DebateLabKIT/deepa2-corpus · Datasets at Hugging Face

text stringlengths 0 1.71k
Indianapolis : Hackett , 1992 .
Cooper , John . “ Plato ’ s Theory of Human Motivation . ” History of Philosophy
Quarterly 1 ( 1984 ): 3 – 21 .
Korsgaard , Christine. “ Self - Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant . ”
Journal of Ethics no. 3 ( 1999 ): 1 – 29 .
Sachs , David. “ A Fallacy in Plato ’ s Republic . Philosophical Review 72 ( 1963 ):
141 – 58 .
Santas , Gerasimos . Understanding Plato ’ s Republic . Oxford : Wiley - Blackwell ,
2010 .
In its 300 - plus pages, Plato ’ s Republic addresses nearly every topic under
the sun: tyranny and democracy, feminism and abortion, Homer and carpentry,
musical scales and solid geometry, immortality and the afterlife, and
why we hate ourselves for screwing up. But all these issues come up in the
context of answering one big question: How should one live? What is the
best kind of life to lead? In particular, why should one live a life of justice
if the wicked seem to be better off?
The main claim in the dialogue is that justice is an excellence or virtue
( aret ê ) that brings eudaimonia , some integration of happiness, success, and
contentment; one lives well if and only if one is a just person. Justice, on
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
204 Joshua I. Weinstein
Plato ’ s account, is founded on how a person ’ s soul or psyche holds together,
since only a person whose priorities are all straight can be counted on to
behave properly. Also, only such a person can really live life to its fullest.
The signifi cance of this argument extends beyond the fact that the
Republic has been one of the most infl uential texts in the history of philosophy.
Arguments of this general kind become more important as one becomes
less confi dent that God rewards the virtuous and punishes the wicked. This
argument had many successors in the ancient world and has been taken up
in various ways in contemporary thought. (For a fuller introduction to the
Republic and its main argument, see Santas. For a contemporary use of the
Republic ’ s strategy, see Korsgaard.)
The basic sketch of the argument is presented by Socrates at the end of
Book 1, where he introduces the concept of ergon , the activity, work or
function that typifi es a thing:
And could eyes perform their function ( ergon ) well if they lacked their
peculiar virtue ( aret ê ) and had the vice instead?
How could they, for don ’ t you mean if they had blindness instead of
sight? [ … ]
So ears, too, deprived of their own virtue perform their function badly?
That ’ s right. [ … ]
Come, then, and let ’ s consider this: Is there some function of a soul that
you couldn ’ t perform with anything else, for example, taking care of things,
ruling, deliberating, and the like? Is there anything other than a soul to
which you could rightly assign these, and say that they are its peculiar
function?
No, none of them.
What of living? Isn ’ t that a function of the soul?
It certainly is.
And don ’ t we also say that there is a virtue of the soul?
We do.
Then, will a soul ever perform its function well, Thrasymachus, if it is
deprived of its own peculiar virtue, or is that impossible?
It ’ s impossible.
Doesn ’ t it follow, then, that a bad soul rules and takes care of things
badly and that good soul does all these things well?
It does.
Now we agreed that justice is a soul ’ s virtue, and injustice its vice?
We did.
Then, it follows that a just soul and a just man will live well, and an
unjust one badly.
Apparently so, according to your argument.
And surely anyone who lives well is blessed and happy ( eudaim ô n ), and
anyone who doesn ’ t is the opposite.
Of course.
Justice Brings Happiness in Plato’s Republic 205
Therefore, a just person is happy, and an unjust one wretched.
So be it.
It profi ts no one to be wretched but to be happy.
Of course.
And so, Thrasymachus, injustice is never more profi table than justice.
(Plato, 353b – 354a)
P1. Every thing performs its activity or function ( ergon ) well if and only if
it has its virtue or excellence ( aret ê ).
P2. The activity of the soul is to live; that is, one lives by the soul.
C1. One lives well if and only if one has the virtue of the soul (instantiation,
P1).
P3. Justice is the virtue of the soul.
C2. One lives well if and only if one is just (substitution, P3 into C1).
P4. One who lives well is happy; one who lives poorly is miserable.
C3. The just person lives happily, the unjust lives miserably (substitution,
P4 into C2).
This sketch leads into the main body of the dialogue, which elaborates,
clarifi es, and defends these premises and conclusions (among many other
things!) Even the seemingly innocuous P4 comes in for examination (578a –
592b). Though one might also wonder about P2 (does one really live only
by the soul and not at all by the body?), the main diffi culty in this argument
is clearly P3: how is justice the specifi c virtue of the soul? Much of the
Republic is devoted to explaining and defending this premise.
The defense of P3 is based on an analysis of the human psyche or soul.
In particular, a human being is shown to be full of confl icting impulses and
abilities so that only by ordering and integrating them can a person be “ at
one. ” Thus, for example, one can both feel a bodily thirst and simultaneously
know (say, from a medical expert) that it would be bad to drink
(439a – d). Confl icts such as this need to be resolved by the principle that
each part of oneself does what it should and does not meddle in the business
of the other parts. Deciding is the job of reason, not of thirst. This
principle makes possible self - unifi cation and psychic health, and when it is

Indianapolis : Hackett , 1992 .

