wildercb/PrivacyTextBooks1.2 · Datasets at Hugging Face

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There are some balances that are clearly off kilter. We can evaluate and
improve balances, but the key to getting it right is to understand that we are
balancing competing priorities.
Data Security Is About Humans, Not Technology
When many people think about data security, they often think of hackers in
hoodies furiously typing on computers. But technology is just one part of
data security. At its core, data security is about humans. People are the
largest component of the data security risk equation, and people are one of
the most challenging variables to control.
Technology is often thought of first when it comes to data security. From
firewalls to encryption to access controls, there is an array of technologies
that can help protect against intruders or improper access to data. At
universities, the main place to study data security is within the computer
science and engineering programs. Certifications for data security are often
tech-heavy, including lots of lines of code, cables, and navigating user
interfaces.
Data security, however, is not really a war between technologies that
attack and technologies that protect. Instead, data security is a struggle with
people using technologies. Most data breaches involve human error. It is
humans who fail to encrypt or that choose poor encryption. It is humans
who fail to patch software. It is humans who put data on portable devices
and lose them or fail to keep them in safe places. It is humans who are
susceptible to being manipulated, deceived, and defrauded though targeted
attacks.7
Data Security Is About Risk Management
An employee at the United Kingdom’s National Health Service (NHS) lost
a USB memory device while delivering it from a clinic to the local
administrative offices. The device contained the health records of
approximately 6,360 people. Fortunately, the device was encrypted.
Unfortunately, the employee had stuck a note on the side of the device with
the password to decrypt it.
On paper, NHS was also doing the right things regarding security—it
was encrypting USB devices. Encryption is a wonderful tool because if a
device is lost or stolen, the data is unreadable. Encryption, however, doesn’t
work like magic—it can still be thwarted if people select bad passwords or
fail to protect their passwords.
The NHS employee likely knew better than to paste his password to the
device. Why, then, did such a ridiculous blunder happen? Even when
people know better, they still do careless things. They recognize a
suspicious link or attachment, yet they still click on it. They know they are
not supposed to write down passwords on sticky notes and attach them to
computers or devices, yet they do so anyway. Why are people so careless?
People are careless because good security is often cumbersome and
inconvenient. One of the basic tendencies of human nature is that the more
inconvenient something is, the less people will do it. The law, as well as
security officials, often neglect to account for this reality.
This is why security policies and measures can look fine on paper but
fail in practice. Suppose a law mandates encryption for personal data on
portable devices. An organization follows the law. So far, so good. The
organization has checked the box on a checklist of best security practices.
The organization might even require a complex password for the device—
check! In a training video shown to new employees a sentence is uttered
about not writing down passwords—check! On paper, it all looks quite
good. All boxes are checked. And yet, it can fail, as we learned from the
NHS case.
The organization or the security team typically don’t take the blame. The
blame goes to the person who unwisely wrote down the password and stuck
it to the device. Blaming the employee, however, is one reason why data
security so often fails. The employee may have been foolish and careless,
but he should have been considered a known variable. His behavior was
foreseeable.
The problem is that there are Hobson’s choices with so much of data
security. For example, with passwords, if you make the password easy, and
the employee will remember it. But then the password can be more readily
cracked. Make the password longer and more complex, but then the
employee can’t remember it. The employee will struggle to figure out what
to do. If the only advice the employee is given is “don’t write the password
down,” this isn’t helpful. The employee needs to find a way to remember
the password, but it’s too difficult to remember. The employee will
inevitably write it down. Who wouldn’t? Employers often advise employees
to use unique passwords for different accounts and devices, so the employee
probably found it necessary to put the password near the device.8
How could this problem have been averted? Telling people not to write
down passwords is unrealistic. People won’t remember them. They must
write them down somewhere. There must be a better way to make it easy
for the employee to remember the password for the device. If organizations
were to help the employee do this rather than demand a more difficult,
inconvenient, or impossible task, then there is a much better chance the
employee won’t use a runaround.
Far too often, security advice is given in training to make the optics look
good for the organization. Organizations can always claim that it told
employees the right things. Training becomes a waste dump for intricate
security advice that only the most assiduous people will follow. On paper,
an organization can point to a training program that says all the right things.
It looks good to show to regulators. “We told our employees not to write
down passwords,” the company can explain to regulators after the breach.
“Our foolish employee didn’t listen, so it’s not our fault.” Unfortunately, in
this context, the focus on making everything look good on paper is terrible
in practice.

Figure 4.1
People often think of data security as a set of clear choices as opposed to
privacy, which is seen as a set of muddy policy issues. Data security,
however, is actually quite muddy itself—it involves difficult policy
decisions about risks and tradeoffs.
Managing human behavior is immensely challenging. People are hard to
control. They need to be educated. They need to care. But people forget.
They have lapses in judgment. They don’t always have enough incentive to
learn what they are supposed to learn or do what they are supposed to do.
One choice is to impose more controls on people—make it harder for

There are some balances that are clearly off kilter. We can evaluate and

improve balances, but the key to getting it right is to understand that we are

balancing competing priorities.

