instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 90
9.34k
| output
stringlengths 16
15.4k
| __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void InitChromeDriverLogging(const CommandLine& command_line) {
bool success = InitLogging(
FILE_PATH_LITERAL("chromedriver.log"),
logging::LOG_TO_BOTH_FILE_AND_SYSTEM_DEBUG_LOG,
logging::LOCK_LOG_FILE,
logging::DELETE_OLD_LOG_FILE,
logging::DISABLE_DCHECK_FOR_NON_OFFICIAL_RELEASE_BUILDS);
if (!success) {
PLOG(ERROR) << "Unable to initialize logging";
}
logging::SetLogItems(false, // enable_process_id
false, // enable_thread_id
true, // enable_timestamp
false); // enable_tickcount
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kLoggingLevel)) {
std::string log_level = command_line.GetSwitchValueASCII(
switches::kLoggingLevel);
int level = 0;
if (base::StringToInt(log_level, &level)) {
logging::SetMinLogLevel(level);
} else {
LOG(WARNING) << "Bad log level: " << log_level;
}
}
}
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void InitChromeDriverLogging(const CommandLine& command_line) {
| 170,461 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void FetchContext::DispatchWillSendRequest(unsigned long,
ResourceRequest&,
const ResourceResponse&,
const FetchInitiatorInfo&) {}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void FetchContext::DispatchWillSendRequest(unsigned long,
ResourceRequest&,
const ResourceResponse&,
Resource::Type,
const FetchInitiatorInfo&) {}
| 172,477 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PageHandler::SetRenderer(RenderProcessHost* process_host,
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host) {
if (host_ == frame_host)
return;
RenderWidgetHostImpl* widget_host =
host_ ? host_->GetRenderWidgetHost() : nullptr;
if (widget_host) {
registrar_.Remove(
this,
content::NOTIFICATION_RENDER_WIDGET_VISIBILITY_CHANGED,
content::Source<RenderWidgetHost>(widget_host));
}
host_ = frame_host;
widget_host = host_ ? host_->GetRenderWidgetHost() : nullptr;
if (widget_host) {
registrar_.Add(
this,
content::NOTIFICATION_RENDER_WIDGET_VISIBILITY_CHANGED,
content::Source<RenderWidgetHost>(widget_host));
}
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void PageHandler::SetRenderer(RenderProcessHost* process_host,
void PageHandler::SetRenderer(int process_host_id,
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host) {
if (host_ == frame_host)
return;
RenderWidgetHostImpl* widget_host =
host_ ? host_->GetRenderWidgetHost() : nullptr;
if (widget_host) {
registrar_.Remove(
this,
content::NOTIFICATION_RENDER_WIDGET_VISIBILITY_CHANGED,
content::Source<RenderWidgetHost>(widget_host));
}
host_ = frame_host;
widget_host = host_ ? host_->GetRenderWidgetHost() : nullptr;
if (widget_host) {
registrar_.Add(
this,
content::NOTIFICATION_RENDER_WIDGET_VISIBILITY_CHANGED,
content::Source<RenderWidgetHost>(widget_host));
}
}
| 172,764 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int jpeg_size(unsigned char* data, unsigned int data_size,
int *width, int *height)
{
int i = 0;
if (i + 3 < data_size && data[i] == 0xFF && data[i+1] == 0xD8 &&
data[i+2] == 0xFF && data[i+3] == 0xE0) {
i += 4;
if(i + 6 < data_size &&
data[i+2] == 'J' && data[i+3] == 'F' && data[i+4] == 'I' &&
data[i+5] == 'F' && data[i+6] == 0x00) {
unsigned short block_length = data[i] * 256 + data[i+1];
while(i<data_size) {
i+=block_length;
if((i + 1) >= data_size)
return -1;
if(data[i] != 0xFF)
return -1;
if(data[i+1] == 0xC0) {
*height = data[i+5]*256 + data[i+6];
*width = data[i+7]*256 + data[i+8];
return 0;
}
i+=2;
block_length = data[i] * 256 + data[i+1];
}
}
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: jpeg: Fix another possible buffer overrun
Found via the clang libfuzzer
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static int jpeg_size(unsigned char* data, unsigned int data_size,
int *width, int *height)
{
int i = 0;
if (i + 3 < data_size && data[i] == 0xFF && data[i+1] == 0xD8 &&
data[i+2] == 0xFF && data[i+3] == 0xE0) {
i += 4;
if(i + 6 < data_size &&
data[i+2] == 'J' && data[i+3] == 'F' && data[i+4] == 'I' &&
data[i+5] == 'F' && data[i+6] == 0x00) {
unsigned short block_length = data[i] * 256 + data[i+1];
while(i<data_size) {
i+=block_length;
if((i + 1) >= data_size)
return -1;
if(data[i] != 0xFF)
return -1;
if(data[i+1] == 0xC0) {
*height = data[i+5]*256 + data[i+6];
*width = data[i+7]*256 + data[i+8];
return 0;
}
i+=2;
if (i + 1 < data_size)
block_length = data[i] * 256 + data[i+1];
}
}
}
return -1;
}
| 169,235 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int key_notify_policy_flush(const struct km_event *c)
{
struct sk_buff *skb_out;
struct sadb_msg *hdr;
skb_out = alloc_skb(sizeof(struct sadb_msg) + 16, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb_out)
return -ENOBUFS;
hdr = (struct sadb_msg *) skb_put(skb_out, sizeof(struct sadb_msg));
hdr->sadb_msg_type = SADB_X_SPDFLUSH;
hdr->sadb_msg_seq = c->seq;
hdr->sadb_msg_pid = c->portid;
hdr->sadb_msg_version = PF_KEY_V2;
hdr->sadb_msg_errno = (uint8_t) 0;
hdr->sadb_msg_len = (sizeof(struct sadb_msg) / sizeof(uint64_t));
pfkey_broadcast(skb_out, GFP_ATOMIC, BROADCAST_ALL, NULL, c->net);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: af_key: initialize satype in key_notify_policy_flush()
This field was left uninitialized. Some user daemons perform check against this
field.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static int key_notify_policy_flush(const struct km_event *c)
{
struct sk_buff *skb_out;
struct sadb_msg *hdr;
skb_out = alloc_skb(sizeof(struct sadb_msg) + 16, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb_out)
return -ENOBUFS;
hdr = (struct sadb_msg *) skb_put(skb_out, sizeof(struct sadb_msg));
hdr->sadb_msg_type = SADB_X_SPDFLUSH;
hdr->sadb_msg_seq = c->seq;
hdr->sadb_msg_pid = c->portid;
hdr->sadb_msg_version = PF_KEY_V2;
hdr->sadb_msg_errno = (uint8_t) 0;
hdr->sadb_msg_satype = SADB_SATYPE_UNSPEC;
hdr->sadb_msg_len = (sizeof(struct sadb_msg) / sizeof(uint64_t));
pfkey_broadcast(skb_out, GFP_ATOMIC, BROADCAST_ALL, NULL, c->net);
return 0;
}
| 166,073 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int handle_vmptrst(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
unsigned long exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
u32 vmx_instruction_info = vmcs_read32(VMX_INSTRUCTION_INFO);
gva_t vmcs_gva;
struct x86_exception e;
if (!nested_vmx_check_permission(vcpu))
return 1;
if (get_vmx_mem_address(vcpu, exit_qualification,
vmx_instruction_info, true, &vmcs_gva))
return 1;
/* ok to use *_system, as hardware has verified cpl=0 */
if (kvm_write_guest_virt_system(&vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt, vmcs_gva,
(void *)&to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.current_vmptr,
sizeof(u64), &e)) {
kvm_inject_page_fault(vcpu, &e);
return 1;
}
nested_vmx_succeed(vcpu);
return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | static int handle_vmptrst(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
unsigned long exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
u32 vmx_instruction_info = vmcs_read32(VMX_INSTRUCTION_INFO);
gva_t vmcs_gva;
struct x86_exception e;
if (!nested_vmx_check_permission(vcpu))
return 1;
if (get_vmx_mem_address(vcpu, exit_qualification,
vmx_instruction_info, true, &vmcs_gva))
return 1;
/* *_system ok, nested_vmx_check_permission has verified cpl=0 */
if (kvm_write_guest_virt_system(&vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt, vmcs_gva,
(void *)&to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.current_vmptr,
sizeof(u64), &e)) {
kvm_inject_page_fault(vcpu, &e);
return 1;
}
nested_vmx_succeed(vcpu);
return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
}
| 169,174 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int generate(struct crypto_rng *tfm, const u8 *src, unsigned int slen,
u8 *dst, unsigned int dlen)
{
return crypto_old_rng_alg(tfm)->rng_make_random(tfm, dst, dlen);
}
Commit Message: crypto: rng - Remove old low-level rng interface
Now that all rng implementations have switched over to the new
interface, we can remove the old low-level interface.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | static int generate(struct crypto_rng *tfm, const u8 *src, unsigned int slen,
| 167,733 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: const char* WinPKIErrorString(void)
{
static char error_string[64];
DWORD error_code = GetLastError();
if ((error_code >> 16) != 0x8009)
return WindowsErrorString();
switch (error_code) {
case NTE_BAD_UID:
return "Bad UID.";
case CRYPT_E_MSG_ERROR:
return "An error occurred while performing an operation on a cryptographic message.";
case CRYPT_E_UNKNOWN_ALGO:
return "Unknown cryptographic algorithm.";
case CRYPT_E_INVALID_MSG_TYPE:
return "Invalid cryptographic message type.";
case CRYPT_E_HASH_VALUE:
return "The hash value is not correct";
case CRYPT_E_ISSUER_SERIALNUMBER:
return "Invalid issuer and/or serial number.";
case CRYPT_E_BAD_LEN:
return "The length specified for the output data was insufficient.";
case CRYPT_E_BAD_ENCODE:
return "An error occurred during encode or decode operation.";
case CRYPT_E_FILE_ERROR:
return "An error occurred while reading or writing to a file.";
case CRYPT_E_NOT_FOUND:
return "Cannot find object or property.";
case CRYPT_E_EXISTS:
return "The object or property already exists.";
case CRYPT_E_NO_PROVIDER:
return "No provider was specified for the store or object.";
case CRYPT_E_DELETED_PREV:
return "The previous certificate or CRL context was deleted.";
case CRYPT_E_NO_MATCH:
return "Cannot find the requested object.";
case CRYPT_E_UNEXPECTED_MSG_TYPE:
case CRYPT_E_NO_KEY_PROPERTY:
case CRYPT_E_NO_DECRYPT_CERT:
return "Private key or certificate issue";
case CRYPT_E_BAD_MSG:
return "Not a cryptographic message.";
case CRYPT_E_NO_SIGNER:
return "The signed cryptographic message does not have a signer for the specified signer index.";
case CRYPT_E_REVOKED:
return "The certificate is revoked.";
case CRYPT_E_NO_REVOCATION_DLL:
case CRYPT_E_NO_REVOCATION_CHECK:
case CRYPT_E_REVOCATION_OFFLINE:
case CRYPT_E_NOT_IN_REVOCATION_DATABASE:
return "Cannot check certificate revocation.";
case CRYPT_E_INVALID_NUMERIC_STRING:
case CRYPT_E_INVALID_PRINTABLE_STRING:
case CRYPT_E_INVALID_IA5_STRING:
case CRYPT_E_INVALID_X500_STRING:
case CRYPT_E_NOT_CHAR_STRING:
return "Invalid string.";
case CRYPT_E_SECURITY_SETTINGS:
return "The cryptographic operation failed due to a local security option setting.";
case CRYPT_E_NO_VERIFY_USAGE_CHECK:
case CRYPT_E_VERIFY_USAGE_OFFLINE:
return "Cannot complete usage check.";
case CRYPT_E_NO_TRUSTED_SIGNER:
return "None of the signers of the cryptographic message or certificate trust list is trusted.";
default:
static_sprintf(error_string, "Unknown PKI error 0x%08lX", error_code);
return error_string;
}
}
Commit Message: [pki] fix https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/403768
* This commit effectively fixes https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/403768 (CVE-2017-13083) as
it is described per its revision 11, which is the latest revision at the time of this commit,
by disabling Windows prompts, enacted during signature validation, that allow the user to
bypass the intended signature verification checks.
* It needs to be pointed out that the vulnerability ("allow(ing) the use of a self-signed
certificate"), which relies on the end-user actively ignoring a Windows prompt that tells
them that the update failed the signature validation whilst also advising against running it,
is being fully addressed, even as the update protocol remains HTTP.
* It also need to be pointed out that the extended delay (48 hours) between the time the
vulnerability was reported and the moment it is fixed in our codebase has to do with
the fact that the reporter chose to deviate from standard security practices by not
disclosing the details of the vulnerability with us, be it publicly or privately,
before creating the cert.org report. The only advance notification we received was a
generic note about the use of HTTP vs HTTPS, which, as have established, is not
immediately relevant to addressing the reported vulnerability.
* Closes #1009
* Note: The other vulnerability scenario described towards the end of #1009, which
doesn't have to do with the "lack of CA checking", will be addressed separately.
CWE ID: CWE-494 | const char* WinPKIErrorString(void)
{
static char error_string[64];
DWORD error_code = GetLastError();
if (((error_code >> 16) != 0x8009) && ((error_code >> 16) != 0x800B))
return WindowsErrorString();
switch (error_code) {
case NTE_BAD_UID:
return "Bad UID.";
case CRYPT_E_MSG_ERROR:
return "An error occurred while performing an operation on a cryptographic message.";
case CRYPT_E_UNKNOWN_ALGO:
return "Unknown cryptographic algorithm.";
case CRYPT_E_INVALID_MSG_TYPE:
return "Invalid cryptographic message type.";
case CRYPT_E_HASH_VALUE:
return "The hash value is not correct";
case CRYPT_E_ISSUER_SERIALNUMBER:
return "Invalid issuer and/or serial number.";
case CRYPT_E_BAD_LEN:
return "The length specified for the output data was insufficient.";
case CRYPT_E_BAD_ENCODE:
return "An error occurred during encode or decode operation.";
case CRYPT_E_FILE_ERROR:
return "An error occurred while reading or writing to a file.";
case CRYPT_E_NOT_FOUND:
return "Cannot find object or property.";
case CRYPT_E_EXISTS:
return "The object or property already exists.";
case CRYPT_E_NO_PROVIDER:
return "No provider was specified for the store or object.";
case CRYPT_E_DELETED_PREV:
return "The previous certificate or CRL context was deleted.";
case CRYPT_E_NO_MATCH:
return "Cannot find the requested object.";
case CRYPT_E_UNEXPECTED_MSG_TYPE:
case CRYPT_E_NO_KEY_PROPERTY:
case CRYPT_E_NO_DECRYPT_CERT:
return "Private key or certificate issue";
case CRYPT_E_BAD_MSG:
return "Not a cryptographic message.";
case CRYPT_E_NO_SIGNER:
return "The signed cryptographic message does not have a signer for the specified signer index.";
case CRYPT_E_REVOKED:
return "The certificate is revoked.";
case CRYPT_E_NO_REVOCATION_DLL:
case CRYPT_E_NO_REVOCATION_CHECK:
case CRYPT_E_REVOCATION_OFFLINE:
case CRYPT_E_NOT_IN_REVOCATION_DATABASE:
return "Cannot check certificate revocation.";
case CRYPT_E_INVALID_NUMERIC_STRING:
case CRYPT_E_INVALID_PRINTABLE_STRING:
case CRYPT_E_INVALID_IA5_STRING:
case CRYPT_E_INVALID_X500_STRING:
case CRYPT_E_NOT_CHAR_STRING:
return "Invalid string.";
case CRYPT_E_SECURITY_SETTINGS:
return "The cryptographic operation failed due to a local security option setting.";
case CRYPT_E_NO_VERIFY_USAGE_CHECK:
case CRYPT_E_VERIFY_USAGE_OFFLINE:
return "Cannot complete usage check.";
case CRYPT_E_NO_TRUSTED_SIGNER:
return "None of the signers of the cryptographic message or certificate trust list is trusted.";
case CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT:
return "The root certificate is not trusted.";
case TRUST_E_NOSIGNATURE:
return "Not digitally signed.";
case TRUST_E_EXPLICIT_DISTRUST:
return "One of the certificates used was marked as untrusted by the user.";
default:
static_sprintf(error_string, "Unknown PKI error 0x%08lX", error_code);
return error_string;
}
}
| 167,816 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long join_session_keyring(const char *name)
{
const struct cred *old;
struct cred *new;
struct key *keyring;
long ret, serial;
new = prepare_creds();
if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;
old = current_cred();
/* if no name is provided, install an anonymous keyring */
if (!name) {
ret = install_session_keyring_to_cred(new, NULL);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
serial = new->session_keyring->serial;
ret = commit_creds(new);
if (ret == 0)
ret = serial;
goto okay;
}
/* allow the user to join or create a named keyring */
mutex_lock(&key_session_mutex);
/* look for an existing keyring of this name */
keyring = find_keyring_by_name(name, false);
if (PTR_ERR(keyring) == -ENOKEY) {
/* not found - try and create a new one */
keyring = keyring_alloc(
name, old->uid, old->gid, old,
KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_LINK,
KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
goto error2;
}
} else if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
goto error2;
} else if (keyring == new->session_keyring) {
ret = 0;
goto error2;
}
/* we've got a keyring - now to install it */
ret = install_session_keyring_to_cred(new, keyring);
if (ret < 0)
goto error2;
commit_creds(new);
mutex_unlock(&key_session_mutex);
ret = keyring->serial;
key_put(keyring);
okay:
return ret;
error2:
mutex_unlock(&key_session_mutex);
error:
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix keyring ref leak in join_session_keyring()
This fixes CVE-2016-0728.
If a thread is asked to join as a session keyring the keyring that's already
set as its session, we leak a keyring reference.
This can be tested with the following program:
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
int main(int argc, const char *argv[])
{
int i = 0;
key_serial_t serial;
serial = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING,
"leaked-keyring");
if (serial < 0) {
perror("keyctl");
return -1;
}
if (keyctl(KEYCTL_SETPERM, serial,
KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_ALL) < 0) {
perror("keyctl");
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < 100; i++) {
serial = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING,
"leaked-keyring");
if (serial < 0) {
perror("keyctl");
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
If, after the program has run, there something like the following line in
/proc/keys:
3f3d898f I--Q--- 100 perm 3f3f0000 0 0 keyring leaked-keyring: empty
with a usage count of 100 * the number of times the program has been run,
then the kernel is malfunctioning. If leaked-keyring has zero usages or
has been garbage collected, then the problem is fixed.
Reported-by: Yevgeny Pats <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Prarit Bhargava <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jarod Wilson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | long join_session_keyring(const char *name)
{
const struct cred *old;
struct cred *new;
struct key *keyring;
long ret, serial;
new = prepare_creds();
if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;
old = current_cred();
/* if no name is provided, install an anonymous keyring */
if (!name) {
ret = install_session_keyring_to_cred(new, NULL);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
serial = new->session_keyring->serial;
ret = commit_creds(new);
if (ret == 0)
ret = serial;
goto okay;
}
/* allow the user to join or create a named keyring */
mutex_lock(&key_session_mutex);
/* look for an existing keyring of this name */
keyring = find_keyring_by_name(name, false);
if (PTR_ERR(keyring) == -ENOKEY) {
/* not found - try and create a new one */
keyring = keyring_alloc(
name, old->uid, old->gid, old,
KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_LINK,
KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
goto error2;
}
} else if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
goto error2;
} else if (keyring == new->session_keyring) {
key_put(keyring);
ret = 0;
goto error2;
}
/* we've got a keyring - now to install it */
ret = install_session_keyring_to_cred(new, keyring);
if (ret < 0)
goto error2;
commit_creds(new);
mutex_unlock(&key_session_mutex);
ret = keyring->serial;
key_put(keyring);
okay:
return ret;
error2:
mutex_unlock(&key_session_mutex);
error:
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
| 167,452 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: openvpn_decrypt (struct buffer *buf, struct buffer work,
const struct crypto_options *opt,
const struct frame* frame)
{
static const char error_prefix[] = "Authenticate/Decrypt packet error";
struct gc_arena gc;
gc_init (&gc);
if (buf->len > 0 && opt->key_ctx_bi)
{
struct key_ctx *ctx = &opt->key_ctx_bi->decrypt;
struct packet_id_net pin;
bool have_pin = false;
/* Verify the HMAC */
if (ctx->hmac)
{
int hmac_len;
uint8_t local_hmac[MAX_HMAC_KEY_LENGTH]; /* HMAC of ciphertext computed locally */
hmac_ctx_reset(ctx->hmac);
/* Assume the length of the input HMAC */
hmac_len = hmac_ctx_size (ctx->hmac);
/* Authentication fails if insufficient data in packet for HMAC */
if (buf->len < hmac_len)
CRYPT_ERROR ("missing authentication info");
hmac_ctx_update (ctx->hmac, BPTR (buf) + hmac_len, BLEN (buf) - hmac_len);
hmac_ctx_final (ctx->hmac, local_hmac);
/* Compare locally computed HMAC with packet HMAC */
if (memcmp (local_hmac, BPTR (buf), hmac_len))
CRYPT_ERROR ("packet HMAC authentication failed");
ASSERT (buf_advance (buf, hmac_len));
}
/* Decrypt packet ID + payload */
if (ctx->cipher)
{
const unsigned int mode = cipher_ctx_mode (ctx->cipher);
const int iv_size = cipher_ctx_iv_length (ctx->cipher);
uint8_t iv_buf[OPENVPN_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
int outlen;
/* initialize work buffer with FRAME_HEADROOM bytes of prepend capacity */
ASSERT (buf_init (&work, FRAME_HEADROOM_ADJ (frame, FRAME_HEADROOM_MARKER_DECRYPT)));
/* use IV if user requested it */
CLEAR (iv_buf);
if (opt->flags & CO_USE_IV)
{
if (buf->len < iv_size)
CRYPT_ERROR ("missing IV info");
memcpy (iv_buf, BPTR (buf), iv_size);
ASSERT (buf_advance (buf, iv_size));
}
/* show the IV's initial state */
if (opt->flags & CO_USE_IV)
dmsg (D_PACKET_CONTENT, "DECRYPT IV: %s", format_hex (iv_buf, iv_size, 0, &gc));
if (buf->len < 1)
CRYPT_ERROR ("missing payload");
/* ctx->cipher was already initialized with key & keylen */
if (!cipher_ctx_reset (ctx->cipher, iv_buf))
CRYPT_ERROR ("cipher init failed");
/* Buffer overflow check (should never happen) */
if (!buf_safe (&work, buf->len))
CRYPT_ERROR ("buffer overflow");
/* Decrypt packet ID, payload */
if (!cipher_ctx_update (ctx->cipher, BPTR (&work), &outlen, BPTR (buf), BLEN (buf)))
CRYPT_ERROR ("cipher update failed");
work.len += outlen;
/* Flush the decryption buffer */
if (!cipher_ctx_final (ctx->cipher, BPTR (&work) + outlen, &outlen))
CRYPT_ERROR ("cipher final failed");
work.len += outlen;
dmsg (D_PACKET_CONTENT, "DECRYPT TO: %s",
format_hex (BPTR (&work), BLEN (&work), 80, &gc));
/* Get packet ID from plaintext buffer or IV, depending on cipher mode */
{
if (mode == OPENVPN_MODE_CBC)
{
if (opt->packet_id)
{
if (!packet_id_read (&pin, &work, BOOL_CAST (opt->flags & CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM)))
CRYPT_ERROR ("error reading CBC packet-id");
have_pin = true;
}
}
else if (mode == OPENVPN_MODE_CFB || mode == OPENVPN_MODE_OFB)
{
struct buffer b;
ASSERT (opt->flags & CO_USE_IV); /* IV and packet-ID required */
ASSERT (opt->packet_id); /* for this mode. */
buf_set_read (&b, iv_buf, iv_size);
if (!packet_id_read (&pin, &b, true))
CRYPT_ERROR ("error reading CFB/OFB packet-id");
have_pin = true;
}
else /* We only support CBC, CFB, or OFB modes right now */
{
ASSERT (0);
}
}
}
else
{
work = *buf;
if (opt->packet_id)
{
if (!packet_id_read (&pin, &work, BOOL_CAST (opt->flags & CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM)))
CRYPT_ERROR ("error reading packet-id");
have_pin = !BOOL_CAST (opt->flags & CO_IGNORE_PACKET_ID);
}
}
if (have_pin)
{
packet_id_reap_test (&opt->packet_id->rec);
if (packet_id_test (&opt->packet_id->rec, &pin))
{
packet_id_add (&opt->packet_id->rec, &pin);
if (opt->pid_persist && (opt->flags & CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM))
packet_id_persist_save_obj (opt->pid_persist, opt->packet_id);
}
else
{
if (!(opt->flags & CO_MUTE_REPLAY_WARNINGS))
msg (D_REPLAY_ERRORS, "%s: bad packet ID (may be a replay): %s -- see the man page entry for --no-replay and --replay-window for more info or silence this warning with --mute-replay-warnings",
error_prefix, packet_id_net_print (&pin, true, &gc));
goto error_exit;
}
}
*buf = work;
}
gc_free (&gc);
return true;
error_exit:
crypto_clear_error();
buf->len = 0;
gc_free (&gc);
return false;
}
Commit Message: Use constant time memcmp when comparing HMACs in openvpn_decrypt.
Signed-off-by: Steffan Karger <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | openvpn_decrypt (struct buffer *buf, struct buffer work,
const struct crypto_options *opt,
const struct frame* frame)
{
static const char error_prefix[] = "Authenticate/Decrypt packet error";
struct gc_arena gc;
gc_init (&gc);
if (buf->len > 0 && opt->key_ctx_bi)
{
struct key_ctx *ctx = &opt->key_ctx_bi->decrypt;
struct packet_id_net pin;
bool have_pin = false;
/* Verify the HMAC */
if (ctx->hmac)
{
int hmac_len;
uint8_t local_hmac[MAX_HMAC_KEY_LENGTH]; /* HMAC of ciphertext computed locally */
hmac_ctx_reset(ctx->hmac);
/* Assume the length of the input HMAC */
hmac_len = hmac_ctx_size (ctx->hmac);
/* Authentication fails if insufficient data in packet for HMAC */
if (buf->len < hmac_len)
CRYPT_ERROR ("missing authentication info");
hmac_ctx_update (ctx->hmac, BPTR (buf) + hmac_len, BLEN (buf) - hmac_len);
hmac_ctx_final (ctx->hmac, local_hmac);
/* Compare locally computed HMAC with packet HMAC */
if (memcmp_constant_time (local_hmac, BPTR (buf), hmac_len))
CRYPT_ERROR ("packet HMAC authentication failed");
ASSERT (buf_advance (buf, hmac_len));
}
/* Decrypt packet ID + payload */
if (ctx->cipher)
{
const unsigned int mode = cipher_ctx_mode (ctx->cipher);
const int iv_size = cipher_ctx_iv_length (ctx->cipher);
uint8_t iv_buf[OPENVPN_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
int outlen;
/* initialize work buffer with FRAME_HEADROOM bytes of prepend capacity */
ASSERT (buf_init (&work, FRAME_HEADROOM_ADJ (frame, FRAME_HEADROOM_MARKER_DECRYPT)));
/* use IV if user requested it */
CLEAR (iv_buf);
if (opt->flags & CO_USE_IV)
{
if (buf->len < iv_size)
CRYPT_ERROR ("missing IV info");
memcpy (iv_buf, BPTR (buf), iv_size);
ASSERT (buf_advance (buf, iv_size));
}
/* show the IV's initial state */
if (opt->flags & CO_USE_IV)
dmsg (D_PACKET_CONTENT, "DECRYPT IV: %s", format_hex (iv_buf, iv_size, 0, &gc));
if (buf->len < 1)
CRYPT_ERROR ("missing payload");
/* ctx->cipher was already initialized with key & keylen */
if (!cipher_ctx_reset (ctx->cipher, iv_buf))
CRYPT_ERROR ("cipher init failed");
/* Buffer overflow check (should never happen) */
if (!buf_safe (&work, buf->len))
CRYPT_ERROR ("buffer overflow");
/* Decrypt packet ID, payload */
if (!cipher_ctx_update (ctx->cipher, BPTR (&work), &outlen, BPTR (buf), BLEN (buf)))
CRYPT_ERROR ("cipher update failed");
work.len += outlen;
/* Flush the decryption buffer */
if (!cipher_ctx_final (ctx->cipher, BPTR (&work) + outlen, &outlen))
CRYPT_ERROR ("cipher final failed");
work.len += outlen;
dmsg (D_PACKET_CONTENT, "DECRYPT TO: %s",
format_hex (BPTR (&work), BLEN (&work), 80, &gc));
/* Get packet ID from plaintext buffer or IV, depending on cipher mode */
{
if (mode == OPENVPN_MODE_CBC)
{
if (opt->packet_id)
{
if (!packet_id_read (&pin, &work, BOOL_CAST (opt->flags & CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM)))
CRYPT_ERROR ("error reading CBC packet-id");
have_pin = true;
}
}
else if (mode == OPENVPN_MODE_CFB || mode == OPENVPN_MODE_OFB)
{
struct buffer b;
ASSERT (opt->flags & CO_USE_IV); /* IV and packet-ID required */
ASSERT (opt->packet_id); /* for this mode. */
buf_set_read (&b, iv_buf, iv_size);
if (!packet_id_read (&pin, &b, true))
CRYPT_ERROR ("error reading CFB/OFB packet-id");
have_pin = true;
}
else /* We only support CBC, CFB, or OFB modes right now */
{
ASSERT (0);
}
}
}
else
{
work = *buf;
if (opt->packet_id)
{
if (!packet_id_read (&pin, &work, BOOL_CAST (opt->flags & CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM)))
CRYPT_ERROR ("error reading packet-id");
have_pin = !BOOL_CAST (opt->flags & CO_IGNORE_PACKET_ID);
}
}
if (have_pin)
{
packet_id_reap_test (&opt->packet_id->rec);
if (packet_id_test (&opt->packet_id->rec, &pin))
{
packet_id_add (&opt->packet_id->rec, &pin);
if (opt->pid_persist && (opt->flags & CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM))
packet_id_persist_save_obj (opt->pid_persist, opt->packet_id);
}
else
{
if (!(opt->flags & CO_MUTE_REPLAY_WARNINGS))
msg (D_REPLAY_ERRORS, "%s: bad packet ID (may be a replay): %s -- see the man page entry for --no-replay and --replay-window for more info or silence this warning with --mute-replay-warnings",
error_prefix, packet_id_net_print (&pin, true, &gc));
goto error_exit;
}
}
*buf = work;
}
gc_free (&gc);
return true;
error_exit:
crypto_clear_error();
buf->len = 0;
gc_free (&gc);
return false;
}
| 166,086 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void InitializePrinting(content::WebContents* web_contents) {
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PRINT_PREVIEW)
printing::PrintViewManager::CreateForWebContents(web_contents);
printing::PrintPreviewMessageHandler::CreateForWebContents(web_contents);
#else
printing::PrintViewManagerBasic::CreateForWebContents(web_contents);
#endif // BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PRINT_PREVIEW)
}
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
[email protected]
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | void InitializePrinting(content::WebContents* web_contents) {
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PRINT_PREVIEW)
printing::PrintViewManager::CreateForWebContents(web_contents);
printing::PrintPreviewMessageHandler::CreateForWebContents(web_contents);
#else
printing::PrintViewManagerBasic::CreateForWebContents(web_contents);
#endif // BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PRINT_PREVIEW)
CreateCompositeClientIfNeeded(web_contents, false /* for_preview */);
}
| 171,894 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual void PreEncodeFrameHook(::libvpx_test::VideoSource *video,
::libvpx_test::Encoder *encoder) {
if (video->frame() == 1) {
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_CPUUSED, cpu_used_);
} else if (video->frame() == 3) {
vpx_active_map_t map = {0};
uint8_t active_map[9 * 13] = {
1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0,
1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0,
1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0,
1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1,
0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1,
1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0,
};
map.cols = (kWidth + 15) / 16;
map.rows = (kHeight + 15) / 16;
ASSERT_EQ(map.cols, 13u);
ASSERT_EQ(map.rows, 9u);
map.active_map = active_map;
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_ACTIVEMAP, &map);
} else if (video->frame() == 15) {
vpx_active_map_t map = {0};
map.cols = (kWidth + 15) / 16;
map.rows = (kHeight + 15) / 16;
map.active_map = NULL;
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_ACTIVEMAP, &map);
}
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | virtual void PreEncodeFrameHook(::libvpx_test::VideoSource *video,
::libvpx_test::Encoder *encoder) {
if (video->frame() == 1) {
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_CPUUSED, cpu_used_);
} else if (video->frame() == 3) {
vpx_active_map_t map = vpx_active_map_t();
uint8_t active_map[9 * 13] = {
1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0,
1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0,
1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0,
1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1,
0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1,
1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0,
};
map.cols = (kWidth + 15) / 16;
map.rows = (kHeight + 15) / 16;
ASSERT_EQ(map.cols, 13u);
ASSERT_EQ(map.rows, 9u);
map.active_map = active_map;
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_ACTIVEMAP, &map);
} else if (video->frame() == 15) {
vpx_active_map_t map = vpx_active_map_t();
map.cols = (kWidth + 15) / 16;
map.rows = (kHeight + 15) / 16;
map.active_map = NULL;
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_ACTIVEMAP, &map);
}
}
| 174,501 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: hcom_client_init
(
OUT p_hsm_com_client_hdl_t *p_hdl,
IN char *server_path,
IN char *client_path,
IN int max_data_len
)
{
hsm_com_client_hdl_t *hdl = NULL;
hsm_com_errno_t res = HSM_COM_OK;
if((strlen(server_path) > (HSM_COM_SVR_MAX_PATH - 1)) ||
(strlen(server_path) == 0)){
res = HSM_COM_PATH_ERR;
goto cleanup;
}
if((strlen(client_path) > (HSM_COM_SVR_MAX_PATH - 1)) ||
(strlen(client_path) == 0)){
res = HSM_COM_PATH_ERR;
goto cleanup;
}
if((hdl = calloc(1,sizeof(hsm_com_client_hdl_t))) == NULL)
{
res = HSM_COM_NO_MEM;
goto cleanup;
}
if((hdl->scr.scratch = malloc(max_data_len)) == NULL)
{
res = HSM_COM_NO_MEM;
goto cleanup;
}
if((hdl->recv_buf = malloc(max_data_len)) == NULL)
{
res = HSM_COM_NO_MEM;
goto cleanup;
}
if((hdl->send_buf = malloc(max_data_len)) == NULL)
{
res = HSM_COM_NO_MEM;
goto cleanup;
}
hdl->scr.scratch_fill = 0;
hdl->scr.scratch_len = max_data_len;
hdl->buf_len = max_data_len;
hdl->trans_id = 1;
strcpy(hdl->s_path,server_path);
strcpy(hdl->c_path,client_path);
hdl->client_state = HSM_COM_C_STATE_IN;
*p_hdl = hdl;
return res;
cleanup:
if(hdl)
{
if (hdl->scr.scratch) {
free(hdl->scr.scratch);
}
if (hdl->recv_buf) {
free(hdl->recv_buf);
}
free(hdl);
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: Fix scripts and code that use well-known tmp files.
CWE ID: CWE-362 | hcom_client_init
(
OUT p_hsm_com_client_hdl_t *p_hdl,
IN char *server_path,
IN char *client_path,
IN int max_data_len
)
{
hsm_com_client_hdl_t *hdl = NULL;
hsm_com_errno_t res = HSM_COM_OK;
if((strlen(server_path) > (HSM_COM_SVR_MAX_PATH - 1)) ||
(strlen(server_path) == 0)){
res = HSM_COM_PATH_ERR;
goto cleanup;
}
if((strlen(client_path) > (HSM_COM_SVR_MAX_PATH - 1)) ||
(strlen(client_path) == 0)){
res = HSM_COM_PATH_ERR;
goto cleanup;
}
if((hdl = calloc(1,sizeof(hsm_com_client_hdl_t))) == NULL)
{
res = HSM_COM_NO_MEM;
goto cleanup;
}
if((hdl->scr.scratch = malloc(max_data_len)) == NULL)
{
res = HSM_COM_NO_MEM;
goto cleanup;
}
if((hdl->recv_buf = malloc(max_data_len)) == NULL)
{
res = HSM_COM_NO_MEM;
goto cleanup;
}
if((hdl->send_buf = malloc(max_data_len)) == NULL)
{
res = HSM_COM_NO_MEM;
goto cleanup;
}
hdl->scr.scratch_fill = 0;
hdl->scr.scratch_len = max_data_len;
hdl->buf_len = max_data_len;
hdl->trans_id = 1;
strcpy(hdl->s_path,server_path);
strcpy(hdl->c_path,client_path);
if (mkstemp(hdl->c_path) == -1)
{
res = HSM_COM_PATH_ERR;
goto cleanup;
}
hdl->client_state = HSM_COM_C_STATE_IN;
*p_hdl = hdl;
return res;
cleanup:
if(hdl)
{
if (hdl->scr.scratch) {
free(hdl->scr.scratch);
}
if (hdl->recv_buf) {
free(hdl->recv_buf);
}
free(hdl);
}
return res;
}
| 170,129 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: nfs4_atomic_open(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd)
{
struct path path = {
.mnt = nd->path.mnt,
.dentry = dentry,
};
struct dentry *parent;
struct iattr attr;
struct rpc_cred *cred;
struct nfs4_state *state;
struct dentry *res;
if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_CREATE) {
attr.ia_mode = nd->intent.open.create_mode;
attr.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE;
if (!IS_POSIXACL(dir))
attr.ia_mode &= ~current->fs->umask;
} else {
attr.ia_valid = 0;
BUG_ON(nd->intent.open.flags & O_CREAT);
}
cred = rpc_lookup_cred();
if (IS_ERR(cred))
return (struct dentry *)cred;
parent = dentry->d_parent;
/* Protect against concurrent sillydeletes */
nfs_block_sillyrename(parent);
state = nfs4_do_open(dir, &path, nd->intent.open.flags, &attr, cred);
put_rpccred(cred);
if (IS_ERR(state)) {
if (PTR_ERR(state) == -ENOENT) {
d_add(dentry, NULL);
nfs_set_verifier(dentry, nfs_save_change_attribute(dir));
}
nfs_unblock_sillyrename(parent);
return (struct dentry *)state;
}
res = d_add_unique(dentry, igrab(state->inode));
if (res != NULL)
path.dentry = res;
nfs_set_verifier(path.dentry, nfs_save_change_attribute(dir));
nfs_unblock_sillyrename(parent);
nfs4_intent_set_file(nd, &path, state);
return res;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | nfs4_atomic_open(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd)
{
struct path path = {
.mnt = nd->path.mnt,
.dentry = dentry,
};
struct dentry *parent;
struct iattr attr;
struct rpc_cred *cred;
struct nfs4_state *state;
struct dentry *res;
fmode_t fmode = nd->intent.open.flags & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE | FMODE_EXEC);
if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_CREATE) {
attr.ia_mode = nd->intent.open.create_mode;
attr.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE;
if (!IS_POSIXACL(dir))
attr.ia_mode &= ~current->fs->umask;
} else {
attr.ia_valid = 0;
BUG_ON(nd->intent.open.flags & O_CREAT);
}
cred = rpc_lookup_cred();
if (IS_ERR(cred))
return (struct dentry *)cred;
parent = dentry->d_parent;
/* Protect against concurrent sillydeletes */
nfs_block_sillyrename(parent);
state = nfs4_do_open(dir, &path, fmode, nd->intent.open.flags, &attr, cred);
put_rpccred(cred);
if (IS_ERR(state)) {
if (PTR_ERR(state) == -ENOENT) {
d_add(dentry, NULL);
nfs_set_verifier(dentry, nfs_save_change_attribute(dir));
}
nfs_unblock_sillyrename(parent);
return (struct dentry *)state;
}
res = d_add_unique(dentry, igrab(state->inode));
if (res != NULL)
path.dentry = res;
nfs_set_verifier(path.dentry, nfs_save_change_attribute(dir));
nfs_unblock_sillyrename(parent);
nfs4_intent_set_file(nd, &path, state, fmode);
return res;
}
| 165,688 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T impeg2d_dec_d_slice(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
UWORD32 i;
yuv_buf_t *ps_cur_frm_buf = &ps_dec->s_cur_frm_buf;
stream_t *ps_stream = &ps_dec->s_bit_stream;
UWORD8 *pu1_vld_buf;
WORD16 i2_dc_diff;
UWORD32 u4_frame_width = ps_dec->u2_frame_width;
UWORD32 u4_frm_offset = 0;
if(ps_dec->u2_picture_structure != FRAME_PICTURE)
{
u4_frame_width <<= 1;
if(ps_dec->u2_picture_structure == BOTTOM_FIELD)
{
u4_frm_offset = ps_dec->u2_frame_width;
}
}
do
{
UWORD32 u4_x_offset, u4_y_offset;
UWORD32 u4_blk_pos;
WORD16 i2_dc_val;
UWORD32 u4_dst_x_offset = u4_frm_offset + (ps_dec->u2_mb_x << 4);
UWORD32 u4_dst_y_offset = (ps_dec->u2_mb_y << 4) * u4_frame_width;
UWORD8 *pu1_vld_buf8 = ps_cur_frm_buf->pu1_y + u4_dst_x_offset + u4_dst_y_offset;
UWORD32 u4_dst_wd = u4_frame_width;
/*------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Discard the Macroblock stuffing in case of MPEG-1 stream */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------*/
while(impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,MB_STUFFING_CODE_LEN) == MB_STUFFING_CODE)
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,MB_STUFFING_CODE_LEN);
/*------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Flush 2 bits from bitstream [MB_Type and MacroBlockAddrIncrement]*/
/*------------------------------------------------------------------*/
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,1);
if(impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream, 1) != 0x01)
{
/* Ignore and continue decoding. */
}
/* Process LUMA blocks of the MB */
for(i = 0; i < NUM_LUMA_BLKS; ++i)
{
u4_x_offset = gai2_impeg2_blk_x_off[i];
u4_y_offset = gai2_impeg2_blk_y_off_frm[i] ;
u4_blk_pos = (u4_y_offset * u4_dst_wd) + u4_x_offset;
pu1_vld_buf = pu1_vld_buf8 + u4_blk_pos;
i2_dc_diff = impeg2d_get_luma_dc_diff(ps_stream);
i2_dc_val = ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[Y_LUMA] + i2_dc_diff;
ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[Y_LUMA] = i2_dc_val;
i2_dc_val = CLIP_U8(i2_dc_val);
ps_dec->pf_memset_8bit_8x8_block(pu1_vld_buf, i2_dc_val, u4_dst_wd);
}
/* Process U block of the MB */
u4_dst_x_offset >>= 1;
u4_dst_y_offset >>= 2;
u4_dst_wd >>= 1;
pu1_vld_buf = ps_cur_frm_buf->pu1_u + u4_dst_x_offset + u4_dst_y_offset;
i2_dc_diff = impeg2d_get_chroma_dc_diff(ps_stream);
i2_dc_val = ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[U_CHROMA] + i2_dc_diff;
ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[U_CHROMA] = i2_dc_val;
i2_dc_val = CLIP_U8(i2_dc_val);
ps_dec->pf_memset_8bit_8x8_block(pu1_vld_buf, i2_dc_val, u4_dst_wd);
/* Process V block of the MB */
pu1_vld_buf = ps_cur_frm_buf->pu1_v + u4_dst_x_offset + u4_dst_y_offset;
i2_dc_diff = impeg2d_get_chroma_dc_diff(ps_stream);
i2_dc_val = ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[V_CHROMA] + i2_dc_diff;
ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[V_CHROMA] = i2_dc_val;
i2_dc_val = CLIP_U8(i2_dc_val);
ps_dec->pf_memset_8bit_8x8_block(pu1_vld_buf, i2_dc_val, u4_dst_wd);
/* Common MB processing Steps */
ps_dec->u2_num_mbs_left--;
ps_dec->u2_mb_x++;
if(ps_dec->s_bit_stream.u4_offset > ps_dec->s_bit_stream.u4_max_offset)
{
return IMPEG2D_BITSTREAM_BUFF_EXCEEDED_ERR;
}
else if (ps_dec->u2_mb_x == ps_dec->u2_num_horiz_mb)
{
ps_dec->u2_mb_x = 0;
ps_dec->u2_mb_y++;
}
/* Flush end of macro block */
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,1);
}
while(ps_dec->u2_num_mbs_left != 0 && impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(&ps_dec->s_bit_stream,23) != 0x0);
return (IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE;
}/* End of impeg2d_dec_d_slice() */
Commit Message: Fixed bit stream access to make sure that it is not read beyond the allocated size.
