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of their failure to share certain converse intentional properties; in particular,
the property of being better or more easily knowable, or of the mind ’ s but
not the body ’ s being such that its existence cannot be rationally doubted
by the same mind.
The dilemma for Descartes ’ fi rst or Meditation 2 mind ≠ body argument
is that it either relies on a false, unrestricted, or excessively general version
of Leibniz ’ principle of the indiscernibility of identicals that allows nonidentity
determinations on the basis of converse intentional properties, in
which case the argument is unsound; or, in case a correct formulation of
Leibniz ’ Law is imposed, excluding converse intentional properties from
permitted applications of the indiscernibility of identicals, the argument is
deductively invalid, in the sense that the truth of its conclusion that
mind ≠ body is not guaranteed by the truth of the argument ’ s corrected
assumptions containing the properly restricted form of Leibniz ’ Law that
excludes converse intentional properties from its permissible applications,
just as we must in the case where 1 + 1 = 2 and Mark Twain = Samuel
Clemens.
Descartes ’ argument, conspicuous weaknesses notwithstanding, represents
a highly instructive effort to mark an essential difference between the
properties of body and mind and to answer the mind – body problem in such
a way as to hold out the prospect of contra - causal freedom of will and the
soul ’ s immortality. Descartes ’ fascinating project of replacing Aristotle ’ s
metaphysics in the Scholastic synthesis of Aristotle and Holy Scripture,
refi ned during the medieval period especially by Thomas Aquinas, with a
new metaphysics or “ fi rst philosophy ” of his own, remains a heroic episode
in the history of early modern philosophy, with a more general moral concerning
the attractions and limitations of rationalist attempts to argue
294 Dale Jacquette
philosophically for signifi cant metaphysical truths to whatever extent possible
exclusively from phenomenology and the resources of ingenious pure
reason.
I know that I exist, and I inquire what I am, I whom know to exist [ . . . ].
But I already know for certain that I am, and that it may be that all these
images, and, speaking generally, all things that relate to the nature of body
are nothing but dreams [and chimeras]. [ . . . ] For if I judge that the wax is
or exists from the fact that I see it, it certainly follows much more clearly that
I am or that I exist myself from the fact that I see it. For it may be that what
I see is not really wax, it may also be that I do not possess eyes with which
to see anything; but it cannot be that when I see, or [ . . . ] when I think I see,
that I myself who think am nought. (Descartes, 152 – 6)
P1. My body has the property of being such that its existence can rationally
be doubted by me (evil demon hypothesis).
P2. My mind does not have the property of being such that its existence
can rationally be doubted by me ( cogito sum ).
P3. For any objects A and B, if A = B, then A and B have all of their properties
in common and there is no difference in their properties (Leibniz ’
Law [na ï ve form] or principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals [na ï ve
form]).
C1. My body has a property that my mind does not have, namely, the
property of being such that its existence can be rationally doubted by
me (conjunction, P1, P2).
C2. My body ≠ my mind ( modus tollens , P3, C1).
(Premises (P1) and (P2) can be reformulated alternatively to the same
effect in terms of the mind ’ s having the (converse intentional) property of
being “ better knowable ” or “ more easily known ” than the body or the
body ’ s existence, unlike the mind ’ s, being known only inferentially from the
evidence of sensation or external empirical perception rather than immediately
in consciousness by refl ection on the occurrence of consciousness.)
In Meditation 6, Descartes returns to the mind – body problem and offers
another argument for the distinction, different in substance while identical
in basic logical structure to the fi rst argument of Meditation 2. Here, signifi
cantly, Descartes, deliberately or not, avoids the “ intensional fallacy ” of
his Meditation 2 proof. In Meditation 6, Descartes no longer attempts to
apply Leibniz ’ Law of the indiscernibility of identicals by singling out a
converse intentional property possessed by the body but not the mind, or
the reverse, but instead fi xes on an evidently nonconverse intentional property.
He invokes the property of the body ’ s divisibility and the mind ’ s
indivisibility. He argues that the body, unlike the mind, can be separated
into distinct parts that will still be bodies in the sense of continuing to be
Descartes’ Arguments for the Mind–Body Distinction 295
spatially extended though now scattered material things. The mind,
Descartes claims, cannot be so divided, but in the relevant sense is indivisible,
possessing an essential unity. It is implicit in Descartes ’ second argument,
moreover, that the soul is immortal, on the grounds that only
something capable of being broken down into component or parts can be
destroyed. Descartes may believe that in this way he secures a new Cartesian
rather than Aristotelian metaphysical foundation for religious belief in the
soul ’ s survival of death and the body ’ s destruction.
“ Nature, ” Descartes says, teaches him these things about extended
bodies. It is noteworthy that Descartes believes after Meditation 3 that he
has dispelled the systematic doubt by which he had previously motivated
his project to tear down the old Aristotelian edifi ce of knowledge and
rebuild natural philosophy or science in a more contemporary sense on the
foundations of his demonstration that a perfectly good and therefore veracious
God exists, who would not allow us to be deceived even by an evil
demon when we clearly and distinctly perceive the properties of what we
take to be the external world. The Meditation 6 proof of mind – body nonidentity
based on the divisibility of body and indivisibility of mind into like
parts could therefore not have been presented in Meditation 2, prior to
Descartes ’ vouchsafi ng the certainty of clear and distinct perceptions with
the insights into the natural properties of such things as the human body
that the later argument requires.
Descartes ’ thesis of the mind ’ s indivisibility is as interesting as it is controversial.
The mind can of course be divided into such faculties as memory,
imagination, calculation, emotion, and will, or into distinct thoughts.
However, this is not the division of the mind into smaller component self -
subsistent minds as its continuing scattered parts. If Descartes is right, then
there is an essential difference in the way that the body is supposed to be
capable of being divided into smaller component bodies, limbs, organs,
cells, and so on, all of which are bodies in the sense of being potentially

