metadata

base_model: BAAI/bge-m3
datasets: []
language: []
library_name: sentence-transformers
metrics:
  - cosine_accuracy
  - dot_accuracy
  - manhattan_accuracy
  - euclidean_accuracy
  - max_accuracy
pipeline_tag: sentence-similarity
tags:
  - sentence-transformers
  - sentence-similarity
  - feature-extraction
  - generated_from_trainer
  - dataset_size:5000
  - loss:TripletLoss
widget:
  - source_sentence: >-
      now widely acknowledged that a study of scientific representation should
      focus on the role of such imaginary entities in scientists' reasoning.
      However, the question is most of the time cast as follows: How can
      fictional or abstract entities represent the phenomena? In this paper, I
      show that this question is not well posed. First, I clarify the notion of
      representation, and I emphasise the importance of what I call the "format"
      of a representation
    sentences:
      - >-
        for the inferences agents can draw from it. Then, I show that the very
        same model can be presented under different formats, which do not enable
        scientists to perform the same inferences. Assuming that the main
        function of a representation is to allow one to draw predictions and
        explanations of the phenomena by reasoning with it, I conclude that
        imaginary models in abstracto are not used as representations:
        scientists always reason with formatted
      - >-
        of representations that happen to arise in science. Empirical studies on
        ways of representing used in science strongly suggest that a formal
        theory of representations of
      - >-
        some practitioners of Hypothetico-Deductivism suggest a methodology for
        the sciences in which the 'best' theory is, conversely, the most
        improbable on a priori grounds; thus Popper in 'The Logic of Scientific
        Discovery', Hutchinson, 1968, p. 142: "Simplicity equals high prior
        improbability . . . Simple statements . . . are to be prized . . .
        because they tell us more; because their empirical content is greater;
        and because they are better testable". 5 This is due to, the fact that
        the experimental law has its meaning independently given (Nagel note 3
        above); whereas "theoretical notions cannot be understood apart from the
        particular theory that implicitly defines them". (Nagel, op. cit. p.
        87); and consequently die with the corresponding death of the parent
        theory. 6 "You will have noticed from this formulation that it is not
        the accumulation of observations which I have in mind when I speak of
        the growth of scientific knowledge, but the repeated overthrow of
        scientific theories ... I can therefore gladly admit that
        falsificationists like myself much prefer an attempt to solve an
        interesting problem by a bold conjecture, even (and especially) if it
        soon turns out false, to any sequence of irrelevant truisms. We prefer
        this because we believe that this is the way in which we can learn from
        our mistakes; and that in finding out our conjecture was false, we have
        learned much about the truth, and shall have got nearer the truth".
        (Popper Conjectures & Refutations, pp. 215, 231). The Supposed
  - source_sentence: >-
      as you like"), many scholars deny that they enjoyed either positive
      freedoms (in particular to speak free of interruption in the Assembly) or
      negative freedoms, where the state could intervene as it wished, as
    sentences:
      - >-
        of prosody such as intonation, kinesic elements such as gestures, and
        paralinguistic elements of expressive voice accompaniment for which the
        text provides both fewer and less exact indications. More significant
        here are those paralinguistic, kinesic, and even linguistic items for
        which the written text offers no notation whatsoever.' Yet there are
        still other reasons that distinguish speech from language that are less
        ARNOLD BERLEANT obvious but of more subtle presence. Something about
        speech makes a claim on our attention; one cannot quite be indifferent
        to it. Speech is, in essence, what phenomenologists call an intentional
        object, one which is an object of our consciousness and toward which our
        consciousness is directed. As such it exercises a peculiar but powerful
        attraction on us. There is, for example, a challenge in giving a
        lecture. Because of the presence of a live audience that is involved (we
        assume) in the presentation, we cannot ignore abrupt shifts in ideas,
        weak transitions, lame inferences, strings of trivialities, or fuzzy
        ideas which we might be able to get away with safely when writing. Words
        that have no force by virtue of their sequence and their freshness drop
        lifeless from the lips in embarrassment. This indeed signifies a basic
        difference between language in general and its literary mode. Language
        is the inert material from which literature is fashioned. Moreover,
        literature has the essential quality of speech and not of the merely
        written word. Thus we can say that literature arises out of
      - >-
        in the aftermath of the Persian wars. The ideal of freedom in these
        contexts is the freedom of whole city-states, not of individuals. The
        final stage in Raaflaub's account of the concept of freedom is the
        emergence of a specifically democratic conception of freedom, which he
        dates to the middle of the fifth century and the rivalry between Athens
        and Sparta. The democratic conception of freedom, Raaflaub argues, was
        at least in part an ideal for indi as well. In what follows I will
        describe the key moments in Raaflaub's history of freedom that
        illustrate its collective character. Then I will discuss in detail
        Raaflaub's account of the democratic ideal of freedom and the freedom of
        individuals. Raaflaub argues that the historical watershed that launches
        the concept of freedom into its central role in Greek political life is
        the invasion of mainland Greece by Persia early in the fifth century
        B.C. (chapter 3).4 This invasion presented an unprecedented threat of
        foreign domination, sparking a newfound concern for the independence and
        self-determination of Greek city-states. At the same time, the prolonged
        encounter with a political culture the Greeks saw as tyrannical and
        slavish led them to value anew the constitutions under which they lived:
        structured, law-governed, and providing citizens some degree of
        participation in their governance. Thus the Persian 4In what follows I
        reference chapters by topic, omitting chapter 1 (on methodological
        issues), chapter 2 (on the concept of freedom before the Persian wars),
        and much of chapter
      - >-
        against Sokrates for his religious views. The current essay argues that
