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two different kinds of internal states: one kind – thoughts – has properties
modeled on the semantic properties of overt linguistic events, while the
other – sense impressions – has properties modeled on the properties of
perceptible objects. If Sellars ’ story is coherent, then the traditional view
that our concepts and knowledge of the mental is simply given is not
compulsory.
The principal objections to Sellars ’ Rylean Myth have been that the situation
described in his thought experiment is either incoherent (Marras) or
so empirically implausible as to be unworthy of serious consideration
(Chisholm, Triplett). Could there really be people who have a rich physical
language as well as a metalanguage yet lack all conception of internal psychological
states, thoughts, and sense impressions?
We [can] characterize the original Rylean language in which they described
themselves and their fellows as not only a behavioristic language, but a behavioristic
language which is restricted to the non - theoretical vocabulary of a
behavioristic psychology. Suppose, now, that in the attempt to account for
the fact that his fellow men behave intelligently not only when their conduct
is threaded on a string of overt verbal episodes – that is to say, as we would
put it when they “ think out loud ” – but also when no detectable verbal output
is present, Jones develops a theory according to which overt utterances are
196 Willem A. deVries
but the culmination of a process which begins with certain inner episodes.
And let us suppose that his model for these episodes which initiate the events
which culminate in overt verbal behavior is that of overt verbal behavior itself.
In other words, using the language of the model, the theory is to the effect
that overt verbal behavior is the culmination of a process which begins with
“ inner speech. ” (EPM § 56, in SPR, 186; in KMG, 266 – 67)
P1. Concepts of mental states can be acquired only innately or by direct
and privileged access to and abstraction from immediate experience of
mental states, which are given by direct intuition (assumption for
reductio ).
P2. Consider a community of behaviorists with an intersubjectively available
language that contains, besides object - level concepts, semantic ( ergo
metalinguistic) concepts as well. Such a community would possess no
concepts of the psychological.
P3. Such a community would have available to it only the resources of
narrow behaviorism to explain human behavior.
P4. The resources of narrow behaviorism are not suffi cient to explain all
human behavior.
P5. If such a community would have available to it only the resources of
narrow behaviorism to explain human behavior, then such a community
would, therefore, face substantial puzzles about numerous forms of
human behavior.
C1. Such a community would, therefore, face substantial puzzles about
numerous forms of human behavior ( modus ponens , P4, P5).
P6. Such a community could enrich its explanatory resources by utilizing
postulational scientifi c methodology.
P7. If such a community could enrich its explanatory resources by utilizing
postulational scientifi c methodology, then using utterances as a model,
this technique could give rise to concepts of inner, speech - like episodes
that cause some of the puzzling forms of behavior, and, indeed, cause as
well the overt linguistic episodes they are modeled on.
C2. Using utterances as a model, this technique could give rise to concepts
of inner, speech - like episodes that cause some of the puzzling
forms of behavior, and, indeed, cause as well the overt linguistic episodes
they are modeled on ( modus ponens , P6, P7).
P8. If other puzzling behaviors need to be explained, then the application
of normal postulational scientifi c methodology, using perceptible objects
as a model, could give rise to concepts of inner, qualitative states that
are normally present when one perceives the perceptible object that is its
model but can be present in one when the external object is absent.
P9. If (P6) such a community could enrich its explanatory resources by
utilizing postulational scientifi c methodology, and using utterances as a
model, this technique could give rise to concepts of inner, (C2) speech -
Sellars’ “Rylean Myth” 197
like episodes that cause some of the puzzling forms of behavior, and,
indeed, cause as well the overt linguistic episodes they are modeled on,
and (P8) the application of normal postulational scientifi c methodology
can explain other puzzling behaviors, then it is possible (and not in the
sense of bare logical possibility, but in the sense that there is a coherent
story with some empirical plausibility) that our concepts of the psychological
are acquired in perfectly normal, intersubjectively available,
empirical ways.
C3. It is possible (and not in the sense of bare logical possibility, but in
the sense that there is a coherent story with some empirical plausibility)
that our concepts of the psychological are acquired in perfectly
normal, intersubjectively available, empirical ways ( modus ponens ,
P9, conjunction, P6, C2, P8).
P10. It is not the case that concepts of mental states can be acquired only
innately or by direct and privileged access to and abstraction from immediate
experience of mental states which are given by direct intuition
( reductio , P1 – P9).
50
Aristotle and the Argument to End
All Arguments
Toni Vogel Carey
Aristotle . Metaphysics , translated by W. D. Ross. Oxford : Clarendon Press ,
1908 .
Friedman , Milton . Essays in Positive Economics . Chicago : University of
Chicago Press , 1953 .
Mill , John Stuart . A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive , in Collected
Works of John Stuart Mill , vols. VII and VIII , edited by J. Robson .
Toronto : Toronto University Press , 1973 .
Parsons , Charles . “ Reason and Intuition , ” Synthese 125 ( 2000 ): 299 – 315 .
This argument, which comes down from Aristotle, is one of the most fundamental
in the history of thought. It is also one of the most abbreviated,
however, which makes it easy to overlook. In the Metaphysics , Aristotle
merely says:
It is impossible that there should be demonstration of absolutely everything;
[for then] there would be an infi nite regress, so that there would still

two different kinds of internal states: one kind – thoughts – has properties

modeled on the semantic properties of overt linguistic events, while the

other – sense impressions – has properties modeled on the properties of

perceptible objects. If Sellars ’ story is coherent, then the traditional view

that our concepts and knowledge of the mental is simply given is not

compulsory.