Bug: 25765591
Change-Id: I98c23a3c3f84f6710f29bffe5ed73adcf51d47f6
CWE ID: CWE-254 | IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T impeg2d_dec_d_slice(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
UWORD32 i;
yuv_buf_t *ps_cur_frm_buf = &ps_dec->s_cur_frm_buf;
stream_t *ps_stream = &ps_dec->s_bit_stream;
UWORD8 *pu1_vld_buf;
WORD16 i2_dc_diff;
UWORD32 u4_frame_width = ps_dec->u2_frame_width;
UWORD32 u4_frm_offset = 0;
if(ps_dec->u2_picture_structure != FRAME_PICTURE)
{
u4_frame_width <<= 1;
if(ps_dec->u2_picture_structure == BOTTOM_FIELD)
{
u4_frm_offset = ps_dec->u2_frame_width;
}
}
do
{
UWORD32 u4_x_offset, u4_y_offset;
UWORD32 u4_blk_pos;
WORD16 i2_dc_val;
UWORD32 u4_dst_x_offset = u4_frm_offset + (ps_dec->u2_mb_x << 4);
UWORD32 u4_dst_y_offset = (ps_dec->u2_mb_y << 4) * u4_frame_width;
UWORD8 *pu1_vld_buf8 = ps_cur_frm_buf->pu1_y + u4_dst_x_offset + u4_dst_y_offset;
UWORD32 u4_dst_wd = u4_frame_width;
/*------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Discard the Macroblock stuffing in case of MPEG-1 stream */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------*/
while(impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,MB_STUFFING_CODE_LEN) == MB_STUFFING_CODE &&
ps_stream->u4_offset < ps_stream->u4_max_offset)
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,MB_STUFFING_CODE_LEN);
/*------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Flush 2 bits from bitstream [MB_Type and MacroBlockAddrIncrement]*/
/*------------------------------------------------------------------*/
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,1);
if(impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream, 1) != 0x01)
{
/* Ignore and continue decoding. */
}
/* Process LUMA blocks of the MB */
for(i = 0; i < NUM_LUMA_BLKS; ++i)
{
u4_x_offset = gai2_impeg2_blk_x_off[i];
u4_y_offset = gai2_impeg2_blk_y_off_frm[i] ;
u4_blk_pos = (u4_y_offset * u4_dst_wd) + u4_x_offset;
pu1_vld_buf = pu1_vld_buf8 + u4_blk_pos;
i2_dc_diff = impeg2d_get_luma_dc_diff(ps_stream);
i2_dc_val = ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[Y_LUMA] + i2_dc_diff;
ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[Y_LUMA] = i2_dc_val;
i2_dc_val = CLIP_U8(i2_dc_val);
ps_dec->pf_memset_8bit_8x8_block(pu1_vld_buf, i2_dc_val, u4_dst_wd);
}
/* Process U block of the MB */
u4_dst_x_offset >>= 1;
u4_dst_y_offset >>= 2;
u4_dst_wd >>= 1;
pu1_vld_buf = ps_cur_frm_buf->pu1_u + u4_dst_x_offset + u4_dst_y_offset;
i2_dc_diff = impeg2d_get_chroma_dc_diff(ps_stream);
i2_dc_val = ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[U_CHROMA] + i2_dc_diff;
ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[U_CHROMA] = i2_dc_val;
i2_dc_val = CLIP_U8(i2_dc_val);
ps_dec->pf_memset_8bit_8x8_block(pu1_vld_buf, i2_dc_val, u4_dst_wd);
/* Process V block of the MB */
pu1_vld_buf = ps_cur_frm_buf->pu1_v + u4_dst_x_offset + u4_dst_y_offset;
i2_dc_diff = impeg2d_get_chroma_dc_diff(ps_stream);
i2_dc_val = ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[V_CHROMA] + i2_dc_diff;
ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[V_CHROMA] = i2_dc_val;
i2_dc_val = CLIP_U8(i2_dc_val);
ps_dec->pf_memset_8bit_8x8_block(pu1_vld_buf, i2_dc_val, u4_dst_wd);
/* Common MB processing Steps */
ps_dec->u2_num_mbs_left--;
ps_dec->u2_mb_x++;
if(ps_dec->s_bit_stream.u4_offset > ps_dec->s_bit_stream.u4_max_offset)
{
return IMPEG2D_BITSTREAM_BUFF_EXCEEDED_ERR;
}
else if (ps_dec->u2_mb_x == ps_dec->u2_num_horiz_mb)
{
ps_dec->u2_mb_x = 0;
ps_dec->u2_mb_y++;
}
/* Flush end of macro block */
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,1);
}
while(ps_dec->u2_num_mbs_left != 0 && impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(&ps_dec->s_bit_stream,23) != 0x0);
return (IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE;
}/* End of impeg2d_dec_d_slice() */
| 173,943 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static ssize_t lbs_debugfs_write(struct file *f, const char __user *buf,
size_t cnt, loff_t *ppos)
{
int r, i;
char *pdata;
char *p;
char *p0;
char *p1;
char *p2;
struct debug_data *d = f->private_data;
pdata = kmalloc(cnt, GFP_KERNEL);
if (pdata == NULL)
return 0;
if (copy_from_user(pdata, buf, cnt)) {
lbs_deb_debugfs("Copy from user failed\n");
kfree(pdata);
return 0;
}
p0 = pdata;
for (i = 0; i < num_of_items; i++) {
do {
p = strstr(p0, d[i].name);
if (p == NULL)
break;
p1 = strchr(p, '\n');
if (p1 == NULL)
break;
p0 = p1++;
p2 = strchr(p, '=');
if (!p2)
break;
p2++;
r = simple_strtoul(p2, NULL, 0);
if (d[i].size == 1)
*((u8 *) d[i].addr) = (u8) r;
else if (d[i].size == 2)
*((u16 *) d[i].addr) = (u16) r;
else if (d[i].size == 4)
*((u32 *) d[i].addr) = (u32) r;
else if (d[i].size == 8)
*((u64 *) d[i].addr) = (u64) r;
break;
} while (1);
}
kfree(pdata);
return (ssize_t)cnt;
}
Commit Message: libertas: potential oops in debugfs
If we do a zero size allocation then it will oops. Also we can't be
sure the user passes us a NUL terminated string so I've added a
terminator.
This code can only be triggered by root.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | static ssize_t lbs_debugfs_write(struct file *f, const char __user *buf,
size_t cnt, loff_t *ppos)
{
int r, i;
char *pdata;
char *p;
char *p0;
char *p1;
char *p2;
struct debug_data *d = f->private_data;
if (cnt == 0)
return 0;
pdata = kmalloc(cnt + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (pdata == NULL)
return 0;
if (copy_from_user(pdata, buf, cnt)) {
lbs_deb_debugfs("Copy from user failed\n");
kfree(pdata);
return 0;
}
pdata[cnt] = '\0';
p0 = pdata;
for (i = 0; i < num_of_items; i++) {
do {
p = strstr(p0, d[i].name);
if (p == NULL)
break;
p1 = strchr(p, '\n');
if (p1 == NULL)
break;
p0 = p1++;
p2 = strchr(p, '=');
if (!p2)
break;
p2++;
r = simple_strtoul(p2, NULL, 0);
if (d[i].size == 1)
*((u8 *) d[i].addr) = (u8) r;
else if (d[i].size == 2)
*((u16 *) d[i].addr) = (u16) r;
else if (d[i].size == 4)
*((u32 *) d[i].addr) = (u32) r;
else if (d[i].size == 8)
*((u64 *) d[i].addr) = (u64) r;
break;
} while (1);
}
kfree(pdata);
return (ssize_t)cnt;
}
| 165,942 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: interlace_row(png_bytep buffer, png_const_bytep imageRow,
unsigned int pixel_size, png_uint_32 w, int pass)
{
png_uint_32 xin, xout, xstep;
/* Note that this can, trivially, be optimized to a memcpy on pass 7, the
* code is presented this way to make it easier to understand. In practice
* consult the code in the libpng source to see other ways of doing this.
*/
xin = PNG_PASS_START_COL(pass);
xstep = 1U<<PNG_PASS_COL_SHIFT(pass);
for (xout=0; xin<w; xin+=xstep)
{
pixel_copy(buffer, xout, imageRow, xin, pixel_size);
++xout;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | interlace_row(png_bytep buffer, png_const_bytep imageRow,
| 173,659 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool TabsCaptureVisibleTabFunction::RunImpl() {
PrefService* service = profile()->GetPrefs();
if (service->GetBoolean(prefs::kDisableScreenshots)) {
error_ = keys::kScreenshotsDisabled;
return false;
}
WebContents* web_contents = NULL;
if (!GetTabToCapture(&web_contents))
return false;
image_format_ = FORMAT_JPEG; // Default format is JPEG.
image_quality_ = kDefaultQuality; // Default quality setting.
if (HasOptionalArgument(1)) {
DictionaryValue* options = NULL;
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(args_->GetDictionary(1, &options));
if (options->HasKey(keys::kFormatKey)) {
std::string format;
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(
options->GetString(keys::kFormatKey, &format));
if (format == keys::kFormatValueJpeg) {
image_format_ = FORMAT_JPEG;
} else if (format == keys::kFormatValuePng) {
image_format_ = FORMAT_PNG;
} else {
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(0);
}
}
if (options->HasKey(keys::kQualityKey)) {
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(
options->GetInteger(keys::kQualityKey, &image_quality_));
}
}
if (!GetExtension()->CanCaptureVisiblePage(
web_contents->GetURL(),
SessionID::IdForTab(web_contents),
&error_)) {
return false;
}
RenderViewHost* render_view_host = web_contents->GetRenderViewHost();
content::RenderWidgetHostView* view = render_view_host->GetView();
if (!view) {
error_ = keys::kInternalVisibleTabCaptureError;
return false;
}
render_view_host->CopyFromBackingStore(
gfx::Rect(),
view->GetViewBounds().size(),
base::Bind(&TabsCaptureVisibleTabFunction::CopyFromBackingStoreComplete,
this));
return true;
}
Commit Message: Don't allow extensions to take screenshots of interstitial pages. Branched from
https://codereview.chromium.org/14885004/ which is trying to test it.
BUG=229504
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14954004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@198297 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | bool TabsCaptureVisibleTabFunction::RunImpl() {
PrefService* service = profile()->GetPrefs();
if (service->GetBoolean(prefs::kDisableScreenshots)) {
error_ = keys::kScreenshotsDisabled;
return false;
}
WebContents* web_contents = NULL;
if (!GetTabToCapture(&web_contents))
return false;
image_format_ = FORMAT_JPEG; // Default format is JPEG.
image_quality_ = kDefaultQuality; // Default quality setting.
if (HasOptionalArgument(1)) {
DictionaryValue* options = NULL;
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(args_->GetDictionary(1, &options));
if (options->HasKey(keys::kFormatKey)) {
std::string format;
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(
options->GetString(keys::kFormatKey, &format));
if (format == keys::kFormatValueJpeg) {
image_format_ = FORMAT_JPEG;
} else if (format == keys::kFormatValuePng) {
image_format_ = FORMAT_PNG;
} else {
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(0);
}
}
if (options->HasKey(keys::kQualityKey)) {
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(
options->GetInteger(keys::kQualityKey, &image_quality_));
}
}
// Use the last committed URL rather than the active URL for permissions
// checking, since the visible page won't be updated until it has been
// committed. A canonical example of this is interstitials, which show the
// URL of the new/loading page (active) but would capture the content of the
// old page (last committed).
//
// TODO(creis): Use WebContents::GetLastCommittedURL instead.
// http://crbug.com/237908.
NavigationEntry* last_committed_entry =
web_contents->GetController().GetLastCommittedEntry();
GURL last_committed_url = last_committed_entry ?
last_committed_entry->GetURL() : GURL();
if (!GetExtension()->CanCaptureVisiblePage(last_committed_url,
SessionID::IdForTab(web_contents),
&error_)) {
return false;
}
RenderViewHost* render_view_host = web_contents->GetRenderViewHost();
content::RenderWidgetHostView* view = render_view_host->GetView();
if (!view) {
error_ = keys::kInternalVisibleTabCaptureError;
return false;
}
render_view_host->CopyFromBackingStore(
gfx::Rect(),
view->GetViewBounds().size(),
base::Bind(&TabsCaptureVisibleTabFunction::CopyFromBackingStoreComplete,
this));
return true;
}
| 171,268 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xmlXPtrEvalXPtrPart(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, xmlChar *name) {
xmlChar *buffer, *cur;
int len;
int level;
if (name == NULL)
name = xmlXPathParseName(ctxt);
if (name == NULL)
XP_ERROR(XPATH_EXPR_ERROR);
if (CUR != '(')
XP_ERROR(XPATH_EXPR_ERROR);
NEXT;
level = 1;
len = xmlStrlen(ctxt->cur);
len++;
buffer = (xmlChar *) xmlMallocAtomic(len * sizeof (xmlChar));
if (buffer == NULL) {
xmlXPtrErrMemory("allocating buffer");
return;
}
cur = buffer;
while (CUR != 0) {
if (CUR == ')') {
level--;
if (level == 0) {
NEXT;
break;
}
*cur++ = CUR;
} else if (CUR == '(') {
level++;
*cur++ = CUR;
} else if (CUR == '^') {
NEXT;
if ((CUR == ')') || (CUR == '(') || (CUR == '^')) {
*cur++ = CUR;
} else {
*cur++ = '^';
*cur++ = CUR;
}
} else {
*cur++ = CUR;
}
NEXT;
}
*cur = 0;
if ((level != 0) && (CUR == 0)) {
xmlFree(buffer);
XP_ERROR(XPTR_SYNTAX_ERROR);
}
if (xmlStrEqual(name, (xmlChar *) "xpointer")) {
const xmlChar *left = CUR_PTR;
CUR_PTR = buffer;
/*
* To evaluate an xpointer scheme element (4.3) we need:
* context initialized to the root
* context position initalized to 1
* context size initialized to 1
*/
ctxt->context->node = (xmlNodePtr)ctxt->context->doc;
ctxt->context->proximityPosition = 1;
ctxt->context->contextSize = 1;
xmlXPathEvalExpr(ctxt);
CUR_PTR=left;
} else if (xmlStrEqual(name, (xmlChar *) "element")) {
const xmlChar *left = CUR_PTR;
xmlChar *name2;
CUR_PTR = buffer;
if (buffer[0] == '/') {
xmlXPathRoot(ctxt);
xmlXPtrEvalChildSeq(ctxt, NULL);
} else {
name2 = xmlXPathParseName(ctxt);
if (name2 == NULL) {
CUR_PTR = left;
xmlFree(buffer);
XP_ERROR(XPATH_EXPR_ERROR);
}
xmlXPtrEvalChildSeq(ctxt, name2);
}
CUR_PTR = left;
#ifdef XPTR_XMLNS_SCHEME
} else if (xmlStrEqual(name, (xmlChar *) "xmlns")) {
const xmlChar *left = CUR_PTR;
xmlChar *prefix;
xmlChar *URI;
xmlURIPtr value;
CUR_PTR = buffer;
prefix = xmlXPathParseNCName(ctxt);
if (prefix == NULL) {
xmlFree(buffer);
xmlFree(name);
XP_ERROR(XPTR_SYNTAX_ERROR);
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (CUR != '=') {
xmlFree(prefix);
xmlFree(buffer);
xmlFree(name);
XP_ERROR(XPTR_SYNTAX_ERROR);
}
NEXT;
SKIP_BLANKS;
/* @@ check escaping in the XPointer WD */
value = xmlParseURI((const char *)ctxt->cur);
if (value == NULL) {
xmlFree(prefix);
xmlFree(buffer);
xmlFree(name);
XP_ERROR(XPTR_SYNTAX_ERROR);
}
URI = xmlSaveUri(value);
xmlFreeURI(value);
if (URI == NULL) {
xmlFree(prefix);
xmlFree(buffer);
xmlFree(name);
XP_ERROR(XPATH_MEMORY_ERROR);
}
xmlXPathRegisterNs(ctxt->context, prefix, URI);
CUR_PTR = left;
xmlFree(URI);
xmlFree(prefix);
#endif /* XPTR_XMLNS_SCHEME */
} else {
xmlXPtrErr(ctxt, XML_XPTR_UNKNOWN_SCHEME,
"unsupported scheme '%s'\n", name);
}
xmlFree(buffer);
xmlFree(name);
}
Commit Message: Fix XPointer bug.
BUG=125462
[email protected]
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10344022
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@135174 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | xmlXPtrEvalXPtrPart(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, xmlChar *name) {
xmlChar *buffer, *cur;
int len;
int level;
if (name == NULL)
name = xmlXPathParseName(ctxt);
if (name == NULL)
XP_ERROR(XPATH_EXPR_ERROR);
if (CUR != '(')
XP_ERROR(XPATH_EXPR_ERROR);
NEXT;
level = 1;
len = xmlStrlen(ctxt->cur);
len++;
buffer = (xmlChar *) xmlMallocAtomic(len * sizeof (xmlChar));
if (buffer == NULL) {
xmlXPtrErrMemory("allocating buffer");
return;
}
cur = buffer;
while (CUR != 0) {
if (CUR == ')') {
level--;
if (level == 0) {
NEXT;
break;
}
} else if (CUR == '(') {
level++;
} else if (CUR == '^') {
if ((NXT(1) == ')') || (NXT(1) == '(') || (NXT(1) == '^')) {
NEXT;
}
}
*cur++ = CUR;
NEXT;
}
*cur = 0;
if ((level != 0) && (CUR == 0)) {
xmlFree(buffer);
XP_ERROR(XPTR_SYNTAX_ERROR);
}
if (xmlStrEqual(name, (xmlChar *) "xpointer")) {
const xmlChar *left = CUR_PTR;
CUR_PTR = buffer;
/*
* To evaluate an xpointer scheme element (4.3) we need:
* context initialized to the root
* context position initalized to 1
* context size initialized to 1
*/
ctxt->context->node = (xmlNodePtr)ctxt->context->doc;
ctxt->context->proximityPosition = 1;
ctxt->context->contextSize = 1;
xmlXPathEvalExpr(ctxt);
CUR_PTR=left;
} else if (xmlStrEqual(name, (xmlChar *) "element")) {
const xmlChar *left = CUR_PTR;
xmlChar *name2;
CUR_PTR = buffer;
if (buffer[0] == '/') {
xmlXPathRoot(ctxt);
xmlXPtrEvalChildSeq(ctxt, NULL);
} else {
name2 = xmlXPathParseName(ctxt);
if (name2 == NULL) {
CUR_PTR = left;
xmlFree(buffer);
XP_ERROR(XPATH_EXPR_ERROR);
}
xmlXPtrEvalChildSeq(ctxt, name2);
}
CUR_PTR = left;
#ifdef XPTR_XMLNS_SCHEME
} else if (xmlStrEqual(name, (xmlChar *) "xmlns")) {
const xmlChar *left = CUR_PTR;
xmlChar *prefix;
xmlChar *URI;
xmlURIPtr value;
CUR_PTR = buffer;
prefix = xmlXPathParseNCName(ctxt);
if (prefix == NULL) {
xmlFree(buffer);
xmlFree(name);
XP_ERROR(XPTR_SYNTAX_ERROR);
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (CUR != '=') {
xmlFree(prefix);
xmlFree(buffer);
xmlFree(name);
XP_ERROR(XPTR_SYNTAX_ERROR);
}
NEXT;
SKIP_BLANKS;
/* @@ check escaping in the XPointer WD */
value = xmlParseURI((const char *)ctxt->cur);
if (value == NULL) {
xmlFree(prefix);
xmlFree(buffer);
xmlFree(name);
XP_ERROR(XPTR_SYNTAX_ERROR);
}
URI = xmlSaveUri(value);
xmlFreeURI(value);
if (URI == NULL) {
xmlFree(prefix);
xmlFree(buffer);
xmlFree(name);
XP_ERROR(XPATH_MEMORY_ERROR);
}
xmlXPathRegisterNs(ctxt->context, prefix, URI);
CUR_PTR = left;
xmlFree(URI);
xmlFree(prefix);
#endif /* XPTR_XMLNS_SCHEME */
} else {
xmlXPtrErr(ctxt, XML_XPTR_UNKNOWN_SCHEME,
"unsupported scheme '%s'\n", name);
}
xmlFree(buffer);
xmlFree(name);
}
| 171,059 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CL_InitRef( void ) {
refimport_t ri;
refexport_t *ret;
#ifdef USE_RENDERER_DLOPEN
GetRefAPI_t GetRefAPI;
char dllName[MAX_OSPATH];
#endif
Com_Printf( "----- Initializing Renderer ----\n" );
#ifdef USE_RENDERER_DLOPEN
cl_renderer = Cvar_Get("cl_renderer", "opengl2", CVAR_ARCHIVE | CVAR_LATCH);
Com_sprintf(dllName, sizeof(dllName), "renderer_%s_" ARCH_STRING DLL_EXT, cl_renderer->string);
if(!(rendererLib = Sys_LoadDll(dllName, qfalse)) && strcmp(cl_renderer->string, cl_renderer->resetString))
{
Com_Printf("failed:\n\"%s\"\n", Sys_LibraryError());
Cvar_ForceReset("cl_renderer");
Com_sprintf(dllName, sizeof(dllName), "renderer_opengl2_" ARCH_STRING DLL_EXT);
rendererLib = Sys_LoadDll(dllName, qfalse);
}
if(!rendererLib)
{
Com_Printf("failed:\n\"%s\"\n", Sys_LibraryError());
Com_Error(ERR_FATAL, "Failed to load renderer");
}
GetRefAPI = Sys_LoadFunction(rendererLib, "GetRefAPI");
if(!GetRefAPI)
{
Com_Error(ERR_FATAL, "Can't load symbol GetRefAPI: '%s'", Sys_LibraryError());
}
#endif
ri.Cmd_AddCommand = Cmd_AddCommand;
ri.Cmd_RemoveCommand = Cmd_RemoveCommand;
ri.Cmd_Argc = Cmd_Argc;
ri.Cmd_Argv = Cmd_Argv;
ri.Cmd_ExecuteText = Cbuf_ExecuteText;
ri.Printf = CL_RefPrintf;
ri.Error = Com_Error;
ri.Milliseconds = CL_ScaledMilliseconds;
ri.Malloc = CL_RefMalloc;
ri.Free = Z_Free;
#ifdef HUNK_DEBUG
ri.Hunk_AllocDebug = Hunk_AllocDebug;
#else
ri.Hunk_Alloc = Hunk_Alloc;
#endif
ri.Hunk_AllocateTempMemory = Hunk_AllocateTempMemory;
ri.Hunk_FreeTempMemory = Hunk_FreeTempMemory;
ri.CM_ClusterPVS = CM_ClusterPVS;
ri.CM_DrawDebugSurface = CM_DrawDebugSurface;
ri.FS_ReadFile = FS_ReadFile;
ri.FS_FreeFile = FS_FreeFile;
ri.FS_WriteFile = FS_WriteFile;
ri.FS_FreeFileList = FS_FreeFileList;
ri.FS_ListFiles = FS_ListFiles;
ri.FS_FileIsInPAK = FS_FileIsInPAK;
ri.FS_FileExists = FS_FileExists;
ri.Cvar_Get = Cvar_Get;
ri.Cvar_Set = Cvar_Set;
ri.Cvar_SetValue = Cvar_SetValue;
ri.Cvar_CheckRange = Cvar_CheckRange;
ri.Cvar_SetDescription = Cvar_SetDescription;
ri.Cvar_VariableIntegerValue = Cvar_VariableIntegerValue;
ri.CIN_UploadCinematic = CIN_UploadCinematic;
ri.CIN_PlayCinematic = CIN_PlayCinematic;
ri.CIN_RunCinematic = CIN_RunCinematic;
ri.CL_WriteAVIVideoFrame = CL_WriteAVIVideoFrame;
ri.IN_Init = IN_Init;
ri.IN_Shutdown = IN_Shutdown;
ri.IN_Restart = IN_Restart;
ri.ftol = Q_ftol;
ri.Sys_SetEnv = Sys_SetEnv;
ri.Sys_GLimpSafeInit = Sys_GLimpSafeInit;
ri.Sys_GLimpInit = Sys_GLimpInit;
ri.Sys_LowPhysicalMemory = Sys_LowPhysicalMemory;
ret = GetRefAPI( REF_API_VERSION, &ri );
#if defined __USEA3D && defined __A3D_GEOM
hA3Dg_ExportRenderGeom (ret);
#endif
Com_Printf( "-------------------------------\n");
if ( !ret ) {
Com_Error (ERR_FATAL, "Couldn't initialize refresh" );
}
re = *ret;
Cvar_Set( "cl_paused", "0" );
}
Commit Message: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s.
CWE ID: CWE-269 | void CL_InitRef( void ) {
refimport_t ri;
refexport_t *ret;
#ifdef USE_RENDERER_DLOPEN
GetRefAPI_t GetRefAPI;
char dllName[MAX_OSPATH];
#endif
Com_Printf( "----- Initializing Renderer ----\n" );
#ifdef USE_RENDERER_DLOPEN
cl_renderer = Cvar_Get("cl_renderer", "opengl2", CVAR_ARCHIVE | CVAR_LATCH | CVAR_PROTECTED);
Com_sprintf(dllName, sizeof(dllName), "renderer_%s_" ARCH_STRING DLL_EXT, cl_renderer->string);
if(!(rendererLib = Sys_LoadDll(dllName, qfalse)) && strcmp(cl_renderer->string, cl_renderer->resetString))
{
Com_Printf("failed:\n\"%s\"\n", Sys_LibraryError());
Cvar_ForceReset("cl_renderer");
Com_sprintf(dllName, sizeof(dllName), "renderer_opengl2_" ARCH_STRING DLL_EXT);
rendererLib = Sys_LoadDll(dllName, qfalse);
}
if(!rendererLib)
{
Com_Printf("failed:\n\"%s\"\n", Sys_LibraryError());
Com_Error(ERR_FATAL, "Failed to load renderer");
}
GetRefAPI = Sys_LoadFunction(rendererLib, "GetRefAPI");
if(!GetRefAPI)
{
Com_Error(ERR_FATAL, "Can't load symbol GetRefAPI: '%s'", Sys_LibraryError());
}
#endif
ri.Cmd_AddCommand = Cmd_AddCommand;
ri.Cmd_RemoveCommand = Cmd_RemoveCommand;
ri.Cmd_Argc = Cmd_Argc;
ri.Cmd_Argv = Cmd_Argv;
ri.Cmd_ExecuteText = Cbuf_ExecuteText;
ri.Printf = CL_RefPrintf;
ri.Error = Com_Error;
ri.Milliseconds = CL_ScaledMilliseconds;
ri.Malloc = CL_RefMalloc;
ri.Free = Z_Free;
#ifdef HUNK_DEBUG
ri.Hunk_AllocDebug = Hunk_AllocDebug;
#else
ri.Hunk_Alloc = Hunk_Alloc;
#endif
ri.Hunk_AllocateTempMemory = Hunk_AllocateTempMemory;
ri.Hunk_FreeTempMemory = Hunk_FreeTempMemory;
ri.CM_ClusterPVS = CM_ClusterPVS;
ri.CM_DrawDebugSurface = CM_DrawDebugSurface;
ri.FS_ReadFile = FS_ReadFile;
ri.FS_FreeFile = FS_FreeFile;
ri.FS_WriteFile = FS_WriteFile;
ri.FS_FreeFileList = FS_FreeFileList;
ri.FS_ListFiles = FS_ListFiles;
ri.FS_FileIsInPAK = FS_FileIsInPAK;
ri.FS_FileExists = FS_FileExists;
ri.Cvar_Get = Cvar_Get;
ri.Cvar_Set = Cvar_Set;
ri.Cvar_SetValue = Cvar_SetValue;
ri.Cvar_CheckRange = Cvar_CheckRange;
ri.Cvar_SetDescription = Cvar_SetDescription;
ri.Cvar_VariableIntegerValue = Cvar_VariableIntegerValue;
ri.CIN_UploadCinematic = CIN_UploadCinematic;
ri.CIN_PlayCinematic = CIN_PlayCinematic;
ri.CIN_RunCinematic = CIN_RunCinematic;
ri.CL_WriteAVIVideoFrame = CL_WriteAVIVideoFrame;
ri.IN_Init = IN_Init;
ri.IN_Shutdown = IN_Shutdown;
ri.IN_Restart = IN_Restart;
ri.ftol = Q_ftol;
ri.Sys_SetEnv = Sys_SetEnv;
ri.Sys_GLimpSafeInit = Sys_GLimpSafeInit;
ri.Sys_GLimpInit = Sys_GLimpInit;
ri.Sys_LowPhysicalMemory = Sys_LowPhysicalMemory;
ret = GetRefAPI( REF_API_VERSION, &ri );
#if defined __USEA3D && defined __A3D_GEOM
hA3Dg_ExportRenderGeom (ret);
#endif
Com_Printf( "-------------------------------\n");
if ( !ret ) {
Com_Error (ERR_FATAL, "Couldn't initialize refresh" );
}
re = *ret;
Cvar_Set( "cl_paused", "0" );
}
| 170,089 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ChromeOSSetImePropertyActivated(
InputMethodStatusConnection* connection, const char* key, bool activated) {
DLOG(INFO) << "SetImePropertyeActivated: " << key << ": " << activated;
DCHECK(key);
g_return_if_fail(connection);
connection->SetImePropertyActivated(key, activated);
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void ChromeOSSetImePropertyActivated(
| 170,527 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: char *my_asctime(time_t t)
{
struct tm *tm;
char *str;
int len;
tm = localtime(&t);
str = g_strdup(asctime(tm));
len = strlen(str);
if (len > 0) str[len-1] = '\0';
return str;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'security' into 'master'
Security
Closes #10
See merge request !17
CWE ID: CWE-416 | char *my_asctime(time_t t)
{
struct tm *tm;
char *str;
int len;
tm = localtime(&t);
if (tm == NULL)
return g_strdup("???");
str = g_strdup(asctime(tm));
len = strlen(str);
if (len > 0) str[len-1] = '\0';
return str;
}
| 168,056 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: XpmCreateDataFromXpmImage(
char ***data_return,
XpmImage *image,
XpmInfo *info)
{
/* calculation variables */
int ErrorStatus;
char buf[BUFSIZ];
char **header = NULL, **data, **sptr, **sptr2, *s;
unsigned int header_size, header_nlines;
unsigned int data_size, data_nlines;
unsigned int extensions = 0, ext_size = 0, ext_nlines = 0;
unsigned int offset, l, n;
*data_return = NULL;
extensions = info && (info->valuemask & XpmExtensions)
&& info->nextensions;
/* compute the number of extensions lines and size */
if (extensions)
CountExtensions(info->extensions, info->nextensions,
&ext_size, &ext_nlines);
/*
* alloc a temporary array of char pointer for the header section which
*/
header_nlines = 1 + image->ncolors; /* this may wrap and/or become 0 */
/* 2nd check superfluous if we do not need header_nlines any further */
if(header_nlines <= image->ncolors ||
header_nlines >= UINT_MAX / sizeof(char *))
return(XpmNoMemory);
header_size = sizeof(char *) * header_nlines;
if (header_size >= UINT_MAX / sizeof(char *))
return (XpmNoMemory);
header = (char **) XpmCalloc(header_size, sizeof(char *)); /* can we trust image->ncolors */
if (!header)
return (XpmNoMemory);
/* print the hints line */
s = buf;
#ifndef VOID_SPRINTF
s +=
#endif
sprintf(s, "%d %d %d %d", image->width, image->height,
image->ncolors, image->cpp);
#ifdef VOID_SPRINTF
s += strlen(s);
#endif
if (info && (info->valuemask & XpmHotspot)) {
#ifndef VOID_SPRINTF
s +=
#endif
sprintf(s, " %d %d", info->x_hotspot, info->y_hotspot);
#ifdef VOID_SPRINTF
s += strlen(s);
#endif
}
if (extensions) {
strcpy(s, " XPMEXT");
s += 7;
}
l = s - buf + 1;
*header = (char *) XpmMalloc(l);
if (!*header)
RETURN(XpmNoMemory);
header_size += l;
strcpy(*header, buf);
/* print colors */
ErrorStatus = CreateColors(header + 1, &header_size,
image->colorTable, image->ncolors, image->cpp);
if (ErrorStatus != XpmSuccess)
RETURN(ErrorStatus);
/* now we know the size needed, alloc the data and copy the header lines */
offset = image->width * image->cpp + 1;
if(offset <= image->width || offset <= image->cpp)
if(offset <= image->width || offset <= image->cpp)
RETURN(XpmNoMemory);
if( (image->height + ext_nlines) >= UINT_MAX / sizeof(char *))
RETURN(XpmNoMemory);
data_size = (image->height + ext_nlines) * sizeof(char *);
RETURN(XpmNoMemory);
data_size += image->height * offset;
RETURN(XpmNoMemory);
data_size += image->height * offset;
if( (header_size + ext_size) >= (UINT_MAX - data_size) )
RETURN(XpmNoMemory);
data_size += header_size + ext_size;
data_nlines = header_nlines + image->height + ext_nlines;
*data = (char *) (data + data_nlines);
/* can header have less elements then n suggests? */
n = image->ncolors;
for (l = 0, sptr = data, sptr2 = header; l <= n && sptr && sptr2; l++, sptr++, sptr2++) {
strcpy(*sptr, *sptr2);
*(sptr + 1) = *sptr + strlen(*sptr2) + 1;
}
/* print pixels */
data[header_nlines] = (char *) data + header_size
+ (image->height + ext_nlines) * sizeof(char *);
CreatePixels(data + header_nlines, data_size-header_nlines, image->width, image->height,
image->cpp, image->data, image->colorTable);
/* print extensions */
if (extensions)
CreateExtensions(data + header_nlines + image->height - 1,
data_size - header_nlines - image->height + 1, offset,
info->extensions, info->nextensions,
ext_nlines);
*data_return = data;
ErrorStatus = XpmSuccess;
/* exit point, free only locally allocated variables */
exit:
if (header) {
for (l = 0; l < header_nlines; l++)
if (header[l])
XpmFree(header[l]);
XpmFree(header);
}
return(ErrorStatus);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787 | XpmCreateDataFromXpmImage(
char ***data_return,
XpmImage *image,
XpmInfo *info)
{
/* calculation variables */
int ErrorStatus;
char buf[BUFSIZ];
char **header = NULL, **data, **sptr, **sptr2, *s;
unsigned int header_size, header_nlines;
unsigned int data_size, data_nlines;
unsigned int extensions = 0, ext_size = 0, ext_nlines = 0;
unsigned int offset, l, n;
*data_return = NULL;
extensions = info && (info->valuemask & XpmExtensions)
&& info->nextensions;
/* compute the number of extensions lines and size */
if (extensions)
if (CountExtensions(info->extensions, info->nextensions,
&ext_size, &ext_nlines))
return(XpmNoMemory);
/*
* alloc a temporary array of char pointer for the header section which
*/
header_nlines = 1 + image->ncolors; /* this may wrap and/or become 0 */
/* 2nd check superfluous if we do not need header_nlines any further */
if(header_nlines <= image->ncolors ||
header_nlines >= UINT_MAX / sizeof(char *))
return(XpmNoMemory);
header_size = sizeof(char *) * header_nlines;
if (header_size >= UINT_MAX / sizeof(char *))
return (XpmNoMemory);
header = (char **) XpmCalloc(header_size, sizeof(char *)); /* can we trust image->ncolors */
if (!header)
return (XpmNoMemory);
/* print the hints line */
s = buf;
#ifndef VOID_SPRINTF
s +=
#endif
sprintf(s, "%d %d %d %d", image->width, image->height,
image->ncolors, image->cpp);
#ifdef VOID_SPRINTF
s += strlen(s);
#endif
if (info && (info->valuemask & XpmHotspot)) {
#ifndef VOID_SPRINTF
s +=
#endif
sprintf(s, " %d %d", info->x_hotspot, info->y_hotspot);
#ifdef VOID_SPRINTF
s += strlen(s);
#endif
}
if (extensions) {
strcpy(s, " XPMEXT");
s += 7;
}
l = s - buf + 1;
*header = (char *) XpmMalloc(l);
if (!*header)
RETURN(XpmNoMemory);
header_size += l;
strcpy(*header, buf);
/* print colors */
ErrorStatus = CreateColors(header + 1, &header_size,
image->colorTable, image->ncolors, image->cpp);
if (ErrorStatus != XpmSuccess)
RETURN(ErrorStatus);
/* now we know the size needed, alloc the data and copy the header lines */
offset = image->width * image->cpp + 1;
if(offset <= image->width || offset <= image->cpp)
if(offset <= image->width || offset <= image->cpp)
RETURN(XpmNoMemory);
if (image->height > UINT_MAX - ext_nlines ||
image->height + ext_nlines >= UINT_MAX / sizeof(char *))
RETURN(XpmNoMemory);
data_size = (image->height + ext_nlines) * sizeof(char *);
RETURN(XpmNoMemory);
data_size += image->height * offset;
RETURN(XpmNoMemory);
data_size += image->height * offset;
if (header_size > UINT_MAX - ext_size ||
header_size + ext_size >= (UINT_MAX - data_size) )
RETURN(XpmNoMemory);
data_size += header_size + ext_size;
data_nlines = header_nlines + image->height + ext_nlines;
*data = (char *) (data + data_nlines);
/* can header have less elements then n suggests? */
n = image->ncolors;
for (l = 0, sptr = data, sptr2 = header; l <= n && sptr && sptr2; l++, sptr++, sptr2++) {
strcpy(*sptr, *sptr2);
*(sptr + 1) = *sptr + strlen(*sptr2) + 1;
}
/* print pixels */
data[header_nlines] = (char *) data + header_size
+ (image->height + ext_nlines) * sizeof(char *);
CreatePixels(data + header_nlines, data_size-header_nlines, image->width, image->height,
image->cpp, image->data, image->colorTable);
/* print extensions */
if (extensions)
CreateExtensions(data + header_nlines + image->height - 1,
data_size - header_nlines - image->height + 1, offset,
info->extensions, info->nextensions,
ext_nlines);
*data_return = data;
ErrorStatus = XpmSuccess;
/* exit point, free only locally allocated variables */
exit:
if (header) {
for (l = 0; l < header_nlines; l++)
if (header[l])
XpmFree(header[l]);
XpmFree(header);
}
return(ErrorStatus);
}
| 165,238 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool GDataDirectory::FromProto(const GDataDirectoryProto& proto) {
DCHECK(proto.gdata_entry().file_info().is_directory());
DCHECK(!proto.gdata_entry().has_file_specific_info());
for (int i = 0; i < proto.child_files_size(); ++i) {
scoped_ptr<GDataFile> file(new GDataFile(NULL, directory_service_));
if (!file->FromProto(proto.child_files(i))) {
RemoveChildren();
return false;
}
AddEntry(file.release());
}
for (int i = 0; i < proto.child_directories_size(); ++i) {
scoped_ptr<GDataDirectory> dir(new GDataDirectory(NULL,
directory_service_));
if (!dir->FromProto(proto.child_directories(i))) {
RemoveChildren();
return false;
}
AddEntry(dir.release());
}
if (!GDataEntry::FromProto(proto.gdata_entry()))
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | bool GDataDirectory::FromProto(const GDataDirectoryProto& proto) {
DCHECK(proto.gdata_entry().file_info().is_directory());
DCHECK(!proto.gdata_entry().has_file_specific_info());
for (int i = 0; i < proto.child_files_size(); ++i) {
scoped_ptr<GDataFile> file(directory_service_->CreateGDataFile());
if (!file->FromProto(proto.child_files(i))) {
RemoveChildren();
return false;
}
AddEntry(file.release());
}
for (int i = 0; i < proto.child_directories_size(); ++i) {
scoped_ptr<GDataDirectory> dir(directory_service_->CreateGDataDirectory());
if (!dir->FromProto(proto.child_directories(i))) {
RemoveChildren();
return false;
}
AddEntry(dir.release());
}
if (!GDataEntry::FromProto(proto.gdata_entry()))
return false;
return true;
}
| 171,487 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int mif_process_cmpt(mif_hdr_t *hdr, char *buf)
{
jas_tvparser_t *tvp;
mif_cmpt_t *cmpt;
int id;
cmpt = 0;
tvp = 0;
if (!(cmpt = mif_cmpt_create())) {
goto error;
}
cmpt->tlx = 0;
cmpt->tly = 0;
cmpt->sampperx = 0;
cmpt->samppery = 0;
cmpt->width = 0;
cmpt->height = 0;
cmpt->prec = 0;
cmpt->sgnd = -1;
cmpt->data = 0;
if (!(tvp = jas_tvparser_create(buf))) {
goto error;
}
while (!(id = jas_tvparser_next(tvp))) {
switch (jas_taginfo_nonull(jas_taginfos_lookup(mif_tags,
jas_tvparser_gettag(tvp)))->id) {
case MIF_TLX:
cmpt->tlx = atoi(jas_tvparser_getval(tvp));
break;
case MIF_TLY:
cmpt->tly = atoi(jas_tvparser_getval(tvp));
break;
case MIF_WIDTH:
cmpt->width = atoi(jas_tvparser_getval(tvp));
break;
case MIF_HEIGHT:
cmpt->height = atoi(jas_tvparser_getval(tvp));
break;
case MIF_HSAMP:
cmpt->sampperx = atoi(jas_tvparser_getval(tvp));
break;
case MIF_VSAMP:
cmpt->samppery = atoi(jas_tvparser_getval(tvp));
break;
case MIF_PREC:
cmpt->prec = atoi(jas_tvparser_getval(tvp));
break;
case MIF_SGND:
cmpt->sgnd = atoi(jas_tvparser_getval(tvp));
break;
case MIF_DATA:
if (!(cmpt->data = jas_strdup(jas_tvparser_getval(tvp)))) {
return -1;
}
break;
}
}
jas_tvparser_destroy(tvp);
if (!cmpt->sampperx || !cmpt->samppery) {
goto error;
}
if (mif_hdr_addcmpt(hdr, hdr->numcmpts, cmpt)) {
goto error;
}
return 0;
error:
if (cmpt) {
mif_cmpt_destroy(cmpt);
}
if (tvp) {
jas_tvparser_destroy(tvp);
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-5221
CWE ID: CWE-416 | static int mif_process_cmpt(mif_hdr_t *hdr, char *buf)
{
jas_tvparser_t *tvp;
mif_cmpt_t *cmpt;
int id;
cmpt = 0;
tvp = 0;
if (!(cmpt = mif_cmpt_create())) {
goto error;
}
cmpt->tlx = 0;
cmpt->tly = 0;
cmpt->sampperx = 0;
cmpt->samppery = 0;
cmpt->width = 0;
cmpt->height = 0;
cmpt->prec = 0;
cmpt->sgnd = -1;
cmpt->data = 0;
if (!(tvp = jas_tvparser_create(buf))) {
goto error;
}
while (!(id = jas_tvparser_next(tvp))) {
switch (jas_taginfo_nonull(jas_taginfos_lookup(mif_tags,
jas_tvparser_gettag(tvp)))->id) {
case MIF_TLX:
cmpt->tlx = atoi(jas_tvparser_getval(tvp));
break;
case MIF_TLY:
cmpt->tly = atoi(jas_tvparser_getval(tvp));
break;
case MIF_WIDTH:
cmpt->width = atoi(jas_tvparser_getval(tvp));
break;
case MIF_HEIGHT:
cmpt->height = atoi(jas_tvparser_getval(tvp));
break;
case MIF_HSAMP:
cmpt->sampperx = atoi(jas_tvparser_getval(tvp));
break;
case MIF_VSAMP:
cmpt->samppery = atoi(jas_tvparser_getval(tvp));
break;
case MIF_PREC:
cmpt->prec = atoi(jas_tvparser_getval(tvp));
break;
case MIF_SGND:
cmpt->sgnd = atoi(jas_tvparser_getval(tvp));
break;
case MIF_DATA:
if (!(cmpt->data = jas_strdup(jas_tvparser_getval(tvp)))) {
return -1;
}
break;
}
}
if (!cmpt->sampperx || !cmpt->samppery) {
goto error;
}
if (mif_hdr_addcmpt(hdr, hdr->numcmpts, cmpt)) {
goto error;
}
jas_tvparser_destroy(tvp);
return 0;
error:
if (cmpt) {
mif_cmpt_destroy(cmpt);
}
if (tvp) {
jas_tvparser_destroy(tvp);
}
return -1;
}
| 168,874 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void utee_param_to_param(struct tee_ta_param *p, struct utee_params *up)
{
size_t n;
uint32_t types = up->types;
p->types = types;
for (n = 0; n < TEE_NUM_PARAMS; n++) {
uintptr_t a = up->vals[n * 2];
size_t b = up->vals[n * 2 + 1];
switch (TEE_PARAM_TYPE_GET(types, n)) {
case TEE_PARAM_TYPE_MEMREF_INPUT:
case TEE_PARAM_TYPE_MEMREF_OUTPUT:
case TEE_PARAM_TYPE_MEMREF_INOUT:
p->u[n].mem.mobj = &mobj_virt;
p->u[n].mem.offs = a;
p->u[n].mem.size = b;
break;
case TEE_PARAM_TYPE_VALUE_INPUT:
case TEE_PARAM_TYPE_VALUE_INOUT:
p->u[n].val.a = a;
p->u[n].val.b = b;
break;
default:
memset(&p->u[n], 0, sizeof(p->u[n]));
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message: core: svc: always check ta parameters
Always check TA parameters from a user TA. This prevents a user TA from
passing invalid pointers to a pseudo TA.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0007: "Buffer checks missing when calling pseudo
TAs".
Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <[email protected]> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Joakim Bech <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Riscure <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static void utee_param_to_param(struct tee_ta_param *p, struct utee_params *up)
static TEE_Result utee_param_to_param(struct user_ta_ctx *utc,
struct tee_ta_param *p,
struct utee_params *up)
{
size_t n;
uint32_t types = up->types;
p->types = types;
for (n = 0; n < TEE_NUM_PARAMS; n++) {
uintptr_t a = up->vals[n * 2];
size_t b = up->vals[n * 2 + 1];
uint32_t flags = TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_READ |
TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_ANY_OWNER;
switch (TEE_PARAM_TYPE_GET(types, n)) {
case TEE_PARAM_TYPE_MEMREF_OUTPUT:
case TEE_PARAM_TYPE_MEMREF_INOUT:
flags |= TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_WRITE;
/*FALLTHROUGH*/
case TEE_PARAM_TYPE_MEMREF_INPUT:
p->u[n].mem.mobj = &mobj_virt;
p->u[n].mem.offs = a;
p->u[n].mem.size = b;
if (tee_mmu_check_access_rights(utc, flags, a, b))
return TEE_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED;
break;
case TEE_PARAM_TYPE_VALUE_INPUT:
case TEE_PARAM_TYPE_VALUE_INOUT:
p->u[n].val.a = a;
p->u[n].val.b = b;
break;
default:
memset(&p->u[n], 0, sizeof(p->u[n]));
break;
}
}
return TEE_SUCCESS;
}
| 169,471 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void WebSocketJob::Wakeup() {
if (!waiting_)
return;
waiting_ = false;
DCHECK(callback_);
MessageLoopForIO::current()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
NewRunnableMethod(this, &WebSocketJob::RetryPendingIO));
}
Commit Message: Use ScopedRunnableMethodFactory in WebSocketJob
Don't post SendPending if it is already posted.
BUG=89795
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7488007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93599 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void WebSocketJob::Wakeup() {
if (!waiting_)
return;
waiting_ = false;
DCHECK(callback_);
MessageLoopForIO::current()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
method_factory_.NewRunnableMethod(&WebSocketJob::RetryPendingIO));
}
| 170,307 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ikev1_n_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext, u_int item_len,
const u_char *ep, uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi0 _U_,
uint32_t proto0 _U_, int depth _U_)
{
const struct ikev1_pl_n *p;
struct ikev1_pl_n n;
const u_char *cp;
const u_char *ep2;
uint32_t doi;
uint32_t proto;
static const char *notify_error_str[] = {
NULL, "INVALID-PAYLOAD-TYPE",
"DOI-NOT-SUPPORTED", "SITUATION-NOT-SUPPORTED",
"INVALID-COOKIE", "INVALID-MAJOR-VERSION",
"INVALID-MINOR-VERSION", "INVALID-EXCHANGE-TYPE",
"INVALID-FLAGS", "INVALID-MESSAGE-ID",
"INVALID-PROTOCOL-ID", "INVALID-SPI",
"INVALID-TRANSFORM-ID", "ATTRIBUTES-NOT-SUPPORTED",
"NO-PROPOSAL-CHOSEN", "BAD-PROPOSAL-SYNTAX",
"PAYLOAD-MALFORMED", "INVALID-KEY-INFORMATION",
"INVALID-ID-INFORMATION", "INVALID-CERT-ENCODING",
"INVALID-CERTIFICATE", "CERT-TYPE-UNSUPPORTED",
"INVALID-CERT-AUTHORITY", "INVALID-HASH-INFORMATION",
"AUTHENTICATION-FAILED", "INVALID-SIGNATURE",
"ADDRESS-NOTIFICATION", "NOTIFY-SA-LIFETIME",
"CERTIFICATE-UNAVAILABLE", "UNSUPPORTED-EXCHANGE-TYPE",
"UNEQUAL-PAYLOAD-LENGTHS",
};
static const char *ipsec_notify_error_str[] = {
"RESERVED",
};
static const char *notify_status_str[] = {
"CONNECTED",
};
static const char *ipsec_notify_status_str[] = {
"RESPONDER-LIFETIME", "REPLAY-STATUS",
"INITIAL-CONTACT",
};
/* NOTE: these macro must be called with x in proper range */
/* 0 - 8191 */
#define NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(x) \
STR_OR_ID((x), notify_error_str)
/* 8192 - 16383 */
#define IPSEC_NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(x) \
STR_OR_ID((u_int)((x) - 8192), ipsec_notify_error_str)
/* 16384 - 24575 */
#define NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(x) \
STR_OR_ID((u_int)((x) - 16384), notify_status_str)
/* 24576 - 32767 */
#define IPSEC_NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(x) \
STR_OR_ID((u_int)((x) - 24576), ipsec_notify_status_str)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s:", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_N)));
p = (const struct ikev1_pl_n *)ext;
ND_TCHECK(*p);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&n, ext, sizeof(n));
doi = ntohl(n.doi);
proto = n.prot_id;
if (doi != 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," doi=%d", doi));
ND_PRINT((ndo," proto=%d", proto));
if (ntohs(n.type) < 8192)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 16384)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", numstr(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 24576)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", numstr(ntohs(n.type))));
if (n.spi_size) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," spi="));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(p + 1), n.spi_size))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)(p + 1) + n.spi_size;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo," doi=ipsec"));
ND_PRINT((ndo," proto=%s", PROTOIDSTR(proto)));
if (ntohs(n.type) < 8192)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 16384)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", IPSEC_NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 24576)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 32768)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", IPSEC_NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", numstr(ntohs(n.type))));
if (n.spi_size) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," spi="));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(p + 1), n.spi_size))
goto trunc;
}
cp = (const u_char *)(p + 1) + n.spi_size;
ep2 = (const u_char *)p + item_len;
if (cp < ep) {
switch (ntohs(n.type)) {
case IPSECDOI_NTYPE_RESPONDER_LIFETIME:
{
const struct attrmap *map = oakley_t_map;
size_t nmap = sizeof(oakley_t_map)/sizeof(oakley_t_map[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo," attrs=("));
while (cp < ep && cp < ep2) {
cp = ikev1_attrmap_print(ndo, cp,
(ep < ep2) ? ep : ep2, map, nmap);
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
break;
}
case IPSECDOI_NTYPE_REPLAY_STATUS:
ND_PRINT((ndo," status=("));
ND_PRINT((ndo,"replay detection %sabled",
EXTRACT_32BITS(cp) ? "en" : "dis"));
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
break;
default:
/*
* XXX - fill in more types here; see, for example,
* draft-ietf-ipsec-notifymsg-04.
*/
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," data=("));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(cp), ep - cp))
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
} else {
if (!ike_show_somedata(ndo, cp, ep))
goto trunc;
}
break;
}
}
return (const u_char *)ext + item_len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_N)));
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13039/IKEv1: Do more bounds checking.
Have ikev1_attrmap_print() and ikev1_attr_print() do full bounds
checking, and return null on a bounds overflow. Have their callers
check for a null return.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | ikev1_n_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext, u_int item_len,
const u_char *ep, uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi0 _U_,
uint32_t proto0 _U_, int depth _U_)
{
const struct ikev1_pl_n *p;
struct ikev1_pl_n n;
const u_char *cp;
const u_char *ep2;
uint32_t doi;
uint32_t proto;
static const char *notify_error_str[] = {
NULL, "INVALID-PAYLOAD-TYPE",
"DOI-NOT-SUPPORTED", "SITUATION-NOT-SUPPORTED",
"INVALID-COOKIE", "INVALID-MAJOR-VERSION",
"INVALID-MINOR-VERSION", "INVALID-EXCHANGE-TYPE",
"INVALID-FLAGS", "INVALID-MESSAGE-ID",
"INVALID-PROTOCOL-ID", "INVALID-SPI",
"INVALID-TRANSFORM-ID", "ATTRIBUTES-NOT-SUPPORTED",
"NO-PROPOSAL-CHOSEN", "BAD-PROPOSAL-SYNTAX",
"PAYLOAD-MALFORMED", "INVALID-KEY-INFORMATION",
"INVALID-ID-INFORMATION", "INVALID-CERT-ENCODING",
"INVALID-CERTIFICATE", "CERT-TYPE-UNSUPPORTED",
"INVALID-CERT-AUTHORITY", "INVALID-HASH-INFORMATION",
"AUTHENTICATION-FAILED", "INVALID-SIGNATURE",
"ADDRESS-NOTIFICATION", "NOTIFY-SA-LIFETIME",
"CERTIFICATE-UNAVAILABLE", "UNSUPPORTED-EXCHANGE-TYPE",
"UNEQUAL-PAYLOAD-LENGTHS",
};
static const char *ipsec_notify_error_str[] = {
"RESERVED",
};
static const char *notify_status_str[] = {
"CONNECTED",
};
static const char *ipsec_notify_status_str[] = {
"RESPONDER-LIFETIME", "REPLAY-STATUS",
"INITIAL-CONTACT",
};
/* NOTE: these macro must be called with x in proper range */
/* 0 - 8191 */
#define NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(x) \
STR_OR_ID((x), notify_error_str)
/* 8192 - 16383 */
#define IPSEC_NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(x) \
STR_OR_ID((u_int)((x) - 8192), ipsec_notify_error_str)
/* 16384 - 24575 */
#define NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(x) \
STR_OR_ID((u_int)((x) - 16384), notify_status_str)
/* 24576 - 32767 */
#define IPSEC_NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(x) \
STR_OR_ID((u_int)((x) - 24576), ipsec_notify_status_str)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s:", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_N)));
p = (const struct ikev1_pl_n *)ext;
ND_TCHECK(*p);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&n, ext, sizeof(n));
doi = ntohl(n.doi);
proto = n.prot_id;
if (doi != 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," doi=%d", doi));
ND_PRINT((ndo," proto=%d", proto));
if (ntohs(n.type) < 8192)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 16384)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", numstr(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 24576)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", numstr(ntohs(n.type))));
if (n.spi_size) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," spi="));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(p + 1), n.spi_size))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)(p + 1) + n.spi_size;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo," doi=ipsec"));
ND_PRINT((ndo," proto=%s", PROTOIDSTR(proto)));
if (ntohs(n.type) < 8192)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 16384)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", IPSEC_NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 24576)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 32768)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", IPSEC_NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", numstr(ntohs(n.type))));
if (n.spi_size) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," spi="));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(p + 1), n.spi_size))
goto trunc;
}
cp = (const u_char *)(p + 1) + n.spi_size;
ep2 = (const u_char *)p + item_len;
if (cp < ep) {
switch (ntohs(n.type)) {
case IPSECDOI_NTYPE_RESPONDER_LIFETIME:
{
const struct attrmap *map = oakley_t_map;
size_t nmap = sizeof(oakley_t_map)/sizeof(oakley_t_map[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo," attrs=("));
while (cp < ep && cp < ep2) {
cp = ikev1_attrmap_print(ndo, cp, ep2, map, nmap);
if (cp == NULL) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
goto trunc;
}
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
break;
}
case IPSECDOI_NTYPE_REPLAY_STATUS:
ND_PRINT((ndo," status=("));
ND_PRINT((ndo,"replay detection %sabled",
EXTRACT_32BITS(cp) ? "en" : "dis"));
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
break;
default:
/*
* XXX - fill in more types here; see, for example,
* draft-ietf-ipsec-notifymsg-04.
*/
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," data=("));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(cp), ep - cp))
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
} else {
if (!ike_show_somedata(ndo, cp, ep))
goto trunc;
}
break;
}
}
return (const u_char *)ext + item_len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_N)));
return NULL;
}
| 167,841 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool f2fs_init_extent_tree(struct inode *inode, struct f2fs_extent *i_ext)
{
struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_I_SB(inode);
struct extent_tree *et;
struct extent_node *en;
struct extent_info ei;
if (!f2fs_may_extent_tree(inode)) {
/* drop largest extent */
if (i_ext && i_ext->len) {
i_ext->len = 0;
return true;
}
return false;
}
et = __grab_extent_tree(inode);
if (!i_ext || !i_ext->len)
return false;
get_extent_info(&ei, i_ext);
write_lock(&et->lock);
if (atomic_read(&et->node_cnt))
goto out;
en = __init_extent_tree(sbi, et, &ei);
if (en) {
spin_lock(&sbi->extent_lock);
list_add_tail(&en->list, &sbi->extent_list);
spin_unlock(&sbi->extent_lock);
}
out:
write_unlock(&et->lock);
return false;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a bug caused by NULL extent tree
Thread A: Thread B:
-f2fs_remount
-sbi->mount_opt.opt = 0;
<--- -f2fs_iget
-do_read_inode
-f2fs_init_extent_tree
-F2FS_I(inode)->extent_tree is NULL
-default_options && parse_options
-remount return
<--- -f2fs_map_blocks
-f2fs_lookup_extent_tree
-f2fs_bug_on(sbi, !et);
The same problem with f2fs_new_inode.
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | bool f2fs_init_extent_tree(struct inode *inode, struct f2fs_extent *i_ext)
static bool __f2fs_init_extent_tree(struct inode *inode, struct f2fs_extent *i_ext)
{
struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_I_SB(inode);
struct extent_tree *et;
struct extent_node *en;
struct extent_info ei;
if (!f2fs_may_extent_tree(inode)) {
/* drop largest extent */
if (i_ext && i_ext->len) {
i_ext->len = 0;
return true;
}
return false;
}
et = __grab_extent_tree(inode);
if (!i_ext || !i_ext->len)
return false;
get_extent_info(&ei, i_ext);
write_lock(&et->lock);
if (atomic_read(&et->node_cnt))
goto out;
en = __init_extent_tree(sbi, et, &ei);
if (en) {
spin_lock(&sbi->extent_lock);
list_add_tail(&en->list, &sbi->extent_list);
spin_unlock(&sbi->extent_lock);
}
out:
write_unlock(&et->lock);
return false;
}
| 169,416 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int asf_read_marker(AVFormatContext *s, int64_t size)
{
AVIOContext *pb = s->pb;
ASFContext *asf = s->priv_data;
int i, count, name_len, ret;
char name[1024];
avio_rl64(pb); // reserved 16 bytes
avio_rl64(pb); // ...
count = avio_rl32(pb); // markers count
avio_rl16(pb); // reserved 2 bytes
name_len = avio_rl16(pb); // name length
for (i = 0; i < name_len; i++)
avio_r8(pb); // skip the name
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
int64_t pres_time;
int name_len;
avio_rl64(pb); // offset, 8 bytes
pres_time = avio_rl64(pb); // presentation time
pres_time -= asf->hdr.preroll * 10000;
avio_rl16(pb); // entry length
avio_rl32(pb); // send time
avio_rl32(pb); // flags
name_len = avio_rl32(pb); // name length
if ((ret = avio_get_str16le(pb, name_len * 2, name,
sizeof(name))) < name_len)
avio_skip(pb, name_len - ret);
avpriv_new_chapter(s, i, (AVRational) { 1, 10000000 }, pres_time,
AV_NOPTS_VALUE, name);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/asfdec: Fix DoS due to lack of eof check
Fixes: loop.asf
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-834 | static int asf_read_marker(AVFormatContext *s, int64_t size)
{
AVIOContext *pb = s->pb;
ASFContext *asf = s->priv_data;
int i, count, name_len, ret;
char name[1024];
avio_rl64(pb); // reserved 16 bytes
avio_rl64(pb); // ...
count = avio_rl32(pb); // markers count
avio_rl16(pb); // reserved 2 bytes
name_len = avio_rl16(pb); // name length
avio_skip(pb, name_len);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
int64_t pres_time;
int name_len;
if (avio_feof(pb))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
avio_rl64(pb); // offset, 8 bytes
pres_time = avio_rl64(pb); // presentation time
pres_time -= asf->hdr.preroll * 10000;
avio_rl16(pb); // entry length
avio_rl32(pb); // send time
avio_rl32(pb); // flags
name_len = avio_rl32(pb); // name length
if ((ret = avio_get_str16le(pb, name_len * 2, name,
sizeof(name))) < name_len)
avio_skip(pb, name_len - ret);
avpriv_new_chapter(s, i, (AVRational) { 1, 10000000 }, pres_time,
AV_NOPTS_VALUE, name);
}
return 0;
}
| 167,775 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: network_init ()
{
#ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS
char *ca_path, *ca_path2;
gnutls_global_init ();
gnutls_certificate_allocate_credentials (&gnutls_xcred);
ca_path = string_expand_home (CONFIG_STRING(config_network_gnutls_ca_file));
if (ca_path)
{
ca_path2 = string_replace (ca_path, "%h", weechat_home);
if (ca_path2)
{
gnutls_certificate_set_x509_trust_file (gnutls_xcred, ca_path2,
GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
free (ca_path2);
}
free (ca_path);
}
gnutls_certificate_client_set_retrieve_function (gnutls_xcred,
&hook_connect_gnutls_set_certificates);
network_init_ok = 1;
gcry_check_version (GCRYPT_VERSION);
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_DISABLE_SECMEM, 0);
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_INITIALIZATION_FINISHED, 0);
#endif
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | network_init ()
{
#ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS
char *ca_path, *ca_path2;
gnutls_global_init ();
gnutls_certificate_allocate_credentials (&gnutls_xcred);
ca_path = string_expand_home (CONFIG_STRING(config_network_gnutls_ca_file));
if (ca_path)
{
ca_path2 = string_replace (ca_path, "%h", weechat_home);
if (ca_path2)
{
gnutls_certificate_set_x509_trust_file (gnutls_xcred, ca_path2,
GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
free (ca_path2);
}
free (ca_path);
}
gnutls_certificate_set_verify_function (gnutls_xcred,
&hook_connect_gnutls_verify_certificates);
gnutls_certificate_client_set_retrieve_function (gnutls_xcred,
&hook_connect_gnutls_set_certificates);
network_init_ok = 1;
gcry_check_version (GCRYPT_VERSION);
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_DISABLE_SECMEM, 0);
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_INITIALIZATION_FINISHED, 0);
#endif
}
| 164,712 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: swabHorDiff16(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
uint16* wp = (uint16*) cp0;
tmsize_t wc = cc / 2;
horDiff16(tif, cp0, cc);
TIFFSwabArrayOfShort(wp, wc);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predict.h, libtiff/tif_predict.c:
Replace assertions by runtime checks to avoid assertions in debug mode,
or buffer overflows in release mode. Can happen when dealing with
unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105
by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations
team.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | swabHorDiff16(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
uint16* wp = (uint16*) cp0;
tmsize_t wc = cc / 2;
if( !horDiff16(tif, cp0, cc) )
return 0;
TIFFSwabArrayOfShort(wp, wc);
return 1;
}
| 166,890 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: image_transform_png_set_expand_gray_1_2_4_to_8_add(image_transform *this,
PNG_CONST image_transform **that, png_byte colour_type, png_byte bit_depth)
{
return image_transform_png_set_expand_add(this, that, colour_type,
bit_depth);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | image_transform_png_set_expand_gray_1_2_4_to_8_add(image_transform *this,
const image_transform **that, png_byte colour_type, png_byte bit_depth)
{
#if PNG_LIBPNG_VER < 10700
return image_transform_png_set_expand_add(this, that, colour_type,
bit_depth);
#else
UNUSED(bit_depth)
this->next = *that;
*that = this;
/* This should do nothing unless the color type is gray and the bit depth is
* less than 8:
*/
return colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY && bit_depth < 8;
#endif /* 1.7 or later */
}
| 173,630 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: pgp_enumerate_blob(sc_card_t *card, pgp_blob_t *blob)
{
const u8 *in;
int r;
if (blob->files != NULL)
return SC_SUCCESS;
if ((r = pgp_read_blob(card, blob)) < 0)
return r;
in = blob->data;
while ((int) blob->len > (in - blob->data)) {
unsigned int cla, tag, tmptag;
size_t len;
const u8 *data = in;
pgp_blob_t *new;
r = sc_asn1_read_tag(&data, blob->len - (in - blob->data),
&cla, &tag, &len);
if (r < 0 || data == NULL) {
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"Unexpected end of contents\n");
return SC_ERROR_OBJECT_NOT_VALID;
}
/* undo ASN1's split of tag & class */
for (tmptag = tag; tmptag > 0x0FF; tmptag >>= 8) {
cla <<= 8;
}
tag |= cla;
/* Awful hack for composite DOs that have
* a TLV with the DO's id encompassing the
* entire blob. Example: Yubikey Neo */
if (tag == blob->id) {
in = data;
continue;
}
/* create fake file system hierarchy by
* using constructed DOs as DF */
if ((new = pgp_new_blob(card, blob, tag, sc_file_new())) == NULL)
return SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
pgp_set_blob(new, data, len);
in = data + len;
}
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | pgp_enumerate_blob(sc_card_t *card, pgp_blob_t *blob)
{
const u8 *in;
int r;
if (blob->files != NULL)
return SC_SUCCESS;
if ((r = pgp_read_blob(card, blob)) < 0)
return r;
in = blob->data;
while ((int) blob->len > (in - blob->data)) {
unsigned int cla, tag, tmptag;
size_t len;
const u8 *data = in;
pgp_blob_t *new;
if (!in)
return SC_ERROR_OBJECT_NOT_VALID;
r = sc_asn1_read_tag(&data, blob->len - (in - blob->data),
&cla, &tag, &len);
if (r < 0 || data == NULL) {
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"Unexpected end of contents\n");
return SC_ERROR_OBJECT_NOT_VALID;
}
if (data + len > blob->data + blob->len)
return SC_ERROR_OBJECT_NOT_VALID;
/* undo ASN1's split of tag & class */
for (tmptag = tag; tmptag > 0x0FF; tmptag >>= 8) {
cla <<= 8;
}
tag |= cla;
/* Awful hack for composite DOs that have
* a TLV with the DO's id encompassing the
* entire blob. Example: Yubikey Neo */
if (tag == blob->id) {
in = data;
continue;
}
/* create fake file system hierarchy by
* using constructed DOs as DF */
if ((new = pgp_new_blob(card, blob, tag, sc_file_new())) == NULL)
return SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
pgp_set_blob(new, data, len);
in = data + len;
}
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
| 169,060 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static u32 __ipv6_select_ident(struct net *net, u32 hashrnd,
const struct in6_addr *dst,
const struct in6_addr *src)
{
u32 hash, id;
hash = __ipv6_addr_jhash(dst, hashrnd);
hash = __ipv6_addr_jhash(src, hash);
hash ^= net_hash_mix(net);
/* Treat id of 0 as unset and if we get 0 back from ip_idents_reserve,
* set the hight order instead thus minimizing possible future
* collisions.
*/
id = ip_idents_reserve(hash, 1);
if (unlikely(!id))
id = 1 << 31;
return id;
}
Commit Message: inet: switch IP ID generator to siphash
According to Amit Klein and Benny Pinkas, IP ID generation is too weak
and might be used by attackers.
Even with recent net_hash_mix() fix (netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix())
having 64bit key and Jenkins hash is risky.
It is time to switch to siphash and its 128bit keys.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Amit Klein <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Benny Pinkas <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static u32 __ipv6_select_ident(struct net *net, u32 hashrnd,
static u32 __ipv6_select_ident(struct net *net,
const struct in6_addr *dst,
const struct in6_addr *src)
{
const struct {
struct in6_addr dst;
struct in6_addr src;
} __aligned(SIPHASH_ALIGNMENT) combined = {
.dst = *dst,
.src = *src,
};
u32 hash, id;
/* Note the following code is not safe, but this is okay. */
if (unlikely(siphash_key_is_zero(&net->ipv4.ip_id_key)))
get_random_bytes(&net->ipv4.ip_id_key,
sizeof(net->ipv4.ip_id_key));
hash = siphash(&combined, sizeof(combined), &net->ipv4.ip_id_key);
/* Treat id of 0 as unset and if we get 0 back from ip_idents_reserve,
* set the hight order instead thus minimizing possible future
* collisions.
*/
id = ip_idents_reserve(hash, 1);
if (unlikely(!id))
id = 1 << 31;
return id;
}
| 169,717 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: _pyfribidi_log2vis (PyObject * self, PyObject * args, PyObject * kw)
{
PyObject *logical = NULL; /* input unicode or string object */
FriBidiParType base = FRIBIDI_TYPE_RTL; /* optional direction */
const char *encoding = "utf-8"; /* optional input string encoding */
int clean = 0; /* optional flag to clean the string */
int reordernsm = 1; /* optional flag to allow reordering of non spacing marks*/
static char *kwargs[] =
{ "logical", "base_direction", "encoding", "clean", "reordernsm", NULL };
if (!PyArg_ParseTupleAndKeywords (args, kw, "O|isii", kwargs,
&logical, &base, &encoding, &clean, &reordernsm))
return NULL;
/* Validate base */
if (!(base == FRIBIDI_TYPE_RTL ||
base == FRIBIDI_TYPE_LTR || base == FRIBIDI_TYPE_ON))
return PyErr_Format (PyExc_ValueError,
"invalid value %d: use either RTL, LTR or ON",
base);
/* Check object type and delegate to one of the log2vis functions */
if (PyUnicode_Check (logical))
return log2vis_unicode (logical, base, clean, reordernsm);
else if (PyString_Check (logical))
return log2vis_encoded_string (logical, encoding, base, clean, reordernsm);
else
return PyErr_Format (PyExc_TypeError,
"expected unicode or str, not %s",
logical->ob_type->tp_name);
}
Commit Message: refactor pyfribidi.c module
pyfribidi.c is now compiled as _pyfribidi. This module only handles
unicode internally and doesn't use the fribidi_utf8_to_unicode
function (which can't handle 4 byte utf-8 sequences). This fixes the
buffer overflow in issue #2.
The code is now also much simpler: pyfribidi.c is down from 280 to 130
lines of code.
We now ship a pure python pyfribidi that handles the case when
non-unicode strings are passed in.
We now also adapt the size of the output string if clean=True is
passed.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | _pyfribidi_log2vis (PyObject * self, PyObject * args, PyObject * kw)
unicode_log2vis (PyUnicodeObject* string,
FriBidiParType base_direction, int clean, int reordernsm)
{
int i;
int length = string->length;
FriBidiChar *logical = NULL; /* input fribidi unicode buffer */
FriBidiChar *visual = NULL; /* output fribidi unicode buffer */
FriBidiStrIndex new_len = 0; /* length of the UTF-8 buffer */
PyUnicodeObject *result = NULL;
/* Allocate fribidi unicode buffers
TODO - Don't copy strings if sizeof(FriBidiChar) == sizeof(Py_UNICODE)
*/
logical = PyMem_New (FriBidiChar, length + 1);
if (logical == NULL) {
PyErr_NoMemory();
goto cleanup;
}
visual = PyMem_New (FriBidiChar, length + 1);
if (visual == NULL) {
PyErr_NoMemory();
goto cleanup;
}
for (i=0; i<length; ++i) {
logical[i] = string->str[i];
}
/* Convert to unicode and order visually */
fribidi_set_reorder_nsm(reordernsm);
if (!fribidi_log2vis (logical, length, &base_direction, visual,
NULL, NULL, NULL)) {
PyErr_SetString (PyExc_RuntimeError,
"fribidi failed to order string");
goto cleanup;
}
/* Cleanup the string if requested */
if (clean) {
length = fribidi_remove_bidi_marks (visual, length, NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
result = (PyUnicodeObject*) PyUnicode_FromUnicode(NULL, length);
if (result == NULL) {
goto cleanup;
}
for (i=0; i<length; ++i) {
result->str[i] = visual[i];
}
cleanup:
/* Delete unicode buffers */
PyMem_Del (logical);
PyMem_Del (visual);
return (PyObject *)result;
}
| 165,638 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void LauncherView::OnBoundsChanged(const gfx::Rect& previous_bounds) {
LayoutToIdealBounds();
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(LauncherIconObserver, observers_,
OnLauncherIconPositionsChanged());
}
Commit Message: ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void LauncherView::OnBoundsChanged(const gfx::Rect& previous_bounds) {
LayoutToIdealBounds();
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(LauncherIconObserver, observers_,
OnLauncherIconPositionsChanged());
if (IsShowingOverflowBubble())
overflow_bubble_->Hide();
}
| 170,894 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: pax_decode_header (struct tar_sparse_file *file)
{
if (file->stat_info->sparse_major > 0)
{
uintmax_t u;
char nbuf[UINTMAX_STRSIZE_BOUND];
union block *blk;
char *p;
size_t i;
off_t start;
#define COPY_BUF(b,buf,src) do \
{ \
char *endp = b->buffer + BLOCKSIZE; \
char *dst = buf; \
do \
{ \
if (dst == buf + UINTMAX_STRSIZE_BOUND -1) \
{ \
ERROR ((0, 0, _("%s: numeric overflow in sparse archive member"), \
file->stat_info->orig_file_name)); \
return false; \
} \
if (src == endp) \
{ \
set_next_block_after (b); \
b = find_next_block (); \
src = b->buffer; \
endp = b->buffer + BLOCKSIZE; \
} \
while (*dst++ != '\n'); \
dst[-1] = 0; \
} while (0)
start = current_block_ordinal ();
set_next_block_after (current_header);
start = current_block_ordinal ();
set_next_block_after (current_header);
blk = find_next_block ();
p = blk->buffer;
COPY_BUF (blk,nbuf,p);
if (!decode_num (&u, nbuf, TYPE_MAXIMUM (size_t)))
}
file->stat_info->sparse_map_size = u;
file->stat_info->sparse_map = xcalloc (file->stat_info->sparse_map_size,
sizeof (*file->stat_info->sparse_map));
file->stat_info->sparse_map_avail = 0;
for (i = 0; i < file->stat_info->sparse_map_size; i++)
{
struct sp_array sp;
COPY_BUF (blk,nbuf,p);
if (!decode_num (&u, nbuf, TYPE_MAXIMUM (off_t)))
{
ERROR ((0, 0, _("%s: malformed sparse archive member"),
file->stat_info->orig_file_name));
return false;
}
sp.offset = u;
COPY_BUF (blk,nbuf,p);
if (!decode_num (&u, nbuf, TYPE_MAXIMUM (off_t)))
{
ERROR ((0, 0, _("%s: malformed sparse archive member"),
file->stat_info->orig_file_name));
return false;
}
sp.numbytes = u;
sparse_add_map (file->stat_info, &sp);
}
set_next_block_after (blk);
file->dumped_size += BLOCKSIZE * (current_block_ordinal () - start);
}
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | pax_decode_header (struct tar_sparse_file *file)
{
if (file->stat_info->sparse_major > 0)
{
uintmax_t u;
char nbuf[UINTMAX_STRSIZE_BOUND];
union block *blk;
char *p;
size_t i;
off_t start;
#define COPY_BUF(b,buf,src) do \
{ \
char *endp = b->buffer + BLOCKSIZE; \
char *dst = buf; \
do \
{ \
if (dst == buf + UINTMAX_STRSIZE_BOUND -1) \
{ \
ERROR ((0, 0, _("%s: numeric overflow in sparse archive member"), \
file->stat_info->orig_file_name)); \
return false; \
} \
if (src == endp) \
{ \
set_next_block_after (b); \
b = find_next_block (); \
if (!b) \
FATAL_ERROR ((0, 0, _("Unexpected EOF in archive"))); \
src = b->buffer; \
endp = b->buffer + BLOCKSIZE; \
} \
while (*dst++ != '\n'); \
dst[-1] = 0; \
} while (0)
start = current_block_ordinal ();
set_next_block_after (current_header);
start = current_block_ordinal ();
set_next_block_after (current_header);
blk = find_next_block ();
if (!blk)
FATAL_ERROR ((0, 0, _("Unexpected EOF in archive")));
p = blk->buffer;
COPY_BUF (blk,nbuf,p);
if (!decode_num (&u, nbuf, TYPE_MAXIMUM (size_t)))
}
file->stat_info->sparse_map_size = u;
file->stat_info->sparse_map = xcalloc (file->stat_info->sparse_map_size,
sizeof (*file->stat_info->sparse_map));
file->stat_info->sparse_map_avail = 0;
for (i = 0; i < file->stat_info->sparse_map_size; i++)
{
struct sp_array sp;
COPY_BUF (blk,nbuf,p);
if (!decode_num (&u, nbuf, TYPE_MAXIMUM (off_t)))
{
ERROR ((0, 0, _("%s: malformed sparse archive member"),
file->stat_info->orig_file_name));
return false;
}
sp.offset = u;
COPY_BUF (blk,nbuf,p);
if (!decode_num (&u, nbuf, TYPE_MAXIMUM (off_t)))
{
ERROR ((0, 0, _("%s: malformed sparse archive member"),
file->stat_info->orig_file_name));
return false;
}
sp.numbytes = u;
sparse_add_map (file->stat_info, &sp);
}
set_next_block_after (blk);
file->dumped_size += BLOCKSIZE * (current_block_ordinal () - start);
}
return true;
}
| 164,776 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void InspectorNetworkAgent::WillSendRequestInternal(
ExecutionContext* execution_context,
unsigned long identifier,
DocumentLoader* loader,
const ResourceRequest& request,
const ResourceResponse& redirect_response,
const FetchInitiatorInfo& initiator_info) {
String request_id = IdentifiersFactory::RequestId(identifier);
String loader_id = loader ? IdentifiersFactory::LoaderId(loader) : "";
resources_data_->ResourceCreated(request_id, loader_id, request.Url());
InspectorPageAgent::ResourceType type = InspectorPageAgent::kOtherResource;
if (initiator_info.name == FetchInitiatorTypeNames::xmlhttprequest) {
type = InspectorPageAgent::kXHRResource;
resources_data_->SetResourceType(request_id, type);
} else if (initiator_info.name == FetchInitiatorTypeNames::document) {
type = InspectorPageAgent::kDocumentResource;
resources_data_->SetResourceType(request_id, type);
}
String frame_id = loader && loader->GetFrame()
? IdentifiersFactory::FrameId(loader->GetFrame())
: "";
std::unique_ptr<protocol::Network::Initiator> initiator_object =
BuildInitiatorObject(loader && loader->GetFrame()
? loader->GetFrame()->GetDocument()
: nullptr,
initiator_info);
if (initiator_info.name == FetchInitiatorTypeNames::document) {
FrameNavigationInitiatorMap::iterator it =
frame_navigation_initiator_map_.find(frame_id);
if (it != frame_navigation_initiator_map_.end())
initiator_object = it->value->clone();
}
std::unique_ptr<protocol::Network::Request> request_info(
BuildObjectForResourceRequest(request));
if (loader) {
request_info->setMixedContentType(MixedContentTypeForContextType(
MixedContentChecker::ContextTypeForInspector(loader->GetFrame(),
request)));
}
request_info->setReferrerPolicy(
GetReferrerPolicy(request.GetReferrerPolicy()));
if (initiator_info.is_link_preload)
request_info->setIsLinkPreload(true);
String resource_type = InspectorPageAgent::ResourceTypeJson(type);
String documentURL =
loader ? UrlWithoutFragment(loader->Url()).GetString()
: UrlWithoutFragment(execution_context->Url()).GetString();
Maybe<String> maybe_frame_id;
if (!frame_id.IsEmpty())
maybe_frame_id = frame_id;
GetFrontend()->requestWillBeSent(
request_id, loader_id, documentURL, std::move(request_info),
MonotonicallyIncreasingTime(), CurrentTime(), std::move(initiator_object),
BuildObjectForResourceResponse(redirect_response), resource_type,
std::move(maybe_frame_id));
if (pending_xhr_replay_data_ && !pending_xhr_replay_data_->Async())
GetFrontend()->flush();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void InspectorNetworkAgent::WillSendRequestInternal(
ExecutionContext* execution_context,
unsigned long identifier,
DocumentLoader* loader,
const ResourceRequest& request,
const ResourceResponse& redirect_response,
const FetchInitiatorInfo& initiator_info,
InspectorPageAgent::ResourceType type) {
String request_id = IdentifiersFactory::RequestId(identifier);
String loader_id = loader ? IdentifiersFactory::LoaderId(loader) : "";
resources_data_->ResourceCreated(request_id, loader_id, request.Url());
if (initiator_info.name == FetchInitiatorTypeNames::xmlhttprequest)
type = InspectorPageAgent::kXHRResource;
resources_data_->SetResourceType(request_id, type);
String frame_id = loader && loader->GetFrame()
? IdentifiersFactory::FrameId(loader->GetFrame())
: "";
std::unique_ptr<protocol::Network::Initiator> initiator_object =
BuildInitiatorObject(loader && loader->GetFrame()
? loader->GetFrame()->GetDocument()
: nullptr,
initiator_info);
if (initiator_info.name == FetchInitiatorTypeNames::document) {
FrameNavigationInitiatorMap::iterator it =
frame_navigation_initiator_map_.find(frame_id);
if (it != frame_navigation_initiator_map_.end())
initiator_object = it->value->clone();
}
std::unique_ptr<protocol::Network::Request> request_info(
BuildObjectForResourceRequest(request));
if (loader) {
request_info->setMixedContentType(MixedContentTypeForContextType(
MixedContentChecker::ContextTypeForInspector(loader->GetFrame(),
request)));
}
request_info->setReferrerPolicy(
GetReferrerPolicy(request.GetReferrerPolicy()));
if (initiator_info.is_link_preload)
request_info->setIsLinkPreload(true);
String resource_type = InspectorPageAgent::ResourceTypeJson(type);
String documentURL =
loader ? UrlWithoutFragment(loader->Url()).GetString()
: UrlWithoutFragment(execution_context->Url()).GetString();
Maybe<String> maybe_frame_id;
if (!frame_id.IsEmpty())
maybe_frame_id = frame_id;
GetFrontend()->requestWillBeSent(
request_id, loader_id, documentURL, std::move(request_info),
MonotonicallyIncreasingTime(), CurrentTime(), std::move(initiator_object),
BuildObjectForResourceResponse(redirect_response), resource_type,
std::move(maybe_frame_id));
if (pending_xhr_replay_data_ && !pending_xhr_replay_data_->Async())
GetFrontend()->flush();
}
| 172,468 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: HRESULT WaitForLoginUIAndGetResult(
CGaiaCredentialBase::UIProcessInfo* uiprocinfo,
std::string* json_result,
DWORD* exit_code,
BSTR* status_text) {
LOGFN(INFO);
DCHECK(uiprocinfo);
DCHECK(json_result);
DCHECK(exit_code);
DCHECK(status_text);
const int kBufferSize = 4096;
std::vector<char> output_buffer(kBufferSize, '\0');
base::ScopedClosureRunner zero_buffer_on_exit(
base::BindOnce(base::IgnoreResult(&RtlSecureZeroMemory),
&output_buffer[0], kBufferSize));
HRESULT hr = WaitForProcess(uiprocinfo->procinfo.process_handle(),
uiprocinfo->parent_handles, exit_code,
&output_buffer[0], kBufferSize);
LOGFN(INFO) << "exit_code=" << exit_code;
if (*exit_code == kUiecAbort) {
LOGFN(ERROR) << "Aborted hr=" << putHR(hr);
return E_ABORT;
} else if (*exit_code != kUiecSuccess) {
LOGFN(ERROR) << "Error hr=" << putHR(hr);
*status_text =
CGaiaCredentialBase::AllocErrorString(IDS_INVALID_UI_RESPONSE_BASE);
return E_FAIL;
}
*json_result = std::string(&output_buffer[0]);
return S_OK;
}
Commit Message: [GCPW] Disallow sign in of consumer accounts when mdm is enabled.
