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intervene in the physiological chain of events.
The most promising way to rule this option out is along the following
lines. First, it is argued that the idea that there is a mental intervention in
the chain that leads to the action means that “ a physical break ” is involved
in this chain. It means, that is, that the transition from the last brain event
on the “ way up ” to the fi rst brain event on the “ way down ” is not dictated
by the laws of physics. Second, it is argued that the obtaining of such a
physical break in the chain which leads to the action is empirically
implausible.
[I]t seems to be a striking fact about people and animals that all of their
non - tendentiously described behavior could be explained in principle by reference
to physical properties alone. All the motions of their bodies [ . . . ] could
be perfectly well explained by reference to the electrical impulses along nerve
fi bers that precede them. These fi rings in turn could be explained by earlier
neurological events, which in turn could be explained by earlier events. [ . . . ]
We have absolutely no reason to believe that there is any break in the physical
explanation of their motion. (Rey, 71)
According to this line of thought, since many physiological processes can
be fully accounted for in physical terms and are completely dictated by
physical laws, we seem to have good reasons to assume that no physical
The Argument from Mental Causation for Physicalism 307
break obtains in the causal chains that lead to our actions. Both the way
up (beginning with an external stimulus and ending with a mental event)
and the way down (beginning with a mental event and ending with an
action) are – it is hard to deny – purely physical. Is it plausible to assume
that only in that short segment, which connects the last brain event on the
way up and the fi rst brain event on the way down, there is nonphysical
intervention? Wouldn ’ t it be plausible to infer from the complete control of
physics over all other transitions that are involved in those processes that
it controls this segment as well?
Opponents of the argument from mental causation might insist that,
appearance to the contrary notwithstanding, the inference from the complete
control of physics over all other transitions that are involved in physiological
processes to its control over that segment is illegitimate since that
segment is signifi cantly different. It is signifi cantly different precisely in that
it involves a mental event, and the unique character of mental events – in
virtue of their phenomenality and/or intentionality, and/or various epistemic
characteristics, and so on – is granted even by physicalists (physicalists
standardly maintain that mental phenomena are special physical phenomena).
Once the uniqueness of mental events is admitted, there is no good
reason to resist ascribing further uniqueness to the causal chains that
include them, and assuming that these causal chains involve nonphysical
links (namely, that those unique mental events that are included in those
chains are unique also in being nonphysical). We shall leave it to the reader
to estimate the strength of this objection to the argument from mental
causation.
P1. Actions are caused by physical events in the brain.
P2. Actions are caused by mental events.
C1. Either mental events are identical with physical events in the brain,
or actions are caused both by mental events and physical events in
the brain (conjunction, P1, P2).
P3. All of the options in which actions are caused both by mental events
and by physical events in the brain while the mental events are not identical
with brain events should be rejected:
(a) causal over - determination;
(b) “ mental – physical causal cooperation ” ;
(c) “ mixed mental – physical causal chains. ”
C2. Mental events are identical with physical events in the brain (disjunctive
syllogism, C1, P3).
80
Davidson ’ s Argument for
Anomalous Monism
Amir Horowitz
Davidson , Donald . “ Mental Events , ” in Essays on Actions and Events ,
207 – 24 . Oxford : Clarendon Press , 1980 .
How should one argue for a specifi c physicalist view of mentality such as
token - physicalism – the view that mental events are physical events but
what determines the mental type of a mental event (e.g., its being pain) is
not its physical type? 1 The natural way for one to go, it seems, is fi rst to
establish physicalism and then show that, given the truth of this general
view, the specifi c version in question is the most plausible one. But Davidson ’ s
argument for anomalous monism beautifully attempts to achieve both purposes
in one stroke: his argument for physicalism assumes a rejection of
strict mental – physical correlations, and thus the resulting physicalism is
token - physicalism, or more specifi cally, Davidson ’ s specifi c version of it,
anomalous monism.
The general physicalist view that Davidson aims to establish (he refers
to it as “ the identity of the mental and the physical ” ) is the view that mental
events are identical with physical events. 2 A physical event, according to
him, is an event that essentially has a physical description. Davidson avoids
the jargon of properties, but it seems natural to take this characterization
2 To be more precise, Davidson confi nes his argument to those mental events that interact
with physical events. Of course, if all mental events interact with physical events, this doesn ’ t
matter. In presenting Davidson ’ s argument, I will ignore this point.
1 There is another use of “ token - physicalism, ” in which it refers to the thesis that takes
mental events to be identical with physical events but is neutral with respect to the question
of mental types.
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Davidson’s Argument for Anomalous Monism 309
to imply that a physical event is an event that has a physical property. An
event that essentially has a physical description might also satisfy nonphysical
descriptions, but Davidson certainly does not allow for such an event
to have properties that are instantiated apart from physical space (this might
explain his characterization of a physical event as an event that has only
one physical description). He thus takes the thesis he argues to be a robust
physicalist thesis that excludes not only Cartesian substance dualism but
also property dualism.
One instructive way that Davidson presents the rationale of the argument

intervene in the physiological chain of events.

