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simultaneously existing spatiotemporally extended things belonging to the
same metaphysical category – in this case, of material entities. Where psychological
entities are concerned, Descartes is emphatic that the mind
cannot be similarly divided. As to the problem of split personalities, or
multiple personal disorder (MPD), Descartes, as we should expect, has
nothing to say. He could presumably argue that in such circumstances there
must be distinct independent minds occupying the same body, perhaps at
different times, each of which, again, unlike the body, remains indivisible
into independently existent minds as self - subsistent continuing minds,
rather than being unifi ed distinct components of one and the same mind.
In order to begin this examination, then, I here say, in the fi rst place, that
there is a great difference between mind and body, inasmuch as body is by
296 Dale Jacquette
nature always divisible, and the mind is entirely indivisible. For, as a matter
of fact, when I consider the mind, that is to say, myself inasmuch as I am only
a thinking thing, I cannot distinguish in myself any parts, but apprehend
myself to be clearly one and entire; and although the whole mind seems to
be united to the whole body, yet if a foot, or an arm, or some other part, is
separated from my body, I am aware that nothing has been taken away from
my mind. And the faculties of willing, feeling, conceiving, etc. cannot be
properly speaking said to be its parts, for it is one and the same mind which
employs itself in willing and in feeling and understanding. But it is quite
otherwise with corporeal or extended objects, for there is not one of these
imaginable by me which my mind cannot divide into parts, and which consequently
I do not recognise as being divisible; this would be suffi cient to
teach me that the mind or soul of man is entirely different from the body, if
I had not already learned it from other sources. (Descartes, 196)
P1. My body has the property of being such that it is divisible, capable of
being divided into like self - subsistent parts that are also component
physical bodies (bodily divisibility).
P2. My mind does not have the property of being such that it is divisible
in the comparable sense as that above into self - subsistent parts that are
also component minds (mental indivisibility).
C1. My mind ≠ my body (Leibniz ’ Law, P1, P2).
P3. Only entities constituted by like parts are capable of being destroyed
(concept of destructibility).
C2. My mind, unlike my body, is indestructible; from which it further
follows that the mind or soul, unlike the body, as religion teaches as
an article of faith, is immortal (P2, C1, P3).
77
Princess Elisabeth and the
Mind – Body Problem
Jen McWeeny
Atherton , Margaret (ed.). “ Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia , ” in Women
Philosophers of the Early Modern Period , 9 – 21 . Indianapolis : Hackett ,
1994 .
Descartes , Ren é . The Philosophical Writings of Descartes , 3 vols., translated
by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch.
Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 1984 – 91 .
Descartes , Ren é . Oeuvres de Descartes , 5 vols., edited by Charles Adams and
Paul Tannery . Paris : Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin , 1971 – 74 .
Descartes , Ren é and Princess Elisabeth . “ Correspondence , ” in Descartes: His
Moral Philosophy and Psychology , translated by John J. Blom, 105 – 17 .
New York : New York University Press , 1978 .
Gassendi , Pierre . “ Fifth Set of Objections , ” in The Philosophical Writings of
Descartes , vol. 2 , translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and
Dugald Murdoch, 179 – 240 . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University
Press , 1984 .
Kim , Jaegwon . Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind – Body
Problem and Mental Causation . Cambridge, MA : The MIT Press , 1998 .
McGinn , Colin . “ Can We Solve the Mind – Body Problem? ” Mind 98 ( 1989 ):
349 – 66 .
Montero , Barbara . “ Post - Physicalism . ” The Journal of Consciousness Studies
8 , 2 ( 2001 ): 61 – 80 .
Tollefson , Deborah . “ Princess Elisabeth and the Problem of Mind – Body
Interaction . ” Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy 14 , 3 ( 1999 ):
59 – 77 .
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
298 Jen McWeeny
The mind – body problem exposes the inconsistencies that arise when mind
and body are conceived as ontologically distinct entities. Human experience
clearly shows that our minds interact with our bodies. When we will to
walk, our legs usually move in the intended direction; when we become ill,
the sharpness of our cognitive capacities is often compromised; when we
are sad, we are frequently moved to tears; and so on. Philosophers who
reject the identity of mind and body or mind and brain face the task of
explaining these relations by illuminating the precise manner in which the
mind moves the body and the body affects the mind. It is unsurprising,
then, that the mind – body problem was fi rst articulated as a response to
Ren é Descartes ’ dualistic philosophy. For Descartes, mind 1 is res cogitans ,
a nonextended, immaterial substance whose essential nature is to think, and
body is its conceptual opposite – res extensa , a material substance with a
particular shape that is extended and located in space. In its Cartesian form,
the mind – body problem asks how an immaterial thing can move a material
thing.
Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia (1618 – 80), also known as “ The Princess
Palatine, ” was the fi rst philosopher to articulate the mind – body problem
in the form of an argument and the fi rst to elicit Descartes ’ serious attention
to the matter, although the mind – body problem is rarely attributed to her.
Princess Elisabeth lived most of her life in Holland, after her father had lost
the throne of Bohemia and her family was exiled from their Palatinate lands
and residence in Heidelberg during the Thirty Years ’ War. She was renowned
for her knowledge of classical languages and her intellectual precision. As
Descartes writes in his dedication to Princess Elisabeth at the beginning of
The Principles of Philosophy , “ You are the only person I have found so far
who has completely understood all my previously published works ”
(Descartes Philosophical Writings , 2: 192). For the last years of her life,
Princess Elisabeth served as abbess at a convent in Herford, Westphalia,

simultaneously existing spatiotemporally extended things belonging to the

same metaphysical category – in this case, of material entities. Where psychological

entities are concerned, Descartes is emphatic that the mind

cannot be similarly divided. As to the problem of split personalities, or

multiple personal disorder (MPD), Descartes, as we should expect, has

nothing to say. He could presumably argue that in such circumstances there

must be distinct independent minds occupying the same body, perhaps at

different times, each of which, again, unlike the body, remains indivisible

into independently existent minds as self - subsistent continuing minds,

rather than being unifi ed distinct components of one and the same mind.

