret = 0;
/* and link it into the destination keyring */
if (keyring && link_ret == 0)
__key_link(key, &edit);
/* disable the authorisation key */
if (authkey)
key_revoke(authkey);
}
mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);
if (keyring && link_ret == 0)
__key_link_end(keyring, &key->index_key, edit);
/* wake up anyone waiting for a key to be constructed */
if (awaken)
wake_up_bit(&key->flags, KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT);
return ret == 0 ? link_ret : ret;
}
| 167,698 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: sysapi_translate_arch( const char *machine, const char *)
{
char tmp[64];
char *tmparch;
#if defined(AIX)
/* AIX machines have a ton of different models encoded into the uname
structure, so go to some other function to decode and group the
architecture together */
struct utsname buf;
if( uname(&buf) < 0 ) {
return NULL;
}
return( get_aix_arch( &buf ) );
#elif defined(HPUX)
return( get_hpux_arch( ) );
#else
if( !strcmp(machine, "alpha") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "ALPHA" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "i86pc") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "INTEL" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "i686") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "INTEL" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "i586") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "INTEL" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "i486") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "INTEL" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "i386") ) { //LDAP entry
#if defined(Darwin)
/* Mac OS X often claims to be i386 in uname, even if the
* hardware is x86_64 and the OS can run 64-bit binaries.
* We'll base our architecture name on the default build
* target for gcc. In 10.5 and earlier, that's i386.
* On 10.6, it's x86_64.
* The value we're querying is the kernel version.
* 10.6 kernels have a version that starts with "10."
* Older versions have a lower first number.
*/
int ret;
char val[32];
size_t len = sizeof(val);
/* assume x86 */
sprintf( tmp, "INTEL" );
ret = sysctlbyname("kern.osrelease", &val, &len, NULL, 0);
if (ret == 0 && strncmp(val, "10.", 3) == 0) {
/* but we could be proven wrong */
sprintf( tmp, "X86_64" );
}
#else
sprintf( tmp, "INTEL" );
#endif
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "ia64") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "IA64" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "x86_64") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "X86_64" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "amd64") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "X86_64" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "sun4u") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "SUN4u" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "sun4m") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "SUN4x" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "sun4c") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "SUN4x" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "sparc") ) { //LDAP entry
sprintf( tmp, "SUN4x" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "Power Macintosh") ) { //LDAP entry
sprintf( tmp, "PPC" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "ppc") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "PPC" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "ppc32") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "PPC" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "ppc64") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "PPC64" );
}
else {
sprintf( tmp, machine );
}
tmparch = strdup( tmp );
if( !tmparch ) {
EXCEPT( "Out of memory!" );
}
return( tmparch );
#endif /* if HPUX else */
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | sysapi_translate_arch( const char *machine, const char *)
{
char tmp[64];
char *tmparch;
#if defined(AIX)
/* AIX machines have a ton of different models encoded into the uname
structure, so go to some other function to decode and group the
architecture together */
struct utsname buf;
if( uname(&buf) < 0 ) {
return NULL;
}
return( get_aix_arch( &buf ) );
#elif defined(HPUX)
return( get_hpux_arch( ) );
#else
if( !strcmp(machine, "alpha") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "ALPHA" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "i86pc") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "INTEL" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "i686") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "INTEL" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "i586") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "INTEL" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "i486") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "INTEL" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "i386") ) { //LDAP entry
#if defined(Darwin)
/* Mac OS X often claims to be i386 in uname, even if the
* hardware is x86_64 and the OS can run 64-bit binaries.
* We'll base our architecture name on the default build
* target for gcc. In 10.5 and earlier, that's i386.
* On 10.6, it's x86_64.
* The value we're querying is the kernel version.
* 10.6 kernels have a version that starts with "10."
* Older versions have a lower first number.
*/
int ret;
char val[32];
size_t len = sizeof(val);
/* assume x86 */
sprintf( tmp, "INTEL" );
ret = sysctlbyname("kern.osrelease", &val, &len, NULL, 0);
if (ret == 0 && strncmp(val, "10.", 3) == 0) {
/* but we could be proven wrong */
sprintf( tmp, "X86_64" );
}
#else
sprintf( tmp, "INTEL" );
#endif
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "ia64") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "IA64" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "x86_64") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "X86_64" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "amd64") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "X86_64" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "sun4u") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "SUN4u" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "sun4m") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "SUN4x" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "sun4c") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "SUN4x" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "sparc") ) { //LDAP entry
sprintf( tmp, "SUN4x" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "Power Macintosh") ) { //LDAP entry
sprintf( tmp, "PPC" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "ppc") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "PPC" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "ppc32") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "PPC" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "ppc64") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "PPC64" );
}
else {
sprintf( tmp, "%s", machine );
}
tmparch = strdup( tmp );
if( !tmparch ) {
EXCEPT( "Out of memory!" );
}
return( tmparch );
#endif /* if HPUX else */
}
| 165,380 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int a2dp_command(struct a2dp_stream_common *common, char cmd)
{
char ack;
DEBUG("A2DP COMMAND %s", dump_a2dp_ctrl_event(cmd));
/* send command */
if (send(common->ctrl_fd, &cmd, 1, MSG_NOSIGNAL) == -1)
{
ERROR("cmd failed (%s)", strerror(errno));
skt_disconnect(common->ctrl_fd);
common->ctrl_fd = AUDIO_SKT_DISCONNECTED;
return -1;
}
/* wait for ack byte */
if (a2dp_ctrl_receive(common, &ack, 1) < 0)
return -1;
DEBUG("A2DP COMMAND %s DONE STATUS %d", dump_a2dp_ctrl_event(cmd), ack);
if (ack == A2DP_CTRL_ACK_INCALL_FAILURE)
return ack;
if (ack != A2DP_CTRL_ACK_SUCCESS)
return -1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | static int a2dp_command(struct a2dp_stream_common *common, char cmd)
{
char ack;
DEBUG("A2DP COMMAND %s", dump_a2dp_ctrl_event(cmd));
/* send command */
if (TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(send(common->ctrl_fd, &cmd, 1, MSG_NOSIGNAL)) == -1)
{
ERROR("cmd failed (%s)", strerror(errno));
skt_disconnect(common->ctrl_fd);
common->ctrl_fd = AUDIO_SKT_DISCONNECTED;
return -1;
}
/* wait for ack byte */
if (a2dp_ctrl_receive(common, &ack, 1) < 0)
return -1;
DEBUG("A2DP COMMAND %s DONE STATUS %d", dump_a2dp_ctrl_event(cmd), ack);
if (ack == A2DP_CTRL_ACK_INCALL_FAILURE)
return ack;
if (ack != A2DP_CTRL_ACK_SUCCESS)
return -1;
return 0;
}
| 173,422 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: WORD32 ixheaacd_qmf_hbe_data_reinit(ia_esbr_hbe_txposer_struct *ptr_hbe_txposer,
WORD16 *p_freq_band_tab[2],
WORD16 *p_num_sfb, WORD32 upsamp_4_flag) {
WORD32 synth_size, sfb, patch, stop_patch;
if (ptr_hbe_txposer != NULL) {
ptr_hbe_txposer->start_band = p_freq_band_tab[LOW][0];
ptr_hbe_txposer->end_band = p_freq_band_tab[LOW][p_num_sfb[LOW]];
ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size =
4 * ((ptr_hbe_txposer->start_band + 4) / 8 + 1);
ptr_hbe_txposer->k_start =
ixheaacd_start_subband2kL_tbl[ptr_hbe_txposer->start_band];
ptr_hbe_txposer->upsamp_4_flag = upsamp_4_flag;
if (upsamp_4_flag) {
if (ptr_hbe_txposer->k_start + ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size > 16)
ptr_hbe_txposer->k_start = 16 - ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size;
} else if (ptr_hbe_txposer->core_frame_length == 768) {
if (ptr_hbe_txposer->k_start + ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size > 24)
ptr_hbe_txposer->k_start = 24 - ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size;
}
memset(ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_buf, 0, 1280 * sizeof(FLOAT32));
synth_size = ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size;
ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_buf_offset = 18 * synth_size;
switch (synth_size) {
case 4:
ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_cos_tab =
(FLOAT32 *)ixheaacd_synth_cos_table_kl_4;
ptr_hbe_txposer->analy_cos_sin_tab =
(FLOAT32 *)ixheaacd_analy_cos_sin_table_kl_8;
ixheaacd_real_synth_fft = &ixheaacd_real_synth_fft_p2;
ixheaacd_cmplx_anal_fft = &ixheaacd_cmplx_anal_fft_p2;
break;
case 8:
ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_cos_tab =
(FLOAT32 *)ixheaacd_synth_cos_table_kl_8;
ptr_hbe_txposer->analy_cos_sin_tab =
(FLOAT32 *)ixheaacd_analy_cos_sin_table_kl_16;
ixheaacd_real_synth_fft = &ixheaacd_real_synth_fft_p2;
ixheaacd_cmplx_anal_fft = &ixheaacd_cmplx_anal_fft_p2;
break;
case 12:
ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_cos_tab =
(FLOAT32 *)ixheaacd_synth_cos_table_kl_12;
ptr_hbe_txposer->analy_cos_sin_tab =
(FLOAT32 *)ixheaacd_analy_cos_sin_table_kl_24;
ixheaacd_real_synth_fft = &ixheaacd_real_synth_fft_p3;
ixheaacd_cmplx_anal_fft = &ixheaacd_cmplx_anal_fft_p3;
break;
case 16:
ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_cos_tab =
(FLOAT32 *)ixheaacd_synth_cos_table_kl_16;
ptr_hbe_txposer->analy_cos_sin_tab =
(FLOAT32 *)ixheaacd_analy_cos_sin_table_kl_32;
ixheaacd_real_synth_fft = &ixheaacd_real_synth_fft_p2;
ixheaacd_cmplx_anal_fft = &ixheaacd_cmplx_anal_fft_p2;
break;
case 20:
ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_cos_tab =
(FLOAT32 *)ixheaacd_synth_cos_table_kl_20;
ptr_hbe_txposer->analy_cos_sin_tab =
(FLOAT32 *)ixheaacd_analy_cos_sin_table_kl_40;
break;
default:
ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_cos_tab =
(FLOAT32 *)ixheaacd_synth_cos_table_kl_4;
ptr_hbe_txposer->analy_cos_sin_tab =
(FLOAT32 *)ixheaacd_analy_cos_sin_table_kl_8;
ixheaacd_real_synth_fft = &ixheaacd_real_synth_fft_p2;
ixheaacd_cmplx_anal_fft = &ixheaacd_cmplx_anal_fft_p2;
}
ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_wind_coeff = ixheaacd_map_prot_filter(synth_size);
memset(ptr_hbe_txposer->analy_buf, 0, 640 * sizeof(FLOAT32));
synth_size = 2 * ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size;
ptr_hbe_txposer->analy_wind_coeff = ixheaacd_map_prot_filter(synth_size);
memset(ptr_hbe_txposer->x_over_qmf, 0, MAX_NUM_PATCHES * sizeof(WORD32));
sfb = 0;
if (upsamp_4_flag) {
stop_patch = MAX_NUM_PATCHES;
ptr_hbe_txposer->max_stretch = MAX_STRETCH;
} else {
stop_patch = MAX_STRETCH;
}
for (patch = 1; patch <= stop_patch; patch++) {
while (sfb <= p_num_sfb[LOW] &&
p_freq_band_tab[LOW][sfb] <= patch * ptr_hbe_txposer->start_band)
sfb++;
if (sfb <= p_num_sfb[LOW]) {
if ((patch * ptr_hbe_txposer->start_band -
p_freq_band_tab[LOW][sfb - 1]) <= 3) {
ptr_hbe_txposer->x_over_qmf[patch - 1] =
p_freq_band_tab[LOW][sfb - 1];
} else {
WORD32 sfb = 0;
while (sfb <= p_num_sfb[HIGH] &&
p_freq_band_tab[HIGH][sfb] <=
patch * ptr_hbe_txposer->start_band)
sfb++;
ptr_hbe_txposer->x_over_qmf[patch - 1] =
p_freq_band_tab[HIGH][sfb - 1];
}
} else {
ptr_hbe_txposer->x_over_qmf[patch - 1] = ptr_hbe_txposer->end_band;
ptr_hbe_txposer->max_stretch = min(patch, MAX_STRETCH);
break;
}
}
}
if (ptr_hbe_txposer->k_start < 0) {
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix for stack corruption in esbr
Bug: 110769924
Test: poc from bug before/after
Change-Id: I99c6e89902064849ea1310c271064bdeccf7f20e
(cherry picked from commit 7e90d745c22695236437297cd8167a9312427a4a)
(cherry picked from commit 5464927f0c1fc721fa03d1c5be77b0b43dfffc50)
CWE ID: CWE-787 | WORD32 ixheaacd_qmf_hbe_data_reinit(ia_esbr_hbe_txposer_struct *ptr_hbe_txposer,
WORD16 *p_freq_band_tab[2],
WORD16 *p_num_sfb, WORD32 upsamp_4_flag) {
WORD32 synth_size, sfb, patch, stop_patch;
if (ptr_hbe_txposer != NULL) {
ptr_hbe_txposer->start_band = p_freq_band_tab[LOW][0];
ptr_hbe_txposer->end_band = p_freq_band_tab[LOW][p_num_sfb[LOW]];
ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size =
4 * ((ptr_hbe_txposer->start_band + 4) / 8 + 1);
ptr_hbe_txposer->k_start =
ixheaacd_start_subband2kL_tbl[ptr_hbe_txposer->start_band];
ptr_hbe_txposer->upsamp_4_flag = upsamp_4_flag;
if (upsamp_4_flag) {
if (ptr_hbe_txposer->k_start + ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size > 16)
ptr_hbe_txposer->k_start = 16 - ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size;
} else if (ptr_hbe_txposer->core_frame_length == 768) {
if (ptr_hbe_txposer->k_start + ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size > 24)
ptr_hbe_txposer->k_start = 24 - ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size;
}
memset(ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_buf, 0, 1280 * sizeof(FLOAT32));
synth_size = ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size;
ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_buf_offset = 18 * synth_size;
switch (synth_size) {
case 4:
ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_cos_tab =
(FLOAT32 *)ixheaacd_synth_cos_table_kl_4;
ptr_hbe_txposer->analy_cos_sin_tab =
(FLOAT32 *)ixheaacd_analy_cos_sin_table_kl_8;
ptr_hbe_txposer->ixheaacd_real_synth_fft = &ixheaacd_real_synth_fft_p2;
ptr_hbe_txposer->ixheaacd_cmplx_anal_fft = &ixheaacd_cmplx_anal_fft_p2;
break;
case 8:
ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_cos_tab =
(FLOAT32 *)ixheaacd_synth_cos_table_kl_8;
ptr_hbe_txposer->analy_cos_sin_tab =
(FLOAT32 *)ixheaacd_analy_cos_sin_table_kl_16;
ptr_hbe_txposer->ixheaacd_real_synth_fft = &ixheaacd_real_synth_fft_p2;
ptr_hbe_txposer->ixheaacd_cmplx_anal_fft = &ixheaacd_cmplx_anal_fft_p2;
break;
case 12:
ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_cos_tab =
(FLOAT32 *)ixheaacd_synth_cos_table_kl_12;
ptr_hbe_txposer->analy_cos_sin_tab =
(FLOAT32 *)ixheaacd_analy_cos_sin_table_kl_24;
ptr_hbe_txposer->ixheaacd_real_synth_fft = &ixheaacd_real_synth_fft_p3;
ptr_hbe_txposer->ixheaacd_cmplx_anal_fft = &ixheaacd_cmplx_anal_fft_p3;
break;
case 16:
ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_cos_tab =
(FLOAT32 *)ixheaacd_synth_cos_table_kl_16;
ptr_hbe_txposer->analy_cos_sin_tab =
(FLOAT32 *)ixheaacd_analy_cos_sin_table_kl_32;
ptr_hbe_txposer->ixheaacd_real_synth_fft = &ixheaacd_real_synth_fft_p2;
ptr_hbe_txposer->ixheaacd_cmplx_anal_fft = &ixheaacd_cmplx_anal_fft_p2;
break;
case 20:
ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_cos_tab =
(FLOAT32 *)ixheaacd_synth_cos_table_kl_20;
ptr_hbe_txposer->analy_cos_sin_tab =
(FLOAT32 *)ixheaacd_analy_cos_sin_table_kl_40;
break;
default:
ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_cos_tab =
(FLOAT32 *)ixheaacd_synth_cos_table_kl_4;
ptr_hbe_txposer->analy_cos_sin_tab =
(FLOAT32 *)ixheaacd_analy_cos_sin_table_kl_8;
ptr_hbe_txposer->ixheaacd_real_synth_fft = &ixheaacd_real_synth_fft_p2;
ptr_hbe_txposer->ixheaacd_cmplx_anal_fft = &ixheaacd_cmplx_anal_fft_p2;
}
ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_wind_coeff = ixheaacd_map_prot_filter(synth_size);
memset(ptr_hbe_txposer->analy_buf, 0, 640 * sizeof(FLOAT32));
synth_size = 2 * ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size;
ptr_hbe_txposer->analy_wind_coeff = ixheaacd_map_prot_filter(synth_size);
memset(ptr_hbe_txposer->x_over_qmf, 0, MAX_NUM_PATCHES * sizeof(WORD32));
sfb = 0;
if (upsamp_4_flag) {
stop_patch = MAX_NUM_PATCHES;
ptr_hbe_txposer->max_stretch = MAX_STRETCH;
} else {
stop_patch = MAX_STRETCH;
}
for (patch = 1; patch <= stop_patch; patch++) {
while (sfb <= p_num_sfb[LOW] &&
p_freq_band_tab[LOW][sfb] <= patch * ptr_hbe_txposer->start_band)
sfb++;
if (sfb <= p_num_sfb[LOW]) {
if ((patch * ptr_hbe_txposer->start_band -
p_freq_band_tab[LOW][sfb - 1]) <= 3) {
ptr_hbe_txposer->x_over_qmf[patch - 1] =
p_freq_band_tab[LOW][sfb - 1];
} else {
WORD32 sfb = 0;
while (sfb <= p_num_sfb[HIGH] &&
p_freq_band_tab[HIGH][sfb] <=
patch * ptr_hbe_txposer->start_band)
sfb++;
ptr_hbe_txposer->x_over_qmf[patch - 1] =
p_freq_band_tab[HIGH][sfb - 1];
}
} else {
ptr_hbe_txposer->x_over_qmf[patch - 1] = ptr_hbe_txposer->end_band;
ptr_hbe_txposer->max_stretch = min(patch, MAX_STRETCH);
break;
}
}
if (ptr_hbe_txposer->k_start < 0) {
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
| 174,092 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void sum_update(const char *p, int32 len)
{
switch (cursum_type) {
case CSUM_MD5:
md5_update(&md, (uchar *)p, len);
break;
case CSUM_MD4:
case CSUM_MD4_OLD:
case CSUM_MD4_BUSTED:
if (len + sumresidue < CSUM_CHUNK) {
memcpy(md.buffer + sumresidue, p, len);
sumresidue += len;
}
if (sumresidue) {
int32 i = CSUM_CHUNK - sumresidue;
memcpy(md.buffer + sumresidue, p, i);
mdfour_update(&md, (uchar *)md.buffer, CSUM_CHUNK);
len -= i;
p += i;
}
while (len >= CSUM_CHUNK) {
mdfour_update(&md, (uchar *)p, CSUM_CHUNK);
len -= CSUM_CHUNK;
p += CSUM_CHUNK;
}
sumresidue = len;
if (sumresidue)
memcpy(md.buffer, p, sumresidue);
break;
case CSUM_NONE:
break;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-354 | void sum_update(const char *p, int32 len)
{
switch (cursum_type) {
case CSUM_MD5:
md5_update(&md, (uchar *)p, len);
break;
case CSUM_MD4:
case CSUM_MD4_OLD:
case CSUM_MD4_BUSTED:
case CSUM_MD4_ARCHAIC:
if (len + sumresidue < CSUM_CHUNK) {
memcpy(md.buffer + sumresidue, p, len);
sumresidue += len;
}
if (sumresidue) {
int32 i = CSUM_CHUNK - sumresidue;
memcpy(md.buffer + sumresidue, p, i);
mdfour_update(&md, (uchar *)md.buffer, CSUM_CHUNK);
len -= i;
p += i;
}
while (len >= CSUM_CHUNK) {
mdfour_update(&md, (uchar *)p, CSUM_CHUNK);
len -= CSUM_CHUNK;
p += CSUM_CHUNK;
}
sumresidue = len;
if (sumresidue)
memcpy(md.buffer, p, sumresidue);
break;
case CSUM_NONE:
break;
}
}
| 164,640 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xmlParseEndTag2(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar *prefix,
const xmlChar *URI, int line, int nsNr, int tlen) {
const xmlChar *name;
GROW;
if ((RAW != '<') || (NXT(1) != '/')) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_LTSLASH_REQUIRED, NULL);
return;
}
SKIP(2);
if ((tlen > 0) && (xmlStrncmp(ctxt->input->cur, ctxt->name, tlen) == 0)) {
if (ctxt->input->cur[tlen] == '>') {
ctxt->input->cur += tlen + 1;
goto done;
}
ctxt->input->cur += tlen;
name = (xmlChar*)1;
} else {
if (prefix == NULL)
name = xmlParseNameAndCompare(ctxt, ctxt->name);
else
name = xmlParseQNameAndCompare(ctxt, ctxt->name, prefix);
}
/*
* We should definitely be at the ending "S? '>'" part
*/
GROW;
SKIP_BLANKS;
if ((!IS_BYTE_CHAR(RAW)) || (RAW != '>')) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_GT_REQUIRED, NULL);
} else
NEXT1;
/*
* [ WFC: Element Type Match ]
* The Name in an element's end-tag must match the element type in the
* start-tag.
*
*/
if (name != (xmlChar*)1) {
if (name == NULL) name = BAD_CAST "unparseable";
if ((line == 0) && (ctxt->node != NULL))
line = ctxt->node->line;
xmlFatalErrMsgStrIntStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_TAG_NAME_MISMATCH,
"Opening and ending tag mismatch: %s line %d and %s\n",
ctxt->name, line, name);
}
/*
* SAX: End of Tag
*/
done:
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (ctxt->sax->endElementNs != NULL) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX))
ctxt->sax->endElementNs(ctxt->userData, ctxt->name, prefix, URI);
spacePop(ctxt);
if (nsNr != 0)
nsPop(ctxt, nsNr);
return;
}
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | xmlParseEndTag2(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar *prefix,
const xmlChar *URI, int line, int nsNr, int tlen) {
const xmlChar *name;
GROW;
if ((RAW != '<') || (NXT(1) != '/')) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_LTSLASH_REQUIRED, NULL);
return;
}
SKIP(2);
if ((tlen > 0) && (xmlStrncmp(ctxt->input->cur, ctxt->name, tlen) == 0)) {
if (ctxt->input->cur[tlen] == '>') {
ctxt->input->cur += tlen + 1;
goto done;
}
ctxt->input->cur += tlen;
name = (xmlChar*)1;
} else {
if (prefix == NULL)
name = xmlParseNameAndCompare(ctxt, ctxt->name);
else
name = xmlParseQNameAndCompare(ctxt, ctxt->name, prefix);
}
/*
* We should definitely be at the ending "S? '>'" part
*/
GROW;
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
return;
SKIP_BLANKS;
if ((!IS_BYTE_CHAR(RAW)) || (RAW != '>')) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_GT_REQUIRED, NULL);
} else
NEXT1;
/*
* [ WFC: Element Type Match ]
* The Name in an element's end-tag must match the element type in the
* start-tag.
*
*/
if (name != (xmlChar*)1) {
if (name == NULL) name = BAD_CAST "unparseable";
if ((line == 0) && (ctxt->node != NULL))
line = ctxt->node->line;
xmlFatalErrMsgStrIntStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_TAG_NAME_MISMATCH,
"Opening and ending tag mismatch: %s line %d and %s\n",
ctxt->name, line, name);
}
/*
* SAX: End of Tag
*/
done:
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (ctxt->sax->endElementNs != NULL) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX))
ctxt->sax->endElementNs(ctxt->userData, ctxt->name, prefix, URI);
spacePop(ctxt);
if (nsNr != 0)
nsPop(ctxt, nsNr);
return;
}
| 171,287 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SyncBackendHost::Initialize(
SyncFrontend* frontend,
const GURL& sync_service_url,
const syncable::ModelTypeSet& types,
net::URLRequestContextGetter* baseline_context_getter,
const SyncCredentials& credentials,
bool delete_sync_data_folder) {
if (!core_thread_.Start())
return;
frontend_ = frontend;
DCHECK(frontend);
registrar_.workers[GROUP_DB] = new DatabaseModelWorker();
registrar_.workers[GROUP_UI] = new UIModelWorker();
registrar_.workers[GROUP_PASSIVE] = new ModelSafeWorker();
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableSyncTypedUrls) || types.count(syncable::TYPED_URLS)) {
registrar_.workers[GROUP_HISTORY] =
new HistoryModelWorker(
profile_->GetHistoryService(Profile::IMPLICIT_ACCESS));
}
for (syncable::ModelTypeSet::const_iterator it = types.begin();
it != types.end(); ++it) {
registrar_.routing_info[(*it)] = GROUP_PASSIVE;
}
PasswordStore* password_store =
profile_->GetPasswordStore(Profile::IMPLICIT_ACCESS);
if (password_store) {
registrar_.workers[GROUP_PASSWORD] =
new PasswordModelWorker(password_store);
} else {
LOG_IF(WARNING, types.count(syncable::PASSWORDS) > 0) << "Password store "
<< "not initialized, cannot sync passwords";
registrar_.routing_info.erase(syncable::PASSWORDS);
}
registrar_.routing_info[syncable::NIGORI] = GROUP_PASSIVE;
core_->CreateSyncNotifier(baseline_context_getter);
InitCore(Core::DoInitializeOptions(
sync_service_url,
MakeHttpBridgeFactory(baseline_context_getter),
credentials,
delete_sync_data_folder,
RestoreEncryptionBootstrapToken(),
false));
}
Commit Message: Enable HistoryModelWorker by default, now that bug 69561 is fixed.
BUG=69561
TEST=Run sync manually and run integration tests, sync should not crash.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7016007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85211 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void SyncBackendHost::Initialize(
SyncFrontend* frontend,
const GURL& sync_service_url,
const syncable::ModelTypeSet& types,
net::URLRequestContextGetter* baseline_context_getter,
const SyncCredentials& credentials,
bool delete_sync_data_folder) {
if (!core_thread_.Start())
return;
frontend_ = frontend;
DCHECK(frontend);
registrar_.workers[GROUP_DB] = new DatabaseModelWorker();
registrar_.workers[GROUP_UI] = new UIModelWorker();
registrar_.workers[GROUP_PASSIVE] = new ModelSafeWorker();
registrar_.workers[GROUP_HISTORY] = new HistoryModelWorker(
profile_->GetHistoryService(Profile::IMPLICIT_ACCESS));
for (syncable::ModelTypeSet::const_iterator it = types.begin();
it != types.end(); ++it) {
registrar_.routing_info[(*it)] = GROUP_PASSIVE;
}
PasswordStore* password_store =
profile_->GetPasswordStore(Profile::IMPLICIT_ACCESS);
if (password_store) {
registrar_.workers[GROUP_PASSWORD] =
new PasswordModelWorker(password_store);
} else {
LOG_IF(WARNING, types.count(syncable::PASSWORDS) > 0) << "Password store "
<< "not initialized, cannot sync passwords";
registrar_.routing_info.erase(syncable::PASSWORDS);
}
registrar_.routing_info[syncable::NIGORI] = GROUP_PASSIVE;
core_->CreateSyncNotifier(baseline_context_getter);
InitCore(Core::DoInitializeOptions(
sync_service_url,
MakeHttpBridgeFactory(baseline_context_getter),
credentials,
delete_sync_data_folder,
RestoreEncryptionBootstrapToken(),
false));
}
| 170,614 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void cJSON_DeleteItemFromObject( cJSON *object, const char *string )
{
cJSON_Delete( cJSON_DetachItemFromObject( object, string ) );
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void cJSON_DeleteItemFromObject( cJSON *object, const char *string )
| 167,283 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: DataReductionProxySettings::~DataReductionProxySettings() {
spdy_proxy_auth_enabled_.Destroy();
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | DataReductionProxySettings::~DataReductionProxySettings() {
| 172,559 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int myrecvfrom6(int sockfd, void *buf, size_t *buflen, int flags,
struct in6_addr *addr, uint32_t *ifindex)
{
struct sockaddr_in6 sin6;
unsigned char cbuf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct in6_pktinfo))];
struct iovec iovec;
struct msghdr msghdr;
struct cmsghdr *cmsghdr;
ssize_t len;
iovec.iov_len = *buflen;
iovec.iov_base = buf;
memset(&msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr));
msghdr.msg_name = &sin6;
msghdr.msg_namelen = sizeof(sin6);
msghdr.msg_iov = &iovec;
msghdr.msg_iovlen = 1;
msghdr.msg_control = cbuf;
msghdr.msg_controllen = sizeof(cbuf);
len = recvmsg(sockfd, &msghdr, flags);
if (len == -1)
return -errno;
*buflen = len;
/* Set ifindex to scope_id now. But since scope_id gets not
* set by kernel for linklocal addresses, use pktinfo to obtain that
* value right after.
*/
*ifindex = sin6.sin6_scope_id;
for (cmsghdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msghdr); cmsghdr;
cmsghdr = CMSG_NXTHDR(&msghdr, cmsghdr)) {
if (cmsghdr->cmsg_level == IPPROTO_IPV6 &&
cmsghdr->cmsg_type == IPV6_PKTINFO &&
cmsghdr->cmsg_len == CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct in6_pktinfo))) {
struct in6_pktinfo *pktinfo;
pktinfo = (struct in6_pktinfo *) CMSG_DATA(cmsghdr);
*ifindex = pktinfo->ipi6_ifindex;
}
}
*addr = sin6.sin6_addr;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: libndp: validate the IPv6 hop limit
None of the NDP messages should ever come from a non-local network; as
stated in RFC4861's 6.1.1 (RS), 6.1.2 (RA), 7.1.1 (NS), 7.1.2 (NA),
and 8.1. (redirect):
- The IP Hop Limit field has a value of 255, i.e., the packet
could not possibly have been forwarded by a router.
This fixes CVE-2016-3698.
Reported by: Julien BERNARD <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Lubomir Rintel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-284 | static int myrecvfrom6(int sockfd, void *buf, size_t *buflen, int flags,
struct in6_addr *addr, uint32_t *ifindex, int *hoplimit)
{
struct sockaddr_in6 sin6;
unsigned char cbuf[2 * CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct in6_pktinfo))];
struct iovec iovec;
struct msghdr msghdr;
struct cmsghdr *cmsghdr;
ssize_t len;
iovec.iov_len = *buflen;
iovec.iov_base = buf;
memset(&msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr));
msghdr.msg_name = &sin6;
msghdr.msg_namelen = sizeof(sin6);
msghdr.msg_iov = &iovec;
msghdr.msg_iovlen = 1;
msghdr.msg_control = cbuf;
msghdr.msg_controllen = sizeof(cbuf);
len = recvmsg(sockfd, &msghdr, flags);
if (len == -1)
return -errno;
*buflen = len;
/* Set ifindex to scope_id now. But since scope_id gets not
* set by kernel for linklocal addresses, use pktinfo to obtain that
* value right after.
*/
*ifindex = sin6.sin6_scope_id;
for (cmsghdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msghdr); cmsghdr;
cmsghdr = CMSG_NXTHDR(&msghdr, cmsghdr)) {
if (cmsghdr->cmsg_level != IPPROTO_IPV6)
continue;
switch(cmsghdr->cmsg_type) {
case IPV6_PKTINFO:
if (cmsghdr->cmsg_len == CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct in6_pktinfo))) {
struct in6_pktinfo *pktinfo;
pktinfo = (struct in6_pktinfo *) CMSG_DATA(cmsghdr);
*ifindex = pktinfo->ipi6_ifindex;
}
break;
case IPV6_HOPLIMIT:
if (cmsghdr->cmsg_len == CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int))) {
int *val;
val = (int *) CMSG_DATA(cmsghdr);
*hoplimit = *val;
}
break;
}
}
*addr = sin6.sin6_addr;
return 0;
}
| 167,348 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int fpga_reset(void)
{
if (!check_boco2()) {
/* we do not have BOCO2, this is not really used */
return 0;
}
printf("PCIe reset through GPIO7: ");
/* apply PCIe reset via GPIO */
kw_gpio_set_valid(KM_PEX_RST_GPIO_PIN, 1);
kw_gpio_direction_output(KM_PEX_RST_GPIO_PIN, 1);
kw_gpio_set_value(KM_PEX_RST_GPIO_PIN, 0);
udelay(1000*10);
kw_gpio_set_value(KM_PEX_RST_GPIO_PIN, 1);
printf(" done\n");
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
CWE ID: CWE-787 | int fpga_reset(void)
{
/* no dedicated reset pin for FPGA */
return 0;
}
| 169,626 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: IndexedDBDispatcher::~IndexedDBDispatcher() {
g_idb_dispatcher_tls.Pointer()->Set(NULL);
}
Commit Message: Add DCHECK to ensure IndexedDBDispatcher doesn't get re-created.
This could happen if there are IDB objects that survive the call to
didStopWorkerRunLoop.
BUG=121734
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9999035
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@131679 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | IndexedDBDispatcher::~IndexedDBDispatcher() {
g_idb_dispatcher_tls.Pointer()->Set(HAS_BEEN_DELETED);
}
| 171,040 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int raw_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
size_t len)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct ipcm_cookie ipc;
struct rtable *rt = NULL;
int free = 0;
__be32 daddr;
__be32 saddr;
u8 tos;
int err;
err = -EMSGSIZE;
if (len > 0xFFFF)
goto out;
/*
* Check the flags.
*/
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_OOB) /* Mirror BSD error message */
goto out; /* compatibility */
/*
* Get and verify the address.
*/
if (msg->msg_namelen) {
struct sockaddr_in *usin = (struct sockaddr_in *)msg->msg_name;
err = -EINVAL;
if (msg->msg_namelen < sizeof(*usin))
goto out;
if (usin->sin_family != AF_INET) {
static int complained;
if (!complained++)
printk(KERN_INFO "%s forgot to set AF_INET in "
"raw sendmsg. Fix it!\n",
current->comm);
err = -EAFNOSUPPORT;
if (usin->sin_family)
goto out;
}
daddr = usin->sin_addr.s_addr;
/* ANK: I did not forget to get protocol from port field.
* I just do not know, who uses this weirdness.
* IP_HDRINCL is much more convenient.
*/
} else {
err = -EDESTADDRREQ;
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
goto out;
daddr = inet->inet_daddr;
}
ipc.addr = inet->inet_saddr;
ipc.opt = NULL;
ipc.tx_flags = 0;
ipc.oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
if (msg->msg_controllen) {
err = ip_cmsg_send(sock_net(sk), msg, &ipc);
if (err)
goto out;
if (ipc.opt)
free = 1;
}
saddr = ipc.addr;
ipc.addr = daddr;
if (!ipc.opt)
ipc.opt = inet->opt;
if (ipc.opt) {
err = -EINVAL;
/* Linux does not mangle headers on raw sockets,
* so that IP options + IP_HDRINCL is non-sense.
