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every logically possible world in which they exist, and therefore a fortiori
actually distinct or nonidentical in the actual world.
C1. Reductive mind – body physicalism or mind – body identity theory is
therefore false, and some form of mind – body nonidentity, probably
some type of property dualism, in particular, is true; (rigidly designated)
mind ≠ (rigidly designated) body ( modus tollens , P1, P2).
79
The Argument from Mental
Causation for Physicalism
Amir Horowitz
Armstrong , David . A Materialist Theory of the Mind . London : Routledge &
Kegan Paul , 1963 .
Lewis , David . “ An Argument for the Identity Theory . ” Journal of Philosophy
66 ( 1966 ): 17 – 25 .
Kim , Jaegwon . Mind in a Physical World . Cambridge, MA : The MIT Press ,
1998 .
Rey , Georges . Contemporary Philosophy of Mind . Oxford : Blackwell , 1997 .
Attempts to establish mind – body physicalism – the view that mental events
are identical with physical events – often appeal to considerations pertaining
to mental causation. The basic idea underlying the argument from mental
causation in favor of physicalism (hereafter, “ the argument from mental
causation ” ) is that physicalism is the only plausible explanation for the
existence of mental causation. The expression “ physical events ” as it is
employed here refers to events whose all properties are such that their
instantiations are logically determined by instantiations of physical
properties.
A similar idea served opponents of dualism ever since this thesis was
offi cially launched by Descartes. These opponents of dualism argued that
the interactions between nonphysical events and physical events cannot
occur (due, e.g., to a confl ict with the law of momentum, or the law of the
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
The Argument from Mental Causation for Physicalism 305
conservation of mass and energy, or the alleged causal closure of the physical
world). Since mental events are supposed by the dualist to be nonphysical,
and since mental – physical interactions cannot be denied, dualism
must be rejected. Put slightly differently, since physical events can only
interact with physical events, the fact that mental events causally interact
with physical events can only be accounted for by assuming that mental
events are themselves physical events. The contemporary argument from
mental causation employs this reasoning. In its simplest form, it asserts
that mental events cause our actions and that brain events cause our actions;
therefore, it is argued, mental events are in fact physical events. But such a
version of the argument cannot do, for there are options in logical space in
which nonphysical mental events as well as physical events cause actions
(the same actions) without being identical. Thus, for the argument to go
through, these options have to be ruled out. Various versions of the argument
indeed rule such options out.
The argument has several versions. Some of them (e.g., Armstrong ’ s)
replace premise P2 with the premise that the concepts of mental events are
concepts of specifi c causal roles, and they adjust premise P1 accordingly.
Defenders of the argument also differ with respect to the way they rule out
the options specifi ed in (P3). Thus, option (3c) is sometimes ruled out by
employing assumptions concerning the nature of the physical world (such
as the causal closure principle), and sometimes by employing specifi c
assumptions about our physiology. I believe that that sub - version of the
version presented here that rules out option (3c) by employing specifi c
assumptions about our physiology is superior to all alternatives. It employs
neither controversial assumptions about the nature of mental concepts nor
assumptions that are arguably biased concerning the nature of the physical
world.
Let us say a few words about the argument ’ s premises. P1 is a well -
established scientifi c claim, one which no contemporary educated person
would deny. P2 is a highly plausible claim, which everybody seems to know
from personal experience: it is hard to deny (although there have been
philosophers who do deny) that our actions are caused by our desires and
our beliefs (regarding what would satisfy our desires). Now P1 and P2
together clearly entail C1. Assuming that P3 takes into account all options
in which both mental events and physical events in the brain can be causes
of our actions without being identical, the argument is formally valid. Of
course, in order to persuade us, a convincing case should also be made in
favor of its premises and in particular – since this is what is mainly at stake
– in favor of ruling out those options mentioned in P3.
These options should be explained. In option (3a) – causal over -
determination – actions are independently caused by both nonphysical
mental events and by physical events; that is, they would have been caused
306 Amir Horowitz
by either. In option (3b) – “ mental – physical causal cooperation ” – nonphysical
mental events and physical events cooperate to cause actions by
means of two separate causal chains – a nonphysical mental one and a
physical one; that is, in the absence of either, the actions would not have
been caused. In option (3c) – “ mixed mental – physical causal chains ” –
nonphysical mental events and physical events are links in the same chains
of events which bring about actions. We shall immediately illustrate this
option.
So as said, all these options should be eliminated. Against option (3a)
– that of causal over - determinism – it has been argued that nowhere in
nature do we encounter such a phenomenon or that its occurrence is
implausible from an evolutionary perspective. Option (3b) – that of mental –
physical causal cooperation – is usually not taken seriously and is ignored.
It is generally assumed that the question that lies at the heart of the argument
from mental causation concerns the status of option (3c), that of
mixed mental – physical causal chains. Armstrong describes this option thus,
“ Let us now consider the situation where a physical stimulus of some sort,
say the sounds of a human voice, brings about certain mental events, say
perceptions and thoughts, which then issue in further physical action. On
the ‘ way up ’ there must be a last physical event in the brain before the
mental events ensue. The mental events must then bring about a fi rst physical
event in the brain on the ‘ way down ’ ” (62). In this case, mental causes

every logically possible world in which they exist, and therefore a fortiori

actually distinct or nonidentical in the actual world.

