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96 Yale Law Journal 943 (1987).
54. James P. Nehf, “Incomparability and the Passive Virtues of Ad Hoc Privacy
Policy,” 76 U niversity o f Colorado Law Review 1, 35,41 (2005).
55. Margaret Jane Radin, Contested Commodities 8-12 (1996).
56. Aleinikoff, “Constitutional Law,” 982.
57. Frank N. Coffin, “Judicial Balancing: The Protean Scales of Justice,” 63 New
York U niversity Law Review 16, 25 (1988).
58. Thomas I. Emerson, The System o f Freedom o f Expression 545, 549 (1970).
59. Richard F. Hixson, Privacy in a Public Society: H um an Rights in Conflict 212
(1987).
60. See Daniel J. Solove, The D igital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Inform a
tion Age 93-97 (2004).
61. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,” 4 H arvard
Law Review 193, 207 (1890).
62. Restatement (Second) of Torts §652(1) cmt. a.
63. Smith v. City of Artesia, 772 P.2d 373, 376 (N.M.Ct. App. 1989).
Notes to Pages 89-96
221
64. Priscilla M. Regan, Legislating Privacy: Technology, Social Values", and Public
P olicy!00(1995).
65. Hixson, Privacy in a Public Society, xiv.
66. Amitai Etzioni, The L im its o f Privacy 196 (1999).
67. Hixson, Privacy in a Public Society, 93.
68. Etzioni, L im its o f Privacy, 187-88, 194, 38, 198.
69. Id. at 198.
70. John Dewey, Ethics (1908), in 5 The M iddle Works o f John Dewey 268 (Jo Ann
Boydston ed., 1978).
71. John Dewey, Liberalism and C ivil Liberties (1936), in 11 The Later Works o f
John Dewey 374-75 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1991).
72. Id. at 373.
73. Spiros Simitis, “Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society,” 135 U niver
sity o f Pennsylvania Law Review 707, 709 (1987). In analyzing the problems of fed
eral legislative policymaking on privacy, Priscilla Regan demonstrates the need for
understanding privacy in terms of its social benefits. See Regan, Legislating Privacy,
xiv (“[AJnalysis of congressional policy making reveals that little attention was
given to the possibility of a broader social importance of privacy”).
74. Robert C. Post, “The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in
the Common Law Tort,” 77 California Law Review 957,959 (1989).
75. See Julie Cohen, “Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as
Object,” 52 Stanford Law Review 1373, 1427-28 (2000) (“Informational privacy, in
short, is a constitutive element of a civil society in the broadest sense of the term”);
Schwartz, “Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace,” 1613 (“[I]nformation privacy
is best conceived of as a constitutive element of civil society”); see also Gavison,
“Privacy and the Limits of Law,” 455 (“Privacy is also essential to democratic gov
ernment because it fosters and encourages the moral autonomy of the citizen, a
central requirement of a democracy”).
76. As Warren and Brandeis observed, “[T]he protection of society must come
mainly through a recognition of the rights of the individual.” Warren & Brandeis,
“Right to Privacy,” 219-20.
77. John Dewey, Experience and N ature (1925), in 1 The Later W orks o f John Dewey
1, 164 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1988).
78. Robert C. Ellickson, “The Evolution of Social Norms: A Perspective from
the Legal Academy,” in Social No7~ms 35, 35 (Michael Hechter & Karl-Dieter Opp
eds., 2001).
79. Cass R. Sunstein, “Social Norms and Social Roles,” 96 Columbia Law Review
903, 914 (1996).
80. Richard H. McAdams, “The Origin, Development, and Regulation of
Norms,” 96 M ichigan Law Review 338,412,416, 426 (1997).
81. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 6 (David Spitz ed., 1975).
82. Angus McLaren, Sextuil Blackmail: A M odern H istory 3, 28, 8, 21, 124 (2002).
83. Lawrence M. Friedman, “Name Robbers: Privacy, Blackmail, and Assorted
Matters in Legal History,” 30 H ojstra Law Review 1093, 1106 (2002).
84. Gavison, “Privacy and the Limits of Law,” 453.
85. Paul M. Schwartz, “Internet Privacy and the State,” 32 Connecticut Law Re
view 815, 842-43 (2000).
2 2 2
Notes to Pages 97-102
86. Allen, Uneasy Access, 36.
87. Gavison, “Feminism,” 43.
88. DeCew, In Pursuit o f Privacy, 94.
89. Laura Gowing, Domestic Dangers: Women, Words, and Sex in Early Modem
London 2-3,109,188-89 (1996).
90. Post, “Social Foundations of Privacy,” 968.
91. Homer, The Odyssey bk. 12,11. 190-98, at 214 (Robert Fitzgerald trans., Vin
tage Books 1990).
92. See Michael Sullivan & John T. Lysaker, “Between Impotence and Illusion:
Adorno’s *Art of Theory and Practice,” 57 New German Critique 87 (1992).
93. Alan Wolfe, “Public and Private in Theory and Practice: Some Implications of
an Uncertain Boundary,” in Public and Private Thought and Practice: Perspectives on a
Grand Dichotomy 182, 186-87 (Jeff Weintraub & Krishan Kumar eds., 1997); see also
Allen, Uneasy Access, 40 (“Privacy can be used for good or ill, to help or to harm”).
5. A Taxonomy o f Privacy
1. In 1967, Alan Westin identified four “basic states of individual privacy”: (1)
solitude, (2) intimacy, (3) anonymity, and (4) reserve (“the creation of a psycholog
ical barrier against unwanted intrusion”). Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom
31-32 (1967). These categories focus mostly on spatial distance and separateness
and fail to capture the many different dimensions of informational privacy. In
1992, Ken Gormley surveyed the law of privacy. See generally Ken Gormley, “One
Hundred Years of Privacy,” 1992 Wisconsin Law Review 1335 (1992). His
categories—tort privacy, Fourth Amendment privacy, First Amendment privacy,
fundamental-decision privacy, and state constitutional privacy—are based on
different areas of law rather than on a more systematic conceptual account of pri
vacy. Id. at 1340. In 1998, Jerry Kang defined privacy as a union of three overlap
ping clusters of ideas: (1) physical space (“the extent to which an individual’s terri
torial solitude is shielded from invasion by unwanted objects or signals”); (2) choice
(“an individual’s ability to make certain significant decisions without interfer
ence”); and (3) flow of personal information (“an individual’s control over the
processing—i.e., the acquisition, disclosure, and use—of personal information”).
Jerry Kang, “Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions,” 50 Stanford Law
Revirw 1193, 1202-03 (1998). Kang’s understanding of privacy is quite rich, but the

