wildercb/PrivacyTextBooks1.2 · Datasets at Hugging Face

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(W. W. Norton 1992) (1977) (“The open display of bodily functions—defecating,
great pain, the process of dying—threatens the dignity of the individual, re
vealing an individual vulnerable to being reduced to his bodily existence, bound
by necessity”).
239. Certain activities, such as defecation, we view as uncivilized to perform in
front of others. William Ian Miller observes, “Clearly defecation is degrading and
contaminating. It is hedged in with rules about appropriateness as to place. And to
violate those rules is a cause for disgrace and shame.” Miller, A natom y o f Disgust,
147,178.
240. Rochelle Gurstein, The Repeal o f Reticence 11 (1996).
241. One victim of Chicago’s invasive strip-search policy testified that “the inci
dent caused her emotional distress that manifested itself in reduced socializing,
poor work performance, paranoia, suicidal feelings, depression, and an inability to
Notes to Pages 148-152
111
disrobe in any place other than a closet.” Joan W. v. City of Chicago, 771 F.2d
1020, 1021-22 (7th Cir. 1985).
242. Restatement (Second) of Torts §652 D (1977).
243. Eugene Volokh explains that this difference may be because the informa
tion revealed via exposure is less useful to those to whom the information is given
than that revealed via disclosure. Volokh, “Freedom of Speech,” 1094.
244. Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474, 478 (Ala. 1964).
245. McNamara v. Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 901, 905 (Tex. App.
1991).
246. Aesop, Fables, in 17 The H arvard Classics (Joseph Jacobs trans., New York,
P.F. Collier & Son 1909-14).
247. See Solove, D igital Person, 131-32 (observing that digital filing require
ments and the conversion of paper files to digital format will lead to significant on
line accessibility of court records).
248. Judicial Conference Comm, on Court Admin. & Case Mgmt., Report on
Privacy and Public Access to Electronic Case Files (2001), http://www.privacy.uscourts
.gov/Policy.htm.
249. Robert Gellman, “Public Records, Public Policy, and Privacy,” H um an
Rights, Winter 1999, at 7, 9.
250. Solove, D igital Person, 131-32; see also Gellman, “Public Records,” 7
(warning that although “[p]rivacy protections were inherent in the technology of
paper,” digitization has led to increased accessibility).
251. Peter A. Winn, “Online Court Records: Balancing Judicial Accountability
and Privacy in an Age of Electronic Information,” 79 W ashington Law Review 307,
315 (2004).
252. Restatement (Second) of Torts §652D cmt. b.
253. See, e.g., Cline v. Rogers, 87 F.3d 176, 179 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that the
constitutional right to information privacy did not apply to the disclosure of police
records because “one’s criminal history is arguably not a private ‘personal matter’
at all, since arTest and conviction information are matters of public record”); Doe v.
City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 268-69 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding that “an individual
cannot expect to have a constitutionally protected privacy interest in matters of
public record” but that plaintiff’s HIV status was not a matter of public record);
Scheetz v. Morning Call, Inc., 946 F.2d 202, 207 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that be
cause information about the victim’s claims of spousal abuse potentially “would
have wound up on the public record,” the victim did not have a privacy interest in
the claims).
254. Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 193-94 (4th Cir. 1990).
255. United States Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm, for Freedom of the
Press, 489 U.S. 749, 780, 764 (1989).
256. Angus McLaren, Sexual Blackmail: A Modem H istoiy 17 (2002).
257. Id. at 20 (quoting “Central Criminal Court,” Tim es (London), June 20,
1895, at 3).
258. Id. at 17, 21.
259. See Leo Katz, Ill-G otten G ains 140-45 (1996) (discussing various philos
ophers’ interpretations of the connection between blackmail and coercion and
the difficulties of formulating a complete theory). The term “blackmail” origi
nated in Tudor times and referred to extortion in general. McLaren, Sexual
238
Notes to Pages 152-155
Blackmail, 12. “Modem blackmail first emerged when criminals in the eigh
teenth century recognized that the laws against sodomy provided them with the
means by which they could extort money from those whom they could entrap.”
Id. at 3.
260. See 31A Am. Jur. 2d, “Extortion, Blackmail, and Threats” §20 (2002) (rec
ognizing that although statutes differ in form, the use of a threat to extract some
thing is at the heart of blackmail). For a discussion of how blackmail laws protected
reputations in different periods of American history, see Lawrence M. Friedman,
“Name Robbers: Privacy, Blackmail, and Assorted Matters in Legal History,” 30
Hofstra Law Review 1093, 1112-13 (2002) (observing that blackmail went “against
the American grain” of allowing second chances and fresh starts).
261. Walter Block & Gary M. Anderson, “Blackmail, Extortion, and Exchange,”
44 New York Law School Law Review 541, 541 (2001).
262. Joseph Isenbergh, “Blackmail from A to C,” 141 University o f Pennsylvania
Law Review 1905, 1914 (1993) (noting that in any given case, individuals who have
obtained valuable information are most likely to disclose it in the presence of a
law forbidding bargaining for secrecy with data subjects, though in the long run,
such laws will deter potential blackmailers from digging for valuable information).
263. Richard A. Posner, “Blackmail, Privacy, and Freedom of Contract,” 141
University o f Pennsylvania Law Review 1817, 1818-20 (1993).
264. Block & Anderson, “Blackmail,” 541—17.
265. Jennifer Gerarda Brown, “Blackmail as Private Justice,” 141 University o f
Pennsylvania Law Review 1935,1971 (1993).
266. Richard A. Epstein, “Blackmail, Inc.,” 50 University o f Chicago Law Review
553,565 (1983).
267. Wendy J. Gordon, “Truth and Consequences: The Force of Blackmail’s
Central Case,” 141 University o f Pennsylvania Law Review 1741, 1761 (1993).
268. Richard H. McAdams, “Group Norms, Gossip, and Blackmail,” 144 Uni
versity o f Pennsylvania Law Review 2237, 2243-64 (1996).
269. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §13 (1965) (defining battery); id. at §21
(defining assault).
270. Henrik Ibsen, Hedda Gabler, in Hedda Gablerand Other-Plays 362 (Una Ellis-
Fermor trans., Penguin Books 1961).
271. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code §518 (West 1999) (defining extortion as “the ob
taining of property from another, with his consent, or the obtaining of an official

