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and had wide jurisdiction over the surrounding territories.
A few scholars – most notably Pierre Gassendi – expressed their doubts
about the possibility of mind – body interaction to Descartes shortly before
Princess Elisabeth did (Gassendi, 1: 238). However, Gassendi ’ s criticism was
raised through a series of questions rather than an argument, and Descartes
did not think that these questions were enough to produce a true “ objection
” to his philosophy (Descartes Philosophical Writings , 1: 266). Princess
Elisabeth formulates the mind – body problem in her very fi rst letter to
Descartes, which is dated May 16, 1643. The general strategy that she
employs is to use Descartes ’ understanding of motion as expressed in his
Optics to show the impossibility of the mind ’ s moving the body as long as
1 In his discussion of the mind – body relation, Descartes makes no conceptual distinction
between “ mind ” (French l ’ esprit , Latin mens ) and “ soul ” (French l ’ â me , Latin anima ).
Princess Elisabeth and the Mind–Body Problem 299
the mind is conceived of as nonextended and immaterial. 2 In response,
Descartes admits that Princess Elisabeth ’ s criticism is justifi ed in light of his
previous writings because he has said “ nearly nothing ” of the union between
body and soul that enables the two to act and to suffer together (Descartes
and Princess Elisabeth, 107). He thus sets about this task in his ensuing
correspondence with her and even devotes his fi nal work, The Passions of
the Soul , to devising a solution to Princess Elisabeth ’ s query. All three of
his “ solutions ” – the question has been improperly posed, the union of the
mind and body cannot be known by the intellect, and “ the seat of the soul ”
is the brain ’ s pineal gland – have been deemed largely unsatisfying by the
majority of commentators, including Princess Elisabeth.
That Descartes himself was unable to produce a viable solution to the
mind – body problem is indicative of its signifi cance to his own thinking and
to that of those philosophers who would follow him. Indeed, many of
modern philosophy ’ s innovations after Descartes, such as Spinoza ’ s monism,
Malebranche ’ s occasionalism, Leibniz ’ monads, and Hume ’ s skepticism, can
be read as responses to this seemingly intractable problem generated by the
Cartesian system. Moreover, the persistence of the mind – body problem has
given rise to the area of contemporary analytic philosophy known as “ philosophy
of mind. ” Today, philosophers of mind most often frame the mind –
body problem in terms of fi nding a physical explanation for mental
phenomena, although some have preferred the term “ nonmental ” to “ physical,
” because current physics makes it diffi cult to specify adequately what
we mean by “ physical ” (see Kim and Montero). Still others have conceded
that the problem cannot be solved (see McGinn). Whereas most contemporary
philosophers of mind answer the mind – body problem by ascribing to
some form of physicalism, they disagree as to what mental states actually
are. In recent years, lively debates have developed as to whether mental
states consist in behavioral dispositions, functional processes, neural states,
or something else besides. Such disputes indicate that Princess Elisabeth ’ s
call for an explication of the manner in which the mind moves the body is
far from answered. The mind – body problem therefore remains one of the
most infl uential and long - standing arguments in the history of Western
philosophy.
I beseech you tell me how the soul of man (since it is but a thinking substance)
can determine the spirits of the body to produce voluntary actions.
For it seems every determination of movement happens from an impulsion of
2 Since Princess Elisabeth only refers to Descartes ’ Meditations in this early correspondence,
there is some question as to whether she was indeed familiar with his physics when she wrote
this letter. See Tollefson for an interpretation that indicates that Princess Elisabeth was referencing
a passage in the Optics .
300 Jen McWeeny
the thing moved, according to the manner in which it is pushed by that which
moves it, or else, depends on the qualifi cation and fi gure of the superfi cies of
the latter. Contact is required for the fi rst two conditions, and extension for
the third. You entirely exclude extension from your notion of the soul, and
contact seems to me incompatible with an immaterial thing. That is why I
ask of you a defi nition of the soul more particular than in your Metaphysic
– that is to say, for a defi nition of the substance separate from its action,
thought. (Elisabeth, qtd. in Blom, 106)
P1. If movement of a thing occurs, it must have been caused by one of the
following: (a) self - impulsion, (b) being pushed by something else, or (c)
the quality and shape of its surface (e.g., a marble).
P2. Descartes defi nes the soul as nonextended and immaterial.
P3. If movement of a thing occurs and that movement is caused by self -
impulsion or being pushed by something else, then contact is required.
P4. Nonextended and immaterial things (souls) cannot make contact with
other things.
C1. Nonextended and immaterial things cannot move themselves by
self - impulsion and cannot move a thing by pushing it ( modus tollens ,
P3, P4).
P5. If movement of a thing occurs by the quality and shape of its surface,
then extension is required.
P6. Nonextended and immaterial things (souls) do not have extension.
C2. Nonextended and immaterial things cannot move themselves by the
quality and shape of their surface ( modus tollens , P5, P6).
P7. If (C1) and (C2), then the soul (as it is defi ned by Descartes) cannot
cause the body to move.
C3. Nonextended and immaterial things cannot move themselves by
self - impulsion and the quality and shape of their surface and cannot
move a thing by pushing it (conjunction, C1, C2).
C4. The soul (as it is defi ned by Descartes) cannot cause the body to
move ( modus ponens , P7, C3).
Implication: If the soul does cause the body to move, then Descartes ’
defi nition of the soul is incorrect.
78
Kripke ’ s Argument for
Mind – Body Property Dualism
Dale Jacquette
Kripke , Saul . Naming and Necessity . Cambridge, MA : Harvard University
Press , 1980 .
Ahmed , Arif . Saul Kripke . New York : Continuum , 2007 .
Bayne , Steven R. “ Kripke ’ s Cartesian Argument . ” Philosophia 18 ( 1988 ):
265 – 9 .
Feldman , Fred . “ Kripke on the Identity Theory . ” The Journal of Philosophy
7 ( 1974 ): 665 – 76 .