96 Yale Law Journal 943 (1987).

54. James P. Nehf, “Incomparability and the Passive Virtues of Ad Hoc Privacy

Policy,” 76 U niversity o f Colorado Law Review 1, 35,41 (2005).

55. Margaret Jane Radin, Contested Commodities 8-12 (1996).

56. Aleinikoff, “Constitutional Law,” 982.

57. Frank N. Coffin, “Judicial Balancing: The Protean Scales of Justice,” 63 New

York U niversity Law Review 16, 25 (1988).

58. Thomas I. Emerson, The System o f Freedom o f Expression 545, 549 (1970).

59. Richard F. Hixson, Privacy in a Public Society: H um an Rights in Conflict 212

(1987).

60. See Daniel J. Solove, The D igital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Inform a

tion Age 93-97 (2004).

61. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,” 4 H arvard

Law Review 193, 207 (1890).

62. Restatement (Second) of Torts §652(1) cmt. a.

63. Smith v. City of Artesia, 772 P.2d 373, 376 (N.M.Ct. App. 1989).

Notes to Pages 89-96

221

64. Priscilla M. Regan, Legislating Privacy: Technology, Social Values", and Public

P olicy!00(1995).

65. Hixson, Privacy in a Public Society, xiv.

66. Amitai Etzioni, The L im its o f Privacy 196 (1999).

67. Hixson, Privacy in a Public Society, 93.

68. Etzioni, L im its o f Privacy, 187-88, 194, 38, 198.

69. Id. at 198.

70. John Dewey, Ethics (1908), in 5 The M iddle Works o f John Dewey 268 (Jo Ann

Boydston ed., 1978).

71. John Dewey, Liberalism and C ivil Liberties (1936), in 11 The Later Works o f

John Dewey 374-75 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1991).

72. Id. at 373.

73. Spiros Simitis, “Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society,” 135 U niver

sity o f Pennsylvania Law Review 707, 709 (1987). In analyzing the problems of fed

eral legislative policymaking on privacy, Priscilla Regan demonstrates the need for

understanding privacy in terms of its social benefits. See Regan, Legislating Privacy,

xiv (“[AJnalysis of congressional policy making reveals that little attention was

given to the possibility of a broader social importance of privacy”).

