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person ’ s right to control of her own body (material implication, C14)
P6. All acts that are an infringement of the right to continued life of some
person, human being, and exercise of some person ’ s right to control of
her own body are wrongful infringements of the right to continued life
of some person, human being, and may not be done.
C16. If A is an infringement of the right to continued life of some person,
human being, and A is an exercise of some person ’ s right to control
of her own body, then A is wrongful infringement of the right to
continued life of some person, human being, and may not be done
(universal instantiation, P6).
272 Leslie Burkholder
C17. If A is an abortion, then A is wrongful infringement of the right to
continued life of some person, human being, and may not be done
(hypothetical syllogism, C15, C16).
C18. No abortion may not be done. All abortions are ethically impermissible
(universal generalization, C17).
Thomson ’ s argument against the argument above is deductively valid. So
if its premises are both true, then its conclusion must be true. That would
mean that the reasoning against abortion – the reasoning that says abortion
is immoral and may not be done – would be unsound. But that reasoning
is deductively valid. So if both the premises in Thomson ’ s reasoning are
true, at least one of the premises in the argument opposing abortion is false.
It is pretty easy to see which one or ones that must be. It is premise P6.
The fact that you may detach yourself in the imaginary case of the famous
violinist shows that the rule stated in premise P6 is not true – someone else ’ s
right to life does not always outweigh the right to control what is done to
your own body.
Not everyone accepts that the premises in Thomson ’ s argument are both
true. Some writers think you cannot detach yourself. In that case, premise
P2 in Thomson ’ s own argument would be false. Some others say that the
conditional in premise P1 in her reasoning is false. The reasoning against
abortion is sound, and yet you may detach yourself from the violinist. This
is because there is some morally important difference between the case of
a mother ’ s aborting a fetus inside her and your detaching the violinist.
P1. If the reasoning opposing abortion is deductively sound, then you may
not detach yourself from the famous violinist.
P2. You are allowed to detach yourself from the violinist. You are not ethically
required to stay attached.
C. The reasoning opposing abortion is not deductively sound ( modus
tollens , P1, P2).
72
Marquis and the Immorality
of Abortion
Leslie Burkholder
Marquis , Don . “ Why Abortion Is Immoral . ” The Journal of Philosophy 86
( 1989 ): 183 – 202 .
Thomson , Judith Jarvis . “ A Defense of Abortion . ” Philosophy and Public
Affairs 1 ( 1971 ): 47 – 66 .
According to Don Marquis, abortions are impermissible because of the
following line of reasoning. Surely, sometimes killing a particular adult or
child is wrong, seriously wrong. Probably, for example, killing you or me
or your little brother right now would be wrong. What makes the killing
so wrong, what explains its wrongness, is that it causes the loss of all the
future experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments that would be had
by you or me or your little brother, and this loss is one of the greatest losses
that can be suffered. But if that explanation is correct, then anything that
causes the loss of all future experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments
is seriously wrong. Abortions of a healthy fetus cause just this loss. They
cause the loss of all future experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments
the fetus would have were it not aborted. So abortions are not just ethically
wrong but seriously wrong.
Marquis ’ argument is deductively valid. This means that if anything is
wrong with the reasoning, one or more of its premises must be false. If they
are all true, the conclusion would also have to be true. One premise that
seems to be false is premise 3. It is a conditional. For it to be false, all that
would need to happen is that the antecedent be true and the consequent be
false. The antecedent in premise 3 is the consequent in premise 2. So it is
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
274 Leslie Burkholder
easy to work out that it should be true. What about the consequent of
premise 3? Look at the chapter in this volume examining Judy Thomson ’ s
famous violinist imaginary case (#71). Detaching yourself from the violinist
would end all that individual ’ s future experiences, activities, projects, and
enjoyments. But would it be wrong for you to detach yourself? If not, then
the consequent of premise 3 is false.
What makes it wrong? Here ’ s one central thing: killing us deprives us of
the value of our future. It deprives us not only of what we value now and
would have, given our current predilections, valued later, but also of what we
would have come to value. (190)
P1. Killing this particular adult human being or child would be seriously
wrong.
P2. What makes it so wrong is that it causes the loss of all this individual ’ s
future experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments, and this loss is
one of the greatest losses that can be suffered.
C1. Killing this particular adult human being or child would be seriously
wrong, and what makes it so wrong is that it causes the loss of all
this individual ’ s future experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments,
and this loss is one of the greatest losses that can be suffered
(conjunction, P1, P2).
P3. If killing this particular adult human being or child would be seriously
wrong and what makes it so wrong is that it causes the loss of all this
individual ’ s future experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments and
this loss is one of the greatest losses that can be suffered, then anything
that causes to any individual the loss of all future experiences, activities,
projects, and enjoyments is seriously wrong.
C2. Anything that causes to any individual the loss of all future experiences,
activities, projects, and enjoyments is seriously wrong ( modus
ponens , C1, P3).

person ’ s right to control of her own body (material implication, C14)

P6. All acts that are an infringement of the right to continued life of some

person, human being, and exercise of some person ’ s right to control of

her own body are wrongful infringements of the right to continued life

of some person, human being, and may not be done.

