DebateLabKIT/deepa2-corpus · Datasets at Hugging Face

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or potentiality that could remain unactualized. It never fails to activate its
tendency; that is, the dedicated effort to unearth, or be aware of, innate
notions and truths contained in it. Such a Leibnizian force ( “ endeavor ” ) is
predetermined never to fail to produce some actual activity, given the right
conditions. By dint of attention or sense - probing, it acquires awareness of
its otherwise unconscious innate mental contents. Second, and related to
this, Leibniz never fails to emphasize well before the Nouveaux essais that
by “ idea ” he does not understand an actualized occurrence or act of thought
but a disposition to think in a certain way: “ an idea consists not in some
act, but in the faculty of thinking, and we are said to have an idea of a
thing even if we do not think of it, if only, on a given occasion, we can
think of it ” ( Philosophical Papers , 207). Given all this, third, for Leibniz,
286 Byron Kaldis
thinking does not amount to a constantly conscious series of occurrent
mental acts with clarity and distinctness, since the soul ’ s always being
active qua substance can be said to still be active even during “ confused ”
(i.e., less that fully clear) states, either as potentially striving toward such
conscious attentive thinking episodes or as being most of the time at a
steady - state attenuated potentiality only. But what safeguards such an attenuated
state from being empty, thus threatening to undermine Leibniz ’ whole
position, is that it contains one of his most innovative elements, what he
famously called “ petites perceptions ” : innumerable minute imperceptible
sensations, each one of which escapes our awareness yet contributes to the
aggregate impression of which we are aware. The Leibnizean conception of
the unconscious is used against Descartes ’ doctrine of constant or permanent
thinking while at the same time avoiding on the other side Locke ’ s
doctrine that the mind can be, at periods, blank or inactive. That the
“ petites perceptions ” turn out to be the capital pillar of Leibniz ’ defence of
innateness in the Nouveaux essais becomes quickly apparent as he puts his
invention to work in almost the whole range of his philosophy.
In the Preface to the Nouveaux essais , Leibniz advances three arguments
corresponding to the following theses (suitably reconstructed in an organized
form): (1) only innate principles ground our knowledge with demonstrative
certainty of the modal status of specifi c truths as necessary and
universally valid; (2) in self - refl ection we become aware of possessing
certain intellectual ideas (see above) being (a) immediately related to, and
(b) always present to, the understanding, although we do not normally pay
constant attention to these, since our everyday distractions and needs
prevent our always being aware of them; and (3) as in a block of marble
its veins predetermine the shape it may take, similarly our soul contains in
an unconscious state innate items which it has the predetermined potentiality,
tendency, or disposition to unearth, that is, become aware of – in
support of this, the thesis of petites perceptions is employed. All these can
be seen to be replies directed at the three prongs of Locke ’ s attack on
innatism: (1) together with (3) answer Locke ’ s contention that necessary
truths do not receive universal assent as they ought to if they were truly
innate to all mankind; (2) together with (3) answer Locke ’ s contention that
our mind cannot possess something of which it is unaware; and (3) together
with Leibniz ’ metaphysical theses about the nature of the mind (see above)
answer Locke ’ s contention that since the mind does not think all the time,
it is possible for the mind to be empty. In the fi rst chapter of Book I of the
Nouveaux essais , Leibniz adds a new aspect to potentiality, this time regarding
not just ideas but also our knowledge of truths and use of inferences:
their enthymemic character.
The signifi cance of Leibniz ’ argumentation cannot be overstated given
the importance of the notion of the unconscious – something he did not
Leibniz’ Argument for Innate Ideas 287
invent but formulated in a novel and plausible manner, his infl uence on
subsequent developments in German idealism, and, perhaps more importantly,
its unnoticed relevance to recent discussions in the philosophy of
mind and evolutionary psychology regarding nativism and concept - innatism,
or current research in neurophysiology. It is worth pointing out that current
neurobiological fi ndings regarding motor cognition corroborate his view of
the unconscious petites perceptions as neural activity falling below a
minimum level or duration required to emerge into awareness. Similarly, in
“ subconcious pre - processing ” during sense perception, it has been shown
that we are not aware, for example, of the hairs of our inner ear that actually
hear sounds but of the resultant aggregate acoustic sensation.
(1) [N]ecessary truths, such as we fi nd in pure mathematics [ . . . ] must
have principles whose proof does not depend on instances nor [ . . . ] on the
testimony of the senses, even though without the senses it would never occur
to us to think of them [ . . . ]. [S]o the proof of them can only come from inner
principles described as innate. It would indeed be wrong to think that we can
easily read these eternal laws of reason in the soul, as the Praetor ’ s edict can
be read on his notice - board, without effort or inquiry; but it is enough that
they can be discovered within us by dint of attention [ . . . ] what shows the
existence of inner sources of necessary truths is also what distinguishes man
from beast. (2) [I]deas which do not originate in sensation come from refl ection.
But refl ection is nothing but attention to what is within us, and the senses
do not give us what we carry with us already [ . . . ] can it be denied that there
is a great deal that is innate in our minds since we are innate to ourselves
[ . . . ] and since we include Being, Unity, Substance [ . . . ] and hosts of other
objects of our intellectual ideas? [ . . . ] (3) I have also used the analogy of the
veined block of marble, as opposed to an entirely homogeneous block of
marble, or to a blank tablet [ . . . ] if there were veins in the block which
marked out the shape of Hercules rather than other shapes, then the block
would be more determined to that shape and Hercules would be innate to it
[ . . . ] even though labour would be required to expose the veins and to polish
them to clarity, removing everything that prevents them from being seen. This
is how ideas and truths are innate in us – as inclinations, dispositions, tendencies,
or natural potentialities and not as action; although these potentialities
are always accompanied by certain actions, often insensible ones, which correspond
to them. (5) [ . . . A]t every moment there is in us an infi nity of
perceptions unaccompanied by awareness or refl ection; that is alterations in
the soul itself, of which we are unaware because these impressions are either
too minute and too numerous or else too unvarying [ . . . ]. But when they are
combined with others they do nevertheless have their effect and make themselves
felt. (6) [A] special affi nity which the human mind has with [necessary
truths . . . ] is what makes us call them innate. So it is not a bare faculty [ . . . ]
a mere possibility of understanding those truths; it is rather a disposition [ . . . ]