*/
if (inet->hdrincl)
goto done;
if (ipc.opt->srr) {
if (!daddr)
goto done;
daddr = ipc.opt->faddr;
}
}
tos = RT_CONN_FLAGS(sk);
if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTROUTE)
tos |= RTO_ONLINK;
if (ipv4_is_multicast(daddr)) {
if (!ipc.oif)
ipc.oif = inet->mc_index;
if (!saddr)
saddr = inet->mc_addr;
}
{
struct flowi4 fl4;
flowi4_init_output(&fl4, ipc.oif, sk->sk_mark, tos,
RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE,
inet->hdrincl ? IPPROTO_RAW : sk->sk_protocol,
FLOWI_FLAG_CAN_SLEEP, daddr, saddr, 0, 0);
if (!inet->hdrincl) {
err = raw_probe_proto_opt(&fl4, msg);
if (err)
goto done;
}
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi4_to_flowi(&fl4));
rt = ip_route_output_flow(sock_net(sk), &fl4, sk);
if (IS_ERR(rt)) {
err = PTR_ERR(rt);
rt = NULL;
goto done;
}
}
err = -EACCES;
if (rt->rt_flags & RTCF_BROADCAST && !sock_flag(sk, SOCK_BROADCAST))
goto done;
if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_CONFIRM)
goto do_confirm;
back_from_confirm:
if (inet->hdrincl)
err = raw_send_hdrinc(sk, msg->msg_iov, len,
&rt, msg->msg_flags);
else {
if (!ipc.addr)
ipc.addr = rt->rt_dst;
lock_sock(sk);
err = ip_append_data(sk, ip_generic_getfrag, msg->msg_iov, len, 0,
&ipc, &rt, msg->msg_flags);
if (err)
ip_flush_pending_frames(sk);
else if (!(msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE)) {
err = ip_push_pending_frames(sk);
if (err == -ENOBUFS && !inet->recverr)
err = 0;
}
release_sock(sk);
}
done:
if (free)
kfree(ipc.opt);
ip_rt_put(rt);
out:
if (err < 0)
return err;
return len;
do_confirm:
dst_confirm(&rt->dst);
if (!(msg->msg_flags & MSG_PROBE) || len)
goto back_from_confirm;
err = 0;
goto done;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | static int raw_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
size_t len)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct ipcm_cookie ipc;
struct rtable *rt = NULL;
int free = 0;
__be32 daddr;
__be32 saddr;
u8 tos;
int err;
struct ip_options_data opt_copy;
err = -EMSGSIZE;
if (len > 0xFFFF)
goto out;
/*
* Check the flags.
*/
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_OOB) /* Mirror BSD error message */
goto out; /* compatibility */
/*
* Get and verify the address.
*/
if (msg->msg_namelen) {
struct sockaddr_in *usin = (struct sockaddr_in *)msg->msg_name;
err = -EINVAL;
if (msg->msg_namelen < sizeof(*usin))
goto out;
if (usin->sin_family != AF_INET) {
static int complained;
if (!complained++)
printk(KERN_INFO "%s forgot to set AF_INET in "
"raw sendmsg. Fix it!\n",
current->comm);
err = -EAFNOSUPPORT;
if (usin->sin_family)
goto out;
}
daddr = usin->sin_addr.s_addr;
/* ANK: I did not forget to get protocol from port field.
* I just do not know, who uses this weirdness.
* IP_HDRINCL is much more convenient.
*/
} else {
err = -EDESTADDRREQ;
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
goto out;
daddr = inet->inet_daddr;
}
ipc.addr = inet->inet_saddr;
ipc.opt = NULL;
ipc.tx_flags = 0;
ipc.oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
if (msg->msg_controllen) {
err = ip_cmsg_send(sock_net(sk), msg, &ipc);
if (err)
goto out;
if (ipc.opt)
free = 1;
}
saddr = ipc.addr;
ipc.addr = daddr;
if (!ipc.opt) {
struct ip_options_rcu *inet_opt;
rcu_read_lock();
inet_opt = rcu_dereference(inet->inet_opt);
if (inet_opt) {
memcpy(&opt_copy, inet_opt,
sizeof(*inet_opt) + inet_opt->opt.optlen);
ipc.opt = &opt_copy.opt;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
if (ipc.opt) {
err = -EINVAL;
/* Linux does not mangle headers on raw sockets,
* so that IP options + IP_HDRINCL is non-sense.
*/
if (inet->hdrincl)
goto done;
if (ipc.opt->opt.srr) {
if (!daddr)
goto done;
daddr = ipc.opt->opt.faddr;
}
}
tos = RT_CONN_FLAGS(sk);
if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTROUTE)
tos |= RTO_ONLINK;
if (ipv4_is_multicast(daddr)) {
if (!ipc.oif)
ipc.oif = inet->mc_index;
if (!saddr)
saddr = inet->mc_addr;
}
{
struct flowi4 fl4;
flowi4_init_output(&fl4, ipc.oif, sk->sk_mark, tos,
RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE,
inet->hdrincl ? IPPROTO_RAW : sk->sk_protocol,
FLOWI_FLAG_CAN_SLEEP, daddr, saddr, 0, 0);
if (!inet->hdrincl) {
err = raw_probe_proto_opt(&fl4, msg);
if (err)
goto done;
}
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi4_to_flowi(&fl4));
rt = ip_route_output_flow(sock_net(sk), &fl4, sk);
if (IS_ERR(rt)) {
err = PTR_ERR(rt);
rt = NULL;
goto done;
}
}
err = -EACCES;
if (rt->rt_flags & RTCF_BROADCAST && !sock_flag(sk, SOCK_BROADCAST))
goto done;
if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_CONFIRM)
goto do_confirm;
back_from_confirm:
if (inet->hdrincl)
err = raw_send_hdrinc(sk, msg->msg_iov, len,
&rt, msg->msg_flags);
else {
if (!ipc.addr)
ipc.addr = rt->rt_dst;
lock_sock(sk);
err = ip_append_data(sk, ip_generic_getfrag, msg->msg_iov, len, 0,
&ipc, &rt, msg->msg_flags);
if (err)
ip_flush_pending_frames(sk);
else if (!(msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE)) {
err = ip_push_pending_frames(sk);
if (err == -ENOBUFS && !inet->recverr)
err = 0;
}
release_sock(sk);
}
done:
if (free)
kfree(ipc.opt);
ip_rt_put(rt);
out:
if (err < 0)
return err;
return len;
do_confirm:
dst_confirm(&rt->dst);
if (!(msg->msg_flags & MSG_PROBE) || len)
goto back_from_confirm;
err = 0;
goto done;
}
| 165,568 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void impeg2d_dec_hdr(void *pv_dec,impeg2d_video_decode_ip_t *ps_ip,
impeg2d_video_decode_op_t *ps_op)
{
UWORD32 u4_bits_read;
dec_state_t *ps_dec;
UWORD32 u4_size = ps_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.u4_num_Bytes;
ps_dec = (dec_state_t *)pv_dec;
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code = 0;
if (u4_size > MAX_BITSTREAM_BUFFER_SIZE)
{
u4_size = MAX_BITSTREAM_BUFFER_SIZE;
}
memcpy(ps_dec->pu1_input_buffer, ps_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.pv_stream_buffer, u4_size);
impeg2d_bit_stream_init(&(ps_dec->s_bit_stream), ps_dec->pu1_input_buffer,
u4_size);
{
{
IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T e_error;
e_error = impeg2d_process_video_header(ps_dec);
if ((IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE != e_error)
{
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code = e_error;
u4_bits_read = impeg2d_bit_stream_num_bits_read(&ps_dec->s_bit_stream);
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed = u4_bits_read>> 3;
if(ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed > ps_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.u4_num_Bytes)
{
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed = ps_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.u4_num_Bytes;
}
if(ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code == 0)
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code = e_error;
if (IMPEG2D_UNSUPPORTED_DIMENSIONS == e_error)
{
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed = 0;
ps_dec->u2_header_done = 0;
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_pic_ht = ps_dec->u2_reinit_max_height;
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_pic_wd = ps_dec->u2_reinit_max_width;
}
impeg2d_next_code(ps_dec, SEQUENCE_HEADER_CODE);
return;
}
}
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_pic_ht = ps_dec->u2_vertical_size;
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_pic_wd = ps_dec->u2_horizontal_size;
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.e_pic_type = IV_NA_FRAME;
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code = IV_SUCCESS;
u4_bits_read = impeg2d_bit_stream_num_bits_read(&ps_dec->s_bit_stream);
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed = u4_bits_read>> 3;
if(ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed > ps_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.u4_num_Bytes)
{
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed = ps_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.u4_num_Bytes;
}
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
/* MOD */
ps_dec->u2_header_done = 1;
}
}
Commit Message: Adding check for min_width and min_height
Add check for min_wd and min_ht. Stride is updated if header
decode is done.
Bug: 74078669
Change-Id: Ided95395e1138335dbb4b05131a8551f6f7bbfcd
(cherry picked from commit 84eba4863dd50083951db83ea3cc81e015bf51da)
CWE ID: CWE-787 | void impeg2d_dec_hdr(void *pv_dec,impeg2d_video_decode_ip_t *ps_ip,
impeg2d_video_decode_op_t *ps_op)
{
UWORD32 u4_bits_read;
dec_state_t *ps_dec;
UWORD32 u4_size = ps_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.u4_num_Bytes;
ps_dec = (dec_state_t *)pv_dec;
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code = 0;
if (u4_size > MAX_BITSTREAM_BUFFER_SIZE)
{
u4_size = MAX_BITSTREAM_BUFFER_SIZE;
}
memcpy(ps_dec->pu1_input_buffer, ps_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.pv_stream_buffer, u4_size);
impeg2d_bit_stream_init(&(ps_dec->s_bit_stream), ps_dec->pu1_input_buffer,
u4_size);
{
{
IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T e_error;
e_error = impeg2d_process_video_header(ps_dec);
if ((IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE != e_error)
{
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code = e_error;
u4_bits_read = impeg2d_bit_stream_num_bits_read(&ps_dec->s_bit_stream);
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed = u4_bits_read>> 3;
if(ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed > ps_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.u4_num_Bytes)
{
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed = ps_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.u4_num_Bytes;
}
if(ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code == 0)
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code = e_error;
if (IMPEG2D_UNSUPPORTED_DIMENSIONS == e_error)
{
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed = 0;
ps_dec->u2_header_done = 0;
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_pic_ht = ps_dec->u2_reinit_max_height;
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_pic_wd = ps_dec->u2_reinit_max_width;
}
impeg2d_next_code(ps_dec, SEQUENCE_HEADER_CODE);
return;
}
}
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_pic_ht = ps_dec->u2_vertical_size;
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_pic_wd = ps_dec->u2_horizontal_size;
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.e_pic_type = IV_NA_FRAME;
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code = IV_SUCCESS;
u4_bits_read = impeg2d_bit_stream_num_bits_read(&ps_dec->s_bit_stream);
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed = u4_bits_read>> 3;
if(ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed > ps_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.u4_num_Bytes)
{
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed = ps_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.u4_num_Bytes;
}
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
/* Set the stride */
if (0 == ps_dec->u4_frm_buf_stride)
{
ps_dec->u4_frm_buf_stride = ps_dec->u2_horizontal_size;
}
/* MOD */
ps_dec->u2_header_done = 1;
}
}
| 174,086 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SMBC_server_internal(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
SMBCCTX *context,
bool connect_if_not_found,
const char *server,
uint16_t port,
const char *share,
char **pp_workgroup,
char **pp_username,
char **pp_password,
bool *in_cache)
{
SMBCSRV *srv=NULL;
char *workgroup = NULL;
struct cli_state *c = NULL;
const char *server_n = server;
int is_ipc = (share != NULL && strcmp(share, "IPC$") == 0);
uint32_t fs_attrs = 0;
const char *username_used;
NTSTATUS status;
char *newserver, *newshare;
int flags = 0;
struct smbXcli_tcon *tcon = NULL;
ZERO_STRUCT(c);
*in_cache = false;
if (server[0] == 0) {
errno = EPERM;
return NULL;
}
/* Look for a cached connection */
srv = SMBC_find_server(ctx, context, server, share,
pp_workgroup, pp_username, pp_password);
/*
* If we found a connection and we're only allowed one share per
* server...
*/
if (srv &&
share != NULL && *share != '\0' &&
smbc_getOptionOneSharePerServer(context)) {
/*
* ... then if there's no current connection to the share,
* connect to it. SMBC_find_server(), or rather the function
* pointed to by context->get_cached_srv_fn which
* was called by SMBC_find_server(), will have issued a tree
* disconnect if the requested share is not the same as the
* one that was already connected.
*/
/*
* Use srv->cli->desthost and srv->cli->share instead of
* server and share below to connect to the actual share,
* i.e., a normal share or a referred share from
* 'msdfs proxy' share.
*/
if (!cli_state_has_tcon(srv->cli)) {
/* Ensure we have accurate auth info */
SMBC_call_auth_fn(ctx, context,
smbXcli_conn_remote_name(srv->cli->conn),
srv->cli->share,
pp_workgroup,
pp_username,
pp_password);
if (!*pp_workgroup || !*pp_username || !*pp_password) {
errno = ENOMEM;
cli_shutdown(srv->cli);
srv->cli = NULL;
smbc_getFunctionRemoveCachedServer(context)(context,
srv);
return NULL;
}
/*
* We don't need to renegotiate encryption
* here as the encryption context is not per
* tid.
*/
status = cli_tree_connect(srv->cli,
srv->cli->share,
"?????",
*pp_password,
strlen(*pp_password)+1);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
errno = map_errno_from_nt_status(status);
cli_shutdown(srv->cli);
srv->cli = NULL;
smbc_getFunctionRemoveCachedServer(context)(context,
srv);
srv = NULL;
}
/* Determine if this share supports case sensitivity */
if (is_ipc) {
DEBUG(4,
("IPC$ so ignore case sensitivity\n"));
status = NT_STATUS_OK;
} else {
status = cli_get_fs_attr_info(c, &fs_attrs);
}
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
DEBUG(4, ("Could not retrieve "
"case sensitivity flag: %s.\n",
nt_errstr(status)));
/*
* We can't determine the case sensitivity of
* the share. We have no choice but to use the
* user-specified case sensitivity setting.
*/
if (smbc_getOptionCaseSensitive(context)) {
cli_set_case_sensitive(c, True);
} else {
cli_set_case_sensitive(c, False);
}
} else if (!is_ipc) {
DEBUG(4,
("Case sensitive: %s\n",
(fs_attrs & FILE_CASE_SENSITIVE_SEARCH
? "True"
: "False")));
cli_set_case_sensitive(
c,
(fs_attrs & FILE_CASE_SENSITIVE_SEARCH
? True
: False));
}
/*
* Regenerate the dev value since it's based on both
* server and share
*/
if (srv) {
const char *remote_name =
smbXcli_conn_remote_name(srv->cli->conn);
srv->dev = (dev_t)(str_checksum(remote_name) ^
str_checksum(srv->cli->share));
}
}
}
/* If we have a connection... */
if (srv) {
/* ... then we're done here. Give 'em what they came for. */
*in_cache = true;
goto done;
}
/* If we're not asked to connect when a connection doesn't exist... */
if (! connect_if_not_found) {
/* ... then we're done here. */
return NULL;
}
if (!*pp_workgroup || !*pp_username || !*pp_password) {
errno = ENOMEM;
return NULL;
}
DEBUG(4,("SMBC_server: server_n=[%s] server=[%s]\n", server_n, server));
DEBUG(4,(" -> server_n=[%s] server=[%s]\n", server_n, server));
status = NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
if (smbc_getOptionUseKerberos(context)) {
flags |= CLI_FULL_CONNECTION_USE_KERBEROS;
}
if (smbc_getOptionFallbackAfterKerberos(context)) {
flags |= CLI_FULL_CONNECTION_FALLBACK_AFTER_KERBEROS;
}
if (smbc_getOptionUseCCache(context)) {
flags |= CLI_FULL_CONNECTION_USE_CCACHE;
}
if (smbc_getOptionUseNTHash(context)) {
flags |= CLI_FULL_CONNECTION_USE_NT_HASH;
flags |= CLI_FULL_CONNECTION_USE_NT_HASH;
}
if (port == 0) {
if (share == NULL || *share == '\0' || is_ipc) {
/*
}
*/
status = cli_connect_nb(server_n, NULL, NBT_SMB_PORT, 0x20,
smbc_getNetbiosName(context),
SMB_SIGNING_DEFAULT, flags, &c);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | SMBC_server_internal(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
SMBCCTX *context,
bool connect_if_not_found,
const char *server,
uint16_t port,
const char *share,
char **pp_workgroup,
char **pp_username,
char **pp_password,
bool *in_cache)
{
SMBCSRV *srv=NULL;
char *workgroup = NULL;
struct cli_state *c = NULL;
const char *server_n = server;
int is_ipc = (share != NULL && strcmp(share, "IPC$") == 0);
uint32_t fs_attrs = 0;
const char *username_used;
NTSTATUS status;
char *newserver, *newshare;
int flags = 0;
struct smbXcli_tcon *tcon = NULL;
int signing_state = SMB_SIGNING_DEFAULT;
ZERO_STRUCT(c);
*in_cache = false;
if (server[0] == 0) {
errno = EPERM;
return NULL;
}
/* Look for a cached connection */
srv = SMBC_find_server(ctx, context, server, share,
pp_workgroup, pp_username, pp_password);
/*
* If we found a connection and we're only allowed one share per
* server...
*/
if (srv &&
share != NULL && *share != '\0' &&
smbc_getOptionOneSharePerServer(context)) {
/*
* ... then if there's no current connection to the share,
* connect to it. SMBC_find_server(), or rather the function
* pointed to by context->get_cached_srv_fn which
* was called by SMBC_find_server(), will have issued a tree
* disconnect if the requested share is not the same as the
* one that was already connected.
*/
/*
* Use srv->cli->desthost and srv->cli->share instead of
* server and share below to connect to the actual share,
* i.e., a normal share or a referred share from
* 'msdfs proxy' share.
*/
if (!cli_state_has_tcon(srv->cli)) {
/* Ensure we have accurate auth info */
SMBC_call_auth_fn(ctx, context,
smbXcli_conn_remote_name(srv->cli->conn),
srv->cli->share,
pp_workgroup,
pp_username,
pp_password);
if (!*pp_workgroup || !*pp_username || !*pp_password) {
errno = ENOMEM;
cli_shutdown(srv->cli);
srv->cli = NULL;
smbc_getFunctionRemoveCachedServer(context)(context,
srv);
return NULL;
}
/*
* We don't need to renegotiate encryption
* here as the encryption context is not per
* tid.
*/
status = cli_tree_connect(srv->cli,
srv->cli->share,
"?????",
*pp_password,
strlen(*pp_password)+1);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
errno = map_errno_from_nt_status(status);
cli_shutdown(srv->cli);
srv->cli = NULL;
smbc_getFunctionRemoveCachedServer(context)(context,
srv);
srv = NULL;
}
/* Determine if this share supports case sensitivity */
if (is_ipc) {
DEBUG(4,
("IPC$ so ignore case sensitivity\n"));
status = NT_STATUS_OK;
} else {
status = cli_get_fs_attr_info(c, &fs_attrs);
}
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
DEBUG(4, ("Could not retrieve "
"case sensitivity flag: %s.\n",
nt_errstr(status)));
/*
* We can't determine the case sensitivity of
* the share. We have no choice but to use the
* user-specified case sensitivity setting.
*/
if (smbc_getOptionCaseSensitive(context)) {
cli_set_case_sensitive(c, True);
} else {
cli_set_case_sensitive(c, False);
}
} else if (!is_ipc) {
DEBUG(4,
("Case sensitive: %s\n",
(fs_attrs & FILE_CASE_SENSITIVE_SEARCH
? "True"
: "False")));
cli_set_case_sensitive(
c,
(fs_attrs & FILE_CASE_SENSITIVE_SEARCH
? True
: False));
}
/*
* Regenerate the dev value since it's based on both
* server and share
*/
if (srv) {
const char *remote_name =
smbXcli_conn_remote_name(srv->cli->conn);
srv->dev = (dev_t)(str_checksum(remote_name) ^
str_checksum(srv->cli->share));
}
}
}
/* If we have a connection... */
if (srv) {
/* ... then we're done here. Give 'em what they came for. */
*in_cache = true;
goto done;
}
/* If we're not asked to connect when a connection doesn't exist... */
if (! connect_if_not_found) {
/* ... then we're done here. */
return NULL;
}
if (!*pp_workgroup || !*pp_username || !*pp_password) {
errno = ENOMEM;
return NULL;
}
DEBUG(4,("SMBC_server: server_n=[%s] server=[%s]\n", server_n, server));
DEBUG(4,(" -> server_n=[%s] server=[%s]\n", server_n, server));
status = NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
if (smbc_getOptionUseKerberos(context)) {
flags |= CLI_FULL_CONNECTION_USE_KERBEROS;
}
if (smbc_getOptionFallbackAfterKerberos(context)) {
flags |= CLI_FULL_CONNECTION_FALLBACK_AFTER_KERBEROS;
}
if (smbc_getOptionUseCCache(context)) {
flags |= CLI_FULL_CONNECTION_USE_CCACHE;
}
if (smbc_getOptionUseNTHash(context)) {
flags |= CLI_FULL_CONNECTION_USE_NT_HASH;
flags |= CLI_FULL_CONNECTION_USE_NT_HASH;
}
if (context->internal->smb_encryption_level != SMBC_ENCRYPTLEVEL_NONE) {
signing_state = SMB_SIGNING_REQUIRED;
}
if (port == 0) {
if (share == NULL || *share == '\0' || is_ipc) {
/*
}
*/
status = cli_connect_nb(server_n, NULL, NBT_SMB_PORT, 0x20,
smbc_getNetbiosName(context),
signing_state, flags, &c);
}
}
| 164,677 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void IBusBusGlobalEngineChangedCallback(
IBusBus* bus, const gchar* engine_name, gpointer user_data) {
DCHECK(engine_name);
DLOG(INFO) << "Global engine is changed to " << engine_name;
g_return_if_fail(user_data);
InputMethodStatusConnection* self
= static_cast<InputMethodStatusConnection*>(user_data);
self->UpdateUI(engine_name);
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | static void IBusBusGlobalEngineChangedCallback(
void IBusBusGlobalEngineChanged(IBusBus* bus, const gchar* engine_name) {
DCHECK(engine_name);
VLOG(1) << "Global engine is changed to " << engine_name;
UpdateUI(engine_name);
}
| 170,538 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: l2tp_call_errors_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat)
{
const uint16_t *ptr = (const uint16_t *)dat;
uint16_t val_h, val_l;
ptr++; /* skip "Reserved" */
val_h = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
val_l = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "CRCErr=%u ", (val_h<<16) + val_l));
val_h = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
val_l = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "FrameErr=%u ", (val_h<<16) + val_l));
val_h = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
val_l = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "HardOver=%u ", (val_h<<16) + val_l));
val_h = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
val_l = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "BufOver=%u ", (val_h<<16) + val_l));
val_h = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
val_l = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Timeout=%u ", (val_h<<16) + val_l));
val_h = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
val_l = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "AlignErr=%u ", (val_h<<16) + val_l));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13006/L2TP: Check whether an AVP's content exceeds the AVP length.
It's not good enough to check whether all the data specified by the AVP
length was captured - you also have to check whether that length is
large enough for all the required data in the AVP.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Yannick Formaggio.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | l2tp_call_errors_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat)
l2tp_call_errors_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat, u_int length)
{
const uint16_t *ptr = (const uint16_t *)dat;
uint16_t val_h, val_l;
if (length < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "AVP too short"));
return;
}
ptr++; /* skip "Reserved" */
length -= 2;
if (length < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "AVP too short"));
return;
}
val_h = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++; length -= 2;
val_l = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++; length -= 2;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "CRCErr=%u ", (val_h<<16) + val_l));
if (length < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "AVP too short"));
return;
}
val_h = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++; length -= 2;
val_l = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++; length -= 2;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "FrameErr=%u ", (val_h<<16) + val_l));
if (length < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "AVP too short"));
return;
}
val_h = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++; length -= 2;
val_l = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++; length -= 2;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "HardOver=%u ", (val_h<<16) + val_l));
if (length < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "AVP too short"));
return;
}
val_h = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++; length -= 2;
val_l = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++; length -= 2;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "BufOver=%u ", (val_h<<16) + val_l));
if (length < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "AVP too short"));
return;
}
val_h = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++; length -= 2;
val_l = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++; length -= 2;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Timeout=%u ", (val_h<<16) + val_l));
if (length < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "AVP too short"));
return;
}
val_h = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
val_l = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "AlignErr=%u ", (val_h<<16) + val_l));
}
| 167,893 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void* sspi_SecureHandleGetUpperPointer(SecHandle* handle)
{
void* pointer;
if (!handle)
return NULL;
pointer = (void*) ~((size_t) handle->dwUpper);
return pointer;
}
Commit Message: nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | void* sspi_SecureHandleGetUpperPointer(SecHandle* handle)
{
void* pointer;
if (!handle || !SecIsValidHandle(handle))
return NULL;
pointer = (void*) ~((size_t) handle->dwUpper);
return pointer;
}
| 167,605 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int virtio_net_load(QEMUFile *f, void *opaque, int version_id)
{
VirtIONet *n = opaque;
VirtIODevice *vdev = VIRTIO_DEVICE(n);
int ret, i, link_down;
if (version_id < 2 || version_id > VIRTIO_NET_VM_VERSION)
return -EINVAL;
ret = virtio_load(vdev, f);
if (ret) {
return ret;
}
qemu_get_buffer(f, n->mac, ETH_ALEN);
n->vqs[0].tx_waiting = qemu_get_be32(f);
virtio_net_set_mrg_rx_bufs(n, qemu_get_be32(f));
if (version_id >= 3)
n->status = qemu_get_be16(f);
if (version_id >= 4) {
if (version_id < 8) {
n->promisc = qemu_get_be32(f);
n->allmulti = qemu_get_be32(f);
} else {
n->promisc = qemu_get_byte(f);
n->allmulti = qemu_get_byte(f);
}
}
if (version_id >= 5) {
n->mac_table.in_use = qemu_get_be32(f);
/* MAC_TABLE_ENTRIES may be different from the saved image */
if (n->mac_table.in_use <= MAC_TABLE_ENTRIES) {
qemu_get_buffer(f, n->mac_table.macs,
n->mac_table.in_use * ETH_ALEN);
} else if (n->mac_table.in_use) {
uint8_t *buf = g_malloc0(n->mac_table.in_use);
qemu_get_buffer(f, buf, n->mac_table.in_use * ETH_ALEN);
g_free(buf);
n->mac_table.multi_overflow = n->mac_table.uni_overflow = 1;
n->mac_table.in_use = 0;
}
}
if (version_id >= 6)
qemu_get_buffer(f, (uint8_t *)n->vlans, MAX_VLAN >> 3);
if (version_id >= 7) {
if (qemu_get_be32(f) && !peer_has_vnet_hdr(n)) {
error_report("virtio-net: saved image requires vnet_hdr=on");
return -1;
}
}
if (version_id >= 9) {
n->mac_table.multi_overflow = qemu_get_byte(f);
n->mac_table.uni_overflow = qemu_get_byte(f);
}
if (version_id >= 10) {
n->alluni = qemu_get_byte(f);
n->nomulti = qemu_get_byte(f);
n->nouni = qemu_get_byte(f);
n->nobcast = qemu_get_byte(f);
}
if (version_id >= 11) {
if (qemu_get_byte(f) && !peer_has_ufo(n)) {
error_report("virtio-net: saved image requires TUN_F_UFO support");
return -1;
}
}
if (n->max_queues > 1) {
if (n->max_queues != qemu_get_be16(f)) {
error_report("virtio-net: different max_queues ");
return -1;
}
n->curr_queues = qemu_get_be16(f);
for (i = 1; i < n->curr_queues; i++) {
n->vqs[i].tx_waiting = qemu_get_be32(f);
}
n->curr_guest_offloads = virtio_net_supported_guest_offloads(n);
}
if (peer_has_vnet_hdr(n)) {
virtio_net_apply_guest_offloads(n);
}
virtio_net_set_queues(n);
/* Find the first multicast entry in the saved MAC filter */
for (i = 0; i < n->mac_table.in_use; i++) {
if (n->mac_table.macs[i * ETH_ALEN] & 1) {
break;
}
}
n->mac_table.first_multi = i;
/* nc.link_down can't be migrated, so infer link_down according
* to link status bit in n->status */
link_down = (n->status & VIRTIO_NET_S_LINK_UP) == 0;
for (i = 0; i < n->max_queues; i++) {
qemu_get_subqueue(n->nic, i)->link_down = link_down;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static int virtio_net_load(QEMUFile *f, void *opaque, int version_id)
{
VirtIONet *n = opaque;
VirtIODevice *vdev = VIRTIO_DEVICE(n);
int ret, i, link_down;
if (version_id < 2 || version_id > VIRTIO_NET_VM_VERSION)
return -EINVAL;
ret = virtio_load(vdev, f);
if (ret) {
return ret;
}
qemu_get_buffer(f, n->mac, ETH_ALEN);
n->vqs[0].tx_waiting = qemu_get_be32(f);
virtio_net_set_mrg_rx_bufs(n, qemu_get_be32(f));
if (version_id >= 3)
n->status = qemu_get_be16(f);
if (version_id >= 4) {
if (version_id < 8) {
n->promisc = qemu_get_be32(f);
n->allmulti = qemu_get_be32(f);
} else {
n->promisc = qemu_get_byte(f);
n->allmulti = qemu_get_byte(f);
}
}
if (version_id >= 5) {
n->mac_table.in_use = qemu_get_be32(f);
/* MAC_TABLE_ENTRIES may be different from the saved image */
if (n->mac_table.in_use <= MAC_TABLE_ENTRIES) {
qemu_get_buffer(f, n->mac_table.macs,
n->mac_table.in_use * ETH_ALEN);
} else if (n->mac_table.in_use) {
uint8_t *buf = g_malloc0(n->mac_table.in_use);
qemu_get_buffer(f, buf, n->mac_table.in_use * ETH_ALEN);
g_free(buf);
n->mac_table.multi_overflow = n->mac_table.uni_overflow = 1;
n->mac_table.in_use = 0;
}
}
if (version_id >= 6)
qemu_get_buffer(f, (uint8_t *)n->vlans, MAX_VLAN >> 3);
if (version_id >= 7) {
if (qemu_get_be32(f) && !peer_has_vnet_hdr(n)) {
error_report("virtio-net: saved image requires vnet_hdr=on");
return -1;
}
}
if (version_id >= 9) {
n->mac_table.multi_overflow = qemu_get_byte(f);
n->mac_table.uni_overflow = qemu_get_byte(f);
}
if (version_id >= 10) {
n->alluni = qemu_get_byte(f);
n->nomulti = qemu_get_byte(f);
n->nouni = qemu_get_byte(f);
n->nobcast = qemu_get_byte(f);
}
if (version_id >= 11) {
if (qemu_get_byte(f) && !peer_has_ufo(n)) {
error_report("virtio-net: saved image requires TUN_F_UFO support");
return -1;
}
}
if (n->max_queues > 1) {
if (n->max_queues != qemu_get_be16(f)) {
error_report("virtio-net: different max_queues ");
return -1;
}
n->curr_queues = qemu_get_be16(f);
if (n->curr_queues > n->max_queues) {
error_report("virtio-net: curr_queues %x > max_queues %x",
n->curr_queues, n->max_queues);
return -1;
}
for (i = 1; i < n->curr_queues; i++) {
n->vqs[i].tx_waiting = qemu_get_be32(f);
}
n->curr_guest_offloads = virtio_net_supported_guest_offloads(n);
}
if (peer_has_vnet_hdr(n)) {
virtio_net_apply_guest_offloads(n);
}
virtio_net_set_queues(n);
/* Find the first multicast entry in the saved MAC filter */
for (i = 0; i < n->mac_table.in_use; i++) {
if (n->mac_table.macs[i * ETH_ALEN] & 1) {
break;
}
}
n->mac_table.first_multi = i;
/* nc.link_down can't be migrated, so infer link_down according
* to link status bit in n->status */
link_down = (n->status & VIRTIO_NET_S_LINK_UP) == 0;
for (i = 0; i < n->max_queues; i++) {
qemu_get_subqueue(n->nic, i)->link_down = link_down;
}
return 0;
}
| 165,362 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int tcos_select_file(sc_card_t *card,
const sc_path_t *in_path,
sc_file_t **file_out)
{
sc_context_t *ctx;
sc_apdu_t apdu;
sc_file_t *file=NULL;
u8 buf[SC_MAX_APDU_BUFFER_SIZE], pathbuf[SC_MAX_PATH_SIZE], *path = pathbuf;
unsigned int i;
int r, pathlen;
assert(card != NULL && in_path != NULL);
ctx=card->ctx;
memcpy(path, in_path->value, in_path->len);
pathlen = in_path->len;
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_4_SHORT, 0xA4, 0, 0x04);
switch (in_path->type) {
case SC_PATH_TYPE_FILE_ID:
if (pathlen != 2) return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
/* fall through */
case SC_PATH_TYPE_FROM_CURRENT:
apdu.p1 = 9;
break;
case SC_PATH_TYPE_DF_NAME:
apdu.p1 = 4;
break;
case SC_PATH_TYPE_PATH:
apdu.p1 = 8;
if (pathlen >= 2 && memcmp(path, "\x3F\x00", 2) == 0) path += 2, pathlen -= 2;
if (pathlen == 0) apdu.p1 = 0;
break;
case SC_PATH_TYPE_PARENT:
apdu.p1 = 3;
pathlen = 0;
break;
default:
SC_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS);
}
if( pathlen == 0 ) apdu.cse = SC_APDU_CASE_2_SHORT;
apdu.lc = pathlen;
apdu.data = path;
apdu.datalen = pathlen;
if (file_out != NULL) {
apdu.resp = buf;
apdu.resplen = sizeof(buf);
apdu.le = 256;
} else {
apdu.resplen = 0;
apdu.le = 0;
apdu.p2 = 0x0C;
apdu.cse = (pathlen == 0) ? SC_APDU_CASE_1 : SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT;
}
r = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
SC_TEST_RET(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r, "APDU transmit failed");
r = sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
if (r || file_out == NULL) SC_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, r);
if (apdu.resplen < 1 || apdu.resp[0] != 0x62){
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, "received invalid template %02X\n", apdu.resp[0]);
SC_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, SC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_DATA_RECEIVED);
}
file = sc_file_new();
if (file == NULL) SC_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
*file_out = file;
file->path = *in_path;
for(i=2; i+1<apdu.resplen && i+1+apdu.resp[i+1]<apdu.resplen; i+=2+apdu.resp[i+1]){
int j, len=apdu.resp[i+1];
unsigned char type=apdu.resp[i], *d=apdu.resp+i+2;
switch (type) {
case 0x80:
case 0x81:
file->size=0;
for(j=0; j<len; ++j) file->size = (file->size<<8) | d[j];
break;
case 0x82:
file->shareable = (d[0] & 0x40) ? 1 : 0;
file->ef_structure = d[0] & 7;
switch ((d[0]>>3) & 7) {
case 0: file->type = SC_FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF; break;
case 7: file->type = SC_FILE_TYPE_DF; break;
default:
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, "invalid file type %02X in file descriptor\n", d[0]);
SC_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, SC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_DATA_RECEIVED);
}
break;
case 0x83:
file->id = (d[0]<<8) | d[1];
break;
case 0x84:
memcpy(file->name, d, len);
file->namelen = len;
break;
case 0x86:
sc_file_set_sec_attr(file, d, len);
break;
default:
if (len>0) sc_file_set_prop_attr(file, d, len);
}
}
file->magic = SC_FILE_MAGIC;
parse_sec_attr(card, file, file->sec_attr, file->sec_attr_len);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | static int tcos_select_file(sc_card_t *card,
const sc_path_t *in_path,
sc_file_t **file_out)
{
sc_context_t *ctx;
sc_apdu_t apdu;
sc_file_t *file=NULL;
u8 buf[SC_MAX_APDU_BUFFER_SIZE], pathbuf[SC_MAX_PATH_SIZE], *path = pathbuf;
unsigned int i;
int r, pathlen;
assert(card != NULL && in_path != NULL);
ctx=card->ctx;
memcpy(path, in_path->value, in_path->len);
pathlen = in_path->len;
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_4_SHORT, 0xA4, 0, 0x04);
switch (in_path->type) {
case SC_PATH_TYPE_FILE_ID:
if (pathlen != 2) return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
/* fall through */
case SC_PATH_TYPE_FROM_CURRENT:
apdu.p1 = 9;
break;
case SC_PATH_TYPE_DF_NAME:
apdu.p1 = 4;
break;
case SC_PATH_TYPE_PATH:
apdu.p1 = 8;
if (pathlen >= 2 && memcmp(path, "\x3F\x00", 2) == 0) path += 2, pathlen -= 2;
if (pathlen == 0) apdu.p1 = 0;
break;
case SC_PATH_TYPE_PARENT:
apdu.p1 = 3;
pathlen = 0;
break;
default:
SC_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS);
}
if( pathlen == 0 ) apdu.cse = SC_APDU_CASE_2_SHORT;
apdu.lc = pathlen;
apdu.data = path;
apdu.datalen = pathlen;
if (file_out != NULL) {
apdu.resp = buf;
apdu.resplen = sizeof(buf);
apdu.le = 256;
} else {
apdu.resplen = 0;
apdu.le = 0;
apdu.p2 = 0x0C;
apdu.cse = (pathlen == 0) ? SC_APDU_CASE_1 : SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT;
}
r = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
SC_TEST_RET(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r, "APDU transmit failed");
r = sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
if (r || file_out == NULL) SC_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, r);
if (apdu.resplen < 1 || apdu.resp[0] != 0x62){
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, "received invalid template %02X\n", apdu.resp[0]);
SC_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, SC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_DATA_RECEIVED);
}
file = sc_file_new();
if (file == NULL) SC_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
*file_out = file;
file->path = *in_path;
for(i=2; i+1<apdu.resplen && i+1+apdu.resp[i+1]<apdu.resplen; i+=2+apdu.resp[i+1]){
size_t j, len=apdu.resp[i+1];
unsigned char type=apdu.resp[i], *d=apdu.resp+i+2;
switch (type) {
case 0x80:
case 0x81:
file->size=0;
for(j=0; j<len; ++j) file->size = (file->size<<8) | d[j];
break;
case 0x82:
file->shareable = (d[0] & 0x40) ? 1 : 0;
file->ef_structure = d[0] & 7;
switch ((d[0]>>3) & 7) {
case 0: file->type = SC_FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF; break;
case 7: file->type = SC_FILE_TYPE_DF; break;
default:
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, "invalid file type %02X in file descriptor\n", d[0]);
SC_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, SC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_DATA_RECEIVED);
}
break;
case 0x83:
file->id = (d[0]<<8) | d[1];
break;
case 0x84:
file->namelen = MIN(sizeof file->name, len);
memcpy(file->name, d, file->namelen);
break;
case 0x86:
sc_file_set_sec_attr(file, d, len);
break;
default:
if (len>0) sc_file_set_prop_attr(file, d, len);
}
}
file->magic = SC_FILE_MAGIC;
parse_sec_attr(card, file, file->sec_attr, file->sec_attr_len);
return 0;
}
| 169,075 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long jpc_bitstream_getbits(jpc_bitstream_t *bitstream, int n)
{
long v;
int u;
/* We can reliably get at most 31 bits since ISO/IEC 9899 only
guarantees that a long can represent values up to 2^31-1. */
assert(n >= 0 && n < 32);
/* Get the number of bits requested from the specified bit stream. */
v = 0;
while (--n >= 0) {
if ((u = jpc_bitstream_getbit(bitstream)) < 0) {
return -1;
}
v = (v << 1) | u;
}
return v;
}
Commit Message: Changed the JPC bitstream code to more gracefully handle a request
for a larger sized integer than what can be handled (i.e., return
with an error instead of failing an assert).
