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stringlengths 90
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Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: NavigateParams::NavigateParams(
Browser* a_browser,
const GURL& a_url,
content::PageTransition a_transition)
: url(a_url),
target_contents(NULL),
source_contents(NULL),
disposition(CURRENT_TAB),
transition(a_transition),
tabstrip_index(-1),
tabstrip_add_types(TabStripModel::ADD_ACTIVE),
window_action(NO_ACTION),
user_gesture(true),
path_behavior(RESPECT),
ref_behavior(IGNORE_REF),
browser(a_browser),
profile(NULL) {
}
Commit Message: Fix memory error in previous CL.
BUG=100315
BUG=99016
TEST=Memory bots go green
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8302001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@105577 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | NavigateParams::NavigateParams(
Browser* a_browser,
const GURL& a_url,
content::PageTransition a_transition)
: url(a_url),
target_contents(NULL),
source_contents(NULL),
disposition(CURRENT_TAB),
transition(a_transition),
is_renderer_initiated(false),
tabstrip_index(-1),
tabstrip_add_types(TabStripModel::ADD_ACTIVE),
window_action(NO_ACTION),
user_gesture(true),
path_behavior(RESPECT),
ref_behavior(IGNORE_REF),
browser(a_browser),
profile(NULL) {
}
| 170,249 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int vmw_gb_surface_define_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,
struct drm_file *file_priv)
{
struct vmw_private *dev_priv = vmw_priv(dev);
struct vmw_user_surface *user_srf;
struct vmw_surface *srf;
struct vmw_resource *res;
struct vmw_resource *tmp;
union drm_vmw_gb_surface_create_arg *arg =
(union drm_vmw_gb_surface_create_arg *)data;
struct drm_vmw_gb_surface_create_req *req = &arg->req;
struct drm_vmw_gb_surface_create_rep *rep = &arg->rep;
struct ttm_object_file *tfile = vmw_fpriv(file_priv)->tfile;
int ret;
uint32_t size;
uint32_t backup_handle;
if (req->multisample_count != 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (req->mip_levels > DRM_VMW_MAX_MIP_LEVELS)
return -EINVAL;
if (unlikely(vmw_user_surface_size == 0))
vmw_user_surface_size = ttm_round_pot(sizeof(*user_srf)) +
128;
size = vmw_user_surface_size + 128;
/* Define a surface based on the parameters. */
ret = vmw_surface_gb_priv_define(dev,
size,
req->svga3d_flags,
req->format,
req->drm_surface_flags & drm_vmw_surface_flag_scanout,
req->mip_levels,
req->multisample_count,
req->array_size,
req->base_size,
&srf);
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
return ret;
user_srf = container_of(srf, struct vmw_user_surface, srf);
if (drm_is_primary_client(file_priv))
user_srf->master = drm_master_get(file_priv->master);
ret = ttm_read_lock(&dev_priv->reservation_sem, true);
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
return ret;
res = &user_srf->srf.res;
if (req->buffer_handle != SVGA3D_INVALID_ID) {
ret = vmw_user_dmabuf_lookup(tfile, req->buffer_handle,
&res->backup,
&user_srf->backup_base);
if (ret == 0 && res->backup->base.num_pages * PAGE_SIZE <
res->backup_size) {
DRM_ERROR("Surface backup buffer is too small.\n");
vmw_dmabuf_unreference(&res->backup);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_unlock;
}
} else if (req->drm_surface_flags & drm_vmw_surface_flag_create_buffer)
ret = vmw_user_dmabuf_alloc(dev_priv, tfile,
res->backup_size,
req->drm_surface_flags &
drm_vmw_surface_flag_shareable,
&backup_handle,
&res->backup,
&user_srf->backup_base);
if (unlikely(ret != 0)) {
vmw_resource_unreference(&res);
goto out_unlock;
}
tmp = vmw_resource_reference(res);
ret = ttm_prime_object_init(tfile, res->backup_size, &user_srf->prime,
req->drm_surface_flags &
drm_vmw_surface_flag_shareable,
VMW_RES_SURFACE,
&vmw_user_surface_base_release, NULL);
if (unlikely(ret != 0)) {
vmw_resource_unreference(&tmp);
vmw_resource_unreference(&res);
goto out_unlock;
}
rep->handle = user_srf->prime.base.hash.key;
rep->backup_size = res->backup_size;
if (res->backup) {
rep->buffer_map_handle =
drm_vma_node_offset_addr(&res->backup->base.vma_node);
rep->buffer_size = res->backup->base.num_pages * PAGE_SIZE;
rep->buffer_handle = backup_handle;
} else {
rep->buffer_map_handle = 0;
rep->buffer_size = 0;
rep->buffer_handle = SVGA3D_INVALID_ID;
}
vmw_resource_unreference(&res);
out_unlock:
ttm_read_unlock(&dev_priv->reservation_sem);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: drm/vmwgfx: Make sure backup_handle is always valid
When vmw_gb_surface_define_ioctl() is called with an existing buffer,
we end up returning an uninitialized variable in the backup_handle.
The fix is to first initialize backup_handle to 0 just to be sure, and
second, when a user-provided buffer is found, we will use the
req->buffer_handle as the backup_handle.
Cc: <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Murray McAllister <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sinclair Yeh <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Deepak Rawat <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | int vmw_gb_surface_define_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,
struct drm_file *file_priv)
{
struct vmw_private *dev_priv = vmw_priv(dev);
struct vmw_user_surface *user_srf;
struct vmw_surface *srf;
struct vmw_resource *res;
struct vmw_resource *tmp;
union drm_vmw_gb_surface_create_arg *arg =
(union drm_vmw_gb_surface_create_arg *)data;
struct drm_vmw_gb_surface_create_req *req = &arg->req;
struct drm_vmw_gb_surface_create_rep *rep = &arg->rep;
struct ttm_object_file *tfile = vmw_fpriv(file_priv)->tfile;
int ret;
uint32_t size;
uint32_t backup_handle = 0;
if (req->multisample_count != 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (req->mip_levels > DRM_VMW_MAX_MIP_LEVELS)
return -EINVAL;
if (unlikely(vmw_user_surface_size == 0))
vmw_user_surface_size = ttm_round_pot(sizeof(*user_srf)) +
128;
size = vmw_user_surface_size + 128;
/* Define a surface based on the parameters. */
ret = vmw_surface_gb_priv_define(dev,
size,
req->svga3d_flags,
req->format,
req->drm_surface_flags & drm_vmw_surface_flag_scanout,
req->mip_levels,
req->multisample_count,
req->array_size,
req->base_size,
&srf);
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
return ret;
user_srf = container_of(srf, struct vmw_user_surface, srf);
if (drm_is_primary_client(file_priv))
user_srf->master = drm_master_get(file_priv->master);
ret = ttm_read_lock(&dev_priv->reservation_sem, true);
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
return ret;
res = &user_srf->srf.res;
if (req->buffer_handle != SVGA3D_INVALID_ID) {
ret = vmw_user_dmabuf_lookup(tfile, req->buffer_handle,
&res->backup,
&user_srf->backup_base);
if (ret == 0) {
if (res->backup->base.num_pages * PAGE_SIZE <
res->backup_size) {
DRM_ERROR("Surface backup buffer is too small.\n");
vmw_dmabuf_unreference(&res->backup);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_unlock;
} else {
backup_handle = req->buffer_handle;
}
}
} else if (req->drm_surface_flags & drm_vmw_surface_flag_create_buffer)
ret = vmw_user_dmabuf_alloc(dev_priv, tfile,
res->backup_size,
req->drm_surface_flags &
drm_vmw_surface_flag_shareable,
&backup_handle,
&res->backup,
&user_srf->backup_base);
if (unlikely(ret != 0)) {
vmw_resource_unreference(&res);
goto out_unlock;
}
tmp = vmw_resource_reference(res);
ret = ttm_prime_object_init(tfile, res->backup_size, &user_srf->prime,
req->drm_surface_flags &
drm_vmw_surface_flag_shareable,
VMW_RES_SURFACE,
&vmw_user_surface_base_release, NULL);
if (unlikely(ret != 0)) {
vmw_resource_unreference(&tmp);
vmw_resource_unreference(&res);
goto out_unlock;
}
rep->handle = user_srf->prime.base.hash.key;
rep->backup_size = res->backup_size;
if (res->backup) {
rep->buffer_map_handle =
drm_vma_node_offset_addr(&res->backup->base.vma_node);
rep->buffer_size = res->backup->base.num_pages * PAGE_SIZE;
rep->buffer_handle = backup_handle;
} else {
rep->buffer_map_handle = 0;
rep->buffer_size = 0;
rep->buffer_handle = SVGA3D_INVALID_ID;
}
vmw_resource_unreference(&res);
out_unlock:
ttm_read_unlock(&dev_priv->reservation_sem);
return ret;
}
| 168,093 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PixelBufferRasterWorkerPool::ScheduleMoreTasks() {
TRACE_EVENT0("cc", "PixelBufferRasterWorkerPool::ScheduleMoreTasks");
enum RasterTaskType {
PREPAINT_TYPE = 0,
REQUIRED_FOR_ACTIVATION_TYPE = 1,
NUM_TYPES = 2
};
NodeVector tasks[NUM_TYPES];
unsigned priority = 2u; // 0-1 reserved for RasterFinished tasks.
TaskGraph graph;
size_t bytes_pending_upload = bytes_pending_upload_;
bool did_throttle_raster_tasks = false;
for (RasterTaskVector::const_iterator it = raster_tasks().begin();
it != raster_tasks().end(); ++it) {
internal::RasterWorkerPoolTask* task = it->get();
TaskMap::iterator pixel_buffer_it = pixel_buffer_tasks_.find(task);
if (pixel_buffer_it == pixel_buffer_tasks_.end())
continue;
if (task->HasFinishedRunning()) {
DCHECK(std::find(completed_tasks_.begin(),
completed_tasks_.end(),
task) != completed_tasks_.end());
continue;
}
size_t new_bytes_pending_upload = bytes_pending_upload;
new_bytes_pending_upload += task->resource()->bytes();
if (new_bytes_pending_upload > max_bytes_pending_upload_) {
did_throttle_raster_tasks = true;
break;
}
internal::WorkerPoolTask* pixel_buffer_task = pixel_buffer_it->second.get();
if (pixel_buffer_task && pixel_buffer_task->HasCompleted()) {
bytes_pending_upload = new_bytes_pending_upload;
continue;
}
size_t scheduled_raster_task_count =
tasks[PREPAINT_TYPE].container().size() +
tasks[REQUIRED_FOR_ACTIVATION_TYPE].container().size();
if (scheduled_raster_task_count >= kMaxScheduledRasterTasks) {
did_throttle_raster_tasks = true;
break;
}
bytes_pending_upload = new_bytes_pending_upload;
RasterTaskType type = IsRasterTaskRequiredForActivation(task) ?
REQUIRED_FOR_ACTIVATION_TYPE :
PREPAINT_TYPE;
if (pixel_buffer_task) {
tasks[type].container().push_back(
CreateGraphNodeForRasterTask(pixel_buffer_task,
task->dependencies(),
priority++,
&graph));
continue;
}
resource_provider()->AcquirePixelBuffer(task->resource()->id());
uint8* buffer = resource_provider()->MapPixelBuffer(
task->resource()->id());
scoped_refptr<internal::WorkerPoolTask> new_pixel_buffer_task(
new PixelBufferWorkerPoolTaskImpl(
task,
buffer,
base::Bind(&PixelBufferRasterWorkerPool::OnRasterTaskCompleted,
base::Unretained(this),
make_scoped_refptr(task))));
pixel_buffer_tasks_[task] = new_pixel_buffer_task;
tasks[type].container().push_back(
CreateGraphNodeForRasterTask(new_pixel_buffer_task.get(),
task->dependencies(),
priority++,
&graph));
}
scoped_refptr<internal::WorkerPoolTask>
new_raster_required_for_activation_finished_task;
size_t scheduled_raster_task_required_for_activation_count =
tasks[REQUIRED_FOR_ACTIVATION_TYPE].container().size();
DCHECK_LE(scheduled_raster_task_required_for_activation_count,
tasks_required_for_activation_.size());
if (scheduled_raster_task_required_for_activation_count ==
tasks_required_for_activation_.size() &&
should_notify_client_if_no_tasks_required_for_activation_are_pending_) {
new_raster_required_for_activation_finished_task =
CreateRasterRequiredForActivationFinishedTask();
internal::GraphNode* raster_required_for_activation_finished_node =
CreateGraphNodeForTask(
new_raster_required_for_activation_finished_task.get(),
0u, // Priority 0
&graph);
AddDependenciesToGraphNode(
raster_required_for_activation_finished_node,
tasks[REQUIRED_FOR_ACTIVATION_TYPE].container());
}
scoped_refptr<internal::WorkerPoolTask> new_raster_finished_task;
size_t scheduled_raster_task_count =
tasks[PREPAINT_TYPE].container().size() +
tasks[REQUIRED_FOR_ACTIVATION_TYPE].container().size();
DCHECK_LE(scheduled_raster_task_count, PendingRasterTaskCount());
if (!did_throttle_raster_tasks &&
should_notify_client_if_no_tasks_are_pending_) {
new_raster_finished_task = CreateRasterFinishedTask();
internal::GraphNode* raster_finished_node =
CreateGraphNodeForTask(new_raster_finished_task.get(),
1u, // Priority 1
&graph);
for (unsigned type = 0; type < NUM_TYPES; ++type) {
AddDependenciesToGraphNode(
raster_finished_node,
tasks[type].container());
}
}
SetTaskGraph(&graph);
scheduled_raster_task_count_ = scheduled_raster_task_count;
set_raster_finished_task(new_raster_finished_task);
set_raster_required_for_activation_finished_task(
new_raster_required_for_activation_finished_task);
}
Commit Message: cc: Simplify raster task completion notification logic
(Relanding after missing activation bug fixed in https://codereview.chromium.org/131763003/)
Previously the pixel buffer raster worker pool used a combination of
polling and explicit notifications from the raster worker pool to decide
when to tell the client about the completion of 1) all tasks or 2) the
subset of tasks required for activation. This patch simplifies the logic
by only triggering the notification based on the OnRasterTasksFinished
and OnRasterTasksRequiredForActivationFinished calls from the worker
pool.
BUG=307841,331534
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/99873007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@243991 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void PixelBufferRasterWorkerPool::ScheduleMoreTasks() {
TRACE_EVENT0("cc", "PixelBufferRasterWorkerPool::ScheduleMoreTasks");
enum RasterTaskType {
PREPAINT_TYPE = 0,
REQUIRED_FOR_ACTIVATION_TYPE = 1,
NUM_TYPES = 2
};
NodeVector tasks[NUM_TYPES];
unsigned priority = 2u; // 0-1 reserved for RasterFinished tasks.
TaskGraph graph;
size_t bytes_pending_upload = bytes_pending_upload_;
bool did_throttle_raster_tasks = false;
for (RasterTaskVector::const_iterator it = raster_tasks().begin();
it != raster_tasks().end(); ++it) {
internal::RasterWorkerPoolTask* task = it->get();
TaskMap::iterator pixel_buffer_it = pixel_buffer_tasks_.find(task);
if (pixel_buffer_it == pixel_buffer_tasks_.end())
continue;
if (task->HasFinishedRunning()) {
DCHECK(std::find(completed_tasks_.begin(),
completed_tasks_.end(),
task) != completed_tasks_.end());
continue;
}
size_t new_bytes_pending_upload = bytes_pending_upload;
new_bytes_pending_upload += task->resource()->bytes();
if (new_bytes_pending_upload > max_bytes_pending_upload_) {
did_throttle_raster_tasks = true;
break;
}
internal::WorkerPoolTask* pixel_buffer_task = pixel_buffer_it->second.get();
if (pixel_buffer_task && pixel_buffer_task->HasCompleted()) {
bytes_pending_upload = new_bytes_pending_upload;
continue;
}
size_t scheduled_raster_task_count =
tasks[PREPAINT_TYPE].container().size() +
tasks[REQUIRED_FOR_ACTIVATION_TYPE].container().size();
if (scheduled_raster_task_count >= kMaxScheduledRasterTasks) {
did_throttle_raster_tasks = true;
break;
}
bytes_pending_upload = new_bytes_pending_upload;
RasterTaskType type = IsRasterTaskRequiredForActivation(task) ?
REQUIRED_FOR_ACTIVATION_TYPE :
PREPAINT_TYPE;
if (pixel_buffer_task) {
tasks[type].container().push_back(
CreateGraphNodeForRasterTask(pixel_buffer_task,
task->dependencies(),
priority++,
&graph));
continue;
}
resource_provider()->AcquirePixelBuffer(task->resource()->id());
uint8* buffer = resource_provider()->MapPixelBuffer(
task->resource()->id());
scoped_refptr<internal::WorkerPoolTask> new_pixel_buffer_task(
new PixelBufferWorkerPoolTaskImpl(
task,
buffer,
base::Bind(&PixelBufferRasterWorkerPool::OnRasterTaskCompleted,
base::Unretained(this),
make_scoped_refptr(task))));
pixel_buffer_tasks_[task] = new_pixel_buffer_task;
tasks[type].container().push_back(
CreateGraphNodeForRasterTask(new_pixel_buffer_task.get(),
task->dependencies(),
priority++,
&graph));
}
scoped_refptr<internal::WorkerPoolTask>
new_raster_required_for_activation_finished_task;
size_t scheduled_raster_task_required_for_activation_count =
tasks[REQUIRED_FOR_ACTIVATION_TYPE].container().size();
DCHECK_LE(scheduled_raster_task_required_for_activation_count,
tasks_required_for_activation_.size());
if (scheduled_raster_task_required_for_activation_count ==
tasks_required_for_activation_.size() &&
should_notify_client_if_no_tasks_required_for_activation_are_pending_) {
new_raster_required_for_activation_finished_task =
CreateRasterRequiredForActivationFinishedTask();
raster_required_for_activation_finished_task_pending_ = true;
internal::GraphNode* raster_required_for_activation_finished_node =
CreateGraphNodeForTask(
new_raster_required_for_activation_finished_task.get(),
0u, // Priority 0
&graph);
AddDependenciesToGraphNode(
raster_required_for_activation_finished_node,
tasks[REQUIRED_FOR_ACTIVATION_TYPE].container());
}
scoped_refptr<internal::WorkerPoolTask> new_raster_finished_task;
size_t scheduled_raster_task_count =
tasks[PREPAINT_TYPE].container().size() +
tasks[REQUIRED_FOR_ACTIVATION_TYPE].container().size();
DCHECK_LE(scheduled_raster_task_count, PendingRasterTaskCount());
if (!did_throttle_raster_tasks &&
should_notify_client_if_no_tasks_are_pending_) {
new_raster_finished_task = CreateRasterFinishedTask();
raster_finished_task_pending_ = true;
internal::GraphNode* raster_finished_node =
CreateGraphNodeForTask(new_raster_finished_task.get(),
1u, // Priority 1
&graph);
for (unsigned type = 0; type < NUM_TYPES; ++type) {
AddDependenciesToGraphNode(
raster_finished_node,
tasks[type].container());
}
}
SetTaskGraph(&graph);
scheduled_raster_task_count_ = scheduled_raster_task_count;
set_raster_finished_task(new_raster_finished_task);
set_raster_required_for_activation_finished_task(
new_raster_required_for_activation_finished_task);
}
| 171,263 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void bnep_net_setup(struct net_device *dev)
{
memset(dev->broadcast, 0xff, ETH_ALEN);
dev->addr_len = ETH_ALEN;
ether_setup(dev);
dev->netdev_ops = &bnep_netdev_ops;
dev->watchdog_timeo = HZ * 2;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
CC: Karsten Keil <[email protected]>
CC: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <[email protected]>
CC: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <[email protected]>
CC: "John W. Linville" <[email protected]>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
CC: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | void bnep_net_setup(struct net_device *dev)
{
memset(dev->broadcast, 0xff, ETH_ALEN);
dev->addr_len = ETH_ALEN;
ether_setup(dev);
dev->priv_flags &= ~IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING;
dev->netdev_ops = &bnep_netdev_ops;
dev->watchdog_timeo = HZ * 2;
}
| 165,737 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void MediaStreamDispatcherHost::CancelAllRequests() {
if (!bindings_.empty())
return;
media_stream_manager_->CancelAllRequests(render_process_id_,
render_frame_id_);
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | void MediaStreamDispatcherHost::CancelAllRequests() {
media_stream_manager_->CancelAllRequests(render_process_id_, render_frame_id_,
requester_id_);
}
| 173,092 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static noinline void key_gc_unused_keys(struct list_head *keys)
{
while (!list_empty(keys)) {
struct key *key =
list_entry(keys->next, struct key, graveyard_link);
list_del(&key->graveyard_link);
kdebug("- %u", key->serial);
key_check(key);
/* Throw away the key data if the key is instantiated */
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags) &&
!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags) &&
key->type->destroy)
key->type->destroy(key);
security_key_free(key);
/* deal with the user's key tracking and quota */
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA, &key->flags)) {
spin_lock(&key->user->lock);
key->user->qnkeys--;
key->user->qnbytes -= key->quotalen;
spin_unlock(&key->user->lock);
}
atomic_dec(&key->user->nkeys);
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags))
atomic_dec(&key->user->nikeys);
key_user_put(key->user);
kfree(key->description);
memzero_explicit(key, sizeof(*key));
kmem_cache_free(key_jar, key);
}
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: [email protected] # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static noinline void key_gc_unused_keys(struct list_head *keys)
{
while (!list_empty(keys)) {
struct key *key =
list_entry(keys->next, struct key, graveyard_link);
short state = key->state;
list_del(&key->graveyard_link);
kdebug("- %u", key->serial);
key_check(key);
/* Throw away the key data if the key is instantiated */
if (state == KEY_IS_POSITIVE && key->type->destroy)
key->type->destroy(key);
security_key_free(key);
/* deal with the user's key tracking and quota */
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA, &key->flags)) {
spin_lock(&key->user->lock);
key->user->qnkeys--;
key->user->qnbytes -= key->quotalen;
spin_unlock(&key->user->lock);
}
atomic_dec(&key->user->nkeys);
if (state != KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED)
atomic_dec(&key->user->nikeys);
key_user_put(key->user);
kfree(key->description);
memzero_explicit(key, sizeof(*key));
kmem_cache_free(key_jar, key);
}
}
| 167,695 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: const Block::Frame& Block::GetFrame(int idx) const
{
assert(idx >= 0);
assert(idx < m_frame_count);
const Frame& f = m_frames[idx];
assert(f.pos > 0);
assert(f.len > 0);
return f;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | const Block::Frame& Block::GetFrame(int idx) const
| 174,324 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual void TreeNodeChanged(TreeModel* model, TreeModelNode* node) {
changed_count_++;
}
Commit Message: Add OVERRIDE to ui::TreeModelObserver overridden methods.
BUG=None
TEST=None
[email protected]
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7046093
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88827 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | virtual void TreeNodeChanged(TreeModel* model, TreeModelNode* node) {
virtual void TreeNodeChanged(TreeModel* model, TreeModelNode* node) OVERRIDE {
changed_count_++;
}
| 170,469 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ftrace_regex_lseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int whence)
{
loff_t ret;
if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
ret = seq_lseek(file, offset, whence);
else
file->f_pos = ret = 1;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | ftrace_regex_lseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int whence)
ftrace_filter_lseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int whence)
{
loff_t ret;
if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
ret = seq_lseek(file, offset, whence);
else
file->f_pos = ret = 1;
return ret;
}
| 166,027 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PreconnectedRequestStats::PreconnectedRequestStats(const GURL& origin,
bool was_preconnected)
: origin(origin),
was_preconnected(was_preconnected) {}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | PreconnectedRequestStats::PreconnectedRequestStats(const GURL& origin,
PreconnectedRequestStats::PreconnectedRequestStats(const url::Origin& origin,
bool was_preconnected)
| 172,375 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void addModuleArgument(sqlite3 *db, Table *pTable, char *zArg){
int nBytes = sizeof(char *)*(2+pTable->nModuleArg);
char **azModuleArg;
azModuleArg = sqlite3DbRealloc(db, pTable->azModuleArg, nBytes);
if( azModuleArg==0 ){
sqlite3DbFree(db, zArg);
}else{
int i = pTable->nModuleArg++;
azModuleArg[i] = zArg;
azModuleArg[i+1] = 0;
pTable->azModuleArg = azModuleArg;
}
}
Commit Message: sqlite: backport bugfixes for dbfuzz2
Bug: 952406
Change-Id: Icbec429742048d6674828726c96d8e265c41b595
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1568152
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Darwin Huang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#651030}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | static void addModuleArgument(sqlite3 *db, Table *pTable, char *zArg){
static void addModuleArgument(Parse *pParse, Table *pTable, char *zArg){
sqlite3_int64 nBytes = sizeof(char *)*(2+pTable->nModuleArg);
char **azModuleArg;
sqlite3 *db = pParse->db;
if( pTable->nModuleArg+3>=db->aLimit[SQLITE_LIMIT_COLUMN] ){
sqlite3ErrorMsg(pParse, "too many columns on %s", pTable->zName);
}
azModuleArg = sqlite3DbRealloc(db, pTable->azModuleArg, nBytes);
if( azModuleArg==0 ){
sqlite3DbFree(db, zArg);
}else{
int i = pTable->nModuleArg++;
azModuleArg[i] = zArg;
azModuleArg[i+1] = 0;
pTable->azModuleArg = azModuleArg;
}
}
| 173,014 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: const BlockEntry* Segment::GetBlock(
const CuePoint& cp,
const CuePoint::TrackPosition& tp)
{
Cluster** const ii = m_clusters;
Cluster** i = ii;
const long count = m_clusterCount + m_clusterPreloadCount;
Cluster** const jj = ii + count;
Cluster** j = jj;
while (i < j)
{
Cluster** const k = i + (j - i) / 2;
assert(k < jj);
Cluster* const pCluster = *k;
assert(pCluster);
const long long pos = pCluster->GetPosition();
assert(pos >= 0);
if (pos < tp.m_pos)
i = k + 1;
else if (pos > tp.m_pos)
j = k;
else
return pCluster->GetEntry(cp, tp);
}
assert(i == j);
Cluster* const pCluster = Cluster::Create(this, -1, tp.m_pos); //, -1);
assert(pCluster);
const ptrdiff_t idx = i - m_clusters;
PreloadCluster(pCluster, idx);
assert(m_clusters);
assert(m_clusterPreloadCount > 0);
assert(m_clusters[idx] == pCluster);
return pCluster->GetEntry(cp, tp);
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | const BlockEntry* Segment::GetBlock(
const long count = m_clusterCount + m_clusterPreloadCount;
Cluster** const jj = ii + count;
Cluster** j = jj;
while (i < j) {
// INVARIANT:
//[ii, i) < pTP->m_pos
//[i, j) ?
//[j, jj) > pTP->m_pos
Cluster** const k = i + (j - i) / 2;
assert(k < jj);
Cluster* const pCluster = *k;
assert(pCluster);
// const long long pos_ = pCluster->m_pos;
// assert(pos_);
// const long long pos = pos_ * ((pos_ < 0) ? -1 : 1);
const long long pos = pCluster->GetPosition();
assert(pos >= 0);
if (pos < tp.m_pos)
i = k + 1;
else if (pos > tp.m_pos)
j = k;
else
return pCluster->GetEntry(cp, tp);
}
assert(i == j);
// assert(Cluster::HasBlockEntries(this, tp.m_pos));
Cluster* const pCluster = Cluster::Create(this, -1, tp.m_pos); //, -1);
assert(pCluster);
const ptrdiff_t idx = i - m_clusters;
PreloadCluster(pCluster, idx);
assert(m_clusters);
assert(m_clusterPreloadCount > 0);
assert(m_clusters[idx] == pCluster);
return pCluster->GetEntry(cp, tp);
}
| 174,288 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PrintWebViewHelper::OnPrintForPrintPreview(
const DictionaryValue& job_settings) {
DCHECK(is_preview_);
if (print_web_view_)
return;
if (!render_view()->webview())
return;
WebFrame* main_frame = render_view()->webview()->mainFrame();
if (!main_frame)
return;
WebDocument document = main_frame->document();
WebElement pdf_element = document.getElementById("pdf-viewer");
if (pdf_element.isNull()) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
WebFrame* pdf_frame = pdf_element.document().frame();
scoped_ptr<PrepareFrameAndViewForPrint> prepare;
if (!InitPrintSettingsAndPrepareFrame(pdf_frame, &pdf_element, &prepare)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to initialize print page settings";
return;
}
if (!UpdatePrintSettings(job_settings, false)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "UpdatePrintSettings failed";
DidFinishPrinting(FAIL_PRINT);
return;
}
if (!RenderPagesForPrint(pdf_frame, &pdf_element, prepare.get())) {
LOG(ERROR) << "RenderPagesForPrint failed";
DidFinishPrinting(FAIL_PRINT);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void PrintWebViewHelper::OnPrintForPrintPreview(
const DictionaryValue& job_settings) {
DCHECK(is_preview_);
if (print_web_view_)
return;
if (!render_view()->webview())
return;
WebFrame* main_frame = render_view()->webview()->mainFrame();
if (!main_frame)
return;
WebDocument document = main_frame->document();
WebElement pdf_element = document.getElementById("pdf-viewer");
if (pdf_element.isNull()) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
if (!UpdatePrintSettings(job_settings, false)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "UpdatePrintSettings failed";
DidFinishPrinting(FAIL_PRINT);
return;
}
WebFrame* pdf_frame = pdf_element.document().frame();
scoped_ptr<PrepareFrameAndViewForPrint> prepare;
prepare.reset(new PrepareFrameAndViewForPrint(print_pages_params_->params,
pdf_frame, &pdf_element));
UpdatePrintableSizeInPrintParameters(pdf_frame, &pdf_element, prepare.get(),
&print_pages_params_->params);
if (!RenderPagesForPrint(pdf_frame, &pdf_element, prepare.get())) {
LOG(ERROR) << "RenderPagesForPrint failed";
DidFinishPrinting(FAIL_PRINT);
}
}
| 170,261 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: WebRunnerMainDelegate::WebRunnerMainDelegate(zx::channel context_channel)
: context_channel_(std::move(context_channel)) {}
Commit Message: [fuchsia] Implement browser tests for WebRunner Context service.
Tests may interact with the WebRunner FIDL services and the underlying
browser objects for end to end testing of service and browser
functionality.
* Add a browser test launcher main() for WebRunner.
* Add some simple navigation tests.
* Wire up GoBack()/GoForward() FIDL calls.
* Add embedded test server resources and initialization logic.
* Add missing deletion & notification calls to BrowserContext dtor.
* Use FIDL events for navigation state changes.
* Bug fixes:
** Move BrowserContext and Screen deletion to PostMainMessageLoopRun(),
so that they may use the MessageLoop during teardown.
** Fix Frame dtor to allow for null WindowTreeHosts (headless case)
** Fix std::move logic in Frame ctor which lead to no WebContents
observer being registered.
Bug: 871594
Change-Id: I36bcbd2436d534d366c6be4eeb54b9f9feadd1ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1164539
Commit-Queue: Kevin Marshall <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Wez <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Fabrice de Gans-Riberi <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#584155}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | WebRunnerMainDelegate::WebRunnerMainDelegate(zx::channel context_channel)
| 172,160 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int tun_set_iff(struct net *net, struct file *file, struct ifreq *ifr)
{
struct tun_struct *tun;
struct tun_file *tfile = file->private_data;
struct net_device *dev;
int err;
if (tfile->detached)
return -EINVAL;
dev = __dev_get_by_name(net, ifr->ifr_name);
if (dev) {
if (ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_TUN_EXCL)
return -EBUSY;
if ((ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_TUN) && dev->netdev_ops == &tun_netdev_ops)
tun = netdev_priv(dev);
else if ((ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_TAP) && dev->netdev_ops == &tap_netdev_ops)
tun = netdev_priv(dev);
else
return -EINVAL;
if (!!(ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_MULTI_QUEUE) !=
!!(tun->flags & IFF_MULTI_QUEUE))
return -EINVAL;
if (tun_not_capable(tun))
return -EPERM;
err = security_tun_dev_open(tun->security);
if (err < 0)
return err;
err = tun_attach(tun, file, ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_NOFILTER);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (tun->flags & IFF_MULTI_QUEUE &&
(tun->numqueues + tun->numdisabled > 1)) {
/* One or more queue has already been attached, no need
* to initialize the device again.
*/
return 0;
}
}
else {
char *name;
unsigned long flags = 0;
int queues = ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_MULTI_QUEUE ?
MAX_TAP_QUEUES : 1;
if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
err = security_tun_dev_create();
if (err < 0)
return err;
/* Set dev type */
if (ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_TUN) {
/* TUN device */
flags |= IFF_TUN;
name = "tun%d";
} else if (ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_TAP) {
/* TAP device */
flags |= IFF_TAP;
name = "tap%d";
} else
return -EINVAL;
if (*ifr->ifr_name)
name = ifr->ifr_name;
dev = alloc_netdev_mqs(sizeof(struct tun_struct), name,
NET_NAME_UNKNOWN, tun_setup, queues,
queues);
if (!dev)
return -ENOMEM;
dev_net_set(dev, net);
dev->rtnl_link_ops = &tun_link_ops;
dev->ifindex = tfile->ifindex;
dev->sysfs_groups[0] = &tun_attr_group;
tun = netdev_priv(dev);
tun->dev = dev;
tun->flags = flags;
tun->txflt.count = 0;
tun->vnet_hdr_sz = sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr);
tun->align = NET_SKB_PAD;
tun->filter_attached = false;
tun->sndbuf = tfile->socket.sk->sk_sndbuf;
tun->rx_batched = 0;
tun->pcpu_stats = netdev_alloc_pcpu_stats(struct tun_pcpu_stats);
if (!tun->pcpu_stats) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto err_free_dev;
}
spin_lock_init(&tun->lock);
err = security_tun_dev_alloc_security(&tun->security);
if (err < 0)
goto err_free_stat;
tun_net_init(dev);
tun_flow_init(tun);
dev->hw_features = NETIF_F_SG | NETIF_F_FRAGLIST |
TUN_USER_FEATURES | NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_TX |
NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_STAG_TX;
dev->features = dev->hw_features | NETIF_F_LLTX;
dev->vlan_features = dev->features &
~(NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_TX |
NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_STAG_TX);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tun->disabled);
err = tun_attach(tun, file, false);
if (err < 0)
goto err_free_flow;
err = register_netdevice(tun->dev);
if (err < 0)
goto err_detach;
}
netif_carrier_on(tun->dev);
tun_debug(KERN_INFO, tun, "tun_set_iff\n");
tun->flags = (tun->flags & ~TUN_FEATURES) |
(ifr->ifr_flags & TUN_FEATURES);
/* Make sure persistent devices do not get stuck in
* xoff state.
*/
if (netif_running(tun->dev))
netif_tx_wake_all_queues(tun->dev);
strcpy(ifr->ifr_name, tun->dev->name);
return 0;
err_detach:
tun_detach_all(dev);
/* register_netdevice() already called tun_free_netdev() */
goto err_free_dev;
err_free_flow:
tun_flow_uninit(tun);
security_tun_dev_free_security(tun->security);
err_free_stat:
free_percpu(tun->pcpu_stats);
err_free_dev:
free_netdev(dev);
return err;
}
Commit Message: tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | static int tun_set_iff(struct net *net, struct file *file, struct ifreq *ifr)
{
struct tun_struct *tun;
struct tun_file *tfile = file->private_data;
struct net_device *dev;
int err;
if (tfile->detached)
return -EINVAL;
dev = __dev_get_by_name(net, ifr->ifr_name);
if (dev) {
if (ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_TUN_EXCL)
return -EBUSY;
if ((ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_TUN) && dev->netdev_ops == &tun_netdev_ops)
tun = netdev_priv(dev);
else if ((ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_TAP) && dev->netdev_ops == &tap_netdev_ops)
tun = netdev_priv(dev);
else
return -EINVAL;
if (!!(ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_MULTI_QUEUE) !=
!!(tun->flags & IFF_MULTI_QUEUE))
return -EINVAL;
if (tun_not_capable(tun))
return -EPERM;
err = security_tun_dev_open(tun->security);
if (err < 0)
return err;
err = tun_attach(tun, file, ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_NOFILTER);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (tun->flags & IFF_MULTI_QUEUE &&
(tun->numqueues + tun->numdisabled > 1)) {
/* One or more queue has already been attached, no need
* to initialize the device again.
*/
return 0;
}
}
else {
char *name;
unsigned long flags = 0;
int queues = ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_MULTI_QUEUE ?
MAX_TAP_QUEUES : 1;
if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
err = security_tun_dev_create();
if (err < 0)
return err;
/* Set dev type */
if (ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_TUN) {
/* TUN device */
flags |= IFF_TUN;
name = "tun%d";
} else if (ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_TAP) {
/* TAP device */
flags |= IFF_TAP;
name = "tap%d";
} else
return -EINVAL;
if (*ifr->ifr_name)
name = ifr->ifr_name;
dev = alloc_netdev_mqs(sizeof(struct tun_struct), name,
NET_NAME_UNKNOWN, tun_setup, queues,
queues);
if (!dev)
return -ENOMEM;
err = dev_get_valid_name(net, dev, name);
if (err)
goto err_free_dev;
dev_net_set(dev, net);
dev->rtnl_link_ops = &tun_link_ops;
dev->ifindex = tfile->ifindex;
dev->sysfs_groups[0] = &tun_attr_group;
tun = netdev_priv(dev);
tun->dev = dev;
tun->flags = flags;
tun->txflt.count = 0;
tun->vnet_hdr_sz = sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr);
tun->align = NET_SKB_PAD;
tun->filter_attached = false;
tun->sndbuf = tfile->socket.sk->sk_sndbuf;
tun->rx_batched = 0;
tun->pcpu_stats = netdev_alloc_pcpu_stats(struct tun_pcpu_stats);
if (!tun->pcpu_stats) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto err_free_dev;
}
spin_lock_init(&tun->lock);
err = security_tun_dev_alloc_security(&tun->security);
if (err < 0)
goto err_free_stat;
tun_net_init(dev);
tun_flow_init(tun);
dev->hw_features = NETIF_F_SG | NETIF_F_FRAGLIST |
TUN_USER_FEATURES | NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_TX |
NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_STAG_TX;
dev->features = dev->hw_features | NETIF_F_LLTX;
dev->vlan_features = dev->features &
~(NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_TX |
NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_STAG_TX);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tun->disabled);
err = tun_attach(tun, file, false);
if (err < 0)
goto err_free_flow;
err = register_netdevice(tun->dev);
if (err < 0)
goto err_detach;
}
netif_carrier_on(tun->dev);
tun_debug(KERN_INFO, tun, "tun_set_iff\n");
tun->flags = (tun->flags & ~TUN_FEATURES) |
(ifr->ifr_flags & TUN_FEATURES);
/* Make sure persistent devices do not get stuck in
* xoff state.