of their failure to share certain converse intentional properties; in particular,

the property of being better or more easily knowable, or of the mind ’ s but

not the body ’ s being such that its existence cannot be rationally doubted

by the same mind.

The dilemma for Descartes ’ fi rst or Meditation 2 mind ≠ body argument

is that it either relies on a false, unrestricted, or excessively general version

of Leibniz ’ principle of the indiscernibility of identicals that allows nonidentity

determinations on the basis of converse intentional properties, in

which case the argument is unsound; or, in case a correct formulation of

Leibniz ’ Law is imposed, excluding converse intentional properties from

permitted applications of the indiscernibility of identicals, the argument is

deductively invalid, in the sense that the truth of its conclusion that

mind ≠ body is not guaranteed by the truth of the argument ’ s corrected

assumptions containing the properly restricted form of Leibniz ’ Law that

excludes converse intentional properties from its permissible applications,

just as we must in the case where 1 + 1 = 2 and Mark Twain = Samuel

Clemens.

Descartes ’ argument, conspicuous weaknesses notwithstanding, represents

a highly instructive effort to mark an essential difference between the

properties of body and mind and to answer the mind – body problem in such

a way as to hold out the prospect of contra - causal freedom of will and the

soul ’ s immortality. Descartes ’ fascinating project of replacing Aristotle ’ s

metaphysics in the Scholastic synthesis of Aristotle and Holy Scripture,

refi ned during the medieval period especially by Thomas Aquinas, with a

new metaphysics or “ fi rst philosophy ” of his own, remains a heroic episode

in the history of early modern philosophy, with a more general moral concerning

the attractions and limitations of rationalist attempts to argue

294 Dale Jacquette

philosophically for signifi cant metaphysical truths to whatever extent possible

exclusively from phenomenology and the resources of ingenious pure

reason.

I know that I exist, and I inquire what I am, I whom know to exist [ . . . ].

