wildercb/PrivacyTextBooks1.2 · Datasets at Hugging Face

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63. United States Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm, for Freedom of the
Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763 (1989).
64. Schoeman, “Privacy,” 3.
65. Parker, “Definition of Privacy,” 280.
66. Richard S. Murphy, “Property Rights in Personal Information: An Eco
nomic Defense of Privacy,” 84 Georgetown Law Journal 2381,2383 (1996).
67. Westin, Privacy and Freedom, 324.
68. According to the Restatement of Torts, “One who appropriates to his own
use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for
invasion of his privacy.” Restatement (Second) of Torts §652C (1977).
69. John Locke, Second Treatise of Government §27, at 19 (1980) (1690).
70. See James Boyle, Shamans, Software, and Spleens: Law and the Construction of
the Information Society 54 (1996).
71. 17 U.S.C. §102 (a) (1994).
72. Shils, “Privacy,” 290.
73. Henry James, The Portrait of a Lady 253 (Geoffrey Moore ed., Penguin
Books 1986) (1881).
74. Jerry Kang, “Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions,” 50 Stanford
Law Review 1193, 1202, 1246 (1998).
75. Miller, Assault on Privacy, 213.
Notes to Pages 27-31
207
76. 8 F.3d 1222 (7th Cir. 1993) (Posner, J.).
77. Id. at 1228.
78. Id. at 1233.
79. Gerety, “Redefining Privacy,” 262-63.
80. Inness, Privacy, Intimacy, and Isolation, 58.
81. Fried, “Privacy,” 483, 477.
82. DeCew, In Pursuit o f Privacy, 53.
83. Daniel A. Farber, “Book Review: Privacy, Intimacy, and Isolation by Julie C.
Inness,” 10 Constitutional Commentary 510, 514-15 (1993).
84. O’Brien, Privacy, Law, and Public Policy, 13.
85. Id. at 14.
86. Id.
87. DeCew, In Pursuit o f Privacy, 2.
88. Allen, Uneasy Access, 8.
89. Paul M. Schwartz, “Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace,” 52 Vanderbilt
Law Review 1609, 1661 (1999).
90. See id. at 1661-64; see also Julie E. Cohen, “Examined Lives: Informational
Privacy and the Subject as Object,” 52 Stanford Law Review 1373 (2000); Paul M.
Schwartz, “Internet Privacy and the State,” 32 Connecticut Law Review 815 (2000).
91. For example, Anita Allen contends that privacy is not merely a matter of in
dividual choice but must in certain instances be “coerced” by the government.
Anita Allen-Castellitto, “Coercing Privacy,” 40 William and Mary Law Review 723
(1999).
92. Paul Freund, Address at the American Law Institute, 52nd Annual Meeting
42-43 (1975); see also J. Braxton Craven, Jr., “Personhood: The Right to Be Let
Alone,” 1976 Duke Law Journal 699, 702 n.15 (1976) (citing Freund’s formulation
of personhood).
93. Bloustein, “Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity,” 971. Bloustein’s article
was in response to William Prosser’s 1960 article “Privacy,” which examined over
300 privacy cases in the seventy years since Warren and Brandeis’s 1890 article.
Prosser concluded that “(t]he law of privacy comprises four distinct kinds of inva
sion of four different interests of the plaintiff, which are tied together by the
common name, but otherwise have almost nothing in common.” William Prosser,
“Privacy,” 48 California Law Review 383, 389 (1960).
94. Bloustein, “Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity,” 973, 974.
95. Jeffrey H. Reiman, “Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood,” in Philosophical Di
mensions o f Privacy, 300, 314.
96. Benn, “Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons,” 26, 7.
97. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding unconstitutional a
statute criminalizing contraceptives for married couples because it invaded the
“zone of privacy” created by the “penumbras” of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth,
and Ninth Amendments); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (extending Gris
wold to the use of contraceptives by unmarried individuals); Roe v. Wade 410 U.S.
113 (1973) (finding that the constitutional right to privacy encompasses the deci
sion to procure an abortion).
98. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).
99. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
100. 505 U.S. 833,851 (1992).
208
Notes to Pages 31-42
101. Michael Sandel, Democracy's Discontent 93 (1996).
102. Louis Henkin, “Privacy and Autonomy,” 74 Columbia Law Review 1410,
1424(1974).
103. DeCew, In Pursuit of Privacy, 44.
104. See, e.g., Joel Feinberg, “Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Privacy: Moral Ideas
in the Constitution?” 58 Notre Dame Law Review 445 (1983); Henkin, “Privacy and
Autonomy,” 1424-25.
105. Jed Rubenfeld, “The Right of Privacy,” 102 Harvard Law Review T il, 750
(1989).
106. Gavison, “Privacy and the Limits of Law,” 438.
107. Rubenfeld, “Right of Privacy,” 773, 754, 758, 770.
108. Id. at 782.
109. Id. at 784, 787, 794.
110. See Daniel J. Solove, The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Infor
mation Age -1-1—17 (2004).
111. Rubenfeld, “Right of Privacy,” 801-02.
112. Id. at 782.
113. Farber, “Book Review,” 516.
114. Robert S. Gerstein, “Intimacy and Privacy,” in Philosophical Dimensions of
Privacy, 265, 265.
115. Inness, Privacy, Intimacy, and Isolation, 56, 76, 77, 78, 91.
116. Charles Fried, An Anatomy of Values: Problems of Personal and Social Choice
142 (1970).
117. James Rachels, “Why Privacy Is Important,” in Philosophical Dimensions of
Privacy, 290, 292.
118. Reiman, “Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood,” 304-06.
119. Gerety, “Redefining Privacy,” 263, 268, 274.
120. DeCew, In Pursuit o f Privacy, 56.