C16. If A is an infringement of the right to continued life of some person,

human being, and A is an exercise of some person ’ s right to control

of her own body, then A is wrongful infringement of the right to

continued life of some person, human being, and may not be done

(universal instantiation, P6).

272 Leslie Burkholder

C17. If A is an abortion, then A is wrongful infringement of the right to

continued life of some person, human being, and may not be done

(hypothetical syllogism, C15, C16).

C18. No abortion may not be done. All abortions are ethically impermissible

(universal generalization, C17).

Thomson ’ s argument against the argument above is deductively valid. So

if its premises are both true, then its conclusion must be true. That would

mean that the reasoning against abortion – the reasoning that says abortion

is immoral and may not be done – would be unsound. But that reasoning

is deductively valid. So if both the premises in Thomson ’ s reasoning are

true, at least one of the premises in the argument opposing abortion is false.

It is pretty easy to see which one or ones that must be. It is premise P6.

The fact that you may detach yourself in the imaginary case of the famous

violinist shows that the rule stated in premise P6 is not true – someone else ’ s

right to life does not always outweigh the right to control what is done to

your own body.

Not everyone accepts that the premises in Thomson ’ s argument are both

true. Some writers think you cannot detach yourself. In that case, premise

P2 in Thomson ’ s own argument would be false. Some others say that the

conditional in premise P1 in her reasoning is false. The reasoning against

abortion is sound, and yet you may detach yourself from the violinist. This

is because there is some morally important difference between the case of

a mother ’ s aborting a fetus inside her and your detaching the violinist.

P1. If the reasoning opposing abortion is deductively sound, then you may

not detach yourself from the famous violinist.

P2. You are allowed to detach yourself from the violinist. You are not ethically

required to stay attached.

C. The reasoning opposing abortion is not deductively sound ( modus

tollens , P1, P2).

72

Marquis and the Immorality

of Abortion

Leslie Burkholder

Marquis , Don . “ Why Abortion Is Immoral . ” The Journal of Philosophy 86

( 1989 ): 183 – 202 .

Thomson , Judith Jarvis . “ A Defense of Abortion . ” Philosophy and Public

Affairs 1 ( 1971 ): 47 – 66 .

According to Don Marquis, abortions are impermissible because of the

following line of reasoning. Surely, sometimes killing a particular adult or

child is wrong, seriously wrong. Probably, for example, killing you or me

or your little brother right now would be wrong. What makes the killing

so wrong, what explains its wrongness, is that it causes the loss of all the

future experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments that would be had

by you or me or your little brother, and this loss is one of the greatest losses

that can be suffered. But if that explanation is correct, then anything that

causes the loss of all future experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments

is seriously wrong. Abortions of a healthy fetus cause just this loss. They

cause the loss of all future experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments

the fetus would have were it not aborted. So abortions are not just ethically

wrong but seriously wrong.

Marquis ’ argument is deductively valid. This means that if anything is

wrong with the reasoning, one or more of its premises must be false. If they

are all true, the conclusion would also have to be true. One premise that

seems to be false is premise 3. It is a conditional. For it to be false, all that

would need to happen is that the antecedent be true and the consequent be

false. The antecedent in premise 3 is the consequent in premise 2. So it is

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

274 Leslie Burkholder

easy to work out that it should be true. What about the consequent of

premise 3? Look at the chapter in this volume examining Judy Thomson ’ s

famous violinist imaginary case (#71). Detaching yourself from the violinist

would end all that individual ’ s future experiences, activities, projects, and

enjoyments. But would it be wrong for you to detach yourself? If not, then

the consequent of premise 3 is false.

What makes it wrong? Here ’ s one central thing: killing us deprives us of

the value of our future. It deprives us not only of what we value now and

would have, given our current predilections, valued later, but also of what we

would have come to value. (190)

P1. Killing this particular adult human being or child would be seriously

wrong.

P2. What makes it so wrong is that it causes the loss of all this individual ’ s

future experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments, and this loss is

one of the greatest losses that can be suffered.

C1. Killing this particular adult human being or child would be seriously

wrong, and what makes it so wrong is that it causes the loss of all

this individual ’ s future experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments,

and this loss is one of the greatest losses that can be suffered

(conjunction, P1, P2).

P3. If killing this particular adult human being or child would be seriously

wrong and what makes it so wrong is that it causes the loss of all this

individual ’ s future experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments and

this loss is one of the greatest losses that can be suffered, then anything

that causes to any individual the loss of all future experiences, activities,

projects, and enjoyments is seriously wrong.

C2. Anything that causes to any individual the loss of all future experiences,

activities, projects, and enjoyments is seriously wrong ( modus

ponens , C1, P3).