wildercb/PrivacyTextBooks1.2 · Datasets at Hugging Face

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As we discussed in the previous chapter, the law can work to lessen
privacy harm and take the sting out of many breaches. It is not clear that the
law could have done much for the Sony executives, but the law could have
helped the employees prevent identity theft and privacy harms.
Although it is especially difficult for the law to help prevent breaches
caused by state-sponsored attacks, we highlight the Sony case because it
demonstrates the enormous potential privacy implications of data breaches.
Unfortunately, hackers and attackers are becoming increasingly aware of
this fact, and they are finding new ways to threaten or inflict privacy harms
to further their nefarious aims.
Ransomware’s Grave Threat to Privacy
As we discussed earlier, ransomware is a significant data security threat.
Ransomware is malicious software that encrypts the files on a computer or
network. Criminal hackers then demand a ransom to decrypt the files.
Otherwise, the files remain inaccessible and the data is lost.
Nearly all experts recommend that to protect against the increasingly
likely threat of a ransomware attack, organizations should routinely back up
their data and test the backup to make sure it works. With the data backed
up, one of the main threats of the ransomware is neutralized.
A big debate with ransomware is over whether organizations should pay
the ransom. Some contend that paying ransoms is the quickest way to get
back up and running. Many others argue that ransoms should never be paid.
They contend that the criminals will become emboldened by the payoff and
might continue their extortion. Another argument against paying is that it
encourages other criminals to use ransomware and sends the message that
ransomware pays.80 The main focus of the decision is on the possibility and
ease of the restoration of the files. For example, in an intelligence memo,
the FBI stated:
The FBI does not advise victims on whether or not to pay the ransom. . . . Individuals or
businesses that regularly backup their files on an external server or device can scrub their hard
drive to remove the ransomware and restore their files from backup. If all individuals and
businesses backed up their files, ransomware would not be a profitable business for
cybercriminal actors.81
In recent years, criminals have added a frightening new dimension to their
use of ransomware. They have realized, much like the Sony hackers, that
heightening the privacy harms can make the breach much worse. Hackers
exfiltrate a copy of the data before they encrypt it. In typical practice, they
demand a payment to provide the decryption key to the encrypted data on
the victim’s system. But some criminals are demanding an additional
payment to destroy the copy of the data that they exfiltrated. They threaten
to release the data to the public if they aren’t paid.82 Security experts refer
to this practice as the “double extortion” model.
In 2016, stories began to circulate about a nasty piece of malware called
“Delilah” that allowed hackers to gather personal information and webcam
data from people who do sensitive things online (such as visiting
pornography websites). Hackers could then use that information to
blackmail those people under the threat of disclosing their secrets to the
world.83 A user on Reddit reported a similar kind of attack in 2018.84 The
criminals extorted victims into providing them with insider information at
targeted companies.
In 2020, five law firms were hit with ransomware called Maze. Instead
of just encrypting the data, the criminals exfiltrated it first and then posted a
small amount of it online when their victims didn’t pay their ransom
demands. The criminals then threatened to post the remainder of the data
online unless the ransom was paid. According to one article: “Recent
reports have shown the hacking group behind Maze ransomware has been
steadily posting the data of its victims online after the organizations fail to
pay the ransom demand. A compiled list of victims shows the data of
several healthcare organizations are included in those postings, despite a
lack of public reporting of those incidents.”85
Maze’s double-extortion model caught on. By the end of 2020, there
were approximately 20 different threat actor groups that had created leak
sites where they posted victims’ data to pressure them into paying ransoms.
One of the most dramatic law firm attacks involved an attack on
Grubman Shire Meiselas & Sacks, an entertainment law firm with many
celebrity clients. The attackers initially demanded a ransom of $21 million.
When the firm refused to pay, the attackers doubled the ransom to $42
million and dumped a small sample of data. When the law firm still didn’t
pay, the attackers started auctioning off celebrities’ files.86
With the introduction of the threat to publicly disclose personal data, it is
much harder for victims to refuse to pay ransoms. Before the data
disclosure threat, the main considerations for whether to pay the ransom
had been the amount of data that would be lost and how much more quickly
the victim could be back in action again. Organizations that routinely
backed up their data could protect themselves. But with a copy exfiltrated
and the possibility it could be dumped publicly, not paying the ransom
means that people’s private data will be exposed. Imagine a hospital that
decided not to pay the ransom, resulting in the hackers posting all their
patient records online. The hospital owes a duty to its patients to protect
their data. Does this duty extend to paying the ransom to prevent the data
from being exposed?
The law hasn’t yet figured out an answer to this question. Much of the
advice for ransomware involves urging organizations not to pay ransoms so
as not to encourage future ransomware attacks. This strategy aims to further
the common good by trying to dry up the criminals’ revenue source, but the
strategy doesn’t account for the privacy harms created by leaked personal
data. Ratcheting up the privacy harms has changed the ransomware
playbook and has made the situation far more complicated and terrible.
IMPROVING SECURITY THROUGH STRONGER PRIVACY RULES
Lawmakers and companies should bridge data security and privacy to make
them go hand-in-hand, and even be mutually reinforcing. As a first step,
lawmakers should embolden privacy law to strengthen data security efforts.
The rampant manipulation of people, as well as the amassing of swollen
troves of personal data, not only threatens privacy but poses significant
risks to security.
A holistic approach to data security law would better integrate privacy
and data security. Strengthening certain controls and protections, typically
found on the privacy side of the ledger, will help strengthen data security as
well. Below, we provide two examples of types of privacy controls that
improve security.