        in their personal lives the Athenians were entirely free, except when
        speech or action materially harmed the community. A second ideology
  - source_sentence: >-
      the rest is only a development of this material. It is to them we have to
      look for the subject matter of propositions. It is the task of the theory
      of knowledge to find them and to understand their construction out of the
      words or symbols. This task is very difficult, and Philosophy has hardly
      yet begun to tackle it at some points. What method have we for tackling it
      ? The idea is to express in an appropriate symbolism what in ordinary
      language leads to endless misunderstandings. That is to say, where
      ordinary language disguises logical structure, where it allows the
      formation of pseudopropositions, where it uses one term in an infinity of
      different meanings, we must replace it by a symbolism which gives a clear
      picture of the logical structure, excludes pseudopropositions, and uses
      its terms unambiguously. Now we can only substitute a clear symbolism for
      the unprecise one by inspecting the phenomena which we want to describe,
      thus trying to understand their logical multiplicity. That is to say, we
      can only arrive at a correct analysis by,what might be called, the logical
      investigation of the phenomena themselves, i.e., in a certain sense a
      posteriori, and not by conjecturing about a priori possibilities. One is
      often tempted to ask from an a priori standpoint: What, after all, can be
      the only forms of atomic propositions, and to answer, e.g.,
      subject-predicate and relational propositions with two or more terms
      further,
    sentences:
      - >-
        quantifier-free logics. In this paper, I will develop 64 normal modal
        semantic tableau systems that can be extended by propositional
        quantifiers yielding 64 extended systems. All in all, we will
        investigate 128 different systems. I will show how these systems can be
        used to prove some interesting theorems and I will discuss Lewis's
        so-called existence postulate and some of its consequences. Finally, I
        will prove
      - >-
        perhaps, propositions relating predicates and relations to one another,
        and so on. But this, I believe, is mere playing with words. An atomic
        form cauuot be foreseen. And it would be surprising if the actual It 2
        164 F. WITTGENSTEIN. phenomena had nothing more to teach us about their
        structure. To such conjectures about the structure of atomic
        propositions, we are led by our ordinary language, which uses the
        subject-predicate and the relational form. But in this our language is
        misleading: I will try to explain this by a simile. Let us imagine two
        parallel planes, I and II. On plane I figures are drawn, say, ellipses
        and rectangles of different sizes and shapes, and it is our task to
        produce images of these figures on plane II. Then we can imagine two
        ways, amongst others, of doing this. We can, first, lay down a law of
        projectionsay that of orthogonal projection or any other-and then
        proceed to project all figures from I into II, according to this law.
        Or, secondly, we could proceed thus: We lay down the rule that every
        ellipse on plane I is to appear as a circle in plane II, and every
        rectangle as a square in II. Such a way of representation may be
        convenient for us if for some reason we prefer to draw only circles and
        squares on plane II. Of course, from these images the exact shapes of
        the original figures on plane I cannot be immediately inferred. We can
        only gather from them that the original was an ellipse
      - >-
        sentence can be said to be true precisely on the same conditions as in
        Wittgenstein's picture theory. For instance, a two-place relation is
        represented in a first-order language by a relation symbol (say " R{ ,
        )") with two argument-places, which thus in effect defines a twoplace
        relation in the language (viz. the one holding between the symbols which
        fill these argument-places) corresponding to the relation it represents
        in the world. An atomic sentence in which the two argument places have
        been filled by individual constants, say "(Ra,b)", is true if and only
        if the relation represented by "R" holds between the individuals
        represented by "a" and "b" (in this order). But this happens precisely
        when the linguistic relation defined by "R" obtains between the symbols
        "a" and "6", that is, precisely when the sentence "R(a,b)" is a true
        picture of the entities represented by "R" , " a ", and "b" in
        Wittgenstein's sence. 2 Wolfgang Stegmüller, " Eine modelltheoretische
        Präzisierung der wittgensteinischen Bildtheorie ", Notre Dame Journal of
        Formal Logic , vol. 7 (1966), pp. 181-195. 3 Erik Stenius Wittgenstein s
        Tractatus : A Critical Exposition of Its Main Lines of Thought ,
        Blackwell, Oxford, 1960. 228 Jaakko Hintikka It seems to me highly
        significant that the closest Wittgenstein comes in the Tractatus to
        giving us an actual example of an elementary proposition is to present a
        relational formula of formal logic. In fact, in Tractatus 3.1432
        Wittgenstein comes rather close to saying what I just said, and in 4.012
        he says in effect that the picture
  - source_sentence: >-
      for nouns: as pronouns refer to previously introduced nouns, so
      prosentences like that's true inherit their content from previously
      introduced sentences. This kind of deflationism concerning the use of true
      (especially in Brandom's version) is an explanation in terms of anaphora;
      the prosentence depends anaphorically on the sentence providing its
      content. A relevant implication of this theory is that true is not
      understood as a predicate and that truth is not a property. Primitivism,
      defended
    sentences:
      - >-
        that by refusing to enter the state, anarchists prevent the state from
        performing its legislative, executive and judicial functions, which are
        necessary in order to have a minimal level of order and security. In
        doing so, anarchists expose those living next to them to the dangers of
        the state of nature, thereby posing an unjust threat. But since we all
        have a natural duty not to pose unjust threats to others, anarchists and
        would-be independents have a duty to leave the state of nature and enter
        the state.13 This duty correlates to a claim-right possessed by those
        living next to them, who also have a right to act in self-defence in
        order to enforce this obligation. This is what justifies the state's
        right to rule. Of course the idea of justifying state legitimacy by
        appealing to natural duties is not new: John Rawls, Jeremy Waldron,
