wildercb/PrivacyTextBooks1.2 · Datasets at Hugging Face

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121. Farber, “Book Review,” 515.
122. W. L. Weinstein, “The Private and the Free: A Conceptual Inquiry,” in
Nomos XIII: Privacy, 27, 33.
123. Priscilla M. Regan, Legislating Privacy: Technology, Social Values, and Public
Policy 213 (1995).
124. Judith Jarvis Thomson, “The Right to Privacy,” in Philosophical Dimensions
of Privacy, 272, 280, 284.
125. H. J. McCloskey, “Privacy and the Right to Privacy,” 55 Philosophy 37 (1980).
126. Kalven, “Privacy in Tort Law,” 327.
127. Inness, Privacy, Intimacy, and Isolation, 36. For a summary of responses to
Thomson and other reductionists, see Amy L. Peikoff, “The Right to Privacy:
Contemporary Reductionists and Their Critics,” 13 Virginia Journal of Social Policy
and the Law 474 (2006).
128. Thomas Scanlon, “Thomson on Privacy,” 4 Philosophy and Public Affairs
315,322 (1975).
3. Reconstructing Privacy
1.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations §§91,43 (G. E. M. Anscombe
trans., 1958). After publishing his highly influential Tractatus Logico-philosopbicus in
Notes to Pages 42-46
209
1921, ’Wittgenstein disappeared from the philosophical scene for over a decade.
See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-philosophicus (D. F. Pears & B. F. McGui-
ness trans., 1961). When he returned, he had substantially altered his views, recog
nizing that he had made “grave mistakes” in Tractatus. See Wittgenstein, Philosoph
ical Investigations, vi. Because Wittgenstein’s thinking changed dramatically during
his career, Tractatus is often referred to as “early” Wittgenstein, and Philosophical
Investigations, along with other works such as On Certainty, is referred to as “late”
Wittgenstein.
2. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §§65, 66, 67. Wittgenstein uses
the term “language-games” to describe the activities involving language. Id. at §7.
Wittgenstein uses “games” as a metaphor to describe language as an active en
deavor such as playing chess, tennis, or a card game. Wittgenstein thus sees lan
guage not as an abstract system of signs, but as a functioning aspect of our daily
lives, as something we do, as a “form of life.” Id. at § 19. There are a “multiplicity”
of language games, such as giving orders, describing appearances, reporting an
event, speculating, singing, and telling a joke. See id. at §23. For more background
on Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblances, see P.M. S. Hacker, Insight and Il
lusion: Themes in the Philosophy o f Wittgenstein 131-34 (1986); Hanna Feinchel
Pitkin, Wittgenstein and Justice: On the Significance of Ludwig Wittgenstein for Social
and Political Thought 63-65 (1972).
3. Legal scholar Steven Winter develops a related view of conceptualization.
He argues, “On the standard view, categories are descriptive, definitional, and
rigidly bounded. The empirical evidence, in contrast, presents a picture of catego
rization as an imaginative and dynamic process that is flexible in application and
elastic in scope.” Steven L. Winter, A Clearing in the Forest: Law, Life, and M ind 69
(2001). Winter contends that categories are “radial”; they consist of a “central
model” or paradigm example and related extensions radiating outward. Id. at 71.
These extensions, “though related to the central case in some fashion, nevertheless
cannot be generated by rule.” Id.
4. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §§68-69,499. Wlien describing the
boundaries of categories, Wittgenstein uses the terms “blurred edges” and “indis
tinct picture.” Id. at §71; see also Winter, Clearing in the Forest, 100-01 (contending
that categories are not static entities but are tools created for particular purposes).
5. Judith Genova, Wittgenstein: A Way of Seeing 44 (1995).
6. Stanley Cavell, “Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language,” in The
New Wittgenstein 35 (Alice Crary & Rupert Read eds., 2000).
7. Genova, Wittgenstein, 35.
8. Richard Bruyer, “Privacy: A Review and Critique of the Literature,” 43 Al
berta Law Review 553, 576 (2006).
9. Raymond Wacks, Law, Morality, and the Private Domain 222 (2000).
10. Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict 61 (1996).
11. For more background about the origins of pragmatism, see Richard Shus-
terman, Practicing Philosophy: Pragmatism and the Philosophical Life (1997); John J.
Stuhr, Genealogical Pragmatism: Philosophy, Experience, and Community (1997);
Michael Sullivan & Daniel J. Solove, “Can Pragmatism Be Radical? Richard
Posner and Legal Pragmatism,” 113 Yale Law Journal 687 (2003); Daniel J. Solove,
“The Darkest Domain: Deference, Judicial Review, and the Bill of Rights,” 84 Iowa
Law Review 941, 970-71 (1999).
210
Notes to Pages 46-51
12. See Richard A. Posner, Overcoming Law (1995); Richard Rorty, Consequences
of Pragmatism: Essays, 1911-1980 (1982); Cornell West, Keeping Faith: Philosophy
and Race in America (1993).
13. William James, Pragmatism 25 (Prometheus Books 1991) (1907). Pragma
tists reject the view of philosophy “as a purely theoretical quest for eternal truths or
knowledge of an ultimate and unchanging reality.” Pragmatism and Classical Amer
ican Philosophy: Essential Readings and Interpretive Essays 3 (John J. Stuhr ed., 2000);
see also John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (1938), in 12 The Later Works of
John Dewey 1, 72 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1988).
14. Although there are many interesting affinities in the thought of Wittgen
stein and the pragmatists, there are many differences as well, and a complete ac
count of the similarities and differences is beyond the scope of this book. For some
interesting examinations of the relationship between pragmatic and Wittgen-
steinian thought, see Hilary Putnam, Pragmatism 27-56 (1995); Rorty, Consequences
of Pragmatism, 19-36; Shusterman, Practicing Philosophy, 17-64.
15. Dewey, Logic, 72.
16. John Dewey, Experience and Nature (1925), in 1 The Later Works of John
Dewey 1, 67 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1988).
17. Robert C. Post, “The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self
in the Common Law Tort,” 77 California Law Review 957,980, 981 (1989).
18. Serge Gutwirth, Privacy and the Information Age 34 (Raf Casert trans.,
2002).
19. Gary T. Marx, “Murky Conceptual Waters: The Public and the Private,” 3
Ethics and Information Technology 157 (2001).
20. Helen Nissenbaum, “Privacy as Contextual Integrity,” 79 Washington Law
Rrview 119, 137-38, 154-55 (2004).'
21. Anita L. Allen, Why Privacy Isn't Everything. Feminist Reflections on Personal
Accountability 2 ,29-30 (2003).
22. See Dewey, Logic, 76, 111-12.

