DebateLabKIT/deepa2-corpus · Datasets at Hugging Face

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Sellars, the standard candidates for basic empirical knowledge (knowledge
of sense - data, knowledge of appearances, etc.) all presuppose other knowledge
on the part of the knower and thus fail EIR. He argues that such
states count as cognitive states only because of their epistemic relations to
other cognitive states. Because he argues by cases, it is unclear whether
some other candidates might pass EIR. For instance, some claim that externalism
evades his critique because then the epistemic status of basic cognitive
states is determined solely by their causal status and they pass EIR (see
Meyers). Just assuming that there are (much less must be) Epistemically
Independent cognitive states, however, begs the question against his argument.
A fi nal resolution of this dispute requires a positive theory of the
suffi cient conditions for possessing a positive epistemic status (see Alston).
Sellars offers one, but this reaches beyond the critique of the given. At very
least, Sellars ’ critique of the given shifts the burden of proof onto those who
believe in epistemically independent cognitive states. They owe us a good
theory of such states and why they have their epistemic status.
Some foundationalists believe that basic cognitive states are not propositionally
structured but are cases of direct knowledge of an object – what
Russell called “ knowledge by acquaintance. ” Such states violate EER: How
could such knowledge justify further knowledge? If John knows O, for some
object O, no proposition seems to be warranted for John solely on that
basis.
If Sellars ’ argument works, knowledge cannot be acquired incrementally
from initial encounters with the world in experience that are already full -
fl edged cognitive states. The epistemic status of our perceptions and introspections
belongs to them because they belong in a complex system of
mutually supporting cognitive states that mediate our practical engagement
with the world around us – though Sellars also rejects standard coherentism
as well. The argument is not a conclusive, once - and - for - all refutation of the
Sellars and the Myth of the Given 191
foundationalist picture of knowledge, but it is a signifi cant challenge to that
picture. Sellars ’ argument, in combination with arguments by Quine and
Davidson, among others, have put foundationalism on the defensive since,
roughly, the mid - point of the twentieth century.
Sellars ’ argument has infl uenced a wide range of late - twentieth - century
philosophers, including Richard Rorty, Paul and Patricia Churchland,
Laurence Bonjour, David Rosenthal, Jay Rosenberg, John McDowell, and
Robert Brandom.
If I reject the framework of traditional empiricism, it is not because I want
to say that empirical knowledge has no foundation. For to put it this way is
to suggest that it is really “ empirical knowledge so - called, ” and to put it in
a box with rumors and hoaxes. There is clearly some point to the picture of
human knowledge as resting on a level of propositions – observation reports
– which do not rest on other propositions in the same way as other propositions
rest on them. On the other hand, I do wish to insist that the metaphor
of “ foundation ” is misleading in that it keeps us from seeing that if there is
a logical dimension in which other empirical propositions rest on observation
reports, there is another logical dimension in which the latter rest on the
former.
Above all, the picture is misleading because of its static character. One
seems forced to choose between the picture of an elephant which rests on a
tortoise (What supports the tortoise?) and the picture of a great Hegelian
serpent of knowledge with its tail in its mouth (Where does it begin?). Neither
will do. For empirical knowledge, like its sophisticated extension, science, is
rational, not because it has a foundation but because it is a self - correcting
enterprise which can put any claim in jeopardy, though not all at once. (EPM
VIII, § 38, in SPR, 170; in KMG, 250)
The doctrine of the given requires that for any empirical knowledge P,
some epistemically independent knowledge G is epistemically effi cacious
with respect to P.
P1. If X cannot serve as a reason for Y, then X cannot be epistemically
effi cacious with respect to Y.
P2. If X cannot serve as a premise in an argument for Y, then X cannot
serve as a reason for Y.
P3. If X is nonpropositional, then X cannot serve as a premise in an
argument.
P4. If X is nonpropositional, then X cannot serve as a reason for Y (hypothetical
syllogism, P3, P2).
C1. If X is nonpropositional, then X cannot be epistemically effi cacious
with respect to Y (hypothetical syllogism, P1, P4).
P5. If X cannot be epistemically effi cacious with respect to Y, then the
nonpropositional cannot serve as the given.
192 Willem A. deVries
C2. The nonpropositional cannot serve as the given ( modus ponens , C1,
P5).
P6. No inferentially acquired, propositionally structured mental state is
epistemically independent.
P7. The epistemic status of noninferentially acquired, propositionally structured
cognitive states presupposes the possession by the knowing subject
of other empirical knowledge, both of particulars and of general empirical
truths.
P8. If noninferentially acquired empirical knowledge presupposes the possession
by the knowing subject of other empirical knowledge, then noninferentially
acquired, propositionally structured cognitive states are not
epistemically independent.
C3. Noninferentially acquired, propositionally structured cognitive states
are not epistemically independent ( modus ponens , P7, P8).
P8. Any empirical, propositional cognition is acquired either inferentially
or noninferentially.
C4. Propositionally structured cognitions, whether inferentially or noninferentially
acquired, are never epistemically independent and cannot
serve as the given (conjunction, P6, C3).
P9. Every cognition is either propositionally structured or not.
C5. Neither propositional or nonpropostitional cognitions can serve as
the given (conjunction, C2, C4).
P10. If neither propositional nor nonpropostitional cognitions can serve as
the given, then it is reasonable to believe that no item of empirical
knowledge can serve the function of a given.
C6. It is reasonable to believe that no item of empirical knowledge can
serve the function of a given ( modus ponens , C5, P10).

