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Many medical professionals and others think that active euthanasia, even
when it is done at the request of the person who dies, is morally wrong.
They also think that passive euthanasia is morally right, at least when it is
done following the wishes of the person who dies. This idea that the two
are ethically different is refl ected in the law in many countries. The law
makes it a crime to commit active euthanasia but not a crime to perform
passive euthanasia when the person who dies doesn ’ t want to be kept alive.
Is this idea about the ethical difference between active and passive euthanasia
sound? According to Rachels ’ argument, it isn ’ t.
One reason why so many people think that there is an important moral
difference between active and passive euthanasia is that they think killing
someone is morally worse than letting someone die. But is it? Is killing, in
itself, worse than letting die? To investigate this issue, two cases may be considered
that are exactly alike except that one involves killing whereas the other
involves letting someone die. Then, it can be asked whether this difference
makes any difference to the moral assessments. It is important that the cases
be exactly alike, except for this one difference, since otherwise one cannot be
confi dent that it is this difference and not some other that accounts for any
variation in the assessments of the two cases. So, let us consider this pair of
cases:
In the fi rst, Smith stands to gain a large inheritance if anything should
happen to his six - year - old cousin. One evening while the child is taking his
bath, Smith sneaks into the bathroom and drowns the child, and then arranges
things so that it will look like an accident.
In the second, Jones also stands to gain if anything should happen to his
six - year - old cousin. Like Smith, Jones sneaks in planning to drown the child
in his bath. However, just as he enters the bathroom Jones sees the child slip
and hit his head, and fall face down in the water. Jones is delighted; he stands
by, ready to push the child ’ s head back under if it is necessary, but it is not
necessary. With only a little thrashing about, the child drowns all by himself,
“ accidentally, ” as Jones watches and does nothing.
Now Smith killed the child, whereas Jones “ merely ” let the child die. That
is the only difference between them. Did either man behave better, from a
moral point of view? If the difference between killing and letting die were in
itself a morally important matter, one should say that Jones ’ s behavior was
less reprehensible than Smith ’ s. But does one really want to say that? I think
not. In the fi rst place, both men acted from the same motive, personal gain,
and both had exactly the same end in view when they acted. It may be inferred
from Smith ’ s conduct that he is a bad man, although that judgment may be
withdrawn or modifi ed if certain further facts are learned about him – for
example, that he is mentally deranged. But would not the very same thing be
inferred about Jones from his conduct? And would not the same further
considerations also be relevant to any, modifi cation of this judgment?
Moreover, suppose Jones pleaded, in his own defense, “ After all, I didn ’ t do
anything except just stand there and watch the child drown. I didn ’ t kill him;
Rachels on Euthanasia 279
I only let him die. ” Again, if letting die were in itself less bad than killing,
this defense should have at least some weight. But it does not. Such a
“ defense ” can only be regarded as a grotesque perversion of moral reasoning.
Morally speaking, it is no defense at all. [ … ] I have argued that killing is not
in itself any worse than letting die; if my contention is right, it follows that
active euthanasia is not any worse than passive euthanasia. (Rachels,
78 – 80)
P1. Smith ’ s killing the child is exactly like Jones ’ s letting the child die except
that Smith kills someone and Jones allows someone to die.
P2. What Smith did is morally as bad as what Jones did.
P3. If killing in itself is morally worse than letting die and Smith ’ s killing
the child is exactly like Jones ’ letting the child die except that Smith kills
someone and Jones allows someone to die, then Smith ’ s behavior should
be more reprehensible than Jones ’ .
C1. Not both killing in itself is morally worse than letting die and Smith ’ s
killing the child is exactly like Jones ’ letting the child die except that
Smith kills someone and Jones allows someone to die ( modus tollens ,
P2, P3).
C2. Not killing in itself is morally worse than letting die or not Smith ’ s
killing the child is exactly like Jones ’ s letting the child die except that
Smith kills someone and Jones allows someone to die (De Morgan ’ s,
C1).
C3. Not not Smith ’ s killing the child is exactly like Jones ’ letting the child
die except that Smith kills someone and Jones allows someone to die
(double negation, P1).
C4. Killing is not in itself morally worse than letting die (disjunctive
syllogism, C2, C3).
P4. If there is an important moral difference between active and passive
euthanasia, then killing someone is morally worse than letting someone
die.
C5. Active euthanasia is not any worse – ethically speaking – than passive
euthanasia ( modus tollens , P4, C4).
There is some ambiguity in the way some parts of the argument are
stated. Formalizing the statements in a language for quantifi ed fi rst - order
logic would bring out these ambiguities. For example, the fi nal conclusion
could mean that active euthanasia is never ethically worse than passive
euthanasia, or it could mean that active euthanasia is not always ethically
worse than passive euthanasia. It is pretty clear that Rachels has in the mind
the second of these two. Again, the intermediate conclusion C1 might mean
that killing is never ethically worse than otherwise identical instances of
letting die. But Rachels does not intend this. All that he means is that killing
is not always worse, morally speaking, than similar cases of letting die.
280 Leslie Burkholder
So long as these ambiguities are removed in a consistent way, this argument
is deductively valid. So if there is anything wrong with the reasoning,
it must be that one or more of the premises are false. If the ambiguities are
not cleared up in the same way, then the argument will turn out to be
invalid.
Part V
Philosophy of Mind
75
Leibniz ’ Argument for
Innate Ideas
Byron Kaldis

Many medical professionals and others think that active euthanasia, even

when it is done at the request of the person who dies, is morally wrong.

