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breadth of his categories limits their usefulness in law. The same is true of the three
categories identified by philosopher Judith DeCew: (1) “informational privacy,” (2)
“accessibility privacy,” and (3) “expressive privacy.” Judith W. DeCew, In Pursuit o f
Privacy: Law, Ethics, and the Rise o f Technology IS —11 (1997).
2. Wiliam L. Prosser, “Privacy,” 48 California Law Review 383, 389 (1960).
3. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,” 4 Harvard
Law Review 193, 195-96 (1890).
4. Of course, there remains the issue of what constitutes valid consent because
there are many occasions in which people affirmatively give out information that
should not be assumed to be consensual. See Julie E. Cohen, “Examined Lives: In
formational Privacy and the Subject as Object,” 52 Stanford Law Review 1373,
1397—98 (2000) (arguing that “people are demonstrably bad at” assessing the risk
of future harms that may flow from the piecemeal, otherwise consensual collection
Notes to Pages 102—107
223
of their private data); Paul M. Schwartz, “Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace,”
52 Vanderbilt Law Review 1609, 1661-64 (1999) (discussing the legal fiction of con
sent in the context of the Internet, specifically the use of boilerplate consent forms
that do not require user agreement before taking effect).
5.
See Anita L. Allen, W hy Privacy Isn't E verything 2, 146 (2003) (discussing
tort theories available as recourse for the invasion of privacy in the context of
sexual harassment claims).
6.1 thank Peter Swire for suggesting and helping develop this diagram.
7. George Orwell, N ineteen Eighty-four 2 (Plume ed. 2003) (1949).
8. Samuel H. Hofstadter, The Development o f the R ight o f Privacy in New York
1-2 (1954) (citing the Mishna and the Code of Maimonides, book 12). Jeffrey
Rosen observes, “Jewish law, for example, has developed a remarkable body of doc
trine around the concept of hezzek re'iyyah, which means ‘the injury caused by
seeing’ or ‘the injury caused by being seen.’... [I]f your neighbor constructs a
window that overlooks your home or courtyard, you are entided to an injuncrion
that not only prohibits your neighbor from observing you but also orders the
window to be removed.” Jeffrey Rosen, The U nwanted G aze 19 (2000).
9. Clay Calvert, Voyeur N ation 36-38 (2000); Avishai Margalit, “Privacy in the
Decent Society,” 68 Social Research 255, 259 (2001). In another version of the story,
Tom is not blinded by others but is inexplicably struck blind upon looking at her
after Lady Godiva asked the townspeople not to look. BBC, “Beyond the Broad
cast, Making History: Lady Godiva of Coventry,” http://www.bbc.co.uk/
education/beyond/factsheets/makhist/makhist6_prog9d.shtml (last visited Jan. 21,
2006).
10. S.C. Code Ann. §16-17-470(A) (2003); see also Ga. Code Ann. §16-11-61
(2003) (criminalizing being a “peeping Tom” when “on or about the premises of
another”); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §14:284 (2004) (defining “PeepingTom” and setting
forth the penalty); N.C. Gen. Stat. §14-202 (Supp. 2004) (criminalizing peeping as
a Class 1 misdemeanor); Va. Code Ann. §18.2-130 (2004) (criminalizing peeping
or spying into a “dwelling or enclosure”).
11. For example, in California, “[a]ny person who installs or who maintains ...
any two-way mirror permitting observation of any restroom, toilet, bathroom,
washroom, shower, locker room, fitting room, motel room, or hotel room is guilty
of a misdemeanor.” Cal. Penal Code §65 3 n (West 1988).
12.4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *169.
13. Orin S. Kerr, “The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitu
tional Myths and the Case for Caution,” 102 M ichigan Law Review 801, 841 (2004).
14. Federal Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 90-351, §2520, 48 Stat.
1103 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §605); Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-3 51, ch. 119, 82 Stat. 212 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. §§2510-2522); Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§2510-2520,
2701-2711, 3121-3127).
15. The list of countries with wiretap laws is too long to include here. For a dis
cussion of specific laws, see Electronic Privacy Information Center & Privacy In
ternational, Privacy and H um an Rights (2005).
16. European Union Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications
(2002), Directive 2002/58/EC.
224
Notes to Pages 108-111
17. See Kang, “Information Privacy,” 1193, 1260 (“Simply put, surveillance
leads to self-censorship”); Peter P. Swire, “Financial Privacy and the Theory of
High-Tech Government Surveillance,” 77 Washington U niversity Law Quarterly
461,473 (1999) (“If I knowr I am under surveillance, I might_restrict my activi
ties, so that nothing embarrassing or otherwise harmful could be detected”).
18. Judge Richard Posner notes, “[Njorms are more effective when people are
under the observation of their peers.” Richard A. Posner, The Problematics o f M oral
and Legal Theory 75 (1999); see also James B. Rule, Private Lives and Public Surveil
lance 28 (1974) (finding that surveillance is helpful to a government “or any other
agency seeking to obtain compliance from a mass clientele in a large-scale social
setting”).
19. John Gilliom, Overseers o f the Poor: Surveillance, Resistance, and the L im its o f
Privacy 3 (2001).
20. Jeffrey Rosen, The N aked Crowd: Reclaim ing Security and Freedom in an A n x
ious Age 36 (2004).
21. Cohen, “Examined Lives,” 1426.
22. See Schwartz, “Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace,” 1656.
23. Stanley I. Benn, “Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons,” in Nomos
X III: Privacy 1,7, 10 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1971).
24. David Lyon, The Electronic Eye: The Rise o f Surveillance Society 6 2 -6 7 (1994).
25. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish 200 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage
Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977).
26. Lyon, Electronic Eye, 63.
27. Daniel J. Solove, The D igital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Inform ation
A ge 185 (2004). For a more extensive account of King’s experience with the FBI,
see David J. Garrow, The F B I and M artin L uther King, Jr. (1981).
28. 533 U.S. 27,40 (2001).
29. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Andrew E. Taslitz, “The
Fourth Amendment in die Twenty-First Century: Technology, Privacy, and Human
Emotions,” 65 Law and Contemporary Problems 125, 144 (2002) (“Central to the
Court’s reasoning was that the thermal imager revealed information concerning ac
tivities inside the home”).
30. 488 U.S. 445, 449 (1989) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).