and had wide jurisdiction over the surrounding territories.

A few scholars – most notably Pierre Gassendi – expressed their doubts

about the possibility of mind – body interaction to Descartes shortly before

Princess Elisabeth did (Gassendi, 1: 238). However, Gassendi ’ s criticism was

raised through a series of questions rather than an argument, and Descartes

did not think that these questions were enough to produce a true “ objection

” to his philosophy (Descartes Philosophical Writings , 1: 266). Princess

Elisabeth formulates the mind – body problem in her very fi rst letter to

Descartes, which is dated May 16, 1643. The general strategy that she

employs is to use Descartes ’ understanding of motion as expressed in his

Optics to show the impossibility of the mind ’ s moving the body as long as

1 In his discussion of the mind – body relation, Descartes makes no conceptual distinction

between “ mind ” (French l ’ esprit , Latin mens ) and “ soul ” (French l ’ â me , Latin anima ).

Princess Elisabeth and the Mind–Body Problem 299

the mind is conceived of as nonextended and immaterial. 2 In response,

Descartes admits that Princess Elisabeth ’ s criticism is justifi ed in light of his

previous writings because he has said “ nearly nothing ” of the union between

body and soul that enables the two to act and to suffer together (Descartes

and Princess Elisabeth, 107). He thus sets about this task in his ensuing

correspondence with her and even devotes his fi nal work, The Passions of

the Soul , to devising a solution to Princess Elisabeth ’ s query. All three of

his “ solutions ” – the question has been improperly posed, the union of the

mind and body cannot be known by the intellect, and “ the seat of the soul ”

is the brain ’ s pineal gland – have been deemed largely unsatisfying by the

majority of commentators, including Princess Elisabeth.