C1. Reductive mind – body physicalism or mind – body identity theory is

therefore false, and some form of mind – body nonidentity, probably

some type of property dualism, in particular, is true; (rigidly designated)

mind ≠ (rigidly designated) body ( modus tollens , P1, P2).

79

The Argument from Mental

Causation for Physicalism

Amir Horowitz

Armstrong , David . A Materialist Theory of the Mind . London : Routledge &

Kegan Paul , 1963 .

Lewis , David . “ An Argument for the Identity Theory . ” Journal of Philosophy

66 ( 1966 ): 17 – 25 .

Kim , Jaegwon . Mind in a Physical World . Cambridge, MA : The MIT Press ,

1998 .

Rey , Georges . Contemporary Philosophy of Mind . Oxford : Blackwell , 1997 .

Attempts to establish mind – body physicalism – the view that mental events

are identical with physical events – often appeal to considerations pertaining

to mental causation. The basic idea underlying the argument from mental

causation in favor of physicalism (hereafter, “ the argument from mental

causation ” ) is that physicalism is the only plausible explanation for the

existence of mental causation. The expression “ physical events ” as it is

employed here refers to events whose all properties are such that their

instantiations are logically determined by instantiations of physical

properties.

A similar idea served opponents of dualism ever since this thesis was

offi cially launched by Descartes. These opponents of dualism argued that

the interactions between nonphysical events and physical events cannot

occur (due, e.g., to a confl ict with the law of momentum, or the law of the

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

The Argument from Mental Causation for Physicalism 305

conservation of mass and energy, or the alleged causal closure of the physical

world). Since mental events are supposed by the dualist to be nonphysical,

and since mental – physical interactions cannot be denied, dualism

must be rejected. Put slightly differently, since physical events can only

interact with physical events, the fact that mental events causally interact

with physical events can only be accounted for by assuming that mental

events are themselves physical events. The contemporary argument from

mental causation employs this reasoning. In its simplest form, it asserts

that mental events cause our actions and that brain events cause our actions;

therefore, it is argued, mental events are in fact physical events. But such a

version of the argument cannot do, for there are options in logical space in

which nonphysical mental events as well as physical events cause actions

(the same actions) without being identical. Thus, for the argument to go

through, these options have to be ruled out. Various versions of the argument

indeed rule such options out.

The argument has several versions. Some of them (e.g., Armstrong ’ s)

replace premise P2 with the premise that the concepts of mental events are

concepts of specifi c causal roles, and they adjust premise P1 accordingly.

Defenders of the argument also differ with respect to the way they rule out

the options specifi ed in (P3). Thus, option (3c) is sometimes ruled out by

employing assumptions concerning the nature of the physical world (such

as the causal closure principle), and sometimes by employing specifi c

assumptions about our physiology. I believe that that sub - version of the

version presented here that rules out option (3c) by employing specifi c

assumptions about our physiology is superior to all alternatives. It employs

neither controversial assumptions about the nature of mental concepts nor

assumptions that are arguably biased concerning the nature of the physical

world.

Let us say a few words about the argument ’ s premises. P1 is a well -

established scientifi c claim, one which no contemporary educated person

would deny. P2 is a highly plausible claim, which everybody seems to know

from personal experience: it is hard to deny (although there have been

philosophers who do deny) that our actions are caused by our desires and

our beliefs (regarding what would satisfy our desires). Now P1 and P2

together clearly entail C1. Assuming that P3 takes into account all options

in which both mental events and physical events in the brain can be causes

of our actions without being identical, the argument is formally valid. Of

course, in order to persuade us, a convincing case should also be made in

favor of its premises and in particular – since this is what is mainly at stake

– in favor of ruling out those options mentioned in P3.

These options should be explained. In option (3a) – causal over -

determination – actions are independently caused by both nonphysical

mental events and by physical events; that is, they would have been caused

306 Amir Horowitz

by either. In option (3b) – “ mental – physical causal cooperation ” – nonphysical

mental events and physical events cooperate to cause actions by

means of two separate causal chains – a nonphysical mental one and a

physical one; that is, in the absence of either, the actions would not have

been caused. In option (3c) – “ mixed mental – physical causal chains ” –

nonphysical mental events and physical events are links in the same chains

of events which bring about actions. We shall immediately illustrate this

option.

So as said, all these options should be eliminated. Against option (3a)

– that of causal over - determinism – it has been argued that nowhere in

nature do we encounter such a phenomenon or that its occurrence is

implausible from an evolutionary perspective. Option (3b) – that of mental –

physical causal cooperation – is usually not taken seriously and is ignored.

It is generally assumed that the question that lies at the heart of the argument

from mental causation concerns the status of option (3c), that of

mixed mental – physical causal chains. Armstrong describes this option thus,

“ Let us now consider the situation where a physical stimulus of some sort,

say the sounds of a human voice, brings about certain mental events, say

perceptions and thoughts, which then issue in further physical action. On

the ‘ way up ’ there must be a last physical event in the brain before the

mental events ensue. The mental events must then bring about a fi rst physical

event in the brain on the ‘ way down ’ ” (62). In this case, mental causes