        Allen Buchanan, Christopher Wellman and Thomas Christiano all defend
        versions of this view.14 But traditional natural duty theories of
        legitimacy all ground political authority in positive duties to help
        others or, more generally, to realize justice. The problem with these
        views, however, is that the very existence of positive duties of this
        sort is denied by many libertarians, who typically argue that all we
        have is negative duties not to harm others. Moreover, even those 12 A
        further problem for Simmons is that typically citizens do not regard the
        benefits provided by the state as the products of a cooperative scheme.
        I find this objection less compelling, but I cannot discuss it here.
      - >-
        by Frege, Moore, and Davidson, is associated with two ideas: (1) that
        truth is a primitive and central trait of our conceptual system and (2)
        that truth, as such, cannot be defined. This second claim can be called
        negative primitivism, and it especially points out the facts about the
        indefinability of truth generally advocated by primitivists. In what
        follows, a connection is established between the deflationist's
        rejection of the predicate and of the property and facts (and
        primitivist
      - >-
        according to which Tr([(p]) and cp should be intersubstitutible in all
        (non-opaque) contexts. Here I am focusing on the property of truth, but
        the issue could be also raised for the concept (Asay 2013; forthcoming).
        It is not clear to me, though, in what measure substantiality at the
        concept level without further specifications is incompatible with
        deflationism, so I will put the question mostly aside. Perhaps, the real
        problem here would be the thesis that a truth predicate only serves a
        logical role. A thoroughly discussion, however, would be required. ©
        2014 The Author dialéctica © 2014 Editorial Board of dialéctica 524
        Andrea Strollo such a thing as a single, determined deflationary
        conception;8 instead, we have a family9 of different approaches that
        share some motivations and philosophical suggestions.10 However, at
        least in its modern evolution, convergences are strong enough to allow
        for a general treatment in terms of such an idealized theory, at least
        in many cases.11 It is worth noting that such general tenets do not have
        the equal importance in characterizing an approach as deflationary. In
        fact, if Tarskian biconditionals and the thesis of the logical role
        could be abandoned without rejecting deflationism,12 or even combined
        with different philosophical conceptions,13 things are rather different
        for the claim that truth is an unsubstantial property, if a property at
        all. Such an (anti)metaphysical project of deflating the nature beside
        the role of truth is the leitmotiv of the entire history of
  - source_sentence: >-
      met, Peter van Inwagen, a libertarian, concludes that free will is a
      mystery. Recently, the Mind Argument has drawn a number of criticisms.
      Here I seek to add to its woes. Quite apart from its other problems, I
      argue, the Mind Argument does a poor job of isolating the important
      concern for libertarians that it raises. Once this concern has been
      clarified,
    sentences:
      - >-
        however, another argument serves to renew the challenge. The
        Assimilation Argument challenges libertarians to explain how ostensible
        exercises of free will are relevantly different from other causally
        undetermined outcomes, outcomes that nobody would count as exercises of
        free will. In particular, libertarians must explain how agents can have
        the power
      - >-
        contended that the Assimilation Argument is unsound. Here I defend the
        Assimilation Argument and the Rollback Argument, a second challenge to
        libertarianism that Franklin rejects. My aim in doing so is to
        underscore the force of these challenges, and thereby to resist what
        appears to be an emerging trend in
      - >-
        (p. 79), it must be capable of generating a theory of knowledge (p. 80),
        and it must harmonise with a plausible account of the way contentful
        states explain behaviour, which, the author argues, is non-causal (p.
        139). The import of some of these requirements becomes more clear in
        Part III, where the theory begins to unfold. It is in fact a version of
        behaviourism, but with the saving grace that it allows mental content to
        be found in behaviour, rather than trying to reduce it away (p. 146). It
        also appears to find value to be intrinsic to behaviour. To be in an
        intentional state-to have a belief or desire, or to possess a concept-is
        to be "liable" to exhibit behavioural responses intrinsically assessable
        in evaluative terms. Two values are articulated; T and D. The former is
        analogous to truth, except that it applies to behaviour rather than
        beliefs; the latter is akin to desirability, and is intended for
        assessments of a response's conative import. In fact, however, the
        theory progresses very little. The focus starts out as one would expect:
        on belief and desire, the intentional states most relevant for
        explaining behaviour. But a problem crops up immediately. The author's
        account of it is complicated by his views on opacity (pp. 180 ff.), but
        here is a simplified version. Ideally, it seems, the treatment of belief
        would say that a person believes that p just in case she is liable to
        make responses intrinsically assessable with respect to T as "good
model-index:
  - name: SentenceTransformer based on BAAI/bge-m3
    results:
      - task:
          type: triplet
          name: Triplet
        dataset:
          name: m3
          type: m3
        metrics:
          - type: cosine_accuracy
            value: 0.978
            name: Cosine Accuracy
          - type: dot_accuracy
            value: 0.022
            name: Dot Accuracy
          - type: manhattan_accuracy
            value: 0.974
            name: Manhattan Accuracy
          - type: euclidean_accuracy
            value: 0.978
            name: Euclidean Accuracy
          - type: max_accuracy
            value: 0.978
            name: Max Accuracy
      - task:
          type: triplet
          name: Triplet
        dataset:
          name: all nli test
          type: all-nli-test
        metrics:
          - type: cosine_accuracy
            value: 0.9755
            name: Cosine Accuracy
          - type: dot_accuracy
            value: 0.0245
            name: Dot Accuracy
          - type: manhattan_accuracy
            value: 0.976
            name: Manhattan Accuracy
          - type: euclidean_accuracy
            value: 0.9755
            name: Euclidean Accuracy
          - type: max_accuracy
            value: 0.976
            name: Max Accuracy

