instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 90
9.34k
| output
stringlengths 16
15.4k
| __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static unsigned int variance_ref(const uint8_t *ref, const uint8_t *src,
int l2w, int l2h, unsigned int *sse_ptr) {
int se = 0;
unsigned int sse = 0;
const int w = 1 << l2w, h = 1 << l2h;
for (int y = 0; y < h; y++) {
for (int x = 0; x < w; x++) {
int diff = ref[w * y + x] - src[w * y + x];
se += diff;
sse += diff * diff;
}
//// Truncate high bit depth results by downshifting (with rounding) by:
//// 2 * (bit_depth - 8) for sse
//// (bit_depth - 8) for se
}
*sse_ptr = sse;
return sse - (((int64_t) se * se) >> (l2w + l2h));
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static unsigned int variance_ref(const uint8_t *ref, const uint8_t *src,
//// Truncate high bit depth results by downshifting (with rounding) by:
//// 2 * (bit_depth - 8) for sse
//// (bit_depth - 8) for se
static void RoundHighBitDepth(int bit_depth, int64_t *se, uint64_t *sse) {
switch (bit_depth) {
case VPX_BITS_12:
*sse = (*sse + 128) >> 8;
*se = (*se + 8) >> 4;
break;
case VPX_BITS_10:
*sse = (*sse + 8) >> 4;
*se = (*se + 2) >> 2;
break;
case VPX_BITS_8:
default:
break;
}
}
| 174,596 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int snd_timer_close(struct snd_timer_instance *timeri)
{
struct snd_timer *timer = NULL;
struct snd_timer_instance *slave, *tmp;
if (snd_BUG_ON(!timeri))
return -ENXIO;
/* force to stop the timer */
snd_timer_stop(timeri);
if (timeri->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_SLAVE) {
/* wait, until the active callback is finished */
spin_lock_irq(&slave_active_lock);
while (timeri->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_CALLBACK) {
spin_unlock_irq(&slave_active_lock);
udelay(10);
spin_lock_irq(&slave_active_lock);
}
spin_unlock_irq(&slave_active_lock);
mutex_lock(®ister_mutex);
list_del(&timeri->open_list);
mutex_unlock(®ister_mutex);
} else {
timer = timeri->timer;
if (snd_BUG_ON(!timer))
goto out;
/* wait, until the active callback is finished */
spin_lock_irq(&timer->lock);
while (timeri->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_CALLBACK) {
spin_unlock_irq(&timer->lock);
udelay(10);
spin_lock_irq(&timer->lock);
}
spin_unlock_irq(&timer->lock);
mutex_lock(®ister_mutex);
list_del(&timeri->open_list);
if (timer && list_empty(&timer->open_list_head) &&
timer->hw.close)
timer->hw.close(timer);
/* remove slave links */
list_for_each_entry_safe(slave, tmp, &timeri->slave_list_head,
open_list) {
spin_lock_irq(&slave_active_lock);
_snd_timer_stop(slave, 1, SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_RESOLUTION);
list_move_tail(&slave->open_list, &snd_timer_slave_list);
slave->master = NULL;
slave->timer = NULL;
spin_unlock_irq(&slave_active_lock);
}
mutex_unlock(®ister_mutex);
}
out:
if (timeri->private_free)
timeri->private_free(timeri);
kfree(timeri->owner);
kfree(timeri);
if (timer)
module_put(timer->module);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: timer: Harden slave timer list handling
A slave timer instance might be still accessible in a racy way while
operating the master instance as it lacks of locking. Since the
master operation is mostly protected with timer->lock, we should cope
with it while changing the slave instance, too. Also, some linked
lists (active_list and ack_list) of slave instances aren't unlinked
immediately at stopping or closing, and this may lead to unexpected
accesses.
This patch tries to address these issues. It adds spin lock of
timer->lock (either from master or slave, which is equivalent) in a
few places. For avoiding a deadlock, we ensure that the global
slave_active_lock is always locked at first before each timer lock.
Also, ack and active_list of slave instances are properly unlinked at
snd_timer_stop() and snd_timer_close().
Last but not least, remove the superfluous call of _snd_timer_stop()
at removing slave links. This is a noop, and calling it may confuse
readers wrt locking. Further cleanup will follow in a later patch.
Actually we've got reports of use-after-free by syzkaller fuzzer, and
this hopefully fixes these issues.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | int snd_timer_close(struct snd_timer_instance *timeri)
{
struct snd_timer *timer = NULL;
struct snd_timer_instance *slave, *tmp;
if (snd_BUG_ON(!timeri))
return -ENXIO;
/* force to stop the timer */
snd_timer_stop(timeri);
if (timeri->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_SLAVE) {
/* wait, until the active callback is finished */
spin_lock_irq(&slave_active_lock);
while (timeri->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_CALLBACK) {
spin_unlock_irq(&slave_active_lock);
udelay(10);
spin_lock_irq(&slave_active_lock);
}
spin_unlock_irq(&slave_active_lock);
mutex_lock(®ister_mutex);
list_del(&timeri->open_list);
mutex_unlock(®ister_mutex);
} else {
timer = timeri->timer;
if (snd_BUG_ON(!timer))
goto out;
/* wait, until the active callback is finished */
spin_lock_irq(&timer->lock);
while (timeri->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_CALLBACK) {
spin_unlock_irq(&timer->lock);
udelay(10);
spin_lock_irq(&timer->lock);
}
spin_unlock_irq(&timer->lock);
mutex_lock(®ister_mutex);
list_del(&timeri->open_list);
if (timer && list_empty(&timer->open_list_head) &&
timer->hw.close)
timer->hw.close(timer);
/* remove slave links */
spin_lock_irq(&slave_active_lock);
spin_lock(&timer->lock);
list_for_each_entry_safe(slave, tmp, &timeri->slave_list_head,
open_list) {
list_move_tail(&slave->open_list, &snd_timer_slave_list);
slave->master = NULL;
slave->timer = NULL;
list_del_init(&slave->ack_list);
list_del_init(&slave->active_list);
}
spin_unlock(&timer->lock);
spin_unlock_irq(&slave_active_lock);
mutex_unlock(®ister_mutex);
}
out:
if (timeri->private_free)
timeri->private_free(timeri);
kfree(timeri->owner);
kfree(timeri);
if (timer)
module_put(timer->module);
return 0;
}
| 167,402 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void perf_pmu_migrate_context(struct pmu *pmu, int src_cpu, int dst_cpu)
{
struct perf_event_context *src_ctx;
struct perf_event_context *dst_ctx;
struct perf_event *event, *tmp;
LIST_HEAD(events);
src_ctx = &per_cpu_ptr(pmu->pmu_cpu_context, src_cpu)->ctx;
dst_ctx = &per_cpu_ptr(pmu->pmu_cpu_context, dst_cpu)->ctx;
mutex_lock(&src_ctx->mutex);
list_for_each_entry_safe(event, tmp, &src_ctx->event_list,
event_entry) {
perf_remove_from_context(event, false);
unaccount_event_cpu(event, src_cpu);
put_ctx(src_ctx);
list_add(&event->migrate_entry, &events);
}
mutex_unlock(&src_ctx->mutex);
synchronize_rcu();
mutex_lock(&dst_ctx->mutex);
list_for_each_entry_safe(event, tmp, &events, migrate_entry) {
list_del(&event->migrate_entry);
if (event->state >= PERF_EVENT_STATE_OFF)
event->state = PERF_EVENT_STATE_INACTIVE;
account_event_cpu(event, dst_cpu);
perf_install_in_context(dst_ctx, event, dst_cpu);
get_ctx(dst_ctx);
}
mutex_unlock(&dst_ctx->mutex);
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix event->ctx locking
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | void perf_pmu_migrate_context(struct pmu *pmu, int src_cpu, int dst_cpu)
{
struct perf_event_context *src_ctx;
struct perf_event_context *dst_ctx;
struct perf_event *event, *tmp;
LIST_HEAD(events);
src_ctx = &per_cpu_ptr(pmu->pmu_cpu_context, src_cpu)->ctx;
dst_ctx = &per_cpu_ptr(pmu->pmu_cpu_context, dst_cpu)->ctx;
/*
* See perf_event_ctx_lock() for comments on the details
* of swizzling perf_event::ctx.
*/
mutex_lock_double(&src_ctx->mutex, &dst_ctx->mutex);
list_for_each_entry_safe(event, tmp, &src_ctx->event_list,
event_entry) {
perf_remove_from_context(event, false);
unaccount_event_cpu(event, src_cpu);
put_ctx(src_ctx);
list_add(&event->migrate_entry, &events);
}
synchronize_rcu();
list_for_each_entry_safe(event, tmp, &events, migrate_entry) {
list_del(&event->migrate_entry);
if (event->state >= PERF_EVENT_STATE_OFF)
event->state = PERF_EVENT_STATE_INACTIVE;
account_event_cpu(event, dst_cpu);
perf_install_in_context(dst_ctx, event, dst_cpu);
get_ctx(dst_ctx);
}
mutex_unlock(&dst_ctx->mutex);
mutex_unlock(&src_ctx->mutex);
}
| 166,992 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteRGFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
int
bit;
register const PixelPacket
*p;
register ssize_t
x;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
byte;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
if((image->columns > 255L) || (image->rows > 255L))
ThrowWriterException(ImageError,"Dimensions must be less than 255x255");
/*
Write header (just the image dimensions)
*/
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,image->columns & 0xff);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,image->rows & 0xff);
/*
Convert MIFF to bit pixels.
*/
(void) SetImageType(image,BilevelType);
x=0;
y=0;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
bit=0;
byte=0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
byte>>=1;
if (GetPixelLuma(image,p) < (QuantumRange/2.0))
byte|=0x80;
bit++;
if (bit == 8)
{
/*
Write a bitmap byte to the image file.
*/
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,byte);
bit=0;
byte=0;
}
p++;
}
if (bit != 0)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,byte);
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: Fix abort when writing to rgf format
The rgf format (LEGO MINDSTORMS EV3 images) caused a software abort because
exception == NULL. When WriteRGFImage is called from WriteImage, it is only
passed two parameters, not three. So, removed the extra parameter and use
image->exception instead as in other coders.
CWE ID: CWE-19 | static MagickBooleanType WriteRGFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,
static MagickBooleanType WriteRGFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image)
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
int
bit;
register const PixelPacket
*p;
register ssize_t
x;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
byte;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
if((image->columns > 255L) || (image->rows > 255L))
ThrowWriterException(ImageError,"Dimensions must be less than 255x255");
/*
Write header (just the image dimensions)
*/
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,image->columns & 0xff);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,image->rows & 0xff);
/*
Convert MIFF to bit pixels.
*/
(void) SetImageType(image,BilevelType);
x=0;
y=0;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
bit=0;
byte=0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
byte>>=1;
if (GetPixelLuma(image,p) < (QuantumRange/2.0))
byte|=0x80;
bit++;
if (bit == 8)
{
/*
Write a bitmap byte to the image file.
*/
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,byte);
bit=0;
byte=0;
}
p++;
}
if (bit != 0)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,byte);
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
| 168,786 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int cmd_handle_untagged(struct ImapData *idata)
{
unsigned int count = 0;
char *s = imap_next_word(idata->buf);
char *pn = imap_next_word(s);
if ((idata->state >= IMAP_SELECTED) && isdigit((unsigned char) *s))
{
pn = s;
s = imap_next_word(s);
/* EXISTS and EXPUNGE are always related to the SELECTED mailbox for the
* connection, so update that one.
*/
if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("EXISTS", s, 6) == 0)
{
mutt_debug(2, "Handling EXISTS\n");
/* new mail arrived */
if (mutt_str_atoui(pn, &count) < 0)
{
mutt_debug(1, "Malformed EXISTS: '%s'\n", pn);
}
if (!(idata->reopen & IMAP_EXPUNGE_PENDING) && count < idata->max_msn)
{
/* Notes 6.0.3 has a tendency to report fewer messages exist than
* it should. */
mutt_debug(1, "Message count is out of sync\n");
return 0;
}
/* at least the InterChange server sends EXISTS messages freely,
* even when there is no new mail */
else if (count == idata->max_msn)
mutt_debug(3, "superfluous EXISTS message.\n");
else
{
if (!(idata->reopen & IMAP_EXPUNGE_PENDING))
{
mutt_debug(2, "New mail in %s - %d messages total.\n", idata->mailbox, count);
idata->reopen |= IMAP_NEWMAIL_PENDING;
}
idata->new_mail_count = count;
}
}
/* pn vs. s: need initial seqno */
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("EXPUNGE", s, 7) == 0)
cmd_parse_expunge(idata, pn);
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("FETCH", s, 5) == 0)
cmd_parse_fetch(idata, pn);
}
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("CAPABILITY", s, 10) == 0)
cmd_parse_capability(idata, s);
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("OK [CAPABILITY", s, 14) == 0)
cmd_parse_capability(idata, pn);
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("OK [CAPABILITY", pn, 14) == 0)
cmd_parse_capability(idata, imap_next_word(pn));
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("LIST", s, 4) == 0)
cmd_parse_list(idata, s);
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("LSUB", s, 4) == 0)
cmd_parse_lsub(idata, s);
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("MYRIGHTS", s, 8) == 0)
cmd_parse_myrights(idata, s);
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("SEARCH", s, 6) == 0)
cmd_parse_search(idata, s);
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("STATUS", s, 6) == 0)
cmd_parse_status(idata, s);
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("ENABLED", s, 7) == 0)
cmd_parse_enabled(idata, s);
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("BYE", s, 3) == 0)
{
mutt_debug(2, "Handling BYE\n");
/* check if we're logging out */
if (idata->status == IMAP_BYE)
return 0;
/* server shut down our connection */
s += 3;
SKIPWS(s);
mutt_error("%s", s);
cmd_handle_fatal(idata);
return -1;
}
else if (ImapServernoise && (mutt_str_strncasecmp("NO", s, 2) == 0))
{
mutt_debug(2, "Handling untagged NO\n");
/* Display the warning message from the server */
mutt_error("%s", s + 3);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Handle NO response without message properly
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static int cmd_handle_untagged(struct ImapData *idata)
{
unsigned int count = 0;
char *s = imap_next_word(idata->buf);
char *pn = imap_next_word(s);
if ((idata->state >= IMAP_SELECTED) && isdigit((unsigned char) *s))
{
pn = s;
s = imap_next_word(s);
/* EXISTS and EXPUNGE are always related to the SELECTED mailbox for the
* connection, so update that one.
*/
if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("EXISTS", s, 6) == 0)
{
mutt_debug(2, "Handling EXISTS\n");
/* new mail arrived */
if (mutt_str_atoui(pn, &count) < 0)
{
mutt_debug(1, "Malformed EXISTS: '%s'\n", pn);
}
if (!(idata->reopen & IMAP_EXPUNGE_PENDING) && count < idata->max_msn)
{
/* Notes 6.0.3 has a tendency to report fewer messages exist than
* it should. */
mutt_debug(1, "Message count is out of sync\n");
return 0;
}
/* at least the InterChange server sends EXISTS messages freely,
* even when there is no new mail */
else if (count == idata->max_msn)
mutt_debug(3, "superfluous EXISTS message.\n");
else
{
if (!(idata->reopen & IMAP_EXPUNGE_PENDING))
{
mutt_debug(2, "New mail in %s - %d messages total.\n", idata->mailbox, count);
idata->reopen |= IMAP_NEWMAIL_PENDING;
}
idata->new_mail_count = count;
}
}
/* pn vs. s: need initial seqno */
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("EXPUNGE", s, 7) == 0)
cmd_parse_expunge(idata, pn);
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("FETCH", s, 5) == 0)
cmd_parse_fetch(idata, pn);
}
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("CAPABILITY", s, 10) == 0)
cmd_parse_capability(idata, s);
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("OK [CAPABILITY", s, 14) == 0)
cmd_parse_capability(idata, pn);
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("OK [CAPABILITY", pn, 14) == 0)
cmd_parse_capability(idata, imap_next_word(pn));
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("LIST", s, 4) == 0)
cmd_parse_list(idata, s);
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("LSUB", s, 4) == 0)
cmd_parse_lsub(idata, s);
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("MYRIGHTS", s, 8) == 0)
cmd_parse_myrights(idata, s);
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("SEARCH", s, 6) == 0)
cmd_parse_search(idata, s);
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("STATUS", s, 6) == 0)
cmd_parse_status(idata, s);
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("ENABLED", s, 7) == 0)
cmd_parse_enabled(idata, s);
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("BYE", s, 3) == 0)
{
mutt_debug(2, "Handling BYE\n");
/* check if we're logging out */
if (idata->status == IMAP_BYE)
return 0;
/* server shut down our connection */
s += 3;
SKIPWS(s);
mutt_error("%s", s);
cmd_handle_fatal(idata);
return -1;
}
else if (ImapServernoise && (mutt_str_strncasecmp("NO", s, 2) == 0))
{
mutt_debug(2, "Handling untagged NO\n");
/* Display the warning message from the server */
mutt_error("%s", s + 2);
}
return 0;
}
| 169,139 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: struct sock *dccp_v4_request_recv_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req,
struct dst_entry *dst)
{
struct inet_request_sock *ireq;
struct inet_sock *newinet;
struct sock *newsk;
if (sk_acceptq_is_full(sk))
goto exit_overflow;
if (dst == NULL && (dst = inet_csk_route_req(sk, req)) == NULL)
goto exit;
newsk = dccp_create_openreq_child(sk, req, skb);
if (newsk == NULL)
goto exit_nonewsk;
sk_setup_caps(newsk, dst);
newinet = inet_sk(newsk);
ireq = inet_rsk(req);
newinet->inet_daddr = ireq->rmt_addr;
newinet->inet_rcv_saddr = ireq->loc_addr;
newinet->inet_saddr = ireq->loc_addr;
newinet->opt = ireq->opt;
ireq->opt = NULL;
newinet->mc_index = inet_iif(skb);
newinet->mc_ttl = ip_hdr(skb)->ttl;
newinet->inet_id = jiffies;
dccp_sync_mss(newsk, dst_mtu(dst));
if (__inet_inherit_port(sk, newsk) < 0) {
sock_put(newsk);
goto exit;
}
__inet_hash_nolisten(newsk, NULL);
return newsk;
exit_overflow:
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_LISTENOVERFLOWS);
exit_nonewsk:
dst_release(dst);
exit:
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_LISTENDROPS);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | struct sock *dccp_v4_request_recv_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req,
struct dst_entry *dst)
{
struct inet_request_sock *ireq;
struct inet_sock *newinet;
struct sock *newsk;
if (sk_acceptq_is_full(sk))
goto exit_overflow;
if (dst == NULL && (dst = inet_csk_route_req(sk, req)) == NULL)
goto exit;
newsk = dccp_create_openreq_child(sk, req, skb);
if (newsk == NULL)
goto exit_nonewsk;
sk_setup_caps(newsk, dst);
newinet = inet_sk(newsk);
ireq = inet_rsk(req);
newinet->inet_daddr = ireq->rmt_addr;
newinet->inet_rcv_saddr = ireq->loc_addr;
newinet->inet_saddr = ireq->loc_addr;
newinet->inet_opt = ireq->opt;
ireq->opt = NULL;
newinet->mc_index = inet_iif(skb);
newinet->mc_ttl = ip_hdr(skb)->ttl;
newinet->inet_id = jiffies;
dccp_sync_mss(newsk, dst_mtu(dst));
if (__inet_inherit_port(sk, newsk) < 0) {
sock_put(newsk);
goto exit;
}
__inet_hash_nolisten(newsk, NULL);
return newsk;
exit_overflow:
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_LISTENOVERFLOWS);
exit_nonewsk:
dst_release(dst);
exit:
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_LISTENDROPS);
return NULL;
}
| 165,541 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ikev1_n_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext, u_int item_len,
const u_char *ep, uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi0 _U_,
uint32_t proto0 _U_, int depth _U_)
{
const struct ikev1_pl_n *p;
struct ikev1_pl_n n;
const u_char *cp;
const u_char *ep2;
uint32_t doi;
uint32_t proto;
static const char *notify_error_str[] = {
NULL, "INVALID-PAYLOAD-TYPE",
"DOI-NOT-SUPPORTED", "SITUATION-NOT-SUPPORTED",
"INVALID-COOKIE", "INVALID-MAJOR-VERSION",
"INVALID-MINOR-VERSION", "INVALID-EXCHANGE-TYPE",
"INVALID-FLAGS", "INVALID-MESSAGE-ID",
"INVALID-PROTOCOL-ID", "INVALID-SPI",
"INVALID-TRANSFORM-ID", "ATTRIBUTES-NOT-SUPPORTED",
"NO-PROPOSAL-CHOSEN", "BAD-PROPOSAL-SYNTAX",
"PAYLOAD-MALFORMED", "INVALID-KEY-INFORMATION",
"INVALID-ID-INFORMATION", "INVALID-CERT-ENCODING",
"INVALID-CERTIFICATE", "CERT-TYPE-UNSUPPORTED",
"INVALID-CERT-AUTHORITY", "INVALID-HASH-INFORMATION",
"AUTHENTICATION-FAILED", "INVALID-SIGNATURE",
"ADDRESS-NOTIFICATION", "NOTIFY-SA-LIFETIME",
"CERTIFICATE-UNAVAILABLE", "UNSUPPORTED-EXCHANGE-TYPE",
"UNEQUAL-PAYLOAD-LENGTHS",
};
static const char *ipsec_notify_error_str[] = {
"RESERVED",
};
static const char *notify_status_str[] = {
"CONNECTED",
};
static const char *ipsec_notify_status_str[] = {
"RESPONDER-LIFETIME", "REPLAY-STATUS",
"INITIAL-CONTACT",
};
/* NOTE: these macro must be called with x in proper range */
/* 0 - 8191 */
#define NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(x) \
STR_OR_ID((x), notify_error_str)
/* 8192 - 16383 */
#define IPSEC_NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(x) \
STR_OR_ID((u_int)((x) - 8192), ipsec_notify_error_str)
/* 16384 - 24575 */
#define NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(x) \
STR_OR_ID((u_int)((x) - 16384), notify_status_str)
/* 24576 - 32767 */
#define IPSEC_NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(x) \
STR_OR_ID((u_int)((x) - 24576), ipsec_notify_status_str)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s:", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_N)));
p = (const struct ikev1_pl_n *)ext;
ND_TCHECK(*p);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&n, ext, sizeof(n));
doi = ntohl(n.doi);
proto = n.prot_id;
if (doi != 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," doi=%d", doi));
ND_PRINT((ndo," proto=%d", proto));
if (ntohs(n.type) < 8192)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 16384)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", numstr(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 24576)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", numstr(ntohs(n.type))));
if (n.spi_size) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," spi="));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(p + 1), n.spi_size))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)(p + 1) + n.spi_size;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo," doi=ipsec"));
ND_PRINT((ndo," proto=%s", PROTOIDSTR(proto)));
if (ntohs(n.type) < 8192)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 16384)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", IPSEC_NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 24576)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 32768)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", IPSEC_NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", numstr(ntohs(n.type))));
if (n.spi_size) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," spi="));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(p + 1), n.spi_size))
goto trunc;
}
cp = (const u_char *)(p + 1) + n.spi_size;
ep2 = (const u_char *)p + item_len;
if (cp < ep) {
switch (ntohs(n.type)) {
case IPSECDOI_NTYPE_RESPONDER_LIFETIME:
{
const struct attrmap *map = oakley_t_map;
size_t nmap = sizeof(oakley_t_map)/sizeof(oakley_t_map[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo," attrs=("));
while (cp < ep && cp < ep2) {
cp = ikev1_attrmap_print(ndo, cp, ep2, map, nmap);
if (cp == NULL) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
goto trunc;
}
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
break;
}
case IPSECDOI_NTYPE_REPLAY_STATUS:
ND_PRINT((ndo," status=("));
ND_PRINT((ndo,"replay detection %sabled",
EXTRACT_32BITS(cp) ? "en" : "dis"));
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
break;
default:
/*
* XXX - fill in more types here; see, for example,
* draft-ietf-ipsec-notifymsg-04.
*/
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," data=("));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(cp), ep - cp))
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
} else {
if (!ike_show_somedata(ndo, cp, ep))
goto trunc;
}
break;
}
}
return (const u_char *)ext + item_len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_N)));
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14469/ISAKMP: Add a missing bounds check
In ikev1_n_print() check bounds before trying to fetch the replay detection
status.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | ikev1_n_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext, u_int item_len,
const u_char *ep, uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi0 _U_,
uint32_t proto0 _U_, int depth _U_)
{
const struct ikev1_pl_n *p;
struct ikev1_pl_n n;
const u_char *cp;
const u_char *ep2;
uint32_t doi;
uint32_t proto;
static const char *notify_error_str[] = {
NULL, "INVALID-PAYLOAD-TYPE",
"DOI-NOT-SUPPORTED", "SITUATION-NOT-SUPPORTED",
"INVALID-COOKIE", "INVALID-MAJOR-VERSION",
"INVALID-MINOR-VERSION", "INVALID-EXCHANGE-TYPE",
"INVALID-FLAGS", "INVALID-MESSAGE-ID",
"INVALID-PROTOCOL-ID", "INVALID-SPI",
"INVALID-TRANSFORM-ID", "ATTRIBUTES-NOT-SUPPORTED",
"NO-PROPOSAL-CHOSEN", "BAD-PROPOSAL-SYNTAX",
"PAYLOAD-MALFORMED", "INVALID-KEY-INFORMATION",
"INVALID-ID-INFORMATION", "INVALID-CERT-ENCODING",
"INVALID-CERTIFICATE", "CERT-TYPE-UNSUPPORTED",
"INVALID-CERT-AUTHORITY", "INVALID-HASH-INFORMATION",
"AUTHENTICATION-FAILED", "INVALID-SIGNATURE",
"ADDRESS-NOTIFICATION", "NOTIFY-SA-LIFETIME",
"CERTIFICATE-UNAVAILABLE", "UNSUPPORTED-EXCHANGE-TYPE",
"UNEQUAL-PAYLOAD-LENGTHS",
};
static const char *ipsec_notify_error_str[] = {
"RESERVED",
};
static const char *notify_status_str[] = {
"CONNECTED",
};
static const char *ipsec_notify_status_str[] = {
"RESPONDER-LIFETIME", "REPLAY-STATUS",
"INITIAL-CONTACT",
};
/* NOTE: these macro must be called with x in proper range */
/* 0 - 8191 */
#define NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(x) \
STR_OR_ID((x), notify_error_str)
/* 8192 - 16383 */
#define IPSEC_NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(x) \
STR_OR_ID((u_int)((x) - 8192), ipsec_notify_error_str)
/* 16384 - 24575 */
#define NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(x) \
STR_OR_ID((u_int)((x) - 16384), notify_status_str)
/* 24576 - 32767 */
#define IPSEC_NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(x) \
STR_OR_ID((u_int)((x) - 24576), ipsec_notify_status_str)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s:", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_N)));
p = (const struct ikev1_pl_n *)ext;
ND_TCHECK(*p);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&n, ext, sizeof(n));
doi = ntohl(n.doi);
proto = n.prot_id;
if (doi != 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," doi=%d", doi));
ND_PRINT((ndo," proto=%d", proto));
if (ntohs(n.type) < 8192)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 16384)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", numstr(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 24576)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", numstr(ntohs(n.type))));
if (n.spi_size) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," spi="));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(p + 1), n.spi_size))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)(p + 1) + n.spi_size;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo," doi=ipsec"));
ND_PRINT((ndo," proto=%s", PROTOIDSTR(proto)));
if (ntohs(n.type) < 8192)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 16384)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", IPSEC_NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 24576)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 32768)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", IPSEC_NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", numstr(ntohs(n.type))));
if (n.spi_size) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," spi="));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(p + 1), n.spi_size))
goto trunc;
}
cp = (const u_char *)(p + 1) + n.spi_size;
ep2 = (const u_char *)p + item_len;
if (cp < ep) {
switch (ntohs(n.type)) {
case IPSECDOI_NTYPE_RESPONDER_LIFETIME:
{
const struct attrmap *map = oakley_t_map;
size_t nmap = sizeof(oakley_t_map)/sizeof(oakley_t_map[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo," attrs=("));
while (cp < ep && cp < ep2) {
cp = ikev1_attrmap_print(ndo, cp, ep2, map, nmap);
if (cp == NULL) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
goto trunc;
}
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
break;
}
case IPSECDOI_NTYPE_REPLAY_STATUS:
ND_PRINT((ndo," status=("));
ND_TCHECK_32BITS(cp);
ND_PRINT((ndo,"replay detection %sabled",
EXTRACT_32BITS(cp) ? "en" : "dis"));
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
break;
default:
/*
* XXX - fill in more types here; see, for example,
* draft-ietf-ipsec-notifymsg-04.
*/
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," data=("));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(cp), ep - cp))
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
} else {
if (!ike_show_somedata(ndo, cp, ep))
goto trunc;
}
break;
}
}
return (const u_char *)ext + item_len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_N)));
return NULL;
}
| 169,842 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static sk_sp<SkImage> unPremulSkImageToPremul(SkImage* input) {
SkImageInfo info = SkImageInfo::Make(input->width(), input->height(),
kN32_SkColorType, kPremul_SkAlphaType);
RefPtr<Uint8Array> dstPixels = copySkImageData(input, info);
if (!dstPixels)
return nullptr;
return newSkImageFromRaster(
info, std::move(dstPixels),
static_cast<size_t>(input->width()) * info.bytesPerPixel());
}
Commit Message: Prevent bad casting in ImageBitmap when calling ArrayBuffer::createOrNull
Currently when ImageBitmap's constructor is invoked, we check whether
dstSize will overflow size_t or not. The problem comes when we call
ArrayBuffer::createOrNull some times in the code.
Both parameters of ArrayBuffer::createOrNull are unsigned. In ImageBitmap
when we call this method, the first parameter is usually width * height.
This could overflow unsigned even if it has been checked safe with size_t,
the reason is that unsigned is a 32-bit value on 64-bit systems, while
size_t is a 64-bit value.
This CL makes a change such that we check whether the dstSize will overflow
unsigned or not. In this case, we can guarantee that createOrNull will not have
any crash.
BUG=664139
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2500493002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#431936}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | static sk_sp<SkImage> unPremulSkImageToPremul(SkImage* input) {
SkImageInfo info = SkImageInfo::Make(input->width(), input->height(),
kN32_SkColorType, kPremul_SkAlphaType);
RefPtr<Uint8Array> dstPixels = copySkImageData(input, info);
if (!dstPixels)
return nullptr;
return newSkImageFromRaster(
info, std::move(dstPixels),
static_cast<unsigned>(input->width()) * info.bytesPerPixel());
}
| 172,507 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool SharedMemory::Create(const SharedMemoryCreateOptions& options) {
DCHECK(!options.executable);
DCHECK(!mapped_file_);
if (options.size == 0)
return false;
uint32 rounded_size = (options.size + 0xffff) & ~0xffff;
name_ = ASCIIToWide(options.name == NULL ? "" : *options.name);
mapped_file_ = CreateFileMapping(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE, NULL,
PAGE_READWRITE, 0, static_cast<DWORD>(rounded_size),
name_.empty() ? NULL : name_.c_str());
if (!mapped_file_)
return false;
created_size_ = options.size;
if (GetLastError() == ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS) {
created_size_ = 0;
if (!options.open_existing) {
Close();
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow in Windows shared memory handling.
BUG=164490
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11450016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171369 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | bool SharedMemory::Create(const SharedMemoryCreateOptions& options) {
DCHECK(!options.executable);
DCHECK(!mapped_file_);
if (options.size == 0)
return false;
uint32 rounded_size = (options.size + 0xffff) & ~0xffff;
if (rounded_size < options.size)
return false;
name_ = ASCIIToWide(options.name == NULL ? "" : *options.name);
mapped_file_ = CreateFileMapping(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE, NULL,
PAGE_READWRITE, 0, static_cast<DWORD>(rounded_size),
name_.empty() ? NULL : name_.c_str());
if (!mapped_file_)
return false;
created_size_ = options.size;
if (GetLastError() == ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS) {
created_size_ = 0;
if (!options.open_existing) {
Close();
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
| 171,538 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Textfield::OnBlur() {
gfx::RenderText* render_text = GetRenderText();
render_text->set_focused(false);
if (PlatformStyle::kTextfieldScrollsToStartOnFocusChange)
model_->MoveCursorTo(gfx::SelectionModel(0, gfx::CURSOR_FORWARD));
if (GetInputMethod()) {
GetInputMethod()->DetachTextInputClient(this);
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
wm::RestoreWindowBoundsOnClientFocusLost(
GetNativeView()->GetToplevelWindow());
#endif // defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
}
StopBlinkingCursor();
cursor_view_.SetVisible(false);
DestroyTouchSelection();
if (use_focus_ring_)
FocusRing::Uninstall(this);
SchedulePaint();
View::OnBlur();
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | void Textfield::OnBlur() {
gfx::RenderText* render_text = GetRenderText();
render_text->set_focused(false);
if (PlatformStyle::kTextfieldScrollsToStartOnFocusChange)
model_->MoveCursorTo(gfx::SelectionModel(0, gfx::CURSOR_FORWARD));
if (GetInputMethod()) {
GetInputMethod()->DetachTextInputClient(this);
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
wm::RestoreWindowBoundsOnClientFocusLost(
GetNativeView()->GetToplevelWindow());
#endif // defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
}
StopBlinkingCursor();
cursor_view_.SetVisible(false);
DestroyTouchSelection();
if (use_focus_ring_)
FocusRing::Uninstall(this);
SchedulePaint();
View::OnBlur();
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
password_input_enabler_.reset();
#endif // defined(OS_MACOSX)
}
| 171,860 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int do_hidp_sock_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, void __user *argp)
{
struct hidp_connadd_req ca;
struct hidp_conndel_req cd;
struct hidp_connlist_req cl;
struct hidp_conninfo ci;
struct socket *csock;
struct socket *isock;
int err;
BT_DBG("cmd %x arg %p", cmd, argp);
switch (cmd) {
case HIDPCONNADD:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (copy_from_user(&ca, argp, sizeof(ca)))
return -EFAULT;
csock = sockfd_lookup(ca.ctrl_sock, &err);
if (!csock)
return err;
isock = sockfd_lookup(ca.intr_sock, &err);
if (!isock) {
sockfd_put(csock);
return err;
}
err = hidp_connection_add(&ca, csock, isock);
if (!err && copy_to_user(argp, &ca, sizeof(ca)))
err = -EFAULT;
sockfd_put(csock);
sockfd_put(isock);
return err;
case HIDPCONNDEL:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (copy_from_user(&cd, argp, sizeof(cd)))
return -EFAULT;
return hidp_connection_del(&cd);
case HIDPGETCONNLIST:
if (copy_from_user(&cl, argp, sizeof(cl)))
return -EFAULT;
if (cl.cnum <= 0)
return -EINVAL;
err = hidp_get_connlist(&cl);
if (!err && copy_to_user(argp, &cl, sizeof(cl)))
return -EFAULT;
return err;
case HIDPGETCONNINFO:
if (copy_from_user(&ci, argp, sizeof(ci)))
return -EFAULT;
err = hidp_get_conninfo(&ci);
if (!err && copy_to_user(argp, &ci, sizeof(ci)))
return -EFAULT;
return err;
}
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: hidp: fix buffer overflow
Struct ca is copied from userspace. It is not checked whether the "name"
field is NULL terminated, which allows local users to obtain potentially
sensitive information from kernel stack memory, via a HIDPCONNADD command.