That Descartes himself was unable to produce a viable solution to the

mind – body problem is indicative of its signifi cance to his own thinking and

to that of those philosophers who would follow him. Indeed, many of

modern philosophy ’ s innovations after Descartes, such as Spinoza ’ s monism,

Malebranche ’ s occasionalism, Leibniz ’ monads, and Hume ’ s skepticism, can

be read as responses to this seemingly intractable problem generated by the

Cartesian system. Moreover, the persistence of the mind – body problem has

given rise to the area of contemporary analytic philosophy known as “ philosophy

of mind. ” Today, philosophers of mind most often frame the mind –

body problem in terms of fi nding a physical explanation for mental

phenomena, although some have preferred the term “ nonmental ” to “ physical,

” because current physics makes it diffi cult to specify adequately what

we mean by “ physical ” (see Kim and Montero). Still others have conceded

that the problem cannot be solved (see McGinn). Whereas most contemporary

philosophers of mind answer the mind – body problem by ascribing to

some form of physicalism, they disagree as to what mental states actually

are. In recent years, lively debates have developed as to whether mental

states consist in behavioral dispositions, functional processes, neural states,

or something else besides. Such disputes indicate that Princess Elisabeth ’ s

call for an explication of the manner in which the mind moves the body is

far from answered. The mind – body problem therefore remains one of the

most infl uential and long - standing arguments in the history of Western

philosophy.

I beseech you tell me how the soul of man (since it is but a thinking substance)

can determine the spirits of the body to produce voluntary actions.

For it seems every determination of movement happens from an impulsion of

2 Since Princess Elisabeth only refers to Descartes ’ Meditations in this early correspondence,

there is some question as to whether she was indeed familiar with his physics when she wrote

this letter. See Tollefson for an interpretation that indicates that Princess Elisabeth was referencing

a passage in the Optics .

300 Jen McWeeny

the thing moved, according to the manner in which it is pushed by that which

moves it, or else, depends on the qualifi cation and fi gure of the superfi cies of

the latter. Contact is required for the fi rst two conditions, and extension for

the third. You entirely exclude extension from your notion of the soul, and

contact seems to me incompatible with an immaterial thing. That is why I

ask of you a defi nition of the soul more particular than in your Metaphysic

– that is to say, for a defi nition of the substance separate from its action,

thought. (Elisabeth, qtd. in Blom, 106)

P1. If movement of a thing occurs, it must have been caused by one of the

following: (a) self - impulsion, (b) being pushed by something else, or (c)

the quality and shape of its surface (e.g., a marble).

P2. Descartes defi nes the soul as nonextended and immaterial.

P3. If movement of a thing occurs and that movement is caused by self -

impulsion or being pushed by something else, then contact is required.

P4. Nonextended and immaterial things (souls) cannot make contact with

other things.

C1. Nonextended and immaterial things cannot move themselves by

self - impulsion and cannot move a thing by pushing it ( modus tollens ,

P3, P4).

P5. If movement of a thing occurs by the quality and shape of its surface,

then extension is required.

P6. Nonextended and immaterial things (souls) do not have extension.

C2. Nonextended and immaterial things cannot move themselves by the

quality and shape of their surface ( modus tollens , P5, P6).

P7. If (C1) and (C2), then the soul (as it is defi ned by Descartes) cannot

cause the body to move.

C3. Nonextended and immaterial things cannot move themselves by

self - impulsion and the quality and shape of their surface and cannot

move a thing by pushing it (conjunction, C1, C2).

C4. The soul (as it is defi ned by Descartes) cannot cause the body to

move ( modus ponens , P7, C3).

Implication: If the soul does cause the body to move, then Descartes ’

defi nition of the soul is incorrect.

78

Kripke ’ s Argument for

Mind – Body Property Dualism

Dale Jacquette

Kripke , Saul . Naming and Necessity . Cambridge, MA : Harvard University

Press , 1980 .

Ahmed , Arif . Saul Kripke . New York : Continuum , 2007 .

Bayne , Steven R. “ Kripke ’ s Cartesian Argument . ” Philosophia 18 ( 1988 ):

265 – 9 .

Feldman , Fred . “ Kripke on the Identity Theory . ” The Journal of Philosophy

7 ( 1974 ): 665 – 76 .