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163. Regina v. Kang-Brown, [2005] ABQB 608 (Can LII).
164. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405,408-09 (2005).
165. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979).
166. Orin S. Kerr, “Internet Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act: The
Big Brother That Isn’t,” 97 Northwestern University Law Review 607, 611 (2003).
167. Orin S. Kerr, “A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act—and a
Legislator’s Guide to Amending It,” 72 George Washington Law Review 1208, 1229
n.142 (2004).
168. See Daniel J. Solove, “Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law,” 72
George Washington Law Review 1264, 1288 (2004).
169. 136 F.3d 1055, 1069 (6th Cir. 1998).
170. Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058,
1065 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
171. Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§2721-2725; Daniel J. Solove,
The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Information Age 147 (2004).
172. Iris M. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference 119-20 (1990).
173. Beate Rossler, The Value o f Privacy 8 (2005). But see Ferdinand David
Schoeman, “Privacy: Philosophical Dimensions of the Literature,” in Philosophical
Notes to Pages 70-73
217
D im ensions o f Privacy: A n Anthology 1, 3 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 1984)
(“One difficulty with regarding privacy as a claim or entitlement to determine
what information about oneself is to be available to others is that it begs the
question about the moral status of privacy. It presumes privacy is something to
be protected at the discretion of the individual to whom the information
relates”).
174. Luciano Floridi, “The Ontological Interpretation of Informational Pri
vacy,” 7 Ethics and Inform ation Technology 185 (2005).
175. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
176. See, e.g., Hoskins v. Howard, 971 P.2d 1135, 1141 (Idaho 1998); Vemars v.
Young, 539 F.2d 966,969 (3d Cir. 1976); Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 704 (D.C.
Cir. 1969).
177. Video Voyeurism Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. §1801 (applies to capturing an
image of an “individual’s naked or undergarment clad genitals, pubic area, but
tocks, or female breast... under circumstances in which that individual has a rea
sonable expectation of privacy regarding such body part or parts”); Anti-Paparazzi
Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8(b) (applies to the capture of visual images or sound of
“the plaintiff engaging in a personal or familial activity under circumstances in
which the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy”).
178. Hosking & Hosking v. Runting, [2005] 1 N.Z.L.R. 1, 117, 249-50 (C.A.
2004).
179. Hunter v. Southam, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145.
180. H. Tomas Gomez-Arostegui, “Defining Private Life Under the European
Convention of Human Rights by Referring to Reasonable Expectations,” 35 Cali
fornia W estern International Law Journal 153, 162 (2005).
181. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, “A Social Networks Theory of Privacy,” 72 U niver
sity o f Chicago Law Review 919, 937 (2005).
182. Minnesota v. Carter, 119 S. Ct. 469, 477 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring).
183. Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, “Reasonable Expectations
of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at
‘Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society,’” 42 D uke Law Journal
727, 732 (1993).
184. Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossldags, “Privacy and Rationality,” in Privacy
and Technologies o f Identity: A Cross-Disciplinary Conversation 15, 16 (Katherine
Strandburg & Daniela Stan Raicu eds. 2006).
185. Strahilevitz, “Social Networks Theory,” 935-36.
186. Acquisti & Grossklags, “Privacy and Rationality,” 17, 25.
187. Solove, D igital Person, 81-92; Paul M. Schwartz, “Privacy and Democracy
in Cyberspace,” 52 Vanderbilt Law Review 1609, 1661-64 (1999).
188. See Anthony Amsterdam, “Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment,” 58
M innesota Law Review 349 (1974) (suggesting that government could diminish a
person’s subjective expectation of privacy by announcing on television each night
that we all can easily be subject to electronic surveillance).
189. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979) (“[WJhere an indi
vidual’s subjective expectations had been ‘conditioned’ by influences alien to well-
recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms, those subjective expectations obviously
could play no meaningful role in ascertaining what the scope of Fourth Amend
ment protection was”).
218
Notes to Pages 74-80
190. George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-four 3 (Plume ed. 2003) (originally pub
lished in 1949).
191. See Dewey, Experience and Nature., 9. Thinking is thus a “tool” for solving
problems. Michael Eldridge, Transforming Experience: John Dewey's Cultural Instru
mentalism 4 (1998).
192. See, e.g., Dewey, Experience and Nature, 151; see also John Dewey, How We
Think (1910).
193. Dewey, Experience and Nature, 65-66.
194. Dewey, Logic, 106-10.
195. Dewey, Experience and Nature, 154.
196. Alan Dershowitz, Rights from Wrongs: A Secular Theory o f the Origins o f
Rights 6-9(2004).
197. See Solove, D igital Person, 13-55 (discussing Kafka’s The Trial, Orwell’s
Nineteen Eighty-four, and Huxley’s Brave New World).
198. Henry David Thoreau, Walden, in Walden and Other W ritings 113 (Barnes &
Noble Books 1993) (1854).
199. B. Moore, Privacy, 73.
200. Id. at 14.
4. The Value of Privacy
1. U.S. Dep’t of Health, Educ. & Welfare, Records, Computers, and the Rights o f Cit
izens 33 (1973); Ruth Gavison, “Privacy and the Limits of Law,” 89 Yale Law Journal
421, 437 (1980) (privacy enables people to “grow, maintain their mental health and
autonomy, create and maintain human relations, and lead meaningful lives”).
2. Michael A. Weinstein, “The Uses of Privacy in the Good Life,” in Nomos
X III: Privacy 88, 97 (J. Roland Pennock & J. W. Chapman eds., 1971).
3. Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom 35 (1967).
4. Paul Freund, “Privacy: One Concept or Many,” in Nomos X III: Privacy, 182,
195.
5. Westin, Privacy and Freedom, 39.