This vulnerability is similar to CVE-2011-1079.
Signed-off-by: Young Xiao <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
CWE ID: CWE-77 | static int do_hidp_sock_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, void __user *argp)
{
struct hidp_connadd_req ca;
struct hidp_conndel_req cd;
struct hidp_connlist_req cl;
struct hidp_conninfo ci;
struct socket *csock;
struct socket *isock;
int err;
BT_DBG("cmd %x arg %p", cmd, argp);
switch (cmd) {
case HIDPCONNADD:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (copy_from_user(&ca, argp, sizeof(ca)))
return -EFAULT;
csock = sockfd_lookup(ca.ctrl_sock, &err);
if (!csock)
return err;
isock = sockfd_lookup(ca.intr_sock, &err);
if (!isock) {
sockfd_put(csock);
return err;
}
ca.name[sizeof(ca.name)-1] = 0;
err = hidp_connection_add(&ca, csock, isock);
if (!err && copy_to_user(argp, &ca, sizeof(ca)))
err = -EFAULT;
sockfd_put(csock);
sockfd_put(isock);
return err;
case HIDPCONNDEL:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (copy_from_user(&cd, argp, sizeof(cd)))
return -EFAULT;
return hidp_connection_del(&cd);
case HIDPGETCONNLIST:
if (copy_from_user(&cl, argp, sizeof(cl)))
return -EFAULT;
if (cl.cnum <= 0)
return -EINVAL;
err = hidp_get_connlist(&cl);
if (!err && copy_to_user(argp, &cl, sizeof(cl)))
return -EFAULT;
return err;
case HIDPGETCONNINFO:
if (copy_from_user(&ci, argp, sizeof(ci)))
return -EFAULT;
err = hidp_get_conninfo(&ci);
if (!err && copy_to_user(argp, &ci, sizeof(ci)))
return -EFAULT;
return err;
}
return -EINVAL;
}
| 169,676 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void WebBluetoothServiceImpl::ClearState() {
characteristic_id_to_notify_session_.clear();
pending_primary_services_requests_.clear();
descriptor_id_to_characteristic_id_.clear();
characteristic_id_to_service_id_.clear();
service_id_to_device_address_.clear();
connected_devices_.reset(
new FrameConnectedBluetoothDevices(render_frame_host_));
device_chooser_controller_.reset();
BluetoothAdapterFactoryWrapper::Get().ReleaseAdapter(this);
}
Commit Message: Ensure device choosers are closed on navigation
The requestDevice() IPCs can race with navigation. This change ensures
that choosers are closed on navigation and adds browser tests to
exercise this for Web Bluetooth and WebUSB.
Bug: 723503
Change-Id: I66760161220e17bd2be9309cca228d161fe76e9c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1099961
Commit-Queue: Reilly Grant <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michael Wasserman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Yasskin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#569900}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | void WebBluetoothServiceImpl::ClearState() {
// Releasing the adapter will drop references to callbacks that have not yet
// been executed. The binding must be closed first so that this is allowed.
binding_.Close();
characteristic_id_to_notify_session_.clear();
pending_primary_services_requests_.clear();
descriptor_id_to_characteristic_id_.clear();
characteristic_id_to_service_id_.clear();
service_id_to_device_address_.clear();
connected_devices_.reset(
new FrameConnectedBluetoothDevices(render_frame_host_));
device_chooser_controller_.reset();
BluetoothAdapterFactoryWrapper::Get().ReleaseAdapter(this);
}
| 173,204 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void user_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
{
seq_puts(m, key->description);
if (key_is_instantiated(key))
seq_printf(m, ": %u", key->datalen);
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: [email protected] # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void user_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
{
seq_puts(m, key->description);
if (key_is_positive(key))
seq_printf(m, ": %u", key->datalen);
}
| 167,709 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: vmxnet3_io_bar0_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr,
uint64_t val, unsigned size)
{
VMXNET3State *s = opaque;
if (VMW_IS_MULTIREG_ADDR(addr, VMXNET3_REG_TXPROD,
VMXNET3_DEVICE_MAX_TX_QUEUES, VMXNET3_REG_ALIGN)) {
int tx_queue_idx =
return;
}
if (VMW_IS_MULTIREG_ADDR(addr, VMXNET3_REG_IMR,
VMXNET3_MAX_INTRS, VMXNET3_REG_ALIGN)) {
int l = VMW_MULTIREG_IDX_BY_ADDR(addr, VMXNET3_REG_IMR,
VMXNET3_REG_ALIGN);
VMW_CBPRN("Interrupt mask for line %d written: 0x%" PRIx64, l, val);
vmxnet3_on_interrupt_mask_changed(s, l, val);
return;
}
if (VMW_IS_MULTIREG_ADDR(addr, VMXNET3_REG_RXPROD,
VMXNET3_DEVICE_MAX_RX_QUEUES, VMXNET3_REG_ALIGN) ||
VMW_IS_MULTIREG_ADDR(addr, VMXNET3_REG_RXPROD2,
VMXNET3_DEVICE_MAX_RX_QUEUES, VMXNET3_REG_ALIGN)) {
return;
}
VMW_WRPRN("BAR0 unknown write [%" PRIx64 "] = %" PRIx64 ", size %d",
(uint64_t) addr, val, size);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | vmxnet3_io_bar0_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr,
uint64_t val, unsigned size)
{
VMXNET3State *s = opaque;
if (!s->device_active) {
return;
}
if (VMW_IS_MULTIREG_ADDR(addr, VMXNET3_REG_TXPROD,
VMXNET3_DEVICE_MAX_TX_QUEUES, VMXNET3_REG_ALIGN)) {
int tx_queue_idx =
return;
}
if (VMW_IS_MULTIREG_ADDR(addr, VMXNET3_REG_IMR,
VMXNET3_MAX_INTRS, VMXNET3_REG_ALIGN)) {
int l = VMW_MULTIREG_IDX_BY_ADDR(addr, VMXNET3_REG_IMR,
VMXNET3_REG_ALIGN);
VMW_CBPRN("Interrupt mask for line %d written: 0x%" PRIx64, l, val);
vmxnet3_on_interrupt_mask_changed(s, l, val);
return;
}
if (VMW_IS_MULTIREG_ADDR(addr, VMXNET3_REG_RXPROD,
VMXNET3_DEVICE_MAX_RX_QUEUES, VMXNET3_REG_ALIGN) ||
VMW_IS_MULTIREG_ADDR(addr, VMXNET3_REG_RXPROD2,
VMXNET3_DEVICE_MAX_RX_QUEUES, VMXNET3_REG_ALIGN)) {
return;
}
VMW_WRPRN("BAR0 unknown write [%" PRIx64 "] = %" PRIx64 ", size %d",
(uint64_t) addr, val, size);
}
| 164,953 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: char *suhosin_encrypt_single_cookie(char *name, int name_len, char *value, int value_len, char *key TSRMLS_DC)
{
char buffer[4096];
char buffer2[4096];
char *buf = buffer, *buf2 = buffer2, *d, *d_url;
int l;
if (name_len > sizeof(buffer)-2) {
buf = estrndup(name, name_len);
} else {
memcpy(buf, name, name_len);
buf[name_len] = 0;
}
name_len = php_url_decode(buf, name_len);
normalize_varname(buf);
name_len = strlen(buf);
if (SUHOSIN_G(cookie_plainlist)) {
if (zend_hash_exists(SUHOSIN_G(cookie_plainlist), buf, name_len+1)) {
encrypt_return_plain:
if (buf != buffer) {
efree(buf);
}
return estrndup(value, value_len);
}
} else if (SUHOSIN_G(cookie_cryptlist)) {
if (!zend_hash_exists(SUHOSIN_G(cookie_cryptlist), buf, name_len+1)) {
goto encrypt_return_plain;
}
}
if (strlen(value) <= sizeof(buffer2)-2) {
memcpy(buf2, value, value_len);
buf2[value_len] = 0;
} else {
buf2 = estrndup(value, value_len);
}
value_len = php_url_decode(buf2, value_len);
d = suhosin_encrypt_string(buf2, value_len, buf, name_len, key TSRMLS_CC);
d_url = php_url_encode(d, strlen(d), &l);
efree(d);
if (buf != buffer) {
efree(buf);
}
if (buf2 != buffer2) {
efree(buf2);
}
return d_url;
}
Commit Message: Fixed stack based buffer overflow in transparent cookie encryption (see separate advisory)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | char *suhosin_encrypt_single_cookie(char *name, int name_len, char *value, int value_len, char *key TSRMLS_DC)
{
char *buf, *buf2, *d, *d_url;
int l;
buf = estrndup(name, name_len);
name_len = php_url_decode(buf, name_len);
normalize_varname(buf);
name_len = strlen(buf);
if (SUHOSIN_G(cookie_plainlist)) {
if (zend_hash_exists(SUHOSIN_G(cookie_plainlist), buf, name_len+1)) {
encrypt_return_plain:
efree(buf);
return estrndup(value, value_len);
}
} else if (SUHOSIN_G(cookie_cryptlist)) {
if (!zend_hash_exists(SUHOSIN_G(cookie_cryptlist), buf, name_len+1)) {
goto encrypt_return_plain;
}
}
buf2 = estrndup(value, value_len);
value_len = php_url_decode(buf2, value_len);
d = suhosin_encrypt_string(buf2, value_len, buf, name_len, key TSRMLS_CC);
d_url = php_url_encode(d, strlen(d), &l);
efree(d);
efree(buf);
efree(buf2);
return d_url;
}
| 165,650 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SaveCardBubbleControllerImpl::ShowBubbleForLocalSave(
const CreditCard& card,
const base::Closure& save_card_callback) {
is_uploading_ = false;
is_reshow_ = false;
should_cvc_be_requested_ = false;
legal_message_lines_.clear();
AutofillMetrics::LogSaveCardPromptMetric(
AutofillMetrics::SAVE_CARD_PROMPT_SHOW_REQUESTED, is_uploading_,
is_reshow_,
pref_service_->GetInteger(
prefs::kAutofillAcceptSaveCreditCardPromptState));
card_ = card;
save_card_callback_ = save_card_callback;
ShowBubble();
}
Commit Message: [autofill] Avoid duplicate instances of the SaveCardBubble.
autofill::SaveCardBubbleControllerImpl::ShowBubble() expects
(via DCHECK) to only be called when the save card bubble is
not already visible. This constraint is violated if the user
clicks multiple times on a submit button.
If the underlying page goes away, the last SaveCardBubbleView
created by the controller will be automatically cleaned up,
but any others are left visible on the screen... holding a
refence to a possibly-deleted controller.
This CL early exits the ShowBubbleFor*** and ReshowBubble logic
if the bubble is already visible.
BUG=708819
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2862933002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#469768}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void SaveCardBubbleControllerImpl::ShowBubbleForLocalSave(
const CreditCard& card,
const base::Closure& save_card_callback) {
// Don't show the bubble if it's already visible.
if (save_card_bubble_view_)
return;
is_uploading_ = false;
is_reshow_ = false;
should_cvc_be_requested_ = false;
legal_message_lines_.clear();
AutofillMetrics::LogSaveCardPromptMetric(
AutofillMetrics::SAVE_CARD_PROMPT_SHOW_REQUESTED, is_uploading_,
is_reshow_,
pref_service_->GetInteger(
prefs::kAutofillAcceptSaveCreditCardPromptState));
card_ = card;
save_card_callback_ = save_card_callback;
ShowBubble();
}
| 172,385 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int nsv_parse_NSVf_header(AVFormatContext *s)
{
NSVContext *nsv = s->priv_data;
AVIOContext *pb = s->pb;
unsigned int av_unused file_size;
unsigned int size;
int64_t duration;
int strings_size;
int table_entries;
int table_entries_used;
nsv->state = NSV_UNSYNC; /* in case we fail */
size = avio_rl32(pb);
if (size < 28)
return -1;
nsv->NSVf_end = size;
file_size = (uint32_t)avio_rl32(pb);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_TRACE, "NSV NSVf chunk_size %u\n", size);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_TRACE, "NSV NSVf file_size %u\n", file_size);
nsv->duration = duration = avio_rl32(pb); /* in ms */
av_log(s, AV_LOG_TRACE, "NSV NSVf duration %"PRId64" ms\n", duration);
strings_size = avio_rl32(pb);
table_entries = avio_rl32(pb);
table_entries_used = avio_rl32(pb);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_TRACE, "NSV NSVf info-strings size: %d, table entries: %d, bis %d\n",
strings_size, table_entries, table_entries_used);
if (avio_feof(pb))
return -1;
av_log(s, AV_LOG_TRACE, "NSV got header; filepos %"PRId64"\n", avio_tell(pb));
if (strings_size > 0) {
char *strings; /* last byte will be '\0' to play safe with str*() */
char *p, *endp;
char *token, *value;
char quote;
p = strings = av_mallocz((size_t)strings_size + 1);
if (!p)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
endp = strings + strings_size;
avio_read(pb, strings, strings_size);
while (p < endp) {
while (*p == ' ')
p++; /* strip out spaces */
if (p >= endp-2)
break;
token = p;
p = strchr(p, '=');
if (!p || p >= endp-2)
break;
*p++ = '\0';
quote = *p++;
value = p;
p = strchr(p, quote);
if (!p || p >= endp)
break;
*p++ = '\0';
av_log(s, AV_LOG_TRACE, "NSV NSVf INFO: %s='%s'\n", token, value);
av_dict_set(&s->metadata, token, value, 0);
}
av_free(strings);
}
if (avio_feof(pb))
return -1;
av_log(s, AV_LOG_TRACE, "NSV got infos; filepos %"PRId64"\n", avio_tell(pb));
if (table_entries_used > 0) {
int i;
nsv->index_entries = table_entries_used;
if((unsigned)table_entries_used >= UINT_MAX / sizeof(uint32_t))
return -1;
nsv->nsvs_file_offset = av_malloc_array((unsigned)table_entries_used, sizeof(uint32_t));
if (!nsv->nsvs_file_offset)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
for(i=0;i<table_entries_used;i++)
nsv->nsvs_file_offset[i] = avio_rl32(pb) + size;
if(table_entries > table_entries_used &&
avio_rl32(pb) == MKTAG('T','O','C','2')) {
nsv->nsvs_timestamps = av_malloc_array((unsigned)table_entries_used, sizeof(uint32_t));
if (!nsv->nsvs_timestamps)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
for(i=0;i<table_entries_used;i++) {
nsv->nsvs_timestamps[i] = avio_rl32(pb);
}
}
}
av_log(s, AV_LOG_TRACE, "NSV got index; filepos %"PRId64"\n", avio_tell(pb));
avio_seek(pb, nsv->base_offset + size, SEEK_SET); /* required for dumbdriving-271.nsv (2 extra bytes) */
if (avio_feof(pb))
return -1;
nsv->state = NSV_HAS_READ_NSVF;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/nsvdec: Fix DoS due to lack of eof check in nsvs_file_offset loop.
Fixes: 20170829.nsv
Co-Author: 张洪亮(望初)" <[email protected]>
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-834 | static int nsv_parse_NSVf_header(AVFormatContext *s)
{
NSVContext *nsv = s->priv_data;
AVIOContext *pb = s->pb;
unsigned int av_unused file_size;
unsigned int size;
int64_t duration;
int strings_size;
int table_entries;
int table_entries_used;
nsv->state = NSV_UNSYNC; /* in case we fail */
size = avio_rl32(pb);
if (size < 28)
return -1;
nsv->NSVf_end = size;
file_size = (uint32_t)avio_rl32(pb);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_TRACE, "NSV NSVf chunk_size %u\n", size);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_TRACE, "NSV NSVf file_size %u\n", file_size);
nsv->duration = duration = avio_rl32(pb); /* in ms */
av_log(s, AV_LOG_TRACE, "NSV NSVf duration %"PRId64" ms\n", duration);
strings_size = avio_rl32(pb);
table_entries = avio_rl32(pb);
table_entries_used = avio_rl32(pb);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_TRACE, "NSV NSVf info-strings size: %d, table entries: %d, bis %d\n",
strings_size, table_entries, table_entries_used);
if (avio_feof(pb))
return -1;
av_log(s, AV_LOG_TRACE, "NSV got header; filepos %"PRId64"\n", avio_tell(pb));
if (strings_size > 0) {
char *strings; /* last byte will be '\0' to play safe with str*() */
char *p, *endp;
char *token, *value;
char quote;
p = strings = av_mallocz((size_t)strings_size + 1);
if (!p)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
endp = strings + strings_size;
avio_read(pb, strings, strings_size);
while (p < endp) {
while (*p == ' ')
p++; /* strip out spaces */
if (p >= endp-2)
break;
token = p;
p = strchr(p, '=');
if (!p || p >= endp-2)
break;
*p++ = '\0';
quote = *p++;
value = p;
p = strchr(p, quote);
if (!p || p >= endp)
break;
*p++ = '\0';
av_log(s, AV_LOG_TRACE, "NSV NSVf INFO: %s='%s'\n", token, value);
av_dict_set(&s->metadata, token, value, 0);
}
av_free(strings);
}
if (avio_feof(pb))
return -1;
av_log(s, AV_LOG_TRACE, "NSV got infos; filepos %"PRId64"\n", avio_tell(pb));
if (table_entries_used > 0) {
int i;
nsv->index_entries = table_entries_used;
if((unsigned)table_entries_used >= UINT_MAX / sizeof(uint32_t))
return -1;
nsv->nsvs_file_offset = av_malloc_array((unsigned)table_entries_used, sizeof(uint32_t));
if (!nsv->nsvs_file_offset)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
for(i=0;i<table_entries_used;i++) {
if (avio_feof(pb))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
nsv->nsvs_file_offset[i] = avio_rl32(pb) + size;
}
if(table_entries > table_entries_used &&
avio_rl32(pb) == MKTAG('T','O','C','2')) {
nsv->nsvs_timestamps = av_malloc_array((unsigned)table_entries_used, sizeof(uint32_t));
if (!nsv->nsvs_timestamps)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
for(i=0;i<table_entries_used;i++) {
nsv->nsvs_timestamps[i] = avio_rl32(pb);
}
}
}
av_log(s, AV_LOG_TRACE, "NSV got index; filepos %"PRId64"\n", avio_tell(pb));
avio_seek(pb, nsv->base_offset + size, SEEK_SET); /* required for dumbdriving-271.nsv (2 extra bytes) */
if (avio_feof(pb))
return -1;
nsv->state = NSV_HAS_READ_NSVF;
return 0;
}
| 167,764 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int cp2112_gpio_direction_input(struct gpio_chip *chip, unsigned offset)
{
struct cp2112_device *dev = gpiochip_get_data(chip);
struct hid_device *hdev = dev->hdev;
u8 *buf = dev->in_out_buffer;
unsigned long flags;
int ret;
spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->lock, flags);
ret = hid_hw_raw_request(hdev, CP2112_GPIO_CONFIG, buf,
CP2112_GPIO_CONFIG_LENGTH, HID_FEATURE_REPORT,
HID_REQ_GET_REPORT);
if (ret != CP2112_GPIO_CONFIG_LENGTH) {
hid_err(hdev, "error requesting GPIO config: %d\n", ret);
goto exit;
}
buf[1] &= ~(1 << offset);
buf[2] = gpio_push_pull;
ret = hid_hw_raw_request(hdev, CP2112_GPIO_CONFIG, buf,
CP2112_GPIO_CONFIG_LENGTH, HID_FEATURE_REPORT,
HID_REQ_SET_REPORT);
if (ret < 0) {
hid_err(hdev, "error setting GPIO config: %d\n", ret);
goto exit;
}
ret = 0;
exit:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
return ret <= 0 ? ret : -EIO;
}
Commit Message: HID: cp2112: fix sleep-while-atomic
A recent commit fixing DMA-buffers on stack added a shared transfer
buffer protected by a spinlock. This is broken as the USB HID request
callbacks can sleep. Fix this up by replacing the spinlock with a mutex.
Fixes: 1ffb3c40ffb5 ("HID: cp2112: make transfer buffers DMA capable")
Cc: stable <[email protected]> # 4.9
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-404 | static int cp2112_gpio_direction_input(struct gpio_chip *chip, unsigned offset)
{
struct cp2112_device *dev = gpiochip_get_data(chip);
struct hid_device *hdev = dev->hdev;
u8 *buf = dev->in_out_buffer;
int ret;
mutex_lock(&dev->lock);
ret = hid_hw_raw_request(hdev, CP2112_GPIO_CONFIG, buf,
CP2112_GPIO_CONFIG_LENGTH, HID_FEATURE_REPORT,
HID_REQ_GET_REPORT);
if (ret != CP2112_GPIO_CONFIG_LENGTH) {
hid_err(hdev, "error requesting GPIO config: %d\n", ret);
goto exit;
}
buf[1] &= ~(1 << offset);
buf[2] = gpio_push_pull;
ret = hid_hw_raw_request(hdev, CP2112_GPIO_CONFIG, buf,
CP2112_GPIO_CONFIG_LENGTH, HID_FEATURE_REPORT,
HID_REQ_SET_REPORT);
if (ret < 0) {
hid_err(hdev, "error setting GPIO config: %d\n", ret);
goto exit;
}
ret = 0;
exit:
mutex_unlock(&dev->lock);
return ret <= 0 ? ret : -EIO;
}
| 168,208 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void MaybeRestoreIBusConfig() {
if (!ibus_) {
return;
}
MaybeDestroyIBusConfig();
if (!ibus_config_) {
GDBusConnection* ibus_connection = ibus_bus_get_connection(ibus_);
if (!ibus_connection) {
LOG(INFO) << "Couldn't create an ibus config object since "
<< "IBus connection is not ready.";
return;
}
const gboolean disconnected
= g_dbus_connection_is_closed(ibus_connection);
if (disconnected) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Couldn't create an ibus config object since "
<< "IBus connection is closed.";
return;
}
ibus_config_ = ibus_config_new(ibus_connection,
NULL /* do not cancel the operation */,
NULL /* do not get error information */);
if (!ibus_config_) {
LOG(ERROR) << "ibus_config_new() failed. ibus-memconf is not ready?";
return;
}
g_object_ref(ibus_config_);
LOG(INFO) << "ibus_config_ is ready.";
}
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void MaybeRestoreIBusConfig() {
if (!ibus_) {
return;
}
MaybeDestroyIBusConfig();
if (!ibus_config_) {
GDBusConnection* ibus_connection = ibus_bus_get_connection(ibus_);
if (!ibus_connection) {
VLOG(1) << "Couldn't create an ibus config object since "
<< "IBus connection is not ready.";
return;
}
const gboolean disconnected
= g_dbus_connection_is_closed(ibus_connection);
if (disconnected) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Couldn't create an ibus config object since "
<< "IBus connection is closed.";
return;
}
ibus_config_ = ibus_config_new(ibus_connection,
NULL /* do not cancel the operation */,
NULL /* do not get error information */);
if (!ibus_config_) {
LOG(ERROR) << "ibus_config_new() failed. ibus-memconf is not ready?";
return;
}
g_object_ref(ibus_config_);
VLOG(1) << "ibus_config_ is ready.";
}
}
| 170,543 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: read_bytes(FILE *fp, void *buf, size_t bytes_to_read, int fail_on_eof,
char *errbuf)
{
size_t amt_read;
amt_read = fread(buf, 1, bytes_to_read, fp);
if (amt_read != bytes_to_read) {
if (ferror(fp)) {
pcap_fmt_errmsg_for_errno(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE,
errno, "error reading dump file");
} else {
if (amt_read == 0 && !fail_on_eof)
return (0); /* EOF */
pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE,
"truncated dump file; tried to read %" PRIsize " bytes, only got %" PRIsize,
bytes_to_read, amt_read);
}
return (-1);
}
return (1);
}
Commit Message: do sanity checks on PHB header length before allocating memory. There was no fault; but doing the check results in a more consistent error
CWE ID: CWE-20 | read_bytes(FILE *fp, void *buf, size_t bytes_to_read, int fail_on_eof,
char *errbuf)
{
size_t amt_read;
amt_read = fread(buf, 1, bytes_to_read, fp);
if (amt_read != bytes_to_read) {
if (ferror(fp)) {
pcap_fmt_errmsg_for_errno(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE,
errno, "error reading dump file");
} else {
if (amt_read == 0 && !fail_on_eof)
return (0); /* EOF */
pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE,
"truncated pcapng dump file; tried to read %" PRIsize " bytes, only got %" PRIsize,
bytes_to_read, amt_read);
}
return (-1);
}
return (1);
}
| 170,188 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int gdTransformAffineGetImage(gdImagePtr *dst,
const gdImagePtr src,
gdRectPtr src_area,
const double affine[6])
{
int res;
double m[6];
gdRect bbox;
gdRect area_full;
if (src_area == NULL) {
area_full.x = 0;
area_full.y = 0;
area_full.width = gdImageSX(src);
area_full.height = gdImageSY(src);
src_area = &area_full;
}
gdTransformAffineBoundingBox(src_area, affine, &bbox);
*dst = gdImageCreateTrueColor(bbox.width, bbox.height);
if (*dst == NULL) {
return GD_FALSE;
}
(*dst)->saveAlphaFlag = 1;
if (!src->trueColor) {
gdImagePaletteToTrueColor(src);
}
/* Translate to dst origin (0,0) */
gdAffineTranslate(m, -bbox.x, -bbox.y);
gdAffineConcat(m, affine, m);
gdImageAlphaBlending(*dst, 0);
res = gdTransformAffineCopy(*dst,
0,0,
src,
src_area,
m);
if (res != GD_TRUE) {
gdImageDestroy(*dst);
dst = NULL;
return GD_FALSE;
} else {
return GD_TRUE;
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed bug #72227: imagescale out-of-bounds read
Ported from https://github.com/libgd/libgd/commit/4f65a3e4eedaffa1efcf9ee1eb08f0b504fbc31a
CWE ID: CWE-125 | int gdTransformAffineGetImage(gdImagePtr *dst,
const gdImagePtr src,
gdRectPtr src_area,
const double affine[6])
{
int res;
double m[6];
gdRect bbox;
gdRect area_full;
if (src_area == NULL) {
area_full.x = 0;
area_full.y = 0;
area_full.width = gdImageSX(src);
area_full.height = gdImageSY(src);
src_area = &area_full;
}
gdTransformAffineBoundingBox(src_area, affine, &bbox);
*dst = gdImageCreateTrueColor(bbox.width, bbox.height);
if (*dst == NULL) {
return GD_FALSE;
}
(*dst)->saveAlphaFlag = 1;
if (!src->trueColor) {
gdImagePaletteToTrueColor(src);
}
/* Translate to dst origin (0,0) */
gdAffineTranslate(m, -bbox.x, -bbox.y);
gdAffineConcat(m, affine, m);
gdImageAlphaBlending(*dst, 0);
res = gdTransformAffineCopy(*dst,
0,0,
src,
src_area,
m);
if (res != GD_TRUE) {
gdImageDestroy(*dst);
dst = NULL;
return GD_FALSE;
} else {
return GD_TRUE;
}
}
| 170,007 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void btsnoop_write(const void *data, size_t length) {
if (logfile_fd != INVALID_FD)
write(logfile_fd, data, length);
btsnoop_net_write(data, length);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | static void btsnoop_write(const void *data, size_t length) {
if (logfile_fd != INVALID_FD)
TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(write(logfile_fd, data, length));
btsnoop_net_write(data, length);
}
| 173,472 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void LauncherView::ShowOverflowMenu() {
#if !defined(OS_MACOSX)
if (!delegate_)
return;
std::vector<LauncherItem> items;
GetOverflowItems(&items);
if (items.empty())
return;
MenuDelegateImpl menu_delegate;
ui::SimpleMenuModel menu_model(&menu_delegate);
for (size_t i = 0; i < items.size(); ++i)
menu_model.AddItem(static_cast<int>(i), delegate_->GetTitle(items[i]));
views::MenuModelAdapter menu_adapter(&menu_model);
overflow_menu_runner_.reset(new views::MenuRunner(menu_adapter.CreateMenu()));
gfx::Rect bounds(overflow_button_->size());
gfx::Point origin;
ConvertPointToScreen(overflow_button_, &origin);
if (overflow_menu_runner_->RunMenuAt(GetWidget(), NULL,
gfx::Rect(origin, size()), views::MenuItemView::TOPLEFT, 0) ==
views::MenuRunner::MENU_DELETED)
return;
Shell::GetInstance()->UpdateShelfVisibility();
if (menu_delegate.activated_command_id() == -1)
return;
LauncherID activated_id = items[menu_delegate.activated_command_id()].id;
LauncherItems::const_iterator window_iter = model_->ItemByID(activated_id);
if (window_iter == model_->items().end())
return; // Window was deleted while menu was up.
