README.md

---
base_model: BAAI/bge-m3
datasets: []
language: []
library_name: sentence-transformers
metrics:
- cosine_accuracy
- dot_accuracy
- manhattan_accuracy
- euclidean_accuracy
- max_accuracy
pipeline_tag: sentence-similarity
tags:
- sentence-transformers
- sentence-similarity
- feature-extraction
- generated_from_trainer
- dataset_size:5000
- loss:TripletLoss
widget:
- source_sentence: 'now widely acknowledged that a study of scientific representation
    should focus on the role of such imaginary entities in scientists'' reasoning.
    However, the question is most of the time cast as follows: How can fictional or
    abstract entities represent the phenomena? In this paper, I show that this question
    is not well posed. First, I clarify the notion of representation, and I emphasise
    the importance of what I call the "format" of a representation'
  sentences:
  - 'for the inferences agents can draw from it. Then, I show that the very same model
    can be presented under different formats, which do not enable scientists to perform
    the same inferences. Assuming that the main function of a representation is to
    allow one to draw predictions and explanations of the phenomena by reasoning with
    it, I conclude that imaginary models in abstracto are not used as representations:
    scientists always reason with formatted'
  - of representations that happen to arise in science. Empirical studies on ways
    of representing used in science strongly suggest that a formal theory of representations
    of
  - 'some practitioners of Hypothetico-Deductivism suggest a methodology for the sciences
    in which the ''best'' theory is, conversely, the most improbable on a priori grounds;
    thus Popper in ''The Logic of Scientific Discovery'', Hutchinson, 1968, p. 142:
    "Simplicity equals high prior improbability . . . Simple statements . . . are
    to be prized . . . because they tell us more; because their empirical content
    is greater; and because they are better testable". 5 This is due to, the fact
    that the experimental law has its meaning independently given (Nagel note 3 above);
    whereas "theoretical notions cannot be understood apart from the particular theory
    that implicitly defines them". (Nagel, op. cit. p. 87); and consequently die with
    the corresponding death of the parent theory. 6 "You will have noticed from this
    formulation that it is not the accumulation of observations which I have in mind
    when I speak of the growth of scientific knowledge, but the repeated overthrow
    of scientific theories ... I can therefore gladly admit that falsificationists
    like myself much prefer an attempt to solve an interesting problem by a bold conjecture,
    even (and especially) if it soon turns out false, to any sequence of irrelevant
    truisms. We prefer this because we believe that this is the way in which we can
    learn from our mistakes; and that in finding out our conjecture was false, we
    have learned much about the truth, and shall have got nearer the truth". (Popper
    Conjectures & Refutations, pp. 215, 231). The Supposed'
- source_sentence: as you like"), many scholars deny that they enjoyed either positive
    freedoms (in particular to speak free of interruption in the Assembly) or negative
    freedoms, where the state could intervene as it wished, as
  sentences:
  - of prosody such as intonation, kinesic elements such as gestures, and paralinguistic
    elements of expressive voice accompaniment for which the text provides both fewer
    and less exact indications. More significant here are those paralinguistic, kinesic,
    and even linguistic items for which the written text offers no notation whatsoever.'
    Yet there are still other reasons that distinguish speech from language that are
    less ARNOLD BERLEANT obvious but of more subtle presence. Something about speech
    makes a claim on our attention; one cannot quite be indifferent to it. Speech
    is, in essence, what phenomenologists call an intentional object, one which is
    an object of our consciousness and toward which our consciousness is directed.
    As such it exercises a peculiar but powerful attraction on us. There is, for example,
    a challenge in giving a lecture. Because of the presence of a live audience that
    is involved (we assume) in the presentation, we cannot ignore abrupt shifts in
    ideas, weak transitions, lame inferences, strings of trivialities, or fuzzy ideas
    which we might be able to get away with safely when writing. Words that have no
    force by virtue of their sequence and their freshness drop lifeless from the lips
    in embarrassment. This indeed signifies a basic difference between language in
    general and its literary mode. Language is the inert material from which literature
    is fashioned. Moreover, literature has the essential quality of speech and not
    of the merely written word. Thus we can say that literature arises out of
  - 'in the aftermath of the Persian wars. The ideal of freedom in these contexts
    is the freedom of whole city-states, not of individuals. The final stage in Raaflaub''s
    account of the concept of freedom is the emergence of a specifically democratic
    conception of freedom, which he dates to the middle of the fifth century and the
    rivalry between Athens and Sparta. The democratic conception of freedom, Raaflaub
    argues, was at least in part an ideal for indi as well. In what follows I will
    describe the key moments in Raaflaub''s history of freedom that illustrate its
    collective character. Then I will discuss in detail Raaflaub''s account of the
    democratic ideal of freedom and the freedom of individuals. Raaflaub argues that
    the historical watershed that launches the concept of freedom into its central
    role in Greek political life is the invasion of mainland Greece by Persia early
    in the fifth century B.C. (chapter 3).4 This invasion presented an unprecedented
    threat of foreign domination, sparking a newfound concern for the independence
    and self-determination of Greek city-states. At the same time, the prolonged encounter
    with a political culture the Greeks saw as tyrannical and slavish led them to
    value anew the constitutions under which they lived: structured, law-governed,
    and providing citizens some degree of participation in their governance. Thus
    the Persian 4In what follows I reference chapters by topic, omitting chapter 1
    (on methodological issues), chapter 2 (on the concept of freedom before the Persian
    wars), and much of chapter'
  - against Sokrates for his religious views. The current essay argues that in their
    personal lives the Athenians were entirely free, except when speech or action
    materially harmed the community. A second ideology
- source_sentence: 'the rest is only a development of this material. It is to them
    we have to look for the subject matter of propositions. It is the task of the
    theory of knowledge to find them and to understand their construction out of the
    words or symbols. This task is very difficult, and Philosophy has hardly yet begun
    to tackle it at some points. What method have we for tackling it ? The idea is
    to express in an appropriate symbolism what in ordinary language leads to endless
    misunderstandings. That is to say, where ordinary language disguises logical structure,
    where it allows the formation of pseudopropositions, where it uses one term in
    an infinity of different meanings, we must replace it by a symbolism which gives
    a clear picture of the logical structure, excludes pseudopropositions, and uses
    its terms unambiguously. Now we can only substitute a clear symbolism for the
    unprecise one by inspecting the phenomena which we want to describe, thus trying
    to understand their logical multiplicity. That is to say, we can only arrive at
    a correct analysis by,what might be called, the logical investigation of the phenomena
    themselves, i.e., in a certain sense a posteriori, and not by conjecturing about
    a priori possibilities. One is often tempted to ask from an a priori standpoint:
    What, after all, can be the only forms of atomic propositions, and to answer,
    e.g., subject-predicate and relational propositions with two or more terms further,'
  sentences:
  - quantifier-free logics. In this paper, I will develop 64 normal modal semantic
    tableau systems that can be extended by propositional quantifiers yielding 64
    extended systems. All in all, we will investigate 128 different systems. I will
    show how these systems can be used to prove some interesting theorems and I will
    discuss Lewis's so-called existence postulate and some of its consequences. Finally,
    I will prove
  - 'perhaps, propositions relating predicates and relations to one another, and so
    on. But this, I believe, is mere playing with words. An atomic form cauuot be
    foreseen. And it would be surprising if the actual It 2 164 F. WITTGENSTEIN. phenomena
    had nothing more to teach us about their structure. To such conjectures about
    the structure of atomic propositions, we are led by our ordinary language, which
    uses the subject-predicate and the relational form. But in this our language is
    misleading: I will try to explain this by a simile. Let us imagine two parallel
    planes, I and II. On plane I figures are drawn, say, ellipses and rectangles of
    different sizes and shapes, and it is our task to produce images of these figures
    on plane II. Then we can imagine two ways, amongst others, of doing this. We can,
    first, lay down a law of projectionsay that of orthogonal projection or any other-and
    then proceed to project all figures from I into II, according to this law. Or,
    secondly, we could proceed thus: We lay down the rule that every ellipse on plane
    I is to appear as a circle in plane II, and every rectangle as a square in II.