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163. Regina v. Kang-Brown, [2005] ABQB 608 (Can LII).

164. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405,408-09 (2005).

165. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979).

166. Orin S. Kerr, “Internet Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act: The

Big Brother That Isn’t,” 97 Northwestern University Law Review 607, 611 (2003).

167. Orin S. Kerr, “A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act—and a

Legislator’s Guide to Amending It,” 72 George Washington Law Review 1208, 1229

n.142 (2004).

168. See Daniel J. Solove, “Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law,” 72

George Washington Law Review 1264, 1288 (2004).

169. 136 F.3d 1055, 1069 (6th Cir. 1998).

170. Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058,

1065 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).

171. Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§2721-2725; Daniel J. Solove,

The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Information Age 147 (2004).

172. Iris M. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference 119-20 (1990).

173. Beate Rossler, The Value o f Privacy 8 (2005). But see Ferdinand David

Schoeman, “Privacy: Philosophical Dimensions of the Literature,” in Philosophical

Notes to Pages 70-73

217

D im ensions o f Privacy: A n Anthology 1, 3 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 1984)

(“One difficulty with regarding privacy as a claim or entitlement to determine

what information about oneself is to be available to others is that it begs the

question about the moral status of privacy. It presumes privacy is something to

be protected at the discretion of the individual to whom the information

relates”).

174. Luciano Floridi, “The Ontological Interpretation of Informational Pri

vacy,” 7 Ethics and Inform ation Technology 185 (2005).

175. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).

176. See, e.g., Hoskins v. Howard, 971 P.2d 1135, 1141 (Idaho 1998); Vemars v.

Young, 539 F.2d 966,969 (3d Cir. 1976); Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 704 (D.C.

Cir. 1969).

177. Video Voyeurism Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. §1801 (applies to capturing an

image of an “individual’s naked or undergarment clad genitals, pubic area, but

tocks, or female breast... under circumstances in which that individual has a rea

sonable expectation of privacy regarding such body part or parts”); Anti-Paparazzi

Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8(b) (applies to the capture of visual images or sound of

“the plaintiff engaging in a personal or familial activity under circumstances in

which the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy”).

178. Hosking & Hosking v. Runting, [2005] 1 N.Z.L.R. 1, 117, 249-50 (C.A.

2004).

179. Hunter v. Southam, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145.

180. H. Tomas Gomez-Arostegui, “Defining Private Life Under the European

Convention of Human Rights by Referring to Reasonable Expectations,” 35 Cali

fornia W estern International Law Journal 153, 162 (2005).

181. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, “A Social Networks Theory of Privacy,” 72 U niver

sity o f Chicago Law Review 919, 937 (2005).

182. Minnesota v. Carter, 119 S. Ct. 469, 477 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring).

183. Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, “Reasonable Expectations

of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at

‘Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society,’” 42 D uke Law Journal

727, 732 (1993).

184. Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossldags, “Privacy and Rationality,” in Privacy

and Technologies o f Identity: A Cross-Disciplinary Conversation 15, 16 (Katherine

Strandburg & Daniela Stan Raicu eds. 2006).

185. Strahilevitz, “Social Networks Theory,” 935-36.

186. Acquisti & Grossklags, “Privacy and Rationality,” 17, 25.

187. Solove, D igital Person, 81-92; Paul M. Schwartz, “Privacy and Democracy

in Cyberspace,” 52 Vanderbilt Law Review 1609, 1661-64 (1999).

188. See Anthony Amsterdam, “Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment,” 58

M innesota Law Review 349 (1974) (suggesting that government could diminish a

person’s subjective expectation of privacy by announcing on television each night

that we all can easily be subject to electronic surveillance).

189. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979) (“[WJhere an indi

vidual’s subjective expectations had been ‘conditioned’ by influences alien to well-

recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms, those subjective expectations obviously

could play no meaningful role in ascertaining what the scope of Fourth Amend

ment protection was”).

218

Notes to Pages 74-80

190. George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-four 3 (Plume ed. 2003) (originally pub

lished in 1949).

191. See Dewey, Experience and Nature., 9. Thinking is thus a “tool” for solving

problems. Michael Eldridge, Transforming Experience: John Dewey's Cultural Instru

mentalism 4 (1998).

192. See, e.g., Dewey, Experience and Nature, 151; see also John Dewey, How We

Think (1910).

193. Dewey, Experience and Nature, 65-66.

194. Dewey, Logic, 106-10.

195. Dewey, Experience and Nature, 154.

196. Alan Dershowitz, Rights from Wrongs: A Secular Theory o f the Origins o f

Rights 6-9(2004).

197. See Solove, D igital Person, 13-55 (discussing Kafka’s The Trial, Orwell’s

Nineteen Eighty-four, and Huxley’s Brave New World).

198. Henry David Thoreau, Walden, in Walden and Other W ritings 113 (Barnes &

Noble Books 1993) (1854).

199. B. Moore, Privacy, 73.

200. Id. at 14.

4. The Value of Privacy

1. U.S. Dep’t of Health, Educ. & Welfare, Records, Computers, and the Rights o f Cit

izens 33 (1973); Ruth Gavison, “Privacy and the Limits of Law,” 89 Yale Law Journal

421, 437 (1980) (privacy enables people to “grow, maintain their mental health and

autonomy, create and maintain human relations, and lead meaningful lives”).

2. Michael A. Weinstein, “The Uses of Privacy in the Good Life,” in Nomos

X III: Privacy 88, 97 (J. Roland Pennock & J. W. Chapman eds., 1971).

3. Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom 35 (1967).

4. Paul Freund, “Privacy: One Concept or Many,” in Nomos X III: Privacy, 182,

195.

5. Westin, Privacy and Freedom, 39.