SentenceTransformer based on BAAI/bge-m3

This is a sentence-transformers model finetuned from BAAI/bge-m3. It maps sentences & paragraphs to a 1024-dimensional dense vector space and can be used for semantic textual similarity, semantic search, paraphrase mining, text classification, clustering, and more.

Model Details

Model Description

Model Type: Sentence Transformer
Base model: BAAI/bge-m3
Maximum Sequence Length: 8192 tokens
Output Dimensionality: 1024 tokens
Similarity Function: Cosine Similarity

Model Sources

Documentation: Sentence Transformers Documentation
Repository: Sentence Transformers on GitHub
Hugging Face: Sentence Transformers on Hugging Face

Full Model Architecture

SentenceTransformer(
  (0): Transformer({'max_seq_length': 8192, 'do_lower_case': False}) with Transformer model: XLMRobertaModel 
  (1): Pooling({'word_embedding_dimension': 1024, 'pooling_mode_cls_token': True, 'pooling_mode_mean_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_max_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_mean_sqrt_len_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_weightedmean_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_lasttoken': False, 'include_prompt': True})
  (2): Normalize()
)

Usage

Direct Usage (Sentence Transformers)

First install the Sentence Transformers library:

pip install -U sentence-transformers

Then you can load this model and run inference.

from sentence_transformers import SentenceTransformer

# Download from the 🤗 Hub
model = SentenceTransformer("m7n/bge-m3-philosophy-triplets_v3")
# Run inference
sentences = [
    'met, Peter van Inwagen, a libertarian, concludes that free will is a mystery. Recently, the Mind Argument has drawn a number of criticisms. Here I seek to add to its woes. Quite apart from its other problems, I argue, the Mind Argument does a poor job of isolating the important concern for libertarians that it raises. Once this concern has been clarified,',
    'however, another argument serves to renew the challenge. The Assimilation Argument challenges libertarians to explain how ostensible exercises of free will are relevantly different from other causally undetermined outcomes, outcomes that nobody would count as exercises of free will. In particular, libertarians must explain how agents can have the power',
    'contended that the Assimilation Argument is unsound. Here I defend the Assimilation Argument and the Rollback Argument, a second challenge to libertarianism that Franklin rejects. My aim in doing so is to underscore the force of these challenges, and thereby to resist what appears to be an emerging trend in',
]
embeddings = model.encode(sentences)
print(embeddings.shape)
# [3, 1024]

# Get the similarity scores for the embeddings
similarities = model.similarity(embeddings, embeddings)
print(similarities.shape)
# [3, 3]

Evaluation

Metrics

Triplet

Dataset: m3
Evaluated with TripletEvaluator

Metric	Value
cosine_accuracy	0.978
dot_accuracy	0.022
manhattan_accuracy	0.974
euclidean_accuracy	0.978
max_accuracy	0.978

Triplet

Dataset: all-nli-test
Evaluated with TripletEvaluator

Metric	Value
cosine_accuracy	0.9755
dot_accuracy	0.0245
manhattan_accuracy	0.976
euclidean_accuracy	0.9755
max_accuracy	0.976

Training Details

Training Dataset

Unnamed Dataset

Size: 5,000 training samples
Columns: anchor, positive, and negative

Approximate statistics based on the first 1000 samples:

	anchor	positive	negative
type	string	string	string
details	min: 17 tokens mean: 288.26 tokens max: 566 tokens	min: 21 tokens mean: 288.3 tokens max: 565 tokens	min: 22 tokens mean: 301.96 tokens max: 577 tokens

Samples:

anchor	positive	negative
Reform (Boston: Auburn House, 1982). 7 See, e.g., K. Polk, 'Rape Reform and Criminal Justice Proces;ing', 31 Crime & Delinquency 191 (1985); W. Loh, 'The Impact of Common Law and Reform Rape Statutes on Prosecution: An Empirical Study', 55 Wash. L. Rev. 543, 552-54 (1980); J. Marsh, A. Geist & N. Caplan, Rape and the Limits of Law Reform 65 (1982). 8 See S. Estrich, Real Rape (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987). 7 Susan Estrich throw their hands up in the air, depending on whether they saw themselves as feminists, or wanted me to. But nearly all of them said the same thing then, and most of them continue to repeat it even today: juries won't convict. You may think it's rape, and I may even think it's rape, but the public doesn't, and we've got too many real rapes in this office to waste our time on cases where the woman will eventually back out, and the jury would never convict. It hasn't been easy to dissuade them. Certainly, what went on in most law school classrooms in the nineteen-eighties, where rape was so politicized that one could hardly debate it, provides no answer to the real world concerns, or at least justifications, that animate so many prosecutors' offices. When I started teaching law in 1981, there was still nothing in the casebooks on rape, so I put my own materials together. Hard cases make good classes. I found better examples than the three English fools,	more sympathetic men: doctors, not drunken sailors. And women who didn't scream quite so much, or fight back quite so vigorously. Two great classes, as these things go. Most of the men I knew were reluctant to teach rape, for reasons that at first I didn't quite understand. But I convinced one to try the next year, and lent him my materials, and watched first with amusement and then with dismay when a delegation of women students came to visit him before class to complain that his (my) materials were sexist and inappropriate. I'd hoped those days were over. After all, all the casebooks now have sections on rape, and everyone covers it somehow. But only last week, a colleague who is one of the best criminal law professors in the country told me of being visited by a similar delegation in 1991, a decade later. They didn't like the way he taught rape. There were victims in the class. They didn't want to hear "the other side". In their view, there was no "other side". Nothing to debate. Lord knows, I'm sympathetic to those who have been victimized and who feel that they have nothing to learn from a debate about rape. Maybe they don't. But the rest of us, the rest of their classmates, the rest of the country, surely do. Silencing the debate only reenforces and reaffirms the status quo that many of us are trying to change. The debate I am interested in is not between the radical feminists	`relations, thwarting possibilities of knowing the specific harms particular acts of rape enact well enough to render intelligible their far-reaching social-political-moral implications. Taking my point of departure from Debra Bergoffen's call for 'a new epistemology of rape', I`
framed, because the key premissthe thesis of universal causal determinismis, in the domain of human behaviour, an unjustified conjecture based on over-simplified, under-informed explanatory models. Kant's semantics of singular cognitive reference (explained herein), which stands independently of his Transcendental Idealism, justifies and emphasises a quadruple distinction between causal description, causal ascription (predication), (approximately) true causal ascription (accurate predication) and cognitively justified causal ascription. Contemporary causal theories of mind, of action	or of meaning do not suffice for causal ascription, and so cannot suffice for causal predication, and hence cannot justify causal determinism about human behaviour. More generally, the principle of universal causal determinism is a regulative principle governing causal inquiry and was so formulated by LaPlace. Only successful, sufficient causal explanation of particular events provides for causal knowledge of those events. Such knowledge we lack in the domain of human behaviour. Rational belief, including scientific belief, requires apportioning belief to justifying evidence; all else	etc.; but causal explanation, in its advanced stages, is not content with such vague statements of uniformities. The uniformities which are sought are the ones which can be correlated with precise, numerical relations. A third characteristic which has often been associated with causality is the concept of determinism or necessity. This third trait of causality has been violently criticized. From Hume to Russell it has been a common contention that necessity is a fiction and that causality merely means invariable connection of uniformity of processes. For the present, without analysing the objections raised to the necessity or determinism of causal relations, I shall limit myself to brief comments on the meaning of necessity, and on the specific sense of necessity in the causal relation. Though necessity, or determinism, should be a fiction or a myth, it is certainly not a meaningless concept. Hume, who presents the most effective objections to the concept of necessity, was quite certain that the concept had a meaning, since otherwise his criticisms would have been of no importance. What then is necessity? Briefly, necessity refers to deductive systems where from self-evident, postu' S. Alexander, Space, Time and Deity, vol. i, p. 288. 320 CAUSALITY lated, or "convenient" concepts other concepts are derived. The clearest illustration of the notion of necessity is the concept of classes where the implicative relation is that of inclusion, or that of from species to genus. Causal relations are deterministic in the sense that cause and effect contain
`presuppositions. In a nutshell view of aspects of the history of science the presuppositions, as part of the relevant historical context, operate within the scientific enterprise. Science used to be views as positivist and final; yet, the logic of methodology, from E.A. Burtt to T.S. Kuhn and Karl Popper`	`show that presuppositions are part of the scientific research. Particularly the pioneering work of the archeologist and philosopher R.G. Collingwood and the seminal thinker S.N. Nasr, who opened the doors for the inquiry of the role of science within Islamic Civilization, are highlighted. We show that the`	continues to evolve, it seems most probable that it will someday diverge again from its seeming congruity with the teachings of the Qur'an. An even sharper critique arises from the unexpressed as sumption that there exists a standard of knowledge on a par with, if not actually higher than, Allah's revealed truth to which that revelation must be submitted for its validation. Thus, while this attempt to claim unity (or at least non-contradiction) between modern science and Islamic revelation does not require any sort of limitation on science or scientific research, it remains unacceptable to the majority of modern scientists, as well as to many Muslim thinkers, because of the implications of its assumptions.8 The first assumption, that science has reached its peak of development, is unacceptable to science. The second assumption, that religious dogma should, or even can, be judged by the tenets of modern science, is rejected by many Muslim thinkers. Scientific Knowledge Needs an Islamic Interpretation In response to the unacceptable and often Positivistic analysis of Bucaille, the Islamic intellectual community has adopted more radical al ternatives, such as Ismail al-Faruqi's call for an Islamization of all knowledge, including modern scientific knowledge.9 His argument grows out of a perception that Islamic culture, which once led the Mediterranean world, is increasingly threatened by secularized and individualistic West ern values?a threat that is as much cultural as it is political. Faruqi's plea for an Islamization of knowledge, then, should be read in the context

Loss: TripletLoss with these parameters:

{
    "distance_metric": "TripletDistanceMetric.COSINE",
    "triplet_margin": 0.05
}

Evaluation Dataset

Unnamed Dataset

Size: 500 evaluation samples
Columns: anchor, positive, and negative

Approximate statistics based on the first 1000 samples:

	anchor	positive	negative
type	string	string	string
details	min: 29 tokens mean: 288.01 tokens max: 646 tokens	min: 26 tokens mean: 286.17 tokens max: 499 tokens	min: 16 tokens mean: 289.98 tokens max: 544 tokens