Unless the registry key "mdm_aca" is explicitly set to 1, always
fail sign in of consumer accounts when mdm enrollment is enabled.
Consumer accounts are defined as accounts with gmail.com or
googlemail.com domain.
Bug: 944049
Change-Id: Icb822f3737d90931de16a8d3317616dd2b159edd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1532903
Commit-Queue: Tien Mai <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Roger Tawa <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#646278}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | HRESULT WaitForLoginUIAndGetResult(
CGaiaCredentialBase::UIProcessInfo* uiprocinfo,
std::string* json_result,
DWORD* exit_code,
BSTR* status_text) {
LOGFN(INFO);
DCHECK(uiprocinfo);
DCHECK(json_result);
DCHECK(exit_code);
DCHECK(status_text);
const int kBufferSize = 4096;
std::vector<char> output_buffer(kBufferSize, '\0');
base::ScopedClosureRunner zero_buffer_on_exit(
base::BindOnce(base::IgnoreResult(&RtlSecureZeroMemory),
&output_buffer[0], kBufferSize));
HRESULT hr = WaitForProcess(uiprocinfo->procinfo.process_handle(),
uiprocinfo->parent_handles, exit_code,
&output_buffer[0], kBufferSize);
LOGFN(INFO) << "exit_code=" << *exit_code;
if (*exit_code == kUiecAbort) {
LOGFN(ERROR) << "Aborted hr=" << putHR(hr);
return E_ABORT;
} else if (*exit_code != kUiecSuccess) {
LOGFN(ERROR) << "Error hr=" << putHR(hr);
*status_text =
CGaiaCredentialBase::AllocErrorString(IDS_INVALID_UI_RESPONSE_BASE);
return E_FAIL;
}
*json_result = std::string(&output_buffer[0]);
return S_OK;
}
| 172,102 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PluginModule::PluginModule(const std::string& name,
const FilePath& path,
PluginDelegate::ModuleLifetime* lifetime_delegate)
: lifetime_delegate_(lifetime_delegate),
callback_tracker_(new ::ppapi::CallbackTracker),
is_in_destructor_(false),
is_crashed_(false),
broker_(NULL),
library_(NULL),
name_(name),
path_(path),
reserve_instance_id_(NULL),
nacl_ipc_proxy_(false) {
if (!host_globals)
host_globals = new HostGlobals;
memset(&entry_points_, 0, sizeof(entry_points_));
pp_module_ = HostGlobals::Get()->AddModule(this);
GetMainThreadMessageLoop(); // Initialize the main thread message loop.
GetLivePluginSet()->insert(this);
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | PluginModule::PluginModule(const std::string& name,
const FilePath& path,
PluginDelegate::ModuleLifetime* lifetime_delegate)
: lifetime_delegate_(lifetime_delegate),
callback_tracker_(new ::ppapi::CallbackTracker),
is_in_destructor_(false),
is_crashed_(false),
broker_(NULL),
library_(NULL),
name_(name),
path_(path),
reserve_instance_id_(NULL) {
if (!host_globals)
host_globals = new HostGlobals;
memset(&entry_points_, 0, sizeof(entry_points_));
pp_module_ = HostGlobals::Get()->AddModule(this);
GetMainThreadMessageLoop(); // Initialize the main thread message loop.
GetLivePluginSet()->insert(this);
}
| 170,747 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void FrameFetchContext::DispatchWillSendRequest(
unsigned long identifier,
ResourceRequest& request,
const ResourceResponse& redirect_response,
const FetchInitiatorInfo& initiator_info) {
if (IsDetached())
return;
if (redirect_response.IsNull()) {
GetFrame()->Loader().Progress().WillStartLoading(identifier,
request.Priority());
}
probe::willSendRequest(GetFrame()->GetDocument(), identifier,
MasterDocumentLoader(), request, redirect_response,
initiator_info);
if (IdlenessDetector* idleness_detector = GetFrame()->GetIdlenessDetector())
idleness_detector->OnWillSendRequest();
if (GetFrame()->FrameScheduler())
GetFrame()->FrameScheduler()->DidStartLoading(identifier);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void FrameFetchContext::DispatchWillSendRequest(
unsigned long identifier,
ResourceRequest& request,
const ResourceResponse& redirect_response,
Resource::Type resource_type,
const FetchInitiatorInfo& initiator_info) {
if (IsDetached())
return;
if (redirect_response.IsNull()) {
GetFrame()->Loader().Progress().WillStartLoading(identifier,
request.Priority());
}
probe::willSendRequest(GetFrame()->GetDocument(), identifier,
MasterDocumentLoader(), request, redirect_response,
initiator_info, resource_type);
if (IdlenessDetector* idleness_detector = GetFrame()->GetIdlenessDetector())
idleness_detector->OnWillSendRequest();
if (GetFrame()->FrameScheduler())
GetFrame()->FrameScheduler()->DidStartLoading(identifier);
}
| 172,474 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage::EnsureMailbox(MailboxSyncMode mode,
GLenum filter) {
if (!texture_holder_->IsMailboxTextureHolder()) {
TRACE_EVENT0("blink", "AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage::EnsureMailbox");
if (!original_skia_image_) {
RetainOriginalSkImage();
}
texture_holder_ = std::make_unique<MailboxTextureHolder>(
std::move(texture_holder_), filter);
}
texture_holder_->Sync(mode);
}
Commit Message: Fix *StaticBitmapImage ThreadChecker and unaccelerated SkImage destroy
- AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage was misusing ThreadChecker by having its
own detach logic. Using proper DetachThread is simpler, cleaner and
correct.
- UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage didn't destroy the SkImage in the
proper thread, leading to GrContext/SkSp problems.
Bug: 890576
Change-Id: Ic71e7f7322b0b851774628247aa5256664bc0723
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1307775
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Charette <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Roman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604427}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage::EnsureMailbox(MailboxSyncMode mode,
GLenum filter) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
if (!texture_holder_->IsMailboxTextureHolder()) {
TRACE_EVENT0("blink", "AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage::EnsureMailbox");
if (!original_skia_image_) {
RetainOriginalSkImage();
}
texture_holder_ = std::make_unique<MailboxTextureHolder>(
std::move(texture_holder_), filter);
}
texture_holder_->Sync(mode);
}
| 172,595 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static jlong Region_createFromParcel(JNIEnv* env, jobject clazz, jobject parcel)
{
if (parcel == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
android::Parcel* p = android::parcelForJavaObject(env, parcel);
SkRegion* region = new SkRegion;
size_t size = p->readInt32();
region->readFromMemory(p->readInplace(size), size);
return reinterpret_cast<jlong>(region);
}
Commit Message: Check that the parcel contained the expected amount of region data. DO NOT MERGE
bug:20883006
Change-Id: Ib47a8ec8696dbc37e958b8dbceb43fcbabf6605b
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static jlong Region_createFromParcel(JNIEnv* env, jobject clazz, jobject parcel)
{
if (parcel == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
android::Parcel* p = android::parcelForJavaObject(env, parcel);
const size_t size = p->readInt32();
const void* regionData = p->readInplace(size);
if (regionData == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
SkRegion* region = new SkRegion;
region->readFromMemory(regionData, size);
return reinterpret_cast<jlong>(region);
}
| 173,341 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int rds_cmsg_atomic(struct rds_sock *rs, struct rds_message *rm,
struct cmsghdr *cmsg)
{
struct page *page = NULL;
struct rds_atomic_args *args;
int ret = 0;
if (cmsg->cmsg_len < CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct rds_atomic_args))
|| rm->atomic.op_active)
return -EINVAL;
args = CMSG_DATA(cmsg);
/* Nonmasked & masked cmsg ops converted to masked hw ops */
switch (cmsg->cmsg_type) {
case RDS_CMSG_ATOMIC_FADD:
rm->atomic.op_type = RDS_ATOMIC_TYPE_FADD;
rm->atomic.op_m_fadd.add = args->fadd.add;
rm->atomic.op_m_fadd.nocarry_mask = 0;
break;
case RDS_CMSG_MASKED_ATOMIC_FADD:
rm->atomic.op_type = RDS_ATOMIC_TYPE_FADD;
rm->atomic.op_m_fadd.add = args->m_fadd.add;
rm->atomic.op_m_fadd.nocarry_mask = args->m_fadd.nocarry_mask;
break;
case RDS_CMSG_ATOMIC_CSWP:
rm->atomic.op_type = RDS_ATOMIC_TYPE_CSWP;
rm->atomic.op_m_cswp.compare = args->cswp.compare;
rm->atomic.op_m_cswp.swap = args->cswp.swap;
rm->atomic.op_m_cswp.compare_mask = ~0;
rm->atomic.op_m_cswp.swap_mask = ~0;
break;
case RDS_CMSG_MASKED_ATOMIC_CSWP:
rm->atomic.op_type = RDS_ATOMIC_TYPE_CSWP;
rm->atomic.op_m_cswp.compare = args->m_cswp.compare;
rm->atomic.op_m_cswp.swap = args->m_cswp.swap;
rm->atomic.op_m_cswp.compare_mask = args->m_cswp.compare_mask;
rm->atomic.op_m_cswp.swap_mask = args->m_cswp.swap_mask;
break;
default:
BUG(); /* should never happen */
}
rm->atomic.op_notify = !!(args->flags & RDS_RDMA_NOTIFY_ME);
rm->atomic.op_silent = !!(args->flags & RDS_RDMA_SILENT);
rm->atomic.op_active = 1;
rm->atomic.op_recverr = rs->rs_recverr;
rm->atomic.op_sg = rds_message_alloc_sgs(rm, 1);
if (!rm->atomic.op_sg) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto err;
}
/* verify 8 byte-aligned */
if (args->local_addr & 0x7) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto err;
}
ret = rds_pin_pages(args->local_addr, 1, &page, 1);
if (ret != 1)
goto err;
ret = 0;
sg_set_page(rm->atomic.op_sg, page, 8, offset_in_page(args->local_addr));
if (rm->atomic.op_notify || rm->atomic.op_recverr) {
/* We allocate an uninitialized notifier here, because
* we don't want to do that in the completion handler. We
* would have to use GFP_ATOMIC there, and don't want to deal
* with failed allocations.
*/
rm->atomic.op_notifier = kmalloc(sizeof(*rm->atomic.op_notifier), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!rm->atomic.op_notifier) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto err;
}
rm->atomic.op_notifier->n_user_token = args->user_token;
rm->atomic.op_notifier->n_status = RDS_RDMA_SUCCESS;
}
rm->atomic.op_rkey = rds_rdma_cookie_key(args->cookie);
rm->atomic.op_remote_addr = args->remote_addr + rds_rdma_cookie_offset(args->cookie);
return ret;
err:
if (page)
put_page(page);
kfree(rm->atomic.op_notifier);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: RDS: null pointer dereference in rds_atomic_free_op
set rm->atomic.op_active to 0 when rds_pin_pages() fails
or the user supplied address is invalid,
this prevents a NULL pointer usage in rds_atomic_free_op()
Signed-off-by: Mohamed Ghannam <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | int rds_cmsg_atomic(struct rds_sock *rs, struct rds_message *rm,
struct cmsghdr *cmsg)
{
struct page *page = NULL;
struct rds_atomic_args *args;
int ret = 0;
if (cmsg->cmsg_len < CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct rds_atomic_args))
|| rm->atomic.op_active)
return -EINVAL;
args = CMSG_DATA(cmsg);
/* Nonmasked & masked cmsg ops converted to masked hw ops */
switch (cmsg->cmsg_type) {
case RDS_CMSG_ATOMIC_FADD:
rm->atomic.op_type = RDS_ATOMIC_TYPE_FADD;
rm->atomic.op_m_fadd.add = args->fadd.add;
rm->atomic.op_m_fadd.nocarry_mask = 0;
break;
case RDS_CMSG_MASKED_ATOMIC_FADD:
rm->atomic.op_type = RDS_ATOMIC_TYPE_FADD;
rm->atomic.op_m_fadd.add = args->m_fadd.add;
rm->atomic.op_m_fadd.nocarry_mask = args->m_fadd.nocarry_mask;
break;
case RDS_CMSG_ATOMIC_CSWP:
rm->atomic.op_type = RDS_ATOMIC_TYPE_CSWP;
rm->atomic.op_m_cswp.compare = args->cswp.compare;
rm->atomic.op_m_cswp.swap = args->cswp.swap;
rm->atomic.op_m_cswp.compare_mask = ~0;
rm->atomic.op_m_cswp.swap_mask = ~0;
break;
case RDS_CMSG_MASKED_ATOMIC_CSWP:
rm->atomic.op_type = RDS_ATOMIC_TYPE_CSWP;
rm->atomic.op_m_cswp.compare = args->m_cswp.compare;
rm->atomic.op_m_cswp.swap = args->m_cswp.swap;
rm->atomic.op_m_cswp.compare_mask = args->m_cswp.compare_mask;
rm->atomic.op_m_cswp.swap_mask = args->m_cswp.swap_mask;
break;
default:
BUG(); /* should never happen */
}
rm->atomic.op_notify = !!(args->flags & RDS_RDMA_NOTIFY_ME);
rm->atomic.op_silent = !!(args->flags & RDS_RDMA_SILENT);
rm->atomic.op_active = 1;
rm->atomic.op_recverr = rs->rs_recverr;
rm->atomic.op_sg = rds_message_alloc_sgs(rm, 1);
if (!rm->atomic.op_sg) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto err;
}
/* verify 8 byte-aligned */
if (args->local_addr & 0x7) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto err;
}
ret = rds_pin_pages(args->local_addr, 1, &page, 1);
if (ret != 1)
goto err;
ret = 0;
sg_set_page(rm->atomic.op_sg, page, 8, offset_in_page(args->local_addr));
if (rm->atomic.op_notify || rm->atomic.op_recverr) {
/* We allocate an uninitialized notifier here, because
* we don't want to do that in the completion handler. We
* would have to use GFP_ATOMIC there, and don't want to deal
* with failed allocations.
*/
rm->atomic.op_notifier = kmalloc(sizeof(*rm->atomic.op_notifier), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!rm->atomic.op_notifier) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto err;
}
rm->atomic.op_notifier->n_user_token = args->user_token;
rm->atomic.op_notifier->n_status = RDS_RDMA_SUCCESS;
}
rm->atomic.op_rkey = rds_rdma_cookie_key(args->cookie);
rm->atomic.op_remote_addr = args->remote_addr + rds_rdma_cookie_offset(args->cookie);
return ret;
err:
if (page)
put_page(page);
rm->atomic.op_active = 0;
kfree(rm->atomic.op_notifier);
return ret;
}
| 169,353 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int irssi_ssl_handshake(GIOChannel *handle)
{
GIOSSLChannel *chan = (GIOSSLChannel *)handle;
int ret, err;
X509 *cert;
const char *errstr;
ret = SSL_connect(chan->ssl);
if (ret <= 0) {
err = SSL_get_error(chan->ssl, ret);
switch (err) {
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
return 1;
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
return 3;
case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
g_warning("SSL handshake failed: %s", "server closed connection");
return -1;
case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
errstr = ERR_reason_error_string(ERR_get_error());
if (errstr == NULL && ret == -1)
errstr = strerror(errno);
g_warning("SSL handshake failed: %s", errstr != NULL ? errstr : "server closed connection unexpectedly");
return -1;
default:
errstr = ERR_reason_error_string(ERR_get_error());
g_warning("SSL handshake failed: %s", errstr != NULL ? errstr : "unknown SSL error");
return -1;
}
}
cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(chan->ssl);
if (cert == NULL) {
g_warning("SSL server supplied no certificate");
return -1;
}
ret = !chan->verify || irssi_ssl_verify(chan->ssl, chan->ctx, cert);
X509_free(cert);
return ret ? 0 : -1;
}
Commit Message: Check if an SSL certificate matches the hostname of the server we are connecting to
git-svn-id: http://svn.irssi.org/repos/irssi/trunk@5104 dbcabf3a-b0e7-0310-adc4-f8d773084564
CWE ID: CWE-20 | int irssi_ssl_handshake(GIOChannel *handle)
{
GIOSSLChannel *chan = (GIOSSLChannel *)handle;
int ret, err;
X509 *cert;
const char *errstr;
ret = SSL_connect(chan->ssl);
if (ret <= 0) {
err = SSL_get_error(chan->ssl, ret);
switch (err) {
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
return 1;
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
return 3;
case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
g_warning("SSL handshake failed: %s", "server closed connection");
return -1;
case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
errstr = ERR_reason_error_string(ERR_get_error());
if (errstr == NULL && ret == -1)
errstr = strerror(errno);
g_warning("SSL handshake failed: %s", errstr != NULL ? errstr : "server closed connection unexpectedly");
return -1;
default:
errstr = ERR_reason_error_string(ERR_get_error());
g_warning("SSL handshake failed: %s", errstr != NULL ? errstr : "unknown SSL error");
return -1;
}
}
cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(chan->ssl);
if (cert == NULL) {
g_warning("SSL server supplied no certificate");
return -1;
}
ret = !chan->verify || irssi_ssl_verify(chan->ssl, chan->ctx, chan->hostname, cert);
X509_free(cert);
return ret ? 0 : -1;
}
| 165,517 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
{
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
int err;
if (opcode == BPF_END || opcode == BPF_NEG) {
if (opcode == BPF_NEG) {
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != 0 ||
insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
insn->off != 0 || insn->imm != 0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_NEG uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
} else {
if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 ||
(insn->imm != 16 && insn->imm != 32 && insn->imm != 64) ||
BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) {
verbose(env, "BPF_END uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/* check src operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic prohibited\n",
insn->dst_reg);
return -EACCES;
}
/* check dest operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP);
if (err)
return err;
} else if (opcode == BPF_MOV) {
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* check src operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
} else {
if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/* check dest operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP);
if (err)
return err;
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) {
/* case: R1 = R2
* copy register state to dest reg
*/
regs[insn->dst_reg] = regs[insn->src_reg];
regs[insn->dst_reg].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
} else {
/* R1 = (u32) R2 */
if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
verbose(env,
"R%d partial copy of pointer\n",
insn->src_reg);
return -EACCES;
}
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
/* high 32 bits are known zero. */
regs[insn->dst_reg].var_off = tnum_cast(
regs[insn->dst_reg].var_off, 4);
__update_reg_bounds(®s[insn->dst_reg]);
}
} else {
/* case: R = imm
* remember the value we stored into this reg
*/
regs[insn->dst_reg].type = SCALAR_VALUE;
__mark_reg_known(regs + insn->dst_reg, insn->imm);
}
} else if (opcode > BPF_END) {
verbose(env, "invalid BPF_ALU opcode %x\n", opcode);
return -EINVAL;
} else { /* all other ALU ops: and, sub, xor, add, ... */
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* check src1 operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
} else {
if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/* check src2 operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
if ((opcode == BPF_MOD || opcode == BPF_DIV) &&
BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K && insn->imm == 0) {
verbose(env, "div by zero\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if ((opcode == BPF_LSH || opcode == BPF_RSH ||
opcode == BPF_ARSH) && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
int size = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 ? 64 : 32;
if (insn->imm < 0 || insn->imm >= size) {
verbose(env, "invalid shift %d\n", insn->imm);
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/* check dest operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK);
if (err)
return err;
return adjust_reg_min_max_vals(env, insn);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix incorrect sign extension in check_alu_op()
Distinguish between
BPF_ALU64|BPF_MOV|BPF_K (load 32-bit immediate, sign-extended to 64-bit)
and BPF_ALU|BPF_MOV|BPF_K (load 32-bit immediate, zero-padded to 64-bit);
only perform sign extension in the first case.
Starting with v4.14, this is exploitable by unprivileged users as long as
the unprivileged_bpf_disabled sysctl isn't set.
Debian assigned CVE-2017-16995 for this issue.
v3:
- add CVE number (Ben Hutchings)
Fixes: 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Edward Cree <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
{
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
int err;
if (opcode == BPF_END || opcode == BPF_NEG) {
if (opcode == BPF_NEG) {
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != 0 ||
insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
insn->off != 0 || insn->imm != 0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_NEG uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
} else {
if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 ||
(insn->imm != 16 && insn->imm != 32 && insn->imm != 64) ||
BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) {
verbose(env, "BPF_END uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/* check src operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic prohibited\n",
insn->dst_reg);
return -EACCES;
}
/* check dest operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP);
if (err)
return err;
} else if (opcode == BPF_MOV) {
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* check src operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
} else {
if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/* check dest operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP);
if (err)
return err;
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) {
/* case: R1 = R2
* copy register state to dest reg
*/
regs[insn->dst_reg] = regs[insn->src_reg];
regs[insn->dst_reg].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
} else {
/* R1 = (u32) R2 */
if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
verbose(env,
"R%d partial copy of pointer\n",
insn->src_reg);
return -EACCES;
}
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
/* high 32 bits are known zero. */
regs[insn->dst_reg].var_off = tnum_cast(
regs[insn->dst_reg].var_off, 4);
__update_reg_bounds(®s[insn->dst_reg]);
}
} else {
/* case: R = imm
* remember the value we stored into this reg
*/
regs[insn->dst_reg].type = SCALAR_VALUE;
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) {
__mark_reg_known(regs + insn->dst_reg,
insn->imm);
} else {
__mark_reg_known(regs + insn->dst_reg,
(u32)insn->imm);
}
}
} else if (opcode > BPF_END) {
verbose(env, "invalid BPF_ALU opcode %x\n", opcode);
return -EINVAL;
} else { /* all other ALU ops: and, sub, xor, add, ... */
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* check src1 operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
} else {
if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/* check src2 operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
if ((opcode == BPF_MOD || opcode == BPF_DIV) &&
BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K && insn->imm == 0) {
verbose(env, "div by zero\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if ((opcode == BPF_LSH || opcode == BPF_RSH ||
opcode == BPF_ARSH) && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
int size = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 ? 64 : 32;
if (insn->imm < 0 || insn->imm >= size) {
verbose(env, "invalid shift %d\n", insn->imm);
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/* check dest operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK);
if (err)
return err;
return adjust_reg_min_max_vals(env, insn);
}
return 0;
}
| 167,660 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter::MaybeCreateThrottle(
NavigationHandle* handle) {
DCHECK(content::MimeHandlerViewMode::UsesCrossProcessFrame());
if (!handle->GetParentFrame()) {
return nullptr;
}
int32_t parent_process_id = handle->GetParentFrame()->GetProcess()->GetID();
auto& map = *GetProcessIdToFilterMap();
if (!base::ContainsKey(map, parent_process_id) || !map[parent_process_id]) {
return nullptr;
}
for (auto& pair : map[parent_process_id]->frame_navigation_helpers_) {
if (!pair.second->ShouldCancelAndIgnore(handle))
continue;
return std::make_unique<CancelAndIgnoreNavigationForPluginFrameThrottle>(
handle);
}
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: [GuestView] - Introduce MimeHandlerViewAttachHelper
This CL is for the most part a mechanical change which extracts almost
all the frame-based MimeHandlerView code out of
ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter. This change both removes the current
clutter form EGVMF as well as fixesa race introduced when the
frame-based logic was added to EGVMF. The reason for the race was that
EGVMF is destroyed on IO thread but all the access to it (for
frame-based MHV) are from UI.
[email protected],[email protected]
Bug: 659750, 896679, 911161, 918861
Change-Id: I6474b870e4d56daa68be03637bb633665d9f9dda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1401451
Commit-Queue: Ehsan Karamad <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: James MacLean <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ehsan Karamad <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621155}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter::MaybeCreateThrottle(
| 173,044 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void skel(const char *homedir, uid_t u, gid_t g) {
char *fname;
if (!arg_shell_none && (strcmp(cfg.shell,"/usr/bin/zsh") == 0 || strcmp(cfg.shell,"/bin/zsh") == 0)) {
if (asprintf(&fname, "%s/.zshrc", homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(fname, &s) == 0)
return;
if (stat("/etc/skel/.zshrc", &s) == 0) {
copy_file("/etc/skel/.zshrc", fname, u, g, 0644);
fs_logger("clone /etc/skel/.zshrc");
}
else {
touch_file_as_user(fname, u, g, 0644);
fs_logger2("touch", fname);
}
free(fname);
}
else if (!arg_shell_none && strcmp(cfg.shell,"/bin/csh") == 0) {
if (asprintf(&fname, "%s/.cshrc", homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(fname, &s) == 0)
return;
if (stat("/etc/skel/.cshrc", &s) == 0) {
copy_file("/etc/skel/.cshrc", fname, u, g, 0644);
fs_logger("clone /etc/skel/.cshrc");
}
else {
touch_file_as_user(fname, u, g, 0644);
fs_logger2("touch", fname);
}
free(fname);
}
else {
if (asprintf(&fname, "%s/.bashrc", homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(fname, &s) == 0)
return;
if (stat("/etc/skel/.bashrc", &s) == 0) {
copy_file("/etc/skel/.bashrc", fname, u, g, 0644);
fs_logger("clone /etc/skel/.bashrc");
}
free(fname);
}
}
Commit Message: security fix
CWE ID: CWE-269 | static void skel(const char *homedir, uid_t u, gid_t g) {
char *fname;
if (!arg_shell_none && (strcmp(cfg.shell,"/usr/bin/zsh") == 0 || strcmp(cfg.shell,"/bin/zsh") == 0)) {
if (asprintf(&fname, "%s/.zshrc", homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(fname, &s) == 0)
return;
if (is_link(fname)) { // stat on dangling symlinks fails, try again using lstat
fprintf(stderr, "Error: invalid %s file\n", fname);
exit(1);
}
if (stat("/etc/skel/.zshrc", &s) == 0) {
copy_file_as_user("/etc/skel/.zshrc", fname, u, g, 0644);
fs_logger("clone /etc/skel/.zshrc");
}
else {
touch_file_as_user(fname, u, g, 0644);
fs_logger2("touch", fname);
}
free(fname);
}
else if (!arg_shell_none && strcmp(cfg.shell,"/bin/csh") == 0) {
if (asprintf(&fname, "%s/.cshrc", homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(fname, &s) == 0)
return;
if (is_link(fname)) { // stat on dangling symlinks fails, try again using lstat
fprintf(stderr, "Error: invalid %s file\n", fname);
exit(1);
}
if (stat("/etc/skel/.cshrc", &s) == 0) {
copy_file_as_user("/etc/skel/.cshrc", fname, u, g, 0644);
fs_logger("clone /etc/skel/.cshrc");
}
else {
touch_file_as_user(fname, u, g, 0644);
fs_logger2("touch", fname);
}
free(fname);
}
else {
if (asprintf(&fname, "%s/.bashrc", homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(fname, &s) == 0)
return;
if (is_link(fname)) { // stat on dangling symlinks fails, try again using lstat
fprintf(stderr, "Error: invalid %s file\n", fname);
exit(1);
}
if (stat("/etc/skel/.bashrc", &s) == 0) {
copy_file_as_user("/etc/skel/.bashrc", fname, u, g, 0644);
fs_logger("clone /etc/skel/.bashrc");
}
free(fname);
}
}
| 168,371 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int readContigTilesIntoBuffer (TIFF* in, uint8* buf,
uint32 imagelength,
uint32 imagewidth,
uint32 tw, uint32 tl,
tsample_t spp, uint16 bps)
{
int status = 1;
tsample_t sample = 0;
tsample_t count = spp;
uint32 row, col, trow;
uint32 nrow, ncol;
uint32 dst_rowsize, shift_width;
uint32 bytes_per_sample, bytes_per_pixel;
uint32 trailing_bits, prev_trailing_bits;
uint32 tile_rowsize = TIFFTileRowSize(in);
uint32 src_offset, dst_offset;
uint32 row_offset, col_offset;
uint8 *bufp = (uint8*) buf;
unsigned char *src = NULL;
unsigned char *dst = NULL;
tsize_t tbytes = 0, tile_buffsize = 0;
tsize_t tilesize = TIFFTileSize(in);
unsigned char *tilebuf = NULL;
bytes_per_sample = (bps + 7) / 8;
bytes_per_pixel = ((bps * spp) + 7) / 8;
if ((bps % 8) == 0)
shift_width = 0;
else
{
if (bytes_per_pixel < (bytes_per_sample + 1))
shift_width = bytes_per_pixel;
else
shift_width = bytes_per_sample + 1;
}
tile_buffsize = tilesize;
if (tilesize == 0 || tile_rowsize == 0)
{
TIFFError("readContigTilesIntoBuffer", "Tile size or tile rowsize is zero");
exit(-1);
}
if (tilesize < (tsize_t)(tl * tile_rowsize))
{
#ifdef DEBUG2
TIFFError("readContigTilesIntoBuffer",
"Tilesize %lu is too small, using alternate calculation %u",
tilesize, tl * tile_rowsize);
#endif
tile_buffsize = tl * tile_rowsize;
if (tl != (tile_buffsize / tile_rowsize))
{
TIFFError("readContigTilesIntoBuffer", "Integer overflow when calculating buffer size.");
exit(-1);
}
}
tilebuf = _TIFFmalloc(tile_buffsize);
if (tilebuf == 0)
return 0;
dst_rowsize = ((imagewidth * bps * spp) + 7) / 8;
for (row = 0; row < imagelength; row += tl)
{
nrow = (row + tl > imagelength) ? imagelength - row : tl;
for (col = 0; col < imagewidth; col += tw)
{
tbytes = TIFFReadTile(in, tilebuf, col, row, 0, 0);
if (tbytes < tilesize && !ignore)
{
TIFFError(TIFFFileName(in),
"Error, can't read tile at row %lu col %lu, Read %lu bytes of %lu",
(unsigned long) col, (unsigned long) row, (unsigned long)tbytes,
(unsigned long)tilesize);
status = 0;
_TIFFfree(tilebuf);
return status;
}
row_offset = row * dst_rowsize;
col_offset = ((col * bps * spp) + 7)/ 8;
bufp = buf + row_offset + col_offset;
if (col + tw > imagewidth)
ncol = imagewidth - col;
else
ncol = tw;
/* Each tile scanline will start on a byte boundary but it
* has to be merged into the scanline for the entire
* image buffer and the previous segment may not have
* ended on a byte boundary
*/
/* Optimization for common bit depths, all samples */
if (((bps % 8) == 0) && (count == spp))
{
for (trow = 0; trow < nrow; trow++)
{
src_offset = trow * tile_rowsize;
_TIFFmemcpy (bufp, tilebuf + src_offset, (ncol * spp * bps) / 8);
bufp += (imagewidth * bps * spp) / 8;
}
}
else
{
/* Bit depths not a multiple of 8 and/or extract fewer than spp samples */
prev_trailing_bits = trailing_bits = 0;
trailing_bits = (ncol * bps * spp) % 8;
/* for (trow = 0; tl < nrow; trow++) */
for (trow = 0; trow < nrow; trow++)
{
src_offset = trow * tile_rowsize;
src = tilebuf + src_offset;
dst_offset = (row + trow) * dst_rowsize;
dst = buf + dst_offset + col_offset;
switch (shift_width)
{
case 0: if (extractContigSamplesBytes (src, dst, ncol, sample,
spp, bps, count, 0, ncol))
{
TIFFError("readContigTilesIntoBuffer",
"Unable to extract row %d from tile %lu",
row, (unsigned long)TIFFCurrentTile(in));
return 1;
}
break;
case 1: if (bps == 1)
{
if (extractContigSamplesShifted8bits (src, dst, ncol,
sample, spp,
bps, count,
0, ncol,
prev_trailing_bits))
{
TIFFError("readContigTilesIntoBuffer",
"Unable to extract row %d from tile %lu",
row, (unsigned long)TIFFCurrentTile(in));
return 1;
}
break;
}
else
if (extractContigSamplesShifted16bits (src, dst, ncol,
sample, spp,
bps, count,
0, ncol,
prev_trailing_bits))
{
TIFFError("readContigTilesIntoBuffer",
"Unable to extract row %d from tile %lu",
row, (unsigned long)TIFFCurrentTile(in));
return 1;
}
break;
case 2: if (extractContigSamplesShifted24bits (src, dst, ncol,
sample, spp,
bps, count,
0, ncol,
prev_trailing_bits))
{
TIFFError("readContigTilesIntoBuffer",
"Unable to extract row %d from tile %lu",
row, (unsigned long)TIFFCurrentTile(in));
return 1;
}
break;
case 3:
case 4:
case 5: if (extractContigSamplesShifted32bits (src, dst, ncol,
sample, spp,
bps, count,
0, ncol,
prev_trailing_bits))
{
TIFFError("readContigTilesIntoBuffer",
"Unable to extract row %d from tile %lu",
row, (unsigned long)TIFFCurrentTile(in));
return 1;
}
break;
default: TIFFError("readContigTilesIntoBuffer", "Unsupported bit depth %d", bps);
return 1;
}
}
prev_trailing_bits += trailing_bits;
/* if (prev_trailing_bits > 7) */
/* prev_trailing_bits-= 8; */
}
}
}
_TIFFfree(tilebuf);
return status;
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix out-of-bound read of up to 3 bytes in
readContigTilesIntoBuffer(). Reported as MSVR 35092 by Axel Souchet
& Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static int readContigTilesIntoBuffer (TIFF* in, uint8* buf,
uint32 imagelength,
uint32 imagewidth,
uint32 tw, uint32 tl,
tsample_t spp, uint16 bps)
{
int status = 1;
tsample_t sample = 0;
tsample_t count = spp;
uint32 row, col, trow;
uint32 nrow, ncol;
uint32 dst_rowsize, shift_width;
uint32 bytes_per_sample, bytes_per_pixel;
uint32 trailing_bits, prev_trailing_bits;
uint32 tile_rowsize = TIFFTileRowSize(in);
uint32 src_offset, dst_offset;
uint32 row_offset, col_offset;
uint8 *bufp = (uint8*) buf;
unsigned char *src = NULL;
unsigned char *dst = NULL;
tsize_t tbytes = 0, tile_buffsize = 0;
tsize_t tilesize = TIFFTileSize(in);
unsigned char *tilebuf = NULL;
bytes_per_sample = (bps + 7) / 8;
bytes_per_pixel = ((bps * spp) + 7) / 8;
if ((bps % 8) == 0)
shift_width = 0;
else
{
if (bytes_per_pixel < (bytes_per_sample + 1))
shift_width = bytes_per_pixel;
else
shift_width = bytes_per_sample + 1;
}
tile_buffsize = tilesize;
if (tilesize == 0 || tile_rowsize == 0)
{
TIFFError("readContigTilesIntoBuffer", "Tile size or tile rowsize is zero");
exit(-1);
}
if (tilesize < (tsize_t)(tl * tile_rowsize))
{
#ifdef DEBUG2
TIFFError("readContigTilesIntoBuffer",
"Tilesize %lu is too small, using alternate calculation %u",
tilesize, tl * tile_rowsize);
#endif
tile_buffsize = tl * tile_rowsize;
if (tl != (tile_buffsize / tile_rowsize))
{
TIFFError("readContigTilesIntoBuffer", "Integer overflow when calculating buffer size.");
exit(-1);
}
}
/* Add 3 padding bytes for extractContigSamplesShifted32bits */
if( tile_buffsize > 0xFFFFFFFFU - 3 )
{
TIFFError("readContigTilesIntoBuffer", "Integer overflow when calculating buffer size.");
exit(-1);
}
tilebuf = _TIFFmalloc(tile_buffsize + 3);
if (tilebuf == 0)
return 0;
tilebuf[tile_buffsize] = 0;
tilebuf[tile_buffsize+1] = 0;
tilebuf[tile_buffsize+2] = 0;
dst_rowsize = ((imagewidth * bps * spp) + 7) / 8;
for (row = 0; row < imagelength; row += tl)
{
nrow = (row + tl > imagelength) ? imagelength - row : tl;
for (col = 0; col < imagewidth; col += tw)
{
tbytes = TIFFReadTile(in, tilebuf, col, row, 0, 0);
if (tbytes < tilesize && !ignore)
{
TIFFError(TIFFFileName(in),
"Error, can't read tile at row %lu col %lu, Read %lu bytes of %lu",
(unsigned long) col, (unsigned long) row, (unsigned long)tbytes,
(unsigned long)tilesize);
status = 0;
_TIFFfree(tilebuf);
return status;
}
row_offset = row * dst_rowsize;
col_offset = ((col * bps * spp) + 7)/ 8;
bufp = buf + row_offset + col_offset;
if (col + tw > imagewidth)
ncol = imagewidth - col;
else
ncol = tw;
/* Each tile scanline will start on a byte boundary but it
* has to be merged into the scanline for the entire
* image buffer and the previous segment may not have
* ended on a byte boundary
*/
/* Optimization for common bit depths, all samples */
if (((bps % 8) == 0) && (count == spp))
{
for (trow = 0; trow < nrow; trow++)
{
src_offset = trow * tile_rowsize;
_TIFFmemcpy (bufp, tilebuf + src_offset, (ncol * spp * bps) / 8);
bufp += (imagewidth * bps * spp) / 8;
}
}
else
{
/* Bit depths not a multiple of 8 and/or extract fewer than spp samples */
prev_trailing_bits = trailing_bits = 0;
trailing_bits = (ncol * bps * spp) % 8;
/* for (trow = 0; tl < nrow; trow++) */
for (trow = 0; trow < nrow; trow++)
{
src_offset = trow * tile_rowsize;
src = tilebuf + src_offset;
dst_offset = (row + trow) * dst_rowsize;
dst = buf + dst_offset + col_offset;
switch (shift_width)
{
case 0: if (extractContigSamplesBytes (src, dst, ncol, sample,
spp, bps, count, 0, ncol))
{
TIFFError("readContigTilesIntoBuffer",
"Unable to extract row %d from tile %lu",
row, (unsigned long)TIFFCurrentTile(in));
return 1;
}
break;
case 1: if (bps == 1)
{
if (extractContigSamplesShifted8bits (src, dst, ncol,
sample, spp,
bps, count,
0, ncol,
prev_trailing_bits))
{
TIFFError("readContigTilesIntoBuffer",
"Unable to extract row %d from tile %lu",
row, (unsigned long)TIFFCurrentTile(in));
return 1;
}
break;
}
else
if (extractContigSamplesShifted16bits (src, dst, ncol,
sample, spp,
bps, count,
0, ncol,
prev_trailing_bits))
{
TIFFError("readContigTilesIntoBuffer",
"Unable to extract row %d from tile %lu",
row, (unsigned long)TIFFCurrentTile(in));
return 1;
}
break;
case 2: if (extractContigSamplesShifted24bits (src, dst, ncol,
sample, spp,
bps, count,
0, ncol,
prev_trailing_bits))
{
TIFFError("readContigTilesIntoBuffer",
"Unable to extract row %d from tile %lu",
row, (unsigned long)TIFFCurrentTile(in));
return 1;
}
break;
case 3:
case 4:
case 5: if (extractContigSamplesShifted32bits (src, dst, ncol,
sample, spp,
bps, count,
0, ncol,
prev_trailing_bits))
{
TIFFError("readContigTilesIntoBuffer",
"Unable to extract row %d from tile %lu",
row, (unsigned long)TIFFCurrentTile(in));
return 1;
}
break;
default: TIFFError("readContigTilesIntoBuffer", "Unsupported bit depth %d", bps);
return 1;
}
}
prev_trailing_bits += trailing_bits;
/* if (prev_trailing_bits > 7) */
/* prev_trailing_bits-= 8; */
}
}
}
_TIFFfree(tilebuf);
return status;
}
| 166,864 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void controloptions (lua_State *L, int opt, const char **fmt,
Header *h) {
switch (opt) {
case ' ': return; /* ignore white spaces */
case '>': h->endian = BIG; return;
case '<': h->endian = LITTLE; return;
case '!': {
int a = getnum(L, fmt, MAXALIGN);
if (!isp2(a))
luaL_error(L, "alignment %d is not a power of 2", a);
h->align = a;
return;
}
default: {
const char *msg = lua_pushfstring(L, "invalid format option '%c'", opt);
luaL_argerror(L, 1, msg);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Security: update Lua struct package for security.
