wildercb/PrivacyTextBooks1.2 · Datasets at Hugging Face

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8.
U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Office of the Inspector General, Office of Audits, Final
Audit Report: Federal Information Security Management Act Audit FY 2014, U.S. Office of
Personnel
Management,
(Nov.
12,
2014),
https://www.opm.gov/our-inspector-
general/reports/2014/federal-information-security-management-act-audit-fy-2014-4a-ci-00-14-
016.pdf.
9.
David Auerbach, The OPM Breach Is a Catastrophe, Slate, (June 16, 2015),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2015/06/opm_hack_it_s_a_catastrophe_
here_s_how_the_government_can_stop_the_next.html.
10.
Nuala O’Connor, Why the OPM Breach Is Unlike Any Other, CDT, (June 22, 2015),
https://cdt.org/insights/why-the-opm-data-breach-is-unlike-any-other/.
11.
For example, Derek Bambauer argues that “disaggregation” should be a key design principle
for data security. Disaggregation “splits information into multiple, separated data stores. The
loss of any single store, or perhaps several of them, does not confer all of an organization’s
information upon an attacker.” Derek E. Bambauer, Ghost in the Network, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1011, 1052 (2014).
12.
Kim Zetter & Andy Greenberg, Why the OPM Breach is Such a Security and Privacy Debacle,
Wired, (June 11, 2015), available athttps://www.wired.com/2015/06/opm-breach-security-
privacy-debacle/.
13.
Ellen Nakashima & Lisa Rein, Chinese Hackers Go After U.S. Workers’ Personal Data, Wash.
Post, (July 10, 2014), http://wapo.st/1kJBCuc?tid=ss_tw.
14.
Id.
15.
See generally Jeff Kosseff, Defining Cybersecurity Law, 103 Iowa L. Rev. 985 (2018); Andrea
M. Matwyshyn, CYBER!, 2017 BYU L. Rev. 1109 (2018); Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Hacking
Speech: Informational Speech and the First Amendment, 107 Nw. U. L. Rev. 795, 845 n.99
(2013); David Thaw, The Efficacy of Cybersecurity Regulation, 30 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 287, 291–
92 (2014).
16.
David Thaw, Data Breach (Regulatory) Effects, 2015 Cardozo L. Rev. De Novo 151, 154–55
(2015).
17.
Thaw also noted that there are different cybersecurity risk profiles for at least for different kinds
of entities ranging from military and critical infrastructure to non-sensitive private entities, not
all of which implicate privacy concerns. Id. (“Defining the unit of analysis that a cybersecurity
law or regulation seeks to address is critical. Approaches necessary for military environments
may be ill-suited—or possibly even damaging—to ordinary consumer-based commercial
environments. This Essay proposes a four-part classification for entities: (1) Military,
intelligence, and other high-reliability or sensitive government operations; (2) Privately
operated “critical infrastructure,” utilities, communications networks, and other infrastructure
operated by private entities but requiring high-reliability operations or utilizing meaningful
sensitive information; (3) Public and other government operations, which are not otherwise
sensitive or high-reliability; (4) Non-critical/non-sensitive private entities, private entities that
neither require high-reliability operations nor utilize meaningful amounts of sensitive
information.”).
18.
Derek E. Bambauer, Privacy Versus Security, 103 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 667, 668–69
(2013). For additional thoughts on the difference between privacy and cybersecurity, see Justin
(Gus) Hurwitz, Cyberensuring Security, 49 Conn. L. Rev. 1495, 1547 (2017) (“Critically, the
task of ‘security’ is fundamentally different from that of ‘privacy.’ Security is about prohibiting
unauthorized parties from accessing or using data or systems; privacy is about prohibiting
authorized parties from exceeding the use of data to which they have been given access.”); Jeff
Kosseff, Hacking Cybersecurity Law, 2020 U. Ill. L. Rev. 811, 814 (2020) (“Cybersecurity laws
often are conflated with privacy laws, as there is significant overlap. Cybersecurity laws,
however, must address more than just the confidentiality of personal information, and also seek
to protect from unauthorized alteration of data and attacks such as ransomware that cause data
or systems to become unavailable. Cybersecurity laws also must focus not just on financial
harms, but any threats to national security or individual privacy or safety.”); Lauren Henry
Scholz, Information Privacy and Data Security, 2015 Cardozo L. Rev. De Novo 107, 109
(2015) (“an institution’s interest in its own data security is not necessarily consonant with the
information privacy interests of the individuals whose personal information is housed.”);
Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Cyber!, 2017 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1109, 1141 (2017) (“Unlike security,
which focuses on properties of systems, privacy analysis uses a particular person—not a
technical system—as the focal point of analysis. Privacy relates to the negotiated rights and
privileges of a (usually) human person in her own information and her choice to engage in its
selective transmission under certain terms.”).
19.
Jeff Kosseff, Defining Cybersecurity Law, 103 Iowa L. Rev. 985, 988–89 (2018).
20.
See Lauren Henry Scholz, Information Privacy and Data Security, 2015 Cardozo L. Rev. De
Novo 107, 115 (2015) (“[I]nformation privacy and data security can be siloed into very
different parts of professional practice.”).
21.
Ari Waldman, Industry Unbound (2021); Ari Ezra Waldman, Designing Without Privacy, 55
Hous. L. Rev. 659, 664 (2018); see also Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan,
Privacy on the Ground (2015).
22.
Id.
23.
Ari Ezra Waldman, Designing Without Privacy, 55 Hous. L. Rev. 659, 664 (2018).
24.
Id.
25.
Id.
26.
See Daniel J. Solove, Understanding Privacy (2008); Neil Richards, Why Privacy Matters
(2021); Lisa Austin, Enough About Me: Why Privacy is About Power, not Consent (or Harm),
in A World Without Privacy?, (Cambridge Press, Austin Sarat, ed. 2015); Julie E. Cohen, What
Privacy is For, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1904 (2013); Woodrow Hartzog & Neil Richards, Privacy’s