breadth of his categories limits their usefulness in law. The same is true of the three

categories identified by philosopher Judith DeCew: (1) “informational privacy,” (2)

“accessibility privacy,” and (3) “expressive privacy.” Judith W. DeCew, In Pursuit o f

Privacy: Law, Ethics, and the Rise o f Technology IS —11 (1997).

2. Wiliam L. Prosser, “Privacy,” 48 California Law Review 383, 389 (1960).

3. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,” 4 Harvard

Law Review 193, 195-96 (1890).

4. Of course, there remains the issue of what constitutes valid consent because

there are many occasions in which people affirmatively give out information that

should not be assumed to be consensual. See Julie E. Cohen, “Examined Lives: In

formational Privacy and the Subject as Object,” 52 Stanford Law Review 1373,

1397—98 (2000) (arguing that “people are demonstrably bad at” assessing the risk

of future harms that may flow from the piecemeal, otherwise consensual collection

Notes to Pages 102—107

223

of their private data); Paul M. Schwartz, “Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace,”

52 Vanderbilt Law Review 1609, 1661-64 (1999) (discussing the legal fiction of con

sent in the context of the Internet, specifically the use of boilerplate consent forms

that do not require user agreement before taking effect).

5.

See Anita L. Allen, W hy Privacy Isn't E verything 2, 146 (2003) (discussing

tort theories available as recourse for the invasion of privacy in the context of

sexual harassment claims).

6.1 thank Peter Swire for suggesting and helping develop this diagram.

7. George Orwell, N ineteen Eighty-four 2 (Plume ed. 2003) (1949).

8. Samuel H. Hofstadter, The Development o f the R ight o f Privacy in New York

1-2 (1954) (citing the Mishna and the Code of Maimonides, book 12). Jeffrey

Rosen observes, “Jewish law, for example, has developed a remarkable body of doc

trine around the concept of hezzek re'iyyah, which means ‘the injury caused by

seeing’ or ‘the injury caused by being seen.’... [I]f your neighbor constructs a

window that overlooks your home or courtyard, you are entided to an injuncrion

that not only prohibits your neighbor from observing you but also orders the

window to be removed.” Jeffrey Rosen, The U nwanted G aze 19 (2000).

