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771,773-81 (1999).
312. Arlette Farge, “The Honor and Secrecy of Families,” in A H istory o f Private
L ife, vol. 3, Passions o f the Renaissance 571, 585 (Roger Chartier ed. & Arthur Gold-
hammer trans., 1989). Heinrich Boll’s novella The Lost Honor o f Katharina Blum is a
remarkable account of the harm of distortion. See Heinrich Boll, The Lost Honor o f
Katharina Blum (Leila Vennewitz trans., 1975) (featuring a character whose life is
ruined by the publication of misleading information).
313. Robert C. Post, “The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation
and the Constitution,” 74 California Law Review 691, 711 (1986).
314. William Shakespeare, The Tragedy o f Othello, the M oor o f Venice act 3, sc. 3,11.
158-64 (Edward Pechter ed., W. W. Norton 2004) (1623).
315. Emily Dickinson, Poems by E m ily Dickinson (1890), quoted in E m ily Dick
inson 17-18 (J.M. Brinnin ed., 1960).
Notes to Pages 161-164
241
316. The notion that the home was one’s “castle” was articulated as early as
1499. See Note, “The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America,” 94 H ar
vard Law Review 1892, 1894 (1981) (dating the first mention to a report written in
1499) (the note was published anonymously but written by historian David Seipp);
see also Semayne’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B. 1605) (“[T]he house of every
one is to him as his ... castle and fortress”).
317. 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *223.
318. Nuisance involves “an invasion of another’s interest in the private use and
enjoyment of land.” Restatement (Second) of Torts §822 (1977). William Black-
stone defined private nuisance as “any thing done to the hurt or annoyance of the
lands, tenements, or hereditaments of another.” 3 William Blackstone, Commen
taries *216.
319. Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Lim itations W hich Rest
upon the Legislative Power o f the States o f the Am erican Union 306 (1868).
320. U.S. Const, amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their per
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated”).
321. Restatement (Second) of Torts §652 B.
322. Craig M. Bradley, The Failure o f the C rim inal Procedure Revolution 95-143
(1993).
323. Vargas, “Privacy Rights Under Mexican Law,” 105.
324. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982, c. 11, §8.
325. Privacy and H utnan Rights, 217.
326. Hoskingv. Runting, [2004] NZCA 34, at [106] (Mar. 25, 2004).
327. Warren & Brandeis, “Right to Privacy,” 193.
328. Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 994 (2d Cir. 1973) (quoting Galella v.
Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)).
329. Dorothy J. Glancy, “The Invention of the Right to Privacy,” 21 A rizona
Law Review 1, 25 (1979).
330. See, e.g., Janette Dillon, Shakespeare and the Solitary M an 3-13 (1981) (dis
cussing approaches to solitude before Shakespeare’s time, which viewed a solitary
life as running counter to the good of the community). Solitude, which became a
coveted aspect of existence by the end of the seventeenth century, was viewed by
many as dangerous and undesirable during the Middle Ages. See Michel Rouche,
“Private Life Conquers State and Society,” in A H istory o f Private Life, vol. 1, From
Pagan Rome to B yzantium 419, 434-35 (Paul Veyne ed. & Arthur Goldhammer
trans., 1987) (describing the concern a ninth-century abbot had for the hermit’s
solitary life).
331. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea §1169b, 11. 18—19 (W. D. Ross trans., Clarendon
Press 1925) (n.d.).
332. See Michael A. Weinstein, “The Uses of Privacy in the Good Life,” in
Nomos X III: Privacy, 88, 91-93 (discussing critiques of solitude).
333. Govind v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr, [1975] INSC 74; [1975] 3 SCR
946; [1975] 2 SCC 148; AIR 1975 SC 1378 (Mar. 18, 1975), available at http://
www. common lii.org/i n/cases/IN SC/1975/75. h tm 1.
334. Hannah Arendt, The H um an Condition 71 (1958).
335. According to philosopher Philip Koch, solitude “gives respite and restora
tion, a time and a place to lick the wounds of social strife.” Philip Koch, Solitude 5
242
Notes to Pages 164-166
(1994); see also Westin, Privacy and Freedom, 35 (“[N]o individual can play indefi
nitely, without relief, the variety of roles that life demands.... Privacy in this as
pect gives individuals, from factory workers to Presidents, a chance to lay their
masks aside for rest. To be always ‘on’ would destroy the human organism”).
336. For Thoreau, solitude fosters better social relationships because “we live
thick and are in each other’s way, and stumble over one another, and I think that we
thus lose some respect for one another.” Henry David Thoreau, Walden, in Walden
and Other W ritings 113 (Barnes & Noble Books 1993) (1854).
337. Many social, political, and religious leaders began their influential public
work with preparations performed in private. See, e.g., Joseph Bensman & Robert
Lilienfeld, Between Public and Private: The Lost Boundaries o f the S e lf37 (1979) (de
scribing how a “religious hero[’s]” retreat to privacy would inspire followers on his
return to the public life); Richard H. Weisberg, “It’s a Positivist, It’s a Pragmatist,
It’s a Codifier! Reflections on Nietzsche and Stendhal,” 18 Cardozo Law Review 85,
92 (1996) (noting that for Nietzsche, “[t]he great legislator is himself (or herself)
conceived of as one whose act of social codification begins with a private program
of creative self-fulfillment”). Sixteenth-century French essayist Michel de Mon
taigne contended that solitude—even for public figures—is not self-indulgent, for
“(t]hey have only stepped back to make a better jump, to get a stronger impetus
wherewith to plunge deeper into the crowd.” Michel de Montaigne, “Of Soli
tude,” in The Complete Essays o f M ontaigne 174, 182 (Donald M. Frame trans.,
1958).
338. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts §652B cmt. c (1977) (“The defen
dant is subject to liability_only when he has intruded into a private place, or has
otherwise invaded a private seclusion that the plaintiff has thrown about his person
or affairs”).
339. Irwin Altman, The Environment and Social Behavior: Privacy, Personal Space,
Territory, Crowding 52-54, 96, 87-89 (Irvington 1981) (1975).
340. Robert C. Post, “The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self
in the Common Law Tort,” 77 California Law Review 957, 966-68, 971-73 (1989).
341. See, e.g., Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 491 (Cal. 1998)
(holding that a car-accident victim had a privacy interest in her conversation with
medical rescuers at the accident scene); Stressman v. Am. Black Hawk Broad. Co.,
416 N.W.2d 685, 687-88 (Iowa 1987) (holding that broadcasting video of the
plaintiff eating at a restaurant might have violated her privacy interest and noting

