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concerns the reconciliation of the following three principles, all of which
he takes to be true:
(a) (At least some) mental events interact causally with physical events.
(b) Causation is nomological: events related as cause and effect fall under
strict deterministic laws.
(c) The mental is anomalous: there are no strict deterministic laws on the
basis of which mental events can be predicted and explained. And in
particular, there are no strict deterministic laws that connect events
under their physical descriptions with events under their mental
descriptions.
Principles (a) and (b) entail the obtaining of laws that connect mental
events and physical events, but this seems to clash with (c), which seems to
forbid mental – physical laws. How can this tension be resolved? Here is
Davidson ’ s brief presentation of his reasoning:
Suppose m , a mental event, caused p , a physical event; then, under some
description m and p instantiate a strict law. This law can only be physical
[ . . . ]. But if m falls under a physical law, it has a physical description; which
is to say it is a physical event. (224)
The basic idea is that there can be laws connecting mental events and
physical events that do not mention the mental events as mental but rather
as physical. We may call or refuse to call such laws “ mental – physical laws ” ;
the point is that the possibility of such laws ensures the consistency of
principles a – c.
P1 and P2 (which express the above principles (a) and principle (b),
respectively) straightforwardly entail C1, namely the claim that there must
be strict deterministic laws that connect mental events with physical events.
The crucial step of the argument comes next. P3 expresses principle (c) but
also involves a generalization of it, namely the idea that all strict laws are
physical laws – laws that employ physical descriptions of the events that
they connect. So those laws that connect mental events with physical events
310 Amir Horowitz
also connect those events – the physical events as well as the mental events
– under physical descriptions, and there are such laws (C2); a fortiori , these
events have physical descriptions (C3) and so (if P5 is accepted) are physical.
In short, it is the causal role of the mental that reveals its physical
nature, for only the physical satisfi es the nomological requirement for
causality.
The argument ’ s offi cial conclusion is the physicalist thesis that mental
events are physical events, but in fact the argument shows more. For the
way to this conclusion goes through the assumption that the mental is
anomalous – that it resists being predicted and explained by means of strict
laws. Thus, according to this argument, the mental is both physical and
anomalous, so the resulting view of the mental is anomalous physicalism,
or as Davidson puts it, anomalous monism. Now, further, one aspect of the
anomalous nature of the mental is that there can be no lawful connections
between mental events with physical events. So anomalous monism excludes
type - physicalism, which is committed to such lawful connections (it identifi
es mental types with physical types), and is a form of token - physicalism.
Since, as we saw, the conclusion of Davidson ’ s argument follows from
the premises and the argument is a formally valid one, the only direct way
to attack it is to attack its premises. Indeed, attacks against the argument ’ s
premises have been launched, mainly against P2 and P3. The argument has
also been attacked indirectly, by claiming that it has an arguably implausible
implication, namely the “ type - epiphenomenalist ” view that the causal effi -
cacy of mental events cannot be attributed to their mental properties.
Whether or not this implication is to count as a reductio ad absurdum of
the argument is a matter of dispute.
P1. Mental events bear causal relations to physical events.
P2. If there is a causal relation between events, then there is an implied
existence of a strict deterministic law that connects those events.
C1. There are strict laws that connect mental events with physical events
( modus ponens , P1, P2).
P3. Strict laws only connect events under physical descriptions with events
under physical descriptions.
C2. There are strict laws that connect mental events under their (nonmental)
physical descriptions with physical events (instantiation, P3,
C1).
P4. If there are strict laws that connect mental events under their (nonmental)
physical descriptions with physical events, then mental events have
physical descriptions.
C3. Mental events have physical descriptions ( modus ponens , C2, P4).
P5. If a mental event has a physical description, then it is a physical event.
C4. Mental events are physical events ( modus ponens , C3, P5).
81
Putnam ’ s Multiple Realization
Argument against
Type - Physicalism
Amir Horowitz
Putnam , Hilary. “ The Nature of Mental States , ” in Hilary Putnam, Mind,
Language, Reality: Philosophical Papers , vol. II , 429 – 40 . Cambridge,
UK : Cambridge University Press , 1975 .
Fodor , Jerry . Psychological Explanations . New York : Random House , 1968 .
Hilary Putnam ’ s multiple realization argument aims to undermine the view
nowadays known as “ type - physicalism. ” According to type - physicalism,
mental properties are physical properties; put differently, mental types are
physical types, and what makes a mental state of a certain type belong to
its type (e.g., its being a pain state) is its physical – chemical makeup. Putnam
took this view, which he labeled “ the brain state theory, ” to be the (then)
standard physicalist view of mentality.
The argument is simple in structure. P1 exposes the real meaning of
type - physicalism. This theory is committed to the claim that all pains share
physical – chemical nature, one which only they have – this is what makes
them states of pain; similarly all states of hunger share physical – chemical
nature that only they have – this is what makes them states of hunger, and
so on for other mental states. We may say that according to P1, type -
physicalism is committed to the thesis of the single realization of mental
properties. One might think that exposing this commitment of type -
physicalism isn ’ t exciting, but we should bear in mind that at the time
Putnam ’ s argument was fi rst published there was no offi cial statement of
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

concerns the reconciliation of the following three principles, all of which

he takes to be true:

(a) (At least some) mental events interact causally with physical events.

