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a preformation which determines our souls and brings it about that they are
derivable from it. (7) [A] “ consideration of the nature of things ” is nothing
288 Byron Kaldis
but the knowledge of the nature of our mind and of those innate ideas, and
there is no need to look for them outside oneself. ( New Essays , 50 – 84)
Three Arguments
P1. The mind knows both truths of matter of fact and truths of reason.
P2. The mind knows truths of reason (simplifi cation, P1).
P3. The truths of reason are necessary, universally valid (true in all possible
words), and absolutely certain.
C1. The mind knows necessary, universal, and absolutely certain truths
(substitution, P2, P3).
P4. Necessity, universality, and certainty can either be established by means
of induction from external sensory data, or they may originate from the
mind itself.
P5. Induction is inadequate in yielding necessity, universal validity, and
certainty.
C2. Necessity, universal validity, and certainty of truths of reason can be
original with the mind itself (disjunctive syllogism, C1, P4, P5).
P6. If necessity and certainty are original with the mind, then they are
contained within it.
C3. The mind contains these originally in itself ( modus ponens , P6, C2).
P7. If the mind contains originally an item of knowledge, then the mind is
not empty ever.
C4. The mind is not empty ever ( modus ponens , C3, P7).
P1. The mind has ideas by means of refl ection.
P2. Ideas of refl ection manifest the capacity of the mind to know itself.
P3. The mind can know itself inwardly either by relying on the senses for
assistance or it is itself endowed with this capacity.
P4. The senses can deliver knowledge (ideas) regarding only the external
world.
C1. The mind ’ s capacity for refl ecting on itself is an endowed capacity
(disjunctive syllogism, P3, P4).
P5. If the mind possesses an endowed capacity, then it contains it in itself
without having it acquired.
C2. The mind contains an endowed capacity without acquiring the
refl ecting capacity ( modus ponens , C1, P5).
P6. If a mental item is contained in the mind without being acquired, then
it is innate.
C3. The mind ’ s refl ecting capacity is innate ( modus ponens , C2, P6).
P7. If the mind has an innate item, then it cannot be empty at its
inception.
Leibniz’ Argument for Innate Ideas 289
P8. If the mind contains something innately (from its inception), then it
contains it continuously.
C4. The mind is not empty ever (hypothetical syllogism, P7, P8).
P1. Either a mental faculty is a bare faculty or it is a predetermined, dedicated,
capacity to search for specifi c objects [truths] in the mind.
P2. An epistemic faculty is a “ bare faculty ” if and only if it is merely an
indeterminate disposition to receive truths (by defi nition).
C1. A mental faculty is either an indeterminate disposition to receive
truths or a predetermined, dedicated, capacity to search for specifi c
truths in the mind (substitution, P1, P2).
P3. The epistemic capacity of knowing necessary truths is a mental faculty.
C2. The epistemic capacity of knowing necessary truths is either a bare
faculty or a predetermined dedicated capacity to search for specifi c
such truths (substitution, C1, P3).
P4. If the epistemic capacity of knowing necessary truths is a bare faculty
of receiving, then it is not the source of such truths.
P5. The mind is the source of the validity (proof) of necessary truths (as
per above: fi rst argument).
C3. The epistemic capacity of knowing necessary truths is not a bare
faculty ( modus tollens , P4, P5).
C4. The epistemic capacity of knowing necessary truths is a predetermined
dedicated capacity to search for specifi c objects in the mind
(disjunctive syllogism, P1, C3).
76
Descartes ’ Arguments for the
Mind – Body Distinction
Dale Jacquette
Descartes , Ren é . Meditations on First Philosophy , in The Philosophical
Works of Descartes , translated by Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T.
Ross. Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press , 1931 .
Almog , Joseph . What Am I? Descartes and the Mind – Body Problem . Oxford :
Oxford University Press , 2001 .
Beck , L. J. The Metaphysics of Descartes: A Study of the Meditations .
Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1965 .
Clarke , D. M. Descartes ’ s Theory of Mind . Oxford : Oxford University Press ,
2003 .
Emmet , Dorothy . “ Descartes on Body and Mind: After 300 Years . ” Cambridge
Journal 4 ( 1950 ): 67 – 82 .
Long , Douglas C. “ Descartes ’ Argument for Mind – Body Dualism . ” The
Philosophical Forum 1 ( 1969 ): 259 – 73 .
Rozemond , Marleen . Descartes ’ s Dualism . Cambridge, MA : Harvard
University Press , 2002 .
Ryle , Gilbert . The Concept of Mind . London : Hutchinson , 1949 .
Ren é Descartes ’ fi rst argument in support of mind – body ontic nonidentity
or substance dualism theory appears in Meditation 2 of his 1641 Meditations
on First Philosophy . The argument is historically signifi cant, if not obviously
incorrect, and has earned its place as a focus of philosophical controversy
for almost four centuries. If Descartes ’ reasoning is sound, then it
answers the long - standing problem of understanding the relation between
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Descartes’ Arguments for the Mind–Body Distinction 291
mind and body. Descartes believes that he has solved the mind – body
problem in metaphysics that he revived from the time of the ancient Greeks,
in keeping with certain religious beliefs about the soul ’ s independence from
material things, and especially from the physical human animal body it

a preformation which determines our souls and brings it about that they are

derivable from it. (7) [A] “ consideration of the nature of things ” is nothing

288 Byron Kaldis

but the knowledge of the nature of our mind and of those innate ideas, and

there is no need to look for them outside oneself. ( New Essays , 50 – 84)

Three Arguments

P1. The mind knows both truths of matter of fact and truths of reason.

