wildercb/PrivacyTextBooks1.2 · Datasets at Hugging Face

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Columbia) s 1(1); Privacy Act CCSM s P125 (Manitoba) s 2(1).
205. Jeanne M. Hauch, “Protecting Private Facts in France: The Warren &
Brandeis Tort Is Alive and Well and Flourishing in Paris,” 68 Tulane Law Revirw
1219,1222,1231-32 (1994).
206. Jorge A. Vargas, “Privacy Rights Under Mexican Law: Emergence and
Legal Configuration of a Panoply of New Rights,” 27 Houston Journal o f Interna
tional Law 73, 111 (2004).
207. Hosking v. Runting, [2005] 1 NZLR 1, [117].
208. Cap. 217, 9-8, quoted in D.S. Choi & S.C. Park, “Korea,” in International
Libel and Privacy Handbook 7-1, 7-2 (Charles J. Glasser, Jr., ed., 2006).
209. Lawrence W. Beer, “Freedom of Expression: The Continuing Revolution,”
53 Law and Contemporary Problems 36, 54-55 (1990); see also Serge Gutwirth, Pri
vacy and the Information Age 26 (Raf Casert trans., 2002).
Notes to Pages 142-145
235
210. Dan Rosen, “Private Lives and Public Eyes: Privacy in the United States
and Japan,” 6 Florida Journal o f International Law 141, 153 (1990).
211. Eugene Volokh, “Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Trou
bling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You,” 52 Stan
fo rd Law Review 1049, 1050-51 (2000); see also Thomas I. Emerson, The System o f
Freedom o f Expression 556 (1970) (“[T]he right of privacy depends upon guaran
teeing an individual freedom from intrusion and freedom to think and believe, not
freedom from discussion of his opinions, actions or affairs”).
212. Richard A. Posner, The Economics o f Justice 271 (1981).
213. Warren & Brandeis, “Right to Privacy,” 210-11.
214. See Daniel J. Solove, “The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy
Protections Against Disclosure,” 53 D uke Law Journal 967, 990-92 (2003).
215. Cohen, “Right to Read Anonymously,” 1012-13.
216. 816 A.2d 1001, 1008 (N.H. 2003).
217. Diane L. Zimmerman, “Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren
and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort,” 68 Cornell Law Review 291, 334 (1983).
218. See, e.g., Kathleen Guzman, “About Outing: Public Discourse, Private
Lives,” 73 Washington U niversity Law Q uarterly 1531, 1568 (1995) (“Outers offer
up the victim as a ‘sacrificial lamb’ to portray themselves as purifying redeemers,
able to solve the problems of discrimination”).
219. John P. Elwood, “Outing, Privacy, and the First Amendment,” 102 Yale Law
Journal 747, 773 (1992) (“Even under the best of circumstances, the relationship
between outing a particular figure and effecting a societal change is simply too at
tenuated to override the outing target’s privacy rights”).
220. John D’Emilio & Estelle B. Freedman, Intim ate M atters: A H istory o f Sexu
ality in Am erica 285-86 (2d ed. 1997).
221. See J. Rosen, U nwanted Gaze, 200 (“[Cjhanges in media technology have
increased the risk of mistaking information for knowledge”); Lawrence Lessig,
“Privacy and Attention Span,” 89 Georgetown Law Journal 2063, 2068-69 (2001)
(arguing that access to limited amounts of information only “creates the impres
sion of knowledge”); Solove, “Virtues,” 1037 (“Much misunderstanding occurs be
cause of the disclosure of private information”).
222. See Solove, “Virtues,” 1041—43 (describing the stigma attached to those
with certain diseases and illnesses).
223. U.S. Dep’t of Health, Educ., & Welfare, Records, 112.
224. Cefalu v. Globe Newspaper Co., 391 N.E.2d 935,939 (Mass. App. Cl 1979).
225. 469 N.E.2d 1025, 1028 (Ohio Cl App. 1984) (quoting Jackson v. Playboy
Enters., 574 F. Supp. 10, 13 (S.D. Ohio 1983)).
226. 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 666, 669 (Cl App. 1984).
227. Duran v. Detroit News, Inc., 504N.W.2d 715, 720 (Mich. Cl App. 1993)
(finding her identity to be “open to the public eye” because her work in Colombia
had been disclosed in newspaper articles, and because she had occasionally used
her real name in the United States); see also Fisher v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. &
Com, 578 N.E.2d 901, 903 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1988) (holding that the disclosure of a
public conversation between a plaintiff and her fellow employees was not a privacy
violation).
228. Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 244 Cal. Rptr. 556, 561 (Ct. App.
1988); see also Multimedia WMAZ, Inc. v. Kubach, 443 S.E.2d 491, 500 (Ga. Ct.
236
Notes to Pages 145-148
App. 1994) (finding that the plaintiff’s disclosure of his infection status to family,
friends, and members of an HIV support group did not render the information
public); Y.G. v. Jewish Hosp., 795 S.W.2d 488, 500 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (holding
that disclosure to doctors and other participants of the plaintiff’s in vitro fertiliza
tion did not render that information public).
229. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, “A Social Networks Theory of Privacy,” 72
U niversity o f Chicago Law Review 919, 974 (2005).
230. Quoted in Norbert Elias, The C ivilizing Process 112 (1994).
231. DeMay v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146, 148-49 (Mich. 1881).
232. Nat’l Archives & Records Admin, v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 171, 168 (2004)
(quoting 5 U.S.C. §552(b) (7) (C) (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Courts have also allowed tort suits based on the dissemination of autopsy photos.
See Reid v. Pierce County, 961 P.2d 333, 339-42 (Wash. 1998) (en banc) (holding
that relatives of deceased persons maintained a cause of action for invasion of pri
vacy when coroner’s office employees disseminated autopsy photos).
233. Earnhardt v. Volusia County Office of the Medical Examiner, No. 2001-
30373-CICI, at 7 (7th Judicial Circuit, July 9, 2001).
234. Judgement of June 16, 1858, Trib. Pr. Inst, de la Seine, 1858 D.P. Ill 62
(Fr.) (1’affaire Rachel), quoted in Hauch, “Protecting Private Facts in France,”
1233.
235. See, e.g., Anita L. Allen, “Lying to Protect Privacy,” 44 Villanova Law Re
view 161, 177 (1999) (“Sex is an area in which we encounter our desires, prejudices
and shame, and cloak these emotions in privacy”).
236. See Elias, C ivilizing Process, 114 (“The social reference of shame and em
barrassment recedes more and more from consciousness. Precisely because the social
command not to show oneself exposed or performing natural functions now oper
ates with regard to everyone[,]... it seems to the adult a command of his own
inner self”).
237. Martha C. Nussbaum, H iding from H um anity: Disgust, Sham e, and the Law
115-16(2004).
238. See William Ian Miller, The A natom y o f D isgust Y ll (1997) (“The civi
lizing process, according to [Norbert] Elias, means the expansion of the private
sphere at the expense of the public. The new norms demand private spaces in
which one prepares, grooms, and does the things that would disgust others if
they were to be witnessed”); Carl D. Schneider, Sham e, Exposure, and Privacy 49