or potentiality that could remain unactualized. It never fails to activate its

tendency; that is, the dedicated effort to unearth, or be aware of, innate

notions and truths contained in it. Such a Leibnizian force ( “ endeavor ” ) is

predetermined never to fail to produce some actual activity, given the right

conditions. By dint of attention or sense - probing, it acquires awareness of

its otherwise unconscious innate mental contents. Second, and related to

this, Leibniz never fails to emphasize well before the Nouveaux essais that

by “ idea ” he does not understand an actualized occurrence or act of thought

but a disposition to think in a certain way: “ an idea consists not in some

act, but in the faculty of thinking, and we are said to have an idea of a

thing even if we do not think of it, if only, on a given occasion, we can

think of it ” ( Philosophical Papers , 207). Given all this, third, for Leibniz,

286 Byron Kaldis

thinking does not amount to a constantly conscious series of occurrent

mental acts with clarity and distinctness, since the soul ’ s always being

active qua substance can be said to still be active even during “ confused ”

(i.e., less that fully clear) states, either as potentially striving toward such

conscious attentive thinking episodes or as being most of the time at a

steady - state attenuated potentiality only. But what safeguards such an attenuated

state from being empty, thus threatening to undermine Leibniz ’ whole

position, is that it contains one of his most innovative elements, what he

famously called “ petites perceptions ” : innumerable minute imperceptible

sensations, each one of which escapes our awareness yet contributes to the

aggregate impression of which we are aware. The Leibnizean conception of

the unconscious is used against Descartes ’ doctrine of constant or permanent

thinking while at the same time avoiding on the other side Locke ’ s

doctrine that the mind can be, at periods, blank or inactive. That the

“ petites perceptions ” turn out to be the capital pillar of Leibniz ’ defence of

innateness in the Nouveaux essais becomes quickly apparent as he puts his

invention to work in almost the whole range of his philosophy.