P2. The mind knows truths of reason (simplifi cation, P1).

P3. The truths of reason are necessary, universally valid (true in all possible

words), and absolutely certain.

C1. The mind knows necessary, universal, and absolutely certain truths

(substitution, P2, P3).

P4. Necessity, universality, and certainty can either be established by means

of induction from external sensory data, or they may originate from the

mind itself.

P5. Induction is inadequate in yielding necessity, universal validity, and

certainty.

C2. Necessity, universal validity, and certainty of truths of reason can be

original with the mind itself (disjunctive syllogism, C1, P4, P5).

P6. If necessity and certainty are original with the mind, then they are

contained within it.

C3. The mind contains these originally in itself ( modus ponens , P6, C2).

P7. If the mind contains originally an item of knowledge, then the mind is

not empty ever.

C4. The mind is not empty ever ( modus ponens , C3, P7).

P1. The mind has ideas by means of refl ection.

P2. Ideas of refl ection manifest the capacity of the mind to know itself.

P3. The mind can know itself inwardly either by relying on the senses for

assistance or it is itself endowed with this capacity.

P4. The senses can deliver knowledge (ideas) regarding only the external

world.

C1. The mind ’ s capacity for refl ecting on itself is an endowed capacity

(disjunctive syllogism, P3, P4).

P5. If the mind possesses an endowed capacity, then it contains it in itself

without having it acquired.

C2. The mind contains an endowed capacity without acquiring the

refl ecting capacity ( modus ponens , C1, P5).

P6. If a mental item is contained in the mind without being acquired, then

it is innate.

C3. The mind ’ s refl ecting capacity is innate ( modus ponens , C2, P6).

P7. If the mind has an innate item, then it cannot be empty at its

inception.

Leibniz’ Argument for Innate Ideas 289

P8. If the mind contains something innately (from its inception), then it

contains it continuously.

C4. The mind is not empty ever (hypothetical syllogism, P7, P8).

P1. Either a mental faculty is a bare faculty or it is a predetermined, dedicated,

capacity to search for specifi c objects [truths] in the mind.

P2. An epistemic faculty is a “ bare faculty ” if and only if it is merely an

indeterminate disposition to receive truths (by defi nition).

C1. A mental faculty is either an indeterminate disposition to receive

truths or a predetermined, dedicated, capacity to search for specifi c

truths in the mind (substitution, P1, P2).

P3. The epistemic capacity of knowing necessary truths is a mental faculty.

C2. The epistemic capacity of knowing necessary truths is either a bare

faculty or a predetermined dedicated capacity to search for specifi c

such truths (substitution, C1, P3).

P4. If the epistemic capacity of knowing necessary truths is a bare faculty

of receiving, then it is not the source of such truths.

P5. The mind is the source of the validity (proof) of necessary truths (as

per above: fi rst argument).

C3. The epistemic capacity of knowing necessary truths is not a bare

faculty ( modus tollens , P4, P5).

C4. The epistemic capacity of knowing necessary truths is a predetermined

dedicated capacity to search for specifi c objects in the mind

(disjunctive syllogism, P1, C3).

76

Descartes ’ Arguments for the

Mind – Body Distinction

Dale Jacquette

Descartes , Ren é . Meditations on First Philosophy , in The Philosophical

Works of Descartes , translated by Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T.

Ross. Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press , 1931 .

Almog , Joseph . What Am I? Descartes and the Mind – Body Problem . Oxford :

Oxford University Press , 2001 .

Beck , L. J. The Metaphysics of Descartes: A Study of the Meditations .

Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1965 .

Clarke , D. M. Descartes ’ s Theory of Mind . Oxford : Oxford University Press ,

2003 .

Emmet , Dorothy . “ Descartes on Body and Mind: After 300 Years . ” Cambridge

Journal 4 ( 1950 ): 67 – 82 .

Long , Douglas C. “ Descartes ’ Argument for Mind – Body Dualism . ” The

Philosophical Forum 1 ( 1969 ): 259 – 73 .

Rozemond , Marleen . Descartes ’ s Dualism . Cambridge, MA : Harvard

University Press , 2002 .

Ryle , Gilbert . The Concept of Mind . London : Hutchinson , 1949 .

Ren é Descartes ’ fi rst argument in support of mind – body ontic nonidentity

or substance dualism theory appears in Meditation 2 of his 1641 Meditations

on First Philosophy . The argument is historically signifi cant, if not obviously

incorrect, and has earned its place as a focus of philosophical controversy

for almost four centuries. If Descartes ’ reasoning is sound, then it

answers the long - standing problem of understanding the relation between

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

Descartes’ Arguments for the Mind–Body Distinction 291

mind and body. Descartes believes that he has solved the mind – body

problem in metaphysics that he revived from the time of the ancient Greeks,

in keeping with certain religious beliefs about the soul ’ s independence from

material things, and especially from the physical human animal body it