Columbia) s 1(1); Privacy Act CCSM s P125 (Manitoba) s 2(1).

205. Jeanne M. Hauch, “Protecting Private Facts in France: The Warren &

Brandeis Tort Is Alive and Well and Flourishing in Paris,” 68 Tulane Law Revirw

1219,1222,1231-32 (1994).

206. Jorge A. Vargas, “Privacy Rights Under Mexican Law: Emergence and

Legal Configuration of a Panoply of New Rights,” 27 Houston Journal o f Interna

tional Law 73, 111 (2004).

207. Hosking v. Runting, [2005] 1 NZLR 1, [117].

208. Cap. 217, 9-8, quoted in D.S. Choi & S.C. Park, “Korea,” in International

Libel and Privacy Handbook 7-1, 7-2 (Charles J. Glasser, Jr., ed., 2006).

209. Lawrence W. Beer, “Freedom of Expression: The Continuing Revolution,”

53 Law and Contemporary Problems 36, 54-55 (1990); see also Serge Gutwirth, Pri

vacy and the Information Age 26 (Raf Casert trans., 2002).

Notes to Pages 142-145

235

210. Dan Rosen, “Private Lives and Public Eyes: Privacy in the United States

and Japan,” 6 Florida Journal o f International Law 141, 153 (1990).

211. Eugene Volokh, “Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Trou

bling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You,” 52 Stan

fo rd Law Review 1049, 1050-51 (2000); see also Thomas I. Emerson, The System o f

Freedom o f Expression 556 (1970) (“[T]he right of privacy depends upon guaran

teeing an individual freedom from intrusion and freedom to think and believe, not

freedom from discussion of his opinions, actions or affairs”).

212. Richard A. Posner, The Economics o f Justice 271 (1981).

213. Warren & Brandeis, “Right to Privacy,” 210-11.

214. See Daniel J. Solove, “The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy

Protections Against Disclosure,” 53 D uke Law Journal 967, 990-92 (2003).

215. Cohen, “Right to Read Anonymously,” 1012-13.

216. 816 A.2d 1001, 1008 (N.H. 2003).

217. Diane L. Zimmerman, “Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren

and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort,” 68 Cornell Law Review 291, 334 (1983).