9. Clay Calvert, Voyeur N ation 36-38 (2000); Avishai Margalit, “Privacy in the

Decent Society,” 68 Social Research 255, 259 (2001). In another version of the story,

Tom is not blinded by others but is inexplicably struck blind upon looking at her

after Lady Godiva asked the townspeople not to look. BBC, “Beyond the Broad

cast, Making History: Lady Godiva of Coventry,” http://www.bbc.co.uk/

education/beyond/factsheets/makhist/makhist6_prog9d.shtml (last visited Jan. 21,

2006).

10. S.C. Code Ann. §16-17-470(A) (2003); see also Ga. Code Ann. §16-11-61

(2003) (criminalizing being a “peeping Tom” when “on or about the premises of

another”); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §14:284 (2004) (defining “PeepingTom” and setting

forth the penalty); N.C. Gen. Stat. §14-202 (Supp. 2004) (criminalizing peeping as

a Class 1 misdemeanor); Va. Code Ann. §18.2-130 (2004) (criminalizing peeping

or spying into a “dwelling or enclosure”).

11. For example, in California, “[a]ny person who installs or who maintains ...

any two-way mirror permitting observation of any restroom, toilet, bathroom,

washroom, shower, locker room, fitting room, motel room, or hotel room is guilty

of a misdemeanor.” Cal. Penal Code §65 3 n (West 1988).

12.4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *169.

13. Orin S. Kerr, “The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitu

tional Myths and the Case for Caution,” 102 M ichigan Law Review 801, 841 (2004).

14. Federal Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 90-351, §2520, 48 Stat.

1103 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §605); Omnibus Crime Control and Safe

Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-3 51, ch. 119, 82 Stat. 212 (codified as amended

at 18 U.S.C. §§2510-2522); Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub.

L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§2510-2520,

2701-2711, 3121-3127).

15. The list of countries with wiretap laws is too long to include here. For a dis

cussion of specific laws, see Electronic Privacy Information Center & Privacy In

ternational, Privacy and H um an Rights (2005).

16. European Union Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications

(2002), Directive 2002/58/EC.

224

Notes to Pages 108-111

17. See Kang, “Information Privacy,” 1193, 1260 (“Simply put, surveillance

leads to self-censorship”); Peter P. Swire, “Financial Privacy and the Theory of

High-Tech Government Surveillance,” 77 Washington U niversity Law Quarterly

461,473 (1999) (“If I knowr I am under surveillance, I might_restrict my activi

ties, so that nothing embarrassing or otherwise harmful could be detected”).

18. Judge Richard Posner notes, “[Njorms are more effective when people are

under the observation of their peers.” Richard A. Posner, The Problematics o f M oral

and Legal Theory 75 (1999); see also James B. Rule, Private Lives and Public Surveil

lance 28 (1974) (finding that surveillance is helpful to a government “or any other

agency seeking to obtain compliance from a mass clientele in a large-scale social

setting”).

19. John Gilliom, Overseers o f the Poor: Surveillance, Resistance, and the L im its o f

Privacy 3 (2001).

20. Jeffrey Rosen, The N aked Crowd: Reclaim ing Security and Freedom in an A n x

ious Age 36 (2004).

21. Cohen, “Examined Lives,” 1426.

22. See Schwartz, “Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace,” 1656.

23. Stanley I. Benn, “Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons,” in Nomos

X III: Privacy 1,7, 10 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1971).

24. David Lyon, The Electronic Eye: The Rise o f Surveillance Society 6 2 -6 7 (1994).

25. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish 200 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage

Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977).

26. Lyon, Electronic Eye, 63.

27. Daniel J. Solove, The D igital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Inform ation

A ge 185 (2004). For a more extensive account of King’s experience with the FBI,

see David J. Garrow, The F B I and M artin L uther King, Jr. (1981).

28. 533 U.S. 27,40 (2001).

29. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Andrew E. Taslitz, “The

Fourth Amendment in die Twenty-First Century: Technology, Privacy, and Human

Emotions,” 65 Law and Contemporary Problems 125, 144 (2002) (“Central to the

Court’s reasoning was that the thermal imager revealed information concerning ac

tivities inside the home”).

30. 488 U.S. 445, 449 (1989) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks

omitted).