(b) Causation is nomological: events related as cause and effect fall under

strict deterministic laws.

(c) The mental is anomalous: there are no strict deterministic laws on the

basis of which mental events can be predicted and explained. And in

particular, there are no strict deterministic laws that connect events

under their physical descriptions with events under their mental

descriptions.

Principles (a) and (b) entail the obtaining of laws that connect mental

events and physical events, but this seems to clash with (c), which seems to

forbid mental – physical laws. How can this tension be resolved? Here is

Davidson ’ s brief presentation of his reasoning:

Suppose m , a mental event, caused p , a physical event; then, under some

description m and p instantiate a strict law. This law can only be physical

[ . . . ]. But if m falls under a physical law, it has a physical description; which

is to say it is a physical event. (224)

The basic idea is that there can be laws connecting mental events and

physical events that do not mention the mental events as mental but rather

as physical. We may call or refuse to call such laws “ mental – physical laws ” ;

the point is that the possibility of such laws ensures the consistency of

principles a – c.

P1 and P2 (which express the above principles (a) and principle (b),

respectively) straightforwardly entail C1, namely the claim that there must

be strict deterministic laws that connect mental events with physical events.

The crucial step of the argument comes next. P3 expresses principle (c) but

also involves a generalization of it, namely the idea that all strict laws are

physical laws – laws that employ physical descriptions of the events that

they connect. So those laws that connect mental events with physical events

310 Amir Horowitz

also connect those events – the physical events as well as the mental events

– under physical descriptions, and there are such laws (C2); a fortiori , these

events have physical descriptions (C3) and so (if P5 is accepted) are physical.

In short, it is the causal role of the mental that reveals its physical

nature, for only the physical satisfi es the nomological requirement for

causality.

The argument ’ s offi cial conclusion is the physicalist thesis that mental

events are physical events, but in fact the argument shows more. For the

way to this conclusion goes through the assumption that the mental is

anomalous – that it resists being predicted and explained by means of strict

laws. Thus, according to this argument, the mental is both physical and

anomalous, so the resulting view of the mental is anomalous physicalism,

or as Davidson puts it, anomalous monism. Now, further, one aspect of the

anomalous nature of the mental is that there can be no lawful connections

between mental events with physical events. So anomalous monism excludes

type - physicalism, which is committed to such lawful connections (it identifi

es mental types with physical types), and is a form of token - physicalism.

Since, as we saw, the conclusion of Davidson ’ s argument follows from

the premises and the argument is a formally valid one, the only direct way

to attack it is to attack its premises. Indeed, attacks against the argument ’ s

premises have been launched, mainly against P2 and P3. The argument has

also been attacked indirectly, by claiming that it has an arguably implausible

implication, namely the “ type - epiphenomenalist ” view that the causal effi -

cacy of mental events cannot be attributed to their mental properties.

Whether or not this implication is to count as a reductio ad absurdum of

the argument is a matter of dispute.

P1. Mental events bear causal relations to physical events.

P2. If there is a causal relation between events, then there is an implied

existence of a strict deterministic law that connects those events.

C1. There are strict laws that connect mental events with physical events

( modus ponens , P1, P2).

P3. Strict laws only connect events under physical descriptions with events

under physical descriptions.

C2. There are strict laws that connect mental events under their (nonmental)

physical descriptions with physical events (instantiation, P3,

C1).

P4. If there are strict laws that connect mental events under their (nonmental)

physical descriptions with physical events, then mental events have

physical descriptions.

C3. Mental events have physical descriptions ( modus ponens , C2, P4).

P5. If a mental event has a physical description, then it is a physical event.

C4. Mental events are physical events ( modus ponens , C3, P5).

81

Putnam ’ s Multiple Realization

Argument against

Type - Physicalism

Amir Horowitz

Putnam , Hilary. “ The Nature of Mental States , ” in Hilary Putnam, Mind,

Language, Reality: Philosophical Papers , vol. II , 429 – 40 . Cambridge,

UK : Cambridge University Press , 1975 .

Fodor , Jerry . Psychological Explanations . New York : Random House , 1968 .

Hilary Putnam ’ s multiple realization argument aims to undermine the view

nowadays known as “ type - physicalism. ” According to type - physicalism,

mental properties are physical properties; put differently, mental types are

physical types, and what makes a mental state of a certain type belong to

its type (e.g., its being a pain state) is its physical – chemical makeup. Putnam

took this view, which he labeled “ the brain state theory, ” to be the (then)

standard physicalist view of mentality.

The argument is simple in structure. P1 exposes the real meaning of

type - physicalism. This theory is committed to the claim that all pains share

physical – chemical nature, one which only they have – this is what makes

them states of pain; similarly all states of hunger share physical – chemical

nature that only they have – this is what makes them states of hunger, and

so on for other mental states. We may say that according to P1, type -

physicalism is committed to the thesis of the single realization of mental

properties. One might think that exposing this commitment of type -

physicalism isn ’ t exciting, but we should bear in mind that at the time

Putnam ’ s argument was fi rst published there was no offi cial statement of

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,