delegate_->ItemClicked(*window_iter, ui::EF_NONE);
#endif // !defined(OS_MACOSX)
}
Commit Message: ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void LauncherView::ShowOverflowMenu() {
void LauncherView::ShowOverflowBubble() {
int first_overflow_index = last_visible_index_ + 1;
DCHECK_LT(first_overflow_index, view_model_->view_size() - 1);
if (!overflow_bubble_.get())
overflow_bubble_.reset(new OverflowBubble());
overflow_bubble_->Show(delegate_,
model_,
overflow_button_,
alignment_,
first_overflow_index);
Shell::GetInstance()->UpdateShelfVisibility();
}
| 170,896 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SvcTest()
: codec_iface_(0),
test_file_name_("hantro_collage_w352h288.yuv"),
stats_file_name_("hantro_collage_w352h288.stat"),
codec_initialized_(false),
decoder_(0) {
memset(&svc_, 0, sizeof(svc_));
memset(&codec_, 0, sizeof(codec_));
memset(&codec_enc_, 0, sizeof(codec_enc_));
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | SvcTest()
: codec_iface_(0),
test_file_name_("hantro_collage_w352h288.yuv"),
codec_initialized_(false),
decoder_(0) {
memset(&svc_, 0, sizeof(svc_));
memset(&codec_, 0, sizeof(codec_));
memset(&codec_enc_, 0, sizeof(codec_enc_));
}
| 174,581 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadWEBPImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
int
webp_status;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
length;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
header[12],
*stream;
WebPDecoderConfig
configure;
WebPDecBuffer
*restrict webp_image = &configure.output;
WebPBitstreamFeatures
*restrict features = &configure.input;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (WebPInitDecoderConfig(&configure) == 0)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"UnableToDecodeImageFile");
webp_image->colorspace=MODE_RGBA;
count=ReadBlob(image,12,header);
if (count != 12)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
status=IsWEBP(header,count);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
length=(size_t) (ReadWebPLSBWord(header+4)+8);
if (length < 12)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
stream=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,sizeof(*stream));
if (stream == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) memcpy(stream,header,12);
count=ReadBlob(image,length-12,stream+12);
if (count != (ssize_t) (length-12))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
webp_status=WebPGetFeatures(stream,length,features);
if (webp_status == VP8_STATUS_OK)
{
image->columns=(size_t) features->width;
image->rows=(size_t) features->height;
image->depth=8;
image->matte=features->has_alpha != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if (IsWEBPImageLossless(stream,length) != MagickFalse)
image->quality=100;
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
stream=(unsigned char*) RelinquishMagickMemory(stream);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
webp_status=WebPDecode(stream,length,&configure);
}
if (webp_status != VP8_STATUS_OK)
{
stream=(unsigned char*) RelinquishMagickMemory(stream);
switch (webp_status)
{
case VP8_STATUS_OUT_OF_MEMORY:
{
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
break;
}
case VP8_STATUS_INVALID_PARAM:
{
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"invalid parameter");
break;
}
case VP8_STATUS_BITSTREAM_ERROR:
{
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
break;
}
case VP8_STATUS_UNSUPPORTED_FEATURE:
{
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"DataEncodingSchemeIsNotSupported");
break;
}
case VP8_STATUS_SUSPENDED:
{
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"decoder suspended");
break;
}
case VP8_STATUS_USER_ABORT:
{
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"user abort");
break;
}
case VP8_STATUS_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA:
{
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
break;
}
default:
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
}
}
p=(unsigned char *) webp_image->u.RGBA.rgba;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
x;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
WebPFreeDecBuffer(webp_image);
stream=(unsigned char*) RelinquishMagickMemory(stream);
return(image);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static Image *ReadWEBPImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
int
webp_status;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
length;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
header[12],
*stream;
WebPDecoderConfig
configure;
WebPDecBuffer
*restrict webp_image = &configure.output;
WebPBitstreamFeatures
*restrict features = &configure.input;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (WebPInitDecoderConfig(&configure) == 0)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"UnableToDecodeImageFile");
webp_image->colorspace=MODE_RGBA;
count=ReadBlob(image,12,header);
if (count != 12)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
status=IsWEBP(header,count);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
length=(size_t) (ReadWebPLSBWord(header+4)+8);
if (length < 12)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
stream=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,sizeof(*stream));
if (stream == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) memcpy(stream,header,12);
count=ReadBlob(image,length-12,stream+12);
if (count != (ssize_t) (length-12))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
webp_status=WebPGetFeatures(stream,length,features);
if (webp_status == VP8_STATUS_OK)
{
image->columns=(size_t) features->width;
image->rows=(size_t) features->height;
image->depth=8;
image->matte=features->has_alpha != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if (IsWEBPImageLossless(stream,length) != MagickFalse)
image->quality=100;
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
stream=(unsigned char*) RelinquishMagickMemory(stream);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
webp_status=WebPDecode(stream,length,&configure);
}
if (webp_status != VP8_STATUS_OK)
{
stream=(unsigned char*) RelinquishMagickMemory(stream);
switch (webp_status)
{
case VP8_STATUS_OUT_OF_MEMORY:
{
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
break;
}
case VP8_STATUS_INVALID_PARAM:
{
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"invalid parameter");
break;
}
case VP8_STATUS_BITSTREAM_ERROR:
{
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
break;
}
case VP8_STATUS_UNSUPPORTED_FEATURE:
{
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"DataEncodingSchemeIsNotSupported");
break;
}
case VP8_STATUS_SUSPENDED:
{
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"decoder suspended");
break;
}
case VP8_STATUS_USER_ABORT:
{
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"user abort");
break;
}
case VP8_STATUS_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA:
{
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
break;
}
default:
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
}
}
p=(unsigned char *) webp_image->u.RGBA.rgba;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
x;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
WebPFreeDecBuffer(webp_image);
stream=(unsigned char*) RelinquishMagickMemory(stream);
return(image);
}
| 168,620 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void send_auth(char *username, char *password) {
struct mt_packet data;
unsigned short width = 0;
unsigned short height = 0;
char *terminal = getenv("TERM");
char md5data[100];
unsigned char md5sum[17];
int plen;
md5_state_t state;
#if defined(__linux__) && defined(_POSIX_MEMLOCK_RANGE)
mlock(md5data, sizeof(md5data));
mlock(md5sum, sizeof(md5data));
#endif
/* Concat string of 0 + password + pass_salt */
md5data[0] = 0;
strncpy(md5data + 1, password, 82);
md5data[83] = '\0';
memcpy(md5data + 1 + strlen(password), pass_salt, 16);
/* Generate md5 sum of md5data with a leading 0 */
md5_init(&state);
md5_append(&state, (const md5_byte_t *)md5data, strlen(password) + 17);
md5_finish(&state, (md5_byte_t *)md5sum + 1);
md5sum[0] = 0;
/* Send combined packet to server */
init_packet(&data, MT_PTYPE_DATA, srcmac, dstmac, sessionkey, outcounter);
plen = add_control_packet(&data, MT_CPTYPE_PASSWORD, md5sum, 17);
plen += add_control_packet(&data, MT_CPTYPE_USERNAME, username, strlen(username));
plen += add_control_packet(&data, MT_CPTYPE_TERM_TYPE, terminal, strlen(terminal));
if (is_a_tty && get_terminal_size(&width, &height) != -1) {
width = htole16(width);
height = htole16(height);
plen += add_control_packet(&data, MT_CPTYPE_TERM_WIDTH, &width, 2);
plen += add_control_packet(&data, MT_CPTYPE_TERM_HEIGHT, &height, 2);
}
outcounter += plen;
/* TODO: handle result */
send_udp(&data, 1);
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #20 from eyalitki/master
2nd round security fixes from eyalitki
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static void send_auth(char *username, char *password) {
struct mt_packet data;
unsigned short width = 0;
unsigned short height = 0;
char *terminal = getenv("TERM");
char md5data[100];
unsigned char md5sum[17];
int plen, act_pass_len;
md5_state_t state;
#if defined(__linux__) && defined(_POSIX_MEMLOCK_RANGE)
mlock(md5data, sizeof(md5data));
mlock(md5sum, sizeof(md5data));
#endif
/* calculate the actual password's length */
act_pass_len = strnlen(password, 82);
/* Concat string of 0 + password + pass_salt */
md5data[0] = 0;
memcpy(md5data + 1, password, act_pass_len);
/* in case that password is long, calculate only using the used-up parts */
memcpy(md5data + 1 + act_pass_len, pass_salt, 16);
/* Generate md5 sum of md5data with a leading 0 */
md5_init(&state);
md5_append(&state, (const md5_byte_t *)md5data, 1 + act_pass_len + 16);
md5_finish(&state, (md5_byte_t *)md5sum + 1);
md5sum[0] = 0;
/* Send combined packet to server */
init_packet(&data, MT_PTYPE_DATA, srcmac, dstmac, sessionkey, outcounter);
plen = add_control_packet(&data, MT_CPTYPE_PASSWORD, md5sum, 17);
plen += add_control_packet(&data, MT_CPTYPE_USERNAME, username, strlen(username));
plen += add_control_packet(&data, MT_CPTYPE_TERM_TYPE, terminal, strlen(terminal));
if (is_a_tty && get_terminal_size(&width, &height) != -1) {
width = htole16(width);
height = htole16(height);
plen += add_control_packet(&data, MT_CPTYPE_TERM_WIDTH, &width, 2);
plen += add_control_packet(&data, MT_CPTYPE_TERM_HEIGHT, &height, 2);
}
outcounter += plen;
/* TODO: handle result */
send_udp(&data, 1);
}
| 166,963 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Browser::TabDetachedAtImpl(TabContents* contents, int index,
DetachType type) {
if (type == DETACH_TYPE_DETACH) {
if (contents == chrome::GetActiveTabContents(this)) {
LocationBar* location_bar = window()->GetLocationBar();
if (location_bar)
location_bar->SaveStateToContents(contents->web_contents());
}
if (!tab_strip_model_->closing_all())
SyncHistoryWithTabs(0);
}
SetAsDelegate(contents->web_contents(), NULL);
RemoveScheduledUpdatesFor(contents->web_contents());
if (find_bar_controller_.get() && index == active_index()) {
find_bar_controller_->ChangeWebContents(NULL);
}
search_delegate_->OnTabDetached(contents->web_contents());
registrar_.Remove(this, content::NOTIFICATION_INTERSTITIAL_ATTACHED,
content::Source<WebContents>(contents->web_contents()));
registrar_.Remove(this, content::NOTIFICATION_INTERSTITIAL_DETACHED,
content::Source<WebContents>(contents->web_contents()));
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void Browser::TabDetachedAtImpl(TabContents* contents, int index,
void Browser::TabDetachedAtImpl(content::WebContents* contents,
int index,
DetachType type) {
if (type == DETACH_TYPE_DETACH) {
if (contents == chrome::GetActiveWebContents(this)) {
LocationBar* location_bar = window()->GetLocationBar();
if (location_bar)
location_bar->SaveStateToContents(contents);
}
if (!tab_strip_model_->closing_all())
SyncHistoryWithTabs(0);
}
SetAsDelegate(contents, NULL);
RemoveScheduledUpdatesFor(contents);
if (find_bar_controller_.get() && index == active_index()) {
find_bar_controller_->ChangeWebContents(NULL);
}
search_delegate_->OnTabDetached(contents);
registrar_.Remove(this, content::NOTIFICATION_INTERSTITIAL_ATTACHED,
content::Source<WebContents>(contents));
registrar_.Remove(this, content::NOTIFICATION_INTERSTITIAL_DETACHED,
content::Source<WebContents>(contents));
}
| 171,508 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static opj_bool pi_next_rpcl(opj_pi_iterator_t * pi)
{
opj_pi_comp_t *comp = NULL;
opj_pi_resolution_t *res = NULL;
long index = 0;
if (!pi->first) {
goto LABEL_SKIP;
} else {
int compno, resno;
pi->first = 0;
pi->dx = 0;
pi->dy = 0;
for (compno = 0; compno < pi->numcomps; compno++) {
comp = &pi->comps[compno];
for (resno = 0; resno < comp->numresolutions; resno++) {
int dx, dy;
res = &comp->resolutions[resno];
dx = comp->dx * (1 << (res->pdx + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
dy = comp->dy * (1 << (res->pdy + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
pi->dx = !pi->dx ? dx : int_min(pi->dx, dx);
pi->dy = !pi->dy ? dy : int_min(pi->dy, dy);
}
}
}
if (!pi->tp_on) {
pi->poc.ty0 = pi->ty0;
pi->poc.tx0 = pi->tx0;
pi->poc.ty1 = pi->ty1;
pi->poc.tx1 = pi->tx1;
}
for (pi->resno = pi->poc.resno0; pi->resno < pi->poc.resno1; pi->resno++) {
for (pi->y = pi->poc.ty0; pi->y < pi->poc.ty1;
pi->y += pi->dy - (pi->y % pi->dy)) {
for (pi->x = pi->poc.tx0; pi->x < pi->poc.tx1;
pi->x += pi->dx - (pi->x % pi->dx)) {
for (pi->compno = pi->poc.compno0; pi->compno < pi->poc.compno1; pi->compno++) {
int levelno;
int trx0, try0;
int trx1, try1;
int rpx, rpy;
int prci, prcj;
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
if (pi->resno >= comp->numresolutions) {
continue;
}
res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno];
levelno = comp->numresolutions - 1 - pi->resno;
trx0 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx0, comp->dx << levelno);
try0 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty0, comp->dy << levelno);
trx1 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx1, comp->dx << levelno);
try1 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty1, comp->dy << levelno);
rpx = res->pdx + levelno;
rpy = res->pdy + levelno;
/* To avoid divisions by zero / undefined behaviour on shift */
if (rpx >= 31 || ((comp->dx << rpx) >> rpx) != comp->dx ||
rpy >= 31 || ((comp->dy << rpy) >> rpy) != comp->dy) {
continue;
}
if (!((pi->y % (comp->dy << rpy) == 0) || ((pi->y == pi->ty0) &&
((try0 << levelno) % (1 << rpy))))) {
continue;
}
if (!((pi->x % (comp->dx << rpx) == 0) || ((pi->x == pi->tx0) &&
((trx0 << levelno) % (1 << rpx))))) {
continue;
}
if ((res->pw == 0) || (res->ph == 0)) {
continue;
}
if ((trx0 == trx1) || (try0 == try1)) {
continue;
}
prci = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->x, comp->dx << levelno), res->pdx)
- int_floordivpow2(trx0, res->pdx);
prcj = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->y, comp->dy << levelno), res->pdy)
- int_floordivpow2(try0, res->pdy);
pi->precno = prci + prcj * res->pw;
for (pi->layno = pi->poc.layno0; pi->layno < pi->poc.layno1; pi->layno++) {
index = pi->layno * pi->step_l + pi->resno * pi->step_r + pi->compno *
pi->step_c + pi->precno * pi->step_p;
if (!pi->include[index]) {
pi->include[index] = 1;
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
LABEL_SKIP:
;
}
}
}
}
}
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
Commit Message: [MJ2] Avoid index out of bounds access to pi->include[]
Signed-off-by: Young_X <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static opj_bool pi_next_rpcl(opj_pi_iterator_t * pi)
{
opj_pi_comp_t *comp = NULL;
opj_pi_resolution_t *res = NULL;
long index = 0;
if (!pi->first) {
goto LABEL_SKIP;
} else {
int compno, resno;
pi->first = 0;
pi->dx = 0;
pi->dy = 0;
for (compno = 0; compno < pi->numcomps; compno++) {
comp = &pi->comps[compno];
for (resno = 0; resno < comp->numresolutions; resno++) {
int dx, dy;
res = &comp->resolutions[resno];
dx = comp->dx * (1 << (res->pdx + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
dy = comp->dy * (1 << (res->pdy + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
pi->dx = !pi->dx ? dx : int_min(pi->dx, dx);
pi->dy = !pi->dy ? dy : int_min(pi->dy, dy);
}
}
}
if (!pi->tp_on) {
pi->poc.ty0 = pi->ty0;
pi->poc.tx0 = pi->tx0;
pi->poc.ty1 = pi->ty1;
pi->poc.tx1 = pi->tx1;
}
for (pi->resno = pi->poc.resno0; pi->resno < pi->poc.resno1; pi->resno++) {
for (pi->y = pi->poc.ty0; pi->y < pi->poc.ty1;
pi->y += pi->dy - (pi->y % pi->dy)) {
for (pi->x = pi->poc.tx0; pi->x < pi->poc.tx1;
pi->x += pi->dx - (pi->x % pi->dx)) {
for (pi->compno = pi->poc.compno0; pi->compno < pi->poc.compno1; pi->compno++) {
int levelno;
int trx0, try0;
int trx1, try1;
int rpx, rpy;
int prci, prcj;
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
if (pi->resno >= comp->numresolutions) {
continue;
}
res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno];
levelno = comp->numresolutions - 1 - pi->resno;
trx0 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx0, comp->dx << levelno);
try0 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty0, comp->dy << levelno);
trx1 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx1, comp->dx << levelno);
try1 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty1, comp->dy << levelno);
rpx = res->pdx + levelno;
rpy = res->pdy + levelno;
/* To avoid divisions by zero / undefined behaviour on shift */
if (rpx >= 31 || ((comp->dx << rpx) >> rpx) != comp->dx ||
rpy >= 31 || ((comp->dy << rpy) >> rpy) != comp->dy) {
continue;
}
if (!((pi->y % (comp->dy << rpy) == 0) || ((pi->y == pi->ty0) &&
((try0 << levelno) % (1 << rpy))))) {
continue;
}
if (!((pi->x % (comp->dx << rpx) == 0) || ((pi->x == pi->tx0) &&
((trx0 << levelno) % (1 << rpx))))) {
continue;
}
if ((res->pw == 0) || (res->ph == 0)) {
continue;
}
if ((trx0 == trx1) || (try0 == try1)) {
continue;
}
prci = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->x, comp->dx << levelno), res->pdx)
- int_floordivpow2(trx0, res->pdx);
prcj = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->y, comp->dy << levelno), res->pdy)
- int_floordivpow2(try0, res->pdy);
pi->precno = prci + prcj * res->pw;
for (pi->layno = pi->poc.layno0; pi->layno < pi->poc.layno1; pi->layno++) {
index = pi->layno * pi->step_l + pi->resno * pi->step_r + pi->compno *
pi->step_c + pi->precno * pi->step_p;
/* Avoids index out of bounds access with include*/
if (index >= pi->include_size) {
opj_pi_emit_error(pi, "Invalid access to pi->include");
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
if (!pi->include[index]) {
pi->include[index] = 1;
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
LABEL_SKIP:
;
}
}
}
}
}
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
| 169,771 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void * gdImageWBMPPtr (gdImagePtr im, int *size, int fg)
{
void *rv;
gdIOCtx *out = gdNewDynamicCtx(2048, NULL);
gdImageWBMPCtx(im, fg, out);
rv = gdDPExtractData(out, size);
out->gd_free(out);
return rv;
}
Commit Message: Sync with upstream
Even though libgd/libgd#492 is not a relevant bug fix for PHP, since
the binding doesn't use the `gdImage*Ptr()` functions at all, we're
porting the fix to stay in sync here.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | void * gdImageWBMPPtr (gdImagePtr im, int *size, int fg)
{
void *rv;
gdIOCtx *out = gdNewDynamicCtx(2048, NULL);
if (!_gdImageWBMPCtx(im, fg, out)) {
rv = gdDPExtractData(out, size);
} else {
rv = NULL;
}
out->gd_free(out);
return rv;
}
| 169,738 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: _warc_read(struct archive_read *a, const void **buf, size_t *bsz, int64_t *off)
{
struct warc_s *w = a->format->data;
const char *rab;
ssize_t nrd;
if (w->cntoff >= w->cntlen) {
eof:
/* it's our lucky day, no work, we can leave early */
*buf = NULL;
*bsz = 0U;
*off = w->cntoff + 4U/*for \r\n\r\n separator*/;
w->unconsumed = 0U;
return (ARCHIVE_EOF);
}
rab = __archive_read_ahead(a, 1U, &nrd);
if (nrd < 0) {
*bsz = 0U;
/* big catastrophe */
return (int)nrd;
} else if (nrd == 0) {
goto eof;
} else if ((size_t)nrd > w->cntlen - w->cntoff) {
/* clamp to content-length */
nrd = w->cntlen - w->cntoff;
}
*off = w->cntoff;
*bsz = nrd;
*buf = rab;
w->cntoff += nrd;
w->unconsumed = (size_t)nrd;
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: warc: consume data once read
The warc decoder only used read ahead, it wouldn't actually consume
data that had previously been printed. This means that if you specify
an invalid content length, it will just reprint the same data over
and over and over again until it hits the desired length.
This means that a WARC resource with e.g.
Content-Length: 666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666665
but only a few hundred bytes of data, causes a quasi-infinite loop.
Consume data in subsequent calls to _warc_read.
Found with an AFL + afl-rb + qsym setup.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | _warc_read(struct archive_read *a, const void **buf, size_t *bsz, int64_t *off)
{
struct warc_s *w = a->format->data;
const char *rab;
ssize_t nrd;
if (w->cntoff >= w->cntlen) {
eof:
/* it's our lucky day, no work, we can leave early */
*buf = NULL;
*bsz = 0U;
*off = w->cntoff + 4U/*for \r\n\r\n separator*/;
w->unconsumed = 0U;
return (ARCHIVE_EOF);
}
if (w->unconsumed) {
__archive_read_consume(a, w->unconsumed);
w->unconsumed = 0U;
}
rab = __archive_read_ahead(a, 1U, &nrd);
if (nrd < 0) {
*bsz = 0U;
/* big catastrophe */
return (int)nrd;
} else if (nrd == 0) {
goto eof;
} else if ((size_t)nrd > w->cntlen - w->cntoff) {
/* clamp to content-length */
nrd = w->cntlen - w->cntoff;
}
*off = w->cntoff;
*bsz = nrd;
*buf = rab;
w->cntoff += nrd;
w->unconsumed = (size_t)nrd;
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
| 168,928 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RemoveActionCallback(const ActionCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(g_task_runner.Get());
DCHECK(g_task_runner.Get()->BelongsToCurrentThread());
std::vector<ActionCallback>* callbacks = g_callbacks.Pointer();
for (size_t i = 0; i < callbacks->size(); ++i) {
if ((*callbacks)[i].Equals(callback)) {
callbacks->erase(callbacks->begin() + i);
return;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Convert Uses of base::RepeatingCallback<>::Equals to Use == or != in //base
Staging this change because some conversions will have semantic changes.
BUG=937566
Change-Id: I2d4950624c0fab00e107814421a161e43da965cc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1507245
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Charette <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Gabriel Charette <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#639702}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void RemoveActionCallback(const ActionCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(g_task_runner.Get());
DCHECK(g_task_runner.Get()->BelongsToCurrentThread());
std::vector<ActionCallback>* callbacks = g_callbacks.Pointer();
for (size_t i = 0; i < callbacks->size(); ++i) {
if ((*callbacks)[i] == callback) {
callbacks->erase(callbacks->begin() + i);
return;
}
}
}
| 172,099 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void FileSystemManagerImpl::CreateWriter(const GURL& file_path,
CreateWriterCallback callback) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
FileSystemURL url(context_->CrackURL(file_path));
base::Optional<base::File::Error> opt_error = ValidateFileSystemURL(url);
if (opt_error) {
std::move(callback).Run(opt_error.value(), nullptr);
return;
}
if (!security_policy_->CanWriteFileSystemFile(process_id_, url)) {
std::move(callback).Run(base::File::FILE_ERROR_SECURITY, nullptr);
return;
}
blink::mojom::FileWriterPtr writer;
mojo::MakeStrongBinding(std::make_unique<storage::FileWriterImpl>(
url, context_->CreateFileSystemOperationRunner(),
blob_storage_context_->context()->AsWeakPtr()),
MakeRequest(&writer));
std::move(callback).Run(base::File::FILE_OK, std::move(writer));
}
Commit Message: Disable FileSystemManager::CreateWriter if WritableFiles isn't enabled.
Bug: 922677
Change-Id: Ib16137cbabb2ec07f1ffc0484722f1d9cc533404
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1416570
Commit-Queue: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#623552}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | void FileSystemManagerImpl::CreateWriter(const GURL& file_path,
CreateWriterCallback callback) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(blink::features::kWritableFilesAPI)) {
bindings_.ReportBadMessage("FileSystemManager.CreateWriter");
return;
}
FileSystemURL url(context_->CrackURL(file_path));
base::Optional<base::File::Error> opt_error = ValidateFileSystemURL(url);
if (opt_error) {
std::move(callback).Run(opt_error.value(), nullptr);
return;
}
if (!security_policy_->CanWriteFileSystemFile(process_id_, url)) {
std::move(callback).Run(base::File::FILE_ERROR_SECURITY, nullptr);
return;
}
blink::mojom::FileWriterPtr writer;
mojo::MakeStrongBinding(std::make_unique<storage::FileWriterImpl>(
url, context_->CreateFileSystemOperationRunner(),
blob_storage_context_->context()->AsWeakPtr()),
MakeRequest(&writer));
std::move(callback).Run(base::File::FILE_OK, std::move(writer));
}
| 173,077 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xsltCompileIdKeyPattern(xsltParserContextPtr ctxt, xmlChar *name,
int aid, int novar, xsltAxis axis) {
xmlChar *lit = NULL;
xmlChar *lit2 = NULL;
if (CUR != '(') {
xsltTransformError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
"xsltCompileIdKeyPattern : ( expected\n");
ctxt->error = 1;
return;
}
if ((aid) && (xmlStrEqual(name, (const xmlChar *)"id"))) {
if (axis != 0) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
"xsltCompileIdKeyPattern : NodeTest expected\n");
ctxt->error = 1;
return;
}
NEXT;
SKIP_BLANKS;
lit = xsltScanLiteral(ctxt);
if (ctxt->error) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
"xsltCompileIdKeyPattern : Literal expected\n");
return;
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (CUR != ')') {
xsltTransformError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
"xsltCompileIdKeyPattern : ) expected\n");
xmlFree(lit);
ctxt->error = 1;
return;
}
NEXT;
PUSH(XSLT_OP_ID, lit, NULL, novar);
lit = NULL;
} else if ((aid) && (xmlStrEqual(name, (const xmlChar *)"key"))) {
if (axis != 0) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
"xsltCompileIdKeyPattern : NodeTest expected\n");
ctxt->error = 1;
return;
}
NEXT;
SKIP_BLANKS;
lit = xsltScanLiteral(ctxt);
if (ctxt->error) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
"xsltCompileIdKeyPattern : Literal expected\n");
return;
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (CUR != ',') {
xsltTransformError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
"xsltCompileIdKeyPattern : , expected\n");
ctxt->error = 1;
return;
}
NEXT;
SKIP_BLANKS;
lit2 = xsltScanLiteral(ctxt);
if (ctxt->error) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
"xsltCompileIdKeyPattern : Literal expected\n");
xmlFree(lit);
return;
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (CUR != ')') {
xsltTransformError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
"xsltCompileIdKeyPattern : ) expected\n");
xmlFree(lit);
xmlFree(lit2);
ctxt->error = 1;
return;
}
NEXT;
/* URGENT TODO: support namespace in keys */
PUSH(XSLT_OP_KEY, lit, lit2, novar);
lit = NULL;
lit2 = NULL;
} else if (xmlStrEqual(name, (const xmlChar *)"processing-instruction")) {
NEXT;
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (CUR != ')') {
lit = xsltScanLiteral(ctxt);
if (ctxt->error) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
"xsltCompileIdKeyPattern : Literal expected\n");
return;
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (CUR != ')') {
xsltTransformError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
"xsltCompileIdKeyPattern : ) expected\n");
ctxt->error = 1;
return;
}
}
NEXT;
PUSH(XSLT_OP_PI, lit, NULL, novar);
lit = NULL;
} else if (xmlStrEqual(name, (const xmlChar *)"text")) {
NEXT;
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (CUR != ')') {
xsltTransformError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
"xsltCompileIdKeyPattern : ) expected\n");
ctxt->error = 1;
return;
}
NEXT;
PUSH(XSLT_OP_TEXT, NULL, NULL, novar);
} else if (xmlStrEqual(name, (const xmlChar *)"comment")) {
NEXT;
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (CUR != ')') {
xsltTransformError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
"xsltCompileIdKeyPattern : ) expected\n");
ctxt->error = 1;
return;
}
NEXT;
PUSH(XSLT_OP_COMMENT, NULL, NULL, novar);
} else if (xmlStrEqual(name, (const xmlChar *)"node")) {
NEXT;
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (CUR != ')') {
xsltTransformError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
"xsltCompileIdKeyPattern : ) expected\n");
ctxt->error = 1;
return;
}
NEXT;
if (axis == AXIS_ATTRIBUTE) {
PUSH(XSLT_OP_ATTR, NULL, NULL, novar);
}
else {
PUSH(XSLT_OP_NODE, NULL, NULL, novar);
}
} else if (aid) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
"xsltCompileIdKeyPattern : expecting 'key' or 'id' or node type\n");
ctxt->error = 1;
return;
} else {
xsltTransformError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
"xsltCompileIdKeyPattern : node type\n");
ctxt->error = 1;
return;
}
error:
return;
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | xsltCompileIdKeyPattern(xsltParserContextPtr ctxt, xmlChar *name,
int aid, int novar, xsltAxis axis) {
xmlChar *lit = NULL;
xmlChar *lit2 = NULL;
if (CUR != '(') {
xsltTransformError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
"xsltCompileIdKeyPattern : ( expected\n");
ctxt->error = 1;
return;
}
if ((aid) && (xmlStrEqual(name, (const xmlChar *)"id"))) {
if (axis != 0) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
"xsltCompileIdKeyPattern : NodeTest expected\n");
ctxt->error = 1;
return;
}
NEXT;
SKIP_BLANKS;
lit = xsltScanLiteral(ctxt);
if (ctxt->error) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
"xsltCompileIdKeyPattern : Literal expected\n");
return;
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (CUR != ')') {
xsltTransformError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
"xsltCompileIdKeyPattern : ) expected\n");
xmlFree(lit);
ctxt->error = 1;
return;
}
NEXT;
PUSH(XSLT_OP_ID, lit, NULL, novar);
lit = NULL;
} else if ((aid) && (xmlStrEqual(name, (const xmlChar *)"key"))) {
if (axis != 0) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
"xsltCompileIdKeyPattern : NodeTest expected\n");
ctxt->error = 1;
return;
}
NEXT;
SKIP_BLANKS;
lit = xsltScanLiteral(ctxt);
if (ctxt->error) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
"xsltCompileIdKeyPattern : Literal expected\n");
return;
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (CUR != ',') {
xsltTransformError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
"xsltCompileIdKeyPattern : , expected\n");
xmlFree(lit);
ctxt->error = 1;
return;
}
NEXT;
SKIP_BLANKS;
lit2 = xsltScanLiteral(ctxt);
if (ctxt->error) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
"xsltCompileIdKeyPattern : Literal expected\n");
xmlFree(lit);
return;
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (CUR != ')') {
xsltTransformError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
"xsltCompileIdKeyPattern : ) expected\n");
xmlFree(lit);
xmlFree(lit2);
ctxt->error = 1;
return;
}
NEXT;
/* URGENT TODO: support namespace in keys */
PUSH(XSLT_OP_KEY, lit, lit2, novar);
lit = NULL;
lit2 = NULL;
} else if (xmlStrEqual(name, (const xmlChar *)"processing-instruction")) {
NEXT;
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (CUR != ')') {
lit = xsltScanLiteral(ctxt);
if (ctxt->error) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
"xsltCompileIdKeyPattern : Literal expected\n");
return;
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (CUR != ')') {
xsltTransformError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
"xsltCompileIdKeyPattern : ) expected\n");
ctxt->error = 1;
return;
}
}
NEXT;
PUSH(XSLT_OP_PI, lit, NULL, novar);
lit = NULL;
} else if (xmlStrEqual(name, (const xmlChar *)"text")) {
NEXT;
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (CUR != ')') {
xsltTransformError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
"xsltCompileIdKeyPattern : ) expected\n");
ctxt->error = 1;
return;
}
NEXT;
PUSH(XSLT_OP_TEXT, NULL, NULL, novar);
} else if (xmlStrEqual(name, (const xmlChar *)"comment")) {
NEXT;
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (CUR != ')') {
xsltTransformError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
"xsltCompileIdKeyPattern : ) expected\n");
ctxt->error = 1;
return;
}
NEXT;
PUSH(XSLT_OP_COMMENT, NULL, NULL, novar);
} else if (xmlStrEqual(name, (const xmlChar *)"node")) {
NEXT;
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (CUR != ')') {
xsltTransformError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
"xsltCompileIdKeyPattern : ) expected\n");
ctxt->error = 1;
return;
}
NEXT;
if (axis == AXIS_ATTRIBUTE) {
PUSH(XSLT_OP_ATTR, NULL, NULL, novar);
}
else {
PUSH(XSLT_OP_NODE, NULL, NULL, novar);
}
} else if (aid) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
"xsltCompileIdKeyPattern : expecting 'key' or 'id' or node type\n");
ctxt->error = 1;
return;
} else {
xsltTransformError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
"xsltCompileIdKeyPattern : node type\n");
ctxt->error = 1;
return;
}
error:
return;
}
| 173,311 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: zsetstrokecolorspace(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p)
{
int code;
zsetstrokecolorspace(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p)
{
int code;
code = zswapcolors(i_ctx_p);
if (code < 0)
/* Now, the actual continuation routine */
push_op_estack(setstrokecolorspace_cont);
code = zsetcolorspace(i_ctx_p);
if (code >= 0)
return o_push_estack;
return code;
}
if (code >= 0)
return o_push_estack;
return code;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | zsetstrokecolorspace(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p)
{
int code;
zsetstrokecolorspace(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p)
{
int code;
es_ptr iesp = esp; /* preserve exec stack in case of error */
code = zswapcolors(i_ctx_p);
if (code < 0)
/* Now, the actual continuation routine */
push_op_estack(setstrokecolorspace_cont);
code = zsetcolorspace(i_ctx_p);
if (code >= 0)
return o_push_estack;
return code;
}
if (code >= 0)
return o_push_estack;
/* Something went wrong, swap back to the non-stroking space and restore the exec stack */
esp = iesp;
(void)zswapcolors(i_ctx_p);
return code;
}
| 164,700 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: GLboolean WebGLRenderingContextBase::isTexture(WebGLTexture* texture) {
if (!texture || isContextLost())
return 0;
if (!texture->HasEverBeenBound())
return 0;
if (texture->IsDeleted())
return 0;
return ContextGL()->IsTexture(texture->Object());
}
Commit Message: Validate all incoming WebGLObjects.
A few entry points were missing the correct validation.
Tested with improved conformance tests in
https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2654 .
