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The argument for ethical vegetarianism starts by asserting that the ability
to suffer is the ground of basic moral consideration. A being deserves basic
moral consideration if it deserves consideration for its own sake. In contrast,
something deserves derivative moral consideration if it deserves consideration
for the sake of something else. The Ethical Vegetarianism
Argument aims to show that nonhuman animals deserve basic moral
consideration.
A being deserves basic moral consideration just in case we are morally
required to take its interests into account when deliberating about what to
do. The ability to suffer is roughly co - extensive with sentience, the capacity
to experience pain, pleasure, and frustration and satisfaction of desires.
Anything that deserves basic moral consideration is said to have interests.
If so, then any being that can suffer has an interest in avoiding suffering.
Things that cannot suffer might merit derivative moral consideration even
when they do not merit consideration for their own sakes.
Knowing that a being deserves moral consideration is necessary but not
suffi cient for moral judgment. In addition, we need to know how various
beings ’ interests stand in relation to one another. The Equal Consideration
of Interests Principle is an independent premise telling us that interests
themselves are equal, regardless of the kind of being that has the interests.
Thus, the Equal Consideration of Interests Principle asserts that the criterion
of moral consideration, the ability to suffer, applies to both nonhuman
and human animals. Thus, the same suffering ought to have the same weight
in judging the rightness or wrongness of our actions, whether a human
nonhuman animal experiences that suffering.
The argument derives C3 from P4 and P5, concluding that causing a
being to suffer without adequate justifi cation is morally wrong. P6 and P7
apply the Equal Consideration of Interests Principle, stated in P3, and C3
to eating meat, concluding that doing so is morally wrong. The premises
introduce the factual claims that industrial production of meat involves
confi ning, killing, and causing animals to experience pain and that by eating
meat one participates in confi ning, killing, and causing pain.
Singer ’ s earliest statement of the argument is his “ All Animals Are
Equal, ” published in 1974 in Philosophical Exchange . The journal is not
The Ethical Vegetarianism Argument 267
widely available, but the article is frequently anthologized. The quotation
below is from Singer ’ s Unsanctifying Human Life.
If a being suffers, there can be no moral justifi cation for refusing to take
that suffering into consideration. No matter what the nature of the being, the
principle of equality requires that its suffering be counted equally with the
like suffering – insofar as rough comparisons can be made – of any other
being. If a being is not capable of suffering, or of experiencing enjoyment or
happiness, there is nothing to be taken into account. This is why the limit of
sentience (using the term as a convenient, if not strictly accurate, shorthand
for the capacity to suffer or experience enjoyment or happiness) is the only
defensible boundary of concern for the interests of others. To mark this
boundary by some characteristic like intelligence or rationality would be to
mark it in an arbitrary way. Why not choose some other characteristic, like
skin color?
The racist violates the principles of equality by giving greater weight to
the interests of members of his own race, when there is a clash between their
interests and the interests of those of another race. Similarly, the speciesist
allows the interests of his own species to override the greater interests of
members of other species. The pattern is the same in each case. Most humans
are speciesists. I shall now briefl y describe some of the practices that show
this.
For the great majority of human beings, especially in urban, industrialized
societies, the most direct form of contact with members of other species is at
mealtimes: we eat them. In doing so we treat them purely as means to our
ends. We regard their life and well - being as subordinate to our taste for a
particular kind of dish. I say “ taste ” deliberately – this is purely a matter of
pleasing our palate. There can be no defense of eating fl esh in terms of satisfying
nutritional needs, since it has been established beyond doubt that we could
satisfy our need for protein and other essential nutrients far more effi ciently
with a diet that replaced animal fl esh by soy beans, or products derived from
soy beans, and other high - protein vegetable products.
It is not merely the act of killing that indicates what we are ready to do
to other species in order to gratify our tastes. The suffering we infl ict on the
animals while they are alive is perhaps an even clearer indication of our speciesism
than the fact that we are prepared to kill them. (84 – 5)
P1. If a being can suffer, then that being ’ s interests merit moral
consideration.
P2. If a being cannot suffer, then that being ’ s interests do not merit moral
consideration.
C1. If a being ’ s interests merit moral consideration, then that being can
suffer (transposition, P2).
C2. A being ’ s interests merit moral consideration if and only if that being
can suffer (material equivalence, P1, C1).
268 Robert L. Muhlnickel
P3. The same interests merit the same moral consideration, regardless of
what kind of being is the interest - bearer (equal consideration of interests
principle).
P4. If one causes a being to suffer without adequate justifi cation, then one
violates that being ’ s interests.
P5. If one violates a being ’ s interests, then one does what is morally wrong.
C3. If one causes a being to suffer without adequate justifi cation, then
one does what is morally wrong (hypothetical syllogism, P4, P5).
P6. If P3, then if one kills, confi nes, or causes nonhuman animals to experience
pain in order to use them as food, then one causes them to suffer
without adequate justifi cation.
P7. If one eats meat, then one participates in killing, confi ning, and causing
nonhuman animals to experience pain in order to use them as food.
C4. If one eats meat, then one causes nonhuman animals to suffer
without adequate justifi cation (hypothetical syllogism, P6, P7).
C5. If one eats meat, the one does what is morally wrong (hypothetical
syllogism, C3, C4).
71
Thomson and the Famous
Violinist
Leslie Burkholder

The argument for ethical vegetarianism starts by asserting that the ability

to suffer is the ground of basic moral consideration. A being deserves basic

moral consideration if it deserves consideration for its own sake. In contrast,

something deserves derivative moral consideration if it deserves consideration

for the sake of something else. The Ethical Vegetarianism

Argument aims to show that nonhuman animals deserve basic moral

consideration.