During an auditing Apple found that the "struct" Lua package
we ship with Redis (http://www.inf.puc-rio.br/~roberto/struct/) contains
a security problem. A bound-checking statement fails because of integer
overflow. The bug exists since we initially integrated this package with
Lua, when scripting was introduced, so every version of Redis with
EVAL/EVALSHA capabilities exposed is affected.
Instead of just fixing the bug, the library was updated to the latest
version shipped by the author.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | static void controloptions (lua_State *L, int opt, const char **fmt,
Header *h) {
switch (opt) {
case ' ': return; /* ignore white spaces */
case '>': h->endian = BIG; return;
case '<': h->endian = LITTLE; return;
case '!': {
int a = getnum(fmt, MAXALIGN);
if (!isp2(a))
luaL_error(L, "alignment %d is not a power of 2", a);
h->align = a;
return;
}
default: {
const char *msg = lua_pushfstring(L, "invalid format option '%c'", opt);
luaL_argerror(L, 1, msg);
}
}
}
| 170,164 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: krb5_gss_pseudo_random(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context,
int prf_key,
const gss_buffer_t prf_in,
ssize_t desired_output_len,
gss_buffer_t prf_out)
{
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_key key = NULL;
krb5_gss_ctx_id_t ctx;
int i;
OM_uint32 minor;
size_t prflen;
krb5_data t, ns;
unsigned char *p;
prf_out->length = 0;
prf_out->value = NULL;
t.length = 0;
t.data = NULL;
ns.length = 0;
ns.data = NULL;
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_t)context;
switch (prf_key) {
case GSS_C_PRF_KEY_FULL:
if (ctx->have_acceptor_subkey) {
key = ctx->acceptor_subkey;
break;
}
/* fallthrough */
case GSS_C_PRF_KEY_PARTIAL:
key = ctx->subkey;
break;
default:
code = EINVAL;
goto cleanup;
}
if (key == NULL) {
code = EINVAL;
goto cleanup;
}
if (desired_output_len == 0)
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
prf_out->value = k5alloc(desired_output_len, &code);
if (prf_out->value == NULL) {
code = KG_INPUT_TOO_LONG;
goto cleanup;
}
prf_out->length = desired_output_len;
code = krb5_c_prf_length(ctx->k5_context,
krb5_k_key_enctype(ctx->k5_context, key),
&prflen);
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
ns.length = 4 + prf_in->length;
ns.data = k5alloc(ns.length, &code);
if (ns.data == NULL) {
code = KG_INPUT_TOO_LONG;
goto cleanup;
}
t.length = prflen;
t.data = k5alloc(t.length, &code);
if (t.data == NULL)
goto cleanup;
memcpy(ns.data + 4, prf_in->value, prf_in->length);
i = 0;
p = (unsigned char *)prf_out->value;
while (desired_output_len > 0) {
store_32_be(i, ns.data);
code = krb5_k_prf(ctx->k5_context, key, &ns, &t);
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
memcpy(p, t.data, MIN(t.length, desired_output_len));
p += t.length;
desired_output_len -= t.length;
i++;
}
cleanup:
if (code != 0)
gss_release_buffer(&minor, prf_out);
krb5_free_data_contents(ctx->k5_context, &ns);
krb5_free_data_contents(ctx->k5_context, &t);
*minor_status = (OM_uint32)code;
return (code == 0) ? GSS_S_COMPLETE : GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
Commit Message: Fix gss_process_context_token() [CVE-2014-5352]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] The krb5 gss_process_context_token() should not
actually delete the context; that leaves the caller with a dangling
pointer and no way to know that it is invalid. Instead, mark the
context as terminated, and check for terminated contexts in the GSS
functions which expect established contexts. Also add checks in
export_sec_context and pseudo_random, and adjust t_prf.c for the
pseudo_random check.
ticket: 8055 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
CWE ID: | krb5_gss_pseudo_random(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context,
int prf_key,
const gss_buffer_t prf_in,
ssize_t desired_output_len,
gss_buffer_t prf_out)
{
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_key key = NULL;
krb5_gss_ctx_id_t ctx;
int i;
OM_uint32 minor;
size_t prflen;
krb5_data t, ns;
unsigned char *p;
prf_out->length = 0;
prf_out->value = NULL;
t.length = 0;
t.data = NULL;
ns.length = 0;
ns.data = NULL;
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_t)context;
if (ctx->terminated || !ctx->established) {
*minor_status = KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE;
return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
}
switch (prf_key) {
case GSS_C_PRF_KEY_FULL:
if (ctx->have_acceptor_subkey) {
key = ctx->acceptor_subkey;
break;
}
/* fallthrough */
case GSS_C_PRF_KEY_PARTIAL:
key = ctx->subkey;
break;
default:
code = EINVAL;
goto cleanup;
}
if (key == NULL) {
code = EINVAL;
goto cleanup;
}
if (desired_output_len == 0)
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
prf_out->value = k5alloc(desired_output_len, &code);
if (prf_out->value == NULL) {
code = KG_INPUT_TOO_LONG;
goto cleanup;
}
prf_out->length = desired_output_len;
code = krb5_c_prf_length(ctx->k5_context,
krb5_k_key_enctype(ctx->k5_context, key),
&prflen);
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
ns.length = 4 + prf_in->length;
ns.data = k5alloc(ns.length, &code);
if (ns.data == NULL) {
code = KG_INPUT_TOO_LONG;
goto cleanup;
}
t.length = prflen;
t.data = k5alloc(t.length, &code);
if (t.data == NULL)
goto cleanup;
memcpy(ns.data + 4, prf_in->value, prf_in->length);
i = 0;
p = (unsigned char *)prf_out->value;
while (desired_output_len > 0) {
store_32_be(i, ns.data);
code = krb5_k_prf(ctx->k5_context, key, &ns, &t);
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
memcpy(p, t.data, MIN(t.length, desired_output_len));
p += t.length;
desired_output_len -= t.length;
i++;
}
cleanup:
if (code != 0)
gss_release_buffer(&minor, prf_out);
krb5_free_data_contents(ctx->k5_context, &ns);
krb5_free_data_contents(ctx->k5_context, &t);
*minor_status = (OM_uint32)code;
return (code == 0) ? GSS_S_COMPLETE : GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
| 166,822 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::AuthorizeService(
const dbus::ObjectPath& device_path,
const std::string& uuid,
const ConfirmationCallback& callback) {
callback.Run(CANCELLED);
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::AuthorizeService(
| 171,216 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: const Chapters::Edition* Chapters::GetEdition(int idx) const
{
if (idx < 0)
return NULL;
if (idx >= m_editions_count)
return NULL;
return m_editions + idx;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | const Chapters::Edition* Chapters::GetEdition(int idx) const
const int size = (m_editions_size == 0) ? 1 : 2 * m_editions_size;
Edition* const editions = new (std::nothrow) Edition[size];
if (editions == NULL)
return false;
for (int idx = 0; idx < m_editions_count; ++idx) {
m_editions[idx].ShallowCopy(editions[idx]);
}
delete[] m_editions;
m_editions = editions;
m_editions_size = size;
return true;
}
| 174,310 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SWFShape_setLeftFillStyle(SWFShape shape, SWFFillStyle fill)
{
ShapeRecord record;
int idx;
if ( shape->isEnded || shape->isMorph )
return;
if(fill == NOFILL)
{
record = addStyleRecord(shape);
record.record.stateChange->leftFill = 0;
record.record.stateChange->flags |= SWF_SHAPE_FILLSTYLE0FLAG;
return;
}
idx = getFillIdx(shape, fill);
if(idx == 0) // fill not present in array
{
SWFFillStyle_addDependency(fill, (SWFCharacter)shape);
if(addFillStyle(shape, fill) < 0)
return;
idx = getFillIdx(shape, fill);
}
record = addStyleRecord(shape);
record.record.stateChange->leftFill = idx;
record.record.stateChange->flags |= SWF_SHAPE_FILLSTYLE0FLAG;
}
Commit Message: SWFShape_setLeftFillStyle: prevent fill overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119 | SWFShape_setLeftFillStyle(SWFShape shape, SWFFillStyle fill)
{
ShapeRecord record;
int idx;
if ( shape->isEnded || shape->isMorph )
return;
if(fill == NOFILL)
{
record = addStyleRecord(shape);
record.record.stateChange->leftFill = 0;
record.record.stateChange->flags |= SWF_SHAPE_FILLSTYLE0FLAG;
return;
}
idx = getFillIdx(shape, fill);
if(idx == 0) // fill not present in array
{
SWFFillStyle_addDependency(fill, (SWFCharacter)shape);
if(addFillStyle(shape, fill) < 0)
return;
idx = getFillIdx(shape, fill);
}
else if (idx >= 255 && shape->useVersion == SWF_SHAPE1)
{
SWF_error("Too many fills for SWFShape V1.\n"
"Use a higher SWFShape version\n");
}
record = addStyleRecord(shape);
record.record.stateChange->leftFill = idx;
record.record.stateChange->flags |= SWF_SHAPE_FILLSTYLE0FLAG;
}
| 169,647 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void set_task_blockstep(struct task_struct *task, bool on)
{
unsigned long debugctl;
/*
* Ensure irq/preemption can't change debugctl in between.
* Note also that both TIF_BLOCKSTEP and debugctl should
* be changed atomically wrt preemption.
* FIXME: this means that set/clear TIF_BLOCKSTEP is simply
* wrong if task != current, SIGKILL can wakeup the stopped
* tracee and set/clear can play with the running task, this
* can confuse the next __switch_to_xtra().
*/
local_irq_disable();
debugctl = get_debugctlmsr();
if (on) {
debugctl |= DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF;
set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_BLOCKSTEP);
} else {
debugctl &= ~DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF;
clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_BLOCKSTEP);
}
if (task == current)
update_debugctlmsr(debugctl);
local_irq_enable();
}
Commit Message: ptrace: ensure arch_ptrace/ptrace_request can never race with SIGKILL
putreg() assumes that the tracee is not running and pt_regs_access() can
safely play with its stack. However a killed tracee can return from
ptrace_stop() to the low-level asm code and do RESTORE_REST, this means
that debugger can actually read/modify the kernel stack until the tracee
does SAVE_REST again.
set_task_blockstep() can race with SIGKILL too and in some sense this
race is even worse, the very fact the tracee can be woken up breaks the
logic.
As Linus suggested we can clear TASK_WAKEKILL around the arch_ptrace()
call, this ensures that nobody can ever wakeup the tracee while the
debugger looks at it. Not only this fixes the mentioned problems, we
can do some cleanups/simplifications in arch_ptrace() paths.
Probably ptrace_unfreeze_traced() needs more callers, for example it
makes sense to make the tracee killable for oom-killer before
access_process_vm().
While at it, add the comment into may_ptrace_stop() to explain why
ptrace_stop() still can't rely on SIGKILL and signal_pending_state().
Reported-by: Salman Qazi <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Suleiman Souhlal <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | void set_task_blockstep(struct task_struct *task, bool on)
{
unsigned long debugctl;
/*
* Ensure irq/preemption can't change debugctl in between.
* Note also that both TIF_BLOCKSTEP and debugctl should
* be changed atomically wrt preemption.
*
* NOTE: this means that set/clear TIF_BLOCKSTEP is only safe if
* task is current or it can't be running, otherwise we can race
* with __switch_to_xtra(). We rely on ptrace_freeze_traced() but
* PTRACE_KILL is not safe.
*/
local_irq_disable();
debugctl = get_debugctlmsr();
if (on) {
debugctl |= DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF;
set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_BLOCKSTEP);
} else {
debugctl &= ~DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF;
clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_BLOCKSTEP);
}
if (task == current)
update_debugctlmsr(debugctl);
local_irq_enable();
}
| 166,135 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imageaffinematrixget)
{
double affine[6];
long type;
zval *options = NULL;
zval **tmp;
int res = GD_FALSE, i;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l|z", &type, &options) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
switch((gdAffineStandardMatrix)type) {
case GD_AFFINE_TRANSLATE:
case GD_AFFINE_SCALE: {
double x, y;
if (!options || Z_TYPE_P(options) != IS_ARRAY) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Array expected as options");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (zend_hash_find(HASH_OF(options), "x", sizeof("x"), (void **)&tmp) != FAILURE) {
if (Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) != IS_DOUBLE) {
zval dval;
dval = **tmp;
zval_copy_ctor(&dval);
convert_to_double(&dval);
x = Z_DVAL(dval);
} else {
x = Z_DVAL_PP(tmp);
}
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Missing x position");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (zend_hash_find(HASH_OF(options), "y", sizeof("y"), (void **)&tmp) != FAILURE) {
if (Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) != IS_DOUBLE) {
zval dval;
dval = **tmp;
zval_copy_ctor(&dval);
convert_to_double(&dval);
y = Z_DVAL(dval);
} else {
y = Z_DVAL_PP(tmp);
}
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Missing y position");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (type == GD_AFFINE_TRANSLATE) {
res = gdAffineTranslate(affine, x, y);
} else {
res = gdAffineScale(affine, x, y);
}
break;
}
case GD_AFFINE_ROTATE:
case GD_AFFINE_SHEAR_HORIZONTAL:
case GD_AFFINE_SHEAR_VERTICAL: {
double angle;
if (!options) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Number is expected as option");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if(Z_TYPE_P(options) != IS_DOUBLE) {
zval dval;
dval = *options;
zval_copy_ctor(&dval);
convert_to_double(&dval);
angle = Z_DVAL(dval);
} else {
angle = Z_DVAL_P(options);
}
if (type == GD_AFFINE_SHEAR_HORIZONTAL) {
res = gdAffineShearHorizontal(affine, angle);
} else if (type == GD_AFFINE_SHEAR_VERTICAL) {
res = gdAffineShearVertical(affine, angle);
} else {
res = gdAffineRotate(affine, angle);
}
break;
}
default:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid type for element %li", type);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (res == GD_FALSE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
} else {
array_init(return_value);
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
add_index_double(return_value, i, affine[i]);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug#72697 - select_colors write out-of-bounds
CWE ID: CWE-787 | PHP_FUNCTION(imageaffinematrixget)
{
double affine[6];
long type;
zval *options = NULL;
zval **tmp;
int res = GD_FALSE, i;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l|z", &type, &options) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
switch((gdAffineStandardMatrix)type) {
case GD_AFFINE_TRANSLATE:
case GD_AFFINE_SCALE: {
double x, y;
if (!options || Z_TYPE_P(options) != IS_ARRAY) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Array expected as options");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (zend_hash_find(HASH_OF(options), "x", sizeof("x"), (void **)&tmp) != FAILURE) {
if (Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) != IS_DOUBLE) {
zval dval;
dval = **tmp;
zval_copy_ctor(&dval);
convert_to_double(&dval);
x = Z_DVAL(dval);
} else {
x = Z_DVAL_PP(tmp);
}
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Missing x position");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (zend_hash_find(HASH_OF(options), "y", sizeof("y"), (void **)&tmp) != FAILURE) {
if (Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) != IS_DOUBLE) {
zval dval;
dval = **tmp;
zval_copy_ctor(&dval);
convert_to_double(&dval);
y = Z_DVAL(dval);
} else {
y = Z_DVAL_PP(tmp);
}
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Missing y position");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (type == GD_AFFINE_TRANSLATE) {
res = gdAffineTranslate(affine, x, y);
} else {
res = gdAffineScale(affine, x, y);
}
break;
}
case GD_AFFINE_ROTATE:
case GD_AFFINE_SHEAR_HORIZONTAL:
case GD_AFFINE_SHEAR_VERTICAL: {
double angle;
if (!options) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Number is expected as option");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if(Z_TYPE_P(options) != IS_DOUBLE) {
zval dval;
dval = *options;
zval_copy_ctor(&dval);
convert_to_double(&dval);
angle = Z_DVAL(dval);
} else {
angle = Z_DVAL_P(options);
}
if (type == GD_AFFINE_SHEAR_HORIZONTAL) {
res = gdAffineShearHorizontal(affine, angle);
} else if (type == GD_AFFINE_SHEAR_VERTICAL) {
res = gdAffineShearVertical(affine, angle);
} else {
res = gdAffineRotate(affine, angle);
}
break;
}
default:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid type for element %li", type);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (res == GD_FALSE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
} else {
array_init(return_value);
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
add_index_double(return_value, i, affine[i]);
}
}
}
| 166,954 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadRGFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
bit,
byte;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
*data;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read RGF header.
*/
image->columns = (unsigned long) ReadBlobByte(image);
image->rows = (unsigned long) ReadBlobByte(image);
image->depth=8;
image->storage_class=PseudoClass;
image->colors=2;
/*
Initialize image structure.
*/
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
/*
Initialize colormap.
*/
image->colormap[0].red=QuantumRange;
image->colormap[0].green=QuantumRange;
image->colormap[0].blue=QuantumRange;
image->colormap[1].red=(Quantum) 0;
image->colormap[1].green=(Quantum) 0;
image->colormap[1].blue=(Quantum) 0;
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
/*
Read hex image data.
*/
data=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->rows,image->columns*
sizeof(*data));
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
p=data;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) (image->columns * image->rows); i++)
{
*p++=ReadBlobByte(image);
}
/*
Convert RGF image to pixel packets.
*/
p=data;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
bit=0;
byte=0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (bit == 0)
byte=(size_t) (*p++);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,(Quantum) ((byte & 0x01) != 0 ? 0x01 : 0x00));
bit++;
byte>>=1;
if (bit == 8)
bit=0;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(data);
(void) SyncImage(image);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static Image *ReadRGFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
bit,
byte;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
*data;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read RGF header.
*/
image->columns = (unsigned long) ReadBlobByte(image);
image->rows = (unsigned long) ReadBlobByte(image);
image->depth=8;
image->storage_class=PseudoClass;
image->colors=2;
/*
Initialize image structure.
*/
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
/*
Initialize colormap.
*/
image->colormap[0].red=QuantumRange;
image->colormap[0].green=QuantumRange;
image->colormap[0].blue=QuantumRange;
image->colormap[1].red=(Quantum) 0;
image->colormap[1].green=(Quantum) 0;
image->colormap[1].blue=(Quantum) 0;
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
/*
Read hex image data.
*/
data=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->rows,image->columns*
sizeof(*data));
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
p=data;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) (image->columns * image->rows); i++)
{
*p++=ReadBlobByte(image);
}
/*
Convert RGF image to pixel packets.
*/
p=data;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
bit=0;
byte=0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (bit == 0)
byte=(size_t) (*p++);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,(Quantum) ((byte & 0x01) != 0 ? 0x01 : 0x00));
bit++;
byte>>=1;
if (bit == 8)
bit=0;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(data);
(void) SyncImage(image);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
| 168,598 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVPXEncoder::setConfig(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR _params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexConfigVideoIntraVOPRefresh:
{
OMX_CONFIG_INTRAREFRESHVOPTYPE *params =
(OMX_CONFIG_INTRAREFRESHVOPTYPE *)_params;
if (params->nPortIndex != kOutputPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
mKeyFrameRequested = params->IntraRefreshVOP;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexConfigVideoBitrate:
{
OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_BITRATETYPE *params =
(OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_BITRATETYPE *)_params;
if (params->nPortIndex != kOutputPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
if (mBitrate != params->nEncodeBitrate) {
mBitrate = params->nEncodeBitrate;
mBitrateUpdated = true;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::setConfig(index, _params);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVPXEncoder::setConfig(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR _params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexConfigVideoIntraVOPRefresh:
{
OMX_CONFIG_INTRAREFRESHVOPTYPE *params =
(OMX_CONFIG_INTRAREFRESHVOPTYPE *)_params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(params)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (params->nPortIndex != kOutputPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
mKeyFrameRequested = params->IntraRefreshVOP;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexConfigVideoBitrate:
{
OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_BITRATETYPE *params =
(OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_BITRATETYPE *)_params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(params)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (params->nPortIndex != kOutputPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
if (mBitrate != params->nEncodeBitrate) {
mBitrate = params->nEncodeBitrate;
mBitrateUpdated = true;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::setConfig(index, _params);
}
}
| 174,215 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: hash_foreach_prepend_string (gpointer key, gpointer val, gpointer user_data)
{
HashAndString *data = (HashAndString*) user_data;
gchar *in = (gchar*) val;
g_hash_table_insert (data->hash, g_strdup ((gchar*) key),
g_strjoin (" ", data->string, in, NULL));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | hash_foreach_prepend_string (gpointer key, gpointer val, gpointer user_data)
| 165,086 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SPL_METHOD(RecursiveDirectoryIterator, getChildren)
{
zval *zpath, *zflags;
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
spl_filesystem_object *subdir;
char slash = SPL_HAS_FLAG(intern->flags, SPL_FILE_DIR_UNIXPATHS) ? '/' : DEFAULT_SLASH;
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
spl_filesystem_object_get_file_name(intern TSRMLS_CC);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(zflags);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(zpath);
ZVAL_LONG(zflags, intern->flags);
ZVAL_STRINGL(zpath, intern->file_name, intern->file_name_len, 1);
spl_instantiate_arg_ex2(Z_OBJCE_P(getThis()), &return_value, 0, zpath, zflags TSRMLS_CC);
zval_ptr_dtor(&zpath);
zval_ptr_dtor(&zflags);
subdir = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(return_value TSRMLS_CC);
if (subdir) {
if (intern->u.dir.sub_path && intern->u.dir.sub_path[0]) {
subdir->u.dir.sub_path_len = spprintf(&subdir->u.dir.sub_path, 0, "%s%c%s", intern->u.dir.sub_path, slash, intern->u.dir.entry.d_name);
} else {
subdir->u.dir.sub_path_len = strlen(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name);
subdir->u.dir.sub_path = estrndup(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name, subdir->u.dir.sub_path_len);
}
subdir->info_class = intern->info_class;
subdir->file_class = intern->file_class;
subdir->oth = intern->oth;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | SPL_METHOD(RecursiveDirectoryIterator, getChildren)
{
zval *zpath, *zflags;
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
spl_filesystem_object *subdir;
char slash = SPL_HAS_FLAG(intern->flags, SPL_FILE_DIR_UNIXPATHS) ? '/' : DEFAULT_SLASH;
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
spl_filesystem_object_get_file_name(intern TSRMLS_CC);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(zflags);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(zpath);
ZVAL_LONG(zflags, intern->flags);
ZVAL_STRINGL(zpath, intern->file_name, intern->file_name_len, 1);
spl_instantiate_arg_ex2(Z_OBJCE_P(getThis()), &return_value, 0, zpath, zflags TSRMLS_CC);
zval_ptr_dtor(&zpath);
zval_ptr_dtor(&zflags);
subdir = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(return_value TSRMLS_CC);
if (subdir) {
if (intern->u.dir.sub_path && intern->u.dir.sub_path[0]) {
subdir->u.dir.sub_path_len = spprintf(&subdir->u.dir.sub_path, 0, "%s%c%s", intern->u.dir.sub_path, slash, intern->u.dir.entry.d_name);
} else {
subdir->u.dir.sub_path_len = strlen(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name);
subdir->u.dir.sub_path = estrndup(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name, subdir->u.dir.sub_path_len);
}
subdir->info_class = intern->info_class;
subdir->file_class = intern->file_class;
subdir->oth = intern->oth;
}
}
| 167,045 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int ne2000_buffer_full(NE2000State *s)
{
int avail, index, boundary;
index = s->curpag << 8;
boundary = s->boundary << 8;
if (index < boundary)
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static int ne2000_buffer_full(NE2000State *s)
{
int avail, index, boundary;
if (s->stop <= s->start) {
return 1;
}
index = s->curpag << 8;
boundary = s->boundary << 8;
if (index < boundary)
return 1;
return 0;
}
| 165,184 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: linkaddr_string(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *ep,
const unsigned int type, const unsigned int len)
{
register u_int i;
register char *cp;
register struct enamemem *tp;
if (len == 0)
return ("<empty>");
if (type == LINKADDR_ETHER && len == ETHER_ADDR_LEN)
return (etheraddr_string(ndo, ep));
if (type == LINKADDR_FRELAY)
return (q922_string(ndo, ep, len));
tp = lookup_bytestring(ndo, ep, len);
if (tp->e_name)
return (tp->e_name);
tp->e_name = cp = (char *)malloc(len*3);
if (tp->e_name == NULL)
(*ndo->ndo_error)(ndo, "linkaddr_string: malloc");
*cp++ = hex[*ep >> 4];
*cp++ = hex[*ep++ & 0xf];
for (i = len-1; i > 0 ; --i) {
*cp++ = ':';
*cp++ = hex[*ep >> 4];
*cp++ = hex[*ep++ & 0xf];
}
*cp = '\0';
return (tp->e_name);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12894/In lookup_bytestring(), take the length of the byte string into account.
Otherwise, if, in our search of the hash table, we come across a byte
string that's shorter than the string we're looking for, we'll search
past the end of the string in the hash table.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | linkaddr_string(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *ep,
const unsigned int type, const unsigned int len)
{
register u_int i;
register char *cp;
register struct bsnamemem *tp;
if (len == 0)
return ("<empty>");
if (type == LINKADDR_ETHER && len == ETHER_ADDR_LEN)
return (etheraddr_string(ndo, ep));
if (type == LINKADDR_FRELAY)
return (q922_string(ndo, ep, len));
tp = lookup_bytestring(ndo, ep, len);
if (tp->bs_name)
return (tp->bs_name);
tp->bs_name = cp = (char *)malloc(len*3);
if (tp->bs_name == NULL)
(*ndo->ndo_error)(ndo, "linkaddr_string: malloc");
*cp++ = hex[*ep >> 4];
*cp++ = hex[*ep++ & 0xf];
for (i = len-1; i > 0 ; --i) {
*cp++ = ':';
*cp++ = hex[*ep >> 4];
*cp++ = hex[*ep++ & 0xf];
}
*cp = '\0';
return (tp->bs_name);
}
| 167,959 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static double ipow( double n, int exp )
{
double r;
if ( exp < 0 )
return 1.0 / ipow( n, -exp );
r = 1;
while ( exp > 0 ) {
if ( exp & 1 )
r *= n;
exp >>= 1;
n *= n;
}
return r;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static double ipow( double n, int exp )
/* Parse the input text to generate a number, and populate the result into item. */
static const char *parse_number(cJSON *item,const char *num)
{
double n=0,sign=1,scale=0;int subscale=0,signsubscale=1;
if (*num=='-') sign=-1,num++; /* Has sign? */
if (*num=='0') num++; /* is zero */
if (*num>='1' && *num<='9') do n=(n*10.0)+(*num++ -'0'); while (*num>='0' && *num<='9'); /* Number? */
if (*num=='.' && num[1]>='0' && num[1]<='9') {num++; do n=(n*10.0)+(*num++ -'0'),scale--; while (*num>='0' && *num<='9');} /* Fractional part? */
if (*num=='e' || *num=='E') /* Exponent? */
{ num++;if (*num=='+') num++; else if (*num=='-') signsubscale=-1,num++; /* With sign? */
while (*num>='0' && *num<='9') subscale=(subscale*10)+(*num++ - '0'); /* Number? */
}
| 167,300 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static ssize_t stellaris_enet_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, size_t size)
{
stellaris_enet_state *s = qemu_get_nic_opaque(nc);
int n;
uint8_t *p;
uint32_t crc;
if ((s->rctl & SE_RCTL_RXEN) == 0)
return -1;
if (s->np >= 31) {
return 0;
}
DPRINTF("Received packet len=%zu\n", size);
n = s->next_packet + s->np;
if (n >= 31)
n -= 31;
s->np++;
s->rx[n].len = size + 6;
p = s->rx[n].data;
*(p++) = (size + 6);
memset(p, 0, (6 - size) & 3);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static ssize_t stellaris_enet_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, size_t size)
{
stellaris_enet_state *s = qemu_get_nic_opaque(nc);
int n;
uint8_t *p;
uint32_t crc;
if ((s->rctl & SE_RCTL_RXEN) == 0)
return -1;
if (s->np >= 31) {
return 0;
}
DPRINTF("Received packet len=%zu\n", size);
n = s->next_packet + s->np;
if (n >= 31)
n -= 31;
if (size >= sizeof(s->rx[n].data) - 6) {
/* If the packet won't fit into the
* emulated 2K RAM, this is reported
* as a FIFO overrun error.
*/
s->ris |= SE_INT_FOV;
stellaris_enet_update(s);
return -1;
}
s->np++;
s->rx[n].len = size + 6;
p = s->rx[n].data;
*(p++) = (size + 6);
memset(p, 0, (6 - size) & 3);
}
| 165,078 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void update_open_stateflags(struct nfs4_state *state, mode_t open_flags)
{
switch (open_flags) {
case FMODE_WRITE:
state->n_wronly++;
break;
case FMODE_READ:
state->n_rdonly++;
break;
case FMODE_READ|FMODE_WRITE:
state->n_rdwr++;
}
nfs4_state_set_mode_locked(state, state->state | open_flags);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | static void update_open_stateflags(struct nfs4_state *state, mode_t open_flags)
static void update_open_stateflags(struct nfs4_state *state, fmode_t fmode)
{
switch (fmode) {
case FMODE_WRITE:
state->n_wronly++;
break;
case FMODE_READ:
state->n_rdonly++;
break;
case FMODE_READ|FMODE_WRITE:
state->n_rdwr++;
}
nfs4_state_set_mode_locked(state, state->state | fmode);
}
| 165,707 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: decode_bundle(bool load, const struct nx_action_bundle *nab,
const struct vl_mff_map *vl_mff_map, uint64_t *tlv_bitmap,
struct ofpbuf *ofpacts)
{
static struct vlog_rate_limit rl = VLOG_RATE_LIMIT_INIT(1, 5);
struct ofpact_bundle *bundle;
uint32_t slave_type;
size_t slaves_size, i;
enum ofperr error;
bundle = ofpact_put_BUNDLE(ofpacts);
bundle->n_slaves = ntohs(nab->n_slaves);
bundle->basis = ntohs(nab->basis);
bundle->fields = ntohs(nab->fields);
bundle->algorithm = ntohs(nab->algorithm);
slave_type = ntohl(nab->slave_type);
slaves_size = ntohs(nab->len) - sizeof *nab;
error = OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
if (!flow_hash_fields_valid(bundle->fields)) {
VLOG_WARN_RL(&rl, "unsupported fields %d", (int) bundle->fields);
} else if (bundle->n_slaves > BUNDLE_MAX_SLAVES) {
VLOG_WARN_RL(&rl, "too many slaves");
} else if (bundle->algorithm != NX_BD_ALG_HRW
&& bundle->algorithm != NX_BD_ALG_ACTIVE_BACKUP) {
VLOG_WARN_RL(&rl, "unsupported algorithm %d", (int) bundle->algorithm);
} else if (slave_type != mf_nxm_header(MFF_IN_PORT)) {
VLOG_WARN_RL(&rl, "unsupported slave type %"PRIu16, slave_type);
} else {
error = 0;
}
if (!is_all_zeros(nab->zero, sizeof nab->zero)) {
VLOG_WARN_RL(&rl, "reserved field is nonzero");
error = OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
}
if (load) {
bundle->dst.ofs = nxm_decode_ofs(nab->ofs_nbits);
bundle->dst.n_bits = nxm_decode_n_bits(nab->ofs_nbits);
error = mf_vl_mff_mf_from_nxm_header(ntohl(nab->dst), vl_mff_map,
&bundle->dst.field, tlv_bitmap);
if (error) {
return error;
}
if (bundle->dst.n_bits < 16) {
VLOG_WARN_RL(&rl, "bundle_load action requires at least 16 bit "
"destination.");
error = OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
}
} else {
if (nab->ofs_nbits || nab->dst) {
VLOG_WARN_RL(&rl, "bundle action has nonzero reserved fields");
error = OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
}
}
if (slaves_size < bundle->n_slaves * sizeof(ovs_be16)) {
VLOG_WARN_RL(&rl, "Nicira action %s only has %"PRIuSIZE" bytes "
"allocated for slaves. %"PRIuSIZE" bytes are required "
"for %"PRIu16" slaves.",
load ? "bundle_load" : "bundle", slaves_size,
bundle->n_slaves * sizeof(ovs_be16), bundle->n_slaves);
error = OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_LEN;
}
for (i = 0; i < bundle->n_slaves; i++) {
ofp_port_t ofp_port = u16_to_ofp(ntohs(((ovs_be16 *)(nab + 1))[i]));
ofpbuf_put(ofpacts, &ofp_port, sizeof ofp_port);
bundle = ofpacts->header;
}
ofpact_finish_BUNDLE(ofpacts, &bundle);
if (!error) {
error = bundle_check(bundle, OFPP_MAX, NULL);
}
return error;
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | decode_bundle(bool load, const struct nx_action_bundle *nab,
const struct vl_mff_map *vl_mff_map, uint64_t *tlv_bitmap,
struct ofpbuf *ofpacts)
{
static struct vlog_rate_limit rl = VLOG_RATE_LIMIT_INIT(1, 5);
struct ofpact_bundle *bundle;
uint32_t slave_type;
size_t slaves_size, i;
enum ofperr error;
bundle = ofpact_put_BUNDLE(ofpacts);
bundle->n_slaves = ntohs(nab->n_slaves);
bundle->basis = ntohs(nab->basis);
bundle->fields = ntohs(nab->fields);
bundle->algorithm = ntohs(nab->algorithm);
slave_type = ntohl(nab->slave_type);
slaves_size = ntohs(nab->len) - sizeof *nab;
error = OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
if (!flow_hash_fields_valid(bundle->fields)) {
VLOG_WARN_RL(&rl, "unsupported fields %d", (int) bundle->fields);
} else if (bundle->n_slaves > BUNDLE_MAX_SLAVES) {
VLOG_WARN_RL(&rl, "too many slaves");
} else if (bundle->algorithm != NX_BD_ALG_HRW
&& bundle->algorithm != NX_BD_ALG_ACTIVE_BACKUP) {
VLOG_WARN_RL(&rl, "unsupported algorithm %d", (int) bundle->algorithm);
} else if (slave_type != mf_nxm_header(MFF_IN_PORT)) {
VLOG_WARN_RL(&rl, "unsupported slave type %"PRIu16, slave_type);
} else {
error = 0;
}
if (!is_all_zeros(nab->zero, sizeof nab->zero)) {
VLOG_WARN_RL(&rl, "reserved field is nonzero");
error = OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
}
if (load) {
bundle->dst.ofs = nxm_decode_ofs(nab->ofs_nbits);
bundle->dst.n_bits = nxm_decode_n_bits(nab->ofs_nbits);
error = mf_vl_mff_mf_from_nxm_header(ntohl(nab->dst), vl_mff_map,
&bundle->dst.field, tlv_bitmap);
if (error) {
return error;
}
if (bundle->dst.n_bits < 16) {
VLOG_WARN_RL(&rl, "bundle_load action requires at least 16 bit "
"destination.");
error = OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
}
} else {
if (nab->ofs_nbits || nab->dst) {
VLOG_WARN_RL(&rl, "bundle action has nonzero reserved fields");
error = OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
}
}
if (slaves_size < bundle->n_slaves * sizeof(ovs_be16)) {
VLOG_WARN_RL(&rl, "Nicira action %s only has %"PRIuSIZE" bytes "
"allocated for slaves. %"PRIuSIZE" bytes are required "
"for %"PRIu16" slaves.",
load ? "bundle_load" : "bundle", slaves_size,
bundle->n_slaves * sizeof(ovs_be16), bundle->n_slaves);
error = OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_LEN;
} else {
for (i = 0; i < bundle->n_slaves; i++) {
ofp_port_t ofp_port
= u16_to_ofp(ntohs(((ovs_be16 *)(nab + 1))[i]));
ofpbuf_put(ofpacts, &ofp_port, sizeof ofp_port);
bundle = ofpacts->header;
}
}
ofpact_finish_BUNDLE(ofpacts, &bundle);
if (!error) {
error = bundle_check(bundle, OFPP_MAX, NULL);
}
return error;
}
| 169,023 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void svc_rdma_get_write_arrays(struct rpcrdma_msg *rmsgp,
struct rpcrdma_write_array **write,
struct rpcrdma_write_array **reply)
{
__be32 *p;
p = (__be32 *)&rmsgp->rm_body.rm_chunks[0];
/* Read list */
while (*p++ != xdr_zero)
p += 5;
/* Write list */
if (*p != xdr_zero) {
*write = (struct rpcrdma_write_array *)p;
while (*p++ != xdr_zero)
p += 1 + be32_to_cpu(*p) * 4;
} else {
*write = NULL;
p++;
}
/* Reply chunk */
if (*p != xdr_zero)
*reply = (struct rpcrdma_write_array *)p;
else
*reply = NULL;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | static void svc_rdma_get_write_arrays(struct rpcrdma_msg *rmsgp,
static void svc_rdma_get_write_arrays(__be32 *rdma_argp,
__be32 **write, __be32 **reply)
{
__be32 *p;
p = rdma_argp + rpcrdma_fixed_maxsz;
/* Read list */
while (*p++ != xdr_zero)
p += 5;
/* Write list */
if (*p != xdr_zero) {
*write = p;
while (*p++ != xdr_zero)
p += 1 + be32_to_cpu(*p) * 4;
} else {
*write = NULL;
p++;
}
/* Reply chunk */
if (*p != xdr_zero)
*reply = p;
else
*reply = NULL;
}
| 168,172 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::allocateBuffer(
OMX_U32 portIndex, size_t size, OMX::buffer_id *buffer,
void **buffer_data) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
BufferMeta *buffer_meta = new BufferMeta(size);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header;
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_AllocateBuffer(
mHandle, &header, portIndex, buffer_meta, size);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(allocateBuffer, err, BUFFER_FMT(portIndex, "%zu@", size));
delete buffer_meta;
buffer_meta = NULL;
*buffer = 0;
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
CHECK_EQ(header->pAppPrivate, buffer_meta);
*buffer = makeBufferID(header);
*buffer_data = header->pBuffer;
addActiveBuffer(portIndex, *buffer);
sp<GraphicBufferSource> bufferSource(getGraphicBufferSource());
if (bufferSource != NULL && portIndex == kPortIndexInput) {
bufferSource->addCodecBuffer(header);
}
CLOG_BUFFER(allocateBuffer, NEW_BUFFER_FMT(*buffer, portIndex, "%zu@%p", size, *buffer_data));
return OK;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE omx: check buffer port before using
Bug: 28816827
Change-Id: I3d5bad4a1ef96dec544b05bb31cc6f7109aae0a5
CWE ID: CWE-119 | status_t OMXNodeInstance::allocateBuffer(
OMX_U32 portIndex, size_t size, OMX::buffer_id *buffer,
void **buffer_data) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
BufferMeta *buffer_meta = new BufferMeta(size, portIndex);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header;
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_AllocateBuffer(
mHandle, &header, portIndex, buffer_meta, size);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(allocateBuffer, err, BUFFER_FMT(portIndex, "%zu@", size));
delete buffer_meta;
buffer_meta = NULL;
*buffer = 0;
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
CHECK_EQ(header->pAppPrivate, buffer_meta);
*buffer = makeBufferID(header);
*buffer_data = header->pBuffer;
addActiveBuffer(portIndex, *buffer);
sp<GraphicBufferSource> bufferSource(getGraphicBufferSource());
if (bufferSource != NULL && portIndex == kPortIndexInput) {
bufferSource->addCodecBuffer(header);
}
CLOG_BUFFER(allocateBuffer, NEW_BUFFER_FMT(*buffer, portIndex, "%zu@%p", size, *buffer_data));
return OK;
}
| 173,524 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: image_transform_png_set_@_mod(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
image_pixel *that, png_const_structp pp,
PNG_CONST transform_display *display)
{
this->next->mod(this->next, that, pp, display);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | image_transform_png_set_@_mod(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
| 173,601 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int futex_wait_requeue_pi(u32 __user *uaddr, unsigned int flags,
u32 val, ktime_t *abs_time, u32 bitset,
u32 __user *uaddr2)
{
struct hrtimer_sleeper timeout, *to = NULL;
struct rt_mutex_waiter rt_waiter;
struct rt_mutex *pi_mutex = NULL;
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb;
union futex_key key2 = FUTEX_KEY_INIT;
struct futex_q q = futex_q_init;
int res, ret;
if (!bitset)
return -EINVAL;
if (abs_time) {
to = &timeout;
hrtimer_init_on_stack(&to->timer, (flags & FLAGS_CLOCKRT) ?