They also think that passive euthanasia is morally right, at least when it is

done following the wishes of the person who dies. This idea that the two

are ethically different is refl ected in the law in many countries. The law

makes it a crime to commit active euthanasia but not a crime to perform

passive euthanasia when the person who dies doesn ’ t want to be kept alive.

Is this idea about the ethical difference between active and passive euthanasia

sound? According to Rachels ’ argument, it isn ’ t.

One reason why so many people think that there is an important moral

difference between active and passive euthanasia is that they think killing

someone is morally worse than letting someone die. But is it? Is killing, in

itself, worse than letting die? To investigate this issue, two cases may be considered

that are exactly alike except that one involves killing whereas the other

involves letting someone die. Then, it can be asked whether this difference

makes any difference to the moral assessments. It is important that the cases

be exactly alike, except for this one difference, since otherwise one cannot be

confi dent that it is this difference and not some other that accounts for any

variation in the assessments of the two cases. So, let us consider this pair of

cases:

In the fi rst, Smith stands to gain a large inheritance if anything should

happen to his six - year - old cousin. One evening while the child is taking his

bath, Smith sneaks into the bathroom and drowns the child, and then arranges

things so that it will look like an accident.

In the second, Jones also stands to gain if anything should happen to his

six - year - old cousin. Like Smith, Jones sneaks in planning to drown the child

in his bath. However, just as he enters the bathroom Jones sees the child slip

and hit his head, and fall face down in the water. Jones is delighted; he stands

by, ready to push the child ’ s head back under if it is necessary, but it is not

necessary. With only a little thrashing about, the child drowns all by himself,

“ accidentally, ” as Jones watches and does nothing.

Now Smith killed the child, whereas Jones “ merely ” let the child die. That

is the only difference between them. Did either man behave better, from a

moral point of view? If the difference between killing and letting die were in

itself a morally important matter, one should say that Jones ’ s behavior was

less reprehensible than Smith ’ s. But does one really want to say that? I think

not. In the fi rst place, both men acted from the same motive, personal gain,

and both had exactly the same end in view when they acted. It may be inferred

from Smith ’ s conduct that he is a bad man, although that judgment may be

withdrawn or modifi ed if certain further facts are learned about him – for

example, that he is mentally deranged. But would not the very same thing be

inferred about Jones from his conduct? And would not the same further

considerations also be relevant to any, modifi cation of this judgment?

Moreover, suppose Jones pleaded, in his own defense, “ After all, I didn ’ t do

anything except just stand there and watch the child drown. I didn ’ t kill him;

Rachels on Euthanasia 279

I only let him die. ” Again, if letting die were in itself less bad than killing,

this defense should have at least some weight. But it does not. Such a

“ defense ” can only be regarded as a grotesque perversion of moral reasoning.

Morally speaking, it is no defense at all. [ … ] I have argued that killing is not

in itself any worse than letting die; if my contention is right, it follows that

active euthanasia is not any worse than passive euthanasia. (Rachels,

78 – 80)

P1. Smith ’ s killing the child is exactly like Jones ’ s letting the child die except

that Smith kills someone and Jones allows someone to die.

P2. What Smith did is morally as bad as what Jones did.

P3. If killing in itself is morally worse than letting die and Smith ’ s killing

the child is exactly like Jones ’ letting the child die except that Smith kills

someone and Jones allows someone to die, then Smith ’ s behavior should

be more reprehensible than Jones ’ .

C1. Not both killing in itself is morally worse than letting die and Smith ’ s

killing the child is exactly like Jones ’ letting the child die except that

Smith kills someone and Jones allows someone to die ( modus tollens ,

P2, P3).

C2. Not killing in itself is morally worse than letting die or not Smith ’ s

killing the child is exactly like Jones ’ s letting the child die except that

Smith kills someone and Jones allows someone to die (De Morgan ’ s,

C1).

C3. Not not Smith ’ s killing the child is exactly like Jones ’ letting the child

die except that Smith kills someone and Jones allows someone to die

(double negation, P1).

C4. Killing is not in itself morally worse than letting die (disjunctive

syllogism, C2, C3).

P4. If there is an important moral difference between active and passive

euthanasia, then killing someone is morally worse than letting someone

die.

C5. Active euthanasia is not any worse – ethically speaking – than passive

euthanasia ( modus tollens , P4, C4).

There is some ambiguity in the way some parts of the argument are

stated. Formalizing the statements in a language for quantifi ed fi rst - order

logic would bring out these ambiguities. For example, the fi nal conclusion

could mean that active euthanasia is never ethically worse than passive

euthanasia, or it could mean that active euthanasia is not always ethically

worse than passive euthanasia. It is pretty clear that Rachels has in the mind

the second of these two. Again, the intermediate conclusion C1 might mean

that killing is never ethically worse than otherwise identical instances of

letting die. But Rachels does not intend this. All that he means is that killing

is not always worse, morally speaking, than similar cases of letting die.

280 Leslie Burkholder

So long as these ambiguities are removed in a consistent way, this argument

is deductively valid. So if there is anything wrong with the reasoning,

it must be that one or more of the premises are false. If the ambiguities are

not cleared up in the same way, then the argument will turn out to be

invalid.

Part V

Philosophy of Mind

75

Leibniz ’ Argument for

Innate Ideas

Byron Kaldis