*/
if (netif_running(tun->dev))
netif_tx_wake_all_queues(tun->dev);
strcpy(ifr->ifr_name, tun->dev->name);
return 0;
err_detach:
tun_detach_all(dev);
/* register_netdevice() already called tun_free_netdev() */
goto err_free_dev;
err_free_flow:
tun_flow_uninit(tun);
security_tun_dev_free_security(tun->security);
err_free_stat:
free_percpu(tun->pcpu_stats);
err_free_dev:
free_netdev(dev);
return err;
}
| 169,854 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SecureProxyChecker::SecureProxyChecker(
scoped_refptr<network::SharedURLLoaderFactory> url_loader_factory)
: url_loader_factory_(std::move(url_loader_factory)) {}
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | SecureProxyChecker::SecureProxyChecker(
scoped_refptr<network::SharedURLLoaderFactory> url_loader_factory)
| 172,423 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: kg_seal(minor_status, context_handle, conf_req_flag, qop_req,
input_message_buffer, conf_state, output_message_buffer, toktype)
OM_uint32 *minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle;
int conf_req_flag;
gss_qop_t qop_req;
gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer;
int *conf_state;
gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer;
int toktype;
{
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_context context;
output_message_buffer->length = 0;
output_message_buffer->value = NULL;
/* Only default qop or matching established cryptosystem is allowed.
There are NO EXTENSIONS to this set for AES and friends! The
new spec says "just use 0". The old spec plus extensions would
actually allow for certain non-zero values. Fix this to handle
them later. */
if (qop_req != 0) {
*minor_status = (OM_uint32) G_UNKNOWN_QOP;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *) context_handle;
if (! ctx->established) {
*minor_status = KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE;
return(GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
}
context = ctx->k5_context;
switch (ctx->proto)
{
case 0:
code = make_seal_token_v1(context, ctx->enc, ctx->seq,
&ctx->seq_send, ctx->initiate,
input_message_buffer, output_message_buffer,
ctx->signalg, ctx->cksum_size, ctx->sealalg,
conf_req_flag, toktype, ctx->mech_used);
break;
case 1:
code = gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3(context, ctx,
input_message_buffer,
output_message_buffer,
conf_req_flag, toktype);
break;
default:
code = G_UNKNOWN_QOP; /* XXX */
break;
}
if (code) {
*minor_status = code;
save_error_info(*minor_status, context);
return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
}
if (conf_state)
*conf_state = conf_req_flag;
*minor_status = 0;
return(GSS_S_COMPLETE);
}
Commit Message: Fix gss_process_context_token() [CVE-2014-5352]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] The krb5 gss_process_context_token() should not
actually delete the context; that leaves the caller with a dangling
pointer and no way to know that it is invalid. Instead, mark the
context as terminated, and check for terminated contexts in the GSS
functions which expect established contexts. Also add checks in
export_sec_context and pseudo_random, and adjust t_prf.c for the
pseudo_random check.
ticket: 8055 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
CWE ID: | kg_seal(minor_status, context_handle, conf_req_flag, qop_req,
input_message_buffer, conf_state, output_message_buffer, toktype)
OM_uint32 *minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle;
int conf_req_flag;
gss_qop_t qop_req;
gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer;
int *conf_state;
gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer;
int toktype;
{
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_context context;
output_message_buffer->length = 0;
output_message_buffer->value = NULL;
/* Only default qop or matching established cryptosystem is allowed.
There are NO EXTENSIONS to this set for AES and friends! The
new spec says "just use 0". The old spec plus extensions would
actually allow for certain non-zero values. Fix this to handle
them later. */
if (qop_req != 0) {
*minor_status = (OM_uint32) G_UNKNOWN_QOP;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *) context_handle;
if (ctx->terminated || !ctx->established) {
*minor_status = KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE;
return(GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
}
context = ctx->k5_context;
switch (ctx->proto)
{
case 0:
code = make_seal_token_v1(context, ctx->enc, ctx->seq,
&ctx->seq_send, ctx->initiate,
input_message_buffer, output_message_buffer,
ctx->signalg, ctx->cksum_size, ctx->sealalg,
conf_req_flag, toktype, ctx->mech_used);
break;
case 1:
code = gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3(context, ctx,
input_message_buffer,
output_message_buffer,
conf_req_flag, toktype);
break;
default:
code = G_UNKNOWN_QOP; /* XXX */
break;
}
if (code) {
*minor_status = code;
save_error_info(*minor_status, context);
return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
}
if (conf_state)
*conf_state = conf_req_flag;
*minor_status = 0;
return(GSS_S_COMPLETE);
}
| 166,817 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void WebDevToolsAgentImpl::clearBrowserCache()
{
m_client->clearBrowserCache();
}
Commit Message: [4/4] Process clearBrowserCahce/cookies commands in browser.
BUG=366585
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/251183005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172984 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | void WebDevToolsAgentImpl::clearBrowserCache()
| 171,348 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static ssize_t aio_setup_single_vector(struct kiocb *kiocb,
int rw, char __user *buf,
unsigned long *nr_segs,
size_t len,
struct iovec *iovec)
{
if (unlikely(!access_ok(!rw, buf, len)))
return -EFAULT;
iovec->iov_base = buf;
iovec->iov_len = len;
*nr_segs = 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: aio: lift iov_iter_init() into aio_setup_..._rw()
the only non-trivial detail is that we do it before rw_verify_area(),
so we'd better cap the length ourselves in aio_setup_single_rw()
case (for vectored case rw_copy_check_uvector() will do that for us).
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | static ssize_t aio_setup_single_vector(struct kiocb *kiocb,
int rw, char __user *buf,
unsigned long *nr_segs,
size_t len,
struct iovec *iovec,
struct iov_iter *iter)
{
if (len > MAX_RW_COUNT)
len = MAX_RW_COUNT;
if (unlikely(!access_ok(!rw, buf, len)))
return -EFAULT;
iovec->iov_base = buf;
iovec->iov_len = len;
*nr_segs = 1;
iov_iter_init(iter, rw, iovec, *nr_segs, len);
return 0;
}
| 170,002 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: status_t AudioFlinger::EffectModule::command(uint32_t cmdCode,
uint32_t cmdSize,
void *pCmdData,
uint32_t *replySize,
void *pReplyData)
{
Mutex::Autolock _l(mLock);
ALOGVV("command(), cmdCode: %d, mEffectInterface: %p", cmdCode, mEffectInterface);
if (mState == DESTROYED || mEffectInterface == NULL) {
return NO_INIT;
}
if (mStatus != NO_ERROR) {
return mStatus;
}
if (cmdCode == EFFECT_CMD_GET_PARAM &&
(*replySize < sizeof(effect_param_t) ||
((effect_param_t *)pCmdData)->psize > *replySize - sizeof(effect_param_t))) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "29251553");
return -EINVAL;
}
status_t status = (*mEffectInterface)->command(mEffectInterface,
cmdCode,
cmdSize,
pCmdData,
replySize,
pReplyData);
if (cmdCode != EFFECT_CMD_GET_PARAM && status == NO_ERROR) {
uint32_t size = (replySize == NULL) ? 0 : *replySize;
for (size_t i = 1; i < mHandles.size(); i++) {
EffectHandle *h = mHandles[i];
if (h != NULL && !h->destroyed_l()) {
h->commandExecuted(cmdCode, cmdSize, pCmdData, size, pReplyData);
}
}
}
return status;
}
Commit Message: Add EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM parameter checking
Bug: 30204301
Change-Id: Ib9c3ee1c2f23c96f8f7092dd9e146bc453d7a290
(cherry picked from commit e4a1d91501d47931dbae19c47815952378787ab6)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | status_t AudioFlinger::EffectModule::command(uint32_t cmdCode,
uint32_t cmdSize,
void *pCmdData,
uint32_t *replySize,
void *pReplyData)
{
Mutex::Autolock _l(mLock);
ALOGVV("command(), cmdCode: %d, mEffectInterface: %p", cmdCode, mEffectInterface);
if (mState == DESTROYED || mEffectInterface == NULL) {
return NO_INIT;
}
if (mStatus != NO_ERROR) {
return mStatus;
}
if (cmdCode == EFFECT_CMD_GET_PARAM &&
(*replySize < sizeof(effect_param_t) ||
((effect_param_t *)pCmdData)->psize > *replySize - sizeof(effect_param_t))) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "29251553");
return -EINVAL;
}
if ((cmdCode == EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM
|| cmdCode == EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM_DEFERRED) && // DEFERRED not generally used
(sizeof(effect_param_t) > cmdSize
|| ((effect_param_t *)pCmdData)->psize > cmdSize
- sizeof(effect_param_t)
|| ((effect_param_t *)pCmdData)->vsize > cmdSize
- sizeof(effect_param_t)
- ((effect_param_t *)pCmdData)->psize
|| roundUpDelta(((effect_param_t *)pCmdData)->psize, (uint32_t)sizeof(int)) >
cmdSize
- sizeof(effect_param_t)
- ((effect_param_t *)pCmdData)->psize
- ((effect_param_t *)pCmdData)->vsize)) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "30204301");
return -EINVAL;
}
status_t status = (*mEffectInterface)->command(mEffectInterface,
cmdCode,
cmdSize,
pCmdData,
replySize,
pReplyData);
if (cmdCode != EFFECT_CMD_GET_PARAM && status == NO_ERROR) {
uint32_t size = (replySize == NULL) ? 0 : *replySize;
for (size_t i = 1; i < mHandles.size(); i++) {
EffectHandle *h = mHandles[i];
if (h != NULL && !h->destroyed_l()) {
h->commandExecuted(cmdCode, cmdSize, pCmdData, size, pReplyData);
}
}
}
return status;
}
| 173,387 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void jas_stream_initbuf(jas_stream_t *stream, int bufmode, char *buf,
int bufsize)
{
/* If this function is being called, the buffer should not have been
initialized yet. */
assert(!stream->bufbase_);
if (bufmode != JAS_STREAM_UNBUF) {
/* The full- or line-buffered mode is being employed. */
if (!buf) {
/* The caller has not specified a buffer to employ, so allocate
one. */
if ((stream->bufbase_ = jas_malloc(JAS_STREAM_BUFSIZE +
JAS_STREAM_MAXPUTBACK))) {
stream->bufmode_ |= JAS_STREAM_FREEBUF;
stream->bufsize_ = JAS_STREAM_BUFSIZE;
} else {
/* The buffer allocation has failed. Resort to unbuffered
operation. */
stream->bufbase_ = stream->tinybuf_;
stream->bufsize_ = 1;
}
} else {
/* The caller has specified a buffer to employ. */
/* The buffer must be large enough to accommodate maximum
putback. */
assert(bufsize > JAS_STREAM_MAXPUTBACK);
stream->bufbase_ = JAS_CAST(uchar *, buf);
stream->bufsize_ = bufsize - JAS_STREAM_MAXPUTBACK;
}
} else {
/* The unbuffered mode is being employed. */
/* A buffer should not have been supplied by the caller. */
assert(!buf);
/* Use a trivial one-character buffer. */
stream->bufbase_ = stream->tinybuf_;
stream->bufsize_ = 1;
}
stream->bufstart_ = &stream->bufbase_[JAS_STREAM_MAXPUTBACK];
stream->ptr_ = stream->bufstart_;
stream->cnt_ = 0;
stream->bufmode_ |= bufmode & JAS_STREAM_BUFMODEMASK;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | static void jas_stream_initbuf(jas_stream_t *stream, int bufmode, char *buf,
int bufsize)
{
/* If this function is being called, the buffer should not have been
initialized yet. */
assert(!stream->bufbase_);
if (bufmode != JAS_STREAM_UNBUF) {
/* The full- or line-buffered mode is being employed. */
if (!buf) {
/* The caller has not specified a buffer to employ, so allocate
one. */
if ((stream->bufbase_ = jas_malloc(JAS_STREAM_BUFSIZE +
JAS_STREAM_MAXPUTBACK))) {
stream->bufmode_ |= JAS_STREAM_FREEBUF;
stream->bufsize_ = JAS_STREAM_BUFSIZE;
} else {
/* The buffer allocation has failed. Resort to unbuffered
operation. */
stream->bufbase_ = stream->tinybuf_;
stream->bufsize_ = 1;
}
} else {
/* The caller has specified a buffer to employ. */
/* The buffer must be large enough to accommodate maximum
putback. */
assert(bufsize > JAS_STREAM_MAXPUTBACK);
stream->bufbase_ = JAS_CAST(jas_uchar *, buf);
stream->bufsize_ = bufsize - JAS_STREAM_MAXPUTBACK;
}
} else {
/* The unbuffered mode is being employed. */
/* A buffer should not have been supplied by the caller. */
assert(!buf);
/* Use a trivial one-character buffer. */
stream->bufbase_ = stream->tinybuf_;
stream->bufsize_ = 1;
}
stream->bufstart_ = &stream->bufbase_[JAS_STREAM_MAXPUTBACK];
stream->ptr_ = stream->bufstart_;
stream->cnt_ = 0;
stream->bufmode_ |= bufmode & JAS_STREAM_BUFMODEMASK;
}
| 168,712 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void FakeCrosDisksClient::Mount(const std::string& source_path,
const std::string& source_format,
const std::string& mount_label,
const std::vector<std::string>& mount_options,
MountAccessMode access_mode,
RemountOption remount,
VoidDBusMethodCallback callback) {
MountType type =
source_format.empty() ? MOUNT_TYPE_DEVICE : MOUNT_TYPE_ARCHIVE;
if (GURL(source_path).is_valid())
type = MOUNT_TYPE_NETWORK_STORAGE;
base::FilePath mounted_path;
switch (type) {
case MOUNT_TYPE_ARCHIVE:
mounted_path = GetArchiveMountPoint().Append(
base::FilePath::FromUTF8Unsafe(mount_label));
break;
case MOUNT_TYPE_DEVICE:
mounted_path = GetRemovableDiskMountPoint().Append(
base::FilePath::FromUTF8Unsafe(mount_label));
break;
case MOUNT_TYPE_NETWORK_STORAGE:
if (custom_mount_point_callback_) {
mounted_path =
custom_mount_point_callback_.Run(source_path, mount_options);
}
break;
case MOUNT_TYPE_INVALID:
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
mounted_paths_.insert(mounted_path);
base::PostTaskWithTraitsAndReplyWithResult(
FROM_HERE,
{base::MayBlock(), base::TaskShutdownBehavior::CONTINUE_ON_SHUTDOWN},
base::BindOnce(&PerformFakeMount, source_path, mounted_path),
base::BindOnce(&FakeCrosDisksClient::DidMount,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), source_path, type,
mounted_path, std::move(callback)));
}
Commit Message: Add a fake DriveFS launcher client.
Using DriveFS requires building and deploying ChromeOS. Add a client for
the fake DriveFS launcher to allow the use of a real DriveFS from a
ChromeOS chroot to be used with a target_os="chromeos" build of chrome.
This connects to the fake DriveFS launcher using mojo over a unix domain
socket named by a command-line flag, using the launcher to create
DriveFS instances.
Bug: 848126
Change-Id: I22dcca154d41bda196dd7c1782bb503f6bcba5b1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1098434
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Sam McNally <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567513}
CWE ID: | void FakeCrosDisksClient::Mount(const std::string& source_path,
const std::string& source_format,
const std::string& mount_label,
const std::vector<std::string>& mount_options,
MountAccessMode access_mode,
RemountOption remount,
VoidDBusMethodCallback callback) {
MountType type =
source_format.empty() ? MOUNT_TYPE_DEVICE : MOUNT_TYPE_ARCHIVE;
if (GURL(source_path).is_valid())
type = MOUNT_TYPE_NETWORK_STORAGE;
base::FilePath mounted_path;
switch (type) {
case MOUNT_TYPE_ARCHIVE:
mounted_path = GetArchiveMountPoint().Append(
base::FilePath::FromUTF8Unsafe(mount_label));
break;
case MOUNT_TYPE_DEVICE:
mounted_path = GetRemovableDiskMountPoint().Append(
base::FilePath::FromUTF8Unsafe(mount_label));
break;
case MOUNT_TYPE_NETWORK_STORAGE:
if (custom_mount_point_callback_) {
mounted_path =
custom_mount_point_callback_.Run(source_path, mount_options);
}
break;
case MOUNT_TYPE_INVALID:
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
mounted_paths_.insert(mounted_path);
base::PostTaskWithTraitsAndReplyWithResult(
FROM_HERE,
{base::MayBlock(), base::TaskShutdownBehavior::CONTINUE_ON_SHUTDOWN},
base::BindOnce(&PerformFakeMount, source_path, mounted_path, type),
base::BindOnce(&FakeCrosDisksClient::DidMount,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), source_path, type,
mounted_path, std::move(callback)));
}
| 171,730 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int spl_filesystem_file_open(spl_filesystem_object *intern, int use_include_path, int silent TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
zval tmp;
intern->type = SPL_FS_FILE;
php_stat(intern->file_name, intern->file_name_len, FS_IS_DIR, &tmp TSRMLS_CC);
if (Z_LVAL(tmp)) {
intern->u.file.open_mode = NULL;
intern->file_name = NULL;
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_LogicException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Cannot use SplFileObject with directories");
return FAILURE;
}
intern->u.file.context = php_stream_context_from_zval(intern->u.file.zcontext, 0);
intern->u.file.stream = php_stream_open_wrapper_ex(intern->file_name, intern->u.file.open_mode, (use_include_path ? USE_PATH : 0) | REPORT_ERRORS, NULL, intern->u.file.context);
if (!intern->file_name_len || !intern->u.file.stream) {
if (!EG(exception)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_RuntimeException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Cannot open file '%s'", intern->file_name_len ? intern->file_name : "");
}
intern->file_name = NULL; /* until here it is not a copy */
intern->u.file.open_mode = NULL;
return FAILURE;
}
if (intern->u.file.zcontext) {
zend_list_addref(Z_RESVAL_P(intern->u.file.zcontext));
}
if (intern->file_name_len > 1 && IS_SLASH_AT(intern->file_name, intern->file_name_len-1)) {
intern->file_name_len--;
}
intern->orig_path = estrndup(intern->u.file.stream->orig_path, strlen(intern->u.file.stream->orig_path));
intern->file_name = estrndup(intern->file_name, intern->file_name_len);
intern->u.file.open_mode = estrndup(intern->u.file.open_mode, intern->u.file.open_mode_len);
/* avoid reference counting in debug mode, thus do it manually */
ZVAL_RESOURCE(&intern->u.file.zresource, php_stream_get_resource_id(intern->u.file.stream));
Z_SET_REFCOUNT(intern->u.file.zresource, 1);
intern->u.file.delimiter = ',';
intern->u.file.enclosure = '"';
intern->u.file.escape = '\\';
zend_hash_find(&intern->std.ce->function_table, "getcurrentline", sizeof("getcurrentline"), (void **) &intern->u.file.func_getCurr);
return SUCCESS;
} /* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | static int spl_filesystem_file_open(spl_filesystem_object *intern, int use_include_path, int silent TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
zval tmp;
intern->type = SPL_FS_FILE;
php_stat(intern->file_name, intern->file_name_len, FS_IS_DIR, &tmp TSRMLS_CC);
if (Z_LVAL(tmp)) {
intern->u.file.open_mode = NULL;
intern->file_name = NULL;
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_LogicException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Cannot use SplFileObject with directories");
return FAILURE;
}
intern->u.file.context = php_stream_context_from_zval(intern->u.file.zcontext, 0);
intern->u.file.stream = php_stream_open_wrapper_ex(intern->file_name, intern->u.file.open_mode, (use_include_path ? USE_PATH : 0) | REPORT_ERRORS, NULL, intern->u.file.context);
if (!intern->file_name_len || !intern->u.file.stream) {
if (!EG(exception)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_RuntimeException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Cannot open file '%s'", intern->file_name_len ? intern->file_name : "");
}
intern->file_name = NULL; /* until here it is not a copy */
intern->u.file.open_mode = NULL;
return FAILURE;
}
if (intern->u.file.zcontext) {
zend_list_addref(Z_RESVAL_P(intern->u.file.zcontext));
}
if (intern->file_name_len > 1 && IS_SLASH_AT(intern->file_name, intern->file_name_len-1)) {
intern->file_name_len--;
}
intern->orig_path = estrndup(intern->u.file.stream->orig_path, strlen(intern->u.file.stream->orig_path));
intern->file_name = estrndup(intern->file_name, intern->file_name_len);
intern->u.file.open_mode = estrndup(intern->u.file.open_mode, intern->u.file.open_mode_len);
/* avoid reference counting in debug mode, thus do it manually */
ZVAL_RESOURCE(&intern->u.file.zresource, php_stream_get_resource_id(intern->u.file.stream));
Z_SET_REFCOUNT(intern->u.file.zresource, 1);
intern->u.file.delimiter = ',';
intern->u.file.enclosure = '"';
intern->u.file.escape = '\\';
zend_hash_find(&intern->std.ce->function_table, "getcurrentline", sizeof("getcurrentline"), (void **) &intern->u.file.func_getCurr);
return SUCCESS;
} /* }}} */
| 167,075 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int l2cap_build_conf_req(struct sock *sk, void *data)
{
struct l2cap_pinfo *pi = l2cap_pi(sk);
struct l2cap_conf_req *req = data;
struct l2cap_conf_rfc rfc = { .mode = L2CAP_MODE_BASIC };
void *ptr = req->data;
BT_DBG("sk %p", sk);
switch (pi->mode) {
case L2CAP_MODE_BASIC:
if (pi->imtu != L2CAP_DEFAULT_MTU)
l2cap_add_conf_opt(&ptr, L2CAP_CONF_MTU, 2, pi->imtu);
break;
case L2CAP_MODE_ERTM:
rfc.mode = L2CAP_MODE_ERTM;
rfc.txwin_size = L2CAP_DEFAULT_RX_WINDOW;
rfc.max_transmit = L2CAP_DEFAULT_MAX_RECEIVE;
rfc.retrans_timeout = cpu_to_le16(L2CAP_DEFAULT_RETRANS_TO);
rfc.monitor_timeout = cpu_to_le16(L2CAP_DEFAULT_MONITOR_TO);
rfc.max_pdu_size = cpu_to_le16(L2CAP_DEFAULT_MAX_RX_APDU);
l2cap_add_conf_opt(&ptr, L2CAP_CONF_RFC,
sizeof(rfc), (unsigned long) &rfc);
break;
}
/* FIXME: Need actual value of the flush timeout */
req->dcid = cpu_to_le16(pi->dcid);
req->flags = cpu_to_le16(0);
return ptr - data;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: Add configuration support for ERTM and Streaming mode
Add support to config_req and config_rsp to configure ERTM and Streaming
mode. If the remote device specifies ERTM or Streaming mode, then the
same mode is proposed. Otherwise ERTM or Basic mode is used. And in case
of a state 2 device, the remote device should propose the same mode. If
not, then the channel gets disconnected.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static int l2cap_build_conf_req(struct sock *sk, void *data)
{
struct l2cap_pinfo *pi = l2cap_pi(sk);
struct l2cap_conf_req *req = data;
struct l2cap_conf_rfc rfc = { .mode = L2CAP_MODE_ERTM };
void *ptr = req->data;
BT_DBG("sk %p", sk);
if (pi->num_conf_req || pi->num_conf_rsp)
goto done;
switch (pi->mode) {
case L2CAP_MODE_STREAMING:
case L2CAP_MODE_ERTM:
pi->conf_state |= L2CAP_CONF_STATE2_DEVICE;
if (!l2cap_mode_supported(pi->mode, pi->conn->feat_mask)) {
struct l2cap_disconn_req req;
req.dcid = cpu_to_le16(pi->dcid);
req.scid = cpu_to_le16(pi->scid);
l2cap_send_cmd(pi->conn, l2cap_get_ident(pi->conn),
L2CAP_DISCONN_REQ, sizeof(req), &req);
}
break;
default:
pi->mode = l2cap_select_mode(rfc.mode, pi->conn->feat_mask);
break;
}
done:
switch (pi->mode) {
case L2CAP_MODE_BASIC:
if (pi->imtu != L2CAP_DEFAULT_MTU)
l2cap_add_conf_opt(&ptr, L2CAP_CONF_MTU, 2, pi->imtu);
break;
case L2CAP_MODE_ERTM:
rfc.mode = L2CAP_MODE_ERTM;
rfc.txwin_size = L2CAP_DEFAULT_TX_WINDOW;
rfc.max_transmit = L2CAP_DEFAULT_MAX_RECEIVE;
rfc.retrans_timeout = 0;
rfc.monitor_timeout = 0;
rfc.max_pdu_size = cpu_to_le16(L2CAP_DEFAULT_MAX_RX_APDU);
l2cap_add_conf_opt(&ptr, L2CAP_CONF_RFC,
sizeof(rfc), (unsigned long) &rfc);
break;
case L2CAP_MODE_STREAMING:
rfc.mode = L2CAP_MODE_STREAMING;
rfc.txwin_size = 0;
rfc.max_transmit = 0;
rfc.retrans_timeout = 0;
rfc.monitor_timeout = 0;
rfc.max_pdu_size = cpu_to_le16(L2CAP_DEFAULT_MAX_RX_APDU);
l2cap_add_conf_opt(&ptr, L2CAP_CONF_RFC,
sizeof(rfc), (unsigned long) &rfc);
break;
}
/* FIXME: Need actual value of the flush timeout */
req->dcid = cpu_to_le16(pi->dcid);
req->flags = cpu_to_le16(0);
return ptr - data;
}
| 167,621 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: Mac_Read_POST_Resource( FT_Library library,
FT_Stream stream,
FT_Long *offsets,
FT_Long resource_cnt,
FT_Long face_index,
FT_Face *aface )
{
FT_Error error = FT_Err_Cannot_Open_Resource;
FT_Memory memory = library->memory;
FT_Byte* pfb_data;
int i, type, flags;
FT_Long len;
FT_Long pfb_len, pfb_pos, pfb_lenpos;
FT_Long rlen, temp;
if ( face_index == -1 )
face_index = 0;
if ( face_index != 0 )
return error;
/* Find the length of all the POST resources, concatenated. Assume */
/* worst case (each resource in its own section). */
pfb_len = 0;
for ( i = 0; i < resource_cnt; ++i )
{
error = FT_Stream_Seek( stream, offsets[i] );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
if ( FT_READ_LONG( temp ) )
goto Exit;
pfb_len += temp + 6;
}
if ( FT_ALLOC( pfb_data, (FT_Long)pfb_len + 2 ) )
goto Exit;
pfb_data[0] = 0x80;
pfb_data[1] = 1; /* Ascii section */
pfb_data[2] = 0; /* 4-byte length, fill in later */
pfb_data[3] = 0;
pfb_data[4] = 0;
pfb_data[5] = 0;
pfb_pos = 6;
pfb_lenpos = 2;
len = 0;
type = 1;
for ( i = 0; i < resource_cnt; ++i )
{
error = FT_Stream_Seek( stream, offsets[i] );
if ( error )
goto Exit2;
if ( FT_READ_LONG( rlen ) )
goto Exit;
if ( FT_READ_USHORT( flags ) )
goto Exit;
FT_TRACE3(( "POST fragment[%d]: offsets=0x%08x, rlen=0x%08x, flags=0x%04x\n",
i, offsets[i], rlen, flags ));
/* the flags are part of the resource, so rlen >= 2. */
/* but some fonts declare rlen = 0 for empty fragment */
if ( rlen > 2 )
if ( ( flags >> 8 ) == type )
len += rlen;
else
{
if ( pfb_lenpos + 3 > pfb_len + 2 )
goto Exit2;
pfb_data[pfb_lenpos ] = (FT_Byte)( len );
pfb_data[pfb_lenpos + 1] = (FT_Byte)( len >> 8 );
pfb_data[pfb_lenpos + 2] = (FT_Byte)( len >> 16 );
pfb_data[pfb_lenpos + 3] = (FT_Byte)( len >> 24 );
if ( ( flags >> 8 ) == 5 ) /* End of font mark */
break;
if ( pfb_pos + 6 > pfb_len + 2 )
goto Exit2;
pfb_data[pfb_pos++] = 0x80;
type = flags >> 8;
len = rlen;
pfb_data[pfb_pos++] = (FT_Byte)type;
pfb_lenpos = pfb_pos;
pfb_data[pfb_pos++] = 0; /* 4-byte length, fill in later */
pfb_data[pfb_pos++] = 0;
pfb_data[pfb_pos++] = 0;
pfb_data[pfb_pos++] = 0;
}
error = FT_Stream_Read( stream, (FT_Byte *)pfb_data + pfb_pos, rlen );
if ( error )
goto Exit2;
pfb_pos += rlen;
}
if ( pfb_pos + 2 > pfb_len + 2 )
goto Exit2;
pfb_data[pfb_pos++] = 0x80;
pfb_data[pfb_pos++] = 3;
if ( pfb_lenpos + 3 > pfb_len + 2 )
goto Exit2;
pfb_data[pfb_lenpos ] = (FT_Byte)( len );
pfb_data[pfb_lenpos + 1] = (FT_Byte)( len >> 8 );
pfb_data[pfb_lenpos + 2] = (FT_Byte)( len >> 16 );
pfb_data[pfb_lenpos + 3] = (FT_Byte)( len >> 24 );
return open_face_from_buffer( library,
pfb_data,
pfb_pos,
face_index,
"type1",
aface );
Exit2:
FT_FREE( pfb_data );
Exit:
return error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | Mac_Read_POST_Resource( FT_Library library,
FT_Stream stream,
FT_Long *offsets,
FT_Long resource_cnt,
FT_Long face_index,
FT_Face *aface )
{
FT_Error error = FT_Err_Cannot_Open_Resource;
FT_Memory memory = library->memory;
FT_Byte* pfb_data;
int i, type, flags;
FT_Long len;
FT_Long pfb_len, pfb_pos, pfb_lenpos;
FT_Long rlen, temp;
if ( face_index == -1 )
face_index = 0;
if ( face_index != 0 )
return error;
/* Find the length of all the POST resources, concatenated. Assume */
/* worst case (each resource in its own section). */
pfb_len = 0;
for ( i = 0; i < resource_cnt; ++i )
{
error = FT_Stream_Seek( stream, offsets[i] );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
if ( FT_READ_LONG( temp ) )
goto Exit;
pfb_len += temp + 6;
}
if ( FT_ALLOC( pfb_data, (FT_Long)pfb_len + 2 ) )
goto Exit;
pfb_data[0] = 0x80;
pfb_data[1] = 1; /* Ascii section */
pfb_data[2] = 0; /* 4-byte length, fill in later */
pfb_data[3] = 0;
pfb_data[4] = 0;
pfb_data[5] = 0;
pfb_pos = 6;
pfb_lenpos = 2;
len = 0;
type = 1;
for ( i = 0; i < resource_cnt; ++i )
{
error = FT_Stream_Seek( stream, offsets[i] );
if ( error )
goto Exit2;
if ( FT_READ_LONG( rlen ) )
goto Exit;
if ( FT_READ_USHORT( flags ) )
goto Exit;
FT_TRACE3(( "POST fragment[%d]: offsets=0x%08x, rlen=0x%08x, flags=0x%04x\n",
i, offsets[i], rlen, flags ));
if ( ( flags >> 8 ) == 0 ) /* Comment, should not be loaded */
continue;
/* the flags are part of the resource, so rlen >= 2. */
/* but some fonts declare rlen = 0 for empty fragment */
if ( rlen > 2 )
if ( ( flags >> 8 ) == type )
len += rlen;
else
{
if ( pfb_lenpos + 3 > pfb_len + 2 )
goto Exit2;
pfb_data[pfb_lenpos ] = (FT_Byte)( len );
pfb_data[pfb_lenpos + 1] = (FT_Byte)( len >> 8 );
pfb_data[pfb_lenpos + 2] = (FT_Byte)( len >> 16 );
pfb_data[pfb_lenpos + 3] = (FT_Byte)( len >> 24 );
if ( ( flags >> 8 ) == 5 ) /* End of font mark */
break;
if ( pfb_pos + 6 > pfb_len + 2 )
goto Exit2;
pfb_data[pfb_pos++] = 0x80;
type = flags >> 8;
len = rlen;
pfb_data[pfb_pos++] = (FT_Byte)type;
pfb_lenpos = pfb_pos;
pfb_data[pfb_pos++] = 0; /* 4-byte length, fill in later */
pfb_data[pfb_pos++] = 0;
pfb_data[pfb_pos++] = 0;
pfb_data[pfb_pos++] = 0;
}
error = FT_Stream_Read( stream, (FT_Byte *)pfb_data + pfb_pos, rlen );
if ( error )
goto Exit2;
pfb_pos += rlen;
}
if ( pfb_pos + 2 > pfb_len + 2 )
goto Exit2;
pfb_data[pfb_pos++] = 0x80;
pfb_data[pfb_pos++] = 3;
if ( pfb_lenpos + 3 > pfb_len + 2 )
goto Exit2;
pfb_data[pfb_lenpos ] = (FT_Byte)( len );
pfb_data[pfb_lenpos + 1] = (FT_Byte)( len >> 8 );
pfb_data[pfb_lenpos + 2] = (FT_Byte)( len >> 16 );
pfb_data[pfb_lenpos + 3] = (FT_Byte)( len >> 24 );
return open_face_from_buffer( library,
pfb_data,
pfb_pos,
face_index,
"type1",
aface );
Exit2:
FT_FREE( pfb_data );
Exit:
return error;
}
| 165,003 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static struct mnt_namespace *create_mnt_ns(struct vfsmount *m)
{
struct mnt_namespace *new_ns = alloc_mnt_ns(&init_user_ns);
if (!IS_ERR(new_ns)) {
struct mount *mnt = real_mount(m);
mnt->mnt_ns = new_ns;
new_ns->root = mnt;
list_add(&mnt->mnt_list, &new_ns->list);
} else {
mntput(m);
}
return new_ns;
}
Commit Message: mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts
CAI Qian <[email protected]> pointed out that the semantics
of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially
increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace.
mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2
mount --make-rshared /
for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done
Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem
as some people have managed to hit this by accident.
As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned.
Ian Kent <[email protected]> described the situation for autofs users
as follows:
> The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of
> the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance
> problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less
> than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that
> have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common
> case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've
> not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries.
>
> The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large
> number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat
> more active mounts.
So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount
namespace at 100,000. This is more than enough for any use case I
know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase
in mounts. Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and
malfunctioning programs.
For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing
to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl.
Tested-by: CAI Qian <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | static struct mnt_namespace *create_mnt_ns(struct vfsmount *m)
{
struct mnt_namespace *new_ns = alloc_mnt_ns(&init_user_ns);
if (!IS_ERR(new_ns)) {
struct mount *mnt = real_mount(m);
mnt->mnt_ns = new_ns;
new_ns->root = mnt;
new_ns->mounts++;
list_add(&mnt->mnt_list, &new_ns->list);
} else {
mntput(m);
}
return new_ns;
}
| 167,010 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void tcp_cwnd_reduction(struct sock *sk, const int prior_unsacked,
int fast_rexmit, int flag)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
int sndcnt = 0;
int delta = tp->snd_ssthresh - tcp_packets_in_flight(tp);
int newly_acked_sacked = prior_unsacked -
(tp->packets_out - tp->sacked_out);
tp->prr_delivered += newly_acked_sacked;
if (delta < 0) {
u64 dividend = (u64)tp->snd_ssthresh * tp->prr_delivered +
tp->prior_cwnd - 1;
sndcnt = div_u64(dividend, tp->prior_cwnd) - tp->prr_out;
} else if ((flag & FLAG_RETRANS_DATA_ACKED) &&
!(flag & FLAG_LOST_RETRANS)) {
sndcnt = min_t(int, delta,
max_t(int, tp->prr_delivered - tp->prr_out,
newly_acked_sacked) + 1);
} else {
sndcnt = min(delta, newly_acked_sacked);
}
sndcnt = max(sndcnt, (fast_rexmit ? 1 : 0));
tp->snd_cwnd = tcp_packets_in_flight(tp) + sndcnt;
}
Commit Message: tcp: fix zero cwnd in tcp_cwnd_reduction
Patch 3759824da87b ("tcp: PRR uses CRB mode by default and SS mode
conditionally") introduced a bug that cwnd may become 0 when both
inflight and sndcnt are 0 (cwnd = inflight + sndcnt). This may lead
to a div-by-zero if the connection starts another cwnd reduction
phase by setting tp->prior_cwnd to the current cwnd (0) in
tcp_init_cwnd_reduction().
To prevent this we skip PRR operation when nothing is acked or
sacked. Then cwnd must be positive in all cases as long as ssthresh
is positive:
1) The proportional reduction mode
inflight > ssthresh > 0
2) The reduction bound mode
a) inflight == ssthresh > 0
b) inflight < ssthresh
sndcnt > 0 since newly_acked_sacked > 0 and inflight < ssthresh
Therefore in all cases inflight and sndcnt can not both be 0.
We check invalid tp->prior_cwnd to avoid potential div0 bugs.
In reality this bug is triggered only with a sequence of less common
events. For example, the connection is terminating an ECN-triggered
cwnd reduction with an inflight 0, then it receives reordered/old
ACKs or DSACKs from prior transmission (which acks nothing). Or the
connection is in fast recovery stage that marks everything lost,
but fails to retransmit due to local issues, then receives data
packets from other end which acks nothing.