CWE ID: | long jpc_bitstream_getbits(jpc_bitstream_t *bitstream, int n)
{
long v;
int u;
/* We can reliably get at most 31 bits since ISO/IEC 9899 only
guarantees that a long can represent values up to 2^31-1. */
//assert(n >= 0 && n < 32);
if (n < 0 || n >= 32) {
return -1;
}
/* Get the number of bits requested from the specified bit stream. */
v = 0;
while (--n >= 0) {
if ((u = jpc_bitstream_getbit(bitstream)) < 0) {
return -1;
}
v = (v << 1) | u;
}
return v;
}
| 168,732 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void BrowserView::TabDetachedAt(TabContents* contents, int index) {
if (index == browser_->active_index()) {
contents_container_->SetWebContents(NULL);
infobar_container_->ChangeTabContents(NULL);
UpdateDevToolsForContents(NULL);
}
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void BrowserView::TabDetachedAt(TabContents* contents, int index) {
void BrowserView::TabDetachedAt(WebContents* contents, int index) {
if (index == browser_->active_index()) {
contents_container_->SetWebContents(NULL);
infobar_container_->ChangeTabContents(NULL);
UpdateDevToolsForContents(NULL);
}
}
| 171,522 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void StoreNewGroup() {
PushNextTask(base::BindOnce(&AppCacheStorageImplTest::Verify_StoreNewGroup,
base::Unretained(this)));
group_ =
new AppCacheGroup(storage(), kManifestUrl, storage()->NewGroupId());
cache_ = new AppCache(storage(), storage()->NewCacheId());
cache_->AddEntry(kEntryUrl, AppCacheEntry(AppCacheEntry::EXPLICIT, 1,
kDefaultEntrySize));
mock_quota_manager_proxy_->mock_manager_->async_ = true;
storage()->StoreGroupAndNewestCache(group_.get(), cache_.get(), delegate());
EXPECT_FALSE(delegate()->stored_group_success_);
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void StoreNewGroup() {
PushNextTask(base::BindOnce(&AppCacheStorageImplTest::Verify_StoreNewGroup,
base::Unretained(this)));
group_ =
new AppCacheGroup(storage(), kManifestUrl, storage()->NewGroupId());
cache_ = new AppCache(storage(), storage()->NewCacheId());
cache_->AddEntry(kEntryUrl,
AppCacheEntry(AppCacheEntry::MASTER, 1, kDefaultEntrySize,
/*padding_size=*/0));
mock_quota_manager_proxy_->mock_manager_->async_ = true;
storage()->StoreGroupAndNewestCache(group_.get(), cache_.get(), delegate());
EXPECT_FALSE(delegate()->stored_group_success_);
}
| 172,991 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: _PUBLIC_ codepoint_t next_codepoint_handle_ext(
struct smb_iconv_handle *ic,
const char *str, charset_t src_charset,
size_t *bytes_consumed)
{
/* it cannot occupy more than 4 bytes in UTF16 format */
smb_iconv_t descriptor;
size_t ilen_orig;
size_t ilen;
size_t olen;
char *outbuf;
if ((str[0] & 0x80) == 0) {
*bytes_consumed = 1;
return (codepoint_t)str[0];
}
/*
* we assume that no multi-byte character can take more than 5 bytes.
* we assume that no multi-byte character can take more than 5 bytes.
* This is OK as we only support codepoints up to 1M (U+100000)
*/
ilen_orig = strnlen(str, 5);
ilen = ilen_orig;
descriptor = get_conv_handle(ic, src_charset, CH_UTF16);
*bytes_consumed = 1;
return INVALID_CODEPOINT;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | _PUBLIC_ codepoint_t next_codepoint_handle_ext(
struct smb_iconv_handle *ic,
const char *str, size_t len,
charset_t src_charset,
size_t *bytes_consumed)
{
/* it cannot occupy more than 4 bytes in UTF16 format */
smb_iconv_t descriptor;
size_t ilen_orig;
size_t ilen;
size_t olen;
char *outbuf;
if ((str[0] & 0x80) == 0) {
*bytes_consumed = 1;
return (codepoint_t)str[0];
}
/*
* we assume that no multi-byte character can take more than 5 bytes.
* we assume that no multi-byte character can take more than 5 bytes.
* This is OK as we only support codepoints up to 1M (U+100000)
*/
ilen_orig = MIN(len, 5);
ilen = ilen_orig;
descriptor = get_conv_handle(ic, src_charset, CH_UTF16);
*bytes_consumed = 1;
return INVALID_CODEPOINT;
}
| 164,670 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int fuse_notify_inval_entry(struct fuse_conn *fc, unsigned int size,
struct fuse_copy_state *cs)
{
struct fuse_notify_inval_entry_out outarg;
int err = -ENOMEM;
char *buf;
struct qstr name;
buf = kzalloc(FUSE_NAME_MAX + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf)
goto err;
err = -EINVAL;
if (size < sizeof(outarg))
goto err;
err = fuse_copy_one(cs, &outarg, sizeof(outarg));
if (err)
goto err;
err = -ENAMETOOLONG;
if (outarg.namelen > FUSE_NAME_MAX)
goto err;
name.name = buf;
name.len = outarg.namelen;
err = fuse_copy_one(cs, buf, outarg.namelen + 1);
if (err)
goto err;
fuse_copy_finish(cs);
buf[outarg.namelen] = 0;
name.hash = full_name_hash(name.name, name.len);
down_read(&fc->killsb);
err = -ENOENT;
if (fc->sb)
err = fuse_reverse_inval_entry(fc->sb, outarg.parent, &name);
up_read(&fc->killsb);
kfree(buf);
return err;
err:
kfree(buf);
fuse_copy_finish(cs);
return err;
}
Commit Message: fuse: check size of FUSE_NOTIFY_INVAL_ENTRY message
FUSE_NOTIFY_INVAL_ENTRY didn't check the length of the write so the
message processing could overrun and result in a "kernel BUG at
fs/fuse/dev.c:629!"
Reported-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>
CC: [email protected]
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static int fuse_notify_inval_entry(struct fuse_conn *fc, unsigned int size,
struct fuse_copy_state *cs)
{
struct fuse_notify_inval_entry_out outarg;
int err = -ENOMEM;
char *buf;
struct qstr name;
buf = kzalloc(FUSE_NAME_MAX + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf)
goto err;
err = -EINVAL;
if (size < sizeof(outarg))
goto err;
err = fuse_copy_one(cs, &outarg, sizeof(outarg));
if (err)
goto err;
err = -ENAMETOOLONG;
if (outarg.namelen > FUSE_NAME_MAX)
goto err;
err = -EINVAL;
if (size != sizeof(outarg) + outarg.namelen + 1)
goto err;
name.name = buf;
name.len = outarg.namelen;
err = fuse_copy_one(cs, buf, outarg.namelen + 1);
if (err)
goto err;
fuse_copy_finish(cs);
buf[outarg.namelen] = 0;
name.hash = full_name_hash(name.name, name.len);
down_read(&fc->killsb);
err = -ENOENT;
if (fc->sb)
err = fuse_reverse_inval_entry(fc->sb, outarg.parent, &name);
up_read(&fc->killsb);
kfree(buf);
return err;
err:
kfree(buf);
fuse_copy_finish(cs);
return err;
}
| 165,747 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int UDPSocketWin::DoBind(const IPEndPoint& address) {
SockaddrStorage storage;
if (!address.ToSockAddr(storage.addr, &storage.addr_len))
return ERR_ADDRESS_INVALID;
int rv = bind(socket_, storage.addr, storage.addr_len);
if (rv == 0)
return OK;
int last_error = WSAGetLastError();
UMA_HISTOGRAM_SPARSE_SLOWLY("Net.UdpSocketBindErrorFromWinOS", last_error);
if (last_error == WSAEACCES || last_error == WSAEINVAL)
return ERR_ADDRESS_IN_USE;
return MapSystemError(last_error);
}
Commit Message: Map posix error codes in bind better, and fix one windows mapping.
r=wtc
BUG=330233
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/101193008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@242224 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416 | int UDPSocketWin::DoBind(const IPEndPoint& address) {
SockaddrStorage storage;
if (!address.ToSockAddr(storage.addr, &storage.addr_len))
return ERR_ADDRESS_INVALID;
int rv = bind(socket_, storage.addr, storage.addr_len);
if (rv == 0)
return OK;
int last_error = WSAGetLastError();
UMA_HISTOGRAM_SPARSE_SLOWLY("Net.UdpSocketBindErrorFromWinOS", last_error);
// * WSAEACCES: If a port is already bound to a socket, WSAEACCES may be
// returned instead of WSAEADDRINUSE, depending on whether the socket
// option SO_REUSEADDR or SO_EXCLUSIVEADDRUSE is set and whether the
// conflicting socket is owned by a different user account. See the MSDN
// page "Using SO_REUSEADDR and SO_EXCLUSIVEADDRUSE" for the gory details.
if (last_error == WSAEACCES || last_error == WSAEADDRNOTAVAIL)
return ERR_ADDRESS_IN_USE;
return MapSystemError(last_error);
}
| 171,317 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: write_header( FT_Error error_code )
{
FT_Face face;
const char* basename;
const char* format;
error = FTC_Manager_LookupFace( handle->cache_manager,
handle->scaler.face_id, &face );
if ( error )
Fatal( "can't access font file" );
if ( !status.header )
{
basename = ft_basename( handle->current_font->filepathname );
switch ( error_code )
{
case FT_Err_Ok:
sprintf( status.header_buffer, "%s %s (file `%s')",
face->family_name, face->style_name, basename );
break;
case FT_Err_Invalid_Pixel_Size:
sprintf( status.header_buffer, "Invalid pixel size (file `%s')",
basename );
break;
case FT_Err_Invalid_PPem:
sprintf( status.header_buffer, "Invalid ppem value (file `%s')",
basename );
break;
default:
sprintf( status.header_buffer, "File `%s': error 0x%04x",
basename, (FT_UShort)error_code );
break;
}
status.header = (const char *)status.header_buffer;
}
grWriteCellString( display->bitmap, 0, 0, status.header,
display->fore_color );
format = "at %g points, first glyph index = %d";
snprintf( status.header_buffer, 256, format, status.ptsize/64., status.Num );
if ( FT_HAS_GLYPH_NAMES( face ) )
{
char* p;
int format_len, gindex, size;
size = strlen( status.header_buffer );
p = status.header_buffer + size;
size = 256 - size;
format = ", name = ";
format_len = strlen( format );
if ( size >= format_len + 2 )
{
gindex = status.Num;
strcpy( p, format );
if ( FT_Get_Glyph_Name( face, gindex, p + format_len, size - format_len ) )
*p = '\0';
}
}
status.header = (const char *)status.header_buffer;
grWriteCellString( display->bitmap, 0, HEADER_HEIGHT,
status.header_buffer, display->fore_color );
grRefreshSurface( display->surface );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | write_header( FT_Error error_code )
{
FT_Face face;
const char* basename;
const char* format;
error = FTC_Manager_LookupFace( handle->cache_manager,
handle->scaler.face_id, &face );
if ( error )
Fatal( "can't access font file" );
if ( !status.header )
{
basename = ft_basename( handle->current_font->filepathname );
switch ( error_code )
{
case FT_Err_Ok:
sprintf( status.header_buffer, "%.50s %.50s (file `%.100s')",
face->family_name, face->style_name, basename );
break;
case FT_Err_Invalid_Pixel_Size:
sprintf( status.header_buffer, "Invalid pixel size (file `%.100s')",
basename );
break;
case FT_Err_Invalid_PPem:
sprintf( status.header_buffer, "Invalid ppem value (file `%.100s')",
basename );
break;
default:
sprintf( status.header_buffer, "File `%.100s': error 0x%04x",
basename, (FT_UShort)error_code );
break;
}
status.header = (const char *)status.header_buffer;
}
grWriteCellString( display->bitmap, 0, 0, status.header,
display->fore_color );
format = "at %g points, first glyph index = %d";
snprintf( status.header_buffer, 256, format, status.ptsize/64., status.Num );
if ( FT_HAS_GLYPH_NAMES( face ) )
{
char* p;
int format_len, gindex, size;
size = strlen( status.header_buffer );
p = status.header_buffer + size;
size = 256 - size;
format = ", name = ";
format_len = strlen( format );
if ( size >= format_len + 2 )
{
gindex = status.Num;
strcpy( p, format );
if ( FT_Get_Glyph_Name( face, gindex, p + format_len, size - format_len ) )
*p = '\0';
}
}
status.header = (const char *)status.header_buffer;
grWriteCellString( display->bitmap, 0, HEADER_HEIGHT,
status.header_buffer, display->fore_color );
grRefreshSurface( display->surface );
}
| 164,998 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void vnc_dpy_update(DisplayState *ds, int x, int y, int w, int h)
{
int i;
VncDisplay *vd = ds->opaque;
struct VncSurface *s = &vd->guest;
h += y;
two 16-pixel blocks but we only mark the first as dirty
*/
w += (x % 16);
x -= (x % 16);
w += (x % 16);
x -= (x % 16);
x = MIN(x, s->ds->width);
y = MIN(y, s->ds->height);
w = MIN(x + w, s->ds->width) - x;
h = MIN(h, s->ds->height);
for (; y < h; y++)
for (i = 0; i < w; i += 16)
void vnc_framebuffer_update(VncState *vs, int x, int y, int w, int h,
int32_t encoding)
{
vnc_write_u16(vs, x);
vnc_write_u16(vs, y);
vnc_write_u16(vs, w);
vnc_write_u16(vs, h);
vnc_write_s32(vs, encoding);
}
void buffer_reserve(Buffer *buffer, size_t len)
{
if ((buffer->capacity - buffer->offset) < len) {
buffer->capacity += (len + 1024);
buffer->buffer = g_realloc(buffer->buffer, buffer->capacity);
if (buffer->buffer == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "vnc: out of memory\n");
exit(1);
}
}
}
int buffer_empty(Buffer *buffer)
{
return buffer->offset == 0;
}
uint8_t *buffer_end(Buffer *buffer)
{
return buffer->buffer + buffer->offset;
}
void buffer_reset(Buffer *buffer)
{
buffer->offset = 0;
}
void buffer_free(Buffer *buffer)
{
g_free(buffer->buffer);
buffer->offset = 0;
buffer->capacity = 0;
buffer->buffer = NULL;
}
void buffer_append(Buffer *buffer, const void *data, size_t len)
{
memcpy(buffer->buffer + buffer->offset, data, len);
buffer->offset += len;
}
static void vnc_desktop_resize(VncState *vs)
{
DisplayState *ds = vs->ds;
if (vs->csock == -1 || !vnc_has_feature(vs, VNC_FEATURE_RESIZE)) {
return;
}
if (vs->client_width == ds_get_width(ds) &&
vs->client_height == ds_get_height(ds)) {
return;
}
vs->client_width = ds_get_width(ds);
vs->client_height = ds_get_height(ds);
vnc_lock_output(vs);
vnc_write_u8(vs, VNC_MSG_SERVER_FRAMEBUFFER_UPDATE);
vnc_write_u8(vs, 0);
vnc_write_u16(vs, 1); /* number of rects */
vnc_framebuffer_update(vs, 0, 0, vs->client_width, vs->client_height,
VNC_ENCODING_DESKTOPRESIZE);
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
vnc_flush(vs);
}
static void vnc_abort_display_jobs(VncDisplay *vd)
{
VncState *vs;
QTAILQ_FOREACH(vs, &vd->clients, next) {
vnc_lock_output(vs);
vs->abort = true;
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
}
QTAILQ_FOREACH(vs, &vd->clients, next) {
vnc_jobs_join(vs);
}
QTAILQ_FOREACH(vs, &vd->clients, next) {
vnc_lock_output(vs);
vs->abort = false;
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static void vnc_dpy_update(DisplayState *ds, int x, int y, int w, int h)
{
int i;
VncDisplay *vd = ds->opaque;
struct VncSurface *s = &vd->guest;
int width = ds_get_width(ds);
int height = ds_get_height(ds);
h += y;
two 16-pixel blocks but we only mark the first as dirty
*/
w += (x % 16);
x -= (x % 16);
w += (x % 16);
x -= (x % 16);
x = MIN(x, width);
y = MIN(y, height);
w = MIN(x + w, width) - x;
h = MIN(h, height);
for (; y < h; y++)
for (i = 0; i < w; i += 16)
void vnc_framebuffer_update(VncState *vs, int x, int y, int w, int h,
int32_t encoding)
{
vnc_write_u16(vs, x);
vnc_write_u16(vs, y);
vnc_write_u16(vs, w);
vnc_write_u16(vs, h);
vnc_write_s32(vs, encoding);
}
void buffer_reserve(Buffer *buffer, size_t len)
{
if ((buffer->capacity - buffer->offset) < len) {
buffer->capacity += (len + 1024);
buffer->buffer = g_realloc(buffer->buffer, buffer->capacity);
if (buffer->buffer == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "vnc: out of memory\n");
exit(1);
}
}
}
int buffer_empty(Buffer *buffer)
{
return buffer->offset == 0;
}
uint8_t *buffer_end(Buffer *buffer)
{
return buffer->buffer + buffer->offset;
}
void buffer_reset(Buffer *buffer)
{
buffer->offset = 0;
}
void buffer_free(Buffer *buffer)
{
g_free(buffer->buffer);
buffer->offset = 0;
buffer->capacity = 0;
buffer->buffer = NULL;
}
void buffer_append(Buffer *buffer, const void *data, size_t len)
{
memcpy(buffer->buffer + buffer->offset, data, len);
buffer->offset += len;
}
static void vnc_desktop_resize(VncState *vs)
{
DisplayState *ds = vs->ds;
if (vs->csock == -1 || !vnc_has_feature(vs, VNC_FEATURE_RESIZE)) {
return;
}
if (vs->client_width == ds_get_width(ds) &&
vs->client_height == ds_get_height(ds)) {
return;
}
vs->client_width = ds_get_width(ds);
vs->client_height = ds_get_height(ds);
vnc_lock_output(vs);
vnc_write_u8(vs, VNC_MSG_SERVER_FRAMEBUFFER_UPDATE);
vnc_write_u8(vs, 0);
vnc_write_u16(vs, 1); /* number of rects */
vnc_framebuffer_update(vs, 0, 0, vs->client_width, vs->client_height,
VNC_ENCODING_DESKTOPRESIZE);
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
vnc_flush(vs);
}
static void vnc_abort_display_jobs(VncDisplay *vd)
{
VncState *vs;
QTAILQ_FOREACH(vs, &vd->clients, next) {
vnc_lock_output(vs);
vs->abort = true;
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
}
QTAILQ_FOREACH(vs, &vd->clients, next) {
vnc_jobs_join(vs);
}
QTAILQ_FOREACH(vs, &vd->clients, next) {
vnc_lock_output(vs);
vs->abort = false;
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
}
}
}
| 165,470 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: QualifyIpPacket(IPHeader *pIpHeader, ULONG len)
{
tTcpIpPacketParsingResult res;
UCHAR ver_len = pIpHeader->v4.ip_verlen;
UCHAR ip_version = (ver_len & 0xF0) >> 4;
USHORT ipHeaderSize = 0;
USHORT fullLength = 0;
res.value = 0;
if (ip_version == 4)
{
ipHeaderSize = (ver_len & 0xF) << 2;
fullLength = swap_short(pIpHeader->v4.ip_length);
DPrintf(3, ("ip_version %d, ipHeaderSize %d, protocol %d, iplen %d\n",
ip_version, ipHeaderSize, pIpHeader->v4.ip_protocol, fullLength));
res.ipStatus = (ipHeaderSize >= sizeof(IPv4Header)) ? ppresIPV4 : ppresNotIP;
if (len < ipHeaderSize) res.ipCheckSum = ppresIPTooShort;
if (fullLength) {}
else
{
DPrintf(2, ("ip v.%d, iplen %d\n", ip_version, fullLength));
}
}
else if (ip_version == 6)
{
UCHAR nextHeader = pIpHeader->v6.ip6_next_header;
BOOLEAN bParsingDone = FALSE;
ipHeaderSize = sizeof(pIpHeader->v6);
res.ipStatus = ppresIPV6;
res.ipCheckSum = ppresCSOK;
fullLength = swap_short(pIpHeader->v6.ip6_payload_len);
fullLength += ipHeaderSize;
while (nextHeader != 59)
{
IPv6ExtHeader *pExt;
switch (nextHeader)
{
case PROTOCOL_TCP:
bParsingDone = TRUE;
res.xxpStatus = ppresXxpKnown;
res.TcpUdp = ppresIsTCP;
res.xxpFull = len >= fullLength ? 1 : 0;
res = ProcessTCPHeader(res, pIpHeader, len, ipHeaderSize);
break;
case PROTOCOL_UDP:
bParsingDone = TRUE;
res.xxpStatus = ppresXxpKnown;
res.TcpUdp = ppresIsUDP;
res.xxpFull = len >= fullLength ? 1 : 0;
res = ProcessUDPHeader(res, pIpHeader, len, ipHeaderSize);
break;
case 0:
case 60:
case 43:
case 44:
case 51:
case 50:
case 135:
if (len >= ((ULONG)ipHeaderSize + 8))
{
pExt = (IPv6ExtHeader *)((PUCHAR)pIpHeader + ipHeaderSize);
nextHeader = pExt->ip6ext_next_header;
ipHeaderSize += 8;
ipHeaderSize += pExt->ip6ext_hdr_len * 8;
}
else
{
DPrintf(0, ("[%s] ERROR: Break in the middle of ext. headers(len %d, hdr > %d)\n", __FUNCTION__, len, ipHeaderSize));
res.ipStatus = ppresNotIP;
bParsingDone = TRUE;
}
break;
default:
res.xxpStatus = ppresXxpOther;
bParsingDone = TRUE;
break;
}
if (bParsingDone)
break;
}
if (ipHeaderSize <= MAX_SUPPORTED_IPV6_HEADERS)
{
DPrintf(3, ("ip_version %d, ipHeaderSize %d, protocol %d, iplen %d\n",
ip_version, ipHeaderSize, nextHeader, fullLength));
res.ipHeaderSize = ipHeaderSize;
}
else
{
DPrintf(0, ("[%s] ERROR: IP chain is too large (%d)\n", __FUNCTION__, ipHeaderSize));
res.ipStatus = ppresNotIP;
}
}
if (res.ipStatus == ppresIPV4)
{
res.ipHeaderSize = ipHeaderSize;
res.xxpFull = len >= fullLength ? 1 : 0;
res.IsFragment = (pIpHeader->v4.ip_offset & ~0xC0) != 0;
switch (pIpHeader->v4.ip_protocol)
{
case PROTOCOL_TCP:
{
res = ProcessTCPHeader(res, pIpHeader, len, ipHeaderSize);
}
break;
case PROTOCOL_UDP:
{
res = ProcessUDPHeader(res, pIpHeader, len, ipHeaderSize);
}
break;
default:
res.xxpStatus = ppresXxpOther;
break;
}
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: More rigoruous testing of incoming packet
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | QualifyIpPacket(IPHeader *pIpHeader, ULONG len)
{
tTcpIpPacketParsingResult res;
res.value = 0;
if (len < 4)
{
res.ipStatus = ppresNotIP;
return res;
}
UCHAR ver_len = pIpHeader->v4.ip_verlen;
UCHAR ip_version = (ver_len & 0xF0) >> 4;
USHORT ipHeaderSize = 0;
USHORT fullLength = 0;
res.value = 0;
if (ip_version == 4)
{
if (len < sizeof(IPv4Header))
{
res.ipStatus = ppresNotIP;
return res;
}
ipHeaderSize = (ver_len & 0xF) << 2;
fullLength = swap_short(pIpHeader->v4.ip_length);
DPrintf(3, ("ip_version %d, ipHeaderSize %d, protocol %d, iplen %d, L2 payload length %d\n",
ip_version, ipHeaderSize, pIpHeader->v4.ip_protocol, fullLength, len));
res.ipStatus = (ipHeaderSize >= sizeof(IPv4Header)) ? ppresIPV4 : ppresNotIP;
if (res.ipStatus == ppresNotIP)
{
return res;
}
if (ipHeaderSize >= fullLength || len < fullLength)
{
DPrintf(2, ("[%s] - truncated packet - ip_version %d, ipHeaderSize %d, protocol %d, iplen %d, L2 payload length %d\n",
ip_version, ipHeaderSize, pIpHeader->v4.ip_protocol, fullLength, len));
res.ipCheckSum = ppresIPTooShort;
return res;
}
}
else if (ip_version == 6)
{
UCHAR nextHeader = pIpHeader->v6.ip6_next_header;
BOOLEAN bParsingDone = FALSE;
ipHeaderSize = sizeof(pIpHeader->v6);
res.ipStatus = ppresIPV6;
res.ipCheckSum = ppresCSOK;
fullLength = swap_short(pIpHeader->v6.ip6_payload_len);
fullLength += ipHeaderSize;
while (nextHeader != 59)
{
IPv6ExtHeader *pExt;
switch (nextHeader)
{
case PROTOCOL_TCP:
bParsingDone = TRUE;
res.xxpStatus = ppresXxpKnown;
res.TcpUdp = ppresIsTCP;
res.xxpFull = len >= fullLength ? 1 : 0;
res = ProcessTCPHeader(res, pIpHeader, len, ipHeaderSize);
break;
case PROTOCOL_UDP:
bParsingDone = TRUE;
res.xxpStatus = ppresXxpKnown;
res.TcpUdp = ppresIsUDP;
res.xxpFull = len >= fullLength ? 1 : 0;
res = ProcessUDPHeader(res, pIpHeader, len, ipHeaderSize);
break;
case 0:
case 60:
case 43:
case 44:
case 51:
case 50:
case 135:
if (len >= ((ULONG)ipHeaderSize + 8))
{
pExt = (IPv6ExtHeader *)((PUCHAR)pIpHeader + ipHeaderSize);
nextHeader = pExt->ip6ext_next_header;
ipHeaderSize += 8;
ipHeaderSize += pExt->ip6ext_hdr_len * 8;
}
else
{
DPrintf(0, ("[%s] ERROR: Break in the middle of ext. headers(len %d, hdr > %d)\n", __FUNCTION__, len, ipHeaderSize));
res.ipStatus = ppresNotIP;
bParsingDone = TRUE;
}
break;
default:
res.xxpStatus = ppresXxpOther;
bParsingDone = TRUE;
break;
}
if (bParsingDone)
break;
}
if (ipHeaderSize <= MAX_SUPPORTED_IPV6_HEADERS)
{
DPrintf(3, ("ip_version %d, ipHeaderSize %d, protocol %d, iplen %d\n",
ip_version, ipHeaderSize, nextHeader, fullLength));
res.ipHeaderSize = ipHeaderSize;
}
else
{
DPrintf(0, ("[%s] ERROR: IP chain is too large (%d)\n", __FUNCTION__, ipHeaderSize));
res.ipStatus = ppresNotIP;
}
}
if (res.ipStatus == ppresIPV4)
{
res.ipHeaderSize = ipHeaderSize;
res.IsFragment = (pIpHeader->v4.ip_offset & ~0xC0) != 0;
switch (pIpHeader->v4.ip_protocol)
{
case PROTOCOL_TCP:
{
res = ProcessTCPHeader(res, pIpHeader, len, ipHeaderSize);
}
break;
case PROTOCOL_UDP:
{
res = ProcessUDPHeader(res, pIpHeader, len, ipHeaderSize);
}
break;
default:
res.xxpStatus = ppresXxpOther;
break;
}
}
return res;
}
| 168,891 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PushMessagingServiceImpl::PushMessagingServiceImpl(Profile* profile)
: profile_(profile),
push_subscription_count_(0),
pending_push_subscription_count_(0),
notification_manager_(profile),
push_messaging_service_observer_(PushMessagingServiceObserver::Create()),
weak_factory_(this) {
DCHECK(profile);
HostContentSettingsMapFactory::GetForProfile(profile_)->AddObserver(this);
registrar_.Add(this, chrome::NOTIFICATION_APP_TERMINATING,
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
}
Commit Message: Remove some senseless indirection from the Push API code
Four files to call one Java function. Let's just call it directly.
BUG=
Change-Id: I6e988e9a000051dd7e3dd2b517a33a09afc2fff6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/749147
Reviewed-by: Anita Woodruff <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Peter Beverloo <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513464}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | PushMessagingServiceImpl::PushMessagingServiceImpl(Profile* profile)
: profile_(profile),
push_subscription_count_(0),
pending_push_subscription_count_(0),
notification_manager_(profile),
weak_factory_(this) {
DCHECK(profile);
HostContentSettingsMapFactory::GetForProfile(profile_)->AddObserver(this);
registrar_.Add(this, chrome::NOTIFICATION_APP_TERMINATING,
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
}
| 172,942 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PaymentRequest::Init(mojom::PaymentRequestClientPtr client,
std::vector<mojom::PaymentMethodDataPtr> method_data,
mojom::PaymentDetailsPtr details,
mojom::PaymentOptionsPtr options) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
client_ = std::move(client);
const GURL last_committed_url = delegate_->GetLastCommittedURL();
if (!OriginSecurityChecker::IsOriginSecure(last_committed_url)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Not in a secure origin";
OnConnectionTerminated();
return;
}
bool allowed_origin =
OriginSecurityChecker::IsSchemeCryptographic(last_committed_url) ||
OriginSecurityChecker::IsOriginLocalhostOrFile(last_committed_url);
if (!allowed_origin) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Only localhost, file://, and cryptographic scheme origins "
"allowed";
}
bool invalid_ssl =
OriginSecurityChecker::IsSchemeCryptographic(last_committed_url) &&
!delegate_->IsSslCertificateValid();
if (invalid_ssl)
LOG(ERROR) << "SSL certificate is not valid";
if (!allowed_origin || invalid_ssl) {
return;
}
std::string error;
if (!ValidatePaymentDetails(ConvertPaymentDetails(details), &error)) {
LOG(ERROR) << error;
OnConnectionTerminated();
return;
}
if (!details->total) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Missing total";
OnConnectionTerminated();
return;
}
spec_ = std::make_unique<PaymentRequestSpec>(
std::move(options), std::move(details), std::move(method_data), this,
delegate_->GetApplicationLocale());
state_ = std::make_unique<PaymentRequestState>(
web_contents_, top_level_origin_, frame_origin_, spec_.get(), this,
delegate_->GetApplicationLocale(), delegate_->GetPersonalDataManager(),
delegate_.get(), &journey_logger_);
journey_logger_.SetRequestedInformation(
spec_->request_shipping(), spec_->request_payer_email(),
spec_->request_payer_phone(), spec_->request_payer_name());
GURL google_pay_url(kGooglePayMethodName);
GURL android_pay_url(kAndroidPayMethodName);
auto non_google_it =
std::find_if(spec_->url_payment_method_identifiers().begin(),
spec_->url_payment_method_identifiers().end(),
[google_pay_url, android_pay_url](const GURL& url) {
return url != google_pay_url && url != android_pay_url;
});
journey_logger_.SetRequestedPaymentMethodTypes(
/*requested_basic_card=*/!spec_->supported_card_networks().empty(),
/*requested_method_google=*/
base::ContainsValue(spec_->url_payment_method_identifiers(),
google_pay_url) ||
base::ContainsValue(spec_->url_payment_method_identifiers(),
android_pay_url),
/*requested_method_other=*/non_google_it !=
spec_->url_payment_method_identifiers().end());
}
Commit Message: [Payment Request][Desktop] Prevent use after free.
Before this patch, a compromised renderer on desktop could make IPC
methods into Payment Request in an unexpected ordering and cause use
after free in the browser.
This patch will disconnect the IPC pipes if:
- Init() is called more than once.
- Any other method is called before Init().
- Show() is called more than once.
- Retry(), UpdateWith(), NoupdatedPaymentDetails(), Abort(), or
Complete() are called before Show().
This patch re-orders the IPC methods in payment_request.cc to match the
order in payment_request.h, which eases verifying correctness of their
error handling.
This patch prints more errors to the developer console, if available, to
improve debuggability by web developers, who rarely check where LOG
prints.
After this patch, unexpected ordering of calls into the Payment Request
IPC from the renderer to the browser on desktop will print an error in
the developer console and disconnect the IPC pipes. The binary might
increase slightly in size because more logs are included in the release
version instead of being stripped at compile time.