    Such a way of representation may be convenient for us if for some reason we prefer
    to draw only circles and squares on plane II. Of course, from these images the
    exact shapes of the original figures on plane I cannot be immediately inferred.
    We can only gather from them that the original was an ellipse'
  - 'sentence can be said to be true precisely on the same conditions as in Wittgenstein''s
    picture theory. For instance, a two-place relation is represented in a first-order
    language by a relation symbol (say " R{ , )") with two argument-places, which
    thus in effect defines a twoplace relation in the language (viz. the one holding
    between the symbols which fill these argument-places) corresponding to the relation
    it represents in the world. An atomic sentence in which the two argument places
    have been filled by individual constants, say "(Ra,b)", is true if and only if
    the relation represented by "R" holds between the individuals represented by "a"
    and "b" (in this order). But this happens precisely when the linguistic relation
    defined by "R" obtains between the symbols "a" and "6", that is, precisely when
    the sentence "R(a,b)" is a true picture of the entities represented by "R" , "
    a ", and "b" in Wittgenstein''s sence. 2 Wolfgang Stegmüller, " Eine modelltheoretische
    Präzisierung der wittgensteinischen Bildtheorie ", Notre Dame Journal of Formal
    Logic , vol. 7 (1966), pp. 181-195. 3 Erik Stenius Wittgenstein s Tractatus :
    A Critical Exposition of Its Main Lines of Thought , Blackwell, Oxford, 1960.
    228 Jaakko Hintikka It seems to me highly significant that the closest Wittgenstein
    comes in the Tractatus to giving us an actual example of an elementary proposition
    is to present a relational formula of formal logic. In fact, in Tractatus 3.1432
    Wittgenstein comes rather close to saying what I just said, and in 4.012 he says
    in effect that the picture'
- source_sentence: 'for nouns: as pronouns refer to previously introduced nouns, so
    prosentences like that''s true inherit their content from previously introduced
    sentences. This kind of deflationism concerning the use of true (especially in
    Brandom''s version) is an explanation in terms of anaphora; the prosentence depends
    anaphorically on the sentence providing its content. A relevant implication of
    this theory is that true is not understood as a predicate and that truth is not
    a property. Primitivism, defended'
  sentences:
  - 'that by refusing to enter the state, anarchists prevent the state from performing
    its legislative, executive and judicial functions, which are necessary in order
    to have a minimal level of order and security. In doing so, anarchists expose
    those living next to them to the dangers of the state of nature, thereby posing
    an unjust threat. But since we all have a natural duty not to pose unjust threats
    to others, anarchists and would-be independents have a duty to leave the state
    of nature and enter the state.13 This duty correlates to a claim-right possessed
    by those living next to them, who also have a right to act in self-defence in
    order to enforce this obligation. This is what justifies the state''s right to
    rule. Of course the idea of justifying state legitimacy by appealing to natural
    duties is not new: John Rawls, Jeremy Waldron, Allen Buchanan, Christopher Wellman
    and Thomas Christiano all defend versions of this view.14 But traditional natural
    duty theories of legitimacy all ground political authority in positive duties
    to help others or, more generally, to realize justice. The problem with these
    views, however, is that the very existence of positive duties of this sort is
    denied by many libertarians, who typically argue that all we have is negative
    duties not to harm others. Moreover, even those 12 A further problem for Simmons
    is that typically citizens do not regard the benefits provided by the state as
    the products of a cooperative scheme. I find this objection less compelling, but
    I cannot discuss it here.'
  - 'by Frege, Moore, and Davidson, is associated with two ideas: (1) that truth is
    a primitive and central trait of our conceptual system and (2) that truth, as
    such, cannot be defined. This second claim can be called negative primitivism,
    and it especially points out the facts about the indefinability of truth generally
    advocated by primitivists. In what follows, a connection is established between
    the deflationist''s rejection of the predicate and of the property and facts (and
    primitivist'
  - according to which Tr([(p]) and cp should be intersubstitutible in all (non-opaque)
    contexts. Here I am focusing on the property of truth, but the issue could be
    also raised for the concept (Asay 2013; forthcoming). It is not clear to me, though,
    in what measure substantiality at the concept level without further specifications
    is incompatible with deflationism, so I will put the question mostly aside. Perhaps,
    the real problem here would be the thesis that a truth predicate only serves a
    logical role. A thoroughly discussion, however, would be required. © 2014 The
    Author dialéctica © 2014 Editorial Board of dialéctica 524 Andrea Strollo such
    a thing as a single, determined deflationary conception;8 instead, we have a family9
    of different approaches that share some motivations and philosophical suggestions.10
    However, at least in its modern evolution, convergences are strong enough to allow
    for a general treatment in terms of such an idealized theory, at least in many
    cases.11 It is worth noting that such general tenets do not have the equal importance
    in characterizing an approach as deflationary. In fact, if Tarskian biconditionals
    and the thesis of the logical role could be abandoned without rejecting deflationism,12
    or even combined with different philosophical conceptions,13 things are rather
    different for the claim that truth is an unsubstantial property, if a property
    at all. Such an (anti)metaphysical project of deflating the nature beside the
    role of truth is the leitmotiv of the entire history of
- source_sentence: met, Peter van Inwagen, a libertarian, concludes that free will
    is a mystery. Recently, the Mind Argument has drawn a number of criticisms. Here
    I seek to add to its woes. Quite apart from its other problems, I argue, the Mind
    Argument does a poor job of isolating the important concern for libertarians that
    it raises. Once this concern has been clarified,
  sentences:
  - however, another argument serves to renew the challenge. The Assimilation Argument
    challenges libertarians to explain how ostensible exercises of free will are relevantly
    different from other causally undetermined outcomes, outcomes that nobody would
    count as exercises of free will. In particular, libertarians must explain how
    agents can have the power
  - contended that the Assimilation Argument is unsound. Here I defend the Assimilation
    Argument and the Rollback Argument, a second challenge to libertarianism that
    Franklin rejects. My aim in doing so is to underscore the force of these challenges,
    and thereby to resist what appears to be an emerging trend in
  - '(p. 79), it must be capable of generating a theory of knowledge (p. 80), and
    it must harmonise with a plausible account of the way contentful states explain
    behaviour, which, the author argues, is non-causal (p. 139). The import of some
    of these requirements becomes more clear in Part III, where the theory begins
    to unfold. It is in fact a version of behaviourism, but with the saving grace
    that it allows mental content to be found in behaviour, rather than trying to
    reduce it away (p. 146). It also appears to find value to be intrinsic to behaviour.
    To be in an intentional state-to have a belief or desire, or to possess a concept-is
    to be "liable" to exhibit behavioural responses intrinsically assessable in evaluative
    terms. Two values are articulated; T and D. The former is analogous to truth,
    except that it applies to behaviour rather than beliefs; the latter is akin to
    desirability, and is intended for assessments of a response''s conative import.
    In fact, however, the theory progresses very little. The focus starts out as one
    would expect: on belief and desire, the intentional states most relevant for explaining
    behaviour. But a problem crops up immediately. The author''s account of it is
    complicated by his views on opacity (pp. 180 ff.), but here is a simplified version.
    Ideally, it seems, the treatment of belief would say that a person believes that
    p just in case she is liable to make responses intrinsically assessable with respect
    to T as "good'
model-index:
- name: SentenceTransformer based on BAAI/bge-m3
  results:
  - task:
      type: triplet
      name: Triplet
    dataset:
      name: m3
      type: m3
    metrics:
    - type: cosine_accuracy
      value: 0.978
      name: Cosine Accuracy
    - type: dot_accuracy
      value: 0.022
      name: Dot Accuracy
    - type: manhattan_accuracy
      value: 0.974
      name: Manhattan Accuracy
    - type: euclidean_accuracy
      value: 0.978
      name: Euclidean Accuracy
    - type: max_accuracy
      value: 0.978
      name: Max Accuracy
  - task:
      type: triplet
      name: Triplet
    dataset:
      name: all nli test
      type: all-nli-test
    metrics:
    - type: cosine_accuracy
      value: 0.9755
      name: Cosine Accuracy
    - type: dot_accuracy
      value: 0.0245
      name: Dot Accuracy
    - type: manhattan_accuracy
      value: 0.976
      name: Manhattan Accuracy
    - type: euclidean_accuracy
      value: 0.9755
      name: Euclidean Accuracy
    - type: max_accuracy
      value: 0.976
      name: Max Accuracy
---