Fixes: 3759824da87b ("tcp: PRR uses CRB mode by default and SS mode conditionally")
Reported-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | static void tcp_cwnd_reduction(struct sock *sk, const int prior_unsacked,
int fast_rexmit, int flag)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
int sndcnt = 0;
int delta = tp->snd_ssthresh - tcp_packets_in_flight(tp);
int newly_acked_sacked = prior_unsacked -
(tp->packets_out - tp->sacked_out);
if (newly_acked_sacked <= 0 || WARN_ON_ONCE(!tp->prior_cwnd))
return;
tp->prr_delivered += newly_acked_sacked;
if (delta < 0) {
u64 dividend = (u64)tp->snd_ssthresh * tp->prr_delivered +
tp->prior_cwnd - 1;
sndcnt = div_u64(dividend, tp->prior_cwnd) - tp->prr_out;
} else if ((flag & FLAG_RETRANS_DATA_ACKED) &&
!(flag & FLAG_LOST_RETRANS)) {
sndcnt = min_t(int, delta,
max_t(int, tp->prr_delivered - tp->prr_out,
newly_acked_sacked) + 1);
} else {
sndcnt = min(delta, newly_acked_sacked);
}
sndcnt = max(sndcnt, (fast_rexmit ? 1 : 0));
tp->snd_cwnd = tcp_packets_in_flight(tp) + sndcnt;
}
| 167,438 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: IDNSpoofChecker::IDNSpoofChecker() {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
checker_ = uspoof_open(&status);
if (U_FAILURE(status)) {
checker_ = nullptr;
return;
}
uspoof_setRestrictionLevel(checker_, USPOOF_HIGHLY_RESTRICTIVE);
SetAllowedUnicodeSet(&status);
int32_t checks = uspoof_getChecks(checker_, &status) | USPOOF_AUX_INFO;
uspoof_setChecks(checker_, checks, &status);
deviation_characters_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u00df\\u03c2\\u200c\\u200d]"), status);
deviation_characters_.freeze();
non_ascii_latin_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:] - [a-zA-Z]]"), status);
non_ascii_latin_letters_.freeze();
kana_letters_exceptions_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u3078-\\u307a\\u30d8-\\u30da\\u30fb-\\u30fe]"),
status);
kana_letters_exceptions_.freeze();
combining_diacritics_exceptions_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u0300-\\u0339]"), status);
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[асԁеһіјӏорԛѕԝхуъЬҽпгѵѡ]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Cyrl:]]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_.freeze();
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status));
lgc_letters_n_ascii_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:][:Greek:][:Cyrillic:][0-9\\u002e_"
"\\u002d][\\u0300-\\u0339]]"),
status);
lgc_letters_n_ascii_.freeze();
UParseError parse_error;
diacritic_remover_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("DropAcc"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("::NFD; ::[:Nonspacing Mark:] Remove; ::NFC;"
" ł > l; ø > o; đ > d;"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
extra_confusable_mapper_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("ExtraConf"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[þϼҏ] > p; [ħнћңҥӈԧԩ] > h;"
"[ĸκкқҝҟҡӄԟ] > k; [ŋп] > n; [ŧтҭ] > t;"
"[ƅьҍв] > b; [ωшщ] > w; [мӎ] > m;"
"[єҽҿၔ] > e; ґ > r; ғ > f; [ҫင] > c;"
"ұ > y; [χҳӽӿ] > x;"
#if defined(OS_WIN)
"ӏ > i;"
#else
"ӏ > l;"
#endif
"ԃ > d; [ԍဌ] > g; ട > s; ၂ > j"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status))
<< "Spoofchecker initalization failed due to an error: "
<< u_errorName(status);
}
Commit Message: Add a few more entries to the confusables list for IDN
U+04CA (ӊ) => h
U+0E1F (ฟ) => w
U+0E23 (ร) => s
Bug: 813925, 813814
Test: components_unittests --gtest_filter=*IDN*
Change-Id: If81ea9bf1c1729f1b6ffc71d718dc5950ac825b5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/927741
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Jungshik Shin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#538159}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | IDNSpoofChecker::IDNSpoofChecker() {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
checker_ = uspoof_open(&status);
if (U_FAILURE(status)) {
checker_ = nullptr;
return;
}
uspoof_setRestrictionLevel(checker_, USPOOF_HIGHLY_RESTRICTIVE);
SetAllowedUnicodeSet(&status);
int32_t checks = uspoof_getChecks(checker_, &status) | USPOOF_AUX_INFO;
uspoof_setChecks(checker_, checks, &status);
deviation_characters_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u00df\\u03c2\\u200c\\u200d]"), status);
deviation_characters_.freeze();
non_ascii_latin_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:] - [a-zA-Z]]"), status);
non_ascii_latin_letters_.freeze();
kana_letters_exceptions_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u3078-\\u307a\\u30d8-\\u30da\\u30fb-\\u30fe]"),
status);
kana_letters_exceptions_.freeze();
combining_diacritics_exceptions_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u0300-\\u0339]"), status);
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[асԁеһіјӏорԛѕԝхуъЬҽпгѵѡ]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Cyrl:]]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_.freeze();
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status));
lgc_letters_n_ascii_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:][:Greek:][:Cyrillic:][0-9\\u002e_"
"\\u002d][\\u0300-\\u0339]]"),
status);
lgc_letters_n_ascii_.freeze();
UParseError parse_error;
diacritic_remover_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("DropAcc"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("::NFD; ::[:Nonspacing Mark:] Remove; ::NFC;"
" ł > l; ø > o; đ > d;"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
// U+04C8 (ӈ), U+04CA (ӊ), U+0527 (ԧ), U+0529 (ԩ)} => h
// - {U+03C9 (ω), U+0448 (ш), U+0449 (щ), U+0E1F (ฟ)} => w
// - {U+0D1F (ട), U+0E23 (ร)} => s
extra_confusable_mapper_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("ExtraConf"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[þϼҏ] > p; [ħнћңҥӈӊԧԩ] > h;"
"[ĸκкқҝҟҡӄԟ] > k; [ŋп] > n; [ŧтҭ] > t;"
"[ƅьҍв] > b; [ωшщฟ] > w; [мӎ] > m;"
"[єҽҿၔ] > e; ґ > r; ғ > f; [ҫင] > c;"
"ұ > y; [χҳӽӿ] > x;"
#if defined(OS_WIN)
"ӏ > i;"
#else
"ӏ > l;"
#endif
"ԃ > d; [ԍဌ] > g; [ടร] > s; ၂ > j"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status))
<< "Spoofchecker initalization failed due to an error: "
<< u_errorName(status);
}
| 172,733 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: struct sock *tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req,
struct dst_entry *dst)
{
struct inet_request_sock *ireq;
struct inet_sock *newinet;
struct tcp_sock *newtp;
struct sock *newsk;
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
struct tcp_md5sig_key *key;
#endif
if (sk_acceptq_is_full(sk))
goto exit_overflow;
if (!dst && (dst = inet_csk_route_req(sk, req)) == NULL)
goto exit;
newsk = tcp_create_openreq_child(sk, req, skb);
if (!newsk)
goto exit_nonewsk;
newsk->sk_gso_type = SKB_GSO_TCPV4;
sk_setup_caps(newsk, dst);
newtp = tcp_sk(newsk);
newinet = inet_sk(newsk);
ireq = inet_rsk(req);
newinet->inet_daddr = ireq->rmt_addr;
newinet->inet_rcv_saddr = ireq->loc_addr;
newinet->inet_saddr = ireq->loc_addr;
newinet->opt = ireq->opt;
ireq->opt = NULL;
newinet->mc_index = inet_iif(skb);
newinet->mc_ttl = ip_hdr(skb)->ttl;
inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = 0;
if (newinet->opt)
inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = newinet->opt->optlen;
newinet->inet_id = newtp->write_seq ^ jiffies;
tcp_mtup_init(newsk);
tcp_sync_mss(newsk, dst_mtu(dst));
newtp->advmss = dst_metric_advmss(dst);
if (tcp_sk(sk)->rx_opt.user_mss &&
tcp_sk(sk)->rx_opt.user_mss < newtp->advmss)
newtp->advmss = tcp_sk(sk)->rx_opt.user_mss;
tcp_initialize_rcv_mss(newsk);
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
/* Copy over the MD5 key from the original socket */
key = tcp_v4_md5_do_lookup(sk, newinet->inet_daddr);
if (key != NULL) {
/*
* We're using one, so create a matching key
* on the newsk structure. If we fail to get
* memory, then we end up not copying the key
* across. Shucks.
*/
char *newkey = kmemdup(key->key, key->keylen, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (newkey != NULL)
tcp_v4_md5_do_add(newsk, newinet->inet_daddr,
newkey, key->keylen);
sk_nocaps_add(newsk, NETIF_F_GSO_MASK);
}
#endif
if (__inet_inherit_port(sk, newsk) < 0) {
sock_put(newsk);
goto exit;
}
__inet_hash_nolisten(newsk, NULL);
return newsk;
exit_overflow:
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_LISTENOVERFLOWS);
exit_nonewsk:
dst_release(dst);
exit:
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_LISTENDROPS);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | struct sock *tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req,
struct dst_entry *dst)
{
struct inet_request_sock *ireq;
struct inet_sock *newinet;
struct tcp_sock *newtp;
struct sock *newsk;
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
struct tcp_md5sig_key *key;
#endif
struct ip_options_rcu *inet_opt;
if (sk_acceptq_is_full(sk))
goto exit_overflow;
if (!dst && (dst = inet_csk_route_req(sk, req)) == NULL)
goto exit;
newsk = tcp_create_openreq_child(sk, req, skb);
if (!newsk)
goto exit_nonewsk;
newsk->sk_gso_type = SKB_GSO_TCPV4;
sk_setup_caps(newsk, dst);
newtp = tcp_sk(newsk);
newinet = inet_sk(newsk);
ireq = inet_rsk(req);
newinet->inet_daddr = ireq->rmt_addr;
newinet->inet_rcv_saddr = ireq->loc_addr;
newinet->inet_saddr = ireq->loc_addr;
inet_opt = ireq->opt;
rcu_assign_pointer(newinet->inet_opt, inet_opt);
ireq->opt = NULL;
newinet->mc_index = inet_iif(skb);
newinet->mc_ttl = ip_hdr(skb)->ttl;
inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = 0;
if (inet_opt)
inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = inet_opt->opt.optlen;
newinet->inet_id = newtp->write_seq ^ jiffies;
tcp_mtup_init(newsk);
tcp_sync_mss(newsk, dst_mtu(dst));
newtp->advmss = dst_metric_advmss(dst);
if (tcp_sk(sk)->rx_opt.user_mss &&
tcp_sk(sk)->rx_opt.user_mss < newtp->advmss)
newtp->advmss = tcp_sk(sk)->rx_opt.user_mss;
tcp_initialize_rcv_mss(newsk);
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
/* Copy over the MD5 key from the original socket */
key = tcp_v4_md5_do_lookup(sk, newinet->inet_daddr);
if (key != NULL) {
/*
* We're using one, so create a matching key
* on the newsk structure. If we fail to get
* memory, then we end up not copying the key
* across. Shucks.
*/
char *newkey = kmemdup(key->key, key->keylen, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (newkey != NULL)
tcp_v4_md5_do_add(newsk, newinet->inet_daddr,
newkey, key->keylen);
sk_nocaps_add(newsk, NETIF_F_GSO_MASK);
}
#endif
if (__inet_inherit_port(sk, newsk) < 0) {
sock_put(newsk);
goto exit;
}
__inet_hash_nolisten(newsk, NULL);
return newsk;
exit_overflow:
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_LISTENOVERFLOWS);
exit_nonewsk:
dst_release(dst);
exit:
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_LISTENDROPS);
return NULL;
}
| 165,572 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: pdf_load_xobject(fz_context *ctx, pdf_document *doc, pdf_obj *dict)
{
pdf_xobject *form;
if ((form = pdf_find_item(ctx, pdf_drop_xobject_imp, dict)) != NULL)
return form;
form->iteration = 0;
/* Store item immediately, to avoid possible recursion if objects refer back to this one */
pdf_store_item(ctx, dict, form, pdf_xobject_size(form));
form->obj = pdf_keep_obj(ctx, dict);
return form;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | pdf_load_xobject(fz_context *ctx, pdf_document *doc, pdf_obj *dict)
{
pdf_xobject *form;
if (!pdf_is_stream(ctx, dict))
fz_throw(ctx, FZ_ERROR_SYNTAX, "XObject must be a stream");
if ((form = pdf_find_item(ctx, pdf_drop_xobject_imp, dict)) != NULL)
return form;
form->iteration = 0;
/* Store item immediately, to avoid possible recursion if objects refer back to this one */
pdf_store_item(ctx, dict, form, pdf_xobject_size(form));
form->obj = pdf_keep_obj(ctx, dict);
return form;
}
| 164,582 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void xhci_kick_ep(XHCIState *xhci, unsigned int slotid,
unsigned int epid, unsigned int streamid)
{
XHCIEPContext *epctx;
assert(slotid >= 1 && slotid <= xhci->numslots);
assert(epid >= 1 && epid <= 31);
if (!xhci->slots[slotid-1].enabled) {
DPRINTF("xhci: xhci_kick_ep for disabled slot %d\n", slotid);
return;
}
epctx = xhci->slots[slotid-1].eps[epid-1];
if (!epctx) {
DPRINTF("xhci: xhci_kick_ep for disabled endpoint %d,%d\n",
epid, slotid);
return;
return;
}
xhci_kick_epctx(epctx, streamid);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | static void xhci_kick_ep(XHCIState *xhci, unsigned int slotid,
unsigned int epid, unsigned int streamid)
{
XHCIEPContext *epctx;
assert(slotid >= 1 && slotid <= xhci->numslots);
assert(epid >= 1 && epid <= 31);
if (!xhci->slots[slotid-1].enabled) {
DPRINTF("xhci: xhci_kick_ep for disabled slot %d\n", slotid);
return;
}
epctx = xhci->slots[slotid-1].eps[epid-1];
if (!epctx) {
DPRINTF("xhci: xhci_kick_ep for disabled endpoint %d,%d\n",
epid, slotid);
return;
return;
}
if (epctx->kick_active) {
return;
}
xhci_kick_epctx(epctx, streamid);
}
| 164,795 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int udpv6_recvmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len,
int noblock, int flags, int *addr_len)
{
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct sk_buff *skb;
unsigned int ulen, copied;
int peeked, off = 0;
int err;
int is_udplite = IS_UDPLITE(sk);
int is_udp4;
bool slow;
if (flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE)
return ipv6_recv_error(sk, msg, len, addr_len);
if (np->rxpmtu && np->rxopt.bits.rxpmtu)
return ipv6_recv_rxpmtu(sk, msg, len, addr_len);
try_again:
skb = __skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags | (noblock ? MSG_DONTWAIT : 0),
&peeked, &off, &err);
if (!skb)
goto out;
ulen = skb->len - sizeof(struct udphdr);
copied = len;
if (copied > ulen)
copied = ulen;
else if (copied < ulen)
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
is_udp4 = (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP));
/*
* If checksum is needed at all, try to do it while copying the
* data. If the data is truncated, or if we only want a partial
* coverage checksum (UDP-Lite), do it before the copy.
*/
if (copied < ulen || UDP_SKB_CB(skb)->partial_cov) {
if (udp_lib_checksum_complete(skb))
goto csum_copy_err;
}
if (skb_csum_unnecessary(skb))
err = skb_copy_datagram_msg(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr),
msg, copied);
else {
err = skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_msg(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr), msg);
if (err == -EINVAL)
goto csum_copy_err;
}
if (unlikely(err)) {
trace_kfree_skb(skb, udpv6_recvmsg);
if (!peeked) {
atomic_inc(&sk->sk_drops);
if (is_udp4)
UDP_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_INERRORS,
is_udplite);
else
UDP6_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_INERRORS,
is_udplite);
}
goto out_free;
}
if (!peeked) {
if (is_udp4)
UDP_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_INDATAGRAMS, is_udplite);
else
UDP6_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_INDATAGRAMS, is_udplite);
}
sock_recv_ts_and_drops(msg, sk, skb);
/* Copy the address. */
if (msg->msg_name) {
DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_in6 *, sin6, msg->msg_name);
sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6;
sin6->sin6_port = udp_hdr(skb)->source;
sin6->sin6_flowinfo = 0;
if (is_udp4) {
ipv6_addr_set_v4mapped(ip_hdr(skb)->saddr,
&sin6->sin6_addr);
sin6->sin6_scope_id = 0;
} else {
sin6->sin6_addr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr;
sin6->sin6_scope_id =
ipv6_iface_scope_id(&sin6->sin6_addr,
inet6_iif(skb));
}
*addr_len = sizeof(*sin6);
}
if (np->rxopt.all)
ip6_datagram_recv_common_ctl(sk, msg, skb);
if (is_udp4) {
if (inet->cmsg_flags)
ip_cmsg_recv(msg, skb);
} else {
if (np->rxopt.all)
ip6_datagram_recv_specific_ctl(sk, msg, skb);
}
err = copied;
if (flags & MSG_TRUNC)
err = ulen;
out_free:
skb_free_datagram_locked(sk, skb);
out:
return err;
csum_copy_err:
slow = lock_sock_fast(sk);
if (!skb_kill_datagram(sk, skb, flags)) {
if (is_udp4) {
UDP_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_CSUMERRORS, is_udplite);
UDP_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_INERRORS, is_udplite);
} else {
UDP6_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_CSUMERRORS, is_udplite);
UDP6_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_INERRORS, is_udplite);
}
}
unlock_sock_fast(sk, slow);
/* starting over for a new packet, but check if we need to yield */
cond_resched();
msg->msg_flags &= ~MSG_TRUNC;
goto try_again;
}
Commit Message: udp: properly support MSG_PEEK with truncated buffers
Backport of this upstream commit into stable kernels :
89c22d8c3b27 ("net: Fix skb csum races when peeking")
exposed a bug in udp stack vs MSG_PEEK support, when user provides
a buffer smaller than skb payload.
In this case,
skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_iovec(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr),
msg->msg_iov);
returns -EFAULT.
This bug does not happen in upstream kernels since Al Viro did a great
job to replace this into :
skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_msg(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr), msg);
This variant is safe vs short buffers.
For the time being, instead reverting Herbert Xu patch and add back
skb->ip_summed invalid changes, simply store the result of
udp_lib_checksum_complete() so that we avoid computing the checksum a
second time, and avoid the problematic
skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_iovec() call.
This patch can be applied on recent kernels as it avoids a double
checksumming, then backported to stable kernels as a bug fix.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-358 | int udpv6_recvmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len,
int noblock, int flags, int *addr_len)
{
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct sk_buff *skb;
unsigned int ulen, copied;
int peeked, off = 0;
int err;
int is_udplite = IS_UDPLITE(sk);
bool checksum_valid = false;
int is_udp4;
bool slow;
if (flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE)
return ipv6_recv_error(sk, msg, len, addr_len);
if (np->rxpmtu && np->rxopt.bits.rxpmtu)
return ipv6_recv_rxpmtu(sk, msg, len, addr_len);
try_again:
skb = __skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags | (noblock ? MSG_DONTWAIT : 0),
&peeked, &off, &err);
if (!skb)
goto out;
ulen = skb->len - sizeof(struct udphdr);
copied = len;
if (copied > ulen)
copied = ulen;
else if (copied < ulen)
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
is_udp4 = (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP));
/*
* If checksum is needed at all, try to do it while copying the
* data. If the data is truncated, or if we only want a partial
* coverage checksum (UDP-Lite), do it before the copy.
*/
if (copied < ulen || UDP_SKB_CB(skb)->partial_cov) {
checksum_valid = !udp_lib_checksum_complete(skb);
if (!checksum_valid)
goto csum_copy_err;
}
if (checksum_valid || skb_csum_unnecessary(skb))
err = skb_copy_datagram_msg(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr),
msg, copied);
else {
err = skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_msg(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr), msg);
if (err == -EINVAL)
goto csum_copy_err;
}
if (unlikely(err)) {
trace_kfree_skb(skb, udpv6_recvmsg);
if (!peeked) {
atomic_inc(&sk->sk_drops);
if (is_udp4)
UDP_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_INERRORS,
is_udplite);
else
UDP6_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_INERRORS,
is_udplite);
}
goto out_free;
}
if (!peeked) {
if (is_udp4)
UDP_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_INDATAGRAMS, is_udplite);
else
UDP6_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_INDATAGRAMS, is_udplite);
}
sock_recv_ts_and_drops(msg, sk, skb);
/* Copy the address. */
if (msg->msg_name) {
DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_in6 *, sin6, msg->msg_name);
sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6;
sin6->sin6_port = udp_hdr(skb)->source;
sin6->sin6_flowinfo = 0;
if (is_udp4) {
ipv6_addr_set_v4mapped(ip_hdr(skb)->saddr,
&sin6->sin6_addr);
sin6->sin6_scope_id = 0;
} else {
sin6->sin6_addr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr;
sin6->sin6_scope_id =
ipv6_iface_scope_id(&sin6->sin6_addr,
inet6_iif(skb));
}
*addr_len = sizeof(*sin6);
}
if (np->rxopt.all)
ip6_datagram_recv_common_ctl(sk, msg, skb);
if (is_udp4) {
if (inet->cmsg_flags)
ip_cmsg_recv(msg, skb);
} else {
if (np->rxopt.all)
ip6_datagram_recv_specific_ctl(sk, msg, skb);
}
err = copied;
if (flags & MSG_TRUNC)
err = ulen;
out_free:
skb_free_datagram_locked(sk, skb);
out:
return err;
csum_copy_err:
slow = lock_sock_fast(sk);
if (!skb_kill_datagram(sk, skb, flags)) {
if (is_udp4) {
UDP_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_CSUMERRORS, is_udplite);
UDP_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_INERRORS, is_udplite);
} else {
UDP6_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_CSUMERRORS, is_udplite);
UDP6_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_INERRORS, is_udplite);
}
}
unlock_sock_fast(sk, slow);
/* starting over for a new packet, but check if we need to yield */
cond_resched();
msg->msg_flags &= ~MSG_TRUNC;
goto try_again;
}
| 168,480 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void CloudPrintInfoCallback(bool enabled,
const std::string& email,
const std::string& proxy_id) {
QuitMessageLoop();
}
Commit Message: Migrate ServiceProcessControl tests off of QuitCurrent*Deprecated().
Bug: 844016
Change-Id: I9403b850456c8ee06cd2539f7cec9599302e81a0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1126576
Commit-Queue: Wez <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573131}
CWE ID: CWE-94 | static void CloudPrintInfoCallback(bool enabled,
void LaunchServiceProcessControlAndWait() {
base::RunLoop run_loop;
LaunchServiceProcessControl(run_loop.QuitClosure());
run_loop.Run();
}
| 172,048 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void WtsConsoleSessionProcessDriver::OnChannelConnected() {
DCHECK(caller_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void WtsConsoleSessionProcessDriver::OnChannelConnected() {
void WtsConsoleSessionProcessDriver::OnChannelConnected(int32 peer_pid) {
DCHECK(caller_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
}
| 171,554 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: transform_display_init(transform_display *dp, png_modifier *pm, png_uint_32 id,
PNG_CONST image_transform *transform_list)
{
memset(dp, 0, sizeof *dp);
/* Standard fields */
standard_display_init(&dp->this, &pm->this, id, 0/*do_interlace*/,
pm->use_update_info);
/* Parameter fields */
dp->pm = pm;
dp->transform_list = transform_list;
/* Local variable fields */
dp->output_colour_type = 255; /* invalid */
dp->output_bit_depth = 255; /* invalid */
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | transform_display_init(transform_display *dp, png_modifier *pm, png_uint_32 id,
const image_transform *transform_list)
{
memset(dp, 0, sizeof *dp);
/* Standard fields */
standard_display_init(&dp->this, &pm->this, id, do_read_interlace,
pm->use_update_info);
/* Parameter fields */
dp->pm = pm;
dp->transform_list = transform_list;
dp->max_gamma_8 = 16;
/* Local variable fields */
dp->output_colour_type = 255; /* invalid */
dp->output_bit_depth = 255; /* invalid */
dp->unpacked = 0; /* not unpacked */
}
| 173,712 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
struct audit_buffer **ab)
{
int i, len;
size_t len_sent = 0;
const char __user *p;
char *buf;
p = (const char __user *)current->mm->arg_start;
audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d", context->execve.argc);
/*
* we need some kernel buffer to hold the userspace args. Just
* allocate one big one rather than allocating one of the right size
* for every single argument inside audit_log_single_execve_arg()
* should be <8k allocation so should be pretty safe.
*/
buf = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf) {
audit_panic("out of memory for argv string");
return;
}
for (i = 0; i < context->execve.argc; i++) {
len = audit_log_single_execve_arg(context, ab, i,
&len_sent, p, buf);
if (len <= 0)
break;
p += len;
}
kfree(buf);
}
Commit Message: audit: fix a double fetch in audit_log_single_execve_arg()
There is a double fetch problem in audit_log_single_execve_arg()
where we first check the execve(2) argumnets for any "bad" characters
which would require hex encoding and then re-fetch the arguments for
logging in the audit record[1]. Of course this leaves a window of
opportunity for an unsavory application to munge with the data.
This patch reworks things by only fetching the argument data once[2]
into a buffer where it is scanned and logged into the audit
records(s). In addition to fixing the double fetch, this patch
improves on the original code in a few other ways: better handling
of large arguments which require encoding, stricter record length
checking, and some performance improvements (completely unverified,
but we got rid of some strlen() calls, that's got to be a good
thing).
As part of the development of this patch, I've also created a basic
regression test for the audit-testsuite, the test can be tracked on
GitHub at the following link:
* https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/25
[1] If you pay careful attention, there is actually a triple fetch
problem due to a strnlen_user() call at the top of the function.
[2] This is a tiny white lie, we do make a call to strnlen_user()
prior to fetching the argument data. I don't like it, but due to the
way the audit record is structured we really have no choice unless we
copy the entire argument at once (which would require a rather
wasteful allocation). The good news is that with this patch the
kernel no longer relies on this strnlen_user() value for anything
beyond recording it in the log, we also update it with a trustworthy
value whenever possible.
Reported-by: Pengfei Wang <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
/* write as much as we can to the audit log */
if (len_buf > 0) {
/* NOTE: some magic numbers here - basically if we
* can't fit a reasonable amount of data into the
* existing audit buffer, flush it and start with
* a new buffer */
if ((sizeof(abuf) + 8) > len_rem) {
len_rem = len_max;
audit_log_end(*ab);
*ab = audit_log_start(context,
GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE);
if (!*ab)
goto out;
}
/* create the non-arg portion of the arg record */
len_tmp = 0;
if (require_data || (iter > 0) ||
((len_abuf + sizeof(abuf)) > len_rem)) {
if (iter == 0) {
len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp],
sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp,
" a%d_len=%lu",
arg, len_full);
}
len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp],
sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp,
" a%d[%d]=", arg, iter++);
} else
len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp],
sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp,
" a%d=", arg);
WARN_ON(len_tmp >= sizeof(abuf));
abuf[sizeof(abuf) - 1] = '\0';
/* log the arg in the audit record */
audit_log_format(*ab, "%s", abuf);
len_rem -= len_tmp;
len_tmp = len_buf;
if (encode) {
if (len_abuf > len_rem)
len_tmp = len_rem / 2; /* encoding */
audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, len_tmp);
len_rem -= len_tmp * 2;
len_abuf -= len_tmp * 2;
} else {
if (len_abuf > len_rem)
len_tmp = len_rem - 2; /* quotes */
audit_log_n_string(*ab, buf, len_tmp);
len_rem -= len_tmp + 2;
/* don't subtract the "2" because we still need
* to add quotes to the remaining string */
len_abuf -= len_tmp;
}
len_buf -= len_tmp;
buf += len_tmp;
}
/* ready to move to the next argument? */
if ((len_buf == 0) && !require_data) {
arg++;
iter = 0;
len_full = 0;
require_data = true;
encode = false;
}
} while (arg < context->execve.argc);
/* NOTE: the caller handles the final audit_log_end() call */
out:
kfree(buf_head);
}
| 167,018 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long Cluster::CreateBlockGroup(long long start_offset, long long size,
long long discard_padding) {
assert(m_entries);
assert(m_entries_size > 0);
assert(m_entries_count >= 0);
assert(m_entries_count < m_entries_size);
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
long long pos = start_offset;
const long long stop = start_offset + size;
long long prev = 1; // nonce
long long next = 0; // nonce
long long duration = -1; // really, this is unsigned
long long bpos = -1;
long long bsize = -1;
while (pos < stop) {
long len;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(id >= 0); // TODO
assert((pos + len) <= stop);
pos += len; // consume ID
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(size >= 0); // TODO
assert((pos + len) <= stop);
pos += len; // consume size
if (id == 0x21) { // Block ID
if (bpos < 0) { // Block ID
bpos = pos;
bsize = size;
}
} else if (id == 0x1B) { // Duration ID
assert(size <= 8);
duration = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
assert(duration >= 0); // TODO
} else if (id == 0x7B) { // ReferenceBlock
assert(size <= 8);
const long size_ = static_cast<long>(size);
long long time;
long status = UnserializeInt(pReader, pos, size_, time);
assert(status == 0);
if (status != 0)
return -1;
if (time <= 0) // see note above
prev = time;
else // weird
next = time;
}
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
assert(bpos >= 0);
assert(bsize >= 0);
const long idx = m_entries_count;
BlockEntry** const ppEntry = m_entries + idx;
BlockEntry*& pEntry = *ppEntry;
pEntry = new (std::nothrow)
BlockGroup(this, idx, bpos, bsize, prev, next, duration, discard_padding);
if (pEntry == NULL)
return -1; // generic error
BlockGroup* const p = static_cast<BlockGroup*>(pEntry);
const long status = p->Parse();
if (status == 0) { // success
++m_entries_count;
return 0;
}
delete pEntry;
pEntry = 0;
return status;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | long Cluster::CreateBlockGroup(long long start_offset, long long size,
long long discard_padding) {
assert(m_entries);
assert(m_entries_size > 0);
assert(m_entries_count >= 0);
assert(m_entries_count < m_entries_size);
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
long long pos = start_offset;
const long long stop = start_offset + size;
long long prev = 1; // nonce
long long next = 0; // nonce
long long duration = -1; // really, this is unsigned
long long bpos = -1;
long long bsize = -1;
while (pos < stop) {
long len;
const long long id = ReadID(pReader, pos, len);
if (id < 0 || (pos + len) > stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; // consume ID
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(size >= 0); // TODO
assert((pos + len) <= stop);
pos += len; // consume size
if (id == 0x21) { // Block ID
if (bpos < 0) { // Block ID
bpos = pos;
bsize = size;
}
} else if (id == 0x1B) { // Duration ID
if (size > 8)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
duration = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (duration < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
} else if (id == 0x7B) { // ReferenceBlock
if (size > 8 || size <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
const long size_ = static_cast<long>(size);
long long time;
long status = UnserializeInt(pReader, pos, size_, time);
assert(status == 0);
if (status != 0)
return -1;
if (time <= 0) // see note above
prev = time;
else // weird
next = time;
}
pos += size; // consume payload
if (pos > stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
if (bpos < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (pos != stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
assert(bsize >= 0);
const long idx = m_entries_count;
BlockEntry** const ppEntry = m_entries + idx;
BlockEntry*& pEntry = *ppEntry;
pEntry = new (std::nothrow)
BlockGroup(this, idx, bpos, bsize, prev, next, duration, discard_padding);
if (pEntry == NULL)
return -1; // generic error
BlockGroup* const p = static_cast<BlockGroup*>(pEntry);
const long status = p->Parse();
if (status == 0) { // success
++m_entries_count;
return 0;
}
delete pEntry;
pEntry = 0;
return status;
}
| 173,806 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: status_t ProCamera2Client::dump(int fd, const Vector<String16>& args) {
String8 result;
result.appendFormat("ProCamera2Client[%d] (%p) PID: %d, dump:\n",
mCameraId,
getRemoteCallback()->asBinder().get(),
mClientPid);
result.append(" State: ");
mFrameProcessor->dump(fd, args);
return dumpDevice(fd, args);
}
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
CWE ID: CWE-264 | status_t ProCamera2Client::dump(int fd, const Vector<String16>& args) {
return BasicClient::dump(fd, args);
}
status_t ProCamera2Client::dumpClient(int fd, const Vector<String16>& args) {
String8 result;
result.appendFormat("ProCamera2Client[%d] (%p) PID: %d, dump:\n",
mCameraId,
getRemoteCallback()->asBinder().get(),
mClientPid);
result.append(" State: ");
mFrameProcessor->dump(fd, args);
return dumpDevice(fd, args);
}
| 173,940 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void smp_proc_id_info(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
uint8_t* p = p_data->p_data;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
STREAM_TO_ARRAY(p_cb->tk, p, BT_OCTET16_LEN); /* reuse TK for IRK */
smp_key_distribution_by_transport(p_cb, NULL);
}
Commit Message: Checks the SMP length to fix OOB read
Bug: 111937065
Test: manual
Change-Id: I330880a6e1671d0117845430db4076dfe1aba688
Merged-In: I330880a6e1671d0117845430db4076dfe1aba688
(cherry picked from commit fceb753bda651c4135f3f93a510e5fcb4c7542b8)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void smp_proc_id_info(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
uint8_t* p = p_data->p_data;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
if (smp_command_has_invalid_parameters(p_cb)) {
tSMP_INT_DATA smp_int_data;
smp_int_data.status = SMP_INVALID_PARAMETERS;
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "111937065");
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &smp_int_data);
return;
}
STREAM_TO_ARRAY(p_cb->tk, p, BT_OCTET16_LEN); /* reuse TK for IRK */
smp_key_distribution_by_transport(p_cb, NULL);
}
| 174,075 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag)
{
if (frag->fragment) OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
if (frag->reassembly) OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly);
OPENSSL_free(frag);
int curr_mtu;
unsigned int len, frag_off, mac_size, blocksize;
/* AHA! Figure out the MTU, and stick to the right size */
if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu() && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU))
{
s->d1->mtu =
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
/* I've seen the kernel return bogus numbers when it doesn't know
* (initial write), so just make sure we have a reasonable number */
if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu())
{
s->d1->mtu = 0;
s->d1->mtu = dtls1_guess_mtu(s->d1->mtu);
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU,
s->d1->mtu, NULL);
}
}
#if 0
mtu = s->d1->mtu;
fprintf(stderr, "using MTU = %d\n", mtu);
mtu -= (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
curr_mtu = mtu - BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s));
if ( curr_mtu > 0)
mtu = curr_mtu;
else if ( ( ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s))) <= 0)
return ret;
if ( BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) + s->init_num >= mtu)
{
ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
if ( ret <= 0)
return ret;
mtu = s->d1->mtu - (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
}
#endif
OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->mtu >= dtls1_min_mtu()); /* should have something reasonable now */
if ( s->init_off == 0 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num ==
(int)s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
if (s->write_hash)
mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
else
mac_size = 0;
if (s->enc_write_ctx &&
(EVP_CIPHER_mode( s->enc_write_ctx->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE))
blocksize = 2 * EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher);
else
blocksize = 0;
frag_off = 0;
while( s->init_num)
{
curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) -
DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - mac_size - blocksize;
if ( curr_mtu <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
{
/* grr.. we could get an error if MTU picked was wrong */
ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
if ( ret <= 0)
return ret;
curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH -
mac_size - blocksize;
}
if ( s->init_num > curr_mtu)
len = curr_mtu;
else
len = s->init_num;
/* XDTLS: this function is too long. split out the CCS part */
if ( type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
{
if ( s->init_off != 0)
{
OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off > DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
s->init_off -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
s->init_num += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
if ( s->init_num > curr_mtu)
len = curr_mtu;
else
len = s->init_num;
}
dtls1_fix_message_header(s, frag_off,
len - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
dtls1_write_message_header(s, (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off]);
OPENSSL_assert(len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
}
ret=dtls1_write_bytes(s,type,&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
len);
if (ret < 0)
{
/* might need to update MTU here, but we don't know
* which previous packet caused the failure -- so can't
* really retransmit anything. continue as if everything
* is fine and wait for an alert to handle the
* retransmit
*/
if ( BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_EXCEEDED, 0, NULL) > 0 )
s->d1->mtu = BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
else
return(-1);
}
else
{
/* bad if this assert fails, only part of the handshake
* message got sent. but why would this happen? */
OPENSSL_assert(len == (unsigned int)ret);
if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && ! s->d1->retransmitting)
{
/* should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case
* we'll ignore the result anyway */
unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off];
const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
int xlen;
if (frag_off == 0 && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
{
/* reconstruct message header is if it
* is being sent in single fragment */
*p++ = msg_hdr->type;
l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len,p);
s2n (msg_hdr->seq,p);
l2n3(0,p);
l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len,p);
p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
xlen = ret;
}
else
{
p += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
xlen = ret - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
}
ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, xlen);
}
if (ret == s->init_num)
{
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
(size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s,
s->msg_callback_arg);
s->init_off = 0; /* done writing this message */
s->init_num = 0;
return(1);
}
s->init_off+=ret;
s->init_num-=ret;
frag_off += (ret -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
}
}
return(0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310 | dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag)
{
if (frag->msg_header.is_ccs)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx);
EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash);
}
if (frag->fragment) OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
if (frag->reassembly) OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly);
OPENSSL_free(frag);
int curr_mtu;
unsigned int len, frag_off, mac_size, blocksize;
/* AHA! Figure out the MTU, and stick to the right size */
if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu() && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU))
{
s->d1->mtu =
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
/* I've seen the kernel return bogus numbers when it doesn't know
* (initial write), so just make sure we have a reasonable number */
if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu())
{
s->d1->mtu = 0;
s->d1->mtu = dtls1_guess_mtu(s->d1->mtu);
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU,
s->d1->mtu, NULL);
}
}
#if 0
mtu = s->d1->mtu;
fprintf(stderr, "using MTU = %d\n", mtu);
mtu -= (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
curr_mtu = mtu - BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s));
if ( curr_mtu > 0)
mtu = curr_mtu;
else if ( ( ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s))) <= 0)
return ret;
if ( BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) + s->init_num >= mtu)
{
ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
if ( ret <= 0)
return ret;
mtu = s->d1->mtu - (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
}
#endif
OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->mtu >= dtls1_min_mtu()); /* should have something reasonable now */
if ( s->init_off == 0 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num ==
(int)s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
if (s->write_hash)
mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
else
mac_size = 0;
if (s->enc_write_ctx &&
(EVP_CIPHER_mode( s->enc_write_ctx->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE))
blocksize = 2 * EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher);
else
blocksize = 0;
frag_off = 0;
while( s->init_num)
{
curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) -
DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - mac_size - blocksize;
if ( curr_mtu <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
{
/* grr.. we could get an error if MTU picked was wrong */
ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
if ( ret <= 0)
return ret;
curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH -
mac_size - blocksize;
}
if ( s->init_num > curr_mtu)
len = curr_mtu;
else
len = s->init_num;
/* XDTLS: this function is too long. split out the CCS part */
if ( type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
{
if ( s->init_off != 0)
{
OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off > DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
s->init_off -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
s->init_num += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
if ( s->init_num > curr_mtu)
len = curr_mtu;
else
len = s->init_num;
}
dtls1_fix_message_header(s, frag_off,
len - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
dtls1_write_message_header(s, (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off]);
OPENSSL_assert(len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
}
ret=dtls1_write_bytes(s,type,&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
len);
if (ret < 0)
{
/* might need to update MTU here, but we don't know
* which previous packet caused the failure -- so can't
* really retransmit anything. continue as if everything
* is fine and wait for an alert to handle the
* retransmit
*/
if ( BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_EXCEEDED, 0, NULL) > 0 )
s->d1->mtu = BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
else
return(-1);
}
else
{
/* bad if this assert fails, only part of the handshake
* message got sent. but why would this happen? */
OPENSSL_assert(len == (unsigned int)ret);
if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && ! s->d1->retransmitting)
{
/* should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case
* we'll ignore the result anyway */
unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off];
const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
int xlen;
if (frag_off == 0 && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
{
/* reconstruct message header is if it
* is being sent in single fragment */
*p++ = msg_hdr->type;
l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len,p);
s2n (msg_hdr->seq,p);
l2n3(0,p);
l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len,p);
p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
xlen = ret;
}
else
{
p += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
xlen = ret - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
}
ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, xlen);
}
if (ret == s->init_num)
{
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
(size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s,
s->msg_callback_arg);
s->init_off = 0; /* done writing this message */
s->init_num = 0;
return(1);
}
s->init_off+=ret;
s->init_num-=ret;
frag_off += (ret -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
}
}
return(0);
}
| 165,334 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int CMS_verify(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
X509_STORE *store, BIO *dcont, BIO *out, unsigned int flags)
{
CMS_SignerInfo *si;
STACK_OF(CMS_SignerInfo) *sinfos;
STACK_OF(X509) *cms_certs = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls = NULL;
X509 *signer;
int i, scount = 0, ret = 0;
BIO *cmsbio = NULL, *tmpin = NULL;
if (!dcont && !check_content(cms))
return 0;
/* Attempt to find all signer certificates */
sinfos = CMS_get0_SignerInfos(cms);
if (sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos) <= 0)
{
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_VERIFY, CMS_R_NO_SIGNERS);
goto err;
}
for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos); i++)
{
si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(sinfos, i);
CMS_SignerInfo_get0_algs(si, NULL, &signer, NULL, NULL);
if (signer)
scount++;
}
if (scount != sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos))
scount += CMS_set1_signers_certs(cms, certs, flags);
if (scount != sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos))
{
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_VERIFY, CMS_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND);
goto err;
}
/* Attempt to verify all signers certs */
if (!(flags & CMS_NO_SIGNER_CERT_VERIFY))
{
cms_certs = CMS_get1_certs(cms);
if (!(flags & CMS_NOCRL))
crls = CMS_get1_crls(cms);
for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos); i++)
{
si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(sinfos, i);
if (!cms_signerinfo_verify_cert(si, store,
cms_certs, crls, flags))
goto err;
}
}
/* Attempt to verify all SignerInfo signed attribute signatures */
if (!(flags & CMS_NO_ATTR_VERIFY))
{
for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos); i++)
{
si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(sinfos, i);
if (CMS_signed_get_attr_count(si) < 0)
continue;
if (CMS_SignerInfo_verify(si) <= 0)
goto err;
}
}
/* Performance optimization: if the content is a memory BIO then
* store its contents in a temporary read only memory BIO. This
* avoids potentially large numbers of slow copies of data which will
* occur when reading from a read write memory BIO when signatures
* are calculated.
