wildercb/PrivacyTextBooks1.2 · Datasets at Hugging Face

text stringlengths 0 118
ment: Some Reflections on Mechanisms for Privacy Protection,” 4 William and
Mary Bill of Rights Journal 455,458 (1995) (footnote omitted).
48. Tom Gerety, “Redefining Privacy,” 12 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties
Law Review 233,234 (1977); Kim Lane Scheppele, Legal Secrets 184—85 (1988).
49. Judith Jarvis Thomson, “The Right to Privacy,” in Philosophical Dimensions of
Privacy: An Anthology 272, 272 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 1984).
50. Report of the Committee on Privacy (HMSO 1972) Cmnd 5012 (Sir Ken
neth Younger, Chairman), at ^658, 665.
51. See, e.g., Joel R. Reidenberg, “Privacy in the Information Economy: A
Fortress or Frontier for Individual Rights?” 44 Federal Communications Law Journal
195,208 (1992) (“The American legal system does not contain a comprehensive set
of privacy rights or principles that collectively address the acquisition, storage,
transmission, use and disclosure of personal information within the business com
munity”); Paul M. Schwartz, “Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace,” 52 Vander
bilt Law Review 1609, 1611 (1999) (“At present, however, no successful standards,
legal or otherwise, exist for limiting the collection and utilization of personal data
in cyberspace”).
52. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the U.S., The 9/11 Commis
sion Report 394 (2004).
53. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations §§66-67 (G.E.M.
Anscombe trans., 1958).
Notes to Pages 9-15
203
54.
See John Dewey, Logic: The Theory o f Inquiry (1938), in 12 The Later Works of
John Dewey 1, 106-10 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1988).
2. Theories o f Privacy and Their Shortcomings
1. Some of the conceptions concentrate on means to achieve privacy; others
focus on the ends or goals of privacy. Further, there is overlap between conceptions,
and the conceptions discussed under different headings are by no means indepen
dent of each other. For example, control over personal information can be seen as a
subset of limited access to the self, which in turn bears significant similarities to the
right to be let alone. These headings are therefore not taxonomic; rather, they track
how scholars have chosen to theorize about privacy. I use the headings to discuss the
primary representatives of conceptual approaches in the discourse.
2. See, e.g., Julie C. Inness, Privacy, Intimacy, and Isolation 56 (1992) (noting
that intimacy is the “common denominator” of privacy); Arthur Miller, The Assault
on Privacy 25 (1971) (stating that control is the “basic attribute” of privacy); David
M. O’Brien, Privacy, Law, and Public Policy 16 (1979) (conceptualizing privacy as
“fundamentally denoting an existential condition of limited access”); Edward J.
Bloustein, “Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser,”
39 New York University Law Revirw 962, 963 (1964) (proposing a “general theory of
individual privacy which will reconcile the divergent strands of legal develop
ment”); Charles Fried, “Privacy,” 77 Yale Law Journal 475, 475 (1968) (seeking to
“isolate from restrictions and intrusions in general whatever is peculiar about inva
sions of privacy”); Ruth Gavison, “Privacy and the Limits of Law,” 89 Yale Law
Journal 421, 423 (1980) (developing a “distinct and coherent” conception of pri
vacy); Tom Gerety, “Redefining Privacy,” 12 Harvard Civil Rigbts-Civil Liberties
Law Rrview 233, 263 (1977) (“Intimacy is the chief restricting concept in the defi
nition of privacy”); Richard B. Parker, “A Definition of Privacy,” 27 Rutgers Law
Review 275,277 (1974) (seeking to articulate “some characteristic common to all or
some of [a list of invasions of‘different personal interests’]”).
3. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,” 4 Harvard
Law Review 193 (1890).
4. See, e.g., Irwin P. Kramer, “The Birth of Privacy Law: A Century Since
Warren and Brandeis,” 39 Catholic University Law Review 703, 704 (1990); Ruth
Gavison, “Too Early for a Requiem: Warren and Brandeis Were Right on Privacy
vs. Free Speech,” 43 South Carolina Law Rroiew 437,438 (1992) (Warren and Bran
deis “single-handedly created a tort”); James H. Barron, “Warren and Brandeis,
The Right to Privacy, 4 Harvard L. Rev. 193 (1890): Demystifying a Landmark Ci
tation,” 13 Suffolk University Law Review 875, 877 (1979) (there is “near unanimity
among courts and commentators that the Warren-Brandeis conceptualization
created the structural and jurisprudential foundation of the tort of invasion of
privacy”).
5. Harry Kalven, Jr., “Privacy in Tort Law—Were Warren and Brandeis
Wrong?” 31 Law and Contemporary Problems 326, 327 (1966); Benjamin E.
Bratman, “Brandeis and Warren’s ‘The Right to Privacy5 and the Birth of the Right
to Privacy,” 69 Tennessee Law Review 623, 624 (2002).
6. Elbridge L. Adams, “The Right of Privacy, and Its Relation to the Law of
Libel,” 39 American Law Review 37, 37 (1905).
204
Notes to Pages 15-19
7. See, e.g., Richard C. Turkington, “Legacy of the Warren and Brandeis Ar
ticle: The Emerging Unencumbered Constitutional Right to Informational Pri
vacy,” 10 Northern Illinois University Law Review 479,481-82 (1990) (observing that
the article “has acquired legendary status in the realm of legal scholarship” and
“has had as much impact on the development of law as any single publication in
legal periodicals”).
8. Warren & Brandeis, “Right to Privacy,” 195.
9. Robert E. Mensel, “ ‘Kodakers Lying in Wait’: Amateur Photography and
the Right to Privacy in New York, 1885-1915,” 43 American Quarterly 24, 28
(1991).
10. Warren & Brandeis, “Right to Privacy,” 196.
11. Robert Ellis Smith, Ben Franklin's Web Site: Privacy and Curiosity from Ply
mouth Rock to the Internet 108-09 (2000); Gini Graham Scott, Mind Your Own Busi
ness: The Battle for Personal Privacy 37-38 (1995).
12. Warren & Brandeis, “Right to Privacy,” 197, 193. Cooley’s treatise was
originally published in 1880, and a second edition was published in 1888. See
Thomas M. Cooley, Law of Torts (2d ed. 1888).
13. Warren & Brandeis, “Right to Privacy,” 205, 200, 197, 198, 207.
14. Daniel J. Solove, Marc Rotenberg, & Paul M. Schwartz, Information Privacy
Law 31 (2d ed. 2006).
15. David W. Leebron, “The Right to Privacy’s Place in the Intellectual His
tory of Tort Law,” 41 Case Western Reseive Law Review 769, 807-09 (1991).
16. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
17. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,466 (1928).
18. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
19. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
20. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 n.10 (1972); Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); Katz, 389 U.S. at 350.