As we discussed in the previous chapter, the law can work to lessen

privacy harm and take the sting out of many breaches. It is not clear that the

law could have done much for the Sony executives, but the law could have

helped the employees prevent identity theft and privacy harms.

Although it is especially difficult for the law to help prevent breaches

caused by state-sponsored attacks, we highlight the Sony case because it

demonstrates the enormous potential privacy implications of data breaches.

Unfortunately, hackers and attackers are becoming increasingly aware of

this fact, and they are finding new ways to threaten or inflict privacy harms

to further their nefarious aims.

Ransomware’s Grave Threat to Privacy

As we discussed earlier, ransomware is a significant data security threat.

Ransomware is malicious software that encrypts the files on a computer or

network. Criminal hackers then demand a ransom to decrypt the files.

Otherwise, the files remain inaccessible and the data is lost.

Nearly all experts recommend that to protect against the increasingly

likely threat of a ransomware attack, organizations should routinely back up

their data and test the backup to make sure it works. With the data backed

up, one of the main threats of the ransomware is neutralized.

A big debate with ransomware is over whether organizations should pay

the ransom. Some contend that paying ransoms is the quickest way to get

back up and running. Many others argue that ransoms should never be paid.

They contend that the criminals will become emboldened by the payoff and

might continue their extortion. Another argument against paying is that it

encourages other criminals to use ransomware and sends the message that

ransomware pays.80 The main focus of the decision is on the possibility and

ease of the restoration of the files. For example, in an intelligence memo,

the FBI stated:

The FBI does not advise victims on whether or not to pay the ransom. . . . Individuals or

businesses that regularly backup their files on an external server or device can scrub their hard

drive to remove the ransomware and restore their files from backup. If all individuals and

businesses backed up their files, ransomware would not be a profitable business for

cybercriminal actors.81

In recent years, criminals have added a frightening new dimension to their

use of ransomware. They have realized, much like the Sony hackers, that

heightening the privacy harms can make the breach much worse. Hackers

exfiltrate a copy of the data before they encrypt it. In typical practice, they

demand a payment to provide the decryption key to the encrypted data on

the victim’s system. But some criminals are demanding an additional

payment to destroy the copy of the data that they exfiltrated. They threaten

to release the data to the public if they aren’t paid.82 Security experts refer

to this practice as the “double extortion” model.

In 2016, stories began to circulate about a nasty piece of malware called

“Delilah” that allowed hackers to gather personal information and webcam

data from people who do sensitive things online (such as visiting

pornography websites). Hackers could then use that information to

blackmail those people under the threat of disclosing their secrets to the

world.83 A user on Reddit reported a similar kind of attack in 2018.84 The

criminals extorted victims into providing them with insider information at

targeted companies.

In 2020, five law firms were hit with ransomware called Maze. Instead

of just encrypting the data, the criminals exfiltrated it first and then posted a

small amount of it online when their victims didn’t pay their ransom

demands. The criminals then threatened to post the remainder of the data

online unless the ransom was paid. According to one article: “Recent

reports have shown the hacking group behind Maze ransomware has been

steadily posting the data of its victims online after the organizations fail to

pay the ransom demand. A compiled list of victims shows the data of

several healthcare organizations are included in those postings, despite a

lack of public reporting of those incidents.”85

Maze’s double-extortion model caught on. By the end of 2020, there

were approximately 20 different threat actor groups that had created leak

sites where they posted victims’ data to pressure them into paying ransoms.

One of the most dramatic law firm attacks involved an attack on

Grubman Shire Meiselas & Sacks, an entertainment law firm with many

celebrity clients. The attackers initially demanded a ransom of $21 million.

When the firm refused to pay, the attackers doubled the ransom to $42

million and dumped a small sample of data. When the law firm still didn’t

pay, the attackers started auctioning off celebrities’ files.86

With the introduction of the threat to publicly disclose personal data, it is

much harder for victims to refuse to pay ransoms. Before the data

disclosure threat, the main considerations for whether to pay the ransom

had been the amount of data that would be lost and how much more quickly

the victim could be back in action again. Organizations that routinely

backed up their data could protect themselves. But with a copy exfiltrated

and the possibility it could be dumped publicly, not paying the ransom

means that people’s private data will be exposed. Imagine a hospital that

decided not to pay the ransom, resulting in the hackers posting all their

patient records online. The hospital owes a duty to its patients to protect

their data. Does this duty extend to paying the ransom to prevent the data

from being exposed?

The law hasn’t yet figured out an answer to this question. Much of the

advice for ransomware involves urging organizations not to pay ransoms so

as not to encourage future ransomware attacks. This strategy aims to further

the common good by trying to dry up the criminals’ revenue source, but the

strategy doesn’t account for the privacy harms created by leaked personal

data. Ratcheting up the privacy harms has changed the ransomware

playbook and has made the situation far more complicated and terrible.

IMPROVING SECURITY THROUGH STRONGER PRIVACY RULES

Lawmakers and companies should bridge data security and privacy to make

them go hand-in-hand, and even be mutually reinforcing. As a first step,

lawmakers should embolden privacy law to strengthen data security efforts.

The rampant manipulation of people, as well as the amassing of swollen

troves of personal data, not only threatens privacy but poses significant

risks to security.

A holistic approach to data security law would better integrate privacy

and data security. Strengthening certain controls and protections, typically

found on the privacy side of the ledger, will help strengthen data security as

well. Below, we provide two examples of types of privacy controls that

improve security.