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children regarding the problems with gender stereotyping ( modus
ponens , P18, C10).
69
Moral Status of Animals from
Marginal Cases
Julia Tanner
Bernstein , Mark . “ Marginal Cases and Moral Relevance . ” Journal of Social
Philosophy 33 , 4 ( 2002 ): 523 – 39 .
Narveson , Jan. “ Animal Rights . ” Canadian Journal of Philosophy VII
( 1977 ): 161 – 78 .
Porphyry . On Abstinence from Animal Food , translated by Thomas Taylor.
London : Centaur Press , 1965 .
Singer , Peter . Animal Liberation . London : Pimlico , 1995 .
It matters a great deal whether animals have moral status. If animals have
moral status, it may be wrong for us to use them as we currently do –
hunting, farming, eating, and experimenting on them. The argument from
marginal cases provides us with a reason to think that some animals have
moral status that is equal to that of “ marginal ” humans.
Many of those who deny that animals have moral status argue that moral
status depends on rational agency or the ability to use language or some
other capacity/capacities that only humans have. There are many such
capacities, so I shall use capacity X to stand in for them all.
But pinning moral status on X (rational agency or any capacity that is
typical of normal adult humans) is problematic. Not all humans will have
X (not all humans are normal adult humans). There are some humans,
known as marginal humans, who do not possess, or do not fully possess,
X. The reason that such humans are called “ marginal cases ” is that they
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
264 Julia Tanner
are atypical insofar as they do not possess the all - important capacity X.
There are, broadly speaking, three types of marginal humans: pre - X – they
have yet to acquire X, such as children; post - X – they have permanently
lost X due to illness, accident, or old age; and non - X – they do not, never
have had, and never will have X.
Those who argue that moral status depends on X are, therefore, faced
with a dilemma. Either, they must admit that marginal humans lack moral
status because they lack X, or they must concede that moral status depends
on something other than X (I will call this “ Z ” ). But some animals will also
have Z. Thus, it must be conceded that those animals (with Z) have moral
status too. This is the argument from marginal cases.
The argument from marginal cases has roots in ancient Greece. Porphyry
was the fi rst to make it (III. 19). But the term “ argument from marginal
cases ” was coined more recently by Narveson (an opponent of the argument)
(164). Peter Singer gives one of the earliest contemporary formulations
(see below). Following Singer ’ s version is a generic version of the
argument.
[H]uman beings are not equal [ . . . ] if we seek some characteristic that all
of them possess [ . . . it] must be a kind of lowest common denominator,
pitched so low that no human being lacks it. The catch is that any such
characteristic [ . . . ] possessed by all human beings will not be possessed only
by human beings. (Singer, 237)
P1. If there is no morally relevant difference between marginal humans and
some nonhuman animals, then if marginal humans have moral status, so
do some nonhuman animals.
P2. There is no morally relevant difference between marginal humans and
some nonhuman animals.
C1. If marginal humans have moral status, then so do some nonhuman
animals ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
P3. Marginal humans have moral status.
C2. Some nonhuman animals have moral status ( modus ponens , C1, P3).
70
The Ethical Vegetarianism
Argument
Robert L. Muhlnickel
Bentham , Jeremy. The Classical Utilitarians , edited by J. Troyer . Indianapolis :
Hackett , 2003 .
DeGrazia , David . Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral Status .
Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press , 1996 .
Rachels , James . “ The Basic Argument for Vegetarianism , ” in The Legacy of
Socrates , edited by S. Rachels , 3 – 15 . New York : Columbia University
Press , 2007 .
Singer , Peter. “ All Animals Are Equal . ” Philosophical Exchange 1 , 5 ( 1974 ):
103 – 16 . Reprinted in Unsanctifying Human Life , edited by H. Kuhse .
Oxford : Blackwell , 2002 .
___. Animal Liberation . New York : Harper Perennial , 2009 .
The ethics of relations between human and nonhuman animals is a minor
topic in the history of Western moral philosophy. Philosophers have given
it more attention since the 1970s, when Peter Singer ’ s work prompted much
thinking about the interests of nonhuman animals. Singer ’ s signature claim
is that the same interests of nonhuman animals and humans deserve the
same degree of moral consideration. At the time, he pressed the analogy
with contemporary liberation movements, saying that nonhuman animals
were unfairly denied moral status just as women and people of color had
been unfairly denied moral status. However, Singer ’ s judgments of social
status and claims of oppression contribute less to its philosophical merit
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
266 Robert L. Muhlnickel
than the impetus he gave to re - thinking the criteria of basic moral status.
The argument presented here makes claims about moral status explicit.
This argument has had more infl uence among nonphilosophers than any
philosophical argument of the past fi fty years, with the possible exceptions
of John Rawls ’ A Theory of Justice and Thomas Kuhn ’ s The Structure of
Scientifi c Revolutions (#90). Although the argument concludes that vegetarianism
is morally required, the considerations adduced in its premises
can be extended to moral judgments about using nonhuman animals in
research, manufacturing, entertainment, and companionship.

children regarding the problems with gender stereotyping ( modus

ponens , P18, C10).