Samples:

anchor	positive	negative
public have now before them, the evidences of natural religion, the evidences of revealed religion, and an account of the duties that result from both" (Paley 1829, v-vi ). Without the arguments of natural theology, revelation and religious morality could not be discussed. The evidence of human reason and of the empirical study of the natural world, was the basis for establishing the existence and character of a deity. Only after these were established could one consider other sources of knowledge. Without the arguments available from natural theology that there exists a single unified, beneficent, and omnipresent deity, there is no warrant for accepting that the deity is capable of revelation, that revelation ought to be a trustworthy basis for knowledge, or that there exists a moral order or set of moral duties. The mere existence of a deity was insufficient for Paley. As a work of theology, the most important conclusion is not only that God merely exists, but also that characteristics about God can be known and inferences about the proper relationship of the individual and society to God can be drawn. As a result, much of the early chapters of Natural Theology did not put forth an argument for the existence of God, but instead excluded bad arguments for the existence of God. In order to understand what Paley's argument is, it is paramount to also understand what it is not. 58 ADAM R. SHAPIRO With the recent restoration of Paley's work, several historians and philosophers of science have begun this	re-examination. Sander Gliboff noted that "Paley devoted a chapter to comparing rival hypotheses unfavorably with his own and eliminating them from consideration one by one" (Gliboff 2000). For Gliboff, doing so was essential for establishing the legitimacy of the central argument of the Natural Theology. The central argument, which is what Paley himself referred to as "the argument" in the opening chapters of the book, is an inference that can be formulated as the claim that if an object has a "purpose," then it has a designer. In analyzing this, Gliboff agreed with Eliot Sober's 1993 assessment that Paley's central argument was based upon "inference to the best explanation" (Sober 2000, 31). Sober ascribed to Paley two possible explanations for apparent purposeful objects, design and random chance. The explanation that purposeful objects have their origins in a designer is pitted against the other possible explanation for the appearance of purpose in an object and is ruled the most likely. Gliboff showed that these were not the only contenders and claims that Paley refutes several alternatives that make up a "pool" of possible explanations. The inference to a designer is judged the most likely. If Natural Theology was in fact based upon an inference to the best explanation, then it becomes clear why a Darwinian conclusion might be seen to uproot Paley. If the workings of nature can be seen to generate purpose without the apparent intentional workings of a designer, then alternate explanations are strengthened and	and intellectual sides of the stratagem. In response to Erasmus Darwin's evolutionary theories. Paley asserted that the divinely designed architecture of nature had remained unchanged since the creation. But the more he emphasized the preordained nature of providence, its effectuation through mechanical dispositions, the less room there appeared to be for particular interventions. Section 2 concentrates on Paley's efforts to reconcile this model of a law-governed, mechanical universe, with the belief
the two lines of work from Sections 2 and 3 together: the realization that there is no in principle difference between functional and natural kinds regarding their epistemic importance for scientific reasoning and explanation provides clues how the problem for HPC theory that I pointed out in Section 2 can be resolved, and HPC theory can be turned into a full‐fledged theory of natural kindhood able to cover kinds in the special sciences as well as the less controversial natural kinds. 1. Brigandt (2009) recently reached a similar conclusion on the basis of different considerations. 2. A Problem for HPC Theory. In the philosophical literature on the topic, two distinct ways of thinking about natural kinds can be found. On the one hand, there is the essentialist tradition that, broadly taken, understands natural kinds as groupings of things according to their natures, their intrinsic properties or causal capacities, their microscopic structures, and so on. On the other hand, there is the more recent tradition that understands natural kinds as groupings of things over which we can make reliable inductions. That these lines of work really are quite distinct can be seen from the way in which they conceive of the problem of natural kinds.2 The former line of work conceives of the problem as a metaphysical problem, that is, as the question, What sorts of things are there in the world? As Brian Ellis put it in a recent defense of essentialism, “membership of a natural kind is	decided by nature, not by us” (2001, 19). The latter line of work, in contrast, sees it as foremost a question in epistemology, that is, as the question, Which ways of grouping things are best suited to help us make inferences and to explain phenomena? Boyd, for example, asserted that “it is a truism that the philosophical theory of natural kinds is about how classificatory schemes come to contribute to the epistemic reliability of inductive and explanatory practices” (1999a, 146; also 1999b, 69). On this view, kind membership is decided more by us than by nature. With respect to the explanation‐grounding capacity of natural kinds, the two lines of work provide different answers that run into different kinds of problems. From the perspective of the essentialist tradition it should be no miracle that natural kinds ground reliable inferences and explanations. If there is a definitive, objective way in which the world is made up of kinds of things, then clearly any explanation of a given phenomenon should ultimately make reference to some of these objectively existing kinds of things. Once we have achieved an inventory of the various kinds that exist in the world and have an account of their metaphysics, we have a theory of the kinds that