8.

U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Office of the Inspector General, Office of Audits, Final

Audit Report: Federal Information Security Management Act Audit FY 2014, U.S. Office of

Personnel

Management,

(Nov.

12,

2014),

https://www.opm.gov/our-inspector-

general/reports/2014/federal-information-security-management-act-audit-fy-2014-4a-ci-00-14-

016.pdf.

9.

David Auerbach, The OPM Breach Is a Catastrophe, Slate, (June 16, 2015),

http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2015/06/opm_hack_it_s_a_catastrophe_

here_s_how_the_government_can_stop_the_next.html.

10.

Nuala O’Connor, Why the OPM Breach Is Unlike Any Other, CDT, (June 22, 2015),

https://cdt.org/insights/why-the-opm-data-breach-is-unlike-any-other/.

11.

For example, Derek Bambauer argues that “disaggregation” should be a key design principle

for data security. Disaggregation “splits information into multiple, separated data stores. The

loss of any single store, or perhaps several of them, does not confer all of an organization’s

information upon an attacker.” Derek E. Bambauer, Ghost in the Network, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev.

1011, 1052 (2014).

12.

Kim Zetter & Andy Greenberg, Why the OPM Breach is Such a Security and Privacy Debacle,

Wired, (June 11, 2015), available athttps://www.wired.com/2015/06/opm-breach-security-

privacy-debacle/.

13.

Ellen Nakashima & Lisa Rein, Chinese Hackers Go After U.S. Workers’ Personal Data, Wash.

Post, (July 10, 2014), http://wapo.st/1kJBCuc?tid=ss_tw.

14.

Id.

15.

See generally Jeff Kosseff, Defining Cybersecurity Law, 103 Iowa L. Rev. 985 (2018); Andrea

M. Matwyshyn, CYBER!, 2017 BYU L. Rev. 1109 (2018); Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Hacking

Speech: Informational Speech and the First Amendment, 107 Nw. U. L. Rev. 795, 845 n.99

(2013); David Thaw, The Efficacy of Cybersecurity Regulation, 30 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 287, 291–

92 (2014).

