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Attorneys file hundreds of lawsuits in the wake of a data breach. The FTC
and Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) typically use the
data breach as the launching point of their enforcement actions. It was the
breach that sparked and fueled so much of the law’s development.
Unfortunately, the more the law has obsessed over data breaches, the less
effective the law becomes in stopping them.
As the number, size, and severity of data breaches continues to rise year
after year, policymakers are doubling down on this approach to regulating
data security. Breach notification laws are proliferating, expanding, and
strengthening in numbers. More regulators are pouncing on breaches.
Breach lawsuits continue to multiply. Unfortunately, this approach is
leading to a dead end.
The law must take a new direction. It needs a new focus. Ironically, to
reduce data breaches, the law must stop obsessing over them.
PART II
Holistic Data Security Law
4
The Big Picture
System and Structure
Rachel followed all the advice on good data security. She chose strong
passwords. She used two-factor authentication, where a code was sent to
her phone whenever a login was attempted from a new device. With two-
factor authentication, she felt assured that her accounts couldn’t be broken
into. But she would soon discover that she was very wrong.
On a warm September night in Salt Lake City, Rachel was getting ready
for bed when her phone lost service. She received a strange message from
her mobile phone service carrier telling her that the SIM card for her phone
number had been updated.1 Rachel took the natural step and turned the
phone off and on again. It didn’t work. Rachel asked her husband to call her
number using his phone. Her phone didn’t ring.
Rachel soon discovered that she had multiple emails saying that her
passwords on various accounts had been reset—accounts that required two-
factor authentication to change the password. What was odd was that her
phone hadn’t buzzed with texts of codes for resetting the passwords. Her
phone had remained silent.
Suddenly, her husband Adam’s phone rang. The caller asked for Rachel.
Adam asked what was happening. “We’re . . . in the process of destroying
your life,” the caller declared. “If you know what’s good for you, put your
wife on the phone.” The caller threatened to destroy Adam and Rachel’s
credit. The caller rattled off the names and addresses of their friends and
relatives. “What would happen if we hurt them?” the caller asked. “What
would happen if we destroyed their credit and then we left them a message
saying it was because of you?”2
How did the hackers take over her phone while it was in her possession
at all times? How did they circumvent two-factor authentication? How did
they commandeer Rachel’s accounts in just a matter of minutes?
Rachel was the victim of an emerging hacking attack known as “SIM
swapping” or “SIM hijacking.” People’s phone numbers are one of the
biggest vulnerabilities they have, given the growing use of two-factor
authentication. The hackers broke into her phone account and switched her
number to a different phone. Then, they started to reset all the passwords
from her accounts. The two-factor authentication codes all came to their
phone, not Rachel’s. In this way, the hackers were able to seize her accounts
at Instagram, Amazon, eBay, PayPal, Netflix, and Hulu.
SIM card attacks usually begin with a hacker tricking a customer’s cell
phone carrier into transferring the customer’s phone number. The hacker
calls the cell phone carrier’s tech support number pretending to be the
target. The hacker explains to the company’s employee that they lost their
SIM card. A SIM card is the commonly used shorthand for a subscriber
identification module, which is a circuit integrated into a cell phone or other
mobile device that links a phone number to a particular device. The SIM
card is how calling your phone number will ring your particular mobile
device rather than another one.
In a SIM attack, the hacker requests that the customer’s phone number
be transferred to a new SIM card. The carrier’s employee will usually ask a
few questions to verify the identity of the customer—maybe asking for the
customer’s Social Security Number or home address. These pieces of
information are easy for hackers to obtain—they are often readily available
in public records or for sale on the Dark Web because of a previous data
breach. Once the hacker has answered the verification questions, the
employee transfers the phone number to the new SIM card.3 All texts and
phone calls to the customer will then no longer go to the customer’s phone
—they will go to the hacker’s phone. From there, the hacker can start
breaking into the customer’s accounts.
Several points of vulnerability enable hackers to carry out SIM card
attacks. Personal data such as addresses, dates of birth, and other
information is readily available to hackers due to inadequate privacy
protections, poor restrictions on the availability of public records, and weak
security at other companies. The cell phone carrier’s customer support
system and the phones themselves were not optimally designed to protect
against this attack. Security expert Bruce Schneier wrote of SIM attacks,
“It’s a classic security vs. usability trade-off. The phone companies want to
provide easy customer service for their legitimate customers, and that
system is what’s being exploited by the SIM hijackers. Companies could
make the fraud harder, but it would necessarily also make it harder for
legitimate customers to modify their accounts.”4
The two-factor authentication schemes that are reliant upon text
messaging are also vulnerable to this attack. The fact that companies and
systems continue to leverage peoples’ Social Security Numbers (which are
easily compromised and hard to change) as ways to verify their identity is
another big vulnerability that hackers readily exploit. The SIM card attack
is thus the product of vulnerabilities marbled throughout the entire data
ecosystem.
With a few exceptions, data security law generally doesn’t look too far
beyond the blast radius of a data breach. The law often fails to hold the
right actors responsible, often worsening the damage that data breaches
cause. Obsessed with data breaches, the law fails to take the right
preventative steps and fails to assign responsibility on the actors who can
prevent and mitigate the harm of a data breach.
With its focus on the breach, the law penalizes organizations that suffer