69

Moral Status of Animals from

Marginal Cases

Julia Tanner

Bernstein , Mark . “ Marginal Cases and Moral Relevance . ” Journal of Social

Philosophy 33 , 4 ( 2002 ): 523 – 39 .

Narveson , Jan. “ Animal Rights . ” Canadian Journal of Philosophy VII

( 1977 ): 161 – 78 .

Porphyry . On Abstinence from Animal Food , translated by Thomas Taylor.

London : Centaur Press , 1965 .

Singer , Peter . Animal Liberation . London : Pimlico , 1995 .

It matters a great deal whether animals have moral status. If animals have

moral status, it may be wrong for us to use them as we currently do –

hunting, farming, eating, and experimenting on them. The argument from

marginal cases provides us with a reason to think that some animals have

moral status that is equal to that of “ marginal ” humans.

Many of those who deny that animals have moral status argue that moral

status depends on rational agency or the ability to use language or some

other capacity/capacities that only humans have. There are many such

capacities, so I shall use capacity X to stand in for them all.

But pinning moral status on X (rational agency or any capacity that is

typical of normal adult humans) is problematic. Not all humans will have

X (not all humans are normal adult humans). There are some humans,

known as marginal humans, who do not possess, or do not fully possess,

X. The reason that such humans are called “ marginal cases ” is that they

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

264 Julia Tanner

are atypical insofar as they do not possess the all - important capacity X.

There are, broadly speaking, three types of marginal humans: pre - X – they

have yet to acquire X, such as children; post - X – they have permanently

lost X due to illness, accident, or old age; and non - X – they do not, never

have had, and never will have X.

Those who argue that moral status depends on X are, therefore, faced

with a dilemma. Either, they must admit that marginal humans lack moral

status because they lack X, or they must concede that moral status depends

on something other than X (I will call this “ Z ” ). But some animals will also

have Z. Thus, it must be conceded that those animals (with Z) have moral

status too. This is the argument from marginal cases.

The argument from marginal cases has roots in ancient Greece. Porphyry

was the fi rst to make it (III. 19). But the term “ argument from marginal

cases ” was coined more recently by Narveson (an opponent of the argument)

(164). Peter Singer gives one of the earliest contemporary formulations

(see below). Following Singer ’ s version is a generic version of the

argument.

[H]uman beings are not equal [ . . . ] if we seek some characteristic that all

of them possess [ . . . it] must be a kind of lowest common denominator,

pitched so low that no human being lacks it. The catch is that any such

characteristic [ . . . ] possessed by all human beings will not be possessed only

by human beings. (Singer, 237)

P1. If there is no morally relevant difference between marginal humans and

some nonhuman animals, then if marginal humans have moral status, so

do some nonhuman animals.

P2. There is no morally relevant difference between marginal humans and

some nonhuman animals.

C1. If marginal humans have moral status, then so do some nonhuman

animals ( modus ponens , P1, P2).

P3. Marginal humans have moral status.

C2. Some nonhuman animals have moral status ( modus ponens , C1, P3).

70

The Ethical Vegetarianism

Argument

Robert L. Muhlnickel

Bentham , Jeremy. The Classical Utilitarians , edited by J. Troyer . Indianapolis :

Hackett , 2003 .

DeGrazia , David . Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral Status .

Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press , 1996 .

Rachels , James . “ The Basic Argument for Vegetarianism , ” in The Legacy of

Socrates , edited by S. Rachels , 3 – 15 . New York : Columbia University

Press , 2007 .

Singer , Peter. “ All Animals Are Equal . ” Philosophical Exchange 1 , 5 ( 1974 ):

103 – 16 . Reprinted in Unsanctifying Human Life , edited by H. Kuhse .

Oxford : Blackwell , 2002 .

___. Animal Liberation . New York : Harper Perennial , 2009 .

The ethics of relations between human and nonhuman animals is a minor

topic in the history of Western moral philosophy. Philosophers have given

it more attention since the 1970s, when Peter Singer ’ s work prompted much

thinking about the interests of nonhuman animals. Singer ’ s signature claim

is that the same interests of nonhuman animals and humans deserve the

same degree of moral consideration. At the time, he pressed the analogy

with contemporary liberation movements, saying that nonhuman animals

were unfairly denied moral status just as women and people of color had

been unfairly denied moral status. However, Singer ’ s judgments of social

status and claims of oppression contribute less to its philosophical merit

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

266 Robert L. Muhlnickel

than the impetus he gave to re - thinking the criteria of basic moral status.

The argument presented here makes claims about moral status explicit.

This argument has had more infl uence among nonphilosophers than any

philosophical argument of the past fi fty years, with the possible exceptions

of John Rawls ’ A Theory of Justice and Thomas Kuhn ’ s The Structure of

Scientifi c Revolutions (#90). Although the argument concludes that vegetarianism

is morally required, the considerations adduced in its premises

can be extended to moral judgments about using nonhuman animals in

research, manufacturing, entertainment, and companionship.