In order to begin this examination, then, I here say, in the fi rst place, that

there is a great difference between mind and body, inasmuch as body is by

296 Dale Jacquette

nature always divisible, and the mind is entirely indivisible. For, as a matter

of fact, when I consider the mind, that is to say, myself inasmuch as I am only

a thinking thing, I cannot distinguish in myself any parts, but apprehend

myself to be clearly one and entire; and although the whole mind seems to

be united to the whole body, yet if a foot, or an arm, or some other part, is

separated from my body, I am aware that nothing has been taken away from

my mind. And the faculties of willing, feeling, conceiving, etc. cannot be

properly speaking said to be its parts, for it is one and the same mind which

employs itself in willing and in feeling and understanding. But it is quite

otherwise with corporeal or extended objects, for there is not one of these

imaginable by me which my mind cannot divide into parts, and which consequently

I do not recognise as being divisible; this would be suffi cient to

teach me that the mind or soul of man is entirely different from the body, if

I had not already learned it from other sources. (Descartes, 196)

P1. My body has the property of being such that it is divisible, capable of

being divided into like self - subsistent parts that are also component

physical bodies (bodily divisibility).

P2. My mind does not have the property of being such that it is divisible

in the comparable sense as that above into self - subsistent parts that are

also component minds (mental indivisibility).

C1. My mind ≠ my body (Leibniz ’ Law, P1, P2).

P3. Only entities constituted by like parts are capable of being destroyed

(concept of destructibility).

C2. My mind, unlike my body, is indestructible; from which it further

follows that the mind or soul, unlike the body, as religion teaches as

an article of faith, is immortal (P2, C1, P3).

77

Princess Elisabeth and the

Mind – Body Problem

Jen McWeeny

Atherton , Margaret (ed.). “ Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia , ” in Women

Philosophers of the Early Modern Period , 9 – 21 . Indianapolis : Hackett ,

1994 .

Descartes , Ren é . The Philosophical Writings of Descartes , 3 vols., translated

by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch.

Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 1984 – 91 .

Descartes , Ren é . Oeuvres de Descartes , 5 vols., edited by Charles Adams and

Paul Tannery . Paris : Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin , 1971 – 74 .

Descartes , Ren é and Princess Elisabeth . “ Correspondence , ” in Descartes: His

Moral Philosophy and Psychology , translated by John J. Blom, 105 – 17 .

New York : New York University Press , 1978 .

Gassendi , Pierre . “ Fifth Set of Objections , ” in The Philosophical Writings of

Descartes , vol. 2 , translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and

Dugald Murdoch, 179 – 240 . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University

Press , 1984 .

Kim , Jaegwon . Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind – Body

Problem and Mental Causation . Cambridge, MA : The MIT Press , 1998 .

McGinn , Colin . “ Can We Solve the Mind – Body Problem? ” Mind 98 ( 1989 ):

349 – 66 .

Montero , Barbara . “ Post - Physicalism . ” The Journal of Consciousness Studies

8 , 2 ( 2001 ): 61 – 80 .

Tollefson , Deborah . “ Princess Elisabeth and the Problem of Mind – Body

Interaction . ” Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy 14 , 3 ( 1999 ):

59 – 77 .

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

298 Jen McWeeny

The mind – body problem exposes the inconsistencies that arise when mind

and body are conceived as ontologically distinct entities. Human experience

clearly shows that our minds interact with our bodies. When we will to

walk, our legs usually move in the intended direction; when we become ill,

the sharpness of our cognitive capacities is often compromised; when we

are sad, we are frequently moved to tears; and so on. Philosophers who

reject the identity of mind and body or mind and brain face the task of

explaining these relations by illuminating the precise manner in which the

mind moves the body and the body affects the mind. It is unsurprising,

then, that the mind – body problem was fi rst articulated as a response to

Ren é Descartes ’ dualistic philosophy. For Descartes, mind 1 is res cogitans ,

a nonextended, immaterial substance whose essential nature is to think, and

body is its conceptual opposite – res extensa , a material substance with a

particular shape that is extended and located in space. In its Cartesian form,

the mind – body problem asks how an immaterial thing can move a material

thing.

Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia (1618 – 80), also known as “ The Princess

Palatine, ” was the fi rst philosopher to articulate the mind – body problem

in the form of an argument and the fi rst to elicit Descartes ’ serious attention

to the matter, although the mind – body problem is rarely attributed to her.

Princess Elisabeth lived most of her life in Holland, after her father had lost

the throne of Bohemia and her family was exiled from their Palatinate lands

and residence in Heidelberg during the Thirty Years ’ War. She was renowned

for her knowledge of classical languages and her intellectual precision. As

Descartes writes in his dedication to Princess Elisabeth at the beginning of

The Principles of Philosophy , “ You are the only person I have found so far

who has completely understood all my previously published works ”

(Descartes Philosophical Writings , 2: 192). For the last years of her life,

Princess Elisabeth served as abbess at a convent in Herford, Westphalia,