# SentenceTransformer based on BAAI/bge-m3

This is a [sentence-transformers](https://www.SBERT.net) model finetuned from [BAAI/bge-m3](https://huggingface.co/BAAI/bge-m3). It maps sentences & paragraphs to a 1024-dimensional dense vector space and can be used for semantic textual similarity, semantic search, paraphrase mining, text classification, clustering, and more.

## Model Details

### Model Description
- **Model Type:** Sentence Transformer
- **Base model:** [BAAI/bge-m3](https://huggingface.co/BAAI/bge-m3) <!-- at revision 5617a9f61b028005a4858fdac845db406aefb181 -->
- **Maximum Sequence Length:** 8192 tokens
- **Output Dimensionality:** 1024 tokens
- **Similarity Function:** Cosine Similarity
<!-- - **Training Dataset:** Unknown -->
<!-- - **Language:** Unknown -->
<!-- - **License:** Unknown -->

### Model Sources

- **Documentation:** [Sentence Transformers Documentation](https://sbert.net)
- **Repository:** [Sentence Transformers on GitHub](https://github.com/UKPLab/sentence-transformers)
- **Hugging Face:** [Sentence Transformers on Hugging Face](https://huggingface.co/models?library=sentence-transformers)

### Full Model Architecture

```
SentenceTransformer(
  (0): Transformer({'max_seq_length': 8192, 'do_lower_case': False}) with Transformer model: XLMRobertaModel 
  (1): Pooling({'word_embedding_dimension': 1024, 'pooling_mode_cls_token': True, 'pooling_mode_mean_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_max_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_mean_sqrt_len_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_weightedmean_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_lasttoken': False, 'include_prompt': True})
  (2): Normalize()
)
```

## Usage

### Direct Usage (Sentence Transformers)

First install the Sentence Transformers library:

```bash
pip install -U sentence-transformers
```