771,773-81 (1999).

312. Arlette Farge, “The Honor and Secrecy of Families,” in A H istory o f Private

L ife, vol. 3, Passions o f the Renaissance 571, 585 (Roger Chartier ed. & Arthur Gold-

hammer trans., 1989). Heinrich Boll’s novella The Lost Honor o f Katharina Blum is a

remarkable account of the harm of distortion. See Heinrich Boll, The Lost Honor o f

Katharina Blum (Leila Vennewitz trans., 1975) (featuring a character whose life is

ruined by the publication of misleading information).

313. Robert C. Post, “The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation

and the Constitution,” 74 California Law Review 691, 711 (1986).

314. William Shakespeare, The Tragedy o f Othello, the M oor o f Venice act 3, sc. 3,11.

158-64 (Edward Pechter ed., W. W. Norton 2004) (1623).

315. Emily Dickinson, Poems by E m ily Dickinson (1890), quoted in E m ily Dick

inson 17-18 (J.M. Brinnin ed., 1960).

Notes to Pages 161-164

241

316. The notion that the home was one’s “castle” was articulated as early as

1499. See Note, “The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America,” 94 H ar

vard Law Review 1892, 1894 (1981) (dating the first mention to a report written in

1499) (the note was published anonymously but written by historian David Seipp);

see also Semayne’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B. 1605) (“[T]he house of every

one is to him as his ... castle and fortress”).

317. 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *223.

318. Nuisance involves “an invasion of another’s interest in the private use and

enjoyment of land.” Restatement (Second) of Torts §822 (1977). William Black-

stone defined private nuisance as “any thing done to the hurt or annoyance of the

lands, tenements, or hereditaments of another.” 3 William Blackstone, Commen

taries *216.

319. Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Lim itations W hich Rest

upon the Legislative Power o f the States o f the Am erican Union 306 (1868).

320. U.S. Const, amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their per

sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall

not be violated”).

321. Restatement (Second) of Torts §652 B.

322. Craig M. Bradley, The Failure o f the C rim inal Procedure Revolution 95-143

(1993).

323. Vargas, “Privacy Rights Under Mexican Law,” 105.

324. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982, c. 11, §8.

