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Thomson , Judith Jarvis . “ A Defense of Abortion . ” Philosophy and Public
Affairs 1 ( 1971 ): 47 – 66 .
“ A Defense of Abortion . ” Available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_
Defense_of_Abortion (accessed April 20, 2011 )
There are many sources of opposition to abortion. Sometimes this opposition
is based on thinking like the following: abortion results in the death
of the fetus. But a fetus is a human being or person and all human beings,
no matter what their age, have a moral right to continued life. So an abortion
infringes on the right to continued life of a person, a human being. Of
course the mother has rights too. She has a right to control what is done
with and to her own body. Her having an abortion would be an exercise
of this right. But the right to continued life is surely more important than
anyone ’ s right to control what is done to his body. So, even though the
mother has this right, its exercise or use to have an abortion wrongfully
violates another person ’ s – the fetus ’ – right to continued life. This means
that an abortion may not be done. It is ethically impermissible.
According to Judith Thomson, if this argument is deductively sound – if
it is deductively valid with all true premises – then in the following imaginary
case it would be morally impermissible to detach yourself from the
famous violinist.
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
270 Leslie Burkholder
You wake up in the morning and fi nd yourself back to back in bed with
an unconscious violinist. A famous unconscious violinist. He has been found
to have a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society of Music Lovers has canvassed
all the available medical records and found that you alone have the right
blood type to help. They have therefore kidnapped you, and last night the
violinist ’ s circulatory system was plugged into yours, so that your kidneys can
be used to extract poisons from his blood as well as your own. The director
of the hospital now tells you, “ Look, we ’ re sorry the Society of Music Lovers
did this to you – we would never have permitted it if we had known. But still,
they did it, and the violinist is now plugged into you. To unplug you would
be to kill him. But never mind, it ’ s only for nine months. By then he will have
recovered from his ailment, and can safely be unplugged from you. ” Is it
morally incumbent on you to accede to this situation? No doubt it would be
very nice of you if you did, a great kindness. But do you have to accede to
it? What if it were not nine months, but nine years? Or longer still? What if
the director of the hospital says, “ Tough luck. I agree, but now you ’ ve got to
stay in bed, with the violinist plugged into you, for the rest of your life.
Because remember this. All persons have a right to life, and violinists are
persons. Granted you have a right to decide what happens in and to your
body, but a person ’ s right to life outweighs your right to decide what happens
in and to your body. So you cannot ever be unplugged from him. ” I imagine
you would regard this as outrageous, which suggests that something really is
wrong with that plausible - sounding argument I mentioned a moment ago.
(Thomson, 48)
Thomson further says that you obviously have no moral obligation to
stay attached to the violinist. The violinist is a human, and so she has a
right to continued life, just as the fetus does. But that is not enough to prove
that you may not have yourself detached. You can volunteer to stay attached
and save the life of the violinist, but you are not ethically required to do
this.
P1. All abortions are acts resulting in the death of some fetus.
P2. All acts resulting in the death of some fetus result in the death of some
human being, person.
P3. Any act resulting in the death of some human being, person, is an
infringement of the right to continued life of some person, human being.
C1. If A is an abortion, then A results in the death of some fetus (universal
instantiation, P1).
C2. If A results in the death of some fetus, then A results in the death
of some human being, a person (universal instantiation, P2).
C3. If A results in the death of some human being, person, then A is an
infringement of the right to continued life of some person, human
being (universal instantiation, P3).
Thomson and the Famous Violinist 271
C4. If A is an abortion, then A results in the death of some human being,
a person (hypothetical syllogism, C1, C2).
C5. If A is an abortion, then A is an infringement of the right to continued
life of some person, human being (hypothetical syllogism, C3,
C4).
C6. All abortions are infringement of the right to continued life of some
person, human being (universal generalization, C5).
P4. All abortions are exercises of the mother ’ s right to control of her own
body.
P5. All exercises of the mother ’ s right to control of her own body are exercises
of some person ’ s right to control of her own body.
C7. If A is an abortion, then A is an infringement of the right to continued
life of some person, human being (universal instantiation, C6).
C8. If A is an abortion, then A is an exercise of the mother ’ s right to
control of her own body (universal instantiation, P4).
C9. If A is an exercise of the mother ’ s right to control of her own body,
then A is an exercise of some person ’ s right to control of her own
body (universal instantiation, P5).
C10. If A is an abortion, then A is an exercise of some person ’ s right to
control of her own body (hypothetical syllogism, C8, C9).
C11. Not A is an abortion or A is an infringement of the right to continued
life of some person, human being (implication, C7).
C12. Not A is an abortion or A is an exercise of some person ’ s right to
control of her own body (material implication, C10).
C13. Both not A is an abortion or A is an infringement of the right to
continued life of some person, and not A is an abortion or A is an
exercise of some person ’ s right to control of her own body (conjunction,
C12, C11).
C14. Not A is an abortion or both A is an infringement of the right to
continued life of some person, human being and A is an exercise of
some person ’ s right to control of her own body (distribution, C13).
C15. If A is an abortion, then both A is an infringement of the right to
continued life of some person, human being, and A is an exercise of some

Thomson , Judith Jarvis . “ A Defense of Abortion . ” Philosophy and Public

Affairs 1 ( 1971 ): 47 – 66 .