Then you can load this model and run inference.
```python
from sentence_transformers import SentenceTransformer

# Download from the 🤗 Hub
model = SentenceTransformer("m7n/bge-m3-philosophy-triplets_v3")
# Run inference
sentences = [
    'met, Peter van Inwagen, a libertarian, concludes that free will is a mystery. Recently, the Mind Argument has drawn a number of criticisms. Here I seek to add to its woes. Quite apart from its other problems, I argue, the Mind Argument does a poor job of isolating the important concern for libertarians that it raises. Once this concern has been clarified,',
    'however, another argument serves to renew the challenge. The Assimilation Argument challenges libertarians to explain how ostensible exercises of free will are relevantly different from other causally undetermined outcomes, outcomes that nobody would count as exercises of free will. In particular, libertarians must explain how agents can have the power',
    'contended that the Assimilation Argument is unsound. Here I defend the Assimilation Argument and the Rollback Argument, a second challenge to libertarianism that Franklin rejects. My aim in doing so is to underscore the force of these challenges, and thereby to resist what appears to be an emerging trend in',
]
embeddings = model.encode(sentences)
print(embeddings.shape)
# [3, 1024]

# Get the similarity scores for the embeddings
similarities = model.similarity(embeddings, embeddings)
print(similarities.shape)
# [3, 3]
```

<!--
### Direct Usage (Transformers)

<details><summary>Click to see the direct usage in Transformers</summary>

</details>
-->

<!--
### Downstream Usage (Sentence Transformers)

You can finetune this model on your own dataset.

<details><summary>Click to expand</summary>

</details>
-->

<!--
### Out-of-Scope Use

*List how the model may foreseeably be misused and address what users ought not to do with the model.*
-->

## Evaluation

### Metrics

#### Triplet
* Dataset: `m3`
* Evaluated with [<code>TripletEvaluator</code>](https://sbert.net/docs/package_reference/sentence_transformer/evaluation.html#sentence_transformers.evaluation.TripletEvaluator)

| Metric             | Value     |
|:-------------------|:----------|
| cosine_accuracy    | 0.978     |
| dot_accuracy       | 0.022     |
| manhattan_accuracy | 0.974     |
| euclidean_accuracy | 0.978     |
| **max_accuracy**   | **0.978** |

#### Triplet
* Dataset: `all-nli-test`
* Evaluated with [<code>TripletEvaluator</code>](https://sbert.net/docs/package_reference/sentence_transformer/evaluation.html#sentence_transformers.evaluation.TripletEvaluator)

| Metric             | Value     |
|:-------------------|:----------|
| cosine_accuracy    | 0.9755    |
| dot_accuracy       | 0.0245    |
| manhattan_accuracy | 0.976     |
| euclidean_accuracy | 0.9755    |
| **max_accuracy**   | **0.976** |

<!--
## Bias, Risks and Limitations

*What are the known or foreseeable issues stemming from this model? You could also flag here known failure cases or weaknesses of the model.*
-->

<!--
### Recommendations

*What are recommendations with respect to the foreseeable issues? For example, filtering explicit content.*
-->

