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Indianapolis : Hackett , 1992 .
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Cooper , John . β Plato β s Theory of Human Motivation . β History of Philosophy
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Quarterly 1 ( 1984 ): 3 β 21 .
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Korsgaard , Christine. β Self - Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant . β
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Journal of Ethics no. 3 ( 1999 ): 1 β 29 .
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Sachs , David. β A Fallacy in Plato β s Republic . Philosophical Review 72 ( 1963 ):
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141 β 58 .
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Santas , Gerasimos . Understanding Plato β s Republic . Oxford : Wiley - Blackwell ,
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2010 .
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In its 300 - plus pages, Plato β s Republic addresses nearly every topic under
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the sun: tyranny and democracy, feminism and abortion, Homer and carpentry,
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musical scales and solid geometry, immortality and the afterlife, and
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why we hate ourselves for screwing up. But all these issues come up in the
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context of answering one big question: How should one live? What is the
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best kind of life to lead? In particular, why should one live a life of justice
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if the wicked seem to be better off?
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The main claim in the dialogue is that justice is an excellence or virtue
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( aret Γͺ ) that brings eudaimonia , some integration of happiness, success, and
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contentment; one lives well if and only if one is a just person. Justice, on
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Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
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First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
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Β© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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204 Joshua I. Weinstein
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Plato β s account, is founded on how a person β s soul or psyche holds together,
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since only a person whose priorities are all straight can be counted on to
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behave properly. Also, only such a person can really live life to its fullest.
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The signifi cance of this argument extends beyond the fact that the
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Republic has been one of the most infl uential texts in the history of philosophy.
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Arguments of this general kind become more important as one becomes
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less confi dent that God rewards the virtuous and punishes the wicked. This
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argument had many successors in the ancient world and has been taken up
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in various ways in contemporary thought. (For a fuller introduction to the
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Republic and its main argument, see Santas. For a contemporary use of the
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Republic β s strategy, see Korsgaard.)
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The basic sketch of the argument is presented by Socrates at the end of
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Book 1, where he introduces the concept of ergon , the activity, work or
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function that typifi es a thing:
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And could eyes perform their function ( ergon ) well if they lacked their
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peculiar virtue ( aret Γͺ ) and had the vice instead?
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How could they, for don β t you mean if they had blindness instead of
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sight? [ β¦ ]
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So ears, too, deprived of their own virtue perform their function badly?
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That β s right. [ β¦ ]
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Come, then, and let β s consider this: Is there some function of a soul that
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you couldn β t perform with anything else, for example, taking care of things,
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ruling, deliberating, and the like? Is there anything other than a soul to
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which you could rightly assign these, and say that they are its peculiar
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function?
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No, none of them.
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What of living? Isn β t that a function of the soul?
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It certainly is.
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And don β t we also say that there is a virtue of the soul?
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We do.
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Then, will a soul ever perform its function well, Thrasymachus, if it is
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deprived of its own peculiar virtue, or is that impossible?
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It β s impossible.
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Doesn β t it follow, then, that a bad soul rules and takes care of things
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badly and that good soul does all these things well?
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It does.
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Now we agreed that justice is a soul β s virtue, and injustice its vice?
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We did.
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Then, it follows that a just soul and a just man will live well, and an
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unjust one badly.
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Apparently so, according to your argument.
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And surely anyone who lives well is blessed and happy ( eudaim Γ΄ n ), and
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anyone who doesn β t is the opposite.
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Of course.
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Justice Brings Happiness in Platoβs Republic 205
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Therefore, a just person is happy, and an unjust one wretched.
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So be it.
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It profi ts no one to be wretched but to be happy.
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Of course.
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And so, Thrasymachus, injustice is never more profi table than justice.
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(Plato, 353b β 354a)
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P1. Every thing performs its activity or function ( ergon ) well if and only if
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it has its virtue or excellence ( aret Γͺ ).
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P2. The activity of the soul is to live; that is, one lives by the soul.
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C1. One lives well if and only if one has the virtue of the soul (instantiation,
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P1).
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P3. Justice is the virtue of the soul.
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C2. One lives well if and only if one is just (substitution, P3 into C1).
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P4. One who lives well is happy; one who lives poorly is miserable.
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C3. The just person lives happily, the unjust lives miserably (substitution,
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P4 into C2).
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This sketch leads into the main body of the dialogue, which elaborates,
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clarifi es, and defends these premises and conclusions (among many other
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things!) Even the seemingly innocuous P4 comes in for examination (578a β
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592b). Though one might also wonder about P2 (does one really live only
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by the soul and not at all by the body?), the main diffi culty in this argument
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is clearly P3: how is justice the specifi c virtue of the soul? Much of the
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Republic is devoted to explaining and defending this premise.
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The defense of P3 is based on an analysis of the human psyche or soul.
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In particular, a human being is shown to be full of confl icting impulses and
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abilities so that only by ordering and integrating them can a person be β at
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one. β Thus, for example, one can both feel a bodily thirst and simultaneously
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know (say, from a medical expert) that it would be bad to drink
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(439a β d). Confl icts such as this need to be resolved by the principle that
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each part of oneself does what it should and does not meddle in the business
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of the other parts. Deciding is the job of reason, not of thirst. This
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principle makes possible self - unifi cation and psychic health, and when it is
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