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hypothesis; see Roth 98).
P6. If empiricism cannot successfully implement its foundationalist project
and there is no better justifi catory standards than those found in science,
then epistemology should appeal to science in justifying scientifi c results
and practices.
Quine’s Epistemology Naturalized 187
P7. No independent philosophical foundation for science is then available
within empiricism, and there are no better standards of justifi cation
available between formal derivation and the standards of empirical
science itself (conjunction, C2, P5).
C3. Epistemology becomes science self - applied where we use the methods
of science to justify scientifi c truths and develop an explanatory
account of the causal mechanisms responsible for the development of
scientifi c theories. In sum, epistemology should be naturalized ( modus
ponens , P6, P7).
48
Sellars and the Myth of
the Given
Willem A. deVries
Sellars , Wilfrid . “ Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind , ” in Minnesota
Studies in the Philosophy of Science , vol. I , edited by Herbert Feigl and
Michael Scriven , 253 – 329 . Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press ,
1956 . (EPM) Reprinted with additional footnotes in Science, Perception
and Reality . London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963; reissued by
Ridgeview Publishing Company in 1991. (SPR) Published separately as
Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind: With an Introduction by
Richard Rorty and a Study Guide by Robert Brandom , edited by Robert
Brandom. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997. Also
reprinted in W. deVries and T. Triplett, Knowledge, Mind, and the
Given: A Reading of Sellars ’ “ Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. ”
Cambridge, MA: Hackett, 2000. (KMG)
Alston , William P. “ What ’ s Wrong With Immediate Knowledge? ” Synthese
55 ( 1983 ): 73 – 96 . Reprinted in Epistemic Justifi cation: Essays in the
Theory of Knowledge . Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989.
___. “ Sellars and the ‘ Myth of the Given ’ , ” 1998 . http://www.ditext.com/
alston/alston2.html (accessed July 27, 2010).
Meyers , R. G. “ Sellars ’ Rejection of Foundations . ” Philosophical Studies 39
( 1981 ): 61 – 78 .
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Sellars and the Myth of the Given 189
Knowledge has a structure: there are relations of dependency among a
person ’ s (and a community ’ s) cognitive states. Skeptical challenges easily
arise; for example, if every piece of knowledge is dependent on others,
how could we acquire our fi rst piece of knowledge (#38)? Many philosophers
have held that knowledge has a hierarchical structure not unlike
that of a well - built house. There must be some cognitive states that are
in direct contact with reality, and that form a fi rm foundation that supports
the rest of our knowledge. For obvious reasons, this has been called
the “ foundationalist picture ” of knowledge ’ s structure. Philosophers cash
this metaphor out via two requirements on knowledge, as follows. (1)
There must be cognitive states that are basic in the sense that they possess
some positive epistemic status independently of their epistemic relations
to any other cognitive states. Call this the Epistemic Independence
Requirement [EIR]. Positive epistemic statuses include being an instance
of knowledge, being justifi ed or warranted, or (more weakly) having some
presumption in its favor. (Many have claimed that basic cognitions must
possess an unassailable epistemic warrant – certainty, incorrigibility, or
even infallibility.) Epistemic relations include deductive and inductive
implication. (2) Every nonbasic cognitive state with positive epistemic
status possesses that status only because of the epistemic relations it bears,
directly or indirectly, to basic cognitive states. Thus the basic states provide
the ultimate support for the rest of our knowledge. Call this the Epistemic
Effi cacy Requirement [EER]. Call such basic – that is, independent
and effi cacious – cognitive states the “ given. ” Many philosophers have
believed that there has to be such a given if there is to be any knowledge
at all.
The EIR and the EER together put constraints on what could play the
role of basic knowledge. Traditionally, philosophers required that basic
knowledge have an unassailable warrant. Although Sellars was a fallibilist
and believed that any cognitive state could be challenged, his argument
against the given, contrary to some interpretations, does not worry about
this issue. If there are no foundations, we need not worry about the strength
of foundational warrant.
A foundationalist structure has been attributed to logical and mathematical
knowledge, which is formal and a priori , as well as to empirical knowledge.
For millennia, Euclidean geometry, which starts with defi nitions and
axioms and derives numerous theorems by long chains of reasoning, has
provided a paradigmatic foundationalist structure. But no axioms – self -
evident general truths – seem adequate to provide the basis for empirical
knowledge. Rather, the common assumption is that particular truths can
be known through direct experience and provide the basis for all empirical
knowledge. Thus, experience supposedly provides us with epistemically
independent and effi cacious cognitive states that form the foundation of
190 Willem A. deVries
empirical knowledge. Empiricism claims that all substantive knowledge
rests on experience.
Sellars ’ argument against the given denies not only that there must be a
given but that there can be a given in the sense defi ned. It is thus an attack
on the foundationalist picture of knowledge, especially its empiricist version.
The argument claims that nothing can satisfy both EIR and EER. To satisfy
EER, a basic cognition must be capable of participating in inferential relations
with other cognitions; it must possess propositional form and be
truth - evaluable. To meet EIR, such a propositionally structured cognition
must possess its epistemic status independently of inferential connections
to other cognitions. No cognitive states satisfy both requirements.
Many philosophers have believed in self - evident cognitive states that are
epistemically independent. Mathematical axioms were traditionally called
self - evident, but is any empirical proposition self - evident? According to

hypothesis; see Roth 98).