*/
if (dcont && (BIO_method_type(dcont) == BIO_TYPE_MEM))
{
char *ptr;
long len;
len = BIO_get_mem_data(dcont, &ptr);
tmpin = BIO_new_mem_buf(ptr, len);
if (tmpin == NULL)
{
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_VERIFY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
}
else
tmpin = dcont;
cmsbio=CMS_dataInit(cms, tmpin);
if (!cmsbio)
goto err;
if (!cms_copy_content(out, cmsbio, flags))
goto err;
if (!(flags & CMS_NO_CONTENT_VERIFY))
{
for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos); i++)
{
si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(sinfos, i);
if (CMS_SignerInfo_verify_content(si, cmsbio) <= 0)
{
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_VERIFY,
CMS_R_CONTENT_VERIFY_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
}
ret = 1;
err:
if (dcont && (tmpin == dcont))
do_free_upto(cmsbio, dcont);
else
BIO_free_all(cmsbio);
if (cms_certs)
sk_X509_pop_free(cms_certs, X509_free);
if (crls)
sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(crls, X509_CRL_free);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Canonicalise input in CMS_verify.
If content is detached and not binary mode translate the input to
CRLF format. Before this change the input was verified verbatim
which lead to a discrepancy between sign and verify.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | int CMS_verify(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
X509_STORE *store, BIO *dcont, BIO *out, unsigned int flags)
{
CMS_SignerInfo *si;
STACK_OF(CMS_SignerInfo) *sinfos;
STACK_OF(X509) *cms_certs = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls = NULL;
X509 *signer;
int i, scount = 0, ret = 0;
BIO *cmsbio = NULL, *tmpin = NULL, *tmpout = NULL;
if (!dcont && !check_content(cms))
return 0;
/* Attempt to find all signer certificates */
sinfos = CMS_get0_SignerInfos(cms);
if (sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos) <= 0)
{
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_VERIFY, CMS_R_NO_SIGNERS);
goto err;
}
for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos); i++)
{
si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(sinfos, i);
CMS_SignerInfo_get0_algs(si, NULL, &signer, NULL, NULL);
if (signer)
scount++;
}
if (scount != sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos))
scount += CMS_set1_signers_certs(cms, certs, flags);
if (scount != sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos))
{
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_VERIFY, CMS_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND);
goto err;
}
/* Attempt to verify all signers certs */
if (!(flags & CMS_NO_SIGNER_CERT_VERIFY))
{
cms_certs = CMS_get1_certs(cms);
if (!(flags & CMS_NOCRL))
crls = CMS_get1_crls(cms);
for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos); i++)
{
si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(sinfos, i);
if (!cms_signerinfo_verify_cert(si, store,
cms_certs, crls, flags))
goto err;
}
}
/* Attempt to verify all SignerInfo signed attribute signatures */
if (!(flags & CMS_NO_ATTR_VERIFY))
{
for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos); i++)
{
si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(sinfos, i);
if (CMS_signed_get_attr_count(si) < 0)
continue;
if (CMS_SignerInfo_verify(si) <= 0)
goto err;
}
}
/* Performance optimization: if the content is a memory BIO then
* store its contents in a temporary read only memory BIO. This
* avoids potentially large numbers of slow copies of data which will
* occur when reading from a read write memory BIO when signatures
* are calculated.
*/
if (dcont && (BIO_method_type(dcont) == BIO_TYPE_MEM))
{
char *ptr;
long len;
len = BIO_get_mem_data(dcont, &ptr);
tmpin = BIO_new_mem_buf(ptr, len);
if (tmpin == NULL)
{
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_VERIFY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
}
else
tmpin = dcont;
/* If not binary mode and detached generate digests by *writing*
* through the BIO. That makes it possible to canonicalise the
* input.
*/
if (!(flags & SMIME_BINARY) && dcont)
{
/* Create output BIO so we can either handle text or to
* ensure included content doesn't override detached content.
*/
tmpout = cms_get_text_bio(out, flags);
if(!tmpout)
{
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_VERIFY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
cmsbio = CMS_dataInit(cms, tmpout);
if (!cmsbio)
goto err;
/* Don't use SMIME_TEXT for verify: it adds headers and
* we want to remove them.
*/
SMIME_crlf_copy(dcont, cmsbio, flags & ~SMIME_TEXT);
if(flags & CMS_TEXT)
{
if (!SMIME_text(tmpout, out))
{
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_VERIFY,CMS_R_SMIME_TEXT_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
}
else
{
cmsbio=CMS_dataInit(cms, tmpin);
if (!cmsbio)
goto err;
if (!cms_copy_content(out, cmsbio, flags))
goto err;
}
if (!(flags & CMS_NO_CONTENT_VERIFY))
{
for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos); i++)
{
si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(sinfos, i);
if (CMS_SignerInfo_verify_content(si, cmsbio) <= 0)
{
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_VERIFY,
CMS_R_CONTENT_VERIFY_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
}
ret = 1;
err:
if (!(flags & SMIME_BINARY) && dcont)
{
do_free_upto(cmsbio, tmpout);
if (tmpin != dcont)
BIO_free(tmpin);
}
else
{
if (dcont && (tmpin == dcont))
do_free_upto(cmsbio, dcont);
else
BIO_free_all(cmsbio);
}
if (tmpout && out != tmpout)
BIO_free_all(tmpout);
if (cms_certs)
sk_X509_pop_free(cms_certs, X509_free);
if (crls)
sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(crls, X509_CRL_free);
return ret;
}
| 166,688 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: my_object_unstringify (MyObject *obj, const char *str, GValue *value, GError **error)
{
if (str[0] == '\0' || !g_ascii_isdigit (str[0])) {
g_value_init (value, G_TYPE_STRING);
g_value_set_string (value, str);
} else {
g_value_init (value, G_TYPE_INT);
g_value_set_int (value, (int) g_ascii_strtoull (str, NULL, 10));
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | my_object_unstringify (MyObject *obj, const char *str, GValue *value, GError **error)
| 165,125 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static char* allocFromUTF32(const char32_t* in, size_t len)
{
if (len == 0) {
return getEmptyString();
}
const ssize_t bytes = utf32_to_utf8_length(in, len);
if (bytes < 0) {
return getEmptyString();
}
SharedBuffer* buf = SharedBuffer::alloc(bytes+1);
ALOG_ASSERT(buf, "Unable to allocate shared buffer");
if (!buf) {
return getEmptyString();
}
char* str = (char*) buf->data();
utf32_to_utf8(in, len, str);
return str;
}
Commit Message: libutils/Unicode.cpp: Correct length computation and add checks for utf16->utf8
Inconsistent behaviour between utf16_to_utf8 and utf16_to_utf8_length
is causing a heap overflow.
Correcting the length computation and adding bound checks to the
conversion functions.
Test: ran libutils_tests
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I6115e3357141ed245c63c6eb25fc0fd0a9a7a2bb
(cherry picked from commit c4966a363e46d2e1074d1a365e232af0dcedd6a1)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static char* allocFromUTF32(const char32_t* in, size_t len)
{
if (len == 0) {
return getEmptyString();
}
const ssize_t resultStrLen = utf32_to_utf8_length(in, len) + 1;
if (resultStrLen < 1) {
return getEmptyString();
}
SharedBuffer* buf = SharedBuffer::alloc(resultStrLen);
ALOG_ASSERT(buf, "Unable to allocate shared buffer");
if (!buf) {
return getEmptyString();
}
char* resultStr = (char*) buf->data();
utf32_to_utf8(in, len, resultStr, resultStrLen);
return resultStr;
}
| 173,418 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool IsSensitiveURL(const GURL& url,
bool is_request_from_browser_or_webui_renderer) {
bool sensitive_chrome_url = false;
const char kGoogleCom[] = "google.com";
const char kClient[] = "clients";
url::Origin origin = url::Origin::Create(url);
if (origin.DomainIs(kGoogleCom)) {
base::StringPiece host = url.host_piece();
while (host.ends_with("."))
host.remove_suffix(1u);
if (is_request_from_browser_or_webui_renderer) {
base::StringPiece::size_type pos = host.rfind(kClient);
if (pos != base::StringPiece::npos) {
bool match = true;
if (pos > 0 && host[pos - 1] != '.') {
match = false;
} else {
for (base::StringPiece::const_iterator
i = host.begin() + pos + strlen(kClient),
end = host.end() - (strlen(kGoogleCom) + 1);
i != end; ++i) {
if (!isdigit(*i)) {
match = false;
break;
}
}
}
sensitive_chrome_url = sensitive_chrome_url || match;
}
}
sensitive_chrome_url = sensitive_chrome_url ||
(url.DomainIs("chrome.google.com") &&
base::StartsWith(url.path_piece(), "/webstore",
base::CompareCase::SENSITIVE));
}
return sensitive_chrome_url || extension_urls::IsWebstoreUpdateUrl(url) ||
extension_urls::IsBlacklistUpdateUrl(url) ||
extension_urls::IsSafeBrowsingUrl(origin, url.path_piece());
}
Commit Message: Hide DevTools frontend from webRequest API
Prevent extensions from observing requests for remote DevTools frontends
and add regression tests.
And update ExtensionTestApi to support initializing the embedded test
server and port from SetUpCommandLine (before SetUpOnMainThread).
BUG=797497,797500
TEST=browser_test --gtest_filter=DevToolsFrontendInWebRequestApiTest.HiddenRequests
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: Ic8f44b5771f2d5796f8c3de128f0a7ab88a77735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/844316
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528187}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | bool IsSensitiveURL(const GURL& url,
bool is_request_from_browser_or_webui_renderer) {
bool sensitive_chrome_url = false;
const char kGoogleCom[] = "google.com";
const char kClient[] = "clients";
url::Origin origin = url::Origin::Create(url);
if (origin.DomainIs(kGoogleCom)) {
base::StringPiece host = url.host_piece();
while (host.ends_with("."))
host.remove_suffix(1u);
if (is_request_from_browser_or_webui_renderer) {
base::StringPiece::size_type pos = host.rfind(kClient);
if (pos != base::StringPiece::npos) {
bool match = true;
if (pos > 0 && host[pos - 1] != '.') {
match = false;
} else {
for (base::StringPiece::const_iterator
i = host.begin() + pos + strlen(kClient),
end = host.end() - (strlen(kGoogleCom) + 1);
i != end; ++i) {
if (!isdigit(*i)) {
match = false;
break;
}
}
}
sensitive_chrome_url = sensitive_chrome_url || match;
}
}
sensitive_chrome_url = sensitive_chrome_url ||
(url.DomainIs("chrome.google.com") &&
base::StartsWith(url.path_piece(), "/webstore",
base::CompareCase::SENSITIVE));
}
if (is_request_from_browser_or_webui_renderer) {
sensitive_chrome_url =
sensitive_chrome_url ||
extensions::ExtensionsAPIClient::Get()->ShouldHideBrowserNetworkRequest(
url);
}
return sensitive_chrome_url || extension_urls::IsWebstoreUpdateUrl(url) ||
extension_urls::IsBlacklistUpdateUrl(url) ||
extension_urls::IsSafeBrowsingUrl(origin, url.path_piece());
}
| 172,673 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int unix_dgram_sendmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
struct sock_iocb *siocb = kiocb_to_siocb(kiocb);
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(sk);
struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr = msg->msg_name;
struct sock *other = NULL;
int namelen = 0; /* fake GCC */
int err;
unsigned int hash;
struct sk_buff *skb;
long timeo;
struct scm_cookie tmp_scm;
int max_level;
int data_len = 0;
if (NULL == siocb->scm)
siocb->scm = &tmp_scm;
wait_for_unix_gc();
err = scm_send(sock, msg, siocb->scm);
if (err < 0)
return err;
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (msg->msg_flags&MSG_OOB)
goto out;
if (msg->msg_namelen) {
err = unix_mkname(sunaddr, msg->msg_namelen, &hash);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
namelen = err;
} else {
sunaddr = NULL;
err = -ENOTCONN;
other = unix_peer_get(sk);
if (!other)
goto out;
}
if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags) && !u->addr
&& (err = unix_autobind(sock)) != 0)
goto out;
err = -EMSGSIZE;
if (len > sk->sk_sndbuf - 32)
goto out;
if (len > SKB_MAX_ALLOC)
data_len = min_t(size_t,
len - SKB_MAX_ALLOC,
MAX_SKB_FRAGS * PAGE_SIZE);
skb = sock_alloc_send_pskb(sk, len - data_len, data_len,
msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err);
if (skb == NULL)
goto out;
err = unix_scm_to_skb(siocb->scm, skb, true);
if (err < 0)
goto out_free;
max_level = err + 1;
unix_get_secdata(siocb->scm, skb);
skb_put(skb, len - data_len);
skb->data_len = data_len;
skb->len = len;
err = skb_copy_datagram_from_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, 0, len);
if (err)
goto out_free;
timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
restart:
if (!other) {
err = -ECONNRESET;
if (sunaddr == NULL)
goto out_free;
other = unix_find_other(net, sunaddr, namelen, sk->sk_type,
hash, &err);
if (other == NULL)
goto out_free;
}
if (sk_filter(other, skb) < 0) {
/* Toss the packet but do not return any error to the sender */
err = len;
goto out_free;
}
unix_state_lock(other);
err = -EPERM;
if (!unix_may_send(sk, other))
goto out_unlock;
if (sock_flag(other, SOCK_DEAD)) {
/*
* Check with 1003.1g - what should
* datagram error
*/
unix_state_unlock(other);
sock_put(other);
err = 0;
unix_state_lock(sk);
if (unix_peer(sk) == other) {
unix_peer(sk) = NULL;
unix_state_unlock(sk);
unix_dgram_disconnected(sk, other);
sock_put(other);
err = -ECONNREFUSED;
} else {
unix_state_unlock(sk);
}
other = NULL;
if (err)
goto out_free;
goto restart;
}
err = -EPIPE;
if (other->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
goto out_unlock;
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_SEQPACKET) {
err = security_unix_may_send(sk->sk_socket, other->sk_socket);
if (err)
goto out_unlock;
}
if (unix_peer(other) != sk && unix_recvq_full(other)) {
if (!timeo) {
err = -EAGAIN;
goto out_unlock;
}
timeo = unix_wait_for_peer(other, timeo);
err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
if (signal_pending(current))
goto out_free;
goto restart;
}
if (sock_flag(other, SOCK_RCVTSTAMP))
__net_timestamp(skb);
maybe_add_creds(skb, sock, other);
skb_queue_tail(&other->sk_receive_queue, skb);
if (max_level > unix_sk(other)->recursion_level)
unix_sk(other)->recursion_level = max_level;
unix_state_unlock(other);
other->sk_data_ready(other, len);
sock_put(other);
scm_destroy(siocb->scm);
return len;
out_unlock:
unix_state_unlock(other);
out_free:
kfree_skb(skb);
out:
if (other)
sock_put(other);
scm_destroy(siocb->scm);
return err;
}
Commit Message: af_netlink: force credentials passing [CVE-2012-3520]
Pablo Neira Ayuso discovered that avahi and
potentially NetworkManager accept spoofed Netlink messages because of a
kernel bug. The kernel passes all-zero SCM_CREDENTIALS ancillary data
to the receiver if the sender did not provide such data, instead of not
including any such data at all or including the correct data from the
peer (as it is the case with AF_UNIX).
This bug was introduced in commit 16e572626961
(af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default)
This patch forces passing credentials for netlink, as
before the regression.
Another fix would be to not add SCM_CREDENTIALS in
netlink messages if not provided by the sender, but it
might break some programs.
With help from Florian Weimer & Petr Matousek
This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3520
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Petr Matousek <[email protected]>
Cc: Florian Weimer <[email protected]>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-287 | static int unix_dgram_sendmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
struct sock_iocb *siocb = kiocb_to_siocb(kiocb);
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(sk);
struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr = msg->msg_name;
struct sock *other = NULL;
int namelen = 0; /* fake GCC */
int err;
unsigned int hash;
struct sk_buff *skb;
long timeo;
struct scm_cookie tmp_scm;
int max_level;
int data_len = 0;
if (NULL == siocb->scm)
siocb->scm = &tmp_scm;
wait_for_unix_gc();
err = scm_send(sock, msg, siocb->scm, false);
if (err < 0)
return err;
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (msg->msg_flags&MSG_OOB)
goto out;
if (msg->msg_namelen) {
err = unix_mkname(sunaddr, msg->msg_namelen, &hash);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
namelen = err;
} else {
sunaddr = NULL;
err = -ENOTCONN;
other = unix_peer_get(sk);
if (!other)
goto out;
}
if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags) && !u->addr
&& (err = unix_autobind(sock)) != 0)
goto out;
err = -EMSGSIZE;
if (len > sk->sk_sndbuf - 32)
goto out;
if (len > SKB_MAX_ALLOC)
data_len = min_t(size_t,
len - SKB_MAX_ALLOC,
MAX_SKB_FRAGS * PAGE_SIZE);
skb = sock_alloc_send_pskb(sk, len - data_len, data_len,
msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err);
if (skb == NULL)
goto out;
err = unix_scm_to_skb(siocb->scm, skb, true);
if (err < 0)
goto out_free;
max_level = err + 1;
unix_get_secdata(siocb->scm, skb);
skb_put(skb, len - data_len);
skb->data_len = data_len;
skb->len = len;
err = skb_copy_datagram_from_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, 0, len);
if (err)
goto out_free;
timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
restart:
if (!other) {
err = -ECONNRESET;
if (sunaddr == NULL)
goto out_free;
other = unix_find_other(net, sunaddr, namelen, sk->sk_type,
hash, &err);
if (other == NULL)
goto out_free;
}
if (sk_filter(other, skb) < 0) {
/* Toss the packet but do not return any error to the sender */
err = len;
goto out_free;
}
unix_state_lock(other);
err = -EPERM;
if (!unix_may_send(sk, other))
goto out_unlock;
if (sock_flag(other, SOCK_DEAD)) {
/*
* Check with 1003.1g - what should
* datagram error
*/
unix_state_unlock(other);
sock_put(other);
err = 0;
unix_state_lock(sk);
if (unix_peer(sk) == other) {
unix_peer(sk) = NULL;
unix_state_unlock(sk);
unix_dgram_disconnected(sk, other);
sock_put(other);
err = -ECONNREFUSED;
} else {
unix_state_unlock(sk);
}
other = NULL;
if (err)
goto out_free;
goto restart;
}
err = -EPIPE;
if (other->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
goto out_unlock;
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_SEQPACKET) {
err = security_unix_may_send(sk->sk_socket, other->sk_socket);
if (err)
goto out_unlock;
}
if (unix_peer(other) != sk && unix_recvq_full(other)) {
if (!timeo) {
err = -EAGAIN;
goto out_unlock;
}
timeo = unix_wait_for_peer(other, timeo);
err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
if (signal_pending(current))
goto out_free;
goto restart;
}
if (sock_flag(other, SOCK_RCVTSTAMP))
__net_timestamp(skb);
maybe_add_creds(skb, sock, other);
skb_queue_tail(&other->sk_receive_queue, skb);
if (max_level > unix_sk(other)->recursion_level)
unix_sk(other)->recursion_level = max_level;
unix_state_unlock(other);
other->sk_data_ready(other, len);
sock_put(other);
scm_destroy(siocb->scm);
return len;
out_unlock:
unix_state_unlock(other);
out_free:
kfree_skb(skb);
out:
if (other)
sock_put(other);
scm_destroy(siocb->scm);
return err;
}
| 165,579 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int rm_read_multi(AVFormatContext *s, AVIOContext *pb,
AVStream *st, char *mime)
{
int number_of_streams = avio_rb16(pb);
int number_of_mdpr;
int i, ret;
unsigned size2;
for (i = 0; i<number_of_streams; i++)
avio_rb16(pb);
number_of_mdpr = avio_rb16(pb);
if (number_of_mdpr != 1) {
avpriv_request_sample(s, "MLTI with multiple (%d) MDPR", number_of_mdpr);
}
for (i = 0; i < number_of_mdpr; i++) {
AVStream *st2;
if (i > 0) {
st2 = avformat_new_stream(s, NULL);
if (!st2) {
ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM);
return ret;
}
st2->id = st->id + (i<<16);
st2->codecpar->bit_rate = st->codecpar->bit_rate;
st2->start_time = st->start_time;
st2->duration = st->duration;
st2->codecpar->codec_type = AVMEDIA_TYPE_DATA;
st2->priv_data = ff_rm_alloc_rmstream();
if (!st2->priv_data)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
} else
st2 = st;
size2 = avio_rb32(pb);
ret = ff_rm_read_mdpr_codecdata(s, s->pb, st2, st2->priv_data,
size2, mime);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/rmdec: Do not pass mime type in rm_read_multi() to ff_rm_read_mdpr_codecdata()
Fixes: use after free()
Fixes: rmdec-crash-ffe85b4cab1597d1cfea6955705e53f1f5c8a362
Found-by: Paul Ch <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | static int rm_read_multi(AVFormatContext *s, AVIOContext *pb,
AVStream *st, char *mime)
{
int number_of_streams = avio_rb16(pb);
int number_of_mdpr;
int i, ret;
unsigned size2;
for (i = 0; i<number_of_streams; i++)
avio_rb16(pb);
number_of_mdpr = avio_rb16(pb);
if (number_of_mdpr != 1) {
avpriv_request_sample(s, "MLTI with multiple (%d) MDPR", number_of_mdpr);
}
for (i = 0; i < number_of_mdpr; i++) {
AVStream *st2;
if (i > 0) {
st2 = avformat_new_stream(s, NULL);
if (!st2) {
ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM);
return ret;
}
st2->id = st->id + (i<<16);
st2->codecpar->bit_rate = st->codecpar->bit_rate;
st2->start_time = st->start_time;
st2->duration = st->duration;
st2->codecpar->codec_type = AVMEDIA_TYPE_DATA;
st2->priv_data = ff_rm_alloc_rmstream();
if (!st2->priv_data)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
} else
st2 = st;
size2 = avio_rb32(pb);
ret = ff_rm_read_mdpr_codecdata(s, s->pb, st2, st2->priv_data,
size2, NULL);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
| 168,924 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, addFromString)
{
char *localname, *cont_str;
size_t localname_len, cont_len;
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "ss", &localname, &localname_len, &cont_str, &cont_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
phar_add_file(&(phar_obj->archive), localname, localname_len, cont_str, cont_len, NULL);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | PHP_METHOD(Phar, addFromString)
{
char *localname, *cont_str;
size_t localname_len, cont_len;
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "ps", &localname, &localname_len, &cont_str, &cont_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
phar_add_file(&(phar_obj->archive), localname, localname_len, cont_str, cont_len, NULL);
}
| 165,071 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_module_get_algo_key_size)
{
MCRYPT_GET_MODE_DIR_ARGS(algorithms_dir);
RETURN_LONG(mcrypt_module_get_algo_key_size(module, dir));
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows
CWE ID: CWE-190 | PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_module_get_algo_key_size)
{
MCRYPT_GET_MODE_DIR_ARGS(algorithms_dir);
RETURN_LONG(mcrypt_module_get_algo_key_size(module, dir));
}
| 167,100 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void cJSON_AddItemToObject( cJSON *object, const char *string, cJSON *item )
{
if ( ! item )
return;
if ( item->string )
cJSON_free( item->string );
item->string = cJSON_strdup( string );
cJSON_AddItemToArray( object, item );
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void cJSON_AddItemToObject( cJSON *object, const char *string, cJSON *item )
| 167,268 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void ComputePrincipleComponent(const float *covariance,
DDSVector3 *principle)
{
DDSVector4
row0,
row1,
row2,
v;
register ssize_t
i;
row0.x = covariance[0];
row0.y = covariance[1];
row0.z = covariance[2];
row0.w = 0.0f;
row1.x = covariance[1];
row1.y = covariance[3];
row1.z = covariance[4];
row1.w = 0.0f;
row2.x = covariance[2];
row2.y = covariance[4];
row2.z = covariance[5];
row2.w = 0.0f;
VectorInit(v,1.0f);
for (i=0; i < 8; i++)
{
DDSVector4
w;
float
a;
w.x = row0.x * v.x;
w.y = row0.y * v.x;
w.z = row0.z * v.x;
w.w = row0.w * v.x;
w.x = (row1.x * v.y) + w.x;
w.y = (row1.y * v.y) + w.y;
w.z = (row1.z * v.y) + w.z;
w.w = (row1.w * v.y) + w.w;
w.x = (row2.x * v.z) + w.x;
w.y = (row2.y * v.z) + w.y;
w.z = (row2.z * v.z) + w.z;
w.w = (row2.w * v.z) + w.w;
a = 1.0f / MaxF(w.x,MaxF(w.y,w.z));
v.x = w.x * a;
v.y = w.y * a;
v.z = w.z * a;
v.w = w.w * a;
}
VectorCopy43(v,principle);
}
Commit Message: Added extra EOF check and some minor refactoring.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static void ComputePrincipleComponent(const float *covariance,
DDSVector3 *principle)
{
DDSVector4
row0,
row1,
row2,
v;
register ssize_t
i;
row0.x = covariance[0];
row0.y = covariance[1];
row0.z = covariance[2];
row0.w = 0.0f;
row1.x = covariance[1];
row1.y = covariance[3];
row1.z = covariance[4];
row1.w = 0.0f;
row2.x = covariance[2];
row2.y = covariance[4];
row2.z = covariance[5];
row2.w = 0.0f;
VectorInit(v,1.0f);
for (i=0; i < 8; i++)
{
DDSVector4
w;
float
a;
w.x = row0.x * v.x;
w.y = row0.y * v.x;
w.z = row0.z * v.x;
w.w = row0.w * v.x;
w.x = (row1.x * v.y) + w.x;
w.y = (row1.y * v.y) + w.y;
w.z = (row1.z * v.y) + w.z;
w.w = (row1.w * v.y) + w.w;
w.x = (row2.x * v.z) + w.x;
w.y = (row2.y * v.z) + w.y;
w.z = (row2.z * v.z) + w.z;
w.w = (row2.w * v.z) + w.w;
a = 1.0f / MagickMax(w.x,MagickMax(w.y,w.z));
v.x = w.x * a;
v.y = w.y * a;
v.z = w.z * a;
v.w = w.w * a;
}
VectorCopy43(v,principle);
}
| 168,898 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int br_mdb_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
struct net_device *dev;
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
struct nlmsghdr *nlh = NULL;
int idx = 0, s_idx;
s_idx = cb->args[0];
rcu_read_lock();
/* In theory this could be wrapped to 0... */
cb->seq = net->dev_base_seq + br_mdb_rehash_seq;
for_each_netdev_rcu(net, dev) {
if (dev->priv_flags & IFF_EBRIDGE) {
struct br_port_msg *bpm;
if (idx < s_idx)
goto skip;
nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).portid,
cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq, RTM_GETMDB,
sizeof(*bpm), NLM_F_MULTI);
if (nlh == NULL)
break;
bpm = nlmsg_data(nlh);
bpm->ifindex = dev->ifindex;
if (br_mdb_fill_info(skb, cb, dev) < 0)
goto out;
if (br_rports_fill_info(skb, cb, dev) < 0)
goto out;
cb->args[1] = 0;
nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
skip:
idx++;
}
}
out:
if (nlh)
nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
rcu_read_unlock();
cb->args[0] = idx;
return skb->len;
}
Commit Message: bridge: fix mdb info leaks
The bridging code discloses heap and stack bytes via the RTM_GETMDB
netlink interface and via the notify messages send to group RTNLGRP_MDB
afer a successful add/del.
Fix both cases by initializing all unset members/padding bytes with
memset(0).
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | static int br_mdb_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
struct net_device *dev;
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
struct nlmsghdr *nlh = NULL;
int idx = 0, s_idx;
s_idx = cb->args[0];
rcu_read_lock();
/* In theory this could be wrapped to 0... */
cb->seq = net->dev_base_seq + br_mdb_rehash_seq;
for_each_netdev_rcu(net, dev) {
if (dev->priv_flags & IFF_EBRIDGE) {
struct br_port_msg *bpm;
if (idx < s_idx)
goto skip;
nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).portid,
cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq, RTM_GETMDB,
sizeof(*bpm), NLM_F_MULTI);
if (nlh == NULL)
break;
bpm = nlmsg_data(nlh);
memset(bpm, 0, sizeof(*bpm));
bpm->ifindex = dev->ifindex;
if (br_mdb_fill_info(skb, cb, dev) < 0)
goto out;
if (br_rports_fill_info(skb, cb, dev) < 0)
goto out;
cb->args[1] = 0;
nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
skip:
idx++;
}
}
out:
if (nlh)
nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
rcu_read_unlock();
cb->args[0] = idx;
return skb->len;
}
| 166,052 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int filter_frame(AVFilterLink *inlink, AVFrame *in)
{
AVFilterContext *ctx = inlink->dst;
FlipContext *s = ctx->priv;
AVFilterLink *outlink = ctx->outputs[0];
AVFrame *out;
uint8_t *inrow, *outrow;
int i, j, plane, step;
out = ff_get_video_buffer(outlink, outlink->w, outlink->h);
if (!out) {
av_frame_free(&in);
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
av_frame_copy_props(out, in);
/* copy palette if required */
if (av_pix_fmt_desc_get(inlink->format)->flags & AV_PIX_FMT_FLAG_PAL)
memcpy(out->data[1], in->data[1], AVPALETTE_SIZE);
for (plane = 0; plane < 4 && in->data[plane]; plane++) {
const int width = (plane == 1 || plane == 2) ? FF_CEIL_RSHIFT(inlink->w, s->hsub) : inlink->w;
const int height = (plane == 1 || plane == 2) ? FF_CEIL_RSHIFT(inlink->h, s->vsub) : inlink->h;
step = s->max_step[plane];
outrow = out->data[plane];
inrow = in ->data[plane] + (width - 1) * step;
for (i = 0; i < height; i++) {
switch (step) {
case 1:
for (j = 0; j < width; j++)
outrow[j] = inrow[-j];
break;
case 2:
{
uint16_t *outrow16 = (uint16_t *)outrow;
uint16_t * inrow16 = (uint16_t *) inrow;
for (j = 0; j < width; j++)
outrow16[j] = inrow16[-j];
}
break;
case 3:
{
uint8_t *in = inrow;
uint8_t *out = outrow;
for (j = 0; j < width; j++, out += 3, in -= 3) {
int32_t v = AV_RB24(in);
AV_WB24(out, v);
}
}
break;
case 4:
{
uint32_t *outrow32 = (uint32_t *)outrow;
uint32_t * inrow32 = (uint32_t *) inrow;
for (j = 0; j < width; j++)
outrow32[j] = inrow32[-j];
}
break;
default:
for (j = 0; j < width; j++)
memcpy(outrow + j*step, inrow - j*step, step);
}
inrow += in ->linesize[plane];
outrow += out->linesize[plane];
}
}
av_frame_free(&in);
return ff_filter_frame(outlink, out);
}
Commit Message: avfilter: fix plane validity checks
Fixes out of array accesses
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static int filter_frame(AVFilterLink *inlink, AVFrame *in)
{
AVFilterContext *ctx = inlink->dst;
FlipContext *s = ctx->priv;
AVFilterLink *outlink = ctx->outputs[0];
AVFrame *out;
uint8_t *inrow, *outrow;
int i, j, plane, step;
out = ff_get_video_buffer(outlink, outlink->w, outlink->h);
if (!out) {
av_frame_free(&in);
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
av_frame_copy_props(out, in);
/* copy palette if required */
if (av_pix_fmt_desc_get(inlink->format)->flags & AV_PIX_FMT_FLAG_PAL)
memcpy(out->data[1], in->data[1], AVPALETTE_SIZE);
for (plane = 0; plane < 4 && in->data[plane] && in->linesize[plane]; plane++) {
const int width = (plane == 1 || plane == 2) ? FF_CEIL_RSHIFT(inlink->w, s->hsub) : inlink->w;
const int height = (plane == 1 || plane == 2) ? FF_CEIL_RSHIFT(inlink->h, s->vsub) : inlink->h;
step = s->max_step[plane];
outrow = out->data[plane];
inrow = in ->data[plane] + (width - 1) * step;
for (i = 0; i < height; i++) {
switch (step) {
case 1:
for (j = 0; j < width; j++)
outrow[j] = inrow[-j];
break;
case 2:
{
uint16_t *outrow16 = (uint16_t *)outrow;
uint16_t * inrow16 = (uint16_t *) inrow;
for (j = 0; j < width; j++)
outrow16[j] = inrow16[-j];
}
break;
case 3:
{
uint8_t *in = inrow;
uint8_t *out = outrow;
for (j = 0; j < width; j++, out += 3, in -= 3) {
int32_t v = AV_RB24(in);
AV_WB24(out, v);
}
}
break;
case 4:
{
uint32_t *outrow32 = (uint32_t *)outrow;
uint32_t * inrow32 = (uint32_t *) inrow;
for (j = 0; j < width; j++)
outrow32[j] = inrow32[-j];
}
break;
default:
for (j = 0; j < width; j++)
memcpy(outrow + j*step, inrow - j*step, step);
}
inrow += in ->linesize[plane];
outrow += out->linesize[plane];
}
}
av_frame_free(&in);
return ff_filter_frame(outlink, out);
}
| 166,002 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PreconnectManager::FinishPreresolveJob(PreresolveJobId job_id,
bool success) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
PreresolveJob* job = preresolve_jobs_.Lookup(job_id);
DCHECK(job);
bool need_preconnect = success && job->need_preconnect();
if (need_preconnect) {
PreconnectUrl(job->url, job->num_sockets, job->allow_credentials,
job->network_isolation_key);
}
PreresolveInfo* info = job->info;
if (info)
info->stats->requests_stats.emplace_back(job->url, need_preconnect);
preresolve_jobs_.Remove(job_id);
--inflight_preresolves_count_;
if (info) {
DCHECK_LE(1u, info->inflight_count);
--info->inflight_count;
}
if (info && info->is_done())
AllPreresolvesForUrlFinished(info);
TryToLaunchPreresolveJobs();
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | void PreconnectManager::FinishPreresolveJob(PreresolveJobId job_id,
bool success) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
PreresolveJob* job = preresolve_jobs_.Lookup(job_id);
DCHECK(job);
bool need_preconnect = success && job->need_preconnect();
if (need_preconnect) {
PreconnectUrl(job->url, job->num_sockets, job->allow_credentials,
job->network_isolation_key);
}
PreresolveInfo* info = job->info;
if (info) {
info->stats->requests_stats.emplace_back(url::Origin::Create(job->url),
need_preconnect);
}
preresolve_jobs_.Remove(job_id);
--inflight_preresolves_count_;
if (info) {
DCHECK_LE(1u, info->inflight_count);
--info->inflight_count;
}
if (info && info->is_done())
AllPreresolvesForUrlFinished(info);
TryToLaunchPreresolveJobs();
}
| 172,374 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: my_object_class_init (MyObjectClass *mobject_class)
{
GObjectClass *gobject_class = G_OBJECT_CLASS (mobject_class);
gobject_class->finalize = my_object_finalize;
gobject_class->set_property = my_object_set_property;
gobject_class->get_property = my_object_get_property;
g_object_class_install_property (gobject_class,
PROP_THIS_IS_A_STRING,
g_param_spec_string ("this_is_a_string",
_("Sample string"),
_("Example of a string property"),
"default value",
G_PARAM_READWRITE));
signals[FROBNICATE] =
g_signal_new ("frobnicate",
G_OBJECT_CLASS_TYPE (mobject_class),
G_SIGNAL_RUN_LAST | G_SIGNAL_DETAILED,
0,
NULL, NULL,
g_cclosure_marshal_VOID__INT,
G_TYPE_NONE, 1, G_TYPE_INT);
signals[SIG0] =
g_signal_new ("sig0",
G_OBJECT_CLASS_TYPE (mobject_class),
G_SIGNAL_RUN_LAST | G_SIGNAL_DETAILED,
0,
NULL, NULL,
my_object_marshal_VOID__STRING_INT_STRING,
G_TYPE_NONE, 3, G_TYPE_STRING, G_TYPE_INT, G_TYPE_STRING);
signals[SIG1] =
g_signal_new ("sig1",
G_OBJECT_CLASS_TYPE (mobject_class),
G_SIGNAL_RUN_LAST | G_SIGNAL_DETAILED,
0,
NULL, NULL,
my_object_marshal_VOID__STRING_BOXED,
G_TYPE_NONE, 2, G_TYPE_STRING, G_TYPE_VALUE);
signals[SIG2] =
g_signal_new ("sig2",
G_OBJECT_CLASS_TYPE (mobject_class),
G_SIGNAL_RUN_LAST | G_SIGNAL_DETAILED,
0,
NULL, NULL,
g_cclosure_marshal_VOID__BOXED,
G_TYPE_NONE, 1, DBUS_TYPE_G_STRING_STRING_HASHTABLE);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | my_object_class_init (MyObjectClass *mobject_class)
| 165,090 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: MagickExport void GetDrawInfo(const ImageInfo *image_info,DrawInfo *draw_info)
{
const char
*option;
ExceptionInfo
*exception;
ImageInfo
*clone_info;
/*
Initialize draw attributes.