Bug: 848914
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ib98a61cc5bf378d1b3338b04acd7e1bc4c2fe008
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1086718
Reviewed-by: Kai Ninomiya <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#565016}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | GLboolean WebGLRenderingContextBase::isTexture(WebGLTexture* texture) {
if (!texture || isContextLost() || !texture->Validate(ContextGroup(), this))
return 0;
if (!texture->HasEverBeenBound())
return 0;
if (texture->IsDeleted())
return 0;
return ContextGL()->IsTexture(texture->Object());
}
| 173,133 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: vrrp_tfile_end_handler(void)
{
vrrp_tracked_file_t *tfile = LIST_TAIL_DATA(vrrp_data->vrrp_track_files);
struct stat statb;
FILE *tf;
int ret;
if (!tfile->file_path) {
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "No file set for track_file %s - removing", tfile->fname);
free_list_element(vrrp_data->vrrp_track_files, vrrp_data->vrrp_track_files->tail);
return;
}
if (track_file_init == TRACK_FILE_NO_INIT)
return;
ret = stat(tfile->file_path, &statb);
if (!ret) {
if (track_file_init == TRACK_FILE_CREATE) {
/* The file exists */
return;
}
if ((statb.st_mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFREG) {
/* It is not a regular file */
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "Cannot initialise track file %s - it is not a regular file", tfile->fname);
return;
}
/* Don't overwrite a file on reload */
if (reload)
return;
}
if (!__test_bit(CONFIG_TEST_BIT, &debug)) {
/* Write the value to the file */
if ((tf = fopen(tfile->file_path, "w"))) {
fprintf(tf, "%d\n", track_file_init_value);
fclose(tf);
}
else
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "Unable to initialise track file %s", tfile->fname);
}
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | vrrp_tfile_end_handler(void)
{
vrrp_tracked_file_t *tfile = LIST_TAIL_DATA(vrrp_data->vrrp_track_files);
struct stat statb;
FILE *tf;
int ret;
if (!tfile->file_path) {
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "No file set for track_file %s - removing", tfile->fname);
free_list_element(vrrp_data->vrrp_track_files, vrrp_data->vrrp_track_files->tail);
return;
}
if (track_file_init == TRACK_FILE_NO_INIT)
return;
ret = stat(tfile->file_path, &statb);
if (!ret) {
if (track_file_init == TRACK_FILE_CREATE) {
/* The file exists */
return;
}
if ((statb.st_mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFREG) {
/* It is not a regular file */
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "Cannot initialise track file %s - it is not a regular file", tfile->fname);
return;
}
/* Don't overwrite a file on reload */
if (reload)
return;
}
if (!__test_bit(CONFIG_TEST_BIT, &debug)) {
/* Write the value to the file */
if ((tf = fopen_safe(tfile->file_path, "w"))) {
fprintf(tf, "%d\n", track_file_init_value);
fclose(tf);
}
else
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "Unable to initialise track file %s", tfile->fname);
}
}
| 168,990 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CrosLibrary::TestApi::SetNetworkLibrary(
NetworkLibrary* library, bool own) {
library_->network_lib_.SetImpl(library, own);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | void CrosLibrary::TestApi::SetNetworkLibrary(
| 170,642 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: header_put_be_short (SF_PRIVATE *psf, int x)
{ if (psf->headindex < SIGNED_SIZEOF (psf->header) - 2)
{ psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 8) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = x ;
} ;
} /* header_put_be_short */
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | header_put_be_short (SF_PRIVATE *psf, int x)
{ psf->header.ptr [psf->header.indx++] = (x >> 8) ;
psf->header.ptr [psf->header.indx++] = x ;
} /* header_put_be_short */
| 170,052 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void TraceEvent::AppendAsJSON(
std::string* out,
const ArgumentFilterPredicate& argument_filter_predicate) const {
int64 time_int64 = timestamp_.ToInternalValue();
int process_id = TraceLog::GetInstance()->process_id();
const char* category_group_name =
TraceLog::GetCategoryGroupName(category_group_enabled_);
DCHECK(!strchr(name_, '"'));
StringAppendF(out, "{\"pid\":%i,\"tid\":%i,\"ts\":%" PRId64
","
"\"ph\":\"%c\",\"cat\":\"%s\",\"name\":\"%s\",\"args\":",
process_id, thread_id_, time_int64, phase_, category_group_name,
name_);
bool strip_args = arg_names_[0] && !argument_filter_predicate.is_null() &&
!argument_filter_predicate.Run(category_group_name, name_);
if (strip_args) {
*out += "\"__stripped__\"";
} else {
*out += "{";
for (int i = 0; i < kTraceMaxNumArgs && arg_names_[i]; ++i) {
if (i > 0)
*out += ",";
*out += "\"";
*out += arg_names_[i];
*out += "\":";
if (arg_types_[i] == TRACE_VALUE_TYPE_CONVERTABLE)
convertable_values_[i]->AppendAsTraceFormat(out);
else
AppendValueAsJSON(arg_types_[i], arg_values_[i], out);
}
*out += "}";
}
if (phase_ == TRACE_EVENT_PHASE_COMPLETE) {
int64 duration = duration_.ToInternalValue();
if (duration != -1)
StringAppendF(out, ",\"dur\":%" PRId64, duration);
if (!thread_timestamp_.is_null()) {
int64 thread_duration = thread_duration_.ToInternalValue();
if (thread_duration != -1)
StringAppendF(out, ",\"tdur\":%" PRId64, thread_duration);
}
}
if (!thread_timestamp_.is_null()) {
int64 thread_time_int64 = thread_timestamp_.ToInternalValue();
StringAppendF(out, ",\"tts\":%" PRId64, thread_time_int64);
}
if (flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_ASYNC_TTS) {
StringAppendF(out, ", \"use_async_tts\":1");
}
if (flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_HAS_ID)
StringAppendF(out, ",\"id\":\"0x%" PRIx64 "\"", static_cast<uint64>(id_));
if (flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_BIND_TO_ENCLOSING)
StringAppendF(out, ",\"bp\":\"e\"");
if ((flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_FLOW_OUT) ||
(flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_FLOW_IN)) {
StringAppendF(out, ",\"bind_id\":\"0x%" PRIx64 "\"",
static_cast<uint64>(bind_id_));
}
if (flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_FLOW_IN)
StringAppendF(out, ",\"flow_in\":true");
if (flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_FLOW_OUT)
StringAppendF(out, ",\"flow_out\":true");
if (flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_HAS_CONTEXT_ID)
StringAppendF(out, ",\"cid\":\"0x%" PRIx64 "\"",
static_cast<uint64>(context_id_));
if (phase_ == TRACE_EVENT_PHASE_INSTANT) {
char scope = '?';
switch (flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_SCOPE_MASK) {
case TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_GLOBAL:
scope = TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_NAME_GLOBAL;
break;
case TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_PROCESS:
scope = TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_NAME_PROCESS;
break;
case TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_THREAD:
scope = TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_NAME_THREAD;
break;
}
StringAppendF(out, ",\"s\":\"%c\"", scope);
}
*out += "}";
}
Commit Message: Tracing: Add support for PII whitelisting of individual trace event arguments
R=dsinclair,shatch
BUG=546093
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1415013003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356690}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void TraceEvent::AppendAsJSON(
std::string* out,
const ArgumentFilterPredicate& argument_filter_predicate) const {
int64 time_int64 = timestamp_.ToInternalValue();
int process_id = TraceLog::GetInstance()->process_id();
const char* category_group_name =
TraceLog::GetCategoryGroupName(category_group_enabled_);
DCHECK(!strchr(name_, '"'));
StringAppendF(out, "{\"pid\":%i,\"tid\":%i,\"ts\":%" PRId64
","
"\"ph\":\"%c\",\"cat\":\"%s\",\"name\":\"%s\",\"args\":",
process_id, thread_id_, time_int64, phase_, category_group_name,
name_);
// TODO(oysteine): The dual predicates here is a bit ugly; if the filtering
// capabilities need to grow even more precise we should rethink this
// approach
ArgumentNameFilterPredicate argument_name_filter_predicate;
bool strip_args =
arg_names_[0] && !argument_filter_predicate.is_null() &&
!argument_filter_predicate.Run(category_group_name, name_,
&argument_name_filter_predicate);
if (strip_args) {
*out += "\"__stripped__\"";
} else {
*out += "{";
for (int i = 0; i < kTraceMaxNumArgs && arg_names_[i]; ++i) {
if (i > 0)
*out += ",";
*out += "\"";
*out += arg_names_[i];
*out += "\":";
if (argument_name_filter_predicate.is_null() ||
argument_name_filter_predicate.Run(arg_names_[i])) {
if (arg_types_[i] == TRACE_VALUE_TYPE_CONVERTABLE)
convertable_values_[i]->AppendAsTraceFormat(out);
else
AppendValueAsJSON(arg_types_[i], arg_values_[i], out);
} else {
*out += "\"__stripped__\"";
}
}
*out += "}";
}
if (phase_ == TRACE_EVENT_PHASE_COMPLETE) {
int64 duration = duration_.ToInternalValue();
if (duration != -1)
StringAppendF(out, ",\"dur\":%" PRId64, duration);
if (!thread_timestamp_.is_null()) {
int64 thread_duration = thread_duration_.ToInternalValue();
if (thread_duration != -1)
StringAppendF(out, ",\"tdur\":%" PRId64, thread_duration);
}
}
if (!thread_timestamp_.is_null()) {
int64 thread_time_int64 = thread_timestamp_.ToInternalValue();
StringAppendF(out, ",\"tts\":%" PRId64, thread_time_int64);
}
if (flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_ASYNC_TTS) {
StringAppendF(out, ", \"use_async_tts\":1");
}
if (flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_HAS_ID)
StringAppendF(out, ",\"id\":\"0x%" PRIx64 "\"", static_cast<uint64>(id_));
if (flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_BIND_TO_ENCLOSING)
StringAppendF(out, ",\"bp\":\"e\"");
if ((flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_FLOW_OUT) ||
(flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_FLOW_IN)) {
StringAppendF(out, ",\"bind_id\":\"0x%" PRIx64 "\"",
static_cast<uint64>(bind_id_));
}
if (flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_FLOW_IN)
StringAppendF(out, ",\"flow_in\":true");
if (flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_FLOW_OUT)
StringAppendF(out, ",\"flow_out\":true");
if (flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_HAS_CONTEXT_ID)
StringAppendF(out, ",\"cid\":\"0x%" PRIx64 "\"",
static_cast<uint64>(context_id_));
if (phase_ == TRACE_EVENT_PHASE_INSTANT) {
char scope = '?';
switch (flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_SCOPE_MASK) {
case TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_GLOBAL:
scope = TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_NAME_GLOBAL;
break;
case TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_PROCESS:
scope = TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_NAME_PROCESS;
break;
case TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_THREAD:
scope = TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_NAME_THREAD;
break;
}
StringAppendF(out, ",\"s\":\"%c\"", scope);
}
*out += "}";
}
| 171,678 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void UtilityServiceFactory::RegisterServices(ServiceMap* services) {
GetContentClient()->utility()->RegisterServices(services);
service_manager::EmbeddedServiceInfo video_capture_info;
video_capture_info.factory = base::Bind(&CreateVideoCaptureService);
services->insert(
std::make_pair(video_capture::mojom::kServiceName, video_capture_info));
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PEPPER_CDMS)
service_manager::EmbeddedServiceInfo info;
info.factory = base::Bind(&CreateMediaService);
services->insert(std::make_pair(media::mojom::kMediaServiceName, info));
#endif
service_manager::EmbeddedServiceInfo shape_detection_info;
shape_detection_info.factory =
base::Bind(&shape_detection::ShapeDetectionService::Create);
services->insert(std::make_pair(shape_detection::mojom::kServiceName,
shape_detection_info));
service_manager::EmbeddedServiceInfo data_decoder_info;
data_decoder_info.factory = base::Bind(&CreateDataDecoderService);
services->insert(
std::make_pair(data_decoder::mojom::kServiceName, data_decoder_info));
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kNetworkService)) {
GetContentClient()->utility()->RegisterNetworkBinders(
network_registry_.get());
service_manager::EmbeddedServiceInfo network_info;
network_info.factory = base::Bind(
&UtilityServiceFactory::CreateNetworkService, base::Unretained(this));
network_info.task_runner = ChildProcess::current()->io_task_runner();
services->insert(
std::make_pair(content::mojom::kNetworkServiceName, network_info));
}
}
Commit Message: media: Support hosting mojo CDM in a standalone service
Currently when mojo CDM is enabled it is hosted in the MediaService
running in the process specified by "mojo_media_host". However, on
some platforms we need to run mojo CDM and other mojo media services in
different processes. For example, on desktop platforms, we want to run
mojo video decoder in the GPU process, but run the mojo CDM in the
utility process.
This CL adds a new build flag "enable_standalone_cdm_service". When
enabled, the mojo CDM service will be hosted in a standalone "cdm"
service running in the utility process. All other mojo media services
will sill be hosted in the "media" servie running in the process
specified by "mojo_media_host".
BUG=664364
TEST=Encrypted media browser tests using mojo CDM is still working.
Change-Id: I95be6e05adc9ebcff966b26958ef1d7becdfb487
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/567172
Commit-Queue: Xiaohan Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dan Sanders <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486947}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void UtilityServiceFactory::RegisterServices(ServiceMap* services) {
GetContentClient()->utility()->RegisterServices(services);
service_manager::EmbeddedServiceInfo video_capture_info;
video_capture_info.factory = base::Bind(&CreateVideoCaptureService);
services->insert(
std::make_pair(video_capture::mojom::kServiceName, video_capture_info));
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PEPPER_CDMS)
service_manager::EmbeddedServiceInfo info;
info.factory = base::Bind(&CreateCdmService);
services->insert(std::make_pair(media::mojom::kCdmServiceName, info));
#endif
service_manager::EmbeddedServiceInfo shape_detection_info;
shape_detection_info.factory =
base::Bind(&shape_detection::ShapeDetectionService::Create);
services->insert(std::make_pair(shape_detection::mojom::kServiceName,
shape_detection_info));
service_manager::EmbeddedServiceInfo data_decoder_info;
data_decoder_info.factory = base::Bind(&CreateDataDecoderService);
services->insert(
std::make_pair(data_decoder::mojom::kServiceName, data_decoder_info));
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kNetworkService)) {
GetContentClient()->utility()->RegisterNetworkBinders(
network_registry_.get());
service_manager::EmbeddedServiceInfo network_info;
network_info.factory = base::Bind(
&UtilityServiceFactory::CreateNetworkService, base::Unretained(this));
network_info.task_runner = ChildProcess::current()->io_task_runner();
services->insert(
std::make_pair(content::mojom::kNetworkServiceName, network_info));
}
}
| 171,942 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SelectionController::SetNonDirectionalSelectionIfNeeded(
const SelectionInFlatTree& passed_selection,
TextGranularity granularity,
EndPointsAdjustmentMode endpoints_adjustment_mode,
HandleVisibility handle_visibility) {
GetDocument().UpdateStyleAndLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
const VisibleSelectionInFlatTree& new_selection =
CreateVisibleSelection(passed_selection);
const PositionInFlatTree& base_position =
original_base_in_flat_tree_.GetPosition();
const VisiblePositionInFlatTree& original_base =
base_position.IsConnected() ? CreateVisiblePosition(base_position)
: VisiblePositionInFlatTree();
const VisiblePositionInFlatTree& base =
original_base.IsNotNull() ? original_base
: CreateVisiblePosition(new_selection.Base());
const VisiblePositionInFlatTree& extent =
CreateVisiblePosition(new_selection.Extent());
const SelectionInFlatTree& adjusted_selection =
endpoints_adjustment_mode == kAdjustEndpointsAtBidiBoundary
? AdjustEndpointsAtBidiBoundary(base, extent)
: SelectionInFlatTree::Builder()
.SetBaseAndExtent(base.DeepEquivalent(),
extent.DeepEquivalent())
.Build();
SelectionInFlatTree::Builder builder(new_selection.AsSelection());
if (adjusted_selection.Base() != base.DeepEquivalent() ||
adjusted_selection.Extent() != extent.DeepEquivalent()) {
original_base_in_flat_tree_ = base.ToPositionWithAffinity();
SetContext(&GetDocument());
builder.SetBaseAndExtent(adjusted_selection.Base(),
adjusted_selection.Extent());
} else if (original_base.IsNotNull()) {
if (CreateVisiblePosition(
Selection().ComputeVisibleSelectionInFlatTree().Base())
.DeepEquivalent() ==
CreateVisiblePosition(new_selection.Base()).DeepEquivalent()) {
builder.SetBaseAndExtent(original_base.DeepEquivalent(),
new_selection.Extent());
}
original_base_in_flat_tree_ = PositionInFlatTreeWithAffinity();
}
builder.SetIsHandleVisible(handle_visibility == HandleVisibility::kVisible);
const SelectionInFlatTree& selection_in_flat_tree = builder.Build();
if (Selection().ComputeVisibleSelectionInFlatTree() ==
CreateVisibleSelection(selection_in_flat_tree) &&
Selection().IsHandleVisible() == selection_in_flat_tree.IsHandleVisible())
return;
Selection().SetSelection(
ConvertToSelectionInDOMTree(selection_in_flat_tree),
SetSelectionData::Builder()
.SetShouldCloseTyping(true)
.SetShouldClearTypingStyle(true)
.SetCursorAlignOnScroll(CursorAlignOnScroll::kIfNeeded)
.SetGranularity(granularity)
.Build());
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void SelectionController::SetNonDirectionalSelectionIfNeeded(
const SelectionInFlatTree& passed_selection,
TextGranularity granularity,
EndPointsAdjustmentMode endpoints_adjustment_mode,
HandleVisibility handle_visibility) {
GetDocument().UpdateStyleAndLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
const VisibleSelectionInFlatTree& new_selection =
CreateVisibleSelection(passed_selection);
const PositionInFlatTree& base_position =
original_base_in_flat_tree_.GetPosition();
const VisiblePositionInFlatTree& original_base =
base_position.IsConnected() ? CreateVisiblePosition(base_position)
: VisiblePositionInFlatTree();
const VisiblePositionInFlatTree& base =
original_base.IsNotNull() ? original_base
: CreateVisiblePosition(new_selection.Base());
const VisiblePositionInFlatTree& extent =
CreateVisiblePosition(new_selection.Extent());
const SelectionInFlatTree& adjusted_selection =
endpoints_adjustment_mode == kAdjustEndpointsAtBidiBoundary
? AdjustEndpointsAtBidiBoundary(base, extent)
: SelectionInFlatTree::Builder()
.SetBaseAndExtent(base.DeepEquivalent(),
extent.DeepEquivalent())
.Build();
SelectionInFlatTree::Builder builder(new_selection.AsSelection());
if (adjusted_selection.Base() != base.DeepEquivalent() ||
adjusted_selection.Extent() != extent.DeepEquivalent()) {
original_base_in_flat_tree_ = base.ToPositionWithAffinity();
SetContext(&GetDocument());
builder.SetBaseAndExtent(adjusted_selection.Base(),
adjusted_selection.Extent());
} else if (original_base.IsNotNull()) {
if (CreateVisiblePosition(
Selection().ComputeVisibleSelectionInFlatTree().Base())
.DeepEquivalent() ==
CreateVisiblePosition(new_selection.Base()).DeepEquivalent()) {
builder.SetBaseAndExtent(original_base.DeepEquivalent(),
new_selection.Extent());
}
original_base_in_flat_tree_ = PositionInFlatTreeWithAffinity();
}
const SelectionInFlatTree& selection_in_flat_tree = builder.Build();
const bool should_show_handle =
handle_visibility == HandleVisibility::kVisible;
if (Selection().ComputeVisibleSelectionInFlatTree() ==
CreateVisibleSelection(selection_in_flat_tree) &&
Selection().IsHandleVisible() == should_show_handle)
return;
Selection().SetSelection(
ConvertToSelectionInDOMTree(selection_in_flat_tree),
SetSelectionData::Builder()
.SetShouldCloseTyping(true)
.SetShouldClearTypingStyle(true)
.SetCursorAlignOnScroll(CursorAlignOnScroll::kIfNeeded)
.SetGranularity(granularity)
.SetShouldShowHandle(should_show_handle)
.Build());
}
| 171,763 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void comps_objrtree_unite(COMPS_ObjRTree *rt1, COMPS_ObjRTree *rt2) {
COMPS_HSList *tmplist, *tmp_subnodes;
COMPS_HSListItem *it;
struct Pair {
COMPS_HSList * subnodes;
char * key;
char added;
} *pair, *parent_pair;
pair = malloc(sizeof(struct Pair));
pair->subnodes = rt2->subnodes;
pair->key = NULL;
tmplist = comps_hslist_create();
comps_hslist_init(tmplist, NULL, NULL, &free);
comps_hslist_append(tmplist, pair, 0);
while (tmplist->first != NULL) {
it = tmplist->first;
comps_hslist_remove(tmplist, tmplist->first);
tmp_subnodes = ((struct Pair*)it->data)->subnodes;
parent_pair = (struct Pair*) it->data;
free(it);
pair = malloc(sizeof(struct Pair));
pair->subnodes = ((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)it->data)->subnodes;
if (parent_pair->key != NULL) {
pair->key = malloc(sizeof(char)
* (strlen(((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)it->data)->key)
+ strlen(parent_pair->key) + 1));
memcpy(pair->key, parent_pair->key,
sizeof(char) * strlen(parent_pair->key));
memcpy(pair->key + strlen(parent_pair->key),
((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)it->data)->key,
sizeof(char)*(strlen(((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)it->data)->key)+1));
} else {
pair->key = malloc(sizeof(char)*
(strlen(((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)it->data)->key) +1));
memcpy(pair->key, ((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)it->data)->key,
sizeof(char)*(strlen(((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)it->data)->key)+1));
}
/* current node has data */
if (((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)it->data)->data != NULL) {
comps_objrtree_set(rt1, pair->key,
(((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)it->data)->data));
}
if (((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)it->data)->subnodes->first) {
comps_hslist_append(tmplist, pair, 0);
} else {
free(pair->key);
free(pair);
}
}
free(parent_pair->key);
free(parent_pair);
}
comps_hslist_destroy(&tmplist);
}
Commit Message: Fix UAF in comps_objmrtree_unite function
The added field is not used at all in many places and it is probably the
left-over of some copy-paste.
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void comps_objrtree_unite(COMPS_ObjRTree *rt1, COMPS_ObjRTree *rt2) {
COMPS_HSList *tmplist, *tmp_subnodes;
COMPS_HSListItem *it;
struct Pair {
COMPS_HSList * subnodes;
char * key;
} *pair, *parent_pair;
pair = malloc(sizeof(struct Pair));
pair->subnodes = rt2->subnodes;
pair->key = NULL;
tmplist = comps_hslist_create();
comps_hslist_init(tmplist, NULL, NULL, &free);
comps_hslist_append(tmplist, pair, 0);
while (tmplist->first != NULL) {
it = tmplist->first;
comps_hslist_remove(tmplist, tmplist->first);
tmp_subnodes = ((struct Pair*)it->data)->subnodes;
parent_pair = (struct Pair*) it->data;
free(it);
pair = malloc(sizeof(struct Pair));
pair->subnodes = ((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)it->data)->subnodes;
if (parent_pair->key != NULL) {
pair->key = malloc(sizeof(char)
* (strlen(((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)it->data)->key)
+ strlen(parent_pair->key) + 1));
memcpy(pair->key, parent_pair->key,
sizeof(char) * strlen(parent_pair->key));
memcpy(pair->key + strlen(parent_pair->key),
((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)it->data)->key,
sizeof(char)*(strlen(((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)it->data)->key)+1));
} else {
pair->key = malloc(sizeof(char)*
(strlen(((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)it->data)->key) +1));
memcpy(pair->key, ((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)it->data)->key,
sizeof(char)*(strlen(((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)it->data)->key)+1));
}
/* current node has data */
if (((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)it->data)->data != NULL) {
comps_objrtree_set(rt1, pair->key,
(((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)it->data)->data));
}
if (((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)it->data)->subnodes->first) {
comps_hslist_append(tmplist, pair, 0);
} else {
free(pair->key);
free(pair);
}
}
free(parent_pair->key);
free(parent_pair);
}
comps_hslist_destroy(&tmplist);
}
| 169,752 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: search_make_new(const struct search_state *const state, int n, const char *const base_name) {
const size_t base_len = strlen(base_name);
const char need_to_append_dot = base_name[base_len - 1] == '.' ? 0 : 1;
struct search_domain *dom;
for (dom = state->head; dom; dom = dom->next) {
if (!n--) {
/* this is the postfix we want */
/* the actual postfix string is kept at the end of the structure */
const u8 *const postfix = ((u8 *) dom) + sizeof(struct search_domain);
const int postfix_len = dom->len;
char *const newname = (char *) mm_malloc(base_len + need_to_append_dot + postfix_len + 1);
if (!newname) return NULL;
memcpy(newname, base_name, base_len);
if (need_to_append_dot) newname[base_len] = '.';
memcpy(newname + base_len + need_to_append_dot, postfix, postfix_len);
newname[base_len + need_to_append_dot + postfix_len] = 0;
return newname;
}
}
/* we ran off the end of the list and still didn't find the requested string */
EVUTIL_ASSERT(0);
return NULL; /* unreachable; stops warnings in some compilers. */
}
Commit Message: evdns: fix searching empty hostnames
From #332:
Here follows a bug report by **Guido Vranken** via the _Tor bug bounty program_. Please credit Guido accordingly.
## Bug report
The DNS code of Libevent contains this rather obvious OOB read:
```c
static char *
search_make_new(const struct search_state *const state, int n, const char *const base_name) {
const size_t base_len = strlen(base_name);
const char need_to_append_dot = base_name[base_len - 1] == '.' ? 0 : 1;
```
If the length of ```base_name``` is 0, then line 3125 reads 1 byte before the buffer. This will trigger a crash on ASAN-protected builds.
To reproduce:
Build libevent with ASAN:
```
$ CFLAGS='-fomit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address' ./configure && make -j4
```
Put the attached ```resolv.conf``` and ```poc.c``` in the source directory and then do:
```
$ gcc -fsanitize=address -fomit-frame-pointer poc.c .libs/libevent.a
$ ./a.out
=================================================================
==22201== ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60060000efdf at pc 0x4429da bp 0x7ffe1ed47300 sp 0x7ffe1ed472f8
READ of size 1 at 0x60060000efdf thread T0
```
P.S. we can add a check earlier, but since this is very uncommon, I didn't add it.
Fixes: #332
CWE ID: CWE-125 | search_make_new(const struct search_state *const state, int n, const char *const base_name) {
const size_t base_len = strlen(base_name);
char need_to_append_dot;
struct search_domain *dom;
if (!base_len) return NULL;
need_to_append_dot = base_name[base_len - 1] == '.' ? 0 : 1;
for (dom = state->head; dom; dom = dom->next) {
if (!n--) {
/* this is the postfix we want */
/* the actual postfix string is kept at the end of the structure */
const u8 *const postfix = ((u8 *) dom) + sizeof(struct search_domain);
const int postfix_len = dom->len;
char *const newname = (char *) mm_malloc(base_len + need_to_append_dot + postfix_len + 1);
if (!newname) return NULL;
memcpy(newname, base_name, base_len);
if (need_to_append_dot) newname[base_len] = '.';
memcpy(newname + base_len + need_to_append_dot, postfix, postfix_len);
newname[base_len + need_to_append_dot + postfix_len] = 0;
return newname;
}
}
/* we ran off the end of the list and still didn't find the requested string */
EVUTIL_ASSERT(0);
return NULL; /* unreachable; stops warnings in some compilers. */
}
| 168,491 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void DownloadCoreServiceImpl::SetDownloadManagerDelegateForTesting(
std::unique_ptr<ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate> new_delegate) {
manager_delegate_.swap(new_delegate);
DownloadManager* dm = BrowserContext::GetDownloadManager(profile_);
dm->SetDelegate(manager_delegate_.get());
manager_delegate_->SetDownloadManager(dm);
if (new_delegate)
new_delegate->Shutdown();
}
Commit Message: Don't downcast DownloadManagerDelegate to ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate.
DownloadManager has public SetDelegate method and tests and or other subsystems
can install their own implementations of the delegate.
Bug: 805905
Change-Id: Iecf1e0aceada0e1048bed1e2d2ceb29ca64295b8
TBR: tests updated to follow the API change.
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/894702
Reviewed-by: David Vallet <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Min Qin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533515}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | void DownloadCoreServiceImpl::SetDownloadManagerDelegateForTesting(
std::unique_ptr<ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate> new_delegate) {
manager_delegate_.swap(new_delegate);
DownloadManager* dm = BrowserContext::GetDownloadManager(profile_);
dm->SetDelegate(manager_delegate_.get());
if (manager_delegate_)
manager_delegate_->SetDownloadManager(dm);
download_manager_created_ = !!manager_delegate_;
if (new_delegate)
new_delegate->Shutdown();
}
| 173,169 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: w3m_exit(int i)
{
#ifdef USE_MIGEMO
init_migemo(); /* close pipe to migemo */
#endif
stopDownload();
deleteFiles();
#ifdef USE_SSL
free_ssl_ctx();
#endif
disconnectFTP();
#ifdef USE_NNTP
disconnectNews();
#endif
#ifdef __MINGW32_VERSION
WSACleanup();
#endif
exit(i);
}
Commit Message: Make temporary directory safely when ~/.w3m is unwritable
CWE ID: CWE-59 | w3m_exit(int i)
{
#ifdef USE_MIGEMO
init_migemo(); /* close pipe to migemo */
#endif
stopDownload();
deleteFiles();
#ifdef USE_SSL
free_ssl_ctx();
#endif
disconnectFTP();
#ifdef USE_NNTP
disconnectNews();
#endif
#ifdef __MINGW32_VERSION
WSACleanup();
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_MKDTEMP
if (no_rc_dir && tmp_dir != rc_dir)
if (rmdir(tmp_dir) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Can't remove temporary directory (%s)!\n", tmp_dir);
exit(1);
}
#endif
exit(i);
}
| 169,345 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(int secure,
int type,
unsigned int flags,
RAND_DRBG *parent)
{
RAND_DRBG *drbg = secure ? OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(sizeof(*drbg))
: OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*drbg));
if (drbg == NULL) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
drbg->secure = secure && CRYPTO_secure_allocated(drbg);
drbg->fork_count = rand_fork_count;
drbg->parent = parent;
if (parent == NULL) {
drbg->get_entropy = rand_drbg_get_entropy;
drbg->cleanup_entropy = rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy;
#ifndef RAND_DRBG_GET_RANDOM_NONCE
drbg->get_nonce = rand_drbg_get_nonce;
drbg->cleanup_nonce = rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce;
#endif
drbg->reseed_interval = master_reseed_interval;
drbg->reseed_time_interval = master_reseed_time_interval;
} else {
drbg->get_entropy = rand_drbg_get_entropy;
drbg->cleanup_entropy = rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy;
/*
* Do not provide nonce callbacks, the child DRBGs will
* obtain their nonce using random bits from the parent.
*/
drbg->reseed_interval = slave_reseed_interval;
drbg->reseed_time_interval = slave_reseed_time_interval;
}
if (RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, type, flags) == 0)
goto err;
if (parent != NULL) {
rand_drbg_lock(parent);
if (drbg->strength > parent->strength) {
/*
* We currently don't support the algorithm from NIST SP 800-90C
* 10.1.2 to use a weaker DRBG as source
*/
rand_drbg_unlock(parent);
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_NEW, RAND_R_PARENT_STRENGTH_TOO_WEAK);
goto err;
}
rand_drbg_unlock(parent);
}
return drbg;
err:
RAND_DRBG_free(drbg);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-330 | static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(int secure,
int type,
unsigned int flags,
RAND_DRBG *parent)
{
RAND_DRBG *drbg = secure ? OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(sizeof(*drbg))
: OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*drbg));
if (drbg == NULL) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
drbg->secure = secure && CRYPTO_secure_allocated(drbg);
drbg->fork_id = openssl_get_fork_id();
drbg->parent = parent;
if (parent == NULL) {
drbg->get_entropy = rand_drbg_get_entropy;
drbg->cleanup_entropy = rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy;
#ifndef RAND_DRBG_GET_RANDOM_NONCE
drbg->get_nonce = rand_drbg_get_nonce;
drbg->cleanup_nonce = rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce;
#endif
drbg->reseed_interval = master_reseed_interval;
drbg->reseed_time_interval = master_reseed_time_interval;
} else {
drbg->get_entropy = rand_drbg_get_entropy;
drbg->cleanup_entropy = rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy;
/*
* Do not provide nonce callbacks, the child DRBGs will
* obtain their nonce using random bits from the parent.
*/
drbg->reseed_interval = slave_reseed_interval;
drbg->reseed_time_interval = slave_reseed_time_interval;
}
if (RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, type, flags) == 0)
goto err;
if (parent != NULL) {
rand_drbg_lock(parent);
if (drbg->strength > parent->strength) {
/*
* We currently don't support the algorithm from NIST SP 800-90C
* 10.1.2 to use a weaker DRBG as source
*/
rand_drbg_unlock(parent);
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_NEW, RAND_R_PARENT_STRENGTH_TOO_WEAK);
goto err;
}
rand_drbg_unlock(parent);
}
return drbg;
err:
RAND_DRBG_free(drbg);
return NULL;
}
| 165,144 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool WebDriverCommand::Init(Response* const response) {
std::string session_id = GetPathVariable(2);
if (session_id.length() == 0) {
response->SetError(
new Error(kBadRequest, "No session ID specified"));
return false;
}
VLOG(1) << "Fetching session: " << session_id;
session_ = SessionManager::GetInstance()->GetSession(session_id);
if (session_ == NULL) {
response->SetError(
new Error(kSessionNotFound, "Session not found: " + session_id));
return false;
}
scoped_ptr<Error> error(session_->WaitForAllTabsToStopLoading());
if (error.get()) {
LOG(WARNING) << error->ToString();
}
error.reset(session_->SwitchToTopFrameIfCurrentFrameInvalid());
if (error.get()) {
LOG(WARNING) << error->ToString();
}
response->SetField("sessionId", Value::CreateStringValue(session_id));
return true;
}
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | bool WebDriverCommand::Init(Response* const response) {
std::string session_id = GetPathVariable(2);
if (session_id.length() == 0) {
response->SetError(
new Error(kBadRequest, "No session ID specified"));
return false;
}
session_ = SessionManager::GetInstance()->GetSession(session_id);
if (session_ == NULL) {
response->SetError(
new Error(kSessionNotFound, "Session not found: " + session_id));
return false;
}
LOG(INFO) << "Waiting for the page to stop loading";
Error* error = session_->WaitForAllTabsToStopLoading();
if (error) {
response->SetError(error);
return false;
}
LOG(INFO) << "Done waiting for the page to stop loading";
error = session_->SwitchToTopFrameIfCurrentFrameInvalid();
if (error) {
response->SetError(error);
return false;
}
response->SetField("sessionId", Value::CreateStringValue(session_id));
return true;
}
| 170,454 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: walk_string(fz_context *ctx, int uni, int remove, editable_str *str)
{
int rune;
if (str->utf8 == NULL)
return;
do
{
char *s = &str->utf8[str->pos];
size_t len;
int n = fz_chartorune(&rune, s);
if (rune == uni)
{
/* Match. Skip over that one. */
str->pos += n;
}
else if (uni == 32) {
/* We don't care if we're given whitespace
* and it doesn't match the string. Don't
* skip forward. Nothing to remove. */
break;
}
else if (rune == 32) {
/* The string has a whitespace, and we
* don't match it; that's forgivable as
* PDF often misses out spaces. Remove this
* if we are removing stuff. */
}
else
{
/* Mismatch. No point in tracking through any more. */
str->pos = -1;
break;
}
if (remove)
{
len = strlen(s+n);
memmove(s, s+n, len+1);
str->edited = 1;
}
}
while (rune != uni);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | walk_string(fz_context *ctx, int uni, int remove, editable_str *str)
{
int rune;
if (str->utf8 == NULL || str->pos == -1)
return;
do
{
char *s = &str->utf8[str->pos];
size_t len;
int n = fz_chartorune(&rune, s);
if (rune == uni)
{
/* Match. Skip over that one. */
str->pos += n;
}
else if (uni == 32) {
/* We don't care if we're given whitespace
* and it doesn't match the string. Don't
* skip forward. Nothing to remove. */
break;
}
else if (rune == 32) {
/* The string has a whitespace, and we
* don't match it; that's forgivable as
* PDF often misses out spaces. Remove this
* if we are removing stuff. */
}
else
{
/* Mismatch. No point in tracking through any more. */
str->pos = -1;
break;
}
if (remove)
{
len = strlen(s+n);
memmove(s, s+n, len+1);
str->edited = 1;
}
}
while (rune != uni);
}
| 164,660 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_module_is_block_algorithm_mode)
{
MCRYPT_GET_MODE_DIR_ARGS(modes_dir)
if (mcrypt_module_is_block_algorithm_mode(module, dir) == 1) {
RETURN_TRUE;
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows
CWE ID: CWE-190 | PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_module_is_block_algorithm_mode)
{
MCRYPT_GET_MODE_DIR_ARGS(modes_dir)
if (mcrypt_module_is_block_algorithm_mode(module, dir) == 1) {
RETURN_TRUE;
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
| 167,096 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int ASN1_TYPE_cmp(const ASN1_TYPE *a, const ASN1_TYPE *b)
{
int result = -1;
if (!a || !b || a->type != b->type)
return -1;
switch (a->type) {
case V_ASN1_OBJECT:
result = OBJ_cmp(a->value.object, b->value.object);
break;
case V_ASN1_BOOLEAN:
result = a->value.boolean - b->value.boolean;
break;
case V_ASN1_NULL:
result = 0; /* They do not have content. */
break;
case V_ASN1_INTEGER:
case V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER:
case V_ASN1_ENUMERATED:
case V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED:
case V_ASN1_BIT_STRING:
case V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING:
case V_ASN1_SEQUENCE:
case V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING:
case V_ASN1_SEQUENCE:
case V_ASN1_SET:
case V_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING:
case V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING:
case V_ASN1_T61STRING:
case V_ASN1_VIDEOTEXSTRING:
case V_ASN1_IA5STRING:
case V_ASN1_UTCTIME:
case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME:
case V_ASN1_GRAPHICSTRING:
case V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING:
case V_ASN1_GENERALSTRING:
case V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING:
case V_ASN1_BMPSTRING:
case V_ASN1_UTF8STRING:
case V_ASN1_OTHER:
default:
result = ASN1_STRING_cmp((ASN1_STRING *)a->value.ptr,
(ASN1_STRING *)b->value.ptr);
break;
}
return result;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | int ASN1_TYPE_cmp(const ASN1_TYPE *a, const ASN1_TYPE *b)
{
int result = -1;
if (!a || !b || a->type != b->type)
return -1;
switch (a->type) {
case V_ASN1_OBJECT:
result = OBJ_cmp(a->value.object, b->value.object);
break;
case V_ASN1_BOOLEAN:
result = a->value.boolean - b->value.boolean;
break;
case V_ASN1_NULL:
result = 0; /* They do not have content. */
break;
case V_ASN1_INTEGER:
case V_ASN1_ENUMERATED:
case V_ASN1_BIT_STRING:
case V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING:
case V_ASN1_SEQUENCE:
case V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING:
case V_ASN1_SEQUENCE:
case V_ASN1_SET:
case V_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING:
case V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING:
case V_ASN1_T61STRING:
case V_ASN1_VIDEOTEXSTRING:
case V_ASN1_IA5STRING:
case V_ASN1_UTCTIME:
case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME:
case V_ASN1_GRAPHICSTRING:
case V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING:
case V_ASN1_GENERALSTRING:
case V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING:
case V_ASN1_BMPSTRING:
case V_ASN1_UTF8STRING:
case V_ASN1_OTHER:
default:
result = ASN1_STRING_cmp((ASN1_STRING *)a->value.ptr,
(ASN1_STRING *)b->value.ptr);
break;
}
return result;
}
| 165,211 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void usage_exit() {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s <codec> <width> <height> <infile> <outfile>\n",
exec_name);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void usage_exit() {
void usage_exit(void) {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s <codec> <width> <height> <infile> <outfile>\n",
exec_name);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
| 174,494 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE4(epoll_ctl, int, epfd, int, op, int, fd,
struct epoll_event __user *, event)
{
int error;
int did_lock_epmutex = 0;
struct file *file, *tfile;
struct eventpoll *ep;
struct epitem *epi;
struct epoll_event epds;
error = -EFAULT;
if (ep_op_has_event(op) &&
copy_from_user(&epds, event, sizeof(struct epoll_event)))
goto error_return;
/* Get the "struct file *" for the eventpoll file */
error = -EBADF;
file = fget(epfd);
if (!file)
goto error_return;
/* Get the "struct file *" for the target file */
tfile = fget(fd);
if (!tfile)
goto error_fput;
/* The target file descriptor must support poll */
error = -EPERM;
if (!tfile->f_op || !tfile->f_op->poll)
goto error_tgt_fput;
/*
* We have to check that the file structure underneath the file descriptor
* the user passed to us _is_ an eventpoll file. And also we do not permit
* adding an epoll file descriptor inside itself.