Sellars, the standard candidates for basic empirical knowledge (knowledge

of sense - data, knowledge of appearances, etc.) all presuppose other knowledge

on the part of the knower and thus fail EIR. He argues that such

states count as cognitive states only because of their epistemic relations to

other cognitive states. Because he argues by cases, it is unclear whether

some other candidates might pass EIR. For instance, some claim that externalism

evades his critique because then the epistemic status of basic cognitive

states is determined solely by their causal status and they pass EIR (see

Meyers). Just assuming that there are (much less must be) Epistemically

Independent cognitive states, however, begs the question against his argument.

A fi nal resolution of this dispute requires a positive theory of the

suffi cient conditions for possessing a positive epistemic status (see Alston).

Sellars offers one, but this reaches beyond the critique of the given. At very

least, Sellars ’ critique of the given shifts the burden of proof onto those who

believe in epistemically independent cognitive states. They owe us a good

theory of such states and why they have their epistemic status.

Some foundationalists believe that basic cognitive states are not propositionally

structured but are cases of direct knowledge of an object – what

Russell called “ knowledge by acquaintance. ” Such states violate EER: How

could such knowledge justify further knowledge? If John knows O, for some

object O, no proposition seems to be warranted for John solely on that

basis.

If Sellars ’ argument works, knowledge cannot be acquired incrementally

from initial encounters with the world in experience that are already full -

fl edged cognitive states. The epistemic status of our perceptions and introspections

belongs to them because they belong in a complex system of

mutually supporting cognitive states that mediate our practical engagement

with the world around us – though Sellars also rejects standard coherentism

as well. The argument is not a conclusive, once - and - for - all refutation of the

Sellars and the Myth of the Given 191

foundationalist picture of knowledge, but it is a signifi cant challenge to that

picture. Sellars ’ argument, in combination with arguments by Quine and

Davidson, among others, have put foundationalism on the defensive since,

roughly, the mid - point of the twentieth century.

Sellars ’ argument has infl uenced a wide range of late - twentieth - century

philosophers, including Richard Rorty, Paul and Patricia Churchland,

Laurence Bonjour, David Rosenthal, Jay Rosenberg, John McDowell, and

Robert Brandom.

If I reject the framework of traditional empiricism, it is not because I want

to say that empirical knowledge has no foundation. For to put it this way is

to suggest that it is really “ empirical knowledge so - called, ” and to put it in

a box with rumors and hoaxes. There is clearly some point to the picture of

human knowledge as resting on a level of propositions – observation reports

– which do not rest on other propositions in the same way as other propositions

rest on them. On the other hand, I do wish to insist that the metaphor

of “ foundation ” is misleading in that it keeps us from seeing that if there is

a logical dimension in which other empirical propositions rest on observation

reports, there is another logical dimension in which the latter rest on the

former.

Above all, the picture is misleading because of its static character. One

seems forced to choose between the picture of an elephant which rests on a

tortoise (What supports the tortoise?) and the picture of a great Hegelian

serpent of knowledge with its tail in its mouth (Where does it begin?). Neither

will do. For empirical knowledge, like its sophisticated extension, science, is

rational, not because it has a foundation but because it is a self - correcting

enterprise which can put any claim in jeopardy, though not all at once. (EPM

VIII, § 38, in SPR, 170; in KMG, 250)

The doctrine of the given requires that for any empirical knowledge P,

some epistemically independent knowledge G is epistemically effi cacious

with respect to P.

P1. If X cannot serve as a reason for Y, then X cannot be epistemically

effi cacious with respect to Y.

P2. If X cannot serve as a premise in an argument for Y, then X cannot

serve as a reason for Y.

P3. If X is nonpropositional, then X cannot serve as a premise in an

argument.

P4. If X is nonpropositional, then X cannot serve as a reason for Y (hypothetical

syllogism, P3, P2).

C1. If X is nonpropositional, then X cannot be epistemically effi cacious

with respect to Y (hypothetical syllogism, P1, P4).

P5. If X cannot be epistemically effi cacious with respect to Y, then the

nonpropositional cannot serve as the given.

192 Willem A. deVries

C2. The nonpropositional cannot serve as the given ( modus ponens , C1,

P5).

P6. No inferentially acquired, propositionally structured mental state is

epistemically independent.

P7. The epistemic status of noninferentially acquired, propositionally structured

cognitive states presupposes the possession by the knowing subject

of other empirical knowledge, both of particulars and of general empirical

truths.

P8. If noninferentially acquired empirical knowledge presupposes the possession

by the knowing subject of other empirical knowledge, then noninferentially

acquired, propositionally structured cognitive states are not

epistemically independent.

C3. Noninferentially acquired, propositionally structured cognitive states

are not epistemically independent ( modus ponens , P7, P8).

P8. Any empirical, propositional cognition is acquired either inferentially

or noninferentially.

C4. Propositionally structured cognitions, whether inferentially or noninferentially

acquired, are never epistemically independent and cannot

serve as the given (conjunction, P6, C3).

P9. Every cognition is either propositionally structured or not.

C5. Neither propositional or nonpropostitional cognitions can serve as

the given (conjunction, C2, C4).

P10. If neither propositional nor nonpropostitional cognitions can serve as

the given, then it is reasonable to believe that no item of empirical

knowledge can serve the function of a given.

C6. It is reasonable to believe that no item of empirical knowledge can

serve the function of a given ( modus ponens , C5, P10).