*/
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"...");
assert(draw_info != (DrawInfo *) NULL);
(void) ResetMagickMemory(draw_info,0,sizeof(*draw_info));
clone_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
GetAffineMatrix(&draw_info->affine);
exception=AcquireExceptionInfo();
(void) QueryColorCompliance("#000F",AllCompliance,&draw_info->fill,
exception);
(void) QueryColorCompliance("#0000",AllCompliance,&draw_info->stroke,
exception);
draw_info->stroke_width=1.0;
draw_info->alpha=OpaqueAlpha;
draw_info->fill_rule=EvenOddRule;
draw_info->linecap=ButtCap;
draw_info->linejoin=MiterJoin;
draw_info->miterlimit=10;
draw_info->decorate=NoDecoration;
draw_info->pointsize=12.0;
draw_info->undercolor.alpha=(Quantum) TransparentAlpha;
draw_info->compose=OverCompositeOp;
draw_info->render=MagickTrue;
draw_info->debug=IsEventLogging();
draw_info->stroke_antialias=clone_info->antialias;
if (clone_info->font != (char *) NULL)
draw_info->font=AcquireString(clone_info->font);
if (clone_info->density != (char *) NULL)
draw_info->density=AcquireString(clone_info->density);
draw_info->text_antialias=clone_info->antialias;
if (clone_info->pointsize != 0.0)
draw_info->pointsize=clone_info->pointsize;
draw_info->border_color=clone_info->border_color;
if (clone_info->server_name != (char *) NULL)
draw_info->server_name=AcquireString(clone_info->server_name);
option=GetImageOption(clone_info,"direction");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
draw_info->direction=(DirectionType) ParseCommandOption(
MagickDirectionOptions,MagickFalse,option);
else
draw_info->direction=UndefinedDirection;
option=GetImageOption(clone_info,"encoding");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
(void) CloneString(&draw_info->encoding,option);
option=GetImageOption(clone_info,"family");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
(void) CloneString(&draw_info->family,option);
option=GetImageOption(clone_info,"fill");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
(void) QueryColorCompliance(option,AllCompliance,&draw_info->fill,
exception);
option=GetImageOption(clone_info,"gravity");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
draw_info->gravity=(GravityType) ParseCommandOption(MagickGravityOptions,
MagickFalse,option);
option=GetImageOption(clone_info,"interline-spacing");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
draw_info->interline_spacing=StringToDouble(option,(char **) NULL);
option=GetImageOption(clone_info,"interword-spacing");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
draw_info->interword_spacing=StringToDouble(option,(char **) NULL);
option=GetImageOption(clone_info,"kerning");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
draw_info->kerning=StringToDouble(option,(char **) NULL);
option=GetImageOption(clone_info,"stroke");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
(void) QueryColorCompliance(option,AllCompliance,&draw_info->stroke,
exception);
option=GetImageOption(clone_info,"strokewidth");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
draw_info->stroke_width=StringToDouble(option,(char **) NULL);
option=GetImageOption(clone_info,"style");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
draw_info->style=(StyleType) ParseCommandOption(MagickStyleOptions,
MagickFalse,option);
option=GetImageOption(clone_info,"undercolor");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
(void) QueryColorCompliance(option,AllCompliance,&draw_info->undercolor,
exception);
option=GetImageOption(clone_info,"weight");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
{
ssize_t
weight;
weight=ParseCommandOption(MagickWeightOptions,MagickFalse,option);
if (weight == -1)
weight=StringToUnsignedLong(option);
draw_info->weight=(size_t) weight;
}
exception=DestroyExceptionInfo(exception);
draw_info->signature=MagickCoreSignature;
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
}
Commit Message: Prevent buffer overflow in magick/draw.c
CWE ID: CWE-119 | MagickExport void GetDrawInfo(const ImageInfo *image_info,DrawInfo *draw_info)
{
const char
*option;
ExceptionInfo
*exception;
ImageInfo
*clone_info;
/*
Initialize draw attributes.
*/
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"...");
assert(draw_info != (DrawInfo *) NULL);
(void) ResetMagickMemory(draw_info,0,sizeof(*draw_info));
clone_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
GetAffineMatrix(&draw_info->affine);
exception=AcquireExceptionInfo();
(void) QueryColorCompliance("#000F",AllCompliance,&draw_info->fill,
exception);
(void) QueryColorCompliance("#0000",AllCompliance,&draw_info->stroke,
exception);
draw_info->stroke_width=1.0;
draw_info->alpha=OpaqueAlpha;
draw_info->fill_rule=EvenOddRule;
draw_info->linecap=ButtCap;
draw_info->linejoin=MiterJoin;
draw_info->miterlimit=10;
draw_info->decorate=NoDecoration;
draw_info->pointsize=12.0;
draw_info->undercolor.alpha=(MagickRealType) TransparentAlpha;
draw_info->compose=OverCompositeOp;
draw_info->render=MagickTrue;
draw_info->debug=IsEventLogging();
draw_info->stroke_antialias=clone_info->antialias;
if (clone_info->font != (char *) NULL)
draw_info->font=AcquireString(clone_info->font);
if (clone_info->density != (char *) NULL)
draw_info->density=AcquireString(clone_info->density);
draw_info->text_antialias=clone_info->antialias;
if (clone_info->pointsize != 0.0)
draw_info->pointsize=clone_info->pointsize;
draw_info->border_color=clone_info->border_color;
if (clone_info->server_name != (char *) NULL)
draw_info->server_name=AcquireString(clone_info->server_name);
option=GetImageOption(clone_info,"direction");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
draw_info->direction=(DirectionType) ParseCommandOption(
MagickDirectionOptions,MagickFalse,option);
else
draw_info->direction=UndefinedDirection;
option=GetImageOption(clone_info,"encoding");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
(void) CloneString(&draw_info->encoding,option);
option=GetImageOption(clone_info,"family");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
(void) CloneString(&draw_info->family,option);
option=GetImageOption(clone_info,"fill");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
(void) QueryColorCompliance(option,AllCompliance,&draw_info->fill,
exception);
option=GetImageOption(clone_info,"gravity");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
draw_info->gravity=(GravityType) ParseCommandOption(MagickGravityOptions,
MagickFalse,option);
option=GetImageOption(clone_info,"interline-spacing");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
draw_info->interline_spacing=StringToDouble(option,(char **) NULL);
option=GetImageOption(clone_info,"interword-spacing");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
draw_info->interword_spacing=StringToDouble(option,(char **) NULL);
option=GetImageOption(clone_info,"kerning");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
draw_info->kerning=StringToDouble(option,(char **) NULL);
option=GetImageOption(clone_info,"stroke");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
(void) QueryColorCompliance(option,AllCompliance,&draw_info->stroke,
exception);
option=GetImageOption(clone_info,"strokewidth");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
draw_info->stroke_width=StringToDouble(option,(char **) NULL);
option=GetImageOption(clone_info,"style");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
draw_info->style=(StyleType) ParseCommandOption(MagickStyleOptions,
MagickFalse,option);
option=GetImageOption(clone_info,"undercolor");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
(void) QueryColorCompliance(option,AllCompliance,&draw_info->undercolor,
exception);
option=GetImageOption(clone_info,"weight");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
{
ssize_t
weight;
weight=ParseCommandOption(MagickWeightOptions,MagickFalse,option);
if (weight == -1)
weight=(ssize_t) StringToUnsignedLong(option);
draw_info->weight=(size_t) weight;
}
exception=DestroyExceptionInfo(exception);
draw_info->signature=MagickCoreSignature;
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
}
| 167,248 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void dma_rx(struct b43_dmaring *ring, int *slot)
{
const struct b43_dma_ops *ops = ring->ops;
struct b43_dmadesc_generic *desc;
struct b43_dmadesc_meta *meta;
struct b43_rxhdr_fw4 *rxhdr;
struct sk_buff *skb;
u16 len;
int err;
dma_addr_t dmaaddr;
desc = ops->idx2desc(ring, *slot, &meta);
sync_descbuffer_for_cpu(ring, meta->dmaaddr, ring->rx_buffersize);
skb = meta->skb;
rxhdr = (struct b43_rxhdr_fw4 *)skb->data;
len = le16_to_cpu(rxhdr->frame_len);
if (len == 0) {
int i = 0;
do {
udelay(2);
barrier();
len = le16_to_cpu(rxhdr->frame_len);
} while (len == 0 && i++ < 5);
if (unlikely(len == 0)) {
dmaaddr = meta->dmaaddr;
goto drop_recycle_buffer;
}
}
if (unlikely(b43_rx_buffer_is_poisoned(ring, skb))) {
/* Something went wrong with the DMA.
* The device did not touch the buffer and did not overwrite the poison. */
b43dbg(ring->dev->wl, "DMA RX: Dropping poisoned buffer.\n");
dmaaddr = meta->dmaaddr;
goto drop_recycle_buffer;
}
if (unlikely(len > ring->rx_buffersize)) {
/* The data did not fit into one descriptor buffer
* and is split over multiple buffers.
* This should never happen, as we try to allocate buffers
* big enough. So simply ignore this packet.
*/
int cnt = 0;
s32 tmp = len;
while (1) {
desc = ops->idx2desc(ring, *slot, &meta);
/* recycle the descriptor buffer. */
b43_poison_rx_buffer(ring, meta->skb);
sync_descbuffer_for_device(ring, meta->dmaaddr,
ring->rx_buffersize);
*slot = next_slot(ring, *slot);
cnt++;
tmp -= ring->rx_buffersize;
if (tmp <= 0)
break;
}
b43err(ring->dev->wl, "DMA RX buffer too small "
"(len: %u, buffer: %u, nr-dropped: %d)\n",
len, ring->rx_buffersize, cnt);
goto drop;
}
dmaaddr = meta->dmaaddr;
err = setup_rx_descbuffer(ring, desc, meta, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (unlikely(err)) {
b43dbg(ring->dev->wl, "DMA RX: setup_rx_descbuffer() failed\n");
goto drop_recycle_buffer;
}
unmap_descbuffer(ring, dmaaddr, ring->rx_buffersize, 0);
skb_put(skb, len + ring->frameoffset);
skb_pull(skb, ring->frameoffset);
b43_rx(ring->dev, skb, rxhdr);
drop:
return;
drop_recycle_buffer:
/* Poison and recycle the RX buffer. */
b43_poison_rx_buffer(ring, skb);
sync_descbuffer_for_device(ring, dmaaddr, ring->rx_buffersize);
}
Commit Message: b43: allocate receive buffers big enough for max frame len + offset
Otherwise, skb_put inside of dma_rx can fail...
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32042
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Larry Finger <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static void dma_rx(struct b43_dmaring *ring, int *slot)
{
const struct b43_dma_ops *ops = ring->ops;
struct b43_dmadesc_generic *desc;
struct b43_dmadesc_meta *meta;
struct b43_rxhdr_fw4 *rxhdr;
struct sk_buff *skb;
u16 len;
int err;
dma_addr_t dmaaddr;
desc = ops->idx2desc(ring, *slot, &meta);
sync_descbuffer_for_cpu(ring, meta->dmaaddr, ring->rx_buffersize);
skb = meta->skb;
rxhdr = (struct b43_rxhdr_fw4 *)skb->data;
len = le16_to_cpu(rxhdr->frame_len);
if (len == 0) {
int i = 0;
do {
udelay(2);
barrier();
len = le16_to_cpu(rxhdr->frame_len);
} while (len == 0 && i++ < 5);
if (unlikely(len == 0)) {
dmaaddr = meta->dmaaddr;
goto drop_recycle_buffer;
}
}
if (unlikely(b43_rx_buffer_is_poisoned(ring, skb))) {
/* Something went wrong with the DMA.
* The device did not touch the buffer and did not overwrite the poison. */
b43dbg(ring->dev->wl, "DMA RX: Dropping poisoned buffer.\n");
dmaaddr = meta->dmaaddr;
goto drop_recycle_buffer;
}
if (unlikely(len + ring->frameoffset > ring->rx_buffersize)) {
/* The data did not fit into one descriptor buffer
* and is split over multiple buffers.
* This should never happen, as we try to allocate buffers
* big enough. So simply ignore this packet.
*/
int cnt = 0;
s32 tmp = len;
while (1) {
desc = ops->idx2desc(ring, *slot, &meta);
/* recycle the descriptor buffer. */
b43_poison_rx_buffer(ring, meta->skb);
sync_descbuffer_for_device(ring, meta->dmaaddr,
ring->rx_buffersize);
*slot = next_slot(ring, *slot);
cnt++;
tmp -= ring->rx_buffersize;
if (tmp <= 0)
break;
}
b43err(ring->dev->wl, "DMA RX buffer too small "
"(len: %u, buffer: %u, nr-dropped: %d)\n",
len, ring->rx_buffersize, cnt);
goto drop;
}
dmaaddr = meta->dmaaddr;
err = setup_rx_descbuffer(ring, desc, meta, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (unlikely(err)) {
b43dbg(ring->dev->wl, "DMA RX: setup_rx_descbuffer() failed\n");
goto drop_recycle_buffer;
}
unmap_descbuffer(ring, dmaaddr, ring->rx_buffersize, 0);
skb_put(skb, len + ring->frameoffset);
skb_pull(skb, ring->frameoffset);
b43_rx(ring->dev, skb, rxhdr);
drop:
return;
drop_recycle_buffer:
/* Poison and recycle the RX buffer. */
b43_poison_rx_buffer(ring, skb);
sync_descbuffer_for_device(ring, dmaaddr, ring->rx_buffersize);
}
| 165,746 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void ConvertLoopSequence(ModSample &smp, STPLoopList &loopList)
{
if(!smp.HasSampleData() || loopList.size() < 2) return;
ModSample newSmp = smp;
newSmp.nLength = 0;
newSmp.pSample = nullptr;
size_t numLoops = loopList.size();
for(size_t i = 0; i < numLoops; i++)
{
STPLoopInfo &info = loopList[i];
if((newSmp.nLength + info.loopLength > MAX_SAMPLE_LENGTH) ||
(info.loopLength > MAX_SAMPLE_LENGTH) ||
(info.loopStart + info.loopLength > smp.nLength))
{
numLoops = i;
break;
}
newSmp.nLength += info.loopLength;
}
if(!newSmp.AllocateSample())
{
return;
}
SmpLength start = 0;
for(size_t i = 0; i < numLoops; i++)
{
STPLoopInfo &info = loopList[i];
memcpy(newSmp.pSample8 + start, smp.pSample8 + info.loopStart, info.loopLength);
info.loopStart = start;
if(i > 0 && i <= mpt::size(newSmp.cues))
{
newSmp.cues[i - 1] = start;
}
start += info.loopLength;
}
smp.FreeSample();
smp = newSmp;
smp.nLoopStart = 0;
smp.nLoopEnd = smp.nLength;
smp.uFlags.set(CHN_LOOP);
}
Commit Message: [Fix] STP: Possible out-of-bounds memory read with malformed STP files (caught with afl-fuzz).
git-svn-id: https://source.openmpt.org/svn/openmpt/trunk/OpenMPT@9567 56274372-70c3-4bfc-bfc3-4c3a0b034d27
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static void ConvertLoopSequence(ModSample &smp, STPLoopList &loopList)
{
if(!smp.HasSampleData() || loopList.size() < 2) return;
ModSample newSmp = smp;
newSmp.nLength = 0;
newSmp.pSample = nullptr;
size_t numLoops = loopList.size();
// Get the total length of the sample after combining all looped sections
for(size_t i = 0; i < numLoops; i++)
{
STPLoopInfo &info = loopList[i];
// If adding this loop would cause the sample length to exceed maximum,
if(info.loopStart >= smp.nLength
|| smp.nLength - info.loopStart < info.loopLength
|| newSmp.nLength > MAX_SAMPLE_LENGTH - info.loopLength)
{
numLoops = i;
break;
}
newSmp.nLength += info.loopLength;
}
if(!newSmp.AllocateSample())
{
return;
}
SmpLength start = 0;
for(size_t i = 0; i < numLoops; i++)
{
STPLoopInfo &info = loopList[i];
memcpy(newSmp.pSample8 + start, smp.pSample8 + info.loopStart, info.loopLength);
info.loopStart = start;
if(i > 0 && i <= mpt::size(newSmp.cues))
{
newSmp.cues[i - 1] = start;
}
start += info.loopLength;
}
smp.FreeSample();
smp = newSmp;
smp.nLoopStart = 0;
smp.nLoopEnd = smp.nLength;
smp.uFlags.set(CHN_LOOP);
}
| 169,337 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static inline ulong encode_twos_comp(long n, int prec)
{
ulong result;
assert(prec >= 2);
jas_eprintf("warning: support for signed data is untested\n");
if (n < 0) {
result = -n;
result = (result ^ 0xffffffffUL) + 1;
result &= (1 << prec) - 1;
} else {
result = n;
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | static inline ulong encode_twos_comp(long n, int prec)
static inline jas_ulong encode_twos_comp(long n, int prec)
{
jas_ulong result;
assert(prec >= 2);
jas_eprintf("warning: support for signed data is untested\n");
if (n < 0) {
result = -n;
result = (result ^ 0xffffffffUL) + 1;
result &= (1 << prec) - 1;
} else {
result = n;
}
return result;
}
| 168,692 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int ext4_show_options(struct seq_file *seq, struct vfsmount *vfs)
{
int def_errors;
unsigned long def_mount_opts;
struct super_block *sb = vfs->mnt_sb;
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
struct ext4_super_block *es = sbi->s_es;
def_mount_opts = le32_to_cpu(es->s_default_mount_opts);
def_errors = le16_to_cpu(es->s_errors);
if (sbi->s_sb_block != 1)
seq_printf(seq, ",sb=%llu", sbi->s_sb_block);
if (test_opt(sb, MINIX_DF))
seq_puts(seq, ",minixdf");
if (test_opt(sb, GRPID) && !(def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_BSDGROUPS))
seq_puts(seq, ",grpid");
if (!test_opt(sb, GRPID) && (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_BSDGROUPS))
seq_puts(seq, ",nogrpid");
if (sbi->s_resuid != EXT4_DEF_RESUID ||
le16_to_cpu(es->s_def_resuid) != EXT4_DEF_RESUID) {
seq_printf(seq, ",resuid=%u", sbi->s_resuid);
}
if (sbi->s_resgid != EXT4_DEF_RESGID ||
le16_to_cpu(es->s_def_resgid) != EXT4_DEF_RESGID) {
seq_printf(seq, ",resgid=%u", sbi->s_resgid);
}
if (test_opt(sb, ERRORS_RO)) {
if (def_errors == EXT4_ERRORS_PANIC ||
def_errors == EXT4_ERRORS_CONTINUE) {
seq_puts(seq, ",errors=remount-ro");
}
}
if (test_opt(sb, ERRORS_CONT) && def_errors != EXT4_ERRORS_CONTINUE)
seq_puts(seq, ",errors=continue");
if (test_opt(sb, ERRORS_PANIC) && def_errors != EXT4_ERRORS_PANIC)
seq_puts(seq, ",errors=panic");
if (test_opt(sb, NO_UID32) && !(def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_UID16))
seq_puts(seq, ",nouid32");
if (test_opt(sb, DEBUG) && !(def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_DEBUG))
seq_puts(seq, ",debug");
if (test_opt(sb, OLDALLOC))
seq_puts(seq, ",oldalloc");
#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_XATTR
if (test_opt(sb, XATTR_USER) &&
!(def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_XATTR_USER))
seq_puts(seq, ",user_xattr");
if (!test_opt(sb, XATTR_USER) &&
(def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_XATTR_USER)) {
seq_puts(seq, ",nouser_xattr");
}
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_POSIX_ACL
if (test_opt(sb, POSIX_ACL) && !(def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_ACL))
seq_puts(seq, ",acl");
if (!test_opt(sb, POSIX_ACL) && (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_ACL))
seq_puts(seq, ",noacl");
#endif
if (sbi->s_commit_interval != JBD2_DEFAULT_MAX_COMMIT_AGE*HZ) {
seq_printf(seq, ",commit=%u",
(unsigned) (sbi->s_commit_interval / HZ));
}
if (sbi->s_min_batch_time != EXT4_DEF_MIN_BATCH_TIME) {
seq_printf(seq, ",min_batch_time=%u",
(unsigned) sbi->s_min_batch_time);
}
if (sbi->s_max_batch_time != EXT4_DEF_MAX_BATCH_TIME) {
seq_printf(seq, ",max_batch_time=%u",
(unsigned) sbi->s_min_batch_time);
}
/*
* We're changing the default of barrier mount option, so
* let's always display its mount state so it's clear what its
* status is.
*/
seq_puts(seq, ",barrier=");
seq_puts(seq, test_opt(sb, BARRIER) ? "1" : "0");
if (test_opt(sb, JOURNAL_ASYNC_COMMIT))
seq_puts(seq, ",journal_async_commit");
if (test_opt(sb, NOBH))
seq_puts(seq, ",nobh");
if (test_opt(sb, I_VERSION))
seq_puts(seq, ",i_version");
if (!test_opt(sb, DELALLOC))
seq_puts(seq, ",nodelalloc");
if (sbi->s_stripe)
seq_printf(seq, ",stripe=%lu", sbi->s_stripe);
/*
* journal mode get enabled in different ways
* So just print the value even if we didn't specify it
*/
if (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) == EXT4_MOUNT_JOURNAL_DATA)
seq_puts(seq, ",data=journal");
else if (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) == EXT4_MOUNT_ORDERED_DATA)
seq_puts(seq, ",data=ordered");
else if (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) == EXT4_MOUNT_WRITEBACK_DATA)
seq_puts(seq, ",data=writeback");
if (sbi->s_inode_readahead_blks != EXT4_DEF_INODE_READAHEAD_BLKS)
seq_printf(seq, ",inode_readahead_blks=%u",
sbi->s_inode_readahead_blks);
if (test_opt(sb, DATA_ERR_ABORT))
seq_puts(seq, ",data_err=abort");
if (test_opt(sb, NO_AUTO_DA_ALLOC))
seq_puts(seq, ",noauto_da_alloc");
if (test_opt(sb, DISCARD))
seq_puts(seq, ",discard");
if (test_opt(sb, NOLOAD))
seq_puts(seq, ",norecovery");
ext4_show_quota_options(seq, sb);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | static int ext4_show_options(struct seq_file *seq, struct vfsmount *vfs)
{
int def_errors;
unsigned long def_mount_opts;
struct super_block *sb = vfs->mnt_sb;
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
struct ext4_super_block *es = sbi->s_es;
def_mount_opts = le32_to_cpu(es->s_default_mount_opts);
def_errors = le16_to_cpu(es->s_errors);
if (sbi->s_sb_block != 1)
seq_printf(seq, ",sb=%llu", sbi->s_sb_block);
if (test_opt(sb, MINIX_DF))
seq_puts(seq, ",minixdf");
if (test_opt(sb, GRPID) && !(def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_BSDGROUPS))
seq_puts(seq, ",grpid");
if (!test_opt(sb, GRPID) && (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_BSDGROUPS))
seq_puts(seq, ",nogrpid");
if (sbi->s_resuid != EXT4_DEF_RESUID ||
le16_to_cpu(es->s_def_resuid) != EXT4_DEF_RESUID) {
seq_printf(seq, ",resuid=%u", sbi->s_resuid);
}
if (sbi->s_resgid != EXT4_DEF_RESGID ||
le16_to_cpu(es->s_def_resgid) != EXT4_DEF_RESGID) {
seq_printf(seq, ",resgid=%u", sbi->s_resgid);
}
if (test_opt(sb, ERRORS_RO)) {
if (def_errors == EXT4_ERRORS_PANIC ||
def_errors == EXT4_ERRORS_CONTINUE) {
seq_puts(seq, ",errors=remount-ro");
}
}
if (test_opt(sb, ERRORS_CONT) && def_errors != EXT4_ERRORS_CONTINUE)
seq_puts(seq, ",errors=continue");
if (test_opt(sb, ERRORS_PANIC) && def_errors != EXT4_ERRORS_PANIC)
seq_puts(seq, ",errors=panic");
if (test_opt(sb, NO_UID32) && !(def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_UID16))
seq_puts(seq, ",nouid32");
if (test_opt(sb, DEBUG) && !(def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_DEBUG))
seq_puts(seq, ",debug");
if (test_opt(sb, OLDALLOC))
seq_puts(seq, ",oldalloc");
#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_XATTR
if (test_opt(sb, XATTR_USER) &&
!(def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_XATTR_USER))
seq_puts(seq, ",user_xattr");
if (!test_opt(sb, XATTR_USER) &&
(def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_XATTR_USER)) {
seq_puts(seq, ",nouser_xattr");
}
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_POSIX_ACL
if (test_opt(sb, POSIX_ACL) && !(def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_ACL))
seq_puts(seq, ",acl");
if (!test_opt(sb, POSIX_ACL) && (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_ACL))
seq_puts(seq, ",noacl");
#endif
if (sbi->s_commit_interval != JBD2_DEFAULT_MAX_COMMIT_AGE*HZ) {
seq_printf(seq, ",commit=%u",
(unsigned) (sbi->s_commit_interval / HZ));
}
if (sbi->s_min_batch_time != EXT4_DEF_MIN_BATCH_TIME) {
seq_printf(seq, ",min_batch_time=%u",
(unsigned) sbi->s_min_batch_time);
}
if (sbi->s_max_batch_time != EXT4_DEF_MAX_BATCH_TIME) {
seq_printf(seq, ",max_batch_time=%u",
(unsigned) sbi->s_min_batch_time);
}
/*
* We're changing the default of barrier mount option, so
* let's always display its mount state so it's clear what its
* status is.
*/
seq_puts(seq, ",barrier=");
seq_puts(seq, test_opt(sb, BARRIER) ? "1" : "0");
if (test_opt(sb, JOURNAL_ASYNC_COMMIT))
seq_puts(seq, ",journal_async_commit");
if (test_opt(sb, NOBH))
seq_puts(seq, ",nobh");
if (test_opt(sb, I_VERSION))
seq_puts(seq, ",i_version");
if (!test_opt(sb, DELALLOC))
seq_puts(seq, ",nodelalloc");
if (sbi->s_stripe)
seq_printf(seq, ",stripe=%lu", sbi->s_stripe);
/*
* journal mode get enabled in different ways
* So just print the value even if we didn't specify it
*/
if (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) == EXT4_MOUNT_JOURNAL_DATA)
seq_puts(seq, ",data=journal");
else if (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) == EXT4_MOUNT_ORDERED_DATA)
seq_puts(seq, ",data=ordered");
else if (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) == EXT4_MOUNT_WRITEBACK_DATA)
seq_puts(seq, ",data=writeback");
if (sbi->s_inode_readahead_blks != EXT4_DEF_INODE_READAHEAD_BLKS)
seq_printf(seq, ",inode_readahead_blks=%u",
sbi->s_inode_readahead_blks);
if (test_opt(sb, DATA_ERR_ABORT))
seq_puts(seq, ",data_err=abort");
if (test_opt(sb, NO_AUTO_DA_ALLOC))
seq_puts(seq, ",noauto_da_alloc");
if (test_opt(sb, DISCARD))
seq_puts(seq, ",discard");
if (test_opt(sb, NOLOAD))
seq_puts(seq, ",norecovery");
if (test_opt(sb, DIOREAD_NOLOCK))
seq_puts(seq, ",dioread_nolock");
ext4_show_quota_options(seq, sb);
return 0;
}
| 167,555 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ExtensionInstallDialogView::InitView() {
int left_column_width =
(prompt_->ShouldShowPermissions() || prompt_->GetRetainedFileCount() > 0)
? kPermissionsLeftColumnWidth
: kNoPermissionsLeftColumnWidth;
if (is_external_install())
left_column_width = kExternalInstallLeftColumnWidth;
int column_set_id = 0;
views::GridLayout* layout = CreateLayout(left_column_width, column_set_id);
ui::ResourceBundle& rb = ui::ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance();
if (prompt_->has_webstore_data()) {
layout->StartRow(0, column_set_id);
views::View* rating = new views::View();
rating->SetLayoutManager(new views::BoxLayout(
views::BoxLayout::kHorizontal, 0, 0, 0));
layout->AddView(rating);
prompt_->AppendRatingStars(AddResourceIcon, rating);
const gfx::FontList& small_font_list =
rb.GetFontList(ui::ResourceBundle::SmallFont);
views::Label* rating_count =
new views::Label(prompt_->GetRatingCount(), small_font_list);
rating_count->SetBorder(views::Border::CreateEmptyBorder(0, 2, 0, 0));
rating->AddChildView(rating_count);
layout->StartRow(0, column_set_id);
views::Label* user_count =
new views::Label(prompt_->GetUserCount(), small_font_list);
user_count->SetAutoColorReadabilityEnabled(false);
user_count->SetEnabledColor(SK_ColorGRAY);
layout->AddView(user_count);
layout->StartRow(0, column_set_id);
views::Link* store_link = new views::Link(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_STORE_LINK));
store_link->SetFontList(small_font_list);
store_link->set_listener(this);
layout->AddView(store_link);
if (prompt_->ShouldShowPermissions()) {
layout->AddPaddingRow(0, views::kRelatedControlVerticalSpacing);
layout->StartRow(0, column_set_id);
layout->AddView(new views::Separator(views::Separator::HORIZONTAL),
3,
1,
views::GridLayout::FILL,
views::GridLayout::FILL);
}
}
int content_width = left_column_width + views::kPanelHorizMargin + kIconSize;
CustomScrollableView* scrollable = new CustomScrollableView();
views::GridLayout* scroll_layout = new views::GridLayout(scrollable);
scrollable->SetLayoutManager(scroll_layout);
views::ColumnSet* scrollable_column_set =
scroll_layout->AddColumnSet(column_set_id);
int scrollable_width = prompt_->has_webstore_data() ? content_width
: left_column_width;
scrollable_column_set->AddColumn(views::GridLayout::LEADING,
views::GridLayout::LEADING,
0, // no resizing
views::GridLayout::USE_PREF,
scrollable_width,
scrollable_width);
int padding_width =
content_width + views::kButtonHEdgeMarginNew - scrollable_width;
scrollable_column_set->AddPaddingColumn(0, padding_width);
layout->StartRow(0, column_set_id);
scroll_view_ = new views::ScrollView();
scroll_view_->set_hide_horizontal_scrollbar(true);
scroll_view_->SetContents(scrollable);
layout->AddView(scroll_view_, 4, 1);
if (is_bundle_install()) {
BundleInstaller::ItemList items = prompt_->bundle()->GetItemsWithState(
BundleInstaller::Item::STATE_PENDING);
scroll_layout->AddPaddingRow(0, views::kRelatedControlSmallVerticalSpacing);
for (const BundleInstaller::Item& item : items) {
scroll_layout->StartRow(0, column_set_id);
views::Label* extension_label =
new views::Label(item.GetNameForDisplay());
extension_label->SetMultiLine(true);
extension_label->SetHorizontalAlignment(gfx::ALIGN_LEFT);
extension_label->SizeToFit(
scrollable_width - kSmallIconSize - kSmallIconPadding);
gfx::ImageSkia image = gfx::ImageSkia::CreateFrom1xBitmap(item.icon);
scroll_layout->AddView(new IconedView(extension_label, image));
}
scroll_layout->AddPaddingRow(0, views::kRelatedControlVerticalSpacing);
}
if (prompt_->ShouldShowPermissions()) {
bool has_permissions =
prompt_->GetPermissionCount(
ExtensionInstallPrompt::PermissionsType::ALL_PERMISSIONS) > 0;
if (has_permissions) {
AddPermissions(
scroll_layout,
rb,
column_set_id,
scrollable_width,
ExtensionInstallPrompt::PermissionsType::REGULAR_PERMISSIONS);
AddPermissions(
scroll_layout,
rb,
column_set_id,
scrollable_width,
ExtensionInstallPrompt::PermissionsType::WITHHELD_PERMISSIONS);
} else {
scroll_layout->AddPaddingRow(0, views::kRelatedControlVerticalSpacing);
scroll_layout->StartRow(0, column_set_id);
views::Label* permission_label = new views::Label(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSION_NO_SPECIAL_PERMISSIONS));
permission_label->SetMultiLine(true);
permission_label->SetHorizontalAlignment(gfx::ALIGN_LEFT);
permission_label->SizeToFit(scrollable_width);
scroll_layout->AddView(permission_label);
}
}
if (prompt_->GetRetainedFileCount()) {
scroll_layout->AddPaddingRow(0, views::kRelatedControlVerticalSpacing);
scroll_layout->StartRow(0, column_set_id);
views::Label* retained_files_header =
new views::Label(prompt_->GetRetainedFilesHeading());
retained_files_header->SetMultiLine(true);
retained_files_header->SetHorizontalAlignment(gfx::ALIGN_LEFT);
retained_files_header->SizeToFit(scrollable_width);
scroll_layout->AddView(retained_files_header);
scroll_layout->StartRow(0, column_set_id);
PermissionDetails details;
for (size_t i = 0; i < prompt_->GetRetainedFileCount(); ++i) {
details.push_back(prompt_->GetRetainedFile(i));
}
ExpandableContainerView* issue_advice_view =
new ExpandableContainerView(this,
base::string16(),
details,
scrollable_width,
false);
scroll_layout->AddView(issue_advice_view);
}
if (prompt_->GetRetainedDeviceCount()) {
scroll_layout->AddPaddingRow(0, views::kRelatedControlVerticalSpacing);
scroll_layout->StartRow(0, column_set_id);
views::Label* retained_devices_header =
new views::Label(prompt_->GetRetainedDevicesHeading());
retained_devices_header->SetMultiLine(true);
retained_devices_header->SetHorizontalAlignment(gfx::ALIGN_LEFT);
retained_devices_header->SizeToFit(scrollable_width);
scroll_layout->AddView(retained_devices_header);
scroll_layout->StartRow(0, column_set_id);
PermissionDetails details;
for (size_t i = 0; i < prompt_->GetRetainedDeviceCount(); ++i) {
details.push_back(prompt_->GetRetainedDeviceMessageString(i));
}
ExpandableContainerView* issue_advice_view =
new ExpandableContainerView(this,
base::string16(),
details,
scrollable_width,
false);
scroll_layout->AddView(issue_advice_view);
}
DCHECK(prompt_->type() >= 0);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Extensions.InstallPrompt.Type",
prompt_->type(),
ExtensionInstallPrompt::NUM_PROMPT_TYPES);
scroll_view_->ClipHeightTo(
0,
std::min(kScrollViewMaxHeight, scrollable->GetPreferredSize().height()));
dialog_size_ = gfx::Size(
content_width + 2 * views::kButtonHEdgeMarginNew,
container_->GetPreferredSize().height());
std::string event_name = ExperienceSamplingEvent::kExtensionInstallDialog;
event_name.append(
ExtensionInstallPrompt::PromptTypeToString(prompt_->type()));
sampling_event_ = ExperienceSamplingEvent::Create(event_name);
}
Commit Message: Make the webstore inline install dialog be tab-modal
Also clean up a few minor lint errors while I'm in here.