## Training Details

### Training Dataset

#### Unnamed Dataset


* Size: 5,000 training samples
* Columns: <code>anchor</code>, <code>positive</code>, and <code>negative</code>
* Approximate statistics based on the first 1000 samples:
  |         | anchor                                                                               | positive                                                                            | negative                                                                             |
  |:--------|:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  | type    | string                                                                               | string                                                                              | string                                                                               |
  | details | <ul><li>min: 17 tokens</li><li>mean: 288.26 tokens</li><li>max: 566 tokens</li></ul> | <ul><li>min: 21 tokens</li><li>mean: 288.3 tokens</li><li>max: 565 tokens</li></ul> | <ul><li>min: 22 tokens</li><li>mean: 301.96 tokens</li><li>max: 577 tokens</li></ul> |
* Samples:
  | anchor                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | positive                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | negative                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
  |:---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  | <code>Reform (Boston: Auburn House, 1982). 7 See, e.g., K. Polk, 'Rape Reform and Criminal Justice Proces;ing', 31 Crime & Delinquency 191 (1985); W. Loh, 'The Impact of Common Law and Reform Rape Statutes on Prosecution: An Empirical Study', 55 Wash. L. Rev. 543, 552-54 (1980); J. Marsh, A. Geist & N. Caplan, Rape and the Limits of Law Reform 65 (1982). 8 See S. Estrich, Real Rape (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987). 7 Susan Estrich throw their hands up in the air, depending on whether they saw themselves as feminists, or wanted me to. But nearly all of them said the same thing then, and most of them continue to repeat it even today: juries won't convict. You may think it's rape, and I may even think it's rape, but the public doesn't, and we've got too many real rapes in this office to waste our time on cases where the woman will eventually back out, and the jury would never convict. It hasn't been easy to dissuade them. Certainly, what went on in most law school classrooms in the nineteen-eighties, where rape was so politicized that one could hardly debate it, provides no answer to the real world concerns, or at least justifications, that animate so many prosecutors' offices. When I started teaching law in 1981, there was still nothing in the casebooks on rape, so I put my own materials together. Hard cases make good classes. I found better examples than the three English fools,</code> | <code>more sympathetic men: doctors, not drunken sailors. And women who didn't scream quite so much, or fight back quite so vigorously. Two great classes, as these things go. Most of the men I knew were reluctant to teach rape, for reasons that at first I didn't quite understand. But I convinced one to try the next year, and lent him my materials, and watched first with amusement and then with dismay when a delegation of women students came to visit him before class to complain that his (my) materials were sexist and inappropriate. I'd hoped those days were over. After all, all the casebooks now have sections on rape, and everyone covers it somehow. But only last week, a colleague who is one of the best criminal law professors in the country told me of being visited by a similar delegation in 1991, a decade later. They didn't like the way he taught rape. There were victims in the class. They didn't want to hear "the other side". In their view, there was no "other side". Nothing to debate. Lord knows, I'm sympathetic to those who have been victimized and who feel that they have nothing to learn from a debate about rape. Maybe they don't. But the rest of us, the rest of their classmates, the rest of the country, surely do. Silencing the debate only reenforces and reaffirms the status quo that many of us are trying to change. The debate I am interested in is not between the radical feminists</code> | <code>relations, thwarting possibilities of knowing the specific harms particular acts of rape enact well enough to render intelligible their far-reaching social-political-moral implications. Taking my point of departure from Debra Bergoffen's call for 'a new epistemology of rape', I</code>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
  | <code>framed, because the key premissthe thesis of universal causal determinismis, in the domain of human behaviour, an unjustified conjecture based on over-simplified, under-informed explanatory models. Kant's semantics of singular cognitive reference (explained herein), which stands independently of his Transcendental Idealism, justifies and emphasises a quadruple distinction between causal description, causal ascription (predication), (approximately) true causal ascription (accurate predication) and cognitively justified causal ascription. Contemporary causal theories of mind, of action</code>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | <code>or of meaning do not suffice for causal ascription, and so cannot suffice for causal predication, and hence cannot justify causal determinism about human behaviour. More generally, the principle of universal causal determinism is a regulative principle governing causal inquiry and was so formulated by LaPlace. Only successful, sufficient causal explanation of particular events provides for causal knowledge of those events. Such knowledge we lack in the domain of human behaviour. Rational belief, including scientific belief, requires apportioning belief to justifying evidence; all else</code>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | <code>etc.; but causal explanation, in its advanced stages, is not content with such vague statements of uniformities. The uniformities which are sought are the ones which can be correlated with precise, numerical relations. A third characteristic which has often been associated with causality is the concept of determinism or necessity. This third trait of causality has been violently criticized. From Hume to Russell it has been a common contention that necessity is a fiction and that causality merely means invariable connection of uniformity of processes. For the present, without analysing the objections raised to the necessity or determinism of causal relations, I shall limit myself to brief comments on the meaning of necessity, and on the specific sense of necessity in the causal relation. Though necessity, or determinism, should be a fiction or a myth, it is certainly not a meaningless concept. Hume, who presents the most effective objections to the concept of necessity, was quite certain that the concept had a meaning, since otherwise his criticisms would have been of no importance. What then is necessity? Briefly, necessity refers to deductive systems where from self-evident, postu' S. Alexander, Space, Time and Deity, vol. i, p. 288. 320 CAUSALITY lated, or "convenient" concepts other concepts are derived. The clearest illustration of the notion of necessity is the concept of classes where the implicative relation is that of inclusion, or that of from species to genus. Causal relations are deterministic in the sense that cause and effect contain</code>                      |
  | <code>presuppositions. In a nutshell view of aspects of the history of science the presuppositions, as part of the relevant historical context, operate within the scientific enterprise. Science used to be views as positivist and final; yet, the logic of methodology, from E.A. Burtt to T.S. Kuhn and Karl Popper</code>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | <code>show that presuppositions are part of the scientific research. Particularly the pioneering work of the archeologist and philosopher R.G. Collingwood and the seminal thinker S.N. Nasr, who opened the doors for the inquiry of the role of science within Islamic Civilization, are highlighted. We show that the</code>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | <code>continues to evolve, it seems most probable that it will someday diverge again from its seeming congruity with the teachings of the Qur'an. An even sharper critique arises from the unexpressed as sumption that there exists a standard of knowledge on a par with, if not actually higher than, Allah's revealed truth to which that revelation must be submitted for its validation. Thus, while this attempt to claim unity (or at least non-contradiction) between modern science and Islamic revelation does not require any sort of limitation on science or scientific research, it remains unacceptable to the majority of modern scientists, as well as to many Muslim thinkers, because of the implications of its assumptions.8 The first assumption, that science has reached its peak of development, is unacceptable to science. The second assumption, that religious dogma should, or even can, be judged by the tenets of modern science, is rejected by many Muslim thinkers. Scientific Knowledge Needs an Islamic Interpretation In response to the unacceptable and often Positivistic analysis of Bucaille, the Islamic intellectual community has adopted more radical al ternatives, such as Ismail al-Faruqi's call for an Islamization of all knowledge, including modern scientific knowledge.9 His argument grows out of a perception that Islamic culture, which once led the Mediterranean world, is increasingly threatened by secularized and individualistic West ern values?a threat that is as much cultural as it is political. Faruqi's plea for an Islamization of knowledge, then, should be read in the context</code> |
* Loss: [<code>TripletLoss</code>](https://sbert.net/docs/package_reference/sentence_transformer/losses.html#tripletloss) with these parameters:
  ```json
  {
      "distance_metric": "TripletDistanceMetric.COSINE",
      "triplet_margin": 0.05
  }
  ```