218. See, e.g., Kathleen Guzman, “About Outing: Public Discourse, Private

Lives,” 73 Washington U niversity Law Q uarterly 1531, 1568 (1995) (“Outers offer

up the victim as a ‘sacrificial lamb’ to portray themselves as purifying redeemers,

able to solve the problems of discrimination”).

219. John P. Elwood, “Outing, Privacy, and the First Amendment,” 102 Yale Law

Journal 747, 773 (1992) (“Even under the best of circumstances, the relationship

between outing a particular figure and effecting a societal change is simply too at

tenuated to override the outing target’s privacy rights”).

220. John D’Emilio & Estelle B. Freedman, Intim ate M atters: A H istory o f Sexu

ality in Am erica 285-86 (2d ed. 1997).

221. See J. Rosen, U nwanted Gaze, 200 (“[Cjhanges in media technology have

increased the risk of mistaking information for knowledge”); Lawrence Lessig,

“Privacy and Attention Span,” 89 Georgetown Law Journal 2063, 2068-69 (2001)

(arguing that access to limited amounts of information only “creates the impres

sion of knowledge”); Solove, “Virtues,” 1037 (“Much misunderstanding occurs be

cause of the disclosure of private information”).

222. See Solove, “Virtues,” 1041—43 (describing the stigma attached to those

with certain diseases and illnesses).

223. U.S. Dep’t of Health, Educ., & Welfare, Records, 112.

224. Cefalu v. Globe Newspaper Co., 391 N.E.2d 935,939 (Mass. App. Cl 1979).

225. 469 N.E.2d 1025, 1028 (Ohio Cl App. 1984) (quoting Jackson v. Playboy

Enters., 574 F. Supp. 10, 13 (S.D. Ohio 1983)).

226. 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 666, 669 (Cl App. 1984).

227. Duran v. Detroit News, Inc., 504N.W.2d 715, 720 (Mich. Cl App. 1993)

(finding her identity to be “open to the public eye” because her work in Colombia

had been disclosed in newspaper articles, and because she had occasionally used

her real name in the United States); see also Fisher v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. &

Com, 578 N.E.2d 901, 903 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1988) (holding that the disclosure of a

public conversation between a plaintiff and her fellow employees was not a privacy

violation).

228. Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 244 Cal. Rptr. 556, 561 (Ct. App.

1988); see also Multimedia WMAZ, Inc. v. Kubach, 443 S.E.2d 491, 500 (Ga. Ct.

236

Notes to Pages 145-148

App. 1994) (finding that the plaintiff’s disclosure of his infection status to family,

friends, and members of an HIV support group did not render the information

public); Y.G. v. Jewish Hosp., 795 S.W.2d 488, 500 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (holding

that disclosure to doctors and other participants of the plaintiff’s in vitro fertiliza

tion did not render that information public).

229. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, “A Social Networks Theory of Privacy,” 72

U niversity o f Chicago Law Review 919, 974 (2005).

230. Quoted in Norbert Elias, The C ivilizing Process 112 (1994).

231. DeMay v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146, 148-49 (Mich. 1881).

232. Nat’l Archives & Records Admin, v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 171, 168 (2004)

(quoting 5 U.S.C. §552(b) (7) (C) (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Courts have also allowed tort suits based on the dissemination of autopsy photos.

See Reid v. Pierce County, 961 P.2d 333, 339-42 (Wash. 1998) (en banc) (holding

that relatives of deceased persons maintained a cause of action for invasion of pri

vacy when coroner’s office employees disseminated autopsy photos).

233. Earnhardt v. Volusia County Office of the Medical Examiner, No. 2001-

30373-CICI, at 7 (7th Judicial Circuit, July 9, 2001).

234. Judgement of June 16, 1858, Trib. Pr. Inst, de la Seine, 1858 D.P. Ill 62

(Fr.) (1’affaire Rachel), quoted in Hauch, “Protecting Private Facts in France,”

1233.

235. See, e.g., Anita L. Allen, “Lying to Protect Privacy,” 44 Villanova Law Re

view 161, 177 (1999) (“Sex is an area in which we encounter our desires, prejudices

and shame, and cloak these emotions in privacy”).

236. See Elias, C ivilizing Process, 114 (“The social reference of shame and em

barrassment recedes more and more from consciousness. Precisely because the social

command not to show oneself exposed or performing natural functions now oper

ates with regard to everyone[,]... it seems to the adult a command of his own

inner self”).

237. Martha C. Nussbaum, H iding from H um anity: Disgust, Sham e, and the Law

115-16(2004).

238. See William Ian Miller, The A natom y o f D isgust Y ll (1997) (“The civi

lizing process, according to [Norbert] Elias, means the expansion of the private

sphere at the expense of the public. The new norms demand private spaces in

which one prepares, grooms, and does the things that would disgust others if

they were to be witnessed”); Carl D. Schneider, Sham e, Exposure, and Privacy 49