wildercb/PrivacyTextBooks1.2 · Datasets at Hugging Face

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risk equation, and they are the most challenging variable to control. It takes
a lot of time and energy to even nudge human behavior, let alone change it
dramatically. Security experts are not usually trained to be human behavior
experts; their knowledge and experience is usually in technology, not
human cognition and psychology.
Scholars have observed predictable patterns of careless human behavior
in nearly every imaginable context. Yet, far too many technologies are
designed in ways that not only fail to counter predictable risky human
behavior but also actively encourage it. Far too many security measures are
designed in ways that fail to account for human limitations. And far too
many data security laws are oblivious to this problem. These laws actively
encourage organizations to implement security measures that fail.
In this chapter, we focus on three broad ways that humans struggle with
security. Accepting these problems and building around them will make an
enormous difference for data security. The problems include:
The Bandwidth Problem
Humans lack the cognitive capabilities to perform many of the security practices they are asked
to follow.
The Carelessness Problem
Humans often act carelessly. They will fail to follow security measures that are too inconvenient
or difficult.
The Gullibility Problem
Humans are prone to trust, even when they ought not to.
Many security standards are checklists of various security controls, with
only a few focusing on human behavior. Of those controls that involve
human behavior, they often provide no guidance on how to predict, plan for,
nudge, and respond to human behavior effectively. Legal rules don’t do
much better, often rewarding a threadbare “checklist” approach to data
security, and sometimes even requiring it.
Instead, we argue that the law should encourage design that works
realistically with human behavior rather than denies the realities of human
nature. The law should discourage design that leads to human behaviors
that create unwarranted security risks.
The law can accomplish these aims by outright restrictions or by using a
mix of incentives and disincentives. The appropriate choice depends upon
the context. We propose four key things that the law can require or
encourage that will make a palpable difference:
Changing the Default Settings
The law can encourage or require default settings that are good for security.
Promoting Mutual Trust
The law can combat gullibility by fostering a more stable set of trust expectations; that is, when
people should expect to trust an email, phone call, or website.
Encouraging Balanced Security Measures
The law can encourage a realistic balance between data security and convenience. The law
should stop rewarding organizations for implementing security measures that merely look good
on paper but that will fail miserably in practice.
Sending Sensible Signals
The law can encourage more secure human behavior by sending clearer signals to people about
security risks.
PROBLEMS WITH PEOPLE
Organizations usually rely upon data security frameworks and standards
when determining what security practices and safeguards they should be
implementing. Examples include the National Institute for Standards and
Technology (NIST) 800-53 and the International Standards Organization
(ISO) 27001. The problem is that companies often have strong incentives to
implement these standards as checklists with little regard to the human side
of the equation. Consider, for example, the 20 Center for Internet Security
(CIS) controls, one of the more popular sets of security controls:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
Basic CIS Controls
Inventory and Control of Hardware Assets
Inventory and Control of Software Assets
Continuous Vulnerability Management
Controlled Use of Administrative Privileges
Secure Configuration for Hardware and Software on Mobile Devices, Laptops, Workstations
and Servers
Maintenance, Monitoring and Analysis of Audit Logs
Foundational CIS Controls
Email and Web Browser Protections
Malware Defenses
Limitation and Control of Network Ports, Protocols and Services
Data Recovery Capabilities
Secure Configuration for Network Devices, such as Firewalls, Routers and Switches
Boundary Defense
Data Protection
Controlled Access Based on the Need to Know
Wireless Access Control
Account Monitoring and Control
Organizational CIS Controls
Implement a Security Awareness and Training Program
Application Software Security

risk equation, and they are the most challenging variable to control. It takes

a lot of time and energy to even nudge human behavior, let alone change it

dramatically. Security experts are not usually trained to be human behavior

experts; their knowledge and experience is usually in technology, not

human cognition and psychology.

Scholars have observed predictable patterns of careless human behavior

in nearly every imaginable context. Yet, far too many technologies are

designed in ways that not only fail to counter predictable risky human

behavior but also actively encourage it. Far too many security measures are

designed in ways that fail to account for human limitations. And far too

many data security laws are oblivious to this problem. These laws actively

encourage organizations to implement security measures that fail.

In this chapter, we focus on three broad ways that humans struggle with

security. Accepting these problems and building around them will make an

enormous difference for data security. The problems include:

The Bandwidth Problem

Humans lack the cognitive capabilities to perform many of the security practices they are asked

to follow.

The Carelessness Problem

Humans often act carelessly. They will fail to follow security measures that are too inconvenient

or difficult.

The Gullibility Problem

Humans are prone to trust, even when they ought not to.

Many security standards are checklists of various security controls, with

only a few focusing on human behavior. Of those controls that involve

human behavior, they often provide no guidance on how to predict, plan for,

nudge, and respond to human behavior effectively. Legal rules don’t do

much better, often rewarding a threadbare “checklist” approach to data

security, and sometimes even requiring it.

Instead, we argue that the law should encourage design that works

realistically with human behavior rather than denies the realities of human

nature. The law should discourage design that leads to human behaviors

that create unwarranted security risks.

The law can accomplish these aims by outright restrictions or by using a

mix of incentives and disincentives. The appropriate choice depends upon

the context. We propose four key things that the law can require or

encourage that will make a palpable difference:

Changing the Default Settings

The law can encourage or require default settings that are good for security.

Promoting Mutual Trust

The law can combat gullibility by fostering a more stable set of trust expectations; that is, when

people should expect to trust an email, phone call, or website.

Encouraging Balanced Security Measures

The law can encourage a realistic balance between data security and convenience. The law

should stop rewarding organizations for implementing security measures that merely look good

on paper but that will fail miserably in practice.

Sending Sensible Signals

The law can encourage more secure human behavior by sending clearer signals to people about

security risks.

PROBLEMS WITH PEOPLE

Organizations usually rely upon data security frameworks and standards

when determining what security practices and safeguards they should be

implementing. Examples include the National Institute for Standards and

Technology (NIST) 800-53 and the International Standards Organization

(ISO) 27001. The problem is that companies often have strong incentives to

implement these standards as checklists with little regard to the human side

of the equation. Consider, for example, the 20 Center for Internet Security

(CIS) controls, one of the more popular sets of security controls:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

Basic CIS Controls

Inventory and Control of Hardware Assets

Inventory and Control of Software Assets

Continuous Vulnerability Management

Controlled Use of Administrative Privileges

Secure Configuration for Hardware and Software on Mobile Devices, Laptops, Workstations

and Servers

Maintenance, Monitoring and Analysis of Audit Logs

Foundational CIS Controls

Email and Web Browser Protections

Malware Defenses

Limitation and Control of Network Ports, Protocols and Services

Data Recovery Capabilities

Secure Configuration for Network Devices, such as Firewalls, Routers and Switches

Boundary Defense

Data Protection

Controlled Access Based on the Need to Know

Wireless Access Control

Account Monitoring and Control

Organizational CIS Controls

Implement a Security Awareness and Training Program

Application Software Security