121. Farber, “Book Review,” 515.

122. W. L. Weinstein, “The Private and the Free: A Conceptual Inquiry,” in

Nomos XIII: Privacy, 27, 33.

123. Priscilla M. Regan, Legislating Privacy: Technology, Social Values, and Public

Policy 213 (1995).

124. Judith Jarvis Thomson, “The Right to Privacy,” in Philosophical Dimensions

of Privacy, 272, 280, 284.

125. H. J. McCloskey, “Privacy and the Right to Privacy,” 55 Philosophy 37 (1980).

126. Kalven, “Privacy in Tort Law,” 327.

127. Inness, Privacy, Intimacy, and Isolation, 36. For a summary of responses to

Thomson and other reductionists, see Amy L. Peikoff, “The Right to Privacy:

Contemporary Reductionists and Their Critics,” 13 Virginia Journal of Social Policy

and the Law 474 (2006).

128. Thomas Scanlon, “Thomson on Privacy,” 4 Philosophy and Public Affairs

315,322 (1975).

3. Reconstructing Privacy

1.

Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations §§91,43 (G. E. M. Anscombe

trans., 1958). After publishing his highly influential Tractatus Logico-philosopbicus in

Notes to Pages 42-46

209

1921, ’Wittgenstein disappeared from the philosophical scene for over a decade.

See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-philosophicus (D. F. Pears & B. F. McGui-

ness trans., 1961). When he returned, he had substantially altered his views, recog

nizing that he had made “grave mistakes” in Tractatus. See Wittgenstein, Philosoph

ical Investigations, vi. Because Wittgenstein’s thinking changed dramatically during

his career, Tractatus is often referred to as “early” Wittgenstein, and Philosophical

Investigations, along with other works such as On Certainty, is referred to as “late”

Wittgenstein.

2. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §§65, 66, 67. Wittgenstein uses

the term “language-games” to describe the activities involving language. Id. at §7.