### Evaluation Dataset

#### Unnamed Dataset


* Size: 500 evaluation samples
* Columns: <code>anchor</code>, <code>positive</code>, and <code>negative</code>
* Approximate statistics based on the first 1000 samples:
  |         | anchor                                                                               | positive                                                                             | negative                                                                             |
  |:--------|:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  | type    | string                                                                               | string                                                                               | string                                                                               |
  | details | <ul><li>min: 29 tokens</li><li>mean: 288.01 tokens</li><li>max: 646 tokens</li></ul> | <ul><li>min: 26 tokens</li><li>mean: 286.17 tokens</li><li>max: 499 tokens</li></ul> | <ul><li>min: 16 tokens</li><li>mean: 289.98 tokens</li><li>max: 544 tokens</li></ul> |
* Samples:
  | anchor                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | positive                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          | negative                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
  |:---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  | <code>public have now before them, the evidences of natural religion, the evidences of revealed religion, and an account of the duties that result from both" (Paley 1829, v-vi ). Without the arguments of natural theology, revelation and religious morality could not be discussed. The evidence of human reason and of the empirical study of the natural world, was the basis for establishing the existence and character of a deity. Only after these were established could one consider other sources of knowledge. Without the arguments available from natural theology that there exists a single unified, beneficent, and omnipresent deity, there is no warrant for accepting that the deity is capable of revelation, that revelation ought to be a trustworthy basis for knowledge, or that there exists a moral order or set of moral duties. The mere existence of a deity was insufficient for Paley. As a work of theology, the most important conclusion is not only that God merely exists, but also that characteristics about God can be known and inferences about the proper relationship of the individual and society to God can be drawn. As a result, much of the early chapters of Natural Theology did not put forth an argument for the existence of God, but instead excluded bad arguments for the existence of God. In order to understand what Paley's argument is, it is paramount to also understand what it is not. 58 ADAM R. SHAPIRO With the recent restoration of Paley's work, several historians and philosophers of science have begun this</code> | <code>re-examination. Sander Gliboff noted that "Paley devoted a chapter to comparing rival hypotheses unfavorably with his own and eliminating them from consideration one by one" (Gliboff 2000). For Gliboff, doing so was essential for establishing the legitimacy of the central argument of the Natural Theology. The central argument, which is what Paley himself referred to as "the argument" in the opening chapters of the book, is an inference that can be formulated as the claim that if an object has a "purpose," then it has a designer. In analyzing this, Gliboff agreed with Eliot Sober's 1993 assessment that Paley's central argument was based upon "inference to the best explanation" (Sober 2000, 31). Sober ascribed to Paley two possible explanations for apparent purposeful objects, design and random chance. The explanation that purposeful objects have their origins in a designer is pitted against the other possible explanation for the appearance of purpose in an object and is ruled the most likely. Gliboff showed that these were not the only contenders and claims that Paley refutes several alternatives that make up a "pool" of possible explanations. The inference to a designer is judged the most likely. If Natural Theology was in fact based upon an inference to the best explanation, then it becomes clear why a Darwinian conclusion might be seen to uproot Paley. If the workings of nature can be seen to generate purpose without the apparent intentional workings of a designer, then alternate explanations are strengthened and</code> | <code>and intellectual sides of the stratagem. In response to Erasmus Darwin's evolutionary theories. Paley asserted that the divinely designed architecture of nature had remained unchanged since the creation. But the more he emphasized the preordained nature of providence, its effectuation through mechanical dispositions, the less room there appeared to be for particular interventions. Section 2 concentrates on Paley's efforts to reconcile this model of a law-governed, mechanical universe, with the belief</code>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
  | <code>the two lines of work from Sections 2 and 3 together: the realization that there is no in principle difference between functional and natural kinds regarding their epistemic importance for scientific reasoning and explanation provides clues how the problem for HPC theory that I pointed out in Section 2 can be resolved, and HPC theory can be turned into a full‐fledged theory of natural kindhood able to cover kinds in the special sciences as well as the less controversial natural kinds. 1. Brigandt (2009) recently reached a similar conclusion on the basis of different considerations. 2. A Problem for HPC Theory. In the philosophical literature on the topic, two distinct ways of thinking about natural kinds can be found. On the one hand, there is the essentialist tradition that, broadly taken, understands natural kinds as groupings of things according to their natures, their intrinsic properties or causal capacities, their microscopic structures, and so on. On the other hand, there is the more recent tradition that understands natural kinds as groupings of things over which we can make reliable inductions. That these lines of work really are quite distinct can be seen from the way in which they conceive of the problem of natural kinds.2 The former line of work conceives of the problem as a metaphysical problem, that is, as the question, What sorts of things are there in the world? As Brian Ellis put it in a recent defense of essentialism, “membership of a natural kind is</code>                                  | <code>decided by nature, not by us” (2001, 19). The latter line of work, in contrast, sees it as foremost a question in epistemology, that is, as the question, Which ways of grouping things are best suited to help us make inferences and to explain phenomena? Boyd, for example, asserted that “it is a truism that the philosophical theory of natural kinds is about how classificatory schemes come to contribute to the epistemic reliability of inductive and explanatory practices” (1999a, 146; also 1999b, 69). On this view, kind membership is decided more by us than by nature. With respect to the explanation‐grounding capacity of natural kinds, the two lines of work provide different answers that run into different kinds of problems. From the perspective of the essentialist tradition it should be no miracle that natural kinds ground reliable inferences and explanations. If there is a definitive, objective way in which the world is made up of kinds of things, then clearly any explanation of a given phenomenon should ultimately make reference to some of these objectively existing kinds of things. Once we have achieved an inventory of the various kinds that exist in the world and have an account of their metaphysics, we have a theory of the kinds that can feature in our explanations. The problem, however, is that we do not have any direct access to the world that would allow us to compile the required inventory of the world’s furniture. Our best bet at obtaining such an inventory is to</code>                                               | <code>There is, however, a selection of strong papers in the collection that do address key topics in the contemporary debate concerning natural kinds— too many, in fact, to review them all here (and hope to do them justice). As such, I shall mention a selection that struck me as of particular interest, since each addresses one of the perennial themes in the natural kinds debate, namely the alleged epistemic utility of natural kinds, and their role in explanatory and inductive reasoning. I'll start with Chapter 2 of the collection, a paper written by Peter Godfrey-Smith. In this chapter, Godfrey-Smith discusses inductive inferences and their associated justification. Inductive inferences are a perennial philo sophical topic, cropping up in both the philosophy of science and epistemol ogy. In the context of the topic of the edited collection, there are apparent inductive benefits bestowed by recognizing and classifying objects into natural kinds, which makes induction a central topic to the broader debate concerning natural kinds. Godfrey-Smith identifies what he takes to be two conflated types of induct ive inference and goes on to sketch a philosophical justification for each, re spectively, which has not been used to justify what philosophers have historically referred to as 'inductive' inferences. The approach employed builds upon Frank Jackson's response to Nelson Goodman's classic 'grue' example, from his new riddle of induction. Godfrey-Smith sketches a method of inference that is built upon statistical models of population sampling, where there are rules telling us how the dis tribution</code> |
  | <code>model, can be chosen in several ways from the set of all elementary experiences. In case (ii) it is obviously conceivable that the mental stream, like a loaf of bread, can be cut into slices in more than one way. At the same time (in ? 67) that Carnap is inclined to consider elementary experiences as abstractions of some kind (as mere 'places' in the stream), he maintains that they are what is "primarily given" both psychologically and epistemologically. The set of all elementary experiences occurring in one's own mental life is symbolically designated by erl. When I wish to show that the owner is a person A, I shall write erlA. When speaking, in what follows, of elementary experiences I shall always assume that we are dealing with experiences of one and the same person unless the contrary is explicitly stated. 1.3. Quality Points The visual field that is a part of my present elementary experience is assumed in the Aufbau to be a two-dimensional spatial configuration of color points. Each color point is characterized by its two 'local signs', which together determine its place in the visual field, and by its hue, saturation, and brightness, which together determine its place in the color solid.9 In this sense, the color points occurring in the elementary expe riences can be thought of as points in a five-dimensional space (the word 'space' here understood in an abstract sense), which may be called the HOW CARNAP BUILT THE WORLD IN</code>                                                                        | <code>1928 341 color space.10 The color points occurring in a given elementary experience will then be a certain subset of the color space. In that space any two points whatsoever have a mutual distance. (How the distance is to be measured is left unexplained in the Aufbau.) If the distance is less than or equal to a certain standard distance, the two points are said to be similar (?hnlich).11 This notion of similarity thus involves the notion of a standard distance. Carnap seems to consider this distance as small, but otherwise he says nothing about it. (The question as to how the choice of standard distance affects the constructions of the Aufbau is disturbing and impossible to answer.) If the points p and p' are similar and if p occurs in the elementary experience e and/?' in e9 then e and e' are said to be part similar (teil?hnlich).,12 Color points are a species of the genus quality points. On one level of thought, in one sense, Carnap considers an elementary experience as a complex of a number of quality points of various kinds. One kind are visual color points, another auditive qualities, a third olfactory, etc. He is also prepared to recognize emotive, volitive, and intellectual qualities (quality points). The word 'sense class' is used to denote such a kind of quality.13 For each sense class, just as for vision, notions of distance and standard distance are postulated. Two points from the same sense class are said to be similar if</code>                                                                                    | <code>presentational of worldly properties, but as blank sensations, extrinsically endowed with representational powers in virtue of standing as 'natural signs' for their normal causes.1 On that view, both colour perceptions and colour beliefs normally correspond with reality, in the simple sense of being true. Still, the view retains a strong case to be regarded a form of anti-realism. This has nothing to do with a failure of correspondence in the sense of plain truth; nor is it to be characterized as a failure of any other kind of 'correspondence'. It is rather to be brought out by means of a contrast in directions of explanation with respect to the individuation of perceptions of colour and the colours of things. Compare the case of shapes. The most basic distinctions are between squareness and circularity, say, as properties of things in the world. Having first identified which property squareness is, we may then identify perceptions of squareness as those which present something as having that property. On the current view concerning colour, the direction of explanation is the reverse. The most basic distinctions are between experiences of redness and experiences of greenness, say, conceived as blank sensations. Having made such distinctions, we may then define a property redness which applies to mind-independent objects, as that of being disposed to produce those experiences red-type ones or as the property of having whatever physical constitution actually grounds that disposition. Thus, although, the colours are perfectly real, in the sense that representations</code>                           |
* Loss: [<code>TripletLoss</code>](https://sbert.net/docs/package_reference/sentence_transformer/losses.html#tripletloss) with these parameters:
  ```json
  {
      "distance_metric": "TripletDistanceMetric.COSINE",
      "triplet_margin": 0.05
  }
  ```

