DebateLabKIT/deepa2-corpus · Datasets at Hugging Face

text stringlengths 0 1.71k
Fitch , G. W. Saul Kripke . London : Acumen , 2004 .
Hughes , Christopher . Kripke: Names, Necessity, and Identity . Oxford :
Oxford University Press , 2004 .
Jacquette , Dale . Philosophy of Mind: The Metaphysics of Consciousness .
New York : Continuum , 2010 .
Preti , Consuelo . On Kripke . Cincinnati, OH : Wadsworth , 2002 .
Saul A. Kripke offers a much - discussed argument against mind – body identity
theory, supporting some type of property dualism, in his 1970 Princeton
University lectures on Naming and Necessity . The argument purports to
explain the relation between mind and body, solving the mind – body problem
at a comparatively high level of abstraction within the context of a comprehensive
philosophical treatment of the nature of transworld identity
conditions and the theory of reference in logic, semantics, and philosophy
of language. Kripke fashions an interesting argumentive methodology with
important metaphysical conclusions based on independently defensible
distinctions in modal logic and referential semantics. As such, Kripke ’ s
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
302 Dale Jacquette
argument demonstrates unexpected connections between traditionally unrelated
areas of inquiry in philosophy of language and the metaphysics of
mind.
Kripke introduces the concepts and explores some of the applications of
a distinction between rigid versus nonrigid designation. A rigid designator
designates the same object in every logically possible world in which the
object exists. According to Kripke, proper names such as ‘ Plato ’ and ‘ Barack
Obama ’ are rigid designators in this sense. Nonrigid designators, in contrast,
potentially designate different individuals in different logically possible
worlds. Defi nite descriptions, whose content may apply to different
objects in different worlds, in contrast with rigidly designative proper
names, are generally nonrigid designators under Kripke ’ s distinction. These
standardly include such referring terms as ‘ The teacher of Aristotle ’ or ‘ The
President of the United States in 2011 ’ , which could in principle refer to
entirely different persons depending on with whom Aristotle happens to
study or the logically contingent American election results as the election
occurs in different logically possible worlds.
Kripke maintains that questions of transworld identity, of identifying
precisely the same individual from one logically possible world to another,
cannot be made with high - powered telescopes and cannot be justifi ed on the
basis of such superfi cial properties as external appearance, since these factors
can differ radically across different logically possible worlds, obscuring the
usual tests for identity and nonidentity that might be conducted in the actual
world. Kripke proposes that transworld identity is a matter of stipulation,
which is to say of decision rather than discovery. We do not look at alternative
logically possible worlds and try to learn from our observations whether
Aristotle exists in another logically possible world and what properties he
might have there. We simply declare, laying it down as a kind of choice we
have made, that there is a logically possible world in which Aristotle exists
and has the following accidental properties different from those he possesses
in the actual world. We must proceed by stipulation in order to make sense
of transworld identities, according to Kripke, and we can only do so in
thought and language by means of rigid designators.
The appeal to rigid designators further enables Kripke to mount an argument
in support of mind – body dualism. The core of the argument is to say
that, since we can consider without internal contradiction that the
mind ≠ body, at least in the sense that corpses presumably exist without
minds, and we can imagine the mind existing without being associated with
a body, it is logically possible that mind ≠ body. If we rigidly designate an
individual body and mind or type of brain and psychological entity or event,
then, since in that case there is at least one logically possible world in which
(rigidly designated) mind ≠ (rigidly designated) body, it must be true that
(rigidly designated) mind ≠ (rigidly designated) body in every logically posKripke’s
Argument for Mind–Body Property Dualism 303
sible world. It follows, then, that mind and body are distinct entities universally
in every logically possible world. It is logically necessary, and
therefore a fortiori actually the case, that mind ≠ body. The least objectionable
mind – body dualism to be accepted as a result of Kripke ’ s argument is
property dualism rather than substance or ontic (Cartesian) dualism, the
latter of which has the additional burden of explaining causal interactions
between the material body and the immaterial mind.
Kripke ’ s argument delivers a powerful implication, supported by the
general considerations that undergird his solution to the problem of understanding
transworld identity and the considerable general utility of the
distinction between rigid and nonrigid designation. Kripke ’ s attitude toward
the argument appears somewhat ambivalent, as in footnote 17 he seems to
step away from the conclusiveness of his own inference when he adds these
qualifi cations: “ rejection of the [mind – body] identity thesis does not imply
acceptance of Cartesian dualism [ . . . ] Descartes ’ notion seems to have been
rendered dubious ever since [David] Hume ’ s critique of the notion of a
Cartesian self. I regard the mind – body problem as wide open and extremely
confusing ” (155).
Descartes, and others following him, argued that a person or mind is
distinct from his body, since the mind could exist without the body. He might
equally well have argued the same conclusion from the premise that the body
could have existed without the mind. Now the one response which I regard
as plainly inadmissible is the response which cheerfully accepts the Cartesian
premise while denying the Cartesian conclusion. Let ‘ Descartes ’ be a name,
or rigid designator, of a certain person, and let ‘ B ’ be a rigid designator of his
body. Then if Descartes were indeed identical to B, the supposed identity,
being an identity between two rigid designators, would be necessary, and
Descartes could not exist without B and B could not exist without Descartes.
(Kripke, 144 – 5)
P1. Mind – body dualism is logically possible.
P2. If mind – body dualism is logically possible, then there is at least one
logically possible world in which the mind is not identical to any material
body, and mental events are not identical to any purely physical events.
P3. The concept of rigid designation implies that rigidly designated
bodies and minds or mental and physical events, if nonidentical in
any logically possible world, are necessarily distinct or nonidentical in

Fitch , G. W. Saul Kripke . London : Acumen , 2004 .