Bug: 912947
Change-Id: Iac2131181c64cd49b4e5ec99f4b4a8ae5d8df57a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1370198
Reviewed-by: anthonyvd <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Rouslan Solomakhin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616822}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | void PaymentRequest::Init(mojom::PaymentRequestClientPtr client,
std::vector<mojom::PaymentMethodDataPtr> method_data,
mojom::PaymentDetailsPtr details,
mojom::PaymentOptionsPtr options) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
if (is_initialized_) {
log_.Error("Attempted initialization twice");
OnConnectionTerminated();
return;
}
is_initialized_ = true;
client_ = std::move(client);
const GURL last_committed_url = delegate_->GetLastCommittedURL();
if (!OriginSecurityChecker::IsOriginSecure(last_committed_url)) {
log_.Error("Not in a secure origin");
OnConnectionTerminated();
return;
}
bool allowed_origin =
OriginSecurityChecker::IsSchemeCryptographic(last_committed_url) ||
OriginSecurityChecker::IsOriginLocalhostOrFile(last_committed_url);
if (!allowed_origin) {
log_.Error(
"Only localhost, file://, and cryptographic scheme origins allowed");
}
bool invalid_ssl =
OriginSecurityChecker::IsSchemeCryptographic(last_committed_url) &&
!delegate_->IsSslCertificateValid();
if (invalid_ssl) {
log_.Error("SSL certificate is not valid.");
}
if (!allowed_origin || invalid_ssl) {
// Intentionally don't set |spec_| and |state_|, so the UI is never shown.
log_.Error(
"No UI will be shown. CanMakePayment will always return false. "
"Show will be rejected with NotSupportedError.");
return;
}
std::string error;
if (!ValidatePaymentDetails(ConvertPaymentDetails(details), &error)) {
log_.Error(error);
OnConnectionTerminated();
return;
}
if (!details->total) {
log_.Error("Missing total");
OnConnectionTerminated();
return;
}
spec_ = std::make_unique<PaymentRequestSpec>(
std::move(options), std::move(details), std::move(method_data), this,
delegate_->GetApplicationLocale());
state_ = std::make_unique<PaymentRequestState>(
web_contents_, top_level_origin_, frame_origin_, spec_.get(), this,
delegate_->GetApplicationLocale(), delegate_->GetPersonalDataManager(),
delegate_.get(), &journey_logger_);
journey_logger_.SetRequestedInformation(
spec_->request_shipping(), spec_->request_payer_email(),
spec_->request_payer_phone(), spec_->request_payer_name());
GURL google_pay_url(kGooglePayMethodName);
GURL android_pay_url(kAndroidPayMethodName);
auto non_google_it =
std::find_if(spec_->url_payment_method_identifiers().begin(),
spec_->url_payment_method_identifiers().end(),
[google_pay_url, android_pay_url](const GURL& url) {
return url != google_pay_url && url != android_pay_url;
});
journey_logger_.SetRequestedPaymentMethodTypes(
/*requested_basic_card=*/!spec_->supported_card_networks().empty(),
/*requested_method_google=*/
base::ContainsValue(spec_->url_payment_method_identifiers(),
google_pay_url) ||
base::ContainsValue(spec_->url_payment_method_identifiers(),
android_pay_url),
/*requested_method_other=*/non_google_it !=
spec_->url_payment_method_identifiers().end());
}
| 173,082 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, copy)
{
char *oldfile, *newfile, *error;
const char *pcr_error;
size_t oldfile_len, newfile_len;
phar_entry_info *oldentry, newentry = {0}, *temp;
int tmp_len = 0;
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "ss", &oldfile, &oldfile_len, &newfile, &newfile_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (PHAR_G(readonly) && !phar_obj->archive->is_data) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0,
"Cannot copy \"%s\" to \"%s\", phar is read-only", oldfile, newfile);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (oldfile_len >= sizeof(".phar")-1 && !memcmp(oldfile, ".phar", sizeof(".phar")-1)) {
/* can't copy a meta file */
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0,
"file \"%s\" cannot be copied to file \"%s\", cannot copy Phar meta-file in %s", oldfile, newfile, phar_obj->archive->fname);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (newfile_len >= sizeof(".phar")-1 && !memcmp(newfile, ".phar", sizeof(".phar")-1)) {
/* can't copy a meta file */
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0,
"file \"%s\" cannot be copied to file \"%s\", cannot copy to Phar meta-file in %s", oldfile, newfile, phar_obj->archive->fname);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (!zend_hash_str_exists(&phar_obj->archive->manifest, oldfile, (uint) oldfile_len) || NULL == (oldentry = zend_hash_str_find_ptr(&phar_obj->archive->manifest, oldfile, (uint) oldfile_len)) || oldentry->is_deleted) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0,
"file \"%s\" cannot be copied to file \"%s\", file does not exist in %s", oldfile, newfile, phar_obj->archive->fname);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (zend_hash_str_exists(&phar_obj->archive->manifest, newfile, (uint) newfile_len)) {
if (NULL != (temp = zend_hash_str_find_ptr(&phar_obj->archive->manifest, newfile, (uint) newfile_len)) || !temp->is_deleted) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0,
"file \"%s\" cannot be copied to file \"%s\", file must not already exist in phar %s", oldfile, newfile, phar_obj->archive->fname);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
tmp_len = (int)newfile_len;
if (phar_path_check(&newfile, &tmp_len, &pcr_error) > pcr_is_ok) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0,
"file \"%s\" contains invalid characters %s, cannot be copied from \"%s\" in phar %s", newfile, pcr_error, oldfile, phar_obj->archive->fname);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
newfile_len = tmp_len;
if (phar_obj->archive->is_persistent) {
if (FAILURE == phar_copy_on_write(&(phar_obj->archive))) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "phar \"%s\" is persistent, unable to copy on write", phar_obj->archive->fname);
return;
}
/* re-populate with copied-on-write entry */
oldentry = zend_hash_str_find_ptr(&phar_obj->archive->manifest, oldfile, (uint) oldfile_len);
}
memcpy((void *) &newentry, oldentry, sizeof(phar_entry_info));
if (Z_TYPE(newentry.metadata) != IS_UNDEF) {
zval_copy_ctor(&newentry.metadata);
newentry.metadata_str.s = NULL;
}
newentry.filename = estrndup(newfile, newfile_len);
newentry.filename_len = newfile_len;
newentry.fp_refcount = 0;
if (oldentry->fp_type != PHAR_FP) {
if (FAILURE == phar_copy_entry_fp(oldentry, &newentry, &error)) {
efree(newentry.filename);
php_stream_close(newentry.fp);
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "%s", error);
efree(error);
return;
}
}
zend_hash_str_add_mem(&oldentry->phar->manifest, newfile, newfile_len, &newentry, sizeof(phar_entry_info));
phar_obj->archive->is_modified = 1;
phar_flush(phar_obj->archive, 0, 0, 0, &error);
if (error) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "%s", error);
efree(error);
}
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | PHP_METHOD(Phar, copy)
{
char *oldfile, *newfile, *error;
const char *pcr_error;
size_t oldfile_len, newfile_len;
phar_entry_info *oldentry, newentry = {0}, *temp;
int tmp_len = 0;
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "pp", &oldfile, &oldfile_len, &newfile, &newfile_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (PHAR_G(readonly) && !phar_obj->archive->is_data) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0,
"Cannot copy \"%s\" to \"%s\", phar is read-only", oldfile, newfile);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (oldfile_len >= sizeof(".phar")-1 && !memcmp(oldfile, ".phar", sizeof(".phar")-1)) {
/* can't copy a meta file */
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0,
"file \"%s\" cannot be copied to file \"%s\", cannot copy Phar meta-file in %s", oldfile, newfile, phar_obj->archive->fname);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (newfile_len >= sizeof(".phar")-1 && !memcmp(newfile, ".phar", sizeof(".phar")-1)) {
/* can't copy a meta file */
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0,
"file \"%s\" cannot be copied to file \"%s\", cannot copy to Phar meta-file in %s", oldfile, newfile, phar_obj->archive->fname);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (!zend_hash_str_exists(&phar_obj->archive->manifest, oldfile, (uint) oldfile_len) || NULL == (oldentry = zend_hash_str_find_ptr(&phar_obj->archive->manifest, oldfile, (uint) oldfile_len)) || oldentry->is_deleted) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0,
"file \"%s\" cannot be copied to file \"%s\", file does not exist in %s", oldfile, newfile, phar_obj->archive->fname);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (zend_hash_str_exists(&phar_obj->archive->manifest, newfile, (uint) newfile_len)) {
if (NULL != (temp = zend_hash_str_find_ptr(&phar_obj->archive->manifest, newfile, (uint) newfile_len)) || !temp->is_deleted) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0,
"file \"%s\" cannot be copied to file \"%s\", file must not already exist in phar %s", oldfile, newfile, phar_obj->archive->fname);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
tmp_len = (int)newfile_len;
if (phar_path_check(&newfile, &tmp_len, &pcr_error) > pcr_is_ok) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0,
"file \"%s\" contains invalid characters %s, cannot be copied from \"%s\" in phar %s", newfile, pcr_error, oldfile, phar_obj->archive->fname);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
newfile_len = tmp_len;
if (phar_obj->archive->is_persistent) {
if (FAILURE == phar_copy_on_write(&(phar_obj->archive))) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "phar \"%s\" is persistent, unable to copy on write", phar_obj->archive->fname);
return;
}
/* re-populate with copied-on-write entry */
oldentry = zend_hash_str_find_ptr(&phar_obj->archive->manifest, oldfile, (uint) oldfile_len);
}
memcpy((void *) &newentry, oldentry, sizeof(phar_entry_info));
if (Z_TYPE(newentry.metadata) != IS_UNDEF) {
zval_copy_ctor(&newentry.metadata);
newentry.metadata_str.s = NULL;
}
newentry.filename = estrndup(newfile, newfile_len);
newentry.filename_len = newfile_len;
newentry.fp_refcount = 0;
if (oldentry->fp_type != PHAR_FP) {
if (FAILURE == phar_copy_entry_fp(oldentry, &newentry, &error)) {
efree(newentry.filename);
php_stream_close(newentry.fp);
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "%s", error);
efree(error);
return;
}
}
zend_hash_str_add_mem(&oldentry->phar->manifest, newfile, newfile_len, &newentry, sizeof(phar_entry_info));
phar_obj->archive->is_modified = 1;
phar_flush(phar_obj->archive, 0, 0, 0, &error);
if (error) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "%s", error);
efree(error);
}
RETURN_TRUE;
}
| 165,064 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void MediaStreamDispatcherHost::BindRequest(
mojom::MediaStreamDispatcherHostRequest request) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
bindings_.AddBinding(this, std::move(request));
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | void MediaStreamDispatcherHost::BindRequest(
void MediaStreamDispatcherHost::Create(
int render_process_id,
int render_frame_id,
MediaStreamManager* media_stream_manager,
mojom::MediaStreamDispatcherHostRequest request) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
mojo::MakeStrongBinding(
std::make_unique<MediaStreamDispatcherHost>(
render_process_id, render_frame_id, media_stream_manager),
std::move(request));
}
| 173,091 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int main(int argc __unused, char** argv)
{
signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
char value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
bool doLog = (property_get("ro.test_harness", value, "0") > 0) && (atoi(value) == 1);
pid_t childPid;
if (doLog && (childPid = fork()) != 0) {
strcpy(argv[0], "media.log");
sp<ProcessState> proc(ProcessState::self());
MediaLogService::instantiate();
ProcessState::self()->startThreadPool();
for (;;) {
siginfo_t info;
int ret = waitid(P_PID, childPid, &info, WEXITED | WSTOPPED | WCONTINUED);
if (ret == EINTR) {
continue;
}
if (ret < 0) {
break;
}
char buffer[32];
const char *code;
switch (info.si_code) {
case CLD_EXITED:
code = "CLD_EXITED";
break;
case CLD_KILLED:
code = "CLD_KILLED";
break;
case CLD_DUMPED:
code = "CLD_DUMPED";
break;
case CLD_STOPPED:
code = "CLD_STOPPED";
break;
case CLD_TRAPPED:
code = "CLD_TRAPPED";
break;
case CLD_CONTINUED:
code = "CLD_CONTINUED";
break;
default:
snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "unknown (%d)", info.si_code);
code = buffer;
break;
}
struct rusage usage;
getrusage(RUSAGE_CHILDREN, &usage);
ALOG(LOG_ERROR, "media.log", "pid %d status %d code %s user %ld.%03lds sys %ld.%03lds",
info.si_pid, info.si_status, code,
usage.ru_utime.tv_sec, usage.ru_utime.tv_usec / 1000,
usage.ru_stime.tv_sec, usage.ru_stime.tv_usec / 1000);
sp<IServiceManager> sm = defaultServiceManager();
sp<IBinder> binder = sm->getService(String16("media.log"));
if (binder != 0) {
Vector<String16> args;
binder->dump(-1, args);
}
switch (info.si_code) {
case CLD_EXITED:
case CLD_KILLED:
case CLD_DUMPED: {
ALOG(LOG_INFO, "media.log", "exiting");
_exit(0);
}
default:
break;
}
}
} else {
if (doLog) {
prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG, SIGKILL); // if parent media.log dies before me, kill me also
setpgid(0, 0); // but if I die first, don't kill my parent
}
InitializeIcuOrDie();
sp<ProcessState> proc(ProcessState::self());
sp<IServiceManager> sm = defaultServiceManager();
ALOGI("ServiceManager: %p", sm.get());
AudioFlinger::instantiate();
MediaPlayerService::instantiate();
ResourceManagerService::instantiate();
CameraService::instantiate();
AudioPolicyService::instantiate();
SoundTriggerHwService::instantiate();
RadioService::instantiate();
registerExtensions();
ProcessState::self()->startThreadPool();
IPCThreadState::self()->joinThreadPool();
}
}
Commit Message: limit mediaserver memory
Limit mediaserver using rlimit, to prevent it from bringing down the system
via the low memory killer.
Default max is 65% of total RAM, but can be customized via system property.
Bug: 28471206
Bug: 28615448
Change-Id: Ic84137435d1ef0a6883e9789a4b4f399e4283f05
CWE ID: CWE-399 | int main(int argc __unused, char** argv)
{
limitProcessMemory(
"ro.media.maxmem", /* property that defines limit */
SIZE_MAX, /* upper limit in bytes */
65 /* upper limit as percentage of physical RAM */);
signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
char value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
bool doLog = (property_get("ro.test_harness", value, "0") > 0) && (atoi(value) == 1);
pid_t childPid;
if (doLog && (childPid = fork()) != 0) {
strcpy(argv[0], "media.log");
sp<ProcessState> proc(ProcessState::self());
MediaLogService::instantiate();
ProcessState::self()->startThreadPool();
for (;;) {
siginfo_t info;
int ret = waitid(P_PID, childPid, &info, WEXITED | WSTOPPED | WCONTINUED);
if (ret == EINTR) {
continue;
}
if (ret < 0) {
break;
}
char buffer[32];
const char *code;
switch (info.si_code) {
case CLD_EXITED:
code = "CLD_EXITED";
break;
case CLD_KILLED:
code = "CLD_KILLED";
break;
case CLD_DUMPED:
code = "CLD_DUMPED";
break;
case CLD_STOPPED:
code = "CLD_STOPPED";
break;
case CLD_TRAPPED:
code = "CLD_TRAPPED";
break;
case CLD_CONTINUED:
code = "CLD_CONTINUED";
break;
default:
snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "unknown (%d)", info.si_code);
code = buffer;
break;
}
struct rusage usage;
getrusage(RUSAGE_CHILDREN, &usage);
ALOG(LOG_ERROR, "media.log", "pid %d status %d code %s user %ld.%03lds sys %ld.%03lds",
info.si_pid, info.si_status, code,
usage.ru_utime.tv_sec, usage.ru_utime.tv_usec / 1000,
usage.ru_stime.tv_sec, usage.ru_stime.tv_usec / 1000);
sp<IServiceManager> sm = defaultServiceManager();
sp<IBinder> binder = sm->getService(String16("media.log"));
if (binder != 0) {
Vector<String16> args;
binder->dump(-1, args);
}
switch (info.si_code) {
case CLD_EXITED:
case CLD_KILLED:
case CLD_DUMPED: {
ALOG(LOG_INFO, "media.log", "exiting");
_exit(0);
}
default:
break;
}
}
} else {
if (doLog) {
prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG, SIGKILL); // if parent media.log dies before me, kill me also
setpgid(0, 0); // but if I die first, don't kill my parent
}
InitializeIcuOrDie();
sp<ProcessState> proc(ProcessState::self());
sp<IServiceManager> sm = defaultServiceManager();
ALOGI("ServiceManager: %p", sm.get());
AudioFlinger::instantiate();
MediaPlayerService::instantiate();
ResourceManagerService::instantiate();
CameraService::instantiate();
AudioPolicyService::instantiate();
SoundTriggerHwService::instantiate();
RadioService::instantiate();
registerExtensions();
ProcessState::self()->startThreadPool();
IPCThreadState::self()->joinThreadPool();
}
}
| 173,564 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: status_t ACodec::setupAACCodec(
bool encoder, int32_t numChannels, int32_t sampleRate,
int32_t bitRate, int32_t aacProfile, bool isADTS, int32_t sbrMode,
int32_t maxOutputChannelCount, const drcParams_t& drc,
int32_t pcmLimiterEnable) {
if (encoder && isADTS) {
return -EINVAL;
}
status_t err = setupRawAudioFormat(
encoder ? kPortIndexInput : kPortIndexOutput,
sampleRate,
numChannels);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
if (encoder) {
err = selectAudioPortFormat(kPortIndexOutput, OMX_AUDIO_CodingAAC);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE def;
InitOMXParams(&def);
def.nPortIndex = kPortIndexOutput;
err = mOMX->getParameter(
mNode, OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition, &def, sizeof(def));
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
def.format.audio.bFlagErrorConcealment = OMX_TRUE;
def.format.audio.eEncoding = OMX_AUDIO_CodingAAC;
err = mOMX->setParameter(
mNode, OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition, &def, sizeof(def));
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE profile;
InitOMXParams(&profile);
profile.nPortIndex = kPortIndexOutput;
err = mOMX->getParameter(
mNode, OMX_IndexParamAudioAac, &profile, sizeof(profile));
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
profile.nChannels = numChannels;
profile.eChannelMode =
(numChannels == 1)
? OMX_AUDIO_ChannelModeMono: OMX_AUDIO_ChannelModeStereo;
profile.nSampleRate = sampleRate;
profile.nBitRate = bitRate;
profile.nAudioBandWidth = 0;
profile.nFrameLength = 0;
profile.nAACtools = OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAll;
profile.nAACERtools = OMX_AUDIO_AACERNone;
profile.eAACProfile = (OMX_AUDIO_AACPROFILETYPE) aacProfile;
profile.eAACStreamFormat = OMX_AUDIO_AACStreamFormatMP4FF;
switch (sbrMode) {
case 0:
profile.nAACtools &= ~OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidSSBR;
profile.nAACtools &= ~OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidDSBR;
break;
case 1:
profile.nAACtools |= OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidSSBR;
profile.nAACtools &= ~OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidDSBR;
break;
case 2:
profile.nAACtools &= ~OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidSSBR;
profile.nAACtools |= OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidDSBR;
break;
case -1:
profile.nAACtools |= OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidSSBR;
profile.nAACtools |= OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidDSBR;
break;
default:
return BAD_VALUE;
}
err = mOMX->setParameter(
mNode, OMX_IndexParamAudioAac, &profile, sizeof(profile));
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
return err;
}
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE profile;
InitOMXParams(&profile);
profile.nPortIndex = kPortIndexInput;
err = mOMX->getParameter(
mNode, OMX_IndexParamAudioAac, &profile, sizeof(profile));
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
profile.nChannels = numChannels;
profile.nSampleRate = sampleRate;
profile.eAACStreamFormat =
isADTS
? OMX_AUDIO_AACStreamFormatMP4ADTS
: OMX_AUDIO_AACStreamFormatMP4FF;
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_ANDROID_AACPRESENTATIONTYPE presentation;
presentation.nMaxOutputChannels = maxOutputChannelCount;
presentation.nDrcCut = drc.drcCut;
presentation.nDrcBoost = drc.drcBoost;
presentation.nHeavyCompression = drc.heavyCompression;
presentation.nTargetReferenceLevel = drc.targetRefLevel;
presentation.nEncodedTargetLevel = drc.encodedTargetLevel;
presentation.nPCMLimiterEnable = pcmLimiterEnable;
status_t res = mOMX->setParameter(mNode, OMX_IndexParamAudioAac, &profile, sizeof(profile));
if (res == OK) {
mOMX->setParameter(mNode, (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_IndexParamAudioAndroidAacPresentation,
&presentation, sizeof(presentation));
} else {
ALOGW("did not set AudioAndroidAacPresentation due to error %d when setting AudioAac", res);
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: Fix initialization of AAC presentation struct
Otherwise the new size checks trip on this.
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I1f8f01097e3a88ff041b69279a6121be842f1766
CWE ID: CWE-119 | status_t ACodec::setupAACCodec(
bool encoder, int32_t numChannels, int32_t sampleRate,
int32_t bitRate, int32_t aacProfile, bool isADTS, int32_t sbrMode,
int32_t maxOutputChannelCount, const drcParams_t& drc,
int32_t pcmLimiterEnable) {
if (encoder && isADTS) {
return -EINVAL;
}
status_t err = setupRawAudioFormat(
encoder ? kPortIndexInput : kPortIndexOutput,
sampleRate,
numChannels);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
if (encoder) {
err = selectAudioPortFormat(kPortIndexOutput, OMX_AUDIO_CodingAAC);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE def;
InitOMXParams(&def);
def.nPortIndex = kPortIndexOutput;
err = mOMX->getParameter(
mNode, OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition, &def, sizeof(def));
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
def.format.audio.bFlagErrorConcealment = OMX_TRUE;
def.format.audio.eEncoding = OMX_AUDIO_CodingAAC;
err = mOMX->setParameter(
mNode, OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition, &def, sizeof(def));
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE profile;
InitOMXParams(&profile);
profile.nPortIndex = kPortIndexOutput;
err = mOMX->getParameter(
mNode, OMX_IndexParamAudioAac, &profile, sizeof(profile));
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
profile.nChannels = numChannels;
profile.eChannelMode =
(numChannels == 1)
? OMX_AUDIO_ChannelModeMono: OMX_AUDIO_ChannelModeStereo;
profile.nSampleRate = sampleRate;
profile.nBitRate = bitRate;
profile.nAudioBandWidth = 0;
profile.nFrameLength = 0;
profile.nAACtools = OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAll;
profile.nAACERtools = OMX_AUDIO_AACERNone;
profile.eAACProfile = (OMX_AUDIO_AACPROFILETYPE) aacProfile;
profile.eAACStreamFormat = OMX_AUDIO_AACStreamFormatMP4FF;
switch (sbrMode) {
case 0:
profile.nAACtools &= ~OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidSSBR;
profile.nAACtools &= ~OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidDSBR;
break;
case 1:
profile.nAACtools |= OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidSSBR;
profile.nAACtools &= ~OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidDSBR;
break;
case 2:
profile.nAACtools &= ~OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidSSBR;
profile.nAACtools |= OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidDSBR;
break;
case -1:
profile.nAACtools |= OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidSSBR;
profile.nAACtools |= OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidDSBR;
break;
default:
return BAD_VALUE;
}
err = mOMX->setParameter(
mNode, OMX_IndexParamAudioAac, &profile, sizeof(profile));
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
return err;
}
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE profile;
InitOMXParams(&profile);
profile.nPortIndex = kPortIndexInput;
err = mOMX->getParameter(
mNode, OMX_IndexParamAudioAac, &profile, sizeof(profile));
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
profile.nChannels = numChannels;
profile.nSampleRate = sampleRate;
profile.eAACStreamFormat =
isADTS
? OMX_AUDIO_AACStreamFormatMP4ADTS
: OMX_AUDIO_AACStreamFormatMP4FF;
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_ANDROID_AACPRESENTATIONTYPE presentation;
InitOMXParams(&presentation);
presentation.nMaxOutputChannels = maxOutputChannelCount;
presentation.nDrcCut = drc.drcCut;
presentation.nDrcBoost = drc.drcBoost;
presentation.nHeavyCompression = drc.heavyCompression;
presentation.nTargetReferenceLevel = drc.targetRefLevel;
presentation.nEncodedTargetLevel = drc.encodedTargetLevel;
presentation.nPCMLimiterEnable = pcmLimiterEnable;
status_t res = mOMX->setParameter(mNode, OMX_IndexParamAudioAac, &profile, sizeof(profile));
if (res == OK) {
mOMX->setParameter(mNode, (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_IndexParamAudioAndroidAacPresentation,
&presentation, sizeof(presentation));
} else {
ALOGW("did not set AudioAndroidAacPresentation due to error %d when setting AudioAac", res);
}
return res;
}
| 174,228 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: mm_sshpam_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
Buffer m;
int success;
debug3("%s", __func__);
buffer_init(&m);
buffer_put_cstring(&m, authctxt->user);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, &m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, &m);
success = buffer_get_int(&m);
if (success == 0) {
debug3("%s: pam_init_ctx failed", __func__);
buffer_free(&m);
return (NULL);
}
buffer_free(&m);
return (authctxt);
}
Commit Message: Don't resend username to PAM; it already has it.
Pointed out by Moritz Jodeit; ok dtucker@
CWE ID: CWE-20 | mm_sshpam_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
Buffer m;
int success;
debug3("%s", __func__);
buffer_init(&m);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, &m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, &m);
success = buffer_get_int(&m);
if (success == 0) {
debug3("%s: pam_init_ctx failed", __func__);
buffer_free(&m);
return (NULL);
}
buffer_free(&m);
return (authctxt);
}
| 166,586 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void OpenSession() {
const int render_process_id = 1;
const int render_frame_id = 1;
const int page_request_id = 1;
const url::Origin security_origin =
url::Origin::Create(GURL("http://test.com"));
ASSERT_TRUE(opened_device_label_.empty());
MediaDeviceInfoArray video_devices;
{
base::RunLoop run_loop;
MediaDevicesManager::BoolDeviceTypes devices_to_enumerate;
devices_to_enumerate[MEDIA_DEVICE_TYPE_VIDEO_INPUT] = true;
media_stream_manager_->media_devices_manager()->EnumerateDevices(
devices_to_enumerate,
base::BindOnce(&VideoInputDevicesEnumerated, run_loop.QuitClosure(),
browser_context_.GetMediaDeviceIDSalt(),
security_origin, &video_devices));
run_loop.Run();
}
ASSERT_FALSE(video_devices.empty());
{
base::RunLoop run_loop;
media_stream_manager_->OpenDevice(
render_process_id, render_frame_id, page_request_id,
video_devices[0].device_id, MEDIA_DEVICE_VIDEO_CAPTURE,
MediaDeviceSaltAndOrigin{browser_context_.GetMediaDeviceIDSalt(),
browser_context_.GetMediaDeviceIDSalt(),
security_origin},
base::BindOnce(&VideoCaptureTest::OnDeviceOpened,
base::Unretained(this), run_loop.QuitClosure()),
MediaStreamManager::DeviceStoppedCallback());
run_loop.Run();
}
ASSERT_NE(MediaStreamDevice::kNoId, opened_session_id_);
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | void OpenSession() {
const int render_process_id = 1;
const int render_frame_id = 1;
const int requester_id = 1;
const int page_request_id = 1;
const url::Origin security_origin =
url::Origin::Create(GURL("http://test.com"));
ASSERT_TRUE(opened_device_label_.empty());
MediaDeviceInfoArray video_devices;
{
base::RunLoop run_loop;
MediaDevicesManager::BoolDeviceTypes devices_to_enumerate;
devices_to_enumerate[MEDIA_DEVICE_TYPE_VIDEO_INPUT] = true;
media_stream_manager_->media_devices_manager()->EnumerateDevices(
devices_to_enumerate,
base::BindOnce(&VideoInputDevicesEnumerated, run_loop.QuitClosure(),
browser_context_.GetMediaDeviceIDSalt(),
security_origin, &video_devices));
run_loop.Run();
}
ASSERT_FALSE(video_devices.empty());
{
base::RunLoop run_loop;
media_stream_manager_->OpenDevice(
render_process_id, render_frame_id, requester_id, page_request_id,
video_devices[0].device_id, MEDIA_DEVICE_VIDEO_CAPTURE,
MediaDeviceSaltAndOrigin{browser_context_.GetMediaDeviceIDSalt(),
browser_context_.GetMediaDeviceIDSalt(),
security_origin},
base::BindOnce(&VideoCaptureTest::OnDeviceOpened,
base::Unretained(this), run_loop.QuitClosure()),
MediaStreamManager::DeviceStoppedCallback());
run_loop.Run();
}
ASSERT_NE(MediaStreamDevice::kNoId, opened_session_id_);
}
| 173,109 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_encrypt)
{
zend_bool raw_output = 0;
char *data, *method, *password, *iv = "";
int data_len, method_len, password_len, iv_len = 0, max_iv_len;
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher_type;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX cipher_ctx;
int i, outlen, keylen;
unsigned char *outbuf, *key;
zend_bool free_iv;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "sss|bs", &data, &data_len, &method, &method_len, &password, &password_len, &raw_output, &iv, &iv_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
cipher_type = EVP_get_cipherbyname(method);
if (!cipher_type) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unknown cipher algorithm");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
keylen = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher_type);
if (keylen > password_len) {
key = emalloc(keylen);
memset(key, 0, keylen);
memcpy(key, password, password_len);
} else {
key = (unsigned char*)password;
}
max_iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher_type);
if (iv_len <= 0 && max_iv_len > 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Using an empty Initialization Vector (iv) is potentially insecure and not recommended");
}
free_iv = php_openssl_validate_iv(&iv, &iv_len, max_iv_len TSRMLS_CC);
outlen = data_len + EVP_CIPHER_block_size(cipher_type);
outbuf = emalloc(outlen + 1);
EVP_EncryptInit(&cipher_ctx, cipher_type, NULL, NULL);
if (password_len > keylen) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&cipher_ctx, password_len);
}
EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&cipher_ctx, NULL, NULL, key, (unsigned char *)iv);
if (data_len > 0) {
EVP_EncryptUpdate(&cipher_ctx, outbuf, &i, (unsigned char *)data, data_len);
}
outlen = i;
if (EVP_EncryptFinal(&cipher_ctx, (unsigned char *)outbuf + i, &i)) {
outlen += i;
if (raw_output) {
outbuf[outlen] = '\0';
RETVAL_STRINGL((char *)outbuf, outlen, 0);
} else {
int base64_str_len;
char *base64_str;
base64_str = (char*)php_base64_encode(outbuf, outlen, &base64_str_len);
efree(outbuf);
RETVAL_STRINGL(base64_str, base64_str_len, 0);
}
} else {
efree(outbuf);
RETVAL_FALSE;
}
if (key != (unsigned char*)password) {
efree(key);
}
if (free_iv) {
efree(iv);
}
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&cipher_ctx);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_encrypt)
{
zend_bool raw_output = 0;
char *data, *method, *password, *iv = "";
int data_len, method_len, password_len, iv_len = 0, max_iv_len;
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher_type;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX cipher_ctx;
int i = 0, outlen, keylen;
unsigned char *outbuf, *key;
zend_bool free_iv;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "sss|bs", &data, &data_len, &method, &method_len, &password, &password_len, &raw_output, &iv, &iv_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
cipher_type = EVP_get_cipherbyname(method);
if (!cipher_type) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unknown cipher algorithm");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
keylen = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher_type);
if (keylen > password_len) {
key = emalloc(keylen);
memset(key, 0, keylen);
memcpy(key, password, password_len);
} else {
key = (unsigned char*)password;
}
max_iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher_type);
if (iv_len <= 0 && max_iv_len > 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Using an empty Initialization Vector (iv) is potentially insecure and not recommended");
}
free_iv = php_openssl_validate_iv(&iv, &iv_len, max_iv_len TSRMLS_CC);
outlen = data_len + EVP_CIPHER_block_size(cipher_type);
outbuf = emalloc(outlen + 1);
EVP_EncryptInit(&cipher_ctx, cipher_type, NULL, NULL);
if (password_len > keylen) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&cipher_ctx, password_len);
}
EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&cipher_ctx, NULL, NULL, key, (unsigned char *)iv);
if (data_len > 0) {
EVP_EncryptUpdate(&cipher_ctx, outbuf, &i, (unsigned char *)data, data_len);
}
outlen = i;
if (EVP_EncryptFinal(&cipher_ctx, (unsigned char *)outbuf + i, &i)) {
outlen += i;
if (raw_output) {
outbuf[outlen] = '\0';
RETVAL_STRINGL((char *)outbuf, outlen, 0);
} else {
int base64_str_len;
char *base64_str;
base64_str = (char*)php_base64_encode(outbuf, outlen, &base64_str_len);
efree(outbuf);
RETVAL_STRINGL(base64_str, base64_str_len, 0);
}
} else {
efree(outbuf);
RETVAL_FALSE;
}
if (key != (unsigned char*)password) {
efree(key);
}
if (free_iv) {
efree(iv);
}
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&cipher_ctx);
}
| 164,805 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int toggle_utf8(const char *name, int fd, bool utf8) {
int r;
struct termios tc = {};
assert(name);
r = ioctl(fd, KDSKBMODE, utf8 ? K_UNICODE : K_XLATE);
if (r < 0)
return log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to %s UTF-8 kbdmode on %s: %m", enable_disable(utf8), name);
r = loop_write(fd, utf8 ? "\033%G" : "\033%@", 3, false);
if (r < 0)
return log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to %s UTF-8 term processing on %s: %m", enable_disable(utf8), name);
r = tcgetattr(fd, &tc);
if (r >= 0) {
SET_FLAG(tc.c_iflag, IUTF8, utf8);
r = tcsetattr(fd, TCSANOW, &tc);
}
if (r < 0)
return log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to %s iutf8 flag on %s: %m", enable_disable(utf8), name);
log_debug("UTF-8 kbdmode %sd on %s", enable_disable(utf8), name);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #12378 from rbalint/vt-kbd-reset-check
VT kbd reset check
CWE ID: CWE-255 | static int toggle_utf8(const char *name, int fd, bool utf8) {
int r;
struct termios tc = {};
assert(name);
r = vt_verify_kbmode(fd);
if (r == -EBUSY) {
log_warning_errno(r, "Virtual console %s is not in K_XLATE or K_UNICODE: %m", name);
return 0;
} else if (r < 0)
return log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to verify kbdmode on %s: %m", name);
r = ioctl(fd, KDSKBMODE, utf8 ? K_UNICODE : K_XLATE);
if (r < 0)
return log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to %s UTF-8 kbdmode on %s: %m", enable_disable(utf8), name);
r = loop_write(fd, utf8 ? "\033%G" : "\033%@", 3, false);
if (r < 0)
return log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to %s UTF-8 term processing on %s: %m", enable_disable(utf8), name);
r = tcgetattr(fd, &tc);
if (r >= 0) {
SET_FLAG(tc.c_iflag, IUTF8, utf8);
r = tcsetattr(fd, TCSANOW, &tc);
}
if (r < 0)
return log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to %s iutf8 flag on %s: %m", enable_disable(utf8), name);
log_debug("UTF-8 kbdmode %sd on %s", enable_disable(utf8), name);
return 0;
}
| 169,779 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: WebContents* PrintPreviewDialogController::CreatePrintPreviewDialog(
WebContents* initiator) {
base::AutoReset<bool> auto_reset(&is_creating_print_preview_dialog_, true);
ConstrainedWebDialogDelegate* web_dialog_delegate =
ShowConstrainedWebDialog(initiator->GetBrowserContext(),
new PrintPreviewDialogDelegate(initiator),
initiator);
WebContents* preview_dialog = web_dialog_delegate->GetWebContents();
GURL print_url(chrome::kChromeUIPrintURL);
content::HostZoomMap::Get(preview_dialog->GetSiteInstance())
->SetZoomLevelForHostAndScheme(print_url.scheme(), print_url.host(), 0);
PrintViewManager::CreateForWebContents(preview_dialog);
extensions::ChromeExtensionWebContentsObserver::CreateForWebContents(
preview_dialog);
preview_dialog_map_[preview_dialog] = initiator;
waiting_for_new_preview_page_ = true;
task_manager::WebContentsTags::CreateForPrintingContents(preview_dialog);
AddObservers(initiator);
AddObservers(preview_dialog);
return preview_dialog;
}
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
[email protected]
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | WebContents* PrintPreviewDialogController::CreatePrintPreviewDialog(
WebContents* initiator) {
base::AutoReset<bool> auto_reset(&is_creating_print_preview_dialog_, true);
ConstrainedWebDialogDelegate* web_dialog_delegate =
ShowConstrainedWebDialog(initiator->GetBrowserContext(),
new PrintPreviewDialogDelegate(initiator),
initiator);
WebContents* preview_dialog = web_dialog_delegate->GetWebContents();
GURL print_url(chrome::kChromeUIPrintURL);
content::HostZoomMap::Get(preview_dialog->GetSiteInstance())
->SetZoomLevelForHostAndScheme(print_url.scheme(), print_url.host(), 0);
PrintViewManager::CreateForWebContents(preview_dialog);
CreateCompositeClientIfNeeded(preview_dialog, true /* for_preview */);
extensions::ChromeExtensionWebContentsObserver::CreateForWebContents(
preview_dialog);
preview_dialog_map_[preview_dialog] = initiator;
waiting_for_new_preview_page_ = true;
task_manager::WebContentsTags::CreateForPrintingContents(preview_dialog);
AddObservers(initiator);
AddObservers(preview_dialog);
return preview_dialog;
}
| 171,887 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static apr_status_t parse_chunk_size(http_ctx_t *ctx, const char *buffer,
apr_size_t len, int linelimit)
{
apr_size_t i = 0;
while (i < len) {
char c = buffer[i];
ap_xlate_proto_from_ascii(&c, 1);
/* handle CRLF after the chunk */
if (ctx->state == BODY_CHUNK_END) {
if (c == LF) {
ctx->state = BODY_CHUNK;
}
i++;
continue;
}
/* handle start of the chunk */
if (ctx->state == BODY_CHUNK) {
if (!apr_isxdigit(c)) {
/*
* Detect invalid character at beginning. This also works for empty
* chunk size lines.
