wildercb/PrivacyTextBooks1.2 · Datasets at Hugging Face

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would be “100% discrete” if they cancelled their accounts, they had to pay
an additional $19 to remove all their information from the website. By
2015, Ashley Madison claimed to have 37.6 million users in more than 46
countries.
Unfortunately for Ashley Madison and its users, a group of hackers
broke into its database and posted 3.2 million records online. The aftermath
of the breach was ugly. People were fired and marriages were destroyed.
Some people received threats of extortion. Some people committed suicide.
Ashley Madison demonstrates in the starkest terms—through blood and
death—how privacy and security are related. Protecting privacy depends
upon protecting security. Moreover, good privacy rules can help keep data
secure. Ashley Madison kept data it shouldn’t have kept. And although
Ashley Madison offered a “Full Delete” option where users could pay to
remove all their information from the site, Ashley Madison actually
retained the information in its database for a year. It flaunted people’s trust,
and everyone involved got burned.
The lesson for data security in the Ashley Madison case is that heeding
the key privacy principle of data minimization can significantly lessen the
harm of a data breach. As we noted earlier, data breaches can’t all be
stopped; they are inevitable. But their damage can be reduced by having
good privacy practices.
Poor Privacy Regulation Allows for More Tools that Compromise Security
Good privacy rules will also regulate and minimize the harmful impact of
manipulation and microtargeting made effective by our personal data,
which can lead to massive data security vulnerabilities. Not only are
surveillance ad networks vectors for the delivery of malware, but they allow
criminals to use our own personal information against us to entice us to
click links or share information.
Tools of surveillance, such as spyware, are regularly re-purposed by
attackers to gain access to databases by stealing credentials or merely
improperly accessing the same information that triggers breach notification.
Privacy laws restrict spyware, but the laws thus far haven’t been effective
enough. As Professor Danielle Citron notes, “At least in theory . . . the
providers of stalking apps could face federal and state criminal charges if it
can be proved beyond a reasonable doubt that they knew or had reason to
know the apps were designed to be ‘primarily useful’ for secret
surveillance.”58 Unfortunately, Citron also observes that “[t]here have been
few, if any, state prosecutions against the entities providing covert
surveillance tools and a modest number at the federal level.”59
Beyond being a grave threat to privacy, spyware also threatens data
security by allowing fraudsters to obtain essential data to carry out a breach.
Spyware such as keystroke loggers is often used to pilfer passwords to gain
access to encrypted files.60
Surveillance tools like trackers and the ubiquitous devices that make up
the “Internet of Things” do hackers’ jobs for them. The fitness app Strava
was designed to be used with fitness trackers like FitBit to record users’
exercise activity and share it with others. It did that, and more. In a data
visualization map released by the company that showed all the activity
tracked by its users, “military analysts noticed that the map is also detailed
enough that it potentially gives away extremely sensitive information about
a subset of Strava users: military personnel on active service.”61 The map
leaked “[s]ensitive information about the location and staffing of military
bases and spy outposts around the world.”62 This is exactly the kind of
information hackers break into databases to obtain.
Lawmakers and those responsible for enforcing the law should target
software primarily designed to invade privacy without sufficient legitimate
uses. For example, those that create and deploy spyware should be faced
with civil liability and even criminal prosecution in some cases. Right now,
the FTC is limited in its fight against spyware, but new privacy and security
legislation could allow those harmed by spyware to pursue lawsuits against
spyware makers under “means and instrumentalities” theories similar to
products liability lawsuits.63
Lack of Accountability Leads to Compromised Data
A key component of strong privacy protection is to ensure that all
repositories of personal data are mapped and have a data shepherd—a
person who is responsible for looking out for that data and who is
accountable for what happens to that data. Far too often, organizations don’t
know all the personal data that they maintain or where it is kept. Personal
data can be collected in so many different ways and at many different times
and places.
For example, a company can collect personal data when people submit a
form to sign up for a newsletter, purchase an item, create an account, call
customer service, and so on. Personal data is collected even when people
visit the company’s website. The company also maintains personal data
about its employees. These repositories of personal data are often
maintained by different departments in different places in the company.
Without a shepherd, over time, the data could be forgotten, lost, or find its
way outside of the security bubble and onto areas of servers that are
accessible to the public.
In fact, the amount of data that is left exposed on unprotected areas of
servers is shocking. The website DataBreaches.net, which has been
chronicling data breaches since 2009, has covered, at the time this book was
written, over 3,500 stories about the online exposure of data.64 Just a few of
the recent headlines on DataBreaches.net include “Twitter-owned SDK
leaking location data of millions of users”;65 “Misconfigured cloud storage
bucket exposed Pfizer drug safety-related reports”;66 “A prison video
visitation service exposed private calls between inmates and their
attorneys”;67 and “Dr Lal PathLabs, one of India’s largest blood test labs,
exposed patient data.”68 This list goes on and on.
Proper accounting for this data would have helped companies properly
configure their systems to avoid exposure. Doing a data inventory and
having all data assigned to data shepherds are key components of good
privacy hygiene. They are also essential for strong security. If organizations
don’t know what data they have, where it is located, and how it should be
used, then it is hard to imagine how they can keep it secure. Despite the oft-
used security metaphor of locks and safes, good security isn’t really about
locking up data; it’s more about looking after data.
THE PRIVACY COSTS OF DATA BREACHES
Poor privacy practices weaken data security, and data breaches are often
data security violations as well. Likewise, poor security practices weaken

would be “100% discrete” if they cancelled their accounts, they had to pay

an additional $19 to remove all their information from the website. By

2015, Ashley Madison claimed to have 37.6 million users in more than 46

countries.