63. United States Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm, for Freedom of the

Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763 (1989).

64. Schoeman, “Privacy,” 3.

65. Parker, “Definition of Privacy,” 280.

66. Richard S. Murphy, “Property Rights in Personal Information: An Eco

nomic Defense of Privacy,” 84 Georgetown Law Journal 2381,2383 (1996).

67. Westin, Privacy and Freedom, 324.

68. According to the Restatement of Torts, “One who appropriates to his own

use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for

invasion of his privacy.” Restatement (Second) of Torts §652C (1977).

69. John Locke, Second Treatise of Government §27, at 19 (1980) (1690).

70. See James Boyle, Shamans, Software, and Spleens: Law and the Construction of

the Information Society 54 (1996).

71. 17 U.S.C. §102 (a) (1994).

72. Shils, “Privacy,” 290.

73. Henry James, The Portrait of a Lady 253 (Geoffrey Moore ed., Penguin

Books 1986) (1881).

74. Jerry Kang, “Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions,” 50 Stanford

Law Review 1193, 1202, 1246 (1998).

75. Miller, Assault on Privacy, 213.

Notes to Pages 27-31

207

76. 8 F.3d 1222 (7th Cir. 1993) (Posner, J.).

77. Id. at 1228.

78. Id. at 1233.

79. Gerety, “Redefining Privacy,” 262-63.

80. Inness, Privacy, Intimacy, and Isolation, 58.

81. Fried, “Privacy,” 483, 477.

82. DeCew, In Pursuit o f Privacy, 53.

83. Daniel A. Farber, “Book Review: Privacy, Intimacy, and Isolation by Julie C.

Inness,” 10 Constitutional Commentary 510, 514-15 (1993).

84. O’Brien, Privacy, Law, and Public Policy, 13.

85. Id. at 14.

86. Id.

87. DeCew, In Pursuit o f Privacy, 2.

88. Allen, Uneasy Access, 8.

89. Paul M. Schwartz, “Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace,” 52 Vanderbilt

Law Review 1609, 1661 (1999).

90. See id. at 1661-64; see also Julie E. Cohen, “Examined Lives: Informational

Privacy and the Subject as Object,” 52 Stanford Law Review 1373 (2000); Paul M.

Schwartz, “Internet Privacy and the State,” 32 Connecticut Law Review 815 (2000).

91. For example, Anita Allen contends that privacy is not merely a matter of in

dividual choice but must in certain instances be “coerced” by the government.

Anita Allen-Castellitto, “Coercing Privacy,” 40 William and Mary Law Review 723

(1999).

92. Paul Freund, Address at the American Law Institute, 52nd Annual Meeting

42-43 (1975); see also J. Braxton Craven, Jr., “Personhood: The Right to Be Let

Alone,” 1976 Duke Law Journal 699, 702 n.15 (1976) (citing Freund’s formulation

of personhood).

93. Bloustein, “Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity,” 971. Bloustein’s article

was in response to William Prosser’s 1960 article “Privacy,” which examined over

300 privacy cases in the seventy years since Warren and Brandeis’s 1890 article.

Prosser concluded that “(t]he law of privacy comprises four distinct kinds of inva

sion of four different interests of the plaintiff, which are tied together by the

common name, but otherwise have almost nothing in common.” William Prosser,

“Privacy,” 48 California Law Review 383, 389 (1960).

94. Bloustein, “Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity,” 973, 974.

95. Jeffrey H. Reiman, “Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood,” in Philosophical Di

mensions o f Privacy, 300, 314.

96. Benn, “Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons,” 26, 7.

97. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding unconstitutional a

statute criminalizing contraceptives for married couples because it invaded the

“zone of privacy” created by the “penumbras” of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth,

and Ninth Amendments); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (extending Gris

wold to the use of contraceptives by unmarried individuals); Roe v. Wade 410 U.S.

113 (1973) (finding that the constitutional right to privacy encompasses the deci

sion to procure an abortion).

98. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).

99. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).

100. 505 U.S. 833,851 (1992).

208

Notes to Pages 31-42

101. Michael Sandel, Democracy's Discontent 93 (1996).

102. Louis Henkin, “Privacy and Autonomy,” 74 Columbia Law Review 1410,

1424(1974).

103. DeCew, In Pursuit of Privacy, 44.

104. See, e.g., Joel Feinberg, “Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Privacy: Moral Ideas

in the Constitution?” 58 Notre Dame Law Review 445 (1983); Henkin, “Privacy and

Autonomy,” 1424-25.

105. Jed Rubenfeld, “The Right of Privacy,” 102 Harvard Law Review T il, 750

(1989).

106. Gavison, “Privacy and the Limits of Law,” 438.

107. Rubenfeld, “Right of Privacy,” 773, 754, 758, 770.

108. Id. at 782.

109. Id. at 784, 787, 794.

110. See Daniel J. Solove, The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Infor

mation Age -1-1—17 (2004).

111. Rubenfeld, “Right of Privacy,” 801-02.

112. Id. at 782.

113. Farber, “Book Review,” 516.

114. Robert S. Gerstein, “Intimacy and Privacy,” in Philosophical Dimensions of

Privacy, 265, 265.

115. Inness, Privacy, Intimacy, and Isolation, 56, 76, 77, 78, 91.

116. Charles Fried, An Anatomy of Values: Problems of Personal and Social Choice

142 (1970).

117. James Rachels, “Why Privacy Is Important,” in Philosophical Dimensions of

Privacy, 290, 292.

118. Reiman, “Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood,” 304-06.

119. Gerety, “Redefining Privacy,” 263, 268, 274.

120. DeCew, In Pursuit o f Privacy, 56.