*/
error = -EINVAL;
if (file == tfile || !is_file_epoll(file))
goto error_tgt_fput;
/*
* At this point it is safe to assume that the "private_data" contains
* our own data structure.
*/
ep = file->private_data;
/*
* When we insert an epoll file descriptor, inside another epoll file
* descriptor, there is the change of creating closed loops, which are
* better be handled here, than in more critical paths. While we are
* checking for loops we also determine the list of files reachable
* and hang them on the tfile_check_list, so we can check that we
* haven't created too many possible wakeup paths.
*
* We need to hold the epmutex across both ep_insert and ep_remove
* b/c we want to make sure we are looking at a coherent view of
* epoll network.
*/
if (op == EPOLL_CTL_ADD || op == EPOLL_CTL_DEL) {
mutex_lock(&epmutex);
did_lock_epmutex = 1;
}
if (op == EPOLL_CTL_ADD) {
if (is_file_epoll(tfile)) {
error = -ELOOP;
if (ep_loop_check(ep, tfile) != 0)
goto error_tgt_fput;
} else
list_add(&tfile->f_tfile_llink, &tfile_check_list);
}
mutex_lock_nested(&ep->mtx, 0);
/*
* Try to lookup the file inside our RB tree, Since we grabbed "mtx"
* above, we can be sure to be able to use the item looked up by
* ep_find() till we release the mutex.
*/
epi = ep_find(ep, tfile, fd);
error = -EINVAL;
switch (op) {
case EPOLL_CTL_ADD:
if (!epi) {
epds.events |= POLLERR | POLLHUP;
error = ep_insert(ep, &epds, tfile, fd);
} else
error = -EEXIST;
clear_tfile_check_list();
break;
case EPOLL_CTL_DEL:
if (epi)
error = ep_remove(ep, epi);
else
error = -ENOENT;
break;
case EPOLL_CTL_MOD:
if (epi) {
epds.events |= POLLERR | POLLHUP;
error = ep_modify(ep, epi, &epds);
} else
error = -ENOENT;
break;
}
mutex_unlock(&ep->mtx);
error_tgt_fput:
if (did_lock_epmutex)
mutex_unlock(&epmutex);
fput(tfile);
error_fput:
fput(file);
error_return:
return error;
}
Commit Message: epoll: clear the tfile_check_list on -ELOOP
An epoll_ctl(,EPOLL_CTL_ADD,,) operation can return '-ELOOP' to prevent
circular epoll dependencies from being created. However, in that case we
do not properly clear the 'tfile_check_list'. Thus, add a call to
clear_tfile_check_list() for the -ELOOP case.
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Yurij M. Plotnikov <[email protected]>
Cc: Nelson Elhage <[email protected]>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Alexandra N. Kossovsky <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | SYSCALL_DEFINE4(epoll_ctl, int, epfd, int, op, int, fd,
struct epoll_event __user *, event)
{
int error;
int did_lock_epmutex = 0;
struct file *file, *tfile;
struct eventpoll *ep;
struct epitem *epi;
struct epoll_event epds;
error = -EFAULT;
if (ep_op_has_event(op) &&
copy_from_user(&epds, event, sizeof(struct epoll_event)))
goto error_return;
/* Get the "struct file *" for the eventpoll file */
error = -EBADF;
file = fget(epfd);
if (!file)
goto error_return;
/* Get the "struct file *" for the target file */
tfile = fget(fd);
if (!tfile)
goto error_fput;
/* The target file descriptor must support poll */
error = -EPERM;
if (!tfile->f_op || !tfile->f_op->poll)
goto error_tgt_fput;
/*
* We have to check that the file structure underneath the file descriptor
* the user passed to us _is_ an eventpoll file. And also we do not permit
* adding an epoll file descriptor inside itself.
*/
error = -EINVAL;
if (file == tfile || !is_file_epoll(file))
goto error_tgt_fput;
/*
* At this point it is safe to assume that the "private_data" contains
* our own data structure.
*/
ep = file->private_data;
/*
* When we insert an epoll file descriptor, inside another epoll file
* descriptor, there is the change of creating closed loops, which are
* better be handled here, than in more critical paths. While we are
* checking for loops we also determine the list of files reachable
* and hang them on the tfile_check_list, so we can check that we
* haven't created too many possible wakeup paths.
*
* We need to hold the epmutex across both ep_insert and ep_remove
* b/c we want to make sure we are looking at a coherent view of
* epoll network.
*/
if (op == EPOLL_CTL_ADD || op == EPOLL_CTL_DEL) {
mutex_lock(&epmutex);
did_lock_epmutex = 1;
}
if (op == EPOLL_CTL_ADD) {
if (is_file_epoll(tfile)) {
error = -ELOOP;
if (ep_loop_check(ep, tfile) != 0) {
clear_tfile_check_list();
goto error_tgt_fput;
}
} else
list_add(&tfile->f_tfile_llink, &tfile_check_list);
}
mutex_lock_nested(&ep->mtx, 0);
/*
* Try to lookup the file inside our RB tree, Since we grabbed "mtx"
* above, we can be sure to be able to use the item looked up by
* ep_find() till we release the mutex.
*/
epi = ep_find(ep, tfile, fd);
error = -EINVAL;
switch (op) {
case EPOLL_CTL_ADD:
if (!epi) {
epds.events |= POLLERR | POLLHUP;
error = ep_insert(ep, &epds, tfile, fd);
} else
error = -EEXIST;
clear_tfile_check_list();
break;
case EPOLL_CTL_DEL:
if (epi)
error = ep_remove(ep, epi);
else
error = -ENOENT;
break;
case EPOLL_CTL_MOD:
if (epi) {
epds.events |= POLLERR | POLLHUP;
error = ep_modify(ep, epi, &epds);
} else
error = -ENOENT;
break;
}
mutex_unlock(&ep->mtx);
error_tgt_fput:
if (did_lock_epmutex)
mutex_unlock(&epmutex);
fput(tfile);
error_fput:
fput(file);
error_return:
return error;
}
| 165,588 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: DefragRegisterTests(void)
{
#ifdef UNITTESTS
UtRegisterTest("DefragInOrderSimpleTest", DefragInOrderSimpleTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragReverseSimpleTest", DefragReverseSimpleTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakBsdTest", DefragSturgesNovakBsdTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakLinuxTest", DefragSturgesNovakLinuxTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakWindowsTest",
DefragSturgesNovakWindowsTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakSolarisTest",
DefragSturgesNovakSolarisTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakFirstTest", DefragSturgesNovakFirstTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakLastTest", DefragSturgesNovakLastTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragIPv4NoDataTest", DefragIPv4NoDataTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragIPv4TooLargeTest", DefragIPv4TooLargeTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragInOrderSimpleTest", IPV6DefragInOrderSimpleTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragReverseSimpleTest", IPV6DefragReverseSimpleTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakBsdTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakBsdTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakLinuxTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakLinuxTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakWindowsTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakWindowsTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakSolarisTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakSolarisTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakFirstTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakFirstTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakLastTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakLastTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragVlanTest", DefragVlanTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragVlanQinQTest", DefragVlanQinQTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragTrackerReuseTest", DefragTrackerReuseTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragTimeoutTest", DefragTimeoutTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragMfIpv4Test", DefragMfIpv4Test);
UtRegisterTest("DefragMfIpv6Test", DefragMfIpv6Test);
#endif /* UNITTESTS */
}
Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host.
CWE ID: CWE-358 | DefragRegisterTests(void)
{
#ifdef UNITTESTS
UtRegisterTest("DefragInOrderSimpleTest", DefragInOrderSimpleTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragReverseSimpleTest", DefragReverseSimpleTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakBsdTest", DefragSturgesNovakBsdTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakLinuxTest", DefragSturgesNovakLinuxTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakWindowsTest",
DefragSturgesNovakWindowsTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakSolarisTest",
DefragSturgesNovakSolarisTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakFirstTest", DefragSturgesNovakFirstTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakLastTest", DefragSturgesNovakLastTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragIPv4NoDataTest", DefragIPv4NoDataTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragIPv4TooLargeTest", DefragIPv4TooLargeTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragInOrderSimpleTest", IPV6DefragInOrderSimpleTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragReverseSimpleTest", IPV6DefragReverseSimpleTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakBsdTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakBsdTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakLinuxTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakLinuxTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakWindowsTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakWindowsTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakSolarisTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakSolarisTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakFirstTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakFirstTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakLastTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakLastTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragVlanTest", DefragVlanTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragVlanQinQTest", DefragVlanQinQTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragTrackerReuseTest", DefragTrackerReuseTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragTimeoutTest", DefragTimeoutTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragMfIpv4Test", DefragMfIpv4Test);
UtRegisterTest("DefragMfIpv6Test", DefragMfIpv6Test);
UtRegisterTest("DefragTestBadProto", DefragTestBadProto);
#endif /* UNITTESTS */
}
| 168,301 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int fib6_add_rt2node(struct fib6_node *fn, struct rt6_info *rt,
struct nl_info *info)
{
struct rt6_info *iter = NULL;
struct rt6_info **ins;
int replace = (info->nlh &&
(info->nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_REPLACE));
int add = (!info->nlh ||
(info->nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_CREATE));
int found = 0;
ins = &fn->leaf;
for (iter = fn->leaf; iter; iter = iter->dst.rt6_next) {
/*
* Search for duplicates
*/
if (iter->rt6i_metric == rt->rt6i_metric) {
/*
* Same priority level
*/
if (info->nlh &&
(info->nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_EXCL))
return -EEXIST;
if (replace) {
found++;
break;
}
if (iter->dst.dev == rt->dst.dev &&
iter->rt6i_idev == rt->rt6i_idev &&
ipv6_addr_equal(&iter->rt6i_gateway,
&rt->rt6i_gateway)) {
if (rt->rt6i_nsiblings)
rt->rt6i_nsiblings = 0;
if (!(iter->rt6i_flags & RTF_EXPIRES))
return -EEXIST;
if (!(rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_EXPIRES))
rt6_clean_expires(iter);
else
rt6_set_expires(iter, rt->dst.expires);
return -EEXIST;
}
/* If we have the same destination and the same metric,
* but not the same gateway, then the route we try to
* add is sibling to this route, increment our counter
* of siblings, and later we will add our route to the
* list.
* Only static routes (which don't have flag
* RTF_EXPIRES) are used for ECMPv6.
*
* To avoid long list, we only had siblings if the
* route have a gateway.
*/
if (rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_GATEWAY &&
!(rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_EXPIRES) &&
!(iter->rt6i_flags & RTF_EXPIRES))
rt->rt6i_nsiblings++;
}
if (iter->rt6i_metric > rt->rt6i_metric)
break;
ins = &iter->dst.rt6_next;
}
/* Reset round-robin state, if necessary */
if (ins == &fn->leaf)
fn->rr_ptr = NULL;
/* Link this route to others same route. */
if (rt->rt6i_nsiblings) {
unsigned int rt6i_nsiblings;
struct rt6_info *sibling, *temp_sibling;
/* Find the first route that have the same metric */
sibling = fn->leaf;
while (sibling) {
if (sibling->rt6i_metric == rt->rt6i_metric) {
list_add_tail(&rt->rt6i_siblings,
&sibling->rt6i_siblings);
break;
}
sibling = sibling->dst.rt6_next;
}
/* For each sibling in the list, increment the counter of
* siblings. BUG() if counters does not match, list of siblings
* is broken!
*/
rt6i_nsiblings = 0;
list_for_each_entry_safe(sibling, temp_sibling,
&rt->rt6i_siblings, rt6i_siblings) {
sibling->rt6i_nsiblings++;
BUG_ON(sibling->rt6i_nsiblings != rt->rt6i_nsiblings);
rt6i_nsiblings++;
}
BUG_ON(rt6i_nsiblings != rt->rt6i_nsiblings);
}
/*
* insert node
*/
if (!replace) {
if (!add)
pr_warn("NLM_F_CREATE should be set when creating new route\n");
add:
rt->dst.rt6_next = iter;
*ins = rt;
rt->rt6i_node = fn;
atomic_inc(&rt->rt6i_ref);
inet6_rt_notify(RTM_NEWROUTE, rt, info);
info->nl_net->ipv6.rt6_stats->fib_rt_entries++;
if (!(fn->fn_flags & RTN_RTINFO)) {
info->nl_net->ipv6.rt6_stats->fib_route_nodes++;
fn->fn_flags |= RTN_RTINFO;
}
} else {
if (!found) {
if (add)
goto add;
pr_warn("NLM_F_REPLACE set, but no existing node found!\n");
return -ENOENT;
}
*ins = rt;
rt->rt6i_node = fn;
rt->dst.rt6_next = iter->dst.rt6_next;
atomic_inc(&rt->rt6i_ref);
inet6_rt_notify(RTM_NEWROUTE, rt, info);
rt6_release(iter);
if (!(fn->fn_flags & RTN_RTINFO)) {
info->nl_net->ipv6.rt6_stats->fib_route_nodes++;
fn->fn_flags |= RTN_RTINFO;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: only static routes qualify for equal cost multipathing
Static routes in this case are non-expiring routes which did not get
configured by autoconf or by icmpv6 redirects.
To make sure we actually get an ecmp route while searching for the first
one in this fib6_node's leafs, also make sure it matches the ecmp route
assumptions.
v2:
a) Removed RTF_EXPIRE check in dst.from chain. The check of RTF_ADDRCONF
already ensures that this route, even if added again without
RTF_EXPIRES (in case of a RA announcement with infinite timeout),
does not cause the rt6i_nsiblings logic to go wrong if a later RA
updates the expiration time later.
v3:
a) Allow RTF_EXPIRES routes to enter the ecmp route set. We have to do so,
because an pmtu event could update the RTF_EXPIRES flag and we would
not count this route, if another route joins this set. We now filter
only for RTF_GATEWAY|RTF_ADDRCONF|RTF_DYNAMIC, which are flags that
don't get changed after rt6_info construction.
Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | static int fib6_add_rt2node(struct fib6_node *fn, struct rt6_info *rt,
struct nl_info *info)
{
struct rt6_info *iter = NULL;
struct rt6_info **ins;
int replace = (info->nlh &&
(info->nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_REPLACE));
int add = (!info->nlh ||
(info->nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_CREATE));
int found = 0;
bool rt_can_ecmp = rt6_qualify_for_ecmp(rt);
ins = &fn->leaf;
for (iter = fn->leaf; iter; iter = iter->dst.rt6_next) {
/*
* Search for duplicates
*/
if (iter->rt6i_metric == rt->rt6i_metric) {
/*
* Same priority level
*/
if (info->nlh &&
(info->nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_EXCL))
return -EEXIST;
if (replace) {
found++;
break;
}
if (iter->dst.dev == rt->dst.dev &&
iter->rt6i_idev == rt->rt6i_idev &&
ipv6_addr_equal(&iter->rt6i_gateway,
&rt->rt6i_gateway)) {
if (rt->rt6i_nsiblings)
rt->rt6i_nsiblings = 0;
if (!(iter->rt6i_flags & RTF_EXPIRES))
return -EEXIST;
if (!(rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_EXPIRES))
rt6_clean_expires(iter);
else
rt6_set_expires(iter, rt->dst.expires);
return -EEXIST;
}
/* If we have the same destination and the same metric,
* but not the same gateway, then the route we try to
* add is sibling to this route, increment our counter
* of siblings, and later we will add our route to the
* list.
* Only static routes (which don't have flag
* RTF_EXPIRES) are used for ECMPv6.
*
* To avoid long list, we only had siblings if the
* route have a gateway.
*/
if (rt_can_ecmp &&
rt6_qualify_for_ecmp(iter))
rt->rt6i_nsiblings++;
}
if (iter->rt6i_metric > rt->rt6i_metric)
break;
ins = &iter->dst.rt6_next;
}
/* Reset round-robin state, if necessary */
if (ins == &fn->leaf)
fn->rr_ptr = NULL;
/* Link this route to others same route. */
if (rt->rt6i_nsiblings) {
unsigned int rt6i_nsiblings;
struct rt6_info *sibling, *temp_sibling;
/* Find the first route that have the same metric */
sibling = fn->leaf;
while (sibling) {
if (sibling->rt6i_metric == rt->rt6i_metric &&
rt6_qualify_for_ecmp(sibling)) {
list_add_tail(&rt->rt6i_siblings,
&sibling->rt6i_siblings);
break;
}
sibling = sibling->dst.rt6_next;
}
/* For each sibling in the list, increment the counter of
* siblings. BUG() if counters does not match, list of siblings
* is broken!
*/
rt6i_nsiblings = 0;
list_for_each_entry_safe(sibling, temp_sibling,
&rt->rt6i_siblings, rt6i_siblings) {
sibling->rt6i_nsiblings++;
BUG_ON(sibling->rt6i_nsiblings != rt->rt6i_nsiblings);
rt6i_nsiblings++;
}
BUG_ON(rt6i_nsiblings != rt->rt6i_nsiblings);
}
/*
* insert node
*/
if (!replace) {
if (!add)
pr_warn("NLM_F_CREATE should be set when creating new route\n");
add:
rt->dst.rt6_next = iter;
*ins = rt;
rt->rt6i_node = fn;
atomic_inc(&rt->rt6i_ref);
inet6_rt_notify(RTM_NEWROUTE, rt, info);
info->nl_net->ipv6.rt6_stats->fib_rt_entries++;
if (!(fn->fn_flags & RTN_RTINFO)) {
info->nl_net->ipv6.rt6_stats->fib_route_nodes++;
fn->fn_flags |= RTN_RTINFO;
}
} else {
if (!found) {
if (add)
goto add;
pr_warn("NLM_F_REPLACE set, but no existing node found!\n");
return -ENOENT;
}
*ins = rt;
rt->rt6i_node = fn;
rt->dst.rt6_next = iter->dst.rt6_next;
atomic_inc(&rt->rt6i_ref);
inet6_rt_notify(RTM_NEWROUTE, rt, info);
rt6_release(iter);
if (!(fn->fn_flags & RTN_RTINFO)) {
info->nl_net->ipv6.rt6_stats->fib_route_nodes++;
fn->fn_flags |= RTN_RTINFO;
}
}
return 0;
}
| 166,022 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Huff_offsetReceive (node_t *node, int *ch, byte *fin, int *offset) {
bloc = *offset;
while (node && node->symbol == INTERNAL_NODE) {
if (get_bit(fin)) {
node = node->right;
} else {
node = node->left;
}
}
if (!node) {
*ch = 0;
return;
}
*ch = node->symbol;
*offset = bloc;
}
Commit Message: Fix/improve buffer overflow in MSG_ReadBits/MSG_WriteBits
Prevent reading past end of message in MSG_ReadBits. If read past
end of msg->data buffer (16348 bytes) the engine could SEGFAULT.
Make MSG_WriteBits use an exact buffer overflow check instead of
possibly failing with a few bytes left.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void Huff_offsetReceive (node_t *node, int *ch, byte *fin, int *offset) {
void Huff_offsetReceive (node_t *node, int *ch, byte *fin, int *offset, int maxoffset) {
bloc = *offset;
while (node && node->symbol == INTERNAL_NODE) {
if (bloc >= maxoffset) {
*ch = 0;
*offset = maxoffset + 1;
return;
}
if (get_bit(fin)) {
node = node->right;
} else {
node = node->left;
}
}
if (!node) {
*ch = 0;
return;
}
*ch = node->symbol;
*offset = bloc;
}
| 167,994 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void tun_net_init(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct tun_struct *tun = netdev_priv(dev);
switch (tun->flags & TUN_TYPE_MASK) {
case TUN_TUN_DEV:
dev->netdev_ops = &tun_netdev_ops;
/* Point-to-Point TUN Device */
dev->hard_header_len = 0;
dev->addr_len = 0;
dev->mtu = 1500;
/* Zero header length */
dev->type = ARPHRD_NONE;
dev->flags = IFF_POINTOPOINT | IFF_NOARP | IFF_MULTICAST;
dev->tx_queue_len = TUN_READQ_SIZE; /* We prefer our own queue length */
break;
case TUN_TAP_DEV:
dev->netdev_ops = &tap_netdev_ops;
/* Ethernet TAP Device */
ether_setup(dev);
random_ether_addr(dev->dev_addr);
dev->tx_queue_len = TUN_READQ_SIZE; /* We prefer our own queue length */
break;
}
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
CC: Karsten Keil <[email protected]>
CC: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <[email protected]>
CC: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <[email protected]>
CC: "John W. Linville" <[email protected]>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
CC: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static void tun_net_init(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct tun_struct *tun = netdev_priv(dev);
switch (tun->flags & TUN_TYPE_MASK) {
case TUN_TUN_DEV:
dev->netdev_ops = &tun_netdev_ops;
/* Point-to-Point TUN Device */
dev->hard_header_len = 0;
dev->addr_len = 0;
dev->mtu = 1500;
/* Zero header length */
dev->type = ARPHRD_NONE;
dev->flags = IFF_POINTOPOINT | IFF_NOARP | IFF_MULTICAST;
dev->tx_queue_len = TUN_READQ_SIZE; /* We prefer our own queue length */
break;
case TUN_TAP_DEV:
dev->netdev_ops = &tap_netdev_ops;
/* Ethernet TAP Device */
ether_setup(dev);
dev->priv_flags &= ~IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING;
random_ether_addr(dev->dev_addr);
dev->tx_queue_len = TUN_READQ_SIZE; /* We prefer our own queue length */
break;
}
}
| 165,730 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: seamless_process(STREAM s)
{
unsigned int pkglen;
char *buf;
pkglen = s->end - s->p;
/* str_handle_lines requires null terminated strings */
buf = xmalloc(pkglen + 1);
STRNCPY(buf, (char *) s->p, pkglen + 1);
str_handle_lines(buf, &seamless_rest, seamless_line_handler, NULL);
xfree(buf);
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119 | seamless_process(STREAM s)
{
unsigned int pkglen;
char *buf;
struct stream packet = *s;
if (!s_check(s))
{
rdp_protocol_error("seamless_process(), stream is in unstable state", &packet);
}
pkglen = s->end - s->p;
/* str_handle_lines requires null terminated strings */
buf = xmalloc(pkglen + 1);
STRNCPY(buf, (char *) s->p, pkglen + 1);
str_handle_lines(buf, &seamless_rest, seamless_line_handler, NULL);
xfree(buf);
}
| 169,808 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Chapters::Atom::ShallowCopy(Atom& rhs) const
{
rhs.m_string_uid = m_string_uid;
rhs.m_uid = m_uid;
rhs.m_start_timecode = m_start_timecode;
rhs.m_stop_timecode = m_stop_timecode;
rhs.m_displays = m_displays;
rhs.m_displays_size = m_displays_size;
rhs.m_displays_count = m_displays_count;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void Chapters::Atom::ShallowCopy(Atom& rhs) const
| 174,442 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped(
const GpuHostMsg_AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped_Params& params_in_pixel,
int gpu_host_id) {
surface_route_id_ = params_in_pixel.route_id;
if (params_in_pixel.protection_state_id &&
params_in_pixel.protection_state_id != protection_state_id_) {
DCHECK(!current_surface_);
if (!params_in_pixel.skip_ack)
InsertSyncPointAndACK(params_in_pixel.route_id, gpu_host_id, false, NULL);
return;
}
if (ShouldFastACK(params_in_pixel.surface_handle)) {
if (!params_in_pixel.skip_ack)
InsertSyncPointAndACK(params_in_pixel.route_id, gpu_host_id, false, NULL);
return;
}
current_surface_ = params_in_pixel.surface_handle;
if (!params_in_pixel.skip_ack)
released_front_lock_ = NULL;
UpdateExternalTexture();
ui::Compositor* compositor = GetCompositor();
if (!compositor) {
if (!params_in_pixel.skip_ack)
InsertSyncPointAndACK(params_in_pixel.route_id, gpu_host_id, true, NULL);
} else {
DCHECK(image_transport_clients_.find(params_in_pixel.surface_handle) !=
image_transport_clients_.end());
gfx::Size surface_size_in_pixel =
image_transport_clients_[params_in_pixel.surface_handle]->size();
gfx::Size surface_size = ConvertSizeToDIP(this, surface_size_in_pixel);
window_->SchedulePaintInRect(gfx::Rect(surface_size));
if (!params_in_pixel.skip_ack) {
can_lock_compositor_ = NO_PENDING_COMMIT;
on_compositing_did_commit_callbacks_.push_back(
base::Bind(&RenderWidgetHostViewAura::InsertSyncPointAndACK,
params_in_pixel.route_id,
gpu_host_id,
true));
if (!compositor->HasObserver(this))
compositor->AddObserver(this);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped(
bool RenderWidgetHostViewAura::SwapBuffersPrepare(
const gfx::Rect& surface_rect,
const gfx::Rect& damage_rect,
BufferPresentedParams* params) {
DCHECK(params->surface_handle);
DCHECK(!params->texture_to_produce);
if (last_swapped_surface_size_ != surface_rect.size()) {
// The surface could have shrunk since we skipped an update, in which
// case we can expect a full update.
DLOG_IF(ERROR, damage_rect != surface_rect) << "Expected full damage rect";
skipped_damage_.setEmpty();
last_swapped_surface_size_ = surface_rect.size();
}
if (ShouldSkipFrame(surface_rect.size())) {
skipped_damage_.op(RectToSkIRect(damage_rect), SkRegion::kUnion_Op);
InsertSyncPointAndACK(*params);
return false;
}
DCHECK(!current_surface_ || image_transport_clients_.find(current_surface_) !=
image_transport_clients_.end());
if (current_surface_)
params->texture_to_produce = image_transport_clients_[current_surface_];
std::swap(current_surface_, params->surface_handle);
DCHECK(image_transport_clients_.find(current_surface_) !=
image_transport_clients_.end());
image_transport_clients_[current_surface_]->Consume(surface_rect.size());
released_front_lock_ = NULL;
UpdateExternalTexture();
return true;
}
void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::SwapBuffersCompleted(
const BufferPresentedParams& params) {
ui::Compositor* compositor = GetCompositor();
if (!compositor) {
InsertSyncPointAndACK(params);
} else {
// Add sending an ACK to the list of things to do OnCompositingDidCommit
can_lock_compositor_ = NO_PENDING_COMMIT;
on_compositing_did_commit_callbacks_.push_back(
base::Bind(&RenderWidgetHostViewAura::InsertSyncPointAndACK, params));
if (!compositor->HasObserver(this))
compositor->AddObserver(this);
}
}
void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped(
const GpuHostMsg_AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped_Params& params_in_pixel,
int gpu_host_id) {
const gfx::Rect surface_rect = gfx::Rect(gfx::Point(), params_in_pixel.size);
BufferPresentedParams ack_params(
params_in_pixel.route_id, gpu_host_id, params_in_pixel.surface_handle);
if (!SwapBuffersPrepare(surface_rect, surface_rect, &ack_params))
return;
previous_damage_.setRect(RectToSkIRect(surface_rect));
skipped_damage_.setEmpty();
ui::Compositor* compositor = GetCompositor();
if (compositor) {
gfx::Size surface_size = ConvertSizeToDIP(this, params_in_pixel.size);
window_->SchedulePaintInRect(gfx::Rect(surface_size));
}
SwapBuffersCompleted(ack_params);
}
| 171,372 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void nsc_encode_subsampling(NSC_CONTEXT* context)
{
UINT16 x;
UINT16 y;
BYTE* co_dst;
BYTE* cg_dst;
INT8* co_src0;
INT8* co_src1;
INT8* cg_src0;
INT8* cg_src1;
UINT32 tempWidth;
UINT32 tempHeight;
tempWidth = ROUND_UP_TO(context->width, 8);
tempHeight = ROUND_UP_TO(context->height, 2);
for (y = 0; y < tempHeight >> 1; y++)
{
co_dst = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[1] + y * (tempWidth >> 1);
cg_dst = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[2] + y * (tempWidth >> 1);
co_src0 = (INT8*) context->priv->PlaneBuffers[1] + (y << 1) * tempWidth;
co_src1 = co_src0 + tempWidth;
cg_src0 = (INT8*) context->priv->PlaneBuffers[2] + (y << 1) * tempWidth;
cg_src1 = cg_src0 + tempWidth;
for (x = 0; x < tempWidth >> 1; x++)
{
*co_dst++ = (BYTE)(((INT16) * co_src0 + (INT16) * (co_src0 + 1) +
(INT16) * co_src1 + (INT16) * (co_src1 + 1)) >> 2);
*cg_dst++ = (BYTE)(((INT16) * cg_src0 + (INT16) * (cg_src0 + 1) +
(INT16) * cg_src1 + (INT16) * (cg_src1 + 1)) >> 2);
co_src0 += 2;
co_src1 += 2;
cg_src0 += 2;
cg_src1 += 2;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8788
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-787 | static void nsc_encode_subsampling(NSC_CONTEXT* context)
static BOOL nsc_encode_subsampling(NSC_CONTEXT* context)
{
UINT16 x;
UINT16 y;
UINT32 tempWidth;
UINT32 tempHeight;
if (!context)
return FALSE;
tempWidth = ROUND_UP_TO(context->width, 8);
tempHeight = ROUND_UP_TO(context->height, 2);
if (tempHeight == 0)
return FALSE;
if (tempWidth > context->priv->PlaneBuffersLength / tempHeight)
return FALSE;
for (y = 0; y < tempHeight >> 1; y++)
{
BYTE* co_dst = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[1] + y * (tempWidth >> 1);
BYTE* cg_dst = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[2] + y * (tempWidth >> 1);
const INT8* co_src0 = (INT8*) context->priv->PlaneBuffers[1] + (y << 1) * tempWidth;
const INT8* co_src1 = co_src0 + tempWidth;
const INT8* cg_src0 = (INT8*) context->priv->PlaneBuffers[2] + (y << 1) * tempWidth;
const INT8* cg_src1 = cg_src0 + tempWidth;
for (x = 0; x < tempWidth >> 1; x++)
{
*co_dst++ = (BYTE)(((INT16) * co_src0 + (INT16) * (co_src0 + 1) +
(INT16) * co_src1 + (INT16) * (co_src1 + 1)) >> 2);
*cg_dst++ = (BYTE)(((INT16) * cg_src0 + (INT16) * (cg_src0 + 1) +
(INT16) * cg_src1 + (INT16) * (cg_src1 + 1)) >> 2);
co_src0 += 2;
co_src1 += 2;
cg_src0 += 2;
cg_src1 += 2;
}
}
return TRUE;
}
| 169,289 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: chrm_modification_init(chrm_modification *me, png_modifier *pm,
PNG_CONST color_encoding *encoding)
{
CIE_color white = white_point(encoding);
/* Original end points: */
me->encoding = encoding;
/* Chromaticities (in fixed point): */
me->wx = fix(chromaticity_x(white));
me->wy = fix(chromaticity_y(white));
me->rx = fix(chromaticity_x(encoding->red));
me->ry = fix(chromaticity_y(encoding->red));
me->gx = fix(chromaticity_x(encoding->green));
me->gy = fix(chromaticity_y(encoding->green));
me->bx = fix(chromaticity_x(encoding->blue));
me->by = fix(chromaticity_y(encoding->blue));
modification_init(&me->this);
me->this.chunk = CHUNK_cHRM;
me->this.modify_fn = chrm_modify;
me->this.add = CHUNK_PLTE;
me->this.next = pm->modifications;
pm->modifications = &me->this;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | chrm_modification_init(chrm_modification *me, png_modifier *pm,
const color_encoding *encoding)
{
CIE_color white = white_point(encoding);
/* Original end points: */
me->encoding = encoding;
/* Chromaticities (in fixed point): */
me->wx = fix(chromaticity_x(white));
me->wy = fix(chromaticity_y(white));
me->rx = fix(chromaticity_x(encoding->red));
me->ry = fix(chromaticity_y(encoding->red));
me->gx = fix(chromaticity_x(encoding->green));
me->gy = fix(chromaticity_y(encoding->green));
me->bx = fix(chromaticity_x(encoding->blue));
me->by = fix(chromaticity_y(encoding->blue));
modification_init(&me->this);
me->this.chunk = CHUNK_cHRM;
me->this.modify_fn = chrm_modify;
me->this.add = CHUNK_PLTE;
me->this.next = pm->modifications;
pm->modifications = &me->this;
}
| 173,606 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static NTSTATUS fd_open_atomic(struct connection_struct *conn,
files_struct *fsp,
int flags,
mode_t mode,
bool *file_created)
{
NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
bool file_existed = VALID_STAT(fsp->fsp_name->st);
*file_created = false;
* We're not creating the file, just pass through.