can feature in our explanations. The problem, however, is that we do not have any direct access to the world that would allow us to compile the required inventory of the world’s furniture. Our best bet at obtaining such an inventory is to	There is, however, a selection of strong papers in the collection that do address key topics in the contemporary debate concerning natural kinds— too many, in fact, to review them all here (and hope to do them justice). As such, I shall mention a selection that struck me as of particular interest, since each addresses one of the perennial themes in the natural kinds debate, namely the alleged epistemic utility of natural kinds, and their role in explanatory and inductive reasoning. I'll start with Chapter 2 of the collection, a paper written by Peter Godfrey-Smith. In this chapter, Godfrey-Smith discusses inductive inferences and their associated justification. Inductive inferences are a perennial philo sophical topic, cropping up in both the philosophy of science and epistemol ogy. In the context of the topic of the edited collection, there are apparent inductive benefits bestowed by recognizing and classifying objects into natural kinds, which makes induction a central topic to the broader debate concerning natural kinds. Godfrey-Smith identifies what he takes to be two conflated types of induct ive inference and goes on to sketch a philosophical justification for each, re spectively, which has not been used to justify what philosophers have historically referred to as 'inductive' inferences. The approach employed builds upon Frank Jackson's response to Nelson Goodman's classic 'grue' example, from his new riddle of induction. Godfrey-Smith sketches a method of inference that is built upon statistical models of population sampling, where there are rules telling us how the dis tribution
model, can be chosen in several ways from the set of all elementary experiences. In case (ii) it is obviously conceivable that the mental stream, like a loaf of bread, can be cut into slices in more than one way. At the same time (in ? 67) that Carnap is inclined to consider elementary experiences as abstractions of some kind (as mere 'places' in the stream), he maintains that they are what is "primarily given" both psychologically and epistemologically. The set of all elementary experiences occurring in one's own mental life is symbolically designated by erl. When I wish to show that the owner is a person A, I shall write erlA. When speaking, in what follows, of elementary experiences I shall always assume that we are dealing with experiences of one and the same person unless the contrary is explicitly stated. 1.3. Quality Points The visual field that is a part of my present elementary experience is assumed in the Aufbau to be a two-dimensional spatial configuration of color points. Each color point is characterized by its two 'local signs', which together determine its place in the visual field, and by its hue, saturation, and brightness, which together determine its place in the color solid.9 In this sense, the color points occurring in the elementary expe riences can be thought of as points in a five-dimensional space (the word 'space' here understood in an abstract sense), which may be called the HOW CARNAP BUILT THE WORLD IN	1928 341 color space.10 The color points occurring in a given elementary experience will then be a certain subset of the color space. In that space any two points whatsoever have a mutual distance. (How the distance is to be measured is left unexplained in the Aufbau.) If the distance is less than or equal to a certain standard distance, the two points are said to be similar (?hnlich).11 This notion of similarity thus involves the notion of a standard distance. Carnap seems to consider this distance as small, but otherwise he says nothing about it. (The question as to how the choice of standard distance affects the constructions of the Aufbau is disturbing and impossible to answer.) If the points p and p' are similar and if p occurs in the elementary experience e and/?' in e9 then e and e' are said to be part similar (teil?hnlich).,12 Color points are a species of the genus quality points. On one level of thought, in one sense, Carnap considers an elementary experience as a complex of a number of quality points of various kinds. One kind are visual color points, another auditive qualities, a third olfactory, etc. He is also prepared to recognize emotive, volitive, and intellectual qualities (quality points). The word 'sense class' is used to denote such a kind of quality.13 For each sense class, just as for vision, notions of distance and standard distance are postulated. Two points from the same sense class are said to be similar if	presentational of worldly properties, but as blank sensations, extrinsically endowed with representational powers in virtue of standing as 'natural signs' for their normal causes.1 On that view, both colour perceptions and colour beliefs normally correspond with reality, in the simple sense of being true. Still, the view retains a strong case to be regarded a form of anti-realism. This has nothing to do with a failure of correspondence in the sense of plain truth; nor is it to be characterized as a failure of any other kind of 'correspondence'. It is rather to be brought out by means of a contrast in directions of explanation with respect to the individuation of perceptions of colour and the colours of things. Compare the case of shapes. The most basic distinctions are between squareness and circularity, say, as properties of things in the world. Having first identified which property squareness is, we may then identify perceptions of squareness as those which present something as having that property. On the current view concerning colour, the direction of explanation is the reverse. The most basic distinctions are between experiences of redness and experiences of greenness, say, conceived as blank sensations. Having made such distinctions, we may then define a property redness which applies to mind-independent objects, as that of being disposed to produce those experiences red-type ones or as the property of having whatever physical constitution actually grounds that disposition. Thus, although, the colours are perfectly real, in the sense that representations