In the Preface to the Nouveaux essais , Leibniz advances three arguments

corresponding to the following theses (suitably reconstructed in an organized

form): (1) only innate principles ground our knowledge with demonstrative

certainty of the modal status of specifi c truths as necessary and

universally valid; (2) in self - refl ection we become aware of possessing

certain intellectual ideas (see above) being (a) immediately related to, and

(b) always present to, the understanding, although we do not normally pay

constant attention to these, since our everyday distractions and needs

prevent our always being aware of them; and (3) as in a block of marble

its veins predetermine the shape it may take, similarly our soul contains in

an unconscious state innate items which it has the predetermined potentiality,

tendency, or disposition to unearth, that is, become aware of – in

support of this, the thesis of petites perceptions is employed. All these can

be seen to be replies directed at the three prongs of Locke ’ s attack on

innatism: (1) together with (3) answer Locke ’ s contention that necessary

truths do not receive universal assent as they ought to if they were truly

innate to all mankind; (2) together with (3) answer Locke ’ s contention that

our mind cannot possess something of which it is unaware; and (3) together

with Leibniz ’ metaphysical theses about the nature of the mind (see above)

answer Locke ’ s contention that since the mind does not think all the time,

it is possible for the mind to be empty. In the fi rst chapter of Book I of the

Nouveaux essais , Leibniz adds a new aspect to potentiality, this time regarding

not just ideas but also our knowledge of truths and use of inferences:

their enthymemic character.

The signifi cance of Leibniz ’ argumentation cannot be overstated given

the importance of the notion of the unconscious – something he did not

Leibniz’ Argument for Innate Ideas 287

invent but formulated in a novel and plausible manner, his infl uence on

subsequent developments in German idealism, and, perhaps more importantly,

its unnoticed relevance to recent discussions in the philosophy of

mind and evolutionary psychology regarding nativism and concept - innatism,

or current research in neurophysiology. It is worth pointing out that current

neurobiological fi ndings regarding motor cognition corroborate his view of

the unconscious petites perceptions as neural activity falling below a

minimum level or duration required to emerge into awareness. Similarly, in

“ subconcious pre - processing ” during sense perception, it has been shown

that we are not aware, for example, of the hairs of our inner ear that actually

hear sounds but of the resultant aggregate acoustic sensation.

(1) [N]ecessary truths, such as we fi nd in pure mathematics [ . . . ] must

have principles whose proof does not depend on instances nor [ . . . ] on the

testimony of the senses, even though without the senses it would never occur

to us to think of them [ . . . ]. [S]o the proof of them can only come from inner

principles described as innate. It would indeed be wrong to think that we can

easily read these eternal laws of reason in the soul, as the Praetor ’ s edict can

be read on his notice - board, without effort or inquiry; but it is enough that

they can be discovered within us by dint of attention [ . . . ] what shows the

existence of inner sources of necessary truths is also what distinguishes man

from beast. (2) [I]deas which do not originate in sensation come from refl ection.

But refl ection is nothing but attention to what is within us, and the senses

do not give us what we carry with us already [ . . . ] can it be denied that there

is a great deal that is innate in our minds since we are innate to ourselves

[ . . . ] and since we include Being, Unity, Substance [ . . . ] and hosts of other

objects of our intellectual ideas? [ . . . ] (3) I have also used the analogy of the

veined block of marble, as opposed to an entirely homogeneous block of

marble, or to a blank tablet [ . . . ] if there were veins in the block which

marked out the shape of Hercules rather than other shapes, then the block

would be more determined to that shape and Hercules would be innate to it

[ . . . ] even though labour would be required to expose the veins and to polish

them to clarity, removing everything that prevents them from being seen. This

is how ideas and truths are innate in us – as inclinations, dispositions, tendencies,

or natural potentialities and not as action; although these potentialities

are always accompanied by certain actions, often insensible ones, which correspond

to them. (5) [ . . . A]t every moment there is in us an infi nity of

perceptions unaccompanied by awareness or refl ection; that is alterations in

the soul itself, of which we are unaware because these impressions are either

too minute and too numerous or else too unvarying [ . . . ]. But when they are

combined with others they do nevertheless have their effect and make themselves

felt. (6) [A] special affi nity which the human mind has with [necessary

truths . . . ] is what makes us call them innate. So it is not a bare faculty [ . . . ]

a mere possibility of understanding those truths; it is rather a disposition [ . . . ]