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P4. All aborting of any healthy fetus would cause the loss to that individual
of all its future experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments.
C3. If A causes to individual F the loss of all future experiences, activities,
projects, and enjoyments, then A is seriously wrong (particular
instantiation, C2).
C4. If A is an abortion of healthy fetus F, then A causes to individual F
the loss of all future experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments
(particular instantiation, P4).
C5. If A is an abortion of healthy fetus F, then A is seriously wrong
(hypothetical syllogism, C3, C4).
C6. All aborting of any healthy fetus is seriously wrong (universal generalization,
C5).
73
Tooley on Abortion
and Infanticide
Ben Saunders
Tooley , Michael . “ Abortion and Infanticide . ” Philosophy & Public Affairs 2
( 1972 ): 37 – 65 .
___. Abortion and Infanticide . Oxford : Clarendon Press , 1983 .
Thomson , Judith Jarvis . “ A Defence of Abortion . ” Philosophy & Public
Affairs 1 ( 1971 ): 47 – 66 .
Abortion is understandably one of the more controversial ethical questions
facing philosophers. Most refuse to take a stance on whether the fetus is a
person. Thompson, for example, grants to her opponent that the fetus is
indeed a person, but argues that abortion is nonetheless permissible, since
one shouldn ’ t be required to suffer great hardship for nine months in order
to keep someone else alive.
Tooley argues that the fetus is not a person and nor in fact is a young
infant. The argument depends on distinguishing between “ human being ”
(which is a merely descriptive biological category) and “ person ” (which
depends on self - awareness and implies a right to life). It is possible that not
all persons are human – for instance, chimpanzees or dolphins may have
the right to life – and that not all humans are persons; for instance, those
in a persistent vegetative state. While the fetus or infant is undeniably
human, Tooley argues that it does not acquire a right to life until it becomes
self - aware. Before this point, it is permissible to kill the infant, even after
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
276 Ben Saunders
it is born. Tooley rejects the ideas that species membership or the mere fact
of being born make any difference to an entity ’ s rights, and he also argues
that the mere potentiality of personhood is not suffi cient to ground rights,
since it would be permissible to kill a kitten that was going to become a
person provided that one did so before it actually became a person.
The argument is important because it has implications not only for abortion
but other areas such as our treatment of animals. The conclusion is
obviously controversial, but that makes it all the more interesting if it can
be established from the premises. It is unclear that it can, however, since it
could be questioned whether the capacity to desire an object is, as Tooley
suggests, a necessary condition for having a right to that object. If not, then
he only succeeds in showing that fetuses and young infants do not satisfy
certain suffi cient conditions for a right to life (they are not persons and their
mere potential for personhood is not itself suffi cient to ground a right to
life), but not that fetuses and young infants cannot have a right to life for
other reasons.
An organism possesses a serious right to life only if it possesses the concept
of a self as a continuing subject of experiences and other mental states, and
believes that it is itself such a continuing entity [ … ] [A] newborn baby does
not possess the concept of a continuing self, any more than a newborn kitten
possess such a concept. If so, infanticide during the time interval shortly after
birth must be morally acceptable. (Tooley “ Abortion, ” 62 – 3)
P1. If A has a morally serious right to X, then A must be able to want X.
P2. If A is able to want X, then A must be able to conceive of X.
C1. If A has a morally serious right to X, then A must be able to conceive
of X (hypothetical syllogism, P1, P2).
P3. Fetuses, young infants, and animals cannot conceive of their continuing
as subjects of mental states.
C2. Fetuses, young infants, and animals cannot want their continuing as
subjects of mental states ( modus tollens , P2, P3).
C3. Fetuses, young infants, and animals do not have morally serious
rights to continue as subjects of mental states ( modus tollens , P1, C2).
P4. If something does not have a morally serious right to life, then it is not
wrong to kill it painlessly.
C4. It is not wrong to kill fetuses, young infants, and animals painlessly
( modus ponens , C3, P4).
74
Rachels on Euthanasia
Leslie Burkholder
Rachels , James . “ Active and Passive Euthanasia , ” New England Journal of
Medicine 292 ( 1975 ): 78 – 80 .
Beauchamp , Tom L. “ A Reply to Rachels on Active and Passive Euthanasia , ”
in Medical Responsibility , edited by Wade L. Robison and Michael S.
Pritchard , 182 – 94 . Clifton, NJ : The Humana Press , 1979 .
Foot , Philippa . “ Killing and Letting Die , ” in Abortion: Moral and Legal
Perspectives , edited by James L. Garfi eld and Paul Hennessey , 177 – 85 .
Amherst, MA : University of Massachusetts Press , 1984 .
Perrett , Roy W. “ Killing, Letting Die, and the Bare Difference Argument , ”
Bioethics 10 ( 1996 ): 131 – 9 .
Active euthanasia happens when a medical professional or another kind of
person deliberately does something that causes a person to die. Passive
euthanasia, on the other hand, occurs when someone dies because medical
professionals or others don ’ t do something needed to keep the patient alive.
This might include not starting a treatment that would prevent the person ’ s
death or not continuing with a procedure or treatment that is keeping a
person or animal alive.
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
278 Leslie Burkholder

P4. All aborting of any healthy fetus would cause the loss to that individual

of all its future experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments.