But I already know for certain that I am, and that it may be that all these

images, and, speaking generally, all things that relate to the nature of body

are nothing but dreams [and chimeras]. [ . . . ] For if I judge that the wax is

or exists from the fact that I see it, it certainly follows much more clearly that

I am or that I exist myself from the fact that I see it. For it may be that what

I see is not really wax, it may also be that I do not possess eyes with which

to see anything; but it cannot be that when I see, or [ . . . ] when I think I see,

that I myself who think am nought. (Descartes, 152 – 6)

P1. My body has the property of being such that its existence can rationally

be doubted by me (evil demon hypothesis).

P2. My mind does not have the property of being such that its existence

can rationally be doubted by me ( cogito sum ).

P3. For any objects A and B, if A = B, then A and B have all of their properties

in common and there is no difference in their properties (Leibniz ’

Law [na ï ve form] or principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals [na ï ve

form]).

C1. My body has a property that my mind does not have, namely, the

property of being such that its existence can be rationally doubted by

me (conjunction, P1, P2).

C2. My body ≠ my mind ( modus tollens , P3, C1).

(Premises (P1) and (P2) can be reformulated alternatively to the same

effect in terms of the mind ’ s having the (converse intentional) property of

being “ better knowable ” or “ more easily known ” than the body or the

body ’ s existence, unlike the mind ’ s, being known only inferentially from the

evidence of sensation or external empirical perception rather than immediately

in consciousness by refl ection on the occurrence of consciousness.)

In Meditation 6, Descartes returns to the mind – body problem and offers

another argument for the distinction, different in substance while identical

in basic logical structure to the fi rst argument of Meditation 2. Here, signifi

cantly, Descartes, deliberately or not, avoids the “ intensional fallacy ” of

his Meditation 2 proof. In Meditation 6, Descartes no longer attempts to

apply Leibniz ’ Law of the indiscernibility of identicals by singling out a

converse intentional property possessed by the body but not the mind, or

the reverse, but instead fi xes on an evidently nonconverse intentional property.

He invokes the property of the body ’ s divisibility and the mind ’ s

indivisibility. He argues that the body, unlike the mind, can be separated

into distinct parts that will still be bodies in the sense of continuing to be

Descartes’ Arguments for the Mind–Body Distinction 295

spatially extended though now scattered material things. The mind,

Descartes claims, cannot be so divided, but in the relevant sense is indivisible,

possessing an essential unity. It is implicit in Descartes ’ second argument,

moreover, that the soul is immortal, on the grounds that only

something capable of being broken down into component or parts can be

destroyed. Descartes may believe that in this way he secures a new Cartesian

rather than Aristotelian metaphysical foundation for religious belief in the

soul ’ s survival of death and the body ’ s destruction.

“ Nature, ” Descartes says, teaches him these things about extended

bodies. It is noteworthy that Descartes believes after Meditation 3 that he

has dispelled the systematic doubt by which he had previously motivated

his project to tear down the old Aristotelian edifi ce of knowledge and

rebuild natural philosophy or science in a more contemporary sense on the

foundations of his demonstration that a perfectly good and therefore veracious

God exists, who would not allow us to be deceived even by an evil

demon when we clearly and distinctly perceive the properties of what we

take to be the external world. The Meditation 6 proof of mind – body nonidentity

based on the divisibility of body and indivisibility of mind into like

parts could therefore not have been presented in Meditation 2, prior to

Descartes ’ vouchsafi ng the certainty of clear and distinct perceptions with

the insights into the natural properties of such things as the human body

that the later argument requires.

Descartes ’ thesis of the mind ’ s indivisibility is as interesting as it is controversial.

The mind can of course be divided into such faculties as memory,

imagination, calculation, emotion, and will, or into distinct thoughts.

However, this is not the division of the mind into smaller component self -

subsistent minds as its continuing scattered parts. If Descartes is right, then

there is an essential difference in the way that the body is supposed to be

capable of being divided into smaller component bodies, limbs, organs,

cells, and so on, all of which are bodies in the sense of being potentially