Cooper , John . “ Plato ’ s Theory of Human Motivation . ” History of Philosophy

Quarterly 1 ( 1984 ): 3 – 21 .

Korsgaard , Christine. “ Self - Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant . ”

Journal of Ethics no. 3 ( 1999 ): 1 – 29 .

Sachs , David. “ A Fallacy in Plato ’ s Republic . Philosophical Review 72 ( 1963 ):

141 – 58 .

Santas , Gerasimos . Understanding Plato ’ s Republic . Oxford : Wiley - Blackwell ,

2010 .

In its 300 - plus pages, Plato ’ s Republic addresses nearly every topic under

the sun: tyranny and democracy, feminism and abortion, Homer and carpentry,

musical scales and solid geometry, immortality and the afterlife, and

why we hate ourselves for screwing up. But all these issues come up in the

context of answering one big question: How should one live? What is the

best kind of life to lead? In particular, why should one live a life of justice

if the wicked seem to be better off?

The main claim in the dialogue is that justice is an excellence or virtue

( aret ê ) that brings eudaimonia , some integration of happiness, success, and

contentment; one lives well if and only if one is a just person. Justice, on

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

204 Joshua I. Weinstein

Plato ’ s account, is founded on how a person ’ s soul or psyche holds together,

since only a person whose priorities are all straight can be counted on to

behave properly. Also, only such a person can really live life to its fullest.

The signifi cance of this argument extends beyond the fact that the

Republic has been one of the most infl uential texts in the history of philosophy.

Arguments of this general kind become more important as one becomes

less confi dent that God rewards the virtuous and punishes the wicked. This

argument had many successors in the ancient world and has been taken up

in various ways in contemporary thought. (For a fuller introduction to the

Republic and its main argument, see Santas. For a contemporary use of the

Republic ’ s strategy, see Korsgaard.)

The basic sketch of the argument is presented by Socrates at the end of

Book 1, where he introduces the concept of ergon , the activity, work or

function that typifi es a thing:

And could eyes perform their function ( ergon ) well if they lacked their

peculiar virtue ( aret ê ) and had the vice instead?

How could they, for don ’ t you mean if they had blindness instead of

sight? [ … ]

So ears, too, deprived of their own virtue perform their function badly?

That ’ s right. [ … ]

Come, then, and let ’ s consider this: Is there some function of a soul that

you couldn ’ t perform with anything else, for example, taking care of things,

ruling, deliberating, and the like? Is there anything other than a soul to

which you could rightly assign these, and say that they are its peculiar

function?

No, none of them.

What of living? Isn ’ t that a function of the soul?

It certainly is.

And don ’ t we also say that there is a virtue of the soul?

We do.

Then, will a soul ever perform its function well, Thrasymachus, if it is

deprived of its own peculiar virtue, or is that impossible?

It ’ s impossible.

Doesn ’ t it follow, then, that a bad soul rules and takes care of things

badly and that good soul does all these things well?

It does.

Now we agreed that justice is a soul ’ s virtue, and injustice its vice?

We did.

Then, it follows that a just soul and a just man will live well, and an

unjust one badly.

Apparently so, according to your argument.

And surely anyone who lives well is blessed and happy ( eudaim ô n ), and

anyone who doesn ’ t is the opposite.

Of course.

Justice Brings Happiness in Plato’s Republic 205

Therefore, a just person is happy, and an unjust one wretched.

So be it.

It profi ts no one to be wretched but to be happy.

Of course.

And so, Thrasymachus, injustice is never more profi table than justice.

(Plato, 353b – 354a)

P1. Every thing performs its activity or function ( ergon ) well if and only if

it has its virtue or excellence ( aret ê ).

P2. The activity of the soul is to live; that is, one lives by the soul.

C1. One lives well if and only if one has the virtue of the soul (instantiation,

P1).

P3. Justice is the virtue of the soul.

C2. One lives well if and only if one is just (substitution, P3 into C1).

P4. One who lives well is happy; one who lives poorly is miserable.

C3. The just person lives happily, the unjust lives miserably (substitution,

P4 into C2).

This sketch leads into the main body of the dialogue, which elaborates,

clarifi es, and defends these premises and conclusions (among many other

things!) Even the seemingly innocuous P4 comes in for examination (578a –

592b). Though one might also wonder about P2 (does one really live only

by the soul and not at all by the body?), the main diffi culty in this argument

is clearly P3: how is justice the specifi c virtue of the soul? Much of the

Republic is devoted to explaining and defending this premise.

The defense of P3 is based on an analysis of the human psyche or soul.

In particular, a human being is shown to be full of confl icting impulses and

abilities so that only by ordering and integrating them can a person be “ at

one. ” Thus, for example, one can both feel a bodily thirst and simultaneously

know (say, from a medical expert) that it would be bad to drink

(439a – d). Confl icts such as this need to be resolved by the principle that

each part of oneself does what it should and does not meddle in the business

of the other parts. Deciding is the job of reason, not of thirst. This

principle makes possible self - unifi cation and psychic health, and when it is