A being deserves basic moral consideration just in case we are morally

required to take its interests into account when deliberating about what to

do. The ability to suffer is roughly co - extensive with sentience, the capacity

to experience pain, pleasure, and frustration and satisfaction of desires.

Anything that deserves basic moral consideration is said to have interests.

If so, then any being that can suffer has an interest in avoiding suffering.

Things that cannot suffer might merit derivative moral consideration even

when they do not merit consideration for their own sakes.

Knowing that a being deserves moral consideration is necessary but not

suffi cient for moral judgment. In addition, we need to know how various

beings ’ interests stand in relation to one another. The Equal Consideration

of Interests Principle is an independent premise telling us that interests

themselves are equal, regardless of the kind of being that has the interests.

Thus, the Equal Consideration of Interests Principle asserts that the criterion

of moral consideration, the ability to suffer, applies to both nonhuman

and human animals. Thus, the same suffering ought to have the same weight

in judging the rightness or wrongness of our actions, whether a human

nonhuman animal experiences that suffering.

The argument derives C3 from P4 and P5, concluding that causing a

being to suffer without adequate justifi cation is morally wrong. P6 and P7

apply the Equal Consideration of Interests Principle, stated in P3, and C3

to eating meat, concluding that doing so is morally wrong. The premises

introduce the factual claims that industrial production of meat involves

confi ning, killing, and causing animals to experience pain and that by eating

meat one participates in confi ning, killing, and causing pain.

Singer ’ s earliest statement of the argument is his “ All Animals Are

Equal, ” published in 1974 in Philosophical Exchange . The journal is not

The Ethical Vegetarianism Argument 267

widely available, but the article is frequently anthologized. The quotation

below is from Singer ’ s Unsanctifying Human Life.

If a being suffers, there can be no moral justifi cation for refusing to take

that suffering into consideration. No matter what the nature of the being, the

principle of equality requires that its suffering be counted equally with the

like suffering – insofar as rough comparisons can be made – of any other

being. If a being is not capable of suffering, or of experiencing enjoyment or

happiness, there is nothing to be taken into account. This is why the limit of

sentience (using the term as a convenient, if not strictly accurate, shorthand

for the capacity to suffer or experience enjoyment or happiness) is the only

defensible boundary of concern for the interests of others. To mark this

boundary by some characteristic like intelligence or rationality would be to

mark it in an arbitrary way. Why not choose some other characteristic, like

skin color?

The racist violates the principles of equality by giving greater weight to

the interests of members of his own race, when there is a clash between their

interests and the interests of those of another race. Similarly, the speciesist

allows the interests of his own species to override the greater interests of

members of other species. The pattern is the same in each case. Most humans

are speciesists. I shall now briefl y describe some of the practices that show

this.

For the great majority of human beings, especially in urban, industrialized

societies, the most direct form of contact with members of other species is at

mealtimes: we eat them. In doing so we treat them purely as means to our

ends. We regard their life and well - being as subordinate to our taste for a

particular kind of dish. I say “ taste ” deliberately – this is purely a matter of

pleasing our palate. There can be no defense of eating fl esh in terms of satisfying

nutritional needs, since it has been established beyond doubt that we could

satisfy our need for protein and other essential nutrients far more effi ciently

with a diet that replaced animal fl esh by soy beans, or products derived from

soy beans, and other high - protein vegetable products.

It is not merely the act of killing that indicates what we are ready to do

to other species in order to gratify our tastes. The suffering we infl ict on the

animals while they are alive is perhaps an even clearer indication of our speciesism

than the fact that we are prepared to kill them. (84 – 5)

P1. If a being can suffer, then that being ’ s interests merit moral

consideration.

P2. If a being cannot suffer, then that being ’ s interests do not merit moral

consideration.

C1. If a being ’ s interests merit moral consideration, then that being can

suffer (transposition, P2).

C2. A being ’ s interests merit moral consideration if and only if that being

can suffer (material equivalence, P1, C1).

268 Robert L. Muhlnickel

P3. The same interests merit the same moral consideration, regardless of

what kind of being is the interest - bearer (equal consideration of interests

principle).

P4. If one causes a being to suffer without adequate justifi cation, then one

violates that being ’ s interests.

P5. If one violates a being ’ s interests, then one does what is morally wrong.

C3. If one causes a being to suffer without adequate justifi cation, then

one does what is morally wrong (hypothetical syllogism, P4, P5).

P6. If P3, then if one kills, confi nes, or causes nonhuman animals to experience

pain in order to use them as food, then one causes them to suffer

without adequate justifi cation.

P7. If one eats meat, then one participates in killing, confi ning, and causing

nonhuman animals to experience pain in order to use them as food.

C4. If one eats meat, then one causes nonhuman animals to suffer

without adequate justifi cation (hypothetical syllogism, P6, P7).

C5. If one eats meat, the one does what is morally wrong (hypothetical

syllogism, C3, C4).

71

Thomson and the Famous

Violinist

Leslie Burkholder