“ A Defense of Abortion . ” Available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_

Defense_of_Abortion (accessed April 20, 2011 )

There are many sources of opposition to abortion. Sometimes this opposition

is based on thinking like the following: abortion results in the death

of the fetus. But a fetus is a human being or person and all human beings,

no matter what their age, have a moral right to continued life. So an abortion

infringes on the right to continued life of a person, a human being. Of

course the mother has rights too. She has a right to control what is done

with and to her own body. Her having an abortion would be an exercise

of this right. But the right to continued life is surely more important than

anyone ’ s right to control what is done to his body. So, even though the

mother has this right, its exercise or use to have an abortion wrongfully

violates another person ’ s – the fetus ’ – right to continued life. This means

that an abortion may not be done. It is ethically impermissible.

According to Judith Thomson, if this argument is deductively sound – if

it is deductively valid with all true premises – then in the following imaginary

case it would be morally impermissible to detach yourself from the

famous violinist.

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

270 Leslie Burkholder

You wake up in the morning and fi nd yourself back to back in bed with

an unconscious violinist. A famous unconscious violinist. He has been found

to have a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society of Music Lovers has canvassed

all the available medical records and found that you alone have the right

blood type to help. They have therefore kidnapped you, and last night the

violinist ’ s circulatory system was plugged into yours, so that your kidneys can

be used to extract poisons from his blood as well as your own. The director

of the hospital now tells you, “ Look, we ’ re sorry the Society of Music Lovers

did this to you – we would never have permitted it if we had known. But still,

they did it, and the violinist is now plugged into you. To unplug you would

be to kill him. But never mind, it ’ s only for nine months. By then he will have

recovered from his ailment, and can safely be unplugged from you. ” Is it

morally incumbent on you to accede to this situation? No doubt it would be

very nice of you if you did, a great kindness. But do you have to accede to

it? What if it were not nine months, but nine years? Or longer still? What if

the director of the hospital says, “ Tough luck. I agree, but now you ’ ve got to

stay in bed, with the violinist plugged into you, for the rest of your life.

Because remember this. All persons have a right to life, and violinists are

persons. Granted you have a right to decide what happens in and to your

body, but a person ’ s right to life outweighs your right to decide what happens

in and to your body. So you cannot ever be unplugged from him. ” I imagine

you would regard this as outrageous, which suggests that something really is

wrong with that plausible - sounding argument I mentioned a moment ago.

(Thomson, 48)

Thomson further says that you obviously have no moral obligation to

stay attached to the violinist. The violinist is a human, and so she has a

right to continued life, just as the fetus does. But that is not enough to prove

that you may not have yourself detached. You can volunteer to stay attached

and save the life of the violinist, but you are not ethically required to do

this.

P1. All abortions are acts resulting in the death of some fetus.

P2. All acts resulting in the death of some fetus result in the death of some

human being, person.

P3. Any act resulting in the death of some human being, person, is an

infringement of the right to continued life of some person, human being.

C1. If A is an abortion, then A results in the death of some fetus (universal

instantiation, P1).

C2. If A results in the death of some fetus, then A results in the death

of some human being, a person (universal instantiation, P2).

C3. If A results in the death of some human being, person, then A is an

infringement of the right to continued life of some person, human

being (universal instantiation, P3).

Thomson and the Famous Violinist 271

C4. If A is an abortion, then A results in the death of some human being,

a person (hypothetical syllogism, C1, C2).

C5. If A is an abortion, then A is an infringement of the right to continued

life of some person, human being (hypothetical syllogism, C3,

C4).

C6. All abortions are infringement of the right to continued life of some

person, human being (universal generalization, C5).

P4. All abortions are exercises of the mother ’ s right to control of her own

body.

P5. All exercises of the mother ’ s right to control of her own body are exercises

of some person ’ s right to control of her own body.

C7. If A is an abortion, then A is an infringement of the right to continued

life of some person, human being (universal instantiation, C6).

C8. If A is an abortion, then A is an exercise of the mother ’ s right to

control of her own body (universal instantiation, P4).

C9. If A is an exercise of the mother ’ s right to control of her own body,

then A is an exercise of some person ’ s right to control of her own

body (universal instantiation, P5).

C10. If A is an abortion, then A is an exercise of some person ’ s right to

control of her own body (hypothetical syllogism, C8, C9).

C11. Not A is an abortion or A is an infringement of the right to continued

life of some person, human being (implication, C7).

C12. Not A is an abortion or A is an exercise of some person ’ s right to

control of her own body (material implication, C10).

C13. Both not A is an abortion or A is an infringement of the right to

continued life of some person, and not A is an abortion or A is an

exercise of some person ’ s right to control of her own body (conjunction,

C12, C11).

C14. Not A is an abortion or both A is an infringement of the right to

continued life of some person, human being and A is an exercise of

some person ’ s right to control of her own body (distribution, C13).

C15. If A is an abortion, then both A is an infringement of the right to

continued life of some person, human being, and A is an exercise of some