CLOCK_REALTIME : CLOCK_MONOTONIC,
HRTIMER_MODE_ABS);
hrtimer_init_sleeper(to, current);
hrtimer_set_expires_range_ns(&to->timer, *abs_time,
current->timer_slack_ns);
}
/*
* The waiter is allocated on our stack, manipulated by the requeue
* code while we sleep on uaddr.
*/
debug_rt_mutex_init_waiter(&rt_waiter);
rt_waiter.task = NULL;
ret = get_futex_key(uaddr2, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &key2, VERIFY_WRITE);
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
goto out;
q.bitset = bitset;
q.rt_waiter = &rt_waiter;
q.requeue_pi_key = &key2;
/*
* Prepare to wait on uaddr. On success, increments q.key (key1) ref
* count.
*/
ret = futex_wait_setup(uaddr, val, flags, &q, &hb);
if (ret)
goto out_key2;
/* Queue the futex_q, drop the hb lock, wait for wakeup. */
futex_wait_queue_me(hb, &q, to);
spin_lock(&hb->lock);
ret = handle_early_requeue_pi_wakeup(hb, &q, &key2, to);
spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
if (ret)
goto out_put_keys;
/*
* In order for us to be here, we know our q.key == key2, and since
* we took the hb->lock above, we also know that futex_requeue() has
* completed and we no longer have to concern ourselves with a wakeup
* race with the atomic proxy lock acquisition by the requeue code. The
* futex_requeue dropped our key1 reference and incremented our key2
* reference count.
*/
/* Check if the requeue code acquired the second futex for us. */
if (!q.rt_waiter) {
/*
* Got the lock. We might not be the anticipated owner if we
* did a lock-steal - fix up the PI-state in that case.
*/
if (q.pi_state && (q.pi_state->owner != current)) {
spin_lock(q.lock_ptr);
ret = fixup_pi_state_owner(uaddr2, &q, current);
spin_unlock(q.lock_ptr);
}
} else {
/*
* We have been woken up by futex_unlock_pi(), a timeout, or a
* signal. futex_unlock_pi() will not destroy the lock_ptr nor
* the pi_state.
*/
WARN_ON(!q.pi_state);
pi_mutex = &q.pi_state->pi_mutex;
ret = rt_mutex_finish_proxy_lock(pi_mutex, to, &rt_waiter, 1);
debug_rt_mutex_free_waiter(&rt_waiter);
spin_lock(q.lock_ptr);
/*
* Fixup the pi_state owner and possibly acquire the lock if we
* haven't already.
*/
res = fixup_owner(uaddr2, &q, !ret);
/*
* If fixup_owner() returned an error, proprogate that. If it
* acquired the lock, clear -ETIMEDOUT or -EINTR.
*/
if (res)
ret = (res < 0) ? res : 0;
/* Unqueue and drop the lock. */
unqueue_me_pi(&q);
}
/*
* If fixup_pi_state_owner() faulted and was unable to handle the
* fault, unlock the rt_mutex and return the fault to userspace.
*/
if (ret == -EFAULT) {
if (pi_mutex && rt_mutex_owner(pi_mutex) == current)
rt_mutex_unlock(pi_mutex);
} else if (ret == -EINTR) {
/*
* We've already been requeued, but cannot restart by calling
* futex_lock_pi() directly. We could restart this syscall, but
* it would detect that the user space "val" changed and return
* -EWOULDBLOCK. Save the overhead of the restart and return
* -EWOULDBLOCK directly.
*/
ret = -EWOULDBLOCK;
}
out_put_keys:
put_futex_key(&q.key);
out_key2:
put_futex_key(&key2);
out:
if (to) {
hrtimer_cancel(&to->timer);
destroy_hrtimer_on_stack(&to->timer);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_wait_requeue_pi()
If uaddr == uaddr2, then we have broken the rule of only requeueing
from a non-pi futex to a pi futex with this call. If we attempt this,
as the trinity test suite manages to do, we miss early wakeups as
q.key is equal to key2 (because they are the same uaddr). We will then
attempt to dereference the pi_mutex (which would exist had the futex_q
been properly requeued to a pi futex) and trigger a NULL pointer
dereference.
Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Jones <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/ad82bfe7f7d130247fbe2b5b4275654807774227.1342809673.git.dvhart@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static int futex_wait_requeue_pi(u32 __user *uaddr, unsigned int flags,
u32 val, ktime_t *abs_time, u32 bitset,
u32 __user *uaddr2)
{
struct hrtimer_sleeper timeout, *to = NULL;
struct rt_mutex_waiter rt_waiter;
struct rt_mutex *pi_mutex = NULL;
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb;
union futex_key key2 = FUTEX_KEY_INIT;
struct futex_q q = futex_q_init;
int res, ret;
if (uaddr == uaddr2)
return -EINVAL;
if (!bitset)
return -EINVAL;
if (abs_time) {
to = &timeout;
hrtimer_init_on_stack(&to->timer, (flags & FLAGS_CLOCKRT) ?
CLOCK_REALTIME : CLOCK_MONOTONIC,
HRTIMER_MODE_ABS);
hrtimer_init_sleeper(to, current);
hrtimer_set_expires_range_ns(&to->timer, *abs_time,
current->timer_slack_ns);
}
/*
* The waiter is allocated on our stack, manipulated by the requeue
* code while we sleep on uaddr.
*/
debug_rt_mutex_init_waiter(&rt_waiter);
rt_waiter.task = NULL;
ret = get_futex_key(uaddr2, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &key2, VERIFY_WRITE);
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
goto out;
q.bitset = bitset;
q.rt_waiter = &rt_waiter;
q.requeue_pi_key = &key2;
/*
* Prepare to wait on uaddr. On success, increments q.key (key1) ref
* count.
*/
ret = futex_wait_setup(uaddr, val, flags, &q, &hb);
if (ret)
goto out_key2;
/* Queue the futex_q, drop the hb lock, wait for wakeup. */
futex_wait_queue_me(hb, &q, to);
spin_lock(&hb->lock);
ret = handle_early_requeue_pi_wakeup(hb, &q, &key2, to);
spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
if (ret)
goto out_put_keys;
/*
* In order for us to be here, we know our q.key == key2, and since
* we took the hb->lock above, we also know that futex_requeue() has
* completed and we no longer have to concern ourselves with a wakeup
* race with the atomic proxy lock acquisition by the requeue code. The
* futex_requeue dropped our key1 reference and incremented our key2
* reference count.
*/
/* Check if the requeue code acquired the second futex for us. */
if (!q.rt_waiter) {
/*
* Got the lock. We might not be the anticipated owner if we
* did a lock-steal - fix up the PI-state in that case.
*/
if (q.pi_state && (q.pi_state->owner != current)) {
spin_lock(q.lock_ptr);
ret = fixup_pi_state_owner(uaddr2, &q, current);
spin_unlock(q.lock_ptr);
}
} else {
/*
* We have been woken up by futex_unlock_pi(), a timeout, or a
* signal. futex_unlock_pi() will not destroy the lock_ptr nor
* the pi_state.
*/
WARN_ON(!q.pi_state);
pi_mutex = &q.pi_state->pi_mutex;
ret = rt_mutex_finish_proxy_lock(pi_mutex, to, &rt_waiter, 1);
debug_rt_mutex_free_waiter(&rt_waiter);
spin_lock(q.lock_ptr);
/*
* Fixup the pi_state owner and possibly acquire the lock if we
* haven't already.
*/
res = fixup_owner(uaddr2, &q, !ret);
/*
* If fixup_owner() returned an error, proprogate that. If it
* acquired the lock, clear -ETIMEDOUT or -EINTR.
*/
if (res)
ret = (res < 0) ? res : 0;
/* Unqueue and drop the lock. */
unqueue_me_pi(&q);
}
/*
* If fixup_pi_state_owner() faulted and was unable to handle the
* fault, unlock the rt_mutex and return the fault to userspace.
*/
if (ret == -EFAULT) {
if (pi_mutex && rt_mutex_owner(pi_mutex) == current)
rt_mutex_unlock(pi_mutex);
} else if (ret == -EINTR) {
/*
* We've already been requeued, but cannot restart by calling
* futex_lock_pi() directly. We could restart this syscall, but
* it would detect that the user space "val" changed and return
* -EWOULDBLOCK. Save the overhead of the restart and return
* -EWOULDBLOCK directly.
*/
ret = -EWOULDBLOCK;
}
out_put_keys:
put_futex_key(&q.key);
out_key2:
put_futex_key(&key2);
out:
if (to) {
hrtimer_cancel(&to->timer);
destroy_hrtimer_on_stack(&to->timer);
}
return ret;
}
| 166,548 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType SetImageType(Image *image,const ImageType type)
{
const char
*artifact;
ImageInfo
*image_info;
MagickBooleanType
status;
QuantizeInfo
*quantize_info;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"...");
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
status=MagickTrue;
image_info=AcquireImageInfo();
image_info->dither=image->dither;
artifact=GetImageArtifact(image,"dither");
if (artifact != (const char *) NULL)
(void) SetImageOption(image_info,"dither",artifact);
switch (type)
{
case BilevelType:
{
if (SetImageMonochrome(image,&image->exception) == MagickFalse)
{
status=TransformImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace);
(void) NormalizeImage(image);
quantize_info=AcquireQuantizeInfo(image_info);
quantize_info->number_colors=2;
quantize_info->colorspace=GRAYColorspace;
status=QuantizeImage(quantize_info,image);
quantize_info=DestroyQuantizeInfo(quantize_info);
}
image->colors=2;
image->matte=MagickFalse;
break;
}
case GrayscaleType:
{
if (SetImageGray(image,&image->exception) == MagickFalse)
status=TransformImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace);
image->matte=MagickFalse;
break;
}
case GrayscaleMatteType:
{
if (SetImageGray(image,&image->exception) == MagickFalse)
status=TransformImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace);
if (image->matte == MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageAlphaChannel(image,OpaqueAlphaChannel);
break;
}
case PaletteType:
{
if (IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) == MagickFalse)
status=TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
if ((image->storage_class == DirectClass) || (image->colors > 256))
{
quantize_info=AcquireQuantizeInfo(image_info);
quantize_info->number_colors=256;
status=QuantizeImage(quantize_info,image);
quantize_info=DestroyQuantizeInfo(quantize_info);
}
image->matte=MagickFalse;
break;
}
case PaletteBilevelMatteType:
{
if (IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) == MagickFalse)
status=TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
if (image->matte == MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageAlphaChannel(image,OpaqueAlphaChannel);
(void) BilevelImageChannel(image,AlphaChannel,(double) QuantumRange/2.0);
quantize_info=AcquireQuantizeInfo(image_info);
status=QuantizeImage(quantize_info,image);
quantize_info=DestroyQuantizeInfo(quantize_info);
break;
}
case PaletteMatteType:
{
if (IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) == MagickFalse)
status=TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
if (image->matte == MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageAlphaChannel(image,OpaqueAlphaChannel);
quantize_info=AcquireQuantizeInfo(image_info);
quantize_info->colorspace=TransparentColorspace;
status=QuantizeImage(quantize_info,image);
quantize_info=DestroyQuantizeInfo(quantize_info);
break;
}
case TrueColorType:
{
if (IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) == MagickFalse)
status=TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
if (image->storage_class != DirectClass)
status=SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass);
image->matte=MagickFalse;
break;
}
case TrueColorMatteType:
{
if (IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) == MagickFalse)
status=TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
if (image->storage_class != DirectClass)
status=SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass);
if (image->matte == MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageAlphaChannel(image,OpaqueAlphaChannel);
break;
}
case ColorSeparationType:
{
if (image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)
{
if (IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) == MagickFalse)
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
status=TransformImageColorspace(image,CMYKColorspace);
}
if (image->storage_class != DirectClass)
status=SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass);
image->matte=MagickFalse;
break;
}
case ColorSeparationMatteType:
{
if (image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)
{
if (IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) == MagickFalse)
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
status=TransformImageColorspace(image,CMYKColorspace);
}
if (image->storage_class != DirectClass)
status=SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass);
if (image->matte == MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageAlphaChannel(image,OpaqueAlphaChannel);
break;
}
case OptimizeType:
case UndefinedType:
break;
}
image_info=DestroyImageInfo(image_info);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(MagickFalse);
image->type=type;
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/281
CWE ID: CWE-416 | MagickExport MagickBooleanType SetImageType(Image *image,const ImageType type)
{
const char
*artifact;
ImageInfo
*image_info;
MagickBooleanType
status;
QuantizeInfo
*quantize_info;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"...");
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
status=MagickTrue;
image_info=AcquireImageInfo();
image_info->dither=image->dither;
artifact=GetImageArtifact(image,"dither");
if (artifact != (const char *) NULL)
(void) SetImageOption(image_info,"dither",artifact);
switch (type)
{
case BilevelType:
{
if (SetImageMonochrome(image,&image->exception) == MagickFalse)
{
status=TransformImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace);
(void) NormalizeImage(image);
quantize_info=AcquireQuantizeInfo(image_info);
quantize_info->number_colors=2;
quantize_info->colorspace=GRAYColorspace;
status=QuantizeImage(quantize_info,image);
quantize_info=DestroyQuantizeInfo(quantize_info);
}
status=AcquireImageColormap(image,2);
image->matte=MagickFalse;
break;
}
case GrayscaleType:
{
if (SetImageGray(image,&image->exception) == MagickFalse)
status=TransformImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace);
image->matte=MagickFalse;
break;
}
case GrayscaleMatteType:
{
if (SetImageGray(image,&image->exception) == MagickFalse)
status=TransformImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace);
if (image->matte == MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageAlphaChannel(image,OpaqueAlphaChannel);
break;
}
case PaletteType:
{
if (IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) == MagickFalse)
status=TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
if ((image->storage_class == DirectClass) || (image->colors > 256))
{
quantize_info=AcquireQuantizeInfo(image_info);
quantize_info->number_colors=256;
status=QuantizeImage(quantize_info,image);
quantize_info=DestroyQuantizeInfo(quantize_info);
}
image->matte=MagickFalse;
break;
}
case PaletteBilevelMatteType:
{
if (IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) == MagickFalse)
status=TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
if (image->matte == MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageAlphaChannel(image,OpaqueAlphaChannel);
(void) BilevelImageChannel(image,AlphaChannel,(double) QuantumRange/2.0);
quantize_info=AcquireQuantizeInfo(image_info);
status=QuantizeImage(quantize_info,image);
quantize_info=DestroyQuantizeInfo(quantize_info);
break;
}
case PaletteMatteType:
{
if (IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) == MagickFalse)
status=TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
if (image->matte == MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageAlphaChannel(image,OpaqueAlphaChannel);
quantize_info=AcquireQuantizeInfo(image_info);
quantize_info->colorspace=TransparentColorspace;
status=QuantizeImage(quantize_info,image);
quantize_info=DestroyQuantizeInfo(quantize_info);
break;
}
case TrueColorType:
{
if (IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) == MagickFalse)
status=TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
if (image->storage_class != DirectClass)
status=SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass);
image->matte=MagickFalse;
break;
}
case TrueColorMatteType:
{
if (IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) == MagickFalse)
status=TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
if (image->storage_class != DirectClass)
status=SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass);
if (image->matte == MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageAlphaChannel(image,OpaqueAlphaChannel);
break;
}
case ColorSeparationType:
{
if (image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)
{
if (IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) == MagickFalse)
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
status=TransformImageColorspace(image,CMYKColorspace);
}
if (image->storage_class != DirectClass)
status=SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass);
image->matte=MagickFalse;
break;
}
case ColorSeparationMatteType:
{
if (image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)
{
if (IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) == MagickFalse)
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
status=TransformImageColorspace(image,CMYKColorspace);
}
if (image->storage_class != DirectClass)
status=SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass);
if (image->matte == MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageAlphaChannel(image,OpaqueAlphaChannel);
break;
}
case OptimizeType:
case UndefinedType:
break;
}
image_info=DestroyImageInfo(image_info);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(MagickFalse);
image->type=type;
return(MagickTrue);
}
| 168,776 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: GetOutboundPinholeTimeout(struct upnphttp * h, const char * action, const char * ns)
{
int r;
static const char resp[] =
"<u:%sResponse "
"xmlns:u=\"%s\">"
"<OutboundPinholeTimeout>%d</OutboundPinholeTimeout>"
"</u:%sResponse>";
char body[512];
int bodylen;
struct NameValueParserData data;
char * int_ip, * int_port, * rem_host, * rem_port, * protocol;
int opt=0;
/*int proto=0;*/
unsigned short iport, rport;
if (GETFLAG(IPV6FCFWDISABLEDMASK))
{
SoapError(h, 702, "FirewallDisabled");
return;
}
ParseNameValue(h->req_buf + h->req_contentoff, h->req_contentlen, &data);
int_ip = GetValueFromNameValueList(&data, "InternalClient");
int_port = GetValueFromNameValueList(&data, "InternalPort");
rem_host = GetValueFromNameValueList(&data, "RemoteHost");
rem_port = GetValueFromNameValueList(&data, "RemotePort");
protocol = GetValueFromNameValueList(&data, "Protocol");
rport = (unsigned short)atoi(rem_port);
iport = (unsigned short)atoi(int_port);
/*proto = atoi(protocol);*/
syslog(LOG_INFO, "%s: retrieving timeout for outbound pinhole from [%s]:%hu to [%s]:%hu protocol %s", action, int_ip, iport,rem_host, rport, protocol);
/* TODO */
r = -1;/*upnp_check_outbound_pinhole(proto, &opt);*/
switch(r)
{
case 1: /* success */
bodylen = snprintf(body, sizeof(body), resp,
action, ns/*"urn:schemas-upnp-org:service:WANIPv6FirewallControl:1"*/,
opt, action);
BuildSendAndCloseSoapResp(h, body, bodylen);
break;
case -5: /* Protocol not supported */
SoapError(h, 705, "ProtocolNotSupported");
break;
default:
SoapError(h, 501, "ActionFailed");
}
ClearNameValueList(&data);
}
Commit Message: GetOutboundPinholeTimeout: check args
CWE ID: CWE-476 | GetOutboundPinholeTimeout(struct upnphttp * h, const char * action, const char * ns)
{
int r;
static const char resp[] =
"<u:%sResponse "
"xmlns:u=\"%s\">"
"<OutboundPinholeTimeout>%d</OutboundPinholeTimeout>"
"</u:%sResponse>";
char body[512];
int bodylen;
struct NameValueParserData data;
char * int_ip, * int_port, * rem_host, * rem_port, * protocol;
int opt=0;
/*int proto=0;*/
unsigned short iport, rport;
if (GETFLAG(IPV6FCFWDISABLEDMASK))
{
SoapError(h, 702, "FirewallDisabled");
return;
}
ParseNameValue(h->req_buf + h->req_contentoff, h->req_contentlen, &data);
int_ip = GetValueFromNameValueList(&data, "InternalClient");
int_port = GetValueFromNameValueList(&data, "InternalPort");
rem_host = GetValueFromNameValueList(&data, "RemoteHost");
rem_port = GetValueFromNameValueList(&data, "RemotePort");
protocol = GetValueFromNameValueList(&data, "Protocol");
if (!int_port || !ext_port || !protocol)
{
ClearNameValueList(&data);
SoapError(h, 402, "Invalid Args");
return;
}
rport = (unsigned short)atoi(rem_port);
iport = (unsigned short)atoi(int_port);
/*proto = atoi(protocol);*/
syslog(LOG_INFO, "%s: retrieving timeout for outbound pinhole from [%s]:%hu to [%s]:%hu protocol %s", action, int_ip, iport,rem_host, rport, protocol);
/* TODO */
r = -1;/*upnp_check_outbound_pinhole(proto, &opt);*/
switch(r)
{
case 1: /* success */
bodylen = snprintf(body, sizeof(body), resp,
action, ns/*"urn:schemas-upnp-org:service:WANIPv6FirewallControl:1"*/,
opt, action);
BuildSendAndCloseSoapResp(h, body, bodylen);
break;
case -5: /* Protocol not supported */
SoapError(h, 705, "ProtocolNotSupported");
break;
default:
SoapError(h, 501, "ActionFailed");
}
ClearNameValueList(&data);
}
| 169,667 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int get_scl(void)
{
return qrio_get_gpio(DEBLOCK_PORT1, DEBLOCK_SCL1);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
CWE ID: CWE-787 | int get_scl(void)
| 169,629 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: logger_get_mask_expanded (struct t_gui_buffer *buffer, const char *mask)
{
char *mask2, *mask_decoded, *mask_decoded2, *mask_decoded3, *mask_decoded4;
char *mask_decoded5;
const char *dir_separator;
int length;
time_t seconds;
struct tm *date_tmp;
mask2 = NULL;
mask_decoded = NULL;
mask_decoded2 = NULL;
mask_decoded3 = NULL;
mask_decoded4 = NULL;
mask_decoded5 = NULL;
dir_separator = weechat_info_get ("dir_separator", "");
if (!dir_separator)
return NULL;
/*
* we first replace directory separator (commonly '/') by \01 because
* buffer mask can contain this char, and will be replaced by replacement
* char ('_' by default)
*/
mask2 = weechat_string_replace (mask, dir_separator, "\01");
if (!mask2)
goto end;
mask_decoded = weechat_buffer_string_replace_local_var (buffer, mask2);
if (!mask_decoded)
goto end;
mask_decoded2 = weechat_string_replace (mask_decoded,
dir_separator,
weechat_config_string (logger_config_file_replacement_char));
if (!mask_decoded2)
goto end;
#ifdef __CYGWIN__
mask_decoded3 = weechat_string_replace (mask_decoded2, "\\",
weechat_config_string (logger_config_file_replacement_char));
#else
mask_decoded3 = strdup (mask_decoded2);
#endif /* __CYGWIN__ */
if (!mask_decoded3)
goto end;
/* restore directory separator */
mask_decoded4 = weechat_string_replace (mask_decoded3,
"\01", dir_separator);
if (!mask_decoded4)
goto end;
/* replace date/time specifiers in mask */
length = strlen (mask_decoded4) + 256 + 1;
mask_decoded5 = malloc (length);
if (!mask_decoded5)
goto end;
seconds = time (NULL);
date_tmp = localtime (&seconds);
mask_decoded5[0] = '\0';
strftime (mask_decoded5, length - 1, mask_decoded4, date_tmp);
/* convert to lower case? */
if (weechat_config_boolean (logger_config_file_name_lower_case))
weechat_string_tolower (mask_decoded5);
if (weechat_logger_plugin->debug)
{
weechat_printf_date_tags (NULL, 0, "no_log",
"%s: buffer = \"%s\", mask = \"%s\", "
"decoded mask = \"%s\"",
LOGGER_PLUGIN_NAME,
weechat_buffer_get_string (buffer, "name"),
mask, mask_decoded5);
}
end:
if (mask2)
free (mask2);
if (mask_decoded)
free (mask_decoded);
if (mask_decoded2)
free (mask_decoded2);
if (mask_decoded3)
free (mask_decoded3);
if (mask_decoded4)
free (mask_decoded4);
return mask_decoded5;
}
Commit Message: logger: call strftime before replacing buffer local variables
CWE ID: CWE-119 | logger_get_mask_expanded (struct t_gui_buffer *buffer, const char *mask)
{
char *mask2, *mask3, *mask4, *mask5, *mask6, *mask7;
const char *dir_separator;
int length;
time_t seconds;
struct tm *date_tmp;
mask2 = NULL;
mask3 = NULL;
mask4 = NULL;
mask5 = NULL;
mask6 = NULL;
mask7 = NULL;
dir_separator = weechat_info_get ("dir_separator", "");
if (!dir_separator)
return NULL;
/* replace date/time specifiers in mask */
length = strlen (mask) + 256 + 1;
mask2 = malloc (length);
if (!mask2)
goto end;
seconds = time (NULL);
date_tmp = localtime (&seconds);
mask2[0] = '\0';
if (strftime (mask2, length - 1, mask, date_tmp) == 0)
mask2[0] = '\0';
/*
* we first replace directory separator (commonly '/') by \01 because
* buffer mask can contain this char, and will be replaced by replacement
* char ('_' by default)
*/
mask3 = weechat_string_replace (mask2, dir_separator, "\01");
if (!mask3)
goto end;
mask4 = weechat_buffer_string_replace_local_var (buffer, mask3);
if (!mask4)
goto end;
mask5 = weechat_string_replace (mask4,
dir_separator,
weechat_config_string (logger_config_file_replacement_char));
if (!mask5)
goto end;
#ifdef __CYGWIN__
mask6 = weechat_string_replace (mask5, "\\",
weechat_config_string (logger_config_file_replacement_char));
#else
mask6 = strdup (mask5);
#endif /* __CYGWIN__ */
if (!mask6)
goto end;
/* restore directory separator */
mask7 = weechat_string_replace (mask6,
"\01", dir_separator);
if (!mask7)
goto end;
/* convert to lower case? */
if (weechat_config_boolean (logger_config_file_name_lower_case))
weechat_string_tolower (mask7);
if (weechat_logger_plugin->debug)
{
weechat_printf_date_tags (NULL, 0, "no_log",
"%s: buffer = \"%s\", mask = \"%s\", "
"decoded mask = \"%s\"",
LOGGER_PLUGIN_NAME,
weechat_buffer_get_string (buffer, "name"),
mask, mask7);
}
end:
if (mask2)
free (mask2);
if (mask3)
free (mask3);
if (mask4)
free (mask4);
if (mask5)
free (mask5);
if (mask6)
free (mask6);
return mask7;
}
| 167,745 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PageSerializer::serializeFrame(Frame* frame)
{
Document* document = frame->document();
KURL url = document->url();
if (!url.isValid() || url.isBlankURL()) {
url = urlForBlankFrame(frame);
}
if (m_resourceURLs.contains(url)) {
return;
}
if (document->isImageDocument()) {
ImageDocument* imageDocument = toImageDocument(document);
addImageToResources(imageDocument->cachedImage(), imageDocument->imageElement()->renderer(), url);
return;
}
Vector<Node*> nodes;
OwnPtr<SerializerMarkupAccumulator> accumulator;
if (m_URLs)
accumulator = adoptPtr(new LinkChangeSerializerMarkupAccumulator(this, document, &nodes, m_URLs, m_directory));
else
accumulator = adoptPtr(new SerializerMarkupAccumulator(this, document, &nodes));
String text = accumulator->serializeNodes(document, IncludeNode);
WTF::TextEncoding textEncoding(document->charset());
CString frameHTML = textEncoding.normalizeAndEncode(text, WTF::EntitiesForUnencodables);
m_resources->append(SerializedResource(url, document->suggestedMIMEType(), SharedBuffer::create(frameHTML.data(), frameHTML.length())));
m_resourceURLs.add(url);
for (Vector<Node*>::iterator iter = nodes.begin(); iter != nodes.end(); ++iter) {
Node* node = *iter;
if (!node->isElementNode())
continue;
Element* element = toElement(node);
if (element->isStyledElement()) {
retrieveResourcesForProperties(element->inlineStyle(), document);
retrieveResourcesForProperties(element->presentationAttributeStyle(), document);
}
if (element->hasTagName(HTMLNames::imgTag)) {
HTMLImageElement* imageElement = toHTMLImageElement(element);
KURL url = document->completeURL(imageElement->getAttribute(HTMLNames::srcAttr));
ImageResource* cachedImage = imageElement->cachedImage();
addImageToResources(cachedImage, imageElement->renderer(), url);
} else if (element->hasTagName(HTMLNames::inputTag)) {
HTMLInputElement* inputElement = toHTMLInputElement(element);
if (inputElement->isImageButton() && inputElement->hasImageLoader()) {
KURL url = inputElement->src();
ImageResource* cachedImage = inputElement->imageLoader()->image();
addImageToResources(cachedImage, inputElement->renderer(), url);
}
} else if (element->hasTagName(HTMLNames::linkTag)) {
HTMLLinkElement* linkElement = toHTMLLinkElement(element);
if (CSSStyleSheet* sheet = linkElement->sheet()) {
KURL url = document->completeURL(linkElement->getAttribute(HTMLNames::hrefAttr));
serializeCSSStyleSheet(sheet, url);
ASSERT(m_resourceURLs.contains(url));
}
} else if (element->hasTagName(HTMLNames::styleTag)) {
HTMLStyleElement* styleElement = toHTMLStyleElement(element);
if (CSSStyleSheet* sheet = styleElement->sheet())
serializeCSSStyleSheet(sheet, KURL());
}
}
for (Frame* childFrame = frame->tree().firstChild(); childFrame; childFrame = childFrame->tree().nextSibling())
serializeFrame(childFrame);
}
Commit Message: Revert 162155 "This review merges the two existing page serializ..."
Change r162155 broke the world even though it was landed using the CQ.
> This review merges the two existing page serializers, WebPageSerializerImpl and
> PageSerializer, into one, PageSerializer. In addition to this it moves all
> the old tests from WebPageNewSerializerTest and WebPageSerializerTest to the
> PageSerializerTest structure and splits out one test for MHTML into a new
> MHTMLTest file.
>
> Saving as 'Webpage, Complete', 'Webpage, HTML Only' and as MHTML when the
> 'Save Page as MHTML' flag is enabled now uses the same code, and should thus
> have the same feature set. Meaning that both modes now should be a bit better.
>
> Detailed list of changes:
>
> - PageSerializerTest: Prepare for more DTD test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove now unneccesary input image test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove unused WebPageSerializer/Impl code
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI morph test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move namespace test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move SVG Image test
> - MHTMLTest: Move MHTML specific test to own test file
> - PageSerializerTest: Delete duplicate XML header test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move blank frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move CSS test
> - PageSerializerTest: Add frameset/frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old iframe test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old elements test
> - Use PageSerizer for saving web pages
> - PageSerializerTest: Test for rewriting links
> - PageSerializer: Add rewrite link accumulator
> - PageSerializer: Serialize images in iframes/frames src
> - PageSerializer: XHTML fix for meta tags
> - PageSerializer: Add presentation CSS
> - PageSerializer: Rename out parameter
>
> BUG=
> [email protected]
>
> Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/68613003
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73673003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162156 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void PageSerializer::serializeFrame(Frame* frame)
{
Document* document = frame->document();
KURL url = document->url();
if (!url.isValid() || url.isBlankURL()) {
url = urlForBlankFrame(frame);
}
if (m_resourceURLs.contains(url)) {
return;
}
Vector<Node*> nodes;
SerializerMarkupAccumulator accumulator(this, document, &nodes);
WTF::TextEncoding textEncoding(document->charset());
CString data;
if (!textEncoding.isValid()) {
// FIXME: iframes used as images trigger this. We should deal with them correctly.
return;
}
String text = accumulator.serializeNodes(document, IncludeNode);
CString frameHTML = textEncoding.normalizeAndEncode(text, WTF::EntitiesForUnencodables);
m_resources->append(SerializedResource(url, document->suggestedMIMEType(), SharedBuffer::create(frameHTML.data(), frameHTML.length())));
m_resourceURLs.add(url);
for (Vector<Node*>::iterator iter = nodes.begin(); iter != nodes.end(); ++iter) {
Node* node = *iter;
if (!node->isElementNode())
continue;
Element* element = toElement(node);
if (element->isStyledElement())
retrieveResourcesForProperties(element->inlineStyle(), document);
if (element->hasTagName(HTMLNames::imgTag)) {
HTMLImageElement* imageElement = toHTMLImageElement(element);
KURL url = document->completeURL(imageElement->getAttribute(HTMLNames::srcAttr));
ImageResource* cachedImage = imageElement->cachedImage();
addImageToResources(cachedImage, imageElement->renderer(), url);
} else if (element->hasTagName(HTMLNames::inputTag)) {
HTMLInputElement* inputElement = toHTMLInputElement(element);
if (inputElement->isImageButton() && inputElement->hasImageLoader()) {
KURL url = inputElement->src();
ImageResource* cachedImage = inputElement->imageLoader()->image();
addImageToResources(cachedImage, inputElement->renderer(), url);
}
} else if (element->hasTagName(HTMLNames::linkTag)) {
HTMLLinkElement* linkElement = toHTMLLinkElement(element);
if (CSSStyleSheet* sheet = linkElement->sheet()) {
KURL url = document->completeURL(linkElement->getAttribute(HTMLNames::hrefAttr));
serializeCSSStyleSheet(sheet, url);
ASSERT(m_resourceURLs.contains(url));
}
} else if (element->hasTagName(HTMLNames::styleTag)) {
HTMLStyleElement* styleElement = toHTMLStyleElement(element);
if (CSSStyleSheet* sheet = styleElement->sheet())
serializeCSSStyleSheet(sheet, KURL());
}
}
for (Frame* childFrame = frame->tree().firstChild(); childFrame; childFrame = childFrame->tree().nextSibling())
serializeFrame(childFrame);
}
| 171,570 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int packet_set_ring(struct sock *sk, union tpacket_req_u *req_u,
int closing, int tx_ring)
{
struct pgv *pg_vec = NULL;
struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(sk);
int was_running, order = 0;
struct packet_ring_buffer *rb;
struct sk_buff_head *rb_queue;
__be16 num;
int err = -EINVAL;
/* Added to avoid minimal code churn */
struct tpacket_req *req = &req_u->req;
/* Opening a Tx-ring is NOT supported in TPACKET_V3 */
if (!closing && tx_ring && (po->tp_version > TPACKET_V2)) {
net_warn_ratelimited("Tx-ring is not supported.\n");
goto out;
}
rb = tx_ring ? &po->tx_ring : &po->rx_ring;
rb_queue = tx_ring ? &sk->sk_write_queue : &sk->sk_receive_queue;
err = -EBUSY;
if (!closing) {
if (atomic_read(&po->mapped))
goto out;
if (packet_read_pending(rb))
goto out;
}
if (req->tp_block_nr) {
/* Sanity tests and some calculations */
err = -EBUSY;
if (unlikely(rb->pg_vec))
goto out;
switch (po->tp_version) {
case TPACKET_V1:
po->tp_hdrlen = TPACKET_HDRLEN;
break;
case TPACKET_V2:
po->tp_hdrlen = TPACKET2_HDRLEN;
break;
case TPACKET_V3:
po->tp_hdrlen = TPACKET3_HDRLEN;
break;
}
err = -EINVAL;
if (unlikely((int)req->tp_block_size <= 0))
goto out;
if (unlikely(!PAGE_ALIGNED(req->tp_block_size)))
goto out;
if (po->tp_version >= TPACKET_V3 &&
(int)(req->tp_block_size -
BLK_PLUS_PRIV(req_u->req3.tp_sizeof_priv)) <= 0)
goto out;
if (unlikely(req->tp_frame_size < po->tp_hdrlen +
po->tp_reserve))
goto out;
if (unlikely(req->tp_frame_size & (TPACKET_ALIGNMENT - 1)))
goto out;
rb->frames_per_block = req->tp_block_size / req->tp_frame_size;
if (unlikely(rb->frames_per_block == 0))
goto out;
if (unlikely((rb->frames_per_block * req->tp_block_nr) !=
req->tp_frame_nr))
goto out;
err = -ENOMEM;
order = get_order(req->tp_block_size);
pg_vec = alloc_pg_vec(req, order);
if (unlikely(!pg_vec))
goto out;
switch (po->tp_version) {
case TPACKET_V3:
/* Transmit path is not supported. We checked
* it above but just being paranoid
*/
if (!tx_ring)
init_prb_bdqc(po, rb, pg_vec, req_u);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
/* Done */
else {
err = -EINVAL;
if (unlikely(req->tp_frame_nr))
goto out;
}
lock_sock(sk);
/* Detach socket from network */
spin_lock(&po->bind_lock);
was_running = po->running;
num = po->num;
if (was_running) {
po->num = 0;
__unregister_prot_hook(sk, false);
}
spin_unlock(&po->bind_lock);
synchronize_net();
err = -EBUSY;
mutex_lock(&po->pg_vec_lock);
if (closing || atomic_read(&po->mapped) == 0) {
err = 0;
spin_lock_bh(&rb_queue->lock);
swap(rb->pg_vec, pg_vec);
rb->frame_max = (req->tp_frame_nr - 1);
rb->head = 0;
rb->frame_size = req->tp_frame_size;
spin_unlock_bh(&rb_queue->lock);
swap(rb->pg_vec_order, order);
swap(rb->pg_vec_len, req->tp_block_nr);
rb->pg_vec_pages = req->tp_block_size/PAGE_SIZE;
po->prot_hook.func = (po->rx_ring.pg_vec) ?
tpacket_rcv : packet_rcv;
skb_queue_purge(rb_queue);
if (atomic_read(&po->mapped))
pr_err("packet_mmap: vma is busy: %d\n",
atomic_read(&po->mapped));
}
mutex_unlock(&po->pg_vec_lock);
spin_lock(&po->bind_lock);
if (was_running) {
po->num = num;
register_prot_hook(sk);
}
spin_unlock(&po->bind_lock);
if (closing && (po->tp_version > TPACKET_V2)) {
/* Because we don't support block-based V3 on tx-ring */
if (!tx_ring)
prb_shutdown_retire_blk_timer(po, rb_queue);
}
release_sock(sk);
if (pg_vec)
free_pg_vec(pg_vec, order, req->tp_block_nr);
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: packet: fix race condition in packet_set_ring
When packet_set_ring creates a ring buffer it will initialize a
struct timer_list if the packet version is TPACKET_V3. This value
can then be raced by a different thread calling setsockopt to
set the version to TPACKET_V1 before packet_set_ring has finished.
This leads to a use-after-free on a function pointer in the
struct timer_list when the socket is closed as the previously
initialized timer will not be deleted.
The bug is fixed by taking lock_sock(sk) in packet_setsockopt when
changing the packet version while also taking the lock at the start
of packet_set_ring.
Fixes: f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.")