*/
return fd_open(conn, fsp, flags, mode);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | static NTSTATUS fd_open_atomic(struct connection_struct *conn,
files_struct *fsp,
int flags,
mode_t mode,
bool *file_created)
{
NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
NTSTATUS retry_status;
bool file_existed = VALID_STAT(fsp->fsp_name->st);
int curr_flags;
*file_created = false;
* We're not creating the file, just pass through.
*/
return fd_open(conn, fsp, flags, mode);
}
| 164,794 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: BOOL SQLWriteFileDSN( LPCSTR pszFileName,
LPCSTR pszAppName,
LPCSTR pszKeyName,
LPCSTR pszString )
{
HINI hIni;
char szFileName[ODBC_FILENAME_MAX+1];
if ( pszFileName[0] == '/' )
{
strncpy( szFileName, sizeof(szFileName) - 5, pszFileName );
}
else
{
char szPath[ODBC_FILENAME_MAX+1];
*szPath = '\0';
_odbcinst_FileINI( szPath );
snprintf( szFileName, sizeof(szFileName) - 5, "%s/%s", szPath, pszFileName );
}
if ( strlen( szFileName ) < 4 || strcmp( szFileName + strlen( szFileName ) - 4, ".dsn" ))
{
strcat( szFileName, ".dsn" );
}
#ifdef __OS2__
if ( iniOpen( &hIni, szFileName, "#;", '[', ']', '=', TRUE, 0L ) != INI_SUCCESS )
#else
if ( iniOpen( &hIni, szFileName, "#;", '[', ']', '=', TRUE ) != INI_SUCCESS )
#endif
{
inst_logPushMsg( __FILE__, __FILE__, __LINE__, LOG_CRITICAL, ODBC_ERROR_INVALID_PATH, "" );
return FALSE;
}
/* delete section */
if ( pszString == NULL && pszKeyName == NULL )
{
if ( iniObjectSeek( hIni, (char *)pszAppName ) == INI_SUCCESS )
{
iniObjectDelete( hIni );
}
}
/* delete entry */
else if ( pszString == NULL )
{
if ( iniPropertySeek( hIni, (char *)pszAppName, (char *)pszKeyName, "" ) == INI_SUCCESS )
{
iniPropertyDelete( hIni );
}
}
else
{
/* add section */
if ( iniObjectSeek( hIni, (char *)pszAppName ) != INI_SUCCESS )
{
iniObjectInsert( hIni, (char *)pszAppName );
}
/* update entry */
if ( iniPropertySeek( hIni, (char *)pszAppName, (char *)pszKeyName, "" ) == INI_SUCCESS )
{
iniObjectSeek( hIni, (char *)pszAppName );
iniPropertyUpdate( hIni, (char *)pszKeyName, (char *)pszString );
}
/* add entry */
else
{
iniObjectSeek( hIni, (char *)pszAppName );
iniPropertyInsert( hIni, (char *)pszKeyName, (char *)pszString );
}
}
if ( iniCommit( hIni ) != INI_SUCCESS )
{
iniClose( hIni );
inst_logPushMsg( __FILE__, __FILE__, __LINE__, LOG_CRITICAL, ODBC_ERROR_REQUEST_FAILED, "" );
return FALSE;
}
iniClose( hIni );
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: New Pre Source
CWE ID: CWE-119 | BOOL SQLWriteFileDSN( LPCSTR pszFileName,
LPCSTR pszAppName,
LPCSTR pszKeyName,
LPCSTR pszString )
{
HINI hIni;
char szFileName[ODBC_FILENAME_MAX+1];
if ( pszFileName[0] == '/' )
{
strncpy( szFileName, pszFileName, sizeof(szFileName) - 5 );
}
else
{
char szPath[ODBC_FILENAME_MAX+1];
*szPath = '\0';
_odbcinst_FileINI( szPath );
snprintf( szFileName, sizeof(szFileName) - 5, "%s/%s", szPath, pszFileName );
}
if ( strlen( szFileName ) < 4 || strcmp( szFileName + strlen( szFileName ) - 4, ".dsn" ))
{
strcat( szFileName, ".dsn" );
}
#ifdef __OS2__
if ( iniOpen( &hIni, szFileName, "#;", '[', ']', '=', TRUE, 0L ) != INI_SUCCESS )
#else
if ( iniOpen( &hIni, szFileName, "#;", '[', ']', '=', TRUE ) != INI_SUCCESS )
#endif
{
inst_logPushMsg( __FILE__, __FILE__, __LINE__, LOG_CRITICAL, ODBC_ERROR_INVALID_PATH, "" );
return FALSE;
}
/* delete section */
if ( pszString == NULL && pszKeyName == NULL )
{
if ( iniObjectSeek( hIni, (char *)pszAppName ) == INI_SUCCESS )
{
iniObjectDelete( hIni );
}
}
/* delete entry */
else if ( pszString == NULL )
{
if ( iniPropertySeek( hIni, (char *)pszAppName, (char *)pszKeyName, "" ) == INI_SUCCESS )
{
iniPropertyDelete( hIni );
}
}
else
{
/* add section */
if ( iniObjectSeek( hIni, (char *)pszAppName ) != INI_SUCCESS )
{
iniObjectInsert( hIni, (char *)pszAppName );
}
/* update entry */
if ( iniPropertySeek( hIni, (char *)pszAppName, (char *)pszKeyName, "" ) == INI_SUCCESS )
{
iniObjectSeek( hIni, (char *)pszAppName );
iniPropertyUpdate( hIni, (char *)pszKeyName, (char *)pszString );
}
/* add entry */
else
{
iniObjectSeek( hIni, (char *)pszAppName );
iniPropertyInsert( hIni, (char *)pszKeyName, (char *)pszString );
}
}
if ( iniCommit( hIni ) != INI_SUCCESS )
{
iniClose( hIni );
inst_logPushMsg( __FILE__, __FILE__, __LINE__, LOG_CRITICAL, ODBC_ERROR_REQUEST_FAILED, "" );
return FALSE;
}
iniClose( hIni );
return TRUE;
}
| 169,317 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void MostVisitedSitesBridge::JavaObserver::OnMostVisitedURLsAvailable(
const NTPTilesVector& tiles) {
JNIEnv* env = AttachCurrentThread();
std::vector<base::string16> titles;
std::vector<std::string> urls;
std::vector<std::string> whitelist_icon_paths;
std::vector<int> sources;
titles.reserve(tiles.size());
urls.reserve(tiles.size());
whitelist_icon_paths.reserve(tiles.size());
sources.reserve(tiles.size());
for (const auto& tile : tiles) {
titles.emplace_back(tile.title);
urls.emplace_back(tile.url.spec());
whitelist_icon_paths.emplace_back(tile.whitelist_icon_path.value());
sources.emplace_back(static_cast<int>(tile.source));
}
Java_MostVisitedURLsObserver_onMostVisitedURLsAvailable(
env, observer_, ToJavaArrayOfStrings(env, titles),
ToJavaArrayOfStrings(env, urls),
ToJavaArrayOfStrings(env, whitelist_icon_paths),
ToJavaIntArray(env, sources));
}
Commit Message: Rename MostVisitedSites.MostVisitedURLsObserver to Observer.
BUG=677672
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2697543002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#449958}
CWE ID: CWE-17 | void MostVisitedSitesBridge::JavaObserver::OnMostVisitedURLsAvailable(
const NTPTilesVector& tiles) {
JNIEnv* env = AttachCurrentThread();
std::vector<base::string16> titles;
std::vector<std::string> urls;
std::vector<std::string> whitelist_icon_paths;
std::vector<int> sources;
titles.reserve(tiles.size());
urls.reserve(tiles.size());
whitelist_icon_paths.reserve(tiles.size());
sources.reserve(tiles.size());
for (const auto& tile : tiles) {
titles.emplace_back(tile.title);
urls.emplace_back(tile.url.spec());
whitelist_icon_paths.emplace_back(tile.whitelist_icon_path.value());
sources.emplace_back(static_cast<int>(tile.source));
}
Java_Observer_onMostVisitedURLsAvailable(
env, observer_, ToJavaArrayOfStrings(env, titles),
ToJavaArrayOfStrings(env, urls),
ToJavaArrayOfStrings(env, whitelist_icon_paths),
ToJavaIntArray(env, sources));
}
| 172,035 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int bt_sock_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int flags)
{
int noblock = flags & MSG_DONTWAIT;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sk_buff *skb;
size_t copied;
int err;
BT_DBG("sock %p sk %p len %zu", sock, sk, len);
if (flags & (MSG_OOB))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, noblock, &err);
if (!skb) {
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
return 0;
return err;
}
msg->msg_namelen = 0;
copied = skb->len;
if (len < copied) {
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
copied = len;
}
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (err == 0)
sock_recv_ts_and_drops(msg, sk, skb);
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
return err ? : copied;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: fix possible info leak in bt_sock_recvmsg()
In case the socket is already shutting down, bt_sock_recvmsg() returns
with 0 without updating msg_namelen leading to net/socket.c leaking the
local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes
of kernel stack memory.
Fix this by moving the msg_namelen assignment in front of the shutdown
test.
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <[email protected]>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | int bt_sock_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int flags)
{
int noblock = flags & MSG_DONTWAIT;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sk_buff *skb;
size_t copied;
int err;
BT_DBG("sock %p sk %p len %zu", sock, sk, len);
if (flags & (MSG_OOB))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
msg->msg_namelen = 0;
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, noblock, &err);
if (!skb) {
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
return 0;
return err;
}
copied = skb->len;
if (len < copied) {
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
copied = len;
}
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (err == 0)
sock_recv_ts_and_drops(msg, sk, skb);
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
return err ? : copied;
}
| 166,043 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void AutofillManager::GetAvailableSuggestions(
const FormData& form,
const FormFieldData& field,
std::vector<Suggestion>* suggestions,
SuggestionsContext* context) {
DCHECK(suggestions);
DCHECK(context);
bool is_autofill_possible = RefreshDataModels();
bool got_autofillable_form =
GetCachedFormAndField(form, field, &context->form_structure,
&context->focused_field) &&
context->form_structure->ShouldBeParsed();
if (got_autofillable_form) {
if (context->focused_field->Type().group() == CREDIT_CARD) {
context->is_filling_credit_card = true;
driver()->DidInteractWithCreditCardForm();
credit_card_form_event_logger_->OnDidInteractWithAutofillableForm(
context->form_structure->form_signature());
} else {
address_form_event_logger_->OnDidInteractWithAutofillableForm(
context->form_structure->form_signature());
}
}
context->is_context_secure =
!IsFormNonSecure(form) ||
!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
features::kAutofillRequireSecureCreditCardContext);
if (!is_autofill_possible || !driver()->RendererIsAvailable() ||
!got_autofillable_form)
return;
context->is_autofill_available = true;
if (context->is_filling_credit_card) {
*suggestions =
GetCreditCardSuggestions(field, context->focused_field->Type(),
&context->is_all_server_suggestions);
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(kAutofillCreditCardAblationExperiment) &&
!suggestions->empty()) {
context->suppress_reason = SuppressReason::kCreditCardsAblation;
suggestions->clear();
return;
}
} else {
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(kAutofillAlwaysFillAddresses) &&
IsDesktopPlatform() && !field.should_autocomplete) {
context->suppress_reason = SuppressReason::kAutocompleteOff;
return;
}
*suggestions = GetProfileSuggestions(*context->form_structure, field,
*context->focused_field);
}
if (!suggestions->empty() && context->is_filling_credit_card &&
!context->is_context_secure) {
Suggestion warning_suggestion(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_AUTOFILL_WARNING_INSECURE_CONNECTION));
warning_suggestion.frontend_id =
POPUP_ITEM_ID_INSECURE_CONTEXT_PAYMENT_DISABLED_MESSAGE;
suggestions->assign(1, warning_suggestion);
} else {
context->section_has_autofilled_field = SectionHasAutofilledField(
*context->form_structure, form, context->focused_field->section);
if (context->section_has_autofilled_field) {
std::set<base::string16> seen_values;
for (auto iter = suggestions->begin(); iter != suggestions->end();) {
if (!seen_values.insert(iter->value).second) {
iter = suggestions->erase(iter);
} else {
iter->label.clear();
iter->icon.clear();
++iter;
}
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: [AF] Don't simplify/dedupe suggestions for (partially) filled sections.
Since Autofill does not fill field by field anymore, this simplifying
and deduping of suggestions is not useful anymore.
Bug: 858820
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:ios-simulator-full-configs;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I36f7cfe425a0bdbf5ba7503a3d96773b405cc19b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1128255
Reviewed-by: Roger McFarlane <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Sebastien Seguin-Gagnon <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573315}
CWE ID: | void AutofillManager::GetAvailableSuggestions(
const FormData& form,
const FormFieldData& field,
std::vector<Suggestion>* suggestions,
SuggestionsContext* context) {
DCHECK(suggestions);
DCHECK(context);
bool is_autofill_possible = RefreshDataModels();
bool got_autofillable_form =
GetCachedFormAndField(form, field, &context->form_structure,
&context->focused_field) &&
context->form_structure->ShouldBeParsed();
if (got_autofillable_form) {
if (context->focused_field->Type().group() == CREDIT_CARD) {
context->is_filling_credit_card = true;
driver()->DidInteractWithCreditCardForm();
credit_card_form_event_logger_->OnDidInteractWithAutofillableForm(
context->form_structure->form_signature());
} else {
address_form_event_logger_->OnDidInteractWithAutofillableForm(
context->form_structure->form_signature());
}
}
context->is_context_secure =
!IsFormNonSecure(form) ||
!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
features::kAutofillRequireSecureCreditCardContext);
if (!is_autofill_possible || !driver()->RendererIsAvailable() ||
!got_autofillable_form)
return;
context->is_autofill_available = true;
if (context->is_filling_credit_card) {
*suggestions =
GetCreditCardSuggestions(field, context->focused_field->Type(),
&context->is_all_server_suggestions);
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(kAutofillCreditCardAblationExperiment) &&
!suggestions->empty()) {
context->suppress_reason = SuppressReason::kCreditCardsAblation;
suggestions->clear();
return;
}
} else {
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(kAutofillAlwaysFillAddresses) &&
IsDesktopPlatform() && !field.should_autocomplete) {
context->suppress_reason = SuppressReason::kAutocompleteOff;
return;
}
*suggestions = GetProfileSuggestions(*context->form_structure, field,
*context->focused_field);
}
if (!suggestions->empty() && context->is_filling_credit_card &&
!context->is_context_secure) {
Suggestion warning_suggestion(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_AUTOFILL_WARNING_INSECURE_CONNECTION));
warning_suggestion.frontend_id =
POPUP_ITEM_ID_INSECURE_CONTEXT_PAYMENT_DISABLED_MESSAGE;
suggestions->assign(1, warning_suggestion);
}
}
| 173,199 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void VRDisplay::OnPresentChange() {
if (is_presenting_ && !is_valid_device_for_presenting_) {
DVLOG(1) << __FUNCTION__ << ": device not valid, not sending event";
return;
}
navigator_vr_->EnqueueVREvent(VRDisplayEvent::Create(
EventTypeNames::vrdisplaypresentchange, true, false, this, ""));
}
Commit Message: WebVR: fix initial vsync
Applications sometimes use window.rAF while not presenting, then switch to
vrDisplay.rAF after presentation starts. Depending on the animation loop's
timing, this can cause a race condition where presentation has been started
but there's no vrDisplay.rAF pending yet. Ensure there's at least vsync
being processed after presentation starts so that a queued window.rAF
can run and schedule a vrDisplay.rAF.
BUG=711789
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2848483003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468167}
CWE ID: | void VRDisplay::OnPresentChange() {
DVLOG(1) << __FUNCTION__ << ": is_presenting_=" << is_presenting_;
if (is_presenting_ && !is_valid_device_for_presenting_) {
DVLOG(1) << __FUNCTION__ << ": device not valid, not sending event";
return;
}
navigator_vr_->EnqueueVREvent(VRDisplayEvent::Create(
EventTypeNames::vrdisplaypresentchange, true, false, this, ""));
}
| 171,996 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool MessageLoop::DoWork() {
if (!nestable_tasks_allowed_) {
return false;
}
for (;;) {
ReloadWorkQueue();
if (work_queue_.empty())
break;
do {
PendingTask pending_task = std::move(work_queue_.front());
work_queue_.pop();
if (pending_task.task.IsCancelled()) {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
DecrementHighResTaskCountIfNeeded(pending_task);
#endif
} else if (!pending_task.delayed_run_time.is_null()) {
int sequence_num = pending_task.sequence_num;
TimeTicks delayed_run_time = pending_task.delayed_run_time;
AddToDelayedWorkQueue(std::move(pending_task));
if (delayed_work_queue_.top().sequence_num == sequence_num)
pump_->ScheduleDelayedWork(delayed_run_time);
} else {
if (DeferOrRunPendingTask(std::move(pending_task)))
return true;
}
} while (!work_queue_.empty());
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Introduce RunLoop::Type::NESTABLE_TASKS_ALLOWED to replace MessageLoop::ScopedNestableTaskAllower.
(as well as MessageLoop::SetNestableTasksAllowed())
Surveying usage: the scoped object is always instantiated right before
RunLoop().Run(). The intent is really to allow nestable tasks in that
RunLoop so it's better to explicitly label that RunLoop as such and it
allows us to break the last dependency that forced some RunLoop users
to use MessageLoop APIs.
There's also the odd case of allowing nestable tasks for loops that are
reentrant from a native task (without going through RunLoop), these
are the minority but will have to be handled (after cleaning up the
majority of cases that are RunLoop induced).
As highlighted by robliao@ in https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/600517
(which was merged in this CL).
[email protected]
Bug: 750779
Change-Id: I43d122c93ec903cff3a6fe7b77ec461ea0656448
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/594713
Commit-Queue: Gabriel Charette <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Liao <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: danakj <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492263}
CWE ID: | bool MessageLoop::DoWork() {
if (!NestableTasksAllowed()) {
return false;
}
for (;;) {
ReloadWorkQueue();
if (work_queue_.empty())
break;
do {
PendingTask pending_task = std::move(work_queue_.front());
work_queue_.pop();
if (pending_task.task.IsCancelled()) {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
DecrementHighResTaskCountIfNeeded(pending_task);
#endif
} else if (!pending_task.delayed_run_time.is_null()) {
int sequence_num = pending_task.sequence_num;
TimeTicks delayed_run_time = pending_task.delayed_run_time;
AddToDelayedWorkQueue(std::move(pending_task));
if (delayed_work_queue_.top().sequence_num == sequence_num)
pump_->ScheduleDelayedWork(delayed_run_time);
} else {
if (DeferOrRunPendingTask(std::move(pending_task)))
return true;
}
} while (!work_queue_.empty());
}
return false;
}
| 171,864 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int build_ntlmssp_auth_blob(unsigned char **pbuffer,
u16 *buflen,
struct cifs_ses *ses,
const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
{
int rc;
AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE *sec_blob;
__u32 flags;
unsigned char *tmp;
rc = setup_ntlmv2_rsp(ses, nls_cp);
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "Error %d during NTLMSSP authentication\n", rc);
*buflen = 0;
goto setup_ntlmv2_ret;
}
*pbuffer = kmalloc(size_of_ntlmssp_blob(ses), GFP_KERNEL);
sec_blob = (AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE *)*pbuffer;
memcpy(sec_blob->Signature, NTLMSSP_SIGNATURE, 8);
sec_blob->MessageType = NtLmAuthenticate;
flags = NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56 |
NTLMSSP_REQUEST_TARGET | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_TARGET_INFO |
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128 | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE |
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SEC;
if (ses->server->sign) {
flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN;
if (!ses->server->session_estab ||
ses->ntlmssp->sesskey_per_smbsess)
flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_XCH;
}
tmp = *pbuffer + sizeof(AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE);
sec_blob->NegotiateFlags = cpu_to_le32(flags);
sec_blob->LmChallengeResponse.BufferOffset =
cpu_to_le32(sizeof(AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE));
sec_blob->LmChallengeResponse.Length = 0;
sec_blob->LmChallengeResponse.MaximumLength = 0;
sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.BufferOffset =
cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
if (ses->user_name != NULL) {
memcpy(tmp, ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE,
ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
tmp += ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE;
sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.Length =
cpu_to_le16(ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.MaximumLength =
cpu_to_le16(ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
} else {
/*
* don't send an NT Response for anonymous access
*/
sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.Length = 0;
sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.MaximumLength = 0;
}
if (ses->domainName == NULL) {
sec_blob->DomainName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->DomainName.Length = 0;
sec_blob->DomainName.MaximumLength = 0;
tmp += 2;
} else {
int len;
len = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)tmp, ses->domainName,
CIFS_MAX_DOMAINNAME_LEN, nls_cp);
len *= 2; /* unicode is 2 bytes each */
sec_blob->DomainName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->DomainName.Length = cpu_to_le16(len);
sec_blob->DomainName.MaximumLength = cpu_to_le16(len);
tmp += len;
}
if (ses->user_name == NULL) {
sec_blob->UserName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->UserName.Length = 0;
sec_blob->UserName.MaximumLength = 0;
tmp += 2;
} else {
int len;
len = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)tmp, ses->user_name,
CIFS_MAX_USERNAME_LEN, nls_cp);
len *= 2; /* unicode is 2 bytes each */
sec_blob->UserName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->UserName.Length = cpu_to_le16(len);
sec_blob->UserName.MaximumLength = cpu_to_le16(len);
tmp += len;
}
sec_blob->WorkstationName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->WorkstationName.Length = 0;
sec_blob->WorkstationName.MaximumLength = 0;
tmp += 2;
if (((ses->ntlmssp->server_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_XCH) ||
(ses->ntlmssp->server_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SEC))
&& !calc_seckey(ses)) {
memcpy(tmp, ses->ntlmssp->ciphertext, CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE);
sec_blob->SessionKey.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->SessionKey.Length = cpu_to_le16(CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE);
sec_blob->SessionKey.MaximumLength =
cpu_to_le16(CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE);
tmp += CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE;
} else {
sec_blob->SessionKey.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->SessionKey.Length = 0;
sec_blob->SessionKey.MaximumLength = 0;
}
*buflen = tmp - *pbuffer;
setup_ntlmv2_ret:
return rc;
}
Commit Message: CIFS: Enable encryption during session setup phase
In order to allow encryption on SMB connection we need to exchange
a session key and generate encryption and decryption keys.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | int build_ntlmssp_auth_blob(unsigned char **pbuffer,
u16 *buflen,
struct cifs_ses *ses,
const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
{
int rc;
AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE *sec_blob;
__u32 flags;
unsigned char *tmp;
rc = setup_ntlmv2_rsp(ses, nls_cp);
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "Error %d during NTLMSSP authentication\n", rc);
*buflen = 0;
goto setup_ntlmv2_ret;
}
*pbuffer = kmalloc(size_of_ntlmssp_blob(ses), GFP_KERNEL);
sec_blob = (AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE *)*pbuffer;
memcpy(sec_blob->Signature, NTLMSSP_SIGNATURE, 8);
sec_blob->MessageType = NtLmAuthenticate;
flags = NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56 |
NTLMSSP_REQUEST_TARGET | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_TARGET_INFO |
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128 | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE |
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SEC |
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL;
if (ses->server->sign)
flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN;
if (!ses->server->session_estab || ses->ntlmssp->sesskey_per_smbsess)
flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_XCH;
tmp = *pbuffer + sizeof(AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE);
sec_blob->NegotiateFlags = cpu_to_le32(flags);
sec_blob->LmChallengeResponse.BufferOffset =
cpu_to_le32(sizeof(AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE));
sec_blob->LmChallengeResponse.Length = 0;
sec_blob->LmChallengeResponse.MaximumLength = 0;
sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.BufferOffset =
cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
if (ses->user_name != NULL) {
memcpy(tmp, ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE,
ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
tmp += ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE;
sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.Length =
cpu_to_le16(ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.MaximumLength =
cpu_to_le16(ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
} else {
/*
* don't send an NT Response for anonymous access
*/
sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.Length = 0;
sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.MaximumLength = 0;
}
if (ses->domainName == NULL) {
sec_blob->DomainName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->DomainName.Length = 0;
sec_blob->DomainName.MaximumLength = 0;
tmp += 2;
} else {
int len;
len = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)tmp, ses->domainName,
CIFS_MAX_DOMAINNAME_LEN, nls_cp);
len *= 2; /* unicode is 2 bytes each */
sec_blob->DomainName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->DomainName.Length = cpu_to_le16(len);
sec_blob->DomainName.MaximumLength = cpu_to_le16(len);
tmp += len;
}
if (ses->user_name == NULL) {
sec_blob->UserName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->UserName.Length = 0;
sec_blob->UserName.MaximumLength = 0;
tmp += 2;
} else {
int len;
len = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)tmp, ses->user_name,
CIFS_MAX_USERNAME_LEN, nls_cp);
len *= 2; /* unicode is 2 bytes each */
sec_blob->UserName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->UserName.Length = cpu_to_le16(len);
sec_blob->UserName.MaximumLength = cpu_to_le16(len);
tmp += len;
}
sec_blob->WorkstationName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->WorkstationName.Length = 0;
sec_blob->WorkstationName.MaximumLength = 0;
tmp += 2;
if (((ses->ntlmssp->server_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_XCH) ||
(ses->ntlmssp->server_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SEC))
&& !calc_seckey(ses)) {
memcpy(tmp, ses->ntlmssp->ciphertext, CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE);
sec_blob->SessionKey.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->SessionKey.Length = cpu_to_le16(CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE);
sec_blob->SessionKey.MaximumLength =
cpu_to_le16(CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE);
tmp += CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE;
} else {
sec_blob->SessionKey.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->SessionKey.Length = 0;
sec_blob->SessionKey.MaximumLength = 0;
}
*buflen = tmp - *pbuffer;
setup_ntlmv2_ret:
return rc;
}
| 169,359 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool CopyDirectory(const FilePath& from_path,
const FilePath& to_path,
bool recursive) {
base::ThreadRestrictions::AssertIOAllowed();
DCHECK(to_path.value().find('*') == std::string::npos);
DCHECK(from_path.value().find('*') == std::string::npos);
char top_dir[PATH_MAX];
if (base::strlcpy(top_dir, from_path.value().c_str(),
arraysize(top_dir)) >= arraysize(top_dir)) {
return false;
}
FilePath real_to_path = to_path;
if (PathExists(real_to_path)) {
if (!AbsolutePath(&real_to_path))
return false;
} else {
real_to_path = real_to_path.DirName();
if (!AbsolutePath(&real_to_path))
return false;
}
FilePath real_from_path = from_path;
if (!AbsolutePath(&real_from_path))
return false;
if (real_to_path.value().size() >= real_from_path.value().size() &&
real_to_path.value().compare(0, real_from_path.value().size(),
real_from_path.value()) == 0)
return false;
bool success = true;
int traverse_type = FileEnumerator::FILES | FileEnumerator::SHOW_SYM_LINKS;
if (recursive)
traverse_type |= FileEnumerator::DIRECTORIES;
FileEnumerator traversal(from_path, recursive, traverse_type);
FileEnumerator::FindInfo info;
FilePath current = from_path;
if (stat(from_path.value().c_str(), &info.stat) < 0) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "CopyDirectory() couldn't stat source directory: "
<< from_path.value() << " errno = " << errno;
success = false;
}
struct stat to_path_stat;
FilePath from_path_base = from_path;
if (recursive && stat(to_path.value().c_str(), &to_path_stat) == 0 &&
S_ISDIR(to_path_stat.st_mode)) {
from_path_base = from_path.DirName();
}
DCHECK(recursive || S_ISDIR(info.stat.st_mode));
while (success && !current.empty()) {
std::string suffix(¤t.value().c_str()[from_path_base.value().size()]);
if (!suffix.empty()) {
DCHECK_EQ('/', suffix[0]);
suffix.erase(0, 1);
}
const FilePath target_path = to_path.Append(suffix);
if (S_ISDIR(info.stat.st_mode)) {
if (mkdir(target_path.value().c_str(), info.stat.st_mode & 01777) != 0 &&
errno != EEXIST) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "CopyDirectory() couldn't create directory: "
<< target_path.value() << " errno = " << errno;
success = false;
}
} else if (S_ISREG(info.stat.st_mode)) {
if (!CopyFile(current, target_path)) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "CopyDirectory() couldn't create file: "
<< target_path.value();
success = false;
}
} else {
DLOG(WARNING) << "CopyDirectory() skipping non-regular file: "
<< current.value();
}
current = traversal.Next();
traversal.GetFindInfo(&info);
}
return success;
}
Commit Message: Fix creating target paths in file_util_posix CopyDirectory.
BUG=167840
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11773018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176659 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-22 | bool CopyDirectory(const FilePath& from_path,
const FilePath& to_path,
bool recursive) {
base::ThreadRestrictions::AssertIOAllowed();
DCHECK(to_path.value().find('*') == std::string::npos);
DCHECK(from_path.value().find('*') == std::string::npos);
char top_dir[PATH_MAX];
if (base::strlcpy(top_dir, from_path.value().c_str(),
arraysize(top_dir)) >= arraysize(top_dir)) {
return false;
}
FilePath real_to_path = to_path;
if (PathExists(real_to_path)) {
if (!AbsolutePath(&real_to_path))
return false;
} else {
real_to_path = real_to_path.DirName();
if (!AbsolutePath(&real_to_path))
return false;
}
FilePath real_from_path = from_path;
if (!AbsolutePath(&real_from_path))
return false;
if (real_to_path.value().size() >= real_from_path.value().size() &&
real_to_path.value().compare(0, real_from_path.value().size(),
real_from_path.value()) == 0)
return false;
bool success = true;
int traverse_type = FileEnumerator::FILES | FileEnumerator::SHOW_SYM_LINKS;
if (recursive)
traverse_type |= FileEnumerator::DIRECTORIES;
FileEnumerator traversal(from_path, recursive, traverse_type);
FileEnumerator::FindInfo info;
FilePath current = from_path;
if (stat(from_path.value().c_str(), &info.stat) < 0) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "CopyDirectory() couldn't stat source directory: "
<< from_path.value() << " errno = " << errno;
success = false;
}
struct stat to_path_stat;
FilePath from_path_base = from_path;
if (recursive && stat(to_path.value().c_str(), &to_path_stat) == 0 &&
S_ISDIR(to_path_stat.st_mode)) {
from_path_base = from_path.DirName();
}
DCHECK(recursive || S_ISDIR(info.stat.st_mode));
while (success && !current.empty()) {
// current is the source path, including from_path, so append
// the suffix after from_path to to_path to create the target_path.