16.

David Thaw, Data Breach (Regulatory) Effects, 2015 Cardozo L. Rev. De Novo 151, 154–55

(2015).

17.

Thaw also noted that there are different cybersecurity risk profiles for at least for different kinds

of entities ranging from military and critical infrastructure to non-sensitive private entities, not

all of which implicate privacy concerns. Id. (“Defining the unit of analysis that a cybersecurity

law or regulation seeks to address is critical. Approaches necessary for military environments

may be ill-suited—or possibly even damaging—to ordinary consumer-based commercial

environments. This Essay proposes a four-part classification for entities: (1) Military,

intelligence, and other high-reliability or sensitive government operations; (2) Privately

operated “critical infrastructure,” utilities, communications networks, and other infrastructure

operated by private entities but requiring high-reliability operations or utilizing meaningful

sensitive information; (3) Public and other government operations, which are not otherwise

sensitive or high-reliability; (4) Non-critical/non-sensitive private entities, private entities that

neither require high-reliability operations nor utilize meaningful amounts of sensitive

information.”).

18.

Derek E. Bambauer, Privacy Versus Security, 103 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 667, 668–69

(2013). For additional thoughts on the difference between privacy and cybersecurity, see Justin

(Gus) Hurwitz, Cyberensuring Security, 49 Conn. L. Rev. 1495, 1547 (2017) (“Critically, the

task of ‘security’ is fundamentally different from that of ‘privacy.’ Security is about prohibiting

unauthorized parties from accessing or using data or systems; privacy is about prohibiting

authorized parties from exceeding the use of data to which they have been given access.”); Jeff

Kosseff, Hacking Cybersecurity Law, 2020 U. Ill. L. Rev. 811, 814 (2020) (“Cybersecurity laws

often are conflated with privacy laws, as there is significant overlap. Cybersecurity laws,

however, must address more than just the confidentiality of personal information, and also seek

to protect from unauthorized alteration of data and attacks such as ransomware that cause data

or systems to become unavailable. Cybersecurity laws also must focus not just on financial

harms, but any threats to national security or individual privacy or safety.”); Lauren Henry

Scholz, Information Privacy and Data Security, 2015 Cardozo L. Rev. De Novo 107, 109

(2015) (“an institution’s interest in its own data security is not necessarily consonant with the

information privacy interests of the individuals whose personal information is housed.”);

Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Cyber!, 2017 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1109, 1141 (2017) (“Unlike security,

which focuses on properties of systems, privacy analysis uses a particular person—not a

technical system—as the focal point of analysis. Privacy relates to the negotiated rights and

privileges of a (usually) human person in her own information and her choice to engage in its

selective transmission under certain terms.”).

19.

Jeff Kosseff, Defining Cybersecurity Law, 103 Iowa L. Rev. 985, 988–89 (2018).

20.

See Lauren Henry Scholz, Information Privacy and Data Security, 2015 Cardozo L. Rev. De

Novo 107, 115 (2015) (“[I]nformation privacy and data security can be siloed into very

different parts of professional practice.”).

21.

Ari Waldman, Industry Unbound (2021); Ari Ezra Waldman, Designing Without Privacy, 55

Hous. L. Rev. 659, 664 (2018); see also Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan,

Privacy on the Ground (2015).

22.

Id.

23.

Ari Ezra Waldman, Designing Without Privacy, 55 Hous. L. Rev. 659, 664 (2018).

24.

Id.

25.

Id.

26.

See Daniel J. Solove, Understanding Privacy (2008); Neil Richards, Why Privacy Matters

(2021); Lisa Austin, Enough About Me: Why Privacy is About Power, not Consent (or Harm),

in A World Without Privacy?, (Cambridge Press, Austin Sarat, ed. 2015); Julie E. Cohen, What

Privacy is For, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1904 (2013); Woodrow Hartzog & Neil Richards, Privacy’s