ment: Some Reflections on Mechanisms for Privacy Protection,” 4 William and

Mary Bill of Rights Journal 455,458 (1995) (footnote omitted).

48. Tom Gerety, “Redefining Privacy,” 12 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties

Law Review 233,234 (1977); Kim Lane Scheppele, Legal Secrets 184—85 (1988).

49. Judith Jarvis Thomson, “The Right to Privacy,” in Philosophical Dimensions of

Privacy: An Anthology 272, 272 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 1984).

50. Report of the Committee on Privacy (HMSO 1972) Cmnd 5012 (Sir Ken

neth Younger, Chairman), at ^658, 665.

51. See, e.g., Joel R. Reidenberg, “Privacy in the Information Economy: A

Fortress or Frontier for Individual Rights?” 44 Federal Communications Law Journal

195,208 (1992) (“The American legal system does not contain a comprehensive set

of privacy rights or principles that collectively address the acquisition, storage,

transmission, use and disclosure of personal information within the business com

munity”); Paul M. Schwartz, “Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace,” 52 Vander

bilt Law Review 1609, 1611 (1999) (“At present, however, no successful standards,

legal or otherwise, exist for limiting the collection and utilization of personal data

in cyberspace”).

52. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the U.S., The 9/11 Commis

sion Report 394 (2004).

53. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations §§66-67 (G.E.M.

Anscombe trans., 1958).

Notes to Pages 9-15

203

54.

See John Dewey, Logic: The Theory o f Inquiry (1938), in 12 The Later Works of

John Dewey 1, 106-10 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1988).

2. Theories o f Privacy and Their Shortcomings

1. Some of the conceptions concentrate on means to achieve privacy; others

focus on the ends or goals of privacy. Further, there is overlap between conceptions,

and the conceptions discussed under different headings are by no means indepen

dent of each other. For example, control over personal information can be seen as a

subset of limited access to the self, which in turn bears significant similarities to the

right to be let alone. These headings are therefore not taxonomic; rather, they track

how scholars have chosen to theorize about privacy. I use the headings to discuss the

primary representatives of conceptual approaches in the discourse.