### Training Hyperparameters
#### Non-Default Hyperparameters

- `eval_strategy`: steps
- `per_device_train_batch_size`: 4
- `per_device_eval_batch_size`: 4
- `learning_rate`: 1e-05
- `warmup_ratio`: 0.1
- `batch_sampler`: no_duplicates

#### All Hyperparameters
<details><summary>Click to expand</summary>

- `overwrite_output_dir`: False
- `do_predict`: False
- `eval_strategy`: steps
- `prediction_loss_only`: True
- `per_device_train_batch_size`: 4
- `per_device_eval_batch_size`: 4
- `per_gpu_train_batch_size`: None
- `per_gpu_eval_batch_size`: None
- `gradient_accumulation_steps`: 1
- `eval_accumulation_steps`: None
- `learning_rate`: 1e-05
- `weight_decay`: 0.0
- `adam_beta1`: 0.9
- `adam_beta2`: 0.999
- `adam_epsilon`: 1e-08
- `max_grad_norm`: 1.0
- `num_train_epochs`: 3
- `max_steps`: -1
- `lr_scheduler_type`: linear
- `lr_scheduler_kwargs`: {}
- `warmup_ratio`: 0.1
- `warmup_steps`: 0
- `log_level`: passive
- `log_level_replica`: warning
- `log_on_each_node`: True
- `logging_nan_inf_filter`: True
- `save_safetensors`: True
- `save_on_each_node`: False
- `save_only_model`: False
- `restore_callback_states_from_checkpoint`: False
- `no_cuda`: False
- `use_cpu`: False
- `use_mps_device`: False
- `seed`: 42
- `data_seed`: None
- `jit_mode_eval`: False
- `use_ipex`: False
- `bf16`: False
- `fp16`: False
- `fp16_opt_level`: O1
- `half_precision_backend`: auto
- `bf16_full_eval`: False
- `fp16_full_eval`: False
- `tf32`: None
- `local_rank`: 0
- `ddp_backend`: None
- `tpu_num_cores`: None
- `tpu_metrics_debug`: False
- `debug`: []
- `dataloader_drop_last`: False
- `dataloader_num_workers`: 0
- `dataloader_prefetch_factor`: None
- `past_index`: -1
- `disable_tqdm`: False
- `remove_unused_columns`: True
- `label_names`: None
- `load_best_model_at_end`: False
- `ignore_data_skip`: False
- `fsdp`: []
- `fsdp_min_num_params`: 0
- `fsdp_config`: {'min_num_params': 0, 'xla': False, 'xla_fsdp_v2': False, 'xla_fsdp_grad_ckpt': False}
- `fsdp_transformer_layer_cls_to_wrap`: None
- `accelerator_config`: {'split_batches': False, 'dispatch_batches': None, 'even_batches': True, 'use_seedable_sampler': True, 'non_blocking': False, 'gradient_accumulation_kwargs': None}
- `deepspeed`: None
- `label_smoothing_factor`: 0.0
- `optim`: adamw_torch
- `optim_args`: None
- `adafactor`: False
- `group_by_length`: False
- `length_column_name`: length
- `ddp_find_unused_parameters`: None
- `ddp_bucket_cap_mb`: None
- `ddp_broadcast_buffers`: False
- `dataloader_pin_memory`: True
- `dataloader_persistent_workers`: False
- `skip_memory_metrics`: True
- `use_legacy_prediction_loop`: False
- `push_to_hub`: False
- `resume_from_checkpoint`: None
- `hub_model_id`: None
- `hub_strategy`: every_save
- `hub_private_repo`: False
- `hub_always_push`: False
- `gradient_checkpointing`: False
- `gradient_checkpointing_kwargs`: None
- `include_inputs_for_metrics`: False
- `eval_do_concat_batches`: True
- `fp16_backend`: auto
- `push_to_hub_model_id`: None
- `push_to_hub_organization`: None
- `mp_parameters`: 
- `auto_find_batch_size`: False
- `full_determinism`: False
- `torchdynamo`: None
- `ray_scope`: last
- `ddp_timeout`: 1800
- `torch_compile`: False
- `torch_compile_backend`: None
- `torch_compile_mode`: None
- `dispatch_batches`: None
- `split_batches`: None
- `include_tokens_per_second`: False
- `include_num_input_tokens_seen`: False
- `neftune_noise_alpha`: None
- `optim_target_modules`: None
- `batch_eval_metrics`: False
- `eval_on_start`: False
- `batch_sampler`: no_duplicates
- `multi_dataset_batch_sampler`: proportional