Data Security Is About Humans, Not Technology

When many people think about data security, they often think of hackers in

hoodies furiously typing on computers. But technology is just one part of

data security. At its core, data security is about humans. People are the

largest component of the data security risk equation, and people are one of

the most challenging variables to control.

Technology is often thought of first when it comes to data security. From

firewalls to encryption to access controls, there is an array of technologies

that can help protect against intruders or improper access to data. At

universities, the main place to study data security is within the computer

science and engineering programs. Certifications for data security are often

tech-heavy, including lots of lines of code, cables, and navigating user

interfaces.

Data security, however, is not really a war between technologies that

attack and technologies that protect. Instead, data security is a struggle with

people using technologies. Most data breaches involve human error. It is

humans who fail to encrypt or that choose poor encryption. It is humans

who fail to patch software. It is humans who put data on portable devices

and lose them or fail to keep them in safe places. It is humans who are

susceptible to being manipulated, deceived, and defrauded though targeted

attacks.7

Data Security Is About Risk Management

An employee at the United Kingdom’s National Health Service (NHS) lost

a USB memory device while delivering it from a clinic to the local

administrative offices. The device contained the health records of

approximately 6,360 people. Fortunately, the device was encrypted.

Unfortunately, the employee had stuck a note on the side of the device with

the password to decrypt it.

On paper, NHS was also doing the right things regarding security—it

was encrypting USB devices. Encryption is a wonderful tool because if a

device is lost or stolen, the data is unreadable. Encryption, however, doesn’t

work like magic—it can still be thwarted if people select bad passwords or

fail to protect their passwords.

The NHS employee likely knew better than to paste his password to the

device. Why, then, did such a ridiculous blunder happen? Even when

people know better, they still do careless things. They recognize a

suspicious link or attachment, yet they still click on it. They know they are

not supposed to write down passwords on sticky notes and attach them to

computers or devices, yet they do so anyway. Why are people so careless?

People are careless because good security is often cumbersome and

inconvenient. One of the basic tendencies of human nature is that the more

inconvenient something is, the less people will do it. The law, as well as

security officials, often neglect to account for this reality.

This is why security policies and measures can look fine on paper but

fail in practice. Suppose a law mandates encryption for personal data on

portable devices. An organization follows the law. So far, so good. The

organization has checked the box on a checklist of best security practices.

The organization might even require a complex password for the device—

check! In a training video shown to new employees a sentence is uttered

about not writing down passwords—check! On paper, it all looks quite

good. All boxes are checked. And yet, it can fail, as we learned from the

NHS case.

The organization or the security team typically don’t take the blame. The

blame goes to the person who unwisely wrote down the password and stuck

it to the device. Blaming the employee, however, is one reason why data

security so often fails. The employee may have been foolish and careless,

but he should have been considered a known variable. His behavior was

foreseeable.

The problem is that there are Hobson’s choices with so much of data

security. For example, with passwords, if you make the password easy, and

the employee will remember it. But then the password can be more readily

cracked. Make the password longer and more complex, but then the

employee can’t remember it. The employee will struggle to figure out what

to do. If the only advice the employee is given is “don’t write the password

down,” this isn’t helpful. The employee needs to find a way to remember

the password, but it’s too difficult to remember. The employee will

inevitably write it down. Who wouldn’t? Employers often advise employees

to use unique passwords for different accounts and devices, so the employee

probably found it necessary to put the password near the device.8

How could this problem have been averted? Telling people not to write

down passwords is unrealistic. People won’t remember them. They must

write them down somewhere. There must be a better way to make it easy

for the employee to remember the password for the device. If organizations

were to help the employee do this rather than demand a more difficult,

inconvenient, or impossible task, then there is a much better chance the

employee won’t use a runaround.

Far too often, security advice is given in training to make the optics look

good for the organization. Organizations can always claim that it told

employees the right things. Training becomes a waste dump for intricate

security advice that only the most assiduous people will follow. On paper,

an organization can point to a training program that says all the right things.

It looks good to show to regulators. “We told our employees not to write

down passwords,” the company can explain to regulators after the breach.

“Our foolish employee didn’t listen, so it’s not our fault.” Unfortunately, in

this context, the focus on making everything look good on paper is terrible

in practice.

Figure 4.1

People often think of data security as a set of clear choices as opposed to

privacy, which is seen as a set of muddy policy issues. Data security,

however, is actually quite muddy itself—it involves difficult policy

decisions about risks and tradeoffs.

Managing human behavior is immensely challenging. People are hard to

control. They need to be educated. They need to care. But people forget.

They have lapses in judgment. They don’t always have enough incentive to

learn what they are supposed to learn or do what they are supposed to do.

One choice is to impose more controls on people—make it harder for