Unfortunately for Ashley Madison and its users, a group of hackers

broke into its database and posted 3.2 million records online. The aftermath

of the breach was ugly. People were fired and marriages were destroyed.

Some people received threats of extortion. Some people committed suicide.

Ashley Madison demonstrates in the starkest terms—through blood and

death—how privacy and security are related. Protecting privacy depends

upon protecting security. Moreover, good privacy rules can help keep data

secure. Ashley Madison kept data it shouldn’t have kept. And although

Ashley Madison offered a “Full Delete” option where users could pay to

remove all their information from the site, Ashley Madison actually

retained the information in its database for a year. It flaunted people’s trust,

and everyone involved got burned.

The lesson for data security in the Ashley Madison case is that heeding

the key privacy principle of data minimization can significantly lessen the

harm of a data breach. As we noted earlier, data breaches can’t all be

stopped; they are inevitable. But their damage can be reduced by having

good privacy practices.

Poor Privacy Regulation Allows for More Tools that Compromise Security

Good privacy rules will also regulate and minimize the harmful impact of

manipulation and microtargeting made effective by our personal data,

which can lead to massive data security vulnerabilities. Not only are

surveillance ad networks vectors for the delivery of malware, but they allow

criminals to use our own personal information against us to entice us to

click links or share information.

Tools of surveillance, such as spyware, are regularly re-purposed by

attackers to gain access to databases by stealing credentials or merely

improperly accessing the same information that triggers breach notification.

Privacy laws restrict spyware, but the laws thus far haven’t been effective

enough. As Professor Danielle Citron notes, “At least in theory . . . the

providers of stalking apps could face federal and state criminal charges if it

can be proved beyond a reasonable doubt that they knew or had reason to

know the apps were designed to be ‘primarily useful’ for secret

surveillance.”58 Unfortunately, Citron also observes that “[t]here have been

few, if any, state prosecutions against the entities providing covert

surveillance tools and a modest number at the federal level.”59

Beyond being a grave threat to privacy, spyware also threatens data

security by allowing fraudsters to obtain essential data to carry out a breach.

Spyware such as keystroke loggers is often used to pilfer passwords to gain

access to encrypted files.60

Surveillance tools like trackers and the ubiquitous devices that make up

the “Internet of Things” do hackers’ jobs for them. The fitness app Strava

was designed to be used with fitness trackers like FitBit to record users’

exercise activity and share it with others. It did that, and more. In a data

visualization map released by the company that showed all the activity

tracked by its users, “military analysts noticed that the map is also detailed

enough that it potentially gives away extremely sensitive information about

a subset of Strava users: military personnel on active service.”61 The map

leaked “[s]ensitive information about the location and staffing of military

bases and spy outposts around the world.”62 This is exactly the kind of

information hackers break into databases to obtain.

Lawmakers and those responsible for enforcing the law should target

software primarily designed to invade privacy without sufficient legitimate

uses. For example, those that create and deploy spyware should be faced

with civil liability and even criminal prosecution in some cases. Right now,

the FTC is limited in its fight against spyware, but new privacy and security

legislation could allow those harmed by spyware to pursue lawsuits against

spyware makers under “means and instrumentalities” theories similar to

products liability lawsuits.63

Lack of Accountability Leads to Compromised Data

A key component of strong privacy protection is to ensure that all

repositories of personal data are mapped and have a data shepherd—a

person who is responsible for looking out for that data and who is

accountable for what happens to that data. Far too often, organizations don’t

know all the personal data that they maintain or where it is kept. Personal

data can be collected in so many different ways and at many different times

and places.

For example, a company can collect personal data when people submit a

form to sign up for a newsletter, purchase an item, create an account, call

customer service, and so on. Personal data is collected even when people

visit the company’s website. The company also maintains personal data

about its employees. These repositories of personal data are often

maintained by different departments in different places in the company.

Without a shepherd, over time, the data could be forgotten, lost, or find its

way outside of the security bubble and onto areas of servers that are

accessible to the public.

In fact, the amount of data that is left exposed on unprotected areas of

servers is shocking. The website DataBreaches.net, which has been

chronicling data breaches since 2009, has covered, at the time this book was

written, over 3,500 stories about the online exposure of data.64 Just a few of

the recent headlines on DataBreaches.net include “Twitter-owned SDK

leaking location data of millions of users”;65 “Misconfigured cloud storage

bucket exposed Pfizer drug safety-related reports”;66 “A prison video

visitation service exposed private calls between inmates and their

attorneys”;67 and “Dr Lal PathLabs, one of India’s largest blood test labs,

exposed patient data.”68 This list goes on and on.

Proper accounting for this data would have helped companies properly

configure their systems to avoid exposure. Doing a data inventory and

having all data assigned to data shepherds are key components of good

privacy hygiene. They are also essential for strong security. If organizations

don’t know what data they have, where it is located, and how it should be

used, then it is hard to imagine how they can keep it secure. Despite the oft-

used security metaphor of locks and safes, good security isn’t really about

locking up data; it’s more about looking after data.

THE PRIVACY COSTS OF DATA BREACHES

Poor privacy practices weaken data security, and data breaches are often

data security violations as well. Likewise, poor security practices weaken