*/
return APR_EGENERAL;
}
else {
ctx->state = BODY_CHUNK_PART;
}
ctx->remaining = 0;
ctx->chunkbits = sizeof(long) * 8;
ctx->chunk_used = 0;
}
/* handle a chunk part, or a chunk extension */
/*
* In theory, we are supposed to expect CRLF only, but our
* test suite sends LF only. Tolerate a missing CR.
*/
if (c == ';' || c == CR) {
ctx->state = BODY_CHUNK_EXT;
}
else if (c == LF) {
if (ctx->remaining) {
ctx->state = BODY_CHUNK_DATA;
}
else {
ctx->state = BODY_CHUNK_TRAILER;
}
}
else if (ctx->state != BODY_CHUNK_EXT) {
int xvalue = 0;
/* ignore leading zeros */
if (!ctx->remaining && c == '0') {
i++;
continue;
}
if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') {
xvalue = c - '0';
}
else if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') {
xvalue = c - 'A' + 0xa;
}
else if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') {
xvalue = c - 'a' + 0xa;
}
else {
/* bogus character */
return APR_EGENERAL;
}
ctx->remaining = (ctx->remaining << 4) | xvalue;
ctx->chunkbits -= 4;
if (ctx->chunkbits <= 0 || ctx->remaining < 0) {
/* overflow */
return APR_ENOSPC;
}
}
i++;
}
/* sanity check */
ctx->chunk_used += len;
if (ctx->chunk_used < 0 || ctx->chunk_used > linelimit) {
return APR_ENOSPC;
}
return APR_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Limit accepted chunk-size to 2^63-1 and be strict about chunk-ext
authorized characters.
Submitted by: Yann Ylavic
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1684513 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static apr_status_t parse_chunk_size(http_ctx_t *ctx, const char *buffer,
apr_size_t len, int linelimit)
{
apr_size_t i = 0;
while (i < len) {
char c = buffer[i];
ap_xlate_proto_from_ascii(&c, 1);
/* handle CRLF after the chunk */
if (ctx->state == BODY_CHUNK_END
|| ctx->state == BODY_CHUNK_END_LF) {
if (c == LF) {
ctx->state = BODY_CHUNK;
}
else if (c == CR && ctx->state == BODY_CHUNK_END) {
ctx->state = BODY_CHUNK_END_LF;
}
else {
/*
* LF expected.
*/
return APR_EINVAL;
}
i++;
continue;
}
/* handle start of the chunk */
if (ctx->state == BODY_CHUNK) {
if (!apr_isxdigit(c)) {
/*
* Detect invalid character at beginning. This also works for
* empty chunk size lines.
*/
return APR_EINVAL;
}
else {
ctx->state = BODY_CHUNK_PART;
}
ctx->remaining = 0;
ctx->chunkbits = sizeof(apr_off_t) * 8;
ctx->chunk_used = 0;
}
if (c == LF) {
if (ctx->remaining) {
ctx->state = BODY_CHUNK_DATA;
}
else {
ctx->state = BODY_CHUNK_TRAILER;
}
}
else if (ctx->state == BODY_CHUNK_LF) {
/*
* LF expected.
*/
return APR_EINVAL;
}
else if (c == CR) {
ctx->state = BODY_CHUNK_LF;
}
else if (c == ';') {
ctx->state = BODY_CHUNK_EXT;
}
else if (ctx->state == BODY_CHUNK_EXT) {
/*
* Control chars (but tabs) are invalid.
*/
if (c != '\t' && apr_iscntrl(c)) {
return APR_EINVAL;
}
}
else if (ctx->state == BODY_CHUNK_PART) {
int xvalue;
/* ignore leading zeros */
if (!ctx->remaining && c == '0') {
i++;
continue;
}
ctx->chunkbits -= 4;
if (ctx->chunkbits < 0) {
/* overflow */
return APR_ENOSPC;
}
if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') {
xvalue = c - '0';
}
else if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') {
xvalue = c - 'A' + 0xa;
}
else if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') {
xvalue = c - 'a' + 0xa;
}
else {
/* bogus character */
return APR_EINVAL;
}
ctx->remaining = (ctx->remaining << 4) | xvalue;
if (ctx->remaining < 0) {
/* overflow */
return APR_ENOSPC;
}
}
else {
/* Should not happen */
return APR_EGENERAL;
}
i++;
}
/* sanity check */
ctx->chunk_used += len;
if (ctx->chunk_used < 0 || ctx->chunk_used > linelimit) {
return APR_ENOSPC;
}
return APR_SUCCESS;
}
| 166,634 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int touch_file(const char *path, bool parents, usec_t stamp, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode) {
_cleanup_close_ int fd;
int r;
assert(path);
if (parents)
mkdir_parents(path, 0755);
fd = open(path, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY, mode > 0 ? mode : 0644);
if (fd < 0)
return -errno;
if (mode != MODE_INVALID) {
r = fchmod(fd, mode);
if (r < 0)
return -errno;
}
if (uid != UID_INVALID || gid != GID_INVALID) {
r = fchown(fd, uid, gid);
if (r < 0)
return -errno;
}
if (stamp != USEC_INFINITY) {
struct timespec ts[2];
timespec_store(&ts[0], stamp);
ts[1] = ts[0];
r = futimens(fd, ts);
} else
r = futimens(fd, NULL);
if (r < 0)
return -errno;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: basic: fix touch() creating files with 07777 mode
mode_t is unsigned, so MODE_INVALID < 0 can never be true.
This fixes a possible DoS where any user could fill /run by writing to
a world-writable /run/systemd/show-status.
CWE ID: CWE-264 | int touch_file(const char *path, bool parents, usec_t stamp, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode) {
_cleanup_close_ int fd;
int r;
assert(path);
if (parents)
mkdir_parents(path, 0755);
fd = open(path, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY,
(mode == 0 || mode == MODE_INVALID) ? 0644 : mode);
if (fd < 0)
return -errno;
if (mode != MODE_INVALID) {
r = fchmod(fd, mode);
if (r < 0)
return -errno;
}
if (uid != UID_INVALID || gid != GID_INVALID) {
r = fchown(fd, uid, gid);
if (r < 0)
return -errno;
}
if (stamp != USEC_INFINITY) {
struct timespec ts[2];
timespec_store(&ts[0], stamp);
ts[1] = ts[0];
r = futimens(fd, ts);
} else
r = futimens(fd, NULL);
if (r < 0)
return -errno;
return 0;
}
| 168,517 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void HeapAllocator::backingFree(void* address) {
if (!address)
return;
ThreadState* state = ThreadState::current();
if (state->sweepForbidden())
return;
ASSERT(!state->isInGC());
BasePage* page = pageFromObject(address);
if (page->isLargeObjectPage() || page->arena()->getThreadState() != state)
return;
HeapObjectHeader* header = HeapObjectHeader::fromPayload(address);
ASSERT(header->checkHeader());
NormalPageArena* arena = static_cast<NormalPage*>(page)->arenaForNormalPage();
state->promptlyFreed(header->gcInfoIndex());
arena->promptlyFreeObject(header);
}
Commit Message: Call HeapObjectHeader::checkHeader solely for its side-effect.
This requires changing its signature. This is a preliminary stage to making it
private.
BUG=633030
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2698673003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#460489}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void HeapAllocator::backingFree(void* address) {
if (!address)
return;
ThreadState* state = ThreadState::current();
if (state->sweepForbidden())
return;
ASSERT(!state->isInGC());
BasePage* page = pageFromObject(address);
if (page->isLargeObjectPage() || page->arena()->getThreadState() != state)
return;
HeapObjectHeader* header = HeapObjectHeader::fromPayload(address);
header->checkHeader();
NormalPageArena* arena = static_cast<NormalPage*>(page)->arenaForNormalPage();
state->promptlyFreed(header->gcInfoIndex());
arena->promptlyFreeObject(header);
}
| 172,706 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static bool ndp_msg_check_valid(struct ndp_msg *msg)
{
size_t len = ndp_msg_payload_len(msg);
enum ndp_msg_type msg_type = ndp_msg_type(msg);
if (len < ndp_msg_type_info(msg_type)->raw_struct_size)
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: libndb: reject redirect and router advertisements from non-link-local
RFC4861 suggests that these messages should only originate from
link-local addresses in 6.1.2 (RA) and 8.1. (redirect):
Mitigates CVE-2016-3698.
Signed-off-by: Lubomir Rintel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-284 | static bool ndp_msg_check_valid(struct ndp_msg *msg)
{
size_t len = ndp_msg_payload_len(msg);
enum ndp_msg_type msg_type = ndp_msg_type(msg);
if (len < ndp_msg_type_info(msg_type)->raw_struct_size)
return false;
if (ndp_msg_type_info(msg_type)->addrto_validate)
return ndp_msg_type_info(msg_type)->addrto_validate(&msg->addrto);
else
return true;
}
| 169,971 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
libettercap_init();
ef_globals_alloc();
select_text_interface();
libettercap_ui_init();
/* etterfilter copyright */
fprintf(stdout, "\n" EC_COLOR_BOLD "%s %s" EC_COLOR_END " copyright %s %s\n\n",
PROGRAM, EC_VERSION, EC_COPYRIGHT, EC_AUTHORS);
/* initialize the line number */
EF_GBL->lineno = 1;
/* getopt related parsing... */
parse_options(argc, argv);
/* set the input for source file */
if (EF_GBL_OPTIONS->source_file) {
yyin = fopen(EF_GBL_OPTIONS->source_file, "r");
if (yyin == NULL)
FATAL_ERROR("Input file not found !");
} else {
FATAL_ERROR("No source file.");
}
/* no buffering */
setbuf(yyin, NULL);
setbuf(stdout, NULL);
setbuf(stderr, NULL);
/* load the tables in etterfilter.tbl */
load_tables();
/* load the constants in etterfilter.cnt */
load_constants();
/* print the message */
fprintf(stdout, "\n Parsing source file \'%s\' ", EF_GBL_OPTIONS->source_file);
fflush(stdout);
ef_debug(1, "\n");
/* begin the parsing */
if (yyparse() == 0)
fprintf(stdout, " done.\n\n");
else
fprintf(stdout, "\n\nThe script contains errors...\n\n");
/* write to file */
if (write_output() != E_SUCCESS)
FATAL_ERROR("Cannot write output file (%s)", EF_GBL_OPTIONS->output_file);
ef_globals_free();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Exit gracefully in case of corrupted filters (Closes issue #782)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int ret_value = 0;
libettercap_init();
ef_globals_alloc();
select_text_interface();
libettercap_ui_init();
/* etterfilter copyright */
fprintf(stdout, "\n" EC_COLOR_BOLD "%s %s" EC_COLOR_END " copyright %s %s\n\n",
PROGRAM, EC_VERSION, EC_COPYRIGHT, EC_AUTHORS);
/* initialize the line number */
EF_GBL->lineno = 1;
/* getopt related parsing... */
parse_options(argc, argv);
/* set the input for source file */
if (EF_GBL_OPTIONS->source_file) {
yyin = fopen(EF_GBL_OPTIONS->source_file, "r");
if (yyin == NULL)
FATAL_ERROR("Input file not found !");
} else {
FATAL_ERROR("No source file.");
}
/* no buffering */
setbuf(yyin, NULL);
setbuf(stdout, NULL);
setbuf(stderr, NULL);
/* load the tables in etterfilter.tbl */
load_tables();
/* load the constants in etterfilter.cnt */
load_constants();
/* print the message */
fprintf(stdout, "\n Parsing source file \'%s\' ", EF_GBL_OPTIONS->source_file);
fflush(stdout);
ef_debug(1, "\n");
/* begin the parsing */
if (yyparse() == 0)
fprintf(stdout, " done.\n\n");
else
fprintf(stdout, "\n\nThe script contains errors...\n\n");
/* write to file */
ret_value = write_output();
if (ret_value == -E_NOTHANDLED)
FATAL_ERROR("Cannot write output file (%s): the filter is not correctly handled.", EF_GBL_OPTIONS->output_file);
else if (ret_value == -E_INVALID)
FATAL_ERROR("Cannot write output file (%s): the filter format is not correct. ", EF_GBL_OPTIONS->output_file);
ef_globals_free();
return 0;
}
| 168,337 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ExtensionTtsController::SpeakOrEnqueue(Utterance* utterance) {
if (IsSpeaking() && utterance->can_enqueue()) {
utterance_queue_.push(utterance);
} else {
Stop();
SpeakNow(utterance);
}
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void ExtensionTtsController::SpeakOrEnqueue(Utterance* utterance) {
std::string gender;
if (options->HasKey(constants::kGenderKey))
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(
options->GetString(constants::kGenderKey, &gender));
if (!gender.empty() &&
gender != constants::kGenderFemale &&
gender != constants::kGenderMale) {
error_ = constants::kErrorInvalidGender;
return false;
}
| 170,389 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int read_entry(
git_index_entry **out,
size_t *out_size,
git_index *index,
const void *buffer,
size_t buffer_size,
const char *last)
{
size_t path_length, entry_size;
const char *path_ptr;
struct entry_short source;
git_index_entry entry = {{0}};
bool compressed = index->version >= INDEX_VERSION_NUMBER_COMP;
char *tmp_path = NULL;
if (INDEX_FOOTER_SIZE + minimal_entry_size > buffer_size)
return -1;
/* buffer is not guaranteed to be aligned */
memcpy(&source, buffer, sizeof(struct entry_short));
entry.ctime.seconds = (git_time_t)ntohl(source.ctime.seconds);
entry.ctime.nanoseconds = ntohl(source.ctime.nanoseconds);
entry.mtime.seconds = (git_time_t)ntohl(source.mtime.seconds);
entry.mtime.nanoseconds = ntohl(source.mtime.nanoseconds);
entry.dev = ntohl(source.dev);
entry.ino = ntohl(source.ino);
entry.mode = ntohl(source.mode);
entry.uid = ntohl(source.uid);
entry.gid = ntohl(source.gid);
entry.file_size = ntohl(source.file_size);
git_oid_cpy(&entry.id, &source.oid);
entry.flags = ntohs(source.flags);
if (entry.flags & GIT_IDXENTRY_EXTENDED) {
uint16_t flags_raw;
size_t flags_offset;
flags_offset = offsetof(struct entry_long, flags_extended);
memcpy(&flags_raw, (const char *) buffer + flags_offset,
sizeof(flags_raw));
flags_raw = ntohs(flags_raw);
memcpy(&entry.flags_extended, &flags_raw, sizeof(flags_raw));
path_ptr = (const char *) buffer + offsetof(struct entry_long, path);
} else
path_ptr = (const char *) buffer + offsetof(struct entry_short, path);
if (!compressed) {
path_length = entry.flags & GIT_IDXENTRY_NAMEMASK;
/* if this is a very long string, we must find its
* real length without overflowing */
if (path_length == 0xFFF) {
const char *path_end;
path_end = memchr(path_ptr, '\0', buffer_size);
if (path_end == NULL)
return -1;
path_length = path_end - path_ptr;
}
entry_size = index_entry_size(path_length, 0, entry.flags);
entry.path = (char *)path_ptr;
} else {
size_t varint_len, last_len, prefix_len, suffix_len, path_len;
uintmax_t strip_len;
strip_len = git_decode_varint((const unsigned char *)path_ptr, &varint_len);
last_len = strlen(last);
if (varint_len == 0 || last_len < strip_len)
return index_error_invalid("incorrect prefix length");
prefix_len = last_len - strip_len;
suffix_len = strlen(path_ptr + varint_len);
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC_ADD(&path_len, prefix_len, suffix_len);
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC_ADD(&path_len, path_len, 1);
tmp_path = git__malloc(path_len);
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC(tmp_path);
memcpy(tmp_path, last, prefix_len);
memcpy(tmp_path + prefix_len, path_ptr + varint_len, suffix_len + 1);
entry_size = index_entry_size(suffix_len, varint_len, entry.flags);
entry.path = tmp_path;
}
if (entry_size == 0)
return -1;
if (INDEX_FOOTER_SIZE + entry_size > buffer_size)
return -1;
if (index_entry_dup(out, index, &entry) < 0) {
git__free(tmp_path);
return -1;
}
git__free(tmp_path);
*out_size = entry_size;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: index: error out on unreasonable prefix-compressed path lengths
When computing the complete path length from the encoded
prefix-compressed path, we end up just allocating the complete path
without ever checking what the encoded path length actually is. This can
easily lead to a denial of service by just encoding an unreasonable long
path name inside of the index. Git already enforces a maximum path
length of 4096 bytes. As we also have that enforcement ready in some
places, just make sure that the resulting path is smaller than
GIT_PATH_MAX.
Reported-by: Krishna Ram Prakash R <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Vivek Parikh <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | static int read_entry(
git_index_entry **out,
size_t *out_size,
git_index *index,
const void *buffer,
size_t buffer_size,
const char *last)
{
size_t path_length, entry_size;
const char *path_ptr;
struct entry_short source;
git_index_entry entry = {{0}};
bool compressed = index->version >= INDEX_VERSION_NUMBER_COMP;
char *tmp_path = NULL;
if (INDEX_FOOTER_SIZE + minimal_entry_size > buffer_size)
return -1;
/* buffer is not guaranteed to be aligned */
memcpy(&source, buffer, sizeof(struct entry_short));
entry.ctime.seconds = (git_time_t)ntohl(source.ctime.seconds);
entry.ctime.nanoseconds = ntohl(source.ctime.nanoseconds);
entry.mtime.seconds = (git_time_t)ntohl(source.mtime.seconds);
entry.mtime.nanoseconds = ntohl(source.mtime.nanoseconds);
entry.dev = ntohl(source.dev);
entry.ino = ntohl(source.ino);
entry.mode = ntohl(source.mode);
entry.uid = ntohl(source.uid);
entry.gid = ntohl(source.gid);
entry.file_size = ntohl(source.file_size);
git_oid_cpy(&entry.id, &source.oid);
entry.flags = ntohs(source.flags);
if (entry.flags & GIT_IDXENTRY_EXTENDED) {
uint16_t flags_raw;
size_t flags_offset;
flags_offset = offsetof(struct entry_long, flags_extended);
memcpy(&flags_raw, (const char *) buffer + flags_offset,
sizeof(flags_raw));
flags_raw = ntohs(flags_raw);
memcpy(&entry.flags_extended, &flags_raw, sizeof(flags_raw));
path_ptr = (const char *) buffer + offsetof(struct entry_long, path);
} else
path_ptr = (const char *) buffer + offsetof(struct entry_short, path);
if (!compressed) {
path_length = entry.flags & GIT_IDXENTRY_NAMEMASK;
/* if this is a very long string, we must find its
* real length without overflowing */
if (path_length == 0xFFF) {
const char *path_end;
path_end = memchr(path_ptr, '\0', buffer_size);
if (path_end == NULL)
return -1;
path_length = path_end - path_ptr;
}
entry_size = index_entry_size(path_length, 0, entry.flags);
entry.path = (char *)path_ptr;
} else {
size_t varint_len, last_len, prefix_len, suffix_len, path_len;
uintmax_t strip_len;
strip_len = git_decode_varint((const unsigned char *)path_ptr, &varint_len);
last_len = strlen(last);
if (varint_len == 0 || last_len < strip_len)
return index_error_invalid("incorrect prefix length");
prefix_len = last_len - strip_len;
suffix_len = strlen(path_ptr + varint_len);
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC_ADD(&path_len, prefix_len, suffix_len);
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC_ADD(&path_len, path_len, 1);
if (path_len > GIT_PATH_MAX)
return index_error_invalid("unreasonable path length");
tmp_path = git__malloc(path_len);
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC(tmp_path);
memcpy(tmp_path, last, prefix_len);
memcpy(tmp_path + prefix_len, path_ptr + varint_len, suffix_len + 1);
entry_size = index_entry_size(suffix_len, varint_len, entry.flags);
entry.path = tmp_path;
}
if (entry_size == 0)
return -1;
if (INDEX_FOOTER_SIZE + entry_size > buffer_size)
return -1;
if (index_entry_dup(out, index, &entry) < 0) {
git__free(tmp_path);
return -1;
}
git__free(tmp_path);
*out_size = entry_size;
return 0;
}
| 170,171 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ext2_xattr_get(struct inode *inode, int name_index, const char *name,
void *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
{
struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
struct ext2_xattr_entry *entry;
size_t name_len, size;
char *end;
int error;
ea_idebug(inode, "name=%d.%s, buffer=%p, buffer_size=%ld",
name_index, name, buffer, (long)buffer_size);
if (name == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
name_len = strlen(name);
if (name_len > 255)
return -ERANGE;
down_read(&EXT2_I(inode)->xattr_sem);
error = -ENODATA;
if (!EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl)
goto cleanup;
ea_idebug(inode, "reading block %d", EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
bh = sb_bread(inode->i_sb, EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
error = -EIO;
if (!bh)
goto cleanup;
ea_bdebug(bh, "b_count=%d, refcount=%d",
atomic_read(&(bh->b_count)), le32_to_cpu(HDR(bh)->h_refcount));
end = bh->b_data + bh->b_size;
if (HDR(bh)->h_magic != cpu_to_le32(EXT2_XATTR_MAGIC) ||
HDR(bh)->h_blocks != cpu_to_le32(1)) {
bad_block: ext2_error(inode->i_sb, "ext2_xattr_get",
"inode %ld: bad block %d", inode->i_ino,
EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
error = -EIO;
goto cleanup;
}
/* find named attribute */
entry = FIRST_ENTRY(bh);
while (!IS_LAST_ENTRY(entry)) {
struct ext2_xattr_entry *next =
EXT2_XATTR_NEXT(entry);
if ((char *)next >= end)
goto bad_block;
if (name_index == entry->e_name_index &&
name_len == entry->e_name_len &&
memcmp(name, entry->e_name, name_len) == 0)
goto found;
entry = next;
}
if (ext2_xattr_cache_insert(bh))
ea_idebug(inode, "cache insert failed");
error = -ENODATA;
goto cleanup;
found:
/* check the buffer size */
if (entry->e_value_block != 0)
goto bad_block;
size = le32_to_cpu(entry->e_value_size);
if (size > inode->i_sb->s_blocksize ||
le16_to_cpu(entry->e_value_offs) + size > inode->i_sb->s_blocksize)
goto bad_block;
if (ext2_xattr_cache_insert(bh))
ea_idebug(inode, "cache insert failed");
if (buffer) {
error = -ERANGE;
if (size > buffer_size)
goto cleanup;
/* return value of attribute */
memcpy(buffer, bh->b_data + le16_to_cpu(entry->e_value_offs),
size);
}
error = size;
cleanup:
brelse(bh);
up_read(&EXT2_I(inode)->xattr_sem);
return error;
}
Commit Message: ext2: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. We convert filesystem from
a global cache to per-fs one. Similarly to ext4 the tricky part is that
xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed before we
get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether the entry is
still valid after getting the buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | ext2_xattr_get(struct inode *inode, int name_index, const char *name,
void *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
{
struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
struct ext2_xattr_entry *entry;
size_t name_len, size;
char *end;
int error;
struct mb2_cache *ext2_mb_cache = EXT2_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_mb_cache;
ea_idebug(inode, "name=%d.%s, buffer=%p, buffer_size=%ld",
name_index, name, buffer, (long)buffer_size);
if (name == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
name_len = strlen(name);
if (name_len > 255)
return -ERANGE;
down_read(&EXT2_I(inode)->xattr_sem);
error = -ENODATA;
if (!EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl)
goto cleanup;
ea_idebug(inode, "reading block %d", EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
bh = sb_bread(inode->i_sb, EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
error = -EIO;
if (!bh)
goto cleanup;
ea_bdebug(bh, "b_count=%d, refcount=%d",
atomic_read(&(bh->b_count)), le32_to_cpu(HDR(bh)->h_refcount));
end = bh->b_data + bh->b_size;
if (HDR(bh)->h_magic != cpu_to_le32(EXT2_XATTR_MAGIC) ||
HDR(bh)->h_blocks != cpu_to_le32(1)) {
bad_block: ext2_error(inode->i_sb, "ext2_xattr_get",
"inode %ld: bad block %d", inode->i_ino,
EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
error = -EIO;
goto cleanup;
}
/* find named attribute */
entry = FIRST_ENTRY(bh);
while (!IS_LAST_ENTRY(entry)) {
struct ext2_xattr_entry *next =
EXT2_XATTR_NEXT(entry);
if ((char *)next >= end)
goto bad_block;
if (name_index == entry->e_name_index &&
name_len == entry->e_name_len &&
memcmp(name, entry->e_name, name_len) == 0)
goto found;
entry = next;
}
if (ext2_xattr_cache_insert(ext2_mb_cache, bh))
ea_idebug(inode, "cache insert failed");
error = -ENODATA;
goto cleanup;
found:
/* check the buffer size */
if (entry->e_value_block != 0)
goto bad_block;
size = le32_to_cpu(entry->e_value_size);
if (size > inode->i_sb->s_blocksize ||
le16_to_cpu(entry->e_value_offs) + size > inode->i_sb->s_blocksize)
goto bad_block;
if (ext2_xattr_cache_insert(ext2_mb_cache, bh))
ea_idebug(inode, "cache insert failed");
if (buffer) {
error = -ERANGE;
if (size > buffer_size)
goto cleanup;
/* return value of attribute */
memcpy(buffer, bh->b_data + le16_to_cpu(entry->e_value_offs),
size);
}
error = size;
cleanup:
brelse(bh);
up_read(&EXT2_I(inode)->xattr_sem);
return error;
}
| 169,980 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void php_wddx_process_data(void *user_data, const XML_Char *s, int len)
{
st_entry *ent;
wddx_stack *stack = (wddx_stack *)user_data;
TSRMLS_FETCH();
if (!wddx_stack_is_empty(stack) && !stack->done) {
wddx_stack_top(stack, (void**)&ent);
switch (ent->type) {
case ST_STRING:
if (Z_STRLEN_P(ent->data) == 0) {
STR_FREE(Z_STRVAL_P(ent->data));
Z_STRVAL_P(ent->data) = estrndup(s, len);
Z_STRLEN_P(ent->data) = len;
} else {
Z_STRVAL_P(ent->data) = erealloc(Z_STRVAL_P(ent->data), Z_STRLEN_P(ent->data) + len + 1);
memcpy(Z_STRVAL_P(ent->data) + Z_STRLEN_P(ent->data), s, len);
Z_STRLEN_P(ent->data) += len;
Z_STRVAL_P(ent->data)[Z_STRLEN_P(ent->data)] = '\0';
}
break;
case ST_BINARY:
if (Z_STRLEN_P(ent->data) == 0) {
STR_FREE(Z_STRVAL_P(ent->data));
Z_STRVAL_P(ent->data) = estrndup(s, len + 1);
} else {
Z_STRVAL_P(ent->data) = erealloc(Z_STRVAL_P(ent->data), Z_STRLEN_P(ent->data) + len + 1);
memcpy(Z_STRVAL_P(ent->data) + Z_STRLEN_P(ent->data), s, len);
}
Z_STRLEN_P(ent->data) += len;
Z_STRVAL_P(ent->data)[Z_STRLEN_P(ent->data)] = '\0';
break;
case ST_NUMBER:
Z_TYPE_P(ent->data) = IS_STRING;
Z_STRLEN_P(ent->data) = len;
Z_STRVAL_P(ent->data) = estrndup(s, len);
convert_scalar_to_number(ent->data TSRMLS_CC);
break;
case ST_BOOLEAN:
if (!strcmp(s, "true")) {
Z_LVAL_P(ent->data) = 1;
} else if (!strcmp(s, "false")) {
Z_LVAL_P(ent->data) = 0;
} else {
zval_ptr_dtor(&ent->data);
if (ent->varname) {
efree(ent->varname);
}
ent->data = NULL;
}
break;
case ST_DATETIME: {
char *tmp;
tmp = emalloc(len + 1);
memcpy(tmp, s, len);
tmp[len] = '\0';
Z_LVAL_P(ent->data) = php_parse_date(tmp, NULL);
/* date out of range < 1969 or > 2038 */
if (Z_LVAL_P(ent->data) == -1) {
Z_TYPE_P(ent->data) = IS_STRING;
Z_STRLEN_P(ent->data) = len;
Z_STRVAL_P(ent->data) = estrndup(s, len);
}
efree(tmp);
}
break;
default:
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72340: Double Free Courruption in wddx_deserialize
CWE ID: CWE-415 | static void php_wddx_process_data(void *user_data, const XML_Char *s, int len)
{
st_entry *ent;
wddx_stack *stack = (wddx_stack *)user_data;
TSRMLS_FETCH();
if (!wddx_stack_is_empty(stack) && !stack->done) {
wddx_stack_top(stack, (void**)&ent);
switch (ent->type) {
case ST_STRING:
if (Z_STRLEN_P(ent->data) == 0) {
STR_FREE(Z_STRVAL_P(ent->data));
Z_STRVAL_P(ent->data) = estrndup(s, len);
Z_STRLEN_P(ent->data) = len;
} else {
Z_STRVAL_P(ent->data) = erealloc(Z_STRVAL_P(ent->data), Z_STRLEN_P(ent->data) + len + 1);
memcpy(Z_STRVAL_P(ent->data) + Z_STRLEN_P(ent->data), s, len);
Z_STRLEN_P(ent->data) += len;
Z_STRVAL_P(ent->data)[Z_STRLEN_P(ent->data)] = '\0';
}
break;
case ST_BINARY:
if (Z_STRLEN_P(ent->data) == 0) {
STR_FREE(Z_STRVAL_P(ent->data));
Z_STRVAL_P(ent->data) = estrndup(s, len + 1);
} else {
Z_STRVAL_P(ent->data) = erealloc(Z_STRVAL_P(ent->data), Z_STRLEN_P(ent->data) + len + 1);
memcpy(Z_STRVAL_P(ent->data) + Z_STRLEN_P(ent->data), s, len);
}
Z_STRLEN_P(ent->data) += len;
Z_STRVAL_P(ent->data)[Z_STRLEN_P(ent->data)] = '\0';
break;
case ST_NUMBER:
Z_TYPE_P(ent->data) = IS_STRING;
Z_STRLEN_P(ent->data) = len;
Z_STRVAL_P(ent->data) = estrndup(s, len);
convert_scalar_to_number(ent->data TSRMLS_CC);
break;
case ST_BOOLEAN:
if(!ent->data) {
break;
}
if (!strcmp(s, "true")) {
Z_LVAL_P(ent->data) = 1;
} else if (!strcmp(s, "false")) {
Z_LVAL_P(ent->data) = 0;
} else {
zval_ptr_dtor(&ent->data);
if (ent->varname) {
efree(ent->varname);
ent->varname = NULL;
}
ent->data = NULL;
}
break;
case ST_DATETIME: {
char *tmp;
tmp = emalloc(len + 1);
memcpy(tmp, s, len);
tmp[len] = '\0';
Z_LVAL_P(ent->data) = php_parse_date(tmp, NULL);
/* date out of range < 1969 or > 2038 */
if (Z_LVAL_P(ent->data) == -1) {
Z_TYPE_P(ent->data) = IS_STRING;
Z_STRLEN_P(ent->data) = len;
Z_STRVAL_P(ent->data) = estrndup(s, len);
}
efree(tmp);
}
break;
default:
break;
}
}
}
| 167,024 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: GLboolean WebGLRenderingContextBase::isRenderbuffer(
WebGLRenderbuffer* renderbuffer) {
if (!renderbuffer || isContextLost())
return 0;
if (!renderbuffer->HasEverBeenBound())
return 0;
if (renderbuffer->IsDeleted())
return 0;
return ContextGL()->IsRenderbuffer(renderbuffer->Object());
}
Commit Message: Validate all incoming WebGLObjects.
A few entry points were missing the correct validation.
Tested with improved conformance tests in
https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2654 .
Bug: 848914
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ib98a61cc5bf378d1b3338b04acd7e1bc4c2fe008
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1086718
Reviewed-by: Kai Ninomiya <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#565016}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | GLboolean WebGLRenderingContextBase::isRenderbuffer(
WebGLRenderbuffer* renderbuffer) {
if (!renderbuffer || isContextLost() ||
!renderbuffer->Validate(ContextGroup(), this))
return 0;
if (!renderbuffer->HasEverBeenBound())
return 0;
if (renderbuffer->IsDeleted())
return 0;
return ContextGL()->IsRenderbuffer(renderbuffer->Object());
}
| 173,131 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadOneDJVUImage(LoadContext* lc,const int pagenum,
const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
ddjvu_page_type_t
type;
ddjvu_pageinfo_t info;
ddjvu_message_t *message;
Image *image;
int logging;
int tag;
/* so, we know that the page is there! Get its dimension, and */
/* Read one DJVU image */
image = lc->image;
/* register PixelPacket *q; */
logging=LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(), " enter ReadOneDJVUImage()");
(void) logging;
#if DEBUG
printf("==== Loading the page %d\n", pagenum);
#endif
lc->page = ddjvu_page_create_by_pageno(lc->document, pagenum); /* 0? */
/* pump data untill the page is ready for rendering. */
tag=(-1);
do {
while ((message = ddjvu_message_peek(lc->context)))
{
tag=process_message(message);
if (tag == 0) break;
ddjvu_message_pop(lc->context);
}
/* fixme: maybe exit? */
/* if (lc->error) break; */
message = pump_data_until_message(lc,image);
if (message)
do {
tag=process_message(message);
if (tag == 0) break;
ddjvu_message_pop(lc->context);
} while ((message = ddjvu_message_peek(lc->context)));
} while (!ddjvu_page_decoding_done(lc->page));
ddjvu_document_get_pageinfo(lc->document, pagenum, &info);
image->x_resolution = (float) info.dpi;
image->y_resolution =(float) info.dpi;
if (image_info->density != (char *) NULL)
{
int
flags;
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
/*
Set rendering resolution.