2. See, e.g., Julie C. Inness, Privacy, Intimacy, and Isolation 56 (1992) (noting

that intimacy is the “common denominator” of privacy); Arthur Miller, The Assault

on Privacy 25 (1971) (stating that control is the “basic attribute” of privacy); David

M. O’Brien, Privacy, Law, and Public Policy 16 (1979) (conceptualizing privacy as

“fundamentally denoting an existential condition of limited access”); Edward J.

Bloustein, “Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser,”

39 New York University Law Revirw 962, 963 (1964) (proposing a “general theory of

individual privacy which will reconcile the divergent strands of legal develop

ment”); Charles Fried, “Privacy,” 77 Yale Law Journal 475, 475 (1968) (seeking to

“isolate from restrictions and intrusions in general whatever is peculiar about inva

sions of privacy”); Ruth Gavison, “Privacy and the Limits of Law,” 89 Yale Law

Journal 421, 423 (1980) (developing a “distinct and coherent” conception of pri

vacy); Tom Gerety, “Redefining Privacy,” 12 Harvard Civil Rigbts-Civil Liberties

Law Rrview 233, 263 (1977) (“Intimacy is the chief restricting concept in the defi

nition of privacy”); Richard B. Parker, “A Definition of Privacy,” 27 Rutgers Law

Review 275,277 (1974) (seeking to articulate “some characteristic common to all or

some of [a list of invasions of‘different personal interests’]”).

3. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,” 4 Harvard

Law Review 193 (1890).

4. See, e.g., Irwin P. Kramer, “The Birth of Privacy Law: A Century Since

Warren and Brandeis,” 39 Catholic University Law Review 703, 704 (1990); Ruth

Gavison, “Too Early for a Requiem: Warren and Brandeis Were Right on Privacy

vs. Free Speech,” 43 South Carolina Law Rroiew 437,438 (1992) (Warren and Bran

deis “single-handedly created a tort”); James H. Barron, “Warren and Brandeis,

The Right to Privacy, 4 Harvard L. Rev. 193 (1890): Demystifying a Landmark Ci

tation,” 13 Suffolk University Law Review 875, 877 (1979) (there is “near unanimity

among courts and commentators that the Warren-Brandeis conceptualization

created the structural and jurisprudential foundation of the tort of invasion of

privacy”).

5. Harry Kalven, Jr., “Privacy in Tort Law—Were Warren and Brandeis

Wrong?” 31 Law and Contemporary Problems 326, 327 (1966); Benjamin E.

Bratman, “Brandeis and Warren’s ‘The Right to Privacy5 and the Birth of the Right

to Privacy,” 69 Tennessee Law Review 623, 624 (2002).

6. Elbridge L. Adams, “The Right of Privacy, and Its Relation to the Law of

Libel,” 39 American Law Review 37, 37 (1905).

204

Notes to Pages 15-19

7. See, e.g., Richard C. Turkington, “Legacy of the Warren and Brandeis Ar

ticle: The Emerging Unencumbered Constitutional Right to Informational Pri

vacy,” 10 Northern Illinois University Law Review 479,481-82 (1990) (observing that

the article “has acquired legendary status in the realm of legal scholarship” and

“has had as much impact on the development of law as any single publication in

legal periodicals”).

8. Warren & Brandeis, “Right to Privacy,” 195.

9. Robert E. Mensel, “ ‘Kodakers Lying in Wait’: Amateur Photography and

the Right to Privacy in New York, 1885-1915,” 43 American Quarterly 24, 28

(1991).

10. Warren & Brandeis, “Right to Privacy,” 196.

11. Robert Ellis Smith, Ben Franklin's Web Site: Privacy and Curiosity from Ply

mouth Rock to the Internet 108-09 (2000); Gini Graham Scott, Mind Your Own Busi

ness: The Battle for Personal Privacy 37-38 (1995).

12. Warren & Brandeis, “Right to Privacy,” 197, 193. Cooley’s treatise was

originally published in 1880, and a second edition was published in 1888. See

Thomas M. Cooley, Law of Torts (2d ed. 1888).

13. Warren & Brandeis, “Right to Privacy,” 205, 200, 197, 198, 207.

14. Daniel J. Solove, Marc Rotenberg, & Paul M. Schwartz, Information Privacy

Law 31 (2d ed. 2006).

15. David W. Leebron, “The Right to Privacy’s Place in the Intellectual His

tory of Tort Law,” 41 Case Western Reseive Law Review 769, 807-09 (1991).

16. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).

17. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,466 (1928).

18. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

19. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).

20. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 n.10 (1972); Stanley v.

Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); Katz, 389 U.S. at 350.