C3. If A causes to individual F the loss of all future experiences, activities,

projects, and enjoyments, then A is seriously wrong (particular

instantiation, C2).

C4. If A is an abortion of healthy fetus F, then A causes to individual F

the loss of all future experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments

(particular instantiation, P4).

C5. If A is an abortion of healthy fetus F, then A is seriously wrong

(hypothetical syllogism, C3, C4).

C6. All aborting of any healthy fetus is seriously wrong (universal generalization,

C5).

73

Tooley on Abortion

and Infanticide

Ben Saunders

Tooley , Michael . “ Abortion and Infanticide . ” Philosophy & Public Affairs 2

( 1972 ): 37 – 65 .

___. Abortion and Infanticide . Oxford : Clarendon Press , 1983 .

Thomson , Judith Jarvis . “ A Defence of Abortion . ” Philosophy & Public

Affairs 1 ( 1971 ): 47 – 66 .

Abortion is understandably one of the more controversial ethical questions

facing philosophers. Most refuse to take a stance on whether the fetus is a

person. Thompson, for example, grants to her opponent that the fetus is

indeed a person, but argues that abortion is nonetheless permissible, since

one shouldn ’ t be required to suffer great hardship for nine months in order

to keep someone else alive.

Tooley argues that the fetus is not a person and nor in fact is a young

infant. The argument depends on distinguishing between “ human being ”

(which is a merely descriptive biological category) and “ person ” (which

depends on self - awareness and implies a right to life). It is possible that not

all persons are human – for instance, chimpanzees or dolphins may have

the right to life – and that not all humans are persons; for instance, those

in a persistent vegetative state. While the fetus or infant is undeniably

human, Tooley argues that it does not acquire a right to life until it becomes

self - aware. Before this point, it is permissible to kill the infant, even after

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

276 Ben Saunders

it is born. Tooley rejects the ideas that species membership or the mere fact

of being born make any difference to an entity ’ s rights, and he also argues

that the mere potentiality of personhood is not suffi cient to ground rights,

since it would be permissible to kill a kitten that was going to become a

person provided that one did so before it actually became a person.

The argument is important because it has implications not only for abortion

but other areas such as our treatment of animals. The conclusion is

obviously controversial, but that makes it all the more interesting if it can

be established from the premises. It is unclear that it can, however, since it

could be questioned whether the capacity to desire an object is, as Tooley

suggests, a necessary condition for having a right to that object. If not, then

he only succeeds in showing that fetuses and young infants do not satisfy

certain suffi cient conditions for a right to life (they are not persons and their

mere potential for personhood is not itself suffi cient to ground a right to

life), but not that fetuses and young infants cannot have a right to life for

other reasons.

An organism possesses a serious right to life only if it possesses the concept

of a self as a continuing subject of experiences and other mental states, and

believes that it is itself such a continuing entity [ … ] [A] newborn baby does

not possess the concept of a continuing self, any more than a newborn kitten

possess such a concept. If so, infanticide during the time interval shortly after

birth must be morally acceptable. (Tooley “ Abortion, ” 62 – 3)

P1. If A has a morally serious right to X, then A must be able to want X.

P2. If A is able to want X, then A must be able to conceive of X.

C1. If A has a morally serious right to X, then A must be able to conceive

of X (hypothetical syllogism, P1, P2).

P3. Fetuses, young infants, and animals cannot conceive of their continuing

as subjects of mental states.

C2. Fetuses, young infants, and animals cannot want their continuing as

subjects of mental states ( modus tollens , P2, P3).

C3. Fetuses, young infants, and animals do not have morally serious

rights to continue as subjects of mental states ( modus tollens , P1, C2).

P4. If something does not have a morally serious right to life, then it is not

wrong to kill it painlessly.

C4. It is not wrong to kill fetuses, young infants, and animals painlessly

( modus ponens , C3, P4).

74

Rachels on Euthanasia

Leslie Burkholder

Rachels , James . “ Active and Passive Euthanasia , ” New England Journal of

Medicine 292 ( 1975 ): 78 – 80 .

Beauchamp , Tom L. “ A Reply to Rachels on Active and Passive Euthanasia , ”

in Medical Responsibility , edited by Wade L. Robison and Michael S.

Pritchard , 182 – 94 . Clifton, NJ : The Humana Press , 1979 .

Foot , Philippa . “ Killing and Letting Die , ” in Abortion: Moral and Legal

Perspectives , edited by James L. Garfi eld and Paul Hennessey , 177 – 85 .

Amherst, MA : University of Massachusetts Press , 1984 .

Perrett , Roy W. “ Killing, Letting Die, and the Bare Difference Argument , ”

Bioethics 10 ( 1996 ): 131 – 9 .

Active euthanasia happens when a medical professional or another kind of

person deliberately does something that causes a person to die. Passive

euthanasia, on the other hand, occurs when someone dies because medical

professionals or others don ’ t do something needed to keep the patient alive.

This might include not starting a treatment that would prevent the person ’ s

death or not continuing with a procedure or treatment that is keeping a

person or animal alive.

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

278 Leslie Burkholder