*/
flags=ParseGeometry(image_info->density,&geometry_info);
image->x_resolution=geometry_info.rho;
image->y_resolution=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
image->y_resolution=image->x_resolution;
info.width=(int) (info.width*image->x_resolution/info.dpi);
info.height=(int) (info.height*image->y_resolution/info.dpi);
info.dpi=(int) MagickMax(image->x_resolution,image->y_resolution);
}
type = ddjvu_page_get_type(lc->page);
/* double -> float! */
/* image->gamma = (float)ddjvu_page_get_gamma(lc->page); */
/* mmc: set image->depth */
/* mmc: This from the type */
image->columns=(size_t) info.width;
image->rows=(size_t) info.height;
/* mmc: bitonal should be palettized, and compressed! */
if (type == DDJVU_PAGETYPE_BITONAL){
image->colorspace = GRAYColorspace;
image->storage_class = PseudoClass;
image->depth = 8UL; /* i only support that? */
image->colors= 2;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
} else {
image->colorspace = RGBColorspace;
image->storage_class = DirectClass;
/* fixme: MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH ?*/
image->depth = 8UL; /* i only support that? */
image->matte = MagickTrue;
/* is this useful? */
}
#if DEBUG
printf("now filling %.20g x %.20g\n",(double) image->columns,(double)
image->rows);
#endif
#if 1 /* per_line */
/* q = QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,0,image->columns,image->rows); */
get_page_image(lc, lc->page, 0, 0, info.width, info.height, image_info);
#else
int i;
for (i = 0;i< image->rows; i++)
{
printf("%d\n",i);
q = QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,i,image->columns,1);
get_page_line(lc, i, quantum_info);
SyncAuthenticPixels(image);
}
#endif /* per_line */
#if DEBUG
printf("END: finished filling %.20g x %.20g\n",(double) image->columns,
(double) image->rows);
#endif
if (!image->ping)
SyncImage(image);
/* indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image); */
/* mmc: ??? Convert PNM pixels to runlength-encoded MIFF packets. */
/* image->colors = */
/* how is the line padding / stride? */
if (lc->page) {
ddjvu_page_release(lc->page);
lc->page = NULL;
}
/* image->page.y=mng_info->y_off[mng_info->object_id]; */
if (tag == 0)
image=DestroyImage(image);
return image;
/* end of reading one DJVU page/image */
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static Image *ReadOneDJVUImage(LoadContext* lc,const int pagenum,
const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
ddjvu_page_type_t
type;
ddjvu_pageinfo_t info;
ddjvu_message_t *message;
Image *image;
int logging;
int tag;
MagickBooleanType status;
/* so, we know that the page is there! Get its dimension, and */
/* Read one DJVU image */
image = lc->image;
/* register PixelPacket *q; */
logging=LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(), " enter ReadOneDJVUImage()");
(void) logging;
#if DEBUG
printf("==== Loading the page %d\n", pagenum);
#endif
lc->page = ddjvu_page_create_by_pageno(lc->document, pagenum); /* 0? */
/* pump data untill the page is ready for rendering. */
tag=(-1);
do {
while ((message = ddjvu_message_peek(lc->context)))
{
tag=process_message(message);
if (tag == 0) break;
ddjvu_message_pop(lc->context);
}
/* fixme: maybe exit? */
/* if (lc->error) break; */
message = pump_data_until_message(lc,image);
if (message)
do {
tag=process_message(message);
if (tag == 0) break;
ddjvu_message_pop(lc->context);
} while ((message = ddjvu_message_peek(lc->context)));
} while (!ddjvu_page_decoding_done(lc->page));
ddjvu_document_get_pageinfo(lc->document, pagenum, &info);
image->x_resolution = (float) info.dpi;
image->y_resolution =(float) info.dpi;
if (image_info->density != (char *) NULL)
{
int
flags;
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
/*
Set rendering resolution.
*/
flags=ParseGeometry(image_info->density,&geometry_info);
image->x_resolution=geometry_info.rho;
image->y_resolution=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
image->y_resolution=image->x_resolution;
info.width=(int) (info.width*image->x_resolution/info.dpi);
info.height=(int) (info.height*image->y_resolution/info.dpi);
info.dpi=(int) MagickMax(image->x_resolution,image->y_resolution);
}
type = ddjvu_page_get_type(lc->page);
/* double -> float! */
/* image->gamma = (float)ddjvu_page_get_gamma(lc->page); */
/* mmc: set image->depth */
/* mmc: This from the type */
image->columns=(size_t) info.width;
image->rows=(size_t) info.height;
/* mmc: bitonal should be palettized, and compressed! */
if (type == DDJVU_PAGETYPE_BITONAL){
image->colorspace = GRAYColorspace;
image->storage_class = PseudoClass;
image->depth = 8UL; /* i only support that? */
image->colors= 2;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
} else {
image->colorspace = RGBColorspace;
image->storage_class = DirectClass;
/* fixme: MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH ?*/
image->depth = 8UL; /* i only support that? */
image->matte = MagickTrue;
/* is this useful? */
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
#if DEBUG
printf("now filling %.20g x %.20g\n",(double) image->columns,(double)
image->rows);
#endif
#if 1 /* per_line */
/* q = QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,0,image->columns,image->rows); */
get_page_image(lc, lc->page, 0, 0, info.width, info.height, image_info);
#else
int i;
for (i = 0;i< image->rows; i++)
{
printf("%d\n",i);
q = QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,i,image->columns,1);
get_page_line(lc, i, quantum_info);
SyncAuthenticPixels(image);
}
#endif /* per_line */
#if DEBUG
printf("END: finished filling %.20g x %.20g\n",(double) image->columns,
(double) image->rows);
#endif
if (!image->ping)
SyncImage(image);
/* indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image); */
/* mmc: ??? Convert PNM pixels to runlength-encoded MIFF packets. */
/* image->colors = */
/* how is the line padding / stride? */
if (lc->page) {
ddjvu_page_release(lc->page);
lc->page = NULL;
}
/* image->page.y=mng_info->y_off[mng_info->object_id]; */
if (tag == 0)
image=DestroyImage(image);
return image;
/* end of reading one DJVU page/image */
}
| 168,558 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int orangefs_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, int type)
{
struct orangefs_inode_s *orangefs_inode = ORANGEFS_I(inode);
int error = 0;
void *value = NULL;
size_t size = 0;
const char *name = NULL;
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS;
if (acl) {
umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
/*
* can we represent this with the traditional file
* mode permission bits?
*/
error = posix_acl_equiv_mode(acl, &mode);
if (error < 0) {
gossip_err("%s: posix_acl_equiv_mode err: %d\n",
__func__,
error);
return error;
}
if (inode->i_mode != mode)
SetModeFlag(orangefs_inode);
inode->i_mode = mode;
mark_inode_dirty_sync(inode);
if (error == 0)
acl = NULL;
}
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
break;
default:
gossip_err("%s: invalid type %d!\n", __func__, type);
return -EINVAL;
}
gossip_debug(GOSSIP_ACL_DEBUG,
"%s: inode %pU, key %s type %d\n",
__func__, get_khandle_from_ino(inode),
name,
type);
if (acl) {
size = posix_acl_xattr_size(acl->a_count);
value = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!value)
return -ENOMEM;
error = posix_acl_to_xattr(&init_user_ns, acl, value, size);
if (error < 0)
goto out;
}
gossip_debug(GOSSIP_ACL_DEBUG,
"%s: name %s, value %p, size %zd, acl %p\n",
__func__, name, value, size, acl);
/*
* Go ahead and set the extended attribute now. NOTE: Suppose acl
* was NULL, then value will be NULL and size will be 0 and that
* will xlate to a removexattr. However, we don't want removexattr
* complain if attributes does not exist.
*/
error = orangefs_inode_setxattr(inode, name, value, size, 0);
out:
kfree(value);
if (!error)
set_cached_acl(inode, type, acl);
return error;
}
Commit Message: posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-285 | int orangefs_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, int type)
{
struct orangefs_inode_s *orangefs_inode = ORANGEFS_I(inode);
int error = 0;
void *value = NULL;
size_t size = 0;
const char *name = NULL;
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS;
if (acl) {
umode_t mode;
error = posix_acl_update_mode(inode, &mode, &acl);
if (error) {
gossip_err("%s: posix_acl_update_mode err: %d\n",
__func__,
error);
return error;
}
if (inode->i_mode != mode)
SetModeFlag(orangefs_inode);
inode->i_mode = mode;
mark_inode_dirty_sync(inode);
}
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
break;
default:
gossip_err("%s: invalid type %d!\n", __func__, type);
return -EINVAL;
}
gossip_debug(GOSSIP_ACL_DEBUG,
"%s: inode %pU, key %s type %d\n",
__func__, get_khandle_from_ino(inode),
name,
type);
if (acl) {
size = posix_acl_xattr_size(acl->a_count);
value = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!value)
return -ENOMEM;
error = posix_acl_to_xattr(&init_user_ns, acl, value, size);
if (error < 0)
goto out;
}
gossip_debug(GOSSIP_ACL_DEBUG,
"%s: name %s, value %p, size %zd, acl %p\n",
__func__, name, value, size, acl);
/*
* Go ahead and set the extended attribute now. NOTE: Suppose acl
* was NULL, then value will be NULL and size will be 0 and that
* will xlate to a removexattr. However, we don't want removexattr
* complain if attributes does not exist.
*/
error = orangefs_inode_setxattr(inode, name, value, size, 0);
out:
kfree(value);
if (!error)
set_cached_acl(inode, type, acl);
return error;
}
| 166,977 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
unsigned char *q;
int j, num;
RSA *rsa;
unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
unsigned int u;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp;
unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
int encodedlen = 0;
int curve_id = 0;
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
#endif
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
unsigned char *p, *d;
int al, i;
unsigned long type;
int n;
CERT *cert;
BIGNUM *r[4];
int nr[4], kn;
BUF_MEM *buf;
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
cert = s->cert;
buf = s->init_buf;
r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
n = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (type & SSL_kRSA) {
rsa = cert->rsa_tmp;
if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
tmp.new_cipher),
SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
tmp.new_cipher));
if (rsa == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
RSA_up_ref(rsa);
cert->rsa_tmp = rsa;
}
if (rsa == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
r[0] = rsa->n;
r[1] = rsa->e;
s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1;
} else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (type & SSL_kEDH) {
dhp = cert->dh_tmp;
if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
tmp.new_cipher),
SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
tmp.new_cipher));
if (dhp == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
s->s3->tmp.dh = dh;
if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
(s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) {
if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
} else {
dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
r[0] = dh->p;
r[1] = dh->g;
}
} else {
dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
r[0] = dh->p;
r[1] = dh->g;
r[2] = dh->pub_key;
} else
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
unsigned char *q;
int j, num;
RSA *rsa;
unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
unsigned int u;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp;
unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
int encodedlen = 0;
int curve_id = 0;
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
#endif
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
unsigned char *p, *d;
int al, i;
unsigned long type;
int n;
CERT *cert;
BIGNUM *r[4];
int nr[4], kn;
BUF_MEM *buf;
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
cert = s->cert;
buf = s->init_buf;
r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
n = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (type & SSL_kRSA) {
rsa = cert->rsa_tmp;
if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
tmp.new_cipher),
SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
tmp.new_cipher));
if (rsa == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
RSA_up_ref(rsa);
cert->rsa_tmp = rsa;
}
if (rsa == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
r[0] = rsa->n;
r[1] = rsa->e;
s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1;
} else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (type & SSL_kEDH) {
dhp = cert->dh_tmp;
if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
tmp.new_cipher),
SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
tmp.new_cipher));
if (dhp == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
s->s3->tmp.dh = dh;
if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
r[0] = dh->p;
r[1] = dh->g;
}
} else {
dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
r[0] = dh->p;
r[1] = dh->g;
r[2] = dh->pub_key;
} else
| 165,257 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_video::fill_this_buffer(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_IN OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE* buffer)
{
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("FTB: buffer->pBuffer[%p]", buffer->pBuffer);
if (m_state == OMX_StateInvalid) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: FTB in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorInvalidState;
}
if (buffer == NULL ||(buffer->nSize != sizeof(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE))) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: omx_video::ftb-->Invalid buffer or size");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (buffer->nVersion.nVersion != OMX_SPEC_VERSION) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: omx_video::ftb-->OMX Version Invalid");
return OMX_ErrorVersionMismatch;
}
if (buffer->nOutputPortIndex != (OMX_U32)PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: omx_video::ftb-->Bad port index");
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
if (!m_sOutPortDef.bEnabled) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: omx_video::ftb-->port is disabled");
return OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateOperation;
}
post_event((unsigned long) hComp, (unsigned long)buffer,OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_FTB);
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug: 27903498
Security Vulnerability - Heap Use-After-Free and Possible LPE in
MediaServer (libOmxVenc problem #3)
CRs-Fixed: 1010088
Change-Id: I898b42034c0add621d4f9d8e02ca0ed4403d4fd3
CWE ID: | OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_video::fill_this_buffer(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_IN OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE* buffer)
{
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("FTB: buffer->pBuffer[%p]", buffer->pBuffer);
if (m_state != OMX_StateExecuting &&
m_state != OMX_StatePause &&
m_state != OMX_StateIdle) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: FTB in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorInvalidState;
}
if (buffer == NULL ||(buffer->nSize != sizeof(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE))) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: omx_video::ftb-->Invalid buffer or size");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (buffer->nVersion.nVersion != OMX_SPEC_VERSION) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: omx_video::ftb-->OMX Version Invalid");
return OMX_ErrorVersionMismatch;
}
if (buffer->nOutputPortIndex != (OMX_U32)PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: omx_video::ftb-->Bad port index");
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
if (!m_sOutPortDef.bEnabled) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: omx_video::ftb-->port is disabled");
return OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateOperation;
}
post_event((unsigned long) hComp, (unsigned long)buffer,OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_FTB);
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
| 173,747 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: jas_matrix_t *jas_matrix_copy(jas_matrix_t *x)
{
jas_matrix_t *y;
int i;
int j;
y = jas_matrix_create(x->numrows_, x->numcols_);
for (i = 0; i < x->numrows_; ++i) {
for (j = 0; j < x->numcols_; ++j) {
*jas_matrix_getref(y, i, j) = jas_matrix_get(x, i, j);
}
}
return y;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | jas_matrix_t *jas_matrix_copy(jas_matrix_t *x)
{
jas_matrix_t *y;
jas_matind_t i;
jas_matind_t j;
y = jas_matrix_create(x->numrows_, x->numcols_);
for (i = 0; i < x->numrows_; ++i) {
for (j = 0; j < x->numcols_; ++j) {
*jas_matrix_getref(y, i, j) = jas_matrix_get(x, i, j);
}
}
return y;
}
| 168,702 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void DocumentLoader::InstallNewDocument(
const KURL& url,
Document* owner_document,
WebGlobalObjectReusePolicy global_object_reuse_policy,
const AtomicString& mime_type,
const AtomicString& encoding,
InstallNewDocumentReason reason,
ParserSynchronizationPolicy parsing_policy,
const KURL& overriding_url) {
DCHECK(!frame_->GetDocument() || !frame_->GetDocument()->IsActive());
DCHECK_EQ(frame_->Tree().ChildCount(), 0u);
if (GetFrameLoader().StateMachine()->IsDisplayingInitialEmptyDocument()) {
GetFrameLoader().StateMachine()->AdvanceTo(
FrameLoaderStateMachine::kCommittedFirstRealLoad);
}
const SecurityOrigin* previous_security_origin = nullptr;
const ContentSecurityPolicy* previous_csp = nullptr;
if (frame_->GetDocument()) {
previous_security_origin = frame_->GetDocument()->GetSecurityOrigin();
previous_csp = frame_->GetDocument()->GetContentSecurityPolicy();
}
if (global_object_reuse_policy != WebGlobalObjectReusePolicy::kUseExisting)
frame_->SetDOMWindow(LocalDOMWindow::Create(*frame_));
if (reason == InstallNewDocumentReason::kNavigation)
WillCommitNavigation();
Document* document = frame_->DomWindow()->InstallNewDocument(
mime_type,
DocumentInit::Create()
.WithDocumentLoader(this)
.WithURL(url)
.WithOwnerDocument(owner_document)
.WithNewRegistrationContext()
.WithPreviousDocumentCSP(previous_csp),
false);
if (frame_->IsMainFrame())
frame_->ClearActivation();
if (frame_->HasReceivedUserGestureBeforeNavigation() !=
had_sticky_activation_) {
frame_->SetDocumentHasReceivedUserGestureBeforeNavigation(
had_sticky_activation_);
GetLocalFrameClient().SetHasReceivedUserGestureBeforeNavigation(
had_sticky_activation_);
}
if (ShouldClearWindowName(*frame_, previous_security_origin, *document)) {
frame_->Tree().ExperimentalSetNulledName();
}
if (!overriding_url.IsEmpty())
document->SetBaseURLOverride(overriding_url);
DidInstallNewDocument(document, previous_csp);
if (reason == InstallNewDocumentReason::kNavigation)
DidCommitNavigation(global_object_reuse_policy);
if (GetFrameLoader().StateMachine()->CommittedFirstRealDocumentLoad()) {
if (document->GetSettings()
->GetForceTouchEventFeatureDetectionForInspector()) {
OriginTrialContext::FromOrCreate(document)->AddFeature(
"ForceTouchEventFeatureDetectionForInspector");
}
OriginTrialContext::AddTokensFromHeader(
document, response_.HttpHeaderField(http_names::kOriginTrial));
}
bool stale_while_revalidate_enabled =
origin_trials::StaleWhileRevalidateEnabled(document);
fetcher_->SetStaleWhileRevalidateEnabled(stale_while_revalidate_enabled);
if (stale_while_revalidate_enabled &&
!RuntimeEnabledFeatures::StaleWhileRevalidateEnabledByRuntimeFlag())
UseCounter::Count(frame_, WebFeature::kStaleWhileRevalidateEnabled);
parser_ = document->OpenForNavigation(parsing_policy, mime_type, encoding);
ScriptableDocumentParser* scriptable_parser =
parser_->AsScriptableDocumentParser();
if (scriptable_parser && GetResource()) {
scriptable_parser->SetInlineScriptCacheHandler(
ToRawResource(GetResource())->InlineScriptCacheHandler());
}
WTF::String feature_policy(
response_.HttpHeaderField(http_names::kFeaturePolicy));
MergeFeaturesFromOriginPolicy(feature_policy, request_.GetOriginPolicy());
document->ApplyFeaturePolicyFromHeader(feature_policy);
GetFrameLoader().DispatchDidClearDocumentOfWindowObject();
}
Commit Message: Inherit the navigation initiator when navigating instead of the parent/opener
Spec PR: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-csp/pull/358
Bug: 905301, 894228, 836148
Change-Id: I43ada2266d42d1cd56dbe3c6dd89d115e878a83a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1314633
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#610850}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void DocumentLoader::InstallNewDocument(
const KURL& url,
Document* owner_document,
WebGlobalObjectReusePolicy global_object_reuse_policy,
const AtomicString& mime_type,
const AtomicString& encoding,
InstallNewDocumentReason reason,
ParserSynchronizationPolicy parsing_policy,
const KURL& overriding_url) {
DCHECK(!frame_->GetDocument() || !frame_->GetDocument()->IsActive());
DCHECK_EQ(frame_->Tree().ChildCount(), 0u);
if (GetFrameLoader().StateMachine()->IsDisplayingInitialEmptyDocument()) {
GetFrameLoader().StateMachine()->AdvanceTo(
FrameLoaderStateMachine::kCommittedFirstRealLoad);
}
const SecurityOrigin* previous_security_origin = nullptr;
if (frame_->GetDocument()) {
previous_security_origin = frame_->GetDocument()->GetSecurityOrigin();
}
if (global_object_reuse_policy != WebGlobalObjectReusePolicy::kUseExisting)
frame_->SetDOMWindow(LocalDOMWindow::Create(*frame_));
if (reason == InstallNewDocumentReason::kNavigation)
WillCommitNavigation();
Document* document = frame_->DomWindow()->InstallNewDocument(
mime_type,
DocumentInit::Create()
.WithDocumentLoader(this)
.WithURL(url)
.WithOwnerDocument(owner_document)
.WithNewRegistrationContext(),
false);
if (frame_->IsMainFrame())
frame_->ClearActivation();
if (frame_->HasReceivedUserGestureBeforeNavigation() !=
had_sticky_activation_) {
frame_->SetDocumentHasReceivedUserGestureBeforeNavigation(
had_sticky_activation_);
GetLocalFrameClient().SetHasReceivedUserGestureBeforeNavigation(
had_sticky_activation_);
}
if (ShouldClearWindowName(*frame_, previous_security_origin, *document)) {
frame_->Tree().ExperimentalSetNulledName();
}
if (!overriding_url.IsEmpty())
document->SetBaseURLOverride(overriding_url);
DidInstallNewDocument(document);
if (reason == InstallNewDocumentReason::kNavigation)
DidCommitNavigation(global_object_reuse_policy);
if (GetFrameLoader().StateMachine()->CommittedFirstRealDocumentLoad()) {
if (document->GetSettings()
->GetForceTouchEventFeatureDetectionForInspector()) {
OriginTrialContext::FromOrCreate(document)->AddFeature(
"ForceTouchEventFeatureDetectionForInspector");
}
OriginTrialContext::AddTokensFromHeader(
document, response_.HttpHeaderField(http_names::kOriginTrial));
}
bool stale_while_revalidate_enabled =
origin_trials::StaleWhileRevalidateEnabled(document);
fetcher_->SetStaleWhileRevalidateEnabled(stale_while_revalidate_enabled);
if (stale_while_revalidate_enabled &&
!RuntimeEnabledFeatures::StaleWhileRevalidateEnabledByRuntimeFlag())
UseCounter::Count(frame_, WebFeature::kStaleWhileRevalidateEnabled);
parser_ = document->OpenForNavigation(parsing_policy, mime_type, encoding);
ScriptableDocumentParser* scriptable_parser =
parser_->AsScriptableDocumentParser();
if (scriptable_parser && GetResource()) {
scriptable_parser->SetInlineScriptCacheHandler(
ToRawResource(GetResource())->InlineScriptCacheHandler());
}
WTF::String feature_policy(
response_.HttpHeaderField(http_names::kFeaturePolicy));
MergeFeaturesFromOriginPolicy(feature_policy, request_.GetOriginPolicy());
document->ApplyFeaturePolicyFromHeader(feature_policy);
GetFrameLoader().DispatchDidClearDocumentOfWindowObject();
}
| 173,057 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int zgfx_decompress(ZGFX_CONTEXT* zgfx, const BYTE* pSrcData, UINT32 SrcSize, BYTE** ppDstData,
UINT32* pDstSize, UINT32 flags)
{
int status = -1;
BYTE descriptor;
wStream* stream = Stream_New((BYTE*)pSrcData, SrcSize);
if (!stream)
return -1;
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(stream) < 1)
goto fail;
Stream_Read_UINT8(stream, descriptor); /* descriptor (1 byte) */
if (descriptor == ZGFX_SEGMENTED_SINGLE)
{
if (!zgfx_decompress_segment(zgfx, stream, Stream_GetRemainingLength(stream)))
goto fail;
*ppDstData = NULL;
if (zgfx->OutputCount > 0)
*ppDstData = (BYTE*) malloc(zgfx->OutputCount);
if (!*ppDstData)
goto fail;
*pDstSize = zgfx->OutputCount;
CopyMemory(*ppDstData, zgfx->OutputBuffer, zgfx->OutputCount);
}
else if (descriptor == ZGFX_SEGMENTED_MULTIPART)
{
UINT32 segmentSize;
UINT16 segmentNumber;
UINT16 segmentCount;
UINT32 uncompressedSize;
BYTE* pConcatenated;
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(stream) < 6)
goto fail;
Stream_Read_UINT16(stream, segmentCount); /* segmentCount (2 bytes) */
Stream_Read_UINT32(stream, uncompressedSize); /* uncompressedSize (4 bytes) */
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(stream) < segmentCount * sizeof(UINT32))
goto fail;
pConcatenated = (BYTE*) malloc(uncompressedSize);
if (!pConcatenated)
goto fail;
*ppDstData = pConcatenated;
*pDstSize = uncompressedSize;
for (segmentNumber = 0; segmentNumber < segmentCount; segmentNumber++)
{
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(stream) < sizeof(UINT32))
goto fail;
Stream_Read_UINT32(stream, segmentSize); /* segmentSize (4 bytes) */
if (!zgfx_decompress_segment(zgfx, stream, segmentSize))
goto fail;
CopyMemory(pConcatenated, zgfx->OutputBuffer, zgfx->OutputCount);
pConcatenated += zgfx->OutputCount;
}
}
else
{
goto fail;
}
status = 1;
fail:
Stream_Free(stream, FALSE);
return status;
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8785
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | int zgfx_decompress(ZGFX_CONTEXT* zgfx, const BYTE* pSrcData, UINT32 SrcSize, BYTE** ppDstData,
UINT32* pDstSize, UINT32 flags)
{
int status = -1;
BYTE descriptor;
wStream* stream = Stream_New((BYTE*)pSrcData, SrcSize);
if (!stream)
return -1;
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(stream) < 1)
goto fail;
Stream_Read_UINT8(stream, descriptor); /* descriptor (1 byte) */
if (descriptor == ZGFX_SEGMENTED_SINGLE)
{
if (!zgfx_decompress_segment(zgfx, stream, Stream_GetRemainingLength(stream)))
goto fail;
*ppDstData = NULL;
if (zgfx->OutputCount > 0)
*ppDstData = (BYTE*) malloc(zgfx->OutputCount);
if (!*ppDstData)
goto fail;
*pDstSize = zgfx->OutputCount;
CopyMemory(*ppDstData, zgfx->OutputBuffer, zgfx->OutputCount);
}
else if (descriptor == ZGFX_SEGMENTED_MULTIPART)
{
UINT32 segmentSize;
UINT16 segmentNumber;
UINT16 segmentCount;
UINT32 uncompressedSize;
BYTE* pConcatenated;
size_t used = 0;
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(stream) < 6)
goto fail;
Stream_Read_UINT16(stream, segmentCount); /* segmentCount (2 bytes) */
Stream_Read_UINT32(stream, uncompressedSize); /* uncompressedSize (4 bytes) */
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(stream) < segmentCount * sizeof(UINT32))
goto fail;
pConcatenated = (BYTE*) malloc(uncompressedSize);
if (!pConcatenated)
goto fail;
*ppDstData = pConcatenated;
*pDstSize = uncompressedSize;
for (segmentNumber = 0; segmentNumber < segmentCount; segmentNumber++)
{
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(stream) < sizeof(UINT32))
goto fail;
Stream_Read_UINT32(stream, segmentSize); /* segmentSize (4 bytes) */
if (!zgfx_decompress_segment(zgfx, stream, segmentSize))
goto fail;
if (zgfx->OutputCount > UINT32_MAX - used)
goto fail;
if (used + zgfx->OutputCount > uncompressedSize)
goto fail;
CopyMemory(pConcatenated, zgfx->OutputBuffer, zgfx->OutputCount);
pConcatenated += zgfx->OutputCount;
used += zgfx->OutputCount;
}
}
else
{
goto fail;
}
status = 1;
fail:
Stream_Free(stream, FALSE);
return status;
}
| 169,294 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int php_stream_temp_set_option(php_stream *stream, int option, int value, void *ptrparam TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
php_stream_temp_data *ts = (php_stream_temp_data*)stream->abstract;
switch(option) {
case PHP_STREAM_OPTION_META_DATA_API:
if (ts->meta) {
zend_hash_copy(Z_ARRVAL_P((zval*)ptrparam), Z_ARRVAL_P(ts->meta), (copy_ctor_func_t) zval_add_ref, NULL, sizeof(zval*));
}
return PHP_STREAM_OPTION_RETURN_OK;
default:
if (ts->innerstream) {
return php_stream_set_option(ts->innerstream, option, value, ptrparam);
}
return PHP_STREAM_OPTION_RETURN_NOTIMPL;
}
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static int php_stream_temp_set_option(php_stream *stream, int option, int value, void *ptrparam TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
php_stream_temp_data *ts = (php_stream_temp_data*)stream->abstract;
switch(option) {
case PHP_STREAM_OPTION_META_DATA_API:
if (ts->meta) {
zend_hash_copy(Z_ARRVAL_P((zval*)ptrparam), Z_ARRVAL_P(ts->meta), (copy_ctor_func_t) zval_add_ref, NULL, sizeof(zval*));
}
return PHP_STREAM_OPTION_RETURN_OK;
default:
if (ts->innerstream) {
return php_stream_set_option(ts->innerstream, option, value, ptrparam);
}
return PHP_STREAM_OPTION_RETURN_NOTIMPL;
}
}
/* }}} */
| 165,482 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int MemBackendImpl::DoomEntriesBetween(Time initial_time,
Time end_time,
const CompletionCallback& callback) {
if (end_time.is_null())
end_time = Time::Max();
DCHECK_GE(end_time, initial_time);
base::LinkNode<MemEntryImpl>* node = lru_list_.head();
while (node != lru_list_.end() && node->value()->GetLastUsed() < initial_time)
node = node->next();
while (node != lru_list_.end() && node->value()->GetLastUsed() < end_time) {
MemEntryImpl* to_doom = node->value();
node = node->next();
to_doom->Doom();
}
return net::OK;
}
Commit Message: [MemCache] Fix bug while iterating LRU list in range doom
This is exact same thing as https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/987919
but on explicit mass-erase rather than eviction.
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for the report and testcase.
Bug: 831963
Change-Id: I96a46700c1f058f7feebe038bcf983dc40eb7102
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1014023
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Josh Karlin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#551205}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | int MemBackendImpl::DoomEntriesBetween(Time initial_time,
Time end_time,
const CompletionCallback& callback) {
if (end_time.is_null())
end_time = Time::Max();
DCHECK_GE(end_time, initial_time);
base::LinkNode<MemEntryImpl>* node = lru_list_.head();
while (node != lru_list_.end() && node->value()->GetLastUsed() < initial_time)
node = node->next();
while (node != lru_list_.end() && node->value()->GetLastUsed() < end_time) {
MemEntryImpl* to_doom = node->value();
node = NextSkippingChildren(lru_list_, node);
to_doom->Doom();
}
return net::OK;
}
| 173,257 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: png_get_uint_16(png_bytep buf)
{
png_uint_16 i = (png_uint_16)(((png_uint_16)(*buf) << 8) +
(png_uint_16)(*(buf + 1)));
return (i);
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
[email protected]
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | png_get_uint_16(png_bytep buf)
{
png_uint_16 i = ((png_uint_16)((*(buf )) & 0xff) << 8) +
((png_uint_16)((*(buf + 1)) & 0xff) );
return (i);
}
| 172,174 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: kex_input_newkeys(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
{
struct ssh *ssh = ctxt;
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
int r;
debug("SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS received");
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS, &kex_protocol_error);
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
kex->done = 1;
sshbuf_reset(kex->peer);
/* sshbuf_reset(kex->my); */
kex->name = NULL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | kex_input_newkeys(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
{
struct ssh *ssh = ctxt;
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
int r;
debug("SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS received");
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS, &kex_protocol_error);
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
if ((r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0)
return r;
kex->done = 1;
sshbuf_reset(kex->peer);
/* sshbuf_reset(kex->my); */
kex->name = NULL;
return 0;
}
| 165,483 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ut64 MACH0_(get_main)(struct MACH0_(obj_t)* bin) {
ut64 addr = 0LL;
struct symbol_t *symbols;
int i;
if (!(symbols = MACH0_(get_symbols) (bin))) {
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; !symbols[i].last; i++) {
if (!strcmp (symbols[i].name, "_main")) {
addr = symbols[i].addr;
break;
}
}
free (symbols);
if (!addr && bin->main_cmd.cmd == LC_MAIN) {
addr = bin->entry + bin->baddr;
}
if (!addr) {
ut8 b[128];
ut64 entry = addr_to_offset(bin, bin->entry);
if (entry > bin->size || entry + sizeof (b) > bin->size)
return 0;
i = r_buf_read_at (bin->b, entry, b, sizeof (b));
if (i < 1) {
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
if (b[i] == 0xe8 && !b[i+3] && !b[i+4]) {
int delta = b[i+1] | (b[i+2] << 8) | (b[i+3] << 16) | (b[i+4] << 24);
return bin->entry + i + 5 + delta;
}
}
}
return addr;
}
Commit Message: Fix null deref and uaf in mach0 parser
CWE ID: CWE-416 | ut64 MACH0_(get_main)(struct MACH0_(obj_t)* bin) {
ut64 addr = 0LL;
struct symbol_t *symbols;
int i;
if (!(symbols = MACH0_(get_symbols) (bin))) {
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; !symbols[i].last; i++) {
if (!strcmp (symbols[i].name, "_main")) {
addr = symbols[i].addr;
break;
}
}
free (symbols);
if (!addr && bin->main_cmd.cmd == LC_MAIN) {
addr = bin->entry + bin->baddr;
}
if (!addr) {
ut8 b[128];
ut64 entry = addr_to_offset(bin, bin->entry);
if (entry > bin->size || entry + sizeof (b) > bin->size) {
return 0;
}
i = r_buf_read_at (bin->b, entry, b, sizeof (b));
if (i < 1) {
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
if (b[i] == 0xe8 && !b[i+3] && !b[i+4]) {
int delta = b[i+1] | (b[i+2] << 8) | (b[i+3] << 16) | (b[i+4] << 24);
return bin->entry + i + 5 + delta;
}
}
}
return addr;
}
| 168,235 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void __skb_tstamp_tx(struct sk_buff *orig_skb,
struct skb_shared_hwtstamps *hwtstamps,
struct sock *sk, int tstype)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
bool tsonly;
if (!sk)
return;
tsonly = sk->sk_tsflags & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_TSONLY;
if (!skb_may_tx_timestamp(sk, tsonly))
return;
if (tsonly) {
#ifdef CONFIG_INET
if ((sk->sk_tsflags & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS) &&
sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_TCP &&
sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM)
skb = tcp_get_timestamping_opt_stats(sk);
else
#endif
skb = alloc_skb(0, GFP_ATOMIC);
} else {
skb = skb_clone(orig_skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
}
if (!skb)
return;
if (tsonly) {
skb_shinfo(skb)->tx_flags = skb_shinfo(orig_skb)->tx_flags;
skb_shinfo(skb)->tskey = skb_shinfo(orig_skb)->tskey;
}
if (hwtstamps)
*skb_hwtstamps(skb) = *hwtstamps;
else
skb->tstamp = ktime_get_real();
__skb_complete_tx_timestamp(skb, sk, tstype);
}
Commit Message: tcp: mark skbs with SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS
SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS can be enabled and disabled
while packets are collected on the error queue.
So, checking SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS in sk->sk_tsflags
is not enough to safely assume that the skb contains
OPT_STATS data.
Add a bit in sock_exterr_skb to indicate whether the
skb contains opt_stats data.
Fixes: 1c885808e456 ("tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING")
Reported-by: JongHwan Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | void __skb_tstamp_tx(struct sk_buff *orig_skb,
struct skb_shared_hwtstamps *hwtstamps,
struct sock *sk, int tstype)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
bool tsonly, opt_stats = false;
if (!sk)
return;
tsonly = sk->sk_tsflags & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_TSONLY;
if (!skb_may_tx_timestamp(sk, tsonly))
return;
if (tsonly) {
#ifdef CONFIG_INET
if ((sk->sk_tsflags & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS) &&
sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_TCP &&
sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM) {
skb = tcp_get_timestamping_opt_stats(sk);
opt_stats = true;
} else
#endif
skb = alloc_skb(0, GFP_ATOMIC);
} else {
skb = skb_clone(orig_skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
}
if (!skb)
return;
if (tsonly) {
skb_shinfo(skb)->tx_flags = skb_shinfo(orig_skb)->tx_flags;
skb_shinfo(skb)->tskey = skb_shinfo(orig_skb)->tskey;
}
if (hwtstamps)
*skb_hwtstamps(skb) = *hwtstamps;
else
skb->tstamp = ktime_get_real();
__skb_complete_tx_timestamp(skb, sk, tstype, opt_stats);
}
| 170,072 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int __kvm_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem,
int user_alloc)
{
int r;
gfn_t base_gfn;
unsigned long npages;
unsigned long i;
struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot;
struct kvm_memory_slot old, new;
struct kvm_memslots *slots, *old_memslots;
r = check_memory_region_flags(mem);
if (r)
goto out;
r = -EINVAL;
/* General sanity checks */
if (mem->memory_size & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))
goto out;
if (mem->guest_phys_addr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))
goto out;
/* We can read the guest memory with __xxx_user() later on. */
if (user_alloc &&
((mem->userspace_addr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)) ||
!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE,
(void __user *)(unsigned long)mem->userspace_addr,
mem->memory_size)))
goto out;
if (mem->slot >= KVM_MEM_SLOTS_NUM)
goto out;
if (mem->guest_phys_addr + mem->memory_size < mem->guest_phys_addr)
goto out;
memslot = id_to_memslot(kvm->memslots, mem->slot);
base_gfn = mem->guest_phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
npages = mem->memory_size >> PAGE_SHIFT;
r = -EINVAL;
if (npages > KVM_MEM_MAX_NR_PAGES)
goto out;
if (!npages)
mem->flags &= ~KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES;
new = old = *memslot;
new.id = mem->slot;
new.base_gfn = base_gfn;
new.npages = npages;
new.flags = mem->flags;
/* Disallow changing a memory slot's size. */
r = -EINVAL;
if (npages && old.npages && npages != old.npages)
goto out_free;
/* Check for overlaps */
r = -EEXIST;
for (i = 0; i < KVM_MEMORY_SLOTS; ++i) {
struct kvm_memory_slot *s = &kvm->memslots->memslots[i];
if (s == memslot || !s->npages)
continue;
if (!((base_gfn + npages <= s->base_gfn) ||
(base_gfn >= s->base_gfn + s->npages)))
goto out_free;
}
/* Free page dirty bitmap if unneeded */
if (!(new.flags & KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES))
new.dirty_bitmap = NULL;
r = -ENOMEM;
/* Allocate if a slot is being created */
if (npages && !old.npages) {
new.user_alloc = user_alloc;
new.userspace_addr = mem->userspace_addr;
if (kvm_arch_create_memslot(&new, npages))
goto out_free;
}
/* Allocate page dirty bitmap if needed */
if ((new.flags & KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES) && !new.dirty_bitmap) {
if (kvm_create_dirty_bitmap(&new) < 0)
goto out_free;
/* destroy any largepage mappings for dirty tracking */
}
if (!npages) {
struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
r = -ENOMEM;
slots = kmemdup(kvm->memslots, sizeof(struct kvm_memslots),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!slots)
goto out_free;
slot = id_to_memslot(slots, mem->slot);
slot->flags |= KVM_MEMSLOT_INVALID;
update_memslots(slots, NULL);
old_memslots = kvm->memslots;
rcu_assign_pointer(kvm->memslots, slots);
synchronize_srcu_expedited(&kvm->srcu);
/* From this point no new shadow pages pointing to a deleted
* memslot will be created.