BUG=550047
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1496033003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#363925}
CWE ID: CWE-17 | void ExtensionInstallDialogView::InitView() {
int left_column_width =
(prompt_->ShouldShowPermissions() || prompt_->GetRetainedFileCount() > 0)
? kPermissionsLeftColumnWidth
: kNoPermissionsLeftColumnWidth;
if (is_external_install())
left_column_width = kExternalInstallLeftColumnWidth;
int column_set_id = 0;
views::GridLayout* layout = CreateLayout(left_column_width, column_set_id);
ui::ResourceBundle& rb = ui::ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance();
if (prompt_->has_webstore_data()) {
layout->StartRow(0, column_set_id);
views::View* rating = new views::View();
rating->SetLayoutManager(new views::BoxLayout(
views::BoxLayout::kHorizontal, 0, 0, 0));
layout->AddView(rating);
prompt_->AppendRatingStars(AddResourceIcon, rating);
const gfx::FontList& small_font_list =
rb.GetFontList(ui::ResourceBundle::SmallFont);
views::Label* rating_count =
new views::Label(prompt_->GetRatingCount(), small_font_list);
rating_count->SetBorder(views::Border::CreateEmptyBorder(0, 2, 0, 0));
rating->AddChildView(rating_count);
layout->StartRow(0, column_set_id);
views::Label* user_count =
new views::Label(prompt_->GetUserCount(), small_font_list);
user_count->SetAutoColorReadabilityEnabled(false);
user_count->SetEnabledColor(SK_ColorGRAY);
layout->AddView(user_count);
layout->StartRow(0, column_set_id);
views::Link* store_link = new views::Link(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_STORE_LINK));
store_link->SetFontList(small_font_list);
store_link->set_listener(this);
layout->AddView(store_link);
if (prompt_->ShouldShowPermissions()) {
layout->AddPaddingRow(0, views::kRelatedControlVerticalSpacing);
layout->StartRow(0, column_set_id);
layout->AddView(new views::Separator(views::Separator::HORIZONTAL),
3,
1,
views::GridLayout::FILL,
views::GridLayout::FILL);
}
}
int content_width = left_column_width + views::kPanelHorizMargin + kIconSize;
CustomScrollableView* scrollable = new CustomScrollableView();
views::GridLayout* scroll_layout = new views::GridLayout(scrollable);
scrollable->SetLayoutManager(scroll_layout);
views::ColumnSet* scrollable_column_set =
scroll_layout->AddColumnSet(column_set_id);
int scrollable_width = prompt_->has_webstore_data() ? content_width
: left_column_width;
scrollable_column_set->AddColumn(views::GridLayout::LEADING,
views::GridLayout::LEADING,
0, // no resizing
views::GridLayout::USE_PREF,
scrollable_width,
scrollable_width);
int padding_width =
content_width + views::kButtonHEdgeMarginNew - scrollable_width;
scrollable_column_set->AddPaddingColumn(0, padding_width);
layout->StartRow(0, column_set_id);
scroll_view_ = new views::ScrollView();
scroll_view_->set_hide_horizontal_scrollbar(true);
scroll_view_->SetContents(scrollable);
layout->AddView(scroll_view_, 4, 1);
if (is_bundle_install()) {
BundleInstaller::ItemList items = prompt_->bundle()->GetItemsWithState(
BundleInstaller::Item::STATE_PENDING);
scroll_layout->AddPaddingRow(0, views::kRelatedControlSmallVerticalSpacing);
for (const BundleInstaller::Item& item : items) {
scroll_layout->StartRow(0, column_set_id);
views::Label* extension_label =
new views::Label(item.GetNameForDisplay());
extension_label->SetMultiLine(true);
extension_label->SetHorizontalAlignment(gfx::ALIGN_LEFT);
extension_label->SizeToFit(
scrollable_width - kSmallIconSize - kSmallIconPadding);
gfx::ImageSkia image = gfx::ImageSkia::CreateFrom1xBitmap(item.icon);
scroll_layout->AddView(new IconedView(extension_label, image));
}
scroll_layout->AddPaddingRow(0, views::kRelatedControlVerticalSpacing);
}
if (prompt_->ShouldShowPermissions()) {
bool has_permissions =
prompt_->GetPermissionCount(
ExtensionInstallPrompt::PermissionsType::ALL_PERMISSIONS) > 0;
if (has_permissions) {
AddPermissions(
scroll_layout,
rb,
column_set_id,
scrollable_width,
ExtensionInstallPrompt::PermissionsType::REGULAR_PERMISSIONS);
AddPermissions(
scroll_layout,
rb,
column_set_id,
scrollable_width,
ExtensionInstallPrompt::PermissionsType::WITHHELD_PERMISSIONS);
} else {
scroll_layout->AddPaddingRow(0, views::kRelatedControlVerticalSpacing);
scroll_layout->StartRow(0, column_set_id);
views::Label* permission_label = new views::Label(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSION_NO_SPECIAL_PERMISSIONS));
permission_label->SetMultiLine(true);
permission_label->SetHorizontalAlignment(gfx::ALIGN_LEFT);
permission_label->SizeToFit(scrollable_width);
scroll_layout->AddView(permission_label);
}
}
if (prompt_->GetRetainedFileCount()) {
scroll_layout->AddPaddingRow(0, views::kRelatedControlVerticalSpacing);
scroll_layout->StartRow(0, column_set_id);
views::Label* retained_files_header =
new views::Label(prompt_->GetRetainedFilesHeading());
retained_files_header->SetMultiLine(true);
retained_files_header->SetHorizontalAlignment(gfx::ALIGN_LEFT);
retained_files_header->SizeToFit(scrollable_width);
scroll_layout->AddView(retained_files_header);
scroll_layout->StartRow(0, column_set_id);
PermissionDetails details;
for (size_t i = 0; i < prompt_->GetRetainedFileCount(); ++i) {
details.push_back(prompt_->GetRetainedFile(i));
}
ExpandableContainerView* issue_advice_view =
new ExpandableContainerView(this,
base::string16(),
details,
scrollable_width,
false);
scroll_layout->AddView(issue_advice_view);
}
if (prompt_->GetRetainedDeviceCount()) {
scroll_layout->AddPaddingRow(0, views::kRelatedControlVerticalSpacing);
scroll_layout->StartRow(0, column_set_id);
views::Label* retained_devices_header =
new views::Label(prompt_->GetRetainedDevicesHeading());
retained_devices_header->SetMultiLine(true);
retained_devices_header->SetHorizontalAlignment(gfx::ALIGN_LEFT);
retained_devices_header->SizeToFit(scrollable_width);
scroll_layout->AddView(retained_devices_header);
scroll_layout->StartRow(0, column_set_id);
PermissionDetails details;
for (size_t i = 0; i < prompt_->GetRetainedDeviceCount(); ++i) {
details.push_back(prompt_->GetRetainedDeviceMessageString(i));
}
ExpandableContainerView* issue_advice_view =
new ExpandableContainerView(this,
base::string16(),
details,
scrollable_width,
false);
scroll_layout->AddView(issue_advice_view);
}
DCHECK_GE(prompt_->type(), 0);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Extensions.InstallPrompt.Type",
prompt_->type(),
ExtensionInstallPrompt::NUM_PROMPT_TYPES);
scroll_view_->ClipHeightTo(
0,
std::min(kScrollViewMaxHeight, scrollable->GetPreferredSize().height()));
dialog_size_ = gfx::Size(
content_width + 2 * views::kButtonHEdgeMarginNew,
container_->GetPreferredSize().height());
std::string event_name = ExperienceSamplingEvent::kExtensionInstallDialog;
event_name.append(
ExtensionInstallPrompt::PromptTypeToString(prompt_->type()));
sampling_event_ = ExperienceSamplingEvent::Create(event_name);
}
| 172,207 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual InputMethodDescriptor current_input_method() const {
return current_input_method_;
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | virtual InputMethodDescriptor current_input_method() const {
virtual input_method::InputMethodDescriptor current_input_method() const {
return current_input_method_;
}
| 170,513 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void smp_process_keypress_notification(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
uint8_t* p = (uint8_t*)p_data;
uint8_t reason = SMP_INVALID_PARAMETERS;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
p_cb->status = *(uint8_t*)p_data;
if (smp_command_has_invalid_parameters(p_cb)) {
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
return;
}
if (p != NULL) {
STREAM_TO_UINT8(p_cb->peer_keypress_notification, p);
} else {
p_cb->peer_keypress_notification = BTM_SP_KEY_OUT_OF_RANGE;
}
p_cb->cb_evt = SMP_PEER_KEYPR_NOT_EVT;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix OOB read before buffer length check
Bug: 111936834
Test: manual
Change-Id: Ib98528fb62db0d724ebd9112d071e367f78e369d
(cherry picked from commit 4548f34c90803c6544f6bed03399f2eabeab2a8e)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | void smp_process_keypress_notification(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
uint8_t* p = (uint8_t*)p_data;
uint8_t reason = SMP_INVALID_PARAMETERS;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
if (smp_command_has_invalid_parameters(p_cb)) {
if (p_cb->rcvd_cmd_len < 2) { // 1 (opcode) + 1 (Notif Type) bytes
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "111936834");
}
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
return;
}
p_cb->status = *(uint8_t*)p_data;
if (p != NULL) {
STREAM_TO_UINT8(p_cb->peer_keypress_notification, p);
} else {
p_cb->peer_keypress_notification = BTM_SP_KEY_OUT_OF_RANGE;
}
p_cb->cb_evt = SMP_PEER_KEYPR_NOT_EVT;
}
| 174,077 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: png_inflate(png_structp png_ptr, const png_byte *data, png_size_t size,
png_bytep output, png_size_t output_size)
{
png_size_t count = 0;
png_ptr->zstream.next_in = (png_bytep)data; /* const_cast: VALID */
png_ptr->zstream.avail_in = size;
while (1)
{
int ret, avail;
/* Reset the output buffer each time round - we empty it
* after every inflate call.
*/
png_ptr->zstream.next_out = png_ptr->zbuf;
png_ptr->zstream.avail_out = png_ptr->zbuf_size;
ret = inflate(&png_ptr->zstream, Z_NO_FLUSH);
avail = png_ptr->zbuf_size - png_ptr->zstream.avail_out;
/* First copy/count any new output - but only if we didn't
* get an error code.
*/
if ((ret == Z_OK || ret == Z_STREAM_END) && avail > 0)
{
if (output != 0 && output_size > count)
{
int copy = output_size - count;
if (avail < copy) copy = avail;
png_memcpy(output + count, png_ptr->zbuf, copy);
}
count += avail;
}
if (ret == Z_OK)
continue;
/* Termination conditions - always reset the zstream, it
* must be left in inflateInit state.
*/
png_ptr->zstream.avail_in = 0;
inflateReset(&png_ptr->zstream);
if (ret == Z_STREAM_END)
return count; /* NOTE: may be zero. */
/* Now handle the error codes - the API always returns 0
* and the error message is dumped into the uncompressed
* buffer if available.
*/
{
PNG_CONST char *msg;
if (png_ptr->zstream.msg != 0)
msg = png_ptr->zstream.msg;
else
{
#if defined(PNG_STDIO_SUPPORTED) && !defined(_WIN32_WCE)
char umsg[52];
switch (ret)
{
case Z_BUF_ERROR:
msg = "Buffer error in compressed datastream in %s chunk";
break;
case Z_DATA_ERROR:
msg = "Data error in compressed datastream in %s chunk";
break;
default:
msg = "Incomplete compressed datastream in %s chunk";
break;
}
png_snprintf(umsg, sizeof umsg, msg, png_ptr->chunk_name);
msg = umsg;
#else
msg = "Damaged compressed datastream in chunk other than IDAT";
#endif
}
png_warning(png_ptr, msg);
}
/* 0 means an error - notice that this code simple ignores
* zero length compressed chunks as a result.
*/
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: Pull follow-up tweak from upstream.
BUG=116162
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9546033
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@125311 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | png_inflate(png_structp png_ptr, const png_byte *data, png_size_t size,
png_bytep output, png_size_t output_size)
{
png_size_t count = 0;
png_ptr->zstream.next_in = (png_bytep)data; /* const_cast: VALID */
png_ptr->zstream.avail_in = size;
while (1)
{
int ret, avail;
/* Reset the output buffer each time round - we empty it
* after every inflate call.
*/
png_ptr->zstream.next_out = png_ptr->zbuf;
png_ptr->zstream.avail_out = png_ptr->zbuf_size;
ret = inflate(&png_ptr->zstream, Z_NO_FLUSH);
avail = png_ptr->zbuf_size - png_ptr->zstream.avail_out;
/* First copy/count any new output - but only if we didn't
* get an error code.
*/
if ((ret == Z_OK || ret == Z_STREAM_END) && avail > 0)
{
if (output != 0 && output_size > count)
{
png_size_t copy = output_size - count;
if ((png_size_t) avail < copy) copy = (png_size_t) avail;
png_memcpy(output + count, png_ptr->zbuf, copy);
}
count += avail;
}
if (ret == Z_OK)
continue;
/* Termination conditions - always reset the zstream, it
* must be left in inflateInit state.
*/
png_ptr->zstream.avail_in = 0;
inflateReset(&png_ptr->zstream);
if (ret == Z_STREAM_END)
return count; /* NOTE: may be zero. */
/* Now handle the error codes - the API always returns 0
* and the error message is dumped into the uncompressed
* buffer if available.
*/
{
PNG_CONST char *msg;
if (png_ptr->zstream.msg != 0)
msg = png_ptr->zstream.msg;
else
{
#if defined(PNG_STDIO_SUPPORTED) && !defined(_WIN32_WCE)
char umsg[52];
switch (ret)
{
case Z_BUF_ERROR:
msg = "Buffer error in compressed datastream in %s chunk";
break;
case Z_DATA_ERROR:
msg = "Data error in compressed datastream in %s chunk";
break;
default:
msg = "Incomplete compressed datastream in %s chunk";
break;
}
png_snprintf(umsg, sizeof umsg, msg, png_ptr->chunk_name);
msg = umsg;
#else
msg = "Damaged compressed datastream in chunk other than IDAT";
#endif
}
png_warning(png_ptr, msg);
}
/* 0 means an error - notice that this code simple ignores
* zero length compressed chunks as a result.
*/
return 0;
}
}
| 171,061 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int mp_pack(lua_State *L) {
int nargs = lua_gettop(L);
int i;
mp_buf *buf;
if (nargs == 0)
return luaL_argerror(L, 0, "MessagePack pack needs input.");
buf = mp_buf_new(L);
for(i = 1; i <= nargs; i++) {
/* Copy argument i to top of stack for _encode processing;
* the encode function pops it from the stack when complete. */
lua_pushvalue(L, i);
mp_encode_lua_type(L,buf,0);
lua_pushlstring(L,(char*)buf->b,buf->len);
/* Reuse the buffer for the next operation by
* setting its free count to the total buffer size
* and the current position to zero. */
buf->free += buf->len;
buf->len = 0;
}
mp_buf_free(L, buf);
/* Concatenate all nargs buffers together */
lua_concat(L, nargs);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Security: fix Lua cmsgpack library stack overflow.
During an auditing effort, the Apple Vulnerability Research team discovered
a critical Redis security issue affecting the Lua scripting part of Redis.
-- Description of the problem
Several years ago I merged a pull request including many small changes at
the Lua MsgPack library (that originally I authored myself). The Pull
Request entered Redis in commit 90b6337c1, in 2014.
Unfortunately one of the changes included a variadic Lua function that
lacked the check for the available Lua C stack. As a result, calling the
"pack" MsgPack library function with a large number of arguments, results
into pushing into the Lua C stack a number of new values proportional to
the number of arguments the function was called with. The pushed values,
moreover, are controlled by untrusted user input.
This in turn causes stack smashing which we believe to be exploitable,
while not very deterministic, but it is likely that an exploit could be
created targeting specific versions of Redis executables. However at its
minimum the issue results in a DoS, crashing the Redis server.
-- Versions affected
Versions greater or equal to Redis 2.8.18 are affected.
-- Reproducing
Reproduce with this (based on the original reproduction script by
Apple security team):
https://gist.github.com/antirez/82445fcbea6d9b19f97014cc6cc79f8a
-- Verification of the fix
The fix was tested in the following way:
1) I checked that the problem is no longer observable running the trigger.
2) The Lua code was analyzed to understand the stack semantics, and that
actually enough stack is allocated in all the cases of mp_pack() calls.
3) The mp_pack() function was modified in order to show exactly what items
in the stack were being set, to make sure that there is no silent overflow
even after the fix.
-- Credits
Thank you to the Apple team and to the other persons that helped me
checking the patch and coordinating this communication.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | int mp_pack(lua_State *L) {
int nargs = lua_gettop(L);
int i;
mp_buf *buf;
if (nargs == 0)
return luaL_argerror(L, 0, "MessagePack pack needs input.");
if (!lua_checkstack(L, nargs))
return luaL_argerror(L, 0, "Too many arguments for MessagePack pack.");
buf = mp_buf_new(L);
for(i = 1; i <= nargs; i++) {
/* Copy argument i to top of stack for _encode processing;
* the encode function pops it from the stack when complete. */
lua_pushvalue(L, i);
mp_encode_lua_type(L,buf,0);
lua_pushlstring(L,(char*)buf->b,buf->len);
/* Reuse the buffer for the next operation by
* setting its free count to the total buffer size
* and the current position to zero. */
buf->free += buf->len;
buf->len = 0;
}
mp_buf_free(L, buf);
/* Concatenate all nargs buffers together */
lua_concat(L, nargs);
return 1;
}
| 170,167 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int sctp_setsockopt_auto_asconf(struct sock *sk, char __user *optval,
unsigned int optlen)
{
int val;
struct sctp_sock *sp = sctp_sk(sk);
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
return -EINVAL;
if (get_user(val, (int __user *)optval))
return -EFAULT;
if (!sctp_is_ep_boundall(sk) && val)
return -EINVAL;
if ((val && sp->do_auto_asconf) || (!val && !sp->do_auto_asconf))
return 0;
if (val == 0 && sp->do_auto_asconf) {
list_del(&sp->auto_asconf_list);
sp->do_auto_asconf = 0;
} else if (val && !sp->do_auto_asconf) {
list_add_tail(&sp->auto_asconf_list,
&sock_net(sk)->sctp.auto_asconf_splist);
sp->do_auto_asconf = 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: sctp: fix ASCONF list handling
->auto_asconf_splist is per namespace and mangled by functions like
sctp_setsockopt_auto_asconf() which doesn't guarantee any serialization.
Also, the call to inet_sk_copy_descendant() was backuping
->auto_asconf_list through the copy but was not honoring
->do_auto_asconf, which could lead to list corruption if it was
different between both sockets.
This commit thus fixes the list handling by using ->addr_wq_lock
spinlock to protect the list. A special handling is done upon socket
creation and destruction for that. Error handlig on sctp_init_sock()
will never return an error after having initialized asconf, so
sctp_destroy_sock() can be called without addrq_wq_lock. The lock now
will be take on sctp_close_sock(), before locking the socket, so we
don't do it in inverse order compared to sctp_addr_wq_timeout_handler().
Instead of taking the lock on sctp_sock_migrate() for copying and
restoring the list values, it's preferred to avoid rewritting it by
implementing sctp_copy_descendant().
Issue was found with a test application that kept flipping sysctl
default_auto_asconf on and off, but one could trigger it by issuing
simultaneous setsockopt() calls on multiple sockets or by
creating/destroying sockets fast enough. This is only triggerable
locally.
Fixes: 9f7d653b67ae ("sctp: Add Auto-ASCONF support (core).")
Reported-by: Ji Jianwen <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | static int sctp_setsockopt_auto_asconf(struct sock *sk, char __user *optval,
unsigned int optlen)
{
int val;
struct sctp_sock *sp = sctp_sk(sk);
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
return -EINVAL;
if (get_user(val, (int __user *)optval))
return -EFAULT;
if (!sctp_is_ep_boundall(sk) && val)
return -EINVAL;
if ((val && sp->do_auto_asconf) || (!val && !sp->do_auto_asconf))
return 0;
spin_lock_bh(&sock_net(sk)->sctp.addr_wq_lock);
if (val == 0 && sp->do_auto_asconf) {
list_del(&sp->auto_asconf_list);
sp->do_auto_asconf = 0;
} else if (val && !sp->do_auto_asconf) {
list_add_tail(&sp->auto_asconf_list,
&sock_net(sk)->sctp.auto_asconf_splist);
sp->do_auto_asconf = 1;
}
spin_unlock_bh(&sock_net(sk)->sctp.addr_wq_lock);
return 0;
}
| 166,630 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: gsm_xsmp_client_connect (GsmXSMPClient *client,
SmsConn conn,
unsigned long *mask_ret,
SmsCallbacks *callbacks_ret)
{
client->priv->conn = conn;
if (client->priv->protocol_timeout) {
g_source_remove (client->priv->protocol_timeout);
client->priv->protocol_timeout = 0;
}
g_debug ("GsmXSMPClient: Initializing client %s", client->priv->description);
*mask_ret = 0;
*mask_ret |= SmsRegisterClientProcMask;
callbacks_ret->register_client.callback = register_client_callback;
callbacks_ret->register_client.manager_data = client;
*mask_ret |= SmsInteractRequestProcMask;
callbacks_ret->interact_request.callback = interact_request_callback;
callbacks_ret->interact_request.manager_data = client;
*mask_ret |= SmsInteractDoneProcMask;
callbacks_ret->interact_done.callback = interact_done_callback;
callbacks_ret->interact_done.manager_data = client;
*mask_ret |= SmsSaveYourselfRequestProcMask;
callbacks_ret->save_yourself_request.callback = save_yourself_request_callback;
callbacks_ret->save_yourself_request.manager_data = client;
*mask_ret |= SmsSaveYourselfP2RequestProcMask;
callbacks_ret->save_yourself_phase2_request.callback = save_yourself_phase2_request_callback;
callbacks_ret->save_yourself_phase2_request.manager_data = client;
*mask_ret |= SmsSaveYourselfDoneProcMask;
callbacks_ret->save_yourself_done.callback = save_yourself_done_callback;
callbacks_ret->save_yourself_done.manager_data = client;
*mask_ret |= SmsCloseConnectionProcMask;
callbacks_ret->close_connection.callback = close_connection_callback;
callbacks_ret->close_connection.manager_data = client;
*mask_ret |= SmsSetPropertiesProcMask;
callbacks_ret->set_properties.callback = set_properties_callback;
callbacks_ret->set_properties.manager_data = client;
*mask_ret |= SmsDeletePropertiesProcMask;
callbacks_ret->delete_properties.callback = delete_properties_callback;
callbacks_ret->delete_properties.manager_data = client;
*mask_ret |= SmsGetPropertiesProcMask;
callbacks_ret->get_properties.callback = get_properties_callback;
callbacks_ret->get_properties.manager_data = client;
}
Commit Message: [gsm] Delay the creation of the GsmXSMPClient until it really exists
We used to create the GsmXSMPClient before the XSMP connection is really
accepted. This can lead to some issues, though. An example is:
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=598211#c19. Quoting:
"What is happening is that a new client (probably metacity in your
case) is opening an ICE connection in the GSM_MANAGER_PHASE_END_SESSION
phase, which causes a new GsmXSMPClient to be added to the client
store. The GSM_MANAGER_PHASE_EXIT phase then begins before the client
has had a chance to establish a xsmp connection, which means that
client->priv->conn will not be initialized at the point that xsmp_stop
is called on the new unregistered client."
The fix is to create the GsmXSMPClient object when there's a real XSMP
connection. This implies moving the timeout that makes sure we don't
have an empty client to the XSMP server.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=598211
CWE ID: CWE-835 | gsm_xsmp_client_connect (GsmXSMPClient *client,
SmsConn conn,
unsigned long *mask_ret,
SmsCallbacks *callbacks_ret)
{
client->priv->conn = conn;
g_debug ("GsmXSMPClient: Initializing client %s", client->priv->description);
*mask_ret = 0;
*mask_ret |= SmsRegisterClientProcMask;
callbacks_ret->register_client.callback = register_client_callback;
callbacks_ret->register_client.manager_data = client;
*mask_ret |= SmsInteractRequestProcMask;
callbacks_ret->interact_request.callback = interact_request_callback;
callbacks_ret->interact_request.manager_data = client;
*mask_ret |= SmsInteractDoneProcMask;
callbacks_ret->interact_done.callback = interact_done_callback;
callbacks_ret->interact_done.manager_data = client;
*mask_ret |= SmsSaveYourselfRequestProcMask;
callbacks_ret->save_yourself_request.callback = save_yourself_request_callback;
callbacks_ret->save_yourself_request.manager_data = client;
*mask_ret |= SmsSaveYourselfP2RequestProcMask;
callbacks_ret->save_yourself_phase2_request.callback = save_yourself_phase2_request_callback;
callbacks_ret->save_yourself_phase2_request.manager_data = client;
*mask_ret |= SmsSaveYourselfDoneProcMask;
callbacks_ret->save_yourself_done.callback = save_yourself_done_callback;
callbacks_ret->save_yourself_done.manager_data = client;
*mask_ret |= SmsCloseConnectionProcMask;
callbacks_ret->close_connection.callback = close_connection_callback;
callbacks_ret->close_connection.manager_data = client;
*mask_ret |= SmsSetPropertiesProcMask;
callbacks_ret->set_properties.callback = set_properties_callback;
callbacks_ret->set_properties.manager_data = client;
*mask_ret |= SmsDeletePropertiesProcMask;
callbacks_ret->delete_properties.callback = delete_properties_callback;
callbacks_ret->delete_properties.manager_data = client;
*mask_ret |= SmsGetPropertiesProcMask;
callbacks_ret->get_properties.callback = get_properties_callback;
callbacks_ret->get_properties.manager_data = client;
}
| 168,049 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ntlm_print_negotiate_flags(UINT32 flags)
{
int i;
const char* str;
WLog_INFO(TAG, "negotiateFlags \"0x%08"PRIX32"\"", flags);
for (i = 31; i >= 0; i--)
{
if ((flags >> i) & 1)
{
str = NTLM_NEGOTIATE_STRINGS[(31 - i)];
WLog_INFO(TAG, "\t%s (%d),", str, (31 - i));
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8789
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | void ntlm_print_negotiate_flags(UINT32 flags)
static void ntlm_print_negotiate_flags(UINT32 flags)
{
int i;
const char* str;
WLog_INFO(TAG, "negotiateFlags \"0x%08"PRIX32"\"", flags);
for (i = 31; i >= 0; i--)
{
if ((flags >> i) & 1)
{
str = NTLM_NEGOTIATE_STRINGS[(31 - i)];
WLog_INFO(TAG, "\t%s (%d),", str, (31 - i));
}
}
}
| 169,275 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void V8ContextNativeHandler::RunWithNativesEnabledModuleSystem(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
CHECK_EQ(args.Length(), 1);
CHECK(args[0]->IsFunction());
v8::Local<v8::Value> call_with_args[] = {
context()->module_system()->NewInstance()};
ModuleSystem::NativesEnabledScope natives_enabled(context()->module_system());
context()->CallFunction(v8::Local<v8::Function>::Cast(args[0]), 1,
call_with_args);
}
Commit Message: Add a test that getModuleSystem() doesn't work cross origin
BUG=504011
[email protected]
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1241443004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338663}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | void V8ContextNativeHandler::RunWithNativesEnabledModuleSystem(
void V8ContextNativeHandler::RunWithNativesEnabled(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
CHECK_EQ(args.Length(), 1);
CHECK(args[0]->IsFunction());
ModuleSystem::NativesEnabledScope natives_enabled(context()->module_system());
context()->CallFunction(v8::Local<v8::Function>::Cast(args[0]));
}
| 171,948 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void dump_boot(DOS_FS * fs, struct boot_sector *b, unsigned lss)
{
unsigned short sectors;
printf("Boot sector contents:\n");
if (!atari_format) {
char id[9];
strncpy(id, (const char *)b->system_id, 8);
id[8] = 0;
printf("System ID \"%s\"\n", id);
} else {
/* On Atari, a 24 bit serial number is stored at offset 8 of the boot
* sector */
printf("Serial number 0x%x\n",
b->system_id[5] | (b->system_id[6] << 8) | (b->
system_id[7] << 16));
}
printf("Media byte 0x%02x (%s)\n", b->media, get_media_descr(b->media));
printf("%10d bytes per logical sector\n", GET_UNALIGNED_W(b->sector_size));
printf("%10d bytes per cluster\n", fs->cluster_size);
printf("%10d reserved sector%s\n", le16toh(b->reserved),
le16toh(b->reserved) == 1 ? "" : "s");
printf("First FAT starts at byte %llu (sector %llu)\n",
(unsigned long long)fs->fat_start,
(unsigned long long)fs->fat_start / lss);
printf("%10d FATs, %d bit entries\n", b->fats, fs->fat_bits);
printf("%10d bytes per FAT (= %u sectors)\n", fs->fat_size,
fs->fat_size / lss);
if (!fs->root_cluster) {
printf("Root directory starts at byte %llu (sector %llu)\n",
(unsigned long long)fs->root_start,
(unsigned long long)fs->root_start / lss);
printf("%10d root directory entries\n", fs->root_entries);
} else {
printf("Root directory start at cluster %lu (arbitrary size)\n",
(unsigned long)fs->root_cluster);
}
printf("Data area starts at byte %llu (sector %llu)\n",
(unsigned long long)fs->data_start,
(unsigned long long)fs->data_start / lss);
printf("%10lu data clusters (%llu bytes)\n",
(unsigned long)fs->data_clusters,
(unsigned long long)fs->data_clusters * fs->cluster_size);
printf("%u sectors/track, %u heads\n", le16toh(b->secs_track),
le16toh(b->heads));
printf("%10u hidden sectors\n", atari_format ?
/* On Atari, the hidden field is only 16 bit wide and unused */
(((unsigned char *)&b->hidden)[0] |
((unsigned char *)&b->hidden)[1] << 8) : le32toh(b->hidden));
sectors = GET_UNALIGNED_W(b->sectors);
printf("%10u sectors total\n", sectors ? sectors : le32toh(b->total_sect));
}
Commit Message: read_boot(): Handle excessive FAT size specifications
The variable used for storing the FAT size (in bytes) was an unsigned
int. Since the size in sectors read from the BPB was not sufficiently
checked, this could end up being zero after multiplying it with the
sector size while some offsets still stayed excessive. Ultimately it
would cause segfaults when accessing FAT entries for which no memory
was allocated.
Make it more robust by changing the types used to store FAT size to
off_t and abort if there is no room for data clusters. Additionally
check that FAT size is not specified as zero.
Fixes #25 and fixes #26.
Reported-by: Hanno Böck
Signed-off-by: Andreas Bombe <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static void dump_boot(DOS_FS * fs, struct boot_sector *b, unsigned lss)
{
unsigned short sectors;
printf("Boot sector contents:\n");
if (!atari_format) {
char id[9];
strncpy(id, (const char *)b->system_id, 8);
id[8] = 0;
printf("System ID \"%s\"\n", id);
} else {
/* On Atari, a 24 bit serial number is stored at offset 8 of the boot
* sector */
printf("Serial number 0x%x\n",
b->system_id[5] | (b->system_id[6] << 8) | (b->
system_id[7] << 16));
}
printf("Media byte 0x%02x (%s)\n", b->media, get_media_descr(b->media));
printf("%10d bytes per logical sector\n", GET_UNALIGNED_W(b->sector_size));
printf("%10d bytes per cluster\n", fs->cluster_size);
printf("%10d reserved sector%s\n", le16toh(b->reserved),
le16toh(b->reserved) == 1 ? "" : "s");
printf("First FAT starts at byte %llu (sector %llu)\n",
(unsigned long long)fs->fat_start,
(unsigned long long)fs->fat_start / lss);
printf("%10d FATs, %d bit entries\n", b->fats, fs->fat_bits);
printf("%10lld bytes per FAT (= %llu sectors)\n", (long long)fs->fat_size,
(long long)fs->fat_size / lss);
if (!fs->root_cluster) {
printf("Root directory starts at byte %llu (sector %llu)\n",
(unsigned long long)fs->root_start,
(unsigned long long)fs->root_start / lss);
printf("%10d root directory entries\n", fs->root_entries);
} else {
printf("Root directory start at cluster %lu (arbitrary size)\n",
(unsigned long)fs->root_cluster);
}
printf("Data area starts at byte %llu (sector %llu)\n",
(unsigned long long)fs->data_start,
(unsigned long long)fs->data_start / lss);
printf("%10lu data clusters (%llu bytes)\n",
(unsigned long)fs->data_clusters,
(unsigned long long)fs->data_clusters * fs->cluster_size);
printf("%u sectors/track, %u heads\n", le16toh(b->secs_track),
le16toh(b->heads));
printf("%10u hidden sectors\n", atari_format ?
/* On Atari, the hidden field is only 16 bit wide and unused */
(((unsigned char *)&b->hidden)[0] |
((unsigned char *)&b->hidden)[1] << 8) : le32toh(b->hidden));
sectors = GET_UNALIGNED_W(b->sectors);
printf("%10u sectors total\n", sectors ? sectors : le32toh(b->total_sect));
}
| 167,231 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool WebRequestPermissions::CanExtensionAccessURL(
const extensions::InfoMap* extension_info_map,
const std::string& extension_id,
const GURL& url,
bool crosses_incognito,
HostPermissionsCheck host_permissions_check) {
if (!extension_info_map)
return true;
const extensions::Extension* extension =
extension_info_map->extensions().GetByID(extension_id);
if (!extension)
return false;
if (crosses_incognito && !extension_info_map->CanCrossIncognito(extension))
return false;
switch (host_permissions_check) {
case DO_NOT_CHECK_HOST:
break;
case REQUIRE_HOST_PERMISSION:
if (!((url.SchemeIs(url::kAboutScheme) ||
extension->permissions_data()->HasHostPermission(url) ||
url.GetOrigin() == extension->url()))) {
return false;
}
break;
case REQUIRE_ALL_URLS:
if (!extension->permissions_data()->HasEffectiveAccessToAllHosts())
return false;
break;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Make extensions use a correct same-origin check.
GURL::GetOrigin does not do the right thing for all types of URLs.
BUG=573317
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1658913002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373381}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | bool WebRequestPermissions::CanExtensionAccessURL(
const extensions::InfoMap* extension_info_map,
const std::string& extension_id,
const GURL& url,
bool crosses_incognito,
HostPermissionsCheck host_permissions_check) {
if (!extension_info_map)
return true;
const extensions::Extension* extension =
extension_info_map->extensions().GetByID(extension_id);
if (!extension)
return false;
if (crosses_incognito && !extension_info_map->CanCrossIncognito(extension))
return false;
switch (host_permissions_check) {
case DO_NOT_CHECK_HOST:
break;
case REQUIRE_HOST_PERMISSION:
if (!url.SchemeIs(url::kAboutScheme) &&
!extension->permissions_data()->HasHostPermission(url) &&
!url::IsSameOriginWith(url, extension->url())) {
return false;
}
break;
case REQUIRE_ALL_URLS:
if (!extension->permissions_data()->HasEffectiveAccessToAllHosts())
return false;
break;
}
return true;
}
| 172,281 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: XRRGetProviderResources(Display *dpy, Window window)
{
XExtDisplayInfo *info = XRRFindDisplay(dpy);
xRRGetProvidersReply rep;
xRRGetProvidersReq *req;
XRRProviderResources *xrpr;
long nbytes, nbytesRead;
int rbytes;
RRCheckExtension (dpy, info, NULL);
LockDisplay (dpy);
GetReq(RRGetProviders, req);
req->reqType = info->codes->major_opcode;
req->randrReqType = X_RRGetProviders;
req->window = window;
if (!_XReply (dpy, (xReply *) &rep, 0, xFalse))
{
UnlockDisplay (dpy);
SyncHandle ();
return NULL;
return NULL;
}
nbytes = (long) rep.length << 2;
nbytesRead = (long) (rep.nProviders * 4);
rbytes = (sizeof(XRRProviderResources) + rep.nProviders * sizeof(RRProvider));
xrpr = (XRRProviderResources *) Xmalloc(rbytes);
if (xrpr == NULL) {
_XEatDataWords (dpy, rep.length);
_XRead32(dpy, (long *) xrpr->providers, rep.nProviders << 2);
if (nbytes > nbytesRead)
_XEatData (dpy, (unsigned long) (nbytes - nbytesRead));
UnlockDisplay (dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (XRRProviderResources *) xrpr;
}
void
XRRFreeProviderResources(XRRProviderResources *provider_resources)
{
free(provider_resources);
}
#define ProviderInfoExtra (SIZEOF(xRRGetProviderInfoReply) - 32)
XRRProviderInfo *
XRRGetProviderInfo(Display *dpy, XRRScreenResources *resources, RRProvider provider)
{
XExtDisplayInfo *info = XRRFindDisplay(dpy);
xRRGetProviderInfoReply rep;
xRRGetProviderInfoReq *req;
int nbytes, nbytesRead, rbytes;
XRRProviderInfo *xpi;
RRCheckExtension (dpy, info, NULL);
LockDisplay (dpy);
GetReq (RRGetProviderInfo, req);
req->reqType = info->codes->major_opcode;
req->randrReqType = X_RRGetProviderInfo;
req->provider = provider;
req->configTimestamp = resources->configTimestamp;
if (!_XReply (dpy, (xReply *) &rep, ProviderInfoExtra >> 2, xFalse))
{
UnlockDisplay (dpy);
SyncHandle ();
return NULL;
}
nbytes = ((long) rep.length << 2) - ProviderInfoExtra;
nbytesRead = (long)(rep.nCrtcs * 4 +
rep.nOutputs * 4 +
rep.nAssociatedProviders * 8 +
((rep.nameLength + 3) & ~3));
return NULL;
}
nbytes = ((long) rep.length << 2) - ProviderInfoExtra;
nbytesRead = (long)(rep.nCrtcs * 4 +
xpi->noutputs = rep.nOutputs;
xpi->nassociatedproviders = rep.nAssociatedProviders;
xpi->crtcs = (RRCrtc *)(xpi + 1);
xpi->outputs = (RROutput *)(xpi->crtcs + rep.nCrtcs);
xpi->associated_providers = (RRProvider *)(xpi->outputs + rep.nOutputs);
xpi->associated_capability = (unsigned int *)(xpi->associated_providers + rep.nAssociatedProviders);
xpi->name = (char *)(xpi->associated_capability + rep.nAssociatedProviders);
_XRead32(dpy, (long *) xpi->crtcs, rep.nCrtcs << 2);
_XRead32(dpy, (long *) xpi->outputs, rep.nOutputs << 2);
_XRead32(dpy, (long *) xpi->associated_providers, rep.nAssociatedProviders << 2);
/*
* _XRead32 reads a series of 32-bit values from the protocol and writes
* them out as a series of "long int" values, but associated_capability
* is defined as unsigned int *, so that won't work for this array.