</details>

### Training Logs
| Epoch  | Step | Training Loss | loss   | all-nli-test_max_accuracy | m3_max_accuracy |
|:------:|:----:|:-------------:|:------:|:-------------------------:|:---------------:|
| 0      | 0    | -             | -      | -                         | 0.91            |
| 0.08   | 100  | 0.0083        | 0.0101 | -                         | 0.916           |
| 0.16   | 200  | 0.0094        | 0.0084 | -                         | 0.932           |
| 0.24   | 300  | 0.0075        | 0.0070 | -                         | 0.942           |
| 0.32   | 400  | 0.0085        | 0.0065 | -                         | 0.952           |
| 0.4    | 500  | 0.0068        | 0.0058 | -                         | 0.956           |
| 0.48   | 600  | 0.0064        | 0.0057 | -                         | 0.958           |
| 0.56   | 700  | 0.0063        | 0.0051 | -                         | 0.964           |
| 0.64   | 800  | 0.0064        | 0.0047 | -                         | 0.974           |
| 0.72   | 900  | 0.0049        | 0.0044 | -                         | 0.974           |
| 0.8    | 1000 | 0.0057        | 0.0043 | -                         | 0.966           |
| 0.88   | 1100 | 0.0042        | 0.0054 | -                         | 0.96            |
| 0.96   | 1200 | 0.0037        | 0.0045 | -                         | 0.972           |
| 1.04   | 1300 | 0.006         | 0.0056 | -                         | 0.962           |
| 1.12   | 1400 | 0.0043        | 0.0053 | -                         | 0.96            |
| 1.2    | 1500 | 0.0026        | 0.0045 | -                         | 0.966           |
| 1.28   | 1600 | 0.001         | 0.0046 | -                         | 0.968           |
| 1.3600 | 1700 | 0.0012        | 0.0045 | -                         | 0.962           |
| 1.44   | 1800 | 0.0007        | 0.0042 | -                         | 0.968           |
| 1.52   | 1900 | 0.0006        | 0.0044 | -                         | 0.968           |
| 1.6    | 2000 | 0.0013        | 0.0040 | -                         | 0.97            |
| 1.6800 | 2100 | 0.0006        | 0.0038 | -                         | 0.974           |
| 1.76   | 2200 | 0.0011        | 0.0036 | -                         | 0.97            |
| 1.8400 | 2300 | 0.0012        | 0.0036 | -                         | 0.966           |
| 1.92   | 2400 | 0.001         | 0.0038 | -                         | 0.968           |
| 2.0    | 2500 | 0.0009        | 0.0038 | -                         | 0.974           |
| 2.08   | 2600 | 0.0006        | 0.0037 | -                         | 0.976           |
| 2.16   | 2700 | 0.0006        | 0.0037 | -                         | 0.98            |
| 2.24   | 2800 | 0.0004        | 0.0035 | -                         | 0.978           |
| 2.32   | 2900 | 0.0003        | 0.0034 | -                         | 0.978           |
| 2.4    | 3000 | 0.0003        | 0.0034 | -                         | 0.978           |
| 2.48   | 3100 | 0.0001        | 0.0033 | -                         | 0.978           |
| 2.56   | 3200 | 0.0003        | 0.0034 | -                         | 0.978           |
| 2.64   | 3300 | 0.0003        | 0.0034 | -                         | 0.976           |
| 2.7200 | 3400 | 0.0001        | 0.0033 | -                         | 0.976           |
| 2.8    | 3500 | 0.0003        | 0.0033 | -                         | 0.976           |
| 2.88   | 3600 | 0.0003        | 0.0033 | -                         | 0.976           |
| 2.96   | 3700 | 0.0003        | 0.0033 | -                         | 0.978           |
| 3.0    | 3750 | -             | -      | 0.976                     | -               |


### Framework Versions
- Python: 3.10.12
- Sentence Transformers: 3.0.1
- Transformers: 4.42.4
- PyTorch: 2.3.1+cu121
- Accelerate: 0.32.1
- Datasets: 2.21.0
- Tokenizers: 0.19.1

## Citation

### BibTeX

#### Sentence Transformers
```bibtex
@inproceedings{reimers-2019-sentence-bert,
    title = "Sentence-BERT: Sentence Embeddings using Siamese BERT-Networks",
    author = "Reimers, Nils and Gurevych, Iryna",
    booktitle = "Proceedings of the 2019 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing",
    month = "11",
    year = "2019",
    publisher = "Association for Computational Linguistics",
    url = "https://arxiv.org/abs/1908.10084",
}
```

#### TripletLoss
```bibtex
@misc{hermans2017defense,
    title={In Defense of the Triplet Loss for Person Re-Identification}, 
    author={Alexander Hermans and Lucas Beyer and Bastian Leibe},
    year={2017},
    eprint={1703.07737},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    primaryClass={cs.CV}
}
```

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