*
* validation of sp->gfn happens in:
* - gfn_to_hva (kvm_read_guest, gfn_to_pfn)
* - kvm_is_visible_gfn (mmu_check_roots)
*/
kvm_arch_flush_shadow_memslot(kvm, slot);
kfree(old_memslots);
}
r = kvm_arch_prepare_memory_region(kvm, &new, old, mem, user_alloc);
if (r)
goto out_free;
/* map/unmap the pages in iommu page table */
if (npages) {
r = kvm_iommu_map_pages(kvm, &new);
if (r)
goto out_free;
} else
kvm_iommu_unmap_pages(kvm, &old);
r = -ENOMEM;
slots = kmemdup(kvm->memslots, sizeof(struct kvm_memslots),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!slots)
goto out_free;
/* actual memory is freed via old in kvm_free_physmem_slot below */
if (!npages) {
new.dirty_bitmap = NULL;
memset(&new.arch, 0, sizeof(new.arch));
}
update_memslots(slots, &new);
old_memslots = kvm->memslots;
rcu_assign_pointer(kvm->memslots, slots);
synchronize_srcu_expedited(&kvm->srcu);
kvm_arch_commit_memory_region(kvm, mem, old, user_alloc);
/*
* If the new memory slot is created, we need to clear all
* mmio sptes.
*/
if (npages && old.base_gfn != mem->guest_phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT)
kvm_arch_flush_shadow_all(kvm);
kvm_free_physmem_slot(&old, &new);
kfree(old_memslots);
return 0;
out_free:
kvm_free_physmem_slot(&new, &old);
out:
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: perform an invalid memslot step for gpa base change
PPC must flush all translations before the new memory slot
is visible.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | int __kvm_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem,
int user_alloc)
{
int r;
gfn_t base_gfn;
unsigned long npages;
unsigned long i;
struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot;
struct kvm_memory_slot old, new;
struct kvm_memslots *slots, *old_memslots;
r = check_memory_region_flags(mem);
if (r)
goto out;
r = -EINVAL;
/* General sanity checks */
if (mem->memory_size & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))
goto out;
if (mem->guest_phys_addr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))
goto out;
/* We can read the guest memory with __xxx_user() later on. */
if (user_alloc &&
((mem->userspace_addr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)) ||
!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE,
(void __user *)(unsigned long)mem->userspace_addr,
mem->memory_size)))
goto out;
if (mem->slot >= KVM_MEM_SLOTS_NUM)
goto out;
if (mem->guest_phys_addr + mem->memory_size < mem->guest_phys_addr)
goto out;
memslot = id_to_memslot(kvm->memslots, mem->slot);
base_gfn = mem->guest_phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
npages = mem->memory_size >> PAGE_SHIFT;
r = -EINVAL;
if (npages > KVM_MEM_MAX_NR_PAGES)
goto out;
if (!npages)
mem->flags &= ~KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES;
new = old = *memslot;
new.id = mem->slot;
new.base_gfn = base_gfn;
new.npages = npages;
new.flags = mem->flags;
/* Disallow changing a memory slot's size. */
r = -EINVAL;
if (npages && old.npages && npages != old.npages)
goto out_free;
/* Check for overlaps */
r = -EEXIST;
for (i = 0; i < KVM_MEMORY_SLOTS; ++i) {
struct kvm_memory_slot *s = &kvm->memslots->memslots[i];
if (s == memslot || !s->npages)
continue;
if (!((base_gfn + npages <= s->base_gfn) ||
(base_gfn >= s->base_gfn + s->npages)))
goto out_free;
}
/* Free page dirty bitmap if unneeded */
if (!(new.flags & KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES))
new.dirty_bitmap = NULL;
r = -ENOMEM;
/* Allocate if a slot is being created */
if (npages && !old.npages) {
new.user_alloc = user_alloc;
new.userspace_addr = mem->userspace_addr;
if (kvm_arch_create_memslot(&new, npages))
goto out_free;
}
/* Allocate page dirty bitmap if needed */
if ((new.flags & KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES) && !new.dirty_bitmap) {
if (kvm_create_dirty_bitmap(&new) < 0)
goto out_free;
/* destroy any largepage mappings for dirty tracking */
}
if (!npages || base_gfn != old.base_gfn) {
struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
r = -ENOMEM;
slots = kmemdup(kvm->memslots, sizeof(struct kvm_memslots),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!slots)
goto out_free;
slot = id_to_memslot(slots, mem->slot);
slot->flags |= KVM_MEMSLOT_INVALID;
update_memslots(slots, NULL);
old_memslots = kvm->memslots;
rcu_assign_pointer(kvm->memslots, slots);
synchronize_srcu_expedited(&kvm->srcu);
/* From this point no new shadow pages pointing to a deleted,
* or moved, memslot will be created.
*
* validation of sp->gfn happens in:
* - gfn_to_hva (kvm_read_guest, gfn_to_pfn)
* - kvm_is_visible_gfn (mmu_check_roots)
*/
kvm_arch_flush_shadow_memslot(kvm, slot);
kfree(old_memslots);
}
r = kvm_arch_prepare_memory_region(kvm, &new, old, mem, user_alloc);
if (r)
goto out_free;
/* map/unmap the pages in iommu page table */
if (npages) {
r = kvm_iommu_map_pages(kvm, &new);
if (r)
goto out_free;
} else
kvm_iommu_unmap_pages(kvm, &old);
r = -ENOMEM;
slots = kmemdup(kvm->memslots, sizeof(struct kvm_memslots),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!slots)
goto out_free;
/* actual memory is freed via old in kvm_free_physmem_slot below */
if (!npages) {
new.dirty_bitmap = NULL;
memset(&new.arch, 0, sizeof(new.arch));
}
update_memslots(slots, &new);
old_memslots = kvm->memslots;
rcu_assign_pointer(kvm->memslots, slots);
synchronize_srcu_expedited(&kvm->srcu);
kvm_arch_commit_memory_region(kvm, mem, old, user_alloc);
/*
* If the new memory slot is created, we need to clear all
* mmio sptes.
*/
if (npages && old.base_gfn != mem->guest_phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT)
kvm_arch_flush_shadow_all(kvm);
kvm_free_physmem_slot(&old, &new);
kfree(old_memslots);
return 0;
out_free:
kvm_free_physmem_slot(&new, &old);
out:
return r;
}
| 165,955 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: cib_remote_msg(gpointer data)
{
const char *value = NULL;
xmlNode *command = NULL;
cib_client_t *client = data;
crm_trace("%s callback", client->encrypted ? "secure" : "clear-text");
command = crm_recv_remote_msg(client->session, client->encrypted);
if (command == NULL) {
return -1;
}
value = crm_element_name(command);
if (safe_str_neq(value, "cib_command")) {
crm_log_xml_trace(command, "Bad command: ");
goto bail;
}
if (client->name == NULL) {
value = crm_element_value(command, F_CLIENTNAME);
if (value == NULL) {
client->name = strdup(client->id);
} else {
client->name = strdup(value);
}
}
if (client->callback_id == NULL) {
value = crm_element_value(command, F_CIB_CALLBACK_TOKEN);
if (value != NULL) {
client->callback_id = strdup(value);
crm_trace("Callback channel for %s is %s", client->id, client->callback_id);
} else {
client->callback_id = strdup(client->id);
}
}
/* unset dangerous options */
xml_remove_prop(command, F_ORIG);
xml_remove_prop(command, F_CIB_HOST);
xml_remove_prop(command, F_CIB_GLOBAL_UPDATE);
crm_xml_add(command, F_TYPE, T_CIB);
crm_xml_add(command, F_CIB_CLIENTID, client->id);
crm_xml_add(command, F_CIB_CLIENTNAME, client->name);
#if ENABLE_ACL
crm_xml_add(command, F_CIB_USER, client->user);
#endif
if (crm_element_value(command, F_CIB_CALLID) == NULL) {
char *call_uuid = crm_generate_uuid();
/* fix the command */
crm_xml_add(command, F_CIB_CALLID, call_uuid);
free(call_uuid);
}
if (crm_element_value(command, F_CIB_CALLOPTS) == NULL) {
crm_xml_add_int(command, F_CIB_CALLOPTS, 0);
}
crm_log_xml_trace(command, "Remote command: ");
cib_common_callback_worker(0, 0, command, client, TRUE);
bail:
free_xml(command);
command = NULL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | cib_remote_msg(gpointer data)
static void
cib_handle_remote_msg(cib_client_t *client, xmlNode *command)
{
const char *value = NULL;
value = crm_element_name(command);
if (safe_str_neq(value, "cib_command")) {
crm_log_xml_trace(command, "Bad command: ");
return;
}
if (client->name == NULL) {
value = crm_element_value(command, F_CLIENTNAME);
if (value == NULL) {
client->name = strdup(client->id);
} else {
client->name = strdup(value);
}
}
if (client->callback_id == NULL) {
value = crm_element_value(command, F_CIB_CALLBACK_TOKEN);
if (value != NULL) {
client->callback_id = strdup(value);
crm_trace("Callback channel for %s is %s", client->id, client->callback_id);
} else {
client->callback_id = strdup(client->id);
}
}
/* unset dangerous options */
xml_remove_prop(command, F_ORIG);
xml_remove_prop(command, F_CIB_HOST);
xml_remove_prop(command, F_CIB_GLOBAL_UPDATE);
crm_xml_add(command, F_TYPE, T_CIB);
crm_xml_add(command, F_CIB_CLIENTID, client->id);
crm_xml_add(command, F_CIB_CLIENTNAME, client->name);
#if ENABLE_ACL
crm_xml_add(command, F_CIB_USER, client->user);
#endif
if (crm_element_value(command, F_CIB_CALLID) == NULL) {
char *call_uuid = crm_generate_uuid();
/* fix the command */
crm_xml_add(command, F_CIB_CALLID, call_uuid);
free(call_uuid);
}
if (crm_element_value(command, F_CIB_CALLOPTS) == NULL) {
crm_xml_add_int(command, F_CIB_CALLOPTS, 0);
}
crm_log_xml_trace(command, "Remote command: ");
cib_common_callback_worker(0, 0, command, client, TRUE);
}
int
cib_remote_msg(gpointer data)
{
xmlNode *command = NULL;
cib_client_t *client = data;
int disconnected = 0;
int timeout = client->remote_auth ? -1 : 1000;
crm_trace("%s callback", client->encrypted ? "secure" : "clear-text");
#ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_GNUTLS_H
if (client->encrypted && (client->handshake_complete == FALSE)) {
int rc = 0;
/* Muliple calls to handshake will be required, this callback
* will be invoked once the client sends more handshake data. */
do {
rc = gnutls_handshake(*client->session);
if (rc < 0 && rc != GNUTLS_E_AGAIN) {
crm_err("Remote cib tls handshake failed");
return -1;
}
} while (rc == GNUTLS_E_INTERRUPTED);
if (rc == 0) {
crm_debug("Remote cib tls handshake completed");
client->handshake_complete = TRUE;
if (client->remote_auth_timeout) {
g_source_remove(client->remote_auth_timeout);
}
/* after handshake, clients must send auth in a few seconds */
client->remote_auth_timeout = g_timeout_add(REMOTE_AUTH_TIMEOUT, remote_auth_timeout_cb, client);
}
return 0;
}
#endif
crm_recv_remote_msg(client->session, &client->recv_buf, client->encrypted, timeout, &disconnected);
/* must pass auth before we will process anything else */
if (client->remote_auth == FALSE) {
xmlNode *reg;
#if ENABLE_ACL
const char *user = NULL;
#endif
command = crm_parse_remote_buffer(&client->recv_buf);
if (cib_remote_auth(command) == FALSE) {
free_xml(command);
return -1;
}
crm_debug("remote connection authenticated successfully");
client->remote_auth = TRUE;
g_source_remove(client->remote_auth_timeout);
client->remote_auth_timeout = 0;
client->name = crm_element_value_copy(command, "name");
#if ENABLE_ACL
user = crm_element_value(command, "user");
if (user) {
new_client->user = strdup(user);
}
#endif
/* send ACK */
reg = create_xml_node(NULL, "cib_result");
crm_xml_add(reg, F_CIB_OPERATION, CRM_OP_REGISTER);
crm_xml_add(reg, F_CIB_CLIENTID, client->id);
crm_send_remote_msg(client->session, reg, client->encrypted);
free_xml(reg);
free_xml(command);
}
command = crm_parse_remote_buffer(&client->recv_buf);
while (command) {
crm_trace("command received");
cib_handle_remote_msg(client, command);
free_xml(command);
command = crm_parse_remote_buffer(&client->recv_buf);
}
if (disconnected) {
crm_trace("disconnected while receiving remote cib msg.");
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
| 166,149 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void InlineSigninHelper::OnClientOAuthSuccessAndBrowserOpened(
const ClientOAuthResult& result,
Profile* profile,
Profile::CreateStatus status) {
if (is_force_sign_in_with_usermanager_)
UnlockProfileAndHideLoginUI(profile_->GetPath(), handler_.get());
Browser* browser = NULL;
if (handler_) {
browser = handler_->GetDesktopBrowser();
}
AboutSigninInternals* about_signin_internals =
AboutSigninInternalsFactory::GetForProfile(profile_);
about_signin_internals->OnRefreshTokenReceived("Successful");
std::string account_id =
AccountTrackerServiceFactory::GetForProfile(profile_)
->SeedAccountInfo(gaia_id_, email_);
signin_metrics::AccessPoint access_point =
signin::GetAccessPointForPromoURL(current_url_);
signin_metrics::Reason reason =
signin::GetSigninReasonForPromoURL(current_url_);
SigninManager* signin_manager = SigninManagerFactory::GetForProfile(profile_);
std::string primary_email =
signin_manager->GetAuthenticatedAccountInfo().email;
if (gaia::AreEmailsSame(email_, primary_email) &&
(reason == signin_metrics::Reason::REASON_REAUTHENTICATION ||
reason == signin_metrics::Reason::REASON_UNLOCK) &&
!password_.empty() && profiles::IsLockAvailable(profile_)) {
LocalAuth::SetLocalAuthCredentials(profile_, password_);
}
#if defined(SYNC_PASSWORD_REUSE_DETECTION_ENABLED)
if (!password_.empty()) {
scoped_refptr<password_manager::PasswordStore> password_store =
PasswordStoreFactory::GetForProfile(profile_,
ServiceAccessType::EXPLICIT_ACCESS);
if (password_store && !primary_email.empty()) {
password_store->SaveGaiaPasswordHash(
primary_email, base::UTF8ToUTF16(password_),
password_manager::metrics_util::SyncPasswordHashChange::
SAVED_ON_CHROME_SIGNIN);
}
}
#endif
if (reason == signin_metrics::Reason::REASON_REAUTHENTICATION ||
reason == signin_metrics::Reason::REASON_UNLOCK ||
reason == signin_metrics::Reason::REASON_ADD_SECONDARY_ACCOUNT) {
ProfileOAuth2TokenServiceFactory::GetForProfile(profile_)->
UpdateCredentials(account_id, result.refresh_token);
if (signin::IsAutoCloseEnabledInURL(current_url_)) {
bool show_account_management = ShouldShowAccountManagement(
current_url_,
AccountConsistencyModeManager::IsMirrorEnabledForProfile(profile_));
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(&InlineLoginHandlerImpl::CloseTab, handler_,
show_account_management));
}
if (reason == signin_metrics::Reason::REASON_REAUTHENTICATION ||
reason == signin_metrics::Reason::REASON_UNLOCK) {
signin_manager->MergeSigninCredentialIntoCookieJar();
}
LogSigninReason(reason);
} else {
browser_sync::ProfileSyncService* sync_service =
ProfileSyncServiceFactory::GetForProfile(profile_);
SigninErrorController* error_controller =
SigninErrorControllerFactory::GetForProfile(profile_);
OneClickSigninSyncStarter::StartSyncMode start_mode =
OneClickSigninSyncStarter::CONFIRM_SYNC_SETTINGS_FIRST;
if (access_point == signin_metrics::AccessPoint::ACCESS_POINT_SETTINGS ||
choose_what_to_sync_) {
bool show_settings_without_configure =
error_controller->HasError() && sync_service &&
sync_service->IsFirstSetupComplete();
if (!show_settings_without_configure)
start_mode = OneClickSigninSyncStarter::CONFIGURE_SYNC_FIRST;
}
OneClickSigninSyncStarter::ConfirmationRequired confirmation_required =
confirm_untrusted_signin_ ?
OneClickSigninSyncStarter::CONFIRM_UNTRUSTED_SIGNIN :
OneClickSigninSyncStarter::CONFIRM_AFTER_SIGNIN;
bool start_signin = !HandleCrossAccountError(
result.refresh_token, confirmation_required, start_mode);
if (start_signin) {
CreateSyncStarter(browser, current_url_, result.refresh_token,
OneClickSigninSyncStarter::CURRENT_PROFILE, start_mode,
confirmation_required);
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->DeleteSoon(FROM_HERE, this);
}
}
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void InlineSigninHelper::OnClientOAuthSuccessAndBrowserOpened(
const ClientOAuthResult& result,
Profile* profile,
Profile::CreateStatus status) {
if (is_force_sign_in_with_usermanager_)
UnlockProfileAndHideLoginUI(profile_->GetPath(), handler_.get());
Browser* browser = NULL;
if (handler_) {
browser = handler_->GetDesktopBrowser();
}
AboutSigninInternals* about_signin_internals =
AboutSigninInternalsFactory::GetForProfile(profile_);
about_signin_internals->OnRefreshTokenReceived("Successful");
std::string account_id =
AccountTrackerServiceFactory::GetForProfile(profile_)
->SeedAccountInfo(gaia_id_, email_);
signin_metrics::AccessPoint access_point =
signin::GetAccessPointForPromoURL(current_url_);
signin_metrics::Reason reason =
signin::GetSigninReasonForPromoURL(current_url_);
SigninManager* signin_manager = SigninManagerFactory::GetForProfile(profile_);
std::string primary_email =
signin_manager->GetAuthenticatedAccountInfo().email;
if (gaia::AreEmailsSame(email_, primary_email) &&
(reason == signin_metrics::Reason::REASON_REAUTHENTICATION ||
reason == signin_metrics::Reason::REASON_UNLOCK) &&
!password_.empty() && profiles::IsLockAvailable(profile_)) {
LocalAuth::SetLocalAuthCredentials(profile_, password_);
}
#if defined(SYNC_PASSWORD_REUSE_DETECTION_ENABLED)
if (!password_.empty()) {
scoped_refptr<password_manager::PasswordStore> password_store =
PasswordStoreFactory::GetForProfile(profile_,
ServiceAccessType::EXPLICIT_ACCESS);
if (password_store && !primary_email.empty()) {
password_store->SaveGaiaPasswordHash(
primary_email, base::UTF8ToUTF16(password_),
password_manager::metrics_util::SyncPasswordHashChange::
SAVED_ON_CHROME_SIGNIN);
}
}
#endif
if (reason == signin_metrics::Reason::REASON_REAUTHENTICATION ||
reason == signin_metrics::Reason::REASON_UNLOCK ||
reason == signin_metrics::Reason::REASON_ADD_SECONDARY_ACCOUNT) {
ProfileOAuth2TokenServiceFactory::GetForProfile(profile_)
->UpdateCredentials(account_id, result.refresh_token,
signin_metrics::SourceForRefreshTokenOperation::
kInlineLoginHandler_Signin);
if (signin::IsAutoCloseEnabledInURL(current_url_)) {
bool show_account_management = ShouldShowAccountManagement(
current_url_,
AccountConsistencyModeManager::IsMirrorEnabledForProfile(profile_));
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(&InlineLoginHandlerImpl::CloseTab, handler_,
show_account_management));
}
if (reason == signin_metrics::Reason::REASON_REAUTHENTICATION ||
reason == signin_metrics::Reason::REASON_UNLOCK) {
signin_manager->MergeSigninCredentialIntoCookieJar();
}
LogSigninReason(reason);
} else {
browser_sync::ProfileSyncService* sync_service =
ProfileSyncServiceFactory::GetForProfile(profile_);
SigninErrorController* error_controller =
SigninErrorControllerFactory::GetForProfile(profile_);
OneClickSigninSyncStarter::StartSyncMode start_mode =
OneClickSigninSyncStarter::CONFIRM_SYNC_SETTINGS_FIRST;
if (access_point == signin_metrics::AccessPoint::ACCESS_POINT_SETTINGS ||
choose_what_to_sync_) {
bool show_settings_without_configure =
error_controller->HasError() && sync_service &&
sync_service->IsFirstSetupComplete();
if (!show_settings_without_configure)
start_mode = OneClickSigninSyncStarter::CONFIGURE_SYNC_FIRST;
}
OneClickSigninSyncStarter::ConfirmationRequired confirmation_required =
confirm_untrusted_signin_ ?
OneClickSigninSyncStarter::CONFIRM_UNTRUSTED_SIGNIN :
OneClickSigninSyncStarter::CONFIRM_AFTER_SIGNIN;
bool start_signin = !HandleCrossAccountError(
result.refresh_token, confirmation_required, start_mode);
if (start_signin) {
CreateSyncStarter(browser, current_url_, result.refresh_token,
OneClickSigninSyncStarter::CURRENT_PROFILE, start_mode,
confirmation_required);
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->DeleteSoon(FROM_HERE, this);
}
}
}
| 172,575 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static struct file *path_openat(int dfd, struct filename *pathname,
struct nameidata *nd, const struct open_flags *op, int flags)
{
struct file *file;
struct path path;
int opened = 0;
int error;
file = get_empty_filp();
if (IS_ERR(file))
return file;
file->f_flags = op->open_flag;
if (unlikely(file->f_flags & __O_TMPFILE)) {
error = do_tmpfile(dfd, pathname, nd, flags, op, file, &opened);
goto out;
}
error = path_init(dfd, pathname, flags, nd);
if (unlikely(error))
goto out;
error = do_last(nd, &path, file, op, &opened, pathname);
while (unlikely(error > 0)) { /* trailing symlink */
struct path link = path;
void *cookie;
if (!(nd->flags & LOOKUP_FOLLOW)) {
path_put_conditional(&path, nd);
path_put(&nd->path);
error = -ELOOP;
break;
}
error = may_follow_link(&link, nd);
if (unlikely(error))
break;
nd->flags |= LOOKUP_PARENT;
nd->flags &= ~(LOOKUP_OPEN|LOOKUP_CREATE|LOOKUP_EXCL);
error = follow_link(&link, nd, &cookie);
if (unlikely(error))
break;
error = do_last(nd, &path, file, op, &opened, pathname);
put_link(nd, &link, cookie);
}
out:
path_cleanup(nd);
if (!(opened & FILE_OPENED)) {
BUG_ON(!error);
put_filp(file);
}
if (unlikely(error)) {
if (error == -EOPENSTALE) {
if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU)
error = -ECHILD;
else
error = -ESTALE;
}
file = ERR_PTR(error);
}
return file;
}
Commit Message: path_openat(): fix double fput()
path_openat() jumps to the wrong place after do_tmpfile() - it has
already done path_cleanup() (as part of path_lookupat() called by
do_tmpfile()), so doing that again can lead to double fput().
Cc: [email protected] # v3.11+
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | static struct file *path_openat(int dfd, struct filename *pathname,
struct nameidata *nd, const struct open_flags *op, int flags)
{
struct file *file;
struct path path;
int opened = 0;
int error;
file = get_empty_filp();
if (IS_ERR(file))
return file;
file->f_flags = op->open_flag;
if (unlikely(file->f_flags & __O_TMPFILE)) {
error = do_tmpfile(dfd, pathname, nd, flags, op, file, &opened);
goto out2;
}
error = path_init(dfd, pathname, flags, nd);
if (unlikely(error))
goto out;
error = do_last(nd, &path, file, op, &opened, pathname);
while (unlikely(error > 0)) { /* trailing symlink */
struct path link = path;
void *cookie;
if (!(nd->flags & LOOKUP_FOLLOW)) {
path_put_conditional(&path, nd);
path_put(&nd->path);
error = -ELOOP;
break;
}
error = may_follow_link(&link, nd);
if (unlikely(error))
break;
nd->flags |= LOOKUP_PARENT;
nd->flags &= ~(LOOKUP_OPEN|LOOKUP_CREATE|LOOKUP_EXCL);
error = follow_link(&link, nd, &cookie);
if (unlikely(error))
break;
error = do_last(nd, &path, file, op, &opened, pathname);
put_link(nd, &link, cookie);
}
out:
path_cleanup(nd);
out2:
if (!(opened & FILE_OPENED)) {
BUG_ON(!error);
put_filp(file);
}
if (unlikely(error)) {
if (error == -EOPENSTALE) {
if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU)
error = -ECHILD;
else
error = -ESTALE;
}
file = ERR_PTR(error);
}
return file;
}
| 166,594 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::AttachInterstitialPage(
InterstitialPageImpl* interstitial_page) {
DCHECK(interstitial_page);
render_manager_.set_interstitial_page(interstitial_page);
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(WebContentsObserver, observers_,
DidAttachInterstitialPage());
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void WebContentsImpl::AttachInterstitialPage(
InterstitialPageImpl* interstitial_page) {
DCHECK(interstitial_page);
render_manager_.set_interstitial_page(interstitial_page);
// Cancel any visible dialogs so that they don't interfere with the
// interstitial.
if (dialog_manager_)
dialog_manager_->CancelActiveAndPendingDialogs(this);
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(WebContentsObserver, observers_,
DidAttachInterstitialPage());
}
| 171,160 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xmlPushInput(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlParserInputPtr input) {
int ret;
if (input == NULL) return(-1);
if (xmlParserDebugEntities) {
if ((ctxt->input != NULL) && (ctxt->input->filename))
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"%s(%d): ", ctxt->input->filename,
ctxt->input->line);
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"Pushing input %d : %.30s\n", ctxt->inputNr+1, input->cur);
}
ret = inputPush(ctxt, input);
GROW;
return(ret);
}
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | xmlPushInput(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlParserInputPtr input) {
int ret;
if (input == NULL) return(-1);
if (xmlParserDebugEntities) {
if ((ctxt->input != NULL) && (ctxt->input->filename))
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"%s(%d): ", ctxt->input->filename,
ctxt->input->line);
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"Pushing input %d : %.30s\n", ctxt->inputNr+1, input->cur);
}
ret = inputPush(ctxt, input);
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
return(-1);
GROW;
return(ret);
}
| 171,309 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SyncManager::SyncInternal::MaybeSetSyncTabsInNigoriNode(
const ModelTypeSet enabled_types) {
if (initialized_ && enabled_types.Has(syncable::SESSIONS)) {
WriteTransaction trans(FROM_HERE, GetUserShare());
WriteNode node(&trans);
if (node.InitByTagLookup(kNigoriTag) != sync_api::BaseNode::INIT_OK) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Unable to set 'sync_tabs' bit because Nigori node not "
<< "found.";
return;
}
sync_pb::NigoriSpecifics specifics(node.GetNigoriSpecifics());
specifics.set_sync_tabs(true);
node.SetNigoriSpecifics(specifics);
}
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | void SyncManager::SyncInternal::MaybeSetSyncTabsInNigoriNode(
}
| 170,795 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void WallpaperManagerBase::GetCustomWallpaperInternal(
const AccountId& account_id,
const WallpaperInfo& info,
const base::FilePath& wallpaper_path,
bool update_wallpaper,
const scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner>& reply_task_runner,
MovableOnDestroyCallbackHolder on_finish,
base::WeakPtr<WallpaperManagerBase> weak_ptr) {
base::FilePath valid_path = wallpaper_path;
if (!base::PathExists(wallpaper_path)) {
valid_path = GetCustomWallpaperDir(kOriginalWallpaperSubDir);
valid_path = valid_path.Append(info.location);
}
if (!base::PathExists(valid_path)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to load custom wallpaper from its original fallback "
"file path: " << valid_path.value();
const std::string& old_path = account_id.GetUserEmail(); // Migrated
valid_path = GetCustomWallpaperPath(kOriginalWallpaperSubDir,
WallpaperFilesId::FromString(old_path),
info.location);
}
if (!base::PathExists(valid_path)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to load previously selected custom wallpaper. "
<< "Fallback to default wallpaper. Expected wallpaper path: "
<< wallpaper_path.value();
reply_task_runner->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&WallpaperManagerBase::DoSetDefaultWallpaper, weak_ptr,
account_id, base::Passed(std::move(on_finish))));
} else {
reply_task_runner->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::Bind(&WallpaperManagerBase::StartLoad, weak_ptr,
account_id, info, update_wallpaper, valid_path,
base::Passed(std::move(on_finish))));
}
}
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
[email protected], [email protected]
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <[email protected]>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void WallpaperManagerBase::GetCustomWallpaperInternal(
const AccountId& account_id,
const WallpaperInfo& info,
const base::FilePath& wallpaper_path,
bool update_wallpaper,
const scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner>& reply_task_runner,
MovableOnDestroyCallbackHolder on_finish,
base::WeakPtr<WallpaperManagerBase> weak_ptr) {
base::FilePath valid_path = wallpaper_path;
if (!base::PathExists(wallpaper_path)) {
valid_path = GetCustomWallpaperDir(kOriginalWallpaperSubDir);
valid_path = valid_path.Append(info.location);
}
if (!base::PathExists(valid_path)) {
const std::string& old_path = account_id.GetUserEmail(); // Migrated
valid_path = GetCustomWallpaperPath(kOriginalWallpaperSubDir,
WallpaperFilesId::FromString(old_path),
info.location);
}
if (!base::PathExists(valid_path)) {
reply_task_runner->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&WallpaperManagerBase::OnCustomWallpaperFileNotFound,
weak_ptr, account_id, wallpaper_path, update_wallpaper,
base::Passed(std::move(on_finish))));
} else {
reply_task_runner->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::Bind(&WallpaperManagerBase::StartLoad, weak_ptr,
account_id, info, update_wallpaper, valid_path,
base::Passed(std::move(on_finish))));
}
}
| 171,972 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int TestOpenProcess(DWORD process_id) {
HANDLE process = ::OpenProcess(PROCESS_VM_READ,
FALSE, // Do not inherit handle.
process_id);
if (NULL == process) {
if (ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED == ::GetLastError()) {
return SBOX_TEST_DENIED;
} else {
return SBOX_TEST_FAILED_TO_EXECUTE_COMMAND;
}
} else {
::CloseHandle(process);
return SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED;
}
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed processes from opening each other
TBR=brettw
BUG=117627
BUG=119150
TEST=sbox_validation_tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9716027
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132477 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | int TestOpenProcess(DWORD process_id) {
int TestOpenProcess(DWORD process_id, DWORD access_mask) {
HANDLE process = ::OpenProcess(access_mask,
FALSE, // Do not inherit handle.
process_id);
if (NULL == process) {
if (ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED == ::GetLastError()) {
return SBOX_TEST_DENIED;
} else {
return SBOX_TEST_FAILED_TO_EXECUTE_COMMAND;
}
} else {
::CloseHandle(process);
return SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED;
}
}
| 170,915 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int ssl2_generate_key_material(SSL *s)
{
unsigned int i;
EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
unsigned char *km;
unsigned char c = '0';
const EVP_MD *md5;
int md_size;
md5 = EVP_md5();
# ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
c = os_toascii['0']; /* Must be an ASCII '0', not EBCDIC '0', see
* SSLv2 docu */
# endif
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
km = s->s2->key_material;
if (s->session->master_key_length < 0 ||
s->session->master_key_length > (int)sizeof(s->session->master_key)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_GENERATE_KEY_MATERIAL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
md_size = EVP_MD_size(md5);
if (md_size < 0)
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < s->s2->key_material_length; i += md_size) {
if (((km - s->s2->key_material) + md_size) >
(int)sizeof(s->s2->key_material)) {
/*
* EVP_DigestFinal_ex() below would write beyond buffer
*/
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_GENERATE_KEY_MATERIAL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, md5, NULL);
OPENSSL_assert(s->session->master_key_length >= 0
&& s->session->master_key_length
< (int)sizeof(s->session->master_key));
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, s->session->master_key,
s->session->master_key_length);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &c, 1);
c++;
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, s->s2->challenge, s->s2->challenge_length);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, s->s2->conn_id, s->s2->conn_id_length);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, km, NULL);
km += md_size;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | int ssl2_generate_key_material(SSL *s)
{
unsigned int i;
EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
unsigned char *km;
unsigned char c = '0';
const EVP_MD *md5;
int md_size;
md5 = EVP_md5();
# ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
c = os_toascii['0']; /* Must be an ASCII '0', not EBCDIC '0', see
* SSLv2 docu */
# endif
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
km = s->s2->key_material;
if (s->session->master_key_length < 0 ||
s->session->master_key_length > (int)sizeof(s->session->master_key)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_GENERATE_KEY_MATERIAL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
md_size = EVP_MD_size(md5);
if (md_size < 0)
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < s->s2->key_material_length; i += md_size) {
if (((km - s->s2->key_material) + md_size) >
(int)sizeof(s->s2->key_material)) {
/*
* EVP_DigestFinal_ex() below would write beyond buffer
*/
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_GENERATE_KEY_MATERIAL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, md5, NULL);
OPENSSL_assert(s->session->master_key_length >= 0
&& s->session->master_key_length
<= (int)sizeof(s->session->master_key));
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, s->session->master_key,
s->session->master_key_length);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &c, 1);
c++;
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, s->s2->challenge, s->s2->challenge_length);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, s->s2->conn_id, s->s2->conn_id_length);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, km, NULL);
km += md_size;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return 1;
}
| 164,801 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int main(int argc, char **argv) {
int frame_cnt = 0;
FILE *outfile = NULL;
vpx_codec_ctx_t codec;
vpx_codec_err_t res;
VpxVideoReader *reader = NULL;
const VpxInterface *decoder = NULL;
const VpxVideoInfo *info = NULL;
exec_name = argv[0];
if (argc != 3)
die("Invalid number of arguments.");
reader = vpx_video_reader_open(argv[1]);
if (!reader)
die("Failed to open %s for reading.", argv[1]);
if (!(outfile = fopen(argv[2], "wb")))
die("Failed to open %s for writing", argv[2]);
info = vpx_video_reader_get_info(reader);
decoder = get_vpx_decoder_by_fourcc(info->codec_fourcc);
if (!decoder)
die("Unknown input codec.");
printf("Using %s\n", vpx_codec_iface_name(decoder->interface()));
res = vpx_codec_dec_init(&codec, decoder->interface(), NULL,
VPX_CODEC_USE_POSTPROC);
if (res == VPX_CODEC_INCAPABLE)
die_codec(&codec, "Postproc not supported by this decoder.");
if (res)
die_codec(&codec, "Failed to initialize decoder.");
while (vpx_video_reader_read_frame(reader)) {
vpx_codec_iter_t iter = NULL;
vpx_image_t *img = NULL;
size_t frame_size = 0;
const unsigned char *frame = vpx_video_reader_get_frame(reader,
&frame_size);
++frame_cnt;
if (frame_cnt % 30 == 1) {
vp8_postproc_cfg_t pp = {0, 0, 0};
if (vpx_codec_control(&codec, VP8_SET_POSTPROC, &pp))
die_codec(&codec, "Failed to turn off postproc.");
} else if (frame_cnt % 30 == 16) {
vp8_postproc_cfg_t pp = {VP8_DEBLOCK | VP8_DEMACROBLOCK | VP8_MFQE,
4, 0};
if (vpx_codec_control(&codec, VP8_SET_POSTPROC, &pp))
die_codec(&codec, "Failed to turn on postproc.");
};
if (vpx_codec_decode(&codec, frame, (unsigned int)frame_size, NULL, 15000))
die_codec(&codec, "Failed to decode frame");
while ((img = vpx_codec_get_frame(&codec, &iter)) != NULL) {
vpx_img_write(img, outfile);
}
}
printf("Processed %d frames.\n", frame_cnt);
if (vpx_codec_destroy(&codec))
die_codec(&codec, "Failed to destroy codec");
printf("Play: ffplay -f rawvideo -pix_fmt yuv420p -s %dx%d %s\n",
info->frame_width, info->frame_height, argv[2]);
vpx_video_reader_close(reader);
fclose(outfile);
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | int main(int argc, char **argv) {
int frame_cnt = 0;
FILE *outfile = NULL;
vpx_codec_ctx_t codec;
vpx_codec_err_t res;
VpxVideoReader *reader = NULL;
const VpxInterface *decoder = NULL;
const VpxVideoInfo *info = NULL;
exec_name = argv[0];
if (argc != 3)
die("Invalid number of arguments.");
reader = vpx_video_reader_open(argv[1]);
if (!reader)
die("Failed to open %s for reading.", argv[1]);
if (!(outfile = fopen(argv[2], "wb")))
die("Failed to open %s for writing", argv[2]);
info = vpx_video_reader_get_info(reader);
decoder = get_vpx_decoder_by_fourcc(info->codec_fourcc);
if (!decoder)
die("Unknown input codec.");
printf("Using %s\n", vpx_codec_iface_name(decoder->codec_interface()));
res = vpx_codec_dec_init(&codec, decoder->codec_interface(), NULL,
VPX_CODEC_USE_POSTPROC);
if (res == VPX_CODEC_INCAPABLE)
die_codec(&codec, "Postproc not supported by this decoder.");
if (res)
die_codec(&codec, "Failed to initialize decoder.");
while (vpx_video_reader_read_frame(reader)) {
vpx_codec_iter_t iter = NULL;
vpx_image_t *img = NULL;
size_t frame_size = 0;
const unsigned char *frame = vpx_video_reader_get_frame(reader,
&frame_size);
++frame_cnt;
if (frame_cnt % 30 == 1) {
vp8_postproc_cfg_t pp = {0, 0, 0};
if (vpx_codec_control(&codec, VP8_SET_POSTPROC, &pp))
die_codec(&codec, "Failed to turn off postproc.");
} else if (frame_cnt % 30 == 16) {
vp8_postproc_cfg_t pp = {VP8_DEBLOCK | VP8_DEMACROBLOCK | VP8_MFQE,
4, 0};
if (vpx_codec_control(&codec, VP8_SET_POSTPROC, &pp))
die_codec(&codec, "Failed to turn on postproc.");
};
if (vpx_codec_decode(&codec, frame, (unsigned int)frame_size, NULL, 15000))
die_codec(&codec, "Failed to decode frame");
while ((img = vpx_codec_get_frame(&codec, &iter)) != NULL) {
vpx_img_write(img, outfile);
}
}
printf("Processed %d frames.\n", frame_cnt);
if (vpx_codec_destroy(&codec))
die_codec(&codec, "Failed to destroy codec");
printf("Play: ffplay -f rawvideo -pix_fmt yuv420p -s %dx%d %s\n",
info->frame_width, info->frame_height, argv[2]);
vpx_video_reader_close(reader);
fclose(outfile);
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}
| 174,478 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void MimeHandlerViewContainer::OnReady() {
if (!render_frame() || !is_embedded_)
return;
blink::WebLocalFrame* frame = render_frame()->GetWebFrame();
blink::WebAssociatedURLLoaderOptions options;
DCHECK(!loader_);
loader_.reset(frame->CreateAssociatedURLLoader(options));
blink::WebURLRequest request(original_url_);
request.SetRequestContext(blink::WebURLRequest::kRequestContextObject);
loader_->LoadAsynchronously(request, this);
}
Commit Message: Skip Service workers in requests for mime handler plugins
BUG=808838
TEST=./browser_tests --gtest_filter=*/ServiceWorkerTest.MimeHandlerView*
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: I82e75c200091babbab648a04232db47e2938d914
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914150
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Istiaque Ahmed <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matt Falkenhagen <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#537386}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void MimeHandlerViewContainer::OnReady() {
if (!render_frame() || !is_embedded_)
return;
blink::WebLocalFrame* frame = render_frame()->GetWebFrame();
blink::WebAssociatedURLLoaderOptions options;
DCHECK(!loader_);
loader_.reset(frame->CreateAssociatedURLLoader(options));
blink::WebURLRequest request(original_url_);
request.SetRequestContext(blink::WebURLRequest::kRequestContextObject);
// The plugin resource request should skip service workers since "plug-ins
// may get their security origins from their own urls".