(W. W. Norton 1992) (1977) (“The open display of bodily functions—defecating,

great pain, the process of dying—threatens the dignity of the individual, re

vealing an individual vulnerable to being reduced to his bodily existence, bound

by necessity”).

239. Certain activities, such as defecation, we view as uncivilized to perform in

front of others. William Ian Miller observes, “Clearly defecation is degrading and

contaminating. It is hedged in with rules about appropriateness as to place. And to

violate those rules is a cause for disgrace and shame.” Miller, A natom y o f Disgust,

147,178.

240. Rochelle Gurstein, The Repeal o f Reticence 11 (1996).

241. One victim of Chicago’s invasive strip-search policy testified that “the inci

dent caused her emotional distress that manifested itself in reduced socializing,

poor work performance, paranoia, suicidal feelings, depression, and an inability to

Notes to Pages 148-152

111

disrobe in any place other than a closet.” Joan W. v. City of Chicago, 771 F.2d

1020, 1021-22 (7th Cir. 1985).

242. Restatement (Second) of Torts §652 D (1977).

243. Eugene Volokh explains that this difference may be because the informa

tion revealed via exposure is less useful to those to whom the information is given

than that revealed via disclosure. Volokh, “Freedom of Speech,” 1094.

244. Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474, 478 (Ala. 1964).

245. McNamara v. Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 901, 905 (Tex. App.

1991).

246. Aesop, Fables, in 17 The H arvard Classics (Joseph Jacobs trans., New York,

P.F. Collier & Son 1909-14).

247. See Solove, D igital Person, 131-32 (observing that digital filing require

ments and the conversion of paper files to digital format will lead to significant on

line accessibility of court records).

248. Judicial Conference Comm, on Court Admin. & Case Mgmt., Report on

Privacy and Public Access to Electronic Case Files (2001), http://www.privacy.uscourts

.gov/Policy.htm.

249. Robert Gellman, “Public Records, Public Policy, and Privacy,” H um an

Rights, Winter 1999, at 7, 9.