Signed-off-by: Philip Pettersson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | static int packet_set_ring(struct sock *sk, union tpacket_req_u *req_u,
int closing, int tx_ring)
{
struct pgv *pg_vec = NULL;
struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(sk);
int was_running, order = 0;
struct packet_ring_buffer *rb;
struct sk_buff_head *rb_queue;
__be16 num;
int err = -EINVAL;
/* Added to avoid minimal code churn */
struct tpacket_req *req = &req_u->req;
lock_sock(sk);
/* Opening a Tx-ring is NOT supported in TPACKET_V3 */
if (!closing && tx_ring && (po->tp_version > TPACKET_V2)) {
net_warn_ratelimited("Tx-ring is not supported.\n");
goto out;
}
rb = tx_ring ? &po->tx_ring : &po->rx_ring;
rb_queue = tx_ring ? &sk->sk_write_queue : &sk->sk_receive_queue;
err = -EBUSY;
if (!closing) {
if (atomic_read(&po->mapped))
goto out;
if (packet_read_pending(rb))
goto out;
}
if (req->tp_block_nr) {
/* Sanity tests and some calculations */
err = -EBUSY;
if (unlikely(rb->pg_vec))
goto out;
switch (po->tp_version) {
case TPACKET_V1:
po->tp_hdrlen = TPACKET_HDRLEN;
break;
case TPACKET_V2:
po->tp_hdrlen = TPACKET2_HDRLEN;
break;
case TPACKET_V3:
po->tp_hdrlen = TPACKET3_HDRLEN;
break;
}
err = -EINVAL;
if (unlikely((int)req->tp_block_size <= 0))
goto out;
if (unlikely(!PAGE_ALIGNED(req->tp_block_size)))
goto out;
if (po->tp_version >= TPACKET_V3 &&
(int)(req->tp_block_size -
BLK_PLUS_PRIV(req_u->req3.tp_sizeof_priv)) <= 0)
goto out;
if (unlikely(req->tp_frame_size < po->tp_hdrlen +
po->tp_reserve))
goto out;
if (unlikely(req->tp_frame_size & (TPACKET_ALIGNMENT - 1)))
goto out;
rb->frames_per_block = req->tp_block_size / req->tp_frame_size;
if (unlikely(rb->frames_per_block == 0))
goto out;
if (unlikely((rb->frames_per_block * req->tp_block_nr) !=
req->tp_frame_nr))
goto out;
err = -ENOMEM;
order = get_order(req->tp_block_size);
pg_vec = alloc_pg_vec(req, order);
if (unlikely(!pg_vec))
goto out;
switch (po->tp_version) {
case TPACKET_V3:
/* Transmit path is not supported. We checked
* it above but just being paranoid
*/
if (!tx_ring)
init_prb_bdqc(po, rb, pg_vec, req_u);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
/* Done */
else {
err = -EINVAL;
if (unlikely(req->tp_frame_nr))
goto out;
}
/* Detach socket from network */
spin_lock(&po->bind_lock);
was_running = po->running;
num = po->num;
if (was_running) {
po->num = 0;
__unregister_prot_hook(sk, false);
}
spin_unlock(&po->bind_lock);
synchronize_net();
err = -EBUSY;
mutex_lock(&po->pg_vec_lock);
if (closing || atomic_read(&po->mapped) == 0) {
err = 0;
spin_lock_bh(&rb_queue->lock);
swap(rb->pg_vec, pg_vec);
rb->frame_max = (req->tp_frame_nr - 1);
rb->head = 0;
rb->frame_size = req->tp_frame_size;
spin_unlock_bh(&rb_queue->lock);
swap(rb->pg_vec_order, order);
swap(rb->pg_vec_len, req->tp_block_nr);
rb->pg_vec_pages = req->tp_block_size/PAGE_SIZE;
po->prot_hook.func = (po->rx_ring.pg_vec) ?
tpacket_rcv : packet_rcv;
skb_queue_purge(rb_queue);
if (atomic_read(&po->mapped))
pr_err("packet_mmap: vma is busy: %d\n",
atomic_read(&po->mapped));
}
mutex_unlock(&po->pg_vec_lock);
spin_lock(&po->bind_lock);
if (was_running) {
po->num = num;
register_prot_hook(sk);
}
spin_unlock(&po->bind_lock);
if (closing && (po->tp_version > TPACKET_V2)) {
/* Because we don't support block-based V3 on tx-ring */
if (!tx_ring)
prb_shutdown_retire_blk_timer(po, rb_queue);
}
if (pg_vec)
free_pg_vec(pg_vec, order, req->tp_block_nr);
out:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
| 166,909 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int gdAlphaBlend (int dst, int src) {
int src_alpha = gdTrueColorGetAlpha(src);
int dst_alpha, alpha, red, green, blue;
int src_weight, dst_weight, tot_weight;
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* Simple cases we want to handle fast. */
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
if( src_alpha == gdAlphaOpaque )
return src;
dst_alpha = gdTrueColorGetAlpha(dst);
if( src_alpha == gdAlphaTransparent )
return dst;
if( dst_alpha == gdAlphaTransparent )
return src;
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* What will the source and destination alphas be? Note that */
/* the destination weighting is substantially reduced as the */
/* overlay becomes quite opaque. */
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
src_weight = gdAlphaTransparent - src_alpha;
dst_weight = (gdAlphaTransparent - dst_alpha) * src_alpha / gdAlphaMax;
tot_weight = src_weight + dst_weight;
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* What red, green and blue result values will we use? */
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
alpha = src_alpha * dst_alpha / gdAlphaMax;
red = (gdTrueColorGetRed(src) * src_weight
+ gdTrueColorGetRed(dst) * dst_weight) / tot_weight;
green = (gdTrueColorGetGreen(src) * src_weight
+ gdTrueColorGetGreen(dst) * dst_weight) / tot_weight;
blue = (gdTrueColorGetBlue(src) * src_weight
+ gdTrueColorGetBlue(dst) * dst_weight) / tot_weight;
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* Return merged result. */
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
return ((alpha << 24) + (red << 16) + (green << 8) + blue);
}
Commit Message: iFixed bug #72446 - Integer Overflow in gdImagePaletteToTrueColor() resulting in heap overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190 | int gdAlphaBlend (int dst, int src) {
int src_alpha = gdTrueColorGetAlpha(src);
int dst_alpha, alpha, red, green, blue;
int src_weight, dst_weight, tot_weight;
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* Simple cases we want to handle fast. */
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
if( src_alpha == gdAlphaOpaque )
return src;
dst_alpha = gdTrueColorGetAlpha(dst);
if( src_alpha == gdAlphaTransparent )
return dst;
if( dst_alpha == gdAlphaTransparent )
return src;
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* What will the source and destination alphas be? Note that */
/* the destination weighting is substantially reduced as the */
/* overlay becomes quite opaque. */
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
src_weight = gdAlphaTransparent - src_alpha;
dst_weight = (gdAlphaTransparent - dst_alpha) * src_alpha / gdAlphaMax;
tot_weight = src_weight + dst_weight;
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* What red, green and blue result values will we use? */
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
alpha = src_alpha * dst_alpha / gdAlphaMax;
red = (gdTrueColorGetRed(src) * src_weight
+ gdTrueColorGetRed(dst) * dst_weight) / tot_weight;
green = (gdTrueColorGetGreen(src) * src_weight
+ gdTrueColorGetGreen(dst) * dst_weight) / tot_weight;
blue = (gdTrueColorGetBlue(src) * src_weight
+ gdTrueColorGetBlue(dst) * dst_weight) / tot_weight;
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* Return merged result. */
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
return ((alpha << 24) + (red << 16) + (green << 8) + blue);
}
| 167,124 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int t220_frontend_attach(struct dvb_usb_adapter *d)
{
u8 obuf[3] = { 0xe, 0x87, 0 };
u8 ibuf[] = { 0 };
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d->dev, obuf, 3, ibuf, 1, 0) < 0)
err("command 0x0e transfer failed.");
obuf[0] = 0xe;
obuf[1] = 0x86;
obuf[2] = 1;
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d->dev, obuf, 3, ibuf, 1, 0) < 0)
err("command 0x0e transfer failed.");
obuf[0] = 0xe;
obuf[1] = 0x80;
obuf[2] = 0;
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d->dev, obuf, 3, ibuf, 1, 0) < 0)
err("command 0x0e transfer failed.");
msleep(50);
obuf[0] = 0xe;
obuf[1] = 0x80;
obuf[2] = 1;
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d->dev, obuf, 3, ibuf, 1, 0) < 0)
err("command 0x0e transfer failed.");
obuf[0] = 0x51;
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d->dev, obuf, 1, ibuf, 1, 0) < 0)
err("command 0x51 transfer failed.");
d->fe_adap[0].fe = dvb_attach(cxd2820r_attach, &cxd2820r_config,
&d->dev->i2c_adap, NULL);
if (d->fe_adap[0].fe != NULL) {
if (dvb_attach(tda18271_attach, d->fe_adap[0].fe, 0x60,
&d->dev->i2c_adap, &tda18271_config)) {
info("Attached TDA18271HD/CXD2820R!");
return 0;
}
}
info("Failed to attach TDA18271HD/CXD2820R!");
return -EIO;
}
Commit Message: [media] dw2102: don't do DMA on stack
On Kernel 4.9, WARNINGs about doing DMA on stack are hit at
the dw2102 driver: one in su3000_power_ctrl() and the other in tt_s2_4600_frontend_attach().
Both were due to the use of buffers on the stack as parameters to
dvb_usb_generic_rw() and the resulting attempt to do DMA with them.
The device was non-functional as a result.
So, switch this driver over to use a buffer within the device state
structure, as has been done with other DVB-USB drivers.
Tested with TechnoTrend TT-connect S2-4600.
[[email protected]: fixed a warning at su3000_i2c_transfer() that
state var were dereferenced before check 'd']
Signed-off-by: Jonathan McDowell <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static int t220_frontend_attach(struct dvb_usb_adapter *d)
static int t220_frontend_attach(struct dvb_usb_adapter *adap)
{
struct dvb_usb_device *d = adap->dev;
struct dw2102_state *state = d->priv;
mutex_lock(&d->data_mutex);
state->data[0] = 0xe;
state->data[1] = 0x87;
state->data[2] = 0x0;
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d, state->data, 3, state->data, 1, 0) < 0)
err("command 0x0e transfer failed.");
state->data[0] = 0xe;
state->data[1] = 0x86;
state->data[2] = 1;
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d, state->data, 3, state->data, 1, 0) < 0)
err("command 0x0e transfer failed.");
state->data[0] = 0xe;
state->data[1] = 0x80;
state->data[2] = 0;
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d, state->data, 3, state->data, 1, 0) < 0)
err("command 0x0e transfer failed.");
msleep(50);
state->data[0] = 0xe;
state->data[1] = 0x80;
state->data[2] = 1;
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d, state->data, 3, state->data, 1, 0) < 0)
err("command 0x0e transfer failed.");
state->data[0] = 0x51;
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d, state->data, 1, state->data, 1, 0) < 0)
err("command 0x51 transfer failed.");
mutex_unlock(&d->data_mutex);
adap->fe_adap[0].fe = dvb_attach(cxd2820r_attach, &cxd2820r_config,
&d->i2c_adap, NULL);
if (adap->fe_adap[0].fe != NULL) {
if (dvb_attach(tda18271_attach, adap->fe_adap[0].fe, 0x60,
&d->i2c_adap, &tda18271_config)) {
info("Attached TDA18271HD/CXD2820R!");
return 0;
}
}
info("Failed to attach TDA18271HD/CXD2820R!");
return -EIO;
}
| 168,228 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int futex_wait_requeue_pi(u32 __user *uaddr, unsigned int flags,
u32 val, ktime_t *abs_time, u32 bitset,
u32 __user *uaddr2)
{
struct hrtimer_sleeper timeout, *to = NULL;
struct rt_mutex_waiter rt_waiter;
struct rt_mutex *pi_mutex = NULL;
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb;
union futex_key key2 = FUTEX_KEY_INIT;
struct futex_q q = futex_q_init;
int res, ret;
if (uaddr == uaddr2)
return -EINVAL;
if (!bitset)
return -EINVAL;
if (abs_time) {
to = &timeout;
hrtimer_init_on_stack(&to->timer, (flags & FLAGS_CLOCKRT) ?
CLOCK_REALTIME : CLOCK_MONOTONIC,
HRTIMER_MODE_ABS);
hrtimer_init_sleeper(to, current);
hrtimer_set_expires_range_ns(&to->timer, *abs_time,
current->timer_slack_ns);
}
/*
* The waiter is allocated on our stack, manipulated by the requeue
* code while we sleep on uaddr.
*/
debug_rt_mutex_init_waiter(&rt_waiter);
RB_CLEAR_NODE(&rt_waiter.pi_tree_entry);
RB_CLEAR_NODE(&rt_waiter.tree_entry);
rt_waiter.task = NULL;
ret = get_futex_key(uaddr2, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &key2, VERIFY_WRITE);
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
goto out;
q.bitset = bitset;
q.rt_waiter = &rt_waiter;
q.requeue_pi_key = &key2;
/*
* Prepare to wait on uaddr. On success, increments q.key (key1) ref
* count.
*/
ret = futex_wait_setup(uaddr, val, flags, &q, &hb);
if (ret)
goto out_key2;
/* Queue the futex_q, drop the hb lock, wait for wakeup. */
futex_wait_queue_me(hb, &q, to);
spin_lock(&hb->lock);
ret = handle_early_requeue_pi_wakeup(hb, &q, &key2, to);
spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
if (ret)
goto out_put_keys;
/*
* In order for us to be here, we know our q.key == key2, and since
* we took the hb->lock above, we also know that futex_requeue() has
* completed and we no longer have to concern ourselves with a wakeup
* race with the atomic proxy lock acquisition by the requeue code. The
* futex_requeue dropped our key1 reference and incremented our key2
* reference count.
*/
/* Check if the requeue code acquired the second futex for us. */
if (!q.rt_waiter) {
/*
* Got the lock. We might not be the anticipated owner if we
* did a lock-steal - fix up the PI-state in that case.
*/
if (q.pi_state && (q.pi_state->owner != current)) {
spin_lock(q.lock_ptr);
ret = fixup_pi_state_owner(uaddr2, &q, current);
spin_unlock(q.lock_ptr);
}
} else {
/*
* We have been woken up by futex_unlock_pi(), a timeout, or a
* signal. futex_unlock_pi() will not destroy the lock_ptr nor
* the pi_state.
*/
WARN_ON(!q.pi_state);
pi_mutex = &q.pi_state->pi_mutex;
ret = rt_mutex_finish_proxy_lock(pi_mutex, to, &rt_waiter, 1);
debug_rt_mutex_free_waiter(&rt_waiter);
spin_lock(q.lock_ptr);
/*
* Fixup the pi_state owner and possibly acquire the lock if we
* haven't already.
*/
res = fixup_owner(uaddr2, &q, !ret);
/*
* If fixup_owner() returned an error, proprogate that. If it
* acquired the lock, clear -ETIMEDOUT or -EINTR.
*/
if (res)
ret = (res < 0) ? res : 0;
/* Unqueue and drop the lock. */
unqueue_me_pi(&q);
}
/*
* If fixup_pi_state_owner() faulted and was unable to handle the
* fault, unlock the rt_mutex and return the fault to userspace.
*/
if (ret == -EFAULT) {
if (pi_mutex && rt_mutex_owner(pi_mutex) == current)
rt_mutex_unlock(pi_mutex);
} else if (ret == -EINTR) {
/*
* We've already been requeued, but cannot restart by calling
* futex_lock_pi() directly. We could restart this syscall, but
* it would detect that the user space "val" changed and return
* -EWOULDBLOCK. Save the overhead of the restart and return
* -EWOULDBLOCK directly.
*/
ret = -EWOULDBLOCK;
}
out_put_keys:
put_futex_key(&q.key);
out_key2:
put_futex_key(&key2);
out:
if (to) {
hrtimer_cancel(&to->timer);
destroy_hrtimer_on_stack(&to->timer);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: futex-prevent-requeue-pi-on-same-futex.patch futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_requeue(..., requeue_pi=1)
If uaddr == uaddr2, then we have broken the rule of only requeueing from
a non-pi futex to a pi futex with this call. If we attempt this, then
dangling pointers may be left for rt_waiter resulting in an exploitable
condition.
This change brings futex_requeue() in line with futex_wait_requeue_pi()
which performs the same check as per commit 6f7b0a2a5c0f ("futex: Forbid
uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_wait_requeue_pi()")
[ tglx: Compare the resulting keys as well, as uaddrs might be
different depending on the mapping ]
Fixes CVE-2014-3153.
Reported-by: Pinkie Pie
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Darren Hart <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static int futex_wait_requeue_pi(u32 __user *uaddr, unsigned int flags,
u32 val, ktime_t *abs_time, u32 bitset,
u32 __user *uaddr2)
{
struct hrtimer_sleeper timeout, *to = NULL;
struct rt_mutex_waiter rt_waiter;
struct rt_mutex *pi_mutex = NULL;
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb;
union futex_key key2 = FUTEX_KEY_INIT;
struct futex_q q = futex_q_init;
int res, ret;
if (uaddr == uaddr2)
return -EINVAL;
if (!bitset)
return -EINVAL;
if (abs_time) {
to = &timeout;
hrtimer_init_on_stack(&to->timer, (flags & FLAGS_CLOCKRT) ?
CLOCK_REALTIME : CLOCK_MONOTONIC,
HRTIMER_MODE_ABS);
hrtimer_init_sleeper(to, current);
hrtimer_set_expires_range_ns(&to->timer, *abs_time,
current->timer_slack_ns);
}
/*
* The waiter is allocated on our stack, manipulated by the requeue
* code while we sleep on uaddr.
*/
debug_rt_mutex_init_waiter(&rt_waiter);
RB_CLEAR_NODE(&rt_waiter.pi_tree_entry);
RB_CLEAR_NODE(&rt_waiter.tree_entry);
rt_waiter.task = NULL;
ret = get_futex_key(uaddr2, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &key2, VERIFY_WRITE);
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
goto out;
q.bitset = bitset;
q.rt_waiter = &rt_waiter;
q.requeue_pi_key = &key2;
/*
* Prepare to wait on uaddr. On success, increments q.key (key1) ref
* count.
*/
ret = futex_wait_setup(uaddr, val, flags, &q, &hb);
if (ret)
goto out_key2;
/*
* The check above which compares uaddrs is not sufficient for
* shared futexes. We need to compare the keys:
*/
if (match_futex(&q.key, &key2)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_put_keys;
}
/* Queue the futex_q, drop the hb lock, wait for wakeup. */
futex_wait_queue_me(hb, &q, to);
spin_lock(&hb->lock);
ret = handle_early_requeue_pi_wakeup(hb, &q, &key2, to);
spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
if (ret)
goto out_put_keys;
/*
* In order for us to be here, we know our q.key == key2, and since
* we took the hb->lock above, we also know that futex_requeue() has
* completed and we no longer have to concern ourselves with a wakeup
* race with the atomic proxy lock acquisition by the requeue code. The
* futex_requeue dropped our key1 reference and incremented our key2
* reference count.
*/
/* Check if the requeue code acquired the second futex for us. */
if (!q.rt_waiter) {
/*
* Got the lock. We might not be the anticipated owner if we
* did a lock-steal - fix up the PI-state in that case.
*/
if (q.pi_state && (q.pi_state->owner != current)) {
spin_lock(q.lock_ptr);
ret = fixup_pi_state_owner(uaddr2, &q, current);
spin_unlock(q.lock_ptr);
}
} else {
/*
* We have been woken up by futex_unlock_pi(), a timeout, or a
* signal. futex_unlock_pi() will not destroy the lock_ptr nor
* the pi_state.
*/
WARN_ON(!q.pi_state);
pi_mutex = &q.pi_state->pi_mutex;
ret = rt_mutex_finish_proxy_lock(pi_mutex, to, &rt_waiter, 1);
debug_rt_mutex_free_waiter(&rt_waiter);
spin_lock(q.lock_ptr);
/*
* Fixup the pi_state owner and possibly acquire the lock if we
* haven't already.
*/
res = fixup_owner(uaddr2, &q, !ret);
/*
* If fixup_owner() returned an error, proprogate that. If it
* acquired the lock, clear -ETIMEDOUT or -EINTR.
*/
if (res)
ret = (res < 0) ? res : 0;
/* Unqueue and drop the lock. */
unqueue_me_pi(&q);
}
/*
* If fixup_pi_state_owner() faulted and was unable to handle the
* fault, unlock the rt_mutex and return the fault to userspace.
*/
if (ret == -EFAULT) {
if (pi_mutex && rt_mutex_owner(pi_mutex) == current)
rt_mutex_unlock(pi_mutex);
} else if (ret == -EINTR) {
/*
* We've already been requeued, but cannot restart by calling
* futex_lock_pi() directly. We could restart this syscall, but
* it would detect that the user space "val" changed and return
* -EWOULDBLOCK. Save the overhead of the restart and return
* -EWOULDBLOCK directly.
*/
ret = -EWOULDBLOCK;
}
out_put_keys:
put_futex_key(&q.key);
out_key2:
put_futex_key(&key2);
out:
if (to) {
hrtimer_cancel(&to->timer);
destroy_hrtimer_on_stack(&to->timer);
}
return ret;
}
| 166,382 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SetManualFallbacksForFilling(bool enabled) {
if (enabled) {
scoped_feature_list_.InitAndEnableFeature(
password_manager::features::kEnableManualFallbacksFilling);
} else {
scoped_feature_list_.InitAndDisableFeature(
password_manager::features::kEnableManualFallbacksFilling);
}
}
Commit Message: Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature.
Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature
as per the naming convention.
Bug: 785953
Change-Id: I4a4baa1649fe9f02c3783a5e4c40bc75e717cc03
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/900566
Reviewed-by: Vaclav Brozek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: NIKHIL SAHNI <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#534923}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | void SetManualFallbacksForFilling(bool enabled) {
if (enabled) {
scoped_feature_list_.InitAndEnableFeature(
password_manager::features::kManualFallbacksFilling);
} else {
scoped_feature_list_.InitAndDisableFeature(
password_manager::features::kManualFallbacksFilling);
}
}
| 171,750 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: uint8_t* FAST_FUNC udhcp_get_option32(struct dhcp_packet *packet, int code)
{
uint8_t *r = udhcp_get_option(packet, code);
if (r) {
if (r[-1] != 4)
r = NULL;
}
return r;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | uint8_t* FAST_FUNC udhcp_get_option32(struct dhcp_packet *packet, int code)
{
uint8_t *r = udhcp_get_option(packet, code);
if (r) {
if (r[-OPT_DATA + OPT_LEN] != 4)
r = NULL;
}
return r;
}
| 164,942 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static long vop_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct vop_vdev *vdev = f->private_data;
struct vop_info *vi = vdev->vi;
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
int ret;
switch (cmd) {
case MIC_VIRTIO_ADD_DEVICE:
{
struct mic_device_desc dd, *dd_config;
if (copy_from_user(&dd, argp, sizeof(dd)))
return -EFAULT;
if (mic_aligned_desc_size(&dd) > MIC_MAX_DESC_BLK_SIZE ||
dd.num_vq > MIC_MAX_VRINGS)
return -EINVAL;
dd_config = kzalloc(mic_desc_size(&dd), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dd_config)
return -ENOMEM;
if (copy_from_user(dd_config, argp, mic_desc_size(&dd))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto free_ret;
}
mutex_lock(&vdev->vdev_mutex);
mutex_lock(&vi->vop_mutex);
ret = vop_virtio_add_device(vdev, dd_config);
if (ret)
goto unlock_ret;
list_add_tail(&vdev->list, &vi->vdev_list);
unlock_ret:
mutex_unlock(&vi->vop_mutex);
mutex_unlock(&vdev->vdev_mutex);
free_ret:
kfree(dd_config);
return ret;
}
case MIC_VIRTIO_COPY_DESC:
{
struct mic_copy_desc copy;
mutex_lock(&vdev->vdev_mutex);
ret = vop_vdev_inited(vdev);
if (ret)
goto _unlock_ret;
if (copy_from_user(©, argp, sizeof(copy))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto _unlock_ret;
}
ret = vop_virtio_copy_desc(vdev, ©);
if (ret < 0)
goto _unlock_ret;
if (copy_to_user(
&((struct mic_copy_desc __user *)argp)->out_len,
©.out_len, sizeof(copy.out_len)))
ret = -EFAULT;
_unlock_ret:
mutex_unlock(&vdev->vdev_mutex);
return ret;
}
case MIC_VIRTIO_CONFIG_CHANGE:
{
void *buf;
mutex_lock(&vdev->vdev_mutex);
ret = vop_vdev_inited(vdev);
if (ret)
goto __unlock_ret;
buf = kzalloc(vdev->dd->config_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto __unlock_ret;
}
if (copy_from_user(buf, argp, vdev->dd->config_len)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto done;
}
ret = vop_virtio_config_change(vdev, buf);
done:
kfree(buf);
__unlock_ret:
mutex_unlock(&vdev->vdev_mutex);
return ret;
}
default:
return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
};
return 0;
}
Commit Message: misc: mic: Fix for double fetch security bug in VOP driver
The MIC VOP driver does two successive reads from user space to read a
variable length data structure. Kernel memory corruption can result if
the data structure changes between the two reads. This patch disallows
the chance of this happening.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116651
Reported by: Pengfei Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sudeep Dutt <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ashutosh Dixit <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static long vop_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct vop_vdev *vdev = f->private_data;
struct vop_info *vi = vdev->vi;
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
int ret;
switch (cmd) {
case MIC_VIRTIO_ADD_DEVICE:
{
struct mic_device_desc dd, *dd_config;
if (copy_from_user(&dd, argp, sizeof(dd)))
return -EFAULT;
if (mic_aligned_desc_size(&dd) > MIC_MAX_DESC_BLK_SIZE ||
dd.num_vq > MIC_MAX_VRINGS)
return -EINVAL;
dd_config = kzalloc(mic_desc_size(&dd), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dd_config)
return -ENOMEM;
if (copy_from_user(dd_config, argp, mic_desc_size(&dd))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto free_ret;
}
/* Ensure desc has not changed between the two reads */
if (memcmp(&dd, dd_config, sizeof(dd))) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto free_ret;
}
mutex_lock(&vdev->vdev_mutex);
mutex_lock(&vi->vop_mutex);
ret = vop_virtio_add_device(vdev, dd_config);
if (ret)
goto unlock_ret;
list_add_tail(&vdev->list, &vi->vdev_list);
unlock_ret:
mutex_unlock(&vi->vop_mutex);
mutex_unlock(&vdev->vdev_mutex);
free_ret:
kfree(dd_config);
return ret;
}
case MIC_VIRTIO_COPY_DESC:
{
struct mic_copy_desc copy;
mutex_lock(&vdev->vdev_mutex);
ret = vop_vdev_inited(vdev);
if (ret)
goto _unlock_ret;
if (copy_from_user(©, argp, sizeof(copy))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto _unlock_ret;
}
ret = vop_virtio_copy_desc(vdev, ©);
if (ret < 0)
goto _unlock_ret;
if (copy_to_user(
&((struct mic_copy_desc __user *)argp)->out_len,
©.out_len, sizeof(copy.out_len)))
ret = -EFAULT;
_unlock_ret:
mutex_unlock(&vdev->vdev_mutex);
return ret;
}
case MIC_VIRTIO_CONFIG_CHANGE:
{
void *buf;
mutex_lock(&vdev->vdev_mutex);
ret = vop_vdev_inited(vdev);
if (ret)
goto __unlock_ret;
buf = kzalloc(vdev->dd->config_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto __unlock_ret;
}
if (copy_from_user(buf, argp, vdev->dd->config_len)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto done;
}
ret = vop_virtio_config_change(vdev, buf);
done:
kfree(buf);
__unlock_ret:
mutex_unlock(&vdev->vdev_mutex);
return ret;
}
default:
return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
};
return 0;
}
| 167,132 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long AudioTrack::Parse(Segment* pSegment, const Info& info,
long long element_start, long long element_size,
AudioTrack*& pResult) {
if (pResult)
return -1;
if (info.type != Track::kAudio)
return -1;
IMkvReader* const pReader = pSegment->m_pReader;
const Settings& s = info.settings;
assert(s.start >= 0);
assert(s.size >= 0);
long long pos = s.start;
assert(pos >= 0);
const long long stop = pos + s.size;
double rate = 8000.0; // MKV default
long long channels = 1;
long long bit_depth = 0;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (id == 0x35) { // Sample Rate
status = UnserializeFloat(pReader, pos, size, rate);
if (status < 0)
return status;
if (rate <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
} else if (id == 0x1F) { // Channel Count
channels = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (channels <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
} else if (id == 0x2264) { // Bit Depth
bit_depth = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (bit_depth <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
AudioTrack* const pTrack =
new (std::nothrow) AudioTrack(pSegment, element_start, element_size);
if (pTrack == NULL)
return -1; // generic error
const int status = info.Copy(pTrack->m_info);
if (status) {
delete pTrack;
return status;
}
pTrack->m_rate = rate;
pTrack->m_channels = channels;
pTrack->m_bitDepth = bit_depth;
pResult = pTrack;
return 0; // success
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | long AudioTrack::Parse(Segment* pSegment, const Info& info,
long long element_start, long long element_size,
AudioTrack*& pResult) {
if (pResult)
return -1;
if (info.type != Track::kAudio)
return -1;
IMkvReader* const pReader = pSegment->m_pReader;
const Settings& s = info.settings;
assert(s.start >= 0);
assert(s.size >= 0);
long long pos = s.start;
assert(pos >= 0);
const long long stop = pos + s.size;
double rate = 8000.0; // MKV default
long long channels = 1;
long long bit_depth = 0;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (id == 0x35) { // Sample Rate
status = UnserializeFloat(pReader, pos, size, rate);
if (status < 0)
return status;
if (rate <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
} else if (id == 0x1F) { // Channel Count
channels = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (channels <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
} else if (id == 0x2264) { // Bit Depth
bit_depth = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (bit_depth <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
pos += size; // consume payload
if (pos > stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
if (pos != stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
AudioTrack* const pTrack =
new (std::nothrow) AudioTrack(pSegment, element_start, element_size);
if (pTrack == NULL)
return -1; // generic error
const int status = info.Copy(pTrack->m_info);
if (status) {
delete pTrack;
return status;
}
pTrack->m_rate = rate;
pTrack->m_channels = channels;
pTrack->m_bitDepth = bit_depth;
pResult = pTrack;
return 0; // success
}
| 173,844 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int send)
{
unsigned char *seq;
EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
size_t md_size;
int i;
EVP_MD_CTX *hmac = NULL, *mac_ctx;
unsigned char header[13];
int stream_mac = (send ? (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM)
: (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM));
int t;
if (send) {
seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&ssl->rlayer);
hash = ssl->write_hash;
} else {
seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&ssl->rlayer);
hash = ssl->read_hash;
}
t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash);
OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0);
md_size = t;
/* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */
if (stream_mac) {
mac_ctx = hash;
} else {
hmac = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (hmac == NULL || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy(hmac, hash))
return -1;
mac_ctx = hmac;
}
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq;
s2n(send ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&ssl->rlayer) :
DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&ssl->rlayer), p);
memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8);
} else
memcpy(header, seq, 8);
header[8] = rec->type;
header[9] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version >> 8);
header[10] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version);
header[11] = (rec->length) >> 8;
header[12] = (rec->length) & 0xff;
if (!send && !SSL_USE_ETM(ssl) &&
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) {
/*
* This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
* timing-side channel information about how many blocks of data we
* are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle.
*/
/* Final param == not SSLv3 */
if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(mac_ctx,
md, &md_size,
header, rec->input,
rec->length + md_size, rec->orig_len,
ssl->s3->read_mac_secret,
ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size, 0) <= 0) {
EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac);
return -1;
}
} else {
if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size) <= 0) {
EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac);
return -1;
}
if (!send && !SSL_USE_ETM(ssl) && FIPS_mode())
if (!tls_fips_digest_extra(ssl->enc_read_ctx,
mac_ctx, rec->input,
rec->length, rec->orig_len)) {
EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac);
return -1;
}
}
EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac);
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "seq=");
{
int z;
for (z = 0; z < 8; z++)
fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", seq[z]);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
fprintf(stderr, "rec=");
{
unsigned int z;
for (z = 0; z < rec->length; z++)
fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", rec->data[z]);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
#endif
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
++seq[i];
if (seq[i] != 0)
break;
}
}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
{
unsigned int z;
for (z = 0; z < md_size; z++)
fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", md[z]);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
#endif
return (md_size);
}
Commit Message: Don't change the state of the ETM flags until CCS processing
Changing the ciphersuite during a renegotiation can result in a crash
leading to a DoS attack. ETM has not been implemented in 1.1.0 for DTLS
so this is TLS only.
The problem is caused by changing the flag indicating whether to use ETM
or not immediately on negotiation of ETM, rather than at CCS. Therefore,
during a renegotiation, if the ETM state is changing (usually due to a
change of ciphersuite), then an error/crash will occur.
Due to the fact that there are separate CCS messages for read and write
we actually now need two flags to determine whether to use ETM or not.
CVE-2017-3733
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int send)
{
unsigned char *seq;
EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
size_t md_size;
int i;
EVP_MD_CTX *hmac = NULL, *mac_ctx;
unsigned char header[13];
int stream_mac = (send ? (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM)
: (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM));
int t;
if (send) {
seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&ssl->rlayer);
hash = ssl->write_hash;
} else {
seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&ssl->rlayer);
hash = ssl->read_hash;
}
t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash);
OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0);
md_size = t;
/* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */
if (stream_mac) {
mac_ctx = hash;
} else {
hmac = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (hmac == NULL || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy(hmac, hash))
return -1;
mac_ctx = hmac;
}
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq;
s2n(send ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&ssl->rlayer) :
DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&ssl->rlayer), p);
memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8);
} else
memcpy(header, seq, 8);
header[8] = rec->type;
header[9] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version >> 8);
header[10] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version);
header[11] = (rec->length) >> 8;
header[12] = (rec->length) & 0xff;
if (!send && !SSL_READ_ETM(ssl) &&
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) {
/*
* This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
* timing-side channel information about how many blocks of data we
* are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle.
*/
/* Final param == not SSLv3 */
if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(mac_ctx,
md, &md_size,
header, rec->input,
rec->length + md_size, rec->orig_len,
ssl->s3->read_mac_secret,
ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size, 0) <= 0) {
EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac);
return -1;
}
} else {
if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size) <= 0) {
EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac);
return -1;
}
if (!send && !SSL_READ_ETM(ssl) && FIPS_mode())
if (!tls_fips_digest_extra(ssl->enc_read_ctx,
mac_ctx, rec->input,
rec->length, rec->orig_len)) {
EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac);
return -1;
}
}
EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac);
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "seq=");
{
int z;
for (z = 0; z < 8; z++)
fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", seq[z]);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
fprintf(stderr, "rec=");
{
unsigned int z;
for (z = 0; z < rec->length; z++)
fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", rec->data[z]);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
#endif
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
++seq[i];
if (seq[i] != 0)
break;
}
}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
{
unsigned int z;
for (z = 0; z < md_size; z++)
fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", md[z]);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
#endif
return (md_size);
}
| 168,424 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int64_t http_seek_internal(URLContext *h, int64_t off, int whence, int force_reconnect)
{
HTTPContext *s = h->priv_data;
URLContext *old_hd = s->hd;
int64_t old_off = s->off;
uint8_t old_buf[BUFFER_SIZE];
int old_buf_size, ret;
AVDictionary *options = NULL;
if (whence == AVSEEK_SIZE)
return s->filesize;
else if (!force_reconnect &&
((whence == SEEK_CUR && off == 0) ||
(whence == SEEK_SET && off == s->off)))
return s->off;
else if ((s->filesize == -1 && whence == SEEK_END))
return AVERROR(ENOSYS);
if (whence == SEEK_CUR)
off += s->off;
else if (whence == SEEK_END)
off += s->filesize;
else if (whence != SEEK_SET)
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
if (off < 0)
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
s->off = off;
if (s->off && h->is_streamed)
return AVERROR(ENOSYS);
/* we save the old context in case the seek fails */
old_buf_size = s->buf_end - s->buf_ptr;
memcpy(old_buf, s->buf_ptr, old_buf_size);
s->hd = NULL;
/* if it fails, continue on old connection */
if ((ret = http_open_cnx(h, &options)) < 0) {
av_dict_free(&options);
memcpy(s->buffer, old_buf, old_buf_size);
s->buf_ptr = s->buffer;
s->buf_end = s->buffer + old_buf_size;
s->hd = old_hd;
s->off = old_off;
return ret;
}
av_dict_free(&options);
ffurl_close(old_hd);
return off;
}
Commit Message: http: make length/offset-related variables unsigned.
Fixes #5992, reported and found by Paul Cher <[email protected]>.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static int64_t http_seek_internal(URLContext *h, int64_t off, int whence, int force_reconnect)
{
HTTPContext *s = h->priv_data;
URLContext *old_hd = s->hd;
uint64_t old_off = s->off;
uint8_t old_buf[BUFFER_SIZE];
int old_buf_size, ret;
AVDictionary *options = NULL;
if (whence == AVSEEK_SIZE)
return s->filesize;
else if (!force_reconnect &&
((whence == SEEK_CUR && off == 0) ||
(whence == SEEK_SET && off == s->off)))
return s->off;
else if ((s->filesize == UINT64_MAX && whence == SEEK_END))
return AVERROR(ENOSYS);
if (whence == SEEK_CUR)
off += s->off;
else if (whence == SEEK_END)
off += s->filesize;
else if (whence != SEEK_SET)
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
if (off < 0)
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
s->off = off;
if (s->off && h->is_streamed)
return AVERROR(ENOSYS);
/* we save the old context in case the seek fails */
old_buf_size = s->buf_end - s->buf_ptr;
memcpy(old_buf, s->buf_ptr, old_buf_size);
s->hd = NULL;
/* if it fails, continue on old connection */
if ((ret = http_open_cnx(h, &options)) < 0) {
av_dict_free(&options);
memcpy(s->buffer, old_buf, old_buf_size);
s->buf_ptr = s->buffer;
s->buf_end = s->buffer + old_buf_size;
s->hd = old_hd;
s->off = old_off;
return ret;
}
av_dict_free(&options);
ffurl_close(old_hd);
return off;
}
| 168,502 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: foreach_nfs_shareopt(const char *shareopts,
nfs_shareopt_callback_t callback, void *cookie)
{
char *shareopts_dup, *opt, *cur, *value;
int was_nul, rc;
if (shareopts == NULL)
return (SA_OK);
shareopts_dup = strdup(shareopts);
if (shareopts_dup == NULL)
return (SA_NO_MEMORY);
opt = shareopts_dup;
was_nul = 0;
while (1) {
cur = opt;
while (*cur != ',' && *cur != '\0')
cur++;
if (*cur == '\0')
was_nul = 1;
*cur = '\0';
if (cur > opt) {
value = strchr(opt, '=');
if (value != NULL) {
*value = '\0';
value++;
}
rc = callback(opt, value, cookie);
if (rc != SA_OK) {
free(shareopts_dup);
return (rc);
}
}
opt = cur + 1;
if (was_nul)
break;
}
free(shareopts_dup);
return (0);
}
Commit Message: Move nfs.c:foreach_nfs_shareopt() to libshare.c:foreach_shareopt()
so that it can be (re)used in other parts of libshare.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | foreach_nfs_shareopt(const char *shareopts,
| 170,133 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void OmniboxEditModel::RestoreState(const State* state) {
controller_->GetToolbarModel()->set_url_replacement_enabled(
!state || state->url_replacement_enabled);
permanent_text_ = controller_->GetToolbarModel()->GetText();
view_->RevertWithoutResettingSearchTermReplacement();
input_ = state ? state->autocomplete_input : AutocompleteInput();
if (!state)
return;
SetFocusState(state->focus_state, OMNIBOX_FOCUS_CHANGE_TAB_SWITCH);
focus_source_ = state->focus_source;
if (state->user_input_in_progress) {
keyword_ = state->keyword;
is_keyword_hint_ = state->is_keyword_hint;
view_->SetUserText(state->user_text,
DisplayTextFromUserText(state->user_text), false);
view_->SetGrayTextAutocompletion(state->gray_text);
}
}
Commit Message: [OriginChip] Re-enable the chip as necessary when switching tabs.