The most promising way to rule this option out is along the following

lines. First, it is argued that the idea that there is a mental intervention in

the chain that leads to the action means that “ a physical break ” is involved

in this chain. It means, that is, that the transition from the last brain event

on the “ way up ” to the fi rst brain event on the “ way down ” is not dictated

by the laws of physics. Second, it is argued that the obtaining of such a

physical break in the chain which leads to the action is empirically

implausible.

[I]t seems to be a striking fact about people and animals that all of their

non - tendentiously described behavior could be explained in principle by reference

to physical properties alone. All the motions of their bodies [ . . . ] could

be perfectly well explained by reference to the electrical impulses along nerve

fi bers that precede them. These fi rings in turn could be explained by earlier

neurological events, which in turn could be explained by earlier events. [ . . . ]

We have absolutely no reason to believe that there is any break in the physical

explanation of their motion. (Rey, 71)

According to this line of thought, since many physiological processes can

be fully accounted for in physical terms and are completely dictated by

physical laws, we seem to have good reasons to assume that no physical

The Argument from Mental Causation for Physicalism 307

break obtains in the causal chains that lead to our actions. Both the way

up (beginning with an external stimulus and ending with a mental event)

and the way down (beginning with a mental event and ending with an

action) are – it is hard to deny – purely physical. Is it plausible to assume

that only in that short segment, which connects the last brain event on the

way up and the fi rst brain event on the way down, there is nonphysical

intervention? Wouldn ’ t it be plausible to infer from the complete control of

physics over all other transitions that are involved in those processes that

it controls this segment as well?

Opponents of the argument from mental causation might insist that,

appearance to the contrary notwithstanding, the inference from the complete

control of physics over all other transitions that are involved in physiological

processes to its control over that segment is illegitimate since that

segment is signifi cantly different. It is signifi cantly different precisely in that

it involves a mental event, and the unique character of mental events – in

virtue of their phenomenality and/or intentionality, and/or various epistemic

characteristics, and so on – is granted even by physicalists (physicalists

standardly maintain that mental phenomena are special physical phenomena).

Once the uniqueness of mental events is admitted, there is no good

reason to resist ascribing further uniqueness to the causal chains that

include them, and assuming that these causal chains involve nonphysical

links (namely, that those unique mental events that are included in those

chains are unique also in being nonphysical). We shall leave it to the reader

to estimate the strength of this objection to the argument from mental

causation.

P1. Actions are caused by physical events in the brain.

P2. Actions are caused by mental events.

C1. Either mental events are identical with physical events in the brain,

or actions are caused both by mental events and physical events in

the brain (conjunction, P1, P2).

P3. All of the options in which actions are caused both by mental events

and by physical events in the brain while the mental events are not identical

with brain events should be rejected:

(a) causal over - determination;

(b) “ mental – physical causal cooperation ” ;

(c) “ mixed mental – physical causal chains. ”

C2. Mental events are identical with physical events in the brain (disjunctive

syllogism, C1, P3).

80

Davidson ’ s Argument for

Anomalous Monism

Amir Horowitz

Davidson , Donald . “ Mental Events , ” in Essays on Actions and Events ,

207 – 24 . Oxford : Clarendon Press , 1980 .

How should one argue for a specifi c physicalist view of mentality such as

token - physicalism – the view that mental events are physical events but

what determines the mental type of a mental event (e.g., its being pain) is

not its physical type? 1 The natural way for one to go, it seems, is fi rst to

establish physicalism and then show that, given the truth of this general

view, the specifi c version in question is the most plausible one. But Davidson ’ s

argument for anomalous monism beautifully attempts to achieve both purposes

in one stroke: his argument for physicalism assumes a rejection of

strict mental – physical correlations, and thus the resulting physicalism is

token - physicalism, or more specifi cally, Davidson ’ s specifi c version of it,

anomalous monism.

The general physicalist view that Davidson aims to establish (he refers

to it as “ the identity of the mental and the physical ” ) is the view that mental

events are identical with physical events. 2 A physical event, according to

him, is an event that essentially has a physical description. Davidson avoids

the jargon of properties, but it seems natural to take this characterization

2 To be more precise, Davidson confi nes his argument to those mental events that interact

with physical events. Of course, if all mental events interact with physical events, this doesn ’ t

matter. In presenting Davidson ’ s argument, I will ignore this point.

1 There is another use of “ token - physicalism, ” in which it refers to the thesis that takes

mental events to be identical with physical events but is neutral with respect to the question

of mental types.

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

Davidson’s Argument for Anomalous Monism 309

to imply that a physical event is an event that has a physical property. An

event that essentially has a physical description might also satisfy nonphysical

descriptions, but Davidson certainly does not allow for such an event

to have properties that are instantiated apart from physical space (this might

explain his characterization of a physical event as an event that has only

one physical description). He thus takes the thesis he argues to be a robust

physicalist thesis that excludes not only Cartesian substance dualism but

also property dualism.

One instructive way that Davidson presents the rationale of the argument