P6. If empiricism cannot successfully implement its foundationalist project

and there is no better justifi catory standards than those found in science,

then epistemology should appeal to science in justifying scientifi c results

and practices.

Quine’s Epistemology Naturalized 187

P7. No independent philosophical foundation for science is then available

within empiricism, and there are no better standards of justifi cation

available between formal derivation and the standards of empirical

science itself (conjunction, C2, P5).

C3. Epistemology becomes science self - applied where we use the methods

of science to justify scientifi c truths and develop an explanatory

account of the causal mechanisms responsible for the development of

scientifi c theories. In sum, epistemology should be naturalized ( modus

ponens , P6, P7).

48

Sellars and the Myth of

the Given

Willem A. deVries

Sellars , Wilfrid . “ Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind , ” in Minnesota

Studies in the Philosophy of Science , vol. I , edited by Herbert Feigl and

Michael Scriven , 253 – 329 . Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press ,

1956 . (EPM) Reprinted with additional footnotes in Science, Perception

and Reality . London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963; reissued by

Ridgeview Publishing Company in 1991. (SPR) Published separately as

Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind: With an Introduction by

Richard Rorty and a Study Guide by Robert Brandom , edited by Robert

Brandom. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997. Also

reprinted in W. deVries and T. Triplett, Knowledge, Mind, and the

Given: A Reading of Sellars ’ “ Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. ”

Cambridge, MA: Hackett, 2000. (KMG)

Alston , William P. “ What ’ s Wrong With Immediate Knowledge? ” Synthese

55 ( 1983 ): 73 – 96 . Reprinted in Epistemic Justifi cation: Essays in the

Theory of Knowledge . Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989.

___. “ Sellars and the ‘ Myth of the Given ’ , ” 1998 . http://www.ditext.com/

alston/alston2.html (accessed July 27, 2010).

Meyers , R. G. “ Sellars ’ Rejection of Foundations . ” Philosophical Studies 39

( 1981 ): 61 – 78 .

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

Sellars and the Myth of the Given 189

Knowledge has a structure: there are relations of dependency among a

person ’ s (and a community ’ s) cognitive states. Skeptical challenges easily

arise; for example, if every piece of knowledge is dependent on others,

how could we acquire our fi rst piece of knowledge (#38)? Many philosophers

have held that knowledge has a hierarchical structure not unlike

that of a well - built house. There must be some cognitive states that are

in direct contact with reality, and that form a fi rm foundation that supports

the rest of our knowledge. For obvious reasons, this has been called

the “ foundationalist picture ” of knowledge ’ s structure. Philosophers cash

this metaphor out via two requirements on knowledge, as follows. (1)

There must be cognitive states that are basic in the sense that they possess

some positive epistemic status independently of their epistemic relations

to any other cognitive states. Call this the Epistemic Independence

Requirement [EIR]. Positive epistemic statuses include being an instance

of knowledge, being justifi ed or warranted, or (more weakly) having some

presumption in its favor. (Many have claimed that basic cognitions must

possess an unassailable epistemic warrant – certainty, incorrigibility, or

even infallibility.) Epistemic relations include deductive and inductive

implication. (2) Every nonbasic cognitive state with positive epistemic

status possesses that status only because of the epistemic relations it bears,

directly or indirectly, to basic cognitive states. Thus the basic states provide

the ultimate support for the rest of our knowledge. Call this the Epistemic

Effi cacy Requirement [EER]. Call such basic – that is, independent

and effi cacious – cognitive states the “ given. ” Many philosophers have

believed that there has to be such a given if there is to be any knowledge

at all.

The EIR and the EER together put constraints on what could play the

role of basic knowledge. Traditionally, philosophers required that basic

knowledge have an unassailable warrant. Although Sellars was a fallibilist

and believed that any cognitive state could be challenged, his argument

against the given, contrary to some interpretations, does not worry about

this issue. If there are no foundations, we need not worry about the strength

of foundational warrant.

A foundationalist structure has been attributed to logical and mathematical

knowledge, which is formal and a priori , as well as to empirical knowledge.

For millennia, Euclidean geometry, which starts with defi nitions and

axioms and derives numerous theorems by long chains of reasoning, has

provided a paradigmatic foundationalist structure. But no axioms – self -

evident general truths – seem adequate to provide the basis for empirical

knowledge. Rather, the common assumption is that particular truths can

be known through direct experience and provide the basis for all empirical

knowledge. Thus, experience supposedly provides us with epistemically

independent and effi cacious cognitive states that form the foundation of

190 Willem A. deVries

empirical knowledge. Empiricism claims that all substantive knowledge

rests on experience.

Sellars ’ argument against the given denies not only that there must be a

given but that there can be a given in the sense defi ned. It is thus an attack

on the foundationalist picture of knowledge, especially its empiricist version.

The argument claims that nothing can satisfy both EIR and EER. To satisfy

EER, a basic cognition must be capable of participating in inferential relations

with other cognitions; it must possess propositional form and be

truth - evaluable. To meet EIR, such a propositionally structured cognition

must possess its epistemic status independently of inferential connections

to other cognitions. No cognitive states satisfy both requirements.

Many philosophers have believed in self - evident cognitive states that are

epistemically independent. Mathematical axioms were traditionally called

self - evident, but is any empirical proposition self - evident? According to