BUG=369500
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/292493003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@271161 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | void OmniboxEditModel::RestoreState(const State* state) {
bool url_replacement_enabled = !state || state->url_replacement_enabled;
controller_->GetToolbarModel()->set_url_replacement_enabled(
url_replacement_enabled);
controller_->GetToolbarModel()->set_origin_chip_enabled(
url_replacement_enabled);
permanent_text_ = controller_->GetToolbarModel()->GetText();
view_->RevertWithoutResettingSearchTermReplacement();
input_ = state ? state->autocomplete_input : AutocompleteInput();
if (!state)
return;
SetFocusState(state->focus_state, OMNIBOX_FOCUS_CHANGE_TAB_SWITCH);
focus_source_ = state->focus_source;
if (state->user_input_in_progress) {
keyword_ = state->keyword;
is_keyword_hint_ = state->is_keyword_hint;
view_->SetUserText(state->user_text,
DisplayTextFromUserText(state->user_text), false);
view_->SetGrayTextAutocompletion(state->gray_text);
}
}
| 171,175 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: uint64_t esp_reg_read(ESPState *s, uint32_t saddr)
{
uint32_t old_val;
trace_esp_mem_readb(saddr, s->rregs[saddr]);
switch (saddr) {
case ESP_FIFO:
if (s->ti_size > 0) {
s->ti_size--;
if ((s->rregs[ESP_RSTAT] & STAT_PIO_MASK) == 0) {
/* Data out. */
qemu_log_mask(LOG_UNIMP,
"esp: PIO data read not implemented\n");
s->rregs[ESP_FIFO] = 0;
} else {
s->rregs[ESP_FIFO] = s->ti_buf[s->ti_rptr++];
}
esp_raise_irq(s);
}
if (s->ti_size == 0) {
s->ti_rptr = 0;
s->ti_wptr = 0;
}
s->ti_wptr = 0;
}
break;
case ESP_RINTR:
/* Clear sequence step, interrupt register and all status bits
except TC */
old_val = s->rregs[ESP_RINTR];
s->rregs[ESP_RINTR] = 0;
s->rregs[ESP_RSTAT] &= ~STAT_TC;
s->rregs[ESP_RSEQ] = SEQ_CD;
esp_lower_irq(s);
return old_val;
case ESP_TCHI:
/* Return the unique id if the value has never been written */
if (!s->tchi_written) {
return s->chip_id;
}
default:
break;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | uint64_t esp_reg_read(ESPState *s, uint32_t saddr)
{
uint32_t old_val;
trace_esp_mem_readb(saddr, s->rregs[saddr]);
switch (saddr) {
case ESP_FIFO:
if ((s->rregs[ESP_RSTAT] & STAT_PIO_MASK) == 0) {
/* Data out. */
qemu_log_mask(LOG_UNIMP, "esp: PIO data read not implemented\n");
s->rregs[ESP_FIFO] = 0;
esp_raise_irq(s);
} else if (s->ti_rptr < s->ti_wptr) {
s->ti_size--;
s->rregs[ESP_FIFO] = s->ti_buf[s->ti_rptr++];
esp_raise_irq(s);
}
if (s->ti_rptr == s->ti_wptr) {
s->ti_rptr = 0;
s->ti_wptr = 0;
}
s->ti_wptr = 0;
}
break;
case ESP_RINTR:
/* Clear sequence step, interrupt register and all status bits
except TC */
old_val = s->rregs[ESP_RINTR];
s->rregs[ESP_RINTR] = 0;
s->rregs[ESP_RSTAT] &= ~STAT_TC;
s->rregs[ESP_RSEQ] = SEQ_CD;
esp_lower_irq(s);
return old_val;
case ESP_TCHI:
/* Return the unique id if the value has never been written */
if (!s->tchi_written) {
return s->chip_id;
}
default:
break;
}
| 165,012 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void *arm_coherent_dma_alloc(struct device *dev, size_t size,
dma_addr_t *handle, gfp_t gfp, struct dma_attrs *attrs)
{
pgprot_t prot = __get_dma_pgprot(attrs, pgprot_kernel);
void *memory;
if (dma_alloc_from_coherent(dev, size, handle, &memory))
return memory;
return __dma_alloc(dev, size, handle, gfp, prot, true,
__builtin_return_address(0));
}
Commit Message: ARM: dma-mapping: don't allow DMA mappings to be marked executable
DMA mapping permissions were being derived from pgprot_kernel directly
without using PAGE_KERNEL. This causes them to be marked with executable
permission, which is not what we want. Fix this.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static void *arm_coherent_dma_alloc(struct device *dev, size_t size,
dma_addr_t *handle, gfp_t gfp, struct dma_attrs *attrs)
{
pgprot_t prot = __get_dma_pgprot(attrs, PAGE_KERNEL);
void *memory;
if (dma_alloc_from_coherent(dev, size, handle, &memory))
return memory;
return __dma_alloc(dev, size, handle, gfp, prot, true,
__builtin_return_address(0));
}
| 167,577 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int dns_parse_callback(void *c, int rr, const void *data, int len, const void *packet)
{
char tmp[256];
struct dpc_ctx *ctx = c;
switch (rr) {
case RR_A:
if (len != 4) return -1;
ctx->addrs[ctx->cnt].scopeid = 0;
memcpy(ctx->addrs[ctx->cnt++].addr, data, 4);
break;
case RR_AAAA:
if (len != 16) return -1;
ctx->addrs[ctx->cnt].family = AF_INET6;
ctx->addrs[ctx->cnt].scopeid = 0;
memcpy(ctx->addrs[ctx->cnt++].addr, data, 16);
break;
case RR_CNAME:
if (__dn_expand(packet, (const unsigned char *)packet + 512,
data, tmp, sizeof tmp) > 0 && is_valid_hostname(tmp))
strcpy(ctx->canon, tmp);
break;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static int dns_parse_callback(void *c, int rr, const void *data, int len, const void *packet)
{
char tmp[256];
struct dpc_ctx *ctx = c;
if (ctx->cnt >= MAXADDRS) return -1;
switch (rr) {
case RR_A:
if (len != 4) return -1;
ctx->addrs[ctx->cnt].scopeid = 0;
memcpy(ctx->addrs[ctx->cnt++].addr, data, 4);
break;
case RR_AAAA:
if (len != 16) return -1;
ctx->addrs[ctx->cnt].family = AF_INET6;
ctx->addrs[ctx->cnt].scopeid = 0;
memcpy(ctx->addrs[ctx->cnt++].addr, data, 16);
break;
case RR_CNAME:
if (__dn_expand(packet, (const unsigned char *)packet + 512,
data, tmp, sizeof tmp) > 0 && is_valid_hostname(tmp))
strcpy(ctx->canon, tmp);
break;
}
return 0;
}
| 164,652 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: Compositor::Compositor(const viz::FrameSinkId& frame_sink_id,
ui::ContextFactory* context_factory,
ui::ContextFactoryPrivate* context_factory_private,
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> task_runner,
bool enable_surface_synchronization,
bool enable_pixel_canvas,
bool external_begin_frames_enabled,
bool force_software_compositor,
const char* trace_environment_name)
: context_factory_(context_factory),
context_factory_private_(context_factory_private),
frame_sink_id_(frame_sink_id),
task_runner_(task_runner),
vsync_manager_(new CompositorVSyncManager()),
external_begin_frames_enabled_(external_begin_frames_enabled),
force_software_compositor_(force_software_compositor),
layer_animator_collection_(this),
is_pixel_canvas_(enable_pixel_canvas),
lock_manager_(task_runner),
trace_environment_name_(trace_environment_name
? trace_environment_name
: kDefaultTraceEnvironmentName),
context_creation_weak_ptr_factory_(this) {
if (context_factory_private) {
auto* host_frame_sink_manager =
context_factory_private_->GetHostFrameSinkManager();
host_frame_sink_manager->RegisterFrameSinkId(
frame_sink_id_, this, viz::ReportFirstSurfaceActivation::kYes);
host_frame_sink_manager->SetFrameSinkDebugLabel(frame_sink_id_,
"Compositor");
}
root_web_layer_ = cc::Layer::Create();
base::CommandLine* command_line = base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
cc::LayerTreeSettings settings;
settings.layers_always_allowed_lcd_text = true;
settings.use_occlusion_for_tile_prioritization = true;
refresh_rate_ = context_factory_->GetRefreshRate();
settings.main_frame_before_activation_enabled = false;
settings.delegated_sync_points_required =
context_factory_->SyncTokensRequiredForDisplayCompositor();
settings.enable_edge_anti_aliasing = false;
if (command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kLimitFps)) {
std::string fps_str =
command_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kLimitFps);
double fps;
if (base::StringToDouble(fps_str, &fps) && fps > 0) {
forced_refresh_rate_ = fps;
}
}
if (command_line->HasSwitch(cc::switches::kUIShowCompositedLayerBorders)) {
std::string layer_borders_string = command_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(
cc::switches::kUIShowCompositedLayerBorders);
std::vector<base::StringPiece> entries = base::SplitStringPiece(
layer_borders_string, ",", base::TRIM_WHITESPACE, base::SPLIT_WANT_ALL);
if (entries.empty()) {
settings.initial_debug_state.show_debug_borders.set();
} else {
for (const auto& entry : entries) {
const struct {
const char* name;
cc::DebugBorderType type;
} kBorders[] = {{cc::switches::kCompositedRenderPassBorders,
cc::DebugBorderType::RENDERPASS},
{cc::switches::kCompositedSurfaceBorders,
cc::DebugBorderType::SURFACE},
{cc::switches::kCompositedLayerBorders,
cc::DebugBorderType::LAYER}};
for (const auto& border : kBorders) {
if (border.name == entry) {
settings.initial_debug_state.show_debug_borders.set(border.type);
break;
}
}
}
}
}
settings.initial_debug_state.show_fps_counter =
command_line->HasSwitch(cc::switches::kUIShowFPSCounter);
settings.initial_debug_state.show_layer_animation_bounds_rects =
command_line->HasSwitch(cc::switches::kUIShowLayerAnimationBounds);
settings.initial_debug_state.show_paint_rects =
command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kUIShowPaintRects);
settings.initial_debug_state.show_property_changed_rects =
command_line->HasSwitch(cc::switches::kUIShowPropertyChangedRects);
settings.initial_debug_state.show_surface_damage_rects =
command_line->HasSwitch(cc::switches::kUIShowSurfaceDamageRects);
settings.initial_debug_state.show_screen_space_rects =
command_line->HasSwitch(cc::switches::kUIShowScreenSpaceRects);
settings.initial_debug_state.SetRecordRenderingStats(
command_line->HasSwitch(cc::switches::kEnableGpuBenchmarking));
settings.enable_surface_synchronization = enable_surface_synchronization;
settings.build_hit_test_data = features::IsVizHitTestingSurfaceLayerEnabled();
settings.use_zero_copy = IsUIZeroCopyEnabled();
settings.use_layer_lists =
command_line->HasSwitch(cc::switches::kUIEnableLayerLists);
settings.use_partial_raster = !settings.use_zero_copy;
settings.use_rgba_4444 =
command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kUIEnableRGBA4444Textures);
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
settings.resource_settings.use_gpu_memory_buffer_resources =
settings.use_zero_copy;
settings.enable_elastic_overscroll = true;
#endif
settings.memory_policy.bytes_limit_when_visible = 512 * 1024 * 1024;
settings.memory_policy.priority_cutoff_when_visible =
gpu::MemoryAllocation::CUTOFF_ALLOW_NICE_TO_HAVE;
settings.disallow_non_exact_resource_reuse =
command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kDisallowNonExactResourceReuse);
if (command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kRunAllCompositorStagesBeforeDraw)) {
settings.wait_for_all_pipeline_stages_before_draw = true;
settings.enable_latency_recovery = false;
}
settings.always_request_presentation_time =
command_line->HasSwitch(cc::switches::kAlwaysRequestPresentationTime);
animation_host_ = cc::AnimationHost::CreateMainInstance();
cc::LayerTreeHost::InitParams params;
params.client = this;
params.task_graph_runner = context_factory_->GetTaskGraphRunner();
params.settings = &settings;
params.main_task_runner = task_runner_;
params.mutator_host = animation_host_.get();
host_ = cc::LayerTreeHost::CreateSingleThreaded(this, std::move(params));
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kUiCompositorScrollWithLayers) &&
host_->GetInputHandler()) {
scroll_input_handler_.reset(
new ScrollInputHandler(host_->GetInputHandler()));
}
animation_timeline_ =
cc::AnimationTimeline::Create(cc::AnimationIdProvider::NextTimelineId());
animation_host_->AddAnimationTimeline(animation_timeline_.get());
host_->SetHasGpuRasterizationTrigger(features::IsUiGpuRasterizationEnabled());
host_->SetRootLayer(root_web_layer_);
host_->SetVisible(true);
if (command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kUISlowAnimations)) {
slow_animations_ = std::make_unique<ScopedAnimationDurationScaleMode>(
ScopedAnimationDurationScaleMode::SLOW_DURATION);
}
}
Commit Message: Don't report OnFirstSurfaceActivation for ui::Compositor
Bug: 893850
Change-Id: Iee754cefbd083d0a21a2b672fb8e837eaab81c43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1293712
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Saman Sami <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601629}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | Compositor::Compositor(const viz::FrameSinkId& frame_sink_id,
ui::ContextFactory* context_factory,
ui::ContextFactoryPrivate* context_factory_private,
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> task_runner,
bool enable_surface_synchronization,
bool enable_pixel_canvas,
bool external_begin_frames_enabled,
bool force_software_compositor,
const char* trace_environment_name)
: context_factory_(context_factory),
context_factory_private_(context_factory_private),
frame_sink_id_(frame_sink_id),
task_runner_(task_runner),
vsync_manager_(new CompositorVSyncManager()),
external_begin_frames_enabled_(external_begin_frames_enabled),
force_software_compositor_(force_software_compositor),
layer_animator_collection_(this),
is_pixel_canvas_(enable_pixel_canvas),
lock_manager_(task_runner),
trace_environment_name_(trace_environment_name
? trace_environment_name
: kDefaultTraceEnvironmentName),
context_creation_weak_ptr_factory_(this) {
if (context_factory_private) {
auto* host_frame_sink_manager =
context_factory_private_->GetHostFrameSinkManager();
host_frame_sink_manager->RegisterFrameSinkId(
frame_sink_id_, this, viz::ReportFirstSurfaceActivation::kNo);
host_frame_sink_manager->SetFrameSinkDebugLabel(frame_sink_id_,
"Compositor");
}
root_web_layer_ = cc::Layer::Create();
base::CommandLine* command_line = base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
cc::LayerTreeSettings settings;
settings.layers_always_allowed_lcd_text = true;
settings.use_occlusion_for_tile_prioritization = true;
refresh_rate_ = context_factory_->GetRefreshRate();
settings.main_frame_before_activation_enabled = false;
settings.delegated_sync_points_required =
context_factory_->SyncTokensRequiredForDisplayCompositor();
settings.enable_edge_anti_aliasing = false;
if (command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kLimitFps)) {
std::string fps_str =
command_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kLimitFps);
double fps;
if (base::StringToDouble(fps_str, &fps) && fps > 0) {
forced_refresh_rate_ = fps;
}
}
if (command_line->HasSwitch(cc::switches::kUIShowCompositedLayerBorders)) {
std::string layer_borders_string = command_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(
cc::switches::kUIShowCompositedLayerBorders);
std::vector<base::StringPiece> entries = base::SplitStringPiece(
layer_borders_string, ",", base::TRIM_WHITESPACE, base::SPLIT_WANT_ALL);
if (entries.empty()) {
settings.initial_debug_state.show_debug_borders.set();
} else {
for (const auto& entry : entries) {
const struct {
const char* name;
cc::DebugBorderType type;
} kBorders[] = {{cc::switches::kCompositedRenderPassBorders,
cc::DebugBorderType::RENDERPASS},
{cc::switches::kCompositedSurfaceBorders,
cc::DebugBorderType::SURFACE},
{cc::switches::kCompositedLayerBorders,
cc::DebugBorderType::LAYER}};
for (const auto& border : kBorders) {
if (border.name == entry) {
settings.initial_debug_state.show_debug_borders.set(border.type);
break;
}
}
}
}
}
settings.initial_debug_state.show_fps_counter =
command_line->HasSwitch(cc::switches::kUIShowFPSCounter);
settings.initial_debug_state.show_layer_animation_bounds_rects =
command_line->HasSwitch(cc::switches::kUIShowLayerAnimationBounds);
settings.initial_debug_state.show_paint_rects =
command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kUIShowPaintRects);
settings.initial_debug_state.show_property_changed_rects =
command_line->HasSwitch(cc::switches::kUIShowPropertyChangedRects);
settings.initial_debug_state.show_surface_damage_rects =
command_line->HasSwitch(cc::switches::kUIShowSurfaceDamageRects);
settings.initial_debug_state.show_screen_space_rects =
command_line->HasSwitch(cc::switches::kUIShowScreenSpaceRects);
settings.initial_debug_state.SetRecordRenderingStats(
command_line->HasSwitch(cc::switches::kEnableGpuBenchmarking));
settings.enable_surface_synchronization = enable_surface_synchronization;
settings.build_hit_test_data = features::IsVizHitTestingSurfaceLayerEnabled();
settings.use_zero_copy = IsUIZeroCopyEnabled();
settings.use_layer_lists =
command_line->HasSwitch(cc::switches::kUIEnableLayerLists);
settings.use_partial_raster = !settings.use_zero_copy;
settings.use_rgba_4444 =
command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kUIEnableRGBA4444Textures);
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
settings.resource_settings.use_gpu_memory_buffer_resources =
settings.use_zero_copy;
settings.enable_elastic_overscroll = true;
#endif
settings.memory_policy.bytes_limit_when_visible = 512 * 1024 * 1024;
settings.memory_policy.priority_cutoff_when_visible =
gpu::MemoryAllocation::CUTOFF_ALLOW_NICE_TO_HAVE;
settings.disallow_non_exact_resource_reuse =
command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kDisallowNonExactResourceReuse);
if (command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kRunAllCompositorStagesBeforeDraw)) {
settings.wait_for_all_pipeline_stages_before_draw = true;
settings.enable_latency_recovery = false;
}
settings.always_request_presentation_time =
command_line->HasSwitch(cc::switches::kAlwaysRequestPresentationTime);
animation_host_ = cc::AnimationHost::CreateMainInstance();
cc::LayerTreeHost::InitParams params;
params.client = this;
params.task_graph_runner = context_factory_->GetTaskGraphRunner();
params.settings = &settings;
params.main_task_runner = task_runner_;
params.mutator_host = animation_host_.get();
host_ = cc::LayerTreeHost::CreateSingleThreaded(this, std::move(params));
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kUiCompositorScrollWithLayers) &&
host_->GetInputHandler()) {
scroll_input_handler_.reset(
new ScrollInputHandler(host_->GetInputHandler()));
}
animation_timeline_ =
cc::AnimationTimeline::Create(cc::AnimationIdProvider::NextTimelineId());
animation_host_->AddAnimationTimeline(animation_timeline_.get());
host_->SetHasGpuRasterizationTrigger(features::IsUiGpuRasterizationEnabled());
host_->SetRootLayer(root_web_layer_);
host_->SetVisible(true);
if (command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kUISlowAnimations)) {
slow_animations_ = std::make_unique<ScopedAnimationDurationScaleMode>(
ScopedAnimationDurationScaleMode::SLOW_DURATION);
}
}
| 172,562 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: usage(const char *prog)
{
/* ANSI C-90 limits strings to 509 characters, so use a string array: */
size_t i;
static const char *usage_string[] = {
" Tests, optimizes and optionally fixes the zlib header in PNG files.",
" Optionally, when fixing, strips ancilliary chunks from the file.",
0,
"OPTIONS",
" OPERATION",
" By default files are just checked for readability with a summary of the",
" of zlib issues founds for each compressed chunk and the IDAT stream in",
" the file.",
" --optimize (-o):",
" Find the smallest deflate window size for the compressed data.",
" --strip=[none|crc|unsafe|unused|transform|color|all]:",
" none (default): Retain all chunks.",
" crc: Remove chunks with a bad CRC.",
" unsafe: Remove chunks that may be unsafe to retain if the image data",
" is modified. This is set automatically if --max is given but",
" may be cancelled by a later --strip=none.",
" unused: Remove chunks not used by libpng when decoding an image.",
" This retains any chunks that might be used by libpng image",
" transformations.",
" transform: unused+bKGD.",
" color: transform+iCCP and cHRM.",
" all: color+gAMA and sRGB.",
" Only ancillary chunks are ever removed. In addition the tRNS and sBIT",
" chunks are never removed as they affect exact interpretation of the",
" image pixel values. The following known chunks are treated specially",
" by the above options:",
" gAMA, sRGB [all]: These specify the gamma encoding used for the pixel",
" values.",
" cHRM, iCCP [color]: These specify how colors are encoded. iCCP also",
" specifies the exact encoding of a pixel value however in practice",
" most programs will ignore it.",
" bKGD [transform]: This is used by libpng transforms."
" --max=<number>:",
" Use IDAT chunks sized <number>. If no number is given the the IDAT",
" chunks will be the maximum size permitted; 2^31-1 bytes. If the option",
" is omitted the original chunk sizes will not be changed. When the",
" option is given --strip=unsafe is set automatically, this may be",
" cancelled if you know that all unknown unsafe-to-copy chunks really are",
" safe to copy across an IDAT size change. This is true of all chunks",
" that have ever been formally proposed as PNG extensions.",
" MESSAGES",
" By default the program only outputs summaries for each file.",
" --quiet (-q):",
" Do not output the summaries except for files which cannot be read. With",
" two --quiets these are not output either.",
" --errors (-e):",
" Output errors from libpng and the program (except too-far-back).",
" --warnings (-w):",
" Output warnings from libpng.",
" OUTPUT",
" By default nothing is written.",
" --out=<file>:",
" Write the optimized/corrected version of the next PNG to <file>. This",
" overrides the following two options",
" --suffix=<suffix>:",
" Set --out=<name><suffix> for all following files unless overridden on",
" a per-file basis by explicit --out.",
" --prefix=<prefix>:",
" Set --out=<prefix><name> for all the following files unless overridden",
" on a per-file basis by explicit --out.",
" These two options can be used together to produce a suffix and prefix.",
" INTERNAL OPTIONS",
#if 0 /*NYI*/
#ifdef PNG_MAXIMUM_INFLATE_WINDOW
" --test:",
" Test the PNG_MAXIMUM_INFLATE_WINDOW option. Setting this disables",
" output as this would produce a broken file.",
#endif
#endif
0,
"EXIT CODES",
" *** SUBJECT TO CHANGE ***",
" The program exit code is value in the range 0..127 holding a bit mask of",
" the following codes. Notice that the results for each file are combined",
" together - check one file at a time to get a meaningful error code!",
" 0x01: The zlib too-far-back error existed in at least one chunk.",
" 0x02: At least once chunk had a CRC error.",
" 0x04: A chunk length was incorrect.",
" 0x08: The file was truncated.",
" Errors less than 16 are potentially recoverable, for a single file if the",
" exit code is less than 16 the file could be read (with corrections if a",
" non-zero code is returned).",
" 0x10: The file could not be read, even with corrections.",
" 0x20: The output file could not be written.",
" 0x40: An unexpected, potentially internal, error occured.",
" If the command line arguments are incorrect the program exits with exit",
" 255. Some older operating systems only support 7-bit exit codes, on those",
" systems it is suggested that this program is first tested by supplying",
" invalid arguments.",
0,
"DESCRIPTION",
" " PROGRAM_NAME ":",
" checks each PNG file on the command line for errors. By default errors are",
" not output and the program just returns an exit code and prints a summary.",
" With the --quiet (-q) option the summaries are suppressed too and the",
" program only outputs unexpected errors (internal errors and file open",
" errors).",
" Various known problems in PNG files are fixed while the file is being read",
" The exit code says what problems were fixed. In particular the zlib error:",
0,
" \"invalid distance too far back\"",
0,
" caused by an incorrect optimization of a zlib stream is fixed in any",
" compressed chunk in which it is encountered. An integrity problem of the",
" PNG stream caused by a bug in libpng which wrote an incorrect chunk length",
" is also fixed. Chunk CRC errors are automatically fixed up.",
0,
" Setting one of the \"OUTPUT\" options causes the possibly modified file to",
" be written to a new file.",
0,
" Notice that some PNG files with the zlib optimization problem can still be",
" read by libpng under some circumstances. This program will still detect",
" and, if requested, correct the error.",
0,
" The program will reliably process all files on the command line unless",
" either an invalid argument causes the usage message (this message) to be",
" produced or the program crashes.",
0,
" The summary lines describe issues encountered with the zlib compressed",
" stream of a chunk. They have the following format, which is SUBJECT TO",
" CHANGE in the future:",
0,
" chunk reason comp-level p1 p2 p3 p4 file",
0,
" p1 through p4 vary according to the 'reason'. There are always 8 space",
" separated fields. Reasons specific formats are:",
0,
" chunk ERR status code read-errno write-errno message file",
" chunk SKP comp-level file-bits zlib-rc compressed message file",
" chunk ??? comp-level file-bits ok-bits compressed uncompress file",
0,
" The various fields are",
0,
"$1 chunk: The chunk type of a chunk in the file or 'HEAD' if a problem",
" is reported by libpng at the start of the IDAT stream.",
"$2 reason: One of:",
" CHK: A zlib header checksum was detected and fixed.",
" TFB: The zlib too far back error was detected and fixed.",
" OK : No errors were detected in the zlib stream and optimization",
" was not requested, or was not possible.",
" OPT: The zlib stream window bits value could be improved (and was).",
" SKP: The chunk was skipped because of a zlib issue (zlib-rc) with",
" explanation 'message'",
" ERR: The read of the file was aborted. The parameters explain why.",
"$3 status: For 'ERR' the accumulate status code from 'EXIT CODES' above.",
" This is printed as a 2 digit hexadecimal value",
" comp-level: The recorded compression level (FLEVEL) of a zlib stream",
" expressed as a string {supfast,stdfast,default,maximum}",
"$4 code: The file exit code; where stop was called, as a fairly terse",
" string {warning,libpng,zlib,invalid,read,write,unexpected}.",
" file-bits: The zlib window bits recorded in the file.",
"$5 read-errno: A system errno value from a read translated by strerror(3).",
" zlib-rc: A zlib return code as a string (see zlib.h).",
" ok-bits: The smallest zlib window bits value that works.",
"$6 write-errno:A system errno value from a write translated by strerror(3).",
" compressed: The count of compressed bytes in the zlib stream, when the",
" reason is 'SKP'; this is a count of the bytes read from the",
" stream when the fatal error was encountered.",
"$7 message: An error message (spaces replaced by _, as in all parameters),",
" uncompress: The count of bytes from uncompressing the zlib stream; this",
" may not be the same as the number of bytes in the image.",
"$8 file: The name of the file (this may contain spaces).",
};
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s {[options] png-file}\n", prog);
for (i=0; i < (sizeof usage_string)/(sizeof usage_string[0]); ++i)
{
if (usage_string[i] != 0)
fputs(usage_string[i], stderr);
fputc('\n', stderr);
}
exit(255);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | usage(const char *prog)
{
/* ANSI C-90 limits strings to 509 characters, so use a string array: */
size_t i;
static const char *usage_string[] = {
" Tests, optimizes and optionally fixes the zlib header in PNG files.",
" Optionally, when fixing, strips ancilliary chunks from the file.",
0,
"OPTIONS",
" OPERATION",
" By default files are just checked for readability with a summary of the",
" of zlib issues founds for each compressed chunk and the IDAT stream in",
" the file.",
" --optimize (-o):",
" Find the smallest deflate window size for the compressed data.",
" --strip=[none|crc|unsafe|unused|transform|color|all]:",
" none (default): Retain all chunks.",
" crc: Remove chunks with a bad CRC.",
" unsafe: Remove chunks that may be unsafe to retain if the image data",
" is modified. This is set automatically if --max is given but",
" may be cancelled by a later --strip=none.",
" unused: Remove chunks not used by libpng when decoding an image.",
" This retains any chunks that might be used by libpng image",
" transformations.",
" transform: unused+bKGD.",
" color: transform+iCCP and cHRM.",
" all: color+gAMA and sRGB.",
" Only ancillary chunks are ever removed. In addition the tRNS and sBIT",
" chunks are never removed as they affect exact interpretation of the",
" image pixel values. The following known chunks are treated specially",
" by the above options:",
" gAMA, sRGB [all]: These specify the gamma encoding used for the pixel",
" values.",
" cHRM, iCCP [color]: These specify how colors are encoded. iCCP also",
" specifies the exact encoding of a pixel value; however, in",
" practice most programs will ignore it.",
" bKGD [transform]: This is used by libpng transforms."
" --max=<number>:",
" Use IDAT chunks sized <number>. If no number is given the the IDAT",
" chunks will be the maximum size permitted; 2^31-1 bytes. If the option",
" is omitted the original chunk sizes will not be changed. When the",
" option is given --strip=unsafe is set automatically. This may be",
" cancelled if you know that all unknown unsafe-to-copy chunks really are",
" safe to copy across an IDAT size change. This is true of all chunks",
" that have ever been formally proposed as PNG extensions.",
" MESSAGES",
" By default the program only outputs summaries for each file.",
" --quiet (-q):",
" Do not output the summaries except for files that cannot be read. With",
" two --quiets these are not output either.",
" --errors (-e):",
" Output errors from libpng and the program (except too-far-back).",
" --warnings (-w):",
" Output warnings from libpng.",
" OUTPUT",
" By default nothing is written.",
" --out=<file>:",
" Write the optimized/corrected version of the next PNG to <file>. This",
" overrides the following two options",
" --suffix=<suffix>:",
" Set --out=<name><suffix> for all following files unless overridden on",
" a per-file basis by explicit --out.",
" --prefix=<prefix>:",
" Set --out=<prefix><name> for all the following files unless overridden",
" on a per-file basis by explicit --out.",
" These two options can be used together to produce a suffix and prefix.",
" INTERNAL OPTIONS",
#if 0 /*NYI*/
#ifdef PNG_MAXIMUM_INFLATE_WINDOW
" --test:",
" Test the PNG_MAXIMUM_INFLATE_WINDOW option. Setting this disables",
" output as this would produce a broken file.",
#endif
#endif
0,
"EXIT CODES",
" *** SUBJECT TO CHANGE ***",
" The program exit code is value in the range 0..127 holding a bit mask of",
" the following codes. Notice that the results for each file are combined",
" together - check one file at a time to get a meaningful error code!",
" 0x01: The zlib too-far-back error existed in at least one chunk.",
" 0x02: At least one chunk had a CRC error.",
" 0x04: A chunk length was incorrect.",
" 0x08: The file was truncated.",
" Errors less than 16 are potentially recoverable, for a single file if the",
" exit code is less than 16 the file could be read (with corrections if a",
" non-zero code is returned).",
" 0x10: The file could not be read, even with corrections.",
" 0x20: The output file could not be written.",
" 0x40: An unexpected, potentially internal, error occurred.",
" If the command line arguments are incorrect the program exits with exit",
" 255. Some older operating systems only support 7-bit exit codes, on those",
" systems it is suggested that this program is first tested by supplying",
" invalid arguments.",
0,
"DESCRIPTION",
" " PROGRAM_NAME ":",
" checks each PNG file on the command line for errors. By default errors are",
" not output and the program just returns an exit code and prints a summary.",
" With the --quiet (-q) option the summaries are suppressed too and the",
" program only outputs unexpected errors (internal errors and file open",
" errors).",
" Various known problems in PNG files are fixed while the file is being read",
" The exit code says what problems were fixed. In particular the zlib error:",
0,
" \"invalid distance too far back\"",
0,
" caused by an incorrect optimization of a zlib stream is fixed in any",
" compressed chunk in which it is encountered. An integrity problem of the",
" PNG stream caused by a bug in libpng which wrote an incorrect chunk length",
" is also fixed. Chunk CRC errors are automatically fixed up.",
0,
" Setting one of the \"OUTPUT\" options causes the possibly modified file to",
" be written to a new file.",
0,
" Notice that some PNG files with the zlib optimization problem can still be",
" read by libpng under some circumstances. This program will still detect",
" and, if requested, correct the error.",
0,
" The program will reliably process all files on the command line unless",
" either an invalid argument causes the usage message (this message) to be",
" produced or the program crashes.",
0,
" The summary lines describe issues encountered with the zlib compressed",
" stream of a chunk. They have the following format, which is SUBJECT TO",
" CHANGE in the future:",
0,
" chunk reason comp-level p1 p2 p3 p4 file",
0,
" p1 through p4 vary according to the 'reason'. There are always 8 space",
" separated fields. Reasons specific formats are:",
0,
" chunk ERR status code read-errno write-errno message file",
" chunk SKP comp-level file-bits zlib-rc compressed message file",
" chunk ??? comp-level file-bits ok-bits compressed uncompress file",
0,
" The various fields are",
0,
"$1 chunk: The chunk type of a chunk in the file or 'HEAD' if a problem",
" is reported by libpng at the start of the IDAT stream.",
"$2 reason: One of:",
" CHK: A zlib header checksum was detected and fixed.",
" TFB: The zlib too far back error was detected and fixed.",
" OK : No errors were detected in the zlib stream and optimization",
" was not requested, or was not possible.",
" OPT: The zlib stream window bits value could be improved (and was).",
" SKP: The chunk was skipped because of a zlib issue (zlib-rc) with",
" explanation 'message'",
" ERR: The read of the file was aborted. The parameters explain why.",
"$3 status: For 'ERR' the accumulated status code from 'EXIT CODES' above.",
" This is printed as a 2 digit hexadecimal value",
" comp-level: The recorded compression level (FLEVEL) of a zlib stream",
" expressed as a string {supfast,stdfast,default,maximum}",
"$4 code: The file exit code; where stop was called, as a fairly terse",
" string {warning,libpng,zlib,invalid,read,write,unexpected}.",
" file-bits: The zlib window bits recorded in the file.",
"$5 read-errno: A system errno value from a read translated by strerror(3).",
" zlib-rc: A zlib return code as a string (see zlib.h).",
" ok-bits: The smallest zlib window bits value that works.",
"$6 write-errno:A system errno value from a write translated by strerror(3).",
" compressed: The count of compressed bytes in the zlib stream, when the",
" reason is 'SKP'; this is a count of the bytes read from the",
" stream when the fatal error was encountered.",
"$7 message: An error message (spaces replaced by _, as in all parameters),",
" uncompress: The count of bytes from uncompressing the zlib stream; this",
" may not be the same as the number of bytes in the image.",
"$8 file: The name of the file (this may contain spaces).",
};
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s {[options] png-file}\n", prog);
for (i=0; i < (sizeof usage_string)/(sizeof usage_string[0]); ++i)
{
if (usage_string[i] != 0)
fputs(usage_string[i], stderr);
fputc('\n', stderr);
}
exit(255);
}
| 173,739 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ExtensionTtsController* ExtensionTtsController::GetInstance() {
return Singleton<ExtensionTtsController>::get();
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | ExtensionTtsController* ExtensionTtsController::GetInstance() {
| 170,379 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static inline int mk_vhost_fdt_open(int id, unsigned int hash,
struct session_request *sr)
{
int i;
int fd;
struct vhost_fdt_hash_table *ht = NULL;
struct vhost_fdt_hash_chain *hc;
if (config->fdt == MK_FALSE) {
return open(sr->real_path.data, sr->file_info.flags_read_only);
}
ht = mk_vhost_fdt_table_lookup(id, sr->host_conf);
if (mk_unlikely(!ht)) {
return open(sr->real_path.data, sr->file_info.flags_read_only);
}
/* We got the hash table, now look around the chains array */
hc = mk_vhost_fdt_chain_lookup(hash, ht);
if (hc) {
/* Increment the readers and return the shared FD */
hc->readers++;
return hc->fd;
}
/*
* Get here means that no entry exists in the hash table for the
* requested file descriptor and hash, we must try to open the file
* and register the entry in the table.
*/
fd = open(sr->real_path.data, sr->file_info.flags_read_only);
if (fd == -1) {
return -1;
}
/* If chains are full, just return the new FD, bad luck... */
if (ht->av_slots <= 0) {
return fd;
}
/* Register the new entry in an available slot */
for (i = 0; i < VHOST_FDT_HASHTABLE_CHAINS; i++) {
hc = &ht->chain[i];
if (hc->fd == -1) {
hc->fd = fd;
hc->hash = hash;
hc->readers++;
ht->av_slots--;
sr->vhost_fdt_id = id;
sr->vhost_fdt_hash = hash;
return fd;
}
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: Request: new request session flag to mark those files opened by FDT
This patch aims to fix a potential DDoS problem that can be caused
in the server quering repetitive non-existent resources.
When serving a static file, the core use Vhost FDT mechanism, but if
it sends a static error page it does a direct open(2). When closing
the resources for the same request it was just calling mk_vhost_close()
which did not clear properly the file descriptor.
This patch adds a new field on the struct session_request called 'fd_is_fdt',
which contains MK_TRUE or MK_FALSE depending of how fd_file was opened.
Thanks to Matthew Daley <[email protected]> for report and troubleshoot this
problem.
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Silva <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static inline int mk_vhost_fdt_open(int id, unsigned int hash,
struct session_request *sr)
{
int i;
int fd;
struct vhost_fdt_hash_table *ht = NULL;
struct vhost_fdt_hash_chain *hc;
if (config->fdt == MK_FALSE) {
return open(sr->real_path.data, sr->file_info.flags_read_only);
}
ht = mk_vhost_fdt_table_lookup(id, sr->host_conf);
if (mk_unlikely(!ht)) {
return open(sr->real_path.data, sr->file_info.flags_read_only);
}
/* We got the hash table, now look around the chains array */
hc = mk_vhost_fdt_chain_lookup(hash, ht);
if (hc) {
/* Increment the readers and return the shared FD */
hc->readers++;
return hc->fd;
}
/*
* Get here means that no entry exists in the hash table for the
* requested file descriptor and hash, we must try to open the file
* and register the entry in the table.
*/
fd = open(sr->real_path.data, sr->file_info.flags_read_only);
if (fd == -1) {
return -1;
}
/* If chains are full, just return the new FD, bad luck... */
if (ht->av_slots <= 0) {
return fd;
}
/* Register the new entry in an available slot */
for (i = 0; i < VHOST_FDT_HASHTABLE_CHAINS; i++) {
hc = &ht->chain[i];
if (hc->fd == -1) {
hc->fd = fd;
hc->hash = hash;
hc->readers++;
ht->av_slots--;
sr->vhost_fdt_id = id;
sr->vhost_fdt_hash = hash;
sr->fd_is_fdt = MK_TRUE;
return fd;
}
}
return -1;
}
| 166,279 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void WT_VoiceFilter (S_FILTER_CONTROL *pFilter, S_WT_INT_FRAME *pWTIntFrame)
{
EAS_PCM *pAudioBuffer;
EAS_I32 k;
EAS_I32 b1;
EAS_I32 b2;
EAS_I32 z1;
EAS_I32 z2;
EAS_I32 acc0;
EAS_I32 acc1;
EAS_I32 numSamples;
/* initialize some local variables */
numSamples = pWTIntFrame->numSamples;
pAudioBuffer = pWTIntFrame->pAudioBuffer;
z1 = pFilter->z1;
z2 = pFilter->z2;
b1 = -pWTIntFrame->frame.b1;
/*lint -e{702} <avoid divide> */
b2 = -pWTIntFrame->frame.b2 >> 1;
/*lint -e{702} <avoid divide> */
k = pWTIntFrame->frame.k >> 1;
while (numSamples--)
{
/* do filter calculations */
acc0 = *pAudioBuffer;
acc1 = z1 * b1;
acc1 += z2 * b2;
acc0 = acc1 + k * acc0;
z2 = z1;
/*lint -e{702} <avoid divide> */
z1 = acc0 >> 14;
*pAudioBuffer++ = (EAS_I16) z1;
}
/* save delay values */
pFilter->z1 = (EAS_I16) z1;
pFilter->z2 = (EAS_I16) z2;
}
Commit Message: Sonivox: sanity check numSamples.
Bug: 26366256
Change-Id: I066888c25035ea4c60c88f316db4508dc4dab6bc
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void WT_VoiceFilter (S_FILTER_CONTROL *pFilter, S_WT_INT_FRAME *pWTIntFrame)
{
EAS_PCM *pAudioBuffer;
EAS_I32 k;
EAS_I32 b1;
EAS_I32 b2;
EAS_I32 z1;
EAS_I32 z2;
EAS_I32 acc0;
EAS_I32 acc1;
EAS_I32 numSamples;
/* initialize some local variables */
numSamples = pWTIntFrame->numSamples;
if (numSamples <= 0) {
ALOGE("b/26366256");
return;
}
pAudioBuffer = pWTIntFrame->pAudioBuffer;
z1 = pFilter->z1;
z2 = pFilter->z2;
b1 = -pWTIntFrame->frame.b1;
/*lint -e{702} <avoid divide> */
b2 = -pWTIntFrame->frame.b2 >> 1;
/*lint -e{702} <avoid divide> */
k = pWTIntFrame->frame.k >> 1;
while (numSamples--)
{
/* do filter calculations */
acc0 = *pAudioBuffer;
acc1 = z1 * b1;
acc1 += z2 * b2;
acc0 = acc1 + k * acc0;
z2 = z1;
/*lint -e{702} <avoid divide> */
z1 = acc0 >> 14;
*pAudioBuffer++ = (EAS_I16) z1;
}
/* save delay values */
pFilter->z1 = (EAS_I16) z1;
pFilter->z2 = (EAS_I16) z2;
}
| 173,921 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void DaemonProcess::OnChannelConnected() {
DCHECK(caller_task_runner()->BelongsToCurrentThread());
DeleteAllDesktopSessions();
next_terminal_id_ = 0;
SendToNetwork(
new ChromotingDaemonNetworkMsg_Configuration(serialized_config_));
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void DaemonProcess::OnChannelConnected() {
void DaemonProcess::OnChannelConnected(int32 peer_pid) {
DCHECK(caller_task_runner()->BelongsToCurrentThread());
DeleteAllDesktopSessions();
next_terminal_id_ = 0;
SendToNetwork(
new ChromotingDaemonNetworkMsg_Configuration(serialized_config_));
}
| 171,540 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ID3::getAlbumArt(size_t *length, String8 *mime) const {
*length = 0;
mime->setTo("");
Iterator it(
*this,
(mVersion == ID3_V2_3 || mVersion == ID3_V2_4) ? "APIC" : "PIC");
while (!it.done()) {
size_t size;
const uint8_t *data = it.getData(&size);
if (!data) {
return NULL;
}
if (mVersion == ID3_V2_3 || mVersion == ID3_V2_4) {
uint8_t encoding = data[0];
mime->setTo((const char *)&data[1]);
size_t mimeLen = strlen((const char *)&data[1]) + 1;
#if 0
uint8_t picType = data[1 + mimeLen];
if (picType != 0x03) {
it.next();
continue;
}
#endif
size_t descLen = StringSize(&data[2 + mimeLen], encoding);
if (size < 2 ||
size - 2 < mimeLen ||
size - 2 - mimeLen < descLen) {
ALOGW("bogus album art sizes");
return NULL;
}
*length = size - 2 - mimeLen - descLen;
return &data[2 + mimeLen + descLen];
} else {
uint8_t encoding = data[0];
if (!memcmp(&data[1], "PNG", 3)) {
mime->setTo("image/png");
} else if (!memcmp(&data[1], "JPG", 3)) {
mime->setTo("image/jpeg");
} else if (!memcmp(&data[1], "-->", 3)) {
mime->setTo("text/plain");
} else {
return NULL;
}
#if 0
uint8_t picType = data[4];
if (picType != 0x03) {
it.next();
continue;
}
#endif
size_t descLen = StringSize(&data[5], encoding);
*length = size - 5 - descLen;
return &data[5 + descLen];
}
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: defensive parsing of mp3 album art information
several points in stagefrights mp3 album art code
used strlen() to parse user-supplied strings that may be
unterminated, resulting in reading beyond the end of a buffer.
This changes the code to use strnlen() for 8-bit encodings and
strengthens the parsing of 16-bit encodings similarly. It also
reworks how we watch for the end-of-buffer to avoid all over-reads.
Bug: 32377688
Test: crafted mp3's w/ good/bad cover art. See what showed in play music
Change-Id: Ia9f526d71b21ef6a61acacf616b573753cd21df6
(cherry picked from commit fa0806b594e98f1aed3ebcfc6a801b4c0056f9eb)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | ID3::getAlbumArt(size_t *length, String8 *mime) const {
*length = 0;
mime->setTo("");
Iterator it(
*this,
(mVersion == ID3_V2_3 || mVersion == ID3_V2_4) ? "APIC" : "PIC");
while (!it.done()) {
size_t size;
const uint8_t *data = it.getData(&size);
if (!data) {
return NULL;
}
if (mVersion == ID3_V2_3 || mVersion == ID3_V2_4) {
uint8_t encoding = data[0];
size_t consumed = 1;
// *always* in an 8-bit encoding
size_t mimeLen = StringSize(&data[consumed], size - consumed, 0x00);
if (mimeLen > size - consumed) {
ALOGW("bogus album art size: mime");
return NULL;
}
mime->setTo((const char *)&data[consumed]);
consumed += mimeLen;
#if 0
uint8_t picType = data[consumed];
if (picType != 0x03) {
it.next();
continue;
}
#endif
consumed++;
if (consumed >= size) {
ALOGW("bogus album art size: pic type");
return NULL;
}
size_t descLen = StringSize(&data[consumed], size - consumed, encoding);
consumed += descLen;
if (consumed >= size) {
ALOGW("bogus album art size: description");
return NULL;
}
*length = size - consumed;
return &data[consumed];
} else {
uint8_t encoding = data[0];
if (size <= 5) {
return NULL;
}
if (!memcmp(&data[1], "PNG", 3)) {
mime->setTo("image/png");
} else if (!memcmp(&data[1], "JPG", 3)) {
mime->setTo("image/jpeg");
} else if (!memcmp(&data[1], "-->", 3)) {
mime->setTo("text/plain");
} else {
return NULL;
}
#if 0
uint8_t picType = data[4];
if (picType != 0x03) {
it.next();
continue;
}
#endif
size_t descLen = StringSize(&data[5], size - 5, encoding);
if (descLen > size - 5) {
return NULL;
}
*length = size - 5 - descLen;
return &data[5 + descLen];
}
}
return NULL;
}
| 174,062 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void exitErrorHandler(jpeg_common_struct *error) {
j_decompress_ptr cinfo = (j_decompress_ptr)error;
str_src_mgr * src = (struct str_src_mgr *)cinfo->src;
src->abort = true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static void exitErrorHandler(jpeg_common_struct *error) {
j_decompress_ptr cinfo = (j_decompress_ptr)error;
str_src_mgr * src = (struct str_src_mgr *)cinfo->src;
longjmp(src->setjmp_buffer, 1);
}
| 165,392 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool IsIDNComponentSafe(base::StringPiece16 label) {
return g_idn_spoof_checker.Get().Check(label);
}
Commit Message: Block domain labels made of Cyrillic letters that look alike Latin
Block a label made entirely of Latin-look-alike Cyrillic letters when the TLD is not an IDN (i.e. this check is ON only for TLDs like 'com', 'net', 'uk', but not applied for IDN TLDs like рф.
BUG=683314
TEST=components_unittests --gtest_filter=U*IDN*
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2683793010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#459226}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | bool IsIDNComponentSafe(base::StringPiece16 label) {
bool IsIDNComponentSafe(base::StringPiece16 label, bool is_tld_ascii) {
return g_idn_spoof_checker.Get().Check(label, is_tld_ascii);
}
| 172,392 |
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