250. Solove, D igital Person, 131-32; see also Gellman, “Public Records,” 7

(warning that although “[p]rivacy protections were inherent in the technology of

paper,” digitization has led to increased accessibility).

251. Peter A. Winn, “Online Court Records: Balancing Judicial Accountability

and Privacy in an Age of Electronic Information,” 79 W ashington Law Review 307,

315 (2004).

252. Restatement (Second) of Torts §652D cmt. b.

253. See, e.g., Cline v. Rogers, 87 F.3d 176, 179 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that the

constitutional right to information privacy did not apply to the disclosure of police

records because “one’s criminal history is arguably not a private ‘personal matter’

at all, since arTest and conviction information are matters of public record”); Doe v.

City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 268-69 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding that “an individual

cannot expect to have a constitutionally protected privacy interest in matters of

public record” but that plaintiff’s HIV status was not a matter of public record);

Scheetz v. Morning Call, Inc., 946 F.2d 202, 207 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that be

cause information about the victim’s claims of spousal abuse potentially “would

have wound up on the public record,” the victim did not have a privacy interest in

the claims).

254. Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 193-94 (4th Cir. 1990).

255. United States Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm, for Freedom of the

Press, 489 U.S. 749, 780, 764 (1989).

256. Angus McLaren, Sexual Blackmail: A Modem H istoiy 17 (2002).

257. Id. at 20 (quoting “Central Criminal Court,” Tim es (London), June 20,

1895, at 3).

258. Id. at 17, 21.

259. See Leo Katz, Ill-G otten G ains 140-45 (1996) (discussing various philos

ophers’ interpretations of the connection between blackmail and coercion and

the difficulties of formulating a complete theory). The term “blackmail” origi

nated in Tudor times and referred to extortion in general. McLaren, Sexual

238

Notes to Pages 152-155

Blackmail, 12. “Modem blackmail first emerged when criminals in the eigh

teenth century recognized that the laws against sodomy provided them with the

means by which they could extort money from those whom they could entrap.”

Id. at 3.

260. See 31A Am. Jur. 2d, “Extortion, Blackmail, and Threats” §20 (2002) (rec

ognizing that although statutes differ in form, the use of a threat to extract some

thing is at the heart of blackmail). For a discussion of how blackmail laws protected

reputations in different periods of American history, see Lawrence M. Friedman,

“Name Robbers: Privacy, Blackmail, and Assorted Matters in Legal History,” 30

Hofstra Law Review 1093, 1112-13 (2002) (observing that blackmail went “against

the American grain” of allowing second chances and fresh starts).

261. Walter Block & Gary M. Anderson, “Blackmail, Extortion, and Exchange,”

44 New York Law School Law Review 541, 541 (2001).

262. Joseph Isenbergh, “Blackmail from A to C,” 141 University o f Pennsylvania

Law Review 1905, 1914 (1993) (noting that in any given case, individuals who have

obtained valuable information are most likely to disclose it in the presence of a

law forbidding bargaining for secrecy with data subjects, though in the long run,

such laws will deter potential blackmailers from digging for valuable information).

263. Richard A. Posner, “Blackmail, Privacy, and Freedom of Contract,” 141

University o f Pennsylvania Law Review 1817, 1818-20 (1993).

264. Block & Anderson, “Blackmail,” 541—17.

265. Jennifer Gerarda Brown, “Blackmail as Private Justice,” 141 University o f

Pennsylvania Law Review 1935,1971 (1993).

266. Richard A. Epstein, “Blackmail, Inc.,” 50 University o f Chicago Law Review

553,565 (1983).

267. Wendy J. Gordon, “Truth and Consequences: The Force of Blackmail’s

Central Case,” 141 University o f Pennsylvania Law Review 1741, 1761 (1993).

268. Richard H. McAdams, “Group Norms, Gossip, and Blackmail,” 144 Uni

versity o f Pennsylvania Law Review 2237, 2243-64 (1996).

269. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §13 (1965) (defining battery); id. at §21

(defining assault).

270. Henrik Ibsen, Hedda Gabler, in Hedda Gablerand Other-Plays 362 (Una Ellis-

Fermor trans., Penguin Books 1961).

271. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code §518 (West 1999) (defining extortion as “the ob

taining of property from another, with his consent, or the obtaining of an official