* Instead we assume for now that "unsigned int" is also 32-bits, so
* the values can be read without any conversion.
*/
_XRead(dpy, (char *) xpi->associated_capability,
rep.nAssociatedProviders << 2);
_XReadPad(dpy, xpi->name, rep.nameLength);
xpi->name[rep.nameLength] = '\0';
/*
* Skip any extra data
*/
if (nbytes > nbytesRead)
_XEatData (dpy, (unsigned long) (nbytes - nbytesRead));
UnlockDisplay (dpy);
SyncHandle ();
return (XRRProviderInfo *) xpi;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787 | XRRGetProviderResources(Display *dpy, Window window)
{
XExtDisplayInfo *info = XRRFindDisplay(dpy);
xRRGetProvidersReply rep;
xRRGetProvidersReq *req;
XRRProviderResources *xrpr;
long nbytes, nbytesRead;
int rbytes;
RRCheckExtension (dpy, info, NULL);
LockDisplay (dpy);
GetReq(RRGetProviders, req);
req->reqType = info->codes->major_opcode;
req->randrReqType = X_RRGetProviders;
req->window = window;
if (!_XReply (dpy, (xReply *) &rep, 0, xFalse))
{
UnlockDisplay (dpy);
SyncHandle ();
return NULL;
return NULL;
}
if (rep.length < INT_MAX >> 2) {
nbytes = (long) rep.length << 2;
nbytesRead = (long) (rep.nProviders * 4);
rbytes = (sizeof(XRRProviderResources) + rep.nProviders *
sizeof(RRProvider));
xrpr = (XRRProviderResources *) Xmalloc(rbytes);
} else {
nbytes = 0;
nbytesRead = 0;
rbytes = 0;
xrpr = NULL;
}
if (xrpr == NULL) {
_XEatDataWords (dpy, rep.length);
_XRead32(dpy, (long *) xrpr->providers, rep.nProviders << 2);
if (nbytes > nbytesRead)
_XEatData (dpy, (unsigned long) (nbytes - nbytesRead));
UnlockDisplay (dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (XRRProviderResources *) xrpr;
}
void
XRRFreeProviderResources(XRRProviderResources *provider_resources)
{
free(provider_resources);
}
#define ProviderInfoExtra (SIZEOF(xRRGetProviderInfoReply) - 32)
XRRProviderInfo *
XRRGetProviderInfo(Display *dpy, XRRScreenResources *resources, RRProvider provider)
{
XExtDisplayInfo *info = XRRFindDisplay(dpy);
xRRGetProviderInfoReply rep;
xRRGetProviderInfoReq *req;
int nbytes, nbytesRead, rbytes;
XRRProviderInfo *xpi;
RRCheckExtension (dpy, info, NULL);
LockDisplay (dpy);
GetReq (RRGetProviderInfo, req);
req->reqType = info->codes->major_opcode;
req->randrReqType = X_RRGetProviderInfo;
req->provider = provider;
req->configTimestamp = resources->configTimestamp;
if (!_XReply (dpy, (xReply *) &rep, ProviderInfoExtra >> 2, xFalse))
{
UnlockDisplay (dpy);
SyncHandle ();
return NULL;
}
nbytes = ((long) rep.length << 2) - ProviderInfoExtra;
nbytesRead = (long)(rep.nCrtcs * 4 +
rep.nOutputs * 4 +
rep.nAssociatedProviders * 8 +
((rep.nameLength + 3) & ~3));
return NULL;
}
if (rep.length > INT_MAX >> 2 || rep.length < ProviderInfoExtra >> 2)
{
if (rep.length < ProviderInfoExtra >> 2)
_XEatDataWords (dpy, rep.length);
else
_XEatDataWords (dpy, rep.length - (ProviderInfoExtra >> 2));
UnlockDisplay (dpy);
SyncHandle ();
return NULL;
}
nbytes = ((long) rep.length << 2) - ProviderInfoExtra;
nbytesRead = (long)(rep.nCrtcs * 4 +
xpi->noutputs = rep.nOutputs;
xpi->nassociatedproviders = rep.nAssociatedProviders;
xpi->crtcs = (RRCrtc *)(xpi + 1);
xpi->outputs = (RROutput *)(xpi->crtcs + rep.nCrtcs);
xpi->associated_providers = (RRProvider *)(xpi->outputs + rep.nOutputs);
xpi->associated_capability = (unsigned int *)(xpi->associated_providers + rep.nAssociatedProviders);
xpi->name = (char *)(xpi->associated_capability + rep.nAssociatedProviders);
_XRead32(dpy, (long *) xpi->crtcs, rep.nCrtcs << 2);
_XRead32(dpy, (long *) xpi->outputs, rep.nOutputs << 2);
_XRead32(dpy, (long *) xpi->associated_providers, rep.nAssociatedProviders << 2);
/*
* _XRead32 reads a series of 32-bit values from the protocol and writes
* them out as a series of "long int" values, but associated_capability
* is defined as unsigned int *, so that won't work for this array.
* Instead we assume for now that "unsigned int" is also 32-bits, so
* the values can be read without any conversion.
*/
_XRead(dpy, (char *) xpi->associated_capability,
rep.nAssociatedProviders << 2);
_XReadPad(dpy, xpi->name, rep.nameLength);
xpi->name[rep.nameLength] = '\0';
/*
* Skip any extra data
*/
if (nbytes > nbytesRead)
_XEatData (dpy, (unsigned long) (nbytes - nbytesRead));
UnlockDisplay (dpy);
SyncHandle ();
return (XRRProviderInfo *) xpi;
}
| 164,916 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: DeviceRequest(
int requesting_process_id,
int requesting_frame_id,
int page_request_id,
bool user_gesture,
MediaStreamRequestType request_type,
const StreamControls& controls,
MediaDeviceSaltAndOrigin salt_and_origin,
DeviceStoppedCallback device_stopped_cb = DeviceStoppedCallback())
: requesting_process_id(requesting_process_id),
requesting_frame_id(requesting_frame_id),
page_request_id(page_request_id),
user_gesture(user_gesture),
controls(controls),
salt_and_origin(std::move(salt_and_origin)),
device_stopped_cb(std::move(device_stopped_cb)),
state_(NUM_MEDIA_TYPES, MEDIA_REQUEST_STATE_NOT_REQUESTED),
request_type_(request_type),
audio_type_(MEDIA_NO_SERVICE),
video_type_(MEDIA_NO_SERVICE),
target_process_id_(-1),
target_frame_id_(-1) {}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | DeviceRequest(
int requesting_process_id,
int requesting_frame_id,
int requester_id,
int page_request_id,
bool user_gesture,
MediaStreamRequestType request_type,
const StreamControls& controls,
MediaDeviceSaltAndOrigin salt_and_origin,
DeviceStoppedCallback device_stopped_cb = DeviceStoppedCallback())
: requesting_process_id(requesting_process_id),
requesting_frame_id(requesting_frame_id),
requester_id(requester_id),
page_request_id(page_request_id),
user_gesture(user_gesture),
controls(controls),
salt_and_origin(std::move(salt_and_origin)),
device_stopped_cb(std::move(device_stopped_cb)),
state_(NUM_MEDIA_TYPES, MEDIA_REQUEST_STATE_NOT_REQUESTED),
request_type_(request_type),
audio_type_(MEDIA_NO_SERVICE),
video_type_(MEDIA_NO_SERVICE),
target_process_id_(-1),
target_frame_id_(-1) {}
| 173,102 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static ssize_t k90_show_current_profile(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf)
{
int ret;
struct usb_interface *usbif = to_usb_interface(dev->parent);
struct usb_device *usbdev = interface_to_usbdev(usbif);
int current_profile;
char data[8];
ret = usb_control_msg(usbdev, usb_rcvctrlpipe(usbdev, 0),
K90_REQUEST_STATUS,
USB_DIR_IN | USB_TYPE_VENDOR |
USB_RECIP_DEVICE, 0, 0, data, 8,
USB_CTRL_SET_TIMEOUT);
if (ret < 0) {
dev_warn(dev, "Failed to get K90 initial state (error %d).\n",
ret);
return -EIO;
}
current_profile = data[7];
if (current_profile < 1 || current_profile > 3) {
dev_warn(dev, "Read invalid current profile: %02hhx.\n",
data[7]);
return -EIO;
}
return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", current_profile);
}
Commit Message: HID: corsair: fix DMA buffers on stack
Not all platforms support DMA to the stack, and specifically since v4.9
this is no longer supported on x86 with VMAP_STACK either.
Note that the macro-mode buffer was larger than necessary.
Fixes: 6f78193ee9ea ("HID: corsair: Add Corsair Vengeance K90 driver")
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static ssize_t k90_show_current_profile(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf)
{
int ret;
struct usb_interface *usbif = to_usb_interface(dev->parent);
struct usb_device *usbdev = interface_to_usbdev(usbif);
int current_profile;
char *data;
data = kmalloc(8, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!data)
return -ENOMEM;
ret = usb_control_msg(usbdev, usb_rcvctrlpipe(usbdev, 0),
K90_REQUEST_STATUS,
USB_DIR_IN | USB_TYPE_VENDOR |
USB_RECIP_DEVICE, 0, 0, data, 8,
USB_CTRL_SET_TIMEOUT);
if (ret < 0) {
dev_warn(dev, "Failed to get K90 initial state (error %d).\n",
ret);
ret = -EIO;
goto out;
}
current_profile = data[7];
if (current_profile < 1 || current_profile > 3) {
dev_warn(dev, "Read invalid current profile: %02hhx.\n",
data[7]);
ret = -EIO;
goto out;
}
ret = snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", current_profile);
out:
kfree(data);
return ret;
}
| 168,394 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static MagickBooleanType DrawStrokePolygon(Image *image,
const DrawInfo *draw_info,const PrimitiveInfo *primitive_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
DrawInfo
*clone_info;
MagickBooleanType
closed_path;
MagickStatusType
status;
PrimitiveInfo
*stroke_polygon;
register const PrimitiveInfo
*p,
*q;
/*
Draw stroked polygon.
*/
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(DrawEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" begin draw-stroke-polygon");
clone_info=CloneDrawInfo((ImageInfo *) NULL,draw_info);
clone_info->fill=draw_info->stroke;
if (clone_info->fill_pattern != (Image *) NULL)
clone_info->fill_pattern=DestroyImage(clone_info->fill_pattern);
if (clone_info->stroke_pattern != (Image *) NULL)
clone_info->fill_pattern=CloneImage(clone_info->stroke_pattern,0,0,
MagickTrue,exception);
clone_info->stroke.alpha=(Quantum) TransparentAlpha;
clone_info->stroke_width=0.0;
clone_info->fill_rule=NonZeroRule;
status=MagickTrue;
for (p=primitive_info; p->primitive != UndefinedPrimitive; p+=p->coordinates)
{
stroke_polygon=TraceStrokePolygon(draw_info,p);
status&=DrawPolygonPrimitive(image,clone_info,stroke_polygon,exception);
if (status == 0)
break;
stroke_polygon=(PrimitiveInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(stroke_polygon);
q=p+p->coordinates-1;
closed_path=(q->point.x == p->point.x) && (q->point.y == p->point.y) ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if ((draw_info->linecap == RoundCap) && (closed_path == MagickFalse))
{
DrawRoundLinecap(image,draw_info,p,exception);
DrawRoundLinecap(image,draw_info,q,exception);
}
}
clone_info=DestroyDrawInfo(clone_info);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(DrawEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" end draw-stroke-polygon");
return(status != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse);
}
Commit Message: Prevent buffer overflow in magick/draw.c
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static MagickBooleanType DrawStrokePolygon(Image *image,
const DrawInfo *draw_info,const PrimitiveInfo *primitive_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
DrawInfo
*clone_info;
MagickBooleanType
closed_path;
MagickStatusType
status;
PrimitiveInfo
*stroke_polygon;
register const PrimitiveInfo
*p,
*q;
/*
Draw stroked polygon.
*/
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(DrawEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" begin draw-stroke-polygon");
clone_info=CloneDrawInfo((ImageInfo *) NULL,draw_info);
clone_info->fill=draw_info->stroke;
if (clone_info->fill_pattern != (Image *) NULL)
clone_info->fill_pattern=DestroyImage(clone_info->fill_pattern);
if (clone_info->stroke_pattern != (Image *) NULL)
clone_info->fill_pattern=CloneImage(clone_info->stroke_pattern,0,0,
MagickTrue,exception);
clone_info->stroke.alpha=(MagickRealType) TransparentAlpha;
clone_info->stroke_width=0.0;
clone_info->fill_rule=NonZeroRule;
status=MagickTrue;
for (p=primitive_info; p->primitive != UndefinedPrimitive; p+=p->coordinates)
{
stroke_polygon=TraceStrokePolygon(draw_info,p);
status&=DrawPolygonPrimitive(image,clone_info,stroke_polygon,exception);
if (status == 0)
break;
stroke_polygon=(PrimitiveInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(stroke_polygon);
q=p+p->coordinates-1;
closed_path=(q->point.x == p->point.x) && (q->point.y == p->point.y) ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if ((draw_info->linecap == RoundCap) && (closed_path == MagickFalse))
{
DrawRoundLinecap(image,draw_info,p,exception);
DrawRoundLinecap(image,draw_info,q,exception);
}
}
clone_info=DestroyDrawInfo(clone_info);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(DrawEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" end draw-stroke-polygon");
return(status != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse);
}
| 167,247 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int snd_timer_user_tselect(struct file *file,
struct snd_timer_select __user *_tselect)
{
struct snd_timer_user *tu;
struct snd_timer_select tselect;
char str[32];
int err = 0;
tu = file->private_data;
mutex_lock(&tu->tread_sem);
if (tu->timeri) {
snd_timer_close(tu->timeri);
tu->timeri = NULL;
}
if (copy_from_user(&tselect, _tselect, sizeof(tselect))) {
err = -EFAULT;
goto __err;
}
sprintf(str, "application %i", current->pid);
if (tselect.id.dev_class != SNDRV_TIMER_CLASS_SLAVE)
tselect.id.dev_sclass = SNDRV_TIMER_SCLASS_APPLICATION;
err = snd_timer_open(&tu->timeri, str, &tselect.id, current->pid);
if (err < 0)
goto __err;
kfree(tu->queue);
tu->queue = NULL;
kfree(tu->tqueue);
tu->tqueue = NULL;
if (tu->tread) {
tu->tqueue = kmalloc(tu->queue_size * sizeof(struct snd_timer_tread),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (tu->tqueue == NULL)
err = -ENOMEM;
} else {
tu->queue = kmalloc(tu->queue_size * sizeof(struct snd_timer_read),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (tu->queue == NULL)
err = -ENOMEM;
}
if (err < 0) {
snd_timer_close(tu->timeri);
tu->timeri = NULL;
} else {
tu->timeri->flags |= SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_FAST;
tu->timeri->callback = tu->tread
? snd_timer_user_tinterrupt : snd_timer_user_interrupt;
tu->timeri->ccallback = snd_timer_user_ccallback;
tu->timeri->callback_data = (void *)tu;
}
__err:
mutex_unlock(&tu->tread_sem);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: timer: Fix race among timer ioctls
ALSA timer ioctls have an open race and this may lead to a
use-after-free of timer instance object. A simplistic fix is to make
each ioctl exclusive. We have already tread_sem for controlling the
tread, and extend this as a global mutex to be applied to each ioctl.
The downside is, of course, the worse concurrency. But these ioctls
aren't to be parallel accessible, in anyway, so it should be fine to
serialize there.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | static int snd_timer_user_tselect(struct file *file,
struct snd_timer_select __user *_tselect)
{
struct snd_timer_user *tu;
struct snd_timer_select tselect;
char str[32];
int err = 0;
tu = file->private_data;
if (tu->timeri) {
snd_timer_close(tu->timeri);
tu->timeri = NULL;
}
if (copy_from_user(&tselect, _tselect, sizeof(tselect))) {
err = -EFAULT;
goto __err;
}
sprintf(str, "application %i", current->pid);
if (tselect.id.dev_class != SNDRV_TIMER_CLASS_SLAVE)
tselect.id.dev_sclass = SNDRV_TIMER_SCLASS_APPLICATION;
err = snd_timer_open(&tu->timeri, str, &tselect.id, current->pid);
if (err < 0)
goto __err;
kfree(tu->queue);
tu->queue = NULL;
kfree(tu->tqueue);
tu->tqueue = NULL;
if (tu->tread) {
tu->tqueue = kmalloc(tu->queue_size * sizeof(struct snd_timer_tread),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (tu->tqueue == NULL)
err = -ENOMEM;
} else {
tu->queue = kmalloc(tu->queue_size * sizeof(struct snd_timer_read),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (tu->queue == NULL)
err = -ENOMEM;
}
if (err < 0) {
snd_timer_close(tu->timeri);
tu->timeri = NULL;
} else {
tu->timeri->flags |= SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_FAST;
tu->timeri->callback = tu->tread
? snd_timer_user_tinterrupt : snd_timer_user_interrupt;
tu->timeri->ccallback = snd_timer_user_ccallback;
tu->timeri->callback_data = (void *)tu;
}
__err:
return err;
}
| 167,407 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: standard_name(char *buffer, size_t bufsize, size_t pos, png_byte colour_type,
int bit_depth, unsigned int npalette, int interlace_type,
png_uint_32 w, png_uint_32 h, int do_interlace)
{
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, colour_types[colour_type]);
if (npalette > 0)
{
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "[");
pos = safecatn(buffer, bufsize, pos, npalette);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "]");
}
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, " ");
pos = safecatn(buffer, bufsize, pos, bit_depth);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, " bit");
if (interlace_type != PNG_INTERLACE_NONE)
{
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, " interlaced");
if (do_interlace)
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "(pngvalid)");
else
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "(libpng)");
}
if (w > 0 || h > 0)
{
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, " ");
pos = safecatn(buffer, bufsize, pos, w);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "x");
pos = safecatn(buffer, bufsize, pos, h);
}
return pos;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | standard_name(char *buffer, size_t bufsize, size_t pos, png_byte colour_type,
int bit_depth, unsigned int npalette, int interlace_type,
png_uint_32 w, png_uint_32 h, int do_interlace)
{
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, colour_types[colour_type]);
if (colour_type == 3) /* must have a palette */
{
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "[");
pos = safecatn(buffer, bufsize, pos, npalette);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "]");
}
else if (npalette != 0)
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "+tRNS");
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, " ");
pos = safecatn(buffer, bufsize, pos, bit_depth);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, " bit");
if (interlace_type != PNG_INTERLACE_NONE)
{
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, " interlaced");
if (do_interlace)
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "(pngvalid)");
else
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "(libpng)");
}
if (w > 0 || h > 0)
{
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, " ");
pos = safecatn(buffer, bufsize, pos, w);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "x");
pos = safecatn(buffer, bufsize, pos, h);
}
return pos;
}
| 173,700 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool SeekHead::ParseEntry(
IMkvReader* pReader,
long long start,
long long size_,
Entry* pEntry)
{
if (size_ <= 0)
return false;
long long pos = start;
const long long stop = start + size_;
long len;
const long long seekIdId = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (seekIdId != 0x13AB) //SeekID ID
return false;
if ((pos + len) > stop)
return false;
pos += len; //consume SeekID id
const long long seekIdSize = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (seekIdSize <= 0)
return false;
if ((pos + len) > stop)
return false;
pos += len; //consume size of field
if ((pos + seekIdSize) > stop)
return false;
pEntry->id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len); //payload
if (pEntry->id <= 0)
return false;
if (len != seekIdSize)
return false;
pos += seekIdSize; //consume SeekID payload
const long long seekPosId = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (seekPosId != 0x13AC) //SeekPos ID
return false;
if ((pos + len) > stop)
return false;
pos += len; //consume id
const long long seekPosSize = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (seekPosSize <= 0)
return false;
if ((pos + len) > stop)
return false;
pos += len; //consume size
if ((pos + seekPosSize) > stop)
return false;
pEntry->pos = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, seekPosSize);
if (pEntry->pos < 0)
return false;
pos += seekPosSize; //consume payload
if (pos != stop)
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | bool SeekHead::ParseEntry(
bool SeekHead::ParseEntry(IMkvReader* pReader, long long start, long long size_,
Entry* pEntry) {
if (size_ <= 0)
return false;
long long pos = start;
const long long stop = start + size_;
long len;
// parse the container for the level-1 element ID
const long long seekIdId = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
// seekIdId;
if (seekIdId != 0x13AB) // SeekID ID
return false;
if ((pos + len) > stop)
return false;
pos += len; // consume SeekID id
const long long seekIdSize = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (seekIdSize <= 0)
return false;
if ((pos + len) > stop)
return false;
pos += len; // consume size of field
if ((pos + seekIdSize) > stop)
return false;
// Note that the SeekId payload really is serialized
// as a "Matroska integer", not as a plain binary value.
// In fact, Matroska requires that ID values in the
// stream exactly match the binary representation as listed
// in the Matroska specification.
//
// This parser is more liberal, and permits IDs to have
// any width. (This could make the representation in the stream
// different from what's in the spec, but it doesn't matter here,
// since we always normalize "Matroska integer" values.)
pEntry->id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len); // payload
if (pEntry->id <= 0)
return false;
if (len != seekIdSize)
return false;
pos += seekIdSize; // consume SeekID payload
const long long seekPosId = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (seekPosId != 0x13AC) // SeekPos ID
return false;
if ((pos + len) > stop)
return false;
pos += len; // consume id
const long long seekPosSize = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (seekPosSize <= 0)
return false;
if ((pos + len) > stop)
return false;
pos += len; // consume size
if ((pos + seekPosSize) > stop)
return false;
pEntry->pos = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, seekPosSize);
if (pEntry->pos < 0)
return false;
pos += seekPosSize; // consume payload
if (pos != stop)
return false;
return true;
}
| 174,426 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool CrossesExtensionProcessBoundary(
const ExtensionSet& extensions,
const GURL& old_url,
const GURL& new_url,
bool should_consider_workaround) {
const extensions::Extension* old_url_extension = GetNonBookmarkAppExtension(
extensions,
old_url);
const extensions::Extension* new_url_extension = GetNonBookmarkAppExtension(
extensions,
new_url);
if (should_consider_workaround) {
bool old_url_is_hosted_app = old_url_extension &&
!old_url_extension->web_extent().is_empty() &&
!AppIsolationInfo::HasIsolatedStorage(old_url_extension);
bool new_url_is_normal_or_hosted = !new_url_extension ||
(!new_url_extension->web_extent().is_empty() &&
!AppIsolationInfo::HasIsolatedStorage(new_url_extension));
bool either_is_web_store =
(old_url_extension &&
old_url_extension->id() == extensions::kWebStoreAppId) ||
(new_url_extension &&
new_url_extension->id() == extensions::kWebStoreAppId);
if (old_url_is_hosted_app &&
new_url_is_normal_or_hosted &&
!either_is_web_store)
return false;
}
return old_url_extension != new_url_extension;
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Update navigations across hypothetical extension extents
Update code to treat navigations across hypothetical extension extents
(e.g. for nonexistent extensions) the same as we do for navigations
crossing installed extension extents.
Bug: 598265
Change-Id: Ibdf2f563ce1fd108ead279077901020a24de732b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/617180
Commit-Queue: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#495779}
CWE ID: | bool CrossesExtensionProcessBoundary(
const ExtensionSet& extensions,
const GURL& old_url,
const GURL& new_url,
bool should_consider_workaround) {
const extensions::Extension* old_url_extension = GetNonBookmarkAppExtension(
extensions,
old_url);
const extensions::Extension* new_url_extension = GetNonBookmarkAppExtension(
extensions,
new_url);
if (should_consider_workaround) {
bool old_url_is_hosted_app = old_url_extension &&
!old_url_extension->web_extent().is_empty() &&
!AppIsolationInfo::HasIsolatedStorage(old_url_extension);
bool new_url_is_normal_or_hosted = !new_url_extension ||
(!new_url_extension->web_extent().is_empty() &&
!AppIsolationInfo::HasIsolatedStorage(new_url_extension));
bool either_is_web_store =
(old_url_extension &&
old_url_extension->id() == extensions::kWebStoreAppId) ||
(new_url_extension &&
new_url_extension->id() == extensions::kWebStoreAppId);
if (old_url_is_hosted_app &&
new_url_is_normal_or_hosted &&
!either_is_web_store)
return false;
}
// If there are no extensions associated with either url, we check if the new
// url points to an extension origin. If it does, fork - extension
// installation should not be a factor.
if (!old_url_extension && !new_url_extension) {
// Hypothetically, we could also do an origin check here to make sure that
// the two urls point two different extensions, but it's not really
// necesary since we know there wasn't an associated extension with the old
// url.
return new_url.SchemeIs(kExtensionScheme);
}
return old_url_extension != new_url_extension;
}
| 172,959 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void fe_netjoin_init(void)
{
settings_add_bool("misc", "hide_netsplit_quits", TRUE);
settings_add_int("misc", "netjoin_max_nicks", 10);
join_tag = -1;
printing_joins = FALSE;
read_settings();
signal_add("setup changed", (SIGNAL_FUNC) read_settings);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'netjoin-timeout' into 'master'
fe-netjoin: remove irc servers on "server disconnected" signal
Closes #7
See merge request !10
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void fe_netjoin_init(void)
{
settings_add_bool("misc", "hide_netsplit_quits", TRUE);
settings_add_int("misc", "netjoin_max_nicks", 10);
join_tag = -1;
printing_joins = FALSE;
read_settings();
signal_add("setup changed", (SIGNAL_FUNC) read_settings);
signal_add("server disconnected", (SIGNAL_FUNC) sig_server_disconnected);
}
| 168,291 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static PHP_FUNCTION(xmlwriter_open_uri)
{
char *valid_file = NULL;
xmlwriter_object *intern;
xmlTextWriterPtr ptr;
char *source;
char resolved_path[MAXPATHLEN + 1];
int source_len;
#ifdef ZEND_ENGINE_2
zval *this = getThis();
ze_xmlwriter_object *ze_obj = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef ZEND_ENGINE_2
xmlOutputBufferPtr out_buffer;
void *ioctx;
#endif
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s", &source, &source_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
#ifdef ZEND_ENGINE_2
if (this) {
/* We do not use XMLWRITER_FROM_OBJECT, xmlwriter init function here */
ze_obj = (ze_xmlwriter_object*) zend_object_store_get_object(this TSRMLS_CC);
}
#endif
if (source_len == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Empty string as source");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
valid_file = _xmlwriter_get_valid_file_path(source, resolved_path, MAXPATHLEN TSRMLS_CC);
if (!valid_file) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to resolve file path");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
/* TODO: Fix either the PHP stream or libxml APIs: it can then detect when a given
path is valid and not report out of memory error. Once it is done, remove the
directory check in _xmlwriter_get_valid_file_path */
#ifndef ZEND_ENGINE_2
ioctx = php_xmlwriter_streams_IO_open_write_wrapper(valid_file TSRMLS_CC);
if (ioctx == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
out_buffer = xmlOutputBufferCreateIO(php_xmlwriter_streams_IO_write,
php_xmlwriter_streams_IO_close, ioctx, NULL);
if (out_buffer == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to create output buffer");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ptr = xmlNewTextWriter(out_buffer);
#else
ptr = xmlNewTextWriterFilename(valid_file, 0);
#endif
if (!ptr) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
intern = emalloc(sizeof(xmlwriter_object));
intern->ptr = ptr;
intern->output = NULL;
#ifndef ZEND_ENGINE_2
intern->uri_output = out_buffer;
#else
if (this) {
if (ze_obj->xmlwriter_ptr) {
xmlwriter_free_resource_ptr(ze_obj->xmlwriter_ptr TSRMLS_CC);
}
ze_obj->xmlwriter_ptr = intern;
RETURN_TRUE;
} else
#endif
{
ZEND_REGISTER_RESOURCE(return_value,intern,le_xmlwriter);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | static PHP_FUNCTION(xmlwriter_open_uri)
{
char *valid_file = NULL;
xmlwriter_object *intern;
xmlTextWriterPtr ptr;
char *source;
char resolved_path[MAXPATHLEN + 1];
int source_len;
#ifdef ZEND_ENGINE_2
zval *this = getThis();
ze_xmlwriter_object *ze_obj = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef ZEND_ENGINE_2
xmlOutputBufferPtr out_buffer;
void *ioctx;
#endif
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "p", &source, &source_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
#ifdef ZEND_ENGINE_2
if (this) {
/* We do not use XMLWRITER_FROM_OBJECT, xmlwriter init function here */
ze_obj = (ze_xmlwriter_object*) zend_object_store_get_object(this TSRMLS_CC);
}
#endif
if (source_len == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Empty string as source");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
valid_file = _xmlwriter_get_valid_file_path(source, resolved_path, MAXPATHLEN TSRMLS_CC);
if (!valid_file) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to resolve file path");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
/* TODO: Fix either the PHP stream or libxml APIs: it can then detect when a given
path is valid and not report out of memory error. Once it is done, remove the
directory check in _xmlwriter_get_valid_file_path */
#ifndef ZEND_ENGINE_2
ioctx = php_xmlwriter_streams_IO_open_write_wrapper(valid_file TSRMLS_CC);
if (ioctx == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
out_buffer = xmlOutputBufferCreateIO(php_xmlwriter_streams_IO_write,
php_xmlwriter_streams_IO_close, ioctx, NULL);
if (out_buffer == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to create output buffer");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ptr = xmlNewTextWriter(out_buffer);
#else
ptr = xmlNewTextWriterFilename(valid_file, 0);
#endif
if (!ptr) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
intern = emalloc(sizeof(xmlwriter_object));
intern->ptr = ptr;
intern->output = NULL;
#ifndef ZEND_ENGINE_2
intern->uri_output = out_buffer;
#else
if (this) {
if (ze_obj->xmlwriter_ptr) {
xmlwriter_free_resource_ptr(ze_obj->xmlwriter_ptr TSRMLS_CC);
}
ze_obj->xmlwriter_ptr = intern;
RETURN_TRUE;
} else
#endif
{
ZEND_REGISTER_RESOURCE(return_value,intern,le_xmlwriter);
}
}
| 165,318 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void *atomic_thread(void *context) {
struct atomic_test_s32_s *at = (struct atomic_test_s32_s *)context;
for (int i = 0; i < at->max_val; i++) {
usleep(1);
atomic_inc_prefix_s32(&at->data[i]);
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | void *atomic_thread(void *context) {
struct atomic_test_s32_s *at = (struct atomic_test_s32_s *)context;
for (int i = 0; i < at->max_val; i++) {
TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(usleep(1));
atomic_inc_prefix_s32(&at->data[i]);
}
return NULL;
}
| 173,490 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void spl_filesystem_dir_it_rewind(zend_object_iterator *iter TSRMLS_DC)
{
spl_filesystem_object *object = spl_filesystem_iterator_to_object((spl_filesystem_iterator *)iter);
object->u.dir.index = 0;
if (object->u.dir.dirp) {
php_stream_rewinddir(object->u.dir.dirp);
}
spl_filesystem_dir_read(object TSRMLS_CC);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | static void spl_filesystem_dir_it_rewind(zend_object_iterator *iter TSRMLS_DC)
{
spl_filesystem_object *object = spl_filesystem_iterator_to_object((spl_filesystem_iterator *)iter);
object->u.dir.index = 0;
if (object->u.dir.dirp) {
php_stream_rewinddir(object->u.dir.dirp);
}
spl_filesystem_dir_read(object TSRMLS_CC);
}
| 167,072 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
{
int ssl_major,ssl_minor;
int i,n;
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
unsigned char *p = NULL;
unsigned short version;
DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
unsigned int is_next_epoch;
rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
/* The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the
* pending records. This is a non-blocking operation. */
dtls1_process_buffered_records(s);
/* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
return 1;
/* get something from the wire */
again:
/* check if we have the header */
if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
(s->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
{
n=ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
/* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
/* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
if (s->packet_length != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
{
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
p=s->packet;
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
/* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
rr->type= *(p++);
ssl_major= *(p++);
ssl_minor= *(p++);
version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
/* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
n2s(p,rr->epoch);
memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), p, 6);
p+=6;
n2s(p,rr->length);
/* Lets check version */
if (!s->first_packet)
{
if (version != s->version)
{
/* unexpected version, silently discard */
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
}
if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00))
{
/* wrong version, silently discard record */
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
{
/* record too long, silently discard it */
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
/* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
}
/* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
if (rr->length > s->packet_length-DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
{
/* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
i=rr->length;
n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
/* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
if ( n != i)
{
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
/* now n == rr->length,
* and s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
}
s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
/* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
if ( bitmap == NULL)
{
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
goto again; /* get another record */
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */
if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
{
#endif
/* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record.
* Don't check if we're listening and this message is
* a ClientHello. They can look as if they're replayed,
* since they arrive from different connections and
* would be dropped unnecessarily.
*/
if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
s->packet_length > DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH &&
s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
!dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap))
{
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length=0; /* dump this record */
goto again; /* get another record */
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
}
#endif
/* just read a 0 length packet */
if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
/* If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT),
* and a handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it
* cannot be processed at this time. However, do not buffer
* anything while listening.
*/
if (is_next_epoch)
{
if ((SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) && !s->d1->listen)
{
dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num);
}
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
if (!dtls1_process_record(s))
{
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
goto again; /* get another record */
}
return(1);
}
Commit Message: A memory leak can occur in dtls1_buffer_record if either of the calls to
ssl3_setup_buffers or pqueue_insert fail. The former will fail if there is a
malloc failure, whilst the latter will fail if attempting to add a duplicate
record to the queue. This should never happen because duplicate records should
be detected and dropped before any attempt to add them to the queue.
Unfortunately records that arrive that are for the next epoch are not being
recorded correctly, and therefore replays are not being detected.
Additionally, these "should not happen" failures that can occur in
dtls1_buffer_record are not being treated as fatal and therefore an attacker
could exploit this by sending repeated replay records for the next epoch,
eventually causing a DoS through memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Chris Mueller for reporting this issue and providing initial
analysis and a patch. Further analysis and the final patch was performed by
Matt Caswell from the OpenSSL development team.
CVE-2015-0206
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
{
int ssl_major,ssl_minor;
int i,n;
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
unsigned char *p = NULL;
unsigned short version;
DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
unsigned int is_next_epoch;
rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
/* The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the
* pending records. This is a non-blocking operation. */
if(dtls1_process_buffered_records(s)<0)
return -1;
/* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
return 1;
/* get something from the wire */
again:
/* check if we have the header */
if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
(s->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
{
n=ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
/* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
/* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
if (s->packet_length != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
{
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
p=s->packet;
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
/* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
rr->type= *(p++);
ssl_major= *(p++);
ssl_minor= *(p++);
version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
/* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
n2s(p,rr->epoch);
memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), p, 6);
p+=6;
n2s(p,rr->length);
/* Lets check version */
if (!s->first_packet)
{
if (version != s->version)
{
/* unexpected version, silently discard */
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
}
if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00))
{
/* wrong version, silently discard record */
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
{
/* record too long, silently discard it */
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
/* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
}
/* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
if (rr->length > s->packet_length-DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
{
/* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
i=rr->length;
n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
/* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
if ( n != i)
{
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
/* now n == rr->length,
* and s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
}
s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
/* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
if ( bitmap == NULL)
{
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
goto again; /* get another record */
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */
if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
{
#endif
/* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record.
* Don't check if we're listening and this message is
* a ClientHello. They can look as if they're replayed,
* since they arrive from different connections and
* would be dropped unnecessarily.
*/
if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
s->packet_length > DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH &&
s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
!dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap))
{
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length=0; /* dump this record */
goto again; /* get another record */
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
}
#endif
/* just read a 0 length packet */
if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
/* If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT),
* and a handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it
* cannot be processed at this time. However, do not buffer
* anything while listening.
*/
if (is_next_epoch)
{
if ((SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) && !s->d1->listen)
{
if(dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num)<0)
return -1;
dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);/* Mark receipt of record. */
}
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
if (!dtls1_process_record(s))
{
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
goto again; /* get another record */
}
dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);/* Mark receipt of record. */
return(1);
}
| 166,746 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ssize_t socket_write_and_transfer_fd(const socket_t *socket, const void *buf, size_t count, int fd) {
assert(socket != NULL);
assert(buf != NULL);
if (fd == INVALID_FD)
return socket_write(socket, buf, count);
struct msghdr msg;
struct iovec iov;
char control_buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))];
iov.iov_base = (void *)buf;
iov.iov_len = count;
msg.msg_iov = &iov;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
msg.msg_control = control_buf;
msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(control_buf);
msg.msg_name = NULL;
msg.msg_namelen = 0;
struct cmsghdr *header = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
header->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
header->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS;
header->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int));
*(int *)CMSG_DATA(header) = fd;
ssize_t ret = sendmsg(socket->fd, &msg, MSG_DONTWAIT);
close(fd);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | ssize_t socket_write_and_transfer_fd(const socket_t *socket, const void *buf, size_t count, int fd) {
assert(socket != NULL);
assert(buf != NULL);
if (fd == INVALID_FD)
return socket_write(socket, buf, count);
struct msghdr msg;
struct iovec iov;
char control_buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))];
iov.iov_base = (void *)buf;
iov.iov_len = count;
msg.msg_iov = &iov;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
msg.msg_control = control_buf;
msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(control_buf);
msg.msg_name = NULL;
msg.msg_namelen = 0;
struct cmsghdr *header = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
header->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
header->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS;
header->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int));
*(int *)CMSG_DATA(header) = fd;
ssize_t ret = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(sendmsg(socket->fd, &msg, MSG_DONTWAIT));
close(fd);
return ret;
}
| 173,488 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool ExtensionViewGuest::NavigateGuest(const std::string& src,
bool force_navigation) {
GURL url = extension_url_.Resolve(src);
bool url_not_allowed = (url != GURL(url::kAboutBlankURL)) &&
(url.GetOrigin() != extension_url_.GetOrigin());
if (!url.is_valid() || url_not_allowed)
return NavigateGuest(url::kAboutBlankURL, true /* force_navigation */);
if (!force_navigation && (url_ == url))
return false;
web_contents()->GetRenderProcessHost()->FilterURL(false, &url);
web_contents()->GetController().LoadURL(url, content::Referrer(),
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_AUTO_TOPLEVEL,
std::string());
url_ = url;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Make extensions use a correct same-origin check.