The principal objections to Sellars ’ Rylean Myth have been that the situation

described in his thought experiment is either incoherent (Marras) or

so empirically implausible as to be unworthy of serious consideration

(Chisholm, Triplett). Could there really be people who have a rich physical

language as well as a metalanguage yet lack all conception of internal psychological

states, thoughts, and sense impressions?

We [can] characterize the original Rylean language in which they described

themselves and their fellows as not only a behavioristic language, but a behavioristic

language which is restricted to the non - theoretical vocabulary of a

behavioristic psychology. Suppose, now, that in the attempt to account for

the fact that his fellow men behave intelligently not only when their conduct

is threaded on a string of overt verbal episodes – that is to say, as we would

put it when they “ think out loud ” – but also when no detectable verbal output

is present, Jones develops a theory according to which overt utterances are

196 Willem A. deVries

but the culmination of a process which begins with certain inner episodes.

And let us suppose that his model for these episodes which initiate the events

which culminate in overt verbal behavior is that of overt verbal behavior itself.

In other words, using the language of the model, the theory is to the effect

that overt verbal behavior is the culmination of a process which begins with

“ inner speech. ” (EPM § 56, in SPR, 186; in KMG, 266 – 67)

P1. Concepts of mental states can be acquired only innately or by direct

and privileged access to and abstraction from immediate experience of

mental states, which are given by direct intuition (assumption for

reductio ).

P2. Consider a community of behaviorists with an intersubjectively available

language that contains, besides object - level concepts, semantic ( ergo

metalinguistic) concepts as well. Such a community would possess no

concepts of the psychological.

P3. Such a community would have available to it only the resources of

narrow behaviorism to explain human behavior.

P4. The resources of narrow behaviorism are not suffi cient to explain all

human behavior.

P5. If such a community would have available to it only the resources of

narrow behaviorism to explain human behavior, then such a community

would, therefore, face substantial puzzles about numerous forms of

human behavior.

C1. Such a community would, therefore, face substantial puzzles about

numerous forms of human behavior ( modus ponens , P4, P5).

P6. Such a community could enrich its explanatory resources by utilizing

postulational scientifi c methodology.

P7. If such a community could enrich its explanatory resources by utilizing

postulational scientifi c methodology, then using utterances as a model,

this technique could give rise to concepts of inner, speech - like episodes

that cause some of the puzzling forms of behavior, and, indeed, cause as

well the overt linguistic episodes they are modeled on.

C2. Using utterances as a model, this technique could give rise to concepts

of inner, speech - like episodes that cause some of the puzzling

forms of behavior, and, indeed, cause as well the overt linguistic episodes

they are modeled on ( modus ponens , P6, P7).

P8. If other puzzling behaviors need to be explained, then the application

of normal postulational scientifi c methodology, using perceptible objects

as a model, could give rise to concepts of inner, qualitative states that

are normally present when one perceives the perceptible object that is its

model but can be present in one when the external object is absent.

P9. If (P6) such a community could enrich its explanatory resources by

utilizing postulational scientifi c methodology, and using utterances as a

model, this technique could give rise to concepts of inner, (C2) speech -

Sellars’ “Rylean Myth” 197

like episodes that cause some of the puzzling forms of behavior, and,

indeed, cause as well the overt linguistic episodes they are modeled on,

and (P8) the application of normal postulational scientifi c methodology

can explain other puzzling behaviors, then it is possible (and not in the

sense of bare logical possibility, but in the sense that there is a coherent

story with some empirical plausibility) that our concepts of the psychological

are acquired in perfectly normal, intersubjectively available,

empirical ways.

C3. It is possible (and not in the sense of bare logical possibility, but in

the sense that there is a coherent story with some empirical plausibility)

that our concepts of the psychological are acquired in perfectly

normal, intersubjectively available, empirical ways ( modus ponens ,

P9, conjunction, P6, C2, P8).

P10. It is not the case that concepts of mental states can be acquired only

innately or by direct and privileged access to and abstraction from immediate

experience of mental states which are given by direct intuition

( reductio , P1 – P9).

50

Aristotle and the Argument to End

All Arguments

Toni Vogel Carey

Aristotle . Metaphysics , translated by W. D. Ross. Oxford : Clarendon Press ,

1908 .

Friedman , Milton . Essays in Positive Economics . Chicago : University of

Chicago Press , 1953 .

Mill , John Stuart . A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive , in Collected

Works of John Stuart Mill , vols. VII and VIII , edited by J. Robson .

Toronto : Toronto University Press , 1973 .

Parsons , Charles . “ Reason and Intuition , ” Synthese 125 ( 2000 ): 299 – 315 .

This argument, which comes down from Aristotle, is one of the most fundamental

in the history of thought. It is also one of the most abbreviated,

however, which makes it easy to overlook. In the Metaphysics , Aristotle

merely says:

It is impossible that there should be demonstration of absolutely everything;

[for then] there would be an infi nite regress, so that there would still