// https://w3c.github.io/ServiceWorker/#implementer-concerns
request.SetServiceWorkerMode(blink::WebURLRequest::ServiceWorkerMode::kNone);
loader_->LoadAsynchronously(request, this);
}
| 172,702 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: make_error(png_store* volatile psIn, png_byte PNG_CONST colour_type,
png_byte bit_depth, int interlace_type, int test, png_const_charp name)
{
png_store * volatile ps = psIn;
context(ps, fault);
check_interlace_type(interlace_type);
Try
{
png_structp pp;
png_infop pi;
pp = set_store_for_write(ps, &pi, name);
if (pp == NULL)
Throw ps;
png_set_IHDR(pp, pi, transform_width(pp, colour_type, bit_depth),
transform_height(pp, colour_type, bit_depth), bit_depth, colour_type,
interlace_type, PNG_COMPRESSION_TYPE_BASE, PNG_FILTER_TYPE_BASE);
if (colour_type == 3) /* palette */
init_standard_palette(ps, pp, pi, 1U << bit_depth, 0/*do tRNS*/);
/* Time for a few errors; these are in various optional chunks, the
* standard tests test the standard chunks pretty well.
*/
# define exception__prev exception_prev_1
# define exception__env exception_env_1
Try
{
/* Expect this to throw: */
ps->expect_error = !error_test[test].warning;
ps->expect_warning = error_test[test].warning;
ps->saw_warning = 0;
error_test[test].fn(pp, pi);
/* Normally the error is only detected here: */
png_write_info(pp, pi);
/* And handle the case where it was only a warning: */
if (ps->expect_warning && ps->saw_warning)
Throw ps;
/* If we get here there is a problem, we have success - no error or
* no warning - when we shouldn't have success. Log an error.
*/
store_log(ps, pp, error_test[test].msg, 1 /*error*/);
}
Catch (fault)
ps = fault; /* expected exit, make sure ps is not clobbered */
#undef exception__prev
#undef exception__env
/* And clear these flags */
ps->expect_error = 0;
ps->expect_warning = 0;
/* Now write the whole image, just to make sure that the detected, or
* undetected, errro has not created problems inside libpng.
*/
if (png_get_rowbytes(pp, pi) !=
transform_rowsize(pp, colour_type, bit_depth))
png_error(pp, "row size incorrect");
else
{
png_uint_32 h = transform_height(pp, colour_type, bit_depth);
int npasses = png_set_interlace_handling(pp);
int pass;
if (npasses != npasses_from_interlace_type(pp, interlace_type))
png_error(pp, "write: png_set_interlace_handling failed");
for (pass=0; pass<npasses; ++pass)
{
png_uint_32 y;
for (y=0; y<h; ++y)
{
png_byte buffer[TRANSFORM_ROWMAX];
transform_row(pp, buffer, colour_type, bit_depth, y);
png_write_row(pp, buffer);
}
}
}
png_write_end(pp, pi);
/* The following deletes the file that was just written. */
store_write_reset(ps);
}
Catch(fault)
{
store_write_reset(fault);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | make_error(png_store* volatile psIn, png_byte PNG_CONST colour_type,
make_error(png_store* const ps, png_byte const colour_type,
png_byte bit_depth, int interlace_type, int test, png_const_charp name)
{
context(ps, fault);
check_interlace_type(interlace_type);
Try
{
png_infop pi;
const png_structp pp = set_store_for_write(ps, &pi, name);
png_uint_32 w, h;
gnu_volatile(pp)
if (pp == NULL)
Throw ps;
w = transform_width(pp, colour_type, bit_depth);
gnu_volatile(w)
h = transform_height(pp, colour_type, bit_depth);
gnu_volatile(h)
png_set_IHDR(pp, pi, w, h, bit_depth, colour_type, interlace_type,
PNG_COMPRESSION_TYPE_BASE, PNG_FILTER_TYPE_BASE);
if (colour_type == 3) /* palette */
init_standard_palette(ps, pp, pi, 1U << bit_depth, 0/*do tRNS*/);
/* Time for a few errors; these are in various optional chunks, the
* standard tests test the standard chunks pretty well.
*/
# define exception__prev exception_prev_1
# define exception__env exception_env_1
Try
{
gnu_volatile(exception__prev)
/* Expect this to throw: */
ps->expect_error = !error_test[test].warning;
ps->expect_warning = error_test[test].warning;
ps->saw_warning = 0;
error_test[test].fn(pp, pi);
/* Normally the error is only detected here: */
png_write_info(pp, pi);
/* And handle the case where it was only a warning: */
if (ps->expect_warning && ps->saw_warning)
Throw ps;
/* If we get here there is a problem, we have success - no error or
* no warning - when we shouldn't have success. Log an error.
*/
store_log(ps, pp, error_test[test].msg, 1 /*error*/);
}
Catch (fault)
{ /* expected exit */
}
#undef exception__prev
#undef exception__env
/* And clear these flags */
ps->expect_error = 0;
ps->expect_warning = 0;
/* Now write the whole image, just to make sure that the detected, or
* undetected, errro has not created problems inside libpng.
*/
if (png_get_rowbytes(pp, pi) !=
transform_rowsize(pp, colour_type, bit_depth))
png_error(pp, "row size incorrect");
else
{
int npasses = set_write_interlace_handling(pp, interlace_type);
int pass;
if (npasses != npasses_from_interlace_type(pp, interlace_type))
png_error(pp, "write: png_set_interlace_handling failed");
for (pass=0; pass<npasses; ++pass)
{
png_uint_32 y;
for (y=0; y<h; ++y)
{
png_byte buffer[TRANSFORM_ROWMAX];
transform_row(pp, buffer, colour_type, bit_depth, y);
# if do_own_interlace
/* If do_own_interlace *and* the image is interlaced we need a
* reduced interlace row; this may be reduced to empty.
*/
if (interlace_type == PNG_INTERLACE_ADAM7)
{
/* The row must not be written if it doesn't exist, notice
* that there are two conditions here, either the row isn't
* ever in the pass or the row would be but isn't wide
* enough to contribute any pixels. In fact the wPass test
* can be used to skip the whole y loop in this case.
*/
if (PNG_ROW_IN_INTERLACE_PASS(y, pass) &&
PNG_PASS_COLS(w, pass) > 0)
interlace_row(buffer, buffer,
bit_size(pp, colour_type, bit_depth), w, pass,
0/*data always bigendian*/);
else
continue;
}
# endif /* do_own_interlace */
png_write_row(pp, buffer);
}
}
}
png_write_end(pp, pi);
/* The following deletes the file that was just written. */
store_write_reset(ps);
}
Catch(fault)
{
store_write_reset(fault);
}
}
| 173,661 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int em_ret(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
ctxt->dst.type = OP_REG;
ctxt->dst.addr.reg = &ctxt->_eip;
ctxt->dst.bytes = ctxt->op_bytes;
return em_pop(ctxt);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Emulator fixes for eip canonical checks on near branches
Before changing rip (during jmp, call, ret, etc.) the target should be asserted
to be canonical one, as real CPUs do. During sysret, both target rsp and rip
should be canonical. If any of these values is noncanonical, a #GP exception
should occur. The exception to this rule are syscall and sysenter instructions
in which the assigned rip is checked during the assignment to the relevant
MSRs.
This patch fixes the emulator to behave as real CPUs do for near branches.
Far branches are handled by the next patch.
This fixes CVE-2014-3647.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static int em_ret(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
int rc;
unsigned long eip;
rc = emulate_pop(ctxt, &eip, ctxt->op_bytes);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
return assign_eip_near(ctxt, eip);
}
| 169,913 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: image_transform_png_set_strip_alpha_set(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
transform_display *that, png_structp pp, png_infop pi)
{
png_set_strip_alpha(pp);
this->next->set(this->next, that, pp, pi);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | image_transform_png_set_strip_alpha_set(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
image_transform_png_set_strip_alpha_set(const image_transform *this,
transform_display *that, png_structp pp, png_infop pi)
{
png_set_strip_alpha(pp);
this->next->set(this->next, that, pp, pi);
}
| 173,653 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int cx24116_send_diseqc_msg(struct dvb_frontend *fe,
struct dvb_diseqc_master_cmd *d)
{
struct cx24116_state *state = fe->demodulator_priv;
int i, ret;
/* Dump DiSEqC message */
if (debug) {
printk(KERN_INFO "cx24116: %s(", __func__);
for (i = 0 ; i < d->msg_len ;) {
printk(KERN_INFO "0x%02x", d->msg[i]);
if (++i < d->msg_len)
printk(KERN_INFO ", ");
}
printk(") toneburst=%d\n", toneburst);
}
/* Validate length */
if (d->msg_len > (CX24116_ARGLEN - CX24116_DISEQC_MSGOFS))
return -EINVAL;
/* DiSEqC message */
for (i = 0; i < d->msg_len; i++)
state->dsec_cmd.args[CX24116_DISEQC_MSGOFS + i] = d->msg[i];
/* DiSEqC message length */
state->dsec_cmd.args[CX24116_DISEQC_MSGLEN] = d->msg_len;
/* Command length */
state->dsec_cmd.len = CX24116_DISEQC_MSGOFS +
state->dsec_cmd.args[CX24116_DISEQC_MSGLEN];
/* DiSEqC toneburst */
if (toneburst == CX24116_DISEQC_MESGCACHE)
/* Message is cached */
return 0;
else if (toneburst == CX24116_DISEQC_TONEOFF)
/* Message is sent without burst */
state->dsec_cmd.args[CX24116_DISEQC_BURST] = 0;
else if (toneburst == CX24116_DISEQC_TONECACHE) {
/*
* Message is sent with derived else cached burst
*
* WRITE PORT GROUP COMMAND 38
*
* 0/A/A: E0 10 38 F0..F3
* 1/B/B: E0 10 38 F4..F7
* 2/C/A: E0 10 38 F8..FB
* 3/D/B: E0 10 38 FC..FF
*
* databyte[3]= 8421:8421
* ABCD:WXYZ
* CLR :SET
*
* WX= PORT SELECT 0..3 (X=TONEBURST)
* Y = VOLTAGE (0=13V, 1=18V)
* Z = BAND (0=LOW, 1=HIGH(22K))
*/
if (d->msg_len >= 4 && d->msg[2] == 0x38)
state->dsec_cmd.args[CX24116_DISEQC_BURST] =
((d->msg[3] & 4) >> 2);
if (debug)
dprintk("%s burst=%d\n", __func__,
state->dsec_cmd.args[CX24116_DISEQC_BURST]);
}
/* Wait for LNB ready */
ret = cx24116_wait_for_lnb(fe);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
/* Wait for voltage/min repeat delay */
msleep(100);
/* Command */
ret = cx24116_cmd_execute(fe, &state->dsec_cmd);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
/*
* Wait for send
*
* Eutelsat spec:
* >15ms delay + (XXX determine if FW does this, see set_tone)
* 13.5ms per byte +
* >15ms delay +
* 12.5ms burst +
* >15ms delay (XXX determine if FW does this, see set_tone)
*/
msleep((state->dsec_cmd.args[CX24116_DISEQC_MSGLEN] << 4) +
((toneburst == CX24116_DISEQC_TONEOFF) ? 30 : 60));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [media] cx24116: fix a buffer overflow when checking userspace params
The maximum size for a DiSEqC command is 6, according to the
userspace API. However, the code allows to write up much more values:
drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24116.c:983 cx24116_send_diseqc_msg() error: buffer overflow 'd->msg' 6 <= 23
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static int cx24116_send_diseqc_msg(struct dvb_frontend *fe,
struct dvb_diseqc_master_cmd *d)
{
struct cx24116_state *state = fe->demodulator_priv;
int i, ret;
/* Validate length */
if (d->msg_len > sizeof(d->msg))
return -EINVAL;
/* Dump DiSEqC message */
if (debug) {
printk(KERN_INFO "cx24116: %s(", __func__);
for (i = 0 ; i < d->msg_len ;) {
printk(KERN_INFO "0x%02x", d->msg[i]);
if (++i < d->msg_len)
printk(KERN_INFO ", ");
}
printk(") toneburst=%d\n", toneburst);
}
/* DiSEqC message */
for (i = 0; i < d->msg_len; i++)
state->dsec_cmd.args[CX24116_DISEQC_MSGOFS + i] = d->msg[i];
/* DiSEqC message length */
state->dsec_cmd.args[CX24116_DISEQC_MSGLEN] = d->msg_len;
/* Command length */
state->dsec_cmd.len = CX24116_DISEQC_MSGOFS +
state->dsec_cmd.args[CX24116_DISEQC_MSGLEN];
/* DiSEqC toneburst */
if (toneburst == CX24116_DISEQC_MESGCACHE)
/* Message is cached */
return 0;
else if (toneburst == CX24116_DISEQC_TONEOFF)
/* Message is sent without burst */
state->dsec_cmd.args[CX24116_DISEQC_BURST] = 0;
else if (toneburst == CX24116_DISEQC_TONECACHE) {
/*
* Message is sent with derived else cached burst
*
* WRITE PORT GROUP COMMAND 38
*
* 0/A/A: E0 10 38 F0..F3
* 1/B/B: E0 10 38 F4..F7
* 2/C/A: E0 10 38 F8..FB
* 3/D/B: E0 10 38 FC..FF
*
* databyte[3]= 8421:8421
* ABCD:WXYZ
* CLR :SET
*
* WX= PORT SELECT 0..3 (X=TONEBURST)
* Y = VOLTAGE (0=13V, 1=18V)
* Z = BAND (0=LOW, 1=HIGH(22K))
*/
if (d->msg_len >= 4 && d->msg[2] == 0x38)
state->dsec_cmd.args[CX24116_DISEQC_BURST] =
((d->msg[3] & 4) >> 2);
if (debug)
dprintk("%s burst=%d\n", __func__,
state->dsec_cmd.args[CX24116_DISEQC_BURST]);
}
/* Wait for LNB ready */
ret = cx24116_wait_for_lnb(fe);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
/* Wait for voltage/min repeat delay */
msleep(100);
/* Command */
ret = cx24116_cmd_execute(fe, &state->dsec_cmd);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
/*
* Wait for send
*
* Eutelsat spec:
* >15ms delay + (XXX determine if FW does this, see set_tone)
* 13.5ms per byte +
* >15ms delay +
* 12.5ms burst +
* >15ms delay (XXX determine if FW does this, see set_tone)
*/
msleep((state->dsec_cmd.args[CX24116_DISEQC_MSGLEN] << 4) +
((toneburst == CX24116_DISEQC_TONEOFF) ? 30 : 60));
return 0;
}
| 169,867 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xsltCopyOf(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, xmlNodePtr node,
xmlNodePtr inst, xsltStylePreCompPtr castedComp) {
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
xsltStyleItemCopyOfPtr comp = (xsltStyleItemCopyOfPtr) castedComp;
#else
xsltStylePreCompPtr comp = castedComp;
#endif
xmlXPathObjectPtr res = NULL;
xmlNodeSetPtr list = NULL;
int i;
xmlDocPtr oldXPContextDoc;
xmlNsPtr *oldXPNamespaces;
xmlNodePtr oldXPContextNode;
int oldXPProximityPosition, oldXPContextSize, oldXPNsNr;
xmlXPathContextPtr xpctxt;
if ((ctxt == NULL) || (node == NULL) || (inst == NULL))
return;
if ((comp == NULL) || (comp->select == NULL) || (comp->comp == NULL)) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, inst,
"xsl:copy-of : compilation failed\n");
return;
}
/*
* SPEC XSLT 1.0:
* "The xsl:copy-of element can be used to insert a result tree
* fragment into the result tree, without first converting it to
* a string as xsl:value-of does (see [7.6.1 Generating Text with
* xsl:value-of]). The required select attribute contains an
* expression. When the result of evaluating the expression is a
* result tree fragment, the complete fragment is copied into the
* result tree. When the result is a node-set, all the nodes in the
* set are copied in document order into the result tree; copying
* an element node copies the attribute nodes, namespace nodes and
* children of the element node as well as the element node itself;
* a root node is copied by copying its children. When the result
* is neither a node-set nor a result tree fragment, the result is
* converted to a string and then inserted into the result tree,
* as with xsl:value-of.
*/
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_COPY_OF,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltCopyOf: select %s\n", comp->select));
#endif
/*
* Evaluate the "select" expression.
*/
xpctxt = ctxt->xpathCtxt;
oldXPContextDoc = xpctxt->doc;
oldXPContextNode = xpctxt->node;
oldXPProximityPosition = xpctxt->proximityPosition;
oldXPContextSize = xpctxt->contextSize;
oldXPNsNr = xpctxt->nsNr;
oldXPNamespaces = xpctxt->namespaces;
xpctxt->node = node;
if (comp != NULL) {
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
if (comp->inScopeNs != NULL) {
xpctxt->namespaces = comp->inScopeNs->list;
xpctxt->nsNr = comp->inScopeNs->xpathNumber;
} else {
xpctxt->namespaces = NULL;
xpctxt->nsNr = 0;
}
#else
xpctxt->namespaces = comp->nsList;
xpctxt->nsNr = comp->nsNr;
#endif
} else {
xpctxt->namespaces = NULL;
xpctxt->nsNr = 0;
}
res = xmlXPathCompiledEval(comp->comp, xpctxt);
xpctxt->doc = oldXPContextDoc;
xpctxt->node = oldXPContextNode;
xpctxt->contextSize = oldXPContextSize;
xpctxt->proximityPosition = oldXPProximityPosition;
xpctxt->nsNr = oldXPNsNr;
xpctxt->namespaces = oldXPNamespaces;
if (res != NULL) {
if (res->type == XPATH_NODESET) {
/*
* Node-set
* --------
*/
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_COPY_OF,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltCopyOf: result is a node set\n"));
#endif
list = res->nodesetval;
if (list != NULL) {
xmlNodePtr cur;
/*
* The list is already sorted in document order by XPath.
* Append everything in this order under ctxt->insert.
*/
for (i = 0;i < list->nodeNr;i++) {
cur = list->nodeTab[i];
if (cur == NULL)
continue;
if ((cur->type == XML_DOCUMENT_NODE) ||
(cur->type == XML_HTML_DOCUMENT_NODE))
{
xsltCopyTreeList(ctxt, inst,
cur->children, ctxt->insert, 0, 0);
} else if (cur->type == XML_ATTRIBUTE_NODE) {
xsltShallowCopyAttr(ctxt, inst,
ctxt->insert, (xmlAttrPtr) cur);
} else {
xsltCopyTreeInternal(ctxt, inst,
cur, ctxt->insert, 0, 0);
}
}
}
} else if (res->type == XPATH_XSLT_TREE) {
/*
* Result tree fragment
* --------------------
* E.g. via <xsl:variable ...><foo/></xsl:variable>
* Note that the root node of such trees is an xmlDocPtr in Libxslt.
*/
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_COPY_OF,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltCopyOf: result is a result tree fragment\n"));
#endif
list = res->nodesetval;
if ((list != NULL) && (list->nodeTab != NULL) &&
(list->nodeTab[0] != NULL) &&
(IS_XSLT_REAL_NODE(list->nodeTab[0])))
{
xsltCopyTreeList(ctxt, inst,
list->nodeTab[0]->children, ctxt->insert, 0, 0);
}
} else {
xmlChar *value = NULL;
/*
* Convert to a string.
*/
value = xmlXPathCastToString(res);
if (value == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, inst,
"Internal error in xsltCopyOf(): "
"failed to cast an XPath object to string.\n");
ctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
} else {
if (value[0] != 0) {
/*
* Append content as text node.
*/
xsltCopyTextString(ctxt, ctxt->insert, value, 0);
}
xmlFree(value);
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_COPY_OF,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltCopyOf: result %s\n", res->stringval));
#endif
}
}
} else {
ctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
}
if (res != NULL)
xmlXPathFreeObject(res);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | xsltCopyOf(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, xmlNodePtr node,
xmlNodePtr inst, xsltStylePreCompPtr castedComp) {
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
xsltStyleItemCopyOfPtr comp = (xsltStyleItemCopyOfPtr) castedComp;
#else
xsltStylePreCompPtr comp = castedComp;
#endif
xmlXPathObjectPtr res = NULL;
xmlNodeSetPtr list = NULL;
int i;
if ((ctxt == NULL) || (node == NULL) || (inst == NULL))
return;
if ((comp == NULL) || (comp->select == NULL) || (comp->comp == NULL)) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, inst,
"xsl:copy-of : compilation failed\n");
return;
}
/*
* SPEC XSLT 1.0:
* "The xsl:copy-of element can be used to insert a result tree
* fragment into the result tree, without first converting it to
* a string as xsl:value-of does (see [7.6.1 Generating Text with
* xsl:value-of]). The required select attribute contains an
* expression. When the result of evaluating the expression is a
* result tree fragment, the complete fragment is copied into the
* result tree. When the result is a node-set, all the nodes in the
* set are copied in document order into the result tree; copying
* an element node copies the attribute nodes, namespace nodes and
* children of the element node as well as the element node itself;
* a root node is copied by copying its children. When the result
* is neither a node-set nor a result tree fragment, the result is
* converted to a string and then inserted into the result tree,
* as with xsl:value-of.
*/
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_COPY_OF,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltCopyOf: select %s\n", comp->select));
#endif
/*
* Evaluate the "select" expression.
*/
res = xsltPreCompEval(ctxt, node, comp);
if (res != NULL) {
if (res->type == XPATH_NODESET) {
/*
* Node-set
* --------
*/
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_COPY_OF,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltCopyOf: result is a node set\n"));
#endif
list = res->nodesetval;
if (list != NULL) {
xmlNodePtr cur;
/*
* The list is already sorted in document order by XPath.
* Append everything in this order under ctxt->insert.
*/
for (i = 0;i < list->nodeNr;i++) {
cur = list->nodeTab[i];
if (cur == NULL)
continue;
if ((cur->type == XML_DOCUMENT_NODE) ||
(cur->type == XML_HTML_DOCUMENT_NODE))
{
xsltCopyTreeList(ctxt, inst,
cur->children, ctxt->insert, 0, 0);
} else if (cur->type == XML_ATTRIBUTE_NODE) {
xsltShallowCopyAttr(ctxt, inst,
ctxt->insert, (xmlAttrPtr) cur);
} else {
xsltCopyTreeInternal(ctxt, inst,
cur, ctxt->insert, 0, 0);
}
}
}
} else if (res->type == XPATH_XSLT_TREE) {
/*
* Result tree fragment
* --------------------
* E.g. via <xsl:variable ...><foo/></xsl:variable>
* Note that the root node of such trees is an xmlDocPtr in Libxslt.
*/
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_COPY_OF,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltCopyOf: result is a result tree fragment\n"));
#endif
list = res->nodesetval;
if ((list != NULL) && (list->nodeTab != NULL) &&
(list->nodeTab[0] != NULL) &&
(IS_XSLT_REAL_NODE(list->nodeTab[0])))
{
xsltCopyTreeList(ctxt, inst,
list->nodeTab[0]->children, ctxt->insert, 0, 0);
}
} else {
xmlChar *value = NULL;
/*
* Convert to a string.
*/
value = xmlXPathCastToString(res);
if (value == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, inst,
"Internal error in xsltCopyOf(): "
"failed to cast an XPath object to string.\n");
ctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
} else {
if (value[0] != 0) {
/*
* Append content as text node.
*/
xsltCopyTextString(ctxt, ctxt->insert, value, 0);
}
xmlFree(value);
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_COPY_OF,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltCopyOf: result %s\n", res->stringval));
#endif
}
}
} else {
ctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
}
if (res != NULL)
xmlXPathFreeObject(res);
}
| 173,322 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: spnego_gss_delete_sec_context(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
gss_buffer_t output_token)
{
OM_uint32 ret = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t *ctx =
(spnego_gss_ctx_id_t *)context_handle;
*minor_status = 0;
if (context_handle == NULL)
return (GSS_S_FAILURE);
if (*ctx == NULL)
return (GSS_S_COMPLETE);
/*
* If this is still an SPNEGO mech, release it locally.
*/
if ((*ctx)->magic_num == SPNEGO_MAGIC_ID) {
(void) gss_delete_sec_context(minor_status,
&(*ctx)->ctx_handle,
output_token);
(void) release_spnego_ctx(ctx);
} else {
ret = gss_delete_sec_context(minor_status,
context_handle,
output_token);
}
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: Fix SPNEGO context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2695]
The SPNEGO mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
mechanism context handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the SPNEGO context structure after context
establishment and refer to it in all GSS methods. Add initiate and
opened flags to the SPNEGO context structure for use in
gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment.
CVE-2015-2695:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established SPNEGO context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. This bug may go unnoticed, because
the most common SPNEGO authentication scenario establishes the context
after just one call to gss_accept_sec_context(). Java server
applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this
bug. A carefully crafted SPNEGO packet might allow the
gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined
results, but applications should not make access control decisions
based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[[email protected]: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-18 | spnego_gss_delete_sec_context(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
gss_buffer_t output_token)
{
OM_uint32 ret = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t *ctx =
(spnego_gss_ctx_id_t *)context_handle;
*minor_status = 0;
if (context_handle == NULL)
return (GSS_S_FAILURE);
if (*ctx == NULL)
return (GSS_S_COMPLETE);
(void) gss_delete_sec_context(minor_status, &(*ctx)->ctx_handle,
output_token);
(void) release_spnego_ctx(ctx);
return (ret);
}
| 166,654 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: setkey_principal3_2_svc(setkey3_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (!(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)) &&
kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_SETKEY, arg->princ, NULL)) {
ret.code = kadm5_setkey_principal_3((void *)handle, arg->princ,
arg->keepold,
arg->n_ks_tuple,
arg->ks_tuple,
arg->keyblocks, arg->n_keys);
} else {
log_unauth("kadm5_setkey_principal", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_SETKEY;
}
if(ret.code != KADM5_AUTH_SETKEY) {
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_setkey_principal", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]
In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler. Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails. Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails. Discovered by Simo Sorce.
CVE-2015-8631:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one. Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-119 | setkey_principal3_2_svc(setkey3_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc service_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (!(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)) &&
kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_SETKEY, arg->princ, NULL)) {
ret.code = kadm5_setkey_principal_3((void *)handle, arg->princ,
arg->keepold,
arg->n_ks_tuple,
arg->ks_tuple,
arg->keyblocks, arg->n_keys);
} else {
log_unauth("kadm5_setkey_principal", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_SETKEY;
}
if(ret.code != KADM5_AUTH_SETKEY) {
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_setkey_principal", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
exit_func:
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
| 167,525 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void TransportTexture::OnTexturesCreated(std::vector<int> textures) {
bool ret = decoder_->MakeCurrent();
if (!ret) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to switch context";
return;
}
output_textures_->clear();
for (size_t i = 0; i < textures.size(); ++i) {
uint32 gl_texture = 0;
ret = decoder_->GetServiceTextureId(textures[i], &gl_texture);
DCHECK(ret) << "Cannot translate client texture ID to service ID";
output_textures_->push_back(gl_texture);
texture_map_.insert(std::make_pair(gl_texture, textures[i]));
}
create_task_->Run();
create_task_.reset();
output_textures_ = NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fixing Coverity bugs (DEAD_CODE and PASS_BY_VALUE)
CIDs 16230, 16439, 16610, 16635
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7215029
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@90134 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void TransportTexture::OnTexturesCreated(std::vector<int> textures) {
void TransportTexture::OnTexturesCreated(const std::vector<int>& textures) {
bool ret = decoder_->MakeCurrent();
if (!ret) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to switch context";
return;
}
output_textures_->clear();
for (size_t i = 0; i < textures.size(); ++i) {
uint32 gl_texture = 0;
ret = decoder_->GetServiceTextureId(textures[i], &gl_texture);
DCHECK(ret) << "Cannot translate client texture ID to service ID";
output_textures_->push_back(gl_texture);
texture_map_.insert(std::make_pair(gl_texture, textures[i]));
}
create_task_->Run();
create_task_.reset();
output_textures_ = NULL;
}
| 170,313 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int fetch_uidl(char *line, void *data)
{
int i, index;
struct Context *ctx = (struct Context *) data;
struct PopData *pop_data = (struct PopData *) ctx->data;
char *endp = NULL;
errno = 0;
index = strtol(line, &endp, 10);
if (errno)
return -1;
while (*endp == ' ')
endp++;
memmove(line, endp, strlen(endp) + 1);
for (i = 0; i < ctx->msgcount; i++)
if (mutt_str_strcmp(line, ctx->hdrs[i]->data) == 0)
break;
if (i == ctx->msgcount)
{
mutt_debug(1, "new header %d %s\n", index, line);
if (i >= ctx->hdrmax)
mx_alloc_memory(ctx);
ctx->msgcount++;
ctx->hdrs[i] = mutt_header_new();
ctx->hdrs[i]->data = mutt_str_strdup(line);
}
else if (ctx->hdrs[i]->index != index - 1)
pop_data->clear_cache = true;
ctx->hdrs[i]->refno = index;
ctx->hdrs[i]->index = index - 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Ensure UID in fetch_uidl
CWE ID: CWE-824 | static int fetch_uidl(char *line, void *data)
{
int i, index;
struct Context *ctx = (struct Context *) data;
struct PopData *pop_data = (struct PopData *) ctx->data;
char *endp = NULL;
errno = 0;
index = strtol(line, &endp, 10);
if (errno)
return -1;
while (*endp == ' ')
endp++;
memmove(line, endp, strlen(endp) + 1);
/* uid must be at least be 1 byte */
if (strlen(line) == 0)
return -1;
for (i = 0; i < ctx->msgcount; i++)
if (mutt_str_strcmp(line, ctx->hdrs[i]->data) == 0)
break;
if (i == ctx->msgcount)
{
mutt_debug(1, "new header %d %s\n", index, line);
if (i >= ctx->hdrmax)
mx_alloc_memory(ctx);
ctx->msgcount++;
ctx->hdrs[i] = mutt_header_new();
ctx->hdrs[i]->data = mutt_str_strdup(line);
}
else if (ctx->hdrs[i]->index != index - 1)
pop_data->clear_cache = true;
ctx->hdrs[i]->refno = index;
ctx->hdrs[i]->index = index - 1;
return 0;
}
| 169,136 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::PassesCurrentSrcCORSAccessCheck(
const KURL& current_src) {
DCHECK(IsMainThread());
return Context()->GetSecurityOrigin() &&
Context()->GetSecurityOrigin()->CanRequest(current_src);
}
Commit Message: Redirect should not circumvent same-origin restrictions
Check whether we have access to the audio data when the format is set.
At this point we have enough information to determine this. The old approach
based on when the src was changed was incorrect because at the point, we
only know the new src; none of the response headers have been read yet.
This new approach also removes the incorrect message reported in 619114.
Bug: 826552, 619114
Change-Id: I95119b3a1e399c05d0fbd2da71f87967978efff6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1069540
Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#564313}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | bool MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::PassesCurrentSrcCORSAccessCheck(
// Test to see if the current media URL taint the origin of the audio context?
return Context()->WouldTaintOrigin(MediaElement()->currentSrc());
}
| 173,148 |
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