74. Robert C. Post, “The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in

the Common Law Tort,” 77 California Law Review 957,959 (1989).

75. See Julie Cohen, “Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as

Object,” 52 Stanford Law Review 1373, 1427-28 (2000) (“Informational privacy, in

short, is a constitutive element of a civil society in the broadest sense of the term”);

Schwartz, “Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace,” 1613 (“[I]nformation privacy

is best conceived of as a constitutive element of civil society”); see also Gavison,

“Privacy and the Limits of Law,” 455 (“Privacy is also essential to democratic gov

ernment because it fosters and encourages the moral autonomy of the citizen, a

central requirement of a democracy”).

76. As Warren and Brandeis observed, “[T]he protection of society must come

mainly through a recognition of the rights of the individual.” Warren & Brandeis,

“Right to Privacy,” 219-20.

77. John Dewey, Experience and N ature (1925), in 1 The Later W orks o f John Dewey

1, 164 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1988).

78. Robert C. Ellickson, “The Evolution of Social Norms: A Perspective from

the Legal Academy,” in Social No7~ms 35, 35 (Michael Hechter & Karl-Dieter Opp

eds., 2001).

79. Cass R. Sunstein, “Social Norms and Social Roles,” 96 Columbia Law Review

903, 914 (1996).

80. Richard H. McAdams, “The Origin, Development, and Regulation of

Norms,” 96 M ichigan Law Review 338,412,416, 426 (1997).

81. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 6 (David Spitz ed., 1975).

82. Angus McLaren, Sextuil Blackmail: A M odern H istory 3, 28, 8, 21, 124 (2002).

83. Lawrence M. Friedman, “Name Robbers: Privacy, Blackmail, and Assorted

Matters in Legal History,” 30 H ojstra Law Review 1093, 1106 (2002).

84. Gavison, “Privacy and the Limits of Law,” 453.

85. Paul M. Schwartz, “Internet Privacy and the State,” 32 Connecticut Law Re

view 815, 842-43 (2000).

2 2 2

Notes to Pages 97-102

86. Allen, Uneasy Access, 36.

87. Gavison, “Feminism,” 43.

88. DeCew, In Pursuit o f Privacy, 94.

89. Laura Gowing, Domestic Dangers: Women, Words, and Sex in Early Modem

London 2-3,109,188-89 (1996).

90. Post, “Social Foundations of Privacy,” 968.

91. Homer, The Odyssey bk. 12,11. 190-98, at 214 (Robert Fitzgerald trans., Vin

tage Books 1990).

92. See Michael Sullivan & John T. Lysaker, “Between Impotence and Illusion:

Adorno’s *Art of Theory and Practice,” 57 New German Critique 87 (1992).

93. Alan Wolfe, “Public and Private in Theory and Practice: Some Implications of

an Uncertain Boundary,” in Public and Private Thought and Practice: Perspectives on a

Grand Dichotomy 182, 186-87 (Jeff Weintraub & Krishan Kumar eds., 1997); see also

Allen, Uneasy Access, 40 (“Privacy can be used for good or ill, to help or to harm”).

5. A Taxonomy o f Privacy

1. In 1967, Alan Westin identified four “basic states of individual privacy”: (1)

solitude, (2) intimacy, (3) anonymity, and (4) reserve (“the creation of a psycholog

ical barrier against unwanted intrusion”). Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom

31-32 (1967). These categories focus mostly on spatial distance and separateness

and fail to capture the many different dimensions of informational privacy. In

1992, Ken Gormley surveyed the law of privacy. See generally Ken Gormley, “One

Hundred Years of Privacy,” 1992 Wisconsin Law Review 1335 (1992). His

categories—tort privacy, Fourth Amendment privacy, First Amendment privacy,

fundamental-decision privacy, and state constitutional privacy—are based on

different areas of law rather than on a more systematic conceptual account of pri

vacy. Id. at 1340. In 1998, Jerry Kang defined privacy as a union of three overlap

ping clusters of ideas: (1) physical space (“the extent to which an individual’s terri

torial solitude is shielded from invasion by unwanted objects or signals”); (2) choice

(“an individual’s ability to make certain significant decisions without interfer

ence”); and (3) flow of personal information (“an individual’s control over the

processing—i.e., the acquisition, disclosure, and use—of personal information”).

Jerry Kang, “Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions,” 50 Stanford Law

Revirw 1193, 1202-03 (1998). Kang’s understanding of privacy is quite rich, but the