Hughes , Christopher . Kripke: Names, Necessity, and Identity . Oxford :

Oxford University Press , 2004 .

Jacquette , Dale . Philosophy of Mind: The Metaphysics of Consciousness .

New York : Continuum , 2010 .

Preti , Consuelo . On Kripke . Cincinnati, OH : Wadsworth , 2002 .

Saul A. Kripke offers a much - discussed argument against mind – body identity

theory, supporting some type of property dualism, in his 1970 Princeton

University lectures on Naming and Necessity . The argument purports to

explain the relation between mind and body, solving the mind – body problem

at a comparatively high level of abstraction within the context of a comprehensive

philosophical treatment of the nature of transworld identity

conditions and the theory of reference in logic, semantics, and philosophy

of language. Kripke fashions an interesting argumentive methodology with

important metaphysical conclusions based on independently defensible

distinctions in modal logic and referential semantics. As such, Kripke ’ s

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

302 Dale Jacquette

argument demonstrates unexpected connections between traditionally unrelated

areas of inquiry in philosophy of language and the metaphysics of

mind.

Kripke introduces the concepts and explores some of the applications of

a distinction between rigid versus nonrigid designation. A rigid designator

designates the same object in every logically possible world in which the

object exists. According to Kripke, proper names such as ‘ Plato ’ and ‘ Barack

Obama ’ are rigid designators in this sense. Nonrigid designators, in contrast,

potentially designate different individuals in different logically possible

worlds. Defi nite descriptions, whose content may apply to different

objects in different worlds, in contrast with rigidly designative proper

names, are generally nonrigid designators under Kripke ’ s distinction. These

standardly include such referring terms as ‘ The teacher of Aristotle ’ or ‘ The

President of the United States in 2011 ’ , which could in principle refer to

entirely different persons depending on with whom Aristotle happens to

study or the logically contingent American election results as the election

occurs in different logically possible worlds.

Kripke maintains that questions of transworld identity, of identifying

precisely the same individual from one logically possible world to another,

cannot be made with high - powered telescopes and cannot be justifi ed on the

basis of such superfi cial properties as external appearance, since these factors

can differ radically across different logically possible worlds, obscuring the

usual tests for identity and nonidentity that might be conducted in the actual

world. Kripke proposes that transworld identity is a matter of stipulation,

which is to say of decision rather than discovery. We do not look at alternative

logically possible worlds and try to learn from our observations whether

Aristotle exists in another logically possible world and what properties he

might have there. We simply declare, laying it down as a kind of choice we

have made, that there is a logically possible world in which Aristotle exists

and has the following accidental properties different from those he possesses

in the actual world. We must proceed by stipulation in order to make sense

of transworld identities, according to Kripke, and we can only do so in

thought and language by means of rigid designators.

The appeal to rigid designators further enables Kripke to mount an argument

in support of mind – body dualism. The core of the argument is to say

that, since we can consider without internal contradiction that the

mind ≠ body, at least in the sense that corpses presumably exist without

minds, and we can imagine the mind existing without being associated with

a body, it is logically possible that mind ≠ body. If we rigidly designate an

individual body and mind or type of brain and psychological entity or event,

then, since in that case there is at least one logically possible world in which

(rigidly designated) mind ≠ (rigidly designated) body, it must be true that

(rigidly designated) mind ≠ (rigidly designated) body in every logically posKripke’s

Argument for Mind–Body Property Dualism 303

sible world. It follows, then, that mind and body are distinct entities universally

in every logically possible world. It is logically necessary, and

therefore a fortiori actually the case, that mind ≠ body. The least objectionable

mind – body dualism to be accepted as a result of Kripke ’ s argument is

property dualism rather than substance or ontic (Cartesian) dualism, the

latter of which has the additional burden of explaining causal interactions

between the material body and the immaterial mind.

Kripke ’ s argument delivers a powerful implication, supported by the

general considerations that undergird his solution to the problem of understanding

transworld identity and the considerable general utility of the

distinction between rigid and nonrigid designation. Kripke ’ s attitude toward

the argument appears somewhat ambivalent, as in footnote 17 he seems to

step away from the conclusiveness of his own inference when he adds these

qualifi cations: “ rejection of the [mind – body] identity thesis does not imply

acceptance of Cartesian dualism [ . . . ] Descartes ’ notion seems to have been

rendered dubious ever since [David] Hume ’ s critique of the notion of a

Cartesian self. I regard the mind – body problem as wide open and extremely

confusing ” (155).

Descartes, and others following him, argued that a person or mind is

distinct from his body, since the mind could exist without the body. He might

equally well have argued the same conclusion from the premise that the body

could have existed without the mind. Now the one response which I regard

as plainly inadmissible is the response which cheerfully accepts the Cartesian

premise while denying the Cartesian conclusion. Let ‘ Descartes ’ be a name,

or rigid designator, of a certain person, and let ‘ B ’ be a rigid designator of his

body. Then if Descartes were indeed identical to B, the supposed identity,

being an identity between two rigid designators, would be necessary, and

Descartes could not exist without B and B could not exist without Descartes.

(Kripke, 144 – 5)

P1. Mind – body dualism is logically possible.

P2. If mind – body dualism is logically possible, then there is at least one

logically possible world in which the mind is not identical to any material

body, and mental events are not identical to any purely physical events.

P3. The concept of rigid designation implies that rigidly designated

bodies and minds or mental and physical events, if nonidentical in

any logically possible world, are necessarily distinct or nonidentical in