325. Privacy and H utnan Rights, 217.

326. Hoskingv. Runting, [2004] NZCA 34, at [106] (Mar. 25, 2004).

327. Warren & Brandeis, “Right to Privacy,” 193.

328. Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 994 (2d Cir. 1973) (quoting Galella v.

Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)).

329. Dorothy J. Glancy, “The Invention of the Right to Privacy,” 21 A rizona

Law Review 1, 25 (1979).

330. See, e.g., Janette Dillon, Shakespeare and the Solitary M an 3-13 (1981) (dis

cussing approaches to solitude before Shakespeare’s time, which viewed a solitary

life as running counter to the good of the community). Solitude, which became a

coveted aspect of existence by the end of the seventeenth century, was viewed by

many as dangerous and undesirable during the Middle Ages. See Michel Rouche,

“Private Life Conquers State and Society,” in A H istory o f Private Life, vol. 1, From

Pagan Rome to B yzantium 419, 434-35 (Paul Veyne ed. & Arthur Goldhammer

trans., 1987) (describing the concern a ninth-century abbot had for the hermit’s

solitary life).

331. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea §1169b, 11. 18—19 (W. D. Ross trans., Clarendon

Press 1925) (n.d.).

332. See Michael A. Weinstein, “The Uses of Privacy in the Good Life,” in

Nomos X III: Privacy, 88, 91-93 (discussing critiques of solitude).

333. Govind v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr, [1975] INSC 74; [1975] 3 SCR

946; [1975] 2 SCC 148; AIR 1975 SC 1378 (Mar. 18, 1975), available at http://

www. common lii.org/i n/cases/IN SC/1975/75. h tm 1.

334. Hannah Arendt, The H um an Condition 71 (1958).

335. According to philosopher Philip Koch, solitude “gives respite and restora

tion, a time and a place to lick the wounds of social strife.” Philip Koch, Solitude 5

242

Notes to Pages 164-166

(1994); see also Westin, Privacy and Freedom, 35 (“[N]o individual can play indefi

nitely, without relief, the variety of roles that life demands.... Privacy in this as

pect gives individuals, from factory workers to Presidents, a chance to lay their

masks aside for rest. To be always ‘on’ would destroy the human organism”).

336. For Thoreau, solitude fosters better social relationships because “we live

thick and are in each other’s way, and stumble over one another, and I think that we

thus lose some respect for one another.” Henry David Thoreau, Walden, in Walden

and Other W ritings 113 (Barnes & Noble Books 1993) (1854).

337. Many social, political, and religious leaders began their influential public

work with preparations performed in private. See, e.g., Joseph Bensman & Robert

Lilienfeld, Between Public and Private: The Lost Boundaries o f the S e lf37 (1979) (de

scribing how a “religious hero[’s]” retreat to privacy would inspire followers on his

return to the public life); Richard H. Weisberg, “It’s a Positivist, It’s a Pragmatist,

It’s a Codifier! Reflections on Nietzsche and Stendhal,” 18 Cardozo Law Review 85,

92 (1996) (noting that for Nietzsche, “[t]he great legislator is himself (or herself)

conceived of as one whose act of social codification begins with a private program

of creative self-fulfillment”). Sixteenth-century French essayist Michel de Mon

taigne contended that solitude—even for public figures—is not self-indulgent, for

“(t]hey have only stepped back to make a better jump, to get a stronger impetus

wherewith to plunge deeper into the crowd.” Michel de Montaigne, “Of Soli

tude,” in The Complete Essays o f M ontaigne 174, 182 (Donald M. Frame trans.,

1958).

338. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts §652B cmt. c (1977) (“The defen

dant is subject to liability_only when he has intruded into a private place, or has

otherwise invaded a private seclusion that the plaintiff has thrown about his person

or affairs”).

339. Irwin Altman, The Environment and Social Behavior: Privacy, Personal Space,

Territory, Crowding 52-54, 96, 87-89 (Irvington 1981) (1975).

340. Robert C. Post, “The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self

in the Common Law Tort,” 77 California Law Review 957, 966-68, 971-73 (1989).

341. See, e.g., Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 491 (Cal. 1998)

(holding that a car-accident victim had a privacy interest in her conversation with

medical rescuers at the accident scene); Stressman v. Am. Black Hawk Broad. Co.,

416 N.W.2d 685, 687-88 (Iowa 1987) (holding that broadcasting video of the

plaintiff eating at a restaurant might have violated her privacy interest and noting