Loss: TripletLoss with these parameters:

{
    "distance_metric": "TripletDistanceMetric.COSINE",
    "triplet_margin": 0.05
}

Training Hyperparameters

Non-Default Hyperparameters

eval_strategy: steps
per_device_train_batch_size: 4
per_device_eval_batch_size: 4
learning_rate: 1e-05
warmup_ratio: 0.1
batch_sampler: no_duplicates

All Hyperparameters

Click to expand

overwrite_output_dir: False
do_predict: False
eval_strategy: steps
prediction_loss_only: True
per_device_train_batch_size: 4
per_device_eval_batch_size: 4
per_gpu_train_batch_size: None
per_gpu_eval_batch_size: None
gradient_accumulation_steps: 1
eval_accumulation_steps: None
learning_rate: 1e-05
weight_decay: 0.0
adam_beta1: 0.9
adam_beta2: 0.999
adam_epsilon: 1e-08
max_grad_norm: 1.0
num_train_epochs: 3
max_steps: -1
lr_scheduler_type: linear
lr_scheduler_kwargs: {}
warmup_ratio: 0.1
warmup_steps: 0
log_level: passive
log_level_replica: warning
log_on_each_node: True
logging_nan_inf_filter: True
save_safetensors: True
save_on_each_node: False
save_only_model: False
restore_callback_states_from_checkpoint: False
no_cuda: False
use_cpu: False
use_mps_device: False
seed: 42
data_seed: None
jit_mode_eval: False
use_ipex: False
bf16: False
fp16: False
fp16_opt_level: O1
half_precision_backend: auto
bf16_full_eval: False
fp16_full_eval: False
tf32: None
local_rank: 0
ddp_backend: None
tpu_num_cores: None
tpu_metrics_debug: False
debug: []
dataloader_drop_last: False
dataloader_num_workers: 0
dataloader_prefetch_factor: None
past_index: -1
disable_tqdm: False
remove_unused_columns: True
label_names: None
load_best_model_at_end: False
ignore_data_skip: False
fsdp: []
fsdp_min_num_params: 0
fsdp_config: {'min_num_params': 0, 'xla': False, 'xla_fsdp_v2': False, 'xla_fsdp_grad_ckpt': False}
fsdp_transformer_layer_cls_to_wrap: None
accelerator_config: {'split_batches': False, 'dispatch_batches': None, 'even_batches': True, 'use_seedable_sampler': True, 'non_blocking': False, 'gradient_accumulation_kwargs': None}
deepspeed: None
label_smoothing_factor: 0.0
optim: adamw_torch
optim_args: None
adafactor: False
group_by_length: False
length_column_name: length
ddp_find_unused_parameters: None
ddp_bucket_cap_mb: None
ddp_broadcast_buffers: False
dataloader_pin_memory: True
dataloader_persistent_workers: False
skip_memory_metrics: True
use_legacy_prediction_loop: False
push_to_hub: False
resume_from_checkpoint: None
hub_model_id: None
hub_strategy: every_save
hub_private_repo: False
hub_always_push: False
gradient_checkpointing: False
gradient_checkpointing_kwargs: None
include_inputs_for_metrics: False
eval_do_concat_batches: True
fp16_backend: auto
push_to_hub_model_id: None
push_to_hub_organization: None
mp_parameters:
auto_find_batch_size: False
full_determinism: False
torchdynamo: None
ray_scope: last
ddp_timeout: 1800
torch_compile: False
torch_compile_backend: None
torch_compile_mode: None
dispatch_batches: None
split_batches: None
include_tokens_per_second: False
include_num_input_tokens_seen: False
neftune_noise_alpha: None
optim_target_modules: None
batch_eval_metrics: False
eval_on_start: False
batch_sampler: no_duplicates
multi_dataset_batch_sampler: proportional

Training Logs

Epoch	Step	Training Loss	loss	all-nli-test_max_accuracy	m3_max_accuracy
0	0	-	-	-	0.91
0.08	100	0.0083	0.0101	-	0.916
0.16	200	0.0094	0.0084	-	0.932
0.24	300	0.0075	0.0070	-	0.942
0.32	400	0.0085	0.0065	-	0.952
0.4	500	0.0068	0.0058	-	0.956
0.48	600	0.0064	0.0057	-	0.958
0.56	700	0.0063	0.0051	-	0.964
0.64	800	0.0064	0.0047	-	0.974
0.72	900	0.0049	0.0044	-	0.974
0.8	1000	0.0057	0.0043	-	0.966
0.88	1100	0.0042	0.0054	-	0.96
0.96	1200	0.0037	0.0045	-	0.972
1.04	1300	0.006	0.0056	-	0.962
1.12	1400	0.0043	0.0053	-	0.96
1.2	1500	0.0026	0.0045	-	0.966
1.28	1600	0.001	0.0046	-	0.968
1.3600	1700	0.0012	0.0045	-	0.962
1.44	1800	0.0007	0.0042	-	0.968
1.52	1900	0.0006	0.0044	-	0.968
1.6	2000	0.0013	0.0040	-	0.97
1.6800	2100	0.0006	0.0038	-	0.974
1.76	2200	0.0011	0.0036	-	0.97
1.8400	2300	0.0012	0.0036	-	0.966
1.92	2400	0.001	0.0038	-	0.968
2.0	2500	0.0009	0.0038	-	0.974
2.08	2600	0.0006	0.0037	-	0.976
2.16	2700	0.0006	0.0037	-	0.98
2.24	2800	0.0004	0.0035	-	0.978
2.32	2900	0.0003	0.0034	-	0.978
2.4	3000	0.0003	0.0034	-	0.978
2.48	3100	0.0001	0.0033	-	0.978
2.56	3200	0.0003	0.0034	-	0.978
2.64	3300	0.0003	0.0034	-	0.976
2.7200	3400	0.0001	0.0033	-	0.976
2.8	3500	0.0003	0.0033	-	0.976
2.88	3600	0.0003	0.0033	-	0.976
2.96	3700	0.0003	0.0033	-	0.978
3.0	3750	-	-	0.976	-

Framework Versions

Python: 3.10.12
Sentence Transformers: 3.0.1
Transformers: 4.42.4
PyTorch: 2.3.1+cu121
Accelerate: 0.32.1
Datasets: 2.21.0
Tokenizers: 0.19.1

Citation

BibTeX

Sentence Transformers

@inproceedings{reimers-2019-sentence-bert,
    title = "Sentence-BERT: Sentence Embeddings using Siamese BERT-Networks",
    author = "Reimers, Nils and Gurevych, Iryna",
    booktitle = "Proceedings of the 2019 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing",
    month = "11",
    year = "2019",
    publisher = "Association for Computational Linguistics",
    url = "https://arxiv.org/abs/1908.10084",
}

TripletLoss

@misc{hermans2017defense,
    title={In Defense of the Triplet Loss for Person Re-Identification}, 
    author={Alexander Hermans and Lucas Beyer and Bastian Leibe},
    year={2017},
    eprint={1703.07737},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    primaryClass={cs.CV}
}