Wittgenstein uses “games” as a metaphor to describe language as an active en

deavor such as playing chess, tennis, or a card game. Wittgenstein thus sees lan

guage not as an abstract system of signs, but as a functioning aspect of our daily

lives, as something we do, as a “form of life.” Id. at § 19. There are a “multiplicity”

of language games, such as giving orders, describing appearances, reporting an

event, speculating, singing, and telling a joke. See id. at §23. For more background

on Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblances, see P.M. S. Hacker, Insight and Il

lusion: Themes in the Philosophy o f Wittgenstein 131-34 (1986); Hanna Feinchel

Pitkin, Wittgenstein and Justice: On the Significance of Ludwig Wittgenstein for Social

and Political Thought 63-65 (1972).

3. Legal scholar Steven Winter develops a related view of conceptualization.

He argues, “On the standard view, categories are descriptive, definitional, and

rigidly bounded. The empirical evidence, in contrast, presents a picture of catego

rization as an imaginative and dynamic process that is flexible in application and

elastic in scope.” Steven L. Winter, A Clearing in the Forest: Law, Life, and M ind 69

(2001). Winter contends that categories are “radial”; they consist of a “central

model” or paradigm example and related extensions radiating outward. Id. at 71.

These extensions, “though related to the central case in some fashion, nevertheless

cannot be generated by rule.” Id.

4. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §§68-69,499. Wlien describing the

boundaries of categories, Wittgenstein uses the terms “blurred edges” and “indis

tinct picture.” Id. at §71; see also Winter, Clearing in the Forest, 100-01 (contending

that categories are not static entities but are tools created for particular purposes).

5. Judith Genova, Wittgenstein: A Way of Seeing 44 (1995).

6. Stanley Cavell, “Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language,” in The

New Wittgenstein 35 (Alice Crary & Rupert Read eds., 2000).

7. Genova, Wittgenstein, 35.

8. Richard Bruyer, “Privacy: A Review and Critique of the Literature,” 43 Al

berta Law Review 553, 576 (2006).

9. Raymond Wacks, Law, Morality, and the Private Domain 222 (2000).

10. Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict 61 (1996).

11. For more background about the origins of pragmatism, see Richard Shus-

terman, Practicing Philosophy: Pragmatism and the Philosophical Life (1997); John J.

Stuhr, Genealogical Pragmatism: Philosophy, Experience, and Community (1997);

Michael Sullivan & Daniel J. Solove, “Can Pragmatism Be Radical? Richard

Posner and Legal Pragmatism,” 113 Yale Law Journal 687 (2003); Daniel J. Solove,

“The Darkest Domain: Deference, Judicial Review, and the Bill of Rights,” 84 Iowa

Law Review 941, 970-71 (1999).

210

Notes to Pages 46-51

12. See Richard A. Posner, Overcoming Law (1995); Richard Rorty, Consequences

of Pragmatism: Essays, 1911-1980 (1982); Cornell West, Keeping Faith: Philosophy

and Race in America (1993).

13. William James, Pragmatism 25 (Prometheus Books 1991) (1907). Pragma

tists reject the view of philosophy “as a purely theoretical quest for eternal truths or

knowledge of an ultimate and unchanging reality.” Pragmatism and Classical Amer

ican Philosophy: Essential Readings and Interpretive Essays 3 (John J. Stuhr ed., 2000);

see also John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (1938), in 12 The Later Works of

John Dewey 1, 72 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1988).

14. Although there are many interesting affinities in the thought of Wittgen

stein and the pragmatists, there are many differences as well, and a complete ac

count of the similarities and differences is beyond the scope of this book. For some

interesting examinations of the relationship between pragmatic and Wittgen-

steinian thought, see Hilary Putnam, Pragmatism 27-56 (1995); Rorty, Consequences

of Pragmatism, 19-36; Shusterman, Practicing Philosophy, 17-64.

15. Dewey, Logic, 72.

16. John Dewey, Experience and Nature (1925), in 1 The Later Works of John

Dewey 1, 67 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1988).

17. Robert C. Post, “The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self

in the Common Law Tort,” 77 California Law Review 957,980, 981 (1989).

18. Serge Gutwirth, Privacy and the Information Age 34 (Raf Casert trans.,

2002).

19. Gary T. Marx, “Murky Conceptual Waters: The Public and the Private,” 3

Ethics and Information Technology 157 (2001).

20. Helen Nissenbaum, “Privacy as Contextual Integrity,” 79 Washington Law

Rrview 119, 137-38, 154-55 (2004).'

21. Anita L. Allen, Why Privacy Isn't Everything. Feminist Reflections on Personal

Accountability 2 ,29-30 (2003).

22. See Dewey, Logic, 76, 111-12.