GURL::GetOrigin does not do the right thing for all types of URLs.
BUG=573317
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1658913002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373381}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | bool ExtensionViewGuest::NavigateGuest(const std::string& src,
bool force_navigation) {
GURL url = extension_url_.Resolve(src);
bool url_not_allowed = url != GURL(url::kAboutBlankURL) &&
!url::IsSameOriginWith(url, extension_url_);
if (!url.is_valid() || url_not_allowed)
return NavigateGuest(url::kAboutBlankURL, true /* force_navigation */);
if (!force_navigation && (url_ == url))
return false;
web_contents()->GetRenderProcessHost()->FilterURL(false, &url);
web_contents()->GetController().LoadURL(url, content::Referrer(),
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_AUTO_TOPLEVEL,
std::string());
url_ = url;
return true;
}
| 172,284 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void scsi_dma_restart_bh(void *opaque)
{
SCSIDiskState *s = opaque;
SCSIRequest *req;
SCSIDiskReq *r;
qemu_bh_delete(s->bh);
s->bh = NULL;
QTAILQ_FOREACH(req, &s->qdev.requests, next) {
r = DO_UPCAST(SCSIDiskReq, req, req);
if (r->status & SCSI_REQ_STATUS_RETRY) {
int status = r->status;
int ret;
r->status &=
~(SCSI_REQ_STATUS_RETRY | SCSI_REQ_STATUS_RETRY_TYPE_MASK);
switch (status & SCSI_REQ_STATUS_RETRY_TYPE_MASK) {
case SCSI_REQ_STATUS_RETRY_READ:
scsi_read_data(&r->req);
break;
case SCSI_REQ_STATUS_RETRY_WRITE:
scsi_write_data(&r->req);
break;
case SCSI_REQ_STATUS_RETRY_FLUSH:
ret = scsi_disk_emulate_command(r, r->iov.iov_base);
if (ret == 0) {
scsi_req_complete(&r->req, GOOD);
}
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: scsi-disk: lazily allocate bounce buffer
It will not be needed for reads and writes if the HBA provides a sglist.
In addition, this lets scsi-disk refuse commands with an excessive
allocation length, as well as limit memory on usual well-behaved guests.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static void scsi_dma_restart_bh(void *opaque)
{
SCSIDiskState *s = opaque;
SCSIRequest *req;
SCSIDiskReq *r;
qemu_bh_delete(s->bh);
s->bh = NULL;
QTAILQ_FOREACH(req, &s->qdev.requests, next) {
r = DO_UPCAST(SCSIDiskReq, req, req);
if (r->status & SCSI_REQ_STATUS_RETRY) {
int status = r->status;
int ret;
r->status &=
~(SCSI_REQ_STATUS_RETRY | SCSI_REQ_STATUS_RETRY_TYPE_MASK);
switch (status & SCSI_REQ_STATUS_RETRY_TYPE_MASK) {
case SCSI_REQ_STATUS_RETRY_READ:
scsi_read_data(&r->req);
break;
case SCSI_REQ_STATUS_RETRY_WRITE:
scsi_write_data(&r->req);
break;
case SCSI_REQ_STATUS_RETRY_FLUSH:
ret = scsi_disk_emulate_command(r);
if (ret == 0) {
scsi_req_complete(&r->req, GOOD);
}
}
}
}
}
| 166,552 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void WebLocalFrameImpl::LoadJavaScriptURL(const KURL& url) {
DCHECK(GetFrame());
Document* owner_document = GetFrame()->GetDocument();
if (!owner_document || !GetFrame()->GetPage())
return;
if (SchemeRegistry::ShouldTreatURLSchemeAsNotAllowingJavascriptURLs(
owner_document->Url().Protocol()))
return;
String script = DecodeURLEscapeSequences(
url.GetString().Substring(strlen("javascript:")));
UserGestureIndicator gesture_indicator(
UserGestureToken::Create(owner_document, UserGestureToken::kNewGesture));
v8::HandleScope handle_scope(ToIsolate(GetFrame()));
v8::Local<v8::Value> result =
GetFrame()->GetScriptController().ExecuteScriptInMainWorldAndReturnValue(
ScriptSourceCode(script));
if (result.IsEmpty() || !result->IsString())
return;
String script_result = ToCoreString(v8::Local<v8::String>::Cast(result));
if (!GetFrame()->GetNavigationScheduler().LocationChangePending()) {
GetFrame()->Loader().ReplaceDocumentWhileExecutingJavaScriptURL(
script_result, owner_document);
}
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | void WebLocalFrameImpl::LoadJavaScriptURL(const KURL& url) {
DCHECK(GetFrame());
Document* owner_document = GetFrame()->GetDocument();
if (!owner_document || !GetFrame()->GetPage())
return;
if (SchemeRegistry::ShouldTreatURLSchemeAsNotAllowingJavascriptURLs(
owner_document->Url().Protocol()))
return;
String script = DecodeURLEscapeSequences(
url.GetString().Substring(strlen("javascript:")));
UserGestureIndicator gesture_indicator(
UserGestureToken::Create(owner_document, UserGestureToken::kNewGesture));
v8::HandleScope handle_scope(ToIsolate(GetFrame()));
v8::Local<v8::Value> result =
GetFrame()->GetScriptController().ExecuteScriptInMainWorldAndReturnValue(
ScriptSourceCode(script));
if (result.IsEmpty() || !result->IsString())
return;
String script_result = ToCoreString(v8::Local<v8::String>::Cast(result));
if (!GetFrame()->GetNavigationScheduler().LocationChangePending()) {
GetFrame()->Loader().ReplaceDocumentWhileExecutingJavaScriptURL(
script_result, owner_document);
}
}
| 172,301 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: gfx::Size CardUnmaskPromptViews::GetPreferredSize() const {
const int kWidth = 375;
return gfx::Size(kWidth, GetHeightForWidth(kWidth));
}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | gfx::Size CardUnmaskPromptViews::GetPreferredSize() const {
// Must hardcode a width so the label knows where to wrap.
const int kWidth = 375;
return gfx::Size(kWidth, GetHeightForWidth(kWidth));
}
| 171,142 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool AppCacheDatabase::UpgradeSchema() {
return DeleteExistingAndCreateNewDatabase();
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | bool AppCacheDatabase::UpgradeSchema() {
// Start from scratch for versions that would require unsupported migrations.
if (meta_table_->GetVersionNumber() < 7)
return DeleteExistingAndCreateNewDatabase();
sql::Transaction transaction(db_.get());
if (!transaction.Begin())
return false;
if (!db_->Execute("ALTER TABLE Caches ADD COLUMN padding_size INTEGER"))
return false;
if (!db_->Execute("ALTER TABLE Entries ADD COLUMN padding_size INTEGER"))
return false;
meta_table_->SetVersionNumber(8);
meta_table_->SetCompatibleVersionNumber(8);
if (!AppCacheBackfillerVersion8(db_.get()).BackfillPaddingSizes())
return false;
return transaction.Commit();
}
| 172,983 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static inline int ip6_ufo_append_data(struct sock *sk,
int getfrag(void *from, char *to, int offset, int len,
int odd, struct sk_buff *skb),
void *from, int length, int hh_len, int fragheaderlen,
int transhdrlen, int mtu,unsigned int flags)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err;
/* There is support for UDP large send offload by network
* device, so create one single skb packet containing complete
* udp datagram
*/
if ((skb = skb_peek_tail(&sk->sk_write_queue)) == NULL) {
skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk,
hh_len + fragheaderlen + transhdrlen + 20,
(flags & MSG_DONTWAIT), &err);
if (skb == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
/* reserve space for Hardware header */
skb_reserve(skb, hh_len);
/* create space for UDP/IP header */
skb_put(skb,fragheaderlen + transhdrlen);
/* initialize network header pointer */
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
/* initialize protocol header pointer */
skb->transport_header = skb->network_header + fragheaderlen;
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL;
skb->csum = 0;
}
err = skb_append_datato_frags(sk,skb, getfrag, from,
(length - transhdrlen));
if (!err) {
struct frag_hdr fhdr;
/* Specify the length of each IPv6 datagram fragment.
* It has to be a multiple of 8.
*/
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size = (mtu - fragheaderlen -
sizeof(struct frag_hdr)) & ~7;
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type = SKB_GSO_UDP;
ipv6_select_ident(&fhdr);
skb_shinfo(skb)->ip6_frag_id = fhdr.identification;
__skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_write_queue, skb);
return 0;
}
/* There is not enough support do UPD LSO,
* so follow normal path
*/
kfree_skb(skb);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: make fragment identifications less predictable
IPv6 fragment identification generation is way beyond what we use for
IPv4 : It uses a single generator. Its not scalable and allows DOS
attacks.
Now inetpeer is IPv6 aware, we can use it to provide a more secure and
scalable frag ident generator (per destination, instead of system wide)
This patch :
1) defines a new secure_ipv6_id() helper
2) extends inet_getid() to provide 32bit results
3) extends ipv6_select_ident() with a new dest parameter
Reported-by: Fernando Gont <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | static inline int ip6_ufo_append_data(struct sock *sk,
int getfrag(void *from, char *to, int offset, int len,
int odd, struct sk_buff *skb),
void *from, int length, int hh_len, int fragheaderlen,
int transhdrlen, int mtu,unsigned int flags,
struct rt6_info *rt)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err;
/* There is support for UDP large send offload by network
* device, so create one single skb packet containing complete
* udp datagram
*/
if ((skb = skb_peek_tail(&sk->sk_write_queue)) == NULL) {
skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk,
hh_len + fragheaderlen + transhdrlen + 20,
(flags & MSG_DONTWAIT), &err);
if (skb == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
/* reserve space for Hardware header */
skb_reserve(skb, hh_len);
/* create space for UDP/IP header */
skb_put(skb,fragheaderlen + transhdrlen);
/* initialize network header pointer */
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
/* initialize protocol header pointer */
skb->transport_header = skb->network_header + fragheaderlen;
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL;
skb->csum = 0;
}
err = skb_append_datato_frags(sk,skb, getfrag, from,
(length - transhdrlen));
if (!err) {
struct frag_hdr fhdr;
/* Specify the length of each IPv6 datagram fragment.
* It has to be a multiple of 8.
*/
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size = (mtu - fragheaderlen -
sizeof(struct frag_hdr)) & ~7;
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type = SKB_GSO_UDP;
ipv6_select_ident(&fhdr, rt);
skb_shinfo(skb)->ip6_frag_id = fhdr.identification;
__skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_write_queue, skb);
return 0;
}
/* There is not enough support do UPD LSO,
* so follow normal path
*/
kfree_skb(skb);
return err;
}
| 165,853 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: midi_synth_load_patch(int dev, int format, const char __user *addr,
int offs, int count, int pmgr_flag)
{
int orig_dev = synth_devs[dev]->midi_dev;
struct sysex_info sysex;
int i;
unsigned long left, src_offs, eox_seen = 0;
int first_byte = 1;
int hdr_size = (unsigned long) &sysex.data[0] - (unsigned long) &sysex;
leave_sysex(dev);
if (!prefix_cmd(orig_dev, 0xf0))
return 0;
if (format != SYSEX_PATCH)
{
/* printk("MIDI Error: Invalid patch format (key) 0x%x\n", format);*/
return -EINVAL;
}
if (count < hdr_size)
{
/* printk("MIDI Error: Patch header too short\n");*/
return -EINVAL;
}
count -= hdr_size;
/*
* Copy the header from user space but ignore the first bytes which have
* been transferred already.
*/
if(copy_from_user(&((char *) &sysex)[offs], &(addr)[offs], hdr_size - offs))
return -EFAULT;
if (count < sysex.len)
{
/* printk(KERN_WARNING "MIDI Warning: Sysex record too short (%d<%d)\n", count, (int) sysex.len);*/
sysex.len = count;
}
left = sysex.len;
src_offs = 0;
for (i = 0; i < left && !signal_pending(current); i++)
{
unsigned char data;
if (get_user(data,
(unsigned char __user *)(addr + hdr_size + i)))
return -EFAULT;
eox_seen = (i > 0 && data & 0x80); /* End of sysex */
if (eox_seen && data != 0xf7)
data = 0xf7;
if (i == 0)
{
if (data != 0xf0)
{
printk(KERN_WARNING "midi_synth: Sysex start missing\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
}
while (!midi_devs[orig_dev]->outputc(orig_dev, (unsigned char) (data & 0xff)) &&
!signal_pending(current))
schedule();
if (!first_byte && data & 0x80)
return 0;
first_byte = 0;
}
if (!eox_seen)
midi_outc(orig_dev, 0xf7);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: sound/oss: remove offset from load_patch callbacks
Was: [PATCH] sound/oss/midi_synth: prevent underflow, use of
uninitialized value, and signedness issue
The offset passed to midi_synth_load_patch() can be essentially
arbitrary. If it's greater than the header length, this will result in
a copy_from_user(dst, src, negative_val). While this will just return
-EFAULT on x86, on other architectures this may cause memory corruption.
Additionally, the length field of the sysex_info structure may not be
initialized prior to its use. Finally, a signed comparison may result
in an unintentionally large loop.
On suggestion by Takashi Iwai, version two removes the offset argument
from the load_patch callbacks entirely, which also resolves similar
issues in opl3. Compile tested only.
v3 adjusts comments and hopefully gets copy offsets right.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | midi_synth_load_patch(int dev, int format, const char __user *addr,
int count, int pmgr_flag)
{
int orig_dev = synth_devs[dev]->midi_dev;
struct sysex_info sysex;
int i;
unsigned long left, src_offs, eox_seen = 0;
int first_byte = 1;
int hdr_size = (unsigned long) &sysex.data[0] - (unsigned long) &sysex;
leave_sysex(dev);
if (!prefix_cmd(orig_dev, 0xf0))
return 0;
/* Invalid patch format */
if (format != SYSEX_PATCH)
return -EINVAL;
/* Patch header too short */
if (count < hdr_size)
return -EINVAL;
count -= hdr_size;
/*
* Copy the header from user space
*/
if (copy_from_user(&sysex, addr, hdr_size))
return -EFAULT;
/* Sysex record too short */
if ((unsigned)count < (unsigned)sysex.len)
sysex.len = count;
left = sysex.len;
src_offs = 0;
for (i = 0; i < left && !signal_pending(current); i++)
{
unsigned char data;
if (get_user(data,
(unsigned char __user *)(addr + hdr_size + i)))
return -EFAULT;
eox_seen = (i > 0 && data & 0x80); /* End of sysex */
if (eox_seen && data != 0xf7)
data = 0xf7;
if (i == 0)
{
if (data != 0xf0)
{
printk(KERN_WARNING "midi_synth: Sysex start missing\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
}
while (!midi_devs[orig_dev]->outputc(orig_dev, (unsigned char) (data & 0xff)) &&
!signal_pending(current))
schedule();
if (!first_byte && data & 0x80)
return 0;
first_byte = 0;
}
if (!eox_seen)
midi_outc(orig_dev, 0xf7);
return 0;
}
| 165,892 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: AppCacheUpdateJob::~AppCacheUpdateJob() {
if (service_)
service_->RemoveObserver(this);
if (internal_state_ != COMPLETED)
Cancel();
DCHECK(!manifest_fetcher_);
DCHECK(pending_url_fetches_.empty());
DCHECK(!inprogress_cache_.get());
DCHECK(pending_master_entries_.empty());
DCHECK(master_entry_fetches_.empty());
if (group_)
group_->SetUpdateAppCacheStatus(AppCacheGroup::IDLE);
}
Commit Message: AppCache: fix a browser crashing bug that can happen during updates.
BUG=558589
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1463463003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#360967}
CWE ID: | AppCacheUpdateJob::~AppCacheUpdateJob() {
if (service_)
service_->RemoveObserver(this);
if (internal_state_ != COMPLETED)
Cancel();
DCHECK(!inprogress_cache_.get());
DCHECK(pending_master_entries_.empty());
// The job must not outlive any of its fetchers.
CHECK(!manifest_fetcher_);
CHECK(pending_url_fetches_.empty());
CHECK(master_entry_fetches_.empty());
if (group_)
group_->SetUpdateAppCacheStatus(AppCacheGroup::IDLE);
}
| 171,734 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: views::ImageButton* close_button() const {
return media_controls_view_->close_button_;
}
Commit Message: [Lock Screen Media Controls] Tweak UI based on new mocks
This CL rearranges the different components of the CrOS lock screen
media controls based on the newest mocks. This involves resizing most
of the child views and their spacings. The artwork was also resized
and re-positioned. Additionally, the close button was moved from the
main view to the header row child view.
Artist and title data about the current session will eventually be
placed to the right of the artwork, but right now this space is empty.
See the bug for before and after pictures.
Bug: 991647
Change-Id: I7b97f31982ccf2912bd2564d5241bfd849d21d92
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1746554
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Becca Hughes <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Mia Bergeron <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#686253}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | views::ImageButton* close_button() const {
| 172,343 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void Ins_MDRP( INS_ARG )
{
Int point;
TT_F26Dot6 distance,
org_dist;
point = (Int)args[0];
if ( BOUNDS( args[0], CUR.zp1.n_points ) )
{
/* Current version of FreeType silently ignores this out of bounds error
* and drops the instruction, see bug #691121
return;
}
/* XXX: Is there some undocumented feature while in the */
/* twilight zone? */
org_dist = CUR_Func_dualproj( CUR.zp1.org_x[point] -
CUR.zp0.org_x[CUR.GS.rp0],
CUR.zp1.org_y[point] -
CUR.zp0.org_y[CUR.GS.rp0] );
/* single width cutin test */
if ( ABS(org_dist) < CUR.GS.single_width_cutin )
{
if ( org_dist >= 0 )
org_dist = CUR.GS.single_width_value;
else
org_dist = -CUR.GS.single_width_value;
}
/* round flag */
if ( (CUR.opcode & 4) != 0 )
distance = CUR_Func_round( org_dist,
CUR.metrics.compensations[CUR.opcode & 3] );
else
distance = Round_None( EXEC_ARGS
org_dist,
CUR.metrics.compensations[CUR.opcode & 3] );
/* minimum distance flag */
if ( (CUR.opcode & 8) != 0 )
{
if ( org_dist >= 0 )
{
if ( distance < CUR.GS.minimum_distance )
distance = CUR.GS.minimum_distance;
}
else
{
if ( distance > -CUR.GS.minimum_distance )
distance = -CUR.GS.minimum_distance;
}
}
/* now move the point */
org_dist = CUR_Func_project( CUR.zp1.cur_x[point] -
CUR.zp0.cur_x[CUR.GS.rp0],
CUR.zp1.cur_y[point] -
CUR.zp0.cur_y[CUR.GS.rp0] );
CUR_Func_move( &CUR.zp1, point, distance - org_dist );
CUR.GS.rp1 = CUR.GS.rp0;
CUR.GS.rp2 = point;
if ( (CUR.opcode & 16) != 0 )
CUR.GS.rp0 = point;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static void Ins_MDRP( INS_ARG )
{
Int point;
TT_F26Dot6 distance,
org_dist;
point = (Int)args[0];
if ( BOUNDS( args[0], CUR.zp1.n_points ) ||
BOUNDS( CUR.GS.rp0, CUR.zp0.n_points) )
{
/* Current version of FreeType silently ignores this out of bounds error
* and drops the instruction, see bug #691121
return;
}
/* XXX: Is there some undocumented feature while in the */
/* twilight zone? */
org_dist = CUR_Func_dualproj( CUR.zp1.org_x[point] -
CUR.zp0.org_x[CUR.GS.rp0],
CUR.zp1.org_y[point] -
CUR.zp0.org_y[CUR.GS.rp0] );
/* single width cutin test */
if ( ABS(org_dist) < CUR.GS.single_width_cutin )
{
if ( org_dist >= 0 )
org_dist = CUR.GS.single_width_value;
else
org_dist = -CUR.GS.single_width_value;
}
/* round flag */
if ( (CUR.opcode & 4) != 0 )
distance = CUR_Func_round( org_dist,
CUR.metrics.compensations[CUR.opcode & 3] );
else
distance = Round_None( EXEC_ARGS
org_dist,
CUR.metrics.compensations[CUR.opcode & 3] );
/* minimum distance flag */
if ( (CUR.opcode & 8) != 0 )
{
if ( org_dist >= 0 )
{
if ( distance < CUR.GS.minimum_distance )
distance = CUR.GS.minimum_distance;
}
else
{
if ( distance > -CUR.GS.minimum_distance )
distance = -CUR.GS.minimum_distance;
}
}
/* now move the point */
org_dist = CUR_Func_project( CUR.zp1.cur_x[point] -
CUR.zp0.cur_x[CUR.GS.rp0],
CUR.zp1.cur_y[point] -
CUR.zp0.cur_y[CUR.GS.rp0] );
CUR_Func_move( &CUR.zp1, point, distance - org_dist );
CUR.GS.rp1 = CUR.GS.rp0;
CUR.GS.rp2 = point;
if ( (CUR.opcode & 16) != 0 )
CUR.GS.rp0 = point;
}
| 164,780 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PowerPopupView() {
SetHorizontalAlignment(ALIGN_RIGHT);
UpdateText();
}
Commit Message: ash: Fix right-alignment of power-status text.
It turns out setting ALING_RIGHT on a Label isn't enough to get proper
right-aligned text. Label has to be explicitly told that it is multi-lined.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9918026
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@129898 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | PowerPopupView() {
SetHorizontalAlignment(ALIGN_RIGHT);
SetMultiLine(true);
UpdateText();
}
| 170,908 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int socket_create(uint16_t port)
{
int sfd = -1;
int yes = 1;
#ifdef WIN32
WSADATA wsa_data;
if (!wsa_init) {
if (WSAStartup(MAKEWORD(2,2), &wsa_data) != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
fprintf(stderr, "WSAStartup failed!\n");
ExitProcess(-1);
}
wsa_init = 1;
}
#endif
struct sockaddr_in saddr;
if (0 > (sfd = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP))) {
perror("socket()");
return -1;
}
if (setsockopt(sfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (void*)&yes, sizeof(int)) == -1) {
perror("setsockopt()");
socket_close(sfd);
return -1;
}
memset((void *) &saddr, 0, sizeof(saddr));
saddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
saddr.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY);
saddr.sin_port = htons(port);
if (0 > bind(sfd, (struct sockaddr *) &saddr, sizeof(saddr))) {
perror("bind()");
socket_close(sfd);
return -1;
}
if (listen(sfd, 1) == -1) {
perror("listen()");
socket_close(sfd);
return -1;
}
return sfd;
}
Commit Message: common: [security fix] Make sure sockets only listen locally
CWE ID: CWE-284 | int socket_create(uint16_t port)
{
int sfd = -1;
int yes = 1;
#ifdef WIN32
WSADATA wsa_data;
if (!wsa_init) {
if (WSAStartup(MAKEWORD(2,2), &wsa_data) != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
fprintf(stderr, "WSAStartup failed!\n");
ExitProcess(-1);
}
wsa_init = 1;
}
#endif
struct sockaddr_in saddr;
if (0 > (sfd = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP))) {
perror("socket()");
return -1;
}
if (setsockopt(sfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (void*)&yes, sizeof(int)) == -1) {
perror("setsockopt()");
socket_close(sfd);
return -1;
}
memset((void *) &saddr, 0, sizeof(saddr));
saddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
saddr.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK);
saddr.sin_port = htons(port);
if (0 > bind(sfd, (struct sockaddr *) &saddr, sizeof(saddr))) {
perror("bind()");
socket_close(sfd);
return -1;
}
if (listen(sfd, 1) == -1) {
perror("listen()");
socket_close(sfd);
return -1;
}
return sfd;
}
| 167,166 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: scoped_refptr<PermissionSet> UnpackPermissionSet(
const Permissions& permissions, std::string* error) {
APIPermissionSet apis;
std::vector<std::string>* permissions_list = permissions.permissions.get();
if (permissions_list) {
PermissionsInfo* info = PermissionsInfo::GetInstance();
for (std::vector<std::string>::iterator it = permissions_list->begin();
it != permissions_list->end(); ++it) {
if (it->find(kDelimiter) != std::string::npos) {
size_t delimiter = it->find(kDelimiter);
std::string permission_name = it->substr(0, delimiter);
std::string permission_arg = it->substr(delimiter + 1);
scoped_ptr<base::Value> permission_json(
base::JSONReader::Read(permission_arg));
if (!permission_json.get()) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(kInvalidParameter, *it);
return NULL;
}
APIPermission* permission = NULL;
const APIPermissionInfo* bluetooth_device_permission_info =
info->GetByID(APIPermission::kBluetoothDevice);
const APIPermissionInfo* usb_device_permission_info =
info->GetByID(APIPermission::kUsbDevice);
if (permission_name == bluetooth_device_permission_info->name()) {
permission = new BluetoothDevicePermission(
bluetooth_device_permission_info);
} else if (permission_name == usb_device_permission_info->name()) {
permission = new UsbDevicePermission(usb_device_permission_info);
} else {
*error = kUnsupportedPermissionId;
return NULL;
}
CHECK(permission);
if (!permission->FromValue(permission_json.get())) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(kInvalidParameter, *it);
return NULL;
}
apis.insert(permission);
} else {
const APIPermissionInfo* permission_info = info->GetByName(*it);
if (!permission_info) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
kUnknownPermissionError, *it);
return NULL;
}
apis.insert(permission_info->id());
}
}
}
URLPatternSet origins;
if (permissions.origins.get()) {
for (std::vector<std::string>::iterator it = permissions.origins->begin();
it != permissions.origins->end(); ++it) {
URLPattern origin(Extension::kValidHostPermissionSchemes);
URLPattern::ParseResult parse_result = origin.Parse(*it);
if (URLPattern::PARSE_SUCCESS != parse_result) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
kInvalidOrigin,
*it,
URLPattern::GetParseResultString(parse_result));
return NULL;
}
origins.AddPattern(origin);
}
}
return scoped_refptr<PermissionSet>(
new PermissionSet(apis, origins, URLPatternSet()));
}
Commit Message: Check prefs before allowing extension file access in the permissions API.
[email protected]
BUG=169632
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11884008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176853 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | scoped_refptr<PermissionSet> UnpackPermissionSet(
const Permissions& permissions,
bool allow_file_access,
std::string* error) {
APIPermissionSet apis;
std::vector<std::string>* permissions_list = permissions.permissions.get();
if (permissions_list) {
PermissionsInfo* info = PermissionsInfo::GetInstance();
for (std::vector<std::string>::iterator it = permissions_list->begin();
it != permissions_list->end(); ++it) {
if (it->find(kDelimiter) != std::string::npos) {
size_t delimiter = it->find(kDelimiter);
std::string permission_name = it->substr(0, delimiter);
std::string permission_arg = it->substr(delimiter + 1);
scoped_ptr<base::Value> permission_json(
base::JSONReader::Read(permission_arg));
if (!permission_json.get()) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(kInvalidParameter, *it);
return NULL;
}
APIPermission* permission = NULL;
const APIPermissionInfo* bluetooth_device_permission_info =
info->GetByID(APIPermission::kBluetoothDevice);
const APIPermissionInfo* usb_device_permission_info =
info->GetByID(APIPermission::kUsbDevice);
if (permission_name == bluetooth_device_permission_info->name()) {
permission = new BluetoothDevicePermission(
bluetooth_device_permission_info);
} else if (permission_name == usb_device_permission_info->name()) {
permission = new UsbDevicePermission(usb_device_permission_info);
} else {
*error = kUnsupportedPermissionId;
return NULL;
}
CHECK(permission);
if (!permission->FromValue(permission_json.get())) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(kInvalidParameter, *it);
return NULL;
}
apis.insert(permission);
} else {
const APIPermissionInfo* permission_info = info->GetByName(*it);
if (!permission_info) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
kUnknownPermissionError, *it);
return NULL;
}
apis.insert(permission_info->id());
}
}
}
URLPatternSet origins;
if (permissions.origins.get()) {
for (std::vector<std::string>::iterator it = permissions.origins->begin();
it != permissions.origins->end(); ++it) {
int allowed_schemes = Extension::kValidHostPermissionSchemes;
if (!allow_file_access)
allowed_schemes &= ~URLPattern::SCHEME_FILE;
URLPattern origin(allowed_schemes);
URLPattern::ParseResult parse_result = origin.Parse(*it);
if (URLPattern::PARSE_SUCCESS != parse_result) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
kInvalidOrigin,
*it,
URLPattern::GetParseResultString(parse_result));
return NULL;
}
origins.AddPattern(origin);
}
}
return scoped_refptr<PermissionSet>(
new PermissionSet(apis, origins, URLPatternSet()));
}
| 171,445 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: IHEVCD_ERROR_T ihevcd_mv_buf_mgr_add_bufs(codec_t *ps_codec)
{
IHEVCD_ERROR_T ret = (IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_SUCCESS;
WORD32 i;
WORD32 max_dpb_size;
WORD32 mv_bank_size_allocated;
WORD32 pic_mv_bank_size;
sps_t *ps_sps;
UWORD8 *pu1_buf;
mv_buf_t *ps_mv_buf;
/* Initialize MV Bank buffer manager */
ps_sps = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_sps;
/* Compute the number of MV Bank buffers needed */
max_dpb_size = ps_sps->ai1_sps_max_dec_pic_buffering[ps_sps->i1_sps_max_sub_layers - 1];
/* Allocate one extra MV Bank to handle current frame
* In case of asynchronous parsing and processing, number of buffers should increase here
* based on when parsing and processing threads are synchronized
*/
max_dpb_size++;
pu1_buf = (UWORD8 *)ps_codec->pv_mv_bank_buf_base;
ps_mv_buf = (mv_buf_t *)pu1_buf;
pu1_buf += max_dpb_size * sizeof(mv_buf_t);
ps_codec->ps_mv_buf = ps_mv_buf;
mv_bank_size_allocated = ps_codec->i4_total_mv_bank_size - max_dpb_size * sizeof(mv_buf_t);
/* Compute MV bank size per picture */
pic_mv_bank_size = ihevcd_get_pic_mv_bank_size(ALIGN64(ps_sps->i2_pic_width_in_luma_samples) *
ALIGN64(ps_sps->i2_pic_height_in_luma_samples));
for(i = 0; i < max_dpb_size; i++)
{
WORD32 buf_ret;
WORD32 num_pu;
WORD32 num_ctb;
WORD32 pic_size;
pic_size = ALIGN64(ps_sps->i2_pic_width_in_luma_samples) *
ALIGN64(ps_sps->i2_pic_height_in_luma_samples);
num_pu = pic_size / (MIN_PU_SIZE * MIN_PU_SIZE);
num_ctb = pic_size / (MIN_CTB_SIZE * MIN_CTB_SIZE);
mv_bank_size_allocated -= pic_mv_bank_size;
if(mv_bank_size_allocated < 0)
{
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_error_code = IHEVCD_INSUFFICIENT_MEM_MVBANK;
return IHEVCD_INSUFFICIENT_MEM_MVBANK;
}
ps_mv_buf->pu4_pic_pu_idx = (UWORD32 *)pu1_buf;
pu1_buf += (num_ctb + 1) * sizeof(WORD32);
ps_mv_buf->pu1_pic_pu_map = pu1_buf;
pu1_buf += num_pu;
ps_mv_buf->pu1_pic_slice_map = (UWORD16 *)pu1_buf;
pu1_buf += ALIGN4(num_ctb * sizeof(UWORD16));
ps_mv_buf->ps_pic_pu = (pu_t *)pu1_buf;
pu1_buf += num_pu * sizeof(pu_t);
buf_ret = ihevc_buf_mgr_add((buf_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_mv_buf_mgr, ps_mv_buf, i);
if(0 != buf_ret)
{
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_error_code = IHEVCD_BUF_MGR_ERROR;
return IHEVCD_BUF_MGR_ERROR;
}
ps_mv_buf++;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Check only allocated mv bufs for releasing from reference
When checking mv bufs for releasing from reference, unallocated
mv bufs were also checked. This issue was fixed by restricting
the loop count to allocated number of mv bufs.
Bug: 34896906
Bug: 34819017
Change-Id: If832f590b301f414d4cd5206414efc61a70c17cb
(cherry picked from commit 23bfe3e06d53ea749073a5d7ceda84239742b2c2)
CWE ID: | IHEVCD_ERROR_T ihevcd_mv_buf_mgr_add_bufs(codec_t *ps_codec)
{
IHEVCD_ERROR_T ret = (IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_SUCCESS;
WORD32 i;
WORD32 max_dpb_size;
WORD32 mv_bank_size_allocated;
WORD32 pic_mv_bank_size;
sps_t *ps_sps;
UWORD8 *pu1_buf;
mv_buf_t *ps_mv_buf;
/* Initialize MV Bank buffer manager */
ps_sps = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_sps;
/* Compute the number of MV Bank buffers needed */
max_dpb_size = ps_sps->ai1_sps_max_dec_pic_buffering[ps_sps->i1_sps_max_sub_layers - 1];
/* Allocate one extra MV Bank to handle current frame
* In case of asynchronous parsing and processing, number of buffers should increase here
* based on when parsing and processing threads are synchronized
*/
max_dpb_size++;
ps_codec->i4_max_dpb_size = max_dpb_size;
pu1_buf = (UWORD8 *)ps_codec->pv_mv_bank_buf_base;
ps_mv_buf = (mv_buf_t *)pu1_buf;
pu1_buf += max_dpb_size * sizeof(mv_buf_t);
ps_codec->ps_mv_buf = ps_mv_buf;
mv_bank_size_allocated = ps_codec->i4_total_mv_bank_size - max_dpb_size * sizeof(mv_buf_t);
/* Compute MV bank size per picture */
pic_mv_bank_size = ihevcd_get_pic_mv_bank_size(ALIGN64(ps_sps->i2_pic_width_in_luma_samples) *
ALIGN64(ps_sps->i2_pic_height_in_luma_samples));
for(i = 0; i < max_dpb_size; i++)
{
WORD32 buf_ret;
WORD32 num_pu;
WORD32 num_ctb;
WORD32 pic_size;
pic_size = ALIGN64(ps_sps->i2_pic_width_in_luma_samples) *
ALIGN64(ps_sps->i2_pic_height_in_luma_samples);
num_pu = pic_size / (MIN_PU_SIZE * MIN_PU_SIZE);
num_ctb = pic_size / (MIN_CTB_SIZE * MIN_CTB_SIZE);
mv_bank_size_allocated -= pic_mv_bank_size;
if(mv_bank_size_allocated < 0)
{
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_error_code = IHEVCD_INSUFFICIENT_MEM_MVBANK;
return IHEVCD_INSUFFICIENT_MEM_MVBANK;
}
ps_mv_buf->pu4_pic_pu_idx = (UWORD32 *)pu1_buf;
pu1_buf += (num_ctb + 1) * sizeof(WORD32);
ps_mv_buf->pu1_pic_pu_map = pu1_buf;
pu1_buf += num_pu;
ps_mv_buf->pu1_pic_slice_map = (UWORD16 *)pu1_buf;
pu1_buf += ALIGN4(num_ctb * sizeof(UWORD16));
ps_mv_buf->ps_pic_pu = (pu_t *)pu1_buf;
pu1_buf += num_pu * sizeof(pu_t);
buf_ret = ihevc_buf_mgr_add((buf_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_mv_buf_mgr, ps_mv_buf, i);
if(0 != buf_ret)
{
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_error_code = IHEVCD_BUF_MGR_ERROR;
return IHEVCD_BUF_MGR_ERROR;
}
ps_mv_buf++;
}
return ret;
}
| 173,999 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool WebSocketJob::SendDataInternal(const char* data, int length) {
if (spdy_websocket_stream_.get())
return ERR_IO_PENDING == spdy_websocket_stream_->SendData(data, length);
return socket_->SendData(data, length);
}
Commit Message: Use ScopedRunnableMethodFactory in WebSocketJob
Don't post SendPending if it is already posted.
BUG=89795
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7488007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93599 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | bool WebSocketJob::SendDataInternal(const char* data, int length) {
if (spdy_websocket_stream_.get())
return ERR_IO_PENDING == spdy_websocket_stream_->SendData(data, length);
if (socket_.get())
return socket_->SendData(data, length);
return false;
}
| 170,306 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int svc_can_register(const uint16_t *name, size_t name_len, pid_t spid, uid_t uid)
{
const char *perm = "add";
if (uid >= AID_APP) {
return 0; /* Don't allow apps to register services */
}
return check_mac_perms_from_lookup(spid, uid, perm, str8(name, name_len)) ? 1 : 0;
}
Commit Message: ServiceManager: Allow system services running as secondary users to add services
This should be reverted when all system services have been cleaned up to not
do this. A process looking up a service while running in the background will
see the service registered by the active user (assuming the service is
registered on every user switch), not the service registered by the user that
the process itself belongs to.
BUG: 30795333
Change-Id: I1b74d58be38ed358f43c163692f9e704f8f31dbe
(cherry picked from commit e6bbe69ba739c8a08837134437aaccfea5f1d943)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static int svc_can_register(const uint16_t *name, size_t name_len, pid_t spid, uid_t uid)
{
const char *perm = "add";
if (multiuser_get_app_id(uid) >= AID_APP) {
return 0; /* Don't allow apps to register services */
}
return check_mac_perms_from_lookup(spid, uid, perm, str8(name, name_len)) ? 1 : 0;
}
| 173,403 |
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