FilePath target_path(to_path);
if (from_path_base != current) {
if (!from_path_base.AppendRelativePath(current, &target_path)) {
success = false;
break;
}
}
if (S_ISDIR(info.stat.st_mode)) {
if (mkdir(target_path.value().c_str(), info.stat.st_mode & 01777) != 0 &&
errno != EEXIST) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "CopyDirectory() couldn't create directory: "
<< target_path.value() << " errno = " << errno;
success = false;
}
} else if (S_ISREG(info.stat.st_mode)) {
if (!CopyFile(current, target_path)) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "CopyDirectory() couldn't create file: "
<< target_path.value();
success = false;
}
} else {
DLOG(WARNING) << "CopyDirectory() skipping non-regular file: "
<< current.value();
}
current = traversal.Next();
traversal.GetFindInfo(&info);
}
return success;
}
| 171,409 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int jas_matrix_cmp(jas_matrix_t *mat0, jas_matrix_t *mat1)
{
int i;
int j;
if (mat0->numrows_ != mat1->numrows_ || mat0->numcols_ !=
mat1->numcols_) {
return 1;
}
for (i = 0; i < mat0->numrows_; i++) {
for (j = 0; j < mat0->numcols_; j++) {
if (jas_matrix_get(mat0, i, j) != jas_matrix_get(mat1, i, j)) {
return 1;
}
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | int jas_matrix_cmp(jas_matrix_t *mat0, jas_matrix_t *mat1)
{
jas_matind_t i;
jas_matind_t j;
if (mat0->numrows_ != mat1->numrows_ || mat0->numcols_ !=
mat1->numcols_) {
return 1;
}
for (i = 0; i < mat0->numrows_; i++) {
for (j = 0; j < mat0->numcols_; j++) {
if (jas_matrix_get(mat0, i, j) != jas_matrix_get(mat1, i, j)) {
return 1;
}
}
}
return 0;
}
| 168,701 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void SkipDXTMipmaps(Image *image, DDSInfo *dds_info, int texel_size)
{
register ssize_t
i;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
size_t
h,
w;
/*
Only skip mipmaps for textures and cube maps
*/
if (dds_info->ddscaps1 & DDSCAPS_MIPMAP
&& (dds_info->ddscaps1 & DDSCAPS_TEXTURE
|| dds_info->ddscaps2 & DDSCAPS2_CUBEMAP))
{
w = DIV2(dds_info->width);
h = DIV2(dds_info->height);
/*
Mipmapcount includes the main image, so start from one
*/
for (i = 1; (i < (ssize_t) dds_info->mipmapcount) && w && h; i++)
{
offset = (MagickOffsetType) ((w + 3) / 4) * ((h + 3) / 4) * texel_size;
(void) SeekBlob(image, offset, SEEK_CUR);
w = DIV2(w);
h = DIV2(h);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Added extra EOF check and some minor refactoring.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static void SkipDXTMipmaps(Image *image, DDSInfo *dds_info, int texel_size)
static MagickBooleanType SkipDXTMipmaps(Image *image,DDSInfo *dds_info,
int texel_size,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
register ssize_t
i;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
size_t
h,
w;
/*
Only skip mipmaps for textures and cube maps
*/
if (dds_info->ddscaps1 & DDSCAPS_MIPMAP
&& (dds_info->ddscaps1 & DDSCAPS_TEXTURE
|| dds_info->ddscaps2 & DDSCAPS2_CUBEMAP))
{
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
return(MagickFalse);
}
w = DIV2(dds_info->width);
h = DIV2(dds_info->height);
/*
Mipmapcount includes the main image, so start from one
*/
for (i = 1; (i < (ssize_t) dds_info->mipmapcount) && w && h; i++)
{
offset = (MagickOffsetType) ((w + 3) / 4) * ((h + 3) / 4) * texel_size;
(void) SeekBlob(image, offset, SEEK_CUR);
w = DIV2(w);
h = DIV2(h);
}
}
return(MagickTrue);
}
| 168,904 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: v8::Local<v8::Value> V8Debugger::collectionEntries(v8::Local<v8::Context> context, v8::Local<v8::Object> object)
{
if (!enabled()) {
NOTREACHED();
return v8::Undefined(m_isolate);
}
v8::Local<v8::Value> argv[] = { object };
v8::Local<v8::Value> entriesValue = callDebuggerMethod("getCollectionEntries", 1, argv).ToLocalChecked();
if (!entriesValue->IsArray())
return v8::Undefined(m_isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Array> entries = entriesValue.As<v8::Array>();
if (!markArrayEntriesAsInternal(context, entries, V8InternalValueType::kEntry))
return v8::Undefined(m_isolate);
if (!entries->SetPrototype(context, v8::Null(m_isolate)).FromMaybe(false))
return v8::Undefined(m_isolate);
return entries;
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | v8::Local<v8::Value> V8Debugger::collectionEntries(v8::Local<v8::Context> context, v8::Local<v8::Object> object)
{
if (!enabled()) {
NOTREACHED();
return v8::Undefined(m_isolate);
}
v8::Local<v8::Value> argv[] = { object };
v8::Local<v8::Value> entriesValue = callDebuggerMethod("getCollectionEntries", 1, argv).ToLocalChecked();
v8::Local<v8::Value> copied;
if (!copyValueFromDebuggerContext(m_isolate, debuggerContext(), context, entriesValue).ToLocal(&copied) || !copied->IsArray())
return v8::Undefined(m_isolate);
if (!markArrayEntriesAsInternal(context, v8::Local<v8::Array>::Cast(copied), V8InternalValueType::kEntry))
return v8::Undefined(m_isolate);
return copied;
}
| 172,064 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: nfs4_callback_svc(void *vrqstp)
{
int err;
struct svc_rqst *rqstp = vrqstp;
set_freezable();
while (!kthread_should_stop()) {
/*
* Listen for a request on the socket
*/
err = svc_recv(rqstp, MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT);
if (err == -EAGAIN || err == -EINTR)
continue;
svc_process(rqstp);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | nfs4_callback_svc(void *vrqstp)
{
int err;
struct svc_rqst *rqstp = vrqstp;
set_freezable();
while (!kthread_freezable_should_stop(NULL)) {
if (signal_pending(current))
flush_signals(current);
/*
* Listen for a request on the socket
*/
err = svc_recv(rqstp, MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT);
if (err == -EAGAIN || err == -EINTR)
continue;
svc_process(rqstp);
}
svc_exit_thread(rqstp);
module_put_and_exit(0);
return 0;
}
| 168,138 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual status_t configureVideoTunnelMode(
node_id node, OMX_U32 portIndex, OMX_BOOL tunneled,
OMX_U32 audioHwSync, native_handle_t **sidebandHandle ) {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(IOMX::getInterfaceDescriptor());
data.writeInt32((int32_t)node);
data.writeInt32(portIndex);
data.writeInt32((int32_t)tunneled);
data.writeInt32(audioHwSync);
remote()->transact(CONFIGURE_VIDEO_TUNNEL_MODE, data, &reply);
status_t err = reply.readInt32();
if (sidebandHandle) {
*sidebandHandle = (native_handle_t *)reply.readNativeHandle();
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: IOMX.cpp uninitialized pointer in BnOMX::onTransact
This can lead to local code execution in media server.
Fix initializes the pointer and checks the error conditions before
returning
Bug: 26403627
Change-Id: I7fa90682060148448dba01d6acbe3471d1ddb500
CWE ID: CWE-264 | virtual status_t configureVideoTunnelMode(
node_id node, OMX_U32 portIndex, OMX_BOOL tunneled,
OMX_U32 audioHwSync, native_handle_t **sidebandHandle ) {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(IOMX::getInterfaceDescriptor());
data.writeInt32((int32_t)node);
data.writeInt32(portIndex);
data.writeInt32((int32_t)tunneled);
data.writeInt32(audioHwSync);
remote()->transact(CONFIGURE_VIDEO_TUNNEL_MODE, data, &reply);
status_t err = reply.readInt32();
if (err == OK && sidebandHandle) {
*sidebandHandle = (native_handle_t *)reply.readNativeHandle();
}
return err;
}
| 173,897 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SoftAACEncoder2::~SoftAACEncoder2() {
aacEncClose(&mAACEncoder);
delete[] mInputFrame;
mInputFrame = NULL;
}
Commit Message: codecs: handle onReset() for a few encoders
Test: Run PoC binaries
Bug: 34749392
Bug: 34705519
Change-Id: I3356eb615b0e79272d71d72578d363671038c6dd
CWE ID: | SoftAACEncoder2::~SoftAACEncoder2() {
aacEncClose(&mAACEncoder);
onReset();
}
| 174,009 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool IDNSpoofChecker::SafeToDisplayAsUnicode(base::StringPiece16 label,
bool is_tld_ascii) {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
int32_t result =
uspoof_check(checker_, label.data(),
base::checked_cast<int32_t>(label.size()), nullptr, &status);
if (U_FAILURE(status) || (result & USPOOF_ALL_CHECKS))
return false;
icu::UnicodeString label_string(FALSE, label.data(),
base::checked_cast<int32_t>(label.size()));
if (deviation_characters_.containsSome(label_string))
return false;
result &= USPOOF_RESTRICTION_LEVEL_MASK;
if (result == USPOOF_ASCII)
return true;
if (result == USPOOF_SINGLE_SCRIPT_RESTRICTIVE &&
kana_letters_exceptions_.containsNone(label_string) &&
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.containsNone(label_string)) {
return !is_tld_ascii || !IsMadeOfLatinAlikeCyrillic(label_string);
}
if (non_ascii_latin_letters_.containsSome(label_string) &&
!lgc_letters_n_ascii_.containsAll(label_string))
return false;
icu::RegexMatcher* dangerous_pattern =
reinterpret_cast<icu::RegexMatcher*>(DangerousPatternTLS().Get());
if (!dangerous_pattern) {
icu::UnicodeString(
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}\p{scx=hani}])"
R"([\u30ce\u30f3\u30bd\u30be])"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}\p{scx=hani}]|)"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}]\u30fc|^\u30fc|)"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}][\u30fd\u30fe]|^[\u30fd\u30fe]|)"
R"(^[\p{scx=kana}]+[\u3078-\u307a][\p{scx=kana}]+$|)"
R"(^[\p{scx=hira}]+[\u30d8-\u30da][\p{scx=hira}]+$|)"
R"([a-z]\u30fb|\u30fb[a-z]|)"
R"([^\p{scx=latn}\p{scx=grek}\p{scx=cyrl}][\u0300-\u0339]|)"
R"(\u0131[\u0300-\u0339]|)"
R"([ijl]\u0307)",
-1, US_INV),
0, status);
DangerousPatternTLS().Set(dangerous_pattern);
}
dangerous_pattern->reset(label_string);
return !dangerous_pattern->find();
}
Commit Message: Add a few more confusability mapping entries
U+0153(œ) => ce
U+00E6(æ), U+04D5 (ӕ) => ae
U+0499(ҙ) => 3
U+0525(ԥ) => n
Bug: 835554, 826019, 836885
Test: components_unittests --gtest_filter=*IDN*
Change-Id: Ic89211f70359d3d67cc25c1805b426b72cdb16ae
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1055894
Commit-Queue: Jungshik Shin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#558928}
CWE ID: | bool IDNSpoofChecker::SafeToDisplayAsUnicode(base::StringPiece16 label,
bool is_tld_ascii) {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
int32_t result =
uspoof_check(checker_, label.data(),
base::checked_cast<int32_t>(label.size()), nullptr, &status);
if (U_FAILURE(status) || (result & USPOOF_ALL_CHECKS))
return false;
icu::UnicodeString label_string(FALSE, label.data(),
base::checked_cast<int32_t>(label.size()));
if (deviation_characters_.containsSome(label_string))
return false;
result &= USPOOF_RESTRICTION_LEVEL_MASK;
if (result == USPOOF_ASCII)
return true;
if (result == USPOOF_SINGLE_SCRIPT_RESTRICTIVE &&
kana_letters_exceptions_.containsNone(label_string) &&
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.containsNone(label_string)) {
return !is_tld_ascii || !IsMadeOfLatinAlikeCyrillic(label_string);
}
if (non_ascii_latin_letters_.containsSome(label_string) &&
!lgc_letters_n_ascii_.containsAll(label_string))
return false;
icu::RegexMatcher* dangerous_pattern =
reinterpret_cast<icu::RegexMatcher*>(DangerousPatternTLS().Get());
if (!dangerous_pattern) {
icu::UnicodeString(
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}\p{scx=hani}])"
R"([\u30ce\u30f3\u30bd\u30be])"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}\p{scx=hani}]|)"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}]\u30fc|^\u30fc|)"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}][\u30fd\u30fe]|^[\u30fd\u30fe]|)"
R"(^[\p{scx=kana}]+[\u3078-\u307a][\p{scx=kana}]+$|)"
R"(^[\p{scx=hira}]+[\u30d8-\u30da][\p{scx=hira}]+$|)"
R"([a-z]\u30fb|\u30fb[a-z]|)"
R"([^\p{scx=latn}\p{scx=grek}\p{scx=cyrl}][\u0300-\u0339]|)"
R"(\u0131[\u0300-\u0339]|)"
R"([ijl]\u0307)",
-1, US_INV),
0, status);
DangerousPatternTLS().Set(dangerous_pattern);
}
dangerous_pattern->reset(label_string);
return !dangerous_pattern->find();
}
| 173,157 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int cdc_parse_cdc_header(struct usb_cdc_parsed_header *hdr,
struct usb_interface *intf,
u8 *buffer,
int buflen)
{
/* duplicates are ignored */
struct usb_cdc_union_desc *union_header = NULL;
/* duplicates are not tolerated */
struct usb_cdc_header_desc *header = NULL;
struct usb_cdc_ether_desc *ether = NULL;
struct usb_cdc_mdlm_detail_desc *detail = NULL;
struct usb_cdc_mdlm_desc *desc = NULL;
unsigned int elength;
int cnt = 0;
memset(hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct usb_cdc_parsed_header));
hdr->phonet_magic_present = false;
while (buflen > 0) {
elength = buffer[0];
if (!elength) {
dev_err(&intf->dev, "skipping garbage byte\n");
elength = 1;
goto next_desc;
}
if (buffer[1] != USB_DT_CS_INTERFACE) {
dev_err(&intf->dev, "skipping garbage\n");
goto next_desc;
}
switch (buffer[2]) {
case USB_CDC_UNION_TYPE: /* we've found it */
if (elength < sizeof(struct usb_cdc_union_desc))
goto next_desc;
if (union_header) {
dev_err(&intf->dev, "More than one union descriptor, skipping ...\n");
goto next_desc;
}
union_header = (struct usb_cdc_union_desc *)buffer;
break;
case USB_CDC_COUNTRY_TYPE:
if (elength < sizeof(struct usb_cdc_country_functional_desc))
goto next_desc;
hdr->usb_cdc_country_functional_desc =
(struct usb_cdc_country_functional_desc *)buffer;
break;
case USB_CDC_HEADER_TYPE:
if (elength != sizeof(struct usb_cdc_header_desc))
goto next_desc;
if (header)
return -EINVAL;
header = (struct usb_cdc_header_desc *)buffer;
break;
case USB_CDC_ACM_TYPE:
if (elength < sizeof(struct usb_cdc_acm_descriptor))
goto next_desc;
hdr->usb_cdc_acm_descriptor =
(struct usb_cdc_acm_descriptor *)buffer;
break;
case USB_CDC_ETHERNET_TYPE:
if (elength != sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ether_desc))
goto next_desc;
if (ether)
return -EINVAL;
ether = (struct usb_cdc_ether_desc *)buffer;
break;
case USB_CDC_CALL_MANAGEMENT_TYPE:
if (elength < sizeof(struct usb_cdc_call_mgmt_descriptor))
goto next_desc;
hdr->usb_cdc_call_mgmt_descriptor =
(struct usb_cdc_call_mgmt_descriptor *)buffer;
break;
case USB_CDC_DMM_TYPE:
if (elength < sizeof(struct usb_cdc_dmm_desc))
goto next_desc;
hdr->usb_cdc_dmm_desc =
(struct usb_cdc_dmm_desc *)buffer;
break;
case USB_CDC_MDLM_TYPE:
if (elength < sizeof(struct usb_cdc_mdlm_desc *))
goto next_desc;
if (desc)
return -EINVAL;
desc = (struct usb_cdc_mdlm_desc *)buffer;
break;
case USB_CDC_MDLM_DETAIL_TYPE:
if (elength < sizeof(struct usb_cdc_mdlm_detail_desc *))
goto next_desc;
if (detail)
return -EINVAL;
detail = (struct usb_cdc_mdlm_detail_desc *)buffer;
break;
case USB_CDC_NCM_TYPE:
if (elength < sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ncm_desc))
goto next_desc;
hdr->usb_cdc_ncm_desc = (struct usb_cdc_ncm_desc *)buffer;
break;
case USB_CDC_MBIM_TYPE:
if (elength < sizeof(struct usb_cdc_mbim_desc))
goto next_desc;
hdr->usb_cdc_mbim_desc = (struct usb_cdc_mbim_desc *)buffer;
break;
case USB_CDC_MBIM_EXTENDED_TYPE:
if (elength < sizeof(struct usb_cdc_mbim_extended_desc))
break;
hdr->usb_cdc_mbim_extended_desc =
(struct usb_cdc_mbim_extended_desc *)buffer;
break;
case CDC_PHONET_MAGIC_NUMBER:
hdr->phonet_magic_present = true;
break;
default:
/*
* there are LOTS more CDC descriptors that
* could legitimately be found here.
*/
dev_dbg(&intf->dev, "Ignoring descriptor: type %02x, length %ud\n",
buffer[2], elength);
goto next_desc;
}
cnt++;
next_desc:
buflen -= elength;
buffer += elength;
}
hdr->usb_cdc_union_desc = union_header;
hdr->usb_cdc_header_desc = header;
hdr->usb_cdc_mdlm_detail_desc = detail;
hdr->usb_cdc_mdlm_desc = desc;
hdr->usb_cdc_ether_desc = ether;
return cnt;
}
Commit Message: USB: core: harden cdc_parse_cdc_header
Andrey Konovalov reported a possible out-of-bounds problem for the
cdc_parse_cdc_header function. He writes:
It looks like cdc_parse_cdc_header() doesn't validate buflen
before accessing buffer[1], buffer[2] and so on. The only check
present is while (buflen > 0).
So fix this issue up by properly validating the buffer length matches
what the descriptor says it is.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | int cdc_parse_cdc_header(struct usb_cdc_parsed_header *hdr,
struct usb_interface *intf,
u8 *buffer,
int buflen)
{
/* duplicates are ignored */
struct usb_cdc_union_desc *union_header = NULL;
/* duplicates are not tolerated */
struct usb_cdc_header_desc *header = NULL;
struct usb_cdc_ether_desc *ether = NULL;
struct usb_cdc_mdlm_detail_desc *detail = NULL;
struct usb_cdc_mdlm_desc *desc = NULL;
unsigned int elength;
int cnt = 0;
memset(hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct usb_cdc_parsed_header));
hdr->phonet_magic_present = false;
while (buflen > 0) {
elength = buffer[0];
if (!elength) {
dev_err(&intf->dev, "skipping garbage byte\n");
elength = 1;
goto next_desc;
}
if ((buflen < elength) || (elength < 3)) {
dev_err(&intf->dev, "invalid descriptor buffer length\n");
break;
}
if (buffer[1] != USB_DT_CS_INTERFACE) {
dev_err(&intf->dev, "skipping garbage\n");
goto next_desc;
}
switch (buffer[2]) {
case USB_CDC_UNION_TYPE: /* we've found it */
if (elength < sizeof(struct usb_cdc_union_desc))
goto next_desc;
if (union_header) {
dev_err(&intf->dev, "More than one union descriptor, skipping ...\n");
goto next_desc;
}
union_header = (struct usb_cdc_union_desc *)buffer;
break;
case USB_CDC_COUNTRY_TYPE:
if (elength < sizeof(struct usb_cdc_country_functional_desc))
goto next_desc;
hdr->usb_cdc_country_functional_desc =
(struct usb_cdc_country_functional_desc *)buffer;
break;
case USB_CDC_HEADER_TYPE:
if (elength != sizeof(struct usb_cdc_header_desc))
goto next_desc;
if (header)
return -EINVAL;
header = (struct usb_cdc_header_desc *)buffer;
break;
case USB_CDC_ACM_TYPE:
if (elength < sizeof(struct usb_cdc_acm_descriptor))
goto next_desc;
hdr->usb_cdc_acm_descriptor =
(struct usb_cdc_acm_descriptor *)buffer;
break;
case USB_CDC_ETHERNET_TYPE:
if (elength != sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ether_desc))
goto next_desc;
if (ether)
return -EINVAL;
ether = (struct usb_cdc_ether_desc *)buffer;
break;
case USB_CDC_CALL_MANAGEMENT_TYPE:
if (elength < sizeof(struct usb_cdc_call_mgmt_descriptor))
goto next_desc;
hdr->usb_cdc_call_mgmt_descriptor =
(struct usb_cdc_call_mgmt_descriptor *)buffer;
break;
case USB_CDC_DMM_TYPE:
if (elength < sizeof(struct usb_cdc_dmm_desc))
goto next_desc;
hdr->usb_cdc_dmm_desc =
(struct usb_cdc_dmm_desc *)buffer;
break;
case USB_CDC_MDLM_TYPE:
if (elength < sizeof(struct usb_cdc_mdlm_desc *))
goto next_desc;
if (desc)
return -EINVAL;
desc = (struct usb_cdc_mdlm_desc *)buffer;
break;
case USB_CDC_MDLM_DETAIL_TYPE:
if (elength < sizeof(struct usb_cdc_mdlm_detail_desc *))
goto next_desc;
if (detail)
return -EINVAL;
detail = (struct usb_cdc_mdlm_detail_desc *)buffer;
break;
case USB_CDC_NCM_TYPE:
if (elength < sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ncm_desc))
goto next_desc;
hdr->usb_cdc_ncm_desc = (struct usb_cdc_ncm_desc *)buffer;
break;
case USB_CDC_MBIM_TYPE:
if (elength < sizeof(struct usb_cdc_mbim_desc))
goto next_desc;
hdr->usb_cdc_mbim_desc = (struct usb_cdc_mbim_desc *)buffer;
break;
case USB_CDC_MBIM_EXTENDED_TYPE:
if (elength < sizeof(struct usb_cdc_mbim_extended_desc))
break;
hdr->usb_cdc_mbim_extended_desc =
(struct usb_cdc_mbim_extended_desc *)buffer;
break;
case CDC_PHONET_MAGIC_NUMBER:
hdr->phonet_magic_present = true;
break;
default:
/*
* there are LOTS more CDC descriptors that
* could legitimately be found here.
*/
dev_dbg(&intf->dev, "Ignoring descriptor: type %02x, length %ud\n",
buffer[2], elength);
goto next_desc;
}
cnt++;
next_desc:
buflen -= elength;
buffer += elength;
}
hdr->usb_cdc_union_desc = union_header;
hdr->usb_cdc_header_desc = header;
hdr->usb_cdc_mdlm_detail_desc = detail;
hdr->usb_cdc_mdlm_desc = desc;
hdr->usb_cdc_ether_desc = ether;
return cnt;
}
| 167,676 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ssize_t v9fs_list_xattr(FsContext *ctx, const char *path,
void *value, size_t vsize)
{
ssize_t size = 0;
void *ovalue = value;
XattrOperations *xops;
char *orig_value, *orig_value_start;
ssize_t xattr_len, parsed_len = 0, attr_len;
char *dirpath, *name;
int dirfd;
/* Get the actual len */
dirpath = g_path_get_dirname(path);
dirfd = local_opendir_nofollow(ctx, dirpath);
g_free(dirpath);
if (dirfd == -1) {
return -1;
}
name = g_path_get_basename(path);
xattr_len = flistxattrat_nofollow(dirfd, name, value, 0);
if (xattr_len <= 0) {
g_free(name);
close_preserve_errno(dirfd);
return xattr_len;
}
/* Now fetch the xattr and find the actual size */
orig_value = g_malloc(xattr_len);
xattr_len = flistxattrat_nofollow(dirfd, name, orig_value, xattr_len);
g_free(name);
close_preserve_errno(dirfd);
if (xattr_len < 0) {
return -1;
}
orig_value_start = orig_value;
while (xattr_len > parsed_len) {
xops = get_xattr_operations(ctx->xops, orig_value);
if (!xops) {
goto next_entry;
}
if (!value) {
size += xops->listxattr(ctx, path, orig_value, value, vsize);
} else {
size = xops->listxattr(ctx, path, orig_value, value, vsize);
if (size < 0) {
goto err_out;
}
value += size;
vsize -= size;
}
next_entry:
/* Got the next entry */
attr_len = strlen(orig_value) + 1;
parsed_len += attr_len;
orig_value += attr_len;
}
if (value) {
size = value - ovalue;
}
err_out:
g_free(orig_value_start);
return size;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | ssize_t v9fs_list_xattr(FsContext *ctx, const char *path,
void *value, size_t vsize)
{
ssize_t size = 0;
void *ovalue = value;
XattrOperations *xops;
char *orig_value, *orig_value_start;
ssize_t xattr_len, parsed_len = 0, attr_len;
char *dirpath, *name;
int dirfd;
/* Get the actual len */
dirpath = g_path_get_dirname(path);
dirfd = local_opendir_nofollow(ctx, dirpath);
g_free(dirpath);
if (dirfd == -1) {
return -1;
}
name = g_path_get_basename(path);
xattr_len = flistxattrat_nofollow(dirfd, name, value, 0);
if (xattr_len <= 0) {
g_free(name);
close_preserve_errno(dirfd);
return xattr_len;
}
/* Now fetch the xattr and find the actual size */
orig_value = g_malloc(xattr_len);
xattr_len = flistxattrat_nofollow(dirfd, name, orig_value, xattr_len);
g_free(name);
close_preserve_errno(dirfd);
if (xattr_len < 0) {
g_free(orig_value);
return -1;
}
orig_value_start = orig_value;
while (xattr_len > parsed_len) {
xops = get_xattr_operations(ctx->xops, orig_value);
if (!xops) {
goto next_entry;
}
if (!value) {
size += xops->listxattr(ctx, path, orig_value, value, vsize);
} else {
size = xops->listxattr(ctx, path, orig_value, value, vsize);
if (size < 0) {
goto err_out;
}
value += size;
vsize -= size;
}
next_entry:
/* Got the next entry */
attr_len = strlen(orig_value) + 1;
parsed_len += attr_len;
orig_value += attr_len;
}
if (value) {
size = value - ovalue;
}
err_out:
g_free(orig_value_start);
return size;
}
| 164,885 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: TabContentsTest()
: ui_thread_(BrowserThread::UI, &message_loop_),
old_browser_client_(NULL) {
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | TabContentsTest()
: ui_thread_(BrowserThread::UI, &message_loop_),
old_client_(NULL),
old_browser_client_(NULL) {
}
| 171,015 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void check_request_for_cacheability(struct stream *s, struct channel *chn)
{
struct http_txn *txn = s->txn;
char *p1, *p2;
char *cur_ptr, *cur_end, *cur_next;
int pragma_found;
int cc_found;
int cur_idx;
if ((txn->flags & (TX_CACHEABLE|TX_CACHE_IGNORE)) == TX_CACHE_IGNORE)
return; /* nothing more to do here */
cur_idx = 0;
pragma_found = cc_found = 0;
cur_next = chn->buf->p + hdr_idx_first_pos(&txn->hdr_idx);
while ((cur_idx = txn->hdr_idx.v[cur_idx].next)) {
struct hdr_idx_elem *cur_hdr;
int val;
cur_hdr = &txn->hdr_idx.v[cur_idx];
cur_ptr = cur_next;
cur_end = cur_ptr + cur_hdr->len;
cur_next = cur_end + cur_hdr->cr + 1;
/* We have one full header between cur_ptr and cur_end, and the
* next header starts at cur_next.
*/
val = http_header_match2(cur_ptr, cur_end, "Pragma", 6);
if (val) {
if ((cur_end - (cur_ptr + val) >= 8) &&
strncasecmp(cur_ptr + val, "no-cache", 8) == 0) {
pragma_found = 1;
continue;
}
}
val = http_header_match2(cur_ptr, cur_end, "Cache-control", 13);
if (!val)
continue;
p2 = p1;
while (p2 < cur_end && *p2 != '=' && *p2 != ',' && !isspace((unsigned char)*p2))
p2++;
/* we have a complete value between p1 and p2. We don't check the
* values after max-age, max-stale nor min-fresh, we simply don't
* use the cache when they're specified.
*/
if (((p2 - p1 == 7) && strncasecmp(p1, "max-age", 7) == 0) ||
((p2 - p1 == 8) && strncasecmp(p1, "no-cache", 8) == 0) ||
((p2 - p1 == 9) && strncasecmp(p1, "max-stale", 9) == 0) ||
((p2 - p1 == 9) && strncasecmp(p1, "min-fresh", 9) == 0)) {
txn->flags |= TX_CACHE_IGNORE;
continue;
}
if ((p2 - p1 == 8) && strncasecmp(p1, "no-store", 8) == 0) {
txn->flags &= ~TX_CACHEABLE & ~TX_CACHE_COOK;
continue;
}
}
/* RFC7234#5.4:
* When the Cache-Control header field is also present and
* understood in a request, Pragma is ignored.
* When the Cache-Control header field is not present in a
* request, caches MUST consider the no-cache request
* pragma-directive as having the same effect as if
* "Cache-Control: no-cache" were present.
*/
if (!cc_found && pragma_found)
txn->flags |= TX_CACHE_IGNORE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void check_request_for_cacheability(struct stream *s, struct channel *chn)
{
struct http_txn *txn = s->txn;
char *p1, *p2;
char *cur_ptr, *cur_end, *cur_next;
int pragma_found;
int cc_found;
int cur_idx;
if ((txn->flags & (TX_CACHEABLE|TX_CACHE_IGNORE)) == TX_CACHE_IGNORE)
return; /* nothing more to do here */
cur_idx = 0;
pragma_found = cc_found = 0;
cur_next = chn->buf->p + hdr_idx_first_pos(&txn->hdr_idx);
while ((cur_idx = txn->hdr_idx.v[cur_idx].next)) {
struct hdr_idx_elem *cur_hdr;
int val;
cur_hdr = &txn->hdr_idx.v[cur_idx];
cur_ptr = cur_next;
cur_end = cur_ptr + cur_hdr->len;
cur_next = cur_end + cur_hdr->cr + 1;
/* We have one full header between cur_ptr and cur_end, and the
* next header starts at cur_next.
*/
val = http_header_match2(cur_ptr, cur_end, "Pragma", 6);
if (val) {
if ((cur_end - (cur_ptr + val) >= 8) &&
strncasecmp(cur_ptr + val, "no-cache", 8) == 0) {
pragma_found = 1;
continue;
}
}
/* Don't use the cache and don't try to store if we found the
* Authorization header */
val = http_header_match2(cur_ptr, cur_end, "Authorization", 13);
if (val) {
txn->flags &= ~TX_CACHEABLE & ~TX_CACHE_COOK;
txn->flags |= TX_CACHE_IGNORE;
continue;
}
val = http_header_match2(cur_ptr, cur_end, "Cache-control", 13);
if (!val)
continue;
p2 = p1;
while (p2 < cur_end && *p2 != '=' && *p2 != ',' && !isspace((unsigned char)*p2))
p2++;
/* we have a complete value between p1 and p2. We don't check the
* values after max-age, max-stale nor min-fresh, we simply don't
* use the cache when they're specified.
*/
if (((p2 - p1 == 7) && strncasecmp(p1, "max-age", 7) == 0) ||
((p2 - p1 == 8) && strncasecmp(p1, "no-cache", 8) == 0) ||
((p2 - p1 == 9) && strncasecmp(p1, "max-stale", 9) == 0) ||
((p2 - p1 == 9) && strncasecmp(p1, "min-fresh", 9) == 0)) {
txn->flags |= TX_CACHE_IGNORE;
continue;
}
if ((p2 - p1 == 8) && strncasecmp(p1, "no-store", 8) == 0) {
txn->flags &= ~TX_CACHEABLE & ~TX_CACHE_COOK;
continue;
}
}
/* RFC7234#5.4:
* When the Cache-Control header field is also present and
* understood in a request, Pragma is ignored.
* When the Cache-Control header field is not present in a
* request, caches MUST consider the no-cache request
* pragma-directive as having the same effect as if
* "Cache-Control: no-cache" were present.
*/
if (!cc_found && pragma_found)
txn->flags |= TX_CACHE_IGNORE;
}
| 164,841 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void WallpaperManager::StartLoadAndSetDefaultWallpaper(
const base::FilePath& path,
const wallpaper::WallpaperLayout layout,
MovableOnDestroyCallbackHolder on_finish,
std::unique_ptr<user_manager::UserImage>* result_out) {
user_image_loader::StartWithFilePath(
task_runner_, path, ImageDecoder::ROBUST_JPEG_CODEC,
0, // Do not crop.
base::Bind(&WallpaperManager::OnDefaultWallpaperDecoded,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), path, layout,
base::Unretained(result_out),
base::Passed(std::move(on_finish))));
}
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
[email protected], [email protected]
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <[email protected]>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void WallpaperManager::StartLoadAndSetDefaultWallpaper(
const base::FilePath& path,
const wallpaper::WallpaperLayout layout,
bool update_wallpaper,
MovableOnDestroyCallbackHolder on_finish,
std::unique_ptr<user_manager::UserImage>* result_out) {
user_image_loader::StartWithFilePath(
task_runner_, path, ImageDecoder::ROBUST_JPEG_CODEC,
0, // Do not crop.
base::Bind(&WallpaperManager::OnDefaultWallpaperDecoded,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), path, layout, update_wallpaper,
base::Unretained(result_out),
base::Passed(std::move(on_finish))));
}
| 171,971 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void ConnectionChangeHandler(void* object, bool connected) {
if (!BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Not on UI thread";
return;
}
InputMethodLibraryImpl* input_method_library =
static_cast<InputMethodLibraryImpl*>(object);
input_method_library->ime_connected_ = connected;
if (connected) {
input_method_library->pending_config_requests_.clear();
input_method_library->pending_config_requests_.insert(
input_method_library->current_config_values_.begin(),
input_method_library->current_config_values_.end());
input_method_library->FlushImeConfig();
input_method_library->ChangeInputMethod(
input_method_library->previous_input_method().id);
input_method_library->ChangeInputMethod(
input_method_library->current_input_method().id);
}
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | static void ConnectionChangeHandler(void* object, bool connected) {
// IBusController override.
virtual void OnConnectionChange(bool connected) {
if (!BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Not on UI thread";
return;
}
ime_connected_ = connected;
if (connected) {
pending_config_requests_.clear();
pending_config_requests_.insert(
current_config_values_.begin(),
current_config_values_.end());
FlushImeConfig();
ChangeInputMethod(previous_input_method().id);
ChangeInputMethod(current_input_method().id);
}
}
| 170,482 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void opl3_setup_voice(int dev, int voice, int chn)
{
struct channel_info *info =
&synth_devs[dev]->chn_info[chn];
opl3_set_instr(dev, voice, info->pgm_num);
devc->voc[voice].bender = 0;
devc->voc[voice].bender_range = info->bender_range;
devc->voc[voice].volume = info->controllers[CTL_MAIN_VOLUME];
devc->voc[voice].panning = (info->controllers[CTL_PAN] * 2) - 128;
}
Commit Message: sound/oss/opl3: validate voice and channel indexes
User-controllable indexes for voice and channel values may cause reading
and writing beyond the bounds of their respective arrays, leading to
potentially exploitable memory corruption. Validate these indexes.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static void opl3_setup_voice(int dev, int voice, int chn)
{
struct channel_info *info;
if (voice < 0 || voice >= devc->nr_voice)
return;
if (chn < 0 || chn > 15)
return;
info = &synth_devs[dev]->chn_info[chn];
opl3_set_instr(dev, voice, info->pgm_num);
devc->voc[voice].bender = 0;
devc->voc[voice].bender_range = info->bender_range;
devc->voc[voice].volume = info->controllers[CTL_MAIN_VOLUME];
devc->voc[voice].panning = (info->controllers[CTL_PAN] * 2) - 128;
}
| 165,891 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void BrowserViewRenderer::DidOverscroll(gfx::Vector2dF accumulated_overscroll,
gfx::Vector2dF latest_overscroll_delta,
gfx::Vector2dF current_fling_velocity) {
const float physical_pixel_scale = dip_scale_ * page_scale_factor_;
if (accumulated_overscroll == latest_overscroll_delta)
overscroll_rounding_error_ = gfx::Vector2dF();
gfx::Vector2dF scaled_overscroll_delta =
gfx::ScaleVector2d(latest_overscroll_delta, physical_pixel_scale);
gfx::Vector2d rounded_overscroll_delta = gfx::ToRoundedVector2d(
scaled_overscroll_delta + overscroll_rounding_error_);
overscroll_rounding_error_ =
scaled_overscroll_delta - rounded_overscroll_delta;
gfx::Vector2dF fling_velocity_pixels =
gfx::ScaleVector2d(current_fling_velocity, physical_pixel_scale);
client_->DidOverscroll(rounded_overscroll_delta, fling_velocity_pixels);
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void BrowserViewRenderer::DidOverscroll(gfx::Vector2dF accumulated_overscroll,
void BrowserViewRenderer::DidOverscroll(
const gfx::Vector2dF& accumulated_overscroll,
const gfx::Vector2dF& latest_overscroll_delta,
const gfx::Vector2dF& current_fling_velocity) {
const float physical_pixel_scale = dip_scale_ * page_scale_factor_;
if (accumulated_overscroll == latest_overscroll_delta)
overscroll_rounding_error_ = gfx::Vector2dF();
gfx::Vector2dF scaled_overscroll_delta =
gfx::ScaleVector2d(latest_overscroll_delta, physical_pixel_scale);
gfx::Vector2d rounded_overscroll_delta = gfx::ToRoundedVector2d(
scaled_overscroll_delta + overscroll_rounding_error_);
overscroll_rounding_error_ =
scaled_overscroll_delta - rounded_overscroll_delta;
gfx::Vector2dF fling_velocity_pixels =
gfx::ScaleVector2d(current_fling_velocity, physical_pixel_scale);
client_->DidOverscroll(rounded_overscroll_delta, fling_velocity_pixels);
}
| 171,613 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ReportRequestHeaders(std::map<std::string, std::string>* request_headers,
const std::string& url,
const std::string& headers) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
EXPECT_FALSE(base::ContainsKey(*request_headers, url));
(*request_headers)[url] = headers;
}
Commit Message: Fix ChromeResourceDispatcherHostDelegateMirrorBrowserTest.MirrorRequestHeader with network service.
The functionality worked, as part of converting DICE, however the test code didn't work since it
depended on accessing the net objects directly. Switch the tests to use the EmbeddedTestServer, to
better match production, which removes the dependency on net/.
Also:
-make GetFilePathWithReplacements replace strings in the mock headers if they're present
-add a global to google_util to ignore ports; that way other tests can be converted without having
to modify each callsite to google_util
Bug: 881976
Change-Id: Ic52023495c1c98c1248025c11cdf37f433fef058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1328142
Commit-Queue: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ramin Halavati <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Maks Orlovich <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607652}
CWE ID: | void ReportRequestHeaders(std::map<std::string, std::string>* request_headers,
| 172,580 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: Node::InsertionNotificationRequest HTMLStyleElement::InsertedInto(
ContainerNode* insertion_point) {
HTMLElement::InsertedInto(insertion_point);
return kInsertionShouldCallDidNotifySubtreeInsertions;
}
Commit Message: Do not crash while reentrantly appending to style element.
When a node is inserted into a container, it is notified via
::InsertedInto. However, a node may request a second notification via
DidNotifySubtreeInsertionsToDocument, which occurs after all the children
have been notified as well. *StyleElement is currently using this
second notification.
This causes a problem, because *ScriptElement is using the same mechanism,
which in turn means that scripts can execute before the state of
*StyleElements are properly updated.
This patch avoids ::DidNotifySubtreeInsertionsToDocument, and instead
processes the stylesheet in ::InsertedInto. The original reason for using
::DidNotifySubtreeInsertionsToDocument in the first place appears to be
invalid now, as the test case is still passing.
[email protected], [email protected]
Bug: 853709, 847570
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2;master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel
Change-Id: Ic0b5fa611044c78c5745cf26870a747f88920a14
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1104347
Commit-Queue: Anders Ruud <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Rune Lillesveen <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#568368}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | Node::InsertionNotificationRequest HTMLStyleElement::InsertedInto(
ContainerNode* insertion_point) {
HTMLElement::InsertedInto(insertion_point);
if (isConnected()) {
if (StyleElement::ProcessStyleSheet(GetDocument(), *this) ==
StyleElement::kProcessingFatalError) {
NotifyLoadedSheetAndAllCriticalSubresources(
kErrorOccurredLoadingSubresource);
}
}
return kInsertionDone;
}
| 173,172 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: cmsBool CMSEXPORT cmsAppendNamedColor(cmsNAMEDCOLORLIST* NamedColorList,
const char* Name,
cmsUInt16Number PCS[3], cmsUInt16Number Colorant[cmsMAXCHANNELS])
{
cmsUInt32Number i;
if (NamedColorList == NULL) return FALSE;
if (NamedColorList ->nColors + 1 > NamedColorList ->Allocated) {
if (!GrowNamedColorList(NamedColorList)) return FALSE;
}
for (i=0; i < NamedColorList ->ColorantCount; i++)
NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].DeviceColorant[i] = Colorant == NULL? 0 : Colorant[i];
for (i=0; i < 3; i++)
NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].PCS[i] = PCS == NULL ? 0 : PCS[i];
if (Name != NULL) {
strncpy(NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].Name, Name,
sizeof(NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].Name));
NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].Name[cmsMAX_PATH-1] = 0;
}
else
NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].Name[0] = 0;
NamedColorList ->nColors++;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Non happy-path fixes
CWE ID: | cmsBool CMSEXPORT cmsAppendNamedColor(cmsNAMEDCOLORLIST* NamedColorList,
const char* Name,
cmsUInt16Number PCS[3], cmsUInt16Number Colorant[cmsMAXCHANNELS])
{
cmsUInt32Number i;
if (NamedColorList == NULL) return FALSE;
if (NamedColorList ->nColors + 1 > NamedColorList ->Allocated) {
if (!GrowNamedColorList(NamedColorList)) return FALSE;
}
for (i=0; i < NamedColorList ->ColorantCount; i++)
NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].DeviceColorant[i] = Colorant == NULL? 0 : Colorant[i];
for (i=0; i < 3; i++)
NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].PCS[i] = PCS == NULL ? 0 : PCS[i];
if (Name != NULL) {
strncpy(NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].Name, Name, cmsMAX_PATH-1);
NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].Name[cmsMAX_PATH-1] = 0;
}
else
NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].Name[0] = 0;
NamedColorList ->nColors++;
return TRUE;
}
| 166,543 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ShouldCancelAndIgnore(NavigationHandle* handle) {
return handle->GetFrameTreeNodeId() == frame_tree_node_id_;
}
Commit Message: [GuestView] - Introduce MimeHandlerViewAttachHelper
This CL is for the most part a mechanical change which extracts almost
all the frame-based MimeHandlerView code out of
ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter. This change both removes the current
clutter form EGVMF as well as fixesa race introduced when the
frame-based logic was added to EGVMF. The reason for the race was that
EGVMF is destroyed on IO thread but all the access to it (for
frame-based MHV) are from UI.
[email protected],[email protected]
Bug: 659750, 896679, 911161, 918861
Change-Id: I6474b870e4d56daa68be03637bb633665d9f9dda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1401451
Commit-Queue: Ehsan Karamad <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: James MacLean <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ehsan Karamad <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621155}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | ShouldCancelAndIgnore(NavigationHandle* handle) {
| 173,049 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: cmsNAMEDCOLORLIST* CMSEXPORT cmsAllocNamedColorList(cmsContext ContextID, cmsUInt32Number n, cmsUInt32Number ColorantCount, const char* Prefix, const char* Suffix)
{
cmsNAMEDCOLORLIST* v = (cmsNAMEDCOLORLIST*) _cmsMallocZero(ContextID, sizeof(cmsNAMEDCOLORLIST));
if (v == NULL) return NULL;
v ->List = NULL;
v ->nColors = 0;
v ->ContextID = ContextID;
while (v -> Allocated < n)
GrowNamedColorList(v);
strncpy(v ->Prefix, Prefix, sizeof(v ->Prefix));
strncpy(v ->Suffix, Suffix, sizeof(v ->Suffix));
v->Prefix[32] = v->Suffix[32] = 0;
v -> ColorantCount = ColorantCount;
return v;
}
Commit Message: Non happy-path fixes
CWE ID: | cmsNAMEDCOLORLIST* CMSEXPORT cmsAllocNamedColorList(cmsContext ContextID, cmsUInt32Number n, cmsUInt32Number ColorantCount, const char* Prefix, const char* Suffix)
{
cmsNAMEDCOLORLIST* v = (cmsNAMEDCOLORLIST*) _cmsMallocZero(ContextID, sizeof(cmsNAMEDCOLORLIST));
if (v == NULL) return NULL;
v ->List = NULL;
v ->nColors = 0;
v ->ContextID = ContextID;
while (v -> Allocated < n)
GrowNamedColorList(v);
strncpy(v ->Prefix, Prefix, sizeof(v ->Prefix)-1);
strncpy(v ->Suffix, Suffix, sizeof(v ->Suffix)-1);
v->Prefix[32] = v->Suffix[32] = 0;
v -> ColorantCount = ColorantCount;
return v;
}
| 166,541 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: gs_main_init1(gs_main_instance * minst)
{
if (minst->init_done < 1) {
gs_dual_memory_t idmem;
int code =
ialloc_init(&idmem, minst->heap,
minst->memory_clump_size, gs_have_level2());
if (code < 0)
return code;
code = gs_lib_init1((gs_memory_t *)idmem.space_system);
if (code < 0)
return code;
alloc_save_init(&idmem);
{
gs_memory_t *mem = (gs_memory_t *)idmem.space_system;
name_table *nt = names_init(minst->name_table_size,
idmem.space_system);
if (nt == 0)
return_error(gs_error_VMerror);
mem->gs_lib_ctx->gs_name_table = nt;
code = gs_register_struct_root(mem, NULL,
(void **)&mem->gs_lib_ctx->gs_name_table,
"the_gs_name_table");
"the_gs_name_table");
if (code < 0)
return code;
}
code = obj_init(&minst->i_ctx_p, &idmem); /* requires name_init */
if (code < 0)
if (code < 0)
return code;
code = i_iodev_init(minst->i_ctx_p);
if (code < 0)
return code;
minst->init_done = 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | gs_main_init1(gs_main_instance * minst)
{
if (minst->init_done < 1) {
gs_dual_memory_t idmem;
int code =
ialloc_init(&idmem, minst->heap,
minst->memory_clump_size, gs_have_level2());
if (code < 0)
return code;
code = gs_lib_init1((gs_memory_t *)idmem.space_system);
if (code < 0)
return code;
alloc_save_init(&idmem);
{
gs_memory_t *mem = (gs_memory_t *)idmem.space_system;
name_table *nt = names_init(minst->name_table_size,
idmem.space_system);
if (nt == 0)
return_error(gs_error_VMerror);
mem->gs_lib_ctx->gs_name_table = nt;
code = gs_register_struct_root(mem, NULL,
(void **)&mem->gs_lib_ctx->gs_name_table,
"the_gs_name_table");
"the_gs_name_table");
if (code < 0)
return code;
mem->gs_lib_ctx->client_check_file_permission = z_check_file_permissions;
}
code = obj_init(&minst->i_ctx_p, &idmem); /* requires name_init */
if (code < 0)
if (code < 0)
return code;
code = i_iodev_init(minst->i_ctx_p);
if (code < 0)
return code;
minst->init_done = 1;
}
return 0;
}
| 165,267 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int touch_file(const char *path, bool parents, usec_t stamp, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode) {
_cleanup_close_ int fd;
int r;
assert(path);
if (parents)
mkdir_parents(path, 0755);
fd = open(path, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY, mode > 0 ? mode : 0644);
if (fd < 0)
return -errno;
if (mode > 0) {
r = fchmod(fd, mode);
if (r < 0)
return -errno;
}
if (uid != UID_INVALID || gid != GID_INVALID) {
r = fchown(fd, uid, gid);
if (r < 0)
return -errno;
}
if (stamp != USEC_INFINITY) {
struct timespec ts[2];
timespec_store(&ts[0], stamp);
ts[1] = ts[0];
r = futimens(fd, ts);
} else
r = futimens(fd, NULL);
if (r < 0)
return -errno;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: util-lib: use MODE_INVALID as invalid value for mode_t everywhere
CWE ID: CWE-264 | int touch_file(const char *path, bool parents, usec_t stamp, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode) {
_cleanup_close_ int fd;
int r;
assert(path);
if (parents)
mkdir_parents(path, 0755);
fd = open(path, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY, mode > 0 ? mode : 0644);
if (fd < 0)
return -errno;
if (mode != MODE_INVALID) {
r = fchmod(fd, mode);
if (r < 0)
return -errno;
}
if (uid != UID_INVALID || gid != GID_INVALID) {
r = fchown(fd, uid, gid);
if (r < 0)
return -errno;
}
if (stamp != USEC_INFINITY) {
struct timespec ts[2];
timespec_store(&ts[0], stamp);
ts[1] = ts[0];
r = futimens(fd, ts);
} else
r = futimens(fd, NULL);
if (r < 0)
return -errno;
return 0;
}
| 170,105 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual bool IsURLAcceptableForWebUI(
BrowserContext* browser_context, const GURL& url) const {
return HasWebUIScheme(url);
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | virtual bool IsURLAcceptableForWebUI(
BrowserContext* browser_context, const GURL& url) const {
return content::GetContentClient()->HasWebUIScheme(url);
}
};
class TabContentsTestClient : public TestContentClient {
public:
TabContentsTestClient() {
}
virtual bool HasWebUIScheme(const GURL& url) const OVERRIDE {
return url.SchemeIs("tabcontentstest");
}
| 171,013 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void HttpBridge::MakeAsynchronousPost() {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
base::AutoLock lock(fetch_state_lock_);
DCHECK(!fetch_state_.request_completed);
if (fetch_state_.aborted)
return;
fetch_state_.url_poster = new URLFetcher(url_for_request_,
URLFetcher::POST, this);
fetch_state_.url_poster->set_request_context(context_getter_for_request_);
fetch_state_.url_poster->set_upload_data(content_type_, request_content_);
fetch_state_.url_poster->set_extra_request_headers(extra_headers_);
fetch_state_.url_poster->set_load_flags(net::LOAD_DO_NOT_SEND_COOKIES);
fetch_state_.url_poster->Start();
}
Commit Message: Use URLFetcher::Create instead of new in http_bridge.cc.
This change modified http_bridge so that it uses a factory to construct
the URLFetcher. Moreover, it modified sync_backend_host_unittest.cc to
use an URLFetcher factory which will prevent access to www.example.com during
the test.
BUG=none
TEST=sync_backend_host_unittest.cc
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7053011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87227 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void HttpBridge::MakeAsynchronousPost() {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
base::AutoLock lock(fetch_state_lock_);
DCHECK(!fetch_state_.request_completed);
if (fetch_state_.aborted)
return;
fetch_state_.url_poster = URLFetcher::Create(0, url_for_request_,
URLFetcher::POST, this);
fetch_state_.url_poster->set_request_context(context_getter_for_request_);
fetch_state_.url_poster->set_upload_data(content_type_, request_content_);
fetch_state_.url_poster->set_extra_request_headers(extra_headers_);
fetch_state_.url_poster->set_load_flags(net::LOAD_DO_NOT_SEND_COOKIES);
fetch_state_.url_poster->Start();
}
| 170,428 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
SSL3_RECORD *rec,
unsigned block_size,
unsigned mac_size)
{
unsigned padding_length, good, to_check, i;
const char has_explicit_iv =
s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_VERSION;
const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ +
mac_size +
(has_explicit_iv ? block_size : 0);
/* These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant
* time. */
if (overhead > rec->length)
return 0;
padding_length = rec->data[rec->length-1];
/* NB: if compression is in operation the first packet may not be of
padding_length--;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310 | int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
SSL3_RECORD *rec,
unsigned block_size,
unsigned mac_size)
{
unsigned padding_length, good, to_check, i;
const char has_explicit_iv =
s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_VERSION;
const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ +
mac_size +
(has_explicit_iv ? block_size : 0);
/* These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant
* time. */
if (overhead > rec->length)
return 0;
/* We can always safely skip the explicit IV. We check at the beginning
* of this function that the record has at least enough space for the
* IV, MAC and padding length byte. (These can be checked in
* non-constant time because it's all public information.) So, if the
* padding was invalid, then we didn't change |rec->length| and this is
* safe. If the padding was valid then we know that we have at least
* overhead+padding_length bytes of space and so this is still safe
* because overhead accounts for the explicit IV. */
if (has_explicit_iv)
{
rec->data += block_size;
rec->input += block_size;
rec->length -= block_size;
}
padding_length = rec->data[rec->length-1];
/* NB: if compression is in operation the first packet may not be of
padding_length--;
}
| 164,868 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int snd_ctl_replace(struct snd_card *card, struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol,
bool add_on_replace)
{
struct snd_ctl_elem_id id;
unsigned int idx;
struct snd_kcontrol *old;
int ret;
if (!kcontrol)
return -EINVAL;
if (snd_BUG_ON(!card || !kcontrol->info)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto error;
}
id = kcontrol->id;
down_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
old = snd_ctl_find_id(card, &id);
if (!old) {
if (add_on_replace)
goto add;
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto error;
}
ret = snd_ctl_remove(card, old);
if (ret < 0) {
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
goto error;
}
add:
if (snd_ctl_find_hole(card, kcontrol->count) < 0) {
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto error;
}
list_add_tail(&kcontrol->list, &card->controls);
card->controls_count += kcontrol->count;
kcontrol->id.numid = card->last_numid + 1;
card->last_numid += kcontrol->count;
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
for (idx = 0; idx < kcontrol->count; idx++, id.index++, id.numid++)
snd_ctl_notify(card, SNDRV_CTL_EVENT_MASK_ADD, &id);
return 0;
error:
snd_ctl_free_one(kcontrol);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: control: Don't access controls outside of protected regions
A control that is visible on the card->controls list can be freed at any time.
This means we must not access any of its memory while not holding the
controls_rw_lock. Otherwise we risk a use after free access.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | int snd_ctl_replace(struct snd_card *card, struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol,
bool add_on_replace)
{
struct snd_ctl_elem_id id;
unsigned int count;
unsigned int idx;
struct snd_kcontrol *old;
int ret;
if (!kcontrol)
return -EINVAL;
if (snd_BUG_ON(!card || !kcontrol->info)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto error;
}
id = kcontrol->id;
down_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
old = snd_ctl_find_id(card, &id);
if (!old) {
if (add_on_replace)
goto add;
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto error;
}
ret = snd_ctl_remove(card, old);
if (ret < 0) {
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
goto error;
}
add:
if (snd_ctl_find_hole(card, kcontrol->count) < 0) {
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto error;
}
list_add_tail(&kcontrol->list, &card->controls);
card->controls_count += kcontrol->count;
kcontrol->id.numid = card->last_numid + 1;
card->last_numid += kcontrol->count;
count = kcontrol->count;
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
for (idx = 0; idx < count; idx++, id.index++, id.numid++)
snd_ctl_notify(card, SNDRV_CTL_EVENT_MASK_ADD, &id);
return 0;
error:
snd_ctl_free_one(kcontrol);
return ret;
}
| 166,294 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: do_core_note(struct magic_set *ms, unsigned char *nbuf, uint32_t type,
int swap, uint32_t namesz, uint32_t descsz,
size_t noff, size_t doff, int *flags, size_t size, int clazz)
{
#ifdef ELFCORE
int os_style = -1;
/*
* Sigh. The 2.0.36 kernel in Debian 2.1, at
* least, doesn't correctly implement name
* sections, in core dumps, as specified by
* the "Program Linking" section of "UNIX(R) System
* V Release 4 Programmer's Guide: ANSI C and
* Programming Support Tools", because my copy
* clearly says "The first 'namesz' bytes in 'name'
* contain a *null-terminated* [emphasis mine]
* character representation of the entry's owner
* or originator", but the 2.0.36 kernel code
* doesn't include the terminating null in the
* name....
*/
if ((namesz == 4 && strncmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "CORE", 4) == 0) ||
(namesz == 5 && strcmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "CORE") == 0)) {
os_style = OS_STYLE_SVR4;
}
if ((namesz == 8 && strcmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "FreeBSD") == 0)) {
os_style = OS_STYLE_FREEBSD;
}
if ((namesz >= 11 && strncmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "NetBSD-CORE", 11)
== 0)) {
os_style = OS_STYLE_NETBSD;
}
if (os_style != -1 && (*flags & FLAGS_DID_CORE_STYLE) == 0) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", %s-style", os_style_names[os_style])
== -1)
return 1;
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_CORE_STYLE;
*flags |= os_style;
}
switch (os_style) {
case OS_STYLE_NETBSD:
if (type == NT_NETBSD_CORE_PROCINFO) {
char sbuf[512];
struct NetBSD_elfcore_procinfo pi;
memset(&pi, 0, sizeof(pi));
memcpy(&pi, nbuf + doff, descsz);
if (file_printf(ms, ", from '%.31s', pid=%u, uid=%u, "
"gid=%u, nlwps=%u, lwp=%u (signal %u/code %u)",
file_printable(sbuf, sizeof(sbuf),
CAST(char *, pi.cpi_name)),
elf_getu32(swap, (uint32_t)pi.cpi_pid),
elf_getu32(swap, pi.cpi_euid),
elf_getu32(swap, pi.cpi_egid),
elf_getu32(swap, pi.cpi_nlwps),
elf_getu32(swap, (uint32_t)pi.cpi_siglwp),
elf_getu32(swap, pi.cpi_signo),
elf_getu32(swap, pi.cpi_sigcode)) == -1)
return 1;
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_CORE;
return 1;
}
break;
default:
if (type == NT_PRPSINFO && *flags & FLAGS_IS_CORE) {
size_t i, j;
unsigned char c;
/*
* Extract the program name. We assume
* it to be 16 characters (that's what it
* is in SunOS 5.x and Linux).
*
* Unfortunately, it's at a different offset
* in various OSes, so try multiple offsets.
* If the characters aren't all printable,
* reject it.
*/
for (i = 0; i < NOFFSETS; i++) {
unsigned char *cname, *cp;
size_t reloffset = prpsoffsets(i);
size_t noffset = doff + reloffset;
size_t k;
for (j = 0; j < 16; j++, noffset++,
reloffset++) {
/*
* Make sure we're not past
* the end of the buffer; if
* we are, just give up.
*/
if (noffset >= size)
goto tryanother;
/*
* Make sure we're not past
* the end of the contents;
* if we are, this obviously
* isn't the right offset.
*/
if (reloffset >= descsz)
goto tryanother;
c = nbuf[noffset];
if (c == '\0') {
/*
* A '\0' at the
* beginning is
* obviously wrong.
* Any other '\0'
* means we're done.
*/
if (j == 0)
goto tryanother;
else
break;
} else {
/*
* A nonprintable
* character is also
* wrong.
*/
if (!isprint(c) || isquote(c))
goto tryanother;
}
}
/*
* Well, that worked.
*/
/*
* Try next offsets, in case this match is
* in the middle of a string.
*/
for (k = i + 1 ; k < NOFFSETS; k++) {
size_t no;
int adjust = 1;
if (prpsoffsets(k) >= prpsoffsets(i))
continue;
for (no = doff + prpsoffsets(k);
no < doff + prpsoffsets(i); no++)
adjust = adjust
&& isprint(nbuf[no]);
if (adjust)
i = k;
}
cname = (unsigned char *)
&nbuf[doff + prpsoffsets(i)];
for (cp = cname; *cp && isprint(*cp); cp++)
continue;
/*
* Linux apparently appends a space at the end
* of the command line: remove it.
*/
while (cp > cname && isspace(cp[-1]))
cp--;
if (file_printf(ms, ", from '%.*s'",
(int)(cp - cname), cname) == -1)
return 1;
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_CORE;
return 1;
tryanother:
;
}
}
break;
}
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Avoid reading past the end of buffer (Rui Reis)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | do_core_note(struct magic_set *ms, unsigned char *nbuf, uint32_t type,
int swap, uint32_t namesz, uint32_t descsz,
size_t noff, size_t doff, int *flags, size_t size, int clazz)
{
#ifdef ELFCORE
int os_style = -1;
/*
* Sigh. The 2.0.36 kernel in Debian 2.1, at
* least, doesn't correctly implement name
* sections, in core dumps, as specified by
* the "Program Linking" section of "UNIX(R) System
* V Release 4 Programmer's Guide: ANSI C and
* Programming Support Tools", because my copy
* clearly says "The first 'namesz' bytes in 'name'
* contain a *null-terminated* [emphasis mine]
* character representation of the entry's owner
* or originator", but the 2.0.36 kernel code
* doesn't include the terminating null in the
* name....
*/
if ((namesz == 4 && strncmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "CORE", 4) == 0) ||
(namesz == 5 && strcmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "CORE") == 0)) {
os_style = OS_STYLE_SVR4;
}
if ((namesz == 8 && strcmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "FreeBSD") == 0)) {
os_style = OS_STYLE_FREEBSD;
}
if ((namesz >= 11 && strncmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "NetBSD-CORE", 11)
== 0)) {
os_style = OS_STYLE_NETBSD;
}
if (os_style != -1 && (*flags & FLAGS_DID_CORE_STYLE) == 0) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", %s-style", os_style_names[os_style])
== -1)
return 1;
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_CORE_STYLE;
*flags |= os_style;
}
switch (os_style) {
case OS_STYLE_NETBSD:
if (type == NT_NETBSD_CORE_PROCINFO) {
char sbuf[512];
struct NetBSD_elfcore_procinfo pi;
memset(&pi, 0, sizeof(pi));
memcpy(&pi, nbuf + doff, descsz);
if (file_printf(ms, ", from '%.31s', pid=%u, uid=%u, "
"gid=%u, nlwps=%u, lwp=%u (signal %u/code %u)",
file_printable(sbuf, sizeof(sbuf),
CAST(char *, pi.cpi_name)),
elf_getu32(swap, (uint32_t)pi.cpi_pid),
elf_getu32(swap, pi.cpi_euid),
elf_getu32(swap, pi.cpi_egid),
elf_getu32(swap, pi.cpi_nlwps),
elf_getu32(swap, (uint32_t)pi.cpi_siglwp),
elf_getu32(swap, pi.cpi_signo),
elf_getu32(swap, pi.cpi_sigcode)) == -1)
return 1;
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_CORE;
return 1;
}
break;
default:
if (type == NT_PRPSINFO && *flags & FLAGS_IS_CORE) {
size_t i, j;
unsigned char c;
/*
* Extract the program name. We assume
* it to be 16 characters (that's what it
* is in SunOS 5.x and Linux).
*
* Unfortunately, it's at a different offset
* in various OSes, so try multiple offsets.
* If the characters aren't all printable,
* reject it.
*/
for (i = 0; i < NOFFSETS; i++) {
unsigned char *cname, *cp;
size_t reloffset = prpsoffsets(i);
size_t noffset = doff + reloffset;
size_t k;
for (j = 0; j < 16; j++, noffset++,
reloffset++) {
/*
* Make sure we're not past
* the end of the buffer; if
* we are, just give up.
*/
if (noffset >= size)
goto tryanother;
/*
* Make sure we're not past
* the end of the contents;
* if we are, this obviously
* isn't the right offset.
*/
if (reloffset >= descsz)
goto tryanother;
c = nbuf[noffset];
if (c == '\0') {
/*
* A '\0' at the
* beginning is
* obviously wrong.
* Any other '\0'
* means we're done.
*/
if (j == 0)
goto tryanother;
else
break;
} else {
/*
* A nonprintable
* character is also
* wrong.
*/
if (!isprint(c) || isquote(c))
goto tryanother;
}
}
/*
* Well, that worked.
*/
/*
* Try next offsets, in case this match is
* in the middle of a string.
*/
for (k = i + 1 ; k < NOFFSETS; k++) {
size_t no;
int adjust = 1;
if (prpsoffsets(k) >= prpsoffsets(i))
continue;
for (no = doff + prpsoffsets(k);
no < doff + prpsoffsets(i); no++)
adjust = adjust
&& isprint(nbuf[no]);
if (adjust)
i = k;
}
cname = (unsigned char *)
&nbuf[doff + prpsoffsets(i)];
for (cp = cname; cp < nbuf + size && *cp
&& isprint(*cp); cp++)
continue;
/*
* Linux apparently appends a space at the end
* of the command line: remove it.
*/
while (cp > cname && isspace(cp[-1]))
cp--;
if (file_printf(ms, ", from '%.*s'",
(int)(cp - cname), cname) == -1)
return 1;
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_CORE;
return 1;
tryanother:
;
}
}
break;
}
#endif
return 0;
}
| 169,254 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
{
char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT };
char *s;
struct kex *kex;
int r;
xxx_host = host;
xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, "ext-info-c")) == NULL)
fatal("%s: kex_names_cat", __func__);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(s);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
compat_cipher_proposal(options.ciphers);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] =
compat_cipher_proposal(options.ciphers);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = options.compression ?
"[email protected],zlib,none" : "none,[email protected],zlib";
myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
if (options.hostkeyalgorithms != NULL) {
if (kex_assemble_names(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG,
&options.hostkeyalgorithms) != 0)
fatal("%s: kex_assemble_namelist", __func__);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
compat_pkalg_proposal(options.hostkeyalgorithms);
} else {
/* Enforce default */
options.hostkeyalgorithms = xstrdup(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG);
/* Prefer algorithms that we already have keys for */
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
compat_pkalg_proposal(
order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port));
}
if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit,
(time_t)options.rekey_interval);
/* start key exchange */
if ((r = kex_setup(active_state, myproposal)) != 0)
fatal("kex_setup: %s", ssh_err(r));
kex = active_state->kex;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_client;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_client;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kexdh_client;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kexdh_client;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kexdh_client;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client;
kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_client;
#endif
kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_client;
kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, active_state);
/* remove ext-info from the KEX proposals for rekeying */
myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] =
compat_kex_proposal(options.kex_algorithms);
if ((r = kex_prop2buf(kex->my, myproposal)) != 0)
fatal("kex_prop2buf: %s", ssh_err(r));
session_id2 = kex->session_id;
session_id2_len = kex->session_id_len;
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
/* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
packet_put_cstring("markus");
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
#endif
}
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
{
char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT };
char *s;
struct kex *kex;
int r;
xxx_host = host;
xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, "ext-info-c")) == NULL)
fatal("%s: kex_names_cat", __func__);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(s);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
compat_cipher_proposal(options.ciphers);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] =
compat_cipher_proposal(options.ciphers);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = options.compression ?
"[email protected],none" : "none,[email protected]";
myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
if (options.hostkeyalgorithms != NULL) {
if (kex_assemble_names(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG,
&options.hostkeyalgorithms) != 0)
fatal("%s: kex_assemble_namelist", __func__);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
compat_pkalg_proposal(options.hostkeyalgorithms);
} else {
/* Enforce default */
options.hostkeyalgorithms = xstrdup(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG);
/* Prefer algorithms that we already have keys for */
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
compat_pkalg_proposal(
order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port));
}
if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit,
(time_t)options.rekey_interval);
/* start key exchange */
if ((r = kex_setup(active_state, myproposal)) != 0)
fatal("kex_setup: %s", ssh_err(r));
kex = active_state->kex;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_client;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_client;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kexdh_client;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kexdh_client;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kexdh_client;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client;
kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_client;
#endif
kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_client;
kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, active_state);
/* remove ext-info from the KEX proposals for rekeying */
myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] =
compat_kex_proposal(options.kex_algorithms);
if ((r = kex_prop2buf(kex->my, myproposal)) != 0)
fatal("kex_prop2buf: %s", ssh_err(r));
session_id2 = kex->session_id;
session_id2_len = kex->session_id_len;
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
/* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
packet_put_cstring("markus");
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
#endif
}
| 168,657 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: BrowserGpuChannelHostFactory::EstablishRequest::EstablishRequest()
: event(false, false),
gpu_process_handle(base::kNullProcessHandle) {
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | BrowserGpuChannelHostFactory::EstablishRequest::EstablishRequest()
: event(false, false) {
}
| 170,918 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: DOMArrayBuffer* FileReaderLoader::ArrayBufferResult() {
DCHECK_EQ(read_type_, kReadAsArrayBuffer);
if (array_buffer_result_)
return array_buffer_result_;
if (!raw_data_ || error_code_ != FileErrorCode::kOK)
return nullptr;
DOMArrayBuffer* result = DOMArrayBuffer::Create(raw_data_->ToArrayBuffer());
if (finished_loading_) {
array_buffer_result_ = result;
AdjustReportedMemoryUsageToV8(
-1 * static_cast<int64_t>(raw_data_->ByteLength()));
raw_data_.reset();
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: FileReader: Make a copy of the ArrayBuffer when returning partial results.
This is to avoid accidentally ending up with multiple references to the
same underlying ArrayBuffer. The extra performance overhead of this is
minimal as usage of partial results is very rare anyway (as can be seen
on https://www.chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/2158).
Bug: 936448
Change-Id: Icd1081adc1c889829fe7fa4af9cf4440097e8854
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1492873
Commit-Queue: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Adam Klein <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#636251}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | DOMArrayBuffer* FileReaderLoader::ArrayBufferResult() {
DCHECK_EQ(read_type_, kReadAsArrayBuffer);
if (array_buffer_result_)
return array_buffer_result_;
if (!raw_data_ || error_code_ != FileErrorCode::kOK)
return nullptr;
if (!finished_loading_) {
return DOMArrayBuffer::Create(
ArrayBuffer::Create(raw_data_->Data(), raw_data_->ByteLength()));
}
array_buffer_result_ = DOMArrayBuffer::Create(raw_data_->ToArrayBuffer());
AdjustReportedMemoryUsageToV8(-1 *
static_cast<int64_t>(raw_data_->ByteLength